THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

A Study
SUBMITTED BY THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
(Pursuant to S. Res. 54, 90th Cong.)

TO THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1967
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
ERNEST ORUENING, Alaska
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York
LEE METCALF, Montana
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee

JAMES R. CALLOWAY, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor

II
FOREWORD

The Atlantic Alliance is at the center of America's concerns, for it is on what happens in the Atlantic community that the world's prospects for peace with freedom chiefly depend. Our interest in Europe is not reduced because of our effort in Vietnam. The strength and mutual confidence of the Atlantic allies are the single most important guarantee that the processes of peaceful change will not break down.

The member states of the Atlantic Alliance may take justified pride in the steadiness of their policies since World War II. We had the will to turn weakness into strength, and we have. We had the will to be both firm and restrained in the tests to which we have been subjected. The combination has been the foundation of peace in the Western world and the ground for our hopes that a genuine European settlement will one day be attained.

The circumstances of 1967 are not the circumstances of 1949. As times change, the Alliance will undergo many changes. It must if it is to serve the purposes and interests of the members. But the all-important question remains the same: to paraphrase Winston Churchill, will the Atlantic allies stay the course?

With this question in mind our subcommittee initiated a Senate study of the Atlantic Alliance. Throughout, the inquiry has been conducted on a professional and nonpartisan basis. The subcommittee has published detailed testimony from Dean Acheson, the late Christian A. Herter, Lauris Norstad, Richard E. Neustadt, Thomas C. Schelling, Malcolm W. Hoag, John J. McCloy, Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara. It has sought the counsel of a number of past and present officials and students of alliance operations in this country and in Europe.

Drawing on this testimony and counsel, this staff report makes certain findings on the tasks of deterrence, defense, and diplomacy that stretch on ahead as far as any of us can see.

HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations.

MARCH 1, 1967.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Will to Collaborate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The Soviet Problem</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Military Posture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. East-West Relations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Alliance Decision-Making</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. The Will to Collaborate

The Atlantic Alliance is commonly described in terms of the commitments of the North Atlantic Treaty and of the institutional arrangements called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A formal description of this kind, however, leaves important things unsaid.

The Alliance is an association, and an important one, within the Atlantic community—a community with a common fund of history, traditions, loyalties, interests, and hopes that give it life and make possible common efforts toward common goals.

The Alliance at work is a group of governments with different preoccupations and prospects. Each government is manned by political leaders and other officials with particular responsibilities and interests. Each set of men naturally prefers to go about its job in independence of the others. They overcome that inclination when they find the others helpful or essential in their work. As Richard Neustadt said to the subcommittee: "The impulse to collaborate is not a law of nature. It emerges from within, arising on the job, expressive of a need for someone else's aid or service."

The origin of the Atlantic Alliance tends to be recalled by reference to the men who founded it. It was a generation of leaders who had a strong will to cooperate and who could and did appeal to a popular will to cooperate in their countries. In the United States, Truman, Marshall, Lovett, Vandenberg, Acheson, Clayton . . . . In Britain, Attlee, Bevin, Ismay, Franks . . . . On the Continent, Spaak, Schuman, Monnet, van Kleffens, Lange, de Gasperi, Stikker . . . . Some have passed on; the others, with few exceptions, are no longer on active service.

A new generation of leaders is growing up who experienced neither the disintegration of the West in the 30's nor the disappointed hopes and the risks of the early postwar years, and who must appeal to young people who have known peace and prosperity but not the sacrifice and effort at which they were bought.

When the United States Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, it formally and legally signified its judgment that our vital interests would be imperiled if Western Europe's many millions of people, great material resources, and strategic positions came under the domination or control of the Soviet Union. It was the conviction of the American Government that the freedom and security of North America and Western Europe were mutually dependent, and that neither continent could any longer "go it alone." This conviction, equally held in Western Europe, was the essential link between the allies and the principal incentive to collaborate.

Today, the weight of private and governmental opinion on both sides of the Atlantic supports the North Atlantic Treaty as an expres-
sion of fundamental common need and common interest. (Even President de Gaulle has stated that he regards the Treaty as useful to French security and has not given notice of withdrawal from the Treaty or the North Atlantic Council.) The foundation of the Alliance is therefore still intact and the basic incentive to cooperate is still at work—but there is handwriting on the wall.

The apparent stability of the East-West military balance, a decade and a half of economic growth without historical parallel, and progress toward Western Europe's economic integration, supplemented in some measure by a hopeful interpretation of Soviet intentions, have led to a notable change in West European attitudes. The people of Western Europe have regained a lively confidence in their institutions and in their future. A sense of security has replaced the earlier sense of danger. We see among some young people (and even among some who are old enough to remember how the Soviet Union behaved when the West was weak) a temptation to assume that because no European country has disappeared behind the Iron Curtain since the Czechoslovak coup of 1948, a strong Western defense is no longer necessary. A logic which concludes that because deterrence has been successful, it is no longer necessary, would appeal to Aesop!

The disrepair of NATO's military arrangements is apparent. The most visible cracks have been produced by President de Gaulle's wrecking hammer. France will be fighting by her allies, we are told, if one of them is subjected to "unprovoked attack", but her President reserves the right to decide whether an attack is unprovoked. As John McCloy commented to the subcommittee: "This is bound to introduce an equivocal note in the Alliance itself, and I do not believe it can be ascribed to a mere slip of the pen."

Some Westerners, preoccupied with other worries, or weary of the cold war and skeptical about policies that have not brought it to an end, or desiring to experiment with new approaches to the East, are finding it comfortable to justify a reduced effort by the Atlantic allies as a reasonable response to what they call the "new situation." In many countries new political forces are gathering, seeking to develop new issues or to exploit the frustrations that have grown up around old ones, and some voices are echoing the familiar Soviet call for the settlement of European security issues by Europeans alone.

Signs of letdown are evident in many quarters in a renewal of narrow, provincial attitudes of a nationalistic, or to coin a term, regionalistic nature. The most pessimistic observers believe that the days of concerted Atlantic efforts are numbered. The conclusion is premature; a warning is not.

The Atlantic Alliance has never been an end in itself. But it has unfinished business as an agency of common defense, a foundation for a solid European settlement permitting the reunification of Germany, and a source of stability in Europe as a pillar of a peaceful international order.

A principal task facing today's allied leaders is to enhance the will to collaborate in the unfinished work of the Alliance. The purpose of this staff report is to suggest certain attitudes and approaches that might be helpful to that end, including ways in which the United States Government might improve some of its own attitudes and approaches.
II. The Soviet Problem

In the presence of the external stimulus once provided by Stalin, it was not difficult for the allies to reach a workable consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat. The job is more difficult today. But such a consensus is the foundation of coordinated allied efforts.

The Chinese Communists openly proclaim their determination to rid the world of their enemies. Not so with the Soviet Union; the Soviet rulers fly the banners of peaceful coexistence. The painful experiences of the two decades since V-E day compel us to look beyond these banners to the realities of Soviet policy.

The consistent aim of the Soviet Union, as revealed by Russian actions, has been to achieve a dominating position in both Europe and the Far East. In the West the bar to the achievement of this aim has been the forces and firmness of the Atlantic Alliance, and since 1949 the Russians have been trying to break the Alliance. For the same reason they have tried to block progress toward unity in Western Europe. They have correctly seen the emergence of any coalition powerful enough to balance Soviet power in Europe as an obstacle in their path. They have correctly recognized the key role of the Federal Republic in both the Atlantic Alliance and in a united Europe and have therefore blocked German unification and sought to divide and confuse German opinion and to foster anti-German sentiments everywhere.

Moscow is now deeply involved in diplomatic maneuvers in Europe, and is overlooking few opportunities to fish in troubled Western waters. (The Soviet leaders have been showing a lively interest in the fishing at the Quai d'Orsay.) Even though the Kremlin may be unsure about many aspects of its world policies, there is no evidence that it wants a strong NATO. On the contrary, to take them at their word, the Soviet leaders anticipate that over a period of time the interests and influence of the United States in Europe will be reduced to the point where NATO will break up and Moscow will be able to deal with a fragmented Western Europe of small and medium-sized states, with obvious implications for the ability of these states—including West Germany—to pursue policies not meeting with Soviet approval.

The Soviet political campaign to strengthen its influence on the European Continent is backed up by all the elements of Soviet power. The Soviet army is the major conventional military force in Europe. Front line Soviet forces in central Europe are approximately matched by NATO's front line forces in West Germany, but the Soviet Union has superior conventional forces in reserve. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has typically done more than the Atlantic allies, and sooner, to provide its armies with the most modern equipment. It is also a very weighty advantage that the main strength of the Warsaw Pact is provided by one army with uniform equipment, a centrally controlled supply system, great room for maneuver, and a single military doctrine.

The Soviet Union has 700 to 800 MRBM and IRBM launchers, most of which are located near its Western borders and targeted on Western Europe. Soviet leaders are carrying out an intensive nuclear weapons research and development program. They have increased quantitatively and improved qualitatively their offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces at a far faster rate than had been
predicted by top American officials. Moscow has begun to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system. Obviously the Soviet rulers do not accept the notion, popular in some American circles, that military technology and strategic strength have reached a kind of plateau and that the present balance of forces is fixed for all time to come.

At least for the time being, the Kremlin seems to want an "all quiet" on its Western front. The turbulent turn of events in Red China, together with Russia's ancient fears of simultaneous involvements in major troubles in Europe and Asia, has probably dictated some caution for now in approaching problems in the West. The nationalist trends in Eastern Europe have reduced the responsiveness of some East European states to Soviet command and to a certain degree have limited Soviet freedom of action. However, nothing is more guarded than the Kremlin's decision-making process, and this makes it difficult for anyone on the outside to predict whether the Soviet leadership is in a cautious or risk-taking mood.

It is true that the communist movement is not "homogeneous" and "monolithic," but it does not follow that the Soviet capacity to influence the world scene is inconsequential. Moreover, Moscow has long prided itself on its opportunism, and it would be dangerous to assume that the future will provide no tempting opportunities to contrive a local crisis or to conduct probing operations, with the idea of calling things off if the West is firm, but with the idea of pushing history along the path of Soviet expectations if things develop favorably. Sometimes it is difficult to call things off, especially in an area as politically unstable and as heavily armed as central Europe.

Stalin tried to evict the West from Berlin in 1948-49, but it was Khrushchev who cranked up the Berlin crisis of 1958-62 and who tried to place missiles in Cuba in 1962. Perhaps the present rulers will eschew adventures in the West, but how long will they rule? Few, if any, students of Soviet affairs anticipated Khrushchev's ouster, and few are likely to anticipate the next shift, or the policy changes to which it may lead.

Here and there it is being said that the Sino-Soviet split is final. Although it may not be possible to patch up Sino-Soviet relations during China's present convulsions, a future reconciliation which offers many mutual advantages cannot be ruled out.

In short, the challenge of the East—whether principally Russian, Chinese, or Sino-Soviet—will continue for an indeterminate time.

To some extent allied officials are bound to view the dangers through the perspective of their own national preoccupations. In consequence, they may not see the situation at a given period in exactly the same terms. But it is very important that allied governments do not base their plans or their performance on unsubstantiated rumors, wishful thinking, or self-serving speculations, no matter what their exalted source.

The allied leaders need therefore to give a higher priority to the continuing, joint review of the evidence bearing on the complex forms of the Soviet challenge, including up-to-date, realistic appraisals of the East European and Chinese situations.

Policy-making begins with information, and policy differences between governments often spring from differences over what the facts are or how they should be interpreted. A joint allied approach
to the evaluation of intelligence could make an important contribution to a consensus on the contingencies for which the Alliance should be prepared.

III. Military Posture

The North Atlantic Treaty does not commit the allies to a particular strategy or its derivative, a particular set of force goals. The commitment is to regard and resist an armed attack on one as an attack on all. As a normal thing, therefore, the allies have regularly reviewed strategy and force requirements against current appraisals of the Soviet threat.

Unfortunately, the very premises of allied policy have had to be reconsidered because of De Gaulle's eviction notice to U.S. and NATO military facilities in France, and his pull-out of French forces from NATO's unified commands and coordinated military forces. NATO has certainly not been strengthened by the French actions, but the resulting difficulties are not insurmountable, given a determination by the fourteen allies to make the necessary adjustments. The fourteen have found a new site for SHAPE in Belgium and for AFCENT (Allied Forces, Center) in the Netherlands, and have decided to move the NATO Council and the Military Committee to Brussels. They are busy adapting communications, infrastructure and defense agencies to the new situation. The fourteen now meet as a Defense Planning Committee under the Council to conduct the military affairs of the Alliance.

Quite apart from the sabot France has thrown into the NATO works, British and American balance-of-payment problems together with German budgetary difficulties have compelled a thorough study of the level of British and American forces in West Germany and the financing of their foreign exchange costs. Nuclear problems, including allied nuclear planning arrangements, have led to intensive discussions and among other things to the formation in NATO of two permanent groups for nuclear planning—a policy body called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee open to any NATO nation willing to participate in its work, and a Nuclear Planning Group of seven Defense Ministers, drawn from the full committee, to handle detailed work. Underway also is a new NATO-wide effort at joint force planning.

Out of this process may emerge a consensus on strategy and force requirements suited to present and foreseeable needs. There is, however, always a danger that what starts as a review may end in reverses and loss of mutual confidence and strength. These matters need to be handled with the care appropriate to decisions that could endanger the hard-won European balance.

The American military presence in Europe is still the hard nub of the Western deterrent. The chief purpose of the American troop commitment is political: to leave no doubt in Western Europe or in Moscow that the United States would be completely involved from the outset of any move against Western Europe. We want no uncertainty in the Kremlin about our intentions. It needs to be clear to the adversary that any act of aggression would be opposed by an effective American combat force, one capable of making a determined stand, so that the engagement would be from the start a Soviet-
American crisis, with all that implies, not just a European one. As Thomas Schelling stated before the subcommittee:

> It is a sign of NATO's success that the nations of Europe can afford to spend so much of their attention on matters of nuclear authority within the Alliance, matters that have more to do with status than with security. But the central feature of NATO strategy is the presence of American troops in Europe **.*

We may lack strength, we may lack unity, we may lack adequate command arrangements, we may even lack the territory to provide any defense in depth, but what we still have and must keep is the physical presence of American troops in Europe in sufficient numbers to make clear that they are a real force, not a token force, and that, in case of military action, they are there to fight and not merely to sound an alarm **.*

The American divisions that we have there, if they are flexible, adaptable, mobile, and properly located, can make a very enormous difference as to whether things get out of hand or, instead, can be controlled.

The American troops, along with the European troops, are not there as a kind of hostage whose destruction would trigger a nuclear response. The Soviet Government cannot suppose that a large-scale attack on Western Europe could be even briefly restricted to conventional forces, and therefore, if a massive attack is to be made, it will surely begin with a nuclear strike against Western Europe and North America, not a march of great armies across NATO's eastern boundaries.

The primary function of NATO's conventional forces, with their vital American component, is to meet a local crisis as effectively as they can, posing the continuous threat that if the crisis continues and enlarges, the risks of escalation continue and enlarge with it—in particular the risks of nuclear war. To perform this function NATO forces capable of containing a sizable, though limited, attack are required. Anything less would be a standing temptation to Soviet probes of allied mettle, and such probes would force the allies to retreat or to engage in brinkmanship, with all the risks either course would involve.

It is sometimes said that if most of the American divisions now in Europe were brought home, they could be moved back in a crisis. This course would involve serious risks. For example: it would be useless against a sizable surprise attack from the East if only because the required airfields would probably be unavailable; it would necessarily make a large crisis out of a small one; it would require a dramatic and perhaps difficult political decision to put American troops back into Europe; it runs the danger that returning too few troops would look irresolute, while returning too many would look belligerent; it might be too slow to prevent a crisis from getting out of control.

The mishandling by the West of a single emergency could profoundly alter the prospects for stability in Europe. And in an emergency we must be able, without any delay, to put military forces into small confrontations to hold ground, not give it, and thus to improve our diplomatic position. The need is for forces on the ready which can
act without unnecessarily difficult political preparations. The ability of SACEUR to move conventional forces, with a strong American component, in several crises in Berlin was important to the successful management of those crises. General Norstad told the subcommittee:

It is argued in some places that conventional forces were things of the last war or even of the 1914–1918 war. I was in a position to "supervise" the part of our forces in the Allied Forces during several confrontations in Berlin. The movement of troops, the willingness to use or commit troops, was an important item. I just do not think we could have met those requirements if we had not had the conventional forces we had.

Indeed, NATO's conventional power is needed not only to respond to emergencies that Moscow would deliberately contrive, but also to deal with the unforeseeable contingencies that history sometimes contrives—border incidents, upheavals in satellite nations that splash over the line, and so forth.

It is, of course, the combat capability of conventional forces that counts. With the advance of technology it may be possible to make some redeployment of combat garrisons and their logistic and support elements now on the Continent without reducing the capability needed to meet the problems of deterrence and initial front-line defense. In time new developments in strategic mobility—both air and sea—and in tactical mobility and firepower may further add to conventional capabilities thereby allowing some reduction in land forces, although the experience in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam is not altogether encouraging in this respect. A technological advance by one side has often been offset by an advance on the other side. Moreover, if numbers are reduced by piecemeal cuts in NATO-assigned units, the problem of preserving the organizational integrity and effectiveness of these units becomes more difficult. At least for the time being, any sizable cutback of American and British troops in Europe almost surely implies a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and their incorporation in military operations at a very early phase of hostilities. It is not self-evident that this would best serve the interests of the United States and its allies.

Furthermore, force requirements are designed not only to contribute to deterrence and defense but also to fortify the diplomatic bargaining position of the West vis-à-vis the East, in particular to contribute to a controlled program of arms reduction and to a genuine European settlement. A critical question is the effect of a one-sided reduction in allied combat capability on the chances for a reciprocal East-West reduction in forces and for winning eventual Soviet acceptance of a stable European settlement. It is hard to see how the West can improve the bargaining position it has worked so long and hard to construct by weakening it—unilaterally.

As the allies continue their search for answers to these questions a number of guiding principles seem pertinent:

One. These delicate and complex issues should be examined and decided by all the NATO allies who wish to cooperate. The destiny and commitment of all Alliance members are involved. To exclude any member from the making of decisions on these vital issues would
be to invite it, in effect, to exclude itself from the taking of actions flowing therefrom.

Two. These questions are at the heart of effective force planning under the Council and its Defense Planning Committee. The Alliance agencies should not be bypassed by self-appointed groups.

Three. The allies need a force on the central European front to which no one nation contributes a disproportionate share. Too large a West German contribution, for example, might help the Russians to nourish East European fears of Germany, prejudice West Germany's chances of improving its relations with Eastern Europe, and thus delay the working out of the future role of a reunified Germany in Europe.

Four. The problem of allocating defense burdens among the allies challenges the sincerity of each ally in living up to its obligation under Article 3 of the Treaty for "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The words of that obligation were purposely placed in the order of their importance: "self-help and mutual aid."

In the years since World War II Americans have provided over $120 billion for the strengthening of the free world. Contrary to the notion of some critics, we do not expect gratitude. Now that our European allies are back on their feet with an earning power growing at a rate exceeding ours, we might reasonably expect this change to be reflected in the sharing of the defense burden.

It is true, of course, that a rich, powerful nation usually has to make the greater sacrifice and usually is in the weakest bargaining position within any alliance that rests upon the sharing of responsibilities and costs. Yet our European allies should recognize that there is inevitably a relation between their willingness to draw on the resources their expanding economies are providing, and the willingness of the American people to give solid support to the principle of mutual aid. As things stand, most Americans and most West Europeans recognize the need for a strong American combat force in Europe, but this attitude may change unless the European allies are willing, as they grow more prosperous, to assume a growing share of the costs of the common defense.

To be sure, all of the allies face balance-of-payment or budgetary difficulties, some greater than others. It is not easy for any of them to meet the costs of defense. One pitfall to be avoided is clearly marked: pentagonal pressuring of an ally to buy more military hardware than is really useful. Mutually beneficial offsetting systems and other joint arrangements are needed to support a fair allocation of defense tasks among all the allies.

Five. These wide-ranging issues require patient, thorough consideration. They cannot be settled in haste, and still be settled wisely. Abrupt or unilateral changes would be unsettling and risk demoralizing friends and allies. If changes in force posture are to be made, they should flow from decisions by the Council or its Defense Planning Committee and should be executed with a view to minimizing the danger that their significance will be misinterpreted by the Soviet Union—or by allied governments and publics. This applies with
special emphasis to any reduction of British and American forces on the Continent.

IV. East-West Relations

In the circumstances that are emerging in Europe and the world it may be possible to give increased emphasis to East-West adjustments. The basic objective of allied policy in Europe is not strength for strength's sake, or to freeze the status quo, but to create an environment for a genuine European settlement serving the legitimate security interests of all concerned. The hope has been that one day security could be achieved on terms which would put a safe end to Europe's unhappy division.

That day is not, unfortunately, at hand. The only kind of a settlement worth talking about is one reached with the consent of all parties—and, as things stand, the minimum terms demanded by each side exceed the maximum the other side is willing to concede.

The problem is obviously most difficult for Germany, for it is the one country through which the line of division runs. The psychological burden of imposed disunity weighs heavily. Although no one inside or outside Germany can now see a way to reunite the nation that would be acceptable to both East and West, no one in Germany can repudiate the goal. Nor can Germany's allies.

Dean Acheson's testimony to the subcommittee in April 1966 suggested how much must be accomplished in improving the East-West environment as a foundation of German reunification. He said:

I would not start by trying to write peace programs, but by having East European countries share more in the life and industry and commerce of Europe. Insofar as Eastern Europe can be brought into the general European picture—share in the new prosperity—this is an advantage. This creates a situation where you can move more freely. If this brings the Russians along, good. ** given a position where people are coming together, economically and politically, where you could reduce the worry over the military situation, where you could begin to talk about boundaries without scaring everyone out of their wits, you get places.

As far ahead as one can see, progress toward a European settlement means a steady and progressive erosion of the importance of the line dividing Europe and partitioning Germany, rather than its dramatic erasure by a formal agreement at the summit. Expanded trade relations, closer diplomatic ties, and better cultural, tourist and scientific contacts between East and West are possible. The Wall may be removed someday. If the division through Europe loses some of its significance, the outlines of a genuine settlement permitting German reunification may become visible.

President Johnson's major policy speech on Europe in October 1966 proposed a greater effort in the direction of East-West reconciliation as a basis for Germany's peaceful reunification. The new West German Government is obviously thinking along the same lines, and has begun a long and delicate effort to recast its relations with Eastern
Europe. West German Chancellor Kiesinger has put it this way, in words especially directed to Moscow:

We wish the reunification of our people in freedom and in peace. We too know that for this not simply a vote is enough; that preconditions must be established, and that above all a climate of mutual trust and mutual understanding must exist as the condition for the solution of this most difficult European problem. I implore the Soviet Russian leaders to take this desire of ours seriously, above all our will to peace, which will ultimately serve the vital interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union, too.

As the West Germans explore the avenues of accommodation they deserve our sympathy, understanding and support. For there will undoubtedly be many detours, disappointments and false starts before they reach their destination.

It is not always helpful to think in grand, let alone grandiose, terms. Western purposes must include German reunification, but this purpose is more likely to be set back than advanced by a diplomacy directly aimed at a quick and full settlement. As the West pursues its long-term goals, certain principles of conduct should be kept in mind:

One. The steadiness and continuity of American policy are essential to the growth of conditions favorable to a settlement, and the people of West Germany, in particular, should feel the confidence in American policy that comes from working together: confidence that they can count on American support for their legitimate goals, that the United States will not enter into any deal with the East over their heads, and that they will not be taken by surprise on any approaches to the Soviet Union.

Two. The importance of full participation by the Federal Republic in a developing European community, including the United Kingdom, cannot be overemphasized. The United States has long supported the concept of a united Western Europe. We should be prepared to accept progress in this direction even if it means, as it may, the development of a "European caucus" in some Atlantic Alliance agencies and the growth of a certain "European nationalism" in political, economic, and military affairs.

The challenge to Western Europe is to find whatever degree and form of closer concert or union will improve its health and strength and its will to play its full and responsible part in world affairs. In the long run, Western Europe will achieve effective unity only if its members, including France, are willing to forego turning the movement for unification to selfish nationalistic advantage. In these matters, the United States Government should restrain its Mother Hen proclivities. Only the Europeans can decide these issues.

Three. The German problem is unavoidably and inescapably an international problem; the fact is inherent in Germany's division, its size, and the implications of its reunification for European stability. This is to say that German affairs are not solely German affairs; non-Germans are necessarily concerned and will necessarily have a voice. All the more reason, therefore, why her allies should not be party to any unnecessary or unfair discrimination against the Federal Republic.
The Federal Republic has formally agreed not to produce nuclear weapons on its territory and has voluntarily renounced national ownership of nuclear weapons. All West German armed forces are assigned to NATO, and the Federal Republic therefore has no national troops in the full sense. There is no West German general staff and there are no arrangements for the autonomous employment of West German troops by the West German Government even in defense of West German territory.

With the full cooperation and agreement of West Germany, therefore, arrangements have been devised that should be reassuring to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as to many in the West.

Four. There are limits beyond which the efforts for reconciliation might seem to ratify the status quo of a divided Germany. In such circumstances, the possibility could not be ruled out that some future West German government, disillusioned with and embittered toward the West, would seek to work out by itself the best deal it could with the Soviet Union.

In their relations with the East the allies should heed the words Secretary General Brosio spoke to the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1966:

The West has shown a great deal of good will in attempting to meet Soviet positions throughout the years. The Soviets, for their part, have not only remained adamant but have maintained the initiative. We are perhaps paying here the price of our invaluable freedom. We are not able to stand firm long enough on positions which appear to us right; our moral questing and intellectual inconstancy force us continuously to conceive and offer new solutions. Our opponents, however, remain steady and obdurate and wait for our further steps.

Five. A possibility that the Soviet Union may prove willing to make some East-West adjustments does not constitute a reason to pay less attention to the defense of Western Europe. As Thomas Schelling said to the subcommittee:

If indeed the Soviet Union has at last decided that it either does not want to conquer that part of the world, or would not know how to control it if it did, that may be precisely because we have achieved a deterrent and potential defense in Western Europe that is now a foregone conclusion to the Soviet Union, and they have learned the facts of life. I would not like to disturb that Soviet belief. I would not like to offer them any alternative temptation at a time when quite possibly they are willing at least to consider weakening some of their own defensive arrangements in Eastern Europe itself.

Six. The North Atlantic Council is the instrument by and through which the allies should coordinate their policies toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This does not mean that the Council is an agency for negotiations with the East. Depending on the subject matter, discussions and negotiations might be carried on bilaterally or in various multilateral meetings. In every case, however, the substance of East-West discussions should be regularly reported to
the North Atlantic Council and there should be no separate agreements against the interests, or without the knowledge, of interested allies.

V. Alliance Decision-Making

Decision-making in an alliance is a consultative process. Poor substitute though it may be for an executive, it is the only means sovereign authorities have to reconcile their differences and reach a workable consensus. In this process, no ally is too small to contribute to policy decisions: an initiative in December 1966 to strengthen the political role of the Alliance was taken not by one of the bigger allies, but by Belgium. And no ally can afford to stand aloof: the golden rule of an alliance is to consult with others as you would have others consult with you.

Even at its best, of course, consultation cannot extinguish deep differences of judgment between policy-makers over many issues, or erase basic disparities of power. By sharing information and analyses and by allowing time for patterns of thought to change, consultation can help to reduce differences, to develop a common perspective, and to minimize the consequences of differences that remain.

Skilled practice of the art of consultation is important to a big power. It helps to take the sting out of its bigness. This places a high premium on the ability of American officials genuinely and generously to collaborate with others who are also knowledgeable and concerned about the emerging problems of the Alliance.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The Council is the top allied agency. All members should resolve to use the Council and its Defense Planning Committee as the central bodies for inter-allied consultation. This rule, although recognized in principle, has not always been observed in practice by the members, including the United States.

A strong case can be made for appointing Permanent Representatives to the Council with sufficient political standing in their own countries to have direct access to heads of government, and, where possible constitutionally, to legislatures and parliaments. When Council decisions and recommendations are referred to member governments, the Representatives would thereby be better able to argue for their support and to explain and defend the requirements of the Alliance before their own countrymen.

FORWARD POLITICAL PLANNING

To improve allied consultation on complex and sensitive political issues, NATO's policy planning activities could and should be strengthenened. What most allied leaders want, and what helps them at home—and what may therefore enhance their willingness and ability to collaborate in an emergency—is confidence that they are involved in the early consideration of major issues and can make their views and wants known before a bigger ally comes to a final decision and acts. Of course, the big powers need the same assurance that the smaller allies will not act unilaterally on important matters affecting the Alliance.
The Berlin task force provides a useful model. In that case the governments concerned disagreed on many issues yet each was insured the opportunity to question anything and to obtain consideration of alternatives before action was taken. In view of the special role of the United States, assurance that our decisions could be questioned and challenged by others reduced public disagreements between the governments and contributed to close cooperation throughout the crisis and thus to its successful handling. The arrangements made it possible for the participating governments to act along agreed lines with full awareness of what the others were doing and why.

In a particular case, such as Berlin, it may be desirable to center planning in Washington. As a general principle, however, it seems desirable to build up the role of the Council and its Secretariat and to concentrate planning at the Council's headquarters.

SACEUR AND SHAPE

The Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the task forces should take full advantage of the advice and assistance of SACEUR and SHAPE. SACEUR is the agent of the whole Alliance, but, by virtue of his second hat as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe (CINCEUR), he provides a most useful connection to the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of all U.S. forces. Furthermore, it is through SACEUR and SHAPE that the development of coordinated allied military plans, the coordination of any allied military actions, and the integration of German forces into the Western defense system, are carried out. SACEUR has proved an indispensable instrument in periods of crisis. McGeorge Bundy expressed it this way:

It is good that on the issue of keeping NATO intact General de Gaulle is still alone, for if the General's position were to be imitated, the principal Western instrument for effective control of crisis in Europe would be destroyed: This instrument is the Supreme Allied Command in Europe ** *. In moments of crisis the vital need of the Alliance is political unity backed by American strength * * *. Without an effective command—plainly responsive both to the Alliance as a whole and to Washington as the center of strategic strength—there would be no instrument for measured response in any new crisis, and without that instrument we should lose a critical governor for peace.

DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC AREA

Greater use should be made of the North Atlantic Council for the multilateral discussion of issues outside the North Atlantic area including the problem of Communist China. These issues are bound to be the subject of many bilateral discussions among governments. And the Alliance itself, of course, does not entitle one ally to claim the support of others on matters beyond the obligations undertaken in the Treaty. But there is a clear need for more discussion and exchange of ideas on the many threats to the interests of Western powers arising in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
In such discussions the European allies have much to contribute from their knowledge and long experience. As Alastair Buchan has written:

If the NATO Council became the most important center in the West for the discussion of economic, political and, where relevant, military developments outside the Atlantic area, its effectiveness and influence would grow rather than diminish. Its discussions have a tradition of privacy which is unobtainable in other Western caucuses, for instance at the United Nations * * * the Council is the Alliance in plenary session, and its discussions give member governments a sense of the way the views of their Western colleagues are developing, in a fashion that no other body can.

Interparliamentary Consultation

Not simply the government executive, but the legislator too, may grow in understanding through inter-allied meetings and discussions. In particular, the North Atlantic Assembly (formerly called the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference), though it is an unofficial body, has contributed to a broader appreciation of the role of the Alliance, to informing public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, and to stimulating some successful NATO ventures.

Recently, the Assembly proposed that it should have a more recognized relationship with the North Atlantic Council. In response to this proposal, the Council might well give such recognition and volunteer an annual report on the state of the Alliance and the issues before it. For its part, the Assembly should improve its own organization and procedures, for example: a stronger Secretariat and better preparation of agenda items.

Joint Ventures on Mutual Problems

The Atlantic allies need to find more ways to help each other with one another's practical problems—and thus to make collaboration in the affairs of the Atlantic community a plus in terms of national politics. Richard Neustadt made this comment before the sub-committee:

If one wants to tie the policies of governments together, over time, one seeks joint ventures or concerns which link the daily doings of key men on either side, making them dependent on each other in their work, giving them concrete incentives to collaborate * * *. Ventures or concerns in common * * * give men inside each government a handhold on the hopes and fears of men inside the other as they do their work and pursue their needs in their own bargaining arena, day by day. For a peacetime alliance, lacking Stalin or his like, few things can help more to keep two governments together.

A case in point: throughout Western Europe one of the most fashionable topics of conversation is the "technological gap" between the United States and Western Europe. The gap may actually be widening. Yet there seems to be no agreement in Europe on what really needs to be done, or how far West European governments
would be ready to pool their efforts to make and exploit technological advances. The field is wide open for scrutiny in Western Europe and in such trans-Atlantic forums as OECD.

There is no shortage of such problems of mutual concern. As has been suggested in this report, opportunities abound for mutually helpful cooperation on problems that do not have to be invented but are already high on national agendas.

**U.S. Policy-Making**

As this report has emphasized, the United States Government cannot work effectively on the unfinished business of the Alliance without attending to some of its own attitudes and approaches. These further lines of improvement commend themselves:

- Particularly in matters affecting the East-West military balance, safety-first is still the rule, or should be. The attitude of some high officials about anti-missile defenses that “we cannot afford to do much about it” could end up endangering the credibility of the Western nuclear deterrent and unsteadying the Western resolve at a moment of crisis. The price of collective safety and individual liberty is high—and may go still higher. Yet as Robert Lovett told a predecessor subcommittee: “We can do whatever we have to do in order to survive * * *.”

- In working with allies, of course, there is no substitute for confidence in the word of the American Government. That is why playing with facts and figures, even if it will gain a few yards now and then, may lose the game. Not all of our appointed officials have learned this lesson. It will be a sad day if the people come to agree with Mark Twain that “there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics.”

- Clear and reasoned policy, approved at the top of the government, is the precondition of effective cooperation with allies. Too often American officials negotiate from divergent points of view, tripping over each other in the process and confusing our allies and ourselves. This is bound to result in making a difficult situation more difficult. There is still much to be done in providing timely, approved formulations of policy and unkinking lines of authority in the conduct of Atlantic affairs.

The founders of the Atlantic Alliance were forward-looking in 1949. Their successors should be equally forward-looking today. The future is filled with challenges no one of the allies can handle in isolation, and that neither North America nor Western Europe can meet alone.

Today’s political leaders—executive and legislative—have solemn duties. Theirs is the main responsibility to assure the common defense, to advance the cause of a genuine European settlement, and to provide for stability in Europe as a basis for a peaceful international society. They must inspire the oncoming generation of young people to do its best in the unfinished work of the Alliance.

For today as yesterday the need for the Alliance is fresh and compelling: it is difficult to imagine a hopeful future which does not rest on the stability and steadiness of our association, and, of course, especially on the steadiness of American policy.