A. Abstract

What conditions are responsible for policy change or continuity in the European Community? This is the general research questions guiding the empirical case study presented in this paper. European sectoral policies are - at varying degrees - in the process of integrating environmental considerations into their cores. This process has been delayed and of marginal effect in the context of the CAP. I argue in this paper that institutional structures, on the European and national levels, and the ideational history of the CAP are responsible for the relative continuity of the CAP.

Triggered by a novel historical context in the mid-1980s, new institutional dynamics have emerged and the historical "path" of the CAP has been partly redirected, though. The new institutional and ideational conditions provided "access points" for policy reformers and altered previous occupation patterns of the Community's "veto points," tilting the complex decision chain of the EC in favor of policy reform.

However, environmental reformers were dependent on a broad reform coalition, capable of competing with the powerful agricultural interest. In this context, environmental interests were pursued often indirectly and always as part of a larger rural policy agenda which attributed no particular priority to the environment. The "dependent" environmental integration strategy allowed environmentalists to place a foot in the door, but it has failed to create an environmentally sustainable CAP - and even favorable conditions for future reforms.

1. Introduction

The European Community[1] has engaged in environmental policy making since the 1970s. Over the years, environmental policies have grown in volume and in status within the Community (Hildebrand, 1993; Liberatore, 1991). With the growing importance of environmental protection on the
national, regional and global level, policy actors are becoming increasingly committed to integrating environmental considerations into other sectoral policies.

In the European Community already its first Environmental Action Programme (EAP) of 1973 noted that effective environmental protection requires the consideration of environmental effects in all "technical planning and decision-making processes" at national and Community level (European Commission, 1973: 6). The third EAP, ten years later, began to attribute priority to the "integration of the environmental dimension into other policies" (OJ No. C46, 1983: 2). In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) established an explicit legal basis for environmental policies on the European level and committed the Community legally to treating environmental protection as an integral part of its other policies (Art. 130r(2)). This commitment gained political weight with the Dublin Declaration on the Environment (1990: 5) and the Treaty on European Union which strongly reiterated the objective of environmentally sustainable, and hence integrated, policy making (Arts. 2 and 130r(2)). Finally, the fifth EAP, which was adopted in 1993, is based on the integration requirement.

Within the Community, the long-term success of the more important initiatives such as the internal market and economic and monetary union will be dependent upon the sustainability of the policies pursued in the fields of industry, energy, transport, agriculture and regional development; but each of these policies, whether viewed separately or as it interfaces with others, is dependent on the carrying capacity of the environment... This implies integration of environmental considerations in the formulation and implementation of economic and sectoral policies, in the decisions of public authorities, in the conduct and development of production processes and in individual behaviour and choice. (Commission, 1993: 37-38)

Yet, the actual integration experience in the European Community has been slow (Weale & Williams, 1993) and varied across policy sectors (Lenschow, 1995). In this paper I will focus on the experience of environmental integration into one of the primary activities of the Community, agricultural policy, and investigate the policy process of environmental reform. The Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been subject to some forms of environmental integration in recent years, however the changes have been very incremental and affected mostly marginal aspects of the CAP. Two questions emerge from this experience: (1) What were the conditions that facilitated change, to the extent that it occurred, after decades of resistance to any kind of CAP reform? (2) What are the constraints that continue to hinder a full paradigm shift towards environmentally sustainable agricultural policy?

A first investigation of the sources for and constraints to change points to a whole range of explanatory variables. Functional pressures for change existed, and were strong from the beginning of the CAP; the bargaining situation shifted in the mid-1980s and affected the CAP negotiations; international factors seem to have influenced the latest reforms of the CAP; on the other hand, the structure of interest mediation has been traditionally biased against reform and continues to act as a constraint. Most of these variables appear significant, if not necessary, for an explanation of continuity and change in the CAP; but, none of them is sufficient.

I will offer an analysis rooted in the historical institutionalist literature. Historical institutionalism assumes that "institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole "cause" of outcomes" (Thelen & Steintoo, 1992: 3). Instead "an institutional approach" structures the explanation of political phenomena by providing a perspective for identifying how these different variables relate to one another; capturing the complexity of the political situation without losing theoretical clarity (ibid: 13). Rather than offering a deterministic explanation for policy outcomes, "new" or historical institutionalism argues that institutions influence the construction of interests, the power relations between competing interests, and the flow of ideas in the political arena (Hall, 1992: 91).

The merit of historical institutionalism lies in its ability to provide insights into political continuity as well as into incidents of change. By focusing on macro- and micro, formal and informal structures, the institutional dynamics and developments that influence policy making processes are brought into perspective. In its historical depth and institutionally broad focus this analytical framework is able to capture the relational aspects of policy making.

The CAP is an interesting case for a historical institutional analysis. Since the mid-1980s the CAP has been reformed several times; within the context of these reforms environmental requirements have been integrated. However, overall reform has been slow, after being resisted for decades, and environmental integration has not occurred on its own merits but in the form of strategic issue linkages, combining several reform agendas into one capable of challenging the status quo. I will offer an
analysis that lets us understand the remarkable resilience of the CAP against change and offer a framework that structures analytically the complex politics that have begun to crack the constraints to change. In short, I build on the work of Peter Hall (1986, 1989, 1992) in illuminating the institutional dynamics that facilitated change: Following and responding to events occurring external to European agricultural policy, actors began to act strategically on the institutional opportunities that presented themselves due to these contextual shifts. The distribution of power in Community policy making changed, new "access points" (Peters, 1994) for change agents opened, and alliances were formed in order to repackage an old policy. Margaret Weir's concept of "path dependence" (1992: 192), on the other hand, will inform my analysis of the historical resistance to change, which continued even after the train of reform seemed set in motion in the mid-1980s: The traditional CAP represented a complex political bargain that became symbolically linked to European integration, writ large. This history influenced, and narrowed, the range of possible paths for policy reform after the CAP's inception, including the paths toward environmental integration. In addition to historical path dependence, policy change was hindered by institutionally well-positioned defenders of the CAP, capable of utilizing the numerous "veto points" (Immergut, 1992) in the complex policy chain of the Community. Looking into the future, environmental integration into the Community's agricultural policy will continued to suffer from "path dependence." In particular, it will be confined by the nature of its recent "successes," that is its ties to other reform agendas such as market liberalization and cohesion policy. These ties may limit future opportunities to go an independent path toward "greening" the CAP.

2. The Evolution of the CAP

Agricultural policy is the policy area often mentioned as the only true common policy of the European Community. It was singled out in the Treaty of Rome as a sector for immediate action and received its original structure in Title II (Art. 38-47) of the EEC Treaty. Five objectives (productivity increase, standard of living for farmers, market stability, security of supplies, reasonable consumer prices), three principles (market unity, Community preference, financial solidarity) and two policy categories (policy of guaranteed prices and a limited structural policy)

The literature on the European Community is abound with references to the economic inefficiency, social and regional bias, and environmental harmfulness of the CAP. The CAP was to be constantly criticized by policy analysts, national and European policy makers, societal actors, even representatives of international organizations, but, though "under strain virtually from its birth and assailed from every quarter - including farming organizations - it had, by the early 1970s, become something of a Community sacred cow" (Urwin, 1991: 135). Consequently, the CAPs reach and assistance levels grew continuously, while no attempts were made to repair the functional deficiencies of the CAP, a decision that would have implied systemic reform.

With respect to the environment, a systemic reform would need to address the "perverse" incentive structure of the CAP that encourages not only surplus production but also environmentally harmful production methods. To reach this objective the market regime would need to be carefully designed and tailored to tire environmental requirements. A sustainable agricultural policy might provide incentives to engage in ecological farming. More importantly, though, it would force farmers to internalize the environmental costs of their operations, and economic assistance would be made conditional upon meeting environmental standards. In addition, such regime would provide for appropriate remuneration of farmers who provide environmental services, such as afforestation and habitat protection, typically giving up profits they may have otherwise secured in the agricultural markets.

After almost three decades of expanding the CAP, and its inherent problems, economic and social reforms began to be more seriously contemplated in the mid-1980s and several changes to the CAP were adopted. While so far no reform attempt succeeded in systemically overhauling the policy, the changes are notable given the traditionally static nature of the policy. Environmental reforms, however, were introduced late and typically within a package targeted primarily at other policy objectives.
The 1984 reform imposed production quotas and guarantee thresholds on dairy and cereal products and it developed a system of co-responsibility levies which held farmers co-responsible for the expenses involved in storing and disposing of surplus. While these reforms rendered environmental benefits, due to the implied disincentives for intensive production methods, environmental objectives did not significantly shape the negotiations leading to the reforms and the benefits proved negligible.

Under the Delors Commission a debate was initiated on the link between agriculture and the environment, and the 1988 CAP reforms were presented as representative of a general shift from agricultural to a rural policy which attended to the social and ecological needs of the rural sector. The reforms extended the restrictive measures controlling the price support measures and they introduced a number of structural policy measures, encouraging the set-aside of arable land, early retirement and income support for poorer farmers. Environmental integration took place in the context of broadening the objectives of the CAP and a corresponding, though limited, adjustment of its mechanisms. However, no specific environmental "tailoring" of the new measures took place.

The 1992 MacSharry reforms proceeded on this path by gradually shifting the basis of the CAP from price support, with its negative economic, social and environmental externalities, to income support. Significantly, the "accompanying measures" introduced the only set of explicitly environmental programs, while generally environmental integration continued to be treated as a beneficial side-effects of reforms that were primarily targeted at limiting surplus production.[2] And arguably, even the agri-environmental action programme was part of a production control agenda as it was adopted to give recognition to the dual role of farmers as producers and as stewards of the countryside, and to encourage farming practices which are less intensive and more in tune with environmental constraints... which should also make a positive contribution to rebalancing markets. (Commission, 1991: 2)

Despite the declared general environmental benefits, the CAP continues to be biased toward environmentally unsustainable production, suffering from poor design, internal contradictions and half-way measures.

Subsequent sections will show that the environmental agenda was introduced in a context that thwarted the institutional insulation of agricultural policy makers in the Community, and hence opened opportunities for other points of view to be considered in the policy making process. The move toward a sustainable redefinition of the CAP, however, remains constrained by the political and institutional history of the CAP with its continuing deep effects on the strategies of actors maneuvering to reform the CAP. The environmental agenda has not yet grown strong enough to become lodged in the core of the CAP in its own right. However, the economic and regional reform agendas have gained strength, in part because their advocates could refer to the implicit environmental benefits of their proposals and included environmentalists in the coalition for a rural policy reform. The rural policy coalition benefitted further from being able to include segments of the "agricultural interest" in an expanding Europe of the 1980s and 1990s, undermining the organizational power of the farming sector in Europe.

3. Alternative Explanations

Before turning to the institutional aspects of the reform process, it is in order to consider the impact of other components responsible for change. This paper does not suggest to discount these other explanatory components, rather it suggests to integrate them into an institutionalist perspective.

3.1. Functional - fiscal, social and environmental - pressures

The Community's agricultural policy has fiscal, social and environmental ramification which created pressures for policy reform. First, the so-called guarantee section of the CAP created the incentive to dramatically increase productivity without regard of the demand situation.[3] Such system proved not only costly to consumers and tax payers but also to the Community budget. By the mid-1980s, in the context of the enlargement of the Community to the South, adding CAP beneficiaries, it became obvious that the EC could no longer meet its obligations without an increase of its own resources, unless, of course, the generally expansive dynamics of the CAP would be stopped and the effects of enlargement on the EC budget minimized in the context of a CAP reform. These budgetary
pressures on the Community played a role in attempts to limit the level price support in the case of surplus production; but the measures introduced since 1984 proved insufficient and the CAP continues to be a heavy burden on the Community budget.

Second, the original CAP proved socially and regionally biased (Zanias, 1994). It favored the large farmers in primarily the Northern regions of the Community because these were best equipped to take advantage of the price incentives through intensification and rationalization of production. Again in the context of enlargement, this bias became exacerbated and pressure for a social reform of the CAP rose. The problematic social and regional dimension of the CAP began to resonate stronger after the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) since the CAP seemed to contradict the stated goal of building a socially and regionally "cohesive" political entity. The slight increase structural policy expenditure within the CAP may be interpreted as a remedy devised to close the gap between these Community policies.

Finally, the harmful environmental effects of the CAP became more and more visible in the 1980s. Until then the agricultural sector was largely perceived as environment-friendly, balancing the pollution produced in urban and industrial regions. In the context of a more environmentally aware public, producing a degree of issue salience, the contradictions between the CAP and the Community's environmental policy came to light. By the 1990s, the issue of ecological destruction became problematic even within the agricultural sector, as it was polluting its own production bases, water and soil (Heeremann, 1992).

Neither of these pressures for "functional spillover" were ever denied by policy makers, even though they became more obvious and salient after the mid-1980s. However, their mere existence does not explain the timing, the speed and the type of the policy reforms that were adopted, subsequently.

With respect to the environmental effects of the CAP, it is unclear why it took until 1992 for explicit and direct environmental measures to be adopted within the CAP and why the indirect measures that were previously adopted were too poorly designed to meet environmental objectives.[4] A sufficient explanation needs to elaborate on the process connecting policy pressure to policy outcome. Since the "correlation" between input (demands for reform) and output (reform) is weak, understanding the intermediate role of the institutional framework and its ability to structure the politics of reform is essential for the explanation.

3.2. A New Intergovernmental Bargaining Context

The European agricultural policy making process has been situated traditionally in a predominantly intergovernmental framework, characterized by the presence of national officials at all stages from policy formulation to decision making, and by the continuing practice of unanimous decision making. This macro-institutional (intergovernmental) structure helps explain the resistance to a substantial reform of the CAP since decision tend to follow the lowest common denominator among the Member States.

Within an intergovernmental explanatory framework, policy changes may be explained by reference to changes in the distribution of powers in the Community, and particularly its decision making body, the Council. Indeed, power relations were altered by the two enlargements of the Community, adding a critic of the CAP (the UK), and two Northern (Ireland and Denmark) as well as three Southern (Greece, Portugal and Spain) potential beneficiaries of the CAP. However, in a bargaining context based on consensus such expanding membership should have contributed to more stagnation rather than change, unless in a context of issue linkage.

Intergovernmental analyses have often pointed to issue linkages as tools to break negotiation deadlocks (Weber & Wiesmuth, 1991); Mark Pollack (1995) argues strongly that particularly the expansion of redistributive policies is linked to "tactical" broad issue linkages. What remains remarkable about the CAP case is that such broad issue linkages meant breaking a "tradition" of politically insulated agricultural policy making. While the intergovernmental paradigm provides a first institutionalist layer for an explanatory framework, a sufficient institutional analysis needs to be complemented by considerations of the historical context and the institutional micro-structures, shaping the nature of the negotiations and bargains.

With respect to environmental integration, it must be observed, that there was no indication of any explicit intergovernmental consensus or bargain for the adoption of environmental measures. The empirical history suggests that these measures were "slipped by" decision makers, a process that
requires us to look beyond intergovernmental macro-structures, as well, and pay close attention to institutional relations and dynamics between the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament, and the organizations representing societal interests.

3.3. Competing Interest Groups

The CAP, like all policies, has a deep impact of the material situations of various groups in society. In its original design it favored large and relatively well-to-do farmers in mostly Northern regions of the Community. It did not benefit smaller farmers, and therefore failed to lift the relative living standards of the average farmer in the Community. Since the CAP maintained prices generally above the world price level it hurt consumers. By claiming most of the revenues of the European Community, the CAP prevented re- and distributive policies favoring other groups in society.

Within an explanatory framework focusing on interest mediation, the continuing high Community expenditure for agriculture suggests that (elite) farming organizations have gained a competitive advantage over other interest groups. Indeed, agricultural interest groups have established a unique influence on national as well as European policy processes, benefitting from organizational strength and privileged access to policy makers (Avery, 1977; Keeler, 1995; Tracy, 1989). On the European level, COPA has represented the interests of the - elite - farming population since the late 1950s. More than other sectoral interest groups, and certainly more than consumer and environmental groups, COPA has developed close links to the Commission and the Council (Avery, 1977, Nugent, 1989). Its early formation and establishment of channels providing regular access to all EC institutions, and hence its ability to influence the early European integration process, have contributed to sending the CAP on a path protective of the farmers' interests. The history of the CAP leaves little doubt that the relative power of the farming lobby has played a decisive role in maintaining the protectionist structure of the CAP over the years.

An explanation focusing on interest mediation would suggest that the recent policy changes are due to a decrease in the relative power of the farming interests and to a growth in influence of socially disadvantaged farmers, consumer groups and environmental groups. Such process of relative power shifts among interest groups requires further inquiry: First, such redistribution of power may simply be due to the fact that with the evolution of the EC the number of Eurogroups, and therefore potential challengers grew; but, the rising number of challengers is not a recent phenomenon and their mere existence does not explain policy access. A complete explanation needs to consider the development of institutional opportunities for new policy demandeurs. Secondly, the coherence and hence strength of COPA may have weakened over time. For instance, enlargement may have resulted in a new diversity of farmers' interests within its membership. In this case an explanation needs to link the historical context to internal organizational processes and their implications on the processes and structure of interest mediation. Thirdly, the agricultural sectors may have lost some of the genuine sympathy and support among European citizens which, according to Keeler, has perpetuated the "asymmetry of interest and organizational clout." Touching also on the environmental dimension of the CAP, he argues that in the past the general public failed to perceive the inflationary effects of the CAP and therefore was more inclined to be sympathetic to the farmers' demands in view of "the nature of their work," the farmers' image as "guardians of the environment" and as representatives of "stability and rootedness" (Keeler, 1995). To the extent that interest group influence is based on public perception, an explanation of changing influence needs to analyze the sources of public perception.

In short, a framework focusing on patterns of interest mediation informs comparative analysis (here, across time periods) in the form of comparative statics. But, it is not sufficient in explaining processes, such as the emergence of absolute and relative weaknesses of the organized farming interest and the growing ability of competing interests to effect policy outcomes.

3.4. International Pressures

The 1992 reform of the CAP was adopted during the final stages of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and the reciprocal influences between the two processes must not be denied. The CAP, which imposed import levies on foreign agricultural producers while paying retribution to European exporters, was under heavy attack in the GATT negotiations. In the past, a series of trade wars had been fought,
culminating in a temporary collapse of the GATT negotiations in 1990. The 1992 CAP reform, however, brought the policy more or less in line with the objectives of the Round.

With respect to the environmental components of the reform, an analysis focusing on the international dimension adds an interesting twist. Under GATT rules not all subsidy payments are designated as trade-distorting measures and hence targeted for cuts. Among the aids that are excluded from the GATT regime are environmental assistance programs. Therefore, in a strategic move environmental programs could be introduced to compensate for price cuts and reductions of other forms of assistance which are subject to GATT scrutiny. Commissioner MacSharry confirmed that the Ministers for Agriculture supported the agro-environmental program under the condition that "the new compensatory aid should... not be subject to the disciplines arising from any GATT settlement - in other words the aids should be in the so-called 'green box'" (Commission, 1992: 3).

However, also international pressures - and the possibilities for issue linkage they open do not offer a sufficient explanation for the CAP reform. The question remains why the GATT negotiations appeared to facilitate a relatively far-reaching CAP reform in 1992 while they failed to do so in earlier years.

4. Institutional and Path-Dependent Constrains to Change

This section will focus on the factors that have hindered a systemic reform of the CAP. I suggest that there existed two distinct constraints, one rooted in the "material" institutional structures surrounding the CAP and the other linked to the symbolic or ideational meaning of the CAP, as historically constructed. I argue that the institutional structures and decision rules enabled CAP defenders to limit access of policy reformers and to veto reform proposals, otherwise. Secondly, I suggest that the CAP gained protection from its historical roots which served to define, and narrow, policy choices in the given institutional and ideational context. In the subsequent section I will turn to the emergence of opportunities for reform.

4.1. Institutional Constraints to Change

In Europe agricultural policy making on the national level is traditionally characterized by a high degree of insularity from other policy sectors and by a neocorporatist structure of interest mediation, providing farming organizations with privileged access to policy making processes (Keeler, 1995; Tracy, 1989). This structure was largely copied at the Community level in the 1960 and was responsible for effective resistance to a reform of the CAP, even though the policy's problems were realized soon after its inception. The historian Urwin concludes "the CAP became a classic study... of how, once decisions have been made and structures established, inertia sets in to make any reform extremely difficult" (Urwin, 1991: 185). I maintain that not only organizational inertia but also the institutionally powerful and unchallenged position of policy makers and groups with a vested interests in the CAP prevented its reform.

To begin with, Agricultural Ministers traditionally formulate their policy positions, for the national as well as European context, independently from the rest of the national cabinets and follow a clientelistic understanding of their mission, that is, as representatives of the organized farming interests. With respect to the CAP, the insulated position of the Agricultural Ministers was reinforced by the technical nature of the policy and the fact that it was funded since 1971 by the EC budget, instead of national treasuries. Despite the existence of externalities, agricultural policy makers maintained exclusive control over "their" policy domain and kept outside interference to a minimum. Environmental Ministers were far from holding their same status and influence; in the first decades of the CAP these ministries were not even in existence. To the extent that the effectiveness of environmental policies depends on collaboration and policy integration, environmental policy makers were particularly harmed by their minimal organizational clout and by the lack of access to agricultural policy makers and the policy process - access that was routinely provided to agricultural interest groups.

Not much tempered nationally, the Agricultural Ministers were rarely faced with a strong institutional counterweight on the European arena either. Tire functional fragmentation of tire
Community's decision making process, which does not provide for systematic and regular cooperation between the various Councils, has allowed the Agricultural Council to adopt policies that effectively determined the Community's budgetary situation without the involvement or control of the Finance Council and that contradicted the Community's own environmental policy, adopted in the Environment Council. To the extent that the protectionist structure of the CAP was responsible for environmental harm, the lack of budgetary oversight worked to the detriment of the environment as well. Contributing to further insulation, the Agricultural Council is not prepared by the COREPER and its working groups, but by a Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA). As the SCA exists independently of the COREPER, agriculture is shielded also from the (limited) policy coordination and interpretation that might occur on this level. Farming interest groups find regular access to all levels of the Council. Hence, national officials, working closely with the farming lobbies at home, continue this cooperation and remain unexposed to other interests on the European level.

In addition to functional insulation, the decision making structure contributed to policy stagnation. Intergovernmental decision making practices have dominated, as a consequence of the French "empty chair" policy and the subsequent Luxembourg compromise in 1966, the formulation of the CAP over the years. Under consensus rules, the Agriculture Council's ability to adopt policy reforms is constrained by a narrow "win set" (Moyer, 1993a: 11). Since the specific national policy interests in the CAP differ widely, it is unlikely that countries can agree on one common reform, including effective ways to integrate the environmental dimension, even after - under lucky circumstances - all national cabinets may have agreed on the necessity of some reform. In other words, the constraining effect of the intergovernmental bargaining structure was further enforced by the complex nature of the original policy package.

The conditions for change were only slightly more favorable in the Commission. After being muted with respect to far-reaching policy proposals in the 1960s,[5] the Commission focused on strengthening its role of managing the CAP. It built an extensive apparatus to oversee the general operations of the policy - the purchase, storage and disposition of surpluses, the management of import levies, and payment of refunds -, and was given large discretionary powers in this domain. National officials and the agricultural lobby came to dominate the committee structure within DGVI,[6] and DGVI evolved into the largest service of the Commission with control over the largest resources. As its influence became linked to its responsibilities of administering the CAP, it developed a strong institutional interest in continuing the existence of the CAP, preferably in its familiar design. DGVI is widely recognized as dominant in the Commission; and its relationship with DGXI continues to be uneven (Interviews, European Commission). To the extent that the Commission was nevertheless capable of proposing policy changes contradicting the interests of the farming "clientele," this was due to the more independent role of the Agriculture Commissioner, compared to his staff, and the collegial decision making structure of the Commission as a whole, limiting the influence of any single policy sector. (I will return to the impact of these institutional opportunities below.) As long as reform proposals would face a "sure" veto in the Council, the relatively greater openness of the Commission was of no immediate consequence, however.

The EP's general record of pointing to the ecological aspects of EC policies (Judge, 1992) was less impressive in the area of agriculture (Arp, 1992: 57-62). The reasons were both internal to the Parliament, and its pattern of interest representation, and inherent to the decision structure of the Community. Until its first direct election, the European Parliament was highly influenced by agricultural pressure groups, which were particularly well represented in the EP's agricultural committee. After 1979, the EP became somewhat more inclined to consider the position of consumers and environmentalists, but it continued to be constrained by its role in the policy making process which is merely consultative and the limits of its budgetary powers which do not extend to the obligatory agricultural expenditures. Hence, the EP's internal shift remained of little consequence.

In brief, the traditional distribution of institutional powers, the decision making rules, and the structure of interest mediation were responsible for the bias and the inflexibility of the CAP. The intergovernmental decision making process and the institutional insularity of the CAP policy process constituted a structure of "veto points" (Immergut, 1992), that needed to be destroyed for change to happen. In addition, there needed to be viable "access points" (Peters, 1994) for setting a reform agenda, but only the structure of the Commission seemed to offer some limited opportunities. Given the complex decision chain in the Community, access points need to be, spread wider and allow for the formation of a reform coalition consisting of diverse EU organizational players (Zito, 1995).
4.2. The Confining Role of Symbols and Packages

Margaret Weir, in her essay on the history of employment policy in the US, argues that the possibilities for policy innovation are often bounded due to "path dependencies" that were created by policy decisions at some point in time, restricting "future possibilities by sending policy off onto particular tracks, along which ideas and interests develop and institutions and strategies adapt" (Weir, 1992: 192). In the case of the CAP, I suggest that indeed policy innovation was bounded by a delicately balanced original bargain and by the symbolic significance this bargain acquired for the emerging European polity as a whole. In the past, environmental integration proved difficult as it would have led the CAP astray from its historical path which was fortified by a high level of symbolic value and closely adapted institutions.

To be more specific, it is often casually stated that the CAP represents the only truly common policy of the European Community. But this "special status" of the policy has resulted in a greater tolerance of the CAP's considerable economic, social and environmental costs. The European agricultural regime gained stability from being a symbol for the viability of European integration. "[S]o convinced became many members of the Community of the vital importance of the CAP, that to criticize it, or even to propose its modification, was sometimes regarded as disloyalty to the idea of the Community itself" (March & Swanney, 1980: 74-75). Only after the Single European Act and the 1992 single market project replaced the CAP as a symbol for European integration, did systemic reform become conceivable.

In addition to the symbolic weight of the CAP, its evolution was confined by its complex internal nature, catering to diverse national interests. The original CAP represented a compromise between the six original members, combining French interest in free access to the European agricultural market, German interest in high prices, and Dutch insistence on import levies. Consequently, it was difficult to replace the environmentally harmful structure of price supports, as the Germans would always threaten to erect market barriers within Europe in response, and hence to destroy the complex bargain that appeared to serve all. Structural environmental measures, on the other hand, were initially resisted as intruding too deeply into national competencies and being non-essential to the original bargain. Once started, the guarantee section of the CAP created such high financial obligations for the Community that it left few funds available for the guidance sections to be expanded later. With staff and finances bound to the market intervention aspects of the CAP, and these aspects largely unchangeable due to their intertwined negotiation history, the range of possible policy innovations was severely limited.

5. The "Story" Behind Reform and Its Continuing Limits

In the remainder of this paper I will outline the changes in political and institutional circumstances that allowed for the introduction of reforms from the mid-1980s, onwards. While the institutional and ideational structure of constraints has not been eliminated, opportunities for change arose in response to external events which had a deep impact on the institutional structures shaping the evolution of the CAP. With respect to environmental integration, the new conditions were not hospitable enough to allow for a truly environmental reform agenda to be set and implemented. But, the new political and institutional climate allowed for the creation of a rural policy coalition which included environmental actors and pursued environmental goals within a broad reform package, that is, linked them to other reform objectives.

5.1. A Changing Policy Context Creates Opportunities for Institutional and Policy Reform

In the early 1980s, i.e. in the context of enlargement, the CAP's burden on the Community budget and its regionally inequitable expenditure pattern triggered the first CAP reform that modified its market intervention system in a restrictive fashion. The reform was negotiated in quite typical intergovernmental fashion, responding to the polarization of positions in the Council with a broad issue linkage arrangement (Pollack, 1995). In the context of the CAP, the process was nevertheless remarkable since the policy's development was tactically linked to an issue that was previously
considered external to its operations. An expansion of budgetary resources for the Community was "traded" for some restrictive measures within the price support system.

The effects of the 1984 reform on agricultural production were minimal, but a number of institutional changes resulted from the debate which proved significant in the longer term. As a consequence of the policy bargain, institutional dynamics and relative powers were effected in ways that were not explicitly intended by the negotiators. The changing institutional framework, however, facilitated the contemplation of further reforms in the future. First, the compromise tied the growth of the CAP budget to the growth of the average GDP in Europe; this was the first time that CAP expenditure was formally fixed. To the extent that the GDP tie could not be achieved at the existing level of price support this commitment imposed pressures for future reforms in which the Finance Council would assume a role. In other words, the compromise comprised a challenge to the insular agricultural policy making practices. Second, the Commission adapted to formalized link between agriculture and the budget under the new leadership of Jacques Delors. The Delors Commission (with former Dutch Finance Minister Frans Andriessen as Commission for Agriculture) acted on the opportunities provided by a Council that was becoming fiscally more conscious and constrained; it was responsible for one of the few instances of the CAP prices being decided, and cut, by qualified majority in the Council, against German opposition (Tracy, 1989: 308). Thirdly, also related to the agro-budget issue linkage, the EP was granted vetoing power over the size of the agricultural budget in 1988,[7] hence it was able to enforce financial responsibility in the Commission and the Agriculture Council, limiting further the latter's leverage over European price levels and the EC budget.

In other words, the bargaining history of the CAP in the early 1980s had institutional consequences that allowed for functional pressures to actually effect policy change. New institutional dynamics contributed to problem recognition and shifted power relations between CAP defenders and opponents. Defenders of the CAP were no longer allowed to monopolize the "veto points" in the policy's decision chain; and indeed, new "veto points" were created favoring the critics of the CAP.

The decisive break, also from an environmental perspective, took place in 1986 with the adoption of the Single European Act. The SEA, which owed a lot to the work of the Delors Commission, provided a politically and symbolically permanent new context for agricultural policy in Europe, leading to new institutional dynamics in and between the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and other, more peripheral, actors. The SEA began to funnel the CAP onto a new historical path, allowing for the introduction of new ideas, interests, and eventually policy processes.

In Delors Commission, the CAP was increasingly viewed in light of the demands of the "new" European economic and political integration process and the focus, as well as the forum, of discussion widened. Under Delors' leadership the power of DGVI in the policy formulation process of the Commission as a whole weakened, market integration and cohesion policy rose to the top of the hierarchy of European policies, and environmental policy gained in stature. Under the new leadership a new emphasis was placed on collegial decision making in the Commission, undermining the dominance of the agricultural service as well as its insulation from "external" points of view. Particularly, the link between the viability of the rural sector throughout Europe, economic cohesion and market unification became a focus on Commission activities.

New institutional dynamics were not limited to the Commission. Member States equally realized the new context for the CAP after adopting the SEA. Clearly, resources had to be freed for this project, and hence expenditures for the CAP had to be rationalized, if not cut. Stephen George writes the single most important factor [behind reforming the CAP] seemed to have been the need to protect the single-market programme. It was the commitment that all member states recognized as essential to their future prosperity, and in the final analysis the protection of a sectoral interest group, even one so well entrenched as the farmers, had to give way to that imperative for industrial survival in the face of US and Japanese competition (1991: 152).

Also in response to the SEA issue linkages between the CAP, cohesion and economic policy as well as the Community budget, the 1988 CAP reform was negotiated in the European Council rather than the Agricultural Council. This change of the decision making forum facilitated effective issue linkage (Wesseis, 1991) and removed the CAP further from its traditional insulation.

In 1992, the future of the CAP reform became additionally linked to the concurrent GATT negotiations, and the role of the Community in international politics. In the larger context of "1992" and the Community's self-assertion as an international actor, the agricultural policy circle became further challenged in its previous insulation form the Community's other policy and institutional
interest. In the Commission, DGVI was forced to coordinate policy with the service for external affairs which had primary responsibility over GATT matters. The Agriculture Council was forced to share competencies, coordinating its policies with the Council of Trade Ministers which was leading the GATT negotiations (Meunier, 1995; Moyer, 1993b). In such larger context, the extraordinary activism of Commissioner MacSharry in reforming the CAP, which could be considered contrary to his institutional interest, has been interpreted as an attempt to maintain control over the specifics of a reform that was inevitable in the larger political and institutional context (Moyer, 1993a). In other words, the new and more advanced context of European integration, created a new political and institutional environment for internal policy developments.

In short, the changing policy context in the 1980s and early 1990s contributed to a institutional reconfiguration of the European Community and eliminated the symbolic appeal of the CAP. As a consequence, agricultural policy choices were no longer made in politically insulated fora with exclusive participation. The structure and occupation of "veto points" was altered, and "access points" were created within a more collegially operating Commission and by establishing institutional links between the Agricultural Ministers to Ministers of Trade and Finance as well as Heads of State. A larger set of interest entered the policy process and found effective representation in the EC institutions. While "access points" for environmentalists were not prominent, environmental integration was facilitated by the new openness.

5.2. Agriculture and Environment: The Construction of Strategic Issue Linkages

Environmental integration into the CAP, to the extent that it occurred, was made possible by the new institutional and ideational context emerging after the mid-1980s. Prior to these changes, neither environmental institutional actors (the Environment Council, DGXI, the EP's committee on the environment, environmental NGOs) nor the concept of environmental sustainable policy were well placed in relation of the institutional actors representing the CAP and the ideas they defended. But, even afterwards the opportunities for an environmental reform remained limited and tied to opportunities opening for other reform agendas. As a consequence, the progress toward environmentally sustainable agricultural policy has remained limited to this day. This final section will elaborate on the politics of environmental integration in the CAP.

In the broader political context of budgetary pressure, the emergence of "cohesion", policy, and the rise of environmental issues on the European political agenda, the new Delors Commission opened the arena for a systemic review of the CAP. In 1985, it produced a 'Green Paper' on Perspectives for the Common Agricultural Policy which offered an unusually critical review and outlook of the European agricultural policy "as a basis for consultation with other Community institutions and interested parties." The 'Green Paper' was the beginning of a process toward redefining the CAP into a rural policy, in the context of the Community's evolution into a more comprehensive polity. It included for the first time a discussion of the environmental problems of the CAP.

In the development of the CAP, the measures to be taken must therefore reconcile the economic, social and environmental objectives of the Community... The oversupply of markets means that increasing emphasis will be put on diversification and extensification of agricultural production, and alternative uses of land. The need to strengthen cohesion, through the reform of the Community's structural funds, means that a more coherent approach to rural development will be required, in which agricultural, ecological, and other aspects will be treated in regional and integrated programmes (Commission, 1987b: 5).

The rural policy agenda emerged as a consequence of the creation of new access points to the CAP policy process, particularly from the angles of economic efficiency and cohesion. Its appeal lay in the shift of the CAP from a single to a multiple interest policy, without denying the farming sector its "right" to extensive public assistance. Curiously, while the budgetary constraints and the institutional arrangements taken to enforce these limits provided the first openings to reforming the CAP, the changes adopted to this day did not limit expenditure; instead, they amounted to shifting funds from price support to income support payments, hence a less "irrational" way of supporting the sector. Income support was offered in the name of social equity, cohesion, and the environment. Increasingly, income assistance to farmers, and particularly those living under disadvantaged conditions, was justified with the environmental service provided by these farmers.
Environmental goals were not central to the rural policy agenda; they were treated as subobjectives to attempts responding to the regional and social needs in rural Europe and targeted at controlling surplus production. For instance, the 1985 regulation on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures provided for structural assistance in areas where agricultural production would contribute to environmental protection, i.e., it seemingly introduced an explicit and direct environmental measure. But in practice, the payments under the regulation were linked to measures directed primarily at output reduction (Bader & May, 1992: 129). The Commission later confirmed that this particular legislation and the Community's overall policy was indeed "concentrating on the double objective of avoiding first the [economic] problems caused by intensive agriculture, and second any negative environmental consequences" (Commission, 1988: 1).

The issue of environmental integration entered the political arena as a tool in the bargaining process to achieve reforms which may be "indispensable for income or market reasons" (Commission, 1985: 2), as Environment Commissioner Clinton Davis remarked in 1985, but faced powerful opposition by defenders of the CAP. Economic and social reform proposals gained weight in the negotiations if they were presented with the "value added" of creating also environmental benefits. Tied to social reforms, the environmental element lifted the stigma attached to welfare payments and introduced the notion of service payments. Tied to structural measures and even price cuts which were primarily targeted at surplus reduction, the environmental benefits created a rationale for generous compensation payments. In view of decreasing internal cohesion of the agricultural lobby after enlargement and the appearance of institutional cracks around the previously well-protected CAP, the farmers and agricultural policy makers became willing to contemplate environmental integration as long as this meant payments rather than costs. However, as a consequence of the policy linkage and the continuing impossibility of having farmers pay for the pollution they might cause or of imposing a system of environmental conditionality, many so-called environmental measures were too poorly designed to effectively achieve and ensure environmental protection.

The cautious and indirect approach to environmental integration and the continuing institutional constraints to a comprehensive reform were confirmed in a 1987 follow-up document to the 'Green Paper.'

A restrictive policy for pricing is indispensable, to be supplemented by action to accommodate the problem of small farms and that of areas where there is a heavy concentration of structurally weak holding. The policy of pricing is therefore favourable to the protection of the environment... [Because the] market support instruments operate independently of schemes to protect the environment[, a]ny effect they may have in this field is indirect. (Commission, 1987a: 16 and 7)

While making reference to the link between the environment and agricultural matters, the agricultural service of the Commission continued to emphasize the services rendered to the environment by the farming sector more than it acknowledged the threats the sector imposes, arguing for remuneration rather than sanctions. Secondly, it explicitly argued that action on the protection of the environment must come in the form of accompanying action under a 'common measure' the main purpose of which has a direct link with improvement of structure, rationalization of farming practices, or the ensuring of a fair standard of living for the agricultural population. (ibid.: 7)

Given that the SEA had been adopted by 1987, hence the more reform-friendly environment was operative, this retreat may seem surprising. The SEA had not only altered the institutional and political context, it had explicitly established a European environmental policy and confirmed that environmental requirements had to be integrated into all other European policies; therefore, there existed the formal possibility to go beyond mere 'accompanying measures.' But, we must consider that the 1985 'Green Paper' was of no immediate political consequence; green papers are often issued by the Commission as political trial balloons and means for agenda setting. Secondly, the cautious 1987 statement was published by DGVI and not the Commission as a whole, and was therefore reflective of the persisting conservative attitude of the agricultural service, as to be expected.

The 1987 statement was indicative that, while the overall political context resulted in institutional cracks that facilitated a broadening of the agenda and a wider participation in agricultural policy making, these cracks were not sufficient to replace the forces protecting the core of the CAP. This was particularly the case with respect to an ecological reform of the CAP, as in the Commission this was neither one of Delors' priorities (Delors, 1992) nor did DGXI have the institutional powers to effectively challenge DGVI without forming a broader alliance. Environmental access point to the Agriculture Council were equally limited. During the negotiation leading to further reforms in 1988,
Agricultural Ministers remained generally rather skeptical about the need to transfer environmental management to Community-level authorities...[uncertain] on what to protect[as] the French, the Germans and the Belgians pointed out that the biggest problems were not linked to agriculture,... [and were otherwise struggling with] conflicts between the north and the south.[12] Consequently, the environment continued to be integrated indirectly, via schemes targeted at economic efficiency or social and regional assistance. The public relations effect of the environmental policy element proved useful, but little was done to ensure the actual environmental benefits of the reforms.

These deficiencies did not go unnoticed by the newly mobilized environmental watchdogs of the CAP. The institutional dynamics affecting Community agricultural policy making had not remained confined to the Commission and the Council; rather they extended to the structure of interest mediation. Both, new policy access points and the creation of a more open ideational environment, through the rhetorical, even though hardly effectual, repackaging of the CAP from an agricultural into a rural policy, contributed to the mobilization of interests that were previously deterred by the overwhelming presence of the agricultural lobby. Environmental NGOs, such as the WWF, the EEB and Greenpeace, began to target the Commission and the Council with public relations campaigns as well as specific policy proposals. Secondly, environmental NGOs joined a range of alternative issue networks in the broad rural alliance. Consumer groups and "renegade" farmers pointed to the continuing environmental harm done by the elite farming sector and the CAP; environmental groups emphasized the social and regional problems inherent in the CAP (various issues of Agence Europe and the European Report).

The CAP was no longer a matter to be dealt with exclusively in agricultural circles, it had become a political issue that resonated throughout the Community. As a result, environmental NGOs competed more successfully for political access and their efforts to create a negative public image of the farming sector were increasingly effective. Faced with the environmental challenge and failing to develop a coherent strategy to deal with the issue within the organized farming sector, environmental matters became more difficult to influence for the agricultural lobby than others (Interviews, COPA).

Not surprisingly, environmentalist received the most outspoken support from DGXI in the Commission. In 1992, Commissioner Ripa di Meana interfered in the CAP negotiation process by publicly arguing that the CAP would have to take account of market forces and by going so far as to equate the CAP "with the environmental devastation wrought on Eastern Europe by decades of communist rule" (Reuter Press, 6 February 1992). While Ripa's and NGOs' interventions were not deeply reflected in the Commission's final reform proposal, they kept the environmental agenda lodged in the reform process.

They contributed to the introduction of the first truly environmental measure within the accompanying package, a proposal that proved surprisingly noncontroversial. Even COPA's only critique regarding the accompanying measures was that they were not sufficiently funded and did not constitute a full recognition of the farmers service to the protection of the countryside (Interview, COPA). This position shows that the farming population had come to accept this aspect of their vocation, at least to the extent that it would lead to a substitution of otherwise lost income. The COPA reminded policy makers that [in] its reform proposal for the Common Agricultural Policy in July 1991, the Commission recognized the role of the farmer in the protection of the rural environment and also as a protector of the countryside, and it spoke of appropriate rewards. The Commission should fulfil its own request through a comprehensive programme and not simply through "accompanying measures" (COPA, 1992).

These "accompanying measures" became part of the final reform package, adopted in 1992. The progress can be traced to continuing institutional openings, this time complemented by opportunities arising from the international environment of the CAP (see above). The 1992 reform also showed, though, that environmental integration continued to depend on a broad, and hence unspecific, coalition and on reform proposals based on issue linkage. Despite the pronouncement of environmental protection as one of the motivating factors for reform, and the repeated argument that all elements of the reform would work in favor of this objective, environmental benefits continued to be used, or rather abused, as rhetorical tools by those interested in correcting the economic inefficiencies of the CAP. Consequently, the instruments chosen were either insufficient or second-best from an environmental perspective. For instance, environmental conditionality and restrictive measures were resisted; the mandatory set aside scheme failed to guard against intensive production (see below), and the agro-environmental program remained underfunded and lacked effective control mechanisms.
Despite this disappointing result from a merely ecological point of view, the policy process revealed that environmental actors had become involved in agricultural policy making and that they would continue to exploit the opportunities emerging in an opening institutional framework.

Following the adoption of the MacSharry reform it was widely acknowledged that environmental aspects did not receive sufficient attention and that, to the extent that they were introduced, this did not occur for the environment's sake, but in order to strengthen the coalition's case for moving toward income support, to support the cohesion element of the reform, and to facilitate a GATT agreement. After taking over the Presidency in July 1992, Britain's Minister for Agriculture, John Gummer, announced that the "fuller integration of environmental protection in the CAP" constituted one of his priorities and that the informal meeting of the Agriculture Council in late September 1992 would look into the issue.[13]

However, the activities since 1992 have shown the drawbacks of dependent environmental integration, instead. Not much progress has been made since; in fact one could argue that a certain extent of policy reversal has taken place (Lenschow, forthcoming). An expansion of the agro-environmental measures has been resisted because they have not become one of the central objectives of the rural alliance, and therefore an easy target for budget cuts rather than expansions. The mandatory set-aside scheme, one the other hand, which was one of the "linked" reform elements intended to limit surplus production with positive environmental side effects, has been "liberalized" since, allowing for (intensive) production of non-food products, i.e., undermining the environmental rationale, to the extent it ever existed. The set-aside episode showed that dependent environmental integration in the CAP invited hypocritical "salesmen" practices and results, and that it proved to be quite easily reversible. One the other hand, the environment has become firmly established in the policy making process, which could not have been achieved by the environmental alliance alone.

6. Conclusions

The European Community is committed to the goal of environmental sustainability and, within that philosophy, to integrating environmental requirements into other policies. This paper has analyzed the process of environmental integration into the Common Agricultural Policy where progress has been slow and occurred mostly at the margins.

In theoretical terms, this paper offers a historical institutionalist perspective of policy reform in the European Community. Such perspective, it is argued, helps organize the complexity of causal mechanisms responsible for change or stagnation. Institutions mediate the emergence of new ideas and the processes of preference formation, policy formulation as well as decision making. A historical perspective illuminates the institutional dynamics effecting policy outcomes over time. In addition, a historical perspective allows us to introduce the notion of "path dependency" (Weir, 1992), that is, the impact the circumstances of a policy's birth or other critical junctures in a policy's history may have on its evolution.

The CAP has proven to be very resilient to change, despite its widely recognized economic, social and environmental deficiencies. I argue in this paper that the CAP has proven resilient because CAP policy was made under institutional conditions hostile to change: insulation, intergovernmentalism, neocorporatism. In addition, the CAP had acquired in its early history a symbolic status for European integration, adding further protection from its opponents. Underneath these constraints always existed latent opportunities for change, particularly within the collegial Commission. But, the "access points" (Peters, 1994) that existed for change agents were ill themselves narrow and far outnumbered by "veto points" (Immergut, 1992) at critical positions in the decision chain.

The paper goes on to show that a changing political context in the mid-1980s, and primarily the adoption of the SEA, have impacted on the institutional structures framing agricultural policy making and that the new institutional dynamics in turn had policy implications. Latent access points in the Commission were activated and a mix of actors began to occupy veto points in the Commission as well as the Council. While intergovernmental decision making practices persisted, opportunities for broad issue linkages emerged. Agricultural policy circles lost their insular status in policy formulation and decision making. And the single market project replaced the CAP as the symbol for European integration.
In this context of institutional and ideational opening, the environmental agenda was set. Political access was provided by an emerging "rural policy coalition" representing multiple interests, including environmental ones. While the environment thus gained access to the CAP policy process, which would have been doubtful outside such coalition, this path toward integration had drawbacks. Environmental integration was pursued indirectly through linkages to other policy objectives, such as economic efficiency and social and regional equality. As a consequence, policy measures were poorly designed to meet environmental objectives. Also as a consequence, the environmental (sub-)objectives dropped out of sight during subsequent reviews and revisions of the initial reform package.

The problems implied in "indirect" integration should be kept in mind for similar processes within other policy sectors. For policy effectiveness it is advisable to match policy objectives to specific policy instruments, rather than compile complex packages which satisfy complex political alliances. "Afin d'obtenir l'optimum économique, il est souhaitable de concevoir des instruments indépendants pour chaque objectif recherché, que ce soit social ou environnemental" (Floyd, 1995). Curiously, this may prove difficult in the context of an integration process that builds on practices of inter-institutional consultation and collaboration, that is, practices which have allowed for the very contemplation of environmental concerns in the CAP.

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Footnotes

1. For simplicity I will use the term 'European Community' throughout the present text, even in the context of events that took place after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

2. All elements of the reform were deemed to have positive effects on the environment. First, the reduction of market intervention and price support was thought to make the use of chemical fertilizers and plant protection products less profitable and hence result in a reduction of their consumption. Second, a mandatory set-aside scheme was assumed to reverse the intensification trend observed in agricultural production. Third, direct income transfers were intended to prevent rural exodus, particularly in less-favored regions where farmers serve to protect the environment. Fourth, the accompanying measures directly support the adoption of production methods favorable to the environment or the development of environmental conservation projects via an agri-environmental action program (Scheele, 1994).

3. Due to its small size (approximately 5% of the total) the CAP's guidance section, supporting structural adjustments of the farming sector, was incapable of counteracting the negative effects of the guarantee section.

4. Environmental directives controlling polluting substances in the Community's waters have been in existence outside the CAP framework since the early 1980s. Further, the production of pesticides has been subjected to some controls since the 1970s in order to protect human health, i.e., without specific regard to their effects on environmental media such as soil and water.

5. In 1968 the so-called Mansholt Plan which would have introduced a larger structural component to control the expansive tendencies of the guarantee section was essentially dismantled in the Council.

6. While DGVI does not exclude other interests from being heard, the access of COPA to policy makers is privileged. No other interests groups would be invited to regular meeting with the Commissioner for Agriculture or conduct weekly exchanges with the Director General of DGVI. (Nulgent, 1989: 194-206, 279-303)
7. the EP "traded" this prerogative for its agreement to doubling the Structural Funds, an example that not only Member States utilize the strategic tool of issue linkages.
8. The SEA established formal powers in the area of the environment, though.
9. This section was quoted by Commissioner Frans Andriessen in an intervention to the informal meeting of agricultural ministers in Denmark, September 6-8 1987.
11. The process of redefining the interest of the farming population was slow with farmers, originally rejecting the notion of receiving direct income support, instead of indirect aid via price supports. The tension has been visible in a number of Parliamentary debates and is reflected in the publications of the COPA. In my Ph.D. dissertation I discuss in some more depth how the changing institutional environment shaped the farmers organizations' perceptions of the opportunity space, and in the end their policy interest (Lenschow, forthcoming).