Table of contents

Introduction................................................................. p. 3

Transatlantic policy networks and the founding of the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950/51: Towards a guideline for successful
archival research.
by Brigitte Leucht.......................................................... p. 5

The Illusion of the Neutral Time: Tracing back the underlying premises of
eastward enlargement through interviews and archival sources.
by Cristina Blanco Sío-López.......................................... p. 16

The Relevance of a Historical Pattern of Political Management: Romanian
Party System Europeanisation.
by Dr. Sorina Soare...................................................... p. 31

Analysis of European Security Culture in Historical Terms.
by Cigdem Ustun.......................................................... p. 49

The Invention of the Museum of Europe.
by Dr. Véronique Charléty.............................................. p. 63

Italy’s and EPC Counter-Terrorist Considerations.
by Ludovica Marchi..................................................... p. 74

Obstructive All the Way? British Policy towards German Unification 1989-90.
by Pyeongeok An........................................................ p. 76

The High Officials in the European Communities, 1952-1967: Methodology and
sources related to the PhD Project.
by Katja Seidel.......................................................... p. 80

The Constitutionalisation of the European Community: West Germany between
Legal Sovereignty and European Integration 1958-1974. Methodology and Source
Material.
by Billy Davies........................................................... p. 86
Introduction

The History of European Integration Research Society (HEIRS) was founded in the summer of 2004 by a group of young researchers at the Universities of Cambridge and Portsmouth. Scattered archival data, difficulties in retrieving information regarding ongoing research and the loneliness that is typical of doctoral research prompted them to create a network of historians and political scientists working on the genesis of the integration process.

The foundation of HEIRS also followed from a widespread recognition of the need to go beyond the restricted boundaries of national history and from a lively debate over the extent to which the integration process requires brand new categories and must be based on multinational archival research as well as on the use various materials and languages. For this reason collaboration among researchers and institutes becomes even more crucial than in nation-based history. Only through the continuous exchange of information can the history of European integration achieve valuable results. When we speak of 'exchange of information', we refer not only to the standard contacts among researchers regarding the progress of one’s own research, which usually takes place in the form of conferences and seminars, but also to more pragmatic information regarding archives and databases. Multinational archival research entails proficiency in various languages and practical knowledge of different kinds of cataloguing systems, admission procedures and copying rules. In this case the tips of a friend regarding a particular archival fond or advice regarding what archivist to contact for a specific kind of research not only saves time, but prevents mistakes and waste of time. Through the creation of a mailing list and of a database with the name of young researchers and their research interests, HEIRS aims to correct this shortcoming and particularly to foster multinational archival research.

Although it is based at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at University of Cambridge, HEIRS aims to foster exchange among young researchers working on the history of European integration, and to enhance collaboration between institutions and research centres, across Europe. The initiative has already proven extremely for the researchers involved and has received positive feedback from established academics and students alike.

The first initiative organised by the HEIRS founding committee was a postgraduate conference designed to gather researchers together and to discuss the state of the field. The HEIRS Colloquium took place in Cambridge on the 6th and 7th November 2004 at Wesley House. It gathered together forty young researchers in a creative and stimulating atmosphere.

In view of the demand expressed by many researchers, we have decided to publish a selection of papers in the form of an online PDF booklet. This publication does not include all the papers presented at the Colloquium but only those whose authors decided to extend their paper. For this reasons, although extremely valuable, the papers by Giuliano Garavini, Francois-Xavier Laffeac and Emmanuelle Heriard Dubreuil have not been included. In other cases, because the authors have submitted their paper for publication in journals (Ludovica Marchi and Pyeongeok An), we have decided to publish only a short abstract of their work. You can contact the authors through the email address you find at the bottom of their abstract. Finally, in two cases (Katja Seidel and Billy Davies), because they are still at the beginning of their research, we have decided to publish only a short paper with guidelines of future research.

We would like to thank the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at Cambridge University for their support and encouragement. We are also very grateful to Dr Julie Smith (Centre of International Studies, Cambridge) and Dr Piers Ludlow (LSE, London) for taking part in our Colloquium and presenting two stimulating papers, and to Mr Richard Balfe for his interesting talk.

Lucia Faltin, Marion Guiral, Linda Risso, George Wilkes
Transatlantic policy networks and the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950/51: Towards a guideline for successful archival research

Brigitte Leuchtt

In this paper I propose to develop a guideline for successful archival research. I do this from the viewpoint of my PhD. Therefore, the general observations I make about archival research derive from the limited viewpoint of one researcher and the experience of one project that is still in progress.1 At the outset, I will provide a brief introduction into the subject of the PhD thesis on “Transatlantic policy networks and the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950/51”. The focus is on multinational archival research which is an essential part of the project. Consequently, I will address a range of issues pertaining to both the selection of archival sources and the realization of multinational archival research. The paper concludes with the proposed guideline for successful archival research.

Introduction to the PhD project

In the PhD thesis, I explore the role of transnational and transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950/51. The transnational and transatlantic networks were composed of a variety of actors, among them politicians, officials, academic and non-academic experts, and others. Ultimately, the thesis will shed new light on how the process of European integration was triggered in 1950/51.

The history of early European integration has narrated the Schuman Plan negotiations as a multinational conference of European states (e.g. Küsters 1988; Lappenküper 1994; Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994). Almost exclusively relying on state sources and focusing on intergovernmental bargaining, Milward (1992) has developed a comprehensive frame for analysing European integration. However, arguing that national governments are the driving force behind European integration, his approach to policy development fails to include any transnational influences. Other historians (e.g. Kaiser 2005 forthcoming) have argued for a transnational approach to studying the history of European integration and have promoted the study of transnational networks. To this date, European integration historiography has focused on the governmental level of the negotiations and has given little attention to the role of individual and collective, public and private actors in the period of agenda setting and during the conference. At the same time, early European integration history has not incorporated satisfactorily the contribution of American actors and networks in the formation of the ECSC.

Likewise, the history of transatlantic relations has described the Schuman Plan conference in terms of intergovernmental bargaining rather than transnational cooperation (e.g. Melandri 1980; Gillingham 1991; Lovett 1996; Schwabe 1988). Winand (1993) has surpassed the governmental level and has partly reconstructed the “Atlantic network”. However, she does not focus on the Truman period. Other works that go beyond the intergovernmental approach deal with individual “transatlantic key persons”, such as the Frenchman Jean Monnet and the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, rather than exploring the scope, structures, functioning and impact of transatlantic policy networks in the founding of the ECSC (Schwartz 1991; Bird 1993; Brinkley and Hackett 1991; Duchêne 1994; Schröder 1994).

Multinational archival research and the PhD project

The thesis realizes a multinational archival approach, including a variety of public and private sources. Archival research entails primary material in publicly accessible archives in Germany, the USA, France and Switzerland. Primary sources present new actors and establish new connections between individual and collective actors. Sources include diaries and journals; official and private correspondence; the minutes of meetings and telephone conversations;
organizational charts; membership lists of a given group; lists of delegations, as e.g. to a conference; (draft) memoranda and (draft) policy papers such as statements of expertise on legal questions. A limited degree of data will be derived from interviews with the few remaining survivors of the treaty negotiations.

At this point, I have done some ‘preliminary archival research’. The main bulk of archival research will be conducted over the next couple of months (2005). Preliminary research has covered, inter alia, the Files for Post-War Europe on the Schuman Plan in the British Foreign Office (available on microfilm); the personal papers of George W. Ball at the Princeton University Library, Seeley S. Mudd Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Public Policy Papers (http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/); the personal papers of John J. McCloy at the Amherst College Library, Archives and Special Collections (http://www.amherst.edu/library/archivesfindingaids/); the personal papers of Herbert Blankenhorn and Walter Hallstein at the German Federal Archives in Koblenz (http://www.bundesarchiv.de/bestaende_findmittel/index.html); and the personal papers of Pierre Uri and Etienne Hirsch at the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence (http://wwwarc.iue.it/dcs/Fonds.html).

Upcoming archival research will include research in public sources and personal papers, including among them, holdings at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne (http://www.jean-monet.ch/anglais/pArchives/archives.htm); the Political Archives at the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/politik/archiv_html); the Archives nationales (http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/index.html) and the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères in Paris (http://www.diplomatic.gouv.fr/archives/service/inventaires/paris/paris.html); the Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri (http://www.trumanlibrary.org/collect.htm); the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (http://www.archives.gov/research_room/index.html) and the Lauinger Library, in Washington, D.C. (http://www.library.georgetown.edu/dept/speccoll/diplo.htm).

To help answer the central research question about the role of transnational and transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the ECSC, a set of questions has been designed. These questions include the formation of specific networks before the Schuman Plan conference; how and to which extent specific networks were responsible for agenda setting; and the problem of which networks were involved in the negotiation. Moreover, the questions are informed by methodological tools and concepts that have been derived from neighbouring disciplines, including the social sciences, and have been tailored to the project. At this point, the research agenda for primary sources links to the methodology of the PhD thesis.

To describe the scope, structures, functioning and impact of the transnational and transatlantic policy networks at the Schuman Plan conference, the thesis utilizes the network concept which was developed within the social sciences. Utilizing the network concept to explore the historical dimension of European integration entails borrowing categories and criteria from the three main analytical frameworks that the network concept has produced: policy networks, epistemic communities, and advocacy coalitions (Heard-Lauréote 2005). The categories and criteria which define these three approaches support the analysis of primary sources. Primary materials guide the privileging of one approach over the other(s).

To study the role of policy networks as facilitators of the transatlantic transfer of politico-legal concepts the thesis applies the concept of cultural transfer. Advanced since the mid-1980s in France, the concept has been adapted for cultural studies and has been used by ethnology, history, literary studies, sociology and pedagogy (Espagne 1997). The three components essential to the concept are an original culture, actors and/or networks who convey their culture and a target culture. To describe what happened at the encounter of different cultures, cultural transfer privileges categories like interchange, interaction, translation and dialogue over notions of influence or coercion (Mitterbauer 1999). The thesis illustrates the transatlantic transfer of politico-legal concepts at the Schuman Plan negotiations in the specific policy areas of (a) the institutional set-up and (b) the economic (anti-trust) provisions of the treaty.

The selection of archival sources

As I have tried to demonstrate, the selection of archival sources is tied to a number of research activities which include assessing secondary literature and some primary sources; formulating a central research question and possibly a related set of sub-questions; and selecting methodological tools that help answer the research
question(s). Moreover, the selection of archival resources entails a number of "intellectual concerns" which cover further conceptual as well as epistemological issues.

Having sketched the selection of archival sources for the PhD project, I would like to take a step back and ask whether the project could be realized without multinational archival research. One could argue that research can draw on plenty of secondary literature and some published primary material. Moreover, the source material described is no longer subject to the thirty-year rule that applies to most public archival sources. Of course, most of the primary materials pertaining to the Schuman Plan conference have not been published and probably never will be. I am thinking, for example, of the voluminous holdings of the West German Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman Plans. Although selected documents have been reproduced in editions dealing with the sources of European Union law (e.g. Schulze/Hoeren 1999), the main bulk of documents remains to be read in the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office in Berlin (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/politik/archiv_html) by historians with a specific interest in the formation of the ECSC. Whereas some governmental sources are edited and published, portions of the personal papers of individual actors are only published when these actors are assigned "crucial importance". The actors whose papers are explored for this project, however, were often not known to the general public in 1950/51. To this date, only a few of the actors have been introduced to the history of European integration and the history of transatlantic relations alike. The actor-oriented approach of this project, combining the network concept with the cultural transfer concept, has suggested a new reading of governmental sources and personal papers. At the same time, it has encouraged the investigation of sources hitherto unexplored for the history of European integration and post-WW II transatlantic relations. Moreover, the reconstruction of transnational networks necessitates the exploration of sources in more than one state. In short, the answer is "no, this project cannot be realized without multinational archival research".

In addition to justifying the necessity for multinational archival research, I would like to take a moment to reflect on why historians use archival sources and more generally, primary sources, in the first place. In addition to providing the answers to research questions, primary sources fulfil a specific function. Referring to a past reality, primary sources provide the means to create 'historic truth'. However simple it may seem, it is worth recalling that primary sources are only traces of the past and that historians select from the remaining traces to create historical evidence (Jenkins 1991). In their written accounts, historians construct a narrative out of the traces, they represent traces and put them under quotation marks. With quotation marks historians create the impression of authenticity in a non-narrative way. Describing this process, Carlo Ginzburg has coined the notion of the historian as an eye-witness (Ginzburg 1990). These reflections touch on history as a professional discipline. More specifically, they link our ideas of the past to the practice of empirical research (methods) and the form in which the findings of empirical research are presented (writing history).

The realization of multinational archival research

Realizing multinational archival research entails a number of "pragmatic concerns" which include, among others, locating archival holdings, negotiating access to archival resources, funding of archival research and copying relevant materials. In outlining pragmatic concerns, I am also addressing the potential problems and pitfalls of realizing a multinational archival research scheme.

Locating archival holdings: In locating archival sources, historians rely on secondary literature, editions of published primary sources and printed archival guides. Once a collection has been tracked, the archive’s website often holds additional information on the size of the holdings, rules of access, potential access restrictions, and so forth. The quality of archival websites and online finding aids varies, as does the amount of information found on the websites. Another possibility to gain additional information on archival holdings is to contact established experts in the field as well as other postgraduate researchers who sometimes might even know the name of the archivist best to contact with a specific research question.

Then again, web sites can function as the starting point to locate primary source material. Recommended sites for the history of European integration are, for example:

\[2\]The categories are derived from Rüsen (1983).

2. The World Wide Web Virtual Library European Integration History Index maintained by the EUI (European University Institute) in Florence: http://vlib.iue.it/hist-eur-integration/index.html

Another useful site is Mark Trachtenberg’s online ‘practical guide’ to Cold War history (2004). Although focusing on the U.S. American side of primary sources, the guide contains valuable links and inside-reviews of major (national) archives on both sides of the Atlantic: http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/guide/guidehome.html

As to an evaluation of locating archival sources for the PhD project, I have been successful in tracking governmental sources and the personal papers of public actors. However, I have encountered difficulties in locating the personal papers of less-known individual actors, including experts to the treaty negotiations.

**Negotiating access to archival sources:** Once archival holdings have been located, access can usually be negotiated. Certainly, this applies to a project dealing with 1950/51. In my experience, permission to access holdings is less of a problem than locating holdings. Again, governmental sources are to be distinguished from the personal papers of actors. Sometimes, actors who are still alive have transferred their papers to archives, but retain the right to grant permission to individual researchers. At times, archives require a letter of support by the academic supervisor. Individual documents that are marked ‘classified’ often can be examined, too, after special permission has been granted on-site. Crucial to getting access permission as well as more specific information about holdings is the correspondence and the communication with archivists. Here, potential language barriers can be problematic for researchers who might have a passive or reading knowledge of a language, but find the active use of a language difficult.

**Funding archival research:** Lack of (sufficient) funding is probably the only real barrier to realizing a multinational archival research scheme. The possibility and necessity to procure (internal and/or external) grants to cover or, at least, help defray expenses is part of every project entailing multinational archival research. In fact, a research project based on multinational archival research requires the developing of a systematic strategy for procuring grant income. Although information on sources is available, mostly online, getting an overview of the funding opportunities for an individual researcher and an individual project is piecemeal work. To explore potential funding possibilities, one has to have an advanced concept for the project. Before submitting applications, researchers should have a clear understanding of the eligibility criteria and the requirements of the application and always mind the deadlines. Of the common eligibility criteria, the citizenship requirement might be an obstacle for EU students and even more so, for international students, who are applying for funding in the UK (e.g. when applying for grants with binational organizations).

**Copying relevant materials:** Information on potential copy limits usually is available on the archival websites. The archives of the European Union in Florence, for example, have fairly strict copy limits on microfiche/-film holdings from governmental sources from EU member states. Copying relevant materials requires being able to evaluate what is important and entails asking the “right” questions. Therefore, a central research question and a related set of sub-questions one poses to the archival documents are important to successful archival research. Of course, any set of questions will have to be fine-tuned in the course of archival research.

The proposed guideline for successful archival research

The proposed guideline for successful archival research represents an attempt to generalize the specific observations made in connection with my PhD topic and its multinational archival research scheme. The guideline comprises four recommendations which postgraduate researchers might find helpful in their pursuit of (multinational) archival research.

1. Take a ‘holistic’ approach to archival research.

A ‘holistic’ approach to archival research necessitates looking at the whole process of doing a PhD and writing a PhD thesis, rather than discussing archival research as an isolated activity. Looking at archival research from a holistic perspective means first, being aware of the fact that archival research is tied to a whole set of research activities and second, being able to place archival research within the set of related and interdependent research activities. Research activities include,
among others, visiting conferences; writing and giving conference papers; (if possible) publishing papers, articles, encyclopaedia entries; participating in- or organizing peer groups; and so forth.

2. Focus on the research activities which are linked to composing the PhD thesis.

Among the research activities related to the PhD process, there are a number of activities that are more or less directly linked to composing the thesis. Research activities cover the assessment of secondary literature and select primary resources; the formulation of a central research question and a related set of sub-questions; and the selection of methodological tools. Next to selecting archival sources these research activities help develop a research agenda for primary sources to be examined.

3. Maintain a timetable for archival research.

When mapping out research activities and their interrelationship, it is crucial to apply them to a timetable. Time management is essential to successful archival research. Time management relates to all aspects of archival research ranging from the intellectual concerns (conceptual and epistemological concerns) to the pragmatic concerns involved in writing a PhD thesis.

4. Manage the challenges of multinational archival research.

A discussion of the pragmatic concerns pertaining to archival research has pointed to a number of potential problems and pitfalls. It is important to realize that the challenges and potential pitfalls of multinational archival research cannot always be avoided, but they can be managed.

A final remark: In their monographs, historians do not acknowledge the problems of archival research. Rather, in prefaces, reference is made to helpful archivists and generous grant awarding bodies. Professional conduct has it that the problems related to archival research are best discussed informally, for example, during small talk at conferences, frequently over lunch or dinner. Maybe the HEIRS colloquia and workshops can contribute to moving the discussion on the challenges of archival research from the lunch and dinner table to the conference table.

Brigitte Leucht
University of Portsmouth
brigitte.leucht@port.ac.uk

Cited Works


The Illusion of the Neutral Time

Tracing back the underlying premises of eastward enlargement through interviews and archival sources

Cristina Blanco Sío-López

“Every island announced
By whom acts as the lookout
Is always Eldorado
That Destiny promises;
Imagination
That, preparing its orgy,
Sees merely a reef
With the sun of the morning”1

When I first approached primary sources dealing with the Eastward Enlargement of the EU, especially those elaborated by EU institutions during the decade of the nineties, I repeatedly observed the presence of a special emphasis on the idea that the end of the Cold War opened a new era, a time full of historic opportunities in which peace, stability and prosperity would finally be possible in what they denominated a “Pan-European Union”2. This idea also entailed the presence of a very particular perception of time that I have decided to name Illusion of the Neutral Time and which I will immediately define.

If ways of living time are supposed to influence ways of delivering political messages and ways of understanding a historical period, then the perception of witnessing a turning point in History, eliminating the bitter confrontations that characterised the post Second World War architecture, must have had some

---

determinant role in the way that the decision of the EU to enlarge to the Central and Eastern European Countries$^3$ (CEECs) was specifically promoted.

To analyse this question, whether the nineties implied a real change in any sense is not important, only the perception that it was true, at least for a short lapse of time. Therefore, if the political actors of that period, perceived that the time they were living, the post-communist landscape the nineties, was something absolutely distinctive, a time of new chances and expectations, this will surely be reflected in the way they communicate this political project to the citizenry.

Coming now to the definition of the earlier mentioned perception of time, I should say that what I call *Illusion of the Neutral Time* (INT) can be defined as an impression of being before an authentic point of departure which, after the analysis of the previous guidelines and time-patterns, would decide to go towards the implementation of the most desirable realities in human and ethical terms. It is also an impression of observing reality from a timeless watchtower, from which the observer believes he has objective and even definitive criteria about the preceding times and feels the turning point is being lived distinctive, new, challenging and full of tangible hopes in contrast with any obscure past.

It is not a reality, neutral times do not exist. It would be enough to think about the terrible war in the ex-Yugoslavia during the nineties to reject any possibility of considering this period hopeful at all. So, this perception of time exists only as an illusion, as a blind moment of emotion and belief in a changing context, for it is typical of *any* transition period in History, not only of the decade of the nineties. It is a moment in which the dreamt future is thought to become our continuous present due to the new positive commitments and formulations.

The term illusion has a twofold meaning, first of all, it means the enthusiastic hope for the future and, secondly, the quality of intermittent mirage that, in the light of the events will see its brilliance erased and its falsity unveiled.

On the other hand, the term neutral makes reference to a deliberate cancellation of the constraints and peculiar characteristics of a particular period in the relevant documentation and a deliberate lack of allusions to ideological attachments in favour of an absolute positive approach in which all, without exclusion, will benefit from Enlargement, as it is supposed to be the only guarantee for the future peace, stability and progress of Europe, as is constantly repeated.

The significance of the context of the nineties lies in the fact that, as Manuel Castells reminds us, "Communism and the Soviet Union, and the reactions against them observable around the world, marked the different societies, internationally, during the last century. However, that powerful empire and its mythology disintegrated in a few years, in one of the most extraordinary examples of unexpected historical change. This is the end of a historical era"$^5$. The same interpretation of the nineties as a time of creation propitious for the feeling of an INT is also shared by Marinella Neri Gualdesi, who maintained that "the nineties mark the present at its creation. In this context, the only thing that seems obvious is the growing power of attraction of the EU, which is supposed to represent a picture of hope. In actual fact, Europe entered the decade of the nineties with the Community of Twelve as the main factor of stability and a model of reconciliation and economic prosperity, which transformed it in the object of attraction for the Eastern part of the continent, which is now-after the rupture of 1989-rediscovering its sense of belonging to Europe"$^6$.

In this particular paper, I will focus on the views which sprang from the European Commission during the decade of the nineties through the interviews I was conducting in my different research missions in Brussels. The actors on which I will concentrate for this study, will be mainly officials of the European Commission who conducted the first accession negotiations, who wrote the texts of the main agreements to make Eastward Enlargement become a reality and designed the main documents for the divulgation of this project, seen and sold as a "re-unification of Europe". This seems to be something finally achieved after long decades of artificial divisions during the Cold War, as they emphasise in their epic accounts of the whole Eastward Enlargement process. I should specify that the written documents that I have compared and contrasted with the testimonies of the interviews were mainly consulted in the DG Enlargement archives, as they had not

---

$^3$ CEECs from now onwards.

$^4$ INT from now onwards.


already been transferred to the Archives of the European Commission, due to their recent dates of publication.

I will, then, analyse how influential this particular perception of time, the INT, was to shape the promotion of such challenging policy, the Eastward Enlargement of the EU, or if this perception of time was, on the other hand, a product of the policies themselves through the myth-making processes of an specially epic diffusion of ideas. That is, if the INT was an instrument or a product of that kind of documentation. However, my initial hypothesis is that the perception of an INT marked one of the main orientations in the ways of promoting Enlargement, an idea that is the fruit of a convergence of interests and needs both by the EU and the CEECs, as I will later detail.

The so-called “Return to Europe” slogan can be considered as one of the main manifestations of an INT in the nineties because the deliberate epic rhetoric of the European documentation of this period makes a special reference to the fact that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the definite moment has arrived to end-up with the unnatural Cold-War divide and to start a new European path of unity and harmony. The CEECs would be, according to this view, coming back to the original European matrix and this is the great idealist dream for the new century. The decade of the nineties would be the soil for the new roots of Europe. The presence of an INT in the sources is, in any case, an assumption that is to be contrasted and verified through the sources themselves.

As the main methodological approach I have decided to use Discourse Analysis, but in a way that is limited to which Alfred Schutz denominated the “level of relevance". I will look for relevant manifestations of an Illusion of the Neutral Time through documents related to the Enlargement process to see to what extent this form of living time was an instrument or a consequence of the context of change of the nineties at the EU level.

Taking discourse as language in action, this methodology tries to unveil the underlying intentions of those who design what should be thought, inducing us, by means of prescriptive communication, to apprehend concepts like the “Return to Europe” slogan and take them to be true. To do this, I will make use of the following principles of Discourse Analysis:

Discourse is not pure content, but “a window to someone's mental or social world,” so it could be useful to shed light on the priorities and objectives of the designers of the Eastward Enlargement of the EU. The reality constructed by the documents, the “Return to Europe” slogan, in this case, is naturalised through discourse and presented as “the way things are”.

It is not any one instance but “repetition of the same pattern in a systematic way, in many instances and occasions that naturalizes a particular view of Reality.” So, it will be necessary to see different kinds of primary sources regarding Enlargement to observe to what extent the case of “Return to Europe” slogan propagation is presented with a relevant frequency. The examination of relevant self-explanatory examples of text and conversation to interpret a regular pattern is a direct commitment of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and that is why I have decided to use it.

CDA’s basic argument elaborated by Hutchby and Wooffitt narrows down to the statement that “it is not the case that designers of a guideline are simply imparting information to a passive recipient when they communicate, but they are actively constructing their accounts for a certain kind of recipient in a particular situation.” A very interesting relationship between the development of CDA and research projects being elaborated about the decade of the nineties has been suggested by Norman Fairclough:

“In the nineties the social and political order established after the Second World War changed radically and irrevocably with the fall of communism; the end of the Cold War; a new liberal consensus based on liberal democracy and free market, which became a model for non-capitalist institutions like universities... an information revolution and so on. These changes also influenced the way people

---

7 The DG Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels holds recent documents that might be consulted through the application for the special permission for documents younger than thirty years. [http://europa.eu.int/historical_archives/index_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/historical_archives/index_en.htm).


and institutions communicate, because we have passed from an informational to a promotional discourse\textsuperscript{13}. It is meaningful to realise, then, that the “Return to Europe” slogan is the example of the “from tell to sell turn in discourse”\textsuperscript{14}, as it entails an incorporation of the genre of commercial advertising into non-commercial genres of features.

On the other hand, it should be taken into account that we are dealing with Institutional Discourse, which is always a goal oriented one that paves the way for the generation of an expected acceptance, contributing to the appearance of a monopoly of the legitimate discourse by the EU Documentation of the nineties\textsuperscript{15}. In this sense, the so-called “Return to Europe” slogan can be considered as one of the main manifestations of an INT in the nineties because the deliberate epic rhetoric of the European documentation of this period makes a special reference to the fact that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the definitive moment has arrived to end the unnatural Cold-War divide and to start a new European path of unity and harmony. The CEECs would be, according to this view, coming back to the original European matrix. The “Return to Europe” slogan, would be, therefore, one of the essential underlying premises in the promotion of Eastward Enlargement and that is why I found it absolutely necessary to explore the origins of such discourse in order to understand how old objectives have been awaken with different motivations but with the same direction, both in the CEECs and at the EU level.

Concerning my main sources, I would like to make a special reference to interviews and to the different types I used in my analysis. First of all, the open-ended interview “which consists of asking key respondents about their insights on certain events an ideas and use such propositions as basis for further enquiry”\textsuperscript{16}. I have combined that type of interview with the so-called focused interview that “follows the same set of questions in all interviews to be able to compare the results afterwards, departing from the same parameters. In the focused interview all the questions should be carefully worded so that the interviewer appears genuinely naïve about the topic to allow the respondent to provide a fresh commentary about it”. However, it is important to bear in mind that the interviews should be compared and contrasted with written sources of corroboratory evidence, between which I would quote speeches, Europe agreements, official documents and declarations, Commission’s reports, etc.

At this stage, I have gathered the most relevant documentation regarding the EU Institutions views on Enlargement, with a special focus on the “Return to Europe” slogan, even though I would need to complete the set of interviews to be later compared. In any case, since the second part of my thesis deals with the German views on Enlargement, I still need to work more on this side despite the fact that I have already been interviewing and consulting documents at the Bundestag, the Commission Permanent Representation in Berlin, the German Permanent Representation in Brussels and the Chancellery. I am now in the second year of my PhD. and I would need about two more years in order to finish my thesis.

The discourse of the “Return to Europe” slogan was born between the years 1949 and 1952, and it is the fruit of the conclusions of the meetings of those Eastern European intellectuals in exile living in London or Paris, who were members of the European Movement, where they acted as representatives of their respective countries as part of the Central and Eastern European Section of the European Movement, whose deposits are to be found in HAEC\textsuperscript{17}. In December 1946, in Paris, Henri Brugmans, Principal of the College of Europe, promoted the creation of the European Union of Federalists and declared that the fact of not being able to have the collaboration of the CEECs, dominated by the Soviet Union was an enormous tragedy. He stated that they would have to start the process of integration of the Old Continent without the CEECs, but hoped they would be able to integrate them as soon as the political circumstances permitted it. Therefore, he decided to give voice to those Eastern European intellectuals in the exile who had left their countries very early at the beginning of the soviet domination. The actual implementation of this integrating will was the creation of the Section of Studies about the CEECs in Strasbourg in 1949, to support the so-called “captive nations”\textsuperscript{18} which would hopefully soon return to Europe, “to end an unnatural division in order to converge in the common European culture and heritage”\textsuperscript{19}.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{16} Historical Archives of the European Communities in Florence.

\textsuperscript{17} This term firstly appeared in “Mouvement Européen. Section Pays de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale”, “Notes sommaires sur la réunion constitutive de la Section
These intellectuals reacted, in the first moments of the Cold War to the impression of their countries being kidnapped and deprived of their signs of identity, which they regarded as part of the Western European mainstream. Since that founding moment, the Eastern European intellectuals in exile were developing, within the already mentioned international meetings, very concrete plans to eventually leave the Soviet sphere and be linked to Western Europe. Between those plans, we can find ideas which really fill the EU contemporary agenda, like the creation of a European citizenship and a European Convention of Human Rights, with special care for political exiles, immigrants and refugees. The Conference about the CEECs, held in London in 1952, was firstly organised by the members of the European Movement to talk about the oppression and lack of liberties in their respective countries, and led, finally, to establish the need for an integrated Western Europe, with a common market and an appropriate supranational body of institutions. They hoped that at the right moment for the liberation of their countries it would be advanced enough so that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could participate in it as soon as possible.

Despite all these outrages, and, as Pérez Sánchez has affirmed, “after the revisionist fallacy of 1953 and the military intervention in Hungary in 1956, the status quo of the bipolar division established after the Second World War was perpetuated till the beginning of the nineties when the question of returning to Europe was opened again”.

As we can observe in the above guidelines, the previously mentioned plans developed at that time sound really near to the events of our present and there is a very precise explanation for that. Most politicians of the CEECs, who were making an effort, at the beginning of the transition, to transform the “Return to Europe” slogan into a reality, have recovered all the ideas of those Eastern Europeans intellectuals in the exile and used them to elaborate their political programmes, as Pérez Sánchez has demonstrated. With the integration of those ideas into the domestic agendas of the CEECs in the nineties, we enter the second channel of the circulation of the ideas about the reunification of Europe: The recovery of the “Return to Europe” slogan to by the CEECs, which was one of the main means of legitimisation by the new political elites.

The allusions to the “Return to Europe” slogan in this realm are abundant, however, there is a lack in the historiography regarding the use of the very same slogan by the European Commission also in the decade of the nineties. This is still an unexplored territory and that is why I consider it interesting and necessary to shed light on the progressive adoption of this slogan also by the EU institutions, as they develop a parallel discourse to that of the CEECs and for the same policy, the project of Eastward Enlargement of the EU.

I will deal now with the uses of the “Return to Europe” slogan by the European Commission, trying to explain why the Commission decided to show solidarity or take control of this discourse recovered by the CEECs in the nineties during their respective transitions and strengthened when they firstly applied for EU membership. I will show, then, that there is a convergence of ways of feeling time and of understanding political change in the nineties, in the way of a final

---


---

opportunity to implement the above mentioned dreams of a united Europe. In few words, I will show that there was a convergence of an INT, both in the CEECs and in the expressions of the relevant actors at the level of the European Commission. It is important to bear in mind that it was the CEECs governments that raised the issue of membership and constantly keep pushing the Community for an explicit commitment to this goal. Although the Commission proposed the negotiation of association agreements in February 1990, it sought to avoid any reference to future accession. In its communication to the Council in 1990, the Commission stated clearly that the associations “in no way represent a sort of membership antechamber. Membership will not be excluded when the time comes, but for the moment being, this is a totally separate question”27. During the commencement of the negotiations with the CEECs, the EC agreed to a formula mentioning their future membership but only went so far “as to recognise membership as the associates, but not as the Community’s final objective”28.

Such association agreements correspond to those described by Mathias Ruete: “In 1989 I actually wrote that the model we should follow with regards to the CEECs was that of the OEEC29. I thought we should create just some kind of currency union with them. You should bear in mind that we were confronted with German unification at that time. And, regarding the main arguments to enlarge, I remember also at that time, very curiously, there was a huge fear that, especially as far as infrastructures was concerned…but, everything else, the CEECs would become an American culture”30. In any case, and with regard to the “Return to Europe” slogan he stated that “it was more than a communication strategy, we genuinely believed. The CEECs belong to the EU and we had to do everything to stabilise these countries economically but also politically”31. This view contrasts with the opinion of Eneko Landaburu, the former Director-General of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission:

“There is no reunification of Europe because Europe has never been united. There were only hegemonic unions, like those carried out by Hitler or by the Roman Empire, always imposing a partial view over a totality. That is why the EU is a complete success because it is the counterpart of the European traumatic past and those countries which enter the European club enter also democracy, a social state of law an the opportunities of stabilisation”32. On the other hand, Manuel Arnal Monreal has also affirmed that the “Return to Europe” slogan is both “a way of attracting the support of the European citizens to the project of Enlargement and the will of starting a new era of political relations with the CEECs. Because the real aim of Enlargement is to overcome, definitely, the History of Europe, which has been the history of confrontation and war. In any case, at the political level, we could say no to the CEECs. There wasn’t other choice except going back to the past and closing the gates of History”33. After the EC had been extremely cautious not to commit itself to CEECs membership in the association negotiations, the Conclusions of the Presidency at the Lisbon European Council in June 1992 started to definitely change that initial position and put the issue of CEECs Enlargement firmly on the agenda. Hence, the Commission’s report to the European Council, created by the First Task Force on Eastern Enlargement stated that “the principle of a Union open to European states that aspire to full participation and who fulfil the conditions for membership is a fundamental element of the European construction and the integration of these new democracies into the European family represents a historic opportunity”34. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that, if Enlargement did not become a specific goal of the Commission until 1992, the “Return to Europe” slogan had already been adopted in the communication strategy of the Commission with the CEECs since 1989. It was born as a way of showing solidarity to the CEECs and as a way

29 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.
30 Interview with Mathias Ruete, held on the 2nd of February 2004 at the DG Enlargement of the European Commission.
31 Ibid.
32 Interview with Eneko Landaburu, held on the 4th of February 2004 at the DG External Relations of the European Commission.
33 Interview with Manuel Arnal Monreal, held on the 6th of February 2004 at the DG Taxation of the European Commission.
of speaking the same language in a metaphoric sense, showing that they did identify with these countries. But, as Eastward Enlargement was not yet decided in 1989, this slogan was not more than the recognition, at the level of institutional discourse, that Enlargement could become an eventual reality and that the attitude of the EC was to remain open to help and assist the CEECs, however, they did not talk about integration.

**Conclusion**

The concluding remarks of this paper are based on a reciprocal response to the realisation of a sudden and irrevocable change in the nineties, with the end of the Cold War division of Europe. The “Return to Europe” slogan was firstly revitalised by the CEECs, whose new political elites go back to the discourses of the past, namely to the explicit enunciation of truncated dreams by the Central and Eastern European intellectuals in the exile who were members of the European Movement.

The response of the actors and designers of the Enlargement process at the European Commission to the call of the CEECs started with prudence at the beginning of the nineties, refusing to commit themselves to what they considered eventually inevitable but still not desirable as they were engaged in the difficulties of the deepening at home, namely with the Maastricht Treaty and the single market. So, in the very first moments after the fall of the Berlin Wall the “Return to Europe” slogan was certainly used by the EU institutions but merely to show solidarity and support to the CEECs by means of speaking the same language, of using the same political discourse as the other riverside. However, first outlined at the Lisbon Meeting of the European Council and then irreversibly formulated in the Copenhagen criteria, the “Return to Europe” slogan turned out to be much than a tranquillisising gesture of solidarity to the CEECs. It became a true convergence, a true reciprocal use of political discourses. Enlargement seems to be, then, interesting for both parts the new and progressive reinforcement of the “Return to Europe” slogan from 1993 at the EU was also the sign that a convergence of ways of understanding historical time was real and thus a coincidence in the shared impression of an INT during the decade of the nineties, a now or never window of opportunity that could be either crossed then or closed forever, making Europe return to the shadows of confrontation, despair and inequality.

Last but not least, we could argue that, if the identification of the political discourse was possible it was also due to the integration of the truncated memories in the horizons of potentiality of the Eastward Enlargement of the EU, to the convergence of the same perception of time, the INT, in both sides and to the understanding of History as the occasional realm of opportunity.

Cristina Blanco Sío-López
European University Institute
Cristina.Blanco.Sio-Lopez@IUE.it

**Cited works**


---

\[35\] European Council’s Declaration on Central and Eastern Europe celebrated in Strasbourg the 8th and 9th of December 1989, p. 1.
The Relevance of a Historical Pattern of Political Management : Romanian Party System Europeanisation.

Dr. Sorina Soare

1. General overview

By analysing Europe’s progressive rediscover in Romania, this study encompass parties as essential ingredients in terms of comprehension of both the pre- and post-accession periods. Although there is an absence of any sceptical discourse on Europe and EU integration enjoys high social support, Romanian parties are incapable of grasping the real issues of the enlargement process. The idealistic image of the EU integration process emphasized by the Romanian parties feeds an important social dismay in front of the economic and social direct consequences of the post-accession period. The alienation of the population from the EU integration and the consequent post-integration democratic deficit (Agh 2004) can therefore become a sheer reality for the Romanian political elite. In other words, since the Romanian political elite does not want to assume any debate about EU integration, they can easily be challenged by those actors who haven’t been granted access to this process: the wide society, populist anti-establishment movements, etc.

In this context, I would like to capture an important aspect in the development of post-1989 Romania, the limited correlation between official consensus about EU and a stable integration process. Thus, this paper lay emphasis on the potential of democratic deficit of the Romanian integration process as a direct consequence of an elite-based process of Europeanisation “through which contacts have been established with Western parties and party internationals” without a complementary internal Europeanisation as a internal mass-based process (Agh 2004: 22). More specifically, by using EU identities and norms only in an instrumental logic, Romanian political parties emphasise exclusively an external Europeanisation. Consequently, the Romanian consensus on EU hides important social, economic and political tensions. In addition, the Romanian parties are thus caught in a rhetorical trap that forces them to approve the enlargement in order to acquire a systemic reputation or an externally delivered proof of attachment to democracy. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper considers this consensus as an ex ante construction, a proof of democratic stability for the external institutions (by Western observers such as the EU but also NATO, IMF, etc.) and not an ex post concept built on several national solved compromises. The European consensus is only a veil drawn over important social conflicts that can undermine the institutional structure of a new democracy.

In order to summarize the theoretical framework of this analysis, note should be taken that the current investigation deals with a general methodological basis, commonplace in the literature that international factors matter in designing democracy (Whitehead 1996, Zielonka and Pravda 2001). Thus, I intend to identify a crisis potential as a result of an incomplete European consensus, the main source of fragility in the integration process.

2. Europeanisation’s conceptual frameworks

The analysis of how Europeanisation acts generally focuses on different trajectories. For the scholars of the democratic transition, Europeanisation implies a necessary convergence between the new democracies and the old Member States. And the long-standing cleavage between the Old and New Members usually portrays the difficulties of a regional Europeanisation in depth. On the other hand, the European studies perspective emphasizes the different ways in which EU influences the national political systems. This perspective aims at explaining the convergence/divergence between a harmonized Europeanised system and specific national systems. But these large theoretical boundaries do not allow a clearer comprehension of what the effects of this process are. Consequently, it should be emphasized that the path of this process is best understood at three levels of analysis: (1) its definition, (2) the identification of the change and of its mechanisms and, finally, (3) the scope and direction of change. Underlying the distinction between these three levels may contribute to avoid the teleological connotation inherent when interpreting the status of new democracies in
2.1. Definition

By paying closer attention to the various aspects of the Europeanisation concept and following a European studies perspective, Olsen underlined its fashionable but also contested character (2002). Therefore, for some authors, such as Kassim (2000), talking about Europeanisation has no real utility due to the lack of organizing capacity of the concept. But, as Olsen suggests, these critics are not relevant per se due to the fact that Europeanisation “is not an unique process and a sui generis phenomenon”, thus “the argument is that different conceptions of Europeanisation complement, rather than exclude, each other. They refer to different but related phenomena” (2002: 922-3). In this paper, I shall limit the theoretical perspective to the Europeanisation as a sectoral approach of a system of governance, limited to a regional perspective and centrally concerned with the consolidation/exportation of a democratic model of political management, as mentioned by the transition studies perspective. Therefore, “the key question here is to what extent and in what ways the political systems of the member states have been transformed under the influence of EU integration” (Goetz 2001: 1036).

2.2. Mechanisms and changes

Having established that Europeanisation portrays a source of change at a domestic level, it is important to assess the impact of this change. Thus, the remaining question concerns the identification of the items of this environment of changes. And, in this paper, I am specifically interested in the changes registered at the level of the political party system. In this general sub-field, I will try to pay particular attention to the context in which parties operate with EU actors, such as the European federations of parties, “non-official channels for networking in favour of EU accession” (Pridham 2001: 192). In this area, by following a classic agreement (Smith 1993: 9), the main pattern of institutional development of the political parties in the region follows an “evolutionary leap”. Accordingly, parties would miss out several classic stages of development. This leap is managed partially by EU party federation and their respective Internationals: an external Europeanisation. Sloam (2003 apud Agh 2004: 22) describe this process as a three level mechanism of ideational transfer, policy transfer and informational transfer.

Similarly, Pridham portrays the European parties’ federations as the managers of the national parties’ compliance with the democratic rule of law or as “important channels whereby democratic practices and procedures may be encouraged” (Pridham 1999: 1222). Still “so far external Europeanisation has only scratched the surface” of the Central and European parties (Sloam, Ibidem). And from this point of view, joining individually EU federation is not a proof of successful Europeanisation while there isn’t an indispensable complementary direction of change: an Internal Europeanisation. The lack of changes promoted by the parties membership or their social basis, the superficial implementation of the various networks of ideas or policies transform this sectoral Europeanisation in a week flux of change. Therefore, I suggested the role of these European federations of parties as deliverers of various quality labels without activating a real realignment of their political identification (Soare 2002).

Indeed, Romanian parties were rapidly caught in a rhetorical trap, which forced them to accept without debate the parameters of the transition: enlargement, economic reform, ethnic and religious tolerance, etc. Consequently, in order to acquire a democratic reputation, parties neglected underlying national cleavages. Therefore, the link between the Romanian parties and democracy was not built on national support but on European labels of quality. A clear European commitment and an acceptance of integration into a party federation was equivalent to:

Proof of coherent ideological program = a status of national and international collaboration = systemic/democratic label of quality.

The opposite correlation can also be identified:
Euro-scepticism or refusal to join a European party federation = lack of a coherent ideological program = national and international ostracism = absence of a democratic label of quality.

By transcending the structural conflicts, the resulting consensus is only an elite level collusion, an open road the alienation of the population and the rise of populist movements.

In this sense, as in the old Member States, “Europe becomes a matter for the governing politicians and their bureaucracies; it is not something that requires the active engagement of, or the consultation with, the electorate at large” (Mair 2001: 48). Europeanisation has a hierarchical effect contributing to the creation of limited spheres of European labelled frameworks whose effectiveness is not matched by a deep relationship with the whole society.

Consequently, following Mair’s criteria, the EU would have had an important impact on the Romanian party system by affecting the mechanism of the system, “the way in which parties interact with one another in the national electoral arena by modifying the ideological distance separating the relevant parties” (2001). This remark suggests also the absence of an influence on the format of the party system, the establishment or the substitution of old parties by new ones. Thus, I suggest not an indirect but an incomplete effect of Europeanisation throughout the political party system in Romania. The EU-based transnational federation of parties has acted as a socialization agency, the national parties using their labels more to gain international respectability and less to manage deep identity engineering.

It is then important to portray the direction of acting of the Europeanisation process. Following this perspective, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001) suggest analysing “the degree of fit” between the prescriptions of the EU and the existing arrangements of the Member States. The adaptation pressure is then described as the main cause of change. Between misfit and adaptation, the direction of change is thus clearly delimited. Still, as Szostak (2004) observes it, the authors fail in the differentiation of the European fields, presenting EU as a “blanket homogenizing force”. Knill and Lemkulh (2002) introduce a more flexible framework by establishing different explanatory approaches. This suggests that the adaptation pressure, opportunity structures and beliefs are essential for the understanding of the directions chosen by the Europeanisation issue.

2.3. Direction and scope of the changes

A supplementary framework for better understanding this process is to portray the analysis of these dynamics and values in conformity with the impact of these effects. In a well-known article on the impact of Europe on national party systems, Mair underlines their limited influence within the national political arena considering that party systems “have perhaps proved to be most impervious to change” (2001: 28). The Irish scholar portrays a real capacity of the national party systems to resist the impact of Europeanisation and this conclusion helps us to better understand the Romanian party situation.

In order to substantiate these theoretical observations, it is necessary to turn to a more empirical approach. In this respect, this methodological approach reflects a broader discussion about the relevance of what is called an in vitro analysis of the party actors. In other terms, it is often emphasized that the understanding of a political system, and in this case a party system, reflects the political structures’ reciprocal dependency on a general national environment. Before this, emphasis is laid on a brief overview of the institutional evolution of the links between Bucharest and Brussels.

3. Brief institutional overview

After the dismantlement of the iron curtain, the legitimacy of the European Communities was strengthened as the unique depository of an economic, commercial and politic European project. This is the starting point of a regional rediscover of Europe, supported by various financial programmes and the progressive establishment of structural relationship with Brussels. Still, while the history-making year of 1989 confirmed a potential enlarged EC, previous relationships, mainly economic, can be mentioned, identifying back at the end of the sixties the beginning of a tortuous political and economic relation between the authorities from Bucharest and the European
institutions. In 1974, Romania is the first communist state integrating a network of economic collaboration with EC. Several other agreements delimit the economic and commercial exchanges between the two. But, abruptly, at the end of the 80s, the commercial negotiations are stopped and, in June 1989, Romania is openly criticised for the rigid internal political management. The late December 1989 events are catalysts for the recent connections with Brussels.

In political terms, in 1993, the democratic Romania signs the first agreements with Brussels and in 1995, in Snagov, a report commonly signed by all the parliamentary parties\(^1\) launches the national strategy for pre-accession. Four years later, in Helsinki, the Commission recommend to initiate the negotiations with Romania. Starting with the 15 February 2000 until the end of 2004, the political elite has to manage the difficult 31 chapters of negotiation. An important delay would be soon registered while Bulgaria succeeded in closing long time before Romania the chapters and the European authorities criticised regularly the Romanian team slowness. Still, the last EU Commission report from October 2004 recommended Romania for the 2007 integration process.

In this framework, it is necessary to go beyond the general impressions of success. Despite the last positive points in terms of October 2004 EU Commission recommendation or the December 2004 announcement of the 31 chapters’ closure, the Romanian integration process cannot be presented as a unitary framework. There are regular regressions and if all the ways go to Brussels, the Romanian path is definitely a tortuous one.

3.1. Democratic conditionality

In order to analyse in depth this tortuous relationship, one has to pay attention to an important variable that define the rhythm of the pre-accession process. While during the 80s, Europe is perceived as a cultural link with the Western societies, at the beginning of the 90s a technical procedure asserts itself as the only interpretation of Europe. The famous Kundera vision synthesised by his article “Occident kidnappé”(1983) is replaced by rigid political and economic agreements\(^2\). Still, within this complex structure with technical sectoral subunits that characterise the final outcome of the integration, one can find a fundamental link with the 80s: the emphasis on the democratic values.

The transition literature identifies democratic conditionality and various politic, economic, cultural, etc. incentives as replacing the classic instrument of control in the promotion of the democracy. Moreover, conditionality implies that foreign institutions can require from a sovereign state that it consolidates democracy before benefiting from a promised advantage, in this case the EU integration. This requirement supposes that state can be sanctioned or even deprived of the promised advantage if it does not comply with the previous agreement. In this regard, “it is the EU that has come to be most associated with practicing democratic conditionality while the prize for compliance is no less than eventual membership for new democracies” (Pridham 1999: 1222).

Significantly for this paper, Romania’s democratic status has been put several times into question by the European institutions since December 1989. First of all, Brussels has criticized the 1990 events of Târgu Mures (the violent clashes between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority from Transylvania) and the violent repression of the anticommunist meeting from Piata Universitatii (June 1990). Over the last decade, several other similar criticisms are mentioned, mainly linked to the miners’ violent actions (1991 or 1999), the minorities rights, the press transparency, etc. Not later that March 2004, Romania’s democratic status is questioned once again. Still, in terms of official reports on Romania, since 1997, the

\(^{1}\) Following the model of the Spanish Moncloa Pact, this meeting symbolises the acceptance of the EU integration process by all the parliamentary parties. Similarly, the agreement reached in October 1977 between the Spanish Government and delegates of the most representative political parties sets the basis for a commonly accepted political transformation.

\(^{2}\) As asserted by Agh (2004: 11), “the alienation of the populations from the EU integration processes has created an “accession democratic deficit”, since they have excluded the social and territorial (n.a. cultural, religious actors too) from the negotiation process, unlike in the Nordic countries where they had organically been included in the negotiation team (…). It is a commonsense that the country as a whole enters the EU and not just the governments that have almost monopolized the EU relationship until now”.
Commission reports have regularly underlined a relatively regular political status in conformity with Copenhagen criteria.

In this general framework, it is relevant to integrate in our analysis the case of Slovakia. At the beginning of 1998, Commission critics of the Mečiar government were an important incentive for the management of the Džurinda government to catch up with the other prospective Member States. These observations have to be integrated in a chronologically larger perspective, since from the early 90s the democratic conditionality has designed the relationships between Slovakia and the EU institutions. Mečiar populist and racist politics were at the centre of these criticisms. Yet more relevant for the analysis, is the Slovakian success story, linked to the strength of European pressure for the civil society and, most of all, for the post-Mečiar government. There are thus indications that political parties do matter in the strategic use of support for or against integration and Džurinda’s government clearly made the difference over the preceding administration. However, the Slovakian case differs in a very important way from the Romanian case - throughout all Romanian governments EU agreement was seen as being essential for the legitimization of the party/parties in government. Significantly, any European boycott/critic was instrumentally used in order to emphasize the lack of commitment to democracy and a potential loss of the legitimacy to govern. Still, rather than an appropriateness of the EU programs, this reaction only shows that the Romanian party landscape is less transparent than it seems at a first glance. In conformity with the hypothesis of this article, the Romanian case illustrates that the commitment of national governments to EU democratic conditionality is not a synonym for long-term Europeanisation. On the contrary, the risk of international isolation and the loss of the democratic label are the main incentives for what I called an ex ante consensus.

4. Rediscovering Europe in Romania

The analysis of the aftermath of the communist regimes points at the difficult birth of parties and party systems over the region. Different obstacles can be mentioned ranging from a very fluid political, economic and social landscape to a more general historical framework. Plus, if at the beginning parties were supposed to be catalysts for stable and rapid democratisation in the region, democratic enthusiasm was soon replaced by scepticism and disillusionment. Therefore, just like in the West, parties rapidly became the new democracies’ mal-aimés (Seiler 2000). One possible explanation of this changing situation entails incapacity of building stable and coherent political identities. And exactly in this area the lack of debate about Europe becomes a fundamental explanatory factor for drifting potentialities.

4.1. Pattern of political management: historical roots of compulsory consensus

It is customary to start an analysis with a description of the most relevant theoretical concepts. And, from this point of view, the conceptual map of Rokkan and Lipset is an essential path for understanding the inner world of a political party system. Viewed from this perspective, the modern political world is part of a comprehensive map gravitating around four cleavages: centre vs. periphery, State vs. Church, primary economic sector vs. secondary economic sector, and workers vs. employers (1967: 14). Following this multilevel scheme, Seiler synthesizes the Rokkanian historical perspective in a morphological explanation of the positive role of cleavages in the construction of a democracy. He portrays the cleavages as a source of stability in a political system guaranteeing political representation of social conflicts. In other words, it can be described as a type of evolution: contradictions → fights → conflicts → cleavages → consensus (2002: 117).

In order to assess the landscape concerning the Europe rediscover in Romania, the present investigation has to deal with a broader historical perspective. Similarly to the European consensus after 1989, the modernization issue was prevalent before the WW II as the main linkage between parties. However, there is no superposition between the two issues. The similarity concerns the mechanism of national political management under the pressure of an external incentive and not the content of the reforms. Between East and West, important historical differences have led to alternative paths of political development. The 19th century emergence of modern political administrations is the key issue of this argument. During this period, a concentrated historical evolution has resulted in a compulsory juxtaposition of national and industrial revolutions in practically all
countries on the Eastern periphery. In this context, this juxtaposition provides the general framework for a multilevel “catching up” with temps perdu. The approval or the rejection of the models of modernization evolved into party differentiations, the Modernists vs. Conservatives (Márkus 1994).

In the Romanian case, the fight for independence portrays another juxtaposition that engendered a real political automatism. For the conservatives or modernists, all party discussions centred on the national legitimacy issue, leaving the political organizations of the various minorities, mainly the Hungarian minority out in the cold. Consequently, all other tensions or social conflicts were underrepresented or even denied in order to better emphasize the national Romanian consensus. The overemphasized national label provided the main party identity and legitimised a cartelization of the Romanian ethnically based parties. All divergent messages from either the minorities’ political organizations or the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) were forgotten. It is thus impossible to identify a classical conceptual map of cleavages. Moreover, I intend to consider the Romanian party system as an ex ante consensus, where the political conflict routinization is required before any institutional democratic competition. In fact, parties refuse to present themselves as representations of sectoral social conflicts in order to achieve a general political consensus throughout the elections. On the contrary, their primary organizing principle is not a limited social base but the whole nation.

Romanian modern party arena constitutes a distinct model of social conflict management by avoiding direct social representation. The consensus necessary for any democratic administration is emphasized prior to any political contest, illustrating a strong, even if socially superficial cartelization of the Romanian ethnic parties. Romanian modernization is presented as a consensual process articulated around the nation’s common well-being.

What are the consequences of this specific pattern of political organization? After all, the Romanian procommunist regime is a limited democracy, but still a democracy. The effet pervers of this democratic deficit of the Romanian political parties before World War II refers directly to the utilization by the communist regime of a political collective global vision, facilitating the implementation of an alternative myth to the national consensus: the myth of the collective destiny (Barbu 1998: 38). The protection of the nation as the main political identity before 1947 opened the road for alternative assessments: a consensus for the people, for the working class, for the socialist society, etc (Ibid.).

For reasons spelt out above, it makes sense to look at the Romanian communist regime only as a partial breakdown with the constitutional monarchy. The consensus structured by the unique party, the PCR, is supposed to transcend any particular identities. The content may change, but the logic is similar to the previous political situation, although the communist regime accomplished a severe transformation of the society. Following the same process presented above, this artificial solidarity indirectly undermined the whole edifice of communist institutions. Social conflicts without any form of representation accelerated the rifts leading to the emergence of an alternative message. This framework could explain the creation of parallel societies, with divergent interests, and the rising of numerous individual protests. And, in this sense, the global political situation focused on a compulsory national consensus brought about, in a more or less straightforward manner, the events of December 1989.

Through the perspective of continuity, characterized by the absence of transparent cleavages and by a compulsory ex ante consensus, recent Romanian history follows this same path. It is thus not difficult to find explanations why the post-communist Romanian party landscape continues this compulsory consensual discourse. The synchronization between ethnos and demos is one of the main guidelines of the Romanian party system. This is the level where the EU intervened indirectly, and superficially, in the configuration of the Romanian party system. The founding dyad of the Romanian party system (anticommunist vs. ex-communist) provides several automatically attached labels to each side of the substitute of cleavage indicated above. Seiler’s economic distinction between maximalists and minimalists is automatically linked to this logic, the historical parties being all associated with an attachment to a profound and rapid economic reform while the opposite pole assimilated with a refractory response to economic
reform. Similarly, in the context of the violent events at the beginning of the 1990s, the FSN and its allies were associated with a non-systemic or a limited democratic attachment, while the historical parties and their main ally, the political organization of the Hungarian minority - RMDSZ, received a democratic label of quality. The international boycott of the FSN after the violent management of the Târgu Mureș or Piața Universității events portrays the impact of external constraints in building the Romanian party system. In other words, on the basis of this initial FSN ostracism, the subsequent collaboration with the EU party federations was seen as natural for the historical parties and very problematic for the PDSR, the main heir of the initial FSN. In this context, the correlation presented above underlines the relevance of a label of quality delivered from peripheral areas of the EU institutions.

The collaboration between the European party federations and the local national parties was a long process. In the Romanian case, only in the mid-1990s could the main party players use nationally their European labels of quality. The coincidence with the 1996 change in power is thus symbolic. To put it most starkly, the acceleration of the Romanian European integration process started in the same period. Precisely why and how this acceleration was managed is a very large topic. In short, for the conjectural reason of the 1996 change in power, the CDR-USD-RMDSZ governmental coalition enjoyed the use of all the consequences of their European party attachment - proof of coherent ideological program, a status of national and international collaboration and a systemic/democratic label of quality. This triple capital of quality was also used in order to begin the EU integration process, relatively frozen since the beginning of the 1990s.

The recent collaboration of the PSD with the European Socialists seemed to confirm a generalized label of quality delivered by the EU party federations to all main party players, with one main exception – PRM. But, according to the data from above, although the individual parties had received labels of quality due to their Europeanisation, this had a limited impact on the Romanian national party system. The party competition per se did not suffer real transformation. The number of the relevant parties in contention in the national political arena remained unchanged. The PRM, as an anti-establishment party, despite its European ostracism, has “other powerful strings to its bows” as Mair observes it for other similar organizations (2001: 33). The PRM acts precisely in the area ignored by all the Europeanised labelled parties. The Romanian ex ante general consensus ignores, as in the past, the social lines of conflicts, by focusing on an overvaluation of the national/common good of the society. After all, the same historical pattern provides an explanation about the current situation. It is worth noting that in order to receive a democratic label of quality all the party players had to embrace the automatically associated labels of a maximalist economic position, a pro-European position, etc. There was no disconnection between the main democratic label and the complementary automatic labels of quality summarized by the founding dyad of the Romanian political arena. And again a veil was thrown over the real social conflicts and this time the winner could be PRM. Therefore, I consider the 2000 presidential and parliamentarian elections not as an accident but a preview of the potential risks of an unstable democracy. Similarly, the 2004 legislative and presidential criticisms of corruption cast important doubts about the stability of the Romanian democracy.

As such, the Romanian absolute consensus about the EU promotes a cartelization among those parties with governing aspirations based on a label of democratic quality and an inevitable reduction of any alternative
debate on EU. In fact, the linkages between the national parties and the EU federations of parties became more and more extensive, with a major exception, the PRM. By using exclusively an exterior pattern of Europeanisation, the Romanian parties act as structures possessing, in conformity with their specific party European networks, the labels of democratic quality that I already described. Nevertheless, the international consensus about their status of political collaboration (the legitimacy of an alliance) is not reflected in the Romanian political arena that is still affected by a strong polarization. What is noteworthy in the present context is that by taking Europe out of the national item of competition, the main excluded party cannot access a label of quality. For reasons spelt out above, the PRM is only partially excluded from the competition. Indirectly, in terms of the label of quality, this specific Europeanisation cannot impeach the establishment of the PRM as a relevant alternative to the systemic part. From this point of view, Europe might have influenced the mechanics of the Romanian party system indirectly by encouraging the use of the artificial logic of the labels of quality and also the implementation of a general *ex ante* consensus, meaning a non-coherent translation of the socio-economic features and facts.

Therefore, not only does the EU demand political reforms, but the Romanian parties continue to exploit their previous labels of quality without trying to target a real reform of the political system. In this area, the incomplete and indirect effects of an external Europeanisation are direct source of confusion and indirect source of instability.

Dr. Sorina Soare
Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford and Chercheure GASPPECO-CEVIPOL, Université libre de Bruxelles
ssoare@ulb.ac.be

*Lists of Acronyms*

CDR (Conventia Democrață din România): Romanian Democratic Convention
EC: European Community
ELDR: European Liberal Democrats
EPP: European People's Party
EU: European Union
FSN (Frontul Salvației Naționale): National Salvation Front
IMF: International Monetary Fund
NATO: North Atlantic Organisation
PCR (Partidul Comunist Român): Romanian Communist Party
PD (Partidul Democrat): Democratic Party
PDSR (Partidul Democratiei Sociale din România): Party of the Romanian Social-Democracy
PES: Party of the European Socialists
PNL (Partidul Național Liberal): National Liberal Party
PNTCD (Partidul Național Târânesc Creștin Democrat): Agrarian Christian Democrat National Party
PRM (Partidul România Mare): Great Romania Party
PSD (Partidul Social Democrat): Social Democratic Party
PSD (Polul Social Democrat): Social Democratic Pole
PSDR (Partidul Social Democrat Român): Romanian Social-Democratic Party
RMDSZ (Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség): Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
SI: Socialist International
USD (Uniunea Social-Democrată): Social-Democrat Union
Cited Works:

− Barbu, Daniel (1998), Sapte teme de politica românească, Antet, Bucuresti.
Analysis of European Security Culture in Historical Terms

Cigdem Ustun

Introduction

The European Union’s development began with a succession of economic agreements and treaties after WW2, in the belief that as the countries cooperated on economic issues, then their cooperation would spread to other spheres of the relations between the countries. The hope was that the spill-over effect would bring peace to the continent after two awfully devastating wars. The main idea behind the ECSC, European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community (EEC) was to set the stage so as to make it impossible for the European countries to enter into further wars. Thus, European Integration encompassed the idea of security in the continent from the very beginning. People have always been in search of a peaceful way to live. It is a very crucial issue today too. I am not going to say that this is more true than ever before, because throughout history, there have been wars, and other bloody conflicts. The security of the people, states and nations has always been important and is important today. However, this issue is topical today because:

The last enlargement brought together two halves of a continent that had been artificially divided for almost five decades. Now, the Union has 25 members, a population of 450 million and the EU has a quarter of the world’s GNP. (MEMO/03/192).

Thus, after the enlargement, new security threats and new expectations have emerged. In one of the EU MEMOS it is said that:

In order to maintain a secure Europe in the midst of these changes, it has become imperative to develop a new security “culture” (understanding) in Europe.

However, it should be remembered that the EU’s security culture would not be a brand new culture. This security culture will be based on the culture that the EU has had for many years. Because of this, one of the aims of this paper is to show the salient features of this historical background.

Also this paper is a part of the ongoing research about the comparison of the EU security culture and Turkish security culture. This issue is especially important since the commission advised on the start of the negotiations. Today, one of the arguments is that the EU needs the energy resources in the Middle East, and Central Asia, thus the Turkish Accession is crucial. Yet, this kind of thinking would be very naïve. This is not an easy process. As mentioned in the “Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession” by the Commission:

… The Union and Turkey has differences in the foreign policy issues when it comes to Turkey’s neighbours.

Thus, it is important to analyse the security cultures and developments of these cultures of the two actors to analyse the accession process. This paper, however, does not go into details of this comparison. Hopefully, the research, when it is over, will be able to make this comparison in detail. This paper is about the security culture in Europe based on the historical development of European Integration, which will be used afterwards in the research to compare and contrast the historical experiences of the two actors in terms of the security culture and tradition.

The European Defence Community and European Political Community’s Effect on the Security Culture of the Union

Common Foreign and Security Policy is not a new policy in the Union and St Malo would not be the starting point for the identity of security. From 1950s up to the present day security has been a significant part of the discussions among member countries whether they are 6, 12, 15 or 25. The story begins with the Pleven Plan. Rene Pleven, was a French politician, who held a succession of Cabinet posts after WWII was twice PM for short periods. In 1950, he sponsored the unsuccessful Pleven Plan for a unified European Army, which laid the groundwork for NATO. This French Plan was suggested after the outbreak of the Korean War. The American and European powers were insisting on the rearmament of Germany. However, French authorities were not really pleased with this idea. This Plan was thought to prevent German troops being under German command and end
the Allied occupation of West Germany. This was an attempt to have an integrated European Army under joint command. As taken from the Pleven Plan:

The setting up of a European Army cannot result from a mere grouping together of national military units... For tasks, which are inevitably common ones, common institutions will do ... under a single European political and military authority. 1

The European Defence Community (EDC) entailed the appointment of a Minister of Defence, who would have the same duties and responsibilities as the national defence ministers have. He would serve as the normal channel between the European Community and outside countries or international organs for everything relating to the carrying out of his task. 2 Furthermore, this plan foresaw the common budget for the European Army and the creation of a Political Community (EPC) with an elected parliament, a European Executive Council, a Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. Parallel to the European Defence Community, as the Pleven Plan suggested, a European Political Community with a two chamber parliamentary assembly, a European Executive Council, a council of ministers and a court of Justice was suggested. Ultimately these two suggestions were not accepted. The French Assembly did not ratify the EDC Treaty and EPC which was in the treaty, (Art 38.) was not ratified either.

Although the French Assembly rejected both EDC and EPC in 1954, they remain significant steps in the history of the integration process and are crucial for an advanced understanding of the security culture in European integration. First of all, the idea of cooperation is evident in these attempts. Although France resisted the idea of the armament of Germany, they tried to integrate, and cooperate to protect their national priorities, under the motto “Cooperation under all circumstances.

Secondly, the failure of EDC and EPC demonstrates the vital importance of national sovereignty in the integration process. It shows that there is a delicate balance between an efficient common foreign policy and at the same time maintaining respect for national sovereignty. (Risso, 2004) While the protection of national sovereignty was a crucial element of the governments’ European policy, they understood that it was important to achieve the harmonisation of their foreign policies. The CFSP established by the EU so as to have a say in world affairs reflects the EU’s stance over this policy. As a result of these two dimensions, economic relations with the third countries came into the agenda. Since, the economic integration had been, not easier, but faster and efficient among the member states, the economic aid, and sanctions have become an important tool for the European Member States.

The EDC and EPC failed because the members were not ready to pool their sovereignties into the foreign and security policy, especially in the armed forces. Still today, the members are not enthusiastic about pooling their sovereignties in these two areas, as Hughes argues. These attempts were very sudden and rapid, so they were not accepted by the members. The European way of doing things has always been step by step, be it small steps. The Monnet method has been a steady and slow one. This is also evident in the theories of the European Integration process.

European Integration has been a functionalist one. Mitrany, (1943) suggested that of a number of units having different responsibilities working together. Each small unit involved in a small peace of national sovereignty that takes these responsibilities to an international level. As they function, further integration will take place. As he says in his work, this network will become so extensive, and people will identify themselves with these new functioning units and so no nation will be able to break the peace. As these units function, the integration will be an automatic one, there is no need for construction. This functionalist approach is crucial in understanding the security culture of the Union. The Member States prefer to develop the policies, step-by-step, small steps in every aspect of their policies. There is a deep belief that a functioning extensive system will appear eventually, and automatically. They applied this to the economic integration and it is applied to the CFSP as well. The Member states would not and did not accept any dramatic transfer of sovereignty. This was the failing point of the EPC and EDC in 1950s and 1960s.

1 As quoted in http://www.eu-history.leidenuniv.nl/index.php3?c=51 (15.10.04).
2 Fursdon (1980).
Developments from the 1970s to the present day and their effects on the security culture in the Union

When we look at the 1970s, on the basis of the Davignon Report the European Political Cooperation was established. This was a small step as had been foreseen by the functionalist approach. The only change for the member states was to inform the other members of the community when they were engaging in an international policy which would affect the others too. This attempt was respectful of the national sovereignties; cooperation in the international sphere was kept very intergovernmental, so as not to disturb any of the members. This was the main understanding in the Single European Act (1986) too. The basis for cooperation, meaning the intergovernmentalism, was not changed.

The collapse of the USSR and communism had an important effect in the security culture of the Union. As Flechtner says:

> The territorial threat from the Eastern Bloc had vanished and with the eastern enlargement of the Union, there was an opportunity for the peaceful unification of the continent. (Flechtner, 2004).

The absence of a threat at the doorstep, helped the Union to give more importance to human rights, political cooperation, promotion of democracy and the rule of law.

In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty brought some changes in the CFSP but, they did not include the changes in the intergovernmental structure of the system at all. After Maastricht, in every IGC and the treaty there have been changes brought to the Policy area, new tasks, and headlines goals came into the agenda. Even, a High Representative for the CFSP was established and given some responsibilities, yet, the idea of national sovereignty was kept. It is argued that the consensus, and the unanimity vote are causing the problems in the Policy. It is a fact that the member states first think nationally, and then, European. The European Union always experienced hard times when there was a conflict in Kosovo, the Gulf Crisis, and the Iraq War. It is a very hard task to transcend the national interests of the individual states. For example in the Kosovo War, the states could not come up with a definitive strategy and instruments to stop the bloodshed at the centre of the continent. There were various reasons for this, like:

> National sensitivities towards the use of force, diverging historical reflexes, the impact of public opinion and vulnerability of governments to their particular constraints.”

Similar restraints prevented the EU Member states from acting together in the War in Iraq. The use of military force and the special relationships among the states caused problems. The relations between the UK and USA and the CEECs and the USA affected the course of events. Furthermore, the understanding of the use of force had a huge effect in the debate, i.e. France and UK maintaining that force must be used to defend interests, and Sweden, Austria and Finland argued the force must be restrained as much as possible. (Ryning, 2003:483) The European Security Policy depends on the 25 Member states attitude. These states should agree on the common pursuit of strategic interests. This requires a common threat perception among the 25 member countries, the political will among these members, and civilian and military tools to act. Although the deficiencies of the policy are not the subject of the paper, this characteristic is important in understanding the culture of the EU. Yes, it is a fact that the states give priority to the national foreign policies and national security, and states have their own agendas, but on the other hand, the dialogue and cooperation to a certain extent continues. This is crucial since it is very hard to continue with the dialogue, when a number of states cannot find a common ground in cases like Iraq. Since the EU could not afford to build up a new security culture, a multilateral international cooperation has become part of the EU security culture today.

In 1947, article II of the Italian constitution, clearly stated the relation between national sovereignty and international cooperation;

> Italy consents, on condition of parity with other states, to limitations of sovereignty necessary to an order for assuring

---

3 As quoted in www.iss-eu.org/newsletter/n31c.html (11.10.04)
The EU owes the continuation of the cooperation and dialogue among the members, to the vagueness of the declarations. For instance, in Solana’s European Security Strategy, Europe’s strategic objectives have been listed after the disputes over the war in Iraq. One of these objectives is “Building Security in the EU’s Neighbourhood”. It is stated in “A Secure Europe in a Better World” that:

We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.

The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.

This statement is a very positive one. However, it does not answer the questions like How?, When?, or who will do these?. This is a common way of declaring statements in Europe. When one looks at the declarations of the Union, one would have a hard time to answer the questions above.

Another important issue in the same document is the subject of “An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism”. Here Solana stressed the significance of the rule based international order. This is a very classical declaration indeed. But it is as crucial as its typicality. It is more important today because we are living in a world, where the bigger countries have their own rules for engagement in wars. However, the Union, tirelessly talks about the significance of multilateralism. Today, it is very sad that the multilateral organisations, and international cooperations are losing their significance since two of the most powerful countries declared their own doctrines. After the September 11 attacks, the common belief was that the international cooperation was at its peak. The Europeans, Russians and Americans with the help of all the other countries in the world would fight against organized crime, terrorism, drugs and all global challenges. However, today, it is very much evident that America is on her own, as the Russians are, after the Beslan attacks. But, the EU and also the member countries seem to be still very much attached to the idea of international cooperation and multilateralism. One of the best examples for this would be the financial support and trade facilitation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is very much related to another characteristic of the EU foreign and security policy. The threats laid down in the Solana Document, are not purely military threats. The policy was never military based and it cannot ever be only military. Always, the Union had a broad set of policy tools and hard power  would be the last resort in the EU. The example of the Islamic Republic of Iran is important in this sense too. As we all know today, there are serious allegations against Iran about nuclear weapons. Here, the EU is trying to negotiate non – proliferation of nuclear weapons with Iran on the basis of financial support and trade. Other than the EU, none of the states like the USA, pursued economic relations or trade facilitations with Iran. This is the best example that would show the importance of cooperation and dialogue with other countries for the EU.

The EU is aware of the fact that the Member states on their own are not capable of affecting world affairs by themselves, but that they need the Union. It should be always kept in mind that the EU is not only Germany, France, and the UK. The smaller countries feel the necessity of the cooperation at the international level. This necessity shows itself in the political culture of the union eventually.

As important as the other reasons, the complexity of the institutional systems in the EU in terms of CFSP affects the culture in the EU.

---

4 Similar provisions were inserted in many other Western European constitutions, as is the case of the French Fourth Republic and West Germany’s Basic Law.

5 I mean military power, although there are people who would assume the economic power as hard power. But in this paper hard power is taken as military power.
As it is seen from Figure I, there are various and different institutions involved in the decision making process of the ESDP. The High Representative, the European Council, Commission, COREPER, Political and Security Committee, DG for External Relations, DG for External and Politico – Military Affairs and the other institutions in Figure I have importance in the decision making process. Some have more power than others, but eventually all these institutions should work together to form a foreign policy. Within the different range of institutions, the officers within these institutions are coming from different backgrounds with different traditions. In the EU decision – making, these differences need to meet at a common point. Thus, the complexity of the institutional structures is strengthening the cooperation and dialogue.

There is also a certain need to mention the proposals and the recommendations by the Institutes, think – tanks and assemblies with a view to forming, a European Security Culture. As Nicole Gnesotto mentioned earlier in one of the speeches:

The European Union needs institutes that are sufficiently European in their financing, staffing and working methods to be able to think European, involve national institutes in joint projects and systematically mix together national strategic cultures – taking into account their relative contributions and not discounting any of them, and in so doing renew the Euro – American strategic dialogue.6

These institutions and the Universities working on development of the EU are crucial in creating an understanding of Europe and European identity. However, it should always be remembered that these institutes are not the decision bodies in the decision making process of the security strategies in the Union. There is an intergovernmental structure in the Union in the decision making, and in accordance with the deficiencies, or the national interests of the member countries, as mentioned above, the decisions will be either lowest common denominator or a little better than LCD. Thus, the security strategies of the Union will always be based on cooperation, and the significance of the international organisations. The Union, is not a state, although, there is still ongoing discussion as to what it is. Today, there are 25 members and in a couple of year’s time it will be 27 or 28.

Since, the Union is an international union in itself, the use of military force by the union would not be the same as that of nation states. Although, there is a certain attempt that can be observed in the Union, to have a physical force, this force is not similar to the force that the US or Russia has. The idea is not and will not be to fight with the states that do not act in a certain way. When the Headline Goals of the Union are read, the aim to have

---

6 As quoted in www.isss-eu.org/newslett/n31e.html (11.10.04)
physical force is to be able to solve the conflicts and stop the bloodshed. This is an important part of the Union culture too. The Union is not willing to attack anyone, but to be able to stop the conflicts so that the consequences of those conflicts will not harm the Union. It is promised that the proposed Security Research Programme is not to be used for the development of any offensive weaponry. As Ryning says:

A European use of force will most likely resemble that of the doctrine of “just war”: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law (jus ad bellum) and the use of force will be severely constrained (jus ad bello) (Ryning, 2003:485).

The Union is bound by international law and will act according to international law, since at the end of the day it is an international organisation. The Union, is neither prepared nor willing to practice preemptive strikes. The Union, feels the soft security measures, and the economic, political and diplomatic instruments should be used to prevent conflicts in the world and if these do not work then as a last resort the use of force may be supported. On top of this, the forces are to make sure that the conflict is over and democratic governments continue their work afterwards.

The importance given to the internationality of the security culture can be seen in Recommendation 724 of the WEU Assembly. In the second part of the recommendations under the title of Policy on training for the military, Art 11 states that:

In Germany, in certain specific areas with a strong internationalist ethos, some training programmes are already provided internationally. For example, the curriculum offered to army, navy, and air force staff officers by the Bundeswehr Joint Staff College includes a European joint exercise, a part of which is taught in conjunction with the national staff colleges of France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands and Portugal to date have supplied instructors. Another association has been set up, compromising other training schools (in the Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal and Swede) offering a curriculum based on existing training programmes. Poland has also shown interest in this area.

The training character as a result of instructor and student exchanges, also reflects this trend. Within the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (Federal Institute for Advanced Political and Security studies) present and future senior management staff drawn from political and government circles, the armed forces, business and other civilian walks of life concerned with security policy receive training through general seminars. These are also open to a limited number of foreign participants by invitation of the federal Chancellery. The Institute also hosts other seminars and colloquies like those on the European Security and Defence Policy, which are attended by EU officers.” (Document A/1816, 2003).

This article is crucial in the sense that it shows the potential in the EU over cooperation, even over a very sensitive issue such as that of armies. As seen, a number of countries are working together in a sense, in training the army officials. This is not something that one can observe in the bilateral relations between the countries. The countries prefer usually to have military exercises like Turkey and Israel do. These two countries have a number of military agreements and practiced military exercises together. Lots of security based agreements take place between the two countries. Since Turkey decided to modernize the military and the defence structure, she needed a partner to be able to provide this kind of service. It was not possible to get the arms and weaponry from the western allies so she decided to get them from Israel. Thus, there have been several agreements and training between the two countries. These relations included the training of the two armies, via operational cooperation between two countries. Turkey also allowed the Israelis to fly over Turkey, in other words she allowed them to use Turkey’s airspace. However, the cooperation between these two countries, in spite of the close military relations, did not include cooperation as the Europeans have. Especially a politico military decision-making authority like the Franco – German Defence and Security Council which is not a very easy task to achieve in other parts of the world, especially where Turkey is situated.

Finally, as regards the cooperation among the Member States, I just want to mention the proposed European Security and Defence College, which is intended to “reflect the entire spread, civilian and military, of the European
Security and Defence Policy.” (Document A/1816, 2003) This college needs to be thought of in a different way than the NATO Defence College. NATO and the EU are very much different from each other, thus the training in the Colleges would have different aims. The EU has obviously more branches than NATO does, and the training of the officers in the EU for the EU, would definitely bring a culture aspect more evident than today’s. And I believe, the culture, which would be more evident, will be more focused on international cooperation than NATO. This culture would make more reference to economic, social and political aspects of the relations more than NATO does. Also the aims of the two organisations are very much different from each other. The Petersberg Tasks are humanitarian, evacuation and logistical support operations, peacekeeping missions crisis management. However, in NATO Article 5, indicates a collective defence.

Another aspect of the EU, which makes its security culture more international, is the absence of “the other”. For the nation states i.e. USA, Turkey, France, Israel there are always the others, i.e. potential enemies. The “other” for the EU cannot be the Muslim population, Mediterranean population or Middle Eastern. These identities are already all in the EU either as citizens of the member countries or as candidates like Turkey. Especially after the Report on October 6, 2004, after the advise of the Commission on the start of the negotiations with Turkey, it is not possible to identify the Muslim population as “the other”. This pushes the EU to be more international, and cooperative in a sense. Because, it owes its existence to the cooperation that exists as that evident between France and Germany which were former enemies.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, although the security and foreign policies in the European Union became more evident in the late 90s, security has always been the main aim of the Union that is why today, we see a security culture based on cooperation and dialogue in the Union. It is a fact that the new threats and challenges are pushing the Union to have more military force, still the goals set for the military force is nothing more than the last resort in saving people. This force should not be thought like a nation states army or NATO’s military capability. Also, it is a fact that the military culture in the Union is a new phenomenon, with new military staff, new military officers, and colleges for the education of the European soldiers that are new to the Union. Thus, it is possible to say the EU is in a process of developing its military culture but definitely, the EU has its own security culture which dates back to the 1950s. Besides, it is a very unique one in the world of Bush and Putin Doctrines.

Cigdem Ustun
University of Limerick
Cigdem.Ustun@ul.ie

Cited works

- EU, MEMO/03/192, 2003: Brussels.
The Invention of the Museum of Europe

Dr. Véronique Charléty

In 2007, Europe should have its museum: it should be in Brussels. In the context of a growing interest for cultural heritage, this information should remain unnoticed. In fact, the desire to provide Europe with a museum indeed raises many questions and also stresses one major paradox: How can this project, conducted by civil society members, fit in with a construction of collective memory traditionally connected to the nation-state framework?

It is particularly difficult to define a European identity, whereas there is already an inclination for writing history on a national level. This is linked with the will to represent European cultural heritage and histories and to use them as pedagogical tools to promote a collective identity, which we commonly share within the framework of European member-states. The destiny of museums is bound up with that of the nation-building process. Following the French Revolution and throughout the 19th century, several European states sought to use the power of cultural heritage politically in order to symbolically close national territory. In this specific historical context, museums were used to write a common history and to produce a common collective memory and identity. From this point of view, the museum contributes to the creation of imagined communities – in the sense in which the phrase was coined by Benedict Anderson (Anderson 1983). The development of museums is thus deeply related to the construction process of modern nation-states.

Consequently, I would like to raise several questions, the foremost being: how to define a common memory for Europe through a museum. How can we represent the history of European integration? How can a museum pass on a supranational principle? These points are linked with the political nature of Europe and open up reflection on the implementation process of this cultural project, raising questions such as: What could be the limits given to Europe and its history, in space and time, in describing a process still under construction?

I would like to start to cast light on this project by examining the strategies adopted to shape the museum, which circumvents the traditional nation-state logic. Then I will examine how this project establishes a new kind of museum. And finally, I would like to end this communication by presenting the issues presented for this project in terms of democracy and citizenship in Europe.

PART I: The Museum of Europe as a Result of a Private Initiative

The project to build the Museum of Europe in Brussels is an interesting initiative coming from the private sector. It is thus the result of a ‘non-decision’ (Muller and Surel 1998), a decision which did not come from the European institutions. This is, in fact, very much linked with the structural difficulty of thinking a European culture and imposing culture as a legitimate public policy in Europe. This project, and the context of its creation, conveys a great deal about the process of European construction itself. Culture is definitely a pointer to the limits of European integration and reveals the remaining national prerogatives in this field. The small degree of institutionalization of this sector in Europe explains why this project was based on different private initiatives, not necessarily linked with the Community framework.

A European public and institutional project would have required the agreement of several European institutions and a significant effort of coordination among many ministers. It would have also required an agreement on one definition of culture and on one legitimate historical representation.

Activist involvement and economic interests were combined in the project’s initiation and drew the attention of a small group of convinced intellectuals and politicians around a project heavily supported by the private sector. The cross financing of the investments in favour of this cultural project was based on three sources.

(1) Private partnership: several private societies and institutions supported a non-profit association created in 1997 to launch the project. To date, 18 private societies have signed a common convention for founding members.  
(2) The Belgian public partnership provided complementary resources to the project. That is to say: the federal government and the federated entities joined the

1 AM Conseil, Banque européenne d’investissement, Banque Lazard, Banque Nationale de Belgique, BASF, Belgacom, BIAC, D’Ieteren, Ethias, Fortis, KBC, Lhoist, Solvay, Suez, TotalFinaElf, UCB, Union financière Boël, VUMmedia. The Museum is also supported by the National Lottery, the King Baudoin Foundation and the Paul-Henri Spaak foundation. Each founding member gives 50 000 euros per year during five years.
founding members to cover all the expenses related to the prefiguration activities of the Museum of Europe, such as temporary exhibitions, books and conferences.  

(3) Last but not least, the creation of the Museum of Europe was also supported by the European Parliament, which joined the project after the mobilization of a group structured around a non-profit organization. The European Parliament had, so to say, taken advantage of the capacity of this association to attract expertise and to build partnership (‘network’ of and for what?). In return, the Museum of Europe took advantage of a political context highly in favour of an activist communication and information policy led by the European Commission to attract tourists to the European institutions in Brussels.

A tripartite meeting (Parliament, Council and Commission) in September 2002 had given its agreement to financial support of the project. One month later, the Vice-President of the European Parliament, the Minister-President of Brussels-Capital and the Mayor of Ixelles (municipality) had granted the Museum a building within the new Parliament under construction. The purpose was to promote better integration of these new buildings (devoted to the European Parliament) in the city. The Museum for Europe could not have found a better location in the heart of the European District, but does that mean in the heart of Europe? Such cooperation between Community institutions and the Belgian local political authorities is quite new. The result of these negotiations is an area of more than 5,000 sq m allocated to the future museum within the building devoted to the European Parliament but with separate access (by Montoyer Street). There will be a permanent exhibition completed by temporary exhibitions, a conference centre, a cafeteria and a shop; all very common characteristics in contemporary museums.

In sum, the fact that this project was mainly implemented in a non-institutional way reveals many obstacles specific to the cultural field. Since 1945, the European cultural programmes remain a very poorly endowed sector because culture still is an essential part of national symbolic territory and is strongly related to a basic component of nation-states. And it is not a coincidence that the democratic deficit, often brought up to underline the limits of the European integration process, is also identified with a cultural deficit. The project to give Europe a Museum summarizes the ongoing coexistence of various representations of identity, legitimacy and democracy in Europe. This Museum focuses on promoting democracy and giving Europe a new instrument for European integration (Shore 2000: 13-122).

How can we evaluate this project in comparison with museums based on a traditional national logic? This initiative has to be placed in the governance perspective. The project entails a dynamic involvement of different kinds of actors on the political stage: the Belgian authorities, aiming to promote the city, the European Parliament, seeking to grant European legitimacy (and a building) to the project, and the private sector. That is why I have considered this project under the light of the governance political theory.

**Part II: Reshaping the Use of Museums within Europe**

In the absence of a structured European cultural policy, the project is presented as a result of a very risky initiative and also as an alternative to traditional patrimonial establishments. Benoît Remiche, General Secretary of the non-profit organization “Museum of Europe” has pointed out three main reasons for giving Europe a museum: 1) the lack of interest in the European democratic debate; 2) the political limits of the European project; and 3) the increasing potential of tourism in Brussels.

At European level, the ‘demarcation process’ is becoming a necessary strategy to impose initiative within the public space. In this specific case, the non-institutional process of its implementation as well as the financial public-private partnership proved to be very innovative. The design of the Museum of Europe is being carried out mainly by a team grouping the Scientific Committee, chaired by Krzysztof Pomian, a prestigious historian who works on museums and historiography, and the private company Tempora, in charge of the coordination and the setting up of the final draft of the project in Brussels. Together, they have to face these challenges. And last but not least, the project has to deal with two principal characteristics of the European construction process, namely its new and unfinished aspects.

That the permanent exhibition has to present a European project still under construction presents obvious difficulties. The main goal of this exhibition is to present a common European history worked out by wars and dissension. The aim is to reflect the diversity and complexity of European national histories. Traditionally, national histories were mainly shown in museums as an aggregation of memories presented in a very positive light (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Bertrand, Cabanel and De Lafargue 2003; Thiesse 1999). By contrast, the museum intends to present a critical view of the European construction and this approach raises very interesting questions in terms of the sociological and political
uses of museums. How can we distance ourselves from national practices? How can we reinvent the museum and re-position the history of European integration in a long-term historical perspective, with respect to the past as well as the future? This is the main challenge of this project, a response to the lack of European legitimacy. This political and cultural project is supported by a context very much in favour of the European dimension of cultural heritage.

In doing so, the Museum of Europe can rely on a European scientific network – the Museums of Europe working group, a flexible – and thus be regarded as a part of a museum federation working on different aspects of European civilization. The simultaneous emergence of the other European museums in this flexible network clearly cannot be a coincidence. In the early 21st century, the expression and defence of identity have coincided with crises of great violence in many countries in or close to Europe. It is interesting to question the underlying meaning of this context. Shortly before the new millennium, three museographic projects emerged on the topic of Europe: one in Berlin (Museum Europäischer Kulturen, referred to as the MEK), another in Marseilles (Musée des Civilisations Européennes et Méditerranéennes, MCEM) and the last in Brussels (Musée de l’Europe, MDE).

The MEK has stated its objectives very clearly: to use its research to present collections which are basically ethnographic, to show common cultural aspects in different European countries, while highlighting their distinctive “ethnic, regional and national” features. The geographical position and history of the museum collections are suggestive of a kind of Mitteleuropa polarity, even though the scope of these collections includes all of Europe.

The MCEM has adopted an anthropological perspective, taking the concept of the European and Mediterranean area in its broadest sense, including countries from Asia to the Atlantic, passing through the Mediterranean and through countries bordering the Mediterranean. The ambition is to start with social phenomena which can be identified through tangible and intangible cultural elements, both present and past, using them to gain an understanding of an area considered as coherent but which has always produced diversity. More importantly, the MCEM aims to highlight long-term processes which transform culture, with borrowings from other cultures being as important as elements forgotten.

The Museum of Europe, however, has focused on the history of the concept of Europe and moved into the construction of the European Union. Its starts with the basic idea that the “European Union which is taking shape in front of our very eyes is not a recent invention arising from a political whim, but rather the result of the lengthy maturing of an idea which goes back over centuries and is as old as Europe itself” (Colardelle 2000 : 230). The Museum is the only one in the network with no plans for possessing its own collections. It would be difficult or almost impossible to assemble these collections on that basis, as the key historic documents are held in the national archives of each of the European countries. The Museum’s goal is to be the “great book of Europe”, and, in striking contrast to all of the other trans-European museums, it has clearly defined the scope it will cover (Barnavi, Goosens 2001). The argument behind its historical definition of Europe is based on Latin Christianity, thus excluding regions with predominantly Orthodox and Muslim traditions.

Not equipped with a collection itself, the Museum will instead present collections and artefacts from the fifty European museum collections in the new federation of European museums, according to the topic chosen for the exhibition. This network also constitutes an exchange platform for collections and is open to new members specialized on European topics.

The Museum of Europe has thus invented a legitimization system based on its multiple financing resources and on an important network of experts. Could networking (movement, circulation and exchange) be the latest way to build a Euroculture in constructing and implementing projects together? The actors in charge of this project knew how to use this trend to put Europe in a museographic form. This “spirit of Europe in the museums” gives the Museum of Europe a more dynamic role within society than is true of the traditional conception of the

---

2 The working group was established as part of the European Council of History Museums by Laurent Gervereau. It is designed to provide reciprocal knowledge on different projects and their state of progress, to discuss common issues and contribute to the emergence of joint projects.

3 Michel Colardelle, responsible of the Marseilles project (regarding the relocation of the national anthropological museum from Paris to Marseilles) is also a member of the network. He prepared a proposal for a European agreement on museum collections.

4 The participants in the network have also been required to take part in several symposia, especially «De l’Europe-monde à l’Europe dans le monde» on the role of contemporary Europe, its values and its divisions (Pomian and Dupuis 2004).
museum, based on an exhibition of static artefacts. We will now have to consider the nature of the project in this perspective.

**Part III: A Political Project to Promote Cultural and Democratic Citizenship**

The museographic project tends to establish common roots through history, myths and beliefs with the perspective of seeing what in this case would be a European culture emerging from this symbolic complex (Smith 1995). The first and principal objective is educational: to promote citizenship through the medium of the museum. This objective has been frequently underlined in documents produced by the team in charge of the Museum of Europe. According to this team, the purpose of the Museum of Europe is to show how the European Union has been established on a common foundation, on a specific civilization and a historical heritage, and that these factors cannot be taken for granted. Consequently, the Museum of Europe is conceived as an “Interpretation Centre for European History,” an Interpretation Centre intended to teach the Europeanisation process to the public at large but especially to the younger generations. The Museum of Europe will become a place where history, memory and the past are interpreted and presented and this should give meaning to a common European identity.

The Scientific Committee had difficulties in setting up limits in time and space in order to offer a complex and critical representation of history, and thus of a European identity. The time limit chosen begins around 1000 AD. The spatial limit was chosen to coincide with the emergence of Latin Christendom. The engagement of the Scientific Committee is very clear here. As Krzysztof Pomian put it, “Politicians may have their reasons when they choose to describe a wider European Union going as far as the Pacific and Central Asia. Historians have to point out how things happened so that decisions can not be taken without ignoring facts.” From this point of view, the exhibition was conceived in considering only facts which could illustrate the emergence, the maturation and the disintegration processes at a supranational level: this is the main line conducting choices among multiple events, processes and actors for the museographic synopsis.

The history of Europe is thus presented as history sui generis and the synopsis tries not to give a positivist or an evolutionary view on European integration. The permanent exhibition should encourage a critical reading of what European history was and is. Within this framework, the Museum of Europe contributes to the legitimisation for the need for history and for a common cultural heritage in Europe and constitutes, in itself, a strong symbolic sign.

It is dedicated to presenting the different stages of the integration of the European continent. The almost one thousand years of European history covered are structured around three periods or units – a “Unit of faith”, “Unit of Enlightenment” and “Unit of a project”, divided by two periods of rupture – namely the religious wars, and the two world wars of the 20th century.

Preceding this historical presentation, an introduction is intended to demonstrate that the European Union has history, while the final part of the exhibition is to underline the ongoing process of integration, again as a subject not to be taken for granted. In the course of the exhibition, the visitor is expected to become aware of the tasks remaining for Europe as a whole, as well as of the historical foundations on which Europe, despite all conflicts, stands. Each fact should raise questions and make the visitor consider the integration process in a critical way. The need for a renewed engagement in favour of Europe should follow from this museographic writing process. The content of the Museum’s exhibition is to be renewed every 6 or 7 years to keep up with the as yet unachieved political objectives of the European venture.

The project seeks to deconstruct a history based on myths and mythical founders by delivering a plural interpretation of recent history, with the prospect of promoting the idea of a critical and engaged memory.

**Conclusion: A Project for Europe?**

The creation of this cultural centre results from three factors: an institutional strategy, the integration of the European institutions in their urban context; a geopolitical one, the localisation of the museum in Brussels; and, finally, an economic strategy based on increasing cultural tourism. The Museum of Europe
takes advantage of, European civil servants from new members States and tourists arriving in Brussels.

The Museum of Europe focuses on delivering a historical and cultural base to an emergent European citizenship dissociated from its national roots. The patriotism resulting from this process is intended to enhance a common reflective and critical attitude towards history. One can wonder, however, how this institution will be able to invent something different from the historical writing of the 19th century. We are curious indeed about a project whose features have much in common with the teaching methods of the 19th century. It must be said that the museum in Brussels fully assumes this pedagogical role.

In observing this project, we can see to what degree citizenship has an institutional component but is also a source of political and philosophical reflection, an arrangement between a liberal logic and a voluntarist purpose to create political and cultural citizenship. Citizenship remains an important source of utopia in Europe. This project constitutes an intellectual, political and urban challenge which is confronted with the limits of every museum – a recording process of memory, situated in time and space – and with the ongoing evolution of its subject, the European integration process.

All things considered, the creation of the Museum of Europe raises questions as to its contents and a legitimate definition of European identity: Who is part of Europe? Who is not and why? Who is likely to integrate one day and according to which principles? There is generally a stronger will to go further than a traditional nation-state configuration and to promote a specific idea of Europe, with the intention to take Brussels from its status as administrative capital to a historical and cultural capital.

An historical museum, an identity museum: above all, the Museum of Europe is intended to contribute to a European citizenship. Therein lies the main challenge: to spread and concretize an abstract idea of a common culture and a common citizenship for Europe.

Dr Véronique Charléty
Groupe de Sociologie Politique Européenne,
Institut d’études polítiques
Strasbourg
charlety@gmx.net

---

**Chronology**

1997
Creation of the non-profit association Museum of Europe;

Oct. 2001-April 2002
Pre-figuration Exhibition: La Belle époque (Brussels);

28 June 2002
Belgian official and public support is given to the project (Guy Verhofstadt and Louis Michel);

3 July - 9 Oct. 2002
The European Parliament decides to give the Museum a building (D4), integrated within the new European Parliament under construction;

24 Sept. 2002
Meeting between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission: support is given to the project;

20 Dec. 2002
The Belgian government gives the project financial support of 1 million euros (Guy Verhofstadt, Louis Michel and Rik Daems);

23 Jan. 2003
Presentation of the Textbook for History in front of the headquarters of the German Foundation Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft. This textbook is intended for teachers and was conceived by the Museum of Europe Association;

Feb. 2003
Agreement on the architectural project with a surface area of 5190 sqm:
- Exhibition area: 3590 sqm (1990 sqm for the permanent exhibition; 1200 sqm for temporary exhibitions and 400 sqm for an area reserved for contemporary art exhibitions);
- Cafeteria: 280 sqm;
- Museum Shop: 220 sqm;
- Storage space: 280 sqm;

15-16 Oct. 2003
State of the art presentation to Belgian and European institutions;

6 Dec. 2003
Meeting of the Scientific Committee;

24 Jan. 2004
Presentation of the Historical Project in front of the Curator’s International Council in Brussels;

24 June 2004
Meeting of Founding Members. Presentation of Financial Plan;

Sept. 2004
Financial Decision of the Belgian and European Institutions;
4 Dec. 2004  Presentation of the museographic project to the Curator’s International Committee and the Direction Committee;

Sept. 2005  Drafting of another pre-figuration exhibition on “The Religious Experience.”

Cited Works:

Italy’s and EPC Counter-Terrorist Considerations

Ludovica Marchi

Abstract
This paper points out the way in which counter-terrorist considerations at the European level shaped Italian foreign policy from 1975 to 1992. Its methodological approach is provided by insights from Foreign Policy Analysis into the domestic sources of Italian positions on European Political Cooperation (EPC), but its emphasis is on empirical investigation. It employs a number of Italian primary sources such as the press, documentation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and parliamentary debates. The latter are little used in analyses of Italian foreign policy although they are a rich source of information on the development of Italian positions with respect to EPC. The paper focuses on counter-terrorist considerations that derive from two streams of cooperation, one among the Justice Ministries of the EC member states in the area of judicial and internal security policies within the EPC framework, and the other among the Interior Ministries in the field of anti-terrorism policies, the Trevi groups, under the EC umbrella. It argues that changes occurred in Italian foreign policy during the period under analysis, giving evidence of a progressive interpenetration of EPC into Italy’s policy-making.

This case study addresses three key questions. The first looks at how far domestic factors led the government to embrace anti-terrorism cooperation at the European level. It does this against the background of the European context in order to show the deep implications for Italy of developments in the EC and the EPC, such as the newly-found common interests of the member states in the use of EPC mechanisms for problems concerning anti-terrorism policies, and judicial and intelligence security cooperation. It finds that three domestic groups were the major actors: (i) the industrial and commercial elites engaged in activities relating to supply of oil and gas from the countries of the Mediterranean, (ii) the political

1 The detailed article is under consideration by the editor of an American journal for publication.
parties and (iii) the public in general. The second enquiry examines how Italy agreed with what was decided in the area of judicial cooperation and in the Trevi groups. It identifies some elements of Italy’s EPC counter-terrorist policy and it questions whether Italian policy was reactive, engaged in creating consensus, influenced by the personality factor of Italian policy-makers and aimed at avoiding subservience to the foreign policy of the United States. The last enquiry centres on how changes took place in Italian foreign policy through efforts to oppose terrorism originating in the Mediterranean. It discusses five specific events (i.e. external factors) and their impact on Italy in order to underscore how Italy increasingly referred to EPC in the shaping of its own policies.

These domestic, industrial and political elites, all active in the Mediterranean, discovered the limitations of EPC. However the paper concludes that, in spite of EPC’s shortcomings, the process of European integration affected Italy and its counter-terrorist policies, highlighting that in the 1980s, unlike the 1970s, behaviours and positions encouraged by EPC became a permanent part of Italy’s policy-making process, and that the expansion of political cooperation in the EC penetrated into Italy’s foreign policy to an ever greater extent.

Ludovica Marchi
PhD University of Reading
Lmbr4@compuserve.com

Obstructive All the Way?
British Policy towards German Unification 1989-90

Pyeongeok An

German unification was one of the most dramatic events in Europe after the Second World War, fundamentally affecting the post-war European architecture. The Federal Republic of Germany, whose sovereignty during the Cold War had been constrained by the legacies of the Second World War emerged a natural hegemon after the completion of the unification. German unification also sped up the movement towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Political Union at the European level. 1

As one of the Three Western Powers that had maintained a responsibility for West Berlin and Germany as a whole, 2 Britain played a role in the external process of the unification. But British policy towards unification has been

---

1 Wiedervereinigung (reunification), and Vereinigung, or Einigung, (Unification, Unity) were both used by Germans to express the unification of two German territories in 1990. To be exact, however, reunification implied that a unified Germany would return to the borders of 1937, which was practically impossible. See Karl Kaiser, ‘Unity, not Reunification, for Germany,’ New York Times, 6 October 1989, A.31.


---

A full version of this article was submitted to German Politics in January 2005 as an entry for the Annual Postgraduate Prize. The outcome will be known in the first half of 2005. If you are interested in the full article, please do not hesitate to contact the author by email. (pea20@cam.ac.uk).
over-identified with that of Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. Many analyses either identify British policy with Mrs Thatcher’s stance, or assign her a dominant, even a domineering role, describing her as getting her own way amidst slightly differing views between Downing Street and the FCO.\(^3\) According to this view, British policy was judged to be reluctant at best, obstructive at worst. By contrast, there are only a few articles or books that stress any positive role played by the British during German unification. Sir Julian Bullard (British Ambassador to Bonn, 1983-1988) and Yvonne Klein do emphasise the contributions made by the FCO. They both pinpoint the suspension of the Four Power Rights as a British idea.\(^4\)

---

\(^3\) See, inter alia, Lothar Kettenacker, ‘Britain and German Unification, 1989/90,’ Klaus Larres and Elizabeth Leehan (eds.), Uneasy Allies (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 99-123; Louis Richardson, ‘British State Strategies after the Cold War,’ Robert Krohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.), After the Cold War (Cambridge, MA.; London: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 127-154; Frank Elbe and Richard Kessler, A Round Table with Sharp Corners: The Diplomatic Path to German Unity (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996), especially p. 241; Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffrey and William E. Paterson, ‘Deutschlands europäische Diplomatie: die Entstehung des regionalen Milieus,’ Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Deutsche Europapolitik: Optionen wirksamer Interessenvertretung (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1998), p. 61. Simon Bulmer and others argue, ‘In bezug auf die deutsche Einheit bezog Thatcher, die zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine dominierende Position in ihrer Regierung innehatte, eine erheblich ablehnende Position als das britische Außenministerium, und sie setzte sich damit auch durch.’ (author’s emphasis). (With regard to German unification, Thatcher, who at that time occupied a dominant position in her government, took a more rejectionist position than the FCO and she had her own way.—author’s translation.). Kettenacker also shares this analysis. Both Kettenacker and Bulmer agree that the FCO’s position was not so different from that of Margaret Thatcher.


This article is based on documents from the Federal Chancellor’s Office declassified in 1998,\(^5\) alongside other primary and secondary materials\(^6\) and interviews that the author conducted with major players involved in the process from both Germany and the UK. It shows that despite Mrs. Thatcher’s delaying tactics, British policy towards German unification was actually helpful. The FCO had a different position from that taken by Mrs Thatcher and, through the two plus four talks, it co-operated very closely with the US and West Germany and made contributions to external aspects of German unification. In contrast to the negative repercussions generated by Mrs Thatcher’s remarks about German unification, official British policy on the reunification was helpful and constructive, though it was not obviously forthcoming at the early stages.

This article elaborates further on the arguments of Bullard and Klein that there was a policy difference between Mrs Thatcher and the FCO, and that

---

\(^5\) Hanns Jürgen Küsters and Daniel Hofmann (eds.), Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit. Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: Oldenburg, 1998). Being a rare exception to the thirty-year rule, the 430 documents disclosed give clear pictures of the German government’s conception and implementation of the unification and integration policies during these crucial years. The documents provide transcripts of the telephone talks that Chancellor Kohl made, copies of the letters that he exchanged with other leaders, such as US President George Bush, the French President François Mitterrand, and of internal discussions in the Federal Republic of means to tackle the situation in East Germany. The documents are not , however, complete in that other archives such as those at the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministries are still closed.

the latter made positive contributions towards the momentous event.\textsuperscript{7} It seeks to clarify the reasons for the policy difference, focusing specifically on the policy-making process.

The first section describes British attitudes and policy towards the unexpected uncertainty precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall from November 1989 to the end of January 1990. The following section analyses the policy differences between Downing Street and the FCO that emerged from the end of January 1990 with the conception of the \textit{two plus four} talks forum.

\textsuperscript{7}Neither Bullard nor Klein refer to the ‘British Problem’ developed at the last round of the two plus four talks; only Bullard clarifies the timing around which the FCO took a pragmatic approach as being end of January. Neither used the documents declassified from the Federal Chancellor’s Office.

\textbf{The High Officials in the European Communities, 1952-1967}

Methodology and sources related to the PhD project

Katja Seidel

\textit{Synopsis of the PhD Project}

To date, research on European integration history has largely been dominated by a national paradigm, focusing on the nation state and state institutions as central actors in the European integration process. However, at present we are experiencing a shift in research interests in European integration history, for the national approach reveals itself to be too narrow to grasp dimensions and processes of European integration that surpass the borders of the nation states. ‘Transnational’ and ‘supranational’ approaches that seek to overcome the purely national viewpoint in writing European history are thus the subject of growing interest among researchers.

The present research project explores the emergence of a European administrative élite in the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and the Commission of the European Economic Community between 1952 and 1967. Consequently, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to a supranational history of European integration.

The High Authority and the Commission, as new kinds of ‘supranational’ administrations, were to be endowed with permanent officials, who, independent of the member states, played a role as pioneers in the European integration process. This generation of the first European civil servants is generally described as the idealistic generation of convinced Europeans, forming a European élite working together to shape Europe and to define European interests. It is therefore highly plausible to presume a far-reaching Europeanization process on the level of the European administration. In the
thesis, I will analyse the Europeanization of this supranational functional élite with its heterogeneous social and national background.

The thesis addresses the following questions: On the first level, the organizational aspect is considered, focusing in particular on the staffing of the bureaucracies and on the problems that occurred when developing and working in a multi-national administration. The motivations of the high officials for seeking a career in the sector of European integration are at the centre of the second set of questions. The focus here lies on the diverse social backgrounds, education and careers of these high officials and on their experiences both inside and outside of the European bureaucracies as possible factors to Europeanization. It is important to consider factors such as social and professional background, as well as the experiences and influences the European civil servants were subjected to, when assuming that these factors have influenced the shape and working style of the European administrations and what is more, the community policy in general. It is therefore interesting to analyse, on a third level of the thesis, whether the officials of a DG shared similar ideas and concepts with their colleagues, i.e. regarding competition policy or the Common Agricultural Policy.

**Methodology**

Being conceptualised as a historical research project embedded in the discipline of European integration history, the principal methodology of the thesis can be best described as a critical analysis of primary sources. However, the analysis of the role of actors and institutions in the European integration process necessitates the application, where appropriate, of theories developed in the social sciences such as historical institutionalism, social constructivism and the concept of Europeanization.

Political scientists have mainly analysed the processes of Europeanization in terms of change, adaptation or development of European strategies for different domestic policy sectors in the member states. In this thesis, the concept of Europeanization will be applied to a group of people - the European high officials - which is, by its nature, concerned with European matters. In this context the concept of multiple social identities as introduced by Risse is helpful when looking at the Europeanization of the identity(ies) of European high officials. Furthermore, the extent to which working in a supranational administration has influenced the behaviour and social identities of actors will be considered.

The insights offered by historical institutionalism may be said to show that the early years of the European administrations have determined the face and, consequently, the policy of these bureaucracies. In theory, therefore, historical institutionalism […] offer(s) the prospect, not just of claiming that “history matters”, but of explaining how and under what conditions historical events do – or do not – shape contemporary and future political choices and outcomes.

**The Source Material: Archives and Interviews**

In order to study a group of European high officials whose origins lie in the six founding member states of the European Communities, it is necessary to explore archival resources in various community and national archives situated in different countries. A challenging problem which anyone studying actors in the development of European integration will encounter is that the 30-year-rule does not apply to documents dealing with personnel. Personal files or documents issued by the DG Administration of the High Authority and the Commission, for example, are still not accessible. It is therefore indispensable to counterbalance this gap in the official documentation with a wide range of alternative sources as I will attempt to demonstrate in the following paragraphs.

---

1 For an introduction to theories of European integrations such as historical institutionalism and social constructivism, see Wiener, A., Dietz, Th. (eds.) (2004). *European Integration Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


The initial sources referred to were the holdings of the European archives, i.e. the Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels (http://europa.eu.int/historical_archives/) and the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence (www.iue.it/ECArchives/). Both archives hold the official records of the High Authority (CEAB) and the Commission (BAC). For this research, internal working papers, speeches written by high officials as well as internal discussions about the institutional setting of the European administrations are of key importance. The minutes of the weekly meetings of the High Authority and the Commission to a certain extent also reveal discussions about staffing and administrative problems. In addition, the archives in Florence hold the private papers of several high officials such as Max Kohnstamm, Emile Noël or Pierre Uri, and a rich collection of interviews with relevant actors.

The holdings of the Community archives are complemented by the holdings of the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne (Switzerland) (www.jean-monnet.ch). This institution holds the personal papers of Jean Monnet including files that cover the administrative problems of the earliest period of the High Authority administration, a portion of the private papers of Robert Schuman, those of Robert Marjolin, a former collaborator of Monnet and EEC-Commissioner, and a number of transcribed interviews. It is indispensable for this thesis to supplement the source material of the Community archives with source material from national archives. Among the most interesting collections are those of the Archives Nationales (AN) (www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr) and the archives of the Foreign Ministry of France (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/archives) in Paris. The AN hold the private papers of European actors such as René Mayer and Christian Pineau as well as documents of the French government related to the negotiation of the Paris and Rome Treaties, and the files of the Commissariat général du Plan, founded by Jean Monnet. Furthermore, in the German Bundesarchiv in Koblenz (www.bundesarchiv.de) I will analyse the private papers of Walter Hallstein and Franz Etzel.

The archives of political parties usually contain the personal papers of their important party members, some of them also actors at the European level. For example, the International Institute for Social History (IISH) (www.iisg.nl) in Amsterdam holds the personal papers of Sicco Mansholt and his chef de cabinet Alfred Mozer. The German archives of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) (www.kas.de/archiv/) in Sankt Augustin store the papers of Hans von der Groeben, a Commissioner in Brussels between 1958 and 1970.

In addition to archival sources, the source materials for this thesis include memoirs and other published texts of high officials; speeches; contemporary newspaper and journal articles, as well as semi-structured interviews.

Interviews are an important source of first-hand information on the life and work of the high officials. I have already conducted approximately 25 semi-structured interviews with former high officials of the High Authority (for example with Max Kohnstamm, Edmond Wellenstein, Marcel Jaurant-Singer and Simon Nora) and the EEC-Commission (among them Professor Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, Professor Aurelio Pappalardo, Franz Froshmaier, Helmut von Verschuer and Georges Rencki). I consider interviews indispensable for research projects related to the personnel of the European Communities. These can, to a certain extent, compensate for the lack of access to personal files where even after 30 years this is blocked. Personal interviews offer additional insight into the biographical background and the career choices of these people.

A general problem that remains is how to verify the information obtained through an interview. However, the more interviews one conducts, the more one is able to compare the declarations of the interviewees, a procedure which helps to establish the credibility of the narrators’ accounts. The comparison of the statements of different interviewees from the same DGs, and the comparison of oral statements with (written) source material and secondary literature, seems to be the only solution to this problem.

To summarise, in most cases interviews can reveal valuable information about the biographies and the careers of the high officials under consideration. The interviews can convey an idea of the atmosphere in the
multi-national administrations of the 1950s and 1960s that does not necessarily emerge from the official documents in the archives. The ensemble of the interviewee’s statements – together with the available written sources – can help to clarify questions such as those of the origins and sources of the European identities of European high officials, or whether there exist typical ‘European’ career patterns.

The fieldwork for this research will be completed by summer 2005.

Katja Seidel
University of Portsmouth
Katja.Seidel@port.ac.uk

The Constitutionalisation of the European Community: West Germany between Legal Sovereignty and European Integration 1958-1974

Methodology and Source Material

Billy Davies

Abstract

The European Union’s extensive and powerful legal framework has proven to be a key process in the ever deepening integration at the European level. In his pioneering work, *The Constitution of Europe*, JHH Weiler (1999)\(^1\) has placed particular importance on the early ‘foundational period’ between 1958 and 1973. In this period, four legal doctrines were established which proved instrumental in the shift – at least judicially – towards a federal Europe. These are the Doctrines of Direct Effect (1963), Supremacy (1964), Human Rights (1969), and of Implied Powers (1970). Whereas EU scholars have largely accepted Weiler’s analysis of the evolution and importance of EU law, none have challenged the simplistic assumption on which it is based, that in this period, the legal-political framework of the EC simply ‘crystallized’. Such a view presupposes a passivity of national institutions in the face of the erosion of their legal powers, which has thus far never been subject to academic scrutiny.

My thesis will investigate how the fundamental transformations in the qualitative nature of the European legal system were received at the national level. Specifically, it will test the assumption that leading figures in one of the EEC’s most pro-integration member states, the FRG, welcomed movements towards a more legally integrated Europe. Germany has broadly been regarded as supportive of integration, because the increased economic

---

exchange which this furthered underlined its post-War identity as the ‘Wirtschaftswunder’. However, Germany also defined itself through the new-found rigour of its legal system. The constitutionalisation of European law brought both of these post-War traditions into potential conflict. My research examines the reactions of leading figures in the German elite towards the penetration by the European Court of Justice to see whether this was resented as an infringement on legal-political sovereignty, or whether it was embraced as a Europe-wide extension of the Rechtsstaat tradition. Additionally, I want to investigate whether the Court’s actions were, on a popular level, seen in terms of legal empowerment vis-à-vis national courts, or as an infringement of national sovereignty given that it was a Luxembourg court that assumed powers over matters which affected important national rights.

While most observers agree that the constitutionalisation of EU law has taken place, we still know very little about why this has come about. It is difficult to find any form of historicisation of European legal evolution in existing literature or current debates. Consequently, assumptions are made concerning the attitudes of certain Member States towards the development of an integrated Europe. The juxtaposition of a developing sense of national constitutional patriotism and the willingness to submit to an external legal structure suggests that the acceptance of European legal doctrine in West Germany was much more complex than has hitherto been asserted. My study will not only break new ground in understanding the nature of the constitutionalisation of European law. Furthermore, by investigating how the public, the political, interest group and bureaucratic elites, and the legal profession defined the ‘national’ interest vis-à-vis European law, my dissertation will add to debates as to whether European integration can best be understood in terms of intergovernmentalism (integration as a result of national interest) or supranationalism (integration as a result of structural pressures in the context of globalisation).

Methodology

The thesis has five main sections of analysis:

1. Political leaders

(b) Opposition

2. Bureaucratic elites
(a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(b) Ministry of Justice
(c) Ministry of Economics

3. Legal-Academic circles

4. Interest Group actors
(a) Trade Unions
(b) Employers Associations
(c) Churches

5. Public Opinion

Particularly close attention will be paid in the analysis of each social sector to how elite aspirations and goals for the integration project were transmitted and perceived by public opinion. The beginnings of my research have shown a fervent belief in integration amongst government and bureaucratic elites during the period, but amongst the other groups there was a spectrum of views, ranging from indifference through to outright hostility. The question then to be raised by this is why West Germany was always perceived as a pro-integration Member State when only a small elite really wanted and understood the aims of the project? How did they ‘sell’ the project to the other sectors? How did the major shift between the CDU and SPD governments affect opinion towards EU Law? How did the political elites within the SPD reconcile their early opposition to European integration with becoming a government in 1969 deeply bound into the integration project? Was the interaction with public opinion pro- or reactive? The relationship between elite aspirations and public perception will then be a critical question of my further research.
This prospect raises a further question for careful consideration. Elite-public interaction is clearly a question for the political scientist, yet my work is a historical piece. Reflections will have to be made on the divergences and parallels between the fields of History and Political Science, particularly in a work analyzing such recent (and on-going) history. An early attempt at demarcation can be made. It could be said that Political Science is the study of institutions, processes and procedures, predominately contemporary ones, but it could also be of past or defunct bodies. History is the study of these in their temporal, social and political context. Institutional history (as for example in this case, examinations of the Bundesverfassungsgericht or the European Court of Justice) is much more difficult to demarcate from Political Science, but draws on the same broader immediacy/context dichotomy as Political Science and History do in general. Institutional history has as a goal in itself the contextualization of an institution in its broader historical environment. A Political Scientist might merely draw on this to make further or more proactive assertions about their present and future behaviour.

These questions currently facing me in my research stand alongside the more typical work of the historian – gathering information and sources from the various archives in Germany and around Europe.

Source Material

My studies are currently based in Berlin, Germany. This has afforded me extensive use of the comprehensive university and state library system found in the German capital, as well as easy access to a number of archives also found there.

Libraries

- Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (Berlin State Library)
  The State Library has two main buildings – one in Unter den Linden, the second on Potsdamer Platz. The first houses older texts and manuscripts, as well as a good sized collection of modern literature. The second, on Potsdamer Platz, contains an archive of German and other European newspapers and journals, as well as a very large selection of information on almost all academic fields. Further details can be found on the State Library website: http://www.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de

- Universitätsbibliothek (University Libraries)
  Berlin has three major universities, each with their own library system. The Freie Universität Berlin library is in west/south Berlin: http://www.ub.fu-berlin.de. The Technische Universität is located in west Berlin: http://www.ub.tu-berlin.de. Finally, the Humboldt Universität can be found in central Berlin, its library website being: http://www.ub.hu-berlin.de.

Of particular relevance to my research is the outstanding Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law based at the Humboldt Universität (http://www.whi-berlin.de/), where a lot of the leading legal-academic specialists in the field give lectures, lead seminars and can be contacted with questions and queries. Papers going back to 1997 are available online on the website. These relate predominately to juridical-legal questions, but there are several commentaries relating to elements of European history and identity. WHI Paper 18/04 is a recent paper in this area, available on the website, which is highly recommended.

- Kooperativer Bibliotheksverbund Berlin-Brandenburg (KOBV)
  (Cooperative Library Association Berlin-Brandenburg)
  The KOBV is a collective of all of Berlin and Brandenburg’s libraries, brought together under one regionalised internet portal. Information about the libraries and catalogues can be found in one website: http://www.kobv.de

Archives

Berlin offers good access to a number of archives. A lot of my current research is being undertaken at the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office. (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de), which is located in the Foreign Office itself in the centre of the city. The material here is well catalogued, can be ordered electronically, copies are easily ordered and the files themselves are quickly and easily accessible through the excellent and friendly service offered by the archive staff. The material is subject to a thirty-year secrecy clause and access to the Reading Room is subject to
written approval by archive staff. Doctoral students need a letter of recommendation from their supervisor and all visitors must leave a form of ID (Passport, driving licence) when entering the Foreign Office. The other Ministry archives (in this case, Justice and Economics) are located in the main Federal Archive in Koblenz in western Germany (http://www.bundesarchiv.de).

Berlin is also the seat of the German Parliament. Parliamentary debates and other materials relating to federal deputies can be found in the Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestages: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/archiv/index.html

Among archives outside Germany, I plan to use the ECJ library/archive in Luxembourg, the European Court of Justice has a library/archive in Luxembourg. (http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/services/index.htm). Written agreement in advance is needed to visit the library, although this was easily forthcoming. Of course, the main source of information outside of Germany for my topic is the European Union Historical Archive in Florence (http://www.iue.it/ECArchives). Of special importance to my subject is the material found there from Walter Hallstein’s Chef de Cabinet on the Commission and later a leading figure at the Federal Chancellor’s Office, Klaus Meyer.

Being based in Berlin is ideal for undertaking my research. As indicated, the library facilities and academic possibilities are outstanding and moreover, the German capital enjoys excellent air, train and road connections to western, central and eastern Europe. I am currently at the beginning of my second year of my doctorate. After completing the archival research in Germany, I have the intention to return to London at the end of 2005 and to finish my thesis by September 2006.

Billy Davies
King’s College London
Billydavies25@hotmail.co.uk