
Effects of “Europe” on National Party Issue Profiles: Assessment and Explanation of Convergence within Party Families

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Voters and party activists are drawn to a particular political party, at least in part, because of its ideological/issue profile.² Hence, *changing* that profile could result in losing current members and/or voters. Precisely because a party can not assume that such change would be cost-free, parties are generally assumed to undertake it reluctantly.

And yet, there is ample evidence that parties do change their profiles, both in their positions and in the relative degrees to which they emphasize particular issues, and sometimes the changes are dramatic. Why, in the face of good reasons for standing pat, do parties change? In addition to possible internal factors, such as changes in who controls the party’s own positions of power, recent literature has focused a good deal of attention on pressures and opportunities from outside the party (i.e., “environmental” factors). (E.g., see Harmel and Svasand 1997; Demker 1997; Panebianco 1988; Deschouwer 1992)

With all of the attention that has been given to environmental explanation for party change, with special attention devoted to the parties of established European democracies, surprisingly little has been focused on possible impact of what might well be considered the most dramatic recent change in the shared environment of those parties: the development of “Europe,” both institutionally and in the minds of its people. It is our purpose in this paper to add to the small but important literature which has developed on this subject, by directly and empirically investigating the extent to which European integration and institutionalization have contributed to convergence and altered emphases within several major party families covering the fifteen more established member states of the European Union.

To what extent has the development of “Europe” contributed to altered issue profiles of national parties? That is the question which drives this paper.

¹The three co-authors bear equal responsibility for this paper. The ordering is chronological, reflecting the order of joining the project.

²To simplify presentation, we will henceforth refer only to issue profile and no longer distinguish between ideological and issue profiles, subsuming the former under the latter.

Extant Literature

In addition to a limited number of studies focusing on individual parties, party systems, or party families, there are only a few studies which cover the broad range of European party families involved in the current study. One of those (Volgens and Klingemann 2002) aims to explain recent polarization and/or convergence in European party systems and only briefly engages the same for party families, while the second (Pennings 2004) focuses upon both individual parties and party families in analyzing possible effects of Europeanization upon references to Europe in party manifestos.

Volgens and Klingemann focus primarily upon the extents to which the period from the 1940s to 1990s has seen greater polarization or convergence among left-right party positions within the national party systems and among the major party families of Europe, using composite position scores based upon data of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG). The study only briefly touches upon the topic of primary interest in our study, intra-party family convergence, finding that

High standard deviations show that parties grouped into the same party family vary considerably in their left-right placements. Contrary to our hypotheses that internationalization and globalization processes militate in favour of party families becoming more similar, these data show that only left-wing party families grew more similar over time. A comparison of standard deviations for the six decades [from the 1940s through 1990s] show only communist, socialist, green, Christian democratic, and regional parties getting closer. Conservative, nationalist, liberal, agrarian/centre, and special issue parties show greater divergence during the 1980s or 1990s, although some of these party families had previously been getting more similar. (2002: 158)

Beyond the broad left-right composite positions, Volgens and Klingemann treat only two issues which “gained prominence over time,” finding that eventually all party families devoted increased attention to the valence issues of the environment and administrative efficiency.

In his study of the effects of Europeanization upon national platforms, Pennings examines differences across parties/families and over time in the extent to which manifestos reference the European level, both generally and by specific policy domain. Relying primarily upon original data produced by automated content analysis, Pennings (2004: 12) finds that

Overall, the linkages to Europe per policy domain are not strongly related to the party family background... However, the party families do slightly incorporate the linkages into their manifestos in the way predicted by the issue saliency theory.

He concludes that “Europeanization has generally got less attention than would be warranted by its ‘objective’ impact on national decision- and policy-making,” and that “party family differences do matter for the degree to which policy areas get linked to Europe, but this impact is not very strong” (2004: 1, 17).

Concepts: European Integration and Europeanization

Confusion in the literature over the use – or rather, variety of uses – of the term “Europeanization” has been well documented elsewhere (e.g., see Bomberg 2002; Radaelli 2000). For our purposes, the most fundamental distinctions are (1) between those which highlight institutionalization at the European level and others which focus on Europe’s *impacts* on national politics, and (2) those which speak only of the European Community/Union and others which refer more broadly to the European level. As illustrations of these definitional alternatives, consider just the following three attempts to define the single term:

In one of the most cited definitions, Ladrech (1994: 69) has conceptualized Europeanization as an

incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.

Later, Ladrech (as cited in Bomberg 2002, endnote #12) has seemingly broadened his definition to include

Responses by actors – institutional and otherwise – to the impact of European integration.

In another highly cited definition, Risse, Green-Cowles, and Caporaso (2001: 3) define Europeanization as

the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules.

To us, Ladrech’s definitions seem too broad from a social scientific perspective; that is, they subsume both the independent variable (what’s happening at the European level) and the most interesting dependent variable (responses at the national level) within one concept. Thus, it is no longer possible to speak of “national-level responses to Europeanization” or in our case to ask “what are the implications of Europeanization for national parties,” since the responses/implications are considered by Ladrech to be parts of Europeanization. And hence, the national-level effects become indicators rather than hypothesized consequences of Europeanization.

We prefer usage closer to that of Risse et al, where the definitional focus remains on the European level alone. For us, Europeanization is the development of political and governmental institutions at the European level. And for us, the relevant institutions may be developed within the European Community/Union or within other European-level organizations/associations, e.g. the Common Market, Schengen, or the Single European Act. What they have in common is the

institutionalization of increased opportunities for regular interaction among officials of European states.

Just as there is disagreement and resulting confusion concerning the meaning of the term “Europeanization,” there is also disagreement and confusion over “European integration.” Is it integration of institutions across nation-states, for instance, or does the integration occur within the minds of individuals? We adopt the latter option. For us, European integration involves the development of European identity and a common European culture; here, emphasis is placed on a process which occurs within the minds of European residents, whether of the elites or the masses.

Thus defined, both Europeanization and European integration are developmental processes. They are not the same thing, but each could presumably affect the other. Theoretically, we hypothesize that both may impact party behavior at the national level.

Theory

With increasingly higher levels of European integration, a process begun in earnest in the aftermath of World War II and certainly continuing today, have come greater opportunities to learn from successes and failures of others on the continent. This is true governmentally (across national governments and their agencies), but also politically (across political parties and other political organizations at the national level). Development of European institutions (i.e., Europeanization) also institutionalized those opportunities through regular meetings of national leaders. From the standpoint of national parties, the developments of popular elections for the European Parliament and of European party federations, in particular, created and regularized both opportunities and new incentives for cooperating with and learning from fellow party family members in other European countries.

The theoretical core of this paper is the expectation that European integration, by enhancing opportunities for cross-national discussion and learning within party families, would likely have produced a convergence of issue profiles for parties within each family – that is, Social Democratic parties becoming more alike, Conservative parties becoming more alike, etc. The process should only have been spurred on by development of European institutions, within which the communications and learning would be regularized and routinized. Though Volkens and Klingemann looked briefly for the same phenomenon and found only limited evidence of such convergence (i.e. limited just to party families of the left), they limited their analysis to composite left-right scores; our expectation is broader than that and covers a range of specific issues over which discussion is likely to take place in European venues (see Table 5).

But what specifically, within the parties’ issue profiles, would be expected to converge? First and foremost, we would expect that for a range of issues, the actual positions taken by the parties would become more similar within each family over time. While Volkens and Klingemann purport to have analyzed parties’ positions, operationalized as composite scores based on Manifestos Research Group data for a number of allegedly left-right issues, the reality is that the

MRG data were designed to measure relative amounts of attention paid to specific issues, not actual positions. Hence, we would argue (following Harmel, Janda, and Tan 1995) that Volkens and Klingemann were analyzing issue “salience” more so than issue positions. And we see no sound reason to expect either European integration or Europeanization to produce convergent salience within party families. Any European-level learning (or perhaps even pressures) would likely produce greater conformity on *positions* taken by family parties, while leaving *salience* exclusively to the purview of national politics.

But for some issues, i.e. the non-valence issues, parties may conceivably make statements seemingly supporting both sides of an issue within a single manifesto. The MRG project produced data for several such issues (some of which are customarily included in attempts to measure “position” on the basis of “relative emphasis”). While we are loathe to consider the difference between the quantities of “positive” and “negative” statements to indicate the party’s actual position on an issue, we do recognize that parties may be strategic in weighting the amount of emphasis given to one side relative to the other. While this stops short of indicating position (which requires determining the strength and not just quantity of the statements), it may well reflect the party’s attempt to establish a particular “tone” for strategic reasons. And because strategy may well be a topic for sharing and learning among the members of a particular party family, we do expect that European integration, spurred on by Europeanization, would result in convergence of tone on particular issues within each party family.

Beyond convergences within party families, there are certain issues for which European integration, again spurred on by Europeanization, would be expected to lessen the manifesto emphasis (or salience) across all parties. Because European integration implies development of a European “community,” for instance, there should be lessened importance attached to any “special,” friendly dyadic relationships, either within or outside of Europe. And because of the expectation (and in some aspects, objective reality) of shifting responsibility for economic orthodoxy (e.g. banking and monetary systems) to the European level as part of Europeanization, there should be lessened attention paid to economic orthodoxy at the national level.

Thus far, then, we are positing *greater convergence* of position and tone within party families for a range of issues, and *declining emphasis* on positive dyadic foreign relationships and economic orthodoxy for parties in general. Tests of these expectations will constitute the first section of analyses below. For these hypotheses, we do not (and indeed are unable to) differentiate between effects of European integration and development of European institutions, noting only that we would not be surprised to find even stronger support beginning with the period of greatest institutional development (i.e. the mid-1970s onward). We should note also that we have no intention of trying to measure the alleged “independent variables” nor to control for possible rival explanations (e.g. the end of the Cold War or broader trends associated with globalization and internationalization). Rather, we shall be content here to note when evidence is consistent with what we would anticipate as consequences of [unmeasured] tandem trends of European integration and Europeanization. When evidence conforms to our expectations, we must stop well short of drawing causal inferences. When evidence does not conform to our expectations, we will be more confident in doubting the related hypotheses of European effects.

The second portion of the analyses focuses upon expected effects of one particular aspect of Europeanization: the writing of European party federation manifestos (i.e., Euromanifestos). Most European party federations – encompassing their respective EP party groups, national party executives, and others – were formed in advance of the first direct elections to the EP in 1979. Party Leaders’ Meetings, consisting primarily of the leaders of the EP party group and the national parties, are normally held at least twice per year. These leadership meetings set the agenda for the EP and have produced Euromanifestos for each of the EP elections beginning with 1979.³ With these functions, according to Hix and Lord (1997, 65), “The Party Leaders’ Meetings have begun to play a new role in coordinating the development of party policy on issues in EU politics at national and European level.”

Taking the national-level implications of the latter statement as research challenge rather than established fact, we do believe there is good reason to anticipate effects of the Party Leader Meetings – and their tremendous opportunity for diffusing policy orientations and strategy – upon national manifestos, with the Euromanifesto serving as guide to both national parties and to our specific expectations. The process of developing the Euromanifesto involves leaders of all national parties within the federation. Though it may be assumed that most or all of what is included in the Euromanifesto has received consensus approval (as in Hix and Lord 1997: 65-67), that does not necessarily mean that all member parties are at exactly the same position, stated with exactly the same tone. For that matter, it should not be assumed that every national party has even addressed all of the issues in its platform; it may be that some parties consent to including an item simply because it has not heretofore been relevant in their national politics. Hence, there is reason to expect that there is room for convergence among federation members on position, tone, and emphasis (i.e., at the level of recognizing issues not included in previous national platforms), even for issues covered in “consensual” Euromanifestos.

Specifically, then, we expect that when an issue has been emphasized (operationalized here as receiving at least 5% of all statements) in a given Euromanifesto, there should be fewer member parties afterwards who do not address the issue at the national level. Regarding “tone,” there should also be convergence in the direction of the Euromanifesto’s tone (i.e. positive or negative) for such issues. And finally, there should be convergence of national parties’ actual positions toward the specific positions emphasized in the Euromanifesto. Though data (i.e. judgmental data on actual positions in Euromanifestos) do not exist for testing the last of those expectations, data do exist with which to address the hypotheses relating Euromanifesto emphases to national party recognition and tone.

³According to Hix and Lord (1997: 65), “By bringing prime ministers and European Commissioners together, the Party Leaders’ Meetings are the only arenas where all the officials fulfilling executive functions at the European level from the same party family meet to discuss the medium- and long-term EU agenda.”

Data and Findings

Part One: European Integration and Europeanization

Above, we posited *greater convergence* of position and tone within party families for a range of issues for which discussion at the European level is likely. For testing the hypothesis for actual issue *positions*, we are limited to judgmental data produced for the Party Change Project for parties of just three European countries (Denmark, Germany, and the U.K.) for the period 1950-1990. (See Harmel, Janda, and Tan 1995.) Thus, issue position data exist for no more than three parties per party family. With such limited data, only the most tentative of findings can be reported. Nevertheless, for the Social Democrats and Liberals (the only families for which data are sufficient to support any analysis), there does appear to be (in analyses not reported in detail here) some convergence, but only for a limited number of issues and over limited periods of time. There was some indication that new EU membership drew parties closer within the Social Democratic family. But again, very little should be made of these indications, which were based on behavior of only a few parties. At best, they are suggestive of the need for further analysis of convergence of party positions in European party families.

For analysis of convergence in *tone*, we rely upon data collected by the Manifesto Research Group on those issues for which “pro” and “con” statements were counted separately (see Table 5).⁴ Thus, for each such variable, our operationalization of tone is the net emphasis in the dominant direction, i.e. simply the arithmetic difference between the percentages of “pro” and “con” statements.⁵

To examine convergences within each party family the standard deviation and the mean of net emphasis for each issue are calculated for each five-year period between 1945 and 1998. The *degree* of convergence is operationalized as the standard deviation itself. Thus measured, as the specific party family under analysis experiences convergence, the standard deviation decreases. Means, on the other hand, provide information on the *direction* of convergence. While higher means with lower standard deviations indicate convergence toward more emphasis, lower means combined with lower standard deviations indicate convergence toward less emphasis.

⁶To eliminate the possible bias caused by the same party having more than one manifesto within

⁴For our analysis, we excluded two such variables – traditional morality and “labor groups” – for which, during the period of our study (ending in 1998), were predominantly national issues which are unlikely to have received substantial treatment in European-level discussion.

⁵Indeed, the reason for excluding valence issues is that there is no similar indicator of tone for such issues. That is, the data are limited to measuring salience, i.e. emphasis.

a five year period, the average of the net emphasis scores for the party's manifestos for each period was taken as that party's score. To eliminate possible noise caused by parties leaving the scene (i.e. dying) or coming onto the scene (i.e. being born) during the period of our study, results reported here are based on analyses of just the parties that have survived for the whole period of the data set (i.e. from 1945 to 1998).⁷ Analyses include – throughout the entire period – the parties of all 15 European countries which were EU members as of 1998. Finally, this study is limited to the four largest mainstream party families in Europe.⁸

The standard deviations and means for the issues under consideration are reported in Tables 1-4, separately for each party family. Table 5 consists of a summary report on convergences and divergences. As can be seen, for all party families under examination there are considerably more convergences than divergences, as hypothesized.⁹ The Social Democrats converged for the issues of foreign special relations, military, constitutionalism, education, and multiculturalism. The Liberals converged for the issues of foreign special relations, protectionism, and multiculturalism. The Conservatives converged for foreign special relations, constitutionalism, and protectionism. Finally, the Christian Democrats converged for the issues

⁶Two other formulae were also used to analyze the movements of the party families, following Volkens and Klingemann (2002). The first is the difference between the maximum and minimum scores within each five-year period. For the second, the differences for all possible pairs of parties within each five-year period were computed, summed, and divided by the number of parties minus one. These later two formulae are very highly correlated and there are only minor differences between the results of these formulae and the results based on the standard deviations. For clearer presentation, the standard deviations and means are chosen for this paper.

⁷The hypotheses were also tested for the sets of parties that include (1) all parties that existed for some part of the period and (2) all parties except those that died prior to 1998. The findings for all three sets of analyses are very similar.

⁸Of the six largest party families, the Greens and Communists are excluded here. The Greens are excluded because most family members have existed for too short a time to support an analysis of convergence. The Communists are excluded because too few remain (only four) when analyzing just parties that survived through 1998.


⁹To account for the possibility that anti-European parties could produce outlier effects counter to our hypothesis, we differentiated parties on the basis of the degree of negativity on the European Community issue. Only a few parties were found to be clearly anti-European Community/Union. While some anti-EC/U parties were found to be outliers for some issues, they were not found to be influential in biasing standard deviations or means.

of foreign special relations, constitutionalism, protectionism, and national way of life. When the means are analyzed, for almost all of the convergences (except for the issues of education and multiculturalism in the case of the Social Democrats) the convergences involve generalized movement toward net emphases of 0, resulting in most instances from lessened emphasis on the issue overall.

Above, we argued that there are certain issues for which European integration, spurred on by Europeanization, would be expected to lessen the manifesto emphasis across all parties, regardless of family. Specifically, we posited *declining emphasis* on positive dyadic foreign relationships and economic orthodoxy.

Figures 1 and 2 present the emphasis scores for these two issues for all parties (which were in existence throughout the period) across our entire period of study. The Figures reveal the expected tendencies for both issues, strongly for friendly dyadic foreign relationships and more moderately for economic orthodoxy. Fewer parties devoted substantial portions of their platforms to these issues at the end of the period than at the beginning. For the foreign relationships variable, not only did the standard deviations decline over time, but the means clearly declined as well.


FIGURE 1*: Party emphasis for the issue of ‘Foreign Special Relations- Positive’**



* Each point refers to a party manifesto. If more than one election manifesto is published within a five-year period the average of the emphasis scores for that period are used here. Parties that have survived for the whole period are represented in the figure, regardless of party family.

** y-axis represents emphasis placed on the issue, as a percentage of all sentences in the manifesto, as provided by the MRG.

FIGURE 2*: Party emphasis for the issue of ‘Economic Orthodoxy’**



* Each point refers to a party manifesto. If more than one election manifesto is published within a five-year period the average of the emphasis scores for that period are used here. Parties that have survived for the whole period are represented in the figure, regardless of party family.
 **y-axis represents emphasis placed on the issue, as a percentage of all sentences in the manifesto, as provided by the MRG.

Thus far, our purpose has been to present evidence concerning expectations of greater convergence of position and tone within party families and of declining emphasis on the issues of positive foreign dyadic relationships and economic orthodoxy. While it was not possible to adequately address the convergence hypothesis with respect to position, we did find evidence consistent with our expectations regarding convergence of tone. Likewise, the data provided evidence of declining emphases on issues involving foreign relationships and economic orthodoxy. While none of these findings should be interpreted as confirming a role for “Europe” in altering national party issue profiles, they are at least consistent with what would be expected if Europe did have such a role.

[Tables 1-4 go here]

Table 1: Social Democrats: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998*

| Period** | Foreign Special Relations | | Military | | Internationalism | | European Community | | Constitutionalism | | Centralization | | Protectionism | | Welfare State | | Education | |
|----------|---------------------------|------|----------|------|------------------|------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|----------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|-----------|------|
| | St Dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean |
| 1945 | 4.2 | -0.1 | 2.7 | -1.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 2.8 | |
| 1950 | 7.5 | 1.9 | 3.6 | -0.8 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.8 | 0.3 | 5.1 | 2.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 3.5 | |
| 1955 | 2.5 | 0.5 | 3.1 | -1.1 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 6.0 | 8.5 | 5.9 | |
| 1960 | 1.6 | 0.9 | 1.7 | -0.1 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 12.8 | -2.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 7.8 | 12.2 | 3.8 | |
| 1965 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 1.5 | -0.6 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 3.0 | -0.1 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 7.2 | 5.1 | |
| 1970 | 1.7 | 0.0 | 1.1 | -0.1 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 4.9 | 8.3 | 2.6 | |
| 1975 | 3.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | -0.3 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 4.7 | 8.3 | 2.6 | |
| 1980 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 1.6 | -0.8 | 2.8 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 2.6 | -0.3 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 8.3 | 3.2 | |
| 1985 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 2.0 | -0.5 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.9 | -0.2 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 2.4 | |
| 1990 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.2 | -0.1 | 2.1 | 3.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 3.3 | |
| 1995 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 2.7 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 0.5 | -0.1 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 2.6 | |

* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the parties within the party family.

** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to data availability.

Table 2: Liberals: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998*

| Period** | Foreign Special Relations | | Military | | Internationalism | | European Community | | Constitutionalism | | Centralization | | Protectionism | | Welfare State | | Education | |
|----------|---------------------------|------|----------|------|------------------|------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|----------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|-----------|---|
| | St Dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | M |
| 1945 | 3.3 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.7 | -0.7 | 5.5 | 4.9 | 1.7 | |
| 1950 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 3.5 | -0.2 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.4 | 0.9 | -0.3 | 5.1 | 4.5 | 2.3 | |
| 1955 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 2.9 | -0.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 1.5 | -0.8 | 5.8 | 2.7 | 3.9 | |
| 1960 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 0.2 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 2.7 | 1.8 | 0.7 | -0.6 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 3.8 | |
| 1965 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 2.9 | -0.9 | 5.4 | 3.9 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 0.4 | -0.1 | 13.0 | 7.5 | 3.9 | |
| 1970 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 3.3 | |
| 1975 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 0.7 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 2.6 | |
| 1980 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 2.9 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.1 | -0.3 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 1.8 | |
| 1985 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 3.3 | |
| 1990 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 2.8 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 0.4 | -0.2 | 7.9 | 1.8 | 3.3 | |
| 1995 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.7 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 4.1 | 1.3 | 3.4 | |

* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the parties within the party family.

** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to data availability.

Table 3: Conservatives: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998*

| Period** | Foreign Special Relations | | Military | | Internationalism | | European Community | | Constitutionalism | | Centralization | | Protectionism | | Welfare State | | Education | |
|----------|---------------------------|------|----------|------|------------------|------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|----------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|-----------|------|
| | St Dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean |
| 1945 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 2.2 | |
| 1950 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 4.7 | -1.6 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 1.9 | |
| 1955 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 3.7 | 2.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 13.4 | -6.0 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 4.8 | 0.9 | 3.5 | |
| 1960 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 1.6 | 12.3 | -5.3 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.1 | -0.4 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 1.6 | |
| 1965 | 2.4 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 5.5 | -2.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.5 | -0.2 | 3.5 | 3.2 | 2.9 | |
| 1970 | 4.6 | -1.4 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 3.4 | |
| 1975 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 18.6 | 11.4 | 3.4 | |
| 1980 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.9 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 5.7 | 4.1 | 3.2 | |
| 1985 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.5 | -0.2 | 13.0 | 11.4 | 1.8 | |
| 1990 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 2.6 | 4.3 | 5.9 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 2.5 | |
| 1995 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 5.2 | 0.6 | -0.1 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 | |

* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the parties within the party family.

** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to data availability.

Table 4: Christian Democrats: Standard Deviations and Means 1945-1998*

| Period** | Foreign Special Relations | | Military | | Internationalism | | European Community | | Constitutionalism | | Centralization | | Protectionism | | Welfare State | | Education | |
|----------|---------------------------|------|----------|------|------------------|------|--------------------|------|-------------------|------|----------------|------|---------------|------|---------------|------|-----------|------|
| | St Dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean | St dev | Mean |
| 1945 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 0.8 | |
| 1950 | 3.0 | -0.6 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 1.9 | |
| 1955 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 4.0 | |
| 1960 | 3.9 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 2.7 | 8.2 | 1.8 | |
| 1965 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 3.9 | 5.7 | 4.8 | |
| 1970 | 4.3 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 2.4 | |
| 1975 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 4.5 | 9.2 | 1.5 | |
| 1980 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.5 | -0.2 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 5.9 | 2.7 | |
| 1985 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -0.2 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 3.2 | |
| 1990 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 1.8 | 3.5 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 3.2 | 4.7 | 2.0 | |
| 1995 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 3.9 | |

* Low standard deviations with low means show convergence toward zero. Low standard deviations with high means indicate convergence with an increase in emphasis. High standard deviations show divergence among the parties within the party family.

** Each year in the period column indicates the beginning year of each five-year period (i.e. the row of 1945 shows the standard deviations and means for the period between 1945-49). The last period only covers 1995-98 due to data availability.

TABLE 5: Convergences and divergences by party family*

| | Social Dem | Liberals | Conservatives | Christian Dem |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Foreign Special Relat. | convergence | convergence | convergence ⁴ | convergence ⁶ |
| Military | convergence | NC | NC | NC |
| Internationalism | NC | NC | NC | NC |
| European Community | divergence | divergence | divergence | NC |
| Constitutionalism | convergence ¹ | NC | convergence | convergence |
| Centralization | divergence | NC | NC | NC |
| Protectionism | NC | convergence | convergence ⁵ | convergence ⁷ |
| Welfare State | NC | NC | NC | NC |
| Education | convergence | NC | NC | NC |
| National Way of Life | NC | NC | NC | convergence |
| Multiculturalism | convergence ² | convergence ³ | NC | NC |

* The convergences and divergences are not necessarily cover the whole period. However, if not stated otherwise, all convergences and divergences are observed for most of the period under examination. Exceptions are noted below.

* NC means either not clear or no change.

1- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1960-64 period.

2- The Social Democrats converged between 1950 and 1965 and then converged again from 1975 onwards, punctuated by a period of little change. The later period of convergence coincides with the high European institutionalization from the late 1970s onward.

3- Convergence is observed for the whole period except the 1965-74 period.

4- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1970-74 period.

5- Convergence is observed for the whole period except for a short-term divergence in the 1975-79 period.

6- Convergence is observed since the 1970-74 period. Before this period there was no clear change. The period of convergence coincides with the high European institutionalization from the late 1970s onward.

7- Convergence is observed since the 1975-79 period. Before this period there was no clear change. The period of convergence coincides with the high European institutionalization from the late 1970s onward.

Part Two: Euromanifestos

Above (see Theory section), we argued that there is reason to expect convergence among federation members on issue emphasis, at least to the extent that issues not previously treated in a party's national manifestos should be mentioned there following emphasis in its federation's Euromanifesto. Operationally, we expect that when an issue has been emphasized in a Euromanifesto – i.e. receiving attention in at least 5% of all statements – there should be fewer member parties afterwards who do not address the issue at the national level.

Our method involves comparing, for each issue and each family, (a) the proportion of non-mentions (i.e. over at least three prior manifestos) changed to mentions during the five year

period after being emphasized in a Euromanifesto to (b) the proportion of non-mentions changed to mentions during a five year period after a Euromanifesto in which the same issue was *not* emphasized.¹⁰ The magnitude (and significance, of course) of the difference between the two proportions serves as an indicator of the degree to which emphasis in a Euromanifesto may affect at least recognition of the issue in national platforms. All Euromanifesto data used in this study have been provided by the Euromanifesto Project (EP), which has employed similar coding procedures to those of the MRG.

For the vast majority (24 of 31, or 74%) of all family-issue combinations for which there were non-mentions at the beginning of the period, the proportion of changes associated with Euromanifestos in which the issues were emphasized exceeds the comparable proportion for control periods, consistent with our expectations.¹¹ Furthermore, in the aggregate, the proportion associated with EM's where and issue was emphasized is 51/98 (or 52%), compared to just 24/99 (or 24%); the difference is significant at the .05 level.¹²

Similar differences in the expected direction exist for component federation families. Though federations now exist for all major party families in Europe, our analyses are limited to the three federations that encompass the four largest mainstream party families in Europe: the Party of European Socialists (Socialists and Social Democrats; PES); the European Peoples' Party (i.e. Conservatives and Christian Democrats; EPP); and the European Liberal, Democratic, and Reform Party (ELDR). For each federation, our analyses cover the four manifestos ending with 1994. For all three federation families, proportions of change associated with EM's in which issues were emphasized exceed the proportions for control periods [19/38 (50%) vs. 11/39 (28%) for PES; 21/42 (50%) vs. 8/40 (20%) for the EPP; 8/14 (57%) vs. 5/16 (31%) for ELDR]; only the difference for the ELDR failed of significance at the .05 level.¹³ Together, these results indicate that the federations' Euromanifestos – and/or the federation-level meetings and processes reflected in those documents – could indeed have been a catalyst for national parties to recognize and mention issues which had previously been ignored.

¹⁰Generally, the “control” period is five years after the closest prior EM where the issue was *not* emphasized. In the case of first instance of emphasis being in the first EM (i.e. 1979), the control period is 1974-1978.

¹¹In this study, we found no instances of national parties changing from “mentioning” to “not mentioning” in the next national manifesto after the issue had been emphasized in a relevant Euromanifesto.

¹²We used the difference of proportions test as described in Blalock (1972: 228-230). The reported difference would also be significant at the .01 level.

¹³The difference reported for the ELDP would be significant at the .10 level.

In addition to expecting convergence of issue recognition across federation members, our arguments above also lead us to expect convergence in direction of tone (or net emphasis), i.e. increases in federation members adopting the same tone as expressed in Euromanifestos for emphasized issues. Parties which did not recognize the issue previously, but which do so after emphasis in an EM, should adopt tone with the same dominant sign (+ or -) as that of the EM. Parties which previously recognized the issue but with different dominant sign, should – after emphasis of the issue in an EM – adopt the same dominant sign as in the EM.

Our data include twenty instances of change from non-mention to mention after EM emphasis; all were in the expected direction. Furthermore, of thirteen instances of parties holding contrary tone prior to EM emphasis, five changed signs to the expected direction, seven moved in the expected direction but without changing sign, and only one increased its strength of tone in the contrary direction. There was no instance of a party switching *to* a dominant sign contrary to that of its EM.

These analyses were premised on the argument that if Euromanifestos make a difference in party issue profiles at the national level, it may well be revealed in (1) convergence of issue recognition among federation members as well as (2) convergence of tone. Our analyses have provided considerable evidence in support of those expectations.

Conclusions

We began this paper by arguing that European integration, by enhancing opportunities for cross-national discussion and learning, and spurred on by development of European institutions, would likely have produced a convergence of issue profiles for parties within each party family. With regard to European integration and Europeanization writ large, we posited greater convergence of position and tone within party families for a range of issues, and declining emphasis on two specific issues for parties in general. With regard to Euromanifestos in particular, we posited convergence of issue position, issue recognition, and tone among members of party federations.

Though data do not exist with which to adequately address our expectations regarding issue position convergence, we have tested the expectations involving tone, emphasis, and recognition. While there were cases of divergence of issue tone, and some that neither converged or diverged, the instances of divergence were far outnumbered by instances of convergence. We found strong evidence of declining emphasis for one of two issues studied, and more moderate evidence for the other. While some parties continued to ignore issues which were emphasized in their federation's Euromanifestos, numerous parties did begin to recognize such issues, and no party adopted a new direction (+ or -) contrary to that of its federation.

While some may justifiably note that our evidence of support is far from universal, it does seem to us that the bigger story line is that – even with all of the limitations of our analyses – the glass is at least half full. With all of the domestic political pressures on national parties, should anyone expect to find marked convergence on all issues, or every issue emphasis and tone of a Euromanifesto duplicated in all member parties’ national platforms? We certainly think not. Again, our analyses are so limited, and hence our findings so tentative, that it would be foolhardy to claim that we have demonstrated that “Europe” has dramatically influenced parties’ manifestos at the national level. But there is substantial evidence here with which to suggest that Europe *could* indeed matter for some issues and to some significant degree for national parties’ issue profiles.

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