ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION
(Second Part)

LIBRARY

WEU's contribution to the development of European union

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur
WEU's contribution to the development of European union

REPORT
subitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on WEU's contribution to the development of European union

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur

I. European union and defence
II. Defence policy
III. Level of forces, limitation and control of armaments
IV. Armaments production
V. The parliamentary dimension
VI. Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Page), MM. Biset, Brugnon (Alternate: Forni), Cermolacce, Faulde, Gessner, Gonella, Grangier, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel, MM. Mangelschots, Mende, Minnooei, Müller, Peljaneburg, Périn (Alternate: Van der Elst), Pertheimo (Alternate: de Koster), Reddemann, Segre, Urwin (Alternate: Channon).

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation  
on WEU's contribution to the development of European union

The Assembly,

Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a binding commitment to automatic military assistance;

Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions;

Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which gives full deterrent value to Article V;

Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a new ethical dimension into relations between signatory States;

Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st May 1976 should make a substantial contribution to:

(a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a view to protecting the production capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the independence of member countries;

(b) preparing a joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to disarmament;

Deploring the fact that in practice the Council takes no account of these considerations;

Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than WEU;

2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or to economic stability;

3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the aim inter alia of harmonising strategic concepts and strengthening procedure for consultation;

4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive and controlled disarmament, consider how WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace;

5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards general and complete disarmament;

6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;

7. Give favourable consideration to the possibility of revising Article IX of the treaty so as to allow better participation by members of parliament in the work of the Assembly.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur)

I. European union and defence

1. While it might have seemed possible ten years ago to project the shape of Europe in the near or more distant future on the basis of earlier concepts and extrapolations starting from the Rome Treaty and its preamble, any such attempt today would be difficult and hazardous. The nine EEC countries have admittedly agreed to call the goal of their joint undertaking "European union", but both the substance and the shape of this European union are increasingly uncertain.

2. Spain and Greece wish to join the Economic Community without delay. Others such as Turkey wish to strengthen their links with the Community with a view to future membership. Yet others are prepared to co-operate closely with Community Europe will probably have to be enlarged in the next ten years and this will bring with it wide-ranging changes in the present European system, particularly in agriculture. But many other aspects of the European undertaking may need revision, perhaps because of enlargement or because of internal developments in member States or because of changing "in international society and the balance of political, economic or military forces, not to mention foreseeable or unforeseeable developments in the crisis with which the capitalist world has been at grips since 1973 and which shows every sign of becoming worse rather than better in years to come. The EEC, which was set up at a time when steady, rapid economic progress was an accepted fact, seems to be having greater difficulty than member States in adjusting its economic and trade policy to the demands of the crisis.

4. The last attempt to explore if not to define the substance of the future European union was the Tindemans report. This provided a basis for a number of discussions in the European Council, but it very soon became apparent that it was destined to fall into oblivion.

5. For instance, the proposal to include defence among the responsibilities and activities of the European union met with a host of objections. The thought of extending the responsibilities of the European Parliament at the expense of the WEU Assembly seems to have been endorsed by none of the governments. The only point on which the nine governments managed to agree was that the European Parliament should be elected by direct universal suffrage before summer 1978. But now it is not at all clear that the nine countries will be able to agree on electoral procedure or on a date. Some are wondering whether it will be possible to hold elections within the prescribed time limits.

6. While the era of high-flung speculation about the future of Europe now seems over, it is clearer than ever that the future European union, if it is ever to see the day, can be based only on what already exists where treaties and institutions are concerned. But one way or another the modified Brussels Treaty is the only sound basis for a common defence policy.

7. On 5th August 1977, the WEU Council answered written question 176 put by a British member of parliament in the following terms:

"There can be no doubt about the binding character of the automatic mutual assistance clause in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, which constitutes a commitment in international law."

This means that the seven governments agree to interpret Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty as an "automatic" commitment clause leaving no margin of interpretation of what may be covered by the word "attack". Without anything else, this statement determines the role of WEU and particularly of its Council, since there can be no such commitment if policies are not closely concerted: it is impossible for States to envisage "automatic" military commitment without first agreeing on the main aspects of their defence policies and on the direction of their foreign policies. Failing this, all the signatories of the pact would be committed by each other's actions and might find themselves having to condone policies of which they might not approve.

8. However this may be, Western Europe stands as one in face of the vital need to avoid at any cost a war which, whatever arms may be used, conventional or nuclear, would bring total ruin. Therefore, while there may be wide divergences between the defence policies of the Western European countries, they draw close together in their recognition of the need for a deterrent. It is no secret that today only nuclear weapons can provide a deterrent capable of making a possible enemy renounce the use of force because of the risk of incurring intolerable destruction on his own territory. It also implies a desire to defend oneself by every means in the event of an attack and also a strategy, i.e. a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons to make them the instrument of a policy of deterrence rather than of war.

9. Thus, de facto solidarity, the need for a deterrent defence policy and divergences between
the defence policies of European States determine the framework of WEU. It must continually consider how passive solidarity can be transformed into active solidarity by deterrent action in the general interest but for which defence policies based on different assessments of the situation must be harmonised. Thus France, which is no longer a member of NATO and will very probably continue to pursue an independent defence policy, is essential to the security of Western Europe because of its geographical position and the existence of its nuclear force, just as Western Europe — and in particular the Federal Republic of Germany — is essential to the security of France.

10. The French Socialist Party, for its part, has clearly and on several occasions given its views on associating the national nuclear force with this solidarity and most recently in an interview with Robert Pontillon in Le Point of 10th October 1977:

"...The claim to wish to defend national territory alone means refusing to take account of undertakings stemming from France's adhesion to the Brussels or Paris Treaties, and I intentionally refrain from mentioning the North Atlantic Treaty which does not make the commitment of forces automatic.

But for us there is no sense in France withdrawing behind its frontiers. The 'threat', as the military say, can be in two forms: direct pressure on our frontiers or on the frontiers of countries of the Alliance to which we belong. By leaving the Alliance, we would accept that our neighbours may be attacked without a move on our part and that we should defend ourselves alone in the event of a direct threat to our frontiers. This is unthinkable.

.......

When Mitterrand says that he does not believe in a national deterrent, it is because he believes in the alliances and for him national deterrence means nothing if it is not included in a system of alliances and solidarity.

What Mitterrand says is that even with a national strike force France cannot argue its case in isolation from its alliances..."

11. A union of countries pursuing very different defence policies would be meaningless without a political expression of their solidarity and so far there is no other than the modified Brussels Treaty. This, and hence WEU itself, is thus the common element serving the security of all in a deterrent which each one exercises with the means available to it: integration of conventional forces in NATO for some, an independent policy with the support of a nuclear force in the case of France.

II. Defence policy

12. From the very beginning, the exercise of most of the WEU Council's military tasks was handed over to NATO. It lost many of its economic activities when the United Kingdom joined the European Communities and much of its political work when nine-power political consultations began. The Council of Ministers has spaced out its meetings and now considers only fairly secondary matters. Nor is there any great political activity at meetings of the Permanent Council. However, the WEU Council has not thereby lost any of the responsibilities assigned to it under the modified Brussels Treaty which is still essential in view of present uncertainty about the future of Europe.

13. Even in the near future, it is not out of the question that internal developments in certain member countries might make their relations with the American partners in the North Atlantic Treaty far more difficult, either because the United States would not be prepared to accept the participation of communists in these countries' governments or because the course adopted by a new majority in their economic, social, trade or even defence policy would not be appreciated across the Atlantic. Moreover, the achievement of an economic and social policy in conformity with the interests of the peoples of these countries might make them stand apart from Community Europe, dominated by the ideology of free enterprise, for there could be no question of a democratically-chosen government subordinating its economic and social policy to foreign policy considerations.

14. In any event, a French majority, whatever it may be, will have to take account of the de facto solidarity between France and its partners and will consequently have to maintain and develop, in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty, consultations and co-operation with the European members of NATO, which will have to be intensified as France moves further away from NATO. In such a case, the WEU Council may have to resume its rôle as a link between one country of Western Europe and the principal European members of the Atlantic Alliance as it did in the days when the United Kingdom was outside the EEC. WEU's intergovernmental character can but encourage action in this field which would be out of the question for a supposedly supranational organisation.

15. Consequently, this does not mean major changes in the immediate future, but rather the maintenance of what exists, it being particularly
essential to be able to resort to the Council since it provides the basis for all the activities of WEU. But the Council must continue to fulfil effectively the rôle incumbent on it under the modified Brussels Treaty.

16. Yet, the WEU Council as it now operates does not appear to be taking its tasks seriously. It is just as if the seven governments have agreed not to touch the modified Brussels Treaty or to apply it only in a most restricted manner to a point that one may wonder whether they really apply it. In fact, the Council’s annual report to the Assembly shows quite clearly that the Council is doing practically nothing to keep itself informed of matters which are within its terms of reference but are supposed to be exercised elsewhere. It hardly wonders to what extent its responsibilities are in fact being exercised by other bodies. For instance, it is evident that France’s non-participation in certain NATO activities makes it impossible for the latter to exercise in full the responsibilities assigned to the WEU Council by the Brussels Treaty. Has the Council ever done anything to make up for this lacuna?

17. The question therefore arises as to why the Council systematically adopts a restrictive view of its commitments and thus does not really respect the treaty it is responsible for applying, nor the promises it has itself made to the Assembly concerning *inter alia* the information it must furnish, nor even certain decisions it has taken such as that of 31st May 1976 conferring a mandate on the Standing Armaments Committee.

18. Admittedly, it is realised that all the governments agree that NATO, the Nine and the independent European programme group allow them to consider together in wider forums than that of the WEU Council matters which concern the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and that they are anxious to avoid duplication and make rational use of the multilateral consultative bodies at their disposal. However, this is not enough to explain the deliberately passive attitude adopted by the Council and its steadfast wish not to implement any of its treaty responsibilities other than those which concern its relations with the Assembly. Even this shows evidence of ill-will in the brevity of its replies to recommendations and written questions, the growing poverty of its annual report and its reluctance whenever there is question of implementing the procedure for a dialogue with the Assembly. In short, everything indicates that the seven governments are aiming at progressively killing off a treaty which they still claim to respect but which they are in fact emptying of substance. There is, for instance, every reason to suspect that they discouraged any attempt by Greece and Turkey to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. It may therefore be wondered whether there are other reasons for the Council’s attitude. Three possible types of motivation may be considered, although it is not possible to determine just how decisive each one may be for each member country, for it is not sure that they all have the same motives, even if the resulting inertia is the same.

19. (i) The fact that certain member countries rely mainly on American strength to ensure their security encourages them to give priority to NATO rather than any collective security organisation to which the United States does not belong. They even seem afraid that the United States may take offence at the smooth operation of any truly European defence organisation, which explains the cold reception given to Mr. Tindemans’ proposals on defence matters and the mediocre results of attempts made on the fringes of NATO, such as Eurogroup and the independent European programme group, to work out a European armaments policy or the hardly-veiled wish in some quarters to reduce WEU’s activities as far as possible. When it visited Norway and Denmark, the General Affairs Committee was able to see how wary these countries were of any European initiative in defence matters. It is not certain that the attitude of all the members of WEU is very different to that of the Norwegians and the Danes.

20. (ii) The modified Brussels Treaty involves different obligations for the various member countries, which has given some of them to believe that it was discriminatory at their expense. For instance, the United Kingdom is not allowed to withdraw forces from Germany without the agreement of its allies. There are ceilings on certain armaments that the Federal Republic may manufacture or possess. It is not difficult to understand why such countries find commitments or bans of this kind hard to bear and deplore the fact that their association with Western Europe in defence matters is linked to such discrimination, since the United Kingdom has to ask its allies for authorisation before moving any troops from the mainland of Europe to Ireland, and the Federal Republic has to face lengthy procedure every time it wishes to build certain types of ship.

21. The reason for such unequal treatment probably resides in the special position of each European country at the time of the negotiations which led to the modification of the Brussels Treaty in 1954. However, some overall balance is to be found since, although the United Kingdom agreed to special commitments, its territory is not subject to the limits and controls imposed on the countries on the mainland of Europe, while the Federal Republic which, because of its situation, is Europe’s most sensitive point, is subject to particular constraints. In short, the
discrimination found in the modified Brussels Treaty is less evident if all its provisions are considered than if the parts applying to one or other signatory are considered.

22. (iii) The existence of an assembly, where the parliaments of member countries are represented relatively fairly, obviously disturbs the governments, which are anxious to keep their external policy at a discreet distance beyond the reach of demonstrations of public opinion. All relations between the Council and the Assembly are branded by this taste for diplomatic secrecy, a long-standing tradition, admittedly, but also essential for camouflaging action abroad which is often a long shot from principles voiced at home. The new factor brought into international relations by the modified Brussels Treaty was precisely the element of parliamentary supervision in the day-to-day life of a defensive alliance, the aim being to ensure democracy in Europe, whose institutional foundations were just being laid. But in practice the Council seems to be intent on depriving the organisation of substance and the governments seem to prefer organisations which are more discreet than WEU.

23. Whatever their reasons, it is clear that the governments are deliberately keeping the Council in a state of semi-lethargy and that the latter is doing nothing it could and should do to apply the modified Brussels Treaty effectively, i.e.:

(a) keep itself informed about how matters within its competence are being dealt with or not in other bodies and take upon itself to do what others are not doing satisfactorily in the foreign policy and defence fields;

(b) keep the Assembly suitably informed about what is being done elsewhere and to this end reach agreement with the organisations concerned for the communication of information that may be transmitted to the Assembly;

(c) implement the protocols on armed forces and the control of armaments, not only in the routine, bureaucratic and superficial manner which is now the rule but bearing in mind their implications for a European defence policy;

(d) establish a European armaments policy, taking account of the requirements of joint defence and the economic and social possibilities and requirements of each member country;

(e) prepare measures for applying Article VII, paragraph 3, of the treaty which makes it incumbent on the Council: "... to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability";

(f) endorse the Assembly's efforts to study and reflect upon all the problems raised by Europe's security and to prepare for the rationalisation of European bodies active in defence matters in anticipation of the time when it will be possible to include these questions in the framework of a European union.

III. Level of forces, limitation and control of armaments

24. It is evident that the situation which induced the signatories of the Brussels Treaty to prescribe procedure for limiting the level of member countries' armed forces and to create the Agency for the Control of Armaments in 1954 is not at all the same today. Other factors now advocate maintaining multilateral control of armaments.

25. First, the limits and control contribute to the level of confidence in the Alliance. For instance, the fact that it is incumbent on the United Kingdom under the treaty not to reduce the level of its forces stationed on the mainland of Europe without the agreement of all its partners is an essential token of confidence in European solidarity and a major factor of deterrence since it is evident to any possible aggressor that it links the United Kingdom to the defence of the continent.

26. Second, the control system, which seems to be applied satisfactorily, might if necessary form a useful brake on an undue increase in armaments by one or other signatory country. It guarantees that none of these countries can be suspected of wishing to follow a course of aggression inside or outside Europe.

27. The existence of armaments control, including inter alia the treaty provisions concerning the Federal Republic of Germany, makes a valuable contribution to détente because it protects the members of WEU against slander campaigns which might provide a pretext for accelerating the armaments policy of their eastern neighbours and demonstrates that the defence of Western Europe is indivisible.

28. The fact that Western Europe's armaments are subject to a controlled agreement allows the WEU countries to tackle problems of security and co-operation in Europe and disarmament problems in the best conditions. It may be hoped that these matters will be considered in a more positive manner in the coming years in the context of more general and complete disarmament than hitherto. Then the Agency might
constitute a model for a wider and more ambitious organisation, for the degree of perfection to which it has raised its methods of controlling armaments is probably unequalled. In short, the maintenance and pursuit of the Agency's activities may, in the future, be a very useful contribution to a policy of détente and peace.

29. However, the Agency will not be able to play its full rôle unless all the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty are prepared to fulfil all their commitments.

30. At present, Article III of Protocol No. III on the control of armaments is not applied by one of the signatory countries, i.e. France, which has moreover apparently never been asked to do so by its partners. This article reads as follows:

"When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union."

31. It is clear that French nuclear armaments have now "passed the experimental stage", but France is subject to neither authorisation for nor control over these weapons. Very probably, if its partners have not asked it to apply the protocol, it is because they are fully aware of the reasons why France could not comply. These reasons are clear enough. On the one hand, they stem from the fact that nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect only if they are in the hands of a purely national authority, alone capable of taking decisions on the use of such weapons; on the other hand, there is the disagreement between France and its partners over NATO. In other words, France does not wish to risk being deprived of its nuclear weapons or restricted in their possible use by a decision of its partners. But, rightly or wrongly, it suspects some of its partners of subordinating their decisions on the defence of Europe to their concern to give the United States every satisfaction it might wish in return for its military protection of Western Europe. For a long time, there has been no doubt about the United States' hostility towards France's nuclear weapons and it could rightly be feared that it might use the means available to it to encourage France's partners in WEU to put a brake on France's nuclear weapons since it has never approved of another member of the Atlantic Alliance having an independent decision-taking ability in respect of the use of the deterrent.

32. Today, some of France's partners are certainly less hostile than in the past to French nuclear weapons. At its meeting in Ottawa on 19th June 1974, the North Atlantic Council even said that:

"... The European members who provide three-quarters of the conventional strength of the Alliance in Europe, and two of whom possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance, undertake to make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defence at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the Alliance."

33. However, it may still be wondered whether all the governments participating in NATO were sincere in Ottawa. In particular, it is known that the Netherlands Government implied that this part of the Ottawa declaration hardly concorded with its views.

34. Indeed, replying to a question put by Mr. Wattmans on 23rd December 1975, Mr. van der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, said:

"Every one of us has had to put up with a phrase here or there which he might not have written if this declaration had been a unilateral one. One of the most difficult paragraphs for my government has been the one dealing with the nuclear forces of certain European allies. I have finally accepted the present formula as a statement of fact and in order not to stand in the way of a consensus, but in doing so I must stress, once again, that in my opinion nothing in the declaration can be construed as support by my government for the idea of a European nuclear force, an idea which is to the Netherlands, now as before, unacceptable."

35. Nuclear weapons are a sufficiently serious matter for a country which has chosen to develop them and for many years made the necessary effort to have a full and sophisticated range not to be able to leave it to an international forum to decide on their possible limitation or abandonment. The French socialists and communists, who were for a long time against the development of French nuclear weapons, can no longer disregard their existence. They have turned their thoughts to the search for means of using these weapons as a factor of security, peace and disarmament. As matters now stand, they too could not leave it to a majority of the members of WEU to take decisions which are essential for France's defence policy.
36. Conversely, if it were seen that France's partners were really applying the spirit and the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty and of the Ottawa declaration, i.e. if they were prepared to consider, with France, and without being influenced from outside all the problems relating to the defence and security of Europe, in other words to make the WEU Council's activities correspond to its responsibilities, a French Government representing the true ambitions of the people and aware of the de facto solidarity linking the defence of France with that of Europe might then consider applying Article III of Protocol No. III. But there can be no question of solidarity being one-way: if France's partners are convinced that French nuclear weapons contribute to Europe's security, as they declared in Ottawa, they too must come to grips with the consequences and demonstrate that they too take seriously the prospect of a real policy for the defence of Europe by Europeans.

37. It might moreover be added that such a choice would also put an end to the mistrust which is constantly re-emerging among European countries, and in particular, between the Federal Republic and its partners. For instance, in recent months there have been accusations in the French press (L'Express, 22nd-28th August 1977) that the Federal Republic had evaded the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty by producing missiles in Zaire which might be used for military as well as for civil purposes and which thus escaped the WEU limits and controls. On the building of two tankers needed by the federal navy, the German press (Wirtschaftswoche, September 1977) complained, inter alia about the slowness of WEU procedure used by the Federal Republic's partners to force it to purchase these tankers abroad. How valid are these accusations? Your Rapporteur cannot say, but they reveal mistrust which would be perfectly unjustified if the de facto solidarity uniting the Western European countries became active solidarity.

38. It is not by turning down the tone of reciprocal accusations or by trying to satisfy the complaints of the other side one by one that France and Federal Germany will manage to overcome the differences voiced by public opinion in the two countries in recent months but by re-establishing confidence based on a shared conviction that the two countries are pursuing a common aim.

39. Finally — and your Rapporteur considers this essential — while the first aim of a defence policy is to be effective, i.e. deterrent, it must also meet certain ethical standards and not merely the requirements of total pragmatism. Armaments are only a means and care must be taken to avoid this means becoming an end for States with all the dangers that involves for world peace. In this respect, the modified Brussels Treaty was an innovation by "moralising" so to say the necessary armaments policy. This is one of the reasons why the task of limiting and controlling levels of forces and armaments, of which it was the first step, must be maintained, pursued and strengthened, for peace and disarmament are the primary interests of all.

IV. Armaments production

40. During the 1954 negotiations which led to the modification of the Brussels Treaty, France was the one to propose that WEU's responsibilities be extended to cover matters relating to armaments production. France's partners appear to have greeted Mr. Mendès-France's proposals in this sense with some scepticism, traces of which are to be found in the pages of Lord Avon's memoirs on this matter. However, they agreed to the creation of the Standing Armaments Committee to promote the joint production of armaments by the WEU member countries.

41. Their scepticism now appears only too justified in view of the work accomplished by the SAC, but this is due largely to the total absence of determination to succeed shown by the seven governments in this connection. However, on 31st May 1976, the Council, following initiatives taken in the Assembly by Mr. Jobert and Mr. Van Elslande, decided to confer a new task on the SAC.

42. The decision taken in 1976 to reactivate the Standing Armaments Committee led the Assembly to put frequent questions to the Council on its intentions in taking this decision. It is now clear that while the independent European programme group is still closely linked with an Atlantic view of defence requirements, although administratively it is independent of NATO, the rôle of the SAC can be defined in relation to the European armaments industries rather than to a defence policy.

43. Until the enquiries conducted by the SAC have led to a published report, it is difficult to say what this rôle will be. But it can already be foreseen that one of its aims will be to remove the obstacles to dividing work between European industries rationally enough to allow worthwhile reductions in the cost price of armaments by lowering operational and marketing expenses as well as investments, without Europe's defence potential suffering. Secondly, a remedy will have to be found for the difficulties to which the European industries are subjected because the crisis in the capitalist world favours large non-European manufacturers.

44. Including sub-contracting, the WEU countries' armaments industries employ almost a million persons. If a determined effort to cut
expenditure on armaments is not accompanied by an organisation of production, a large proportion of these workers would become unemployed and Europe's armaments research capability would gradually dry up.

45. Finally, several European countries have had to try to compensate the smallness of their national markets and the difficulty of penetrating the markets of their partners by selling arms to African, Asian or South American countries, thus accelerating the arms race in those areas. The fast increase in the price of oil since 1973 has added to the arms-producing countries' determination to sell and improve the purchasing capacity of their customers. This matter needs sorting out, as President Carter recently underlined, but this is hardly possible unless a code of good behaviour is drawn up between arms-producing countries.

46. Here too the SAC might play an important role if it does not limit its ambitions to purely industrial organisation but considers the overall problem of arms sales with a view to reaching a common definition of principles seeking to reduce the scale of arms sales and prevent them from upsetting the balance and fanning the flames of conflicts outside Europe.

47. On 10th September 1977, the important Hamburg newspaper Die Welt gave a particularly remarkable example of the effects of joint production on the currently prevailing anarchy in the sale of European armaments to the developing countries. According to Die Welt, a number of Middle Eastern countries were believed to have signed a contract with the French manufacturer of the Alpha-Jet, Marcel Dassault, for 200 aircraft of this type. This aircraft is a co-production of Dassault in France and Dornier in the Federal Republic, but the French Government was prepared to sell aircraft to these countries to which the Government of the Federal Republic considered it undesirable to supply military equipment of this kind. But the Federal Government could not prevent Dornier from delivering German-manufactured parts for the aircraft to its French associate, which allowed the Dornier-Dassault consortium to circumvent the decisions of the Federal Government, just as it could if necessary circumvent decisions of the French Government.

48. This example shows that in the absence of adequate intergovernmental consultations co-production can be a way for industrialists to evade control by governments, already not very inclined to restrict sales of arms to underdeveloped countries. An essential aspect of the SAC's mandate might thus be to work out procedure to prevent industrialists from acting in this way by creating a European office for the armaments trade to harmonise principles and practice in selling countries with a view to preventing unrestrained competition leading to the over-arming of countries whose only real priority should be economic development. This would be a major contribution to general and complete disarmament.

49. Generally speaking, the SAC's mandate, which is economic rather than military, the latter field being left to the independent European programme group, should eventually place it in the framework of the future European union rather than NATO, making it something of an extension of the Community institutions to the armaments field.

50. But this is only one course. The effectiveness of the SAC's work will depend solely on the determination of governments, to organise the European armaments industry in order to rescue it from its present crisis and to lay down industrial, social and commercial standards with which they would be prepared to comply. As long as this determination is not manifest, the charter of the Standing Armaments Committee, like the decision of 31st May 1976, will remain a dead letter.

51. One of the prospects offered by Mr. Mendès-France in 1964 when he proposed creating the SAC was in fact to limit competition, organise production and prevent the development of anarchy in the sale of arms. Twenty-three years later, it is time for the seven governments to abandon the ambiguous positions behind which they have been constantly hiding to paralyse the SAC and say whether they really have the political will to inject life into this body.

V. The parliamentary dimension

52. The WEU Assembly will continue to be distinct from other European parliamentary assemblies not only because of its responsibilities but also because of its membership. Whereas the North Atlantic Assembly represents only very partially the parliaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, since inter alia there is no communist representation, which is possible because of its rather vague statutes, the European Parliament will no longer ensure a permanent link with the parliaments of member countries when it is elected by direct suffrage.

53. On the other hand, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and consequently the WEU Assembly are composed of delegations which are fairly representative of national parliaments. This is an essential aspect because no co-ordination of independent defence policies can be achieved other than through the national parliaments. Moreover, the Assembly has received its responsibilities from the modified Brussels Treaty itself. Since it receives a
report from the Council, it is empowered to deal with all matters relating to European security.

54. The remarks of Mr. von Hassel, as reported in Die Welt of 1st August 1977, should thus be borne in mind. He warned against "the danger of the establishment of a nine-power European Parliament in the framework of the EEC leading to the other institutions created in Europe being shelved".

55. It is not therefore its membership which hinders the work of the WEU Assembly but first and foremost the fact that its partner, the Council, is constantly evading its responsibilities, carefully providing only a strict minimum of information and avoiding any dialogue or debate, while at the same time pouring out a wealth of fine words to attenuate the Assembly's discontent.

56. It is obvious that a clash is inevitable if the Assembly is generally anxious to apply the modified Brussels Treaty correctly whereas the Council's main concern is to apply it in the most restrictive manner possible. The Assembly's principal duty is therefore to inform public opinion by every means available to it of the Council's demise.

57. But in order to widen its audience, the Assembly should follow in the wake of its President's encouragement and, throwing linguistic and diplomatic habits to the winds, tackle the essential fundamental problems of Europe's defence policy. Only too often has it confined itself to matters more technical than political, or skirted round the substance of debates by using procedural devices or by concealing deep-seated divergences behind unanimous votes. By endeavouring to reach the core of the subject, your Rapporteur does not expect to achieve unanimity on his report but hopes to open a debate in which fundamental problems will be tackled in full view of European public opinion. The danger threatening European parliamentarism is not differences of views but the camouflaging of such differences with fine words likely to obtain false majorities but which in the long run lead only to indifference and scepticism among public opinion.

58. The WEU Assembly's responsibility is the defence of Western Europe in all its aspects: political, military, strategic, scientific and technical. Its means of action, faced with a defaulting Council, is to draw on public opinion and to this end it must be clear in what it says, firm in its attitude and steadfast in its requirements vis-à-vis the Council.

VI. Conclusions

59. At a time of such uncertainty regarding the future of Western Europe, as envisaged so far, and of NATO, the modified Brussels Treaty provides relatively firm ground because of the "automatic" nature of its Article V. WEU, having little support from advocates of a European defence community as of an Atlantic community, constitutes the minimum on which the member countries can agree in defence matters. It is there to ensure a permanent link between countries which cannot consider their security in isolation but yet do not share the same political, economic and social concepts and do not have the same concept of a defence policy based on deterrence.

60. Furthermore, WEU offers a number of instruments which might prove most useful in a policy for "moralising" international relations in the manufacture and sale of arms and in the limitation of forces and control of armaments. At present, the use it makes of these instruments is too limited but the Assembly's efforts should be directed towards urging governments to meet their mutual undertakings in full in order to achieve greater security no longer based solely on the accumulation of armaments but on mutual confidence, controlled disarmament and international co-operation.

61. The institutional framework is not the only means offered by WEU for helping to prepare the future European union in fields within its competence. Of greater importance is its experience and fundamental work at the level of the Council and its technical bodies and of the Assembly. An attempt has been made in this report to define a number of lines of action which your Rapporteur proposes for WEU because he feels they are appropriate for a European union based on democracy and seeking to promote a little more peace and justice in Europe and throughout the world. Should the future European union come into being, it will not make its presence felt by breaking in new ground. On the contrary, it is by pursuing and organising work which can be started here and now in the framework of existing institutions that we can lay the foundations for tomorrow's Europe.