WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance
Consideration of current problems

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
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MBFR negotiations in Vienna

1. Adopted in Committee by 9 votes to 0 with 8 abstentions.

2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens, Amrein, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon (Substitute: Forni), Cermolacce, Fioret, Fletcher, Mrs. Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: de Bruyne), MM. Grangier, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Péridier, Porsheine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel, Urwin, Van Hoylandt.

N.B. The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation

on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance
— consideration of current problems

The Assembly,

Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the essential guarantee of European security;

Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence responsibilities;

Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country called upon to take part in a European union;

Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266);

Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and consequently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159),

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the Assembly, and in particular:
   
   (a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence responsibilities;

   (b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions of the union;

2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its participation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters;

3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in the field of arms policy;

4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy to be implemented by the forces of the member States;

5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe.
I. Towards an adult Europe

(i) Closer union

1. Since the first Prague coup in 1947, and above all since the signing of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, soon followed by the Warsaw Pact, free Europe has lived in the shadow of the two blocs under the balance of terror. While belonging to one of these blocs, Western Europe (in the geographical sense extending beyond the seven members of WEU) sought in varying degrees but untiringly to define its own identity and promote the union. The Council of Europe (or greater Europe), Western European Union which replaced the stillborn European Defence Community, and the European Economic Community each in turn provided the appropriate framework.

2. Although the first two have stood still while continuing a steady dialogue and collaboration between their members in their own specific fields, it has become increasingly clear since the summit meetings in The Hague, Copenhagen and Paris that the Economic Community, since enlarged to nine, has set a closer union as its goal which some believe to be resolutely political and defensive but which is discreetly called European, which leaves a wide enough margin for future developments.

(ii) Beyond the two blocs

3. This emerging Europe, while sheltering below the American nuclear umbrella, quickly understood that it had to move cautiously and gradually extend beyond the two blocs to create, in a shape yet to be defined, a political, economic and strategic group. The bipolar world of the fifties has since become five-fold, if not more, since China made its entrance on the world stage and Japan has become an economic power to be reckoned with.

4. Today, the outstripping of the blocs is more satisfactory than twenty years ago. Following a variety of events, the United States has readjusted its commitments abroad. Here reference is made not only to the disturbances caused by the tragedy in South-East Asia and the internal unrest in that great country but also to the effects of the upsurge of the European States within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly since 1967: the opening towards the East, policy of détente, attempts to achieve balanced force reductions leading towards the inter-German agreement, the Helsinki agreement and the MBFR negotiations.

5. Further, the Soviet Union's European policy seems to have developed towards a more defensive concept, having guaranteed the status quo of its conquests in Europe, in order to be able more easily to guard the Asian front. Or such, at least, is the general feeling in Europe in spite of warnings of caution which are sounded regularly.

(iii) Europe with world-wide responsibilities

6. The will to outstrip the blocs — which might also be called a need for European self-assertion — has been considerably strengthened by Europe's vast economic expansion, however shaken it may at present be by a dangerous depression. An economic community which alone represents 20% of the gross social product of the whole world, 41% of international trade and about 50% of world monetary reserves — an economic giant — cannot deny its world responsibilities in establishing peace and social justice. With the exception of the United States' possession of intercontinental nuclear weaponry, Europe's responsibilities towards the world as a whole and towards the southern hemisphere in particular are at least equal to those of the United States. Seen from Washington, political Europe may seem parochial — according to Mr. Ball — because of its mosaic of peoples, nations (large and small), languages and national reactions. However this may be, Europe contributes generously and without political bias to the development of the southern hemisphere and shoulders its share of the heavy burden of joint defence.

7. Satisfaction may be derived from the statement by Mr. Ortoli in the European Parliament on 18th February 1975:

    “Europe must behave as an adult and never forget that it is a profound moral reality at the same time as a great commercial power.”

8. But what Europe is lacking is political stature. The major task of our governments is to shape this without delay with the enthusiastic
support of public opinion in our various countries.

II. Prospects of political union

9. In a report published in June 1975, the Commission of the European Communities outlines what a European union might be and possible ways of achieving it.

(i) The proposal

10. There is a fairly clear picture of the future. The Commission (paragraph 3) states that:

"the possibility of a number of independent and parallel organisations must be excluded."

It also rejects (paragraphs 7 and 8) the type of union based on:

"a network of special agreements involving all or only some of the member States depending on the subject"

which it considers contrary to the concept of a European identity.

11. It believes the union’s responsibilities should include foreign policy and defence policy (paragraphs 59, 60 and 61).

12. Admittedly (paragraph 74):

"The Atlantic Alliance plays and will continue to play a decisive role in the security of Western Europe, but the security of the union, its long-term cohesion and solidarity between its peoples cannot be truly guaranteed if defence matters are purely and simply left on one side when the union is being established."

13. Moreover (paragraph 87):

"In the field of external relations, only a single organisation is capable of guaranteeing the necessary degree of consistency between the various aspects of a policy of international co-operation. In addition, it would make the union’s own personality stand out more clearly at international level"

which, moreover :

"does not mean that the institutions of the union act in all their fields of competence in accordance with the same legal rules."

14. Finally, in paragraph 76, the Commission states that for a European defence policy to be considered and accepted by the peoples of the union:

"the European institutions will have to be recognised as authoritative and representative of a sufficiently high degree of solidarity between those peoples."

Consequently, (paragraph 77):

"A period of strengthening the union will be necessary before all these conditions can be met."

(ii) Fields of competence

15. These various considerations bring the Commission to consider the field of defence (paragraph 77) as:

"a field of potential competence for the union, which would thus not be endowed with powers and means of action in this field from the outset."

16. The competence and potential competence of the union shall be laid down in the act of constitution (paragraph 12). The member States would thus have to enter into an undertaking in principle in this field which would have some immediate repercussions. Thus, (paragraph 78):

"As a potential competence would be involved, the member States would be bound not to engage with non-member countries in actions which might endanger the security of another member State or compromise the union’s long-term cohesion."

17. The Commission further suggests (paragraph 79):

"periodic discussions on defence problems and the defence effort held in a truly European framework with the participation of all the member States"

and (paragraph 80):

"a systematic comparison of the strategic planning of the various countries with the aim of arriving at a common view, taking account of the specific interests of Europe."

18. Finally, the Commission recalls the Paris communiqué stating that the European union must be set up "with the fullest respect for the treaties already signed". It considers that this should not be construed to mean that no institutional change is desirable or even necessary but that fullest respect for the treaties implies (paragraph 93):
“that the institutional system of the union should be based on the existing institutions.”

(iii) The present situation

19. There now exists a European Community as defined in the EEC, ECSC and Euratom treaties. These treaties attribute certain specific responsibilities to the Community and consequently to the Commission. In other fields, their responsibilities are concurrent with those retained by the member States. Lastly, there are potential fields of competence, i.e. areas not yet attributed to the Community but which are destined to be entrusted to it at a time and in conditions which are to be the subject of a subsequent decision.

20. This is the head under which the Commission’s report envisages the future European union’s defence responsibilities and hence all foreign policy questions connected with defence. However, drawing on its experience of the European Community, the Commission made the following comment (paragraph 22):

“In sectors where there were no Community instruments or rules, or where they were inadequate, governments have not been capable on their own of bringing into being and maintaining with the necessary continuity the will to act on their national structures and guide development towards common objectives.”

21. However, as matters now stand, nine-power political consultations have developed outside the strict framework of the Community and this experience has led the Commission not to retain this type of framework for the model European union. It states (paragraph 65):

“Hitherto, political co-operation has seldom led to anything more than the Community reacting to events. If these objectives are to be achieved, the first thing to be done is to complete the elimination of the frequently artificial distinction between Community activities and matters for political co-operation. This distinction makes it impossible to deal with our problems in context or to act as effectively as we should, while our partners are faced with a multitude of interlocutors none of whom is really in a position to speak for Europe. It is not enough to try and remedy the situation through co-ordination of the two structures. In the European union, all questions of common interest must be considered in a single institutional framework.”

22. However, the extension of such a framework to defence and foreign affairs raises difficulties which are underlined by the Commission (paragraph 66):

“The union would invoke its competence only when necessary, so that certain matters might, for a very long period and perhaps indefinitely, be dealt with solely by the member States.”

23. Thus, as the Commission admits (paragraph 23):

“There may be areas which fall within the general competence of the union but where the union cannot or need not yet be given powers of its own. Here it would be useful to organise co-operation within the union. Such co-operation could, moreover, help to promote agreement on certain basic options and so, in appropriate fields, lead at a later stage to the union being given powers of its own.”

(iv) The aims

24. The Commission’s aims in the fields of foreign affairs and defence are thus defined (paragraph 63):

“The general political aspects of international relations are dealt with under the system of political co-operation established between the nine member States of the Community.

Matters relating specifically to defence are dealt with at NATO and in Western European Union.

These various forms of collaboration will have to be organised coherently and given a new dimension in the union.”

And (paragraph 66):

“As regards the distribution of fields of competence between the union and the member States, the final objective is a common policy with direct attribution of powers to the union institutions in all areas where the member States acting alone cannot have as effective a voice as would the union acting as one, or where the absence of a common policy would make it impossible for the union to pursue the objectives of its internal development or to contribute to international actions of interest to the union.”
III. European defence

(i) A question evaded for too long

25. The question of European defence underlies all discussions on European union and the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. But the roots of the question are rarely tackled whether by the European countries or in the Atlantic Alliance. The question is possibly evaded for two reasons: because it might elicit doubts about the sincerity of the admission of the European countries to the Atlantic Alliance and because for Europe to have a defence system of its own might eventually lead to a political organisation completely independent of the United States.

26. In 1973, Mr. Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had the courage to raise the problem in the WEU Assembly. At the time, his speech evoked reservations in many European capitals not because of the hint of European self-assertion but because of fears of opening the door to an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. There has since been no mention of the subject, at least officially, but it is still obviously a topical matter and WEU is the appropriate framework for discussing it.

27. European defence is indubitably a matter for the European union which the Nine have set as an objective, as they affirmed at the summit meeting in Paris in December 1974. There can be no question of political unification, even limited to loose, flexible confederal links, if a start is not made on integrating the means of defence. Some independent integrated defence capability is, moreover, the firmest guarantee for a clearly distinguished political entity.

(ii) Faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance

28. What is also mandatory is that the implementation of the joint defence system for nine-power Europe cannot weaken the Atlantic Alliance but should strengthen it.

29. Is it necessary to recall the solemn declaration in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 in which the nine governments affirmed that there was no alternative to the security afforded by the nuclear armament of the United States and the presence of American troops on our continent? As far as is known, none of the members of WEU expressed reservations in endorsing the Ottawa declaration.

30. In preparing to integrate their means of defence, the Nine must clearly confirm that they remain faithful to the Alliance, particularly since this will afford them protection from disagreeable surprises during the process of progressive integration.

31. Should it eventually be possible to achieve the military integration of the Nine, it will be just as essential to maintain the Alliance for obvious geographic and military reasons. The fact is that the area covered by the Nine is lacking in depth, is too drawn out geographically and, above all, there is such an enormous difference between the Franco-British nuclear arsenal and that of the USSR that the United States nuclear guarantee will still be essential.

32. It has been said that joint European defence might disturb the Soviet Union and thus endanger the policy of détente. It is clear that the Soviet Union has always frowned upon any form of European unification, even the Common Market. But in all honesty it cannot feel threatened by a political and military change which, although strengthening the defensive cohesion of the Alliance, changes practically nothing in the ratio of forces.

33. Incidentally, it should be underlined that the EEC Commission in its report of 25th June 1975 sees defence as a potential competence of the European union, while affirming that this defence must be placed in the Atlantic framework.

(iii) A first firm step

34. Over and above the studies and discussion which will arise, some definite progress must be made without delay. This calls to mind the views expressed by the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs — inter alia in the WEU Assembly on 5th December 1974 and 28th May 1975 — on a joint armaments and matériel policy. This would be a small but essential step. A European defence system will be possible only insofar as Europe has an independent arms and matériel production capability. This implies first a joint approach and second a reshaping of the armaments industries which moreover would improve the chances where trade with the United States and Canada is concerned.

35. At a future European Council meeting, it is therefore important to work out a truly European defence concept which takes account of the requirements of the Atlantic Alliance.

(iv) The deterrent

36. A European union fully competent in defence matters cannot exclude the possibility of having
its own strategic and tactical nuclear arms, at least in the long run. Public opinion's aversion to this weapon of destruction in our different countries is acknowledged. But today there can be no effective defence without the deterrent and the European union would be a third class political force if it excluded for ever the possibility of ensuring its own defence by nuclear means.

37. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom (whose political and economic power cannot be compared with that of the United States and the USSR) provided themselves with independent nuclear means because they considered they could not lower their guard in the absence of an effective world-wide organisation which could ban or limit nuclear weapons. A political confederation which included these two countries and which inherited French and British nuclear weapons would automatically become a nuclear power. It is inconceivable for these two countries to agree to join a European political union which eliminated the deterrent. On the other hand, it is equally inconceivable for the nuclear arms the European union would inherit to remain exclusively under French and British command, at least in the final stage of the union. After a period of transition, the French and British deterrents should therefore take their place in a European defence system capable of defining its own strategy. To those who morally might not be able to subscribe to this the following question might be put : what distinction is there between nuclear defence ensured by the United States and European nuclear defence, other than a thin coating of hypocrisy? The only valid argument is the high cost of nuclear means, but it is evident that, as with French or British nuclear defence systems, the European union's strategy would never go further than what is strictly necessary to deter a possible enemy.

38. For the time being and as long as the United States is firmly committed in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance to applying a joint strategy which meets in full the defence requirements of Western Europe, the organisation of a European strike force is not an immediate necessity. But now is the time to prepare for the future particularly if it were to transpire that NATO could not indefinitely remain Western Europe's only resort for its security.

IV. WEU's rôle in the interim period

39. As the formation of a European union will certainly be a long drawn out task, it will be necessary to preserve what now exists in the field of defence and political co-operation and also to make WEU's mission converge with that of the future European union in which WEU will eventually be absorbed.

(i) Preserving what exists

40. It should be recalled that the Brussels Treaty is a treaty of alliance with wide-ranging commitments, which, if diluted, would have most serious repercussions on the security of Europe. Conversely, there are certain discriminatory aspects to this treaty which cause the governments of several member countries to accept it only with reluctance. This is the case for Germany, because of the bans imposed on it, the United Kingdom, because of the commitment to maintain a large force on the continent of Europe, and the other countries of continental Europe which have to submit to verification of their forces as a whole.

41. However this may be, in the end all the members of WEU are affected by these discriminatory clauses which consequently are not really discriminatory but are rather concessions from which each country draws some advantage. To renounce the treaty or even its discriminatory clauses — which would mean calling in question the work of the treaty as a whole — would put an end to the only instrument which exists for preparing the European union in the field of defence and foreign policy.

42. However, the application of the treaty is proving to be hardly satisfactory at the moment because the Council is no longer meeting at ministerial level and, whatever it may claim, the Council at ambassadorial level is taking absolutely no initiative, even in WEU's own specific field. Thus, in reply to Written Questions 158 and 159, the WEU Council said that these questions:

"relate to recent developments in the United States' nuclear strategy and their consequences for NATO defence planning. The Council are not in a position to appraise these matters."

43. Such a position is contrary to all the Council's commitments to the Assembly and, because of its implications, helps to weaken the prospects of European union in the form envisaged by the Commission of the Communities. It should further be recalled that the WEU Council was itself set up under the Brussels Treaty and to allow it to become dormant would
be making the treaty dormant, which would be tantamount to abandoning one of the essential foundations of European union.

44. Some ground has also been gained bilaterally and this must be preserved and extended insofar as possible. Most characteristic of this is possibly the Franco-German treaty with the compulsory and detailed consultations it has introduced. Although this treaty may not have produced identity of views between France and Germany on many essential matters, it has at least allowed these two countries to hold regular detailed consultations on all the matters which interest them, and particularly those affecting foreign policy and defence. This could serve as a model for the future European union.

(ii) Preparing the European union

45. WEU can also offer a number of instruments for preparing this union, the first being the Standing Armaments Committee, referring to which the Council recalled, in reply to Recommendation 266, that

"the Council are at present discussing the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe."

46. This reply, to which the seven member governments subscribed, seems to meet the concerns expressed by the EEC Commission in paragraph 51 of its report:

"Another major step forward would be the development of a common policy on arms and equipment, possibly involving the setting up of a "European Arms Agency", which would bring about a more rational use of available funds and the industrial and technological potential of the member States. Experience has shown that the lack of a common policy in this field has meant that a number of industries are excessively dependent on sources outside the Community. This situation not only adversely affects the production of military equipment, and hence Europe's scope for independence, but also certain non-military industries."

47. Because of the responsibilities entrusted to it under the modified Brussels Treaty, and insofar as the activities of both the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee are closely supervised by the WEU Council, the latter continues to have an important rôle to play in preparing for a European union which would include these activities and it should be recalled, as the Assembly has done on many occasions, that WEU is not a closed shop but meets the wish of the EEC Commission as expressed in paragraph 10 of its report which recalls that the European union must:

"be open to the accession of other European countries which have a democratic pluralist political system and are able to assume the burdens and responsibilities that go with membership of the union. It seems reasonable that the conditions for the accession of such countries should be similar in character to those set out in the present treaties, one of which is the unanimous agreement of the member States."

48. One of the main rôles of the WEU Council would also be to meet the view contained in paragraph 18 of the report of the Commission that member States:

"would clearly be bound, once the union was established, to refrain from any action which in the long term could jeopardise the union's exercise of its competence."

49. Regarding procedure, the Council, in its own particular field and during the interim period in which this task would be entrusted to it, might play the rôle which the Commission assigns to the institutions of the union which (paragraph 73)

"will have the task of preparing and implementing joint positions and actions."

This would correspond to a proposal which has already been made on many occasions by the WEU Assembly but which the Council has never taken into account.

50. Finally, by virtue of the amended Brussels Treaty, the WEU Assembly still has responsibilities pursuant to the application of the Brussels Treaty, i.e. the activities of the Council, the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee. If it is desirable for these duties to be transferred one day to a true European parliament, it is essential for the WEU Assembly to continue to exercise its duties as long as the parliament of the European union has not been officially entrusted with the responsibilities incumbent upon the WEU Assembly by virtue of the Brussels Treaty.
(iii) The WEU Assembly's duty

51. Insofar as it is considered, as set out explicitly by the EEC Commission in paragraph 2 of its report, that WEU is the present expression of Europe in foreign policy and defence matters, the policy pursued by the governments in the framework of the WEU Council must correspond to that defined by the Commission for the future European Community. In the twenty years of its existence, the Council has seen the exercise of its cultural and social activities handed over to the Council of Europe and political consultations and the co-ordination of member States' policies in the United Nations and specialised world agencies transferred to nine-power consultations. This was probably very reasonable. But at a time when the joint activities of the Nine are to be reviewed, the Council should at least keep in close touch with the EEC bodies exercising responsibilities falling within its purview.

52. Several times the Assembly has recommended that the WEU Council, pending a true nine-power political union, should take over the political and defence aspects of Europe and open its doors to the Common Market countries which are not members of WEU.

53. Since the European Council, as the result of several decisions reached at summit meetings, is in the process of becoming the nucleus of the European union, WEU's main ambition should be to play its full rôle in the interim period until the treaty of the union is ratified and its institutions established. The achievement of the union will moreover be facilitated by regular discussions on defence problems in a purely European framework as recalled in the resolution adopted by the Presidential Committee on 11th September 1975.

54. The WEU Assembly cannot give up its compelling commitment to impress upon the Council, which is too often indifferent, the need to make full use of the possibilities afforded by the Brussels Treaty with an eye to the future European union.

V. Evolution of the Atlantic Alliance

(i) The threshold of a third stage?

55. The first twenty-six years of the Atlantic Alliance may be roughly divided into two stages:

(a) from the beginning until December 1967, when the West's defence system was being set up against the military giant in the East for, as Mr. Speak said, "we were afraid". During the first fifteen years, NATO made this fear recede and even disappear;

(b) from December 1967 until the Helsinki conference in July 1975, following the Harmel report on the future tasks of the Alliance, a policy of détente replaced the cold war.

56. The main question now is: will the CSCE introduce a third stage, that of entente in the part of the world which includes Alaska and Vladivostok, since, because of the Helsinki agreements, security and co-operation in Europe include the whole northern area of the globe?

57. If this is so, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals might gradually break away from the fixed rôle in which it provides two banks, each of which is used as a military base by one of the two superpowers.

58. The stage of the two blocs must be left still further behind. Even if the division of the old continent into two well-defined areas — East and West — continues, the military alliances of both sides will probably be affected, particularly if the MBFR talks are successful and SALT II, which may be considered as the cornerstone of détente, avoids the vague and general provisions of SALT I in 1972.

59. How will the Atlantic Alliance evolve during this third stage? The form proposed by President Kennedy in 1971, i.e. an Alliance based on two pillars, one on each side of the Atlantic, has not been achieved. The Alliance is still under the hegemony of the United States but responsibility for this also rests with the Western Europeans who, in a quarter of a century, have been unable to agree on a form of political unification or on a joint defence concept.

60. In recent years, there have been vast changes in the international situation, mainly through the development of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two great powers first sought shelter from nuclear war, on the one hand by technical negotiations on the use of nuclear weapons and on the other by intensifying consultations on all world problems. Following the agreement reached in the framework of the CSCE, the SALT negotiations might lead to a second agreement, whereas the MBFR talks have resumed after a long period of marking time.
61. There has been a sharp drop in East-West tension, in which the Atlantic Alliance was born, and the emergence of a spirit of détente has transformed the nature of relations between the members of NATO and has roused a section of public opinion against the military paternalism of the United States.

62. Moreover, there have been a number of internal problems in the Atlantic Alliance. France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure is no longer so serious as it was a few years ago since relations between France and its partners in defence matters have been organised on a new basis. However, the development of French nuclear weapons — particularly tactical weapons — has aroused new problems between France and its neighbours.

63. The yet uncertain direction of developments in Portugal raises serious problems for the Alliance as a whole, for the Azores constitute a bridge between the United States and Europe.

64. In summer 1974, there was a serious crisis in relations between Greece and Turkey which is still far from a solution and which considerably weakened the Alliance's defence capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean.

65. Finally, the bilateral agreements between the United States and Spain also concern the European members of the Alliance.

66. It is manifest from these various factors that the Atlantic Alliance depends more than ever on the United States now that United States security seems to depend less on the Alliance than on its direct relations with the Soviet Union. Admittedly, Europe is still an essential part of American defence policy, as President Ford confirmed in Brussels earlier this year, but it tends to take second place to direct relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(ii) A strategy which meets Europe's requirements

67. The initial doctrine on which Western Europe's defence was based was that of massive retaliation, which meant that the United States would intervene with its full strategic nuclear force against any power invading Western Europe. But as Soviet nuclear strength developed, Europeans and Americans began to wonder whether it was conceivable for the United States to run the risk of a nuclear exchange which would destroy its own territory for the sole purpose of defending its allies, however important it might consider the civilisation or economic and commercial strength of Europe.

68. NATO thus had to make a major effort in the sixties to build up sufficient conventional forces to meet a possible attack without necessarily leading to a nuclear exchange and American forces in Europe were armed with tactical nuclear weapons intended to raise a second screen in front of the strategic deterrent of the United States. A number of these weapons were subsequently made available to the armed forces of several NATO member countries under a two-key system which made those concerned even more dependent on the strategy defined in Washington.

69. The aim of this new strategy of flexible response was to allow the Americans, on the territory of mainland Europe and with the assistance of their European allies, to meet any attack and at the same time still retain the possibility of negotiating in order to avoid recourse to strategic nuclear weapons which might result in mass destruction on their own territory. However rational from the American point of view, a serious drawback of this strategy is that it might make Europe a battlefield in which conventional weapons might be used — in themselves capable of wreaking considerable havoc — or so-called tactical nuclear weapons which even so would be capable of completely destroying the densely-populated territory of Western Europe.

70. This strategy, implying the possibility of war being waged on European territory, was distasteful to the European nations but, lacking adequate strength of their own, they had to bow to the strategic wishes of the United States for fear lest the Americans should abandon Europe.

71. Everything indicates that, as matters now stand, for lack of a union Europe will have to accept this situation. American opinion, keenly aware of the importance which Western Europe attaches to the presence of American forces on its territory as a guarantee of American deterrence, is exerting growing pressure on the United States Government to use the threat of withdrawing its forces in order to induce Europeans to adapt their own forces to the requirements of American strategy. Moreover, the European countries have progressively relaxed their defence effort as "fear" receded, whilst at the same time relying on the strength of the United States.

72. Since European forces are deployed in a NATO framework to implement a strategy about
which European public opinion knows very little and likes even less, the governments are experiencing growing difficulty in making the conventional military effort NATO demands. The share of the gross national product which most Western European countries earmark for defence is constantly shrinking and many governments are criticised for their defence efforts by some sections of public opinion. They are accused of jeopardising what is considered more rational and urgent action to meet the economic crisis. Furthermore, in recent years there have been signs of demoralisation in the armies of several European countries and servicemen are now no longer certain that the defence system of which they are a part really serves the security of their countries, with the result that they lack confidence in themselves and in the possibility of collective defence.

73. The only strategy to suit Europe is one based on massive retaliation. This does not mean that Europe need not have conventional forces or even tactical nuclear forces. It would be unthinkable for Europe to have to resort to strategic nuclear weapons in order to meet a minor or limited attack. In that event it would be practically powerless in face of such an attack and thus incapable of deterring it. But Europe cannot lose sight of the essential principle that the aim of European strategy must be to deter a possible aggressor. It is therefore important to restrict the means available to what is absolutely essential for meeting a minor attack so that the deterrent, i.e. the strategic nuclear force, comes into play at the very start of an international crisis and precludes the possibility of recourse to conventional war or tactical nuclear weapons.

74. Since it is impossible for Western Europe to make such views prevail with the United States, the only solution at this stage is to maintain NATO as the shield for our security and freedom and invite the Americans to prepare with us a strategy which meets Europe's vital requirements. The chances of this will be enhanced if European co-operation is developed in all aspects of defence until such time as an effective, truly European defence system eventually takes over from American military hegemony in Western Europe.

VI. Discussion in Committee

75. There was a lively and detailed discussion on this report at the meeting of the General Affairs Committee in Copenhagen on 23rd October 1975. It was finally adopted by only 9 votes to 0 with 8 abstentions. The abstentions were directed not so much towards the text of the recommendation but stemmed rather from serious reservations on the part of certain Committee members on several trends followed by your Rapporteur. However, not all the reservations were of the same nature, nor did they all relate to the same points. They must therefore be classified, account being taken of their impact compared with the report as a whole.

76. (i) One Committee member considered the report to be too biased in favour of the United States. Feeling that alliance with the United States is still essential for European security, he feared that in such an alliance Europe might have difficulty in choosing the course to be followed in economic and social terms. He also thought that the presence of American forces was not essential for European security.

77. (ii) Other Committee members, on the contrary, expressed the fear that your Rapporteur was underestimating the magnitude of the Soviet threat and exaggerating the importance of the results of the Helsinki conference. This view was qualified by some members who drew a distinction between the Soviets' unrelenting political aggressiveness and their military aggressiveness which appeared to be slackening off to some extent, at least in Europe.

78. (iii) Some members feared that progress towards European union might serve to separate Europe from the American guarantee; their view was that to extend purely European co-operation to defence matters would eventually weaken NATO. For them, American paternalism was not the danger but rather nascent isolationism in the United States.

79. (iv) Several Committee members expressed the wish that the European union should keep away from nuclear matters which they considered should remain the prerogative of the superpowers. However, none of them specified what should become of French and British nuclear weapons in the event of a European union being formed in the field of defence.

80. (v) Other members joined the latter in rejecting the concept of massive retaliation, preferring the strategy of flexible response, i.e. they were satisfied with present American thinking.
81. (vi) Some members found the Rapporteur had not taken due account of the new possibilities open to nuclear weapons since the sea now afforded nuclear forces a second strike capability which enhanced the deterrent effect of such forces. Your Rapporteur is quite prepared to accept this criticism, although he does not feel it has any great effect on his line of thought.

82. (vii) Your Rapporteur was criticised for using the word hegemony in defining the special position of the United States in the Alliance. Your Rapporteur attaches no derogatory meaning to this word, which he considers perfectly appropriate to the present situation in the Alliance. There is no denying that the United States plays a primordial rôle, demonstrated by the fact that it is responsible for appointing the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces. Is this not the very rôle which, since the days of ancient Greece, gives a very precise meaning to the word hegemony?

83. (viii) Some Committee members considered that political union was not at all a preliminary to joint European defence but could only be the result. Others felt a debate on European defence was not expedient at this stage.

84. (ix) One Committee member underlined that any progress towards European union required prior strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament and its election by universal suffrage.

85. (x) Another Committee member was anxious to avoid any conclusion which sought to strengthen WEU.

86. Since your Rapporteur has set out his own ideas on these various points in earlier chapters, in what he hopes are measured but unambiguous terms, he feels there is no call to enter into further controversy here and trusts he has managed to sum up in a generally-acceptable manner the views put to him in Committee.
The negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) (covering the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) began in Vienna on 30th October 1973. The participants are all seven of the Warsaw Pact States and twelve of the fifteen NATO nations (France, Iceland, Portugal are not negotiating). The allied negotiators in Vienna are bound, on questions of policy and strategy, by guidance elaborated in the NATO Council.

The main elements of the western position are:

1. The overall result of MBFR should be a common ceiling on ground force manpower of both sides in the area of reductions of approximately 700,000 men on each side, in order to correct the existing disparity in ground force manpower between the two sides in the area (ca. 925,000 WP men to NATO's approximately 777,000; 15,500 WP main battle tanks in active units to NATO’s 6,000).

2. There should be no separate national ceilings on individual States since this would inhibit force rearrangement within the area of reductions and give the WP a droit de regard over NATO’s internal affairs.

3. The common ceiling should be reached in two phases; in the first phase only United States and Soviet forces would be withdrawn (a Soviet tank army of five divisions including some 68,000 soldiers and 1,700 main battle tanks as well as 29,000 United States soldiers); in the second phase the forces of the remaining direct participants (nations with territory or troops in the area of reductions) would be addressed.

The principal elements of the eastern position are:

1. The “existing correlation of forces” (i.e. existing imbalance in WP favour) is to be maintained; the two sides would reduce first by equal amounts and then by equal percentages: specifically, in 1975 the direct participants would make a “symbolic” reduction of 20,000 men on each side followed in 1976 by a 5% reduction on each side and in 1977 by a 10% reduction on each side (the East thus opposes the common ceiling; it is interested in imposing national ceilings on forces of allied direct participants, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany).

2. Air and nuclear forces should be included in the reductions (both sides agree that naval and amphibious forces should not be included).

3. The two sides should negotiate the reduction of forces of all direct participants simultaneously from the outset (the East rejects the two-phase concept and is especially interested in early reductions in the Bundeswehr).

In almost two years of hard negotiating, there has been no fundamental change in the position of either side. The East has advanced some procedural, non-substantive rearrangements of its basic proposal. In addition, the East at one point proposed that all forces in the area be frozen prior to reductions. NATO rejected this since it would have frozen the very disparities which the Alliance is attempting to eliminate in these negotiations; also, thus far, the WP has refused to engage in a data exchange, without which a freeze would be highly illusory. For its part, NATO has proposed that there be separate freezes on the ground and air manpower of each side between phases to prevent possible circumvention. The East has not made a definitive response to this proposal.

The negotiations, which are now in recess, are scheduled to resume in Vienna on 26th September. There has been much speculation in the press that the Alliance is considering an offer to introduce nuclear elements into the negotiations this autumn. There have even been press reports in the past few days that the Alliance has in fact decided on such an offer. These particular reports are speculative and erroneous. The allies are continually reviewing the prospects for progress in the MBFR negotiations. In this context, several possibilities have been examined and remain under consideration. However, no decisions of any kind have been taken with respect to the possible introduction of new proposals in the coming round of negotiations.