THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY
AND THE NON CONCERT OF EUROPE

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Abstract

It is now three years since the end of the cold war and we have not found a new European security consensus. Beside uncertainty due to large scale reform in all organizations and the violent conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, we must recognize a third cause: the rise of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Its "Europeanist" interest is to set up legally and institutionally separate security and defence mechanisms for Western Europe. ESDI interests weaken the transatlantic link, clutter the decision making process, and risk short term military and security capabilities for long term political objectives. Three developments enabled ESDI to reach its take-off stage: German unification, great power competition over the security vacuum left by the end of the cold war, and a lack of leadership in the Atlantic Alliance. An analysis of these causes direct to the need for a German-American coalition, especially on closer CSCE-NATO ties to prevent further disintegration.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the democratic reawakening in Central and Eastern Europe of 1989, we have witnessed a tremendous amount of change and subsequent reform in European security affairs. The three institutional pillars of Europe--the North Atlantic Alliance, (NATO) the European Community, (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)--have modified their objectives, procedures and, in the case of the CSCE, membership in an unprecedented rapid fashion. However, we have not been able to find either a new security consensus or a functioning security architecture for post-cold war Europe. From the chaos in Yugoslavia to the sustained rivalry and competition inside the halls of the multilateral institutions we witness the effects of diverging national interests.

1. I would like to acknowledge the research support received for this project from the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security and the NATO Fellowship Programme.
The conflict among Alliance states over the new roles for NATO, the CSCE, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Franco-German Army Corps (now called Eurocorps) go beyond routine diplomatic posturing. Quarrels over mandate, membership and tasking affect real crisis management. Though not all new, the Europeanist challenge to NATO is now at a break point. If we borrow the terms of Walt Rostow's development model, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is now in a "take-off stage."² ESDI aspirations are founded on a long standing discord between the French vision of a Europe independent of the United States and the cold war practice of North Atlantic security cooperation. Reduced to its core, the struggle is between on the one hand those states--led by France--that want to create institutionally and legally separate European security and defence mechanisms but without closing the door on political cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance (read the USA) and on the other hand those states--led by the UK--that acknowledge the need for greater European security cooperation but want to do so without weakening the integrated North Atlantic link.

It is frequently heard that positing the security divergence in an Atlanticist versus Europeanist framework is outdated and unhelpful since a uniting Europe must sooner or

later take care of its own security and defence and an
American withdrawal is only a matter of time. I argue that
the issue does matter greatly for two reasons. First, the
politics of ESDI are far ahead of its capabilities. Back in
1990, most members intended to set up "interlocking
institutions with complementary functions." Instead we now
have institutional rivalry producing duplication in some
places, stalemate in others, and confusion in most. The
combined NATO and WEU fleets in the Adriatic represent the
duplication, the UN monitoring force in Yugoslavia reflects
the stalemate. Various NATO-WEU and NATO-Eurocorps ad hoc
arrangements reflect the confusion. The result is a decline
in decision efficiency in the European security area. This
we must frankly call regress not progress. Second, unlike
during the Cold War, the discord may speed up the American
withdrawal from Europe. If it does when Western Europe is
not yet able to replace the level of American security
stability, the cost of this discord may rise higher yet.

A recent assessment of the security developments in
Europe argued that a lot of the confusion was due to
domestic and international policy overload, that changes
have been modest, and that the prospects for finding a
working relationship between the new European Political
Union and the WEU on the one hand and NATO on the other are
improving.\textsuperscript{3} I do not share the optimism. Though subtle at
first, I argue that the political changes towards establishing a independent European Security and Defence Identity have been large and that we are just beginning to see the results. I argue below that three key factors—not just policy overload—help understand what lies behind the growing discord. It is by understanding the causes of the discord—and not by papering it over—that we may begin to apply better remedies.

First, the reform process in all three fora (NATO, EC, CSCE) suffered from a false start. The members were hurried into an agenda set by the immediate pressures of German unification. For sure, there is nothing irrational about stabilizing Germany in Europe. However, as a result, finding medium-to-long term solutions to running Europe after the cold war became subjugated to a patchwork of compromises to avert a German derailment. Predictably, the compromises began to unravel as soon as German unification was accomplished. Second, the end of containment created a political/security vacuum in Europe. Despite the appeal for cooperation and the rhetoric of pan-European unity, states and coalitions of states pursued narrower interests and even hidden agendas in order to gain maximum influence in the new vacuum. Competitive liaison mechanisms with the states of Central and Eastern Europe is an example of such

competition. Third, the reform process has been without clear leadership. An American-German partnership sought by Washington failed to materialize. Only this coalition could have provided a powerful enough force to maintain a unified and integrated security decision making forum. Without leadership, the agenda often lacked clear direction.

II. GERMAN UNIFICATION AND SECURITY REFORM: GET READY, FIRE, AIM!

Until the late Fall of 1989, Western reaction to the end of the Cold War was hesitant. The change of heart in the Soviet arms control and disarmament approach was slow to register, complicated by unilateral cuts that appeared as public grandstanding. The West was near passive about democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and torn about how to help Gorbachev, worrying alternately about causing a reactionary backlash and not achieving enough reforms.

Imminent signs of German Unification focused everyone's attention. In December 1989, President Bush swept aside Western opposition to German unification. Chancellor Kohl's suggestion of confederated structures in his November speech and the pace of East Germans moving West had led to a mixture of lukewarm and negative responses from, among
others, France and Britain. Among four guidelines, Bush stressed Germany’s role in NATO and swung strong American support behind a gradual but undelayed unification process.  

4. In January 1990 official sources in both West and East Germany hypothesized aloud about a demilitarized and neutral East Germany inside a future unified Germany.  

5. Though conscious of Soviet concerns about simply rolling NATO eastward, the White House nevertheless jumped hard on any watering down of Germany’s status in NATO. In the Bush-Kohl Camp David summit of February 25, Kohl agreed to keep Germany fully inside the integrated military command and extend the Washington Treaty to the Oder-Neisse border.  

6. In March, the US administration devised a multi-institutional package of assurances aimed at easing Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany firmly inside the West and aimed at avoiding singularizing Germany. Key aspects of this package dealt with specific reform proposals for NATO and the CSCE. These proposals became the political core of the London NATO Summit and part of the Paris CSCE summit of 1990. The NATO summit was timed to coincide with the

4. The four are: Free elections for East and West Germany, respect for the Helsinki Final Act on borders, a united Germany in NATO and the EC, and a gradual and peaceful unification process. New York Times, December 12, 1989.


6. Department of State, Background Briefing, July 17, 1990.
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in order to strengthen Gorbachev's hand against the conservative challenge to his leadership.

The London Declaration emphasized the new vision of a "Europe whole and free" and an alliance set to build an "united continent" as it extended the hand of friendship to the old cold war adversaries. It contained a non-aggression pledge to individual Warsaw Pact members, an invitation to regular diplomatic liaison, and an invitation to President Gorbachev to visit the Alliance. It promised a strategy review of forward based defence, force restructuring, and the elimination of nuclear tipped artillery. Finally, it detailed a list of CSCE reform proposals including institutionalizing a new function aimed at conflict prevention.

German unification challenged the EC as much as it did NATO. The European summit in Dublin in June 1990 adopted a more ambitious reform plan than expected. It called two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) to reform the EC. The IGC on economic and monetary union was no surprise. The momentum of the Single European Act of 1987 and the "Europe 1992" programme to complete the internal market by January

1993 had paved the way for it. However, the second IGC on political union was pushed ahead of schedule.

The principal reason for its fast track was a Franco-German understanding arrived at in the crux of the unification process. French-German relations reached a crisis point at the onset of unification. Mitterrand’s visits to Kiev and East Berlin in December 1989 were an insult to Kohl’s government as the obvious purpose was to slow if not stop the pace of unification. Kohl abruptly rejected Mitterrand’s request for quick monetary union on February 15. Mitterrand’s visit with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Lafontaine, an advocate of slow unification, prior to the East German elections, was held in bad taste in Bonn. Despite years of close cooperation, the Germans were reminded of deep seated French mistrust.

It appears that the Christian Democratic coalition’s victory in the East German election of mid March shattered any remaining French hope for a slow down. Soon afterward, Kohl and Mitterrand buried their hatchet in what looked like a quid pro quo: French cooperation on quick unification in return for German assent to speed up monetary union. But in


agreeing to monetary union, and closer ties to the West, Kohl demanded political reforms so that control over the Deutsche Mark would not just transfer to member governments but to a more federalist EC.

The renewed Franco-German axis in fact restored the traditional engine of the EC and became the driving force in both IGC's. It also provided France with a forum to advance its design for a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the Twelve.

During the unification talks, West German Foreign Minister Genscher strove hard to turn the CSCE into a truly pan-European security forum, not least to deflect concern about German influence in Eastern Europe. The tone and the list of proposals on the CSCE in the London Declaration reflect the Alliance's recognition that something other than just NATO had to fill the Warsaw Pact vacuum. France could obviously agree to strengthen any organization other than NATO. Having fended off German neutrality, Washington realized that it had to show goodwill and move along on CSCE reform. Indeed, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had pressed for a better CSCE profile during the unification talks. Moreover, German troop reductions agreed to in the Moscow Treaty on German Unification were only politically binding until the
ratification of overall troop reductions in CFE.\textsuperscript{10} Hence the need for a speedy CSCE summit to ratify the CFE accord.

NATO's intent to discard its forward based defence and to multinationalize stationed troops in Germany follow logically from the Soviet pull back out of Eastern Europe and East Germany. However, the stated political direction of both NATO and the CSCE was based on a false consensus. The Bush administration did not take the CSCE anymore serious now than before and France did not share the need to reform NATO nor the need for NATO to liaison with Eastern Europe. Moreover, East European states like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were more interested in NATO membership than in the CSCE. Upgrading the latter meant little to them. Meanwhile, the IGC on Political Union brought with it a forum and an agenda for the Twelve to consider hard security and eventual defence policy even though there was no clear agreement on its explicit need or a common agenda to do so.

\textbf{III. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE}

Once the German question was settled, the London Declaration turned fragile. Despite German predictions to the contrary, French foreign policy did not change after containment.\textsuperscript{11} France never favoured NATO reforms but in the summer of 1990 it had found itself in a bind: either freeze NATO and let Germany float free or go along with NATO reform and anchor Germany. Predictably, it chose the latter. But with unification settled, it immediately began to hammer away at the NATO proposals.

From the Fall of 1990, France sought to contain NATO while building up the mandate and activities of the EC, the WEU and Franco-German Security Cooperation. First, France resisted an official role for NATO in the Gulf War and opposed an out-of-area specific mission for NATO's new Rapid Reaction Corps. German constitutional limits and Bonn's dislike of the way London maneuvered itself into commanding the new Rapid Reaction Corps helped the French position. Second, France insisted that NATO's references to ESDI remained general and non-restrictive. Most NATO declarations purposed "transparency and complementarity" between NATO and ESDI. We now know that these mean little and certainly do not prohibit duplication. While NATO remained the "forum for consultation--it used to be principal forum--and the venue for decision on the defence of the allies," it came to

acknowledge the existence of a European identity, not only in the form of the WEU as a pillar within NATO but eventually as a separate concept from NATO altogether. Paragraph 52 of the Alliance Strategic Concept agreed to at the Rome NATO summit of 1991 was a direct victory for the French and states that:

"... an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defense."\(^{12}\)

Third, France and other ESDI advocates, including Germany, used the IGC on Political Union to move the WEU away from NATO's European pillar and even away from a middle or "bridge" position to an "integral part" of the European Political Union.\(^{13}\) Fourth, Mitterrand and Kohl surprised their European and Atlantic colleagues with their announcement to set up a Franco-German Army Corps intended to be a "Eurocorps" or future core of an ESDI force.\(^{14}\) Since the Eurocorps is even more independent of NATO than the WEU, it should be seen as a third track of European defence. Fifth, France--and in this it was quite alone--limited as much as it could the substance of NATO's newly


formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) programme for liaison with Central and Eastern Europe (NACC). Last, it resisted both in NATO and in the CSCE—and has until this writing—a closer working relationship between NATO and the CSCE.

French leadership on ESDI has produced tangible results for the first time in post War Atlantic history. Though the results are largely on paper, they have moved decades-old barricades. NATO now recognizes a separate European entity in its jurisdiction. Amendments to the Treaties of Rome as well as the WEU's new mandate will make the latter's merger into the Treaties much more likely. The Franco-German Eurocorps is firmly in place as a political guarantee behind the slower EC-WEU development and the politically shaky Maastricht accord. Logically, ESDI advocates are now busy developing WEU and Eurocorps military capacity and European armament and logistical capabilities.

The British were the most concerned of the major powers in Europe about France's dogged determination on ESDI, fearing of course an American withdrawal from Europe. They tried in vain to get tougher language on ESDI within NATO. They also failed to get a strong and consistent American defence of NATO's political mandate. They resisted adding hard security and defence to the present or future mandate of the new European Political Union. In the Spring of 1991,
London proposed—in an effort to find a compromise—a reformed WEU as a "bridge" between NATO and the EC with an operational mandate confined to out-of-area.

However, the British pursued interests other than merely defending the Alliance. First, as in the case of France, the end of containment challenged their political and military role in Europe. While France resorted to the EC, the UK capitalized on NATO’s new Rapid Reaction Corps. Given the rising Franco-German rapport on ESDI, the apparent lack of American concern, and the pressure for defence cuts, London secured a part of its stationed force in Germany by taking the command of the high profile force. Second, Prime Minister Major sought to correct Margaret Thatcher’s obstructionist course towards the EC. Realizing the UK isolation on ESDI, Foreign Secretary Hurd drafted a joint paper with his Italian colleague de Michelis as a middle position in the IGC. In it, the UK conceded the possibility of an eventual EC common defence and agreed to immediate closer WEU-EC ties. The Anglo-Italian letter stated that the WEU can "take account" of EPU directives. While the Italian government had softened its earlier and more ambitious design for a WEU-EC merger—perhaps as a result of


the unrest in Yugoslavia and Albania—it was Britain that moved most dramatically from its traditional Atlanticist position.

At the Maastricht summit, Prime Minister Major made slight ESDI concessions even beyond the Anglo-Italian letter in return for a separate UK track on monetary union and social policy. He agreed to an eventual common defense for the European Political Union and that the WEU could "elaborate and implement" EPU "requests." He also agreed that the WEU need not be confined to out of NATO-area. In effect, London agreed that the WEU would not be equidistant between the EC and NATO. Though the British government secured a continued military and political role on the continent, it had to compromise a lot of traditional Alliance values to do so.

President Bush and Secretary Baker, with remarkable cooperation between the Department of State and the National Security Council staff, managed a clever approach on German unification. But after unification, American policy toward Europe lost its overall coherence. Understandably, the drawn


out and semantic ESDI debate could not hold the attention of many policy makers during the Gulf War, the intense Arab-Israeli peace talks that followed, and amidst the crumbling Soviet Union and the stalled GATT talks.

But a crowded agenda alone does not explain the feeble and inconsistent American approach. There is evidence to suggest that the ESDI issue created a false consensus among several key policy makers: they agreed on the same course of action (do nothing) for different reasons, all along seeking different outcomes. On the one hand there was a core of realists, usually militarists, that argued that since ESDI did not have independent intelligence or airlift capabilities and no money to develop these quickly, and since Western Europe did not have regional or global interests where the United States had no interests, there could be no independent ESDI policy. Therefore, NATO faced no serious threat. To them, the political stirring in the European alphabet soup amounted to words only. On the opposite side were some top political aides who saw European union and ESDI as both inevitable and desirable. To them, European integration would tie in the Germans and assume the financial burden for security and defence that the United States was keen to hand over. Thus for drastically different reasons, neither group felt the need to oppose ESDI designs.
A third group composed of traditional Atlanticists felt that the politics of ESDI—even before it could gain military capability—were divisive enough to unglue the Atlantic consensus. They were concerned about the protracted debates in NATO over its future political mission. However, their concerns were never translated into official policy. In the Fall of 1990, American officials at NATO sought first to revamp NATO's military force structure so that Congressional pressure on troop cuts could be contained. No serious reaction to the ESDI design came until after a Franco-German letter to the IGC on Political Union in which Paris and Bonn reconfirmed their intention to open the perspective of an eventual common defence for the EC, to bring the WEU into the new political union, and for the European Council to set foreign and security directives. The Atlanticist group finally got a draft paper of their position out as a diplomatic demarche. It implied that Europeans could not talk about security issues among themselves, caucus within NATO, or set up fora that did not strengthen NATO. This infamous Bartholomew Paper was seen by most as heavy handed and was quickly abandoned.


Bush, who was most likely not briefed on it, never pursued it during his meeting with Mitterrand in Martinique. Nor was the strident tone of the paper shared by Baker or his key aides. Later that Spring, after the Baker-Genscher joint agreement of May 10, Baker and his EC counterparts agreed on several principles for American cooperation on ESDI: no weakening of NATO's integrated Military Command, all European members of NATO to be involved in ESDI, NATO as the forum of decision on security and defence among the Washington Treaty members, and a European power projection to be for out of NATO's area. Incidentally, nearly all of these so-called principles are severely compromised today.

The primary American objective at the 1991 Rome summit was the completion of the Alliance Strategic Concept and the institutionalization of NACC. With the collapse of the USSR, the vague NATO liaison with Eastern Europe had to be strengthened. Helped by an earlier and radical Canadian proposal to offer associate NATO membership to stable East European states, Genscher and Baker proposed in early October a permanent cooperation council as a compromise. In return for French cooperation on NATO's continued core functions and the creation of the NACC, the US agreed to recognize the increasingly important role of a European

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defence identity, as we saw in paragraph 52 of the Alliance Strategic Concept above.

III. THE MISSING LINK

A close German-American coalition did not materialize even though prospects looked good in the immediate aftermath of unification. It failed to materialize simply because Germany does not want to be the junior partner, representing American leadership in Europe. Its core interests are European, therefore it will not fail France. After unification, the security reform process in Europe and the ESDI controversy in particular helped speed up Germany's articulation of these interests.

When President Bush declared Germany to be a "Partner in Leadership" in May of 1989, it was not mere rhetoric. The Bush administration set out to build a stronger relationship with West Germany then had existed in the latter Reagan years because the new team knew it was their most vital link to Europe both in terms of trade and security. Bush's strong defence and constructive support of German unification was aimed not only at protecting NATO and securing Gorbachev's

reform programme but also at supporting Kohl’s government in the upcoming election battle. One must recall that in early 1990 most analysts predicted a SPD victory later that year.\textsuperscript{24} Given its likely leader’s reputation (Oskar Lafontaine) on a neutralist Germany, the American administration was keen to avoid Kohl’s political isolation amidst the uncertainty brought by unification.

Yet, close American support for rapid unification without singularization or for "conditioning the decision making process," as one US official called it, did not cement a new relationship.\textsuperscript{25} Some minor issues reflected the continued ambivalence between the two. For example, American officials bristled that there was no surprise at the outcome of the Gorbachev-Kohl summit in Stravopol in July 1990. Beneath the defensive US response was an acute sensitivity that Kohl had kept the glory of the denouement to himself.\textsuperscript{26} While some Americans felt they had not received enough credit for their role, ironically, many German officials felt that German unification was unstoppable and while US support was welcome, it was not seen as crucial to the outcome. Also, it was generally felt

\textsuperscript{24} New York Times, February 13, 1990.

\textsuperscript{25} Background Briefing, July 17, 1990.

that the generous aid and credit package offered by Bonn to Moscow clinched the final deal.

More seriously, the German-American "partnership" was mismanaged by both sides during the Gulf War. As a result, the remainder of the post-unification honeymoon spirit evaporated. Bonn's lack of clear position in the early phase of the crisis perhaps reflected its preoccupation with rebuilding the ex-German Democratic Republic but it was perceived in the United States as a neutralist German position on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Later on, American opinion makers kept criticizing the Germans for not contributing enough to the war effort while the German infrastructure in fact made a vital contribution to the movement of American troops and materiel. To top it off, the Germans did not enjoy American interpretations of their constitution that maintained they could send troops out of the NATO area and the Americans were dismayed at the amount of effort it took for Germany to fulfill its simple obligation when NATO decided to send a small contingent to Turkey.

Underlying these grievances were serious divergent interests that became evident after unification and were exacerbated by trade on the one hand and by the security reform process and ESDI in particular on the other hand. On the trade side, high German interest rates were needed to
attract new money to rebuild former East Germany. However, these rates did not help the recession-stuck American economy. Despite US pressure, Germany did not isolate the French in their opposition to cut agricultural subsidies and unravel the Uruguay round. It was clear that America would reap no immediate trade benefits from its partner.

German foreign policy during and immediately after unification continued to adhere to the unwritten rule that its national interest be sought via the multilateral fora to avoid overt unilateral policies. As such the German position on security reform in Europe was more subtle than the French or British. Yet, more so than was the case with the other states, ESDI exerted contradictory demands on Bonn. While keeping a low profile in the political debates on NATO's reform, Germany consistently prevented French isolation within NATO. In addition, it formulated with France the key ingredients of the WEU-EC relationship. When it became apparent that NATO troops would remain in Germany, Chancellor Kohl was willing to set up the politically controversial Eurocorps to keep French troops on German soil. At the same time, as was evident from the joint Genscher-Baker declarations of May and October 1991, Germany sought to assure America of its continued interest in NATO. It was one of the strongest proponents of a rapid and substantial cooperation program between NATO and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. More strongly than its major
partners, but with little success, Germany sought a concrete security role for the CSCE.

Despite Germany's stated refusal to pursue its Europeanist interests at the cost of its Atlanticist interests or vice versa, the Americans began to realize that the end result is not quite evenhanded. As is often the case with middle positions, Germany is more favourably disposed to the extreme to which it goes than the extreme from which it comes. In other words, while its declaratory policy is impeccably Atlanticist, its actions are progressively Europeanist.

ESDI has sped up Germany's task of "normalizing" its own foreign and security policy. Some of this normalizing in effect means renationalizing. And some of this means de-Americanizing. In the Eurocorps decision, for example, Germany sought not only to keep French troops in Germany but also to release some German troops from their exclusive NATO designation. Given the renewed Franco-German axis and Britain's need to tie itself closer to the EC, America--had it wanted to--would have been hard pressed to achieve a stronger German position on slowing down ESDI.

VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP

German unification simultaneously sped up and misdirected the European security reform agenda. It covered a false consensus on the future of NATO and the CSCE and provided for an unneeded new security forum in the form of the IGC on Political Union. Political Union itself is a undeniable goal but the fast track common security and defence leg was pushed by ESDI advocates in part to challenge NATO much before it could actually assume any NATO tasks or even before there was common agreement on the need for such an alternative entity. The Gulf War and the 1991 crisis in Yugoslavia were interpreted by ESDI advocates as further evidence to speed up the formation of a more independent European entity. Philip Zelikow has argued that political constraints agreed to at Maastricht combined with declining military capabilities may actually reduce Western Europe's ability to deal with security crises.28 Having put ESDI on the table under circumstances of competing national interests and without clear American leadership, has indeed produced divergence and uncertainty where neither was inevitable.

If we examine, for example, the present situation with the loose agreements on ESDI of the summer of 1991 between the American secretary of state and the EC foreign ministers, we find considerable slippage. They stipulated that there be no weakening of the NATO integrated military command. Technically, the command and its process is firmly in place today. However, it suffers from political watering down, even competition. The WEU now has its own military planning cell which includes planning for in NATO area. Ad hoc arrangements are coming into place to define the WEU-NATO, the NATO-Eurocorps, and the NATO-CSCE roles during a military crisis. In other words, the operation of the NATO process is becoming subject to political agreements to kick it in gear. NATO is still the essential forum for decision making but there are now other fora which either need to agree with NATO or need a piece of the action for NATO to operate. It was also agreed that all European members of NATO be involved in ESDI. However, as is clear from the WEU declarations of Maastricht and Petersberg, without EC membership there can be no full ESDI membership. Finally, the foreign ministers agreed that ESDI was envisaged for out of NATO area. However, both the WEU and the Eurocorps have now in area mandates as well.

These ESDI developments have caused a divergence of interest and the breaking up of the coordination regime created under NATO. They do complicate the decision making
process on real security issues. Key member states are now sorting out which organization should undertake which action under what circumstances. The Yugoslav crisis, first in Croatia and now in Bosnia, would not automatically have achieved a NATO response since NATO is foremost a defensive alliance. When the United States willingly moved aside to let the eager EC handle the Yugoslav civil war, NATO was in effect further weakened. No matter how much force restructuring or new core functions were agreed to in Rome, NATO cannot continue to ignore the high costs of war in Eastern Europe. But the rise of ESDI has made it much more difficult now to use NATO if the members want to.

While rolling back ESDI is nearly impossible now, an understanding of the causes of the rise of ESDI shows that a stronger common interest needs to be found to overcome divisive political schemes and that American leadership is required. But American leadership cannot prevail in the face of a strong Franco-German axis going the other direction. New common ground between Germany and America is a sine qua non to revive the security reform process in Europe.

Without challenging the EC integration agenda, Germany must put the breaks on ESDI for now. But what is in it for Bonn? A full fledged NATO-CSCE cooperation scheme on peacekeeping and perhaps even peacemaking that guarantees more stability for Eastern Europe than the present
arrangement would make it worthwhile for Germany to slow ESDI and reinforce the Atlantic link. This in turn requires a shift in American and British policy towards the CSCE and NATO; towards adding to NATO's defence role a credible crisis management and conflict resolution role. Only a German-American coalition with British backing can push France along.