REPUBLICANS URGE MAJOR REFORM OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The House Republican Committee on Western Alliances today recommended a series of far-reaching steps designed to revitalize NATO, update Europe's role in Alliance affairs, and regain for the Alliance "an essential relevance in dealing with the needs and interests of its membership".

The Committee, composed of 15 House Republicans and chaired by Rep. Paul Findley (Ill), warned that without a comprehensive reworking of Alliance responsibilities and relationships, the NATO crisis will accelerate "with the governments all but blind to the alarming evidence of decay that no amount of official posturing can hide".

As a first step, the Committee recommended that both the U.S. and its allies apply a searching re-assessment of NATO, determining whether the Treaty should be altered and whether NATO policy is answering common needs of the Alliance --- security and otherwise. "We are convinced that existing and still developing obstacles to allied unity cannot be overcome without the exercise of political will, from all member governments at the highest levels", the Committee emphasized.

This inter-allied review should lead to a NATO summit conference to approve and formally announce agreed-to changes before the end of 1969 when, the Committee noted, NATO parties are free to withdraw from the Treaty.

The Committee made the following specific recommendations:

1) Establish a NATO "strategy council" to give Europeans a genuine role in determining NATO defense policy and nuclear deterrence. Thus far, the U.S. has "appropriated all direction" in strategy decisions. The proposed council should "rear a European awareness and sophistication sufficient to earn the right to participate in the evolution of deterrent doctrine for the Atlantic area", the Committee asserted, claiming that the existing McNamara Committee is only intended "to make the Europeans conversant in nuclear affairs".

MORE...MORE...
2) Revitalize the NATO Council as the "principal instrument for allied political decisioning, to resolve Alliance problems, determine strategy as recommended by the proposed "strategy council", consult on crises within and outside the NATO sphere.

3) Broaden NATO Council's responsibility by authorizing it to seek inter-allied agreement on questions of East-West relations and trade, disarmament, German reunification and central European security, aid to the underdeveloped countries, and other common issues.

4) Revise NATO targets, quotas, and force levels which are currently outmoded or ignored.

5) Attempt to harmonize national defense policies and defense budgets of the NATO partners.

6) Consider more equitable distribution of NATO command positions, including the appointment of a European commander as SACEUR.

7) Grant official status to the North Atlantic Assembly (formerly known as NATO Parliamentarians Conference).

8) Establish NATO machinery for the collection and review, on a continuing basis, of worldwide intelligence material.

9) Clarify U.S. nuclear defense policy toward Europe.

The overriding objective, the Committee stressed, is "to make an honest endeavor to utilize Alliance organs fully, and to make NATO a relevant instrument for inter-allied accomodation and decision".

"The problems which confront NATO ... are political in nature. We believe that European initiative and will must again be activated.... This will help, at the earliest stage, to correct the psychology and reality of imbalance, brought about by American power and preëminance", the Republican group stated.

Rep. Findley said the statement was prepared by a team consisting of Rep. Seymour Halpern (NY) as chairman, and Rep. Marvin Esch (Mich)

Other members of the Committee are: Reps. E. Ross Adair (Ind), William O. Cowger (Ky), William C. Cramer (Fla), Sherman P. Lloyd (Utah), William S. Mailliard (Calif), Rogers C.B. Morton (Md), Alexander Pirnie (NY), Albert H. Quie (Minn), William V. Roth (Del), Herman Schneebeli (Pa), Charles W. Whalen (Ohio), and Larry Winn, Jr. (Kans).

FULL TEXT OF STATEMENT IS ATTACHED
The withdrawal of France from the command structure constitutes the most dramatic and unnerving spectacle of the long NATO crisis. To deflate the blow and reassert established policy, working organs of NATO have been transferred from French soil and, at the instigation of Washington, the so-called McNamara Committee was launched to give some Europeans a closed-door education in American nuclear strategy.

In two previous statements, we explored the nature of the NATO dilemma and attempted to identify major influences tending to weaken the Alliance.* Excluding for the moment the neglect and crude methodology on the part of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, most of these influences cannot be shunted aside as mere transitory, minor indulgences on the part of the Western allies and outside powers. NATO is at a critical crossroads, reflecting the state of inter-allied diplomacy and worldwide political change.

For this reason, the concept of the Atlantic Alliance, its validity and objectives, should be undergoing the most profound re-examination. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Thus far the "Atlantic Debate" is exclusively centered in the Congress and among troubled private observers. There is no indication that the present administration, recognizing the seriousness of the NATO problem and allied relations generally, is prepared to apply the searching assessment which must precede a revitalization of Atlantic institutions. The paucity of official thought and action in this crucial area does not auger well for the future of the Alliance. Judging from the record, what discussion has evolved within the Executive Branch is largely piecemeal, unevenly responsive to annoying manifestations of NATO discord, subservient to entrenched attitudes and protective of all the familiar NATO cliches.

We propose, therefore, as a first and essential step, that the government undertake a thorough appraisal of the NATO situation, with a view toward developing a more realistic and meaningful policy toward NATO and Western Europe. At the same time, the European states should be encouraged to come forward, collectively, with proposals for improving allied diplomacy and for recasting NATO in a manner that meets their interests and concerns.

We are convinced that existing and still developing obstacles to allied unity cannot be overcome without the exercise of political will, from all member governments at the highest levels. The problem which confronts NATO, as an institution for allied cooperation, are political in nature. NATO is primarily a military alliance, but the credibility of collective self-defense depends always upon the political interests of the member states. If the Alliance is to be preserved, these must remain reasonably well aligned and loyal to changing conditions, within and outside of the NATO region. The American disregard of NATO has served domestically to weaken the common interest.

It remains to be seen that the present Inter-NATO inquiry, proposed by Belgium, will accomplish, though one should not minimize its potential. However, its task may be circumscribed because it in fact a high-level undertaking to which the governments, formally and during the course of the study, have committed themselves. Its preliminary recommendations, to be debated by the Ministerial Council in December, 1967, may constitute merely a compromised holding action, by reaffirming the Soviet threat and suggesting some institutional rearrangements, and ignoring the potent political problems.

Nevertheless, as indicated in the Council resolution, the scope of the inquiry is broad, and in order not to prejudge or injure its potential value, the re-evaluation which we here recommend should proceed in liaison with the inquiry or await its December conclusions.

The re-evaluation which we recommend for the United States and its allies, concurrent with or in consequence of the NATO-born study, and which must lead to multilateral discussions, should address itself to such questions as:

Is NATO, as militarily organized, realistically answering present and future security needs?

Fundamentally, is the Organization and its military policy a hindrance in achieving security in central Europe, German reunification, and other political objectives?

Should the treaty, or any of its articles, be revised or redrafted in light of developments which have taken place since its inception?

In what manner shall the burden and responsibility for nuclear deterrence be born?

Should NATO be equipped to harmonize other major areas of policy besides the military, such as post-Versailles relations, aid to the underdeveloped nations, and international monetary questions?

And most significantly: how do the other members visualize NATO and in what way do they feel it can or should be strengthened?

We stress that by 1969, parties may withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, although it is at present inconceivable that any member state—even France—would exercise this option. The approaching end to this contractual period provides a convenient interval to initiate immediately a planned and coordinated inter-allied review. Following this review, we recommend a meeting of Chiefs of State to approve and announce the results.
The success of the Marshall Plan was due, in part, to the fact that from the beginning, the re-building program depended upon European initiative and will, jointly effectuated. We believe that European initiative and will must again be activated in order to strengthen and modernize institutions of allied cooperation, such as NATO. This will help, at the earliest stage, to correct the psychology and reality of imbalance, brought about by American power and predominance.

On previous occasions, we have emphasized this imbalance as being one of the most damaging causes of the NATO decline. It discourages the European governments from making solid contributions to allied defense, in their own behalf; it is an anachronism, despite American power, in that the European states have regained their self-respect and viability; it has promoted among Europeans a curious ambivalence toward NATO: on the one hand, a resentment of American hegemony, and on the other hand, an unhealthy resignation to playing a ritualistic or minor role, due to the accepted power realities.

Manifestly, the study we propose must come to grips with this disequilibrium and, insofar as possible, suggest means of overcoming it and developing a truly European role in Alliance politics. To rectify this situation, and meet other dilemmas of the NATO crisis, we wish to set forth additional recommendations of a more concrete nature, which hopefully will contribute to the present Atlantic discussion and spur the Administration and the Congress to the necessary action.

In order to bridge the technological gap and bring about genuine European participation in matters of strategy and nuclear defense, we propose the establishment of a permanent, working NATO body where these issues can be debated and jointly resolved on a continuing basis.

The object is not merely to make the Europeans conversant in nuclear affairs and keep them abreast of changing American doctrine, although this is a prerequisite, and presently addresses the work of the McNamara Committee. Americans complain that Europe is ignorant of these matters, which must therefore be handled exclusively by the United States, which owns both the nuclear punch and all the expertise.

This is why the Alliance serves only to orchestrate American planning and strategic concepts, reinforcing the sharp imbalance of responsibility.

Thus, we must create the facilities for co-determination within the Alliance. What must emerge is a European capability to contribute to nuclear defense of the NATO area, a process whereby concepts for European defense and Atlantic security flow from Europe as well as from Washington. It is time to openly encourage our allies to formulate, in reply to their own conceived interests, a workable format for continuing close, Atlantic military cooperation.
The proposed strategy council must have the benefit of expert staff, and European members must have access to American nuclear planning information. This does not require that the United States relinquish control over strategic armaments, and their employment. Rather, it means rearing a European awareness and sophistication sufficient to earn the right to participate in the evolution of deterrent doctrine for the Atlantic area, and hence the capacity to judge and propose as an intellectual peer.

For instance, the European states should weigh the suitability of a cooperatively-owned nuclear capability on the continent, assigned to NATO.

Why should it be America which, having monopolized the means of nuclear defense, also appropriates all direction in the common interest? The only serious proposal of recent date, the multilateral force, was an American concept.

Suggestions for a European Nuclear Force have been voiced over a prolonged period, with no conclusive results.

Would such a contingent be redundant, too costly, or politically unwise? Does the existing American formula, to employ nuclear weapons at some stage in case of war on the continent, legitimately answer European security needs, now and in the future?

These are questions not only for the United States, but equally for the other NATO members, whose territorial integrity may be primarily at stake.

Hence, NATO must serve as the format through which Europe, prosperous and increasingly self-assertive, becomes once again a determinant of its own destiny. Instead of perpetuating and accentuating the disparity between allies, the Organization must function as an honest broker of genuinely European concepts and proposals. To share determination over the ultimate questions of defense and therefore survival, Europe must be provided with the wherewithal to contribute to strategy, which is a vital first step in re-distributing responsibility within the Alliance.

Agreement on this point presupposes that NATO's problems cannot be solved only through mechanical tinkering: the 1963 appointment of allied observers to SAC at Omaha, assignment of an allied nuclear deputy to SACEUR that same year, a coequal voice over the firing of IRBM's for the European state accepting such a contingent on its soil, etc. In essence these measures, while useful in themselves, leave undisturbed the accomplished American might and strategy and do not go to the heart of the more basic problem we have been discussing.

In further redressing the imbalance, we recommend that the NATO Council, or any other agreed-to grouping, be utilized on a continuing basis and at short notice for diplomatic consultation among the allies. This forum should emerge as the principal
instrument for allied political decisioning, to resolve Alliance problems, determine strategy as recommended by the proposed strategy council, consult on crises erupting within or outside NATO territory, harmonize policy on matters of mutual concern, such as East-West relations, and exchange and review intelligence on a daily basis. This is a large order of business. Whether or not these newly-envisioned responsibilities for the Council would succeed in revitalizing NATO is dependent mainly on the attitude of the United States, the only member which can conceivably match power and will with its global interests.

This suggestion probably means that clashes will occur and differences of opinion will become more obvious. It means that we must be prepared to consider the advice of allies on matters which perhaps affect us more than them. Hitherto, our unwillingness to use fully Alliance channels has been due, in part, to our apprehension about splitting the Alliance and implanting the impression of discord.

It is in the swell of this proposition that Alliances soon lose their self-generating, assumptive importance to the membership. What the Organization discusses, communally, becomes steadily less momentous; the communiques become more and more repetitious and meaningless. As the Alliance (i.e. allegiance to the common cause) loses its hold, the lowest common denominator gets more elusive and banal. Here exhaustive efforts are expended to shore up a united front for public consumption, but the gap between pretense and substantive accomplishment becomes greater.

This is a prescription for the decay of international organization. A major cause is the inability of members to confront and resolve differing interests, shading the discord with platitudes and artificial fence-mending. Soon, in this case, the alliance may become a liability by frustrating the new and legitimate demands of its members; by intensifying disagreements through would-be, pseudo solutions; by posing a paper deterrent to aggression whose intent and promise becomes more and more ambiguous and therefore dangerous to peace and stability.

To be sure, an honest endeavor to utilize Alliance organs fully, to make NATO a relevant instrument for accommodation and decision, carries its own risks. The greater gamble, however, is to allow NATO a steadily diminishing influence.

We suggest that this newly-refurbished political arm attempt to reach positive agreements on the broad questions of East-West trade (supplementing COCOM) and relations with Eastern Europe generally, on present and future disarmament moves, on the reunification of Germany, on aid to the undeveloped countries, worldwide security problems and other important matters. For instance, it could take the lead in evolving a combined and coordinated approach to assist the poor nations, through a Western aid consortium which harnesses our mutual abundance, technology, and trading power for the benefit of the emerging states.
There are other pertinent recommendations that flow from the two proposals made above, which are not novel by any means. In fact, the Republican Fact-Finding Mission to NATO in 1965, composed of members of this Committee, recommended the establishment of a NATO Diplomatic Standing Group as a political organ.

The proposed group should also be equipped to bring allied thinking to bear on crises which erupt anywhere in the world, as a sort of "crisis management" vehicle.

As Europe is brought more and more into the resolution of common strategy, a closer military harmonization should emerge with respect to national defense policies and budgets.

Long-term agreements should be negotiated, among all the allies, to establish a cost-sharing formula for the stationing of troops abroad in the common defense.

Targets, quotas, and force levels which are presently and patently ignored should be revised through Alliance negotiation in response to conceived security needs and domestic concerns.

This Committee has already recommended that the North Atlantic Assembly, composed of elected representatives of the member-states who debate and exchange ideas on Atlantic affairs, be given official status as a part of the NATO organization. The Assembly exists today as an unofficial body and until this year was known as the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.*

Consideration should be given to a more equitable distribution of NATO command positions, including the appointment of a European officer as SACEUR and a revision of existing practice under which SACEUR is, for all intents and purposes, assigned and discharged by the U.S. President. A full exchange and review of intelligence material should be carried forth on a continuous basis.

As our own re-examination of NATO policy proceeds, in conjunction with that of our allies, and as the Europeans emerge from their abdicated strategic role, a clarification of our nuclear course of action must, of course, flow automatically.

We have deliberately avoided a stress on so-called "hardware" solutions to the NATO crisis. The problem of nuclear-sharing has been pictured, on too many occasions, as a purely or predominantly tangible grant of nuclear control to our allies, who presumably desire a finger on the trigger, contending that this is the sole answer to their insecurity and impotence. While this claim is revealing and holds sway among segments of European opinion, it does not fully represent the true situation. To the extent that Europeans desire to acquire nuclear weapons on their own or gain some authority over the U.S. deterrent, this is symptomatic of deeper frustrations which cannot simply be assuaged by a negligible national deterrent or some mechanical formula to communally unleash U.S. power on the continent. Many Europeans, in fact, who speak harshly about the U.S. hegemony, would rather leave the crucial decisions up to Washington.

* Statement of House Republican Committee on Western Alliances, June 11, 1967.
Misgivings about American strategic doctrine and doubts about the American guarantee have been far more persuasive factors in convincing Europeans that a "hardware" solution may be necessary. In attempting to judge opinion and government policy abroad, at this stage, we must not rule out the possibility that a dissemination of nuclear weapons may become superfluous when these misgivings and doubts are properly answered or when, as we have set forth, the Alliance operates properly. Our recommendation to develop a genuine Europe function in the determination of Atlantic defense strategy is certainly urgent in redressing the European sense of weakness and removing uncertainties. Furthermore, we believe that our European allies should share the initiative in jointly resolving the question of a European nuclear role in NATO which, demonstrably, must evolve from the thorough and basic re-evaluation of Alliance affairs we advised earlier. The MLF concept went some distance toward granting Europeans real control over a nuclear contingent; this was a wholly American scheme which was never enthusiastically embraced by our allies. The failure of this plan, and the danger of oversimplifying European sentiment and motives, should warn us against manufacturing artful and hasty replies to the serious problems besetting the Alliance.

As we suggested above, moreover, American cooperation toward the erection of an essentially European-owned nuclear deterrent, linked in some manner to NATO, should come only after official opinion abroad has coalesced. One of MLF's serious shortcomings was that it was pushed upon the NATO countries before they had sufficiently thought through its consequences and the whole question of nuclear participation; from country to country opinion varied and kept shifting. If stampeded into fruition, MLF might have served to divide the NATO membership, by enlisting only a minority of parties which would have monopolized control within an Alliance of proverbial equals.

Furthermore, one cannot dismiss the possibility that England and France, the other NATO nuclear states, may in the future decide to cooperate in this field, either informally or through joint management. While this prospect appears remote at this stage, any discussion about a NATO nuclear force must make reference to the already existing national capabilities.

The essential point is that the European NATO states should be encouraged to formulate a unified position on the question of obtaining a European nuclear force to which the United States, presumably, would render support and assistance. It would be a serious mistake for the American government to foist new and costly joint-management schemes upon the Europeans unless opinion abroad solidifies. However, a nuclear non-proliferation treaty should not foreclose a European option to develop, on the basis of existing national capabilities, a European deterrent force which is responsive to their conceived interests. This, of course, relates to our earlier discussion concerning an intensive, inter-allied review of NATO objectives and an enlarged role for Europe in
strategy determination.

We are convinced that, while the urgency of the military threat from Moscow may have receded, a closely aligned program for defense of the Atlantic area remains essential. We reject the notion that developing political interests, and changing patterns of thought, are inevitably antithetical to the maintenance of sound military preparedness. But unless the Alliance can adjust to these shifting currents, and serve to channel and coordinate the new energies and interests of its members, its influence will slowly erode.

The Soviet effort today is geared to loosening French ties to NATO, to nourishing areas of allied discord, and ultimately to neutralizing the military potency of the Alliance, as members tend to go their separate ways. This would be a tragedy, not only for our mutual security, but indeed for Western civilization.

As we have stated previously, NATO is both part and consequence of allied diplomacy; we cannot build a wall around it and render it immune from changing objectives and perspectives.

In failing to grasp the significance of contemporary pressures and events, in allowing NATO to flounder and grow steadily less vital to the member-states, the United States risks playing directly into the hands of Moscow and its long-range strategy of disabling the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO is constantly buffeted by often unexpected and seemingly extraneous developments.

Three recent and unrelated events, which need not be spelled out in detail, reflect the changing political context:

(1) the decision of the West German cabinet, reached independently, to trim military spending by $2.2 billion through 1971, which might reduce the size of the Bundeswehr by 40,000 to 60,000 men;

(2) the statement of Premier Maurer of Rumania, on a visit to the Netherlands, urging that NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dismantled and that every country "should be master of his own house."

(3) the British White Paper on defense, which calls for a 20% reduction in military manpower by the mid-70's, and the withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia.

We do not infer that these isolated actions will destroy NATO. But they do portray, however inadequately, the fluid character of politics on the continent and the emergence of new preoccupations. The real challenge in preserving NATO is to reclaim for it a positive role in shaping political decisioning among the allies, including questions of nuclear strategy.
We are convinced that the problems of NATO are the outgrowth of a lack of political will. With the comprehensive re-assessment proposed in this statement, together with institutional changes geared to updating Europe's role in Alliance affairs, NATO can regain an essential relevance in dealing with the needs and interests of its membership. We are equally convinced that nothing short of the recommendations contained herein can solve the NATO crisis, which has been allowed to fester interminably, with the governments all but blind to the alarming evidence of decay that no amount of official posturing can hide.