Gendered Integration?
A Feminist Analysis of Nordic Membership in the European Union

Katie Verlin Laatikainen
University of South Carolina

Mailing Address:
535 West End Ave, 5F
New York, NY 10024
Tel. 212-501-9411

Introduction

As concerns are raised among members of the European Union about the consequences of enlargement during a period of renewed "Euro-sclerosis", there are parallel concerns in the new Nordic member states about the possible transformative aspects that membership will introduce into domestic society. Some of the most vocal skeptics of Nordic membership have been women who express concern about the effect membership will have on their status and position in these "woman-friendly" societies. The perceived threat that these women articulate suggests a new line of inquiry not only for the growing feminist IR literature, but also for integration analysis in general: is European integration gendered? This paper is a condensation of a larger study which examines the socio-political position of women in the new EU member-states Finland and Sweden as well as the policies and structures of the European Union to reveal the impact of the integration process on the lives of women in these Nordic societies. Using a feminist framework for analysis illuminates yet another dimension of the structural "democratic deficit" detailed elsewhere in the European integration literature.

In addition this study broadens the Feminist and IR theory interface by extending the subject of feminist inquiry into new areas of IR theory. Feminist approaches to International Relations theory have heretofore focused upon the patriarchal or masculine nature of international security and the concept of the state. These analyses take aim at revered concepts in IR theory such as the "State", "International Security" and "the National Interest" and reveal patterns of male domination and the systematic subjection of women which correspond to the widely chronicled inequality of women worldwide. There have also been feminist forays into development and comparative politics. However, the 'low politics' area of International Relations Theory, such as international cooperation and international integration which have as a normative focus the explanation and understanding of instances of

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1 I have chosen to limit my examination to the two new Nordic EU member-states, though the conditions of women (and their skepticism of the EU) in all these societies is roughly similar. As Norway has elected to remain outside the EU (in good measure because of the women's resounding no vote), the direct impact of the EU on the position of Norwegian women is of little relevance. Denmark has been a member of the European Community since 1972; most of Denmark's policies and legislation for women have been promulgated under conditions of membership. Nonetheless, as the polling information from the two Danish referenda on the Maastricht Treaty demonstrate, Danish women share with their northern neighbors a wariness of Europe.


3 See for instance Sue Ellen Charlton, Jane Everett, and Kathleen Staudt; eds Women, the State and Development, 1989.
international cooperation, remain unexplored in the burgeoning feminist IR literature. The present study begins to fill this gap in feminist IR theory by employing the feminist conceptualization of public/private spheres and productive/reproductive functions to analyze the process of European integration and its impact on Nordic women.

I will begin this analysis by elaborating and reformulating the feminist framework of public and private spheres in the following section. The feminist framework of public and private spheres is refined by adding the functional dichotomy of production and reproduction which often is conflated with the public private dichotomy. I examine the feminist critique of the liberal state with this framework, and then show how certain kinds of social welfare state policies can ameliorate the functional dichotomy of public and private spheres.

In Part II, I examine the propitious situation of Finnish and Swedish women. They have the highest political representation rates in the world, and their position on the labor market is much better than their counterparts elsewhere. This happy state of affairs is explained as I apply the feminist framework of public/private and production/reproduction to the social history of women in Finland and Sweden. The policies emanating from the equality-sex role debates of the 1960's encouraged the integration of reproduction and care work that was previously private to emerge onto the public sphere, which gave women a stronger position in the public sphere vis-a-vis men and productive activities.

In Part III, the structure of Europe as envisioned under the Maastricht Treaty is elaborated. The weakness of the political decision-making procedures, along with the structural impediments inherent in Subsidarity, discourages the integration of social reproduction with production. Part IV then details the implications of this gendered structure for Swedish and Finnish women.

I. A Theoretical Framework for Analysis: Public/Private Spheres and Productive/Reproductive Functions

The state of feminist scholarship today is diverse and fragmented; feminists disagree on as many issues amongst themselves as they do with more mainstream political theorists. From liberal feminism to marxist feminism, from radical feminists to cultural feminists, the perspectives on and prescriptions for women and society are often contradictory. However, as Drude Dahlerup notes, most feminists share a basic consensus that the split between the public and private spheres has been and remains detrimental for women.\(^4\) Unfortunately, there has been little consensus over the conceptualization of these terms, and they are often used with the assumption that the reader knows the conceptual boundaries of these spheres.

The terms are generally used dichotomously and are considered mutually exclusive as Elshtain has argued, "No private sphere as a conceptually demarcated and socially determined dimension within a wider social life can exist without some public world as a contrast." Often one sphere is defined and emphasized, and the other is a repository for all other activities. For instance, Dahlerup limits the concept of "public" to denote action by the state, and all else is private, i.e. industrial production ("private enterprise"), various non-governmental associations and organizations, and of course the family. These studies by Elshtain and Dahlerup emphasize how women have been consigned to the private sphere throughout history.

On the other hand, Carole Pateman's feminist critique is more closely focused upon the conditions of the public/private dichotomy under liberalism and capitalist production. In addition to the political relationships of the polis, Pateman's "public" includes those social/economic activities of market relations: they are opposite sides of the same liberal civic society. In bourgeois liberal theory, the "public" is seen as separate and independent of relationships in the domestic, "private" realm; citizens and consumer/producers as part of civil society are properly political (i.e. subject to state intervention, support, regulation or the like) while the domestic or household sphere of the private is unrelated to activities in the "public".

Each of these examples has suggested that the public and private are not simply separate realms of social life but rather realms whose activities are assumed to be autonomous from each other. I contend that part of the definitional problem concerning the "public" and "private" is that most conceptualizations conflate the spatial arrangements of public and private with functional understanding of production and reproduction. Eisenstein observes how the division of public and private realms is congruent with different social activities which therefore creates sexual classes. "By relegating woman to her supposedly biological role, as a mother, she is sidelined into the private sphere of home and family. Because patriarchal ideology presents motherhood as natural, woman's assignment to the private sphere and dismissal from the public realm is argued as a defense of the natural order of things." A functionalist understanding of women, based upon a woman's ability to bear children, has been a consistent theme of Western political thought, as both Susan Okin and Jean Bethke Elshtain have detailed. "In Plato's second-best polis and in Aristotle's preferred

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one, in Rousseau's close-knit democratic republic and even to a large extent in Mill's liberal state, the sphere of public life is in many respects premised on the existence of the private sphere of a family whose demands define woman's function and lifestyle and exclude her from equal participation and status in the world of economic and public life.⁹

Some conceptual clarity might be gained if we examine more closely the implicit arrangement of social functions that undergird all these formulations of public and private, namely production and reproduction. Production refers to the cultivation, extraction, creation or manipulation of the physical world to sustain life; in the modern world, this occurs through commodity production and servicing either through the capitalist labor market or through Weberian administrative bureaucracies. Reproduction, on the other hand, refers not only to physical human reproduction but also to care of dependent members of society, i.e. the young, the sick and disabled, and the elderly. This care-work is sometimes termed social reproduction. "Caring differs fundamentally from the production of objects, a difference which does not lie in the hierarchical organization or the wages, but in the accomplishments required by the different tasks, and in the social experiences that each task entails."¹⁰

Maintaining a functional understanding of production and reproduction does not imply an inevitable functional understanding of women. Leira, Eisenstein and Dinnerstein among others have distinguished the biological and political elements of motherhood, noting that while only women can bear children (a biological fact), nothing suggests that only women can rear children (a political decision or cultural practice).

In formulating my conceptualization of public and private, I have chosen to separate the dichotomies of public/private and production/reproduction. I define public and private spatially, and retain the functionality of reproductive and productive processes. The private sphere is the household, which may contain an extended family, an nuclear family, co-habiting couples or a single-parent family. At a recent Nordic conference, a household or family was conceptualized as those who eat out of the same refrigerator. For this study, the crucial conceptualization of the private sphere is anchored upon the household, which remains much more constant spatially than the varying forms of family over the ages. I agree with Leira that the public is the realm in which "the state, central or local, claims some form of control or responsibility", either through administration, subsidies, regulation or the like.¹¹

My conceptualization of these two realms is not necessarily mutually exclusive: informal relationships such as friendship or helping neighbors do not fit neatly into either the public or the private as I have defined it. However, creating a more concise notion of public and private allows a more precise examination of the various arrangements of production and reproduction within these spheres over time. Table one offers a summary of public and

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¹¹ Leira, 1993, p.35.
private realms in different epochs as well as examining the arrangements of production and reproduction.

Table one suggests that Eisenstein exaggerates her case when she argues that "Although the meaning of 'public' and 'private' changes in concrete ways, the assignment of public space to men and private space to women is continuous in Western history." 12 More accurate is Drude Dahlerup's contention that "the public-private split does not always equal a male/female distinction."13 What is implicit in Dahlerup's view is that the public/private split has not always equalled a productive/reproductive distinction. Certainly women, given their reproductive capacities, have been confined to the private, household sphere throughout Western history; however, men have been present in both spheres, as slaves during the classical era and as serfs during the feudal era. More importantly, however, there has not been as consistent a sexual distinction with respect to productive and reproductive functions. In their examination of the transition from peasant to bourgeois middle class life, the ethnographers Jonas Fryckman and Orvar Löfgren describe how peasant men and women both engaged in productive activities as a household.

Marriage was of course a foundation for both production and reproduction in peasant society, but twosomeness did not have the same emotional and symbolic value it was later to acquire. The couple was simply a component of the economy of self-sufficiency...Farm production was based on a well-tried and efficient division of labor between men and women...The men often spent more days on the road than behind the plow, working at a variety of jobs scattered over a wide area. The fact that the man of the house was often away from home meant that the womenfolk had a greater responsibility for day-to-day work on the farm and also created a need for cooperation among women in neighboring farms and from different generations. 14

It is clear from this illustration that women rarely left the household and ventured into the wider public sphere, but it also shows that women engaged in productive work within the household sphere. What one finds historically using the two dimensions of public/private and production/social reproduction is intriguing—while theorists such as Elshtain are correct in seeing a universal assignment of women to the private sphere, by introducing the dimension of production/reproduction one can observe how throughout most of Western history there has been a recognition of the inter-relationship between the functions of production and reproduction, even if they have been asymmetrically valued.

13 Dahlerup, 1987, p 105
14 Jonas Fryckman and Orvar Löfgren. *Culture Builders: A Historical Anthropology of Middle Class Life*, 1987, p. 92
### TABLE ONE. PUBLIC/PRIVATE AND PRODUCTION/REPRODUCTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

#### EARLY PASTORAL SOCIETIES

| No distinction between Public and Private | Productive (cultivative and husbandry) and social reproductive processes occur class and tribes of limited size. The limited size of these early societies did not allow for a distinction between the household, private sphere and the public sphere. Anthropological studies suggest that while there is sex role difference in specific types of work, both men and women engage in both productive and reproductive activities |

#### ANCIENT GREECE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Public Realm</th>
<th>The State</th>
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<td>The Family</td>
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<tr>
<th>Private Realm</th>
<th>Production and Social Reproduction via slaves and family</th>
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<td></td>
<td>The Athenian polis reinforced the state form that had emerged with the first civilizations c. 3300 B.C. Male citizens were directly active in the affairs of the state (i.e., to declare war on Sparta or not?) the public state realm was fairly distinct from the household sphere where wives, children, and slaves were responsible for both production and reproduction. Note: Only proper men could be citizens, but in the private sphere both men and women engage in both productive and reproductive activities</td>
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#### FEUDAL EUROPE

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<th>Public Realm</th>
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<td>The Church?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Private Sphere</th>
<th>Production and Social Reproduction</th>
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<tr>
<td>Production and Social Reproduction continue to function within the household sphere as families and serfs, men and women, engage in both productive and reproductive activities</td>
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#### BOURgeois CAPITALIST SOCIETY

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<th>Public Realm</th>
<th>The State</th>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial Production</td>
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<th>Private Sphere</th>
<th>Social Reproduction via the family</th>
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<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Production becomes subject to regulation and subsidization by state expenditure, and state activities expanded to include protecting industrial production. Social reproduction is relegated to the private household sphere, free from state or public authority. Hence, the dichotomy between private and public gains a functional dimension under conditions of bourgeois capitalism</td>
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### NORDIC SOCIAL WELFARE SOCIETY

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<th>Public Realm</th>
<th>The State</th>
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<tr>
<td>Industrial Production (corporatism)</td>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<tr>
<th>Private Sphere</th>
<th>The Family</th>
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The first wave of social democracies saw the establishment of the social insurance system, first by legislation then extended in corporatist bargaining procedures. These measures were introduced to enhance the productive processes through pensions and unemployment protection. The second wave extends social policy to social reproduction via the state's involvement in and responsibility for caregiving services such as health care, home help and daycare. Tension exists between the demands for state assistance to production (support to industry) and the newer support of reproduction. The significance is that the division between public and private transcends the sexual, functional division that it had under conditions of bourgeois capitalism. The private, household sphere is the domain of the emotive family.

### EUROPEAN UNION

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<th>Public Realm</th>
<th>EU Institutions</th>
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<td>Industrial Production</td>
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<tr>
<th>Private Realm</th>
<th>Social Policy via Subsidiarity</th>
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The structure of the European Union as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty centralizes economic and monetary policies in support of the single market. Social policy should not intrude with this primary integrative effort. Social policies specifically designed for gender equality target women in the workplace and do not integrate productive and reproductive aspects of women's lives. The Subsidiarity principle prevents the centralization of social policy on the European level. Consequently the countervailing power of reproduction to production is lost and a new functional dichotomy between the public, European realm and the private realm of social policy is established. The centralization of economic and monetary policy on the European level entails the loss of the macroeconomic instruments on the national level, inhibiting the ability to undertake social services.
The Feminist Critique of Liberalism

The creation of separate functional spheres appears to be a novelty of liberal capitalism. The interrelationship between production and social reproduction within the household was severed when efficient industrial production through wage labor in factories was introduced. For the first time, production and reproduction were in ideology and practice distinct spheres of activity held to be unrelated. Whereas women were once both productive and reproductive agents within an integrated household unit, albeit subject the worst forms of legal discrimination and subjection, under conditions of bourgeois capitalism women are consigned to the private sphere based upon a functionalist understanding of women and their reproductive capacities. Indeed, the efficiency of industrial capitalism in fact is premised upon this assignment of production and reproduction to separate spheres.

Perhaps two of the best examples of these feminist critiques of liberalism are the penetrating analyses by Zillah Eisenstein and Carole Pateman. They contend that the patriarchal character of liberalism is more insidious than the blatant misogyny of earlier political thought or practice. Liberal thought and the associated practice of industrial capitalism assumes the separation of production and social reproduction into autonomous realms of life whose activities are considered to be unrelated. By assigning production and reproduction to separate spheres, bourgeois liberalism masks the subjection of women to men in an apparently universal theory of individualism. The exclusion of women goes unnoticed because the liberal assumes that the public/private distinction applies to all people in the same way. Yet, the two spheres have completely different forms of association free association by "individuals" in the market place (an individual who contracts his labor for a wage) and the polis (one man, one vote) is governed by universal, impersonal, and conventional criteria, while the relations in the household or "private" sphere continued to exhibit "natural", functional subordination

These differing forms of association are no accident, particularly when political liberalism is translated into liberal economics. "Individualization", argues Anneli Anttonen, "in terms of civic, political and social rights was originally a deeply masculine project in which the personal autonomy and economic independence of men required the subordination of women: unlimited personal autonomy cannot be a universal right." Pateman and Eisenstein have illustrated how capitalist industrial production, in order to function as efficiently as possible, requires workers/individuals who are free from (reproductive) demands in the private sphere. The extensive demands of social reproduction, from attending to sick children or elderly parents, require more flexibility in workers' schedules than production

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managers and the demands of efficiency are likely to offer. It is precisely the de-linking of
the costs of social reproduction which makes industrial production so efficient. The
implication of functional differentiation in public and private spheres under liberalism is this:
individualism in the public sphere, particularly for productive activities outside the household,
is tenable only if one who cannot act as an autonomous individual can undertake the
responsibility and unpaid labor of social reproduction within the household. To obtain the
gains of efficiency that industrial production promises, workers entering into wage labor enter
as individuals, free from the unrelativizable and time consuming work of social reproduction.
The demands of care work and social reproduction do not allow for individuation. As
Anttonen suggests, "Autonomy defined in economic terms is a profoundly masculine ideal,
because there are always people—children, the elderly, and the handicapped—who need care."17
It is women who are charged with this care work.

Because of the long-standing functional understanding of women's role in society, i.e.
their ability to bear children and their "natural" affinity for care-giving, women have borne the
lion(ess)'s share of social reproduction in the private sphere, even as they become
increasingly active in the public sphere of production. This functional understanding of
women has prevented them from full participation as individuals despite the ostensible
universality of individualism. Okin suggests that "The continuing inequality of women, and
not only of those in the work force, clearly performs important functions for the capitalist
economy."18 Eisenstein agrees. "The market itself tries to reinforce the sexual hierarchy of
patriarchy that indirectly bolsters woman's primary role as a mother. Both the choices of
work open to her in the market and the wages she can earn keep her in a secondary position
to men."19 Women are thus charged with the unpaid and unacknowledged responsibility for
physical and social reproduction in the private sphere and cannot therefore attain the sort of
individualism in the public sphere that liberalism confers as its greatest gift.

As Pateman argues, precisely because liberalism conceptualizes civil society in
abstraction from the ascriptive domestic sphere, the latter and the women who "work" there
are ignored in most liberal theoretical discussion. Okin contends, "There is no denying that
what housewives and mothers do is work, nor that it is necessary. However, it is frequently
not regarded as work: 'working mothers' are mothers who work outside the homes, only. The
bearing and rearing of children, particularly in this age of population consciousness, are all
too frequently perceived as the luxury and indulgence of private life, rather than as a process
of overwhelming social importance."20 Indeed, economists have only recently recognized
enormity of the "hidden economy" of the household sphere and economic analysis continues

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to run up against the difficulty of addressing the contributions of housewives and the unpaid social and reproductive work that women continue to undertake privately.

This (unpaid and unacknowledged) social reproductive work that women undertake based upon their functional capacity inhibits their ability to participate as fully integrated members of the public sphere. This is the reason why women continue to face inequality despite the extension of political franchise and labor market opportunities to them. That such formal measures for equality have had so little impact in raising the status of women reveals how liberalism in fact depends upon a subordinate position of women. Obtaining franchise was but the first step toward individualism for women by giving them a connection to a social order not based upon family or ascriptive relationships; however, it was not sufficient because women were not otherwise engaged in the public sphere. So long as women continue to be overwhelmingly responsible for social reproduction in the private sphere, and numerous time-use studies have shown this to be the case even today, women are unable to participate as fully individualized as men in the public sphere. The universal individualism of liberalism that effectively excludes women.

Fundamentally, the feminist critique of liberalism is that for the first time, the historically dichotomous spheres of public and private have become sexually differentiated and valued. This is not to idealize the condition of women under feudal or earlier eras. The absolute repression of women throughout these earlier eras was embedded in law and practice. Eisenstein argues that liberalism plays an important role in sundering ascriptive bonds and introducing the concepts of individual freedom. However, Eisenstein's conclusion is that liberalism holds inherent and irreconcilable contradictions for women. "While the liberal underpinnings of feminist theory are essential to feminism (i.e., individuals free from ascribed bonds or functionalist definitions), the patriarchal underpinnings of liberal theory are indispensable to liberalism. This is the contradictory reality that defines the problem." Are feminist aims of equality compatible with liberal practice? Is there a way to recognize the interrelationship between production and reproduction in liberal societies? The growth of the welfare state during the second half of the twentieth century can be seen as the most extensive test yet of this question.

The Welfare State: A Friend of Women?

It is of course true that most Western societies are not liberal in the strictest sense as presented in the above discussion. Moan Harrington has argued that this liberal state that her feminist colleagues bemoan is merely an abstraction: in most Western liberal societies, there is a welfare state which implicitly recognizes the inter-relationship of the public and private

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spheres. She points to a social liberal tradition which mediates the excesses of the atomistic, individualist liberal state of times past. As Harrington has argued, varying degrees and types of social welfare legislation in these societies imply recognition that the two spheres are not completely separate. What Harrington fails to do, however, is to explicate the kind of social welfare that a society supports. Can the welfare state go beyond a "male model of work, a model which assumes that the worker adjusts personal life to the job rather than the job taking into account personal needs." 23

Anneli Anttonen has identified the critical difference when she distinguishes between social insurance welfare state and the social service welfare state. The social insurance state encompasses all those policies that guarantees the basic economic security of citizens, usually through their labor market activities. The social service state includes what has been called maternal social policies, or those that support reproduction. "The domain of feminine social policy is characterized by such determinants as motherhood, caring, nursing, helping, upbringing and education--the whole sphere of social reproduction." 25

From a woman's perspective, particularly if she is an unpaid housewife or employed only part-time in order to engage in social reproductive work in the household, welfare policies that support or subsidize production are unlikely to do much to benefit the housewife or relieve her double burden if she is employed outside the home. Some types of social policy do nothing to integrate and in fact may reinforce the dichotomous pattern of public production and private reproduction, i.e. unemployment insurance or contributory pension schemes. Only when social welfare policy focuses directly upon the activities of reproduction and care-giving is there a societal recognition of the interrelationship between production and reproduction. "If women are to be equal workers and citizens with men," argues Susan Okin,

then not only must women attain equal pay for comparable work, and equal representation, but workers and citizens must also be able to be parents, or care-givers for elderly parents...It also requires that the responsibilities of the previously "non-political" private sphere be shared These all too necessary changes require political action as well as changes in the behavior of individual

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23 Anne Showstack Sassoon, Women and the State, 1987, p. 31.


men and women...

Pension programs, when undertaken as part of public social policy, begin to address the aspects of social reproduction by alleviating the care-giving aspects of the elderly. Of crucial importance for women are social welfare policies that recognize more explicitly the interrelationship between production and reproduction: such policies could include public responsibility for providing day care, child care allowances, maternity and paternity parental leave for women and men who want to participate fully in both the labor market and social reproduction. Home help services for the elderly or infirm are another explicit link between the state and care policies. For women who elect to remain active in private care-giving within the home, the state may provide a care-giver's pension as well as monetary or other support for care-giving activities within the home. Such policies bring women (and social reproduction) into the public sphere: the private burden of care-work for employed mothers is eased through state support of child-care while home-maker's care-giving activities are recognized as politically important enough to receive public support and subsidies. In effect, social service welfare policies re-establish the link between production and reproduction by elevating social reproduction to the public sphere. With such public care-giving services, the functional dichotomy between the public and private spheres is blurred.

Feminist analysts such as Pateman and Eisenstein argue that women's full and equal participation in the public sphere of production is impossible without such integration of the productive and reproductive functions. Child care and housework which were once the preserve of unpaid labor of women as wives allowed the worker-husband-father to be free of private, reproductive duties. Formal or legal equality for women in the public sphere, even equal pay provisions, cannot account for the hidden and private burdens of social reproduction assigned to women. Furthermore, time-use studies have shown that it is women who continue to bear most of the burden of unpaid and privatized care-work which hampers their full participation in productive (and paid) activities. Obviously those societies that recognize and accommodate the interrelationship of productive and reproductive functions offer a political environment that facilitates the full participation of women.

Helga Marie Hernes remains suspicious of the benefits of "reproduction going public". For Hernes, the growth of state support of social services and care-giving has only had the effect of transferring women's dependence from men and husbands in the private sphere to a new type of dependence on the state. For Hernes, women's status and relation to the welfare state, as citizens, as clients and consumers of welfare state services, and as employees, is fundamentally different than men's. She argues that women are more dependent on state policies than men, a contention that is clearly dubious if one considers state subsidies

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26 Okin, 1992, p. 323.

to industry and corporate welfare. Indeed, women are more often on public payrolls than men, but we should not be blind to the long history of state support of industry through work creation schemes and industrial subsidies: the state's support of production may be more indirect, but it is still public support.

Anette Borchorst and Birte Siim add their skepticism to the discussion of the welfare state. They argue that the welfare state has institutionalized the burden of women's double work day: the contradictions between the paid work in the public sphere and unpaid work in the private sphere is borne by women, and men's dominance in the public sphere continues unabated. Aside from their messy use of 'public' by which I presume they mean production, there is nothing truly new in women having two roles: women have in previous eras undertaken both productive and reproductive activities. Their criticism, which is fair, is that under current conditions, men do not undertake private reproductive responsibilities equally with women. However, this fault cannot be laid at the door of public social policy: it is a behavioral and attitudinal problem. We must not forget, Raija Julkunen argues, that

It is as welfare state citizens, clients, users and professionals that women have been integrated into the public sphere... (Precisely because women are not influential in productive channels), they are compelled to realize their interests through the state. Women are thus more dependent on the state than men, and conversely, the state means more to them than to men. Women's life strategies and collective emancipatory struggles need the state.

We now have a framework by which we can assess the configuration of production and reproduction in any given society. Does a given society value production and reproduction equally? Does a society attempt to integrate or segregate the functions of production and reproduction? Because of their functional ability to bear children (and the presumed attendant features of nurturance), women are responsible for care-giving; public policies that support social reproduction are therefore of benefit to all women whether they are private care-givers or employed in the labor market. Only through publicly supported care services can welfare states begin to transcend the functional distinctions between public and private spheres that have proven so detrimental to women. Social insurance, the more common understanding of social welfare policy, merely reinforces productive activities. State support for reproduction, through subsidies, financial transfers or direct supply of services, places reproduction in the same sphere with production. Public care-giving offers women, who have so long labored unseen and unpaid within the private sphere, a countervailing power to that which production in the public sphere. While often social reproduction is evaluated as a cost and production a contribution to society, public support for reproductive

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activities begins to redress this imbalance and recognize the importance of reproduction to society.

II. The Nordic Case: Public-Private and Production-Reproduction in Finland and Sweden

The Nordic states provide an interesting case within this theoretical construct. On nearly every indicator of the status of women in society, Nordic states are presented as the most "woman-friendly" in the world. On the UNDP's Human Development Index, the Nordic countries consistently rate the highest on the gender sensitive index, significantly higher than their European counterparts (See table 2). Women have gone farthest in the Nordic region in terms of gaining equality with men in the public sphere: roughly 40% of the political representatives in these countries are women, and the Social Democratic parties in the Nordic region have committed themselves to gender quotas to increase the number of women in political leadership positions. For instance, in the newly elected coalition government in Finland which is led by the Social Democrats, 7 of the 18 new ministers are women.

Elina Haavio-Mannila, in addition to being active in the Nordic sex role debates of the 1960s, has spent a good portion of her scholarly life investigating the position of women in Finland and the other Nordic countries. She finds that gender differences among men and women are least notable in Finland, and most perceptible in Norway and Iceland. She suggests that all Nordic women have made considerable advances in the (public) arena compared with other Western women, but share many of the same difficulties of continued responsibility within the home. After examining more closely the socio-economic position of Swedish and Finnish women, I will apply the feminist framework detailed in the previous section.

Finnish and Swedish Women in the Public Sphere

1) Politics

The first women to obtain franchise in Europe were Finnish: in 1906, women were enfranchised at the same time as Finnish men during Finland's long effort for increased autonomy as a Russian duchy. Nineteen women were elected to Finland's first parliament, including the most beloved Finnish parliamentarian Miina Sillenpaa. Even before obtaining franchise, Finnish women were organizing and fighting for equality. The first real feminist organization was the Finnish Women's Association, founded in 1884, whose agenda included complete equality in suffrage, education, professional training, and pay. A later offshoot was the Women's Rights Union, whose program was more radical and aggressive. Soon after, the

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
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<th>% Difference HDI &amp; Gender Adjusted HDI</th>
<th>Ave. Female/Male Ratio</th>
<th>Females as a % of Males:</th>
<th>Life Expectancy*</th>
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* Adjusted for natural biological life expectancy advantage for females
repeal of legal obstacles for women began, culminating in 1929 with full legal independent status for women even upon marriage. The efforts to increase legal equality between men and women in Sweden and Finland are detailed in Annex 1, which offers some comparative data on women's representation in a number of political arenas. In the March 1994, the National Council of Women, an umbrella organization, had hopes of electing 101 women to Parliament, making Finland the first country to ever have a majority of women in Parliament. Only 67 women were elected to the 200 seat parliament, which is actually a decrease of ten from the previous parliament. Another signpost of increasing women's presence is the tight presidential race last year between Elizabeth Rehn and Matti Ahtisaari who was the eventual winner. (It should be noted that Norway has long had a very popular female head of state, Gro Harlem Brundtland).

Sweden was actually the last Nordic state to offer women full franchise in 1921, though full independence for women, including married women, was attained at this time as well. But Sweden over these seven decades has charged ahead of even her Nordic neighbors to become, in the words of the Council of Europe, "far and away the model country" in terms of political equality for women. Maud Eduards has shown that women were reticent voters in the 1920's, but today women are more numerous at the polls where turnout averages about 80%. In the general election of November 1994, women made up 41% of the Riksdag's 349 members, a world record. Of the ruling Social Democratic party, there are equal numbers of male and female parliamentarians, eleven of the current 22 cabinet members are women.

Political representation is changing qualitatively as well. While women have long been present in Nordic governments and parliamentary committees, Haavio-Mannila and Skard have shown that women have been overwhelmingly assigned to "...issues connected with women's traditional role--primarily social policies and educational and cultural matters. It is conceivable that women themselves have preferred social policy and education committees because of their interest in these issues, their belief in their importance, and the fact that they have felt most competent in these areas. It is also possible that men have been unwilling to allow women into "their" strongholds, or that competition for the finance, trade and industry committees has been so fierce that women have not stood the pace." 32 Jaana Kuusipalo has identified an informal quota that has functioned in Finnish politics wherein women have been almost assured leadership positions in the areas of social policy and health and education. "Women have been allowed to get power, but even in top-level politics, they have been pushed to their sectors and isolated there." 33

However, in the new Finnish and Swedish governments, women have broken the old sexual division of labor that dominated in older governments: Sweden's government has women in the ministerial posts for Foreign Affairs, the European Union, Justice, Public Administration as well as the traditional post of Culture, while the stronghold of women, Social Affairs, is held by a man. In the former Finnish government, Elizabeth Rehn served as a popular Minister of Defense; in the newly elected government of March 1995, the ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defense, Second Finance, Transportation, Labor (a critically important post during a period of high unemployment) are women. Women can be found in the expected Ministerial posts of Health and Social Affairs as well. Haavio-Mannila and Skard report that with the growing number of women in Parliament, more women are active in Parliamentary committees beyond the areas of 'women's traditional expertise' such as health and social affairs, particularly in the areas of justice, interior, and foreign affairs.

Leadership of the civil service appears to be less representative of women than the elected positions of parliament despite the large presence of women employed by the public sector. Hernes and Hanninen-Salmelin discover that Finland has more women bureaucrats than any other Nordic country. 26% of all civil servants up to the level of first secretary are women; Finnish women also have a higher number of top bureaucratic posts, but it is a mere 6%. In Sweden, only 2% of top level bureaucrats are women.34 This may be remedied in Sweden since the Commission on Women's Representation Report, "Every Other Seat for Women (1987)" which has as an objective 30% representation on national directorates, official commissions, committees and boards by 1993 and full equality by 1998. The specter of legal requirements has been raised in light of the failure of voluntary efforts.

Women have steadily increased their presence in local politics as well. About one-third of the seats on the local councils are held by women, though Sirkka Sinkkonen finds a strong horizontal and vertical division of labor in the local governments. The vertical division mirrors that found on the national level, with men dominating the committees that deal with issues of the productive sector, such as roads, harbors, traffic, building and so on, while women are more often found on committees dealing with health, education, culture, libraries, child care and social affairs. However, even in those local committees where women predominate, there is often a men in a leadership position (See Annex 2). Sirkkonen finds that if Finland, when women are found in leadership positions in local government, it is usually in rural, geographically remote areas.35

All of the Finnish parties and most of the Swedish parties have composite women's groups which are of varying significance for the formulation of party policy. These women's groups acts as specialists in certain areas, notably children, family and elderly policies. They have also introduced practical work into the community by opening kindergartens, elder


homes, family planning centers, and many innovative social policies. Many of these functions have been overtaken by the state, with the approval of women's groups. They also act as pressure groups within the parties. "the fact that the Swedish SDP has had "jamstalldhet" or equality of status in the party manifesto since the 1960's, and that the party has become well known outside Sweden for its equal rights policies is undoubtedly due to the strong women's federation within that party." 36 The Swedish SDP's women's group has offered opinions on a number of issues and not all of them are "women's concerns", i.e. nuclear power

Unlike Denmark and Norway where women's groups have a more independent, outsider approach to the political establishment, in Sweden and Finland women's issues have been integrated into the platforms of the established parties, with varying emphases. Kandolin and Uusitalo argue that women in Finland have been fairly successful at organizing within the party system and have been much more closely allied to the political institutions than in the other Nordic countries, "a fact that should be viewed against the background of greater sex equality in many fields in Finland the length of education is more equal, more women have full-time paid work, there is less segregation in the labor market, and there is a relatively high proportion of women in the bureaucracy." 37 In Sweden, the firm position of women in the dominant SDP has incorporated women's concerns into the system. The most obvious example of the institutionalization of the fight for equality in Sweden and Finland are the Councils for Equality that have been established under their respective Ministries for Social Affairs. These Councils act as advisory bodies to Parliament and, along with the Equality Ombudsman in each country, are responsible for promoting the measures of equality legislation. Furthermore, they are often originators of legislative initiatives, promote research on women, and cooperate in international efforts on behalf of women.

Finland and Sweden continue to strengthen and expand legislation that promotes equality. Sweden enacted a new Equal Opportunities Act in 1992, and Finland expanded their Act on Equality in 1994. Both pieces of legislation are quite similar and have two functions: first to ban discrimination based upon sex, and secondly to compel employers to promote equality in the workplace. Equality in working conditions and opportunities are ensconced in law; if an employee or applicant is a victim of discrimination, they have recourse to union representation at the Labor Court or may apply for help directly from the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman. In Finland, pro-active measures have been taken as the Equal Opportunity Act has been expanded to require that state and municipal bodies reach equality through targeted recruitment and training programs. This has already had a salutary effect on the number of women active in leadership positions in municipal and county boards.

The mixed institutional milieu of Nordic corporatism, with its myriad committee systems, public boards and councils where collaboration occurs between interest organizations

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37 Cited in Unfinished Democracy, 1985, p. 32.
and the administration, is not as open to women as the parliamentary system. Women remain a tiny minority on the seats of public boards (See annex 2), an important condition as these entities grow in importance and influence in managing, advising, coordinating, and formulating legislation in specific fields. Helga Marie Hernes and Eva Hanninen-Salmelin suggest that women’s weak position in the corporate arena is attributed to 1) the powerlessness of women in the agencies and institutions that are the principle actors in this system, i.e. administration, universities and economic organizations, and 2) those organizations in which women predominate are marginal to the functioning of the corporatist system. "The power which is exercised is the a product of an historically evolved exchange agreement between major institutions (employers and unions) where men define, negotiate, and reach decisions (of public importance)."38 Although women have a strong presence in the labor market, they have no share of the control of power in that labor market. (See Table 4, Number 6) However, the poor representation on the public boards may be ameliorated by legislative action taken in Sweden and Finland to increase women’s representation. Skard and Haavio-Mannila are able to generalize about the role women play in Nordic politics. "Specialization occurs in politics--in general, women concentrate on questions relating to reproduction and men converge on matters of production in society. In this way women are able to utilize their experience and insight from traditional women’s fields, although at the same time they are denied opportunities of acquiring skills and influencing the production and planning of society."39

2) Labor Market

Women constitute nearly one half of the labor market in Finland: 52% of the salaried wage earners and of the 359,000 entrepreneurs or self-employed in Finland, women account for 35% of the total. Of all Finnish women, 72% are engaged in the labor market. Of all women employed, some 35% work in the public sector, but women predominate in this area: sixty-four percent of all public sector employment is held by women. In the private sector, women occupy 41% of the positions, 59% of private sector employment is held by men. In contrast to their Swedish counterparts, Finnish women overwhelmingly work full-time. However, they are remunerated at a rate of 69.4% of men.

Segregation in the labor market is entrenched. Surveys have shown that 13 of 20 main occupations were clearly gender dominated, with 80% of those employed in that occupation being either men or women. Female dominated occupations include child-minders, home-minders and home-helpers, cleaners, auxiliary nurses and orderlies, nurses, sisters, lab and dental assistants, housekeepers, chefs and cooks, welfare workers, nursery school teachers, general clerical staff, cashiers, bank employees, secretaries.


39 Skard and Haavio-Mannila, p. 80.

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and typists. Male dominated fields were more closely associated with production machinists, fitters, engine repairers, civil, electrical, mechanical engineers, building machine operators, woodworkers, joiners, and carpenters, plumbers, metal workers, and company /organizational directors. Occupations with balanced representation between the sexes includes farmers and foresters, teachers, agricultural laborers, and shop workers/managers.

Swedish women constitute 48% of the labor force. 81% of all women aged 20-64 are active on the labor market. However, 40% of employed women work part-time (6% of men work part-time) in traditionally "female" occupations of carework and clerical or office work. The proportion of women employed by the public bodies is 67.3% in Sweden. As in Finland, there is a high degree of labor market segregation between men and women. Around 35% of women are in occupations dominated (9 of 10) by women, while 40% of men work in occupations where 9 out of 10 employed are men. Occupations dominated by women include child-care, nursing, care of the elderly, routine industrial jobs and office work. Of the 52 occupational fields that the labor ministry surveys annually, only five have an equal balance of men and women. There is a wage differential between men and women that work full time. These women earn about 80% of men's earnings, which is much higher than many women in the Western world. Most of the pay differential between Swedish men and women is attributable to women's predominance in part-time work.

Leadership by women in the private sector is discouraging. Just under 10% of the managers in the Swedish private sector are women, and less than one half of one percent have obtained the most senior managerial positions. In the Swedish public sector, 30% of managerial posts are "manned" by women.

Less readily accessible is the entrepreneurship which women are increasingly drawn to in Sweden. Women entrepreneurs are found in the service trades, often as sole providers, that seldom come into contact with the formal labor market and trade associations. Entrepreneurship may be the only means of support that women can find, especially in sparsely populated rural regions without many formal labor market opportunities. In a 1992 survey, 60% of the women who started their own companies did so because they wanted to realize an idea or work independently. Twenty-five percent started their own company as a result of unemployment, but only 6% started their company because they saw a need for their service or product. Women have often faced hurdles in sounding out ideas or applying for loans because banks and corporate advisors fail to take them seriously.

Haavio-Mannila attributes the high rate of Swedish and Finnish women's participation in the labor force to economic expansion and the need for labor in the post-WWII era. However, this is not a completely satisfying explanation. It leaves open the question of why the Nordic states, unlike Germany and Austria for instance, chose to recruit female labor rather than importing guest workers.

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40 This interesting discussion was found in Ingmarie Froman, "Sweden for Women", 1994.
Indeed, the idea of women leaving the household sphere where they had only engaged in care-work and reproduction is exposed as largely a myth in several historical anthologies on Finnish women. Pirjo Markkola describes the very late industrialization process in Finland, in 1940, 60% of the population was still engaged in forestry and agriculture and she shows how Finnish women continued to be active in productive efforts even when the bourgeois ideology called for a functional and sexual separation of public and private. Maritta Pohls suggests that because capitalism appeared simultaneously in agriculture and industry in Finland, and not as a consequence of the former, wage work became common for both Finnish men and women. Nordic women never really abandoned productive endeavors to the sole pursuit of social reproduction in the household private sphere. Women worked because it was a necessity, not a right. In this way, Nordic women may have advanced further in obtaining equality with men in the public sphere because they already had a foot in the door (of the public sphere).

While Nordic women still face labor market segregation and inequality in the Nordic system of centralized labor bargaining, as table 2 demonstrates they enjoy a superior equality to men than most of their female counterparts in Europe. Nordic women participate extensively in the labor market, and are remunerated at a higher rate than any other women in the world. In the political sphere, women have dramatically increased their presence. The political leadership positions are more and more often held by women. On a number of indicators, women in Sweden and Finland enjoy greater equality with men in the public sphere than is the case elsewhere. In the following section, I will show that the extensive participation of women in politics and labor market and the advantages that Swedish and Finnish women enjoy are the result of changes in the organization of social reproduction.

Applying the Framework

While all European states may be properly termed welfare states, very few of these European states have undertaken responsibility for social reproduction to the extent that the Nordic states have. Common to the European welfare state are various arrangements of social insurance. Esping-Andersen has investigated the corporatist systems of Europe and in his most recent study, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), he presents a comparative typology of European welfare states based upon these social insurance arrangements. Critics such as Ann Shola Orloff and Anneli Anttonen argue that this type of social welfare analysis with its narrow focus of social rights has become hegemonic in the mainstream analysis of the welfare state. They charge that more attention should be paid to the relationship between the family and the state and the expansion of the notion of social rights that such an approach

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would entail. This narrow focus surprises Anttonen and Sipila, "in view of the key importance of social care services, particularly to women, and in view of the fact that there are marked variations between different countries".

The development of publicly supported social care policies has been most extensive in the Nordic region of Europe. Hernes argues that there have been two great waves of social welfare innovation in the Nordic region. "The first wave of reforms affected mainly market activities and thus mainly men, leading to extensive organizational developments especially in the form of trade unions and employer organizations. The second wave has incorporated reproductive areas, such as maternal health, child care, care of the aged and sick, etc. socialization and schooling. All this work used to be carried out by women within the family or by charitable private organizations run by women." The first wave began during the great class compromises across the Nordic region in the 1930's, and the second wave of social reproduction welfare policies began in earnest in the 1970's as a result of the Nordic sex role debates.

The first wave of social welfare reform did very little to alter women's material circumstance, though Yvonne Hirdman explains how the great social compromise between labor and industry in Sweden depended upon an ongoing "gender contract". The peace between capital and labor was made possible because of an implicit gender contract based upon a notion of essential (functional) difference of the sexes. She describes the nature of this contract throughout the 20th century. From the 1920's through the 1950's, while unmarried women were allowed some room in the public sphere for employment, the ideal was based on a woman as being essentially different than men, her social mission being one of creating a strong and harmonious household. The most powerful women's group during in the 1920's and 1930's was the Swedish Housewives Association based entirely on the differences between men and women and the absence of any other element, employer, the breadwinner, or men in general is revealing. More than 80% of the women in urban areas defined themselves as housewives, and the reforms of the 1930's were modelled around a family that was assumed to have a housewife. Those who worked were considered a threat. While those like Alva and Gunnar Myrdal disagreed and sought to ease the integration of women into the public sphere of working life, the social engineers of the 1930's were concerned with

the position of mothers working in the home, and the problem of married women working outside the home. Although the focus of the 'small life' and women's primary situation--marriage and childbearing--was problematized and politicized, women were more or less shoved to the side...In fact, it was now as if women were becoming more 'social' while men, to a larger extent, were

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becoming more 'democratic'--i.e. as political creatures involved in matters of policy and in the activities of trade unions.  

The social contract between men, industry owners and wage-earners, during this first wave of social welfare reform was based upon equality, while the relationship between the sexes was based upon difference, with a purported equal status of the reproductive work that women undertook within the home.

During the 1950's, this notion of women's functional role in the home continued to dominate, but there was an effort to include women into the public sphere before and after they had served their primary responsibility as mothers. The economy was booming, and the need for labor was great. Women were to have dual roles, but not simultaneously. The state sought to reinforce this approach by allocating child allowances for mothers, and penalizing mothers who worked during a child's formative years.

The legitimization of the "housewife contract" began to break down in the 1960's with the advent of the sex-role debates in the Nordic region Elina Haavio-Mannila, Eva Moberg, Edmund Dahlstrom, and of course Alva Myrdal were all crucial participants. They were the principal spokes-people for a new societal gender contract based upon an understanding of women not as essentially different but as fundamentally similar. In addition to opening the discussion of discrimination and inequality in the work-place, emancipation from economic dependence was sought for those women that decided to stay within the home by providing them with state credits.

But foremost, the sex role participants rejected a functionalist understanding of women based upon their child-bearing capacity and a promoted the idea of the essential equality between men and women. A fundamental shift occurred in the gender contract from essential difference to essential similarity of the sexes. In Sweden, the debates were introduced by the Swedish Liberal Party; the Social Democratic Party quickly followed suit and adopted a platform of equality and outlined the societal changes that were required: expanded day-care, expansion of social services, broader solidarity between the sexes and a shorter work-day. In short, the SDP incorporated a new gender contract into the functioning of the welfare state. Whereas the Liberals were interested in fostering equality among individuals with consequence for personal, family relationships, Hirdman claims that the Social Democratic party sought to institutionalize equality politics.

The new social gender contract which was drafted during this period was therefore based on two primary participants: the woman, who was released to do work outside the home, and the state, which provided aid, mainly in the

form of day-care centers, new tax legislation, and parental leave insurance...\textsuperscript{46}

The Liberals' emphasis on equality among individuals rather than groups did have some impact. As Edmund Dahlstrom remarked during this period, they emphasized the need for a redistribution of roles and duties \textit{within the family} to increase the opportunity for women to assert their equality in a 'free' labor market. In the event, the role of the husband has become the focus of attention...(They) have stressed the need for the husband to share equally the responsibilities of educating the children and maintaining the household. They have pointed to the favorable consequences for men who contribute more actively to child care and household work and whose wives--on more equal terms--shoulder their own share of the burdens of working life.\textsuperscript{47}

These sex role debates introduced the second wave of social welfare innovation which continue to reverberate today. The doctrine of equality remains strong in the Nordic states and it is based, as Leira argues, on a model of the employed mother. Equality policies in themselves do not necessary constitute a threat to the gendered division of labor unless they re-establish the inter-dependence of production and reproduction in society. Equality based on similarity and not equal status of different functional activities requires that both men and women can and should be active as individuals in the public sphere and care-givers in the private sphere. Since individualism in the public sphere depends upon someone else taking responsibility for care work, in Scandinavia the relationship and conflicting demands of production and reproduction have been mediated through social care provisions supported by the state.

The Nordic reorganization of production and reproduction breaks down the functional dichotomy between public and private. Instead of a strict separation of production and reproduction into distinct spheres, social reproduction has as Hernes describes it, "gone public". The participation or support of the Nordic welfare state in a panoply of social care services transcends the functional dichotomy between public and private and helps individuals combine fulfillment in both productive work and social reproduction.

One area of policies, elder care and retirement pensions, stems from the first wave of social welfare reform. A basic state pension and guaranteed access to health services are the fundamentals of independence for the elderly in Finland and Sweden. Anttonen and Sipila suggest that the distinctive characteristic of services for the elderly in Scandinavia is universalism. Access to care, health services, and housing for the elderly is not based upon a pension or contributory scheme, rather, "universalism means that the right to any given

\textsuperscript{46} Hirdman, 1994, p 30.

service is based upon citizenship and on the need for care, not on insurance contributions or on poverty. State provisions for elder care include both housing and home help services as well as allowances for care in the home of the frail elderly. As Waerness and Leira have remarked, state support of elder care increases the independence of those cared for, i.e., they do not have to rely on family support, and it also increases the independence of adult children who might otherwise have to stay home to care for elderly parents. The Nordic states have some of the most extensive home help services that have enabled prolonged independence for the elderly. "In the Scandinavian countries, home help has not been introduced as an extension of health care with the aim of keeping old people out of institutions; at least so far it has rather been regarded as an independent welfare service."

Closer to the heart of the matter are the family policies of the state that help individuals combine working life and family life. The first step is family planning. In both Finland and Sweden, women decide on the spacing and number of children they wish to have. Family planning clinics and contraceptives are widely available. Abortions have been legal since the 1970's. Upon deciding to have children, obstetric care and health care for mother and child has been included in the general system of free health in both Sweden and Finland. The real juggling act between working life and family life begins with the birth of a child. The state assists this juggling act in two ways: entitlement to leaves of absence and by supporting child-care services. "The leaves of absence give priority to the carer aspects of parenthood when these conflict with the demands of employment, while state-funded day care encourages or facilitates expansion of earner aspects."

As Leira explains, all the Nordic policies express a preference for private, parental care for the early months of a newborn's life. Central authorities subsidize parental leave to a varying degree by ensuring job security and some proportion of income during leave. In Sweden, a leave of absence with parental benefit is provided for a total of 15 months at 90% compensation of gross income for the first 12 months and a fixed daily rate of 60 SEK for the remaining 3 months. Parents who are not employed before the birth of a child receive the fixed daily rate for the 15 month period. Parents may share this leave, but cannot take compensation simultaneously. Fathers are entitled to an additional ten days of father's leave with compensation at the birth of a child, and 86% of all fathers take this leave. On the other hand, it is usually the mother who takes most of the parental leave. Ninety percent of parental leave is taken by women, and half of all fathers never take a day of parental allowance. This is a result not of law but of prevailing values. In an effort to redress the adverse consequences this could have for women who are away from the labor market for extended periods of time, in 1994 the Act on Equality was strengthened with a new provision for a "father's month". One of the twelve months of parental leave cannot be transferred from

48 Anttonen and Sipilä, 1995, p. 11.
50 Leira, 1993, p. 43.
one parent to another, so the father must take this leave or the family forfeits the compensation. These 30 days can be taken any time up to the child's 8th birthday. "One purpose of the 'father's month' is to strengthen the position of men vis-a-vis their colleagues and employers when they wish to take parental leave. Another is to emphasize the equal responsibility for children and housework. This tightening up of parental leave is a unique step from an international point of view; in many countries, the father does not even have the legal opportunity of taking leave for childbirth."\(^{51}\)

In Finland, parental leave is granted for 263 days (about 11 months) with compensation. In 1992, the compensation was 80% of the wage, but in a series of budget austerity programs, this has been decreased to 66% of the annual wage. The mother must take the first 105 days, and the remaining can be taken by either parent. A Finnish father is entitled to 6-12 days of paternity leave in connection with the birth, and an additional six days leave any time during the parental leave period. Finland has also introduced measures to increase paternal leave. Since early 1994, the 12 days of parental leave are non-transferable and are deducted from the total 263 days of parental leave if they are not taken by the father.

Two other elements augment the carer aspect of Swedish parental leave. Either parent can take time off (up to 60 days per year per child with compensation) to care for a sick child. In addition, parents of children under age 8 are entitled to shorten their working day, from 8 to 6 hours, but with a corresponding reduction in pay. Similar provisions exist in Finland. Until a Finnish child turns four, one parent may shorten the workday to six hours and receive a partial home care allowance. This allowance, being partial, is very small and only about 2000 families have taken advantage of it. Finnish law entitles either parent to stay at home with a sick child for up to four days. This law does not guarantee compensation, but compensation is often agreed in collective labor agreements. After comparing the Nordic leave policies, Leira notes that the "Swedish system of paid parental leave offers considerable larger concessions to the carer aspects of parental obligations. The Scandinavian countries are not alone in this endeavor to mediate between work and family obligations, but Sweden in particular is advanced compared to the other countries of Western Europe."\(^{52}\)

The second way that the Nordic social service state attempts to integrate working life and social reproduction is through its support of day care. "The introduction of collective child care contributed to a 'deprivatization' of family life...Entering the labor market to work for pay, the mother's time for child-care was reduced while their economic-provider role was expanded. The gender differentiation of parenting took on new forms."\(^{53}\) The state sponsorship of care services, developed by professionals under state auspices, became an entitlement.

\(^{51}\) Froman, 1994, p. 2.

\(^{52}\) Leira, 1993, p. 45.

\(^{53}\) Leira, 1993, p. 47.
Anttonen and Sipila argue that "The best example of the Scandinavian way of integrating working life with social care services has been the development of children's day care to a very high standard. In Finland and Sweden parents of small children enjoy certain rights that entitle them to municipal day care. In Finland, they also have the option of a home care allowance instead. In Finland, the organization of children's day care has been the responsibility of municipal governments since 1973. Since 1990, all children under age 3 have a guaranteed right to a municipal day care place; it has become a subjective right. This right was set to be extended to all pre-school age children in 1995, but austerity measures have meant abandoning this goal for the present. In lieu of a municipal day place (supply has not kept up with demand) parents are entitled to financial support (the home care allowance) for taking care of the child at home or in a private day care. The allowance is not large enough to cover the loss of one parent's income if he or she decided to stay home, though some municipalities where day care places are scarce (i.e. Helsinki), a municipal home allowance combined with the state allowance may well compensate for the loss of one income. About 70%, or 87,000 families receive the home care allowance. "Children's day care is arguably the most important social service in Finnish society today. Half the country's social service expenditure goes into children's day care, and half of the social services staff are employed in this area."

"One point that is not often mentioned in accounts of Scandinavian countries is that local authorities are by no means the only providers of social care services...Child minders in families, working under municipal supervision, provide most of the day care services for children under three in Finland and in Denmark." In Norway and Denmark, 40% of day care is organized and run by employers, while in Finland and Sweden that is a rare case. What we can see with respect to day care is that, particularly for Finland and Sweden, the social service state has attempted to ameliorate the demands of social reproduction and production. These services are considered a universal entitlement, not tied to employment as is the case in Norway and Denmark.

In Sweden, municipal authorities are also charged with the provision of day care services. While it has been a subject of debate, Sweden has not made day care services a subjective right. Thirty percent of Swedish children aged 0-2 are in some form of municipal or family day care, and over 80% of children aged 3-6 are likewise placed. Around 50% of all pre-school aged children are cared for in various day care centers or family day homes, while 39% are cared for by a parent. Employed mothers working full-time are given priority of access to municipal day care. Sweden also offers a child allowance. In addition, a parent who looks after a child in the home gains supplementary (ATP) pension points. As in Finland there is a gap between supply and demand of day care services. Sweden's longer

56 Anttonen and Sipilä, 1995, p. 20.
parental leave mitigates the problem slightly, and mothers often work part-time to ensure child care. One proposed solution to the shortage of day care has been a long debate about reducing the age for school entrance.

The social care provision of the Finnish and Swedish social welfare states with respect to balancing productive and reproductive activities can be compared. In Finland, where women are more often found in full-time employment, the social reproduction provision of the welfare state have emphasized day care provisions to enable a more active participation in the labor market. In Sweden, the greater emphasis and generosity of the publicly subsidized parental leave offers public validation of the carer aspect of the balance. In both cases, state support has proven crucial in helping parents integrate productive and reproductive activities.

It is not surprising that as the Nordic states adopted these social services as social rights in the 1970's and 1980's, the number of women employed in the public sector rose dramatically. "The widespread expansion of the public sector opened up a large and growing labor market for women. They (are) now paid for doing the work they previously done free of charge at home and they acquired a firm foothold in the labor market. The availability of public, subsidized day care facilities for children and the elderly and an improved public transport system are important factors underlying the internationally high female labor participation rate in Sweden."  

There has been criticism of the role of the Nordic care state in women's lives by some Nordic Feminists. Helga Marie Hernes has suggested suggest that this development merely signals a transfer of women's dependence in the private sphere to dependence on the state  

"A relationship of mutual dependency develops between women and the state, and this can in part be explained by the fact that the market as an institution has played a more marginal role in most women's lives compared to family and the state...Neither the process of 'job creation' in the service sector nor the process of becoming clients has given rise to patterns of organization as strong and as integrated as men's participation in industrial production."

Despite their presence on the labor market, Hernes and Leira are concerned with the lack of women's influence and organizational influence over carework in the corporatist system of interest articulation and mediation. The corporatist system was designed to mediate conflicts in production, while women are overwhelmingly engaged in the (new) public business of care work and social reproduction. Their relative powerlessness in the corporatist system in fact may be less critical in exerting control over their working lives than their political representation in government where legislation and budgets have a more direct impact. The

57 "Equality Between Men and Women in Sweden", 1993, p. 3


26
recent amendment to the Finnish Act on Equality establishes guidelines to improve women's representation on municipal and county boards where much of this carework is organized. The Swedish campaign for "Every Other Seat for a Woman" encourages the same in Sweden. While there is certainly segregation in the public sphere, men engaged in production and women employed by the state to render social services, it is impossible to determine whether this is a problem of pernicious discrimination or simply an occupational preference of women. It is probably a bit of both. In any case, the most important feature of the Nordic social service state is that by elevating carework into the public sphere, there has been a reintegration of production and reproduction.

Raija Julkunen has chosen to emphasize this transformation of the tasks of the Nordic welfare state that has allowed women to make room for themselves in the public sphere. She rejects a view that posits women only as the subjects of state policy, preferring to emphasize the contributions that women themselves have made to the creation of a caring state. "Some kind of social infrastructure existed before the expansion in the 1960's. I would even claim that this early socio-political infrastructure derived from the female life sphere and women's activities (rather than the need for labor thesis). I believe that the formation of the Finnish welfare state should be seen not only as the product of a disunited feeble working class, but also in the light of women's power.. their vital economic contribution and their civic and political activities." Her picture is one in which women had a role in building the caring state, and now as public employment is increasingly feminized, they have a special stake in maintaining the caring state. During the past 25 years, the number of women employed in the Finnish public sector has trebled, while the number of men has increased by one-fifth. Women are increasingly moving into positions of leadership in public employment as well as into more male dominated areas. Men may continue to predominate in production and private industry, but "the expansion of the caring state is one indication of the feminist conquest of the public sphere."

In Finland and Sweden, state supplied services such as child care, health and elder care, as well as economic transfers for maternal and paternal leave, child allowances, and housing allowances have become elements of citizenship just as unemployment insurance and pension programs did for an earlier generation. The universalist and entitlement nature of these state services is an important feature: it contrasts with the needs-based (and stigmatizing) social policies of more bourgeois liberal societies such as Britain and the US. In these social democratic welfare societies where the social rights of citizenship are based

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61 Julkunen, 1990, p. 149, my inclusion.


upon participation in the labor market, the extension of the state’s activities into caring have deepened women's citizenship by enabling them to work outside the home, in addition, by formulating the extension of social care services as an entitlement for all citizens, it also validates the care work that women do, both in the home and on the job.

The Nordic state's support of reproductive functions has the salutary effect of public recognition of the interdependence between productive and reproductive functions of society. While the Nordic corporatist system of collective bargaining is organized to emphasize and optimize societal production in these small, export-driven economies, the support that the Nordic welfare state (the other side of the "public" coin) offers to care-giving and social reproduction acts as a countervailing power to the priorities of production in Nordic society. Nordic women, through the social reproduction activities of the Nordic welfare state, have been able to participate (in both productive and reproductive functions) more fully in the public sphere than their counterparts elsewhere.

III. The Gendered Nature of European Integration

The Nordic integration of production and reproduction in the public sphere serves as a contrast to the gendered nature of European integration. The following examination of the structure and decision-making process of the European Union reveals the gendered structure of the European Union and how it confers prerogatives upon the production over reproduction. Understanding the nature and process of integration in Europe has been likened to blind men describing an elephant; fundamentally, there is precious little agreement about what we are observing in the first place, so that analysis, prescriptions and the like do not always flow from the same starting point. "Europe" is constantly evolving, and such change will mean different things to different analysts. We cannot entirely avoid conceptual blinders, but any analysis of an emerging Europe should make explicit the concept of Europe that is used.

The concept of European Union in this paper is based upon structure outlined in the Treaty of Maastricht. Maastricht serves as an agreed upon framework for the future evolution of the European project, and more importantly, it defined the terms that the Nordic states accepted upon membership. So what does Maastricht Europe look like? It builds upon the advances in completing the single market (the first phase of economic union), wherein goods, services, capital and labor may move freely within and among the member states. The European Monetary System (phase two of EMU) creates conditions for stability, i.e. fixed exchange rate bands, in the monetary and financial relationships between member-states. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union lays the groundwork for complete economic and monetary integration with the aim of full economic union, a European Central Bank and a single currency. The provisions of Maastricht set out stringent convergence criteria in preparation for phase three, such as national debt ratios below 60% of GDP and budgetary

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deficits limited to 3% of GDP. While member states cannot be compelled to join the single
currency union envisioned, they have submitted to the convergence criteria of the EMS.
Economic and Monetary Union comprises the first and most prominent pillar of Europe.

The second pillar is the Social Dimension as established in the Social Charter, signed
in 1989. As Beverly Springer has detailed, the social dimension is designed to ameliorate the
adverse consequences of the formation of the single market, and it does so by establishing
European norms of social protection. The third pillar is the creation of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP), wherein member states consult and coordinate a common
position.

So what sort of social norms have been established at the EU level with respect to
women and social reproduction? Though a provision for equal pay was incorporated into
the Treaty of Rome already in 1958 (Article 119), implementation of women's policies have
moved as slowly as the rest of the social agenda in the European integration. Additional
movement in this area began in 1976 when the Directive was passed for equal treatment of
both sexes in terms of access to employment, vocational training, and working conditions.
Earnest efforts really got under way with the Social Charter which was adopted in 1989. One
of the twelve basic principles of the Social Charter is the right of men and women to equal
treatment.

There have been impressive initiatives and research undertaken by the European
Commission's Directorate General Five, which has a department for Equal Opportunities.
Considerable amounts of Commission research underscores the difficulties that women face in
pursuing a full life in the public sphere. The European Parliament is another institution that
is sensitive to the demands of women. The European Parliament not only has a respectable
number of women MEPs, but also an active Women's Rights Committee. A major new
initiative called NOW, the Opportunities for Women project, is being funded through the
European Parliament's human resources project. The Women's Rights Committee has worked
closely with the Commission to further women's issues. Conferences and workshops are held
several times a year, and there is a monthly publication by the Commission called the
"Women of Europe News Letter" which details not only the obstacles that women face in
Europe but also the efforts undertaken by all the institutions of the EU to ameliorate those
obstacles. The information and support network for women is extensive and well organized.
Despite all this promising activity in the Parliament, the power of this institution is currently
rather limited.

The Equal Opportunities Unit of the Commission's DG-V is now into its third action
programme, and many proposals from the first action programme remain unadopted. After
the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, the Council of Ministers accepted a number of the
Commission's Recommendations concerning women: in child-care, they have adopted a

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resolution to improve services and shared parental tasks; they have adopted a Code of Good Practices concerning sexual harassment; and a guarantee of 14 weeks paid maternity leave for pregnant women. While there has been much discussion about more progressive policy to aid women, particularly in the Commission, there has been little concrete action taken.

The European Union is inadequate, politically and structurally, for effectively incorporating women's interests and social reproduction into a sphere of real consequence. While the Commission may offer social recommendations that go far in integrating the competing demands of production and reproduction in women's lives, the EU decision-making process gives ultimate authority to the Council of Ministers. The Council has seen fit to act on social legislation that focuses more narrowly upon women as productive agents, i.e. sexual harassment, equal pay, sexual discrimination, and the like. Whereas the Commission and the Parliament discuss policies that could help women combine production and reproduction, work and home life, authoritative decisions are taken by the Council which has heretofore been less apt to act on such policies (the Council has notably spurned Commission and Parliament recommendations on the issues such as the organization of working time, protection for atypical work, social security, and parental leave). Until very recently social legislation required unanimity in the Council, while economic harmonization required only majority decision-making. Within the last year, majority decision-making was introduced for social policy.

While decisions on social policy no longer require unanimity, the Council has not passed many social directives that integrate the demands of production and reproduction (the 14 weeks maternity leave being the exception). Furthermore, even if the Council were to adopt more such directives, the ability to compel implementation by member-states is weak. This does not necessarily harm Nordic women because many of the policies in place in the Nordic region are far more advanced than anything emanating from Brussels. It does, however, illustrate an inherent political weakness on the EU level to balance the demands of production and reproduction. Unlike the Swedish or Finnish state that acts as a counterweight to the corporatist system of production, the hybrid nature of European political institutions makes balancing the demands of social reproduction with production on the European level a dubious proposition.

In contrast to the Nordic legislation, EU legislative efforts on behalf of women have been marginal, and have had little effect as the 1994 Women's congress held in Greece detailed. Women still face higher and more chronic unemployment than men, and still receive less pay (only 62-82% of men's pay in unskilled jobs, 54-70% of all others, see table two). Ireland's Minister for Social Welfare remarked upon the lack of social policy integration of production and reproductive functions: "The social dialogue still sees the typical worker as male, with obligations only to his employer and who is able to work for fixed hours every day."

In addition to these serious political deficiencies, there are critical structural impediments to the integration of production and reproduction in European social policy. An examination of the emergent structure of the European Union suggests why this context has proven inadequate for effectively incorporating reproduction concerns into the politico-economic policy making process. European Monetary Union and centralized macroeconomic policy are the main pillar of European Union while social policy remains truncated and subject to "subsidiarity". Subsidiarity has a long history associated with the Catholic Church. The idea was that by ensuring social policy remains private and out of the state's purview, the Church could maintain an important role in society. "The ideal is a privately organized but publicly funded welfare arrangement. Subsidiarity attaches greater emphasis on people's duties and obligations than on citizen's rights." 67 As translated in the Social Charter, subsidiarity continues to prevent centralized social policy at the EU level by providing national governments with the primary responsibility for social policy.

Centralized policy-making in Brussels is dedicated to economic integration and "high politics", while social policy and social security systems are relegated to the new "private" sphere, national politics. The White paper leading up to the Social Charter put the matter clearly: the social dimension "is not in opposition to nor must it slow down the completion of the internal market." 68 Ostensibly the principle of subsidiarity is to allow for decision-making to occur at the level closest to the citizen. Subsidiarity in EU Social Policy should accommodate divergent national preferences with respect to the extent of social welfare provisions in each national context. As a result, women in some states may enjoy extensive rights and participation, while women in other member-states may lack the right of access to day care or paid maternity leave. These differences are not the concern of Brussels; it is entirely a "private", national concern. As Springer concludes, EU policies for women "...have not reached a point where it makes much difference to the lives of working women. It constitutes a very small factor in the accumulation of forces edging Europe toward integration." 69 Social services are not going to become an element of EU citizenship: rather, EU citizens only have economic rights to mobility. The four freedoms (goods, services, capital, and labor) and the centralized coordination of monetary policy in the EU privileges business and productive interests and consequently recreates bourgeois liberal dichotomies. Unlike the Nordic social-welfare states that have integrated production and reproduction in the public sphere, the EU is in effect recreating the structural public-private distinction on a regional rather than societal level and therefore limiting the definition of what constitutes "politics" in the "public" EU realm. The structure of "Europe" reflects a classical liberal state: the archetypical public-private dichotomy is reinforced via the disjunction of European policy-making spheres (refer to Table one). There is a recognized need to address social, and particularly women's issues, but the reality is that European policy making is a process that

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67 Anttonen and Sipilä, 1995, p. 15.


centralizes only economic policy-making (and that unevenly) while social policies are relegated to a sphere of national discretion, subject only to the formation of weak European norms.

IV. Practical Implications of European Integration for Nordic Women

In October 1994, some 57% of Finnish voters chose affirmatively on the EU membership referendum. One month later, Sweden followed Finland into the EU with a smaller majority of about 52%. Women in both countries, save young urban women in Finland, were more critical in the membership referenda than men. At first glance, this decentralized European approach to social policies does not seem to adversely affect Nordic women. The social welfare arrangements in the Nordic region need not be abandoned, according to subsidiarity logic. However, there are a number of consequences that membership, as defined by Maastricht and the Social Charter, entails for Nordic women.

While the question of the ultimate date of full monetary union has not been resolved and is not likely to happen before 1999, even Nordic compliance with the convergence criteria (stage II of Monetary Union) has begun to make its impact felt. The convergence criteria sets limits for public spending as a percentage of GDP as well limits levels of public debt. In getting in shape to join the monetary union, national budgets and public spending must be slashed. This affects Nordic women in two ways. They and Nordic men (given the universality of Nordic social security) shall be adversely affected by the loss of economic transfers (child care allowances, child credits, etc.) that support reproduction. But women shall be hurt more than men because not only do they rely on these transfers more, but the majority of women are public employees in the service sector. As the Nordic welfare state trims down to limber up for monetary union, it is the women's employment and ties to the public sphere that are threatened most. In effect, newly unemployed women could be conveniently directed to undertake care-giving responsibility (of children shut out of day-care, of elderly parents) privately. The propitious balance between productive and reproductive functions in the Nordic public sphere is in this way undermined. Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson revealed the priorities that EU membership reinforces: there can be no welfare state without a health productive sector.

While it is true that no members-state can be compelled to join phase III, Finland's government has voiced its aspirations for joining the single currency (stage III of EMU), and Sweden is reserving judgement until it successfully meets the convergence criteria. Most economic studies have suggested that smaller economies will be the ones that benefit most from a more stable currency. Staying outside the currency union would adversely affect investment for smaller economies as well. If Finland and Sweden join the single currency, there will be a loss of macro-economic instruments that have been used to support the Nordic welfare state. All indications suggest that the management of the emu is mimic that of the German mark: a consuming preference for low inflation. Paulette Kurzer has identified the threats to social care policies:
Monetary integration became a convenient pretext for rolling back the advances of the welfare state and for placing a moratorium on public-sector growth and social spending. More likely than not, EMS participation would induce a real reduction in public expenditures, bring an end to a system of wage bargaining that yielded wage compensations above national productivity increases, and limit consumer spending. In theory, every consumer and producer stands to gain from low inflation and stable exchange rates. In reality, financial agents assign much greater value to price stability and central banks are quicker to trade economic growth and employment for low inflation.\(^\text{70}\)

Historically, the Swedish and Finnish monetary approaches have diverged from the German approach: they have used macroeconomic instruments to maintain a policy of full employment, often at the cost of inflation. Full employment is a political choice that distinguishes the Nordic model and has benefitted both men and women. As members of the single currency, monetary union, such a macroeconomic choice and the macroeconomic maneuverability of interest currency rate changes are impossible.

There is also the corollary of social dumping. With a number of different social systems, the perceived threat is that investment will go to those countries with the lowest operating costs, meaning the lowest labor and social cost. It is not so much loss of existing industry to areas of the EU with lower labor costs, but it is primarily a threat of loss of investment. This is critical for the Nordic states and their corporatist welfare state: if they experience a loss of investment, traditionally the state has been able to offer work programs, re-training, or unemployment benefits as alternatives. The ability of the Nordic state to act in such a way within the Union is undermined.

The collapse of social solidarity in Scandinavia which is the real threat that EU membership entails. While other EU societies such as France have an exemplary record of women in the labor force and a high provision of day care facilities, but the lower proportion of French women on the labor market suggests that day care plays a different role there. The high number of pre-schools suggests that French day care policy is one of socialization rather than balancing production and reproduction. The social policies of other countries are not integrated into a program of solidarity between men and women to the same extent as in Finland and Sweden. Anttonen and Sipilä tie these elements together when they conclude that in the Nordic model of social care services, "there is an abundant supply of services for both children and the frail elderly, and women's participation in gainful employment outside the home is higher than anywhere else in the world."\(^\text{71}\)


\(^{71}\) Anttonen and Sipilä, 1995, p. 22.
While subsidiarity policy indeed does not interfere with the social security systems of member-states, and while subsidiarity is ostensibly a way to allow national social welfare preferences to manifest themselves, centralized monetary policy and a currency union effectively strips away the tools that the Swedish and Finnish welfare states have used in the past to support their social systems. Integration of Europe, as manifest by Maastricht, is indeed gendered, at least for Nordic women, because it re-introduces public and private dichotomies and prejudices productive functions of society over reproductive functions in the disjunctions of European policy-making levels. Integration as mapped out by Maastricht strips away the countervailing power of the Nordic social service welfare state to processes of production in the public sphere.
Annex 1: Selected Legislative Landmarks For Finnish and Swedish Women

Finland:

1734 General Code, women no longer classified with children and lunatics
1864 Statute sets the age of legal competence of unmarried women at 25 years and puts an end to arranged marriages
1864 Right of women to work in the post office
1865 Rural Municipalities Administration Act gives propertied women the right to vote
1865 Repeal of Commercial Code, Section 14, concerning annual hiring regulations
1868 Conditions of Marriage Act
1873 Municipal Administrations of Towns Act gives propertied women the right to vote
1878 Equality between men and women as regards the right of inheritance in countryside
1879 Freedom of Occupation Ordinance, right of married woman to her own occupation or trade with the permission and guarantee of her husband
1889 Marital Property Act
1898 Guardianship Act, legal age of majority reduced to 21 years
1901 Right of women to study at university, ending the special dispensation rule
1906 Electoral Act, universal and equal suffrage and eligibility for office
1915 Teaching positions at state schools open to women
1916 Positions in post office opened to married women
1917 Local Government Act, universal and equal suffrage and eligibility for office
1926 Right of women to positions in the civil service
1929 Marriage Act, women no longer the wards of their husbands, women given the right to own their own property
1937 Act on Maternity Allowance passed
1937 Act on statutory school lunches passed
1944 Acts passed instituting local government maternity and child health care clinics and also local government health visitors
1961 Contraceptive pill introduced
1962 The principle of equal pay for work of equal value is established in both the public and private sector
1970 Abortion becomes legal, sex education becomes part of the school curriculum
1978 Parents gain the right of parental leave
1985 The Act on Home Care Allowance is passed
1986 Women entitled to keep their own name upon marriage; the child may take either the mother's or father's name
1987 Act on Equality between men and women promotes equality and bans discrimination on the basis of sex with a stipulation of equal pay
1990 Children up to age 3 are guaranteed a municipal day care place
1992 Equality Act amended to ban discrimination based upon pregnancy or parenthood
Sweden:

1845 Equal Inheritance rights for men and women
1846 Widows, divorcees, and unmarried women entitled to work in manual trades and some commerce
1858 Unmarried women over 25 years may attain majority by decision of court. Marriage implies return to minority status
1859 Women entitled to some teaching positions
1864 Husbands lose legal right to strike wives
1870 Women gain the right to take high school diploma from private schools
1873 Women gain right to take college degree, except doctor of law and theology
1874 Unmarried women gain majority at 21 years
1919 Women gain the right to vote and hold office
1921 Married women gain majority at age 21, men and women equal in new Marriage code
1925 With few exceptions, women gain right to same civil servant positions as men
1927 Public secondary schools open to girls
1935 Equal basic pensions for men and women
1937 Maternity insurance benefits introduced
1938 Legalization of contraceptives
1939 Gainfully employed women may not be dismissed due to pregnancy, childbirth or marriage
1947 Equal pay for equal work
1947 Child allowances introduced
1950 Both parents declared legal guardian of children
1951 Women entitled to retain Swedish citizenship upon marriage to foreign citizen
1958 Women entitled to be ordained into clergy
1960 Employers and unions agree to abolish differential wage rates for women over a five year period
1964 Oral Contraceptives legalized in Sweden
1969 Compulsory schools adopt new curriculum promoting equality of the sexes
1970 Secondary schools adopt new curriculum promoting equality of the sexes
1971 Separate income tax assessment for wife and husband introduced
1974 Parents entitled to share parental allowances upon birth of child
1975 Abortion legalized through the 18th week
1976 Decree for sexual equality in the civil service
1977 Settlement between employers and unions on equality between the sexes
1979 Right to 6-hour workday for parents of small children
1980 Law against sex discrimination in employment, Spouse means-test abolished for student loans; Equality of the sexes settlement with municipal and county governments; New law on accession to throne, so that King's daughter stands to inherit the throne
1982 Ban on pornographic "live" shows, Social security points accrued for care within the home for children under 3; Women's organizations become eligible for state support
1983 New sexual equality settlement between employers and unions, opening all
occupations for women. Women eligible for military service

1984       Sexual equality agreement within civil service
1985       Sexual equality agreement for public companies and utilities
1988       Parliamentary decision for 5-year national action plan for equality between the sexes
1989       Nordic action plan for equality between the sexes
# ANNEX 2: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF FINNISH AND SWEDISH WOMEN

## FINLAND

### 1. Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
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### 2. Municipal Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Female Candidates</th>
<th>Women Elected to Parliament</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>78.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>75.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>73.7</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>69.0</td>
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<td>32.4</td>
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3. Central Employee Organizations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Women %</td>
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<td>164</td>
<td>37.0</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>67.7</td>
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<td>Board</td>
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<td>57.1</td>
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SAK=Central Union of Finnish Trade Organizations
TVK=Confederation of Salaried Employees in Finland
AKAVA=Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals in Finland
STTK=confederation for Technical Employees in Finland

SWEDEN

1. Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
<th>Women Elected</th>
<th>% of Parliament</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>93</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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2. Parliamentary Committees

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committees</th>
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<th>1983 Proportion of Committee</th>
<th>1989 Proportion of Committee</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W  M</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural Affairs</td>
<td>7 10</td>
<td>53 47</td>
<td>41 59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>12 5</td>
<td>47 53</td>
<td>71 29</td>
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<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>10 7</td>
<td>47 53</td>
<td>59 41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>8 9</td>
<td>36 64</td>
<td>47 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>5 12</td>
<td>36 64</td>
<td>29 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7 10</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>41 59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>7 10</td>
<td>36 64</td>
<td>41 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Market</td>
<td>8 9</td>
<td>40 60</td>
<td>47 53</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>5 12</td>
<td>-- 100</td>
<td>29 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>2 15</td>
<td>36 64</td>
<td>12 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>6 11</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>35 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4 13</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>24 76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>3 14</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>18 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional</td>
<td>6 11</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>35 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>3 14</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>18 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax</td>
<td>3 14</td>
<td>20 80</td>
<td>18 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>96 176</td>
<td>26 74</td>
<td>35 65</td>
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</table>

3. Composition of Ministerial Committees

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<th>Type of Participation</th>
<th>1990 Number</th>
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<th>1990 Proportion in the Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W  M</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>21 180</td>
<td>12 88</td>
<td>10 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member</td>
<td>185 438</td>
<td>21 79</td>
<td>30 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>365 1241</td>
<td>12 88</td>
<td>30 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of Committee</td>
<td>110 257</td>
<td>18 82</td>
<td>30 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>681 2116</td>
<td>16 84</td>
<td>24 76</td>
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</table>
4. Municipal and County Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>1988 Number</th>
<th>1988 Proportion at that Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W  M</td>
<td>1982 W  M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Council</td>
<td>723 1019</td>
<td>33 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Council</td>
<td>4582 8980</td>
<td>30 70</td>
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5. Members of Local Authorities, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body</th>
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<th>1989 Proportion in Body</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W  M</td>
<td>1980 W  M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Gov't Council</td>
<td>4558 9004</td>
<td>29 71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Gov't Board</td>
<td>768 2758</td>
<td>14 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Board</td>
<td>311 157</td>
<td>63 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare Board</td>
<td>1729 1445</td>
<td>50 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture Board</td>
<td>1097 1015</td>
<td>43 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
<td>1423 1705</td>
<td>38 62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local District Board</td>
<td>711 924</td>
<td>25 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Board</td>
<td>667 1750</td>
<td>21 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Board</td>
<td>128 342</td>
<td>18 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Board</td>
<td>406 1334</td>
<td>10 90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recreation Committee</td>
<td>546 2003</td>
<td>16 84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Estate Committee</td>
<td>94 445</td>
<td>13 87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building Committee</td>
<td>428 1023</td>
<td>12 88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic Safety Board</td>
<td>87 461</td>
<td>13 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Board</td>
<td>144 1023</td>
<td>8 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Board</td>
<td>68 727</td>
<td>4 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Board</td>
<td>23 230</td>
<td>6 94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Representation in Trade Unions, Federations and Coordinating Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>1990 Number</th>
<th>Proportion in Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LO: Swedish Trade Union Confederation**

- **Members**: 1,008,100 W, 1,252,100 M (45% W, 55% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 2 W, 13 M (13% W, 87% M)
- **Chair of Member Org.**: 1 W, 22 M (4% W, 96% M)
- **LO's Representatives**: 34 W, 134 M (23% W, 77% M)

**TCO. Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees**

- **Members**: 667,224 W, 476,783 M (58% W, 42% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 3 W, 14 M (21% W, 79% M)
- **Chair of Member Org.**: 4 W, 16 M (20% W, 80% M)
- **TCO's Representatives**: 39 W, 61 M (39% W, 61% M)

**SACO. Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations**

- **Members**: 130,664 W, 190,062 M (41% W, 59% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 3 W, 7 M (30% W, 70% M)
- **Chair of Member Org.**: 6 W, 19 M (24% W, 76% M)
- **SACO's Congress**: 63 W, 137 M (32% W, 68% M)

**PTK: Federation of Salaried Employees in Industry & Service**

- **Members**: 225,100 W, 332,600 M (40% W, 60% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 17 W, 34 M (33% W, 67% M)
- **Congress Representatives**: 7 W, 7 M (100% W)

**Metallindustriarbetareförbundet: Metalworker's Union**

- **Members**: 97,500 W, 368,300 M (21% W, 79% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 2 W, 11 M (15% W, 85% M)
- **Congress Representatives**: 28 W, 272 M (9% W, 91% M)

**KTK: Federation of Salaried Local Government Employees**

- **Members**: 262,759 W, 57,679 M (82% W, 18% M)
- **Executive Committee**: 3 W, 7 M (30% W, 70% M)
- **Congress Representatives**: 23 W, 17 M (58% W, 42% M)
Bibliography

*Feminism and Liberalism:*


*Socialism, Corporatism and the Welfare State:*


### 6. Cont'd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number 1990</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komunnalarbetareforbundet: Municipal Worker's Union</td>
<td>513,500</td>
<td>120,500</td>
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<td>Members</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Executive Committee</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>210</td>
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<td>TCO-S: The Section for State Employees</td>
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<td>102,600</td>
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<td>100,300</td>
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<td>Members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Committee</td>
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Source: Finnish and Swedish Councils for Equality


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EU Policy and Women in(Continental) Europe:


Other:


