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"EUROPE IN THE 1980s"

THE SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON, KCMG, MC
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS,
TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
AT THE SHERATON CENTRE
NEW YORK

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"New York is a city which has everything. It has produced historic achievements in many fields of human endeavor, from financial wizardry to artistic innovation. So I am all the more full of admiration for the stamina with which people like you stand up to speeches on foreign policy at this time of the year.

"It disproves the assertion of a New York journalist that 'the true New Yorker does not really seek information about the outside world. He feels that anything that is not in New York is not likely to be interesting.'

"I shall try to be interesting today. But it is not something that all British Foreign Secretaries have achieved. A poet wrote the following of one of my predecessors:

'Last night I tossed and turned in bed,
But could not sleep -- at length I said,
I'll think of Viscount Castlereagh
And of Speeches -- that's the way.'

"I hope that I shall give you food for thought today but not provide you with the midday equivalent of a nightcap.

"In a speech in London just 30 years ago, General Eisenhower, then Allied Commander in Europe, called for unity among the European nations. 'It would be difficult indeed,' he said, 'to overstate the benefits, in these years of stress and tension, that would accrue to NATO if the free nations of Europe were truly a unit.'

"A great deal has happened since then. There is no United States of Europe. But there is a European Community of Ten Nations, which soon should be increased to Twelve. Great strides have been

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made in integrating the economies of its members. There has also been progress, which I shall describe, towards the development of a common foreign policy.

"Indeed, I have chosen to speak about Europe today because this Community of Ten nowadays provides increasingly the context in which Britain frames its domestic and its foreign policies. As it happens, Britain currently occupies the Presidency of the Community. So it is particularly appropriate for the British Foreign Secretary to talk to an American audience about Europe's foreign policy: how it has developed up to now, how it may grow in the future and how I believe it can contribute to the overall strength of the Western world.

"Let me say at the outset that Britain's membership of the European Community does not conflict with but contributes to a new chapter in our historic friendship and partnership with the United States. Ours is a tried and tested friendship based on a shared history and a common heritage, a friendship which, again in General Eisenhower's words, 'was never recorded on legal parchment but in the hearts of our two peoples.' The affection shown by so many Americans for the Prince and Princess of Wales at the time of their wedding shows that these bonds of sentiment and friendship remain strong.

"But the most important element in the great Anglo-American friendship is our shared belief in democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. These are precisely the principles on which the European Community rests. Britain's active membership of the Community of ten nations, shortly we hope to be joined by two newly democratic states, Spain and Portugal, will strengthen rather than dilute our ties with the United States.

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"It took the First World War to put an end to the period when the United States had tried to stand aloof from Europe. Even then, American involvement in European affairs was reluctant and not entirely happy for either side. Some European leaders found President Wilson's high-minded style oppressive. The French leader Clemenceau grumbled: 'Mr. Wilson bores me with his 14 points; the Lord God has only 10.' Then as the peace talks dragged on, Clemenceau asked: 'How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man in 2,000 years to know anything about peace on earth?' But in any case this first American dip into European waters was soon followed by another period of deliberate isolation.

"The Second World War and its aftermath changed all that, this time permanently. America's military intervention made it possible to restore the freedom of Western Europe and at the time every European knew that this was so. In the first years of peace, the Marshall Plan was one of the most imaginative and successful expressions of generosity and self-interest that the world has ever known. America realized that isolation was no longer an option. From that day, like it or not, you have had to have a global foreign policy.

"De Tocqueville was talking of Americans as individuals when he said that 'if an American were to confine his activity to his own affairs he would be robbed of half of his existence.' But his remark has become equally true of America's foreign policy to the great benefit of Europe and the world.

"Your foreign policy has been based on close identification with the peoples and objectives of the Western democracies. The foreign policies of the Europeans and of America are designed to

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defend our common way of life. Your aims and ours are identical in this respect. Their identity is symbolized by the North Atlantic Treaty, which established the Alliance which had kept the peace in Europe for over three decades.

"If the United States waited for nearly two centuries before adopting an active foreign policy, it is small wonder that the European Community took two decades, from its first steps towards economic unity, before embarking on the difficult waters of foreign policy coordination. Our problems of course were very different from yours. No-one in Western Europe had ever thought of isolation as a possibility. The individual states of Europe each had a long tradition of active foreign policy. It had expressed itself in a shifting pattern of alliances. It had been reflected in bitter rivalry in every corner of the world -- even including, once upon a time, here in North America.

"These wounds of course have long been healed. To prove it once again, Britain will make the magnanimous gesture of sending a Cabinet Minister -- the Lord Chancellor -- to represent us at the anniversary celebrations next month of the Battle of Yorktown.

"The British were defeated in 1781 by an unholy alliance of the Americans and the French. As the British soldiers withdrew from Yorktown with their regimental band playing -- so it is said -- 'The world turned upside down.' They were not to know that 200 years later those same three nations would be joined not in battle but, with others in a powerful alliance to preserve peace and freedom. But nor were they to know that before this happened the bankruptcy of these individual foreign policies was demonstrated by the shattering experience of two world wars, which left our continent weak,

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impoverished and divided by that tragic rift which Winston Churchill christened the Iron Curtain.

"Yet it was one thing to see, in the late 40s, that the old system was bankrupt. It was another to move forward to a better one.

"So it is no mean achievement on the part of Europe that, when I spoke yesterday in the United Nations General Assembly, I was able to do so in the name not of Britain alone but of the members of the European Community. The speech, in itself, may not have been remarkable. You know the definition of a camel: 'a horse designed by a committee.' But I think it made good sense and was received as a balanced and coherent approach to the problems of the world today.

"Before I talk about the coordination of foreign policy in the Community, let me say something about the institution itself. The Community is a group of free and democratic states committed to pursuing an even greater degree of unity through common economic rules and policies. We do not pretend that this will be easy. Reconciling strongly held national interests never is. Nor is sharing out scarce resources, as the occasional quarrel between Federal and State authorities on this side of the Atlantic shows. I therefore fear that you will continue to hear of squabbles about money, fish, sheepmeat, turkeys and the like.

"But this does not mean that the Community is falling apart. Far from it: it is a sign that the Community is in business, facing and not ducking the issues. I believe it can and will emerge strengthened as a result of the negotiations now in progress, and that it can and will continue to promote the economic strength of its members. And I am quite clear that it is in Western interests that it should.

"Let me turn now the cooperation of the Ten in foreign policy. Because the Community is a customs union, it had from the beginning to adopt common external policies in many areas, of trade and economic relations. But there was no Treaty obligation to consult on foreign policy as such.

"It was some years before the interaction of external economic policy and foreign policy proper led the members to establish the system which bears the somewhat colorless title of European Political Cooperation.

"So political cooperation grew naturally out of economic integration. And over the years the realization has grown that economic policy and foreign policy are Siamese twins. In politics, as in economics, the countries that make up Western Europe are too small today to operate successfully on their own. They have to find a unified response to modern problems if they are to control their own destinies.

"The political side has in fact moved faster in recent years than the economic, catching up, you might say, with the economic integration registered in the early period. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that the Community's economic problems can be compensated for by means of a more active foreign policy. Progress is needed on both fronts if the Community is to realize its potential.

"What, then, has been achieved in our political cooperation? Let me take three examples.

"First is that complex process known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE for short). Throughout the years of detailed and exacting negotiations, from the preparatory conference in Helsinki in the early 70s right through to the review

meetings still waiting to be concluded in Madrid, the members of the Community have managed to act closely in unison. There may be some in this room who know how greatly this has strengthened the overall Western position, and how it contributed in particular to the humanitarian sections of the Helsinki Final Act. At times it has even been the Ten, rather than the 15 members of NATO, who have given a lead.

"A second, and I know more controversial, area of European activity is the Middle East. Critics of the European efforts in this field sometimes forget that the Venice Declaration of June 1980 was issued at a time when the Camp David process was for various reasons in doldrums and likely to remain so for some time. In the consequent political vacuum, frustration was growing. Even the most moderate Arab leaders were demanding to know what the West as a whole was doing to promote the generally accepted goal of a just and lasting settlement. The United States, for understandable reasons, was unable at the time to give a satisfactory answer. At Venice the European Community, whose economic interests of course are even more directly involved in the region than are those of the United States, suggested some principles for progress. We believe they are balanced and realistic. They included, of course, Israel's security. But they also covered the Palestinian problem with an emphasis different from that of Camp David.

"At Venice the Ten drew attention to the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own future and suggested that the Palestinian Liberation Organization must be associated with any peace efforts. We believed, then, and are even more convinced today,

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that a proper appreciation of the Palestinian aspect is essential if a lasting solution is to be found, and if the historic progress initiated at Camp David on the Egypt-Israel front is to be extended to the West Bank. We did not see then, and we do not see now, that the two balancing principles on which the European approach is based -- security for Israel and self-determination for the Palestinians -- can be regarded as anything but even-handed and irrefutable.

"My third example is a more recent initiative. It will soon be two years since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, exposing to the world the hollowness of Soviet claims to champion peace and self-determination. We must not let Afghanistan become, like Ethiopia in the 1950s, the victim of aggression on the part of one government and indifference on the part of the rest. We must continue to work hard for a Soviet withdrawal, not only so that Afghanistan may regain its independence, but so that other countries directly affected by the invasion know that world opinion is behind them as they face the pressure of war.

"The U.N. General Assembly has passed strong resolutions by overwhelming majorities, but such resolutions are unfortunately not self-executing. There is a need for active and imaginative diplomacy, to pin the responsibility for the present situations where it belongs, in Moscow, and to create the framework for a political solution against the day when such a thing may be possible. These were the reasons for the proposals put forward in June by the Ten members of the European Community -- proposals which roughly 70 countries have since supported.

"In the years ahead, I expect European Political Cooperation to develop pragmatically. There will be no grand design, no

abolition of national foreign policies, no Euro-Foreign Office, no one Foreign Minister to the power of ten. But my nine colleagues and I will meet more often, agree more often, act together more often. We shall extend the range of subjects on which we concert. We shall launch more initiatives, and more of them will bring results.

"When you ask us questions, our answers will be quicker and more helpful to you. Our cooperation in the Ten will not replace or compete with other groups in which most of the Members of the Community are cooperating with other states: in particular, the role of NATO will not be impaired. But we in the Ten, soon to be Twelve, will become more and more what on our best days we are already: an economic and political grouping of substantial weight and consequence in the great events of the world.

"I should not like to exaggerate. The influence which the Ten or Twelve can have, in a world dominated by superpowers and super weapons, will be limited. We cannot hope to set the world to rights or wave a wand over ancient international problems to produce an instant solution. Like other practitioners of the diplomatic art, we shall need patience and perseverance, and a willingness to tolerate second-best solutions when the best is not attainable.

"I return to my starting point. Will this development of European Political Cooperation be in America's interests? Was General Eisenhower, in fact, right?

" I believe that he was. It should be fruitful, not harmful, for Europe to operate in parallel to the United States. Europe has political and commercial ties with areas of the world with which

/America ...

America is less familiar. In Africa, for example, there are leaders who are used to dealing with the Europeans and who feel at ease with us. The links that are being built up between the Ten and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) may in time produce something similar in another region of the world. For some situations it may be easier for Europe to develop a basis of common interest than it is for America as a superpower. European activity can give the West a greater flexibility and diversity in its international efforts. Not to deploy this flexibility with energy and imagination would be to waste our opportunities.

"I see another advantage to America and to NATO. Without the growth of European Political Cooperation, some Europeans might come to feel that only the superpowers can play a role on the world stage nowadays. This could feed the mood of resignation, even fatalism, which some have detected in the Old Continent. European Political Cooperation, by involving all of the Ten in activities directed to the world as a whole, can enhance both a sense of responsibility and a sense of involvement.

"General Eisenhower might be a little disappointed if he could read today the articles in your media and in ours about policy differences between our governments or about divergent trends in public opinion on the two sides of the Atlantic. America and Europe inevitably have a difference of perspectives. I find I have to adjust to it every time I fly the Atlantic.

"Europeans, living next door to the Warsaw Pact and with memories of a war fought in their own farms and cities, inevitably have particular apprehensions about the possibility of nuclear war

in Europe. It is of course understandable -- indeed, I would say admirable -- that the United States, bearing the main brunt of Western security, should attach first priority to strengthening their defenses in the face of the unremitting Soviet military buildup. I hope you will find it no less understandable that Europeans should attach a very high priority to arms control negotiations which will make a real contribution to Western security. These two objectives are entirely complementary. It is essential for NATO to adopt -- and be seen by public opinion in member countries to be adopting -- a serious and thorough approach to arms control negotiations. Equally, we should not negotiate from a position of weakness. Indeed, there is little prospect of success in negotiations if we do so. I trust that on both sides of the Atlantic it will be widely accepted that a parallel approach on these lines is the sensible way forward.

"The only way to deal with such differences is the traditional way of consultation. I am glad that this is given such a high priority over here.

"Al Haig and I have been in close and frequent contact ever since the first day when he took office. We should be careful not to exaggerate our differences, least of all in public. We should not forget the close identity of interests and of ideals which link the United States to Britain and to the European Community as a whole. But we should not look for a total uniformity of view which, thank God, can never exist on this side of the Iron Curtain. To say more on this theme would only be to echo the words of your Secretary of State's speech in Berlin ten days ago.

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"As Al Haig reminded us on that occasion, Western society is based on democracy and pluralism. There are ways in which this can seem to make us weaker than the monolithic regimes. We cannot spend money without it being voted. We cannot pass laws without consulting our Parliaments. We cannot take decisions without regard to our public opinion. We cannot even come to power without being elected.

"But in reality this pluralism is our strength. It gives us flexibility, creativity, variety, imagination, vigor. An alliance of equals, all contributing to policy, is infinitely stronger than any system on the solar model. The policies of Western Governments have greater weight precisely because they must command the support of public opinion.

"In the 80s, we must exploit these strengths. The fundamental objectives and beliefs of Europe and America will remain the same. We can afford diversity over methods. There is a role for the European Ten, a role for NATO, a role for the wider family of industrialized democracies. When there are differences within and among these groups, we must consult. When there seem to be no differences, we must consult just the same otherwise differences will develop.

"There is strength in diversity, and also in unity. What I have been suggesting is diversity without dispute in our methods, unity without uniformity in our policies, and identity in our aims and our ideals.

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