



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1993

II

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1993

II

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Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	VLD
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM. DE DECKER Armand	PRL
GHSQUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOUCHERON Jean-Michel	Socialist
COLOMBIER Georges	UDF
COUVEINHES René	RPR
DUMONT Jean	Ind. Rep.
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GEOFFROY Aloys	UDF
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JACQUAT Denis	UDF
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KASPEREIT Gabriel	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
SCHREINER Bernard	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ANDRÉ René	RPR
BONREPAUX Augustin	Socialist
BRANGER Jean-Guy	UDF
BRIANE Jean	UDF
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DANIEL Christian	RPR
DECAGNY Jean-Claude	UDF
DENIAU Xavier	RPR
Mrs. DURRIEU Josette	Socialist
MM. EHRMANN Charles	UDF
HUNAULT Michel	RPR
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LE JEUNE Édouard	UCDP
de LIPKOWSKI Jean	RPR
MASSON Jean-Louis	RPR
d'ORNANO Paul	RPR
PRORIOL Jean	UDF
ROGER Jean	Dem. Left

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORG Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNS Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
NEUMANN Gerhard	SPD
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGNELLI Arduino	Socialist
ANDREOTTI Giulio	Chr. Dem.
BENVENUTI Roberto	PDS
BOSCO Rinaldo	Northern League
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
DE CAROLIS Stelio	PRI
FERRARINI Giulio	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
LECCISI Pino	Chr. Dem.
MANISCO Lucio	Ref. Com.
MANNINO Calogero	Chr. Dem.
MARONI Roberto	Northern League
PAIRE Giacomo	PLI
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	PDS
PIZZO Pietro	Socialist
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
TATARELLA Giuseppe	PDS

Substitutes

MM. BATTISTUZZI Paolo	PLI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
CALDORO Stefano	Socialist
CICCIOMESSERE Roberto	Radical
COVI Giorgio	PRI
DE PAOLI Paolo	PSDI
FAVA Claudio	Rete
FERRARI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
GOTTARDO Settimo	Chr. Dem.
GUZZETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LECCESE Vito	Verdi

MM. LIBERATORI Vittorio
MESORACA Maurizio
RUBNER Hans
SPERONI Francesco
TRABACCHINI Quarto
VINCI Luigi
VISIBELLI Roberto

Socialist
PDS
SVP
Northern League
PDS
Ref. Com.
MSI-DN

LUXEMBOURG**Representatives**

Mrs. ERR Lydie
Mr. GOERENS Charles
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle

Soc. Workers
Dem.
Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille
KONEN René
REGENWETTER Jean

Soc. Chr.
Dem.
Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS**Representatives**

MM. AARTS Harry
Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN
Elisabeth
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob
EISMA Doeke
STOFFELEN Pieter
van VELZEN Wim
VERBEEK Jan Willem

CDA
Labour
CDA
D66
Labour
CDA
VVD

Substitutes

MM. DEES Dick
EVERSDIJK Huib
JURGENS E.C.M.
van der LINDEN René
Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van
APPELDOORN Marian H.J.
Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas
Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine

VVD
CDA
Labour
CDA
CDA
CDA
Labour
Labour

PORTUGAL**Representatives**

MM. AMARAL Fernando
BRITO Raul Fernando
CANDAL Carlos
FERNANDES MARQUES
Joaquim
MACHETE Rui Manuel
PINTO Carlos
ROSETA Pedro

Soc. Dem.
Socialist
Socialist
Soc. Dem.
Soc. Dem.
Soc. Dem.
Soc. Dem.
Soc. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela
MM. ALEGRE Manuel
CURTO Abílio Aleixo
MARTINS Alberto de Sousa
POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro
REIS LEITE José Guilherme
RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano

Soc. Dem.
Socialist
Socialist
Socialist
Soc. Dem.
Soc. Dem.
PCP

SPAIN**Representatives**

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco
BORDERAS Augusto
CUCO Alfons
DIAZ Lorenzo
FABRA Juan Manuel
HOMS I FERRET Francesc
LOPEZ HENARES José Luis
MARTINEZ Miguel Angel
MOYA Pedro
PERINAT Luis Guillermo
de PUIG Lluís Maria
ROMAN Rafael

People's Party
Socialist
Socialist
Soc. and Dem.
Centre
People's Party
C.i.U.
People's Party
Socialist
Socialist
People's Party
Socialist
Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BARRIONUEVO José
BOLINAGA Imanol
DIAZ DE MERA Agustin
Mrs. FRIAS Milagros
MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel
GONZALEZ-LAXE Fernando
Mrs. GUIRADO Ana
MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO
Santiago
NÚÑEZ Manuel
PALACIOS Marcelo
RODRIGUEZ GOMEZ Jaime
VAZQUEZ Narcis

Socialist
Basque Nat.
People's Party
Socialist
Socialist
Socialist
Socialist
People's Party
Socialist
Socialist
People's Party
United Left

UNITED KINGDOM**Representatives**

MM. ATKINSON David
BANKS Tony
COX Thomas
Dame Peggy FENNER
Lord FINSBERG
Mr. HARDY Peter
Sir John HUNT
Sir Russell JOHNSTON
Lord KIRKHILL
Mr. LITHERLAND Robert
Lord NEWALL
MM. RATHBONE Tim
REDMOND Martin
Sir Dudley SMITH
Sir Keith SPEED
Sir Donald THOMPSON
MM. THOMPSON John
WARD John

Conservative
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Conservative
SLD
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ALEXANDER Richard
BOWDEN Andrew
CUMMINGS John
CUNLIFFE Lawrence
DAVIS Terry
DICKS Terry
DUNNACHIE Jimmy
Sir Anthony DURANT
Earl of DUNDEE
Mr. FRY Peter
Dr. GODMAN Norman
Baroness HOOPER
MM. HOWELL Ralph
HUGHES Roy
Baroness LOCKWOOD
Lord MACKIE of BENSHE
MM. MARSHALL Jim
TOWNEND John

Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Labour
Labour
Conservative
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Conservative
Conservative
Labour
Labour
SLD
Labour
Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.2. Examination of credentials.3. Election of the President of the Assembly.4. Address by the President of the Assembly.5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (Doc. 1358).7. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">8. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision</i>, Doc. 1368).9. The development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order</i>, Doc. 1365).10. Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order</i>, Doc. 1364). |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Ehrmann, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes had been ratified by that Assembly with the exception of Mr. Dumont, Mr. Boucheron and Mr. Croze, members of the French Delegation.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly unanimously ratified

the credentials of Mr. Dumont, Mr. Boucheron and Mr. Croze, subject to their subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

5. Observers

The Provisional President welcomed the observers from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Sweden and Turkey.

6. Election of the President

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely, Sir Dudley Smith.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Sir Dudley Smith was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Sir Dudley Smith took the Chair.

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

Speaker: Mr. Péciaux.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates were proposed for eight posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Kempinaire, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Machete, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Machete were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

9. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Doc. 1376)

The President announced that Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Soell and others had tabled a motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council.

Speaker: Mr. De Decker.

The Assembly decided to refer the motion to disagree to the Political Committee for an opinion.

10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1358)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was adopted.

11. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. Cox, Rathbone and Dr. Godman.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Defence Committee

France

- MM. Alloncle, Baumel, Briane, Dumont and Jacquat as titular members; MM. Masseret, Jeambrun, Galley, Le Jeune and de Lipkowski as alternate members.

Political Committee

France

- MM. Ehrmann, Kaspereit, de Lipkowski, d'Ornano and Seitlinger as titular members; MM. Colombier, Bonrepaux, Baumel, Gouteyron and Le Grand as alternate members.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

France

- MM. Jeambrun, Le Grand, Roger and Valleix as titular members; MM. Branger, Dumont, Schreiner and Galley as alternate members.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

France

- MM. Branger, Daniel, Mrs. Durrieu and Mr. Masson as titular members; MM. Geoffroy, Hunault, Croze and Proriol as alternate members.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

France

- MM. André, Couveinhes, Deniau and Le Jeune as titular members; MM. Proriol, Geoffroy, Briane and Masson as alternate members;

Germany

- Mr. Neumann as an alternate member.

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

France

- MM. Birraux, Decagny and Gouteyron as titular members; MM. Seitlinger, Couveinhes, Hunault and Jacquat as alternate members.

13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1368)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision.

The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 8)¹.

14. The situation in East Timor

(Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1374)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a decision on the situation in East Timor.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Thursday, 17th June, as the final item of business.

15. The situation in former Yugoslavia

(Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1375)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a decision on the situation in former Yugoslavia.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place during the morning sitting on Wednesday, 16th June.

16. The situation in Somalia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1377)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider

the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the situation in Somalia.

Speaker: Mr. Rodrigues.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place during the afternoon sitting on Wednesday, 16th June.

17. The development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1365)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Kempinaire, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Cox and Müller.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Philipov and Slatinsky (Observers from Bulgaria).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Kempinaire, Rapporteur, and Mr. Tummers, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 86)².

18. Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1364)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 537)³.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

1. See page 20.

2. See page 21.

3. See page 22.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 88) ⁴.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 87) ⁵.

***19. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 15th June 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.30 p.m.

4. See page 24.

5. See page 25.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Soell Steiner Vogel	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete) Mr. Roseta
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux Sarens Seeuws	Italy	
	MM. <i>Gottardo</i> (Andreotti) Benvenuti Colombo Covi (De Carolis) Ferrarini Foschi <i>Guzzetti</i> (Leccisi) <i>Battistuzzi</i> (Mannino) Parisi <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli) <i>Visibelli</i> (Tatarella)	Spain
France		MM. Borderas Cuco Fabra <i>Bolinaga</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares Martinez Moya <i>Rodriguez Gomez</i> (Perinat) de Puig Roman
MM. Alloncle Baumel Birraux <i>Daniel</i> (Boucheron) <i>Ehrmann</i> (Colombier) <i>Croze</i> (Dumont) <i>de Lipkowski</i> (Galley) Geoffroy <i>Briane</i> (Gouteyron) <i>Hunault</i> (Jacquat) Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Schreiner <i>Decagny</i> (Seitlinger) Valleix	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom
Germany	Netherlands	MM. Atkinson Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Dr. <i>Godman</i> (Lord Kirkhill) Mr. <i>Cunliffe</i> (Litherland) Lord Newall MM. Rathbone <i>Davis</i> (Redmond) Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
MM. Antretter <i>Neumann</i> (Mrs. Blunck) Mrs. <i>Mascher</i> (Büchler) MM. Holtz Kittelmann Müller Reddemann <i>Lummer</i> (von Schmude)	Mr. <i>van der Linden</i> (Aarts) Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer <i>Tummers</i> (Eisma) Stoffelen	
	Portugal	
	MM. Amaral Brito	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Mr. Sprung Mrs. Terborg	Portugal
Mr. Biefnot		Mr. Pinto
France	Italy	
MM. Colombier Couveinhes Masseret	MM. Agnelli Bosco Manisco Maroni Paire Pizzo Rodotà	Spain
Germany		MM. Alvarez Diaz
MM. Böhm Bühler Irmer Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup	Netherlands	United Kingdom
	MM. van Velzen Verbeek	MM. Banks Hardy

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 536¹***on the enlargement of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's energetic action, which resulted in a protocol of accession to WEU with Greece, a declaration on WEU observers regarding Denmark and Ireland and a document on associate membership regarding Iceland, Norway and Turkey within a year after the WEU declaration on enlargement issued at Maastricht on 10th December 1991;
- (ii) Regretting that the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
- (iii) Noting that at an earlier stage it strongly expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be admitted simultaneously as full members and regretting that the Council was not willing to accept this view;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that, according to the document on associate membership of WEU, Iceland, Norway and Turkey will become associate members on the day that Greece becomes a member of WEU;
- (v) Considering that Article IX of the modified Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's rôle and existence;
- (vi) Noting the Council's reply to Written Questions 300, 311 and 312, where it suggests that the existence of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty does not preclude the Assembly retaining its full autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in the Assembly's activities of representatives from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU;
- (vii) Stressing that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic should also find expression in specific relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
- (viii) Considering that national parliaments, when examining for ratification the protocol of Greece's accession to WEU, will have to take account of the proposed suspension of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and of Greece's rôle in European efforts to solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;
- (ix) Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives from new member states, associate member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will be a significant burden on the budget, personnel, office space and chamber required for the Assembly to perform its task properly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Confirm the Assembly's full autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in its activities of representatives from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU and provide sufficient accommodation and financial means for the Assembly to implement the consequences of the accession of Greece, associate membership of Iceland, Norway and Turkey, and observer states of Denmark and Ireland, as decided in Rome on 20th November 1992;
2. Indicate which countries will be asked to participate in the budget of the Assembly, and their respective contributions to the financing of this budget, so that the Assembly may keep an account of the effective participation in WEU;
3. Indicate whether Greece, which has not signed the document on associate membership, is nevertheless committed to this text;
4. Take no steps to promote ratification of the protocol of Greece's accession to WEU before Greece has clarified its position regarding the solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th April 1993 (See Document 1360).

RESOLUTION 87 ¹***on the crisis in former Yugoslavia***

The Assembly,

(i) Recalling the series of recommendations adopted in an effort to help resolve the crisis in former Yugoslavia, but regretting that the advice given by the Assembly over the past eighteen months has been accepted only belatedly and in part;

(ii) Pleased that the United Nations Security Council has now agreed to strengthen the sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro and that, in particular, the WEU Council is to give technical assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,

URGES WEU MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Now to examine, in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, all possible means to bring peace to the area, including the use of force as necessary, and to maintain the principle that territory must not be seized illegally.

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th April 1993 (See Document 1362).

ORDER 85¹***on the enlargement of WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the protocol of accession of Greece to WEU; the declaration on WEU observers regarding Denmark and Ireland and the document on the associate membership of WEU regarding Iceland, Norway and Turkey;
 - (ii) Stressing the need to formalise the relationship between WEU Assembly and parliamentary representatives from Denmark and Ireland on the one hand and from Iceland, Norway and Turkey on the other, in an "observer statute" and an "associate member statute" respectively;
 - (iii) Considering the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak republic at various levels;
 - (iv) Noting that parliamentarians from the states mentioned under (iii) should be invited to the Assembly's plenary sessions on a permanent basis as guest members, without voting rights;
 - (v) Insisting, however, that at all times, the Assembly should retain the right to suspend parliamentary delegations from countries where the practice of parliamentary democracy is violated or where human rights are not being respected;
 - (vi) Considering that the participation of a disproportionate number of parliamentary observers from non-WEU member states in the plenary debates of the Assembly may affect the character of the dialogue between Council and Assembly;
 - (vii) Aware that any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommodation and budget;
 - (viii) Considering that it is urgent to make a coherent examination of all political and budgetary questions, including the rules of procedure, in order to take full account of the consequences for the Assembly of WEU's enlargement,
1. Invites its Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges:
 - (a) to examine the creation of a specific "associate member" status for representatives of associate member states which will give full participation and voting rights in committees and the right to participate in the plenary sessions of the Assembly with membership of delegations on the same basis as the present Council of Europe arrangements;
 - (b) to examine the creation of an "observer status" and a "permanent observer" or "guest member status" for representatives of observer states and of the nine central European countries assembled in the forum of consultation respectively;
 2. Invites the Political Committee to monitor the development of WEU's enlargement;
 3. Invites the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to examine in detail the consequences of enlargement for the Assembly's budget and premises;
 4. Invites the Presidential Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the Political Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in this matter, so as to ensure that appropriate reports and recommendations can be put to the Assembly no later than its December 1993 meeting.

1. Adopted by the Standing Committee in Rome on 19th April 1993 (See Document 1360).

DECISION 8***on amending Rule 15 on the Standing Committee***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To replace paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 15 by the following text:

- “ 4. It shall be convened by the President of the Assembly at the request of the Presidential Committee, which shall fix the date and duration of its meetings.
5. The Standing Committee shall examine committee reports included in its agenda by the Presidential Committee.
6. An urgent matter may be placed before it by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives or substitutes. In this case, the President of the Assembly shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the Standing Committee has a draft text before it and receives appropriate information allowing it to discuss the text in full knowledge of the facts.
7. The Standing Committee shall act on behalf of the Assembly.
8. Unless otherwise specified in the present rule, procedure in the Standing Committee shall be the same as in plenary sittings of the Assembly.
9. The provisions of Rule 24 on reports of debates and Rule 25 on the timetable of sittings and orders of the day shall not be applicable to the Standing Committee.
10. The Chairman of the Standing Committee shall take part in discussions and votes without a casting vote.
11. The provisions of Rule 21 (b) on speeches in committee shall be applicable to the Standing Committee.”

ORDER 86***on the development of relations between the WEU Assembly
and the parliaments of Central European countries***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the declaration issued at the close of the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers of WEU with states of Central Europe held in Bonn on 19th June 1992 in which the ministers “advocated the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the states concerned”;
- (ii) Stressing the importance already achieved in recent years in relations between the Assembly and its committees and the parliaments of those states;
- (iii) Convinced of the need for the parties concerned to strengthen and develop these relations;
- (iv) Aware that exchanges of views on the building of Europe, particularly on security and defence questions, cannot be restricted to the governmental level but that parliamentarians must play an active part in them;
- (v) Considering that the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries will help to make this debate more useful and fruitful,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To encourage visits by Assembly committees to Central European countries, particularly when they prepare reports concerning that region;
2. To promote the Assembly’s participation in symposia and any other type of meeting at which parliamentarians are present that might be organised by those countries;
3. To extend regular invitations to ministers for foreign affairs and defence from the forum of consultation to speak at Assembly sessions;
4. To send reports, the letter from the Assembly and other publications to the largest possible number of interested persons and institutions in Central European countries;
5. To arrange for parliaments, governments and specialised institutions and associations in those countries to send the Assembly any documents and information they consider useful in order to ensure a better knowledge and greater understanding of their opinions, aims and decisions.

RECOMMENDATION 537

on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and the Asian parts of the Russian Federation from Vancouver to Vladivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992;
- (ii) Emphasising that this important confidence- and security-building measure can reach its goal of creating a new multinational co-operative security approach only if all member states of the Community of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded;
- (iii) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of WEU member states should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures;
- (iv) Welcoming the decision of the WEU Council to form a single group of states in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty;
- (v) Noting however the difficulties encountered by the WEU Open Skies Expert Group in harmonising the different options for practical WEU co-operation during nearly two years of discussions which made it impossible to reach an agreement for the use of a single type of observation aircraft;
- (vi) Noting that the WEU aircraft pool envisaged now is to be based on the number of aircraft actually available equipped with appropriate sensors in order to conduct joint air observation missions in accordance with the treaty in its most cost-effective conditions;
- (vii) Considering that a number of questions are still open such as:
 - the selection of appropriate sensors to equip the aircraft;
 - the status of associate members and observers within the WEU group of states;
 - cost-sharing;
 - whether and to what extent should the WEU Satellite Centre be asked to take on the task of interpreting the images gathered by the sensors;
- (viii) Welcoming the efforts of the Council to negotiate the conditions of co-operation with the Russian Federation, in particular regarding its participation in the WEU aircraft pool;
- (ix) Stressing however that the WEU contacts with the Russian Federation should not be exclusive and that co-operation should be enlarged to include all interested countries of the Community of Independent States and also the eight Central and Eastern European countries with which the Council has established regular consultations;
- (x) Deeming it necessary for WEU as a group of states within the Open Skies Treaty to elaborate at an early stage concepts for the possible extension of the open skies régime to wider areas as provided for in the treaty and to establish close working contacts with the Open Skies Consultative Commission,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on its decision regarding the creation of a WEU aircraft pool intended for air observation missions in the framework of the open skies régime;
2. Ensure that no type of aircraft made available by a member country shall be excluded from the pool;
3. Inform the Assembly:
 - (a) whether Greece, the associate members and the observers are already part of the group of states created by the WEU Vienna declaration;
 - (b) whether WEU has decided in the meantime to transform this group in accordance with Article III, Section II, paragraph 3 of the Open Skies Treaty, as announced in Vienna;

4. Give an enlarged mandate to the WEU expert group:
 - (a) to examine all the additional consequences not yet tackled and which arise from the decision taken in Vienna to act as a group of states;
 - (b) to evaluate the conditions for mandating the WEU Satellite Centre to interpret sensor imagery;
 - (c) in liaison with the NATO Verification Co-ordinating Committee, to determine how to use the open skies observation means for the CFE Treaty;
 - (d) to examine the possible extension of the open skies régime to wider areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and protection of the environment;
5. Take a joint initiative urging Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to accede to the Open Skies Treaty;
6. Seek co-operation similar to that envisaged with the Russian Federation also with other member states of the Community of Independent States, in particular with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and inform the Assembly of the results of the relevant negotiations;
7. Establish a permanent WEU representation with the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna.

RESOLUTION 88***on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty***

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and the Asian parts of the Russian Federation from Vancouver to Vladivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992;

(ii) Emphasising that this important confidence- and security-building measure can reach its goal of creating a new multinational co-operative security approach only if all member states of the Community of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded;

(iii) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of WEU member states and of all the other signatories should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures,

URGES the governments and the parliaments of WEU member states and of all the other signatories of the Open Skies Treaty to ensure that the ratification procedure is concluded before the end of 1993.

ORDER 87***on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty***

The Assembly,

INVITES the President of the Assembly to transmit the resolution on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty to all signatories of the Open Skies Treaty.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Security in the Mediterranean (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1371 and amendments</i>). | 2. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1369</i>). |
|---|---|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

A candidate had been proposed for one of the two remaining posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Martinez.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Martinez was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

4. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- Mr. Ferrarini as a titular member and Mr. Leccese as an alternate member.

5. Security in the Mediterranean

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1371 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Parisi, Rodrigues and Roman.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Amaral, Brito, Borderas and de Puig.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others:

1. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) which would seek to emulate the success of the CSCE in arms control and reduction, enhanced security through confidence-building measures, and the protection of human and minority rights;”

Speaker: Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur, proposed that the new paragraph be inserted after paragraph (vii) and not after paragraph (iv).

This amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Roseta:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert:

“ (ix) Convinced nevertheless that the risk of

proliferation of weapons systems and technology, whether nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region;”

Speaker: Mr. Roseta.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Roseta:

4. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest in the development, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean countries;”

Speaker: Mr. Roseta.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson and others:

2. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and pursue its establishment with vigour and perseverance;”

Speakers: MM. Atkinson, Roseta and Stoffelen.

An amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee to add “at the appropriate time” after “CSCM and”.

Speaker: Mr. Atkinson.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Parisi and others:

3. After the last paragraph of the draft recom-

mendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Hold effective consultations with the Community institutions and European political co-operation so that action to ensure military security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of political and economic co-operation in the region.”

Speakers: MM. Parisi and Roseta.

An amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Roseta to leave out “military”.

Speaker: Mr. Parisi.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

Thus amended, the amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 538)¹.

6. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1369)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

The debate was closed.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.

1. See page 29.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Mr. Fernandes Marques Mrs. Aguiar (Machete) Mr. Roseta
MM. Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux	MM. <i>Gottardo</i> (Andreotti) Benvenuti Colombo <i>Covi</i> (De Carolis) Foschi <i>Caccia</i> (Leccisi) <i>Battistuzzi</i> (Mannino) Paire Parisi <i>Mesoraca</i> (Pecchioli)	Spain MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Fabra <i>Bolinaga</i> (Homs I Ferret) Martinez <i>Rodriguez Gomez</i> (Perinat) de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Branger</i> (Birraux) Colombier Dumont Kaspereit Schreiner Valleix	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	MM. Atkinson <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Mr. Hardy Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Kirkhill Mr. Litherland Lord Newall Earl <i>of Dundee</i> (Rathbone) Sir Keith Speed Sir Donald Thompson
Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Antretter <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) <i>Neumann</i> (Holtz) <i>Probst</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Lummer</i> (von Schmude) Soell	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer Stoffelen <i>Eversdijk</i> (van Velzen)	
	Portugal	
	MM. Amaral Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Böhm Bühler Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Sprung Steiner	MM. Eisma Verbeek
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Sarens Seeuws	Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Portugal Mr. Pinto
France	Italy	Spain
MM. Alloncle Baumel Boucheron Couveinhes Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Masseret Seitlinger	MM. Agnelli Bosco Ferrarini Manisco Maroni Pizzo Rodotà Tatarella	MM. Cuco Diaz Lopez Henares Moya
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mrs. Blunck	Mr. Aarts	Lord Finsberg Sir John Hunt MM. Redmond Thompson Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 538***on security in the Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious that it is in Western Europe's own interest to have equally good relations with both its eastern and southern neighbours;
- (ii) Aware that prosperous socio-economic conditions and democratic institutions are not only the most important factors for promoting the internal stability of each country and peaceful international relations, but also contribute to the flourishing of each people's culture and traditions;
- (iii) Recognising that the stability of a whole region increases with the homogeneity of the political institutions and socio-economic systems of the countries in that region;
- (iv) Convinced that Western Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote economic and social development, peace and security in the Mediterranean as confirmed at the EC's Lisbon summit in 1992;
- (v) Aware that throughout the southern Mediterranean region there is growing concern over the increasing threat of Islamic fundamentalist movements, while in some of these countries terrorism may endanger the stability of society;
- (vi) Conscious that Egypt, while not a Maghreb country, shares many of the Maghreb member countries' security concerns;
- (vii) Convinced that a favourable conclusion to the Middle East peace process, which is vital for peace and security in the Mediterranean as a whole, will also lead to increased European responsibility for the promotion of economic and social development, peace and security in that region;
- (viii) Noting the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) which would seek to emulate the success of the CSCE in arms control and reduction, enhanced security through confidence-building measures, and the protection of human and minority rights;
- (ix) Recognising that at the moment there is no military threat to Western Europe from any of the states south of the Mediterranean;
- (x) Convinced nevertheless that the risk of proliferation of weapons systems and technology, whether nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region;
- (xi) Convinced that co-operation between universities and institutes for research into and studies of security matters on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean might lead to better mutual understanding,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Implement its decisions to establish a gradual and phased security dialogue with the Maghreb countries, starting with a restricted number of individual southern Mediterranean countries, which at a later stage could be extended to include all the countries of the region and lead to true co-operation in security matters;
2. In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest in the development, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean countries;
3. Promote bilateral military training and exchange programmes between its member states and countries in the southern Mediterranean region on a bilateral basis, as a first step towards a system of confidence-building measures;
4. Promote efforts by its member states, both in their bilateral trade relations and in international negotiations, to prevent or at least reduce the proliferation of weapons systems, be they nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, which could threaten peace and stability in the Mediterranean region;

5. Commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and, at the appropriate time, pursue its establishment with vigour and perseverance;
6. Encourage the WEU Institute for Security Studies to remain in regular contact with similar institutes in the area to the south of the Mediterranean;
7. Hold effective consultations with the Community institutions and European political co-operation so that action to ensure security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of political and economic co-operation in the region.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>1. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.</p> <p>2. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (<i>Debate and vote on the motion to disagree</i>, Doc. 1376).</p> | <p>3. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>Vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1369).</p> <p>4. European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1370).</p> |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg

Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by Lord Finsberg, MM. Cox and Davis.

4. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Debate and vote on the motion to disagree, Doc. 1376)

Mr. Soell moved the motion to disagree.

The previous question was moved by Lord Finsberg in accordance with Rule 33 (1) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the previous question.

The previous question was agreed to unanimously.

In accordance with Rule 33 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the motion to disagree was withdrawn from the agenda.

5. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1369)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 539) ¹.

6. European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1370)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Soell, Rodrigues, Hardy and Slatinsky (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Marshall, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 540) ².

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 16th June 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 4.40 p.m.

1. See page 33.

2. See page 34.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Parisi <i>De Paoli</i> (Rodotà) <i>Visibelli</i> (Tatarella)	Spain
MM. Kelchtermans Péciaux Seeuws		MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Martinez <i>Rodriguez Gomez</i> (Perinat) de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg	
Mr. Geoffroy	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) <i>Neumann</i> (Holtz) Soell Steiner	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. De Hoop Scheffer Stoffelen <i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)	MM. <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg MM. Hardy <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland) Lord Kirkhill Lord Newall Earl <i>of Dundee</i> (Rathbone) Dr. <i>Godman</i> (Redmond) Sir Keith Speed Mr. Thompson
Italy	Portugal	
MM. Benvenuti Foschi <i>Caccia</i> (Leccisi) <i>Battistuzzi</i> (Mannino) Paire	MM. Amaral Brito <i>Curto</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques <i>Rodrigues</i> (Pinto) Roseta	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Kempinaire Sarens	Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm Bühler Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup Müller Reddemann von Schmude Sprung Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. Aarts Eisma van Velzen
France		Portugal
MM. Alloncle Baumel Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger Valleix	Italy	Mr. Machete
	MM. Agnelli Andreotti Bosco Colombo De Carolis Ferrarini Manisco Maroni Pecchioli Pizzo	Spain
		MM. Cuco Diaz Fabra Homs I Ferret Lopez Henares Moya
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Atkinson Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Sir Donald Thompson Mr. Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 539***on the interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Council has so far given no juridically-based justification for its decision to consider that the high contracting parties to the Paris Protocols of 23rd October 1954 would be authorised to release themselves from their commitments in 1998;
- (ii) Recalling that, in its answer to Written Questions 306, 309, 314 and 315, the Council at last agreed to examine the Assembly's views on this matter;
- (iii) Considering that the Assembly's competence to interpret, on the same basis as the Council, the Protocols of 23rd October 1954 is established by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (iv) Recalling that, in its answer to Recommendation 372, the Council assured the Assembly that "no substantial reforms of WEU will be undertaken without prior consultation with the Assembly";
- (v) Considering that the Paris Protocols are not simply a revision of the 1948 Brussels Treaty but establish a new treaty because:
 - (a) they are directed towards new goals;
 - (b) they are the basis of a European union whose vocation is to be enlarged and entirely new means are implemented;
 - (c) the Paris Agreements are not limited to Protocol No. I which modifies the Brussels Treaty but include three other protocols whose aim is different;
 - (d) they create a new organisation;
 - (e) for the first time they associate the parliaments of the high contracting parties with the application of an alliance;
- (vi) Considering it quite clear that the high contracting parties, when signing and ratifying the Paris Agreements, considered that the essential provisions of those agreements should remain in force for half a century because of Article XII of the new treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Concur with its juridically-based interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, according to which the 1954 Paris Agreements establish a new treaty, and conform to it.

RECOMMENDATION 540

on European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the replacement of the former threat of a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact by the risk of smaller-scale conflicts has not improved stability in Europe;
- (ii) Considering that in these circumstances all existing security organisations have a rôle to play in ensuring and preserving peace and security;
- (iii) Considering that Western European countries will have to assume their responsibilities in a number of security issues which are apparently less vital for their North American allies;
- (iv) Noting that, apart from the criteria for recognition of new states adopted by the European Council, there is an urgent need for a more detailed definition of the rights of peoples to self-determination;
- (v) Noting that, without close co-operation between member states of the EC in intelligence-gathering and analysis, a common European foreign and security policy cannot be alert and effective;
- (vi) Aware that the deep changes in Europe since the end of the cold war are influencing the respective responsibilities of both the United States and Western Europe to such a degree that the transformation of the old transatlantic bargain into a new partnership should be considered, as this could reinforce the existing close relationship and safeguard it for the future;
- (vii) Aware that geostrategic changes have also influenced the rôle of nuclear weapons in European security;
- (viii) Noting that the work of the WEU military planning cell is of the greatest importance in preparing any operational activity by WEU;
- (ix) Considering that, for the implementation of an effective European foreign and security policy, it is also vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to start making contingency plans for crisis management and conflict solution;
- (x) Recalling the recommendations already passed on the issues of conflict prevention and peace-making in the former Yugoslavia;
- (xi) Considering that a European security policy implies:
 - assistance to Central and European states, often with no experience of democracy, to find their way to pluralist societies;
 - financial and economic support for states to help them move away from command economies towards market economies;
 - cultural, educational and financial support to help states, peoples and minorities deal with the strife unbridled by the unfreezing of historic rivalries which, until recently, have been suppressed by imposed collectivism;
- (xii) Considering that this policy must give priority to the following goals:
 - to prevent any cross-border attack by one European state on another and to work towards ensuring that this principle is accepted by all European states;
 - to ensure that, within states, different ethnic or religious groups tolerate each other, minority rights are respected and to ensure that, if conflict does arise in one state, neighbouring states are not drawn into the conflict;
 - to ensure that Europe is able to resist any covert or overt threat to its security from outside Europe and is in a position to respond to crises, aggression and arms proliferation outside Europe;
 - to provide a collaborative structure for western security ties with the former Soviet Union;
 - to encourage democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet republics and encourage the development of shared liberal democratic values;

- to seek to ensure stability in Central and Eastern Europe through extensive economic co-operation and a fully-developed system of conflict resolution, peace-keeping and possibly peace-making;
- to avoid the re-emergence of nationalism amongst European armies; and
- to maintain a close relationship with the United States, based on a new partnership in order to pursue common economic, political and security interests,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Start to examine the aspects concerning European security which should be part of a new Atlantic partnership;
2. Re-examine the rôle of both United States and European nuclear weapons in European security in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Give priority to the establishment of contingency plans for crisis management, conflict solution and the employment of forces under WEU auspices, including decisions regarding the necessary command, control and communication arrangements;
4. Establish as a matter of exceptional urgency ways of ensuring that CSCE and WEU are in a position to prevent the conflict in the Balkans from spreading, especially to Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
5. Always inform the Assembly of issues arising from ministerial and other meetings and to do so before communicating with the European Parliament.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The situation in former Yugoslavia (<i>Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1379</i>).2. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1366</i>). | <ol style="list-style-type: none">3. Address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.4. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy. |
|---|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The situation in former Yugoslavia

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1379)

The oral report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Finsberg, MM. De Carolis, Rodrigues, Andronov (*Observer from Russia*) and Paire.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 541)¹.

The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council

Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Andreatta answered questions put by Mr. Foschi, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Keith Speed, MM. Atkinson and Eisma.

5. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business for the next sitting.

The proposal was agreed to.

6. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy

Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fabbri answered questions put by MM. Ferrarini, Péciaux, Borderas, Lord Mackie of Benshie and Mr. Davis.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

1. See page 38.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. De Carolis	MM. Pinto
MM. Kelchtermans	Ferrarini	Roseta
Pécriaux	Foschi	
	<i>Caccia (Leccisi)</i>	Spain
France	<i>Ferrari (Mannino)</i>	MM. <i>Diaz de Mera (Alvarez)</i>
MM. Baumel	Paire	Borderas
Colombier	Parisi	Fabra
Dumont	<i>Mesoraca (Pecchioli)</i>	<i>Bolinaga (Homs I Ferret)</i>
<i>Hunault (Galley)</i>	Pizzo	Martinez
Jacquat	Rodotà	<i>Rodriguez Gomez</i>
Kaspereit	<i>Battistuzzi (Tatarella)</i>	(Perinat)
Schreiner		de Puig
Valleix		Roman
	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. Err	United Kingdom
Germany		MM. Atkinson
MM. Antretter	Netherlands	<i>Davis (Banks)</i>
<i>Reimann (Büchler)</i>	MM. Aarts	<i>Bowden</i>
<i>Neumann (Holtz)</i>	De Hoop Scheffer	(Dame Peggy Fenner)
<i>Probst</i>	Eisma	Lord Finsberg
(Meyer zu Bentrup)	Stoffelen	Mr. Hardy
Reddemann	<i>Eversdijk (van Velzen)</i>	Sir John Hunt
Soell		Sir Russell Johnston
Steiner		Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i>
	Portugal	(Lord Kirkhill)
Italy	MM. Amaral	MM. <i>Marshall (Litherland)</i>
MM. <i>Liberatori (Agnelli)</i>	Brito	<i>Fry (Lord Newall)</i>
<i>Gottardo (Andreotti)</i>	<i>Rodrigues (Candal)</i>	Rathbone
Benvenuti	<i>Curto</i>	Sir Keith Speed
<i>De Paoli (Bosco)</i>	(Fernandes Marques)	Sir Donald Thompson
	Mrs. <i>Aguiar (Machete)</i>	MM. Thompson
		Ward

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot	Mrs. Blunck	Mr. Goerens
Chevalier	MM. Böhm	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Kempinaire	Bühler	
Sarens	Irmer	Netherlands
Seeuws	Kittelmann	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
	Menzel	Mr. Verbeek
France	Müller	
MM. Alloncle	von Schmude	Spain
Birraux	Sprung	MM. Cuco
Boucheron	Mrs. Terborg	Diaz
Couveinhes	Mr. Vogel	Lopez Henares
Geoffroy		Moya
Gouteyron	Italy	
Jeambrun	MM. Colombo	United Kingdom
Jung	Manisco	MM. Cox
Masseret	Maroni	Redmond
Seitlinger		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 541***on the situation in former Yugoslavia***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serbian forces has created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them to continue their action and which has encouraged Croatian forces to adopt the same policy;
- (ii) Considering that the Security Council resolution authorising troops to be sent to protect the six "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, combined with the apparent lack of willingness among the United Nations member states to provide the additional troops and equipment required to implement this resolution effectively is most probably further proof of the international community's inability to put an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
- (iii) Aware that defensive air protection of blue berets throughout Bosnian territory is to be ensured by NATO, under the control of the United Nations, on the basis of structures already in place for monitoring air space;
- (iv) Considering that the lives of peace-keeping troops (blue berets) in Bosnia should not be put at risk by what might seem to be an undermining of their neutral status following air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions or a lifting of the United Nations arms embargo;
- (v) Considering that any plan of action which, on the one hand, in fact accepts the status quo, including the territorial gains made by the Serbs, and, on the other hand, fails to include guarantees for terminating ethnic cleansing practices and protection for the Muslim population in the safe areas is not a just and equitable solution to the conflict and may create a situation of permanent instability and violence;
- (vi) Noting that, despite operation Deny Flight, it is said that there have been some 500 violations by Croat and Serb helicopters making night flights to transport equipment, ammunition, food and even troop reinforcements to the Bosnian lines;
- (vii) Noting that there is still a serious risk of the present conflict spreading to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo where heavily-armed Serbian security forces retain control over a 90% ethnic Albanian population, which is liable to lead to a further extension of the conflict;
- (viii) Aware that the United States has decided to send 300 troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to avoid an extension of the conflict;
- (ix) Noting that both humanitarian aid convoys and United Nations forces in former Yugoslavia are increasingly under deliberate attack by the warring parties;
- (x) Noting that the sudden removal of Dobrica Cosic from the post of Federal President, the ill-treatment of Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the largest opposition party, and his arrest together with his wife and other opposition politicians and journalists are further evidence of the anti-democratic character of those holding power in Serbia-Montenegro;
- (xi) Noting that the action programme has put a de facto end to the territorial integrity and the maintenance, wanted by some, of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, independently of its future constitutional organisation;
- (xii) Noting that the refusal of the WEU countries to accept any fait accompli in Bosnia-Herzegovina is coming up against the fact that they are proving incapable of ensuring application of the Vance-Owen plan and the implementation of United Nations resolutions on this matter, including those demanding the retreat of Bosnian Serb forces from the territories they have conquered;
- (xiii) Also noting the apparent resignation of the international community in face of this situation;
- (xiv) Noting that every new day of inconclusiveness by the international community constitutes new encouragement for Bosnian Serbs and Croats to make new territorial conquests;
- (xv) Convinced that, in spite of tacit agreement by the West on the "evolving" status quo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the territorial gains made at the expense of the Muslim population, such gains will certainly be challenged by that population and this will lead to the creation of a Palestinian-type situation in the heart of Europe;

(xvi) Wishing the working methods of the United Nations to be strengthened and a more effective command to be created for its operations;

(xvii) Noting that, at present, diverging opinions among Western European countries and the indifference of the United States are major obstacles to any early solution of the conflict;

(xviii) Convinced that, in view of continuing hesitation and delay in implementing the Washington common action programme, economic sanctions seem, for the time being, to remain the main means of leverage for ending the fighting;

(xix) Noting that, under the Security Council resolution adopted last April on tightening economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, United Nations members are required to take action against firms identified as working on behalf of Belgrade;

(xx) Noting that, on its borders with Bosnia, the Republic of Serbia does not accept the deployment of United Nations monitors responsible for ensuring that it stops sending supplies to the warring Serbs in Bosnia, except for food and medical supplies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Support and strengthen the action of the United Nations, now involved in a series of regional conflicts which are bringing it face to face with a serious crisis of responsibility;
2. Ensure the strict application of Resolution 836 on the creation of security areas on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993;
3. In particular, help the adjustment and reinforcement of forces of WEU countries that may be required by the implementation of Resolution 836 and consider assigning some of these forces to the support of units responsible for protecting security areas;
4. Help to strengthen measures to apply economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and to maintain the embargo on arms for all the belligerent parties, including Croatia;
5. Make every effort to avoid the conflict spreading to Vojvodina and Kosovo;
6. Arrange to send WEU units to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to ensure stability and security in that area of the Balkans;
7. Strengthen the operational structures and arrangements of WEU so that it may play a major rôle in preventing future crises under the aegis of the United Nations and, if necessary, in agreement with NATO.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1366*).
2. WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1367*).

3. The situation in Somalia (*Presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1377*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.02 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1366*)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Parisi, Caccia, Hardy, Lord Mackie of Benshie and Mr. Antretter.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Err and Mr. Slatinsky (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. Baumel, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 542) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 89) ².

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 88) ³.

4. WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1367*)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Keith Speed, joint Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Dunnachie, Steiner, Eisma, Diaconescu (*Observer from Romania*), Fry, Vassiliades (*Observer from Greece*) and Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Marten, joint Rapporteur, and Mr. de Puig, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

1. See page 43.

2. See page 44.

3. See page 45.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

The President informed the Assembly that he had received a request to move an oral amendment, notwithstanding the time-limits imposed by Rule 31 (2), from Sir Keith Speed.

He asked the Assembly if it would authorise, exceptionally, this proceeding.

The Assembly unanimously authorised Sir Keith Speed to move the following amendment:

At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

“7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions.”

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 543) ⁴.

5. The situation in Somalia

(Presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1377)

The motion for a recommendation was presented by Mr. de Puig in place of Mr. De Decker.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Ferrarini and Rodrigues.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Puig and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion for a recommendation.

The motion for a recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 544) ⁵.

6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

A candidate had been proposed for the remaining post of Vice-President, namely Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was as follows: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Machete and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 17th June 1993, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

4. See page 46.

5. See page 48.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Pizzo <i>De Paoli</i> (Rodotà)	MM. <i>Rodriguez Gomez</i> (Perinat) de Puig Roman
MM. Kelchtermans Péciaux	Luxembourg	
France	Mrs. Err	United Kingdom
Mr. Baumel	Netherlands	Earl <i>of Dundee</i> (Atkinson)
Germany	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	MM. <i>Davis</i> (Banks)
MM. Antretter <i>Marten</i> (Böhm) Büchler Reddemann Steiner	MM. Eisma Stoffelen <i>Eversdijk</i> (van Velzen)	<i>Dunnachie</i> (Cox) <i>Bowden</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner)
Italy	Portugal	Lord Finsberg
MM. Benvenuti De Carolis Ferrarini Foschi <i>Caccia</i> (Leccisi) <i>Ferrari</i> (Mannino) Paire Parisi	MM. Amaral Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal)	Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Lord Kirkhill)
	Spain	MM. <i>Marshall</i> (Litherland)
	MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Fabra Lopez Henares	Lord Newall Mr. Rathbone Sir Keith Speed MM. <i>Fry</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) Thompson Ward

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Kempinaire Sarens Seeuws	Mrs. Blunck MM. Bühler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Meyer zu Bentrup Müller von Schmude Soell Sprung Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France		Netherlands
MM. Alloncle Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Dumont Galley Geoffroy Gouteyron Jacquat Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Schreiner Seitlinger Valleix	Italy	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Verbeek
	MM. Agnelli Andreotti Bosco Colombo Manisco Maroni Pecchioli Tatarella	Portugal
		MM. Fernandes Marques Machete Pinto Roseta
		Spain
		MM. Cuco Diaz Homs I Ferret Martinez Moya
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Redmond

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 542

on United Nations operations – interaction with WEU

The Assembly,

- (i) Determined to uphold the authority of the United Nations Organisation and to support moves to make it much more effective;
- (ii) Welcoming therefore the UN Secretary-General's intention to improve the working of the United Nations and in general supporting the ideas expressed in "An Agenda for Peace";
- (iii) Strongly supporting the establishment of a UN military planning staff together with a 24 hour situation centre, appropriate training, logistics, transport, communications and intelligence-gathering facilities to enable the UN to play its proper rôle in command of its own operations;
- (iv) Pleased that increased links are now evident between Western European Union and the United Nations and that the presidency of the WEU Council has taken a series of initiatives to that end;
- (v) Convinced that the example shown by those nations which have traditionally supported the UN could serve us in good stead for the future conduct of UN operations, and congratulating those governments which have made forces available for UN, NATO and WEU operations, and the men and women who serve in those forces, often in difficult, trying and frustrating circumstances, at sea, on land and in the air;
- (vi) Believing that WEU's experience of operations both during the Gulf conflict and now concerning the former Yugoslavia is worth sharing with the UN and that there are many parallels between the two organisations which may be used to mutual benefit;
- (vii) Considering that the question of whether or not WEU may be declared a regional organisation under the terms of the UN Charter should be fully debated and that in general WEU should take action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty only under the aegis of a UN mandate;
- (viii) Recognising that sanctions can be an alternative to war and believing that when such sanctions have been approved by the United Nations they must be enforced, calling therefore on the Council of Ministers and national administrations to publish the evidence available to them of significant breaches of sanctions;
- (ix) Seeking support in national parliaments to ensure that defence budgets are restructured to take account of the need to participate in UN operations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include the subject of participation by member countries in UN operations promptly and regularly on its agenda and on that of the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the planning cell, the Secretariat-General and its various working groups and keep the Assembly informed;
2. Study the possible participation in UN operations by WEU per se, with appropriate WEU co-ordination;
3. In parallel with the Assembly, make a thorough examination of the pros and cons of declaring WEU a regional organisation within the meaning of the UN Charter and reaffirm WEU's acceptance of the principle of possible action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty under the aegis and in support of the UN;
4. Establish a working relationship with the UN Secretary-General using both the WEU Chairman-in-Office's good offices and those of the WEU Secretary-General and his staff and instruct the planning cell to offer advice for the UN Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York, especially with a view to facilitating the creation of a similar planning cell for the UN;
5. Direct the WEU planning cell to examine ways in which WEU governments might support the UN in terms of:
 - logistic co-operation and procurement;
 - transport pooling;
 - communication arrangements;
 - intelligence gathering;
 - command and control for operations;
 - the formulation of rules of engagement;
 - training co-ordination.

RESOLUTION 89***on United Nations operations – interaction with WEU***

The Assembly,

INVITES the parliaments of member, associate and observer countries to support the United Nations and the general ideas expressed in the “Agenda for Peace”.

ORDER 88***on United Nations operations – interaction with WEU***

The Assembly,

REQUESTS its President to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to address the next plenary session of the WEU Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 543

*on WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic –
reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519, 525, 530 and 531 and in particular the recommendations to:
 - (a) Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo;
 - (b) Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to “offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757” and in particular respond to Romania’s request for assistance;
 - (c) In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces;
- (ii) Pleased that WEU has signed Memoranda of Understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on helping police the Danube and that such operations are already producing a deterrent effect on possible sanction breakers;
- (iii) Pleased that WEU and NATO have agreed a composite force for Adriatic operations (“Operation Sharp Guard”) with a joint command in Naples;
- (iv) Pleased that all member countries are in one way or another fully supporting United Nations-mandated operations in the Adriatic, on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Slovenia and considering such action already a symbol of European willingness to co-operate in the field of security;
- (v) Pleased that the Greek Government has more actively encouraged the application of United Nations-mandated sanctions;
- (vi) Considering that the Memoranda of Understanding signed with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are a tangible sign of the good and practical relations prevailing in the WEU Forum for Consultation;
- (vii) Welcoming the recent contacts between WEU and both Russia and the Ukraine over the application of the United Nations embargo;
- (viii) Convinced that the Council should initiate a specific exercise programme so that forces now answerable to WEU may train together on a regular basis at all levels and further suggesting that the ideal starting point for such a programme would be the forthcoming Ardente 93 exercise in Italy;
- (ix) Congratulating the Council and the Presidency on their initiatives,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Inform the Assembly of the terms of the Memoranda of Understanding signed with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and in particular make explicit any security guarantees given to any or all of these countries;
2. Ensure that the longer-term political implications of WEU’s involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic are fully studied and appreciated;
3. Explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible compliance with all United Nations sanctions even to the extent of asking member states to second customs and/or police officers to help with the task;
4. Encourage the Russian authorities to give practical expression to their offer to help ensure that all embargos are fully respected on the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;

5. Develop the liaison established with the Ukrainian authorities with a view to signing a possible Memorandum of Understanding for WEU to provide technical assistance to the Ukraine so that United Nations sanctions may be seen to be fully respected;
6. Urge the United Nations to implement a compensation scheme to reimburse at least in part those countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which have suffered considerable financial loss as a result of embargo enforcement;
7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions.

RECOMMENDATION 544***on the situation in Somalia***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the United Nations operation in Somalia is degenerating in a way that may be harmful to the authority of the United Nations;
- (ii) Recalling that armed forces from four member countries of WEU are taking part in Operation UNSOM 2;
- (iii) Considering that it is for WEU to ensure that any action in which forces of several of its members are involved conforms with Articles VI and VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Meet as a matter of urgency to co-ordinate the efforts of member countries in order to ensure that the operation in Somalia respects the principles governing action by the United Nations.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1993

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1363).2. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland.3. The Assembly's communication policy (<i>Presentation of</i> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><i>and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1378 and amendments).4. The situation in East Timor (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution</i>, Doc. 1380). |
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to set up the Standing Committee with the following change in membership proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation:

- Lord Finsberg as a titular member in place of Sir Keith Speed.

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Technological and Aerospace Committee proposed by the Spanish Delegation:

- Mr. Borderas as a titular member and Mr. Palacios as an alternate member.

4. Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1363)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Atkinson.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 545)¹.

5. The Assembly's communication policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recommendation, Doc. 1378 and amendments)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: The Earl of Dundee.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Paire:

2. At the end of the draft order proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“In consultation with the delegations of

¹. See page 52.

national parliaments, to organise a press and information network in the capitals of member countries to act as a sound box for the activities of WEU, including its Assembly, at a time that is crucial for the organisation, the delegations of national parliaments financing the section of the network set up in their own country."

Speakers: Mr. Pizzo, Lord Finsberg and Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 89)².

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 90)³.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and add a new paragraph as follows:

"Arrange for WEU to adopt a specifically European form of graphic identification;"

Speakers: Mr. Lopez Henares and Sir Russell Johnston.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 546)⁴.

6. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland

Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland, addressed the Assembly.

Mrs. Rehn answered questions put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Borderas, Lord Finsberg, Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Ferrarini.

7. The situation in East Timor

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Political Committee
and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1380)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Finsberg, MM. Fabra, Brito, Rodrigues, Mrs. Aguiar and Mr. Vassiliades (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 91)⁵.

Speaker (point of order) : Lord Finsberg.

8. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

2. See page 53.

3. See page 54.

4. See page 55.

5. See page 56.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

France	Luxembourg	Spain
MM. Dumont Galley Jacquat Schreiner Valleix	Mr. <i>Regenwetter</i> (Mrs. Err)	MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Fabra Lopez Henares <i>Rodriguez Gomez</i> (Perinat)
	Netherlands	
Germany	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman Mr. Stoffelen	United Kingdom
MM. Büchler <i>Lenzer</i> (Bühler) <i>Probst</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup)		MM. Atkinson <i>Davis</i> (Banks) Dame Peggy Fenner Lord Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir John Hunt Sir Russell Johnston Lord Newall Mr. <i>Bowden</i> (Rathbone) Earl <i>of Dundee</i> (Sir Keith Speed) MM. <i>Fry</i> (Sir Donald Thompson) Thompson Ward
	Portugal	
Italy	MM. Amaral Brito <i>Rodrigues</i> (Candal) <i>Poças Santos</i> (Fernandes Marques) Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete) MM. <i>Curto</i> (Pinto) Roseta	
MM. <i>Liberatori</i> (Agnelli) De Carolis Ferrarini <i>Caccia</i> (Leccisi) <i>Ferrari</i> (Mannino) <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pizzo		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Böhm Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Müller Reddemann von Schmude Soell Sprung Steiner	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Kelchtermans Kempinaire Péciaux Sarens Seeuws	Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France		Netherlands
MM. Alloncle Baumel Birraux Boucheron Colombier Couveinhes Geoffroy Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Kaspereit Masseret Seitlinger	Italy	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Eisma van Velzen Verbeek
	MM. Andreotti Benvenuti Bosco Colombo Foschi Manisco Maroni Paire Pecchioli Rodotà Tatarella	Spain
Germany		MM. Cuco Diaz Homs I Ferret Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck		United Kingdom
		Mr. Cox Lord Kirkhill MM. Litherland Redmond

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 545***on anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent progress achieved in international efforts to strengthen disarmament measures and to promote non-proliferation by concluding the START II Treaty and the chemical weapons convention (CWC) and by extending the scope and membership of the missile technology control régime (MTCR) ;
- (ii) Concerned, however, about certain Far Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries which do not yet intend to join the chemical weapons convention and the MTCR régime;
- (iii) Disturbed by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty;
- (iv) Observing that the proliferation of theatre and strategic missile technology into sensitive regions which might affect the security of Europe is still continuing;
- (v) Concerned that certain countries in unstable regions are continuing their attempts to try to obtain ABC and missile capabilities;
- (vi) Gratified that the symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe held in Rome provided a useful opportunity to draw the attention of decision-makers to the risks stemming from missile proliferation;
- (vii) Convinced therefore that the European governments, and in particular those of WEU member countries, must shoulder their responsibilities by taking appropriate decisions to guarantee the security of their populations and military forces before risk becomes threat;
- (viii) Taking note of the recent decision by the United States to abandon further research and development of an orbital-based anti-missile global protection system (SDI) in favour of a land-based system;
- (ix) Convinced that all the discussions and negotiations so far initiated on a bilateral or multinational basis on possible means of creating a system of protection of any kind whatsoever should lead to openness and enhanced international confidence and not a new arms race between a privileged group of states and others outside the system;
- (x) Reiterating that Western European Union has made great progress in taking a leading rôle in space observation and that – as demonstrated at the symposium – European industry has excellent experience and expertise of anti-missile technology;
- (xi) Convinced that the appropriate approach in the present situation should first be to create a universal early warning and surveillance system, concrete defence and protection requirements remaining initially under regional or national control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take a leading rôle in promoting, in relevant international conferences and institutions, further initiatives for developing and strengthening disarmament, confidence-building measures, non-proliferation régimes and political dialogue;
2. Take an initiative in the United Nations with the aim of establishing an international early warning and surveillance centre open to all countries interested in sharing data and information on missile activities and linked to an obligation to notify all missile firings and space launches;
3. Adopt without delay its position on a global protection system discussed between the United States and Russia and ask for there to be prior consultations between the United States and its allies before resuming these talks;
4. Decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system for Europe.

ORDER 89***on the Assembly's communication policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Assembly's efforts in questions of communication in recent years and noting that they have achieved significant results;
- (ii) Aware nevertheless that the public still has very little knowledge of the rôle and activities of WEU as a whole and of its parliamentary Assembly in particular;
- (iii) Convinced that priority should be given to communication policy,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To ensure that, in all its activities, the Assembly gives priority to its communication policy;
2. To make provision for the financial resources necessary for taking the following initiatives in the immediate future:
 - (a) procurement of equipment allowing audiovisual presentations to be given to interested members of the public;
 - (b) production of a video clip to be made available to television channels;
 - (c) publication of a brief, attractive booklet on WEU;
 - (d) invitation to a group of American journalists to the capitals of two or three member states to meet the chairmen of national delegations and of foreign affairs and defence committees, the visit winding up in Paris with a meeting of the Presidential Committee;
 - (e) creation of an annual prize to recompense work making a particularly significant contribution to the security and defence of Europe;
 - (f) prior study and installation of an electronic server allowing access to Assembly documents by telephone;
3. To take appropriate steps to increase and organise regular visits to the Assembly, during or outside sessions, by groups of interested persons – students, parliamentarians, officials, members of specialised associations or institutes, journalists, etc. – by reaching agreements with the institutions to which these persons belong;
4. To organise, at the seat of the Assembly, a seminar to consider WEU's means of communication to be attended by committee members, staff of information services in the ministries for foreign affairs and defence of member countries, staff of information services in national parliaments and staff from the Assembly and the Secretariat-General responsible for information.

RESOLUTION 90***on the Assembly's communication policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction the considerable progress achieved in circulating detailed information to the general public on its aims and activities;
- (ii) Aware of the importance of the rôle that national delegations and individual parliamentarians should play in order to offset the remaining shortcomings in keeping the public informed about WEU as a whole and our Assembly in particular,

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To study the possibility of inviting groups of journalists from their respective countries to accompany their delegations to the WEU Assembly during plenary sessions so that they may obtain first-hand information on the activities of the Assembly and of the parliamentarians from their countries;
2. To ensure that all activities in which their parliamentarians participate within the framework of the Assembly's work and visits by Assembly committees are publicised as widely as possible;
3. To require their national delegations to produce regular reports of its activities to parliament and to ensure the reports are distributed to the press;
4. To hold regular debates on the work of their national delegations and to encourage their foreign affairs and defence committees to take an active interest in the work of WEU and its Assembly;
5. To encourage the participation of parliamentarians, in their capacity as members of the WEU Assembly, in symposia, seminars and other similar activities dealing with European security and defence policy.

RECOMMENDATION 546***on the Assembly's communication policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the use by WEU of a form of graphic identification might help to ensure a clearer perception of the organisation and eventually a better knowledge of it among the public;
- (ii) Considering it necessary therefore that WEU, on the one hand, and its subsidiary organs, on the other, adopt a logo of their own;
- (iii) Taking into account paragraph 8 of Recommendation 530 asking that the Council:
“ Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to use it to distinguish their military forces – ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel – taking part in WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of such a badge ”;
- (iv) Recalling Order 74,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Arrange for WEU to adopt a specifically European form of graphic identification;
2. Include WEU's information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to examining specific measures that it might take, including:
 - (a) the publication of guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council;
 - (b) the preparation and publication of basic information on WEU, presented in an understandable form with a view to wide circulation in all member countries;
 - (c) the establishment of WEU information offices in the European member countries of the alliance, the United States and Canada;
 - (d) the development of initiatives taken by the Institute for Security Studies to strengthen co-operation with groups, associations and private institutes that already exist in order to increase the interest aroused by studies of Western European security matters;
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure closer co-operation between its own press and information service and that of the Assembly.

RESOLUTION 91***on the situation in East Timor***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Resolution 84 on the situation in East Timor adopted in December 1991;
 - (ii) Considering the Indonesian court's condemnation of "Xanana" Gusmao to life imprisonment for "rebellion", "secessionism" and "illegal possession of fire-arms" and the arbitrary arrest of many other Timorese;
 - (iii) Recalling that the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia has still not been recognised by the United Nations;
 - (iv) Considering that the Indonesian Government's policy of forced annexation continues to be accompanied by non-respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence;
 - (v) Considering that the international community must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence, a right recognised by the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament,
1. Calls upon the Indonesian Government:
- (a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and to free political prisoners;
 - (b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions necessary for the free exercise of self-determination;
 - (c) to allow international aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humanitarian activities on the territory of East Timor and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights;
2. Asks all member states of WEU:
- (a) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia;
 - (b) to suspend immediately military agreements with and assistance to Indonesia;
 - (c) to encourage Portugal and Indonesia to approach their dialogue on East Timor with a view to securing an internationally-acceptable solution to the East Timor problem.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1993

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Election of the President of the Assembly.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
Speaker: Mr. Péciaux.
8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council.
Speaker: Mr. De Decker.
10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (Doc. 1358).
11. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Cox, Mr. Rathbone, Dr. Godman.
12. Changes in the membership of committees.
13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1368).
Speaker: Mr. Thompson (Chairman and Rapporteur).
14. The situation in East Timor (*Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1374).
Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.
15. The situation in former Yugoslavia (*Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1375).
Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.
16. The situation in Somalia (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1377).
Speaker: Mr. Rodrigues.
17. The development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1365).
Speakers: Mr. Kempinaire (Rapporteur), Mr. Cox, Mr. Müller, Mr. Philipov (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Slatinsky (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Kempinaire (Rapporteur), Mr. Tummers (Chairman).
18. Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order*, Doc. 1364).
Speaker: Mr. Tummers (Rapporteur).
19. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Ehrmann, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

¹. See page 16.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, being its most senior member, I already had the honour of opening the session of the French National Assembly on 2nd April last, when I said that – though I regretted not being the youngest – aging is less a matter of the passing of years than of abandoning one's ideals.

Mine – unchanged – are the love of an immortal, one and indivisible France and the belief that peace must prevail in Europe, cradle of democracy and human rights, if Europe's position in the world or even its very existence are to be preserved.

For centuries, as well I know having been a history teacher, Europe has been the theatre of countless wars between hereditary enemies over

The President (continued)

land or provinces causing deaths by the tens of millions. They also lost Europe its pre-eminence in the world, so that today – to quote Valéry – it is no more than a small headland off Asia which one day could well swallow it up.

France in particular has been continually invaded and laid waste, after having itself conquered and pillaged on a large scale. In seventy years it has been through three wars – 1870-1871, 1914-1918, 1939-1945 – leaving millions dead and tens of millions of wounded and refugees fleeing the horrors of invasion.

For all these reasons, and because my father was killed in the 1914-1918 war and I myself fought in that of 1939-1945, I am an ardent supporter of the European Community and WEU, both of which, in addition of course to the action of NATO and the United Nations, have helped to keep the peace between the peoples of Europe.

Too many of the critics of Western Europe today forget what it was before 1945, i.e. one continuous battlefield. Today, we know that war cannot break out among the Twelve, even though they sometimes have conflicting interests.

The Sarajevo of 1991 is not the same as Sarajevo in 1914, and we should never forget it.

Too little is known about the work of WEU, set up in 1957 by seven countries and later enlarged to nine, i.e. the Twelve less Ireland, Denmark and Greece, which will shortly be joining.

Outside yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, who knows that there is a WEU Council consisting of the foreign affairs and defence ministers of the Nine and that there is a Permanent Council, a Secretary-General and an Assembly, the only European assembly empowered by treaty to discuss defence questions – something the WEU Council is apt to forget and may, indeed, well forget because so little is known of your institutions that virtually any one of them could be closed down without public opinion caring a jot about the blow to democracy that it would be.

Who knows that WEU has responsibilities for peace-keeping, preventing conflict, managing crises, assisting humanitarian missions and limiting arms, and that if its action has been restricted it has been because governments are not always in agreement on aims and means and that there is frequently a *mésentente cordiale* with NATO which is, in fact, controlled by the United States?

Who knows that WEU has nevertheless done useful work? It was WEU that co-ordinated naval action in the Strait of Hormuz in 1987

and in the Gulf war in 1990 and that continues to do so today in the blockade of former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic and along the Danube. It is WEU that is providing humanitarian aid to the Kurds, etc.

You are not advertised enough. The peoples of Europe need to know these things to help restore their confidence in the future.

With the whole world in economic crisis, instead of holding luxury receptions at prestigious restaurants in the Place Vendôme or the Eiffel Tower, could not the money be used to advertise in the press and on the radio and television in order to tell the public that the future of the European Community, even when enlarged to include most of Europe, is bound up with an increase in WEU's military capability?

The European Community – whose armed forces WEU should constitute – is now realising that if WEU had had that military capability it might, by swift action, have been able to prevent the conflicts in the Balkans.

Governments, too, are realising that the collapse of the former USSR, and the population explosion throughout the world could engender invasions on a colossal scale, and that fundamentalist Islam could well spread from an Algeria already torn by civil war to the south of the former USSR in Asia via Iraq, Iran etc. to countries possibly in possession of the atomic bomb. All these factors, together with the United States' gradual withdrawal, will force Europe to think harder about its security as foreseen moreover in the Maastricht Treaty and now the Balladur plan.

Under the Petersberg declaration of June 1992, WEU – which the Mediterranean states of Greece, Turkey and Ireland in Western Europe, Denmark, Finland, the Baltic States, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in Northern Europe and Austria, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and the Slovak Republic in Central Europe all want to join – is now assured that military units will be made available to it for military tasks. The WEU Forum of Consultation, set up in May 1993, consisting of the Nine plus some of the states I have just listed, offers much hope for the future.

This rôle of a European military arm in the service of causes upheld by the United Nations must inevitably grow. Let us hope that the countries of Europe become more united, and make the necessary sacrifices to ensure the maintenance of peace and the survival of democratic governments as the defenders of human rights.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

The President (continued)

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of those of representatives and substitutes whose names have been published in Notice No. 1 and who have been nominated since our last session.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, I propose that the Assembly ratify the credentials of these representatives and substitutes, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any opposition?...

These credentials are therefore ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should like to welcome parliamentary observers from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Sweden and Turkey.

I welcome them, together with members of the Permanent Council present at this session.

6. Election of the President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Under Rule 10, paragraphs 2 and 10, no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives, and representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Sir Dudley Smith.

This candidature has been correctly submitted in the form prescribed by the Rules of Procedure.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that we should elect Sir Dudley Smith President by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I accordingly declare Sir Dudley Smith President of the Assembly of Western European Union, and invite him, with my congratulations, to take the chair.

(Sir Dudley Smith then took the Chair)

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Ladies and gentlemen, you do me great honour in electing me as President. I am fully conscious of the honour, as I have been a member of the Assembly for fourteen years. All I can promise you is that I shall do my best, not only in your interests as representatives of your various countries and various parties, but in the interests of the countries that form Western European Union.

What we are about is important, and the more we can contribute towards the peace and stability of Europe the better it will be for all the people whom we represent in our countries as elected persons in our various assemblies.

This event is pleasant for me in another way. Life is full of links, as you know. When one looks back, one finds many correlations. When I thought that I might be nominated for this rôle, I looked back and found that the first President of Western European Union was Lord Muirshiel. I knew him far better as Jack Maclay when, as a young man, I first came to the House of Commons. Jack Maclay was Secretary of State for Scotland in the government at that time and he had formerly been President of the Assembly of WEU.

Another of my own party, who was elected President of the Assembly of WEU 21 years ago, was John Peel, now Sir John Peel and still with us. He was my Whip for a time in the British House of Commons, so there is a link there.

The third link is an old friend of mine, although of a different political persuasion, Fred Mulley, who had been Minister of Defence in the British Labour Government. He is now Lord Mulley and is in the House of Lords.

Fred Mulley was also a distinguished parliamentarian, and President of this Assembly from 1980-83. So I feel that one is carrying on some kind of British tradition and maintaining the continuity of the Assembly.

I do not intend to make a long speech because, like all of you, I have been at the receiving end of speeches which are far too long. However, certain things have to be said at this juncture.

The President (continued)

We are now experiencing a great change in Europe – certainly greater than at any previous period in this organisation's history. It is, of course, change for the better, given that the armed confrontation between East and West is now at an end. But it is also change which is seriously unsettling as new challenges to European security come to the fore.

WEU is changing rapidly. My main task as President will be humbly to make sure that the Assembly adapts itself effectively, especially in its links with the wider Europe. I am delighted to see so many parliamentary observers here today from a record number of countries. You are all most welcome. You will have realised how welcome you are from the enthusiastic response that you received when the provisional President introduced you.

My task will be all the easier because of the work of my predecessor and good colleague, Mr. Hartmut Soell. Although we are on different sides of the political fence, we both have the success of this organisation very much at heart.

I know that I speak for all of you when I say that we have appreciated the tactful, good-humoured and firm way in which he has guided our work in the past year. He took over at a difficult time but he succeeded admirably. We were jolly lucky to have him, especially after the sad and much-lamented loss of my good friend and the good friend of many of us, Robert Pontillon. Robert was a considerable man. His standing can be judged by the fact that there were no fewer than three former Prime Ministers at his memorial service.

I should also like to welcome all the observers at this session, particularly those from NATO. The WEU-NATO relationship, despite what some press comment may say, is blossoming. It was recently emphasised by our own Secretary-General, Willem van Eekelen, and the NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner. The first joint meeting of WEU and the North Atlantic Permanent Council on 8th June was not only symbolic of the relationship, but resulted in a single command and control arrangement for combined WEU and NATO operations in the Adriatic – something which we in the Assembly have been urging.

NATO symbolises the transatlantic partnership. I am pleased to report that this is flourishing. It is exemplified by the letter that I received recently as outgoing Chairman of the Defence Committee from Mr. Les Aspin, the United States Secretary of Defence. He said: "I share your appreciation of the security challenges that face Europe and the United States to make more effective use of our increasingly

scarce defence resources in this time of great change in the international environment. To do so will require more than the usual co-operation among the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Let me assure you that we desire effective action, and are less concerned about the institutional framework." I am sure that we all agree with him.

I was also struck by the enthusiasm and force of a speech by General Shalikashvili, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, which I heard recently in Berlin. The General asserted that there was no other security structure militarily so capable as NATO, but that it needed to keep its plans flexible and more than one step ahead of its potential opponents. I support that thought and I believe that the majority, if not all, of us here today, do the same. NATO is still highly relevant and important and I submit that we are increasingly its European pillar.

This has been a difficult and tricky time in greater Europe because of the vicious civil war in the Balkans. But the Assembly has not been inactive. As Defence Committee Chairman, I flew out to WEU and NATO ships in the Adriatic last summer. Later, with other colleagues, I witnessed the sanctions embargo at work on the Danube in Romania. It is largely thanks to Mr. Soell that our new Standing Committee, which was set up in 1991, was instrumental last September in expressing the Assembly's views on the Yugoslav affair in a particularly apt and remarkably unanimous way.

Today we may regret that our governments did not follow our advice on sanctions to a greater degree. Had they done so, we could have stopped some of the mayhem and slaughter. But there has been a definite response to a good number of our recommendations, especially those which relate to the current embargo. We have also noted the efforts of Greece to move closer to its future WEU partners in matters relating to the former Yugoslavia. I intend to continue to use the Standing Committee to allow the Assembly to respond to urgent matters arising between our sessions.

This April the Standing Committee adopted an important report on enlargement. I know that many of our new associate members and observer countries are obviously concerned about the status that they will have in our Assembly. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is now examining the question and will be reporting on it in the autumn.

It is vital that we should take the right decisions, because the European Community is likely to be considerably enlarged in only eighteen months. We shall undoubtedly have new countries joining us shortly after that.

The President (continued)

Meanwhile, matters are already in hand to begin the review of the European security arrangements agreed at Maastricht. Whatever the outcome of the debate on whether the 50-year period before the theoretically possible denunciation of the modified Brussels Treaty dates from 1948 or 1955, it is obvious that the maintenance of defence as a specific component of national sovereignty depends entirely on the political will of all of our countries.

If I say nothing else, I say with full sincerity that I am convinced – and I am sure that you are convinced because your presence here indicates that – that there will be an increasing need to preserve WEU as a distinct organisation in the future and that our Assembly must continue to play a proper rôle. At the end of the day, we are the representatives of the people. No government is bigger or more important than the people and we represent the people.

To do so we must not shun dialogue. I therefore intend to develop our relationships especially with national parliaments, with the European Parliament, and with the CSCE and North Atlantic Assemblies where a number of us are double-hatted.

With regard to our own governments, and especially the WEU Permanent Council, I shall make every effort for increased rapport. With a majority of our permanent representatives in Brussels now dedicated to WEU, we held a first meeting between our Presidential Committee and the new Permanent Council earlier this year and we shall be following up shortly with meetings with our Defence and Political Committees.

The transition of the Permanent Council from London to Brussels has led to something of a hiatus. I know that colleagues feel that the Council has not always been forthcoming with the information to which our Assembly is entitled and which is essential for us to fulfil our rôle.

We have also gained the impression that our governments and the Council have not been willing to face up to the financial implications of enlargement, especially where the Assembly is concerned. At the same time, they have urged us to take specific measures, for example regarding participation of our new associate members, once ratification of Greek membership has taken place in our ten national parliaments.

It would obviously be very foolhardy to take unilateral decisions with budgetary implications, with no prospect of the necessary funds being available. I know that my British colleague, Mr. Rathbone, the Chairman of the Budget Committee, will be returning to this point during the session.

The presence at our session of two Ministers on behalf of the Italian Chairmanship-in-Office should allow us to question qualified Council representatives about all of these points, as well as the wider political aspects. The presence of Mr. Poos from Luxembourg, who will take over the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council on 1st July, will, I am sure, help to start the process which will allow a solution to be found. Previous dealings have taught us how much value he attaches to the balanced operation of WEU and to recognise in him an attentive partner.

At its meeting in Rome in April, the Standing Committee adopted a recommendation and an order on the enlargement of WEU which will be the basis for the Assembly's work in the next six months, as well as a recommendation on the situation in former Yugoslavia. These texts have been sent to you and will no doubt be the subject of further comment during the various debates scheduled for this week.

The same is true of the declaration on the WEU Assembly's place in the European Union, in which the Presidential Committee defined the principles which we consider should govern relations between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament. I hope delegates will have a chance to read it during the session. We should obviously like the European Parliament, too, to explain its own ideas on the subject.

Another dimension of our work has been the Presidential Committee's need to arrange for changes in the Assembly's secretariat, made necessary by the retirement of our Clerk, Mr. Georges Moulias. As matters now stand, the development of the Assembly's work, its enlargement and its participation in a steadily growing number of outside activities will mean that its new requirements cannot be met merely by changing the duties of a few members of the Office of the Clerk. The Assembly will be unable to avoid asking the Council for a slight, but real, increase under several heads of its 1994 budget to meet the needs that already exist and which have now become urgent.

This session is the last one at which Georges Moulias will be in his familiar place. On behalf of us all, I extend our warmest thanks to him for the work he has accomplished at the head of an efficient secretariat which has been able to adapt as technology has progressed and as our work has increased.

Originally a member of the French diplomatic service, Georges joined WEU on 16th June 1965. Those of you who are mathematicians will work that out as twenty-eight years ago this Wednesday. He was first Clerk Assistant and then Clerk. We have all appreciated his devotion to the Assembly and to WEU. We like, know and understand his erudition, courtesy, and, above all, his complete independence of all

The President (continued)

parties and authorities which might have tempted him to exert pressure on the secretariat. We wish him and his popular wife Elisabeth a happy and fulfilling retirement.

I have every confidence in the new team under Mr. Henri Burgelin which takes over on 1st July and look forward to a bright future where all components of WEU will play a full part.

You may rest assured that I shall do my best with your help to make sure that our voice is heard where it matters. Thank you again for your confidence. I hope that I can retain it.

I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my colleagues and I welcome your constructive comments on WEU and its future. On behalf of all the Socialist Group members, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Hartmut Soell very warmly for the excellent work he performed during his term of office. As you have said, his task was not easy, since he took over in difficult circumstances following the death of the much-lamented Robert Pontillon.

May I, Mr. President, again express my congratulations and best wishes for your success, and assure you of our complete loyalty at all times during your period of office.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Pécriaux. You and I have been old colleagues for some time. What you have said is deeply appreciated.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election by secret ballot of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that proposals for candidatures for Vice-Presidents shall each be sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Also, Rule 7 (1) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I am advised that six candidates have been properly sponsored.

In alphabetical order they are: Mr. Foschi, Mr. Kempinaire, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Machete, Mr. Steiner and Mr. Valleix.

I propose that these nominations be approved by the Assembly by acclamation, and that the three remaining places be filled later.

If this is done, the order of seniority of the Vice-Presidents will be determined by age.

Is there any objection to the election of these Vice-Presidents by acclamation?...

I take it that there is no objection.

I accordingly declare the following elected Vice-Presidents, in this order of precedence: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Machete.

9. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Doc. 1376)

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Soell and others have tabled a motion to disagree to the content of the annual report of the Council.

In accordance with Rule 29, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure, the vote on this motion will be held tomorrow, Tuesday afternoon, after the address by Mr. Poos.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you have just said that a motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report has been tabled and that the debate on this motion will take place tomorrow afternoon. May I ask the Assembly and you, Mr. President, for guidance on whether it might not be better to refer this motion to the Political Committee for its opinion so that tomorrow afternoon's debate will be that much fuller?

The PRESIDENT. – I am advised that the rules do not cover that point completely, but there is no reason why you should not make such a proposal. We can allow the Assembly to vote on the matter democratically if that is the general will. Speeches are not required. I shall put the matter to a vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is carried.

The matter will be referred to the Political Committee.

10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1358)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

Is there any opposition to the draft order of business contained in Document 1358?...

The President (continued)

The draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly is agreed to.

**11. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I invite to the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Mr. President, honourable parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen, may I begin by offering both my own and the Council's warmest congratulations to Sir Dudley Smith on being elected as President of your Assembly. We all know just how much Sir Dudley has contributed to the Assembly's Defence Committee which he has chaired since 1989. His intimate knowledge of the problems of European security, coupled with calm realism tinged with typically British humour, augur well for an effective and fruitful presidency and one which is closely in line with those of your outgoing President Soell and his much-lamented predecessor, Senator Pontillon.

Let me say at this point just how grateful I am to President Soell for his very constructive approach to all the problems which occurred during WEU's difficult transition period in 1992 and the early weeks of 1993. I hope that he will continue to serve alongside you for a long time to come as an active promoter of WEU's development which he has followed within your Assembly since the reactivation of 1984.

I should also like to express appreciation to Mr. Moulias for everything that he has accomplished during his long term of office and for the many personal contacts that I have had with him. The best wishes of the Council go to him and to Mrs. Moulias.

Since your last session in December 1992, the work of the WEU Permanent Council has moved into top gear – adaptation work on the Rue de la Régence building has just moved into its final phase.

The preparatory work for the Rome ministerial meeting on 19th May showed that the Permanent Council, backed up by the Council Working Group and served by the Secretariat and Planning Cell, was now playing its full part as a central body for deliberation and decision-making in implementation of the Petersberg and Rome declarations. The decisions reported in the Rome communiqués are evidence of the progress made in giving the evolving European union its defence dimension.

My remarks to you today will focus on three aspects of WEU's action which I believe may well lead to significant developments in the short and medium term, both as regards the stability of the European continent and as regards the strengthening of its ability to confront the new risks likely to flare up on the periphery of our continent.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – The conflicts tearing Bosnia apart and other similarly violent trouble spots further afield show that the most direct threat to the peace of Europe is from this type of local war and highlights the extent to which fundamental change is needed if a common European defence is to be able to contain such conflicts. That might be within the framework of the United Nations, take the form of a coalition or be an independent European action. The reality is that the involvement of the United Nations or the United States in local European conflicts which have no obvious implications for world security can no longer be taken for granted. At the very least, Europe should bear the economic and financial consequences in full. How could it, in the eyes of the world, not fully assume its political responsibilities towards a part of itself?

During the twentieth century, a quarter of the population living between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea have been subjected to border changes or upheavals which have created minorities. Fourteen of these changes are potentially destabilising, while a further half-dozen or so border conflicts are simmering. There is an urgent need for a code of conduct – both inter- and intra-state – to regulate territorial disputes and minority rights, backed up by a raft of sanctions and arbitration procedures which may if necessary be applied by force. Such developments are under discussion within the CSCE and the Council of Europe, but the approach is still too theoretical. Europe needs new instruments of international law. As each day passes we see that delays and mistakes cannot be made up or rectified.

At least there is no shortage of political warning mechanisms, given the existence of institutions with shared objectives available to discuss crisis situations as they occur. The WEU Forum of Consultation is one such instrument of preventive diplomacy. Its future work will focus on conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping methods based on experience gained, and on the implementation of arms control treaties with the aim of finding and defining forms of concrete co-operation. The specific background to this initiative, namely the development of associate relationships between the countries of Central Europe and the European Community, means that it is potentially much more effective, for in it can be seen

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

the beginnings of political co-operation with the future European union.

At the beginning of the month, I took part in the tenth NATO workshop in Budapest. Our partners and friends from Central Europe actively urged us to formulate an ambitious, and therefore imaginative, common foreign and security policy; in short, a policy geared to crisis prevention and the establishment of new forums of co-operation. The democracies of Central Europe have to be able to play their rightful part within this process, both for obvious historical reasons and for no less important geopolitical considerations. The WEU Forum of Consultation, just like the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, are not ends in themselves but instruments of transition. The CSCE has not yet reached a level of effectiveness which would make it the main framework for pan-European security. A collective pan-European system of security bringing together the countries of Western Europe and the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is still to be invented, and this vital task should, I believe, be at the very centre of the development of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The Assembly's plans to increase the level of contacts with the parliaments of Central European countries and the invitation to the Foreign and Defence Ministers of these countries to address this Assembly seem to me extremely positive. It is up to WEU and its various component bodies to make their own contribution to the implementation of a European Ostpolitik.

The offer made on 5th April 1993 by WEU Ministers to provide concrete support of a civilian nature to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to strengthen the measures they had taken to implement the embargo on the Danube led to the start last Monday of the first river-based operations. Under WEU auspices, the member states have made available to the three riparian states a dozen patrol boats and approximately 270 specialists, principally customs officers. With Italy ensuring on-the-spot co-ordination, these operations will be carried out in conjunction with the other competent organisations.

This initiative is in line with the aims set out for WEU by the Petersberg declaration, which provides for co-ordinated measures to be taken on a case-by-case basis by the member states for conflict prevention, crisis management and the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. It is an excellent illustration of the co-operation which WEU member states plan to promote and develop with their partners of Central Europe.

Secondly, WEU's contribution to peace-keeping operations.

In the absence of a common foreign and security policy, WEU's possible rôle in peace-keeping, and even more peace-making, is dependent on mandates given by the CSCE or the United Nations. The possible operations fall into four categories: preventive deployment of forces; the implementation of economic sanctions backed up by appropriate military means; the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of safe areas by military means; the implementation of an agreed peace plan backed up by the use of force against any parties violating the terms of the plan.

WEU member states could be called upon to take action under four possible scenarios, depending on the precise situation and the type of operation needed: firstly, on their own account, and secondly, jointly with the alliance.

An example is the operation to implement the embargo in the Adriatic. On 8th June last, the WEU and NATO Councils met in joint session to approve a combined concept of operation to implement Security Council Resolution 820. This agreement provides for a single command and control arrangement known as Sharp Guard. The member states assigning vessels to the embargo operations will retain full command of those vessels. The WEU and NATO Councils will jointly issue political directives which will then be translated into military directives by the appropriate WEU and NATO authorities co-operating within a joint ad hoc body known as Milcom Adriatic. In this specific case, the quest for complementarity between WEU and NATO has produced genuine partnership. Concern to achieve effectiveness and procedural flexibility has proved that all those who saw duplication and institutional rivalry between the alliance and its European pillar were wrong.

The two other scenarios for WEU engagement are, firstly, the one in which our organisation would supply the command and control structures and the basic forces with additional contributions coming from other states requiring ad hoc co-ordination; and secondly, the situation in which WEU would be used to mount an operation and then ensure the rotation of troop contingents and assets for the duration of the operation.

In defining force packages, WEU will have to take account of the various types of possible operation under the aegis of the United Nations, and possibly plan to inform the United Nations periodically of the state of these forces and supply the appropriate planning information.

Whatever happens, the considerable problems which may be encountered by the United Nations in carrying out its missions, together with the possible risk of its decision-making mechanisms being blocked, will mean that a

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

future European Union will have to be able to act autonomously, not only within its own continental area, but wherever its vital interests or nationals are seriously threatened.

It is in this context that the Planning Cell and the Defence Representatives Group are continuing their work on forces which may be made available to WEU and on the definition of the links with the major multinational units set up under the alliance's force-restructuring programme or in response to multilateral European initiatives. Joint rules governing the use of these forces are being studied.

(The speaker continued in English)

I do not want to say much on the terrible situation in former Yugoslavia. The Assembly knows my opinion that we have not sufficiently used our military capabilities to underpin our political objectives. Today I will only make three comments. First, in the future there will be little demand for peace-keeping in the traditional sense, i.e. with the consent of the parties. There will be much more need for policing with all that it implies, including the occasional use of force. Second, we will have to refine the terminologies of the United Nations Agenda for Peace to be more precise about enforcement action. Bosnia is not just a humanitarian problem, and we have to deal with the possible use of force to avoid escalation towards a European war in the Balkans. And third, we will have to discuss the paradox that in order to be effective we will have to act quickly and decisively, whereas at the same time the United Nations is acting incrementally, formulating a strategy as it moves from resolution to resolution, thus lacking clear objectives from the outset.

Thirdly and finally, the strengthening of European co-operation in the field of defence.

The restructuring of WEU member countries' armed forces will continue to demand a high level of investment, given the manifold and unpredictable nature of the new risks. Those risks will call for the immediate and continued availability of highly flexible and diverse means of surveillance, deterrence and reaction, all requiring the highest level of technological and industrial know-how to perfect. Apart from regional conflicts, the greatest risks facing us are the possibility of one or other successor state of the former Soviet Union imploding and unscrupulous governments using nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.

From this point of view, it was right for the Assembly to organise a symposium in Rome last April on the subject of anti-missile defence for Europe, and to put down markers for the future direction of our organisation along the lines of

previous initiatives with regard to space co-operation within WEU. The Rome symposium provided an opportunity for a very useful review of this question, showing once again that Europe already possesses the considerable experience and expertise needed to set up a warning and surveillance system and develop the appropriate means of protection. The likely costs of such a venture will test Europe's ability to devise new forms of co-operation, burden-sharing and pooling of resources. Since this topic is also on the Council's agenda, there will doubtless be a fruitful interaction in the coming months between the investigative work of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and that of government experts.

Individually, WEU member states no longer have the financial resources to acquire all the necessary means for either deterrence on the European mainland or for force projection beyond Europe. Space, strategic air and maritime transport, logistics beyond Europe and telecommunications are just some examples of where urgent co-operation is required. This is the only way to offset the effects of steadily declining national defence budgets. The restructuring operations now in progress should enable WEU to play a greater operational rôle in this area, over and above its traditional rôle of providing political impetus.

Since 4th December last, the activities of the former IEPG have been transferred to WEU. On 19th May this year, WEU Defence Ministers approved the arrangements for this transfer, which will principally involve relocating the Permanent Secretariat's functions from Lisbon to Brussels. The IEPG acronym has now been replaced by WEAG, the Western European Armaments Group, whose activities are co-ordinated by the National Armaments Directors. With this move comes a strengthening of the European pillar and institutional rationalisation in the field of European armaments co-operation, a development beneficial to transparency, complementarity and reciprocity, which are the avowed hallmarks of WEU-NATO relations. Finally, an ad hoc study group set up by the National Armaments Directors has been tasked with evaluating the plan for a European Armaments Agency, as referred to in WEU's Maastricht declaration. Following a series of meetings to be attended by representatives of the presidency and the WEU secretariat, a report is to be drawn up for the next meeting of National Armaments Directors to be held at WEU's Brussels headquarters in October.

For the effectiveness and the credibility of both organisations, WEU and the alliance will continue to work together for the collective defence of the European mainland and the transatlantic area. A functional and pragmatic sharing of tasks between our two organisations,

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

based on the needs of the moment, will be the over-riding consideration according to the practical arrangements dictated by the edification of the European Union and the transformation of the alliance. The co-operation between the respective councils and secretariats under the auspices of the Italian presidency has proved to be as fruitful as one would have expected given the common objectives and shared strategic culture. The presence of Manfred Wörner in Rome, mine in Athens and, in the meantime, a joint session of the councils in Brussels are evidence of the continuing development of a dialogue on substantive issues.

Until such time as the Europeans have achieved a minimum of political unity to underpin a balanced security system founded on the CSCE, NATO and WEU, the question of security guarantees will continue to arise. To this extent, and independently of the prospects for the European Union, the American military presence will remain an irreplaceable token of stability for European countries in general and in particular for those more directly facing the uncertainties surrounding the development of the new republics born of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia.

I think the time has come for WEU, both for the Council and the parliamentary Assembly, to relaunch the debate on the strategic and political parameters of the defence model which the European Union should espouse.

This debate should be directed towards both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. In reviewing the union, scheduled for 1996, we should adopt a better method of preparation than used for the Maastricht Treaty. Having personally been a member of the Dooze Committee which led up to the Single Act of Luxembourg, I believe that again we need a small committee, one person per member country, to explore the scope of a possible consensus, before another intergovernmental conference is launched. We should not be bogged down in a multitude of proposals but concentrate on a few key issues.

With regard to the alliance, we have to prepare for the summit proposed by President Clinton to be held before the end of this year. This was proposed last Thursday in Athens. Here I see a specific rôle for WEU in formulating our views on how the European pillar of the alliance should function. From what I told you earlier you will have noted that the transparency between WEU and NATO is functioning well. In the same way, we have made excellent progress with our enlargement to include all members of the EC and all European members of NATO as full members, observers or associate members and the activation of our Planning Cell, and in this I pay tribute to the

active Italian presidency. But much still has to be done on the substance. How will the alliance make use of its European pillar's inputs and contributions? How will the Americans' lesser inclination to provide leadership be matched by Europe assuming larger responsibilities? The next few months will be crucial in answering these questions and adapting transatlantic relations to new realities. I hope that this Assembly will play its part in that important event.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. van Eekelen. As usual, that was an interesting and helpful summary of the position, which is always appreciated by the Assembly.

I understand that you have kindly offered to answer questions. One person has caught my eye. If anyone else would like to ask a question, I hope that they will indicate that.

I call Mr. Cox to ask the first question.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I thank you, Mr. President, and I thank the Secretary-General for the presentation that he has given. He commented on peace-keeping rôles. Discussion is one thing. I put it to you that the real test is what protection will be given to members of peace-keeping forces that now exist. The patience of many countries which send members to peace-keeping operations is being sorely tested. There has been the brutal murder of more than twenty Pakistani troops in Somalia, and in the past few days the brutal murder of Spanish peace-keeping forces in former Yugoslavia. I am sure that you are aware of that, and also of the risk that British troops were put to last Thursday and the humiliation to which they were subjected.

Those of us who are elected members in our representative parliaments know that the people whom we represent in those parliaments are reaching the end of their patience in the face of the humiliation that the peace-keeping forces are sadly suffering. What discussions are you having with the United Nations about protecting, as far as possible, members of peace-keeping forces from countries with which many members of the Assembly are partners?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – That is a crucial question with which we are all grappling. I submit that it is not the only question because our forces are there to accomplish a task. If one talks exclusively about protecting our forces, one misses part of the point. To me, the point is how we can make the presence of our forces more useful and more effective in achieving their objectives. In that, we are all at fault – the United Nations, the European Community, NATO and WEU. We send our forces with insufficiently clear objec-

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

tives. I pointed out that difficulty in my speech. The United Nations, of necessity, is adopting salami tactics in reverse.

The United Nations defines a strategy as it adopts one resolution after the other, but our military men would like a clear strategy from the beginning. That is one of the paradoxes with which we shall have to struggle. As I said, I believe that some of our traditional peace-keeping operations will decline, with the consent of the parties. We shall have to focus more on the policing function in the way that the British Government did in the days of the empire. Many of the functions that we have to perform today as an international community are similar to maintaining law and order, with appropriate use of force whenever necessary.

The point about protecting our forces is taken care of by the safe area resolution in the case of Bosnia. It is beyond doubt that we shall use force to protect our forces. It is interesting to note that in Bosnia punitive action was quickly taken. It is important that we restore the credibility of our presence and that we do so by using force where necessary. If one is not prepared to use force, the whole operation is in doubt.

The usual course is to use force appropriate and proportional to the conditions. In the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, however, I hope that governments now realise that the operation is not only a humanitarian one: the use of force is essential to maintain credibility and thereby enhance deterrence.

In the last session of this Assembly I said that I was struck by the need to apply deterrence. I said that willingness to use force where necessary was lacking in many situations. Force is an essential element. I hope that that will be taken into consideration in these matters.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – The Secretary-General and the Assembly are often more of a mind on questions of strategic importance and of administration than jointly we are with the Council of Ministers, but the Secretary-General was speaking in the same sort of terms as the Council of Ministers in encouraging the Assembly to take on new tasks and responsibilities, particularly in building bridges to the evolving states in Eastern and Central Europe. Unfortunately, however, as with forces on the ground, one must establish the credibility of the presence and support it sufficiently. The same goes for parliamentary assemblies.

I make no excuse for returning to the awkward problem of budget. It would be incorrect not to do so and take advantage of the Secretary-General's presence here as we start the planning

cycle and look forward to 1994. I wonder whether we could, as in the past, look to the Secretary-General for his support in seeking the increased budgets which are necessary for the Assembly to do its job at least as well as in the past and hopefully even better in future.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – As Secretary-General I am in exactly the same position as the Assembly. I am confronted by the Budget Committee, which, as a result of a lack of funds in member countries, must be stringent. I propose additional tasks to my Council and the Council agrees to them but then the Budget Committee usually says: "You should undertake those new tasks but perhaps you should do a little less in some of the older, more traditional tasks." It is not always the case that taking on new responsibilities means that we get more money. At least, I am not getting more money.

If I have any advice to give – I have given it to Mr. Rathbone in the past – it is that the better the Assembly formulates its plans for new activities the better the chance that the Council will respond positively. In the past, the Council has thought that some of the new projects could be undertaken with existing personnel and resources. If the Assembly can make it clear that that is not possible, the Council will be forthcoming to the maximum possible extent.

The argument that the Assembly is using again – that the Council is not co-operating with the Assembly in providing funds for enlargement – is exaggerated. Enlargement, with the accession of Spain and Portugal, was a necessity and was fully recognised by the Council. That is why refurbishment of this building took place. I am sure that again there will be full recognition of that by the Council when any future enlargement takes place.

We ought to concentrate on other issues. The Council has co-operated as much as it could reasonably be expected to do.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Dr. Godman.

Dr. GODMAN (*United Kingdom*). – In your address, Mr. Secretary-General, you referred to the stability given to security in Europe by the continuing American presence, but how confident are you that the American presence will remain over the next few years?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – That is exactly why I said that, during the next five months, before the next alliance summit, we should think about what we can do to ensure that the American presence remains in Europe. I repeat that virtually every country in

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

Europe, including former adversaries, believes that the American presence makes our continent more stable and secure than it would be without their presence, but I have always advocated a new relationship. I have sometimes called it a transatlantic bargain or contract. We should define the functions that we Europeans will be able to perform in the future, as well as the functions for which an American contribution will be needed for a very long time to come.

That could include a new commitment by us. That would make it possible for the American Congress to say that because the Europeans are doing much more, and doing it much more efficiently, they are prepared to continue their commitment to Europe. It will be part of the deal. That is why we have to perform our functions more adequately. The Americans will then recognise that their presence in Europe serves a good purpose. If we remain disorganised, as we have been in the past, I wonder whether the Americans will retain their willingness to keep a reasonable presence on our continent.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you again, Mr. van Eekelen. You know that your attendance here is always appreciated. We certainly respect your frankness in talking to us on matters of mutual interest.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, I invite the Assembly to agree to the setting up of the six permanent committees of the Assembly, with the proposed changes in membership of these committees contained in Notice No. 1, which has already been distributed.

Is there any objection?...

The committees are accordingly appointed, and the changes in membership are agreed to.

13. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1368)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure and vote on the draft decision, Document 1368.

I ask Mr. Thompson to be kind enough to address us.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – May I begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on

your unanimous election and remind you of your comment that you hope to have a successful period in office. If that happens, we shall have a successful Assembly.

The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is one of the smallest, if not the smallest, of the committees. As its Chairman, I have learnt that its rôle in the affairs of the Assembly is very important. Its work has laid the foundations of our Assembly. I pay tribute to our predecessors on the committee, whose wisdom in drafting our Rules of Procedure has provided a sound base for the conduct of our affairs on a traditional, democratic basis. The essence of good and efficient organisation is to have a set of rules which enhances the democratic procedures and the smooth working of the business of the Assembly, while retaining the confidence of the members.

As you are aware, since its establishment, the members of the Standing Committee have expressed concern about the constitutional arrangements provided for in the rules of the Assembly for committee activities. My report on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges recognises certain adjustments to Rule 15. The recommendations will allow the Standing Committee to function more efficiently. It was only when the Standing Committee first met that the need for these adjustments became apparent. The explanatory memorandum provides for an input from the Presidential Committee in deciding when and for how long the Standing Committee should meet. The original rules suggest that it should meet twice a year. It was found that this was unnecessary, so we had to amend that rule.

New paragraph 5 makes a link between the Presidential Committee and the Standing Committee. New paragraph 6 makes appropriate provision for dealing with urgent matters put forward by the Chairman of the Council, or by no fewer than a quarter of the representatives or substitutes. That reflects the total membership of the Assembly, both representatives and alternates. New paragraph 7 improves the wording of the original paragraph 6. New paragraph 8 provides for flexibility in the efficient operation of the Standing Committee, as does paragraph 9.

Paragraph 10 relates to the President of the Assembly. He can act as chairman of the Standing Committee. That will protect the interests of the chair. New paragraph 11 relates to procedure concerning interpretation and documentation.

The second part of the report relates to the interpretation of provisions concerning urgent procedure under Rule 44. In that case, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is not suggesting a change of rule but is asking for the Assembly's support for the clarification of

Mr. Thompson (continued)

Rule 44 that relates to urgent procedure. Those interpretations, referred to in the text, will, if adopted by the Assembly, be of great assistance to you, Mr. President, and the Assembly, while protecting the rights of members of the Assembly to raise genuinely urgent issues at the appropriate time. The committee felt that this interpretation needed to be clarified. We had a good example earlier this afternoon when this practice was properly carried out. I refer to the proposal for an urgent debate on East Timor and former Yugoslavia.

(Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are no speakers on the list.

We shall now note on the draft decision contained in Document 1368.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft decision is agreed to unanimously¹.

14. The situation in East Timor

(Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1374)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now consider the motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure on the situation in East Timor, Document 1374, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Political Committee.

I remind the Assembly that the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Following Rule 44(1), I shall give a brief explanation of the request. As Mr. Thompson just said, during the previous part-session, our Assembly decided in principle to have a debate on the situation in East Timor under the urgent procedure, but the decision had to be taken on the last day. For that practical reason, the Assembly referred the

matter to the Political Committee, which discussed the report after the session. The logical conclusion of the Assembly's decision is to debate the issue. The motion is in the following terms:

“ The Political Committee,

(i) Considering the Indonesian court's condemnation of “Xanana” Gusmao to life imprisonment;

(ii) Considering that the Indonesian Government's policy of forced annexation continues to be accompanied by non-respect for human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence;

(iii) Considering that the international community must take further action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may exercise the right to self-determination and independence,

Requests an urgent debate on East Timor to be held during the present session of the Assembly.”

My proposal on behalf of the Political Committee is that a debate on the motion should be included in the orders of the day.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?

Does a representative of the Bureau wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the request for a debate under the urgent procedure.

I suggest that if this is agreed to, the motion for a decision be referred to the Political Committee.

I now put the request for urgent procedure to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

I propose that the substantive debate should take place on Thursday in the latter part of the morning.

I therefore propose that the order of business be modified on the lines that I have suggested.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

15. The situation in former Yugoslavia

(Motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1375)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now consider the motion for a decision with a request for urgent procedure on the situation in former Yugoslavia, Document 1375, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Political Committee.

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Stoffelen to state the reasons for this request.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I can be extremely brief. It is unthinkable, or it should be, that the European pillar of NATO and the security branch of the Community should have a part-session and not debate the situation in former Yugoslavia. I say that on behalf of the Political Committee. Our proposed motion is as follows:

“ The Political Committee,

(i) Considering the recent developments in the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia;

(ii) Noting that at present there still seem to be major obstacles to an early solution of the conflict, which may spread to other regions;

(iii) Noting that every new day of inconclusiveness by the international community constitutes encouragement for the warring parties to make new territorial conquests,

Requests an urgent debate on the situation in former Yugoslavia to be held during the present session of the Assembly. ”

We propose that a debate in the report on the situation in former Yugoslavia should be included in the order of business of this part-session. We have appointed a rapporteur, a draft recommendation is ready and the Political Committee will discuss the text at the end of today's sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?

Does a representative of the Bureau wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the request for a debate under the urgent procedure.

I suggest that, if this is agreed to, the proposed decision be referred to the Political Committee.

I now put the request for urgent procedure to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

I propose that the substantive debate take place on Wednesday morning, before the discussion of the report by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, the vote on which will be taken at the beginning of the afternoon.

I therefore propose that the order of business be modified on the lines I have suggested.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

16. The situation in Somalia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1377)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now consider the motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure on the situation in Somalia, Document 1377, tabled by Mr. De Decker and others.

I call Mr. De Decker or one of his colleagues to explain the reasons for this request.

Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – As Mr. De Decker is not here, may I, as co-signatory of the motion, explain the reasons for our request. The reasoning outlined by Mr. Stoffelen applies also to Somalia. It would be totally unthinkable – one has only to read today's papers to see why – for us to have no debate on Somalia during this part-session. We would have to be very Eurocentric not to refer to so grave a situation or to this United Nations operation where the killing is beginning to reach the proportion we all know about and a tide of racism is now unfurling.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?...

Does a member of the Bureau wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the request for urgent procedure.

I suggest that, if this is agreed to, the motion for a recommendation be referred to the Political Committee.

I put the request for urgent procedure to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

I propose that the substantive debate take place on Wednesday afternoon, after the vote on the report by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

I therefore propose that the order of business be modified on the lines I have suggested.

Is there any opposition.

It is so decided.

17. The development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1365)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Par-

The President (continued)

liamentary and Public Relations on the development of relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of Central European countries and vote on the draft order, Document 1365.

I call Mr. Kempinaire to present his report.

Mr. KEMPINAIRE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report which I am pleased to present to this Assembly on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations deals with a subject on which I believe we are all agreed, namely the need to strengthen relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the nine Central European countries which make up what is known as WEU's forum of consultation, namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and the three Baltic states. Co-operation between WEU and these countries in the field of security policy obviously cannot be confined to intergovernmental co-operation purely at forum level. Ministers have acknowledged this fact, and the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the countries concerned must take it upon themselves to support and encourage initiatives undertaken at government level.

Starting in 1990, this Assembly established contacts with the parliaments of the Central European countries. Parliamentary delegations from these countries attended our debates as observers and took an active part in the symposium on a new security order in Europe organised by the WEU Assembly last year in Berlin. Several WEU committees have visited a number of these countries over the last two years. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, for example, visited Warsaw last March and held in-depth discussions with parliamentary representatives of all the major political groupings within the Sejm and the Senate, and with representatives of foreign affairs and defence ministries. I would also remind you that the foreign affairs ministers of former Czechoslovakia and of Poland, Hungary and Romania have been invited to speak to this Assembly.

Until now these contacts have taken place only on a purely ad hoc basis. We now need to pursue our relations in a more structured way. In this connection, we must obviously take account of what the members of parliament of these countries expect of us – for naturally these countries do have expectations. I have set these out in my report. How do these countries, and in particular the parliaments of these countries, perceive future relations between themselves and WEU and, more specifically, the Assembly?

Despite significant variations in the composition of governments and parliamentary assem-

blies, opinions converge on this issue. The basic foreign policy choice for all these countries is to try to effect a rapprochement with existing institutions, originally Western European ones, both in economic policy terms and in the field of security and defence. Some of these countries, for example Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, have even explicitly set themselves the goal of eventually becoming full members of WEU, or would at any rate like to see closer co-operation with WEU than is currently the case within the forum; also that such co-operation be extended, all other things being equal, to certain WEU bodies such as the planning cell, the specialist working parties, the Institute for Security Studies and the European Armaments Agency. The parliaments of all these countries wish, henceforward, to continue to extend their relations with the Assembly. We have received more or less concrete proposals and desiderata from various quarters. I refer in the first place to raising the number of members of parliament who can attend our Assembly as delegates. Another specific proposal relates to the possibility of attendance at meetings and involvement in the preparation of reports by our committees. A further proposal relates to the granting of permanent status within the WEU Assembly. Terms such as permanent observer or permanent guest have been used in this connection.

On 19th April our Standing Committee asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine the creation of a permanent status, within the context of adjustment by the Assembly to WEU's enlargement, for parliamentary representatives of the forum countries of Central Europe. The aim is to submit this proposal to the Assembly along with other amendments to our working practices connected with WEU's enlargement, during the course of the next part-session in December of this year. The new regulations will enable us to respond to the expectations of our colleagues from Central Europe. Until then, we can achieve a number of things within the framework of our current Rules of Procedure to strengthen our relations with the parliaments of these countries by broadening the present range of contacts. Specifically, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has made the following proposals: Assembly committees should be encouraged to visit these countries, particularly when they prepare reports concerning that region. Members of this Assembly should take part whenever possible in symposia and other meetings on security matters organised by these countries. In this connection I would point out that the Polish Sejm is organising a symposium for this autumn on WEU thinking on security perspectives in Central Europe. The foreign affairs and defence ministers of these countries should also continue to be invited to speak at

Mr. Kempinaire (continued)

the WEU Assembly. Lastly, in order for each to gain a better knowledge and understanding of each others' views, this Assembly and the parliaments of the countries in question should organise a systematic exchange of all documents relating to European security issues.

Mr. President, the draft order we are submitting to the Assembly for approval calls on the Presidential Committee to take the necessary steps in this connection.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on the report, which I have read with interest. Although I welcome the report, debates such as this are opportunities to express not just our views but, if need be, any concerns we may have about the report.

I am sure that members of the Assembly welcome the closer contact and association with parliaments of Central European countries. Many of us are members not only of WEU but of the Council of Europe, where we have already begun to make contacts and forge friendships with the representatives of the nine countries listed in the report. Obviously, that is to be welcomed.

I have always believed that the cornerstone of WEU is the respect of human rights. Some of the countries listed in the report give cause for great concern about the way in which they treat their minority groups. During recent months delegations from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have visited London at the invitation of the British group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The meetings were very interesting. I attended all of them because until last November I was one of the officers of the British group.

We discussed many matters, such as the rôle of parliaments, the prospects for developing trade and the exchange of technology between countries. It was all interesting and pleasant until we asked: "Tell us a little about human and civil rights in your countries." We are all aware that many people in the three countries were born there, but of parents of Russian origin. The members of those delegations made it clear to us that even though those people were born in their countries, they did not regard them as true citizens.

I should like the Rapporteur to tell me – I realise that he cannot do so today – specifically relating to the three countries that I have mentioned, about the rights of people of Russian background who have been born in those countries to form political parties if they wish. What is their right to vote? What is their right to the ownership of land and property?

In our detailed discussions, it was made clear that the delegations from those three countries did not want the people to whom I have referred in what they term "our" country. However, those countries are the countries of the people whom they do not want. Those are the countries where they were born. One of the countries listed is Romania and human rights in Romania leave a great deal to be desired. I make it clear that those countries must understand that they must respect the human rights of people who live in those countries, whatever their background and wherever their parents may have been born.

Some of the countries listed in the report have started to develop armaments industries and some will undoubtedly specialise in developing sophisticated military equipment. I believe that there are already far too many arms on the market. We may be told: "We have a right to produce weapons if we wish." That may be true, but we must say to those countries that we have a right to know exactly where they are selling some of the arms. It is clear that there is a lucrative and developing arms trade with, to mention just two countries, Iraq and Iran. We know about the human rights records of those countries.

We now talk increasingly about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and rightly so. However, some of the military equipment that is now being produced and on the market has enormous destructive power, as we know. We have a right to express concern about the development of those weapons within countries that seek closer association with WEU.

I hope that my point on those two issues will be taken up by the Rapporteur because in the order to instruct the Presidential Committee, there is no reference to human rights in the nine countries mentioned, nor is there any reference to the discussion that we hope to have with those countries as they develop their military industry. I have not tabled an amendment to the report because I basically agree with it. However, this is an opportunity for us, while generally welcoming the report, to express our concerns. I have expressed two concerns. In the Socialist Group to which I belong, when I said that I would seek to speak in this debate, it was made clear that there was widespread concern on the two issues. I do not expect the Rapporteur to be able to answer my points today. I hope that, under paragraph 5 of the instructions to the Presidential Committee, my points will be taken into account.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the collapse of the ideologies and systems of the communist

Mr. Müller (continued)

countries, and especially the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, have had many consequences for Europe. Two of them affect WEU, both in general and directly.

The first of these relates to security policy; it is the fear, felt in the central and southern countries of Eastern Europe, some of which are actually new countries, that a military vacuum might arise and that, in the long term, developments that cannot now be foreseen might pose a new threat to them. That is why the politicians of those countries are keen to establish good contacts with their former opponents in the West, and you all know that there have been many demands for membership of NATO itself.

We all know that this is certainly not possible in this form at present, which is why I believe that WEU has a major rôle to play here, in recognising these countries' security policy interests, establishing contacts, organising exchanges of views and helping to build up a relationship of trust between these countries and the member states of WEU in the defence policy and military fields.

The second consequence of that collapse was the emergence of new democracies there, of parliamentary systems like our traditional ones. We must realise that some of these countries did not have any parliamentary traditions, or that these had been interrupted for decades. That means that the politicians who are responsible there now, and who are elected to those parliaments, need to exchange experiences in purely political matters with others who have already had years of parliamentary experience.

That is why we welcome the idea of close exchanges of views between politicians and members of parliament from the Assembly of WEU and also from the parliaments of these central and southern states of Eastern Europe.

I believe – and I am sure most of us have found this – that holding talks with delegations that have come here and also sending delegations from our Assembly and its committees to these countries has always proved very fruitful. To take just one example: not so long ago the Political Committee went to Bulgaria, and during the talks there I became very aware of the sense of insecurity felt in the Balkans, because the conflicts in former Yugoslavia have, of course, made even countries that are not directly affected afraid of what will happen next and concerned about future developments there. So Yugoslavia's immediate neighbours are perhaps even more concerned about this than we Western European politicians.

We also started receiving delegations from a very early date. The first came in 1990 and perhaps it is typical of the insecurity in this field

that we received delegations from countries that no longer exist today. I have only to think of Yugoslavia – a Yugoslav delegation came here in 1990 – and Czechoslovakia, where we now have two countries with representatives who visit us here as observers. You can see how rapidly events have moved here, and what new problems we could face as a result.

Let me make one comment on the report itself, a comment reflecting a slight doubt although not about the Rapporteur, who has simply used the material he had. He writes that a Eurobarometer poll showed that 56% of the people of Hungary and 49% of the people of Estonia had heard of WEU. I doubt that, because I know that in my country, Germany, less than 56% have heard of WEU. The number is in fact substantially lower, which is why I am very sceptical about these figures. Perhaps people confused WEU with NATO or with the European defence community in general, and when one of them was mentioned this was recorded as recognition or knowledge of WEU. I just wanted to point this out, because I do not believe those statistics are correct.

Let me close by asking our Assembly's Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to determine as quickly as possible the function of applicant countries. I think we should create a definite status of permanent observer – or whatever we want to call it; we should make it quite clear what rights these observers have, whether they have the right to speak and whether they can even, where appropriate, draw up reports. They certainly cannot have the right to vote in the Assembly, nor can they have the right to vote in the committees, but we should offer them as many opportunities as possible to work with us. Money should not be the issue. I think money plays a very minor rôle here, for the Assembly's services are available to everyone and no new translations are made. So money cannot be the determining factor, which is why I believe that we can all continue with this policy of exchanges of views and experiences, both here in Paris and in the countries concerned – in the interests of all of us and in the interest of our countries.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller. We have with us today two observers from Bulgaria. We are delighted to welcome them. Both have asked to take the floor and, exceptionally, we have been able to fit them into the debate. I ask them both to keep to five minutes. We shall then be able to call both of them.

I call Mr. Philipov, a member of parliament from Bulgaria.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – On behalf of our delegation, I should like to

Mr. Philipov (continued)

congratulate Mr. Kempinaire on the information about developments in Bulgaria. At the last session our delegation had to make some remarks about some unconfirmed facts concerning the political situation in Bulgaria. This time we would like to say that we are fully behind every word of the information in the report about Bulgaria.

My next point is on the information relating to other countries. We in Central Europe are sometimes too busy with our problems inside our own countries. We do not have enough time to look around us and see what is happening in neighbouring countries. If the information about them is as correct as that about Bulgaria, it could be useful for our parliament to study the experience of those countries. We are sure that the report will be useful for our parliament and to our future relations with friendly countries around us.

Once more, on behalf of our delegation I express our great satisfaction with the report. We are grateful for the development of contacts between WEU and Bulgaria during the past six months.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your admirable brevity, Sir.

I call Mr. Slatinsky.

Mr. SLATINSKY (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – Bulgaria supports the new rôle of WEU, the activation of its co-operation with its partner countries, involving meetings with the simultaneous participation of the ministers of foreign affairs and of defence. The intensification of those relations is an essential part of the process of establishing a durable and peaceful order in Europe, resting on partnership and co-operation.

The gradual integration with Western European Union is among the priority targets of Bulgarian foreign policy. Bulgaria, including its parliaments, will render its assistance in the best possible way for the realisation of mechanisms for collaboration between WEU and its partners for the prevention of conflicts and the maintenance of peace.

The memorandum signed between Bulgaria and WEU in respect of the application of the sanctions of the United Nations along the Danube river is a joint activity of a non-military character and a concrete illustration of co-operation in the attempt to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. It is very important to us that maximum efforts be made to prevent the conflict from expanding. The international community should have concern for the security of every country which runs the risk of becoming an eventual target of aggressive activity as a result of the support which it renders to opera-

tions under the United Nations mandate. We cherish considerable hopes for this in relation to WEU and its capacity for prompt, correct and proper action on such occasions.

Bulgaria is hoping that the development of the European processes will speed up the granting of associate status to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the WEU Assembly, ensuring an inherent connection between their national security and the security of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the list of speakers.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Kempinaire, wish to speak?

Mr. KEMPINAIRE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Cox and Mr. Müller for having read this report so attentively. My comments are as follows: the purpose of this report was not to make value judgments on these countries on the basis of their human rights record. However, Mr. Cox is right, respect for human rights is the cornerstone both of Western European culture and of the Council of Europe, and a condition of membership both of our own Assembly and of the Council of Europe.

I would remind Mr. Cox that although he has made certain observations about human rights infringement in certain Central European countries, it should also be noted that virtually all these countries, with the exception of Romania and Latvia if I am not mistaken, are already full members of the Council of Europe, where the criterion is, of course, respect for human rights.

I would ask that some allowance be made for these countries. They must be approached with the necessary goodwill. We have had democracy for hundreds of years, but these countries only set out tentatively a few years ago on the road to democracy. They are also at present having to contend with severe economic difficulties and appalling social problems. Nevertheless, since the dismantling of the Berlin wall and the recent détente between East and West, all of them have held free elections, either parliamentary or local. They have all adopted a constitution – in the majority of cases an extremely liberal one – often more liberal than the constitutions of some Western European nations. They have now all held one and in some cases two presidential elections, and all such elections have been conducted democratically. They have also been monitored by ourselves. I would therefore again make a plea for a measure of indulgence.

I should like to repeat the point I made at the start of my speech. The intention is not to make value judgments. The purpose of the report was to draw up an inventory – as its title: “The development of relations...” suggests. Steady

Mr. Kempinaire (continued)

progress is being made in this direction day by day, week by week. Elections have recently taken place again in Latvia, and so on.

My reply to Mr. Müller would be that I am largely in agreement with his comments. He asked whether the politicians in these countries were ready to join or wanted to join Western European institutions. There is no doubt that they are impatient. If possible, they would like to become full members tomorrow, or next month, of WEU, of the European Community and any other Western European institution you care to name. WEU's task – and this was the primary objective of the present report – is to maintain the dialogue between ourselves and the countries of Central Europe, and to further the transmission of the parliamentary tradition we possess to these countries.

This parliamentary tradition has been interrupted for over forty years in the countries of Eastern Europe – not to mention the countries of the former Soviet Union, who have never known democracy in their entire history. Let us help these countries through dialogue, invitations and various other types of exchanges to build their own democracies – confident that our help will achieve results. As to Eurobarometer's finding that 50% of the population in these countries know what WEU is, I believe the equivalent figure in our case would be less than 5%. I admit to being somewhat sceptical but the survey was conducted by the European Community over a sample of ten thousand people. I may have my doubts about this poll, but I wanted to take up something from what I regard as objective statistics from the European Community.

Mr. President, these are my replies to the various speakers. I should also like to thank the Bulgarian representatives for their constructive contribution to the debate in this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kempinaire.

Does the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Tummers, wish to reply?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you have just reminded me of the number of years you have been a member of our Assembly. Let me add my years. I have now been speaking in this Assembly for fifteen years and I have spoken in every debate on our relations with parliaments and the public, which I have always regarded as a matter of great importance. If we insert the key of parliamentary democracy in the door of the WEU Assembly, then my committee could be called a key committee. But I am struck every time by the feebleness of our colleagues' interest in the parliaments. The situation should really be described

as most unparliamentary, as a challenge to our colleagues to respect the parliamentary activities of this Assembly. We must seek to ensure good democratic and parliamentary relations with the member states of our organisation, and in particular with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. When you look at the figures in the poll on knowledge of our organisation, you may well ask how much respect those who keep going on about parliamentary work and parliamentary democracy have for good relations between the parliaments.

Having said that, Mr. President, all that remains is for me to thank Mr. Kempinaire for the work he has done. I would also like to thank the secretariat that assisted him. On the basis of the figures obtained from the poll on knowledge of WEU and its Assembly, I think it is high time – and here I am thinking back to the discussion of the report by Lady Hooper and Sir Russell Johnston – that we regarded the activities of my committee as key activities. Only then can the activities of the other committees be fruitful.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers. Your record is long and remarkable and shows great persistence when you talk so expertly and sincerely on this subject. It is very much appreciated by the Assembly.

We have now reached the end of the debate on this report. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has presented a draft order, to which no amendments have been tabled. We shall therefore vote on the draft order contained in Document 1365.

As you know, under the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives who are present so desire, there can be a roll-call vote on the draft order.

Does any member wish to ask for a roll-call vote?...

No.

We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted unanimously¹.

18. Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty

(Presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1364)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty and votes on the draft recommen-

1. See page 21.

The President (continued)

dation, draft resolution and draft order, Document 1364.

I ask Mr. Tummers to be good enough to address the Assembly from the tribune.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report I am submitting on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee concerns the treaty signed in Helsinki and known as the Open Skies Treaty. This report touches on two extremely important areas. One is the way we use the space above and surrounding the earth. The other is our technical approach to the things we do in space with regard to peace and security.

We know from history, from ancient mythology, and also from more recent experience, that the space above and surrounding the earth is a special haven for man's imagination. In short, space forms part of the cultural heritage of mankind.

Today we are in the process of conquering space, thanks to all kinds of technical aerospace equipment. We have even reached the point where it is said that if we send any more objects into space, they risk colliding with what has already been sent up there, that is, crashing into the space debris. However, we have also discovered that space is the best place from which to observe what is happening on earth. This can be done in various ways. Technically, we can observe how biological developments occur on earth. We may also be able to monitor, from space, any mutual threats to mankind on the earth's surface.

So in the first part of my argument I point out that space is a cultural heritage for our imagination. In the second part, I describe the way we use space to monitor what is happening in the world, thanks to the powers we have mastered.

It is now important to look at four aspects: the political and diplomatic factors which resulted in the treaty we are discussing and what we should do with this treaty; the progress made as regards its ratification and in what way we will be participating; the economic aspect of the question of technical equipment, its distribution and any material interests this may involve for the various countries; and lastly, the price we will have to pay for this, the price of security.

The treaty we now have rests on a solid basis. It has been approved by the participant countries. It is the outcome of good and rational consultations. But to date only five of the states that took part in the consultations have ratified it: Canada, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Denmark. We know from recent reports that ratification procedures have begun and are progressing in France.

The parliamentarians in our Assembly therefore have a parliamentary task to perform at home too. I call on them – as does the report – to do their utmost to try to ensure that the treaty is ratified quickly in their own countries.

Another point concerns the aircraft and equipment to be used and the economic implications that might have. The second aspect – ratification – could be slowed down by excessively long discussion, based on competition, on whether to opt for one aircraft and its equipment or another – from another country and of another make – and whether they should be inter-changed among themselves on the basis of other interests. It would be a great pity if ratification was held up by excessively long discussion of questions of economics and competition. I think it is very important that when the parliamentarians in this Assembly return home they raise this matter in their own parliament whenever peace and security are discussed.

The next aspect is the price of security, which I have already discussed in other reports. At first it was thought that following the Reykjavik summit, the world order would change and large sums of defence money would be released which could be used for many other things. But from discussions with specialists at the time the outlook did not seem too hopeful. People must realise clearly that monitoring peace and security does not simply mean going off somewhere, peering through binoculars, or counting aircraft. It costs money, because it requires highly sophisticated equipment. That is the price we have to pay for security.

In short, Mr. President, today we are presenting the Open Skies Treaty to the parliamentarians who are members of our Assembly. We are trying to send them home with the mission to ensure that their national parliaments ratify and then implement the treaty as soon as possible.

The political and diplomatic work has been done. Too few countries have ratified the treaty so far, so that needs to be encouraged. Economic questions must not slow this down. We must be willing to pay the price of peace and security. Let us hope that, with the work done on this report, we can take another step towards greater risk-control and greater chances of peace and security on earth.

Mr. President, I thank all those who have helped with this work. Let me also add, in relation to the activities of our Assembly, that the trainees have been a great help. I strongly believe that this system of working with trainees must not be abolished, but should be expanded. It can only be of benefit to our work.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers, for your interesting and important report. I am sorry that there are not more delegates who wish

The President (continued)

to speak on the subject. Perhaps they are put off by its technical nature. One delegate had asked to speak but he is not here, so I am unable to call him, and I can hardly ask you to reply to yourself. We will therefore vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1364.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1364.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously².

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1364.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted unanimously³.

19. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 15th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Security in the Mediterranean (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1371 and amendments).
2. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1369).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.30 p.m.)

1. See page 22.

2. See page 24.

3. See page 25.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1993

SUMMARY

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attendance register.2. Adoption of the minutes.3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.4. Change in the membership of a committee.5. Security in the Mediterranean (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1371 and amendments</i>). | <p><i>Speakers:</i> Mr. Roseta (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Müller, Mr. Parisi, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Roman, Mr. Amaral, Mr. Brito, Mr. Borderas, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Roseta (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Stoffelen (<i>Chairman</i>), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Parisi, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Parisi.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">6. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1369</i>). <p><i>Speakers:</i> Mr. Goerens (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Stoffelen (<i>Chairman</i>).</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. |
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The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.

I have received the nomination of Mr. Miguel Angel Martinez for one of the vacant vice-presidential places.

The nomination has been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I propose that the election of Mr. Martinez as a Vice-President should be by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10 (7).

Is there any objection to the nomination?...

I believe the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare our colleague Mr. Martinez duly elected a Vice-President, and his seniority will, as required by Rule 10 (7), be determined by his age.

4. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT. – Under Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly has to approve the changes in the composition of committees asked for by the Italian Delegation.

These changes have been published in Notice No. 2 which has been distributed.

Does anybody wish to oppose these changes?...

The changes are agreed to.

5. Security in the Mediterranean

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1371 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on security in the Mediterranean and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1371 and amendments.

1. See page 28.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Mediterranean has always been an area of vital importance to the security of Europe. Clearly the concept of security I have in mind is the broader concept, which is all-embracing and which goes far beyond the purely military aspects.

I am well aware that the Mediterranean is made up of many different cultures and peoples – indeed this is what gives it its rich character – which, while sharing some features, also show enormous diversity. These are countries which differ not only in size, but in their religion, their language and their standard of living.

For centuries, or even millennia, the Mediterranean was the centre of the world, not only in the generation of new ideas, inventions and technological advances, but also in trade, art and culture, and also military power.

The question now is whether, after a long period of confrontation, there can be a long period of co-operation and partnership. The fact is that there really is no chance of a peaceful and prosperous future for Europe and the Arab world without a framework of solidarity and joint development, nor can there be security, progress and development if countries see one another as a potential threat.

It is increasingly obvious that the future of Europe, by which I mean its security, is related to the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The stability and sustainable development of the countries bordering the sea, known in ancient times as *Mare Nostrum*, are crucial to the security of Europe.

There must be co-operation between all the countries on either side of the sea, not only to prevent instability, but to create a climate where others are not perceived as a threat – and I repeat, perceived as a threat, because I do not believe that this threat actually exists.

Instability in the countries of the southern Mediterranean has its roots in economic, social and political factors: unemployment, low investment, foreign debt, demographic pressures – although, as the report shows, these are not as serious as they were a few years ago – the formation of huge cities such as Cairo, for instance, the problems of meeting demands for housing, basic sanitation and adequate living conditions, and the inefficiencies of agricultural production and failures in our supply networks.

On the other hand, the disappearance of East/West polarisation as a major factor in the Mediterranean region and the subsequent rel-

ative lack of interest on the part of the former superpowers creates a more significant rôle for the organisations and countries of Western Europe, particularly in promoting security and development and preventing new antagonisms and tensions from arising in other areas, as they have, unfortunately, arisen in the Balkans.

This increased rôle for Europe is desired by all of the countries of the southern Mediterranean, without exception. I was able to confirm this on the journey I made to those countries on behalf of the Political Committee before drafting this report.

For all the aforementioned reasons, the purely commercial view which some European countries had of their relations with the countries of the southern Mediterranean in the past had to come to an end. The European Community therefore launched its renovated Mediterranean policy and the European Council's Lisbon declaration of almost a year ago affirms its desire to implement an overall policy of security, joint development and prosperity for all, while respecting the culture and traditions of each country.

In its Petersberg declaration of exactly one year ago, the Council of Ministers of WEU also defined the terms of reference for the establishment of a progressive dialogue with the Maghreb countries. Bearing in mind that a respect for human rights should form the basis of relations between all countries, the political dialogue which ought to lead to co-operation between the European Community and WEU on the one hand, and the countries of North Africa on the other hand, must permit immediate harmonisation of political and security aspects.

Clearly, from an economic viewpoint, support for development must facilitate the establishment of market economies, which exist in widely varying degrees in the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and must also facilitate the integration and modernisation of economic systems designed to create employment and meet people's aspirations for their well-being. The aim is to increase technical co-operation and, in the long term, to create a Euro-Maghreb free trade area.

In the context of the agreement between Morocco and the European Community, which is in an advanced state of preparation, preliminary contacts with Tunisia are aiming at the creation of a real partnership which goes beyond economic matters and establishes mechanisms for political dialogue and extended co-operation in other areas.

We must also step up contacts from a cultural point of view to increase our understanding of the culture, values, diversity and way of life of each nation, respecting the identity by which it is enriched and which no one wishes to see

Mr. Roseta (continued)

threatened by the imposition of destructive uniformity; the vital importance of matters within the competence of Western European Union in this context cannot be denied and they must consequently play a decisive rôle in the dialogue and co-operation in the Mediterranean.

The geopolitical situation, strategic interests and need for reliable communications lead me to conclude that the stability of the countries in the area must be considered an essential element in the security of the whole of Europe.

It is essential to build up gradually a climate of confidence which transcends mutual threat perceptions, which are not based on reality. The greatest risk appears to be the risk of urban violence and certain forms of terrorism in some southern Mediterranean countries, provoked by both external and internal forces exploiting a particular view of the dominant Islamic religion, and which can result in the use of force to resolve difficult situations.

Western European Union has a very important rôle to play in ensuring that the Mediterranean finds a new equilibrium and becomes an area of security rather than one of confrontation stemming from the difficulties and differences of economic, social and political development and from an inability to reduce tensions appreciably.

The report which I have the honour to present to you today on behalf of the Political Committee endeavours to put forward some proposals for WEU's rôle in determining the fundamental elements of stability and security in the Mediterranean.

I started from the particular, the actual situation in each country – excluding Turkey, which was the subject of an excellent report by Mr. Moya a few months ago – and proceeded to the general. I tried to summarise the economic, social and political situation in each country and allude to the present rôle of Islam in each of them. The situations are quite different, from relatively open market economies to narrowly centralised, state-controlled economies; from countries where there are elected and pluralist parliaments to others where the parliament has been dissolved or there is no parliament at all, and yet others where there is one single force represented in an assembly – hence there is no multi-party democracy.

Although it is true that there are serious economic and social problems, the report does not, in my view, offer a desperate and catastrophic picture, which would not correspond to reality. I believe that solutions can be found to the situation in each country, some with greater, some with lesser problems.

The general understanding that the market economy is the only model which can assure prosperity and development is accepted. Some countries have launched ambitious privatisation programmes; there is a real desire for democratisation and greater respect for human rights, although it must be said that situations exist which need to be put right, including for example the treatment of detainees. However, I wanted to say that I found increasing press freedom and a pluralism which is to be applauded. I must also mention the desire to improve the situation of certain categories within the population, starting with the legal status of women.

I then go on to deal with the Middle East peace process. The Israeli Government seems to be prepared to tackle the matter of Palestinian autonomy. The peace process has reached a crucial stage. We hope that important steps will be taken. A solution to this problem could relieve considerable tensions and have very positive implications not only for security, which is our prime concern, but also for economic and social development with which, in my opinion, it is closely linked.

The view expressed to me was that although Europe has a rôle to play, that rôle will be much more important once an agreement is reached in the Middle East peace process. Not only will this stimulate trade and assist development, but it will also promote peace and co-operation in security matters, and there is no doubt that Western European Union will have a very relevant rôle to play.

As regards the Arab Maghreb Union, I confirm in my report that although economic co-operation is still very tentative, due in particular to the different structures which exist in the five member countries and also bearing in mind that the organisation has only been in existence for four years, this Union provides a forum for regular political consultations which could play a significant rôle in conflict avoidance. It could also, therefore, be an important agent in security matters.

The problem of Western Sahara is leading to a United Nations resolution and, as you will be aware, a referendum is planned before the end of this year.

The proposal presented by Spain and Italy, seconded by France and Portugal, for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, drawing on the experience and success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, is an objective which cannot and must not be forgotten. However, the enormous complexity and multiplicity of problems to be resolved – the Arab-Israeli peace process, the situation in former Yugoslavia, the questions of Cyprus and Libya, to mention but a

Mr. Roseta (continued)

few – leave us no option but to take a pragmatic view and propose that Western European Union and the European Community immediately initiate a dialogue with a limited number of countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, before extending this to include other countries and formalising it in the context of a conference.

All the people with whom we spoke in the southern Mediterranean countries believe that a CSCM could be very important in the long term, but that its potential would be limited if it were launched prematurely, before the conclusion of the Middle East peace process. But I am in no doubt that this conference is justified as an overall approach, in view of the security, economic, social and human rights issues.

One matter which had to be included was the question of fundamentalism, which I believe is largely aroused by the economic and social frustrations of the countries of the southern Mediterranean. As I said earlier, some aspects of this problem are not as serious as we are led to believe, one of these being the problem of demographic pressure.

Although considerable demographic pressure exists, the image of, for instance, the Maghreb and Egypt experiencing an uncontrollable demographic explosion is no longer as accurate as it was, as my report and other published works demonstrate. In fact, the birth rate in the Arab countries is declining; in recent years there has been a reduction in the fertility index, as can be seen from paragraph 218 of my report.

Be that as it may, we cannot ignore the fact that it is these frustrations and economic and social problems which are exploited by some groups, with the encouragement, moreover, of external forces. What are these forces? In my report – which clearly is not the work of a historian – as far as history is concerned I restrict myself to saying that until the Gulf war fundamentalist movements received backing, financial for the most part, from certain countries in that region. Everyone will know who they were, but what is important is that since the Gulf war Egypt, Algeria and even Tunisia have accused Iran, in particular, of supporting the fundamentalists and even Islamic terrorist movements, using Sudan as a sort of turntable.

Nor must we forget the phenomenon of the so-called Afghans, who are not Afghans at all. Thirty-five thousand combatants from Arab countries travelled to Afghanistan and today many of them are unemployed, and some are, shall we say, imbued with a fundamentalist ideology which could pose a threat to these countries. For reasons given in my report, I do not believe that this threat extends to Morocco, but

all the other countries are extremely concerned about this fundamentalist threat.

In conclusion, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen – for it is time for me to give way to other colleagues who wish to speak – I must make it clear that, at the present time, none of the southern Mediterranean states poses a military threat to Western Europe. None of them has anything like the military capability to sustain such a threat. None of them has any political aspirations which would justify the perception of such a threat. Nevertheless, as the saying goes in many countries, and Portugal is no exception, prevention is better than cure. I believe that, as stated in the draft recommendation, we must prevent any attempt at proliferation of dangerous weapons through massive arms exports.

Europe in general and Western European Union in particular can contribute to creating conditions favourable to development and global security in the Mediterranean. Obviously it should not interfere in the internal affairs of any country, but it should continue to publicise its values as regards human rights, which are universal. However, it can transfer its experience, and I do not mean merely technological experience, or the experience of administrative techniques so essential for the organisation and management either of a market economy, a modern society, or of central and local public administration, which the requirements of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries demand. Europe, through its experience and its historical links, must have a global policy which includes security; it must strive to create the confidence-building measures contained in the draft recommendation: the development of bilateral military training programmes and exchange of intelligence between officials of, for instance, the armed forces and later – why not? – of joint manoeuvres. We must always bear in mind that the partnership must operate not only within the area of competence of the European Community as regards economic, social, migration and other matters, but also, where security is concerned, within the area of competence of WEU.

In conclusion, may I say that Europe in general and WEU in particular must not remain insensitive to these problems and that there is no time to lose.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta, for your very interesting presentation.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Günther Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, now that the East-West conflict no longer plays a rôle in security policy, for the time being at least, following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the

Mr. Müller (continued)

dissolution of the Soviet Union, we are looking more towards other areas, that is, we are no longer so concerned with security policy considerations. For instance, we are looking towards the Mediterranean area, where we know that the East-West conflict started. The founding of NATO as the western defence alliance dates back directly to the announcement of the Truman doctrine on 10th March 1947, when the American Government sent the sixth fleet into the Mediterranean – where it is still stationed today – and guaranteed the stability and inviolability of the Turkish and Greek frontiers; for it was on Greek soil that a bloody civil war was waged, in which the communists tried to seize power.

When we look at the Mediterranean today, we find that it is still an area of unrest. We can begin at the corner of the Mediterranean area, where war has already broken out, in former Yugoslavia. Serbia and Montenegro border the Mediterranean. I certainly think – unlike Mr. Roseta – that there are states which pose a threat to our security; for the Serbs have stated very clearly that they would reply to any intervention by western troops on their soil with a missile attack on Italy. And they have enough missiles, more than Italy, for example, in numerical terms.

If we look at the other Mediterranean countries, we cannot just sit back and say all is well there either. The Mediterranean is a centre of unrest, a centre of terrorism. Take the NATO member state Turkey, with its PKK insurgent movement in the south. Or go further, to Lebanon, where hostages are taken. Go to Israel, or Palestine, go on to Egypt, where tourist buses are ambushed and where Coptic Christians are being intimidated by Islamic fundamentalists.

Go further south, to Sudan, where the fundamentalists hold power and give strong support to the fundamentalist movements in the states bordering the Mediterranean to the north, and in Algeria. Go to Libya, where an attempt was made to obtain chemical weapons, or, last of all, go to Algeria, where the outcome of the struggle for power between the fundamentalists and the present government is still touch and go.

Mr. Roseta was quite right to warn against selling them arms of any kind; one reason for the influence and power of the fundamentalists is the quantity of their weapons. The fundamentalist Mujahiddin, who were and still are fighting in Afghanistan, have in fact been provided with weapons indiscriminately, so that there is now such an arms surplus that it is sometimes put to use elsewhere.

Aside from the security problems, we must also realise that the Mediterranean area is, of course, of great interest to us for other reasons

too. To take a few key words, without going into detail, I will refer first to energy supplies. I am thinking not just of oil production as such – for there are oil-producing countries in this region – but in particular of the fact that this is an area in which energy is transported, by oil and gas pipelines and tanker traffic.

Then there are the environmental problems in the Mediterranean area. We know about the pollution of the Mediterranean. We know that in reality North Africa, the Asian part of the Mediterranean area and Europe would have to work together to clean up this area.

Take the population explosion and poverty, which Mr. Roseta also mentioned. The very fact that in Algeria, for instance, more than 50% of the population is below the age of sixteen and that youth unemployment is very serious there, at over 50%, shows the scale of the challenges we are facing in the North.

Let us also remember – and this is my penultimate point – that we are dealing with a different culture, a different cultural milieu. You know that in my home country, Germany, there is tension between Germans and foreigners. In France there is tension between the French and North Africans. To some extent this has its roots in the existence of a different culture, a foreign culture.

Islam and Christianity: I believe it is our great task to bring the two cultures closer together, to show more concern for others. Others must also show concern for us, but obviously we must also know the other culture if we want to understand it better and practise tolerance. That is why I believe there is an urgent need for close co-operation, especially in the cultural field, perhaps under the aegis of the Council of Europe, between the countries of North Africa, Asia and Europe.

Coming now to the last aspect, security, I believe that the most important unit in military terms that exists in Europe today, following the change in the security policy ceiling, is the American sixth fleet in the Mediterranean. The Balkan conflict has made it quite clear how defenceless we really are, and that we Europeans cannot – and probably could not even if we wanted to – intervene in this conflict and resolve it. That shows how very weak we are in the field of security policy too. Remember that the present situation, with the North African states lacking the potential to risk a war with their European neighbours, may not necessarily continue indefinitely!

So we see that we are weak and that basically we have to rely on the American sixth fleet to ensure any stability at all in that region. That is why we should consider making a more concerted effort here than before. As you know, we have a new body, the growing Franco-German

Mr. Müller (continued)

Eurocorps. We should think about creating something of that kind at WEU or NATO level in the Mediterranean, at least for the navy and air force; for, in the long term, I believe this area will always be prone to conflict. And it is always a good idea to be prepared to respond appropriately to the threat of conflict.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I believe that this is very much the time for our Assembly to discuss problems of security in the Mediterranean and in particular how Western European Union can contribute to their solution.

I have previously had occasion to look closely at some aspects of the problems of this geopolitical area and I am convinced that there is at present a tendency to underestimate the growing potential for destabilisation around the Mediterranean. Our Rapporteur has given us a full and careful analysis to which I have nothing to add except my congratulations. In my view it is very important that we should select from the overall context of Mr. Roseta's systematic report a number of points, which have to some extent already been taken up by Mr. Müller, concerning crises which might arise from political, and more especially economic situations in the Mediterranean area.

What I feel to be of very great concern is the pattern of the social, economic and demographic differences between the countries north and south of the Mediterranean. Colleagues who attended the third Mediterranean Regional Conference to which I was able to contribute on the specific rôle of Sicily, from which I come, found that the conference discussed these problems very carefully and in great detail and made very important practical suggestions as a starting point for studies and further planning, as already highlighted in Mr. Roseta's report.

It was stated that the population of Mediterranean countries not belonging to the Community is growing at an explosive rate greatly in excess of the figure for the countries in the EC. While I agree with Mr. Müller that the trend is not the same as before, the rate is certainly most alarming. In 1985, the population split between the EC and the countries around the Mediterranean was 61.5% in the EC and 38.5% in the other Mediterranean countries, with the Mediterranean members of the EC having 22.2% of the total. The EC figure will be down to 53.8% by the year 2000 and to 47.3% by 2015; the fact that the growth trend is not still the same as in previous years is matched by the fact that the growth of European populations is certainly not increasing but is unfortunately declining further. Zero growth is now a fact and we must hope that growth will not fall below zero.

By 2015, there will be 372 million people living in the countries around the Mediterranean as against 333 million living in the EC, including 127 million in the EC Mediterranean countries. In particular, four countries – Turkey, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco – will on their own have a population of about 270 million.

By the year 2000, the number of people aged over 65 in the EC countries will already exceed 18% against less than 6% in the other Mediterranean countries; the present gap is tending to widen because there will still be a difference of about ten years in average life expectancy in the two groups of countries.

Against the background of these facts, which in themselves are not encouraging, we have to note that the growth of industrial and agricultural production in the Mediterranean countries is tending to slow down. Growth in the lowest-income countries fell on average from around 6% from 1965 to 1980 to slightly over 2% from 1980 to 1987; in middle-income countries it fell from about 6.5% to about 3% over these same periods. Growth declined in particular in the industrial sector falling from an average of 6% to 1.9% in the low-income countries and from 5.9% to 3.8% in the middle-income countries.

These are problems which await a solution and can be solved, they are already being partly solved but only through increasingly close co-operation between the countries around the Mediterranean. In the matter of security, it is essential not to lag behind but, as both the Rapporteur and Mr. Müller have said, to anticipate by a vigilant approach looking towards the solutions which will be needed for problems which we can already foresee.

But this is the point of my amendment, focusing on an aspect which is by no means the least important. I am proposing better and increasingly effective maintenance of security in the Mediterranean to be achieved through ever closer collaboration.

I accept Mr. Roseta's judicious argument that it is advisable on both realistic and pragmatic grounds not to go too quickly with what is certainly an important Mediterranean security conference. In all honesty, I must say that the problem is not that of promoting conferences leading on to sub-conferences; the problem is that of an overall policy for the Mediterranean area. My amendment in fact looks for co-ordination of a co-operative strategy for economic policy in the Mediterranean region.

The third Mediterranean Regional Conference held at Taormina a few months ago unanimously approved a resolution for the creation of a foundation on Mediterranean problems, to be set up probably in Palermo – and here one of my hopes comes back to Sicily – to look into the reasons for population move-

Mr. Parisi (continued)

ments, birth rates and population growth and development which may be connected with movement potential and social and economic imbalances liable to arise in this context.

This is an important aspect which Mr. Roseta has dealt with clearly and carefully and it is my reason for proposing the amendment, looking, as it does, toward the time that the CSCE or some other organisation provides a structure for ongoing consultation with the Community institutions and with the institutions involved in European political co-operation in order to combine the search for military security, of which Mr. Müller spoke at length, with the progressive establishment of European Union which will have to be the true guarantor of equilibrium and security in the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to congratulate Mr. Roseta on his report.

The scope and complexity of the report and the nature of its subject matter presented the Rapporteur with enormous difficulties, which have resulted in a contradiction: the draft recommendation does not reflect the skill with which the facts have been set out or the significance of the conclusions. This results in a further contradiction between the reservations I have concerning the text of the recommendations and my appreciation of the document my colleague Pedro Roseta has produced. The text on which we will vote does not reflect the spirit of enlightenment and profound understanding of history which are evident in the analyses and reflections of the report.

Ladies and gentlemen, some members of WEU have quite fiercely defended the creation of a CSCM which would include all the Mediterranean countries and Iran and, to the North, the member states of the EC, Canada, the United States and some republics of the CIS.

In my view this would be quite pointless. No agreements can possibly be reached until there is real progress in the Middle East peace negotiations and a definite improvement in the chaos which reigns in former Yugoslavia.

The Rapporteur was wise to approach the delicate matter of WEU and the Mediterranean by supplying extensive information, but without advancing categorical views and definitive solutions.

The EC's Mediterranean policy is still not clearly defined and contains many unknown factors and contradictions. The security of the Mediterranean is inseparable from the problems of North-South relations. To be more specific, it

is a special part of that complex relationship which has been the subject of innumerable conferences and debates which are little more than rhetorical exercises without practical results. We all know that far from closing up, the chasm between North and South has only deepened. The countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are no exception: they are falling behind. In economic development, as on the scientific and cultural fronts, the distance between the Maghreb and the developed countries of Europe has increased year by year.

It is true – as Mr. Roseta points out – that at the moment none of the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean constitutes any military threat whatsoever to Europe. But it is also true, and quite unacceptable, that big European companies continue to sell sophisticated heavy weapons to countries in that region.

Ladies and gentlemen, it will certainly not be with words and promises of true co-operation – because the co-operation which exists today is a sham – that Europe will help to improve and give some dignity to the terrible living conditions in the Maghreb and in Egypt and reduce the explosive tensions which are brewing there.

Today the population of the Maghreb alone is 65 million. By the end of the century it will be over 85 million. How can we help them? Definitely not by continuing with mistaken policies, the effects of which are well known.

There will be no security in the Mediterranean until Europe takes up as its own problem the struggle against the economic and social underdevelopment of the Islamic countries on the southern shores of the old Roman *Mare Nostrum*. This will not be a philanthropic venture. The economic and humanistic dimension of the Mediterranean problem cannot be dissociated from political and military strategy if we genuinely want to make the Mediterranean an area of stability, peace and real co-operation.

The demographic pressure of the Maghreb on Europe will not be contained by restrictive laws erecting barriers against immigration, nor by irrational displays of racism. That is not the way.

Differences arising out of different political options do not prevent me from saying that Mr. Roseta's report is one of the most important and courageous documents of its kind submitted to our Assembly. Our colleague is correct in stating that only a strong, united and stable Maghreb can be a partner for Europe and make a positive contribution to the peace and prosperity of the continent and throughout the whole of the Mediterranean area. In this case, the demands of economic logic and the transformation of societies go hand in hand with

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

philanthropic imperatives and historical links. Europe's global policy must be altruistic and unpatronising and must not exclude the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Roman.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to congratulate Mr. Roseta on his very full, well-documented and down-to-earth report. Its basic achievement, to my mind, is that it keeps to what is possible, which is extremely important in policy-making generally and absolutely essential when it comes to security and defence policy. The very gradual approach which he suggests should be adopted in the dialogue with the Maghreb countries, in confidence-building measures and in arms control, is, in my view, extremely sensible although I wonder whether Mr. Roseta is being ambitious enough in his aims or instead not a little too tentative in his approach.

The report sets out the various problems in this area: the economic crisis, fundamentalism, migration and also, and I think this aspect could be developed more fully, issues such as the internal economic integration of the Maghreb bloc, problems of indebtedness and financing, which must necessarily be provided by the European Community. The object would be to help bring about agreement on something we do not yet have, namely union between the Maghreb and the European Community. This is obviously a prospect for the future, based on mutual understanding between Europe and North Africa.

The report covers this entire range of problems and, wisely in my view, avoids the kind of over-reaction that can induce a sort of mental paralysis, preventing one from seeing beyond the particular problem one is looking at. Now we have several proposals here, on which I think we are all in agreement. I will summarise them very briefly.

First, Europe cannot feel at ease in security terms if there is tension and instability on its southern flank as a result of major inequalities. Any kind of imbalance makes security solutions not based on co-operation unrealistic.

Second, Europe cannot think in terms of solutions involving disengagement. This would only increase the flow of illegal immigrants and lead to political instability. The European Community and WEU need to balance pan-European awareness and openness to the East against a perception of the Mediterranean region as a natural extension of Europe.

Third, an extension of democratic rights is essential for mutual confidence. Political régimes which fail to respect human rights are highly unlikely to inspire confidence at the nego-

tiating table. Régimes whose legitimacy is not based on an internal consensus tend to seek that legitimacy by picking outside quarrels, or attacking enemies of the nation. In short they are a threat to peace and security.

Fourth, it is difficult to achieve development without a reasonable degree of disarmament. In this particular geographic area arms control can and should be a factor in development.

Fifth, security and stability cannot survive amidst economic chaos and uncertainty. As we are all aware, economic development and co-operation at every level are the very essence of security and its firmest possible pillar.

In conclusion, history tells us how we have drawn closer and come face to face with one another across the Mediterranean divide. Commercial and cultural exchanges have woven special and inextricable relationships between those on the northern and southern shores – relationships born of true complementarity and essential solidarity. Overcoming the problems now facing us will inevitably require a redefinition of these relationships in global terms. Mr. Roseta's excellent report on security in the Mediterranean contributes to that redefinition by bringing to light long-standing prejudices and poorly-understood grievances, both of which could be utterly detrimental to relationships between peoples and areas so widely different from one another. Geographic proximity, history and the interdependence of our interests are taking us, of necessity, ever further along the road to co-operation.

(*Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have read with particular interest and – I admit – great emotion the report drawn up by Mr. Roseta on the subject of security in the Mediterranean.

I say interest, because over a long period of time I have become accustomed to reading his wonderful writings and admiring his eloquent speeches in the Portuguese parliament, where he is set on a course leading to the highest level of our best political minds.

Whatever he has to say enriches our cultural and philanthropic heritage. So I read his report with great enthusiasm, and I really must now congratulate him on the excellent work he has produced.

He has the exceptional and gratifying ability firmly and eloquently to lead us to consider a subject which has not been given due attention by those in power or by the politicians in international decision-making bodies. He has opened up new avenues of thought on aspects which

Mr. Amaral (continued)

must include the concerns of a responsible Europe, where the very fundamental issues of its security, development and peace are concerned.

Because we cannot forget that one of the strongest and most influential elements at the very heart of our western civilisation and culture is that which is born of the Mediterranean way of life, we must applaud the admirable contribution made by Mr. Roseta in the form of the report which we now have the pleasure of discussing.

Europe cannot be a closed fortress, concerned only with its own preoccupations. It wants to guarantee its peace and security and to ensure its progress and development. If Europe is in favour of defending peace, it will have to open itself up to other nations and states and join forces with them to ensure that these objectives are the result of a balance achieved through solidarity and dialogue, in which tolerance and co-operation support the creation of the future we all desire, respecting each nation's culture and identity, recognising and guaranteeing human rights, and defending the rights of the citizen.

However, although such openness is a historical responsibility which Europe assumes in conformity with its purpose, the process must start with Europe's closest neighbours. The Mediterranean is not a sea which divides, a lake on which interests clash, or a battleground of religious contradictions. It must be a crossroads, where civilisations and cultures enrich and revitalise one another. Security, development and peace will be the common denominator which serves as a platform to co-ordinate the efforts to which I have referred. There is a pressing need for Europe to build bridges through dialogue with its southern neighbours.

Mr. Roseta has described the economic, social, cultural and political aspects of the character of each of them. With a masterly hand he has clearly, concisely and impressively drawn the lines of the fabric into which each country weaves its economic, financial, social, religious and political concerns. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia are described with the analytical precision of one who seeks a way into the maze of the many and complex problems. This complete and instructive synthesis leaves us in no doubt as to the urgency and necessity of the issues.

In addition to the cultural, political, economic and demographic factors which affect security in the Mediterranean, allow me briefly to touch upon the political and human rights elements which Mr. Roseta has explained with particular relevance and with his usual skill.

It is a fact that Europe has been encouraging the establishment of truly democratic structures in the southern Mediterranean countries. There is a feeling and an awareness that these are essential elements in a balanced, stable society. In principle they will ensure that citizens have the same rights and obligations and that no one can a priori be denied the right to participate in the structures of power. Democracy is essential to social and economic development, in order to guarantee the defence of human rights and the rights of the citizen. But we also know that democracy can neither be established by law, nor imposed by any authority. It is possible only when it reflects the collective will of a nation which regards it as a liberating force, necessary for the personal development of the individual and the community to which he belongs. But tolerance is possible, and cultures and religions can coexist. This is why Mr. Roseta states explicitly, in paragraph 211 of the report we are discussing:

"On the other hand, it is necessary not to try to impose democratic systems, now part of the European cultural heritage, but which are alien to the indigenous Arab culture and identity."

It is in this context, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in this Europe which is changing with alarming speed, that we enthusiastically support the draft recommendation proposed by Mr. Roseta, for the benefit of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, today, as in the past, the security of both the individual and society as a whole is a major preoccupation. Surveys carried out by a wide variety of specialised institutes have only confirmed this finding.

Europeans, in particular, have every reason to pay the greatest attention to their security. After almost fifty years of peace, albeit based on fear of the nuclear deterrent, Europe is once again experiencing war and undergoing periods of uncertainty and anxiety. Nationalist tendencies and intolerance are perhaps the principal factors responsible for the present instability in Europe, that is to say in Central and Eastern Europe, and events in former Yugoslavia are the most visible expression of this.

Guaranteeing stability and security in the Mediterranean area must, in the present circumstances, be one of the West's main priorities. However, this region is not free from danger either. Some of the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean are faced with the threat of fundamentalist movements; others are facing serious economic, social and demographic problems. Unless appropriate steps are taken, there is a possibility that the internal sta-

Mr. Brito (continued)

bility of the region and its, and our, collective security could be threatened.

As the Rapporteur says in the preamble to this draft recommendation on security in the Mediterranean, this Assembly is not only aware of the interest of Western Europe in maintaining good relations with its neighbours to the East and South, but also considers economic and social prosperity to be a determining factor for the stability of societies and the collective security of nations. I recognise, however, that Europe has been giving particular support to the countries of these two regions, support which is obviously justified, in view of the speed with which events have developed in Central and Eastern Europe.

Although prosperity is not synonymous with security, in the majority of cases it is a condition which fosters it. Though the East needs and must continue to receive our assistance, we cannot and must not stop giving as much assistance as possible to our Mediterranean partners if we want to ensure that in the future, as now, the southern Mediterranean is not to constitute a serious threat.

Nevertheless, as in the case of aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, I believe that we should make this conditional upon an undertaking on the part of the beneficiary countries to respect the values of tolerance and democracy and the importance of law and the safeguarding of human rights.

Although I give priority to economic aid and technical co-operation in the package of measures, which I consider urgent, to encourage dialogue, guarantee stability and ensure peace and security, I subscribe fully to all the other initiatives proposed by the Rapporteur and also to the earliest possible establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, because even if there were no other reasons for supporting it, the success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be sufficient to justify it.

Before I finish, I would like to express my support for the draft recommendation under discussion and congratulate my colleague Mr. Roseta for the excellent report he has presented, which I sincerely hope will be heeded by the responsible European politicians.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Roseta on his report, which comes at both an opportune and a critical time. Political events in Europe have assumed such gravity and acquired such speed and pace that it does not seem possible that all they reflect is the

explosion of fratricidal brutality in former Yugoslavia.

The terrible problem in the Balkans and the difficulties encountered by countries in Central and Eastern Europe blind us to the situation in the South, a region which we, the inhabitants, leaders and democratically-elected representatives of southern Europe call the Mediterranean. Those of us who live in Spain, Portugal, Italy or Greece know and understand the problems of Ukraine, the Baltic countries and Russia, but our neighbours in the South are the peoples of the Maghreb.

Next summer, nearly one million Africans will cross Spain to spend their holidays in the Maghreb. At the beginning of the month of August, between twenty and forty thousand people a day will sail from the port of Algeciras to cross the fourteen kilometres of the Straits of Gibraltar. Yet, once again, the roads will take their deadly toll, with holiday-makers exhausted by journeys of over one or two thousand kilometres liable to be accident casualties during the summer months.

The reason for this situation is that the relationship between Europe and the Maghreb is a North-South, wealth-poverty relationship. The migratory flow from Africa goes northward. Europe represents for the Africans what America represented for our forefathers.

The situation brought about by external debt, absolute dependence not only on external technology but also on food, population growth which is still very high in terms of the capacity for social integration, the runaway expansion of towns or to be more exact shanty-towns leading to the urbanisation of a society which in mentality is still rural in nature, a population with 25% or more under sixteen and the fact that the Islamic tradition makes no separation between lay and religious society, is both inconsistent and explosive.

Given such a situation, what is it possible to do?

As so aptly said by Mr. Roseta in the conclusions to his report: "Europe must include the southern Mediterranean region in its global policy, not only because it has historic links with that region but because henceforward it will not be able to view the various areas around it in isolation from their surroundings."

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have been responsible for the last two years for the report to the sub-committee on the Mediterranean basin of the Civilian Affairs Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and I presented the report recently in Berlin. It is difficult to be optimistic when faced with the problems of North Africa and we have to be courageous enough to admit that there is little time left

Mr. Borderas (continued)

before the situation becomes irreversible. That time we must use as swiftly as we possibly can. As policy-makers it is our responsibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, reading down the list of speakers in this debate it is apparent that the vast majority are from the southern European countries – a perfectly understandable situation given that those who live in southern Europe and around the Mediterranean have a particular awareness of the problems of those areas. However, Mr. President, I am very sorry – and I consider it somewhat unfortunate – that a similar awareness of the problems of the Mediterranean countries is not shared, or at least does not appear to be shared, by parliamentary representatives from the countries of northern Europe, particularly in view of the fact that the issues we are discussing are not solely the concern of the southern European countries but problems which affect Europe as a whole, the entire Mediterranean region, North Africa, and indeed, in my view, the whole world.

The strategic position of the Mediterranean and the nature of the problems that exist there identify it as an area of sensitivity in terms of world security and stability. Thus it was highly appropriate that the Assembly should produce a report on security in the Mediterranean. The report introduced by Mr. Roseta, which was widely discussed in committee, has helped us picture the kinds of problems involved, and Mr. Roseta has made them clearer still, adding possible solutions, or at least suggested solutions, as to how these problems may be quickly resolved.

Mr. Roseta is to be congratulated for his extremely detailed and balanced report and also for his proposals, for although some of us might have wished to see slightly more adventurous suggestions we have to admit that those he has laid before us today are all sound and to the point. This is a good report, and its recommendations are sound.

You know the problems. First and foremost there is that of preserving peace. The situation in the Middle East and in former Yugoslavia both provide clear examples of the problems likely to arise in the Mediterranean – situations like that in Cyprus, where peace does not exist – and needing to be resolved. These are defence questions with both security and, in some cases, military implications. Second, there are problems of political instability within the Mediterranean region and herein lie some of the most disturbing developments for the future: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its destabilising effect in some of the Maghreb countries and the

whole North African area. Naturally, the situation in the Balkans remains far and away the most likely to erupt. We have no solutions as yet nor have we any idea of what consequences may stem from the agreement which we all hope will be reached in the very near future. Nor have we any idea how the situation in the Balkans may develop before a peaceful solution is reached. The problem is the instability arising and the extreme inequalities between North and South, referred to by several speakers.

We are here faced with a highly serious situation. It is not just the contrast between wealth and poverty that gives rise to difficulties; these are compounded, among other factors, by the present population explosion and that forecast during the next few years in the southern Mediterranean regions. These present the risk, as one eminent member of this Assembly has pointed out, not just of large-scale movement of migrants from North African countries in the direction of Europe but of a veritable march into Europe itself.

We are facing an enormous, indeed a massive challenge that requires immediate and urgent action. And there is also, naturally, a need for development in these areas and for co-operation, and a need to transfer technology to help these countries grow and create their own development path.

Lastly, there is another factor which I feel affects the extremely sensitive situation in the Mediterranean area. Here two cultures come into contact and interact: western culture so to speak and the culture of Islam. The latter is going through a difficult phase and there is currently a degree of conflict between the two in both cultural and political terms. We are approaching the point where this may take on serious proportions. All this is happening in the Mediterranean region. There has been growing awareness of the fact in recent years and significant efforts have been made in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has devoted part of its time to the crises in the Mediterranean, by the Inter-Parliamentary Union at the Malaga conference on a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean and in the European Community, which has put forward a number of policies for dealing with the situation in that region; then there is the suggestion for a Mediterranean forum of certain countries, while the African countries have set up the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), an institution designed to be a single channel for dialogue. There is also the Atlantic Alliance itself, which has just held a symposium in Granada on security in the Mediterranean.

These initiatives are already under way and are, so to speak, making haste slowly, but progressing nevertheless. The concern is there. We

Mr. de Puig (continued)

have set out the problems and in so doing have also to some extent opened up possibilities of finding solutions.

In conclusion, I should just like to refer to one proposal – the Spanish proposal for a conference on co-operation and security in the Mediterranean, with the backing of the Portuguese and the support of the Italians and the French, though it has, for the moment, lost momentum. However, my own view is that this has to be the master solution in the medium term for whilst it is true that all institutions and forums ought to concern themselves with the problems of the Mediterranean, it is equally true that a number of institutions are operational in the area, for example the EC, NATO, Forum, etc., so that there are several institutions putting forward their own piecemeal solutions bilaterally, multilaterally or unilaterally without any overall strategy for a global approach to the problem. I refer to solutions and arrangements of a political nature between the countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean, economic agreements between North and South and – why not? – even security arrangements, i.e. those dealt with in this report, which of course are urgently needed.

I would therefore add to this list an initiative on cultural understanding and dialogue because there are differences in principle, some of a religious nature, which also need to be taken into consideration and tabled for discussion so that we have a full picture of everything coming under the heading of dialogue and co-operation in this area of Europe.

In my view WEU needs to be watchful and supportive and we should all vote for the proposals for dialogue and co-operation contained in Mr. Roseta's report in the hope that our concern over the situation in the Mediterranean will quickly enable us to find legal and political solutions for dealing with these problems clearly and effectively.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Roseta, the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – May I begin by thanking the speakers in this debate for their more than kind words about me, and also for their thoughts, suggestions and criticisms. They have underlined the aspects largely deserving emphasis for the observers and other visitors with us today.

I am naturally very much aware that things are not very bright. You certainly realised this when reading the explanatory memorandum, and I said so myself a few moments ago. Conflicts, mainly potential, are there. We hear of ter-

rorist attacks and the emergence of fundamentalism, a doctrine advanced by certain forces and I specifically mentioned Iran. We all know about it. Nor, of course, do I forget those serious problems which go beyond security in the strict sense and are closely linked with unemployment, the frustrations of young people and their lack of prospects for the future, and uncontrolled urban expansion. Mr. Borderas rightly noted that these giant cities consist of people whose mentality is still very rural. They come from the countryside and live in shanty-towns, sometimes even in the tombs of the dead. Their living conditions are unimaginably bad.

The problems of pollution and the environment raised by Mr. Müller and referred to in the explanatory memorandum to my report, are another field for co-operation. Not, perhaps, in WEU, but in the partnership just set up by the European Community; this co-operation should concern not only the pollution of the Mediterranean but also that of the air, rivers, soil, etc.

Mr. Müller spoke of the population explosion and poverty. So did I in my explanatory memorandum, but some distinctions have to be made. A wide range of statistics and forecasts in particular, advanced by experts or institutions like the Institut National d'Études Démographiques in Paris, suggest that as urbanisation proceeds and development takes off, at least in some countries, the fertility rate falls and does so very rapidly. However, it should be realised that for some years to come, possibly decades, a vital problem will continue to arise in the short and medium term, namely the arrival, year after year, of young people on the labour market. Only some of them – a greater or lesser proportion depending on the country – will find employment. In Tunisia, for example, it is 80% and in other countries 50%, but in some cases it can be disastrously low. The answer is to be found in development, technology transfer and communicating techniques for building a modern society and above all developing an efficient and stimulating administration. Some European organisations have not yet realised how important it has become, if the economies of the countries of southern Europe are to take off, that they should have capable, efficient and, if possible, incorrupt forms of government. We should not mince our words. However, to have a government of this kind modern management techniques have to be mastered not only at central but also at local and regional levels.

I agree with Mr. Müller's reference to the great challenge posed by the problem of propagating cultures while respecting diversity in a spirit of tolerance. I said the same thing myself, and I thank him for this further emphasis.

Mr. Müller also raised the question of whether WEU should act in the Mediterranean. My reply is a clear yes. The five amendments tabled will

Mr. Roseta (continued)

add to and reinforce the draft recommendation in that direction. I consider that WEU has a right to be heard, not only as regards encouragement for bilateral training programmes and exchanges in the military and other fields, but also in the introduction of confidence-building measures, the gradual development of a dialogue with the Maghreb countries, and encouragement for the efforts of member countries to avoid the proliferation of dangerous weapons. It is absurd that countries which have to find ways of feeding, housing and employing young people should apply national resources to the production of such weapons.

To Mr. Parisi, who referred to the alarming gap between North and South, my answer is that it can be bridged. As you know, in other parts of the world, and I am thinking particularly of some Asian countries, we see evidence of impressive economic take-off. Take-off is also possible in these other areas. We must try to prevent the gap being widened in the short term by the development of an explosive situation. This should be our rôle not as WEU members, but as Europeans. The Community must promote a policy to narrow the gap.

As regards security problems, I entirely agree with Mr. Parisi. Like me, he considers that we should not be over hasty in setting up the CSCM. I shall revert to this when we debate the amendments – to which I am not opposed, but which should be qualified as regards timing. If not, we could lose hold of reality and be too early with a conference which cannot and should not be organised at this stage if we do not want to strangle a worthwhile idea at birth. As Mr. de Puig rightly said, in the medium term the CSCM is a worthwhile project but it should not be put into effect before the conflicts are over, particularly that in former Yugoslavia, or before the successful conclusion of the peace process in the Middle East. Over-hasty action could lead us up a blind alley and have us holding a pointless conference brought to a halt by two or three armed conflicts which it would be powerless to solve. I shall revert to this when we debate the amendments to which I agree, subject to further slight amendment.

I shall reply to my Portuguese colleagues at the end of my statement.

Like Mr. Roman, I am against any kind of alarmist behaviour which can be both paralysing and very dangerous. But I reject the adjective timid with which he qualified some of the measures I propose. These measures are realistic, bearing in mind the present situation. I am a step-by-step man, and as this is a question of a first step by our Assembly with a view to achieving the broadest possible consensus – as we shall shortly see – I consider it more prudent

to advance on firm ground. At a later stage, in one or two years, we might envisage more specific measures, for example in our Political Committee. I have it in mind that the Defence Committee and also other committees may wish to report on this region.

I thank Mr. Roman for his other comments. The spread of democracy is indeed a fundamental need and Europe should not retreat into its shell.

I shall reply more fully to Mr. Amaral later on, but may I say immediately that we should not transpose models too mechanically. Human rights, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, are one thing, and concrete democratic systems are another. If we tried to transfer institutions as they stand to countries with wholly different traditions which have to be respected, it would be a total failure. However, you agree with me on this point.

You concluded with a very important remark, that we must leave our prejudices and failures to understand, rooted deep in history, behind us. I have found examples on both sides. Mr. Müller, for example, spoke of the alarming cases of rejection in Germany, but these can be found all over and even on the other side there are people who consider that Europe represents not a military threat but a threat in the sense that it offends those countries' values with its media systems and an invasive culture. Encouraging tolerance and dialogue is the way to overcome these fears and mistrust.

I fully share Mr. Borderas's approach, namely that it is difficult to be optimistic, but that we do have the time we need to avoid being trapped in irreversible situations. I firmly believe that by taking many different and overall approaches, not just commercial, financial and others as before but concerning also security, and therefore WEU, Europe can avoid arriving at such extremities by encouraging confidence-building measures, a climate of confidence and naturally also development itself.

The two-culture dialectic referred to by Mr. de Puig is in my view rewarding. It exists. There are dividing barriers, but improved knowledge and a better dialogue can make cultures mutually enriching. As regards political instability, the sources of Islamic fundamentalism have to be combated. As I said, these are domestic unemployment, the frustration of young people, poor housing and little or no economic development; but some sources are external, and therefore concern us. We should be aware that, for example, Iran and Sudan are turntables threatening the stability of countries on the Mediterranean. Not only must we not forget it, we should also draw the appropriate conclusions both in WEU and other organisations which, together with the governments of our member

Mr. Roseta (continued)

countries, should exert pressure in the necessary way so that countries such as Iran and Sudan cease to act in this way.

As regards the proposal relating to the CSCM, I agree with Mr. de Puig that too many institutions are involved. But before passing on to the general forum we have to move forward in the case-by-case dialogue. Beyond the problem of peace in the Near East and the problem of former Yugoslavia, there are the aspirations these countries have. They vary: Egypt, in company with other countries as you have just said, favours the Mediterranean forum, others prefer a country-by-country dialogue and the Maghreb countries want a 5 + 5 dialogue or a dialogue with Europe + 5, i.e. Europe with the AMU. But quite apart from these wishes, what is both important and at the same time more realistic because it is more gradual and positive, is the need to make progress in resolving the conflict and to set up the CSCM thereafter. I hope that everyone will accept the sub-amendment I shall shortly table, since the proposal it contains is in my view the only realistic way of preventing the idea of a CSCM being throttled at birth.

(The speaker continued in Portuguese)

I would like to thank my Portuguese colleagues, Mr. Amaral, Mr. Rodrigues and Mr. Brito, for their kind words. I do not have a great deal to add to what has already been said.

Mr. Rodrigues mentioned a certain contradiction between the recommendation and the report because, in his opinion, the recommendation fell short of the report. I would like to say that, with the proposed amendments I am about to present, this criticism will no longer be entirely valid, once I have had the opportunity to propose, and see approved in the Political Committee, amendments which reduce the force of this criticism as regards the final part of the recommendation to the Council. In any event, it would be difficult to take the whole text and all the ideas in the preamble and carry them over into the draft recommendation. It is a difficult choice to make, but I believe that if one reads the preamble, the essential points are there. Not everything, but what I believe to be the essential part.

I agree with him when he says that the economic and social aspects cannot be divorced from the military and security problems. They are indivisible, and cannot be separated. I believe that it is this global approach which could lead to an understanding, through dialogue, of the problems of the countries in question.

It would also like to thank Mr. Amaral for his kind words. He knows how much I appreciate it,

but the fact that he is a valued friend of long standing makes me tend to discount his compliments a little.

I would like to say that tolerance and the coexistence of different cultures within a pluralistic system are, in fact, fundamental, rather than the adoption of exported models, as I recently said to another colleague. What is essential and universal is respect for human rights. We know that in some countries – and I myself mentioned, by way of example, the treatment of detainees – there are real problems. Indeed, Amnesty International and other organisations have already raised this matter. But we must not forget either that many of these countries are making an effort to overcome these problems. In a few days' time, on 25th June, there will be free, multi-party elections in Morocco. Morocco has a new constitution which, in its preamble, accepts human rights as they are universally recognised. There is greater press freedom in practically all the countries of North Africa. Tunisia is preparing for multi-party elections in the spring of 1994; Egypt already has a parliament with a number of different parties.

I believe that it is possible – and this is where we have a part to play – to apply pressure so that human rights are respected. Obviously it would be a different matter, as I said earlier, to export specific models. Democracy has many different facets, and obviously we cannot impose a model, be it British, French, Portuguese, or any other – that would be ridiculous. They must be permitted to develop their own model of an advanced society, although we must certainly make it clear that without democracy there will be no development. It is absurd to think that there can be development without freedom of cultural creativity, and private initiative in all areas.

Finally, I would also like to thank Mr. Brito for his comments. I agree with practically all he said, even as regards the CSCE. I acknowledge that the success of the CSCE is a stimulus but, in spite of everything, I would like to remind him that the circumstances are completely different. The CSCE did not start with open warfare raging, as it is today in former Yugoslavia; the CSCE did not start in the middle of a difficult situation, of which there are now many. In my view the analogy of the CSCM and CSCE can be real only when we succeed in overcoming those immediate obstacles.

Thank you all very much. In a moment I will ask the President to give me the floor to present the two proposed amendments. I believe that with my proposals, duly amended by those of Mr. Atkinson and his colleagues and those of Mr. Parisi, my draft recommendation will be greatly improved.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

The President (continued)

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to reply briefly?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – After the elegant and rich reply given by the Rapporteur, I can be brief. First, I express our gratitude and compliments to the Rapporteur for his great expertise, for his south European enthusiasm and temperament, and for his inspired and inspiring words.

Second, listening to the debate, I could imagine that some who are not familiar with the subject would feel that it was most important for south Europeans. That would be wrong, as Mr. Müller said. The subject is vital for the whole of Europe, as Mr. Borderas declared. The whole complex of relevant factors could cause a risky situation. Not much time may be left before an irreversible situation arises. Mr. Roman wondered whether the Rapporteur had been over-ambitious. That may be so, but on the other hand, we had to make our selection. I fully understand that some feel that it could be worth while to give more attention to other aspects. Nevertheless, this was a marvellous choice.

Third, the committee decided during the debate on the amendments to be as positive, as productive and as co-operative as possible. I hope that the Assembly will adopt the text, unanimously if possible.

(*Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – The Political Committee has produced in Document 1371 a draft recommendation to which five amendments have been tabled. The amendments will be called in the order in which they relate to the text, that is, Amendments 1, 5, 4, 2 and 3.

Amendment 1 is as follows:

1. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) which would seek to emulate the success of the CSCE in arms control and reduction, enhanced security through confidence-building measures, and the protection of human and minority rights;”

I call Mr. Atkinson to move Amendment 1.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I resisted the temptation to speak at length in support of the amendments in the general debate. I hope that they are self-explanatory and I am grateful to the many colleagues who have signed them. All of us here acknowledge the success of the CSCE process in the control of arms in Europe, in respecting frontiers in

Europe and especially in the confidence-building measures and mechanisms which have been developed to avoid conflict, to encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes and to encourage respect for human rights and minority rights in Europe, which contributed so much to the end of the cold war in Europe.

The CSCE process was, of course, never involved in Yugoslavia. My amendments seek to apply the CSCE experience to the Mediterranean and to the Middle East. The CSCM would be the appropriate next step, as soon as the peace process succeeds, I hope, in resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict, to maintain dialogue and consensus in the region. It is not a new proposal, but Mr. Roseta's report refers to it only as a very long-term project. That means that it will continue to be ignored and that it will continue to be shelved, which would be a mistake. I believe that the WEU Council should pursue the CSCM with the utmost vigour and commitment. I hope that the Assembly will endorse my amendments which call on it to do so.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Would the Rapporteur or the Chairman like to make a comment?...

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – The committee approved Amendment 1 as it stands. This is a question of principle, and we are not against principles.

However, I propose to the author of the amendment that he agree, since the Political Committee so voted, that his text be inserted after paragraph (vii) of the preamble, not after paragraph (iv). This is purely a matter of order. The Political Committee thought that this order was better. The amendment would then become new paragraph (viii) instead of (v).

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I have had an acknowledgment from Mr. Atkinson that he agrees with Mr. Roseta's suggestion, which is helpful.

We shall therefore vote in the usual way by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 5 reads:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert:

“(ix) Convinced nevertheless that the risk of proliferation of weapons systems and technology, whether nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region;”

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Roseta to move Amendment 5.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Amendment 5 is designed to word the thought of the Rapporteur and the Political Committee – which approved it unanimously – more precisely by replacing a somewhat contradictory text by the preceding paragraph.

To say that the Assembly is “convinced that the risk of weapons systems... might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace and stability in the Mediterranean region” is more correct than to say that the risk is already a threat. A risk which may be confirmed cannot already be a threat.

I think that we are all in agreement. This is merely a clarification of the thinking of the Rapporteur and the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Does the Chairman want to say anything?...

As he does not, we shall vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 4, which reads:

4. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest in the development, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean countries;”.

I call Mr. Roseta to move the amendment.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – This amendment, which in my view gets round certain criticism, in particular that of Mr. Rodrigues, is also designed to convey the thinking of the report, which is perhaps somewhat remote from the operative paragraphs of the recommendation, more explicitly.

We should clearly recommend that the Council: “In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest” – the interest of WEU as a whole – “in the development, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean countries”.

This is a clarification, in the recommendation, of the thinking in the report, where the plan is that security be secured by the combination

of all these factors. I noted, incidentally, that Mr. Parisi, without knowing of my amendment, which came later – and I did not know of his either – expressed much the same notion.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendment 2, which reads as follows:

2. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and pursue its establishment with vigour and perseverance;”.

I call Mr. Atkinson to move Amendment 2.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Roseta has just told us that he is not against the principle of a CSCM. Therefore, he will undoubtedly wish to support the amendment, which asks the WEU Council to commit itself to that principle and pursue it with the utmost vigour.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not intend to speak against the amendment but rather to table an oral amendment to the amendment which was approved by a very large majority, not to say unanimously, in the Political Committee. May I ask for the attention of Mr. Atkinson and his colleagues.

I maintain our request to the Council to commit itself to the principle of a CSCM. We are all agreed. I repeat I also agree. However, in order to avoid creating a major division between us just on this one point, preventing me from voting in favour, I propose that we add the words “at the appropriate time”, after “commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and”, the rest of the amendment remaining unchanged.

All the Political Committee is asking you to do is to agree to the introduction of these three words. The reason is that it is one thing to invite the Council to commit itself now to the principle of a CSCM, and another thing to recommend it “at the appropriate time” – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps in three months’ time, perhaps in a year – “to pursue its establishment with vigour and perseverance”.

Mr. Roseta (continued)

I hope that we can avoid holding two separate votes but, as Rapporteur, I am unable to agree to your amendment without this oral amendment, since it is contrary to the spirit of the report and because I consider it entirely unrealistic to set up a CSCM immediately. The effect would be to call the idea of a CSCM in question, and even kill it outright.

According to everyone I have spoken to from the southern shores of the Mediterranean, if we launch the idea of a CSCM immediately, it will not last two weeks. We do not want to go into discussions on procedure and lose an idea which in the medium term should be saved. In the report, I spoke of the long term, but that was my mistake.

In conclusion, Mr. Atkinson, I want to save this idea; in the medium term, I do not wish to see it launched now, against the wishes of the majority of countries and in circumstances which would lead to its being negated once and for all.

The PRESIDENT. – I thought that we were getting too much sweetness and light. Mr. Atkinson has indicated that he is not prepared to adopt Mr. Roseta's suggestion. I understand that Mr. Stoffelen wishes to comment.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I noticed from looking at you, Mr. President, and at Mr. Atkinson, that there is some misunderstanding.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – That is right.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Wait a second. Mr. Atkinson and many other colleagues want to make it clear that we must pursue this issue with the utmost energy. We do not oppose that. The only thing that we say is that we must face reality and be aware that this tremendous activity, which could start now, must take into account feasibility. We must recognise the problems. It would be wrong to think that if we decided to set up a CSCM, it could be a practical system tomorrow. We must bear in mind that the moment must be suitable and appropriate. In the committee we did not speak about the medium term. The position is clear to everyone, whether or not an amendment has been tabled. If we could represent the Council of Ministers, we would agree that we want to see a CSCM created as soon as possible, if possible tomorrow. But we must face reality. We must choose the right moment at which it will be possible to achieve the consent of all the relevant countries. Our activity and energy must not be blind. We must use a wise energy and bear in mind the feasibility of what we are doing. That is what we want to make clear. I hope that our difference is more or less about a form of words.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Atkinson, do you wish to press your amendment?

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, I do, because, once we put in the words "at the appropriate time", we give excuses for further delay and procrastination and for shelving the pursuit of the concept of a CSCM, to which so many speakers in the debate gave their support. I think that my amendment is clear. We are asking the WEU Council to commit itself to the principle and pursue it with the utmost vigour and commitment. No further clarity than that is required. If we accept the sub-amendment, I fear that we shall give excuses for further delay.

The PRESIDENT. – The amendment to the amendment is to add "at the appropriate time" after "CSCM and".

We will now vote on Mr. Roseta's amendment to the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amendment to Amendment 2 is agreed to.

I will now put Amendment 2, as amended, to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

We now move on to Amendment 3, which reads as follows:

3. After the last paragraph of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Hold effective consultations with the Community institutions and European political co-operation so that action to ensure military security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of political and economic co-operation in the region."

I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not think I need say anything further after the earlier remarks of the Rapporteur, Mr. Roseta, because the amendment is self-explanatory. It seems to me that the need to set up a realistic agreement for bringing the CSCM into being calls for immediate action to co-ordinate the requirements of military security and the strategy for political and economic co-operation.

Mr. Roseta has already said that he agrees and that there is no harm in having too much. My feeling is that in this case it may be better to make the most of having too much.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Parisi.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not wish to speak against the amendment but may I remind Mr. Parisi that the Political Committee passed his amendment subject to a minor sub-amendment, of little importance, and I am sure he will agree.

Amendment 3 states: "...so that action to ensure military security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of political and economic co-operation in the region". The word "military" can be deleted, since in our view action with security in view is not solely military. No doubt you agree.

It should however be stressed that we are recommending that effective consultations should be held, not that the matter should be referred to the European Commission. It is the WEU Council and the Political Committee, as well, that should hold effective consultations with the Community institutions, so as to avoid duplication of work and misunderstandings. So, if you agree, we can delete the word "military" and then proceed to a vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I think I am right in saying that you agree, Mr. Parisi?

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my amendment seeks to underline the economic and demographic aspects of population movements, which I believe almost obviously give a positive answer to the Rapporteur's request. I therefore have no objection. On behalf of the committee I accept the Rapporteur's request. What I am seeking is a clear statement of the strategy for economic and political co-operation in the overall context of Mediterranean security.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Parisi.

I shall put the amendment to Amendment 3 first.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amendment to Amendment 3 is agreed to.

I shall now put Amendment 3, as amended, to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3, as amended, is agreed to unanimously.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1371, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives wish to vote by roll-call they must say so.

Does anyone wish to have a roll-call vote?...

No. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted unanimously¹.

Congratulations, Mr. Roseta.

6. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1369)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on the interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, Document 1369.

I call Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Political Committee of our Assembly asked me to produce the report on the interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The contested passage reads as follows: The treaty shall "remain in force for fifty years. After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto". Clarification of this question, which is the purpose of this report, is important for several reasons, one being that our Assembly's interpretation of Article XII is not the same as the Council's. Whereas some members of the Assembly argue that the starting-point, or entry into force, of the modified Brussels Treaty is the year 1954, the Council dates its entry into force from 1948, so the fifty-year clause in Article XII means that a member state of Western European Union could cease to be a party to the modified Brussels Treaty either fifty years after 1948 according to the Council's interpretation, or fifty years after the entry into force of the modified Brussels Treaty according to the Assembly's interpretation, i.e. in 2005.

It is in our interest that the Assembly and the Council should take the same view for obvious reasons, one being the credibility of the organisation as a whole. In the draft recommendation before you the Council is urged to concur with the Assembly's juridically-based interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, according to which the 1954 Paris Agreements establish a new treaty, and to conform to it.

The Assembly is of the opinion that the 1954 Paris Protocols are not simply a revision of the

1. See page 29.

Mr. Goerens (continued)

1948 Brussels Treaty, but establish a new treaty. As an assembly, we consider that the 1954 treaty is a new treaty because the protocols negotiated under the Paris Agreements are directed towards new goals, because they are the basis of a European union whose vocation is to be enlarged and entirely new means are implemented, because the Paris Agreements are not limited to Protocol No. 1, which modifies the Brussels Treaty but includes three other protocols whose aim is different, because these protocols create a new organisation and because, for the first time, they associate the parliaments of the High Contracting Parties with the application of an alliance.

The Council takes an entirely different view. On 5th April 1993, the Council sent a written answer to parliamentary questions 306, 309, 314 and 315 on the subject dealt with in this report which was a kind of sequel to what was already written into the Maastricht Treaty, where Article J4, paragraph 6, reads: "With a view to furthering the objective of this treaty" – i.e. the Maastricht Treaty – "and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty," – this is a legal absurdity since the Brussels Treaty had only ten articles – "the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N, paragraph 2, on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then".

So the Council considers that the date of entry into force of the treaty that is the juridical basis of our organisation is 25th August 1948. This reply by the Council is all the more surprising in that Mr. Colombo, Chairman-in-Office, at a joint meeting of the Presidential Committee of our Assembly and the Council on 18th November 1992, accepted the principle of a consultation of independent legal experts. To our knowledge, there has been no meeting of legal experts from member countries.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as I have just said, the Council's reply is most surprising and I should like to read it out to you:

"B. A legal obligation to submit diverging interpretations or disputes to independent arbitration cannot be found in the modified Brussels Treaty, nor in any other binding act applicable within Western European Union. There is no evidence of a constitutional practice within WEU envisaging independent arbitration upon request by one of its bodies. Furthermore, there exists no general legal obligation upon the bodies and organs of an international organisation to submit diverging interpretations or disputes to independent arbitration. However, the Council does not

foreclose the possibility for further evaluation of additional considerations that the Assembly might wish to present."

It is on this last sentence of the Council's reply to the Assembly that the present report is based.

What are these additional considerations?

The Assembly considers that there is no case for asking any authority to arbitrate on these disagreements between the Council and the Assembly. The Assembly's view is that the Assembly's prerogatives, as defined in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, give the Assembly a right of scrutiny and this right includes the Council's interpretation of the treaty – in this case, Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Assembly has never asked for arbitration, as the Council claims.

The Council invokes the absence of any constitutional examples; it says there is no precedent. Of course, there is no precedent, since the modified Brussels Treaty is the first treaty of alliance to subject government action to scrutiny by a new parliamentary assembly.

As regards the substantive issue, the Council admits that Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty is a denunciation clause, not a termination clause. We agree with the Council on this, but not on its other points constituting the basic reasons why the Council holds a different view from that of the Assembly.

The Assembly considers that the Paris Agreements bring an entirely new treaty into being. To find the reasons for this declaration by the Assembly, we have to go back to the history of the 1950s, i.e. to 30th August 1954, when, in a vote on a previous question, the French National Assembly rejected the treaty setting up a European defence community. That treaty had been signed by the six founder members of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and its purpose was to allow the Federal Republic of Germany to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, a condition insisted on by the United States for deploying its forces on the territory of the Federal Republic in the framework of NATO.

Thus the aim of the NATO countries was to find a formula whereby the Federal Republic could join NATO while satisfying the French Parliament on a number of points: ensuring (i) a link between community Europe and defence Europe, as the Council had done for handling economic matters with the United Kingdom, which, in 1954, did not belong to the ECSC nor, subsequently, to the EEC or Euratom, (ii) the participation of the United Kingdom in the organisation of Europe's defence, (iii) controlled limitation of the levels of forces and armaments of the Federal Republic of Germany which, at the same time, placed the latter on an equal footing with its allies and (iv) compatibility

Mr. Goerens (continued)

between these obligations and the participation of member countries in NATO.

It was for practical reasons that, between 28th September and 30th October 1954, the Seven plus the United States and Canada took the 1948 Brussels Treaty as a basis for their discussion and work. The 1948 treaty was obviously still in force at that time, but it had lost all practical impact. Moreover, the community treaty setting up the European defence community was intended to replace it completely. This was the purpose of the four protocols comprising the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954. Of these protocols, only Protocol No. I modified the Brussels Treaty, whereas the others did not even refer to it. This proves that these protocols could take up sections of one treaty that never came into force, and also refer to another treaty with no practical impact.

In order to keep to my time-limit, I shall sum up the Assembly's attitude to the problem which now regrettably opposes it to the Council. The Assembly considers that the starting point for the application of the fifty year clause, as it is generally known, is the modified Brussels Treaty, not the Brussels Treaty, as argued by the Council, for reasons I shall list briefly: (i) the aim of the treaty is new; (ii) the 1954 agreements concern a new entity. The accession of Germany and Italy to the Paris Agreements was not, as the Council claims, a simple enlargement of the Brussels Treaty to include two new members; in view of the importance of those countries, it completely transformed the nature of the coalition by giving it a European dimension; (iii) the Paris Agreements established a new organisation, as indicated by the new title. The Western Union of 1948 was the prolongation, for the countries concerned, of the 1945 alliance. The Western European Union of 1954 was no longer just an alliance but the military aspect of the building of a new Europe whose defence was organised in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, as underlined in Article IV of the new treaty; (iv) the Paris Agreements are not limited to Protocol No. I. This is obvious, if only from a look at Protocols Nos. II, III and IV. It is obviously the new entity set up by the Paris Agreements that is concerned by Article XII of the 1954 treaty, even if its text is identical with that of Article X of the 1948 treaty.

I shall confine myself to this statement of the reasons which have led the Political Committee to propose to the Assembly the draft recommendation presented, prompted by an offer from the chairmanship-in-office of the Council to the effect that, in the light of new facts or arguments, the Council would be prepared to review its position – or at least, this is what I understood. We, on our side, are thus at an end of

what we have to do and at the final stage in the dialogue with the Council on the interpretation of Article XII. It is now for the Council to respond and the purpose of this report is to solicit that reply.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Goerens. The formidable nature of this interpretation has probably dissuaded members from putting down their names to speak. We have only one name on the list of speakers, but, as far as I can see, Mr. Ferrarini is not here, so we shall not have the debate. The Chairman of the committee is, however, present, and I am delighted to give him the floor.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – One could say that what is at stake is just a legal problem, but as I am a lawyer and a former Chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, I would not describe a legal problem as “just” a legal problem.

The text of the report is abundantly clear. At stake is the relationship between this Assembly and the Council. I can put it another way. We all agree that we want to act as a parliament. We represent the people. We are addressing ourselves to governments – the Council being the representative of governments. In the relationship between a parliament and a government, the government should be able to convince the parliament. If it does, the parliament accepts the government's proposals. The reverse is also true. The only action open to us is to explain again why we hold our opinion. We are trying to convince the government but, in a way, we are being too reasonable and too moderate. We must blame ourselves. We are repeating our offer. If we and the government cannot agree, we should ask the opinion of others. We could easily find ways in which to do that.

It should be unthinkable that a government would be unwilling to respect a moderate request made by the representatives of the people. I fear that the credibility of this Assembly is at stake.

The Council needs to take the Assembly seriously.

Despite the fact that the Assembly has so much confidence in the Rapporteur and the committee that no one wished to speak in the debate, and despite the fact that we all know that the method is an extremely relevant legal method, there is much more to it than that. Therefore, even on this subject I make a plea for peaceful relations. I sincerely hope that the government – the Council – is willing to have peaceful relations with the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen, for a very clear speech. I am sure that it was greatly appreciated by the Assembly.

The President (continued)

The debate is now concluded. The order of business provides for the vote on the draft recommendation to be taken this afternoon. For technical reasons, it is probably better to stick to that arrangement. I hope that the Assembly is content with that.

***7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

2. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (Debate and vote on the motion to disagree, Document 1376).
3. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1369).
4. European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1370).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.20 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Lord Finsberg, Mr. Cox, Mr. Davis.
4. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Debate and vote on the motion to disagree*, Doc. 1376).
Speakers: Mr. Soell, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman of the Political Committee).
5. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1369).
6. European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1370).
Speakers: Mr. Marshall (Rapporteur), Mr. Soell, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Slatinsky (Observer from Bulgaria), Mr. Marshall (Rapporteur), Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman).
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome Mr. Poos warmly. He is an old friend of the Assembly. Seven years ago, he was the Chairman-in-Office of Western European Union. If I may say so without offence, he did an extremely valuable job, which was recognised on all sides. That is why we are delighted that we have the reincarnation, seven years later, of a very busy man, who in his time has also been Chairman-in-Office of the European Commission.

As I said in delineating his posts in his government, he is a man of considerable activity and an important man in Luxembourg.

You are very welcome, Mr. Poos. You have been to our official lunch today where you explained to me that although you are a Chairman-in-Office in waiting – you will shortly come into post – and although you are happy to have questions, you do not especially want to be questioned on the issues that so many people have been trying to raise this week because it would mean jumping the fences a little early. We know, sir, that you have very much at heart the anxieties that have been expressed by the Assembly generally and by individual members of it.

Yesterday, I sought to defuse some of the understandable anger felt by some members. I endeavoured to try to get some harmony into the talks about this matter. I always believe that dialogue can save situations far better than confrontation. I know that we look forward very much, both at the level of the secretariat and at the political and parliamentary level, to having dialogue, not only with me as President, but

1. See page 32.

The President (continued)

with a number of our committees which will visit Luxembourg during Luxembourg's presidency.

Therefore, it is a particular pleasure to welcome you here today to talk to us and to ask you to answer questions afterwards. I ask you, sir, if you would be kind enough to address us.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, with the end of the cold war and of the East-West confrontation, the geopolitical map of Europe is radically changed. The old political and military threat no longer exists. On the other hand, the persistence of conflicts in Europe and around its borders reminds us that we are still far from the pan-European peace which we hoped would be established quickly after the revolutions of 1989.

There is now a greater risk of crises resulting in human tragedy, which in many cases threaten to escalate and spill over into neighbouring countries and endanger the stability and even the security of Europe.

The international community and Europe in particular must organise themselves so that they can deal with two problems – existing conflicts and the prevention of new crises.

Your former President, Professor Hartmut Soell, invited me to say a few words to you about Europe's security architecture and the rôle of WEU. I accepted with the greatest pleasure this invitation from the outgoing President who has made an outstanding contribution to the future and political rôle of the WEU Assembly.

The crisis in former Yugoslavia is a concrete example of what is facing Europe and, through Europe, the whole international community. The barbaric ethnic cleansing and the atrocities perpetrated in its name are an outrage to all the principles and values of a civilised society. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is continuing despite all attempts at peaceful, political settlements, the displays of extreme nationalism at our frontiers – or even the attractions of fundamentalism – the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – discussed in Mr. Lenzer's excellent report – the existence of uncontrolled nuclear weapons and waste just outside the confines of Europe are all new challenges facing our continent in the closing years of the century.

In the case of Yugoslavia, we are all well aware of the disappointment and even frustration felt by our people over the fact that the international organisations are powerless to stop the fighting and the massive violations of human rights. Having said that, I do not agree

with some of the media which seek to blame the Atlantic Alliance, the European Communities and even WEU, for the continuation of the fighting. Let us have no more of the jeremiads accusing the international and European institutions of being feeble and harking back to the spirit of Munich.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the fact that responsibility for starting the fighting does not seem to me to be clearly established, we are not witnessing a classical war of aggression. What is going on at present in Bosnia is a civil war between three ethnic groups for the conquest of territory; their common feature is unrestrained nationalism sometimes fuelled by a longing for revenge going back far into history.

Our governments and the organisations to which we belong have done everything in their power to promote a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Everyone rejects the two alternative extreme attitudes to the war. The first would be to do nothing and to let events take their course. The second would be to send a powerful imperial army which would have to occupy the country and stay there indefinitely with all the risks this would involve.

Faced with these two extremes, which no one, no government, no parliament belonging to our organisation recommends, we are therefore reduced to working through political, diplomatic and economic channels to win respect for international law and prevent internationalisation of the conflict.

Persuasion and political and economic pressure on the warring parties and particularly on the Serbs, together with humanitarian aid to the civilian population formed the basis of the European Community's policy, beginning with the sending of the troika missions, followed by the sending of Community observers, the appointment of the European mediators and negotiators, Lord Carrington and Lord Owen, and the convening of the London International Conference.

The Twelve, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance are now unanimous in regarding the Vance-Owen plan as the central strategic element of their policy in Bosnia. Resolution 836 of the United Nations Security Council, which will probably be followed by others, is intended to ensure the progressive implementation of the plan on the ground. This will take a long time and will require a great deal of patience. Lastly, a little more humility will be needed and this is no doubt the wisest advice given to us in Luxembourg last week by the representative of the strongest military power in the world.

At this critical moment in the history of our continent we must all realise exactly where our responsibility lies. It is only in that way that we shall defeat the forces of racism, hate and bar-

Mr. Poos (continued)

barism and win the day for the law and for human rights, tolerance and democracy.

As things stand at present, therefore, with more and more factors involving risks and instability, we must not relax our determination to achieve our common objectives, which are the strengthening of security and stability in Europe.

The terrible crisis in Yugoslavia demonstrates very clearly that the international organisations responsible for security must co-operate closely. They must also focus the political will of their member states on finding effective means of preventing conflicts, managing crises and keeping the peace.

As complementary institutions which reinforce each other, the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO, the European Community and WEU must contribute to European security. No institution is capable on its own of meeting all the challenges facing us. Each one will have to play its full part.

I welcome the new rôle of the United Nations organisation. The United Nations now has the leading rôle in managing the most serious world crises. It has had to intervene on a massive scale in former Yugoslavia. In a large number of other regional conflicts, the United Nations is taking on major responsibility. Today, more than 70 000 blue berets are deployed over four continents. Here again, I approve your wish for closer interaction between WEU and the United Nations as recommended in Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's report.

Secondly, since the adoption of the Paris Charter in 1990, the CSCE is now the leading forum for pan-European co-operation after having been the institution in which two opposing blocs tried to organise their coexistence. At Helsinki, the heads of state and government considered that the main aim of the CSCE should be the prevention of conflicts and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Since Helsinki, the CSCE is in a position to become involved in peace-keeping, by bringing into action where appropriate existing institutions such as NATO and WEU or the European Community which have the necessary resources. The European Community can, of course, only provide finance.

As agreed in Rome and Maastricht, NATO remains the leading forum for consultation between the allies. It will continue to be the institution where they agree policies relating to their security and defence commitments under the Washington Treaty. The alliance structures are being progressively adapted to the new security requirements. The recent ministerial meeting in Athens clearly showed that the

partners were united in face of the new political and military challenges.

Europe's security still depends on close co-operation with North America. Strong transatlantic links and the continued presence of American forces in Europe, as confirmed in so many words by the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to the North Atlantic Council in Athens, are in the interests of all the allies and remain essential for the security of the alliance.

In the changed international situation, adequate resources must continue to be provided both to maintain an effective military contribution to the common defence and to guarantee that NATO can carry out its new duties and rôles.

NATO and the United Nations are jointly studying ways and means of implementing the peace plan for Bosnia. On 10th June 1993, the United Nations Secretariat-General authorised the alliance to provide air cover for UNPROFOR on the basis of paragraph 10 of Resolution 836 concerning the safe havens in Bosnia. NATO is already enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Adriatic, NATO and WEU vessels are working to implement the sanctions ordered by the United Nations.

In this last case, I feel it to be highly significant that for the first time in the history of the two organisations, the Permanent Councils of NATO and WEU held a joint meeting on 8th June 1993. The important result of this joint session was that procedures and command arrangements were worked out for joint operation by the NATO and WEU naval forces to enforce the blockade in the Adriatic. However, what seems to me to be even more important than the conduct of this operation is the spirit underlying the joint session of the two councils.

This is emphasised in paragraph 4 of the joint communiqué which I would like to quote briefly:

"The combined operation will give concrete expression to the determination of NATO and WEU to continue to act together in co-operation for the effective implementation of the sanctions decided upon by the United Nations Security Council and to contribute to a settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. This reflects our commitment to the principles of transparency and complementarity in pursuit of our mutual goal of enhanced security through NATO and WEU."

It is in this spirit that I shall now look at WEU's rôle in Europe's security architecture which, as we see, is basically as an active and

Mr. Poos (continued)

autonomous interface between the future European Union and NATO.

I would like to start by mentioning the changes which are taking place in WEU on the basis of the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations.

First, the enlargement of our organisation is going ahead. When, as we expect, Greece joins within a few months, its membership will be even closer to that of the European Community.

Second, WEU's operational rôle is being substantially enhanced; the transfer of the Council and Secretariat to Brussels has been completed; the Permanent Council, which meets regularly, is steadily developing its rôle as a central organ for discussion and decision; a planning cell with a staff of about forty has been set up. It has defined the first principles and organisational rules for every action which WEU can be called on to undertake. It has also worked out a number of scenarios for intervention in former Yugoslavia. Lastly, at the Rome Council, the French, German and Belgian ministers declared that the states contributing to the Eurocorps consider that it is part of the units earmarked as "forces answerable to WEU".

Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany have announced that the units which those countries are willing to make available to WEU will include the central multinational division and the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force. Over the next few months work on listing national forces which can serve WEU will be continued.

In Rome, the Council of Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to work out, in due course, procedures and rules of conduct for forces answerable to WEU. A progress report on this subject will be submitted to the next ministerial meeting and will cover in particular the management of humanitarian and peace-keeping operations.

Third, at their meeting in Luxembourg on 5th April last, ministers offered to provide help to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania for enforcement of the embargo on the Danube. Rome marked the first step in implementing this initiative which is a practical operation with the partners of the Forum of Consultation.

This action on the Danube is being pursued effectively by WEU, which in this way is making a practical and credible contribution to enforcement of the sanctions ordered by the Security Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. WEU is working in close co-ordination with the European Community and the CSCE and in liaison with the missions helping with the implementation of sanctions.

Luxembourg attaches great importance to this operation on the Danube which was jointly agreed with the riparian countries. As you know, my country is taking part in this action, which involves in all some 270 customs officers, by sending eight staff from the customs administration. This contribution is additional to the action which WEU is taking jointly with NATO in the Adriatic.

All these activities show that our organisation has a new capacity for action and is of use in helping the search for a solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. They also show that WEU is able to adapt. It should be remembered that the action on the Danube is non-military. It is my hope that, as it develops in the future, WEU will continue to take full account of the military and civilian nature of any tasks and peace-keeping operations which it may have to undertake in future.

The fact is that in the present fragile state of security, missions to maintain or restore peace or to provide humanitarian aid are likely to multiply. They will be carried out under the instructions and authority of the United Nations and the CSCE.

Fourth, WEU is continuing and stepping up its co-operation with the countries of Central Europe in the Forum of Consultation. In so doing it is providing a structure well suited to promoting dialogue, understanding, trust and, therefore, the prevention of conflicts in that part of Europe. Serving as a complement to the NACC in NATO, the Forum has the merit of taking account of those countries' specific security requirements. Beyond that, we shall be exploring possibilities for more practical co-operation with the same countries in areas such as disarmament or peace-keeping operations.

This concludes my remarks on the future of WEU as an independent institution.

I should like now to analyse the prospects for relations between WEU and the future European Union as the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty draws near. After the yes vote in the second referendum in Denmark and as the ratification procedure is going ahead in the United Kingdom, we can reasonably expect the treaty to come into force around October and in any case before the end of the year.

This being so, Luxembourg will be taking over the presidency of WEU at what may be a decisive key period in the history of the organisation. WEU must here and now get ready to play its part as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of reinforcing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, as foreseen in the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations.

Mr. Poos (continued)

Here, there are two tasks on which WEU should concentrate in the immediate future. The first is the establishment of institutional and working relations between WEU and the future European Union. When the operation on the Danube was initiated practical co-operation was established as required between the two organisations through the contributions of the two presidencies. Luxembourg is determined to continue this co-operation during its presidency. It will encourage the creation of close links between the two secretariats as well. Similarly, each organisation's individual experience should make it possible to harmonise joint working methods.

A second, more significant, task is the implementation of Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty under which the European Union requests WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". Here there is a first legitimate question concerning the concept of defence. My own view is that it should not be interpreted too narrowly. The concept should rather be given a flexible content, allowing for the aims of European security and co-operation policy and the new realities of which I have spoken.

Luxembourg will want to respect in full the progressive nature of the move towards the common foreign and security policy foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty and the Maastricht declaration of the WEU member states. The whole of Maastricht, but Maastricht only, must be implemented step by step.

My country will be particularly concerned to observe the criteria of transparency, complementarity and compatibility in relation to NATO. My view is that close consultation between the presidency of WEU and the presidency of the future European Union will be essential for the success of the task I have just described. I am sure that the Belgian and Greek presidencies will see the matter in the same spirit.

To conclude, I would say that Europe's security and defence architecture is far from being completed. The process is long and complex but may perhaps be speeded up over the next few months.

Another interesting contribution to this debate could be the initiative announced by the new French Government, which will be presented to the twelve heads of state and government next week at the European summit in Copenhagen. WEU will certainly be watching closely the new developments now taking shape.

The Italian presidency has been able to build on the solid foundations left by earlier presi-

dencies. It has done admirable work over an extremely difficult period at international and institutional level. With the mandates handed down in Rome we have a major and consistent programme of work. While it holds the presidency of WEU, Luxembourg will in turn seek to advance the construction of European defence.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would not wish to end without paying tribute to the constructive rôle played by WEU's parliamentary Assembly. I have studied the conference documents with great interest and offer my congratulations on the quality of the reports presented on behalf of the committees.

I am well aware that WEU's parliamentary Assembly is the only European assembly with competence in defence matters. The incoming presidency will attach great political importance to good relations between the Council and the Assembly. To that end it will be working closely with Sir Dudley Smith to whom I offer my warmest congratulations on his unanimous election as President of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Poos, particularly for your kind words at the end of your speech. Your comment about the status of the Assembly is not lost on us, especially in view of the subject that we discussed earlier.

I understand that you are happy to answer questions. I have only one name at the moment; perhaps others would indicate their wish to ask a question.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I have two questions. First, will the Minister say more about the CSCE, which most of us here think has been a complete failure on account of what has happened in the former Yugoslavia? Secondly, can the Minister think of any government which has the will to implement the Vance-Owen plan without putting in half a million troops?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I shall try to answer these two questions briefly.

It is not fair to blame any particular organisation for the failure of international action to put an end to the fighting in former Yugoslavia. It is no fairer to blame the CSCE than the United Nations, the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance or WEU. They have all failed because, in fact, as I have tried to explain – although this may only have been a personal opinion – what is involved is a real civil war for which a solution cannot be imposed from outside but must be negotiated within the country. This is the line taken in the Vance-

Mr. Poos (continued)

Owen plan which was discussed with the three separate elements in Bosnia and after prolonged negotiations was accepted by them when suddenly at the last moment disaster intervened; the self-styled palace parliament of Bosnian Serbs refused to back the plan.

That is why we still think that this plan remains the only imaginable political solution capable of stopping the fighting.

The second question concerns the military resources needed to implement the plan. The view taken in Resolution 836 of the United Nations Security Council was that the first stage of implementing the Vance-Owen plan would require 7 500 men. I have not dreamed up this figure which was in fact suggested by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council in a report submitted yesterday. This is the number of men he considers necessary to safeguard the safe havens defined in Resolution 836. Quite clearly, however, in the view of both the United Nations and the alliance which made a statement on this problem at the Athens meeting, these safe havens are only a first step towards implementing the Vance-Owen plan. It is not possible to stop there. The next step which will become necessary is to roll back the Serbs from the areas they have occupied illegally and do not correspond to the proposals of the Vance-Owen plan. We have not yet reached this second stage and clearly, as you are right in saying, if we do reach it many more men are likely to be required.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tom Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – As a number of member states of WEU are reviewing their defence commitments and spending, does the Minister think that if there were further calls on WEU or, indeed, the United Nations, to supply additional peace-keeping forces over, for instance, a three-year period, there would be adequate resources to meet such a request should it be made?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Some WEU member countries which have sent blue berets to former Yugoslavia are already spending substantial amounts and this is a fairly heavy drain on their national budgets. I am thinking of France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and, even in relative terms, of Luxembourg which has sent forty men amounting to one-tenth of its armed forces, to former Yugoslavia. In the years and perhaps the months to come, the United Nations or the CSCE will, in my opinion, call on military organisations including WEU to mobilise funds and military resources.

The governments and parliaments of member countries will then have to respond positively because security is beyond price as has so often been stressed. What is at stake is our survival and that of the generations to come.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – As the safe havens are not safe, does the Minister agree that we have not yet taken the first step towards peace in former Yugoslavia?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. POOS (*Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*). – I want to correct the question through my answer. It is right to say that the safe havens are not yet safe, but it is our obligation to make them safe.

The PRESIDENT. – As there are no other questions, I again thank you, Minister, for speaking to us and for answering our questions. We are all very appreciative of the fact that you have come here to do so. We know that we shall see you again during your term in office. I expect that it will be interesting and controversial, but we know only too well that you will be able to handle the business. As I have said, we regard you as a friend of the Assembly.

4. Motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Debate and vote on the motion to disagree, Doc. 1376)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the debate and vote on the motion to disagree to the content of the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council, Document 1376, tabled by Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Soell and others.

I call Mr. Soell to move the motion.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this motion, which disagrees to the report of the Council, is an attempt to set out the sum total of the experience we as the Assembly, as the Presidential Committee, as the Standing Committee of this Assembly, but also as the plenary, have gained over the past months.

I do not want to go into detail, but simply to point out that in this motion – I will say how we want to deal with it later; I am sure the Chairman of the Political Committee will have something to say too – we once again make it clear that if the WEU Assembly is to maintain its prestige and its international rôle, in particular by representing the national parliaments of nine member states which are used to monitoring their national security policy very strictly in accordance with their parliamentary tradition, it must co-operate very closely with the

Mr. Soell (continued)

Ministerial Council, and that in recent months it has not managed to do so as closely as in the past in various areas. I am saying this against the background of very specific circumstances, which further emphasise the rôle of the parliamentary Assembly.

Let me emphasise once again that it is a question of upholding the international status of this Assembly. It is unique. There is no other international parliamentary assembly in the security field with this kind of treaty-based right of control and initiative. Neither the European Parliament nor the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians, which is not treaty-based, has the same status. It is purely and simply a question of upholding this status and fulfilling the tasks before us, which will become even more important in future.

Since we have elected a new President and we all assume that he will most emphatically uphold the status of the Assembly, we will follow his advice and postpone this motion, to give him an opportunity to discuss future co-operation together with the Ministerial Council and its representatives and to make better arrangements than those we have seen in the past months. I think we should follow this advice and give him this opportunity.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Soell.

I have to draw to the attention of the Assembly the fact that notice was given to me by Lord Finsberg before the opening of the present sitting, in accordance with Rule 33(1), of his intention to move the previous question.

If the Assembly agrees to Lord Finsberg's motion, the subject of debate will be removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly. If on the other hand, the previous question is not agreed to, the debate will proceed in the usual way.

I call Lord Finsberg to move the previous question, which will take precedence for the time being over the debate on the order of the day that has just been moved. In the debate on the previous question, in addition to the mover only one speaker against the motion and the rapporteur and chairman of any committee concerned may be heard, as laid down in Rule 33(3). Moreover, under Rule 32(7) speeches on procedural questions must not exceed five minutes.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I make it clear in moving the motion that I do not quarrel with the substance of Mr. Soell's document. We have all been frustrated, to use a diplomatic word, over the past few months by the actions of the ambassadors and the ministers. That said, I believe that the timing of this debate

is bad. You, Sir Dudley, have just taken over as President. There is to be a new Clerk of the Assembly and we are to have a new Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers. It must be right to give an opportunity to those three new people to sit down and to see whether there is a way in which we can restore a situation that has been allowed to get out of hand.

If we adopted the procedure of adjourning the debate, it could come back at a later stage, but based on today's document, much of which might then be out-of-date. By agreeing to what I suggest, if the President is not able to succeed, there is nothing to prevent any of us from tabling a fresh motion with up-to-date facts that could be debated at a later session. That is why I decided to move the previous question rather than an adjournment of the debate. We would not be acting in our best interests if we proceeded today with this document. I repeat, so that my friends, Mr. Soell and Mr. Stoffelen, do not think that I disagree with them on the principle of the matter, that it is the timing with which I am concerned. We must give the new troika the opportunity to proceed. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

Does anyone wish to speak against the motion on the previous question?...

No. That being so, I call Mr. Stoffelen, as Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I have come to the same conclusion. In the Political Committee we had a heated discussion on the motion tabled by Mr. Péciaux and others. It became clear that most members had clear sympathy for the text of the motion. To avoid any misunderstanding, I point out that the text does not just reflect the opinion of some individual members. In the committee, there was clear sympathy for the text of the motion. However, we too felt that it would be a matter of due respect to the newly-elected President and others, as Lord Finsberg said, to give them the opportunity, in the Presidential Committee and elsewhere, to bring about a satisfactory improvement, which is urgently needed in relations between the Assembly and the Council.

For that reason, the committee instructed me to ask for a postponement of the discussion about the relations between the Assembly and the Council to a later session. I had originally intended to move another procedural motion, but that does not matter now.

The conclusion is that we should not debate the text now. We should bear in mind that the text reflects the opinion of many, if not all, members of the committee. There was a clear

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

majority. The Assembly should have no illusions. This is not the right moment. I agree with Lord Finsberg's proposal.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

We shall now proceed to vote on Lord Finsberg's motion on the previous question contained in Document 1376.

To make matters clear, I remind members that the effect of agreeing to the motion is to remove the subject of the debate from the agenda and from the register. Under the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more members want a roll-call vote, they should stand up. I suspect that you do not want a roll-call vote. In that case, we shall have the usual procedure of a show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The previous question is agreed to unanimously.

The subject raised in the debate on the motion tabled by Mr. Péciaux and others has been removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly under Rule 33(1). The wise words of Mr. Stoffelen and of Lord Finsberg put the whole matter into context for the Assembly. Thank you very much.

5. Interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1369)

The PRESIDENT. – I explained before we adjourned at lunch-time that the orders of the day provided for the vote on the draft recommendation on the interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, Document 1369, which was moved by Mr. Goerens.

There is no more debate on that subject.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in that document.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1370)

The PRESIDENT. – We now move on to the next item on the agenda, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on European security policy – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1370.

I call on my British colleague, Mr. Marshall, to present the report.

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President and members of the Assembly, may I say first how delighted I am to have the opportunity to present the report to the Assembly on behalf of the Political Committee. When the committee first asked me to undertake the task, I was filled with a great deal of trepidation. The more I read about future European security policy, the more I realised that my initial trepidation was more than justified. I was certainly provided with the opportunity for a great deal of intellectual stimulation. The reading list seemed endless at the outset. I must be honest and say that I never got to the end of the reading list. If I had continued to read the material available, the report would not have been presented in June, but towards the end of the year.

Before I briefly discuss the text of the report, I take the opportunity to thank the Clerk of the Political Committee for his assistance and support in drafting the report. He kept me on the tramlines and he ensured that the timetable that the Political Committee had in mind was strictly adhered to.

In view of the work that has gone into the report, I hope that members who have read the report have realised that it is derivative rather than original.

Nevertheless, I hope that the report provides a useful overview of the many aspects which are likely to affect future European security and the institutions which are available to deal with it.

It became clear, and I am sure that it is clear to most members of the Assembly, that future European security policies will inevitably have to be based on political, social and economic considerations, in addition to the military aspects of security. The report recognises at the outset that, with the ending of the cold war and the hegemony that it imposed in the two halves of Europe, the security of the European continent is in many ways less stable now than during the cold war. The report recommends methods of dealing with that fact, especially in conflict prevention and resolution.

1. See page 33.

Mr. Marshall (continued)

The report further analyses the various threats to European security from both within and without the continent. This includes, among others, the residual threat from Russia and the other successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The report also considers the problems arising from migration and ethnic conflicts. It also examines the threat to Europe from the Middle East and the problems associated with arms proliferation. It offers ways of dealing with and containing further arms proliferation.

A definition of a European security policy is offered in paragraphs (xi) and (xii) of the draft recommendation and in paragraphs 59 and 60 of the main report. I realise that the policy is not definitive, but I believe that it covers most of the aspects which ought to be addressed in developing a European security policy.

Importantly, the report recognises the continuing mutuality of interest between Europe and North America, against the background of the discussion which has taken place between the European allies and North America. But the report emphasises that, with the end of the cold war, the relationship has changed and, in the view of the Political Committee, will continue to change. However, given good will on both sides, that should not lead to any great rift between Europe and our North American allies.

The report further argues for greater arms control and verification procedures. Importantly, it acknowledges the diminishing rôle of nuclear weapons in European defence. The report examines, perhaps too briefly, the various institutions involved in European security – the European Community, NATO, WEU, the Council of Europe and the CSCE.

CSCE received some faint praise from my fellow countryman Lord Finsberg. Perhaps I could abuse the rostrum by saying that while CSCE has not been so powerful as many of us would have liked, I do not accept the negative attitude adopted by Lord Finsberg. In future we must build on the foundations of CSCE so that we have an organisation and a forum in Europe which is available to address positively and quickly the security problems which are likely to arise in Europe in the next ten to twenty years.

The report examined the various institutions involved in European security, including CSCE and the United Nations. It considers how they have attempted to adapt to the post cold war situation. If we had examined in close detail the dreadful problem in the former republic of Yugoslavia, the Political Committee might have condemned even more strongly many of those organisations.

Perhaps at this juncture I could make a personal point in response to the questions which were put to the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg. In future we must ensure that institutions do not take precipitate decisions or actions. My view, which was covertly expressed in the report, is that the action of the European Community in so quickly recognising the republics of the former Yugoslavia has to a great extent exacerbated the situation in the Republic of Bosnia. So in future we must bear in mind that we should not jump in too quickly. We should stand back, take a medium-term view and not do anything that might exacerbate rather than alleviate the problems.

Looking to the future, on the military front, the report recognises the important rôle of rapid reaction forces and the need for greater rôle specification. On the political front, the report calls for further co-operation between the institutions involved in European security.

I am delighted to present the report to the Assembly on behalf of the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Marshall, for a relevant and interesting report.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – First I want to congratulate the Rapporteur on this very comprehensive but also very detailed analysis of the situation in which we find ourselves. It is a very complex situation which – as the report points out – obviously does not only contain new factors. What is new is, above all, the compilation of the various factors and the fact that they have become much more immediate. The conflicts discussed and the European institutions' approach to them have, in my view, been described correctly and soberly, especially the fact that once disputes become armed conflicts, politics come to a halt for the time being, because the violence escalates and basically it becomes almost impossible to stem the tide of hatred.

At the same time this is a very balanced report, because it warns against trying to find what it calls enemy substitutes outside Europe, for that would only lead into a dead-end.

Stress is laid on a critical attitude to the arms trade, and especially the European involvement in its growth, and the absurdity of the fact that we are reducing our military potential under the terms of the CFE and the Paris Charter, monitoring this reduction very closely and verifying progress at every stage, while at the same time, by exporting weapons, we are helping to build up a military potential elsewhere in the world. At any rate it is most important to our Assembly that this item should not be dropped from the

Mr. Soell (continued)

agenda. The same clearly also applies to the agenda of the European Community and the European Parliament.

This is also a task – let me emphasise – for the future Western European armaments group, into which the existing Independent European Programme Group will be incorporated. It is important to plan ahead from the outset, in the case of arms co-operation as well, to ensure that we do not have to rely on large-scale exports in order to bring costs down drastically. Otherwise we will have a whole range of arms co-operation agreements on large-scale weapons systems which will implicitly force us to export. The public will of course regard it as a kind of moral double standard if the Europeans keep on calling for the control of arms proliferation throughout the world while still concerning themselves with exports, through the back door, because in a sense they have been forced to do so by these misguided arms co-operation agreements.

The report states that Europe will have to pay the price for a greater share of transatlantic security. I assume this will not be reflected in higher armaments costs. The public finds it increasingly absurd that on the one hand we now have two million armed soldiers and spend some DM 250 billion a year thanks to the new WEU members, while on the other hand we are unable to provide 15 000 or 20 000 blue berets for certain peace missions quite close to home. We must make it clear that this will be one of our future tasks.

We cannot accept the fact that budget pressures are forcing every single government to economise on its own behalf, to some extent, but without international discussion in the framework of WEU. We should indeed give the Ministerial Council and also the Assembly an opportunity to check through the various budgets. Here too Mr. Marshall's report contains some good suggestions.

The next point: the NPT régime: we know that we can leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty in two years' time. We all have good reason to extend the effectiveness of this régime. That means, of course, that the nuclear powers must make real progress in the disarmament process. We should also discuss the significance of nuclear weapons at European level, in the framework of WEU. The report notes this too, and I can only endorse it.

Lastly, let me turn to the question of common European interests. That is a very good phrase and relates to the further development and perception of national interests. We have seen the misguided conclusions to which the pursuit of individual interests has led in today's crises. It really is urgently necessary for us to arrive at a

common European interest. That includes the institutions we are building up within WEU. But it also includes, at least as importantly, attempts to formulate a European diplomacy, which we do not yet have. We have national diplomacies, with their individual perceptions and their specific historical experiences. But we do not yet have any attempts to formulate a common European diplomacy that is really worthy of the name.

Nor do we yet have co-ordination with the European Community's foreign, trade, economic or financial policy. Taking the Yugoslav crisis as an instance, it is clear that in June 1991 Brussels sent out completely wrong signals to Belgrade when it declared itself prepared to grant Belgrade a huge loan of 1.4 billion ecu on condition that the Yugoslav Federation would be held together in its existing form. This sent out totally counter-productive signals to the gentlemen of the old communist nomenklatura in Belgrade, who pursued the policies with which we are all now familiar. That also forms part of the framework we have to define.

Let me once again warmly thank the Rapporteur for what he said in his report and for the draft recommendation, which I approve in full.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Soell.

The next speaker is Mr. Rodrigues from Portugal.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are not discussing a run of the mill report even though few members are present. In his reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council, Mr. Marshall uses the theme of European security policy for a dissertation looking at policy as an all-embracing subject, extending to all aspects of life, as Aristotle would have done. I congratulate him.

The ambitious aim of the report and the thoughts which it provokes on problems vital to the future of Europe and all mankind mean that any comment in a debate like this one is inadequate.

Mr. Marshall recalls that the end of the cold war, which was greeted throughout the world, brought instability rather than greater stability. The implosion of the Soviet Union introduced greater uncertainty and insecurity on a world scale. The new world order looked forward to by President Bush has all the appearance of dangerous world disorder. Like Mr. Marshall I think there is no hope that Russia will quickly resolve the present crisis and its accompanying social and economic chaos.

NATO and WEU have changed. Other organisations such as NACC have been set up. Despite the promises of complementarity and

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

transparency these institutions are not working in an atmosphere of true and healthy co-operation. Their rôles, attributes and spheres of action are fairly confused. There is no genuine confidence in their joint work. In the case of NATO, the strategic concepts defined in Rome in 1991 are now out of date, scarcely two years later.

Mr. Marshall reminds us that the transatlantic contract on which the traditional relations between Western Europe and the United States were based meant recognition by Europe of United States leadership. The words are a bit strong but reflect the position accurately. Mr. Marshall says we must avoid misunderstandings but he also says that any future model for NATO would be valueless if it aroused feelings of indifference or hostility in North America.

There is obvious ambiguity. Mr. Marshall reminds us also that the United States must understand that the world has changed and that its political and military relations with Europe cannot be the same as before. The report is not always clear, however. The Rapporteur tells us that the United States wants to reduce its burdens but at the same time maintain and influence leadership. Any agreement defining rôles and responsibilities toward the rest of the world looks to be no more than a dream.

Ladies and gentlemen, as the Rapporteur stresses, the creation of the Franco-German corps leaves a number of questions unanswered. In my view, however, the unknowns resulting from the changes to NATO and from its very ambiguous relations with WEU are even more numerous and disturbing. We still have no more information about the practical arrangements announced in Rome to guarantee the transparency and complementarity which must exist between NATO and the European security structure of which WEU would, in the well-known phrase, be the essential pillar. The Rapporteur recognises that it is very difficult to know to what extent the United States and some European member countries of NATO will allow this European pillar to gain some degree of independence and become more than an appendix to NATO.

The position here is stated with the greatest clarity. As Mr. Marshall recalls, the United States is still treating Europe as a protectorate. Although Europeans provide 80% of NATO's conventional forces, United States officers are at the head of the only two major commands and one of the three major subordinate commands. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is also American as has been the case from the outset. Mr. Marshall recognises that, while maintaining its military structure, NATO may be stretching towards a political line going beyond the

limits of its original vocation as a security organisation. Where could this lead us? To what kind of political and military intervention outside the treaty area?

Mr. Marshall also observes that despite everything which has been said about Europeanising the West's security structure, WEU has been more an object than a subject in the discussions about the future European security architecture. I think he is right. I do not believe that the way to end NATO's hegemony is to give WEU the greater operational rôle favoured by some. I am one of those who right from the start have distanced themselves from excessive European integration. The common foreign security policy defined in the Maastricht Treaty is destined to be an historic failure because of the dangers of supranationality. History suggests that the upheavals which have completely changed the geostrategic situation in Europe mean that we should move not towards the restructuring of the military blocs but towards their gradual elimination.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. Peter Hardy of the United Kingdom is the next speaker.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on a report that is both relevant and timely. It deserves a favourable reception by the Assembly.

The report is relevant, because it recognises inherently the fundamental weaknesses of the present European defence policy. Yesterday, Mr. van Eekelen referred to the uncertainties surrounding the development of the new republics that have been born as a result of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. My colleague, Mr. Marshall, was right to point out that there is very little chance of aggressive action being taken by Russia. It has considerable military might. In addition, it has such grave economic problems that they are certain to diminish the prospect of aggression.

Unfortunately, Europe, in its structures and attitudes, is still in a cold war position. It is eager to take the benefit of the peace dividend, but it has not been sufficiently alert to the reality of modern and developing needs. Therefore we have the dreadful position in Yugoslavia today.

Yesterday, Mr. President, you referred to the mayhem and slaughter – which could have been stopped – and my colleague Tom Cox, asking Mr. van Eekelen a question, referred to the patience of many member states being sorely tried, and to the embarrassment and difficulty facing United Nations troops in Bosnia, which was demonstrated beyond peradventure by the obvious frustration of British soldiers who had

Mr. Hardy (continued)

to stand by while a Croatian mob murdered Muslim drivers who had been promised safe passage.

Mr. van Eekelen said that the point was taken care of by the establishment of safe havens. Not many people would care to underwrite the insurance of those who have the misfortune to live in such areas. I am not criticising Mr. van Eekelen because he also said that the Assembly knew his opinion – that we have not used our military capability sufficiently to underpin our political objectives. The difficulty is that Europe is not sure what its political objectives are. I therefore commend to the Assembly the recommendations that Mr. Marshall offers.

I find it interesting that the first recommendation starts with the word “start”. The report recommends that the Council “Start to examine the aspects concerning European security which should be part of a new Atlantic partnership”. European politicians have been so busy arguing that there should be a European defence institution and a new Community-based defence security system that they have not begun to identify needs or the steps that must be taken to ensure that those needs are met.

I commend the third recommendation of the report, which suggests that we should give some priority to crisis management. The situation in Yugoslavia demonstrates beyond doubt that, although the problems there were germinating for almost ten years after the death of Tito, Europe was singularly unprepared to respond to events that always seemed likely, if not certain. Crisis management preparation has a long way to go before it begins to provide even a rudimentary response to reality. I am not suggesting that there should not be a proper European defence system in the twenty-first century, but those who believe that they can suddenly pass defence responsibility to the European Community live in cloud-cuckoo-land.

We do not expect people to be marathon runners when the only evidence of their capacity to move is a tottering walk. The same is true – or should be – in regard to EC defence responsibility. I am deeply worried about the Yugoslav situation. There is no sign that Europe will take the action necessary to secure safe havens. If Europe is not prepared to take such action, we will witness the humiliation of United Nations forces being withdrawn and slaughter on an even more massive scale.

It is regrettable that, although in the Council of Europe and in this Assembly, politicians from a number of countries and from many different political parties have drawn attention to the needs, our governments have failed to respond. More death, mayhem and slaughter will ensue.

The situation illustrates the need for a more purposeful approach to defence in Europe. I am delighted that Mr. Marshall recommends that the issue be approached as a matter of urgency.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Our final speaker, Mr. Slatinsky, is an observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. SLATINSKY (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – Our analysis of the dynamic processes of our continent shows that in the complex and intricate network of security structures, WEU, the military component of European integration, is gradually coming to the fore. WEU was ridiculed until very recently as a sleeping beauty that was frequently kissed but could not be awakened, but its radicalism today is impressive. New approaches are sought to bring WEU and NATO closer and to define WEU as the European pillar of NATO. For Bulgaria, the gradation of Western European structures is abstract. For us, priorities and values are there, where guarantees, co-operation and support are more sincere and efficient.

Until recently, Bulgaria stood on the eastern side of the iron curtain. Now, war is raging not far from our boundaries. This time, the salvation of those who are drowning will not be exclusively their own business. Their salvation will depend on the common efforts of the whole continent. Perhaps, in somebody's plans, countries such as ours will have the honour to serve as a cordon sanitaire or buffer zone – detaching the rich north from the poor south, Catholic Europe from rising Islam – but such intentions are untenable.

We should all realise that the Euro-Atlantic security area is a common, unified area. The problems could be solved by integrated efforts, with equitable involvement of the enormous intellectual, moral and rich in positive energy potential of the former socialist countries, whose speedy affiliation to the values of democracy through intensive support for the normal development of their political and economic reforms is vital not only to them but for western civilisation. Without us, the peoples of Eastern Europe, it will not be possible to achieve either a new identity or to elaborate and implement a common foreign and security policy. The main conclusion that all of us can draw is that, today, the Balkans are like a testing ground for democratic societies on both sides of the Atlantic. If no adequate model is devised to settle the crises of political behaviour, or of new thinking, events in our permanently explosive region may one day become the common fate of the world, which is so vulnerable but deserves a better destiny.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Slatinsky. We are always pleased when observers make relevant and short speeches.

The debate is now closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to respond?

Mr. MARSHALL (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief, Mr. President. There were only four short speeches in the debate. I shall deal with them in my own order, starting with that of the leader of the British Labour Group, Mr. Hardy. He heaped praise upon my shoulders; I hope that Brutus's knife is not sticking out of my back. Nevertheless, I thank him for his remarks.

I failed to understand why Mr. Hardy appeared to be arguing that because countries wanted to reap the peace dividend, they were putting at risk their military resources and so undermining their ability to take action in conflicts either in Europe or throughout the world. I do not accept that analysis. Clearly, it would be a problem if countries continued to reap the peace dividend but ignored future military demands. However, the failure in former Yugoslavia was due not to a lack of weaponry, manpower, aircraft or ships, but to a lack of political will in Europe and North America to take decisive military action. The military hardware exists; it is the political will that is lacking.

That brings me to the speech of our former President, Mr. Soell. He rightly argued that the position that I have just highlighted was likely to continue until Europe as a whole began to develop a European interest, as distinct from a multiplicity of national interests throughout the continent. I am sure that he has read the report and therefore recognises that it deals with the need to develop a European common interest in paragraphs 45 and 46. That is something that I hope the committee and the Assembly recognise and accept.

I fully accept Mr. Soell's point about arms exports. At a time when European countries are seeking to reduce the burden of armaments upon their communities, it would be hypocritical if they tried to maintain the proficiency of their armaments industries to export to countries that, by no stretch of the imagination, either need the weaponry for internal or external reasons or can afford the financial burden involved without imposing great economic problems upon their populations.

Mr. Rodrigues said that I had written an essay. I do not know what that means in Portuguese, but I certainly know what it means in English. The undertone to his comment appeared to be some disparagement of my

report, although I am sure that he did not mean that. He appeared to be saying that I had been asked to write a political paper, but instead had produced an essay. I was grateful for his further clarification.

Mr. Rodrigues rightly said that in coming years we would have to face the changing relationship between Europe and its North American allies, especially the United States. He was also right to say that, throughout the cold war period, NATO was undoubtedly led by the United States. Political decisions were agreed among the members of NATO, but inevitably the American view prevailed. In the coming years there will be a shift in the centre of gravity of that relationship so that the partnership between Europe and the United States becomes more equal.

There is a down side to that – a point made in the report, but which I was urged to tone down. It is that if the centre of gravity is to shift and the partnership to become more equal – especially when there is a desire for further reductions in defence expenditure – Europe will have to find the military hardware to back up that military partnership. There will come a time in the not too distant future – it is already starting in the United Kingdom, as will be evident in the defence debate in the House of Commons tomorrow – when we will have to examine our defence budgets to determine whether, first, they fit in with the new relationship between Europe and North America and, secondly, whether our existing forces are sufficient to deal with any conflicts likely to arise in Europe.

I say to Mr. Slatinsky, our guest from Bulgaria, that I fully understand the fear implicit in his speech. He appeared to be seeking a commitment from NATO that it would go to the defence of countries such as Bulgaria. He also seemed to ask whether such countries would be able to enter NATO in the short or medium term. I have to tell him that the answer to that is no. I do not believe that NATO intends to encourage countries in that part of Eastern Europe even to look forward to being members of NATO. My view is that the best way forward for such countries is to renew their self-confidence, which means that we should encourage them to build up their political and democratic institutions and to ensure that their defence ministries are staffed and controlled by civilians whom they can trust, rather than by the inevitable generals. On the economic front, they must ensure that the European Community and other centres in Europe provide increasing resources – both in expertise and in money, if required – to enable them further to develop market economies. In that way, they can build up a mutuality of trust – a self-interest among all the countries of Europe, East and West, based upon shared political and economic values.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Marshall, for an excellent report.

Does the Chairman wish to say anything?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I have the pleasant task of complimenting the Rapporteur on, if not his maiden speech, his maiden report. It was an excellent report. I shall now explain why the Political Committee selected this report. We noticed during the discussions in Maastricht and in Petersberg later that a clear compromise was found. We in WEU are at the centre of the circle, with security and defence plans, and the European pillar.

One of the first questions is whether the Community has a security policy. If not, what is the security policy of the Council? There is no lack of declarations, with between twenty and sixty, and once at NATO in Rome there were more than eighty. However, there is a lack of a concrete security policy, or if there is such a policy, we cannot discover it.

The greater problem is not just to have a generally-prescribed security policy, but to have the political will to come to the real implementation of principles. I do not intend to speak about former Yugoslavia. However, in general, if we in Europe take decisions but are not willing to promote respect for those decisions, we can forget it. The Rapporteur tried to be as concrete as possible. We know that our policy is not concrete enough. He not only described general principles, but tried to make more concrete the impact of security policy. This is the first step. We hope that the productive co-operation will be noticed. There is repetition, I admit, between the Assembly and the Council. I hope that the Assembly will adopt this marvellous text by a great majority, if not unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. As you suggest, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation.

Under the Rules of Procedure, if five or more people want a roll-call vote they can say so. I

suspect that nobody does. Please interrupt me when I put this point at any time, otherwise, I shall assume that in a fairly non-controversial debate that will not be the case.

We shall vote by show of hands in the usual way.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 16th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The situation in former Yugoslavia (Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1379).
2. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1366).
3. Address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 4.40 p.m.)

1. See page 34.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The situation in former Yugoslavia (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1379*).
Speakers: Mr. Baumel (*Rapporteur*), Lord Finsberg, Mr. De Carolis, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Andronov (*Observer from Russia*), Mr. Paire, Mr. Baumel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*).
4. Address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council.

Replies by Mr. Andreatta to questions put by: Mr. Foschi, Lord Finsberg, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Keith Speed, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Eisma.

5. Change in the order of business.
6. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy.

Replies by Mr. Fabbri to questions put by: Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Borderas, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Davis.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The situation in former Yugoslavia

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1379)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the oral report of the Political Committee on the situation in former Yugoslavia and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1379.

I call Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur, to present the report.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is no simple task to present a report on the current situation in former Yugoslavia at a time when things are happening in such swift succession, fighting has intensified, violence has risen to new peaks and yet only a few hours ago, a pale hope for a possible cease-fire has broken through. It is therefore very difficult for me to produce up-to-date information, as the Assembly would no doubt wish, since any information quickly becomes obsolete. It is even more difficult for me to present firm conclusions for the same reason.

The current situation in Yugoslavia prompts deep anxiety together with a feeling of utter revulsion. Who would have thought that Europe, after the thaw in the cold war two years ago and the ending of war in the Gulf, would again be the theatre of such a tragedy. For virtually a year and a half now, we have been the unwilling spectators of a conflict between peoples that previously lived in peaceful coexistence despite the burden of a long and oppressive history. It never entered our heads that certain practices and methods buried deep in the past would re-emerge.

So we are appalled not only by the scale of the fighting but also by the use of practices that shame mankind: ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, the removal of individual opponents and the running of concentration camps. Today therefore the situation is worse than it was.

1. See page 37.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Bosnia is sinking before our very eyes, without the slightest application of the international caselaw established during the Gulf war. The bravery of UNPROFOR officers and soldiers is beyond question. They try to perform their duty in the face of immense difficulties, but for much of the time of course they are powerless onlookers and often themselves in danger of being taken hostage. Clearly they are paying the price of the West's inability to agree on common objectives. Lastly, there is not much point in slanging the United Nations whose powers are limited, as we can see, and whose objectives are perhaps more ambitious than the organisation's resources permit. Ultimately, the United Nations reflects the indecisiveness and impotence of the principal western powers and the divisions amongst them – for it is in the Security Council that decisions ultimately have to be taken. Unfortunately it has to be acknowledged that the various resolutions passed by the United Nations have too often been thwarted or violated before the ink was dry on the paper.

Yet we must not give way to pessimism and despair. The present situation is critical and any right-thinking person or policy-maker has a duty to reject certain forms of behaviour openly and to try, cost what it may, to secure peace and obedience to the rule of law.

Until now this line of action has produced very disappointing results. However there is no reason not to persevere. WEU has a rôle to play here and should lend formal support to United Nations' action and especially to obtain recognition and implementation of the various resolutions passed by that organisation, in particular the most recent.

We should certainly do all we can to bring about a truce. According to the newspapers this morning a meeting seems to have taken place yesterday between the chiefs-of-staff of the various opposing factions and was able to reach agreement on such a truce. Our hope is that talks between the leaders of the three communities, Serb, Bosnian and Croat, will first lead to a cease-fire agreement and then allow the parties to enter into negotiations.

However is not all of this too late in the day? Some 70% of Bosnia is already under occupation and it seems useless to hope, as many still do, that a Yugoslav federation can be restored. How can a state like Bosnia-Herzegovina achieve and maintain its independence in a unitary form? How can men and women fighting so bitterly against one another come together once more and form a single community?

Are we not rather headed towards a form of coexistence in three separate areas – one under Serb and one under Croatian domination and,

in the middle, a large area around Sarajevo which would be a predominantly Muslim state? Might such a solution not lead to continual frontier disputes, confrontations and a situation of uninterrupted violence? Situated right in the heart of Europe, is there not a danger of Bosnia becoming the Palestine of Europe with all that this implies? These are extremely disturbing matters which obviously cannot all be settled in a short debate such as this morning's.

To return to the main point, I think, first of all, that WEU cannot remain silent in the face of such a disaster. This Assembly must be prepared to take decisions, even if we have relatively little hope of their being wholly effective. It is in this spirit that we are putting forward the draft recommendation, on which I do not propose to comment further.

Ultimately, what we seek in making these recommendations is to express our support for the United Nations, regardless of its weaknesses and impotence at the moment and irrespective of difficulties of performance. These recommendations are and remain a ray of hope, the biggest we have, and will continue to be so. No other form of intervention has as good a prospect of success.

Second, we must support Resolution 836 to ensure that safe areas are set up on a firm basis.

Third, we have to try to obtain a report of the blue beret operation to ensure forces receive more specific instructions. They cannot stand by without lifting a finger in a situation of this nature.

General Morillon's appeal struck a powerful chord in many different quarters. The General, who is French and a highly talented officer in the service of UNPROFOR, had the courage to voice a number of unpalatable truths. It is vital for the United Nations forces, who are exposed and vulnerable to play a fully effective part in operations. For them to do so they need to have the necessary resources. If, as is to be hoped, a lull in the fighting or even a truce makes possible the setting up of safe areas, UNPROFOR has to be able to protect populations, as well as itself. Hence the relative positions of the various communities have to be restored.

Finally, it is absolutely necessary for sanctions to be applied somewhat more strictly and effectively. They have more impact than one tends to believe. One of our members who was in Belgrade recently has told us something of the effects that sanctions may already be having in Serbia. We have to ensure that they are applied to even greater effect, particularly on the Danube, where there is now a system of surveillance in place. We must show extreme caution as regards demands from the Bosnian leaders which seek – perfectly understandably from their point of view – to have the arms embargo

Mr. Baumel (continued)

lifted. It becomes clear, if well looked into, that the embargo penalises those who are already worst off and in the long run acts to the aggressors' advantage since those on one side are not allowed to attack, or to possess weapons to defend themselves, while those on the other, the aggressors, have one of the most powerful armies in Europe. The objections that arise are readily understood: it could pave the way for a disastrous internationalisation of the conflict and it would certainly lead to an inflow of arms from all quarters to all factions and possibly even the involvement of foreign contingents. We therefore have to tread very cautiously in this area, even at the risk of the Bosnian leaders feeling somewhat let down by us.

Finally, we must do all in our power to ensure that the conflagration does not spread even further. Any extension of hostilities outside the area already so sadly affected would have serious consequences for European diplomacy.

Clearly another major threat we have to fear is that fighting may break out in that part of Kosovo which currently forms part of Serbian territory. Here the potential danger is very grave, because – as you know – 90% of the population of Kosovo are of Albanian origin. Any fighting in this country would trigger intervention by another. Then there is Macedonia, where events could be worse for any escalation or spread in the fighting into Macedonia would very probably lead to diplomatic or military intervention by neighbouring countries. So we have to make our views clearly known – basically arguing for a return to peace – and at the same time avoid any action whatsoever that might help to worsen this tragic situation.

To conclude, I think that developments over the last year and a half in former Yugoslavia must give us serious pause for thought, the reason being that the situation arose just when WEU's organisation was not effective enough. We were just emerging from a long period of relative inertia. However, WEU is now wide awake and commands impressive resources. It is to be hoped that in the near future it will emerge, alongside other institutions of course, as one of the pillars of European security.

Another factor which should make us think carefully is the importance, now more than ever before, of strengthening WEU's structures and resources. To that end we have to close the unending debate about specific resources for WEU, as opposed to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. We must become a little less nationalistic. We need a rather more European defence strategy for, in addition to former Yugoslavia, there are many other fragile democracies in the East with a legitimate need for security. They feel utterly vulnerable in the face of other

powers, such as Russia. We therefore need to give these fragile and anxious democracies the assurance that they will be protected and that tomorrow security will be theirs as well.

These are the reasons why, on behalf of the Political Committee, I move the adoption of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel, for, as always, a thought-provoking address.

The debate is now open.

I call, first, Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – We appreciate the hard work that has been done by Mr. Baumel in a very short time. He typifies in his report what the Assembly has been talking about for more than a year. We parliamentarians have always been in advance of our governments. As Virgil said, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. That was the message I gleaned from Mr. Poos's speech yesterday. That is not a criticism of Mr. Poos as an individual – I would have made that criticism of any minister who made a speech such as we heard yesterday.

We have what I can only call *Mein Kampf*; we have warned, step by step, what would happen. We could have read debates such as these in the 1930s, when we took no action. We are still taking no decisive action. In item (vi) of the preamble Mr. Baumel says that there have been 500 violations of the no-fly zone. It has to be noted that since 12th April, when NATO started to enforce the no-fly zone, there have been only forty-nine violations. If ministers had listened to what I and my British colleague Peter Hardy said more than twelve months ago, that figure could have been zero, but they have been supine and inactive. I do not mince my words.

We are now saying that something has to be done to ensure that the war does not spread to Kosovo and Macedonia. We said that a year ago. It is hoped that 200 or 300 troops will be sent to the area to prevent the conflict spreading. Does anyone believe that such a force will deter the Serbs? Until recently, the overwhelming bulk of the violence, murder and genocide has been perpetrated by the Serbs. That is not quite the case today. Some Croats and Muslims are behaving in an equally bestial fashion.

Mr. Baumel spoke about General Morillon – a superb soldier. There are other superb soldiers from my country who are working with blue helmets, but what are they to do when they are trying to deliver humanitarian aid and they are blocked by women with wooden staves, behind whom are soldiers sniping? What are we asking them to do? What can we ask them to do? The alternative is to instruct them to fire at will. Should they fire at the human shield? We acted

Lord Finsberg (continued)

too late. This is a crime in which all our governments share some blame. They would not listen to what their parliamentarians said.

Now, we rest our hopes on two courses. Mr. Baumel suggested a truce. I am not sure whether we are talking about the thirty-eighth or the 338th truce. I have come to the conclusion that people in former Yugoslavia are the biggest consumers of invisible ink – what they sign today they repudiate tomorrow and claim they have never signed. The second option is to establish safe havens. How safe will they be? Shells fall on them daily and we do nothing. I am in a state of despair as, I believe, is every other member of the Assembly and our ministers. I do not know how to solve the problem.

I asked Mr. Poos a question yesterday. I did not get an answer because there is no answer, but I still repeat the question. The Vance-Owen plan exists. Will WEU, NATO and the United Nations implement it? If so, how?

Serbia will not give up much of the territory that she has conquered. I am not sure that Croatia will give up some of her conquered territory. We have a plan on the table. We all pay lip service to it, just as we paid lip service to the old League of Nations before the second world war.

What do we do, my friends? I believe that we have to do two things. First, as Mr. Baumel said, we must enforce sanctions rigorously and expose the governments that are turning a blind eye to sanctions-busting. We must demand that the firms that are busting sanctions are named so that they may be held up to public obloquy.

Secondly, I believe we have to send sufficient troops to ensure that, come what may, Kosovo and Macedonia are not added to the bloodbath. That means that those who have talked big must commit ground forces to the area. Too many countries have left this business mainly to France and Great Britain, with some forces coming from Italy and Holland and a few from Belgium. We have had loud talk but little else from many major powers. We must ensure there are sufficient troops in the region to guarantee the continued independence and safety of Kosovo and Macedonia. Other than that, we will have to countenance the continuation of the brutal murders. We cannot separate these people. The task is impossible. No troops, whether wearing blue helmets or national uniforms, can intervene sensibly in such a bestial civil war.

I am sorry if I have sounded even more pessimistic than I was in the previous two sessions, but I am pessimistic because democracy has had its first chance to prevent conflict in Europe and failed. In my opinion, the CSCE is a busted

flush. It was established with the specific purpose of preventing this sort of thing and, like a horse in the Grand National, it has fallen at the first hurdle. It now falls to WEU and the United Nations to do something. I hope to God that we can do something.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Finsberg.

The next speaker is Mr. De Carolis.

Mr. DE CAROLIS (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to speak in this debate which I believe requires all of us to direct our thoughts to matters of serious concern.

Furthermore, apart from the hopeful message mentioned by Mr. Baumel which I can only take as such, we are faced with a situation which is changing continuously and in an alarming manner.

A few days ago, the Vance-Owen plan seemed to be the obvious repository for all our hopes because, with all its uncertainties this compromise scheme offered the only possibility of success for the restoration of peace in this tormented part of our Europe. This plan maintained the integrity of the Bosnian state, deprived the Serbs of the crushing victory they seemed to have won and by providing for the deployment of 40 000 blue berets to ensure that the peace agreements were respected, would have provided against any resumption of the fighting.

Beyond the appeal from the previous speaker that this plan should remain on the table, we have, however, to admit that in the face of the many doubts expressed in the international press and of growing western shilly-shallying, it has not been difficult for the Serbs to reject this last possibility still on the table. Today therefore we have to look at an even more frightening picture. The Serbs have obtained much more than was proposed because, apart from the territory won by force of arms, they have now managed to ruin the international institutions, including the United Nations, the European Community, WEU and even NATO.

Here our thanks must of course go to the armed forces of all the countries for what they are doing. I wish to pay tribute to Admiral Mariani, commanding the naval force and here present, who can bear witness better than us to the difficult conditions in which they have to operate.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Yugoslav slaughterhouse has stunned the West and has revealed its divisions, its pitiful selfishness and its serious weakness. At this time, we also have to say to ourselves that we have the daily growing feeling that even massive intervention by 200 000 men at the beginning would perhaps not have resolved the present situation.

Mr. De Carolis (continued)

What has to be done, therefore, is to step up every form of diplomatic pressure to the maximum, in an effort to arrive with the warring parties at a solution which cannot be delayed much longer, bearing in mind that it is from Yugoslavia and that part of the world that the biggest threats to international peace have come.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Carolis.

I call Mr. Rodrigues from Portugal.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this urgent debate poses a fundamental question: in the face of escalating violence in Bosnia, should our Assembly recommend specific measures that might bring WEU operational forces into action? My reply to this would be no.

I voted in the Political Committee against the first draft put forward by Mr. Baumel, for whom I have the greatest respect, just as, for the same reason, I shall vote against the new text submitted to this Assembly today. I disagree with the spirit of the draft as I do with that of the recommendation.

The situation in Bosnia has reached such catastrophic proportions for the people of the region and for Europe as a whole that each of us has a duty to speak out frankly, even at the risk of giving offence. This is not the time for political rhetoric.

I think we have to go right back to the beginning – to the underlying causes of the break-up of Yugoslavia. However we would do Europe no service at all by proposing specific measures that might have entirely the opposite effect to that intended. The first question we have to ask ourselves is whether WEU can achieve any more in Bosnia than the United Nations has been able to achieve. My answer would be that it cannot.

To draw such a conclusion gives rise to a number of worrying considerations concerning both the United Nations' rôle in this area and the manner in which that organisation is discharging the worldwide, humanitarian task for which it was set up. The second question, then, is whether the United Nations is not deviating from its peace-keeping rôle and its duty to provide a universal channel for dialogue between peoples. Is the Security Council, given its present make-up, responsibilities, structure and powers, in a position to meet the expectations placed on it by humanity on the threshold of the twenty-first century?

The lack of affirmative replies is sufficient warning in itself to WEU of the need for caution and humility, particularly the latter.

Ladies and gentlemen, to throw all the blame on to the Serbs, Croats, Muslims and other peoples of former Yugoslavia would no doubt be convenient but would also distort the facts of history. The great powers patently bear the main responsibility for the worsening tragedy in Yugoslavia. Might I particularly remind members at this juncture that Germany's premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was a political act fraught with disastrous consequences. As each day goes by it becomes more and more apparent that this decision had a decisive influence in triggering the current situation of chaos.

For centuries the southern Slavs made common cause in the fight against their various oppressors. Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Muslims from Bosnia and Kosovo fought alongside one another as brothers against the Turks and, on occasion, against the Austrians and Hungarians.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not in any way underestimate the significance of religious and cultural differences, but I feel we should not forget that the very people who are today locked in bloody and senseless conflict coexisted peacefully for forty years within the boundaries of a federal state.

The Vance-Owen plan was doomed to failure from the start. In it I see an artificial structure, at odds with social reality and the course of history. It was for good reason after all that a tiny minority of Bosnian Serbs rejected it, in defiance of the United Nations; even Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has now voiced certain criticism.

I believe that the peoples of former Yugoslavia will one day return to the negotiating table, sit down calmly and reach agreement about new ways of living and working peacefully together.

On the subject of Bosnia, which is virtually an artificial state with no foundation in history, it might at some stage be useful to resume talks on the proposed tri-ethnic confederation, as suggested by Ambassador Cutileiro.

Ladies and gentlemen, the atrocities committed in former Yugoslavia still have to be assessed and blame apportioned for them. For this very reason, I cannot agree with a recommendation which, far from bringing us closer to a peaceful solution, would in my view increase the danger of a huge escalation in violence.

I am convinced that sending WEU operational units into Macedonia would be an unforgivable error. We should draw a lesson from what is happening in the safe areas of Bosnia. There are enough mine-fields around ready to explode. Let us not add to their number.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

The situation in Somalia provides us with a ready-made example of what could happen in the event of fatalities among soldiers from WEU countries.

We will not, I repeat, achieve a peaceful solution in Bosnia or bring about a return to normality in the area as a whole using methods that could lead to an intensification of the war.

I should like to conclude by emphasising one particular point: the tragedy in Bosnia, like the tragedy currently unfolding in Somalia, brings home to us all the urgent need for discussions at world level on the repeated calls for reform of the United Nations.

The new world disorder provides continuing evidence that the United Nations is failing to carry out its rôle. It is deviating from its main purpose as a worldwide institution, designed to preserve peace and understanding between nations and peoples, and turning into an instrument of power politics.

There is an urgent need to rebuild the United Nations from top to bottom and give it back its distinctive humanitarian rôle.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rodrigues.

I have a request to speak from Mr. Andronov, an observer from Russia.

Mr. ANDRONOV (*Observer from Russia*). – Thank you Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen for allowing me to speak as a representative of the Russian Parliament. I am pleased to be able to participate in the debates in the Assembly, especially on the question of former Yugoslavia.

Yesterday, on behalf of the Russian Parliament, I invited your President and his colleagues to visit Russia at a time convenient to the President. We shall await his visit to Moscow.

I now come to the situation in Yugoslavia. I am not speaking on behalf of the government; I am speaking on behalf of the Russian Parliament – perhaps the majority of members of the Russian Parliament. Yugoslavia is a difficult issue for us. I am here for the first time and I should like to please you, but I choose to tell you honestly about the views of Russian parliamentarians about Yugoslavia right now.

Unfortunately, the wounds of the Afghan war are still wide open in my country. We still remember the thousands of young boys who were killed in Afghanistan, just for nothing. Many thousands were wounded and crippled, and now live in Russia, suffering. Hundreds of Russian families are still waiting for their boys who are missing in action in Afghanistan or who

are still alive in captivity. We saw this bloody, terrible and savage war and we still feel the pain of that war.

We are also guilty. We killed many people in Afghanistan, just for nothing, and we realised that too late. With our weaponry, we killed approximately 1.5 million innocent Afghan people. We destroyed almost the whole country with our bombs, our missiles and our artillery. My friend Victor Losev was captured, tortured and beheaded. I am still trying to rescue some Russian prisoners of war in Afghanistan.

Please understand what we feel about the possibility of being involved in another war. We believe that the war in Yugoslavia is similar to the war in Afghanistan. There are many mountains and forests, and different groups are killing each other for some crazy political or religious reasons. How can we tell poor Russian families that again they will have to send their boys to kill and to die, as they did in Afghanistan? We completely support your efforts to bring peace to Yugoslavia and we shall back your efforts as much as possible. But please understand the domestic situation in Russia.

Many Russians consider the Serbs as Slavic brothers. You may not like to hear that, but we must face reality. If the bodies of young Russian soldiers are brought back to Moscow in coffins, even three, four or five of them, I do not know how long the government will survive. Please believe me. It is possible that many people will go on to the streets to denounce that business, and I shall have to join them.

We came here as friends and we shall try to help to find a peaceful resolution. However, I decided to make these remarks so that you would have a real picture of what is happening now in Russia. We want to help, but I do not know how we can do that. I thank you very much for your hospitality. Looking to the future, we want to help and to co-operate, and we hope that Russia will be part of Western European Union. Thank you very much for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Andronov. I assure you that the Assembly is delighted to have your observer team with us during the session. We hope that you will come here again and that you will give us the wisdom of your advice.

We now have one final speaker in the debate before we have the summing up.

I call Mr. Paire.

Mr. PAIRE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. President for allowing me to say a few words. I share the Assembly's disappointment at the fact that the international situation is so fraught with danger and tragedy, particularly in the case of Yugoslavia.

Mr. Paire (continued)

We believe that international law has been violated and we cannot accept the elevation of violence to the status of international law. We know that the dangers are enormous; there is the risk that Kosovo and Macedonia may become involved and, why not, even Albania later on. We know that Albania belongs to the Federation of Muslim Arab States so that even an extension of the fighting to intercontinental level cannot be ruled out.

I believe that sanctions should be applied strictly and that supplies of energy products and weapons to the warring parties should be prevented; the solution can and must be diplomatic and political; I believe therefore that if the application of sanctions proves inadequate, the Muslims should be armed and placed on equal footing. That is probably the only way we shall be able to persuade them to negotiate.

I join Mr. De Carolis in paying tribute to Admiral Mariani. I too am well aware of the difficulties faced by United Nations troops in various parts of the world and not only – but more particularly – in former Yugoslavia; virtually caught between two fires, young men who are sent to bring aid and succour and to help in keeping the peace often meet their deaths instead.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Paire. I also thank you for your brevity.

The debate is now closed.

Does Mr. Baumel wish to sum up?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, having listened to the speeches of the various members, I can only endorse what has been said since I am basically in agreement. The statement by Mr. Rodrigues is the only instance where I have certain reservations.

What more can I say other than that we are utterly dismayed at the way the conflict has developed. We have a complex feeling of impotence. We feel guilty and none too proud of the action taken by our governments. That said, we must not give up.

Europe is in an extremely serious situation. For the first time since the end of the cold war and the war in the Gulf, Europe has demonstrated its inability to enforce an international order founded on freedom and the right to self-determination and to act in the face of aggression.

I am afraid that this inaction will set a bad example and lead to similar aggression from other sources in the future. We shall have to keep careful watch and ensure that institutions whose responsibility it is to safeguard those freedoms and in particular the United Nations

can act as quickly as possible to prevent a repetition of such violations of international law and national rights.

Like Lord Finsberg, I take the view that we must really do our utmost to bring the violence in former Yugoslavia to a halt and to uphold a firm policy for the situation tomorrow.

However I am a realist. I wonder whether any country will be willing to send troops into the area to restore border security and drive back the aggressors. I am afraid that what has been conquered will remain occupied and that we shall in the end reach a lop-sided agreement to return to some kind of peace. It makes me very sad, for I am among several members here who remember certain events prior to the second world war, that also showed the democratic countries' weakness and compliance in the face of an aggressor. We paid the price.

So now more than ever we should reaffirm our determination to defend the international community and to equip ourselves with the means to enforce international law. To that end we should ask WEU – since we are meeting here in WEU – to reorganise its resources as quickly as possible – which is what we all wish – so that it is capable of effective action to enforce peace and stability within the framework of a European security policy.

We must ensure that the first steps made to give the necessary resources to WEU – which have already had an effect and are greatly increasing the organisation's scope for action – should continue until it becomes a real pillar of European defence.

This is really important. The time has come for all Western European nations and WEU member states to agree once and for all that the organisation must be a real and credible peace-defending organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Baumel.

I call the Chairman of the Political Committee, Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I shall be extremely brief. I shall first say a few sentences in French.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – I feel privileged to have this opportunity of expressing my admiration for the work of our Rapporteur and for his expert knowledge but most of all for his creative skill.

(The speaker continued in English)

The Political Committee spent many hours struggling on the text. The recommendation is both a bare minimum and the maximum which all our efforts could produce. With the exception of our colleague, Mr. Rodrigues, every member

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

of the committee supported those efforts and the recommendation. I hope that the Assembly will support this useful minimum but substantial text.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1379.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Ladies and gentlemen, I propose that we have a short suspension of probably about fifteen minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11 a.m.)

**4. Address by Mr. Andreatta,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy,
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council**

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Andreatta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy and Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council.

We welcome you, Mr. Andreatta. On behalf of the Assembly may I say that, although the Italian presidency is coming to a close, you are very welcome here. It is a great honour that you have been able to come to address us. When the Assembly met in Rome in April, your office was then held by Mr. Colombo. Your distinguished career had not led you along paths that touched upon the activities of WEU. We are grateful to you for the interest that you are showing in our organisation and for the work that you have already undertaken for us. We have been particularly happy with the Italian presidency.

This has been a time of change for WEU, with our headquarters moving to Brussels and the establishment of the satellite agency in Torrejón. Your country has presided magnificently over the operations in the Adriatic, particularly off the coast of Montenegro. A number of us have seen those operations for ourselves. I repeat that we are very grateful to you.

I understand that you are prepared to answer questions. Therefore I invite you to come to the tribune to address the Assembly.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words. Government representatives are not accustomed these days to hearing kind words from assemblies and their presidents so I am particularly grateful for what you have said.

It is a privilege and pleasure for me to be here at the close of Italy's presidency of WEU which has seen major changes and developments in our organisation.

Above all, I would not wish to miss this opportunity of thanking all members of the WEU Assembly as I am convinced that, without its constant participation and its valuable links with public opinion in our countries, it would not have been possible to go forward as we have.

I think I can say that our full and frequent contacts, sometimes involving a considerable amount of profitable discussion, have been one of the most worthwhile experiences of our presidency. I say this with sincerity and I thank you for the attention that you have always given and are still giving to the development of WEU and its rôle.

Lastly, my warmest recognition and thanks go to your President, Mr. Soell, who has always been very ready to give advice and encouragement. At the same time I offer my best wishes to your newly-elected President, Sir Dudley Smith, for success with his duties.

Traditionally, the presidency reports to the Assembly on developments during the year of office. I am glad to do so and also to offer some ideas for the future on the basis of the experience gained.

Over the year, we have committed ourselves in every way to promoting the rôle of WEU and in particular its development along the lines laid down at Maastricht and Petersberg.

It has certainly been a difficult year and a crucial year for the prospects for European construction. Firstly, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has proved more difficult than expected, with inevitable political consequences for the whole European process including the construction of the security-defence dimension. Secondly, international developments, including first and foremost the crisis in Yugoslavia but also currencies in disarray and the difficult economic position, have faced our countries with a complex situation when world equilibria are changing and at possibly the most delicate stage in the construction of Europe.

Turning for a moment to what WEU has done over the past twelve months, I would say that it

1. See page 38.

Mr. Andreatta (continued)

has attained its essential objectives and that, in unsettled economic conditions, it has kept on track towards the targets we all wish to achieve.

The feature of the first six months was the enlargement of WEU and its transfer to Brussels; to that end the Assembly provided great encouragement and very valuable advice which was appreciated by the governments of all member states.

The predominantly political aspects of our work over the last six months relate mainly to the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Of course, everyone is aware that this crisis has caused a great deal of heartache for the European countries and has made them realise that the efforts made by the whole international community are inadequate and that the existing machinery is not really suitable. However, while recognising realistically the limits of the possible, WEU has maintained an active presence and has played a part that I consider to be politically significant, particularly as regards the application of effective sanctions against former Yugoslavia.

The recently-started operation to reinforce checks on the Danube, in agreement with the three riparian states – Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary – should make a decisive contribution to closing off a major loophole for evading the blockade and to strengthening sanctions as called for by United Nations Security Council resolutions and by the commitments entered into by the Twelve as part of the measures to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Clearly, this is only a limited operation but its originality and political significance are far from negligible. The initiative, launched after intensive negotiations with the riparian states, is in fact a further, symbolic affirmation of the rôle which WEU can play in peace-making under United Nations auspices and above all in the European context to protect the specific interests of the European countries. Furthermore, this is a practical example of the collaboration which can be developed between the member countries of WEU and the Central European countries for common action on security matters; it anticipates and, therefore, opens up prospects to be expected from the step-by-step construction of the security-defence dimension in Europe.

I believe that all this is fully in line with the aims of the Assembly as expressed in Recommendation 526 on the development of security co-operation between the countries of Central Europe.

Lastly, it is worth noting that all the WEU countries will be contributing to the initiative involving about 269 men and nine patrol boats.

Another point I wish to mention, as I believe it to be politically important, relates to the combined operation of NATO and WEU naval forces to enforce the blockade in the Adriatic. This has been achieved by the issue of directives by the Adriatic Military Committee composed of the members of the NATO Military Committee and the military representatives of WEU, and by the approval of these directives at a joint session of the North Atlantic Council and the Permanent Council of WEU. This saw a new chapter in relations between NATO and WEU in full application of the principles of transparency, complementarity and co-operation laid down at Maastricht and Petersberg.

In practice, this will enable operations to be carried out even more effectively for the full enforcement of the blockade in the territorial waters of Serbia and Montenegro.

This also seems to me to be fully in line with the terms of Assembly Recommendation 526.

In addition, at its meeting on 19th May in Rome, the WEU Council of Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to study the creation of safe havens in Bosnia and the possibility that WEU might co-ordinate the rotation of the troops deployed by member states in the framework of UNPROFOR and participation by member states in the protection of safe havens.

These studies have already been started by the planning cell and a group of national experts. The central position of the Vance-Owen plan and the reinforcement of UNPROFOR are the reference point for a solution safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and putting an end to the interminable series of unacceptable outrages perpetrated there.

Over and above the implementation of measures to bring the fighting to an end, we must also try to draw from the Yugoslav crisis a warning and a lesson for the future because this crisis has highlighted the need for new and more effective security structures if we are to protect our continent from the emergence of new breeding grounds for tension and warfare and instead to promote development in a context of stability where peoples, cultures and ethnic groups exist side by side.

Among other things this means that WEU, as the European security and defence dimension, will be required to play an increasingly active and decisive rôle in managing these crises so closely affecting our countries' security interests and in peace-keeping in particular.

Mr. Andreatta (continued)

On the subject of peace-keeping, the Italian presidency initiated a lengthy discussion in the Council meeting in Rome on 19th May. It is obvious, too, that one of WEU's future objectives will be to allow more significant participation by the European countries in maintaining security and peace and preventing conflicts in Europe.

Among the institutions and organisations required to contribute to maintaining a stable balance in Europe, WEU has all the potential needed for the effective implementation of various forms of humanitarian, peace-keeping and peace-making action.

Our objective, is, of course, to reshape the architecture of Europe but the only feasible approach is to improve relationships between the institutions currently working in Europe. We must start from present reality to create reality for the future.

The recent development in relations between NATO and WEU is a very positive first step. At the North Atlantic Council on 10th-11th June, special mention was made of these closer relations with particular reference to how the two organisations have co-operated closely together in their contribution to the efforts of the international community to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. But more will certainly have to be done to clarify and identify the basic criteria for sharing duties and for rationalising the different peace-keeping activities. This certainly ties up with the basic question of WEU's future rôle in safeguarding European security and with the question of relations with European Union and NATO.

WEU is undoubtedly an organisation which by virtue of the flexibility of its structure, which needs to be safeguarded and possibly extended in future, is capable of dealing effectively with specifically European crises which do not require intervention on a wider scale, say by NATO and hence with the involvement of the United States, but can be resolved at a lower, sub-regional level.

As regards crisis management and peace-keeping, it seems to me that WEU should work out a basic criterion and premiss for its own concrete initiatives in case of future diplomatic action by the Twelve or possibly under mandate from the United Nations and the CSCE. In the event of a crisis, prior diplomatic action by the Twelve might often constitute the precondition for WEU to undertake a practical rôle.

It also seems essential that WEU be able to command suitable forces for peace-keeping missions and this raises the fundamental problem of how to create such forces meeting modern and effective criteria.

It was against this background that the Council of Ministers, meeting on 19th May, instructed the Permanent Council to submit a report to the next ministerial meeting on the forces available to WEU, with particular reference to the conduct of humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. At that meeting, ministers noted that all member states are now in the process of identifying those military units that they are prepared to make available to WEU for various missions. These should include rapid deployment air, naval and land forces and command centres to direct operations.

In this context, we particularly welcomed the announcement made to the Rome Council by the Belgian Defence Minister concerning the availability to WEU of the multinational central division of the rapid reaction force, the British representative's confirmation of both this announcement and the availability of the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force and the statement by Germany and France that the Eurocorps would also be available to WEU.

It seems to me that for the future rôle of WEU the availability of rapid deployment forces is especially important. On this particular point, I believe that urgent attention needs to be given to ensuring the prompt availability of multilateral units with proper training and therefore able to act effectively in various crisis scenarios to be worked out and identified by the planning cell.

The Italo-Franco-Spanish initiative for closer European co-operation of naval air forces is aimed precisely at the earmarking of an air-sea component needed to take urgent action for emergencies in various theatres. What is required is the formation of a naval air-force that would not be permanent but could be quickly mobilised and deployed not only in the Mediterranean but also in other geographical areas.

I also consider that the responsibilities of the planning cell should be stepped up and a study made of a possible skeleton command structure in the form of the nucleus of a mixed general staff responsible to the presidency. This should not of course be seen in any way as an alternative to the NATO command structure and integrated forces.

I should also like to tell you that the opening of the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrejón on 28th April last was a highly important event. This centre will be able to contribute significantly to the collection and joint evaluation of data useful for our defence policy. It is my hope that in the not too distant future the centre's work will include the planning of a joint satellite system for the WEU countries and I trust that the relevant studies now in progress will shortly lead to ministerial decisions on the subject.

Mr. Andreatta (continued)

I hope that I have given a necessarily brief but sufficiently detailed picture of the essential features, objectives and approaches of the Italian presidency's efforts during its year of office.

Faithful to its European vocation, Italy has made the maximum commitment in this rôle in the conviction that WEU can and must serve as the European defence component and at the same time strengthen the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance.

To Luxembourg, which will be taking over the presidency in a few days' time, I offer my warmest wishes for success in the difficult missions which await WEU in today's complex world.

The incoming presidency can count on Italy's wholehearted support in the discharge of its duties.

Finally, I should like to repeat yet again Italy's full support for the action and activities of the WEU parliamentary Assembly which we regard as essential for enhancing the organisation's rôle and for linking that rôle with the positions adopted by the political forces in member countries.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for your wide review of events. I am sure that a number of people want to ask questions and I should be pleased if you would answer them, the first being a fellow Italian, Mr. Foschi.

Would you like to ask your question, Mr. Foschi?

Mr. FOSCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, I believe that the interest of the Minister's speech lies in the fact that he has described what the Italian presidency has done over the past twelve months in very clear and practical terms. The period has been of particular importance for WEU, which has recovered its *raison d'être*, unfortunately in tragic circumstances.

In concluding, Minister, you stressed the importance you attach to WEU's parliamentary Assembly and when our President, Sir Dudley Smith, called you he paid tribute to the Italian presidency's positive contribution.

Over the year I have heard other colleagues from all delegations express support for the dialogue which the Italian presidency has re-established in a positive manner with the parliamentary Assembly. I must, however, ask you a question because over the last few days the parliamentary Assembly has suffered the embarrassment of a less positive dialogue with the Council of Ministers, in terms of its replies and attitudes, and with the Permanent Council; some of the prospects now surfacing in the Com-

munity and the European Parliament are also disturbing.

I would therefore like to ask you whether, after the end of the Italian presidency, this recognition of the rôle of WEU's parliamentary Assembly could not and should not also provide the opportunity for urgent, in-depth consideration of the Assembly's future prospects, based on the action and initiative of the Italian Government in collaboration with the new Luxembourg presidency of the Council?

Recently the press has been writing of the democratic deficit which this Assembly may create for the work of WEU if it does not establish clearly the rôle it is capable of playing positively and responsibly in conjunction with other responsible institutions and with NATO and other agencies which cannot be identified with the existing institutions of the Twelve. I believe that, looking ahead, Europe will have even greater need of this rôle of the parliamentary Assembly. You may perhaps be able to add something concerning the creation of the space and guarantees required by WEU's parliamentary Assembly.

I conclude by saying that the existence of an assembly where members of national parliaments can express an expert opinion, through a choice by the European Parliament, is an important instrument for maintaining the link between governments and electorates and a link which by virtue of being interparliamentary and at community level prevents the mobilisation of national public opinions on such important matters which should be considered in a more enlightened manner. The significance of an assembly like yours in security policy is therefore decisive. What is important is to be able to integrate it so that it can lead on to the development of institutions as the Community assumes responsibility for security policy. Basically, the European Community will only take on the nature of a federation if political, monetary and defence policy pass to its control. Any obstacle to the achievement of this seems to me to conflict with the European design.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – In welcoming the question, I would recall that, when the European defence community was under discussion a great Italian statesman, Alcide De Gasperi, insisted that no intergovernmental organisation should be without a structure for parliamentary scrutiny. It is in this spirit that Italy regards as essential a rôle which combines the powers of government representatives with the existence of a scrutinising assembly which provides the link with electorates in the pursuit of the institution's objectives. We have tried to maintain a

Mr. Andreatta (continued)

correct relationship and to increase the amount of information exchanged between the Council and the Assembly. Clearly we shall work in future for the continuing extension of this relationship.

Europe's defence problems have the attention of the press and of electorates partly because of the high quality and importance of the debates which have taken place in this Assembly. To some extent the problem of the expiry of the treaty underlies this question – which I think others will be asking.

As members know, the Committee of Legal Experts consulted by the presidency of the Council of Ministers arrived at an interpretation which would bring the expiry date of the treaty to fifty years from 1948. It has already been stated that the Council is prepared to consider any possible objection and any new legal interpretations which the Assembly might submit; I believe, however, that the problem should be approached in the context of the Maastricht Treaty and the problem of the importance of an ad hoc assembly to deal with security and defence problems should be looked at within the overall architecture of Europe. It seems to me that the dispute about duration could constitute a page in the defence of the rôle of a parliament but it would appear rather to be in the obstinate style of opposition in the defence of parliaments, an argument about the duration of the Assembly when what it really needed is to see what rôle an assembly to study safety and defence programmes could perform within the new institutions.

I am well aware of the complexity of the task but I am sure that the Council and Assembly must in future give it much more thought; and it would appear to me to be fertile ground for planning a more definitive rôle for the Assembly after the one it has fulfilled over the difficult years of the half century.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I will not follow Mr. Foschi's question because the Minister's answer was in complete contradiction to what Mr. Colombo promised us when we had our meeting in Rome. However, we can pursue that later.

I shall ask the Minister a specific question to which I should like a specific answer. He referred to the Vance-Owen plan. Does he believe that any government will implement the Vance-Owen plan, or are we merely having more of a talking shop?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU*

Council) (Translation). – The Vance-Owen plan applies the principle of defending Europe's boundaries embodied in the Helsinki Agreement. If revisionist tendencies make progress in Europe, the continent's security will be threatened. So I do not know whether it will be possible to implement the Vance-Owen plan by peace-enforcing action; peace and the lifting of the embargo on Serbia are impossible if the integrity of Bosnia along lines substantially in conformity with the Vance-Owen plan is not respected. Like the questioner I am sceptical about any willingness to deploy forces capable of implementing it on the ground. I believe that implementation is a long-term objective which will involve the use of all possible instruments.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Minister, my question relates to relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Union or the Atlantic Alliance.

Following the invitation to European Community member states to join WEU or acquire observer status if they so wish, and to the other European member states of NATO or the Atlantic Alliance to become WEU associate members, I should like to enquire what stage has been reached in the enlargement of WEU. Is there a final deadline or have any specific arrangements been made?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – There is no technical or legal time-limit. My hope is that the current ratification procedures will be concluded speedily.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, why is the Council of Ministers still so reluctant fully to publish the nationalities, identities and details of ships breaking the embargoes on the Danube and in the Adriatic?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – The names of ships which break the embargo are passed on to the United Nations. I believe that their identity is known.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, yesterday the Assembly passed a recommendation calling on the Council to commit itself to applying the successful Helsinki prin-

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

ciples to the Mediterranean and Middle East through the establishment of a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. I appreciate that your country has been at the forefront in promoting that idea. Do you welcome the recommendation passed by the Assembly yesterday and, if so, when do you consider that it would be an appropriate time for the WEU Council to promote the establishment of such a CSCM?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – I believe that for Europe's security a number of sub-regional organisations are needed within the CSCE. I am thinking above all of the position of the Nordic countries and the acute problems facing the Baltic states.

I believe that in the Mediterranean the information provided by the Assembly opens up a prospect of some importance. The details are to some extent anticipated by the initiatives taken in the western Mediterranean and in the eastern Mediterranean, in the latter case with some difficulty. I have to say that my experience in launching the initiative in the eastern Mediterranean shows that even allied countries have suspicions which make it difficult to put intentions into practice. Realistically, therefore, I find it difficult to set a date. I can say that, so far as my country is concerned, the initiative is welcome and will have our full support.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have just heard the Minister's views on peace-keeping and peace-making, the importance of the WEU planning cell, and multinational military forces. The Minister emphasised their importance. But these are mere words. I note that hardly anything has actually happened in this regard. Peace-keeping, to which the Minister attaches such importance, does not help, and peace-enforcement is too dangerous. Surely we should be more realistic and more modest about our objectives and confine ourselves to the humanitarian aspect and to applying the embargo.

WEU co-ordinates the monitoring operations on the Danube. Does the Minister not agree that we in WEU came to this far too late? As for applying the embargo, why did that take us so long? Does the Minister agree that it is most important to give financial compensation for the damage this embargo on the remaining Yugoslavia has done to its neighbours – I am thinking of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Macedonia – who have suffered most from it?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREATTA (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council*) (Translation). – I fully agree with the last part of your assessment. Outside the scope of the Danube operation, but still in a crucial area such as Macedonia I believe that financial compensation should be found for the damage caused by the embargo to an economy like that of Macedonia integrated as it is with Serbia and the other states of former Yugoslavia.

Even though Lord Owen has said that Macedonia stinks of oil and has suggested that up till now supplies of this essential raw material are still passing through Macedonia to help Serbia in continuing to exist, I believe that this violation of the embargo must be stopped.

I believe that the United Nations must take on this task and mobilise funds from the Muslim countries and, in particular, the wealthy Arab countries by way of reparation and revenge by the international community on Serbia for its behaviour.

A fortnight ago deployment of forces on the Danube began and even the British Foreign Minister noted during his recent travels that the position as regards trade along the Danube had changed radically since the patrol boats organised by WEU had come into service. Otherwise we are at a standstill and faced by tragedy. Clearly any peace-keeping action and even more any peace-enforcing actions need many more troops on the ground. It is also clear for a number of reasons that governments have only very limited possibilities for providing such forces.

I do not know whether you, as representatives of public opinion, of Europe's political forces and of national parliaments are in a position to press for decisions on the use of forces which for some countries would have to be called up. Our communities with high living standards tend to shy away from crises even if we all know that this is short-sighted and that the security of all of us is threatened by the way in which this problem will ultimately be resolved.

The NATO services estimate that by doubling the number of troops in Bosnia, it would be possible to defend the havens, which is one method of keeping the peace. This is clearly a very serious problem, however. The international community must have at its disposal forces which can be mobilised automatically. It is unimaginable that, in the manner of Central European princes of the eighteenth century, the United Nations Secretary-General would commit forces for any and every operation and forces which had not had common training. This raises, therefore, the problem of regional organisations like ours which have forces available automatically as soon as the United Nations and the CSCE decide to intervene, thus

Mr. Andreatta (continued)

going over the heads of national parliaments and eliminating to some extent the limits of voluntary organisations such as ours. This is the origin of the tragedy and powerlessness repeated in at least two interventions and frittered away in verbal statements with which all our parliaments and governments seek to salve their consciences.

If any lesson is to be drawn from what has happened we must turn our thoughts to various means of action and automatic procedures. In order not to betray the victims and not to cause difficulties for the UNPROFOR troops, Europe and the civilian world must stay at the ready and the economic sanctions must threaten even more damage than military action would threaten at the moment. Absolute determination to maintain economic sanctions for five or ten years until such time as the political objectives are achieved and such time as other people in power decide that it will cost Serbia more not to bow to the wishes of the international community.

The PRESIDENT. – May I thank you, Mr. Andreatta, for sparing the time to address the Assembly and answer questions. We are all politicians and know only too well how great are the pressures placed on all ministers, particularly ministers for foreign affairs, at a time such as this for Europe when the tensions are so great and when views are divided on what should be done.

You will shortly lay down the burden of Chairman-in-Office, but happily you will continue as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. I know that, as a result of the excellent way that the Italian presidency has guided WEU, you will continue to take a great interest in its affairs.

May I wish you well after you lay down the WEU burden. Also, I wish you the very best of Godspeed in all your endeavours on behalf of all European countries.

5. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT. – Before I introduce our next guest, I propose a small change in the order of business. I propose that the debate on the motion for a recommendation proposed by Mr. De Decker and others on the situation in Somalia, which, at its first sitting, the Assembly agreed should be debated this afternoon after the conclusion of the proceedings on the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee and the vote on the draft recommendation, should instead be taken this afternoon after the report of the Defence Committee and the draft recommendation on WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic.

This is a small change, but it is helpful for technical reasons.

Is there any opposition?...

I see that there is none.

In that case, the modification in the order of business is agreed to.

6. Address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Fabbri, Minister of Defence of Italy.

On behalf of the Assembly, I should like to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Fabbri, who is the co-Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council.

As I was Chairman of the Defence Committee before I was appointed to this office, I know that Mr. Fabbri's ministry has played an extremely active rôle during the Italian presidency of WEU and has acquitted itself with great distinction, particularly in the operations in the Adriatic. It is largely due to the Italian efforts that we now have a composite force in the Adriatic to apply the United Nations embargo, with the joint NATO-WEU military command structure based in Naples.

In this context, I should also like to welcome Admiral Mariani, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Fleet. He is most welcome here.

May I ask you, Mr. Fabbri, to address us. I understand that you will be happy to answer questions. We know that all ministers are under a great deal of pressure. If, however, questions are kept short, we should be able to take them all.

Will you please come to the tribune to address us.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted at the end of Italy's presidency of WEU, to have this opportunity to be with you, a few months after becoming my country's Minister of Defence; and turning to you, Mr. President, also newly appointed, I offer you my warmest wishes before going on to a debate on today's most pressing questions and taking stock of the last twelve months with more particular reference to the organisation's military functions.

The challenge facing WEU, like the Atlantic Alliance, is very clear and extremely important for our future; it is to work for a stable and peaceful transition to a really united free Europe.

Mr. Fabbri (continued)

The disappearance of the blocs and the ending of the cold war has opened the way to hotbeds of crisis and tension which are very difficult to control. Our countries, as members of this organisation and of NATO, have heavy responsibilities in the matter of stabilisation and humanitarian aid. It is as well to remember that in many cases such aid without military backing means only the waste and dispersal of resources.

Europe makes a substantial contribution to crisis management on our continent which also means that we deliberately assume responsibility for the benefit of western and Atlantic solidarity as a whole.

The fact that European and North American objectives coincide and that in various ways WEU now includes all the European countries, leads me to start by looking at the delicate and controversial problem of relations between the two organisations. This affects the development of WEU and the whole plan for the construction of Europe, including ways of implementing the frequently repeated statement that this organisation should be at one and the same time the instrument for ensuring a European defence identity and the European pillar of NATO.

Statements of principle on this subject are extremely clear.

The Rome Atlantic summit and the European summit at Maastricht established the framework for the future development of Europe's defence policy; this can be summarised as essential compatibility and complementarity of the two organisations and the need to avoid duplication which would be too costly for our countries.

While these are the objectives, it has to be recognised that their implementation has run into difficulties and doubts which are being overcome but are slow to disappear.

The fact is that we are faced with a fundamental dilemma. It has to be decided whether European and western security can continue to be guaranteed with the same resources and the same policies as over the forty years of cold war. European security was left entirely to the protection of the Atlantic Alliance within which American nuclear cover provided the final and the most credible guarantee against the massive threat from the former Soviet Union.

The community of interests and not solely of security interests on the two sides of the Atlantic is certainly less than it was. Military conditions on the continent have changed, however, with the emergence of more scattered and less serious threats which have to be dealt with by various means and approaches.

At the same time, Maastricht has set the target of political union of the members of the European Community. This future prospect for Europe and the changed strategic situation on the continent argue for an enhanced defence identity in the shape of WEU. A group of countries moving towards integration and abandoning their own separate military guarantee neglect an essential responsibility towards their own citizens.

That is why, even while safeguarding irreplaceable transatlantic solidarity the scaffolding and foundations of the new European security architecture cannot remain the same as in the past.

Even though they are physiological, these changes are not painless and it is understandable if not justifiable that our allies across the Atlantic, who are themselves looking at their future rôle in a no-longer-divided Europe, are feeling some concern about developments of which they cannot yet clearly see the outcome.

We must make the United States and Canada understand that Europe remains firmly committed to the solidarity of NATO, built up over more than forty years. At the same time, our message must convince them that, without jeopardising western unity, Europe cannot forego the right to establish a separate security and defence rôle. We must in turn warn ourselves that if this rôle is to be achieved, both resources and the political will will be needed and that mere words are not enough. On this basis and applying the rules of complementarity in practice the old trusting link will continue and be strengthened without any risk of damaging competition.

This was the line followed during Italy's year of presidency which respects, I am sure, the guidelines and intentions of all the member countries of our organisation.

At practical level, the dialogue with the alliance has been considerably stepped up since the recent transfer to Brussels. Psychological understanding should be increased by geographical proximity which assists daily contacts and consultations.

During this year of presidency, WEU's military dimension has been enhanced. In reporting on this, I would like to offer a few points for your joint consideration.

As it has grown as an institution, WEU has had to cope with the tragic test of the crisis in former Yugoslavia which has required physical intervention in the Adriatic and planning, which together have demonstrated the ability of a structure not yet firmly established to respond effectively to its member countries' demands.

Mr. Fabbri (continued)

Events in Bosnia are facing the international community with ever-increasing responsibilities and are forcing them towards a decision on a difficult issue of principle which may constitute a precedent for the future.

In a world where crises and upheavals seem to be multiplying it has to be decided whether and at what risk we are actually prepared to assume the burden of maintaining peace and to provide the necessary share of resources for that purpose. Against this requirement, after the euphoria which spread to large parts of the general public when the blocs disappeared, there are now pressing but premature demands to reduce military strengths.

This tendency threatens to jeopardise the ability of our armed forces to defend our countries and to undertake actions which are becoming increasingly numerous and burdensome.

It is my hope that this Assembly which carries so much authority because it represents the free parliaments of our countries, can provide a genuine voice to bring about a timely reversal of the trend.

The European countries have reacted in substantial measure to the recent events in Bosnia. Resolution 836 which orders the creation of safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the line taken at our ministerial session in Rome on 19th May.

At Rome, where the continuing validity of the Vance-Owen plan was reiterated, the aim was to identify measures designed to contain the fighting and to promote a gradual slackening of tension between the two parties until a real cease-fire could be reached.

In any case, it is of particular importance to confirm that the international community, and the European countries in particular, will not accept the territorial conquests won by violence by the Serbs.

From a military point of view, the implementation of Resolution 836 will be neither straightforward nor easy. The United Nations' original assessments seemed to start from the premise that the safe havens would be established after a genuine cease-fire between the parties so that as a result only a few thousand troops would be needed to guarantee the safe havens with the backing of air cover.

In view of the difficulty encountered in consolidating the repeated cease-fires which have been signed but never respected, it is reasonable to anticipate that there will be considerable military friction and that a relatively high number of troops will therefore be needed. In addition, the rules of engagement will have to be adapted to the new circumstances and made more definite.

As regards air cover, it is not my feeling that the NATO meeting in Athens removed all doubts as to whether it should be provided for the blue berets only or for the people living in the safe havens also.

In my opinion there should be no doubt; the aim of the international action for Bosnia is to save the people living there. I cannot see therefore how it would be possible in the event of attack on the safe havens to decide whether it was directed against the peace-keeping forces only or against the population, in which case there would be no intervention from the air.

To tell the truth, genuine protection of the so-called safe havens will depend ultimately on the willingness of the members of the United Nations to contribute to strengthening UNPROFOR.

Much stronger protection is also needed for the humanitarian aid convoys, in view of the many volunteers who have become victims and the high level of the risks which have so far led the United Nations to deliver aid mainly by air.

WEU has a direct and visible rôle in the international action to deal with the crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Until 7th June, the sea embargo in the Adriatic was monitored by a WEU fleet co-ordinated with the NATO fleet. This has recently been transformed into a joint action by the two organisations. This new initiative under the operational control of the Commander of NATO Forces Southern Europe but with the inclusion of some WEU officers in the command structure, was agreed in order to economise resources and to safeguard the identity of Europe's contribution at the same time.

Since 22nd November 1992, when the enforcement operation started, WEU ships have challenged a total of 6 733 vessels. Four hundred and eighty-four have been inspected at sea and 109 have been diverted to port for inspection, while five vessels have been seized in accordance with Resolution 820.

Lastly, with the recent tightening of United Nations sanctions, monitoring of the embargo also includes the naval blockade of Montenegrin ports.

To the timely appreciation of the situation by WEU must be ascribed the fact that, while the Ministerial Council was meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992, it was stated that the organisation was prepared to offer the riparian Danube states technical assistance and equipment to make the United Nations embargo more effective.

After a great deal of preparatory work on the occasion of the WEU ministerial meeting in

Mr. Fabbri (continued)

Rome on 20th May, extended to include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, agreements were signed with Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to go ahead with the operation, which has the character of a customs action and involves operational assistance to those countries in implementation of United Nations Resolutions 787 and 820.

During the year of Italy's presidency, major progress has been made in setting up military forces answerable to WEU and determining relations with the Atlantic Alliance, through the double-hatted approach with NATO in accordance with the spirit of the Petersberg declaration.

Progress has also been made in setting up the Eurocorps through collaboration between France and Germany, and satisfactory arrangements have been worked out for operational relations between the NATO supreme command and this multinational unit. This has removed doubts and distrust concerning the Franco-German initiative. What is now needed is to remove the original, if historically important, bilateral name to make the Eurocorps genuinely European, and to become an instrument with effective potential for use on WEU missions; in the meanwhile it will be possible and expedient to clear up the problem of Germany's well-known constitutional restrictions.

Other ideas for multinational units have come to fruition or are in the process of becoming so. This is a positive move, consistent with Petersberg, which is gradually putting our organisation into a position to carry out its tasks and to adapt its forces to them through the flexibility of the double-hatted arrangement under which forces can be available for both WEU and NATO missions at the same time.

These are the principles underlying European air-sea co-operation, based on a French, Italian and Spanish proposal, open to all the European partners and intended to be called on from time to time to meet specific requirements and to operate in the spirit of Maastricht, that is under the rules of complementarity and permanent consultation with NATO.

A new element of great importance is the satisfactory operation of the planning cell transferred to Brussels last January, and working under General Caltabiano of the Italian air force.

Another major step forward in strengthening the operational rôle of WEU is the commitment of great technological and military importance in respect of space activity in accordance with the recommendation adopted by the Ministerial Council in November 1988.

In practical terms, the Torrejón satellite evaluation centre was opened on 28th April and will receive Helios satellite data from Italy, France and Spain.

I should also like to mention the symposium organised by this Assembly's ad hoc committee on the prospects for a European anti-missile defence; this study is very timely from the standpoint of security and industrial technological research. One has only to think of the need to defend our continent against the threat of ballistic missiles now becoming increasingly pressing with the proliferation of armaments which cannot fail to be of concern to the international community.

The progress we have made with common defence must not be underestimated. At the same time we must not forget that genuine European unity will be the union of the nations. This requires pressing ahead strongly with integration so that, without destroying our separate entities, we arrive at a genuine amalgam which must be not only political and economic but also human.

The defence world must make its contribution, relying more on shared experiences through a powerful drive for exchanges between the young members of the armed forces of the old continent.

Much more can and should be done to step up multiple secondment of troops to training schools. Exchanges of units from one country to another for long training periods can and must be increased; a policy of complete integration of military units, including small units, from our countries can and must be pursued, together with practical efforts to standardise armaments. The European armaments agency is the natural institution for these tasks so that the operational, economic and industrial benefits can ultimately be obtained.

Before this Assembly which is the only European parliamentary body competent in security matters and whose essential rôle is fully appreciated by my country I should like to stress the historic importance of these objectives. To regard them as utopian means renouncing our responsibility. The slow, uncertain and inconclusive advance towards this target is tantamount in one way to abandoning the protection of our civilisation.

If it is true that thought and discussion lead on to action it is my hope that the work of this Assembly may encourage the determination of governments to move Europe forward as rapidly as possible towards European Union underpinned by its essential defence component.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for that extensive review of matters that affect all of us, and on which we have expressed a number of views this morning.

The President (continued)

We are happy to see with us Mr. Georges Wohlfart, the Secretary of State for Defence of Luxembourg. He has been listening patiently to our proceedings this morning. I am sure that we shall see him on other occasions in view of Luxembourg's forthcoming presidency. We extend our warmest welcome, Mr. Wohlfart, and we are pleased that you have been able to be with us.

We shall now proceed to questions to the Minister of Defence.

The first question is from Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, my thanks for your clear and detailed statement which has thrown light on a number of questions raised here and in committee. I would like, however, to ask you one specific question.

Since the Berlin wall came down there has been a growing tendency on the part of governments and national parliaments to cut down on defence spending because of economic and budgetary difficulties. Conversely, the end of the cold war has not put an end to conflicts, which have broken out dangerously and dramatically on the European and world scene as in former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

The rôle and responsibilities of the more developed countries, particularly in Europe, for guaranteeing peace and protecting human rights seem to be growing. What is your view on the subject?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think this is a vital question. It is true that when the Berlin wall came down we all had the feeling that it was possible to go ahead and dismantle defence structures because peace was ensured from then on and the Soviet bear no longer frightened anyone. This was unfortunately an illusion.

There has been no lessening of the basic priorities for the defence of our territories because the former Soviet empire is in fact very far from being stabilised and other threats are coming from other parts of the world. Above all, exactly as after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire, we have witnessed the explosion of a series of crises in which regional and ethnic elements are interwoven.

We all realise the need to promote peace and step up military intervention and the need to provide food aid by using troops; this is becoming an essential prior condition for bringing help to people in need.

All this raises problems closely linked with the resources needed for the purpose.

I am back from a very interesting trip to Mozambique and Somalia which has given serious cause for concern. In particular, having seen the situation in Somalia on the ground, I am convinced that if we wish to avoid a holocaust and a human, political and civilian tragedy in this part of Africa, peace-keeping action will have to be continued there for a long time to counter the factions wishing to indulge in armed conflict.

These then are the recommendations and warnings stated with great conviction at the last NATO Council. We must, of course, seek the optimum use of resources. Substantial savings are possible on defence; commitments must be selective and priorities carefully set but we must not delude ourselves that government finance problems can be resolved primarily by cutting funds for the strengthening, maintenance and modernisation of our defence structures.

My country is working towards a new defence model which will involve savings but also fresh investment, for example, on air defence.

We must therefore work against the trend and a sort of childish approach which regards with suspicion and mistrust any expenditure on military structures must be combated with reasoned and common sense arguments emphasising that the democracies' military structures are always means of defence and humanitarian aid and are designed to promote and maintain peace.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Ministers have just referred to the meetings recently held in Rome. It was specifically mentioned that some countries, Belgium in particular, would commit troops to WEU. Reference was made to a rapid reaction force. These are certainly new arrangements.

I should like to ask the Ministers if they are now in a position to give us their views or provide us with information on the types of contract and convention binding on countries participating in this type of operation. I particularly have in mind troops made available, the definition of rapid reaction and also, of course, how costs are to be met.

If a reply cannot be given immediately, which I would fully understand, I should be happy to receive one in writing at a later date.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Your question gives me an opportunity to say more on a subject which I tried to cover in my answer to Mr. Ferrarini. What is involved is the organisation of the new forces which must be flexible and able to intervene quickly, as required for peace-keeping and security action. These are of course new

Mr. Fabbri (continued)

departures, which call for some imagination and careful thought, but our military structures are capable of adapting their efforts to these new requirements as well. It seems to me that the need to train these intervention units must be used as an opportunity for achieving certain major objectives; at the same time the objectives must be rapid intervention and modernisation combined with greater flexibility and the saving of resources. All these objectives go together and are dealt with by the so-called double-hatted approach which I tried to explain in my speech.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – I am delighted to see the Minister here with us in the Assembly today and I am taking the opportunity to put two questions to him. Firstly, what arrangements have been made to upgrade Italian air bases to accommodate aircraft from countries contributing to the enforcement of the no-fly zone over former Yugoslavia and which countries currently have airborne units on these bases? My second question is perhaps somewhat removed from the subject, but in view of your presence here, Minister, I will take this opportunity to put it to you nevertheless. How do matters stand at present as regards Italy's contribution to the construction of the European fighter aircraft (EFA) – now better known as the new European fighter aircraft – or perhaps that name is now out of date too and we should be referring to the European fighter aircraft 2000?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Your main question relates to the organisation of the air bases used for logistic, organisational and technical support for the large-scale multinational operation known as deny fly. I think that my country has made a substantial contribution to our common cause and has shown that it possesses great professional and organisational capacity by providing efficient bases which have worked brilliantly. Naturally we have been greatly assisted by the fact that these bases are already equipped for collaboration and already used by NATO. Once again, the complementarity and co-ordination which can be achieved on the basis of existing structures have been shown to work efficiently.

The aircraft operating and provided by different allies come from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Turkey. At Falconara, therefore, there is a base which has operated under the instructions of the High Commissioner for Refugees and I have had the opportunity to pay it a visit; all the

military personnel operating on the Italian bases expressed their gratitude and full satisfaction concerning the help received.

On the other hand, as regards your question concerning the Eurofighter, you know better than me that the project has been substantially simplified to reduce the cost. Unfortunately, the project will be slightly delayed and will result – we earnestly hope but there is reasonable expectation – in a product better suited to the new defence framework. My country has no intention of withdrawing from the project; taking account of the time by which we can expect the aircraft to be available, we believe that we are providing ourselves with bridging air protection to ensure our security from the present time until the Eurofighter actually becomes available.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE OF BENSHE (*United Kingdom*). – Minister, in your speech I understood you to say that the establishment of safe havens, which was WEU policy, would require extra troops and air cover. I was then rather horrified to hear you say that air cover, or air strength, would be used to reply to an attack on peace-keeping forces or the inhabitants of a haven, and especially to an attack on peace-keeping forces. I trust and hope that an attack on the inhabitants of a safe haven would, indeed, incur a reply from the air or our forces.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to clarify and confirm my earlier statement. With special reference to the problem of the so-called safe havens I asked the question but I also gave my reply. Looking at the number of troops needed to ensure protection I observed that the initial estimate attributed to the United Nations was too low as NATO's calculation showed that in order to protect Sarajevo alone, at least 5 000 men would be needed. The figure depends on the nature of the terrain but even more on the kind of fighting going on where, as someone said, atrocities are being committed from balcony to balcony and not only from village to village. In order to keep the havens secure and make the other six secure a very large number of men and land forces have to be mobilised. Naturally, this raises the question of who will provide the protecting units.

As regards the statement which surprised you, I wish to be very clear. The problem to be resolved is the following: are the people to be protected simply the peace-keeping forces deployed for whose protection immediate air action must be taken if they are attacked on the ground or – and I tend towards this solution – if the havens have to be safe and if finally we can guarantee security in any part of that tormented

Mr. Fabbri (continued)

land, should everyone there be safe and above all the people who live there? This raises another problem, however; in this way a kind of zone would be created like those created around Israel's boundaries. But this is yet another problem, the choice that the international community must make comes down, in my opinion, to protecting the people who live in the areas to be made safe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Fabbri.

The final question is from Mr. Terry Davis, also of the United Kingdom.

Mr. DAVIS (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister referred to the importance of protecting food convoys. Last week, our soldiers stood and watched the unarmed Muslim drivers of a food convoy being taken from their lorries and shot by Croats. How does the Minister expect the people of Europe to have confidence in a Council of Ministers which regards that as protection?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. FABBRI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Protection of the volunteers who have generously thrown themselves into supportive action on a vast scale and through the roads of former Yugoslavia to bring help has become of dramatic immediacy now that many of these volunteers, unfortunately from my country as well as others, have been killed. The question has been debated in the Italian Parliament and is in the forefront of our thoughts. As Europeans we must welcome the fact that in a world where selfishness seems to prevail together with outrageous individualism, so many forces are working for solidarity, love for one's neighbour and help for the weak in danger of losing the precious gift of life. It is naturally not easy to organise such solidarity and volunteers almost systematically fight shy of any idea of regimentation and restriction. Nevertheless, I believe that the international community and member states should make a great effort to ensure that solidarity is well organised and protected. So in order to avoid confusion, the terms of the questions must be perfectly clear. The final point of reference for organisation with the help of individual governments must be the High Commissioner for Refugees, while protection must be provided by the United Nations forces. What has to be established is how the individual states are prepared to contribute to strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can give the necessary protection.

This is the problem before us on which we must all reflect but without losing too much time because otherwise the great wave of solidarity will be dispersed or the volunteers will be in serious risk of their lives.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Fabbri. The range and content of the many questions put to you and your ministerial colleague, Mr. Andreatta, show the concern and special interest in the subject of those members of WEU who asked them. Their questions demonstrated that the Assembly listened with care to the address of both you and your ministerial colleague. It is helpful to have ministers of your calibre to address WEU. Italy's presidency of the Council of WEU has led to Italy having great expertise in defence matters, which is something that affects all our parliaments and countries.

On behalf of the Assembly may I again thank you very much for addressing us. We have enjoyed having you here. Although you will no longer be involved in the presidency of WEU, we look forward to seeing you here again in your rôle as Minister of Defence of Italy.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Document 1366).
2. WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1367).
3. The situation in Somalia (Presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Document 1377).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1366*).
Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Parisi, Mr. Caccia, Mr. Hardy, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Eversdijk, Mrs. Err, Mr. Slatinski (*Observer from Bulgaria*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Baumel (*Chairman*).
4. WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence*

Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1367).

Speakers: Sir Keith Speed (*joint Rapporteur*), Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Dunnachie, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Diaconescu (*Observer from Romania*), Mr. Fry, Mr. Vassiliades (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Philipov (*Observer from Bulgaria*), Mr. Marten (*joint Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig (*Vice-Chairman*), Sir Keith Speed.

5. The situation in Somalia (*Presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1377*).

Speakers: Mr. de Puig (*in place of Mr. De Decker*), Mr. Ferrarini, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*).

6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.02 p.m. with Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. United Nations operations – interaction with WEU

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Defence Committee
and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution
and draft order, Doc. 1366)*

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of the report of the Defence Committee on United Nations

operations – interaction with WEU, debate and votes on the draft recommendation, draft resolution and draft order, Document 1366.

I have pleasure in calling Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, the Rapporteur of the committee, who I know has put a great deal of work into the report.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I shall not make a long speech, but I should like to underline some of the important aspects of the report. Since I am allowed to speak in my own language, I shall continue my speech in my mother tongue.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, as I said a moment ago, the report under discussion has turned out to be rather long. It has become a detailed report. I must apologise to my colleagues for this, because I know that long reports are not necessarily the best. That is one reason for keeping them short. Another reason is that my parliamentary colleagues are so inundated with paperwork that they simply do not have the time to read through long reports. So why is this report so long? The Defence Committee decided to draw up a report on this matter because there has been much discussion about United Nations operations. So the report was also intended as a reference paper. For although we talk about them a lot, in my experience we tend not to

1. See page 42.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

know what sort of operations we are talking about.

In his Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General of the United Nations did a service to his organisation and to us as well as drawing a clear picture of the kind of operations we will probably be dealing with more often in future.

It has been said that the credibility of the United Nations is at stake because of various incidents that have occurred and also because not all United Nations operations are equally successful. I do not agree with that at all. If the United Nations is losing credibility, then we are all at fault. The United Nations is not an organisation floating around in the air above us. It is an organisation of which our governments form a part, and if blame is to be allotted, we too are to blame for the United Nations' failure to operate effectively.

Recently, a good deal has been demanded of the United Nations – hence the Agenda for Peace. Traditionally the United Nations was concerned with a form of peace-keeping such as the operations which have, sadly, been going on for so long in Cyprus. Gradually a second generation of United Nations operations has emerged, which are no longer concerned with peace-keeping in the traditional sense of the word, but in which we cross a dividing line and talk of peace-enforcement.

The functioning of the Security Council is central to the entire development of the second generation of United Nations operations. I do not want to express a view prematurely today, especially since this Assembly's Political Committee will be submitting a report in the not too distant future, clarifying the political aspects of the United Nations in relation to WEU. Another reason is that this does not fall within the terms of reference of my report.

Yet I would like to make a few remarks – as Rapporteur – on the functioning of the Security Council. The Security Council is no longer representative of the changing world picture over the last few decades. I think the United Nations operations reflect this too.

What I mean is that not every country always feels obliged to bow to the authority of the Security Council. It then becomes a question of representativeness versus legitimacy. In other words, the more countries feel the Security Council no longer has the legitimacy to summon them to take part in United Nations security operations, the less effective these operations will be. So we now have representativeness versus legitimacy versus effectiveness.

I think we must make the Security Council more representative and reconsider the whole

question of representation, but I also think the countries that belong to the Security Council – the permanent members – should not be allowed to step aside from decisions they themselves have taken. In other words, when a resolution is adopted calling on members to take part in a United Nations operation, you often find that other countries have to implement that resolution.

The United States has kept too much in the background in United Nations operations. I noticed that at a congress I was attending in Newport, where someone, referring to the United States, spoke of the Rambo effect. In other words – this came up in Newport too – the attitude is: Lucky we're there; if the United Nations fails, we can go and settle matters our own way. This kind of attitude does not improve the effectiveness of United Nations operations or the credibility of the United Nations.

Mr. President, we could talk about the effect of the operations for a long time. The report before us is not a topical report. It is emphatically not concerned with the operations in Yugoslavia or the United Nations operations in Somalia. It is an attempt, on the basis of the most recent events and experience, to shed some light on the whole spectrum of United Nations operations.

I want to draw my colleagues' attention to two points and ask them to look at the draft recommendation. First I would ask you to consider paragraph (iii) of the preamble. In it the Defence Committee calls for good working relations to be established between a United Nations military planning staff and that of WEU. This is repeated in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. The know-how that exists in WEU and its planning cell should, where possible, be made available for United Nations operations. It is clear that much still remains to be done as regards the co-ordination, planning and military equipment of the United Nations. That is one rôle for WEU.

I also want you to consider paragraph (ix) of the preamble. The question of the defence budget is on the agenda of national parliaments. The United Nations must be given the financial resources it needs to enable it to function. There are demands for more United Nations operations and more United Nations interventions, partly because of the CNN effect. That costs money, which cannot always come from the same sources. We as parliamentarians should also raise the question of the United Nations in our national parliaments when we discuss our defence budget, which we do mainly in terms of NATO, WEU and national security.

Mr. President, Mr. Boutros-Ghali has done both the Security Council and the United Nations a service by publishing his report, but

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

he has also done us a service. With the collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war we were looking forward to a new world order. That has now become a more distant prospect, because of the many regional conflicts – to put it rather euphemistically. We have seen the proof that the only organisation in the world that can do anything about this is the United Nations. We must not be as cynical as we seem inclined to be. We must give all our support to the United Nations in this Assembly and at home in our national parliaments. We would be very pleased if the President of this Assembly would invite Mr. Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General, to address our next part-session. It would be extremely valuable for us to be able to welcome to this house Mr. Boutros-Ghali, who has shown so much initiative and brought such a clear picture of United Nations operations to our attention.

(Mr. Foschi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, I will take this opportunity to stress the importance of your report, and in particular the great volume of information it presents, due to your wide experience in this field.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's excellent report is extensive and very detailed and covers, in particular, a subject which she emphasised in her presentation concerning her intention not to refer to the force deployed but to summarise the conditions under which the United Nations operates and the possibility of integration with WEU. I am sure that members are well aware of the two speeds which we have to bear in mind; firstly, an effective operational relationship is needed for the immediate future – and it seems to me that the two speeches by ministers today, together with the events which unfortunately fill the papers and our hearts at the moment, showed that it is extremely important at the moment to discuss WEU's rôle – and secondly, the need to realise that it is difficult for the United Nations to intervene effectively. The need for effective integration has become very pressing, particularly since the end of the second world war and even more since the end of the cold war. For some time trust in the United Nations has been increasing, in the belief that it can and should represent the only alternative to the world disorder which could follow from the disappearance of the two balancing blocs.

I must admit that, until now, action by the United Nations has not been as decisive and effective as we would have liked and as the situation demanded.

I believe that everyone understands both the references made this morning by speakers who called on ministers for clear guarantees for WEU and the disappointment felt concerning the inadequate countermeasures taken by the United Nations. In these circumstances and because of the states' Realpolitik, the United Nations has had to take the rôle it is given – not always first-hand. Military operations in the Gulf war, for example, were handed over to a multinational allied command without the United Nations being able to do any more.

These observations should not lead to the conclusion that the organisation has resigned itself to a simple back seat rôle in the management of world crises. On the contrary, it is working out strategies, however laboriously, and is setting targets whereby it will – if not impeded – take on an increasingly important and central rôle in the difficult task of maintaining world peace. The Rapporteur quite rightly recalled the great qualities of the present United Nations Secretary-General who has introduced the Agenda for Peace which explains to the United Nations Security Council his ideas for initiatives and strategies for the maintenance of peace. Admittedly, there is a long-standing demand from several quarters for a basic revision of the United Nations' statute to take account of the fact that the world has changed and that the United Nations itself should not be involved in actual crises as happened with the League of Nations before the second world war.

On the basis of the Agenda for Peace, we have to consider the possibilities for integration between WEU and the structures and opportunities which can be provided by the United Nations. It seems to me that the fifth point in the report goes in this direction by giving a very clear list. Account must be taken, in particular, of the fact that neither the United Nations nor WEU has its own troops and always has to call on forces made available by the states. The problem therefore will be to decide which institution will be best suited to take specific decisions and, in particular, whether co-ordination should take place within the meaning of Articles 52 and 53 of the United Nations Charter, or whether it is possible to go beyond them on the basis of a new form of co-ordination. Is it necessary for co-ordination to be authorised beforehand by the Security Council and exclusively for conciliation or coercive action? Or is a wider mandate imaginable?

In his agenda, Mr. Boutros-Ghali identifies four main areas for United Nations intervention; they are, preventive diplomacy, the restoration of peace, the maintenance of peace, and

Mr. Parisi (continued)

the consolidation of peace after armed conflict. In these four areas there appears to be the possibility of more effective operational action by WEU with a genuine rôle.

Preventive diplomacy cannot fail to be an interesting innovation because until now armed forces have always been deployed after the event, that is, after the outbreak of fighting. This is unquestionably a first point to which WEU could make a contribution, as happens within the Organisation of African States.

The restoration of peace becomes necessary when the international crisis has already broken out but there still seems a possibility of bringing the warring parties back together; WEU might be used successfully in the process of mediation and negotiation.

Actual peace-keeping involves sending forces under United Nations auspices, with limited authority to deploy between the belligerents, maintain order in particular areas and the like. This is the area in which the United Nations has had the clearest rôle until now. With reference to the use of armed forces by the organisation, the Secretary-General puts forward the most innovative and interesting ideas. Because general circumstances have changed, he considers that the time has at last come to make agreements for the constitution of United Nations armed forces. This would mean that international peace and security would become the responsibility of a fully-fledged separate international police force. It would certainly be useful for such troops to be co-ordinated at regional level and this could be done very easily by WEU for the European area.

The consolidation of peace is the final stage in the United Nations strategy for conflict management, and at the same time the newest. It involves all forms of action which must be taken so that normal life can be resumed in areas where the fighting has been taking place. Amongst other things it involves disarming the warring parties, restoring order, collecting and possibly destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, providing advice and training for security personnel, monitoring elections, supporting efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening government institutions and promoting formal and informal procedures for political involvement.

This is where effective interaction could be developed. If in fact this had been the case, the Yugoslav situation would have been better handled and WEU would have been able to operate more effectively. Strong support from the Assembly is therefore desirable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caccia.

Mr. CACCIA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to comment briefly on the report and the policies proposed in it. It rightly stresses the need for speedier political and military decisions. The question of integration of the organisations is equally important. WEU's experience can serve as a reference not only for the one region but for all the regions of the world. Thirdly, the importance is stressed of not reacting in a manner which can be called irrational. For example, if the forces in Somalia had been better integrated operations would have taken a much more reasonable course.

Next, WEU must be looked upon as an important defence entity – no longer as a nation but as a single entity and therefore a single decision-making centre to operate in areas of conflict. On the other hand, in some cases there will be specific decisions by WEU and the same nations may take different attitudes regarding United Nations co-operation.

It is therefore time for WEU not to invite and beg any longer but to take a firmer line; it is now time not to be carried along by events but to direct them and to take the political lead in many situations arising not only from ethnic and religious differences but above all from economic causes which have become difficult not only for us but for governments.

The danger alluded to several times here is that selfish interests will prevail and that economic interests will take precedence over ideals and may shatter political alliances. This problem becomes more urgent every day because it is not the same as it was when everything was cut and dried and there were enemies on one side and friends on the other; today problems arise and develop in various ways and take apparently innocuous forms.

For example, for eighteen months we have been faced by the tragedy of former Yugoslavia but if WEU as a peace-loving political organisation had had greater political clout we should have been able to assess these events immediately after the disappearance of Tito when the unifying forces represented by the man who had united several different ethnic and religious groups were shattered and released feelings that had been suppressed for ages.

We must set aside our individual feelings and discuss more important matters. I think that WEU should ask the United Nations to let it be a regional reference for dealing with the problems facing us, the point being that the United Nations is no longer equipped to deal with to-day's circumstances. Mr. Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace offers new ideas but we know that fresh action does not always follow from new ideas; there is a transitional period when the new ideas put before us are in danger of fading away.

Mr. Caccia (continued)

The United Nations should therefore act vigorously for all the nations it represents and it should not be a place where peace is cherished for only a few. With the Agenda for Peace, the United Nations has taken a definite choice and must therefore be able to give a response not only to those needing it but also to the most powerful.

If the United Nations is to take on a new rôle it must, if I may say so, become the policeman for the whole world and not only for the underprivileged but also for the wealthy because it is only in that way that it can become a supranational and regional world force capable of taking on all individual and national selfishness.

For the United Nations to deal with many situations throughout the world at this time it needs armed forces which must be politically briefed from a different standpoint. When a soldier goes to war he has to expect that the enemy will use weapons at once. A United Nations soldier on the other hand has to anticipate moves and motivations and to use arms only as a last resort. Attitudes and behaviour must therefore be changed. Only in this way can we deal with the new circumstances by using arms immediately to counter an offensive without having first defined where we wish our peace efforts to be directed.

Political pressure must be increased and I believe that WEU must commit itself with all its resources and potential because it is only through strong political pressure that we can assist the United Nations in carrying out the most dangerous and difficult missions.

The four points listed in Mr. Boutros-Ghali's agenda can only become effective if the United Nations takes not advisory but mandatory decisions such as will strike fear into anyone who wishes to disturb the peace of the world. The title might be "education for peace". If this is what we want, some part of the United Nations organisation must be capable of meeting this need on the basis of our history and our sufferings and of wars which have been waged on our territory so that the democracies can hunt down dictatorships.

This raises the difficult problem of relationships between the United Nations, NATO, WEU and the United States. The United States has been our traditional ally and has come to Europe's aid not only for the sake of oil but because democratic values were under threat. Today, however, the interests of the United States are also economic and in conflict with those of Europe and the other countries. We must remember this, as otherwise we risk breaking a traditional relationship of alliance and friendship with one of the countries which

represents our interests through a shared history and political and cultural background. That is why we must immediately open more detailed discussions in WEU and NATO to narrow the existing differences. It is also true that the United States is paying a high price. The document presented by the Defence Committee shows that the WEU countries together provide about 17 000 men – and I would point out that Italy provides more than 4 000 and not 1 800 – while the United States has sent 22 000 troops to Somalia.

Clearly, therefore, there is a power relationship which must be used to restore democracy and peace in the countries where we have to operate. In this context, I believe that our colleague's report can be a first step in strengthening not only our Assembly but also the Council of Ministers so that we acquire greater political clout in international relationships.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur. Her report must have involved considerable effort. She may recall that I was something of a nuisance in the committee stage consideration of the report. I proposed a number of amendments. She was not enthusiastic about many of them. However, she accepted those amendments which I regard as the most significant.

I am sure that the Rapporteur understands that the reason for the amendments was the important, fundamental commitment to the cause of international authority, which I know she shares. At this stage in man's history, it is essential for international authority to succeed. At a time when it is important for international authority to have adequate capacity – at this point in man's history it is vital that it is seen to have adequate capacity – and for it to be seen to succeed, we are faced with a historic opportunity.

The end of forty years of a cold war that sterilised the United Nations means that international authority has an opportunity to succeed and serve the history of mankind. However, the end of that cold war presents new problems and difficulties. The rise of excessive nationalism is the greatest cause of instability in our continent and in the African surrogacies. There never has been a time when the need for powerful international authority has been so great. The recent horrific experience in Yugoslavia more than justifies that claim.

When we consider the near humiliation of United Nations troops – British troops wearing blue helmets – last week, we must conclude that the situation in Yugoslavia is unacceptable. It was unacceptable for them to have to stand

Mr. Hardy (continued)

beside a Croatian mob that was killing the drivers and looting lorries that had been given safe passage. It was also unacceptable that they had no lawful means by which to respond and to insist upon order prevailing. It was not good enough.

Nor is it right that General Morillon, who has served with such distinction, should have had to tell Europe and the world that United Nations troops will have to withdraw if that behaviour continues. The world cannot afford the United Nations failing in Yugoslavia. If it fails there, it fails everywhere. If it fails, so does Europe. Therefore, there is an obligation upon us to secure success.

I take the view – Yugoslavia demonstrates it beyond all doubt – that the United Nations must have a continuing command and control capacity. It also needs continuing confidence that, if it needs fighting soldiers, they will be provided. It is interesting to note that fourteen member states have sent military observers there but that only twelve have sent fighting soldiers. We may need fighting soldiers rather more than we may need civilian policemen, medical orderlies or military observers. If the soldiers are not there – I do not pray that they will have to be used – the need for them to be there will certainly be noticed.

Lord Finsberg referred this morning to the no-fly zone. When combat aircraft are seen to intercept aircraft making illegal incursions over Yugoslavia, the number of those incursions falls dramatically. Cynicism is prevalent. The problem is that if aircraft making illegal incursions continue to do so for months without being intercepted, the incursions may succeed. Force may therefore be necessary on occasion.

I am delighted that the committee accepted one amendment which relates to sanctions. If delegates look at the report, they will see that it contains a clear statement that sanctions are preferable to war. Conflict means that we have reached the last resort situation, and that is best avoided. Sanctions can be an alternative to war. I accept that they are a nuisance and that the responsibility to adopt sanctions and to ensure that they are fulfilled may be complicated and demanding. However, they are far better than killing people. We have reached the point where we must demonstrate that sanctions can work. The alternative is too ugly. At this point, we must be seen to succeed. That is why I demanded last year that the Council of Ministers should publish the evidence. It is a pity that the detailed evidence has not been published.

The continuing madness of man in these final years of the twentieth century means that the

problems posed by excessive nationalism or greed require adequate international authority if they are to be overcome. Cynics will say – they are saying it today – that the United Nations cannot succeed. If it does not succeed, God help us!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE OF BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – I should like, first, to congratulate Mr. Hardy on making the speech that I wanted to make. He underlined all the correct points and I could not agree with him more. Secondly, and perhaps more important, I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur, for whom I have long held an admiration, both for her person and for her ability.

This is an admirable report from which I have learnt a great deal. I shall consult it in future when I want to argue with some knowledge instead of my usual substitute for knowledge, which is conviction.

The United Nations could recruit a lightly-armed police force to do the job that many troops are doing. Much of the work is not a soldier's job. It is not reasonable to ask members of the Gordon Highlanders or the Black Watch to turn the other cheek – they are trained to fight. The present use of soldiers is a great waste of manpower. The United Nations could build up a body of well-trained people to perform peace-keeping duties. That is a practical suggestion.

Since the end of the cold war, the United Nations has ventured into new territory – in some cases with success. It has been involved all over the world. One thinks immediately of Cambodia and Angola. It is self-evident that we need to back up authority with force. We should not shrink from that fact. We must state openly that that is the case.

There is one weakness in the report. It refers to WEU and the United Nations. WEU is a part of NATO. I should like the two to be linked when we talk of the relationship with the United Nations.

They should certainly be more closely linked than they have been on occasion. For me, the essential paragraph in the report is paragraph 73, which states: "As far as logistics go, it is obvious that very few large-scale operations could take place without active American involvement." That is fundamental. I have long said that, while it is right and proper to build up WEU, we must build it up as a pillar of NATO because in NATO we have the structure, training and force that contained the might of the Soviet Union and preserved peace. NATO must seek a new rôle.

The United Nations is in a hopeful stage. The dreams that people have held since the League

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

of Nations collapsed might be fulfilled. The United Nations has thrown away the doctrine that the internal affairs of any country are a matter only for that country. Internal affairs are no longer regarded as sacrosanct. We cannot allow internal affairs to be sacrosanct in the present world. The most powerful example is, of course, Yugoslavia, as many others have said.

I am deeply ashamed as a Brit and as a European that we have been so weak-kneed, so cowardly and so indecisive. If we do not react we will pay for it. Two years ago, the issue could have been resolved. Today, the only move left to us is to guard the places where we have said the Muslims may have safe havens. We must ensure that they really are safe havens. There must be total sanctions. Air power must be used, if necessary, to enforce sanctions. We must bring the matter to a just conclusion. If we do not, the United Nations can go to sleep and we will all go to hell.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Lord Mackie.

I now call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and congratulate her on her informative and clearly set out report and on her recommendations, which are concerned with consensus and can therefore be regarded as realistic.

Although it is now a few years since the collapse of the Stalinist party dictatorships, hopes of a more peaceful future in Europe and the world have not been fulfilled. War has returned to Europe, and notwithstanding threats and sanctions by the international community, the aggressors have continued their advance in an attempt to change internationally-recognised borders by terrorism and campaigns of annihilation. But in the southern hemisphere, too, a power vacuum seems to have appeared with the withdrawal of the superpowers; long-standing clan and tribal rivalries are breaking out again and more and more states are becoming engulfed in a maelstrom of hatred and violence. The tragedies in Cambodia, Somalia, Angola and Liberia are grave indications that international peace-making measures to stem ethno-nationalist conflicts are reaching their limits. The United Nations seems to be overstretched as regards the legal and practical feasibility of finding a peaceful solution to inner-state conflicts, partly because the EC all too casually shifted the responsibility for resolving the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia on to the shoulders of the United Nations.

In the report Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali showed how the United Nations' instruments would need to be reformed

in order finally to respond in real terms to the long-recognised need for conflict-prevention diplomacy and active crisis management by the United Nations. It is not enough gradually to go on developing the existing institutions and instruments of the United Nations Security Council. We now need a kind of complete escalation ladder of collective security, which will make it clear to local aggressors and warmongers that their policy of violence will not go unanswered by the international community. This implies that we must deter potential aggressors from an escalation of force, by means that range from sending fact-finding missions to crisis areas, giving international guarantees for the protection of minorities, stationing peace-keeping forces and imposing economic sanctions, to military intervention to enforce peace. But that is just what we are not doing, as the progress of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows. Assurances of peace have been followed again and again by limited aggression, which the EC and the United Nations Security Council have ignored, despite all their verbal show of strength.

I think our organisation and the EC must therefore adjust to the new security policy challenges. One of the worst experiences of the conflict in Yugoslavia is perhaps that the Serbian leadership has managed to divide the member states of the EC and WEU among themselves. So there is no alternative: wherever our basic common security interests are at stake – the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia is surely a notable example – we must decide by a majority vote on common action by our community. How are we to obtain a range of CSCE sanction instruments on the basis of a majority vote if the EC member states retain a right of veto?

Furthermore, we must speak with one voice in the United Nations bodies, especially in the Security Council, and assert our common position. The impression must not be allowed to arise that the United Nations is dominated by the United States and will decline into a kind of paralysis if the United States administration seems unable to lay down a consistent line. We should take the United States' suggestion that Germany and Japan be accepted as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as an opportunity to consider whether in future the EC or WEU should define a mandate for the permanent European members of the United Nations Security Council.

Furthermore, I endorse the recommendation made in the report that the WEU military planning cell should seek ways of achieving closer co-operation with the appropriate United Nations bodies. Here I think it would be useful if our satellite centre in Torrejón reported its findings to the United Nations Security Council in due course.

Mr. Antretter (continued)

There are many useful proposals in the report, and I would suggest that we also consider how we can establish a common position at the United Nations disarmament conference. I think that, following the successful conclusion of the agreement on the proscription of chemical weapons, it is now time to pursue a common policy within the global framework of the United Nations to put a stop to nuclear tests and to check the proliferation of means of mass destruction and their launcher systems. A policy of conflict prevention must involve controlling the unchecked proliferation of war materials. The disarmament conference under the aegis of the United Nations is surely a suitable framework for achieving this.

Mr. President, the data presented by SIPRI yesterday is disturbing evidence that since the end of the cold war the number of inner- and inter-state conflicts has increased alarmingly. The peace dividends have not yet been distributed. So we should embark without delay on the further joint steps towards disarmament proposed in this recommendation.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Eversdijk.

Mr. EVERSDIJK (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too want to start by expressing my respect and appreciation to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman for her report. She has dealt with the matter thoroughly and comprehensively. When we remember that the members of the Netherlands Senate are not career politicians, we realise how many extra hours of work this involved. My compliments to her.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tackled a very difficult question. For, if the Rapporteur's objective is to be achieved, namely the involvement of regional organisations such as WEU through the United Nations, then obviously this cannot just apply to an organisation like ours. It must apply worldwide, to other regional organisations in the world as well. But they are rather different in nature and kind. Take, for instance, an organisation such as the OAS. Has the Rapporteur any idea what they think about this in United Nations circles?

Mr. President, the purpose of this report is to strengthen the rôle of the United Nations as the only means of keeping peace. That endeavour naturally deserves all our support. Has the Rapporteur any idea of the United Nations' views on that? In other words: how realistic is this ideal?

Today, this very week, as we observe together that the international community has failed in

former Yugoslavia, it has become extremely important to strengthen the rôle of the United Nations.

When we return home tomorrow evening and are asked how much progress we have made this week, we shall blush for shame. We must in fact admit that a new sort of apartheid, a new version of homelands have been created by force in Bosnia. A cleansing without parallel is taking place, and the international community has to look on grinding its teeth. Mr. Hardy said just now that sanctions must bite. Yes, I agree, but unfortunately people – especially the people in former Yugoslavia – are extremely inventive. They are still armed to the teeth, with very heavy weapons. They are inventive, and it looks as if the main victims are the neighbouring countries of Bulgaria and Romania, which are battling with enormous problems as a result of their collapsing economies. In fact they are the ones who have to pay. They cannot hand in the bill anywhere because there is no one to hand it to.

I agree with Lord Mackie's comment that the rôle of the NATO alliance is insufficiently highlighted in the recommendations. After all, the NATO alliance has its own troops, its own infrastructure and its own command structure. The essential rôle of the United States is particularly clear in the NATO alliance. Whether we are dealing with a conflict in the Gulf, in Somalia or in Bosnia, the support of the United States will always be essential. Let me refer you to paragraph 73, where this point is raised. In my view it should have been brought out more clearly in the recommendations. This small criticism in no way detracts from my appreciation of the report as a whole. I hope it will represent a small step forward. Big steps are not taken here, alas. Once again, this is a small step forward towards a little more peace in a world where there are currently conflicts in 143 places.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Err.

Mrs. ERR (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I would first like to thank Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and congratulate her on a very full and informative report which could well be used as a discussion paper in other forums.

The spread of conflict since the end of the cold war shows that the change to democracy is not in itself the key to peace. From the wide range of United Nations action it is clear that the end of the cold war has necessitated more intervention such as the supervision of cease-fires, monitoring the peaceful transition to democracy in the countries concerned, and observation of elections. This widening rôle obviously costs money and it also calls for a redefinition of the United Nations' responsibilities which are neatly summarised under the headings peace-making and peace-keeping.

Mrs. Err (continued)

A sustained financial effort is required. To this end, the Agenda for Peace includes the creation of a reserve fund for peace-keeping operations, and our Rapporteur makes other funding suggestions which I can endorse.

Peace is a *sine qua non* for harmonious world development. It will not come free of charge, particularly in what is generally known as the third world, and the necessary cost will be shared in the fairest way possible. In any case, even in financial terms and quite apart from the human cost, the price of war is always greater than that of any kind of peace.

Here are a few thoughts prompted by various points covered by the report including the concept of security, United Nations reform, the right of intervention and the rôle of regional organisations.

Today, security is no longer a concept limited to strategic or military concerns. It no longer depends solely on diplomatic relations with other states, it is also and above all bound up with how we manage to solve the problems that are the cause or effect of civil or other wars: underdevelopment, famine, uncontrolled population growth, environmental deterioration, emigration, the crushing burden of debt, drugs and the growing inequality between rich and poor. All these issues will need to be dealt with at world level, since global interdependence is now an accepted truth with the United Nations responsible for the practical management of these matters together, as necessary, with the regional organisations under its authority.

As regards the right of intervention, since the second world war the basic principles on which security is anchored have been the sovereignty of states and non-intervention. The non-intervention principle is now under fire and the right or even duty to intervene, which I prefer to term the obligation to take humanitarian action, is increasingly discussed. Here let me quote an article by Mr. Christophe Ruffin, a doctor, vice-president of Médecins sans Frontières and lecturer at the French École Nationale d'Administration, which appeared in *Le Monde des débats* in January 1993 and makes some very pertinent comment on this subject. It states my point of view better than I could do myself:

"The right of intervention is in fact the recognition that the great powers – the five members of the Security Council plus the major funding powers, Germany and Japan – be allowed to take action on the basis of subjective criteria and if necessary disregarding national sovereignty, particularly in the countries of the South.

Most of both the third world countries and the former European communist countries today feel vulnerable in the face of a small group of developed countries in the imperial position of having all economic, commercial and military power concentrated in their hands. They fear that the right of intervention may be used as authority to take over national policy-making, creating a two-tier type of sovereignty.

Rather than invoking an exceptional right that would always be suspect, it would be better to locate such intervention in the universal framework of the Charter of the United Nations. It is the only instrument that provides not only for the recognition and protection of the sovereignty of states but also for the use of force for coercive purposes. Many of the provisions of the Charter of which no use was made during the cold war allow the excessive prerogatives of the Security Council to be restricted."

The establishment of the Military Staff Committee provided for in Chapter V, recourse to the International Court of Justice to define crimes against humanity which constitute threats to peace and justify the use of force, and the introduction of a graduated response system are so many guarantees for keeping the decisions of the Security Council within bounds.

As for the reorganisation of the United Nations, that presupposes a reorganisation of the Security Council which would enlarge its membership to include all nations capable of providing a solution to existing problems. Here reference is made to regional authorities.

In my view, the democratic legitimacy referred to in the report also has to be the responsibility of the Security Council and the General Assembly. This could well calm the fears, justified or otherwise, of developing countries that might suspect permanent members, individually or jointly, of taking political decisions primarily serving the ends of the developed world.

Intervention by the United Nations may be regarded as operations by an international police force. If such activities are to be continued the United Nations will have to have its own specific military force. WEU's experience in connection with the planning cell could possibly be a useful model for the definition of the minimum powers required for the effective management of operations conducted under the aegis of the United Nations.

I now come to the United Nations regional organisation concept and the rôle such organisations would have.

Neither NATO nor WEU is a regional organisation within the meaning of Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter, although they are

Mrs. Err (continued)

regarded as such by the United Nations. So an in-depth study of the pros and cons of recognising WEU as a regional organisation is needed.

This question is particularly thorny in that the powers of a regional organisation of this kind are not defined; even experts very seldom agree on the subject.

Being named a United Nations regional organisation is unimportant if the organisation in question has no effective instrument for settling disputes and preventing crises. The example of the CSCE shows clearly how true this statement is. In my view Western European Union might in this respect present better guarantees of effectiveness than the CSCE can just now.

Under Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council may utilise a regional body for enforcement action under its authority. In a way, WEU has already performed tasks along these lines, such as the control of the Danube by customs officers from various WEU countries; other similar activities could certainly be envisaged in the future. Thought could also be given to more systematic recourse to WEU's services for peace-keeping activities.

What is the situation as regards WEU taking initiatives on its own without endorsement by the Security Council? Such out of area activities appear to me questionable, since WEU's terms of reference do not concern any country other than its own members. Consequently out of area action could be taken only if authorised by the Security Council.

The last question I wish to raise, to which I can give no reply, is whether, without the agreement of the Security Council, WEU acting as a regional authority would still be entitled to carry out activities under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty in the event of aggression against a WEU member state.

I consider this a vital question. If action under Article V were to depend on the veto of any single permanent member of the Security Council, the result would be to empty the Brussels Treaty of its meaning, since countries would cease to have the right to the legitimate collective defence enshrined in Article V. In the case of Western European Union, it would be better not to run the risk of wanting everything and finishing up with nothing.

So a great many questions arise to which there are no answers. The arguments on both sides also need to be discussed in the national institutions, particularly the question of funding the new responsibilities and missions of the United Nations.

Our task is to inform our fellow citizens, who are on the whole well disposed towards the United Nations ideal, that new responsibilities are becoming necessary and that they have to be funded by everyone of us in the interest of all.

To conclude, I am in agreement with the draft recommendation, the draft resolution and the draft order presented by the Rapporteur on behalf of the Defence Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker, Mr. Slatinsky, Observer from Bulgaria, is the last speaker.

Mr. SLATINSKY (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – According to an apt expression, the United Nations is an amorphous formation with exalted ideals, good intentions and good-willed weaknesses. The absence of a clear policy on the Yugoslav crisis had led to the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Those sanctions are certainly not a proof of strength.

As the United Nations does not have its own armed forces, its own infrastructure or the required financial backing, it is content with its operations, which have low efficiency. The political objectives should be clear and should be compatible with the available military resources and with the mandate for the troops acting under the United Nations banner. Peace-keeping is not an emotional or an incidental activity; it is a process that sometimes takes decades, as in Cyprus.

The criteria by which a distinction is drawn between interference in the internal affairs of a nation and an operation to save the country are still not clear. The tendency towards ever greater commitment of the international community to the solution of internal problems requires a legal shape and juridical perfection.

The Balkan crisis contains lessons that should be drawn, especially by Bulgaria.

First, events should receive objective coverage and should not be reported as they are seen from the West. In Bosnia, one cannot speak of a single perpetrator. Rather, one should speak of the more guilty and the less guilty.

Secondly, the morals of the rich countries are not absolute. They are often vulnerable. In some cases we have encountered double standards and a recurrence of thinking which dates back to the end of the last century and the beginning of this century. That thinking is characterised by indifference to the Balkan peoples.

The Republic of Bulgaria gives its wholehearted support to the resolutions of the Security Council and makes all the arrangements for the enforcement of the embargo. Our principal policy in that respect was voiced in special declarations made by the Bulgarian Par-

Mr. Slatinsky (continued)

liament and Government. Our government is eager to co-operate with all the establishments and countries involved. That is illustrated by the memorandum that it signed with WEU on controlling the Danube. Bulgaria needs understanding, help and support in its efforts actively to participate in constructing the new European architecture, the foundations of which are the common goals, common approaches and mutual responsibilities in politics, economics and security.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Slatinsky, for being commendably brief.

That ends the debate.

I am sure that the Rapporteur would like to reply.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I thank my colleagues for their comments. I am particularly pleased that the debate today has broadened and deepened our knowledge of the matter. Some practical comments were made on the report itself, but there were also some that went beyond it. You have put your views on future United Nations operations in a rather broader perspective. I will happily read your statements again when they appear in print and I will keep the speeches with my report as reference documents.

I now want to discuss a few comments by my colleagues. One of them noted the changing nature of United Nations operations. Many spoke of former Yugoslavia and Somalia. I pointed out that the traditional peace-keeping operations are tending more and more to become peace-enforcing operations. We have gradually reached this situation without intending to. That makes me think that in future we should perhaps concentrate more on an early warning system. When conflicts break out, we must be able to identify their source. They are not necessarily just border conflicts. In countries with weak economies, measured by our standards, social and economic factors may play a part. An early warning system must be capable of preventing the United Nations from having to intervene.

One colleague spoke of penalising countries responsible for conflicts. I can only offer my personal opinion here, since the Defence Committee has not discussed this.

I do not think it is a good idea to set up tribunals. We already have a tribunal before which those guilty of crimes in former Yugoslavia will have to appear. If I had to be a defendant before that tribunal I would delay the settlement of the conflict as long as possible. If I knew of a solution to the conflict but also knew that proceedings would be started against me the fol-

lowing week, then it is clear that a tribunal would not help to settle the conflict, but would be more likely to prolong it. I quite understand that we all want to do something about "Yugoslavia", but I think there are other things which we should have done and should still do.

I do not agree with Mr. Hardy that if the United Nations operation in Yugoslavia fails, all their operations will fail. This is a form of cynicism, probably born of a sense of helplessness. I do not think we should be pessimistic. The recent conflicts have certainly made it clear that we must concentrate more on the safety of people sent out to areas of conflict under the aegis of the United Nations. Since the United Nations is increasingly turning to peace-enforcing operations with regard to conflicts, we need far clearer rules and codes of conduct for the troops who are sent out. The soldiers want clarity from the politicians: tell us the result you are expecting and we will do the job. A soldier cannot carry out vague orders. We must not put troops in an unsafe and unstable situation.

As for the police force, I refer to that in my report. If you read paragraphs 50, 51 and 52 of Mr. Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace, you will gain a good idea of the rôle of the police force in the operations as a whole. I agree with that.

I think Mr. Antretter's ideas can serve as a useful basis for the WEU Political Committee's work. The ideas on the decision-making and functioning of the CSCE fit the terms of reference of that committee perfectly.

Some members have spoken about sanctions and about NATO playing a greater rôle. It seems to me that NATO is not adequately equipped at the moment. There are constant discussions about NATO's own rôle and position. NATO cannot do what WEU can, namely react pragmatically and directly. I do not want to see rivalry between NATO and WEU, quite the contrary. Anyone who knows me knows that. NATO could play a rôle, but at the moment the reverse is true. Whenever the United Nations asks NATO to do something, the NATO countries turn out to be unable or unprepared to play their part. The United States plays a separate rôle there, independently of the United Nations. I certainly hope NATO will be able to play its part in future.

Compensation measures for sanctions cannot come from the United Nations. It is short of money to finance its own operations. For instance, various countries are paying for their military attachés in New York out of their own pockets because there is no money available for this in the United Nations budget. I have no answer to the question where the money for financial compensation for sanctions should come from. Let me also tell Mr. Slatinsky that the question of sanctions can be raised during the next debate, on the embargo on the Danube.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

Mrs. Err put a number of questions. I was afraid she might assume I could answer them all. Luckily she has said she does not expect that. There will have to be a discussion on the regionalisation of WEU and the United Nations structures in the Political Committee. We recommended the Council to study this question in our report.

As for the United Nations General Assembly, let me point out that it is an assembly of governments. There is no United Nations assembly as such. That is a shortcoming, and I hope the situation will change in the future. WEU and the Council of Europe have an assembly. The United Nations is an organisation of countries originally known as the League of Nations. We are represented by our governments. I hope the Political Committee will put forward a recommendation on parliamentary representation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your reply, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee want to add anything?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I also thank all those who have spoken in this debate. Above all I wish to pay tribute to the excellent work of our Rapporteur, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, aware as I now am of how fully she documented and prepared herself for the writing of this report which relates to one of the most vital areas of our international action.

The report is an important one. Today, we see the limits to the effectiveness of the United Nations: we see that its ambitions outstrip its resources. The documentation in the report is first-rate and it also presents a great number of useful thoughts and ideas, with particular regard to the important problem of special training for the troops detailed for blue beret duty. The transition from strictly military soldier to peace-keeper does not come naturally. The aim is neither to form an army nor to ape the Salvation Army. This is a very serious technical problem, and I was much impressed by the chapter on the training schools in the Nordic countries for the officers and other ranks of these armed services of the future.

I wish, moreover, like Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, to emphasise strongly the United Nations' presence in other operational theatres. Our eyes are naturally riveted on the situation in Bosnia and we forget that the United Nations is at work in many other theatres, starting with Cyprus, where it has been involved for some twenty-eight years. This is a problem which will have considerable bearing on the future, and great importance should therefore be attached to it. These operations, moreover, are not difficult

from the military point of view alone; they also have a considerable financial aspect. It has to be remembered that currently the United Nations Organisation is terribly in debt and unable to finance the operations under its command throughout the world, one example being Bosnia, where we can see what a burden these operations are on the budgets of the United Kingdom, France and other contributing countries.

Lastly, I think I can say with certainty that the United Nations needs to have its own operational military capability, which currently it does not have. The United Nations has had a Military Staff Committee from the outset but this has never been really operational. We must give it teeth. Better chains of command need to be organised and better unit commanders chosen. Above all, we must make sure there is satisfactory co-operation between contingents from different countries, some of which are old military nations with centuries of experience, e.g. the United Kingdom and France, while others are new, above all there is the third world, lacking all idea of what action in a theatre of operations involves. This accounts for some of the instances of misplaced action to be noted here and there, but I shall not dwell on this point.

Thus we have a vast field for thought and action. I congratulate Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on having provided us with this opportunity first to give her report all the attention it deserves, and next to debate a problem that will dominate discussions, not only in WEU but also in other international organisations and certainly, whatever else happens, in the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. Your comments conclude a very satisfactory debate.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, the draft resolution and the draft order. First, the draft recommendation contained in Document 1366.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

¹ See page 43.

The President (continued)

We will now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1366.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

We will now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1366.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted unanimously².

4. WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1367)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on WEU initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic – reply to the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1367.

I call Sir Keith Speed, joint Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – It is my great pleasure and honour to present the report on behalf of the Defence Committee. I should like to thank the committee, my co-Rapporteur Mr. Marten, and Mr. Cameron for their valuable assistance. The report was passed unanimously by the committee. This is inevitably an interim report. The process is, alas, ongoing and we are learning and improving as we go along. Even the

events of the past few days – we heard about NATO and WEU forces in the Adriatic from Italian ministers today – show that we are improving and tightening up. I hope that the explanatory memorandum is an up-to-date aide-mémoire for all members of the Assembly. Recent initiatives to enforce sanctions are spelt out in the report. I do not think that the Assembly should underestimate the deterrent effect of operations in the Adriatic and on the Danube.

This morning, we heard the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs quote the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, who recently saw the great emptiness of barges and ships on the Danube. The deterrent is working and helping to impose the sanctions for which United Nations Security Council resolutions have called.

The story of sanctions is something about which we can be proud. Various colleagues have already said today that if our ministers had listened to us twelve months ago much of the unhappiness of recent months might not have occurred. Our resolutions have been consistent. A number of them are in the report. We have for many months demanded tough sanctions that would work. We have demanded that there be less duplication among the agencies that are enforcing sanctions.

We have demanded more co-operation between the countries in WEU, the countries in NATO and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We have also demanded more transparency for those who are breaking the sanctions, often to considerable advantage to themselves. Those who are breaking sanctions do so in defiance of the United Nations and the international community and, in their own way, are helping to prolong the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

I draw attention to paragraph 44, in particular where we make it very clear that we want much more publicity to be given to sanction breakers. To that end, I hope that the Assembly will accept from the Rapporteurs an oral amendment which is offered largely in the light of recent events and the answers I received from the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister this morning. The amendment would form a seventh recommendation and reads as follows:

“At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions.”

We must make that point loudly and clearly.

We heard from the Italian Foreign Minister this morning that details of those vessels are sent

1. See page 44.

2. See page 45.

Sir Keith Speed (continued)

to the United Nations. That is all well and good, but why should the matter rest there? Colleagues have already spoken today of the condemnation that the international community should make of those countries, companies and individual ships and crews that are breaking the sanctions in defiance of the United Nations. In their own way, they are contributing to the devastation, misery and death in former Yugoslavia. I hope that the Assembly will accept the oral amendment, which I believe strengthens the report.

The explanatory memorandum contains much about the Greek Government and Greek ships. Alas, until now what publicity there has been about sanction breakers almost invariably has been about Greek ships. It is clear that the Greek Government is doing all that it can to curb that practice and to bring pressure to bear on the Greek shipowners who are breaking the sanctions.

The third recommendation is designed to help the Greek Government. Perhaps some of our governments could send policemen or customs officers to help the Greek Government seek out the sanction breakers and bring them to book. That is what we all want.

The other recommendations are largely self-explanatory. They are certainly in accordance with the Assembly's earlier resolutions. I am especially pleased that the duplication of NATO and WEU naval forces in the Adriatic is coming to an end.

We heard this morning that a planning, command and communications cell has been set up in Naples with WEU Italian naval officers working with NATO. The new structure will be much more efficient and will work better. It is precisely the sort of co-operation that we all want between NATO and WEU. Again, it is largely in line with what this Assembly – this body of parliamentarians – has called for over a considerable period.

Recommendation 6 reflects the very real problem for those states, especially the riparian states of the Danube, which traditionally have traded with the different republics in former Yugoslavia and which are now suffering real financial loss. As Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman said earlier, there is no easy solution. The United Nations has no money of its own, but if there is to be compensation the United Nations should be the body to organise that. Undoubtedly, the only people who could provide compensation would be the wealthier countries, most of which are within WEU or NATO. We must face the problems and try to do something about them. Indeed, some of our observer friends from Central and Eastern Europe have reminded us of that.

I was interested in what the distinguished observer from Russia said this morning about the real problem Russia would have, following its experiences in the Afghanistan war, in sending any forces to help preserve the peace in Yugoslavia. I accept and understand what he said. Indeed, it is reflected in the views of the public in many of our constituencies. Although there is a specific recommendation calling on both Russia and Ukraine to do all that they can to support the embargo, that does not necessarily mean sending young men to be killed on the battlefield – it means using the professionalism of their navies and, perhaps, their police forces to make a real contribution to enforcing the embargo.

The WEU satellite centre in Spain became operational only a few weeks ago, but I understand that it is already making a significant contribution to surveillance and the enforcing of the embargoes and sanctions imposed on former Yugoslavia. Again, that is a good example of something that the Assembly has been calling for over many years. The fact that we now have that satellite centre is due not least to the efforts of our former colleague Mr. Fourré.

I commend the report and its recommendations. I hope that the additional oral amendment will be accepted as it will result in tougher action with transparencies so that we can see who is breaking the sanctions and then bring all the forces of the United Nations and public opinion to bear upon them. I will not pretend – I do not think any of us would – that sanctions alone will bring an end to the tragic conflict in Yugoslavia. However, the tighter and tougher sanctions that we now have, both on the Danube and in the Adriatic – largely inspired by this Assembly – are a major step towards denying the various warring partners the materials of war. Perhaps that will bring the end of that tragic conflict a little nearer.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Keith.

The debate is now open.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I do not wish to delay the Assembly. As Sir Keith said, today we have had two general debates on the former Yugoslavia, both of which were effectively led – first by Mr. Baumel and, secondly, by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. Therefore much of the ground has already been covered.

I want to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Marten and Sir Keith on an excellent and informative report. I want also to make a few brief comments on the report, principally to underline what they have said. First, there is the importance of sanctions. I confess that I was sceptical when they were introduced because we

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

have not had good experiences of sanctions in the various countries where we have tried to impose them. However, this time they have been remarkably effective. Indeed, the great efforts made to break the sanctions have demonstrated that.

I was in Belgrade at the beginning of May and there was visible evidence of the oil sanctions working. Public transport was virtually non-existent, with only trams and trolley buses running. There were relatively few cars on the streets. I spoke to a number of businessmen who were in total despair because their businesses could not function. The pressure of sanctions is real and must be sustained. If it is, that will be crucial in the negotiations with former Yugoslavia – the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro. There are almost one million people unemployed and those states are producing many goods that are piling up because it cannot sell them. They cannot go on like that for long.

Sanctions have become successful so, as Sir Keith said, it is essential that they are made tight and effective.

Sir Keith also dwelt on the issues of transparency and information. I underline that point. The first reference to security guarantees is in paragraph 1 of the recommendations to the Council. The report refers to the security guarantees given to Bulgaria, to Hungary and to Romania, and to the need to make them explicit. They should be made explicit so that people know what they are and what they mean. We are the people who will have to fulfil them in time. There is also the question of making explicit the identity of those who are breaching the sanctions. I warmly commend Sir Keith's oral amendment which pressed that point further.

I refer briefly to the border between Serbia and the area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. It is still open, despite the fact that the recently-deposed President of Yugoslavia, Mr. Cosic, argued for the presence of United Nations monitors there. Sir Keith referred to the Russians and to the fact that negotiations are going on. I agree very much with him. The remarks made by our Russian colleague this morning were moving. They were disturbing, but they were also honest, and that was good. He referred to the brotherly feeling between Serbs and Russians as fellow Slavs and he made it clear to many people how difficult it would be for the Russians to take a strong line in the area.

There is also the question of compensation, about which Sir Keith did not speak when introducing the report. That matter is dealt with in the report and it is terribly important. There is

enormous pressure on the countries that are being asked to fulfil the embargo. Paragraph 6 of the recommendations to the Council urges the United Nations to "implement a compensation scheme to reimburse at least in part" those affected. The countries listed are Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

My next point is not within the ambit of the report because it deals only with the Danube and with the Adriatic. I hope that the Assembly agrees that we should include in the list Albania and Macedonia, which also have a heavy burden to bear. A certain amount of oil is going from Albania to Serbia by land. That is not because the Albanians love the Serbs, but because, as Sir Keith rightly said, people can make a lot of money and money is desperately needed in Albania. We must deal with the reality.

Sir Keith assured us that the Greeks, or at least the Greek Government, are now toeing the line. I hope that that is so. I have not been happy with Greece. I remember, for example, the meeting between the Greek Government and President Milosevic in which both agreed that Macedonia would never be recognised. Greece's position has not been quite satisfactory for some time. If, as the Rapporteur has said, the Greek position has improved, that is good. The Rapporteur also referred to Romania.

I shall conclude on a positive note. In paragraph 47, Sir Keith and Mr. Marten say that they "strongly believe that the pragmatic and practical arrangements developed of late within WEU and reported to the Assembly by the Council in the thirty-eighth annual report augur well for the future. Never before has WEU in general nor the Council in particular been so active, with all its subsidiary organs starting to 'fire on all cylinders' ". That is good news; we do not have much of that and it is nice to get it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

I now call Mr. Dunnachie.

Mr. DUNNACHIE (*United Kingdom*). – In addressing the Assembly for the first time, I shall be brief. I believe that many good causes have been lost or embarrassed by a flood of words. I can be brief because the report is a good one. I first congratulate the Rapporteurs on the report, which deserves to be seen as most important. It is important because, if the world is to reach stability, international authority must be respected. The report perceives that need and respects it.

If there is an omission in the report it is the evidence of breaches of sanctions. The then Chairman of the Council of Ministers confirmed that such evidence was withheld. Confidentiality may sometimes be wise, but it cannot be acceptable that those who have made enormous profits from defiance of the United Nations or

Mr. Dunnachie (continued)

who have disregarded an international decision should for ever be free from criticism or penalty. The interests of the Assembly and the fact that the report was being prepared may have helped to strengthen the international position. That would be further helped if potential offenders realised that their greedy activities would in future be exposed and that substantial penalties would be imposed on them.

I point out to the Assembly that some of the ships that continually break the embargo are Greek-owned. Greece, as the Assembly knows, is on the verge of becoming a member of WEU. I suggest to the Assembly that membership should be withheld if the Greek Government does not deal effectively with this serious matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dunnachie. If everyone was as brief and concise as you have been, we should get through the business far more expeditiously.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too would like to thank the Rapporteur for this topical report, which makes it clear that it is not easy to enforce sanctions. I am also grateful that the recommendations are to be supplemented by a further one on publishing the evidence of any known breach of sanctions.

In addition to what has been said, I want to raise two other aspects in this debate and make a few comments on them.

I personally find it frustrating and rather shameful to see how little effect the embargo had for a long time in checking the disgusting, inhumane goings-on in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sanctions could not take effect for a long time, because they were constantly being disregarded by evil profiteers prepared to use any means to make their dirty money. Even though it is clear that the number of breaches of the embargo has now been reduced considerably, we still find – as has also been said here – that there have been a substantial number of very recent, definite breaches. That shows that people are still unscrupulously trying to make money out of the mass murders in former Yugoslavia.

The example of these sanctions introduced by the United Nations has made it quite clear that an embargo will have the desired effect only if it can be enforced completely. It is to be hoped that the agreement on assistance will help to tighten the controls on the Danube so that the banned goods can no longer reach the war zone or support the belligerent parties.

Unfortunately, these agreements have come very late; too late, in my view, for many of those who have already died in this dirty war. I think

it was naïve to believe – and we often pointed this out in this Assembly – that it is enough simply to declare an embargo. As we have said again and again, if we decide on measures of this kind, we must immediately provide the management resources to apply them, and apply them rigorously. Mr. Baumel emphasised the same point this morning.

That does not just mean making equipment and management resources available. Obviously it also means that those concerned must be unconditionally prepared to enforce the embargo. Primarily, of course, that means the Danube riparian states. We are all aware that the riparian states were already in a difficult economic situation and that the commitment to enforce sanctions will make it even worse. I pointed this out in the Defence Committee.

This means that we must be prepared to give these countries a psychological boost. Of course, it also means telling them that the additional economic difficulties resulting from their enforcement activities will be alleviated.

I do not think it is enough for us to include a recommendation that the United Nations should look into this subject and consider how these countries can be helped. It is a European problem too, and we Europeans have an obligation to help as much as we can. I would have been pleased if we could have seen our way to calling on the European Community to give as much as possible of this necessary support.

I only hope that in future we will manage to plan ahead and co-ordinate our views more successfully on how to enforce an embargo before deciding on it. However, I also hope this embargo will now bite, that it will be effective, and that all those who have called today for further-reaching measures will actually be prepared to give the necessary support, without any of the selfishness that has, I must say, been evident. I believe that really is the signal we in this Assembly can and must give.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Steiner.

I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank the Rapporteurs for their good report. I agree with Sir Russell Johnston's comment that economic sanctions can be very effective. I would add, however, that they must be properly enforced. In September 1992 the WEU Assembly noted that sanctions were being breached on a large scale, except in the Adriatic, where good control was very soon established. Yet it took nearly a year from that statement in September 1992 before we achieved more effective control over the Danube. It took far too long and should have happened much sooner. The international community should do what it is capable of doing. This could have been an example.

Mr. Eisma (continued)

We have got there at last. This report makes a number of recommendations. I am in favour of adding a recommendation to the effect that the WEU Assembly and WEU in general must be informed, in relation to any breaches on the Danube, of the nationalities which are breaching the embargo. This is not just a matter for the United Nations: WEU too must be given this information. WEU has taken over responsibility for co-ordinating the application of the embargo on the Danube, so it is only logical that we should be informed as soon as possible of any breaches. This operation is our responsibility, so we also need information on any abuses.

I come to my next point. Paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation points out that if the embargo is to be successful those countries which have suffered financial loss as a result of its enforcement should receive compensation. A number of countries are mentioned, but I note the omission of a number of other countries which should also receive compensation for the enormous economic loss they are suffering as a result of the embargo. It does not affect us, the West, but it does affect the countries that have been listed. The list misses out Albania, and especially Macedonia. Why were these two not mentioned as countries which also suffer enormously from the embargo? They deserve compensation for that. I would like to hear the Rapporteur's response to this.

Paragraph 3 recommends that the Council explore, with the Greek authorities, ways of ensuring complete compliance with the embargo. That is really something, Mr. President. It sounds almost euphemistic, but it does indicate that we have noted that Greece has breached the embargo. It is a hard statement, but probably also a fair one, for otherwise it would not have been made. Otherwise we would not have to help ensure compliance with the embargo, which also applies to the route from Greece to Serbia-Montenegro. I do not see any Greek names on the list of speakers. I would have liked to hear the reaction of the Greek representatives in the Assembly to paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation. For the rest, I think it is a good one.

Mr. President, a few words on monitoring the embargo on the border between Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation refers only to the Russian authorities helping ensure respect for the embargo. Why is only Russia named? Why is monitoring the embargo along the border between Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia not also a matter for the United Nations and WEU? Another question: how can we persuade Milosevic to accept these controls? We all know that he will not allow the border to be monitored

at present. Can some parts of the package of sanctions in relation to Serbia-Montenegro be suspended if Mr. Milosevic allows border controls between Bosnia and Serbia, and especially if Kosovo shows more respect for democratic freedoms?

Mr. President, these are my thoughts on reading the draft recommendation.

Let me close as I began. An embargo can work, but it must be properly enforced. This too is a task for WEU, not just in the case of the Danube but also elsewhere in the region.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Diaconescu, Observer from Romania.

Mr. DIACONESCU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my congratulations to Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed for the high quality of the report they have submitted. We are entirely in agreement with the revised draft recommendation.

On the subject of the Danube, I wish to reiterate our appreciation of the visit that Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Marten, co-Rapporteur, paid to Romania in October 1992 at the invitation of the Romanian Defence Minister. This visit came at the right time in every respect, including the conclusions reached, for it gave an opportunity to check that the embargo was being observed and to confirm Romania's lack of technical resources at the time.

May I also express the Romanian Parliament's satisfaction at the visit that Mr. Hartmut Soell, outgoing President of the WEU Assembly, and the Political Committee, headed by Mr. Pieter Stoffelen, paid to Romania in April 1993.

My thanks are also due to the WEU Assembly for the valuable personal support given by its President for the decision to provide WEU help to Romania in preventing the Danube from being used to bypass the embargo. In our view, the co-operation arrived at between WEU and the states on the Danube, namely Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, in lending assistance in the enforcement of the embargo represents the first step in the formulation of a real and practical partnership between WEU member states and three of the Central European countries. Romania is firmly determined to take full responsibility for the international obligations it will assume.

The many tense situations in certain regions of former Yugoslavia and the risk of escalating conflict and external military intervention are sources of extreme disquiet for Romania and explain why the Foreign Policy Committee of the Senate, in the framework of the specific resources allocated to parliamentary diplomacy, has set up a sub-committee to monitor the Yugoslav crisis.

Mr. Diaconescu (continued)

The sub-committee's first aim will be to organise the efficient and rapid flow of information between parliament and the national and international institutions and bodies involved in implementing the Security Council's resolutions, and the next will be to assess the economic effects of the embargo and find ways of offsetting the substantial losses sustained by the Romanian economy, which is engaged in the transition towards a market economy. The sub-committee has already begun a dialogue with the foreign policy committees of other parliaments in the region, which have informed us of their favourable reaction to the initiative.

Lastly, the sub-committee would like to co-operate with European and international parliamentary structures in the search for a lasting solution to the problem. I am in a position to tell you that we have already contacted Mr. Michael Marshall, President of the Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, with particular reference to the mission to be organised in the near future by the IPU for Bosnia. Participation by Romanian parliamentarians in a mission of this kind might bear fruit since Romania has no dispute with the other countries in the area. In taking this initiative, the Romanian Parliament is making the point that peace can be brought to the region, or elsewhere, only by political methods, not the use of force.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Romania considers that WEU is essential to European security and able to contribute to ensuring the security of all the Central European countries. Romania hopes it can look forward to a future shared with WEU member countries through strengthened institutional links, the only guarantee that the future will see a new peaceful order in Europe.

We consider that very special importance should be attached to the partnership concept in the development of our relations with WEU at all levels, whether political, parliamentary, military or scientific. We hope that it will be possible to arrange more visits by representatives and delegations from WEU and its parliamentary Assembly to Romania, so that you may be even better informed on how things are in our country.

We confirm Romania's interest in having a WEU documentation and information office in Bucharest and in intensifying co-operation between Romanian scientific bodies and the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

In conclusion, I would confirm once again the Romanian Parliament's support for the government and its efforts to establish a genuine partnership with WEU accompanied by step-by-step progress towards Romania's accession to

a European union in which WEU would be responsible for security and defence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. That completes the published list of speakers, but I have received applications from three other delegates who would like to speak in the debate. I ask them to be brief.

I call Mr. Peter Fry.

Mr. FRY (*United Kingdom*). – It is right to congratulate those who presented the report, not least because it is one of the most satisfactory areas of activity concerning the sorry story of Yugoslavia. I agree with what Mr. Steiner said about our policy not having been a universal success. The test of any embargo is whether the purpose for which it was imposed has been achieved. It is reasonably clear to most of us that we have failed to stop the fighting in Yugoslavia. We have also failed to stop the fighting spreading. I refer not just to the fighting between the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims. There now appears to be a three-way fight going on. In that fight, United Nations troops find themselves, to use an English phrase, piggy in the middle.

It is important for us to examine the report in the context of our two earlier debates, which appear to demonstrate the sorry state of affairs over international co-operation. We are witnessing the worst loss of life and the worst misery that has been caused since the second world war, even though we have had the satisfaction of seeing what was known as the cold war come to an end.

I may be thought to be making a controversial statement when I say that the leadership of the major powers of the world is very much weaker than I should like it to be and that it is very much weaker than it was in the past. Furthermore, the question mark hanging over the rôle that the United States will play in Europe in the future gives me cause for very great concern. It is absolutely essential that we should try to make the organisations that are already in being much more effective. It cannot be said that we do not have sufficient machinery for effective co-operation. We have the United Nations, WEU, NATO and CSCE. Some people may cynically ask, why, with all those organisations, are we not more effective? The report makes a real effort to point the way towards making what can be achieved more possible. I support strongly the additional amendment tabled by my colleague, Sir Keith Speed.

Even this report does not answer some of the questions. It is all very well to talk about closing the frontier between Serbia and Bosnia, but who will close it? Who will enforce the sanctions at that border? Without an effective closure of lines of communication, the fighting will continue.

Mr. Fry (continued)

I strongly support the point that was made earlier about Macedonians, who are even unsure about their name. Macedonia's political and economic future is in doubt. We must bear in mind the fact that further action may be needed there. Above all, we should take a good look at the machinery that is in operation to establish whether the millions of words that we speak could be more effective and ensure that there is a peace to keep. We cannot have peace-keeping that results only from the aggressor gaining all his objectives. That is the danger we face in Yugoslavia. It is the danger that international organisations must face up to. We do ourselves no good if we take comfort from small successes. Nevertheless, I am pleased that WEU has been effective in the one area that seems to have paid off – checking on the embargo. I ask that those in authority look closely at what more can be done with other international organisations to make other activities as effective.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Fry.

I now call Mr. Vassiliades, Observer from Greece.

Mr. VASSILIADES (*Observer from Greece*). – I congratulate the joint Rapporteurs on producing an excellent and informative report, which I believe will be taken into consideration by all concerned. A more informed Assembly can better take the right decisions. That is necessary when it is dealing with sensitive problems in difficult circumstances. Solidarity is much needed.

I feel that I should repeat Greece's position on the embargo. We affirm the need for strict observance of sanctions by all countries. It is well known that, due to its geographical location, Greece suffers severely from the embargo, but despite the damage to our economy, we are determined to take all necessary measures to ensure that the embargo is enforced in the hope that it will soon produce positive results.

We appreciate the operations in the Adriatic and on the Danube and hope that systematic violations of the embargo in other areas will attract attention. Fact-finding missions and reports such as the one under discussion should be welcomed. The same could be said of the need for all concerned to be present at working level when such discussions are held in the Assembly. On occasion, opinions are formed in the absence of the interested and sometimes well-informed parties which may be in a position to give explanations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vassiliades, especially for being brief in view of the time constraint.

I now call Mr. Philipov, Observer from Bulgaria.

Mr. PHILIPOV (*Observer from Bulgaria*). – I shall try to be brief. I, too, am grateful for the report. It contains the first mention of Bulgaria as a partner in WEU. We are participating in the joint actions on the Danube.

There are two sides to an embargo. One is the punishment of the guilty; the other is the suffering of the innocent trading partner and neighbour. Bulgaria is one of the trading partners. I shall give two figures. Each month, we lose an estimated \$250 million in trade. During the past half year, it is estimated that more than \$1.8 billion has been lost. Sanctions have led to the blocking of our traditional transport and communication routes to Western and Central Europe, which has considerably restricted our export opportunities and raised the costs of our foreign trade.

In spite of the difficulties, however, Bulgaria, like Greece and others in the region, will do its best to continue to secure observance of sanctions. In the meantime, I should like to mention that observance of the embargo should not stop economic development and reform in, or disrupt the social stability of the countries involved. The international community ought to take urgent steps to render assistance to the countries that are experiencing grave economic difficulties.

Sanctions represent a joint act of the international community and on no occasion should the consequences of pursuing them be allowed to be a burden on the countries that share a boundary with the country under an embargo. If that burden is carried alone, sanctions on other countries some time in the future are likely to be doomed to failure. Doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions would be raised and questions would be asked about their usefulness in the search for peaceful solutions to future conflicts and crises.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Philipov.

The debate is closed.

I now call the joint Rapporteur to reply to the debate.

Mr. MARTEN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Sir Keith Speed and I were asked to prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990-91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo.

In view of the short time available and to ensure that the next Rapporteur has a chance to

Mr. Marten (continued)

speak after this debate, I will be very brief and confine myself to two or three of the main points which have been raised.

I think we all agree that the burden of sanctions must be shared by several countries, including some that have not even been mentioned today, for instance rich countries such as Japan and the United States. There I agree with what Mr. Philipov and other speakers have said. I am sure the joint Rapporteur, Sir Keith Speed, also agrees.

Mr. Steiner said the embargo must be enforced on a continuous basis. He explained this in detail, and I can only underline his words.

During our visits to Romania we saw the serious attempts being made there to enforce this embargo with the help of other countries. I would like to congratulate Mr. Diaconescu, the Romanian representative, on that initiative. We were extremely well provided with information on our visits to Romania. The government representatives and the officers who accompanied us willingly supplied us with all the information we needed. In my view Romania has proved that it will certainly be a reliable partner in our Assembly in the future.

Overall, ladies and gentlemen, I hope you will approve this report by Sir Keith Speed and myself unanimously, so that through the reinforcement of sanctions the rape, the massacres, the murders and the killings in former Yugoslavia come to an end.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Marten.

I call the Vice-Chairman of the committee, Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – In the absence of Mr. Baumel, may I, on behalf of the Defence Committee, stress the importance and interest of this report and pay tribute to the Rapporteurs.

It deals with a subject of a highly topical nature and its political dimension is one of which we are all aware so I shall leave it at that. WEU being involved in co-ordinating embargo measures, it was right that we should be vigilant and find out what was actually taking place.

The two Rapporteurs tackled this tricky subject, not omitting the details and including an assessment of the way in which countries were applying the embargo. Their work was so skilful and exhaustive that in practical terms they could be called the perfect pair, an Anglo-German combination which rapidly won the unanimous approval of the committee. They tell us that the embargo is working which is paramount, but that it needs to be intensified and

improved; and they say that sanctions are important but should be applied fully and across the board. Everyone agreed, but as Mr. Steiner has said, once the decision to impose an embargo was taken it had to be effective at all levels. So what needs strengthening has to be strengthened. It is true, as Sir Keith Speed said, that sanctions and the embargo on their own will not be decisive. The embargo must be backed up by political efforts, and perhaps some degree of military deterrence, but there is no denying that the embargo is reducing the offensive capability of the warring sides, and that this is already having a dissuasive political effect.

We should also consider the implications of the embargo and its cost which could be very high for certain entirely innocent third countries. To ease these countries' situation the Rapporteurs propose a number of guidelines; this too is a difficult subject.

The report and the draft recommendation are written with such clarity, lucidity and sense of proportion that, as I have just said, the committee voted unanimously in favour. I hope that the Assembly will do the same.

The PRESIDENT. – Before we proceed to vote on the draft recommendation, I have to inform the Assembly that I have received a request from Sir Keith Speed to propose an oral amendment.

Under Rule 31 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered.

However, in view of the argument put forward by Sir Keith, I am willing – if the Assembly agrees – to allow him to propose his amendment.

Is there any objection to that?...

There does not appear to be, so I think that the Assembly agrees to my proposal.

I call Sir Keith Speed.

Sir Keith SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move my oral amendment:

“At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

‘7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions.’”

The PRESIDENT. – As a roll-call vote has not been called for, I will now put the amendment to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

The amendment is agreed to unanimously.

The President (continued)

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1367, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted unanimously¹.

5. The situation in Somalia

(Presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1377)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of, debate and vote on the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Somalia, Document 1377, tabled by Mr. De Decker and others.

As Mr. De Decker is not with us today, I call Mr. de Puig to present the motion for a recommendation on behalf of the Political Committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – In the absence of Mr. De Decker, the Political Committee has asked me to introduce this motion for a recommendation to which I am one of the signatories.

In view of the hour I shall be brief. I would remind the Assembly that Somalia has nearly eight million inhabitants and became an independent country in 1960. It has been faced since January 1991 with internal clashes between what might be called “clans” and “sub-clans”, since we cannot speak of political divisions in the European sense. Although the people of Somalia form one single tribe, divisions exist between clans, chiefs and sub-clans and this explains the complexity of the conflicts and how difficult it is to find a solution.

After January 1991 and the fall of Mohamed Siad Bare, who had ensured some degree of stability after independence, violent struggles quickly broke out between clans and groups opposed not only to the government but also to each other.

In January 1991, the European Community and the Federal Republic of Germany announced that they were sending emergency aid in the form of medicines. Their example was

later followed by the Arab League, OAU and later still in 1991 by Médecins sans Frontières and the Red Cross, the purpose in every case being to remedy the poverty, destitution and widespread chaos.

In December 1991, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, requested the warring parties to find a solution and undertook to help by means of United Nations intervention in the form of a peace-keeping force.

During 1992 the clashes intensified. The United Nations peace-keeping operations were not accepted by all parties, and it was felt necessary to adopt United Nations Resolutions 746 on humanitarian assistance, a little later 767 for the installation of four United Nations operational centres with military observers and later still, 794, the first to authorise the dispatch to Somalia of an international armed force to ensure, at the very least, the distribution of humanitarian aid and put an end to the chaos prevailing throughout the country.

Despite the efforts of the United States, the European Community countries and international organisations, we failed to solve the problem or even hold a real and effective peace conference.

Meanwhile, with groups and clans gathering together under General Aidid, who had already announced his opposition to the presence of United Nations troops in Somalia, acts of terrible cruelty have been perpetrated, United Nations troops have been attacked and the situation of chaos, poverty, destitution and death has become intolerable.

Everyone has tried to send food aid and medical supplies, but the rival bands and clans continue to fight among themselves. In recent weeks, the fighting has reached fever-pitch.

The United Nations forces have tried to set up peace areas. They failed. They were attacked.

As you know, last week twenty-three Pakistani members of the United Nations peace-keeping force were killed. The United Nations command replied by an attack on 12th June. North American soliders, supported by troops from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, Turkey, Norway, Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and India participated in an operation to take General Aidid hostage. They failed to do so but they managed to destroy his headquarters.

Somali nationals were killed in this operation, and when a number of Somali groups staged a demonstration, the lamentable incident took place in which Pakistani soldiers, enraged at the death of their compatriots a few days before, fired at the civilian population and killed at least twenty people.

1. See page 46.

Mr. de Puig (continued)

We all know the reasons for the United Nations operation. The United States commander said that the aim was to stabilise the situation, and that the operation was a peace-keeping one intended to prevent General Aidid from taking action. Even the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, said that it was a disarmament operation, though he regretted the action by the Pakistani peace-keeping troops and ordered an inquiry.

In Somalia, opposition to the action by United Nations troops is general. The image of the international mission in Somalia has been blackened. Germany has considered withdrawing its troops.

Since the armed forces of four WEU member countries are involved and the United Nations action in Somalia is degenerating, and in view of the fact that WEU should keep watch on any action involving troops from its member countries, Mr. De Decker and ten other members tabled a motion for a recommendation that the Council meet as a matter of urgency to co-ordinate the efforts of member countries to ensure that the operation in Somalia obeys the principles governing action by the United Nations.

Thus the aim is to find out what happened, and to prevent the possible recurrence of certain regrettable actions in a complex situation where there is no kind of political issue, only rivalry between gangs and clans. Getting involved in this kind of struggle, or war, could be prejudicial to our organisation, and in the last analysis does nothing to solve Somalia's problems.

This is our purpose in signing the motion for a recommendation, which I hope you will adopt.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

The debate is now open.

I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I see that although this is a problem of some importance only a few of us are still here. Beyond doubt, the situation in Somalia is liable to become worse and to harm the image of the United Nations in the eyes not only of a large part of the Somali public but also in other countries of the third and fourth worlds.

After the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of East-West confrontation, the United Nations found itself freer to operate in accordance with its statutory purpose of defending and maintaining peace. The end of ideological confrontation also ended the policy of vetoes which in so many cases blocked initiatives backed by the largest international assembly.

One of the most delicate and difficult problems to be faced and resolved by the United Nations is the use of force. When, where and how can force be used? In some cases, such as former Yugoslavia, a stronger hand and greater decisiveness would be desirable at least to implement the resolutions adopted and to protect the safe havens and the people living there. Action goes too far in other cases such as Somalia and civilian casualties are caused; this in itself is very serious and above all causes incalculable damage to image and credibility.

We are all well aware how difficult it is to strike the right balance between the two opposing possibilities and requirements but precisely for that reason I believe that we must keep our nerve. Most probably we are facing provocation from some of the warring factions who use women and children as a shield. Organisations like the United Nations and its representatives wearing the blue beret cannot and must not fall for these tricks. It is one thing to attack military objectives even at the risk of causing civilian casualties but quite another thing to fire on a civilian demonstration.

After the massacre of twenty-three Pakistani soldiers, the situation became very tense but the reply could not and should not have been that given by the Pakistanis themselves at the celebrated four-kilometre stone. I therefore share the proposal in Mr. De Decker's recommendation and agree on the need for speedy and decisive action by the United Nations to get the UNSOM mission back on track, for the reason also that WEU has troops from four member countries on the spot.

My personal view is that the Pakistani troops should not stay in Somalia after what has happened and this should not be regarded as an accusation against them. Certainly, there are excuses and attenuating circumstances to justify what happened but the situation on the spot has become untenable and could lead to more bloodshed. Nor should this mean any United Nations or WEU disengagement from this suffering country; there remains the need to fight the warlords and provide military aid, and more particularly the need for the international community to start the reconstruction of the Somali state which has broken down completely and to guarantee basic structures and a minimum of authority and working institutions.

What is incredible is that there is no authority in a position to arrest and try those guilty of even very serious offences. The United Nations forces must be ready to deal with any type of emergency including the maintenance of public order. They must be in a position to respond strongly to armed attacks and they must also be equipped with tear gas, water jets and plastic bullets to deal with civilian demonstrations, as

Mr. Ferrarini (continued)

so often happens in our cities too, without indulging in any undue use of force.

Without some such action I believe that what is happening in Somalia will go on indefinitely and that it will become increasingly difficult for the international military forces deployed there to discharge their duties.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Like Mr. Ferrarini, I shall begin by expressing my regret that this urgent debate requested by Mr. De Decker and others is attended by so few parliamentarians. It does no good for WEU's image.

Mr. President, the whole of the world looks on with alarm at the dangerous developments in the situation created in Somalia. Operation Restore Hope launched with spectacular media backing on an unprecedented scale for its kind has not achieved the humanitarian objectives which were its justification.

Events during the past few days have brought certain situations undermining the authority and prestige of the United Nations into sharper outline. Unfortunately, armed forces from four WEU member countries are involved in the UNSOM 2 operation, which is looking more and more like a reckless, or worse still, criminal, adventure as each day passes.

In Somalia bombs are replacing supplies of rice.

Military forces landed claiming theirs was a humanitarian mission; they had come in the name of civilisation, prepared to fight barbarism and to create an atmosphere of reconciliation and lasting peace. These forces, or at least some of them, are now involved in actions which are unthinkable under international law and acting increasingly as the instrument of a policy whereby irrational violence is the general rule.

Ladies and gentlemen, Somalia is becoming the scene of bloody reprisals reminiscent of episodes in the thirty years' war.

There is such confusion today that it is no longer possible to tell whether the United Nations is responsible for a particular incident or whether it is the result of unilateral decisions by the commander of the blue berets and the United States Government.

American air strikes and the punitive revenge taken by Pakistani troops offend the consciences of the democratic world. The facts are that a force deployed to restore and keep the peace has been caught up in what resembles the plot of a Greek tragedy and instead become an angel of death. The misgivings voiced by Mr. Klaus

Kinkel raise a question-mark about the presence of German troops in Somalia.

The massacre of Somali demonstrators by members of the Pakistani peace-keeping forces in revenge for the death of their fellow soldiers will go down in history as a revolting episode which concerns all of us in Europe and demands that we reflect upon it. The same applies to the American air raids which, monthly, are more serious still in that the United States is a very large civilised and democratic nation.

It is difficult to understand President Clinton's enthusiasm in welcoming the Mogadishu bombing raids and his pride – to quote his own word – in the courage and skill of the American airmen who went on these raids that had such tragic effects. It is not true, the world is not grateful to him for this kind of prowess. His words gave offence throughout the globe and even among his own people.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Somali tragedy is an endless source of valuable lessons for all those in WEU and elsewhere looking for solutions to another tragedy of today, i.e. that now unfolding in the geographical area which used to be Yugoslavia.

Somalia does at least teach us what not to do. The major television networks make it impossible to conceal the evidence. In the streets of the Somali capital the great bulk of the population is beginning to curse United Nations troops, whether American or European, whites in general and the soldiers from third world countries shipped to the Horn of Africa to kill African civilians.

A provisional assessment for the action to combat hunger and poverty, under the official banner of Operation Restore Hope, yields a terrible conclusion. Strategic interests and unmentionable ambitions override principles and humanitarian aims.

Operation Restore Hope was presented in December as a test for the new international order, but it is turning out to be a bloodstained chapter in its history.

As I have already said, it is alarming that troops from four WEU member countries should be involved in an operation which is such an insult to the conscience of so-called civilised and democratic nations.

Mr. President, the Rapporteur departed somewhat from the spirit of Mr. De Decker's motion, but even so I shall vote for the motion for a recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The debate is now closed.

Do you wish to make a quick summary, Mr. de Puig?

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I thank those who have spoken and would like to say to Mr. Ferrarini that I agree with everything he said. Like him I recognise that there have been provocations, as we all know; but the United Nations, its peace-keeping troops and its missions should not rise to provocation. We must be on our guard the whole time.

This morning Mr. Fabbri, the Italian Defence Minister, back from Somalia, said that more effective monitoring was being organised to deal with provocation and to guide the actions of troops that might find themselves in ambiguous situations.

I agree with those who referred to the need to rebuild the state of Somalia. It is the reason why four WEU member countries are in Somalia: to try to rebuild the country, whose territory is split by ethnic divisions and clans in conditions of widespread and extreme poverty. The troops from these countries went there to keep the peace, but found themselves faced by clans and gangs having no political aims or any objective other than power for power's sake. This being so, it is very difficult to do anything about poverty.

I do not agree, I am sorry to say, with all Mr. Rodrigues's arguments, though I do agree with some of them. As I have just said, we went to Somalia to keep the peace. You say this was unrealistic, and you keep trotting out your anti-American arguments. I do not know whether these are naïve or deliberate, but allow me to say that I find them completely out of date. However this may be, all countries agreed to tough action by United Nations forces, with the approval of the Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General and the present President of Somalia, Mr. Ali Madji Mohamed.

So the legitimate part of the Somali Government was in favour of this action. Statements and claims are not made any truer simply by repetition. Both politics and history are what they are, not what we should like them to be; and this was the way things happened. I may perhaps have deviated a few millimetres from Mr. De Decker's report, but believe me, you have gone away off into outer space.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. de Puig.

Does the Chairman wish to say anything?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It seldom occurs that my committee disagrees so much with Mr. Rodrigues. When I think about Somalia I think about people starving from hunger and about a desperate attempt to rescue starving people. I am proud that at least one organisation in the world, the United Nations, is trying desperately hard to ensure that hungry people will be fed. I cannot believe that anybody disagrees with that statement. On most occa-

sions Mr. Rodrigues and I agree, but today we have disagreed strongly.

The committee has expressed a favourable opinion on the text of the motion tabled by Mr. De Decker and others. I hope that the Assembly, including Mr. Rodrigues, will vote in favour of it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Stoffelen.

We shall now vote on the motion for a recommendation contained in Document 1377.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

I see that that is not the case.

The vote will be by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion for a recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I have received the nomination of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer for the remaining vice-presidential place.

The nomination has been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I propose that the election of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer as a Vice-President should be by acclamation, in accordance with Rule 10(7).

Is there any objection?...

I believe the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare our colleague, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, duly elected as Vice-President.

The Vice-Presidents' seniority will, as required by Rule 10(7), be determined by age and will be as follows: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Machete and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 17th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium (Presen-

¹ See page 48.

The President (continued)

tation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1363).

2. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland.
3. The Assembly's communication policy (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recom-

mendation, Document 1378 and amendments).

4. The situation in East Timor (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1380).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1993

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Changes in the membership of committees.
4. Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1363*).

Speakers: Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lopez Henares (*Chairman*).
5. The Assembly's communication policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recommendation, Doc. 1378 and amendments*).

Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston (*Rapporteur*), the Earl of Dundee, Mr. Pizzo, Lord Finsberg, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Lopez Henares, Sir Russell Johnston.

6. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland.

Replies by Mrs. Rehn to questions put by: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Borderas, Lord Finsberg, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Ferrarini.

7. The situation in East Timor (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1380*).

Speakers: Mr. Roseta (*Rapporteur*), Lord Finsberg, Mr. Fabra, Mr. Brito, Mr. Rodrigues, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Vassiliades (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Roseta (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*); (point of order): Lord Finsberg.

8. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure, I invite the Assembly to agree to the setting up of the Standing Committee with the

proposed change in membership contained in Notice No. 6, which has already been distributed.

Is there any objection?...

The Standing Committee is accordingly appointed and the change in membership agreed to.

I am informed by the Spanish Delegation of a proposed change in the membership of the Technological and Aerospace Committee:

Mr. Palacios, a titular member, becomes an alternate and Mr. Borderas, an alternate, becomes a titular member.

Is there any objection?...

The changes are agreed to.

4. Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1363)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the sym-

1. See page 51.

The President (continued)

posium and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1363.

I call Mr. Lenzer to present his report.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, twice within a short space of time I have had the honour to submit a report on behalf of our committee on an anti-missile defence system for Europe, together with a draft recommendation for you to vote on.

We began to look into this complex question in December 1992. Even then we agreed that we would continue to pursue the matter. A symposium was held in Rome on 20th and 21st April this year at which we discussed political questions, especially questions of defence policy, but also technical and scientific questions and industrial policy, and heard the views of notable experts in the scientific, economic – and, of course, also political fields.

I am sure this report will not be the last word on the subject either. We will have to consider in committee in what form to pursue the matter.

Let me briefly remind you of the political background and explain why we are still concerned with these matters at the present time. I deliberately said the present time, because many people seem to think that military threats are now a thing of the past. But I believe it is an illusion to assume that the end of the bipolar world, of large blocs, can be equated with the disappearance of all military threats. And to believe that we no longer need to build up certain defence systems, e.g. an anti-missile defence system such as the one recommended in this report, is also, in our view, a grave mistake.

That is why, as I said, I shall briefly remind you of the background to our work.

Firstly, in the former communist East, long-suppressed tensions have been released by the collapse of the USSR. Old nationalist feelings are reviving. The systematically deepening integration in Western Europe goes hand in hand with rapid and unpredictable disintegration in Eastern Europe. The collapse of the former Soviet Union has given rise to risks in relation to the safety of nuclear weapons which do not just have ethnic, religious or nationalist roots, but stem above all from the undreamed-of scale of the problem of minorities and all the accompanying risks.

Secondly, many third world regions face a double obstacle to development: the economic obstacle of limited resources, indebtedness, population explosion and distressing ecological conditions; and the military one resulting from over-arming and religious and tribal conflicts

that damage the economy, destroy the environment and threaten the survival of the people.

Thirdly, the proliferation of weapons and armaments technology has an adverse effect on the situations we have outlined above. Arms control policy will have an important task to perform here in future, as will the kind of preventive policy we are pursuing in this Assembly.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is why this draft recommendation – I will not say anything about the report itself – begins by welcoming all the initiatives for arms control, disarmament and the political handling of conflicts. But we also express our concern about certain Far Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries, where there is quite clearly a tendency to withdraw from any kind of control régime. If we look at the difficulties in relation to North Korea, which was preparing to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty – thank God this conflict has meanwhile been resolved by intensive negotiations – we gain some idea of the nature of these difficulties.

We also stated that the proliferation of theatre and strategic missile technology into sensitive regions which might affect the security of Europe is still continuing, because certain countries are still trying to employ this technology as a means of achieving their political demands and building up a kind of threat capacity for which we must be prepared, here in Central Europe too.

The symposium held in Rome last April provided analyses of the situation and showed the options for action. By the time we left we were firmly convinced that WEU should make an active contribution to the political discussion of these questions, and that our committee, which also deals with technical and scientific matters, should naturally also consider appropriate technical and scientific means of answering these threats.

Let me conclude this brief statement by discussing the actual substance of the draft recommendation.

The first recommendation is that the Council should not confine itself, so to speak, to reacting, but should play a very active part in all international initiatives for arms control and the further development of control régimes, confidence-building measures, non-proliferation régimes, i.e. every form of political dialogue.

We also recommend that it take an initiative in the United Nations with the aim of establishing an international early warning and surveillance centre open to all countries interested in sharing data and information on missile activities and linked to an obligation to notify

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

all missile firings and space launches. I believe that only if we can implement confidence-building measures of this kind, in which each country has the feeling that it has autonomous access to all the information of importance to its security, will it also prove possible to establish the necessary mutual trust. We decided that we should also become involved in the discussions between the United States on the one hand and Russia and other CIS states on the other, on creating a kind of security partnership on the basis of prior consultations between these countries.

As mentioned elsewhere, we should take an active part in the process of developing a new security structure or architecture in Europe.

Lastly – and this is something we have said from the outset – we recommend the Council to have a careful risk assessment carried out. I think it is time we tried to organise the facts at our disposal, and gave European industry a definite mandate to conduct a feasibility study, in order to give us, the politicians, an idea of what action to take – for in the end it is up to us, the political bodies – to decide on the requirements for a cost-effective antimissile protection system for Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, let me close by thanking all the members of our committee who have helped, in pragmatic, committed and always fair discussions, to look into the facts that are before you and that form the background to this report. I would also like to thank the committee secretary, Mr. Burchard, for his active assistance, as well as all the experts who helped us during the course of the Rome symposium.

As I said, this is a further step along a road at the end of which I hope we will see a security structure within our states that is based on mutual trust and is both effective and efficient.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much indeed, Mr. Lenzer, for this splendid report and for a presentation that was very much to the point.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am not surprised that not many members of the Assembly wish to speak in this debate. The report is excellent and follows that which Mr. Lenzer produced last December. There is little more that can or should be said, but there is one thing that I think must be said. The matter is of the greatest importance to the Assembly, to European security and to international stability.

The symposium on which the report is based took place in April this year. It is a pity that we did not know then what the United States Defence Secretary, Mr. Aspin, announced on 13th May – the end of SDI, or Star Wars, as it has been dubbed. Although the Rapporteur has amended his explanatory memorandum and the committee has amended its draft recommendation to take account of the announcement, I believe that the demise of SDI deserves careful consideration by the Assembly. The whole world will come to regret the decision unless it is reversed or responded to, not least by WEU.

There is no doubt that the pursuit of SDI contributed greatly to the end of the cold war and to the end of the Soviet Union. To his credit, Mr. Gorbachev perceived that he could not match the technology and resources that President Reagan was prepared to deploy to SDI.

As a consequence of Mr. Aspin's announcement last month, instead of a space-based defence system to defend the free world – or, indeed, the entire world – the United States now proposes a theatre missile system to defend the United States. It is a pity that Mr. Aspin did not consult his allies and WEU more widely. As our recommendations make plain, we have proposals that were relevant then, but which are even more relevant now in the light of that announcement.

It is also a pity that Mr. Aspin appears to have ignored the proposals and the offer of President Yeltsin, who told Congress last month that Russia wanted to develop global defences with the United States, sharing costs and technology accordingly. Once again, Mr. Lenzer's recommendations are more relevant in the light of that than they were before Mr. Aspin's announcement.

In abandoning global defence, the United States is ignoring certain realities, including those mentioned in Mr. Lenzer's excellent report. For example, it ignores the reality that the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction shows no sign of abating. By the end of the decade, fifteen or more countries will have the capability to produce ballistic missiles, six countries will have missiles with ranges of 2 000 kilometres or more and several may possess missiles with intercontinental ranges. At least eight countries will have nuclear weapons or advanced nuclear weapons programmes, thirty will probably possess a chemical weapon capability and seven or more will possess biological weapons.

By the early years of the twenty-first century, numerous countries will be armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and they will have the ability to release not one, but dozens of small bomblets – cluster munitions that would overwhelm any land-based defence system. The implications of that for western

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

security, for European security and for international stability – or instability – are tremendous. The deployment of space-based missile defences, preferably in co-operation with Russia, is an essential minimum response to such proliferation.

The absence of such deployment will serve only to encourage such proliferation and will also challenge our will and our capability to respond to regional aggression, such as that of Iraq towards Kuwait. Coalitions such as that put together under United Nations auspices to pursue the Desert Storm war will become difficult to organise.

The Clinton government's decision to abandon global defence without regard to the anticipated need for global defence is as irresponsible as it is premature as it is dangerous – and we in this Assembly should not be afraid to say so. I hope that, in response to the draft recommendations in the report, the WEU Council will behave otherwise – responsibly, prudently and with foresight, as we strongly urge it to do, especially in recommendations 3 and 4.

Europe cannot afford to abandon the goal of effective missile defence, and that must be a space-based defence system. That must remain our policy and our priority. Let us talk to the Russians about it if America will not, but let us do it now. We must pass the recommendations unanimously. We look forward to the Council's response with both interest and a great deal of concern.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson. You stated you were not surprised that very few members asked to speak, given the quality of the report. However your own speech is very much appreciated.

The debate is closed.

The President does not normally express a view during the debate but at least I can say how frustrating it is to have wanted to speak and not be able to. I am sorry I cannot do so now as I would readily have supported the points of view expressed.

I feel that it is most important for our Assembly – and I hope that here I am echoing the views of the Council of Ministers – to awaken public awareness in our own countries and attract public attention to the responsibilities that have to be shouldered. There is an immediate and imperative need for this as you will have noted from the debate. The danger is clearly there, though we may not know whether the urgency is a matter of tomorrow or five or ten years' time. Mr. Atkinson's warning puts yet another dimension on it.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. Let me turn to you first. I am actually very grateful that you too have expressed your views on this subject. After all, we have known each other for quite some time – nearly twenty years, I think – thanks to working in the same committee, and I know what commitment you have always shown as its Rapporteur. That is why I do not find it at all unusual; in fact, I believe that your statements from the President's chair give the subject even more weight.

Coming now to the statement by Mr. Atkinson, whom I would like to thank and whose views I fully endorse, let me say the following. It is indeed depressing to look at the scenario that may await us at the end of this century with regard to the proliferation of nuclear and conventional missiles, and possibly chemical and biological weapons, and with regard to the ballistic technology available in many countries – you gave the figures. What makes these weapons so dangerous is that people transport them to specific places in the world in order to achieve their demands.

It is a depressing scenario, and one on which we must adopt an early stand, in political terms and by means of arms control and disarmament policy; here we must act and not just react.

Mr. President, perhaps for once it is a good sign that few colleagues are speaking on this subject today. It is a difficult subject and one has to have studied it for quite a long time before being able to join in the discussion here. But perhaps our Assembly is also fully aware that these new threats are far more complex than at a time when the world was still divided into large blocs and when we thought that every danger could be evaluated and analysed more or less realistically.

It is the diffuse nature of the threats today that persuades us all – or so I hope and trust – that we must take action, and we must do so because the world has not become a more peaceful place – whatever some people may hastily and rashly claim. In fact there are more and more attempts to pursue local or regional conflicts by means of force. Since this is literally brought home to us by the media every day, perhaps the political background to this report is already so clear that there is no need for a major debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

You have given us a great deal to think about.

I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am going to speak very briefly, since after the magnificent presentation

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

by Mr. Lenzer and the equally brilliant speech by Mr. Atkinson, there is really not much more to say. Although there have been few speeches, the quality of those we have heard makes up for the lack of quantity.

In my speech, Mr. President, I should briefly like to comment on the good sense of the Technological and Aerospace Committee in presenting this draft recommendation to the Assembly. We are most certainly at a key point in terms of technological development and the threats posed by the modern world. The events of the Gulf war were a testing ground in terms of what might happen if new weapons technology continues to be arbitrarily and widely disseminated throughout the many countries to which it is now accessible. It therefore seems to me that Mr. Lenzer is entirely right in stating at the beginning of his report that our proposals must maintain a balance, since as a security and defence organisation, we must needs show sensitivity in advocating disarmament and arms control measures. However, taking a balanced and reasoned approach must not prevent us from also being aware of technological developments and on our guard as to the threat that these imply. I therefore congratulate Mr. Lenzer for his skill in presenting a balanced view in his opening remarks to the report.

Finally, as Mr. Lenzer himself has told us, speaking for the committee, the present report is unlikely to be the last on the subject. We must be extremely alert to such matters, Mr. President, in our rôle as a parliamentary Assembly with powers of supervision and a pressure group function in relation to the Council of Ministers. We must therefore ensure that we submit the proposals contained in the report to the Council of Ministers, as a matter of priority, in view of the need to establish a system of control to counter the increased threat of possible development of long-range missiles – within the framework as always of the United Nations – and seek the support of the United States for this proposal.

As a result of developments in technology, cruise missiles now have a range of two to three thousand kilometres and with the use of micro-technology it is possible to arm them with nuclear warheads or bacteriological weapons that can cause very serious damage. As chairman of the symposium in Rome, I can definitely say that two basic considerations came out of the discussions. First, a good deal of information has been made available on this particular danger, and second – a source of great satisfaction to us as Europeans – many proposals drawn up on that occasion were of extremely high quality – as was the information provided by certain delegations, for example,

the Italians and the French – demonstrating Europe's very great technical capability in this field. I believe that with this information, and additionally by demonstrating the necessary political sensitivity, the proposals contained in the draft recommendation should be entirely acceptable. For this reason, Mr. President, the committee approved them unanimously and I am submitting them to the Assembly with the recommendation that they be adopted with the same unanimity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1363.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I congratulate the whole Assembly and Mr. Lenzer in particular.

5. The Assembly's communication policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recommendation, Doc. 1378 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We could begin the debate on Sir Russell Johnston's report straight away and break off around 11 a.m. for the address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland.

Is there any objection?...

This is agreed to.

The next order of the day is therefore the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the Assembly's communication policy and votes on the draft order, draft resolution and draft recommendation, Document 1378 and amendments.

I call Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President and colleagues, I feel a bit of a fraud standing here presenting the report as I have had nothing to do with its preparation. To put it directly, I am the less acceptable face of

1. See page 52.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Lady Hooper, who was appointed Rapporteur and who should have been charming and cajoling you instead of me. Unfortunately, the timing of the debate meant that Lady Hooper could not be present because of a long-standing previous commitment and it was decided that I should undertake the task in her place.

My first responsibility is to thank her for her work and to express regret that she was unable to be present to see it to completion. My second responsibility is to thank Mr. Pedregosa, the Clerk to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, for the immense amount of painstaking and hard work he has put into the report. The Assembly is fortunate in having officials of his dedication.

It is the commonest cry in politics that no one is paying proper attention to what one says, or that no one gives adequate credit to its relevance or proper weight to its significance. We are all full of speeches that would shatter the complacency of the existing order and point in new and fruitful directions. We make such speeches in the Assembly. We sit down, warm with the feeling of a task admirably accomplished. The following morning, inexplicably, the speech is not in *Le Figaro*, it is not in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* or the *Financial Times*. It is nowhere at all.

Why? We have to blame somebody. Certainly, it can hardly be our own fault. So there is the institution within which we have dropped these shining pearls – WEU. It should get its act together. The press department should be more diligent. The press themselves – damn them! – should be more responsive.

So what can we do? We must have an image. So let us have a logo. After all, everyone who is anyone has a logo. What about offices? Let us set them up all over the place. Let member countries stuff them with lively, and preferably young and attractive people – certainly not boring old baldies like me. We need people with hair and flair who will project WEU as an institution which is exciting, forward-looking and intrinsic to our security and our welfare.

About three years ago the French military very intelligently conducted an opinion poll on WEU in all our member states. Instead of asking the respondents the usual incomprehensible questions which opinion pollsters usually ask, such as: "What are your feelings about WEU policy in the Aegean?", they asked much more simple questions. They said: "Have you ever heard of WEU? What is it?" Surprise, surprise, our Teutonic friends got the prize – 5% of the population of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland knew what WEU was. The Brits and the French trailed behind at 3.5%. Incidentally, that was

despite the fact that the headquarters of WEU was in London and the Assembly was sited in Paris.

If one believes that WEU should be a reasonably frequent subject of conversation at the breakfast table in Paris, Berlin or London, those figures are not what one might describe as encouraging. But I do not believe that it should. I do not consider that widespread public ignorance is necessarily a condemnation. After all, remember that incompetence and ineffectiveness often attract more attention than efficiency. Failure receives more coverage than success.

However, as a parliamentary Assembly we have both an interest and a duty to explain our activities and make it easier for people to find out about us and about what we do. The proposals in the report are directed towards those objectives. They are about communication, which, as politicians, we all know is an unending activity that can always be improved.

The proposals are not especially ambitious. They are made in the full knowledge of budgetary constraints, which may exclude certain proposals and necessitate placing others in some order of priority. As the explanatory memorandum sets out, our proposals are still founded on the 1988 plan, which already has had some degree of success. First, the letter sent out by the President is a success. It is fairly widely distributed and reasonably well read. It is always difficult to be sure about these things, but I count it as a success.

Requests for reports have increased. As the appendix states, last December we had 205 individual requests. That may not seem an enormous number when spread all over member states of WEU, but it is a considerable advance and there is a clear trend.

The Assembly also now has a logo. I shall say a few words about logos because an amendment has been tabled about them. There is a suggestion at the end of the report that one visual aid should be used to weld together the various parts. Birds and stars are suggested as the common element. For the Assembly we suggest putting the hemicycle in the centre of the logo. I understand that the Council has made inquiries and that there is a real possibility that birds and stars will be adopted. I am not entirely satisfied that it is all that terrible or confusing to have slight variations in logos. We already have a fair amount of confusion in logos.

I am wearing the Council of Europe tie. Everyone thinks that it is a European Community tie. As many people do not know the difference between the Council of Europe and the European Community, that adds to their considerable confusion even when I lucidly explain it to them. So we should not get too excited about logos.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Then there is the matter of the video. The simplest thing that I can do is to read a short passage from the explanatory memorandum in paragraph 33 of the report, in case you have not read it – I am sure that that is a slight on you. It says:

“One must be aware of the high cost of undertaking anything whatsoever in the audiovisual sector. A recent example is the assessment of the possibility of holding our plenary session in Strasbourg. Use of the normal audiovisual facilities at the disposal of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament for each of their sessions was offered to us at a cost of F 160 000 per day, which means that, after two and a half days of normal use, the Assembly's entire information budget would have been spent.”

That is a problem. So let us not be too ambitious. One can be as ambitious as one wishes in seeking to increase the budgetary allowance available to us, but we must be practical.

Then there is the question of the booklet, as it is called in the report. I would prefer to call it a leaflet, but the difference between a booklet and a leaflet could be the subject of a certain amount of theological dispute. The Council of Europe has been successful in producing a short, attractive, eye-catching leaflet which explains in simple language what it is all about. That is something that we should have. We should try to standardise the way in which our national delegations behave because they have the primary responsibility for telling people in their countries what we do. If they do not do so, people will not know.

There are different practices in different countries. I understand that in the Federal Republic of Germany a report is produced for each plenary session which is then circulated to all members of the Bundestag. In France the delegation has to appear before the Foreign Affairs Committee and be scrutinised and questioned. In the United Kingdom we produce a report twice a year which sets out what is happening in WEU and reports the resounding contributions made by the British representatives. But the reports are not debated. Nor has either the Foreign Affairs or Defence Select Committees ever asked to do so. In Spain there is an annual report which is also not debated unless someone wants to debate it. I do not believe that anyone has yet asked to do so.

There is room for each delegation to examine what its country does and consider whether it could be done better in practice. That would not cost any money. An amendment has been tabled suggesting that more money should be spent. I shall oppose it because it is not practical. But it

is practical to ask delegations to examine their practices. Visits by committees are increasingly used effectively to attract attention and explain the activities that we undertake.

The report contains two proposals. The first relates to the placing of officers – that there should be officers in the various Community countries. I doubt whether that would make a significant difference. It would certainly cost a lot of money. Secondly, there is the proposal to bring people across from the United States and tell them what we do. That would also cost a lot of money.

In the middle of July the Defence Committee is going to the United States. That ten- or twelve-day visit will do far more than an organisation that is paid to project the image of WEU. This organisation is active and alive. An opportunity is afforded to a wide range of senators and representatives to speak to members. That is important.

The report does not pretend to provide a definitive answer to the problem of achieving for WEU, specifically for the Assembly, the attention that it deserves. There is no final answer. There is the need for more cohesion. There is criticism of the Council and its attitude to the Assembly. We know about that, because we have discussed it in the different political groups and a paper concerning the annual report has been referred to the Political Committee. Cohesion is necessary, if we are to have an organisation that projects itself effectively. That is a relatively new and certainly relevant factor.

The report, if accepted and steadily implemented, which is what has happened since 1988, will improve understanding and knowledge of our work. I commend it to the Assembly.

(Sir Dudley Smith, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Sir Russell.

The debate is open.

I call Lord Dundee.

Earl of DUNDEE (*United Kingdom*). – Whatever Western European Union may have achieved, or might come to achieve, must, to some degree at least, be linked to its public image. As to how its public image can affect its actual achievement, all of us will be very grateful to Sir Russell Johnston for his excellent analysis and recommendations on the Assembly's communications policy.

However, one should perhaps begin by asking whether it would really matter if WEU had no communications policy at all, or if the public never came to learn anything of its work and endeavours. In defence matters, and with

Earl of Dundee (continued)

certain defence agencies, we know that success very often depends upon a low profile, or even upon secrecy.

Nor in our case, although we might not need to be very secretive, has WEU been put off by its low profile. For example, the high quality of WEU reports and debates has not been undermined just because only a few people read them. In the same way, lack of public awareness in itself has not usually deterred high standards of academic research at any time or place.

What, then, is the case for trying to bring about increased public awareness now for the work of WEU? Since the collapse of communism, many of us have come to believe that one of the most important and exciting developments in defence policy is, and will be, collective security.

We have already debated this week the Open Skies Treaty. There is a growing number of opportunities, whether technical, political or humanitarian, to foster new partnerships and new confidence between countries and continents. This system will work only if it is based on mutual respect. And it will be trusted only if it can be supported by reasoned argument and common sense. That is why the WEU Assembly has a vital rôle to play. It is the only European assembly for debating defence questions. The scope for engendering trust over defence issues, the benefit of collective security, itself the principle of reason applied to defence questions in general: if we want all these things then we must also have greater publicity for the WEU Assembly.

The next question to ask is how much understanding there already is of these new developments and opportunities. The Assembly should certainly be commended for its efforts over its communications policy in recent years. However, the rôle of international agencies still confuses the public. People do not really know which ones set out to do what, and still less what their relative strengths are for initiation and co-ordination. Some of us may feel that the actual and real strength of this Assembly is one that works in a paradoxical way. For example, the Assembly does not have power. That is one of the main reasons for our proceedings being neglected by journalists. Yet if the Assembly had more power, its deliberations would be associated to a great extent with official government policy. Conversely, if the Assembly lacks that official link, it thereby gains an independent image.

And it is from the independence of thought and argument in an assembly such as this that can come the background for trust and confidence in collective security.

That leads to a question: to decide upon certain methods of communication. This is the matter principally addressed by Sir Russell in his recommendations. We are invited to look at two general categories. The first is those measures that do not cost the Assembly anything – the adoption of logos, visits to the Assembly, academic seminars, better contacts with the press, and so on. Secondly a package of suggestions has been specifically costed. Obviously not all of them could be afforded simultaneously, or in this financial year. No doubt, however, they could be introduced over a period of time. What is important and, I hope, what can come out of this debate, is that there should be the political will to encourage reasoned debate and openness in defence matters, the political decision to make use of WEU in that respect, and a concerted effort, in the interests of attitudes and agreements towards security and peace, to bring this understanding to people in their own homes.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Lord Dundee.

The debate is closed.

The Chairman of the committee not being here, does Sir Russell want to make any other comments?

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – No.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case, we shall vote on the draft order, the draft resolution and the draft recommendation.

Two amendments have been tabled.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Paire, is as follows:

2. At the end of the draft order proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“In consultation with the delegations of national parliaments, to organise a press and information network in the capitals of member countries to act as a sound box for the activities of WEU, including its Assembly, at a time that is crucial for the organisation, the delegations of national parliaments financing the section of the network set up in their own country.”

I call Mr. Pizzo to move the amendment.

Mr. PIZZO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am speaking to the amendment because Mr. Paire has had to return to Italy. The purpose of the amendment which is self-explanatory is to improve communication policy for security and peace and therefore to increase the necessary appropriations in our organisation's budget.

At this historic moment, I believe it to be particularly important that the general public should be informed of the work of our organisation so that the activities of WEU are better known and understood.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pizzo.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to oppose the amendment because it is impractical. We know already that we cannot obtain enough funds for the work that we are trying to do. We have been frustrated time and again in our attempts to get additional staff and resources to enable new members to join us. The amendment flies in the face of everything that Sir Russell Johnston has said and would make us look foolish. I hope that my colleagues will reject it overwhelmingly.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I too should like to oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that only one member is allowed to speak against the amendment.

I call Sir Russell Johnston to give the committee's view.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I do not recommend acceptance of the amendment. As Lord Finsberg said, there is a practical difficulty with the last part of the amendment which suggests that delegations of national parliaments should finance the section of the network that is set up in their home country. In some countries, there is no mechanism to enable that to be done and such a proposition is therefore not practical.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

I shall now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1378.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 1378.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously².

We now come to the draft recommendation to which one amendment has been tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares.

Amendment 1 is as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and add a new paragraph as follows:

“Arrange for WEU to adopt a specifically European form of graphic identification;”

I call Mr. Lopez Henares to move the amendment.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his report, but the first paragraph of the draft recommendation concerns me as it permits a different logo for each unit of our organisation. Graphic presentation is good for our organisation but I do not think that it is useful to have a different logo for each unit. I suspect that that will be more confusing than helpful. That is why I propose the amendment. I suggest that there is a graphic identification which identifies WEU's work – no more. I do not think that it is our mission to deal with such technical details and I believe that the amendment clarifies the situation and avoids the possibility of there being too many logos.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

It seems not. I therefore call Sir Russell Johnston to give the committee's opinion.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I do not see any reason to oppose the amendment. In some respects, it improves the original text. It refers specifically to a European form of graphic identification. Mr. Lopez Henares tabled the amendment with a view to precluding variation between the separate parts of WEU. As far as I can see, his amendment would not achieve that aim. The examples we give in Appendix III have one feature in common – they all have the bird and stars. I have no objection to the amendment, but perhaps not

1. See page 53.

2. See page 54.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

quite for the reasons that Mr. Lopez Henares would wish.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Russell.

I put the amendment to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands.)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1378, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Address by Mrs. Rehn, Minister of Defence of Finland

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by the Minister of Defence of Finland.

On behalf of the Assembly, I extend a warm welcome to Mrs. Rehn. We have not had a visit from a Finnish minister before, although we have had the advantage of having had observers from Helsinki. When, in the summer of 1991, during a visit of the Defence Committee to Finland, Mrs. Rehn asked me to take part in a television discussion with her, I did not think that it would lead to the public debate on European security and its future that is taking place in her country. That debate has burgeoned, and I know that Mrs. Rehn has been an active participant in it.

As I said in my opening speech at the beginning of the week, there is a distinct possibility that Finland will become a member of the European Community in less than eighteen months. The links established at Maastricht between membership of the European Community and of WEU lead one to conclude that we shall be extremely interested to hear what you have to say about events in your country. We are delighted that Finland is now so prominent in peace-keeping in a peace-loving Europe.

We are most grateful to you for finding time to visit us. Will you please now address the Assembly.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. It was with great pleasure that I received the invitation to address the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. It is a special honour for me to be the first Finnish minister to speak to this Assembly. I do so in the company of many distinguished speakers who have already addressed the Assembly.

My presence here, however, is not the first contact between Finland and the Assembly. I was pleased to have the Assembly's Defence Committee as my guests in Finland two years ago and, as you know, Finnish parliamentarians have also been invited as observers to the plenary session of the Assembly. One of those observers is here today.

Representatives of my government have, at different times and levels, had direct contacts with WEU officials. These have been very useful and have provided us with information on the activities of WEU. We will continue to seek appropriate contacts with the organisation to be able to follow the development of the rôle of WEU in the context of the European Union and its defence dimension as well.

Unprecedented changes have taken place in Europe and the world as a whole during the past few years. These events have left none of us untouched. In the post-war world our policy of neutrality served us well in keeping us outside superpower rivalry. In the radically transformed international environment we are confronted with new and different kinds of challenges. There are great opportunities and possibilities to be exploited, but there are also grave uncertainties and instabilities, which we must face with determination and courage.

Today, Finland's point of departure is military non-alliance and a credible independent defence. In March last year, we applied for membership of the European Union. We share the objectives of the European Union in the field of foreign and security policy. We are also prepared to participate actively and constructively in its development. We are well on our way in our negotiations with the Community and hope that we can proceed without undue delay.

As I have just stated, we Europeans are confronted with new challenges arising from the political, ethnic and even religious rivalries and turbulence around us. The methods of traditional peace-keeping appear insufficient in the light of developments and have to be complemented by a wide spectrum of crisis management measures.

1. See page 55.

Mrs. Rehn (continued)

That is why, in addressing you today, I am focusing on peace-keeping and crisis management in Europe and throughout the world. Perhaps the Assembly expects me to talk about Finland's defence and our view of the security policy that surrounds us, but every time that I have had meetings with the West, East, South and so on in the Nordic countries, the main topic of discussion has been crisis management, peace-keeping and, sometimes, peace-enforcement. That is why I am very much focusing on those matters today.

The United Nations has, for more than four decades, worked for peace by deploying troops and observers in conflict areas. The United Nations has had its successes and its failures. It has, however, been the only institution at the disposal of the international community in trying to create suitable conditions for the restoration of peace.

The conceptual foundations of United Nations peace-keeping were laid down in the 1950s. Finland was one of the first countries to participate in United Nations peace-keeping on the Suez Canal in 1956, and has since contributed well over 30 000 troops to different operations – not so bad for a country with only five million inhabitants. We have been at the forefront of peace-keeping for more than thirty years. As a European neutral, we were readily accepted by parties to various conflicts. We have also been an active partner in creating a joint Nordic training system, which in recent years has been made available to peace-keepers from many other countries.

Many countries have attended our training. This is an area where we believe we can substantially and usefully contribute to the further development of international peace-keeping activities.

Traditional peace-keeping has been successful in most cases, but it has its inherent limits, as has been amply proved by the developments in former Yugoslavia as well as in Somalia. New conflicts call for new conceptual approaches and new methods. The concept of peace-keeping has been expanded. The United Nations Charter gives the framework, in Chapter VII, for actions beyond disengaging warring parties and observer tasks.

The question is how far the international community can go in this respect. If we are, as is the current tendency, to give peace-keeping operations under a United Nations mandate more muscle, how are we to go about it? This is a question widely debated in the United Nations, the CSCE, NATO and WEU. There is all the difference between deployment with the consent and co-operation of the parties and deployment

without their consent, with the right to use force as a preventive measure.

Careful attention must be paid to defining the modalities of co-operation between the various organisations to ensure the widest possible political support for the planned action. Regardless of who mandates action, it is vitally important to work out all the necessary elements to guarantee the successful implementation of the operation – training, leadership, command structures, rules of engagement, communications and logistics.

As the structures of the cold war have collapsed, new conflicts and instabilities have arisen in Europe and in parts of the former Soviet Union. They prevent the development of true democracy, which is a central element in creating a common security system in Europe.

The war in former Yugoslavia and the conflicts in the former Soviet Union have demonstrated that political stability in Europe cannot be taken for granted and that the use of force cannot be excluded. The examples around us are crushing European civilisation, but the international community does not have the means or the capability to do anything about it. We all feel very sorry about that.

We have demonstrated our solidarity with the common European cause by dispatching Finnish United Nations troops to Croatia and Macedonia. In this respect we are sharing the burden of responsibility. Naturally, however, the key question from our perspective is the stability of areas located close to us. We are committed to wholehearted co-operation with our neighbours to promote stability. The authentic sovereignty of the Baltic states is obviously one of the essential prerequisites of stable development in our part of Europe.

We are all committed to the joint values written down in the CSCE Paris Charter. We can and must create new patterns of international co-operation and arrangements to meet the increasing need for joint crisis management.

In principle the United Nations has a better chance than ever to respond. The permanent members of the Security Council are working closely together. The CSCE is also striving towards more meaningful action.

United Nations peace-keeping has greatly expanded, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the past two or three years. New elements, such as supervision of elections, development of democracy and human rights and assuring deliveries of humanitarian assistance have been added to its repertoire. It is also moving more and more towards preventive diplomacy and preventive action, as in Macedonia. The joint Nordic battalion deployed in the area is the first of its kind in United Nations history.

Mrs. Rehn (continued)

NATO responded for its part by creating the NACC with its former adversaries. The NACC has far-reaching ambitions in the field of peace-keeping. Finland has just recently been invited to attend the NACC ad hoc working group on peace-keeping together with Sweden and Austria. Our intention is to make our know-how available to this forum and to learn from this important form of co-operation.

The European Community also has plans for developing its abilities in crisis management and peace-keeping. In this work WEU is an integral element. In the Petersberg declaration WEU stated its readiness to contribute to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making. When we join the Community we will also define our relations with WEU. This we will do in due course.

Peace-enforcement is an issue widely debated in Finland. We must not forget, however, that the use of force cannot always be defined as peace-enforcement, or that there will always be an either/or situation. The United Nations Charter clearly mandates the use of force under Chapter VII. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has defined it, we are seeing the development of extended peace-keeping, where traditional peace-keeping is not enough and where the use of force has been authorised beyond self-defence. There is a gulf between peace-keeping and peace-enforcement which is difficult to manage and to define.

The Security Council has authorised the use of force to secure the implementation of the given mandate. A new pattern is clearly emerging, which makes it possible to use collective force in cases where crisis management is needed. It is to be assumed that the Security Council will continue to move towards a more forceful response to crises. This will also apply to civil wars, which tend to involve intolerable human suffering, as in the case of Somalia. Besides Somalia, the United Nations has launched other operations, which include a variety of duties in addition to traditional peace-keeping, as in Cambodia.

The reference to intolerable human suffering can be easily exemplified and I am glad to do so, as the Chairperson for the Finnish UNICEF Committee. There are thirty-seven committees and groups nationally. In the first world war, some 10% of the war victims were civilians; today the figure is approaching 90%. According to available statistics, more than 1.5 million children have been killed in armed conflicts in the past decade, with another 4 million left handicapped. There are millions of refugees; most of them are under eighteen. In fact, warfare has become so cruel and uncaring today that the innocent and unprotected are not only the first

victims, but remain at risk even after cease-fires and peace negotiations have been agreed.

In the case of former Yugoslavia, the international community has so far been unable to put an end to the use of force and the ensuing suffering. This erodes the credibility of the organisations that have committed themselves to the management of this crisis. The new joint action plan must be implemented in a way compatible with the principles of the Vance-Owen plan.

Finland has stated its preparedness in principle to contribute to international efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We give our support to the resolution of the Security Council establishing safe areas in Bosnia, which constitute the first step in the implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Though we cannot, at this moment, contribute troops to UNPROFOR that are adequately trained and equipped for the necessary tasks, as mandated in Security Council Resolution 836, we will consider favourably the supply of material assistance to this operation. However, the consent of the parties to the conflict remains a necessary condition for the participation of Finnish troops.

Unfortunately, the crisis is far from being solved and it will undoubtedly take a long time to deal with the consequences. The whole international community has already suffered disappointments. There are clearly lessons to be learnt. Firstly, the objectives of crisis management must correspond to the realities in the field and the means to achieve them must be commensurate with their dimensions. Secondly, special attention must be paid to ensuring that, despite possible differing views, the institutions and states participating in a particular crisis management operation co-operate in all circumstances.

Participation in international peace-keeping has been one of the cornerstones of our foreign policy. Today, we see it more as an integral part of our security policy. It has become a question of our standing in the new Europe and our own security, in a more concrete manner. The situation today calls for deeper participation in international co-operation and in the field of security policy. This is a responsibility we are prepared to share. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mrs. Rehn.

Mrs. Rehn, after her excellent address, has kindly offered to answer questions.

I first ask Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to put her question. She has produced important reports on women in the defence forces.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – Not only have I produced a report on women in the armed forces, but my most recent report was on United Nations operations in relation to WEU. For that reason I could not agree more with what the Minister has just said about United Nations operations, the way to look ahead and how we should move from the present position and the traditional rôle towards peace-enforcement, which is called the second generation of United Nations operations.

So I compliment the Minister on her speech. I hope that she will find time to read the report about United Nations operations, which was adopted by the Assembly yesterday. In it, I gave the Nordic countries and the Nordic structure as an example. In the recommendations I asked that such a structure should be used for a range of preparations and especially deployment of troops in United Nations operations. However, my question goes beyond that subject.

I know that in your country a discussion is being held about how defence should be organised in relation to international organisations. You said that when Finland joined the European Community it would define its relations. What is the current position? It would be good for the Assembly to know what point the discussions in your country have reached.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – I am pleased to answer that question. My answer is crystal clear for the time being. We are discussing the issue a great deal. It is good that the discussions are open-minded. There are many nuances in the discussions. Some people in Finland are very much in favour of a quick response to the demands from both WEU and NATO. Others believe that we should be careful and should not take any steps yet. Personally I am of the opinion, and I believe that my government shares that opinion, that we should keep all the windows and doors open in considering our procedures and the measures taken by WEU and NATO. In due course we shall give our answer.

The worst possible thing that we could do now is to say no. The world has learnt already that one should not say “never” to anything because changes have taken place so quickly in the world in matters of security and defence policy.

So, if it is sufficient, for the time being we are having open-minded discussions and positive discussions about the various possibilities. The answer will be given and decisions will be taken when we consider that it is the right time. We are pleased to be able to follow the work of WEU as observers and to follow the work of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, as well as to take part in the ad hoc working group on peace-keeping. So we are very much involved.

I have visited and spoken to as many of my colleagues as possible in both the East and the West so that we know what language we are speaking and what each other thinks.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the Assembly and I should like to thank you most sincerely for the very cordial reception we received from you and your government when we visited Helsinki in July 1991 – a visit already referred to by Sir Dudley Smith, former Chairman of the Defence Committee and President of the Assembly.

Minister, Finland has in the past had arrangements with the former Soviet Union for a major exchange of military equipment and technology. I and my colleagues on the Defence Committee sailed into the Bay of Helsinki on a Soviet-built mine-layer. Does this type of contact still exist today, or does Finland's new stance on emerging from the special position of neutrality that the country maintained for many years and which undoubtedly constituted a bridge for peace between East and West now allow for greater rapprochement with WEU countries in terms of military technology exchanges, and in what areas? Secondly, Minister, a major debate is being conducted in all WEU countries as to whether or not conscription or compulsory military service should be retained, or whether we should only have professional armies. What is your opinion on the subject?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – Thank you for those questions. I shall try to answer them in the proper way. In Finland we have found that the conscript system is the cheapest for us. It is also important in encouraging patriotism. Involvement is widespread among the people. Everyone is involved in some way as young men come into the conscript system. We are also building up our defence with a considerable number of reserves. In a crisis we could call up about 500 000 men from the reserves – not women so far. That system has been the most favourable for us.

As for our co-operation with the former Soviet Union, our neutrality between the two blocs was real. We never had any military operations or special exchanges of information with the Soviet Union that we did not have with other countries. In our opinion, one should be a good friend with one's neighbours. That is especially true of the Nordic countries. We have always co-operated. The Nordic Defence Ministers meet twice a year to talk about our common problems and the security situation in the world and the surrounding region. We also wish to be

Mrs. Rehn (continued)

friends with our eastern neighbours. If one must have enemies, they should be as far away as possible and one's neighbours should be friends. That is a good policy for defence and security.

We have bought quite a lot of material from the Soviet Union because of our lack of money. We are very poor at the moment and we have cut our defence budget more than most European countries.

We do not have many opportunities to buy from Russia, but we still buy spare parts and some new material from her. We decided to buy the F-18 fighter from America. That was not a political statement. It was for technical, economic and standardisation reasons. That decision was good for us. I say that, even in Paris, because there was competition from France. Our purchasing policy has been neutral. We have bought some material from the West and some from the East. We have also produced some of our own material. That is always important. It amounts to about a third of our needs.

Our policy remains very much the same as in the past. We try to be good friends with our neighbours and to create peace. We, too, want to be involved in crisis management.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next question is from Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I begin by thanking the Minister not merely for an interesting but a very moving speech. It will repay reading, even though we have heard it. The Minister mentioned CSCE. Does she really believe that CSCE has a future, bearing in mind the reasons for which it was set up, the fact that it failed at the first hurdle and that it has been supine in dealing with the defence problems of the former Yugoslavia?

The Minister knows that anxieties have been expressed by the Visegrad countries. They felt that they were part of the Warsaw Pact, which has now disappeared. The Warsaw Pact was opposed by NATO. Those countries feel that no one will now guarantee their security. One can say to them: "But what are you afraid of?" They say: "We are afraid". Although we know that the North Atlantic Co-operation Council has been set up, does the Minister believe that a better way could be found to reassure those countries and allay their genuine fears?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – Finland believes that CSCE is its baby. We do not want our baby to be hurt. It is one thing to wish to believe and another really to believe.

That, I believe, is the question that Lord Finsberg put to me. There are so many elements in CSCE that are valuable and that we should fight for. They ought to be allowed to continue and survive.

As for the question about human rights and the problems faced by minorities, all the topics that we have discussed will help to provide security for them in Europe. If I did not believe in that, it would be very bad. We also have to work hard to make it possible for minority peoples to survive. It would be unwise for Europe to give up. We should do our best to help these countries to survive under the CSCE umbrella. Finland is working hard on that. I truly believe in CSCE.

I was also asked about the former Warsaw Pact countries – Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and so on. I have spoken to representatives of these countries. I know how alone they feel themselves to be. However, I am not the person who can provide the answers. I am one politician who admits that I do not know the answers. I cannot, therefore, answer that question. Nevertheless, one way for those countries to feel that they belong with the rest of us is through NACC. We can have discussions with them in NACC. When I met my colleague, the Russian Defence Minister, he was about to visit Brussels to attend a NACC meeting. He wanted to attend that meeting, and he was happy about the fact that he was going to make a speech to NACC. That possibility is now open to members of the former eastern bloc countries. We are working hard for the creation of a new and peaceful Europe, so that the former eastern bloc countries can feel that their economic, social welfare and equality problems are brought to the surface.

I believe that we should have strong defences. We know, however, that force creates more force. We should therefore use diplomacy as far as possible and strive for a peaceful solution by means other than force. That is the best way to create a new, peaceful Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Rehn.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful to the Minister for her positive and hopeful speech. I was nevertheless surprised by her reply to the question put to her by our Spanish colleague. She defended the past neutrality of Finland as a virtue and said that equality of treatment as between the two blocs, as she put it, was praiseworthy in itself. However, I had always understood that Finland's neutrality, like Austria's, had been forced upon it by historic circumstances and geographical factors.

There is no doubt that there was no equality in the minds of the people of Finland as between

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

the Soviet empire, as it was, and the free association of western states. I found that part of the Minister's speech difficult to understand. Perhaps I misunderstood her.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – I think that we are both speaking the same language, but perhaps there is a difference of nuance. Historic reasons made Finland neutral. We had the second world war and the winter war. Finland wanted and needed to be neutral as between the two blocs. Sweden adopts the same approach, but it did not go through that war, so our history is different from that of Sweden and it led to our neutrality. It was a real neutrality, for which we worked. We worked hard for it by means of our persistence and our foreign policy. Our neutrality did not come to us just as a gift. Co-operation, especially with the Nordic countries, went on all the time.

As for trade, we joined EFTA. There was the possibility of a co-operation treaty with the West. We are pleased that it is possible to act today in an atmosphere where there is no formal neutrality, in an atmosphere where one can look to both East and West.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ferrarini.

Mr. FERRARINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to add my thanks to the Minister for her well thought out and stimulating statement. I should also like to emphasise our gratitude to Finland for its rôle in maintaining defence and world peace during the difficult years of the cold war.

Today, one of the leftovers from the cold war which is unfortunately creating and maintaining friction and trouble in the Baltic area, is the presence of Russian troops in independent states such as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia; and even if there is reluctance to say so officially, the problem is interwoven with that of the presence of Russian minorities in those countries.

I am looking to a future situation when all the Russian troops have to go back home and all the Russian and other ethnic minorities in those countries fully recognise the possibility of participating in social, civilian and political life. I believe that your country is interested in this question for historical, cultural and geographical reasons.

I would be very grateful if you could tell us what initiatives your country has taken or plans to take to promote this process of détente.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mrs. REHN (*Minister of Defence of Finland*). – This issue is very important for Finland and

I am grateful to Mr. Ferrarini for asking that question. There is but a short distance of sea between Finland and the Baltic states. It is important that their independence is real. Nordic Prime Ministers have expressed their concern about the situation and have stressed that Russian troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible. When I had discussions with my colleague in Moscow, the matter was on the agenda. We are following developments. There has been a steady withdrawal, but it could have been quicker. The Russians accuse the Baltic states of not being fair to the Russian minority. There is something of a link between the two issues. As always, the truth probably lies somewhere between the two assertions.

It is important for us that the Baltic states are genuinely sovereign states. That means that they should have a credible and independent defence capability. It is natural for us to support Estonia as Estonians understand Finnish. We are therefore able to train their soldiers in a language they understand. We have already trained twenty soldiers and we have taken more.

We have also provided help with infrastructure – with legislation and administration – and we have given material help, but we have not provided Estonia with any weapons. We do not give or sell weapons to their armed forces as we do not believe that we should supply arms while there are foreign troops in their country. I realise that that might sound a little strange. The matter has been discussed by Nordic Defence Ministers. We have a common policy towards the Baltic states. We believe that what we are doing is correct.

It is important that Estonia and the other Baltic states should be able to protect their area themselves. It is crucial that no country should be just a white spot on the map of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Rehn.

It is a happy coincidence that, in a week when two women have become the Prime Ministers of their countries, we should have a visit by a distinguished lady minister from one of the more outlying countries of Europe. The range of the questions that have been asked demonstrates the Assembly's interest in what you have said and you will have heard the flattering remarks that almost all those who have asked you questions have made about your speech, which was thought-provoking and interesting. As one of my colleagues said, it will repay rereading. We are extremely grateful to you for coming. It is always nice to see ministers from countries that have not been represented here often; it is even better when they give a performance such as you have given today. You have obviously endeared yourself to the Assembly. We look forward to seeing you again.

7. *The situation in East Timor*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1380)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of the report of the Political Committee on the situation in East Timor, debate and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1380.

I call Mr. Roseta, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in December 1991, this Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 84 on the situation in East Timor, calling on the Indonesian Government to put a stop to the repeated violations of human rights which were being perpetrated in that area, and recognise the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence. This is a right which is recognised in the United Nations Charter and has been acknowledged and reaffirmed in various resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, following an excellent report written by our former President Robert Pontillon to whom I would once again like to pay tribute.

Moreover, our December 1991 resolution requested all member states to impose an embargo on the shipment or sale of arms to Indonesia.

The resolution was adopted following a massacre which had taken place a few days previously, on 12th November 1991, when dozens of unarmed demonstrators were killed by Indonesian forces in Dili. The resolution roundly condemned the massacre.

In spite of tremendous international indignation aroused by this event, the Indonesian authorities confined themselves to imposing minor penalties on some of the soldiers responsible for the massacre, whereas a number of young Timorese who were accused of having taken part in the demonstration were given long prison sentences and, in one case, a life sentence.

Since then the situation has continued to deteriorate with the Indonesian Government's refusal to respond to the international community's insistence that they cease their unlawful occupation of the territory.

On 20th November 1992, the leader of the armed resistance movement, José Alexandre Xanana Gusmão, was taken prisoner and his recent trial was conducted in a totally unaccep-

table manner, violating the most elementary principles of law: he was not allowed to appoint a lawyer, the lawyer who was imposed upon him was not permitted to attend his interrogation and Amnesty International was not permitted to attend the hearings. On 17th May, the judges even prevented Xanana Gusmão from reading out a defence document, in violation of Indonesian law itself. The United Nations observer was unable to leave Bali and was only able to attend two of the court sessions, contrary to the undertakings given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ali Alatas.

After this charade of a trial, Xanana Gusmão was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On 5th April 1993, the Indonesian army announced the capture of António Gomes da Costa, Ma'Huno Bulerek, who had taken over the leadership of the armed resistance since Gusmão's capture. The present situation of Ma'Huno and many other prisoners detained after Gusmão is not known.

It must be made quite clear that Indonesia has no right to detain, try and sentence Timorese citizens who are fighting for the restoration of international law – which Indonesia has been violating repeatedly and constantly for many years – and for their right to self-determination and the enjoyment of human rights – such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to hold demonstrations, freedom of association, etc. – which Indonesia has been denying them.

However, it is the dictatorial Indonesian régime that should be standing in the dock, not the Timorese people, who are merely demanding their fundamental rights.

This is why, in the draft resolution I am presenting on behalf of the Political Committee, which approved it by a large majority, we are demanding that the Indonesian Government should release all political prisoners, namely all those who are fighting or demonstrating for their lawful rights which are recognised by the international community.

On 11th March 1993, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights also adopted a resolution criticising Indonesia's policy of repression and the use of torture in East Timor.

Mr. President, it is not possible to say that WEU should not trouble itself about the situation in Timor. Indeed, these are issues which threaten the security of much of the world – I would even say world security in general – and which are the concern of Portugal, which is recognised as the power responsible for administering the territory and is a member state of WEU.

Mr. Roseta (continued)

We cannot have two different sets of values – we cannot condemn, as we have repeatedly done, the armed aggression and the very serious human rights violations which are taking place in Bosnia, for instance, become involved in the situation in Somalia, and forget Timor.

The United Nations Secretary-General was mandated by the General Assembly to seek a global solution to the problem, in consultation with all the parties concerned.

On 17th December 1992 the first meeting took place at United Nations headquarters, under the aegis of that organisation, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Dr. Durão Barroso and his Indonesian counterpart, Mr. Ali Alatas. They met again on 20th April. From these meetings it became obvious that differences existed between the two countries, but they have agreed to continue the dialogue on confidence-building measures designed to improve the atmosphere surrounding the negotiations and allow progress to be made towards a solution to the substance of the matter. Another meeting was fixed for 17th September.

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that the question of East Timor is not a bilateral matter between Portugal and Indonesia, as some would like to think. It is a matter which concerns the entire international community, because it threatens both the fundamental principles which affect everyone, and resolutions accepted by the highest authorities, namely the United Nations General Assembly. The international community recognises that the people of Timor have their own identity, culture and language, and a national awareness which, furthermore, the present struggle serves only to accentuate.

This is why we must once more affirm that this iniquitous situation of aggression against these people must stop and the maximum pressure be brought to bear by all member states of WEU on the Indonesian Government to obtain the re-establishment of international law, the respect for human rights which have been so brutally violated, and the realisation of the right to self-determination and independence.

I am grateful for the confidence the Political Committee has shown in charging me with presenting this report and the draft resolution and I hope, ladies and gentlemen, that you will agree with the demand to the Indonesian authorities to release all prisoners, from Xanana Gusmão and Ma'Huno to those whose names we do not know; that all violations of international law and human rights must stop immediately and the exercise of people's right to self-determination and independence must be guaranteed; that the Indonesian Government must proceed

to withdraw its forces from the territory and agree to create the political conditions necessary for unhindered self-determination. This should be implemented under the aegis of the United Nations and in consultation with Portugal, the administrative authority, and also with the Timorese people – this was implicit in the approval of sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 2 of the Political Committee's draft resolution; that the international aid organisations and human rights organisations be permitted to carry out their humanitarian activities throughout the territory of East Timor.

Consequently, within the context of WEU, we propose, for obvious reasons, that, as in 1991, the Assembly request all member states to place an immediate embargo on arms destined for Indonesia and to suspend, also immediately, all military aid to that country.

I am sure that all member countries will support me once again in this recommendation, so that this potentially explosive situation, which threatens fundamental rights and which has been going on for almost eighteen years, can finally come to an end, and that fundamental human rights can be recognised, because they are the very essence of all our democratic organisations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta.

The debate is open.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I can be brief because we heard about the situation in East Timor when we debated the matter in December 1991. I want to say a few words today because the United Kingdom and Portugal probably have the oldest alliance in the world. We are immensely friendly with Portugal, which feels that it has a genuine responsibility for East Timor.

There are only three facts, and they are incontrovertible. First, there are gross violations of human rights in East Timor. Secondly, East Timor is illegally occupied by Indonesia. Thirdly, it is essential that the talks between Indonesia and Portugal, referred to in the explanatory memorandum, continue with a view to finding a solution that will end the abuses that I mentioned and that will give the people of East Timor the right to self-determination. That is the fundamental right of all people and a fundamental reason why nations belong to the United Nations. The fact that Indonesia is a member of the United Nations should make that country realise that it must accept the obligations that go with that membership.

The talks referred to in the explanatory memorandum must take place quietly, without pub-

Lord Finsberg (continued)

licity, without emotional speeches from either side and without any playing to public opinion in any country. The Assembly wants a just solution and frequently just solutions are hampered by overplaying to the media. The document is set out in exactly the right terms and I hope very much that we shall accept the resolution unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Fabra.

Mr. FABRA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. I asked to be called to speak here today, not because I wished to submit an amendment or qualify a phrase or an idea – a wholly superfluous exercise in the case of such a down-to-earth report as the one so succinctly presented and closely argued by my colleague, Mr. Roseta. My brief comments at this juncture – for brief they must obviously be – are intended merely as an expression of support to the people of East Timor and of solidarity with Spain's neighbour, Portugal, a country that has petitioned continually since 1975 in all the available international forums in an attempt to bring a halt to human rights violations in East Timor and achieve the withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces; and also for international aid organisations and United Nations missions to be allowed to carry out their various humanitarian tasks within the territory.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this draft resolution attacks the failure to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. For this reason, I should like to ask the parliamentary representatives present to ensure that paragraph 2 of the present draft resolution is more than a mere plea to our governments. Rather, it is up to each of us – and I include among our number the parliamentary representatives with observer status – to put to good use the means placed at our disposal, in the form of the procedures of our various houses of parliament, and demand that our respective governments apply an embargo on arms destined for Indonesia, suspend military aid to that country and use their good offices to enable Portugal and Indonesia to make progress towards self-determination and independence for East Timor at the meeting to be held on 17th September next.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Brito.

Mr. BRITO (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the increasingly frequent violations by some countries of the universal values and principles of moral, cultural and legal support for our civilisation are undermining the credibility of our institutions.

Under the guise of pragmatism, which has been elevated by some to the status of a virtue,

the greatest crimes against humanity are being tolerated every day. The genocide of the Timorese people is a perfect example of this.

From whichever angle we approach the situation, if we are honest with ourselves we very soon see that the international community could have intervened successfully long ago, were it not for the fact that pragmatism was the prevailing policy in the resolution of international conflicts.

Indonesia has invoked many different arguments, but the reality is that it is protected by its commercial importance. Regardless of the condemnations directed against it, in the major international organisations it enjoys the complicity of some western governments, who are sufficiently shameless to supply it with military equipment.

The pictures shown by CNN of the massacre of around two hundred young people in the cemetery at Dili late in 1991 are the most eloquent proof of the use to which the Indonesian armed forces put the arms which are being sold to them.

Trustworthy sources, such as Amnesty International and the Catholic Church, estimate at 200 000 the number of Timorese victims resulting from the occupation and annexation of East Timor.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure I am not mistaken when I say that none of us disputes the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. Moreover, this right has been systematically guaranteed by resolutions approved over the years by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, whose example has been followed by the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and this very Assembly.

I am also convinced that these days not even the most generous parliamentarian is taken in by the Indonesian Government's promises that they will now, at last, respect human rights, unless they are obliged to do so.

As the report we are discussing says, Indonesia continues to show the greatest disregard for human life and for the most basic human rights. The life sentence imposed on the historic Timorese leader Xanana Gusmão and the summary manner in which his trial was conducted are the best proof of the fact that the Indonesian régime has no intention of altering its behaviour.

The pragmatic approach, based on the idea that the occupation would cease when opposed by the resistance movement, has clearly failed, quite apart from the sacrifice of 200 000 lives, and the moment has now come for the international community to review its strategy with regard to East Timor.

Mr. Brito (continued)

The draft resolution on which we are voting today does not meet with my entire approval, although I support it. I believe that we could and must go even further than an arms embargo and the suspension of military aid.

Around 70% of Indonesia's commercial relations are with Europe, the United States and Japan. In my view, these three great economic and democratic powers have at their disposal the only instrument capable of leading Indonesia to re-establish a useful dialogue, with a view to finding a solution politically acceptable to all parties. I am referring, of course, to the economic instrument. Nevertheless, I would like to say that, given the type of decisions which have been taken recently, Indonesia should understand that the time has now come for a change of policy.

The release of Xanana Gusmão and other political prisoners and the admission of humanitarian and human rights organisations, together with the acceptance of all resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council are just some of the confidence-building measures which we trust will be taken, so that the Indonesian Government can regain the respect of the international community.

In conclusion, I hope that our governments will ensure that the measures approved by this Assembly are rigorously applied.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, first I would like to express my agreement with the spirit and content of the excellent report presented on behalf of the Political Committee by our colleague Mr. Roleta and also with the commendation.

WEU, mindful of the violation of human rights and in defence of the people's right to self-determination, cannot remain indifferent to the continued and provocative disregard for both in East Timor. Indonesia, which invaded the territory in 1975 and then proceeded to annexe it, practised a policy of genocide – massacring over one quarter of the population – and refused to apply resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

The trial of the leader of the Timorese resistance, Xanana Gusmão, who was taken prisoner in November 1992, was a travesty of justice and was denounced as such by the international community. The sentence condemning him to life imprisonment was the most unprincipled outcome of an unlawful trial in which the prisoner was deprived of the most basic elements of defence.

Nothing is known about the situation of Ma'Huno, the Timorese patriot who was leader of the resistance movement when he was taken prisoner on 3rd April. Since that time the Indonesian authorities have been holding him strictly incommunicado. We do not even know where he is being held.

Ladies and gentlemen, the contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Indonesian Government is taking on shocking proportions. The President of the Indonesian Republic, General Suharto, presents his country as a champion in the struggle for the rights and freedoms of the people. In his closing speech at the non-aligned summit in Djakarta he condemned, and I quote, "the domination of the weak by the strong, the poor by the rich". He was also emphatic in his condemnation of the atrocities committed in Bosnia and the serious violations of human rights which are affecting people everywhere. He went on to state that powerful countries must respect their weak neighbours, and took the opportunity to reaffirm his support for the struggle of the Palestinian people, and I quote: "for their inalienable right of self-determination and independence".

However, President Suharto said not one word on the subject of East Timor.

The facts confirm that we are facing a head-on collision between the principles, however just, proclaimed by General Suharto at the non-aligned conference and the practice, which denies those same principles.

This was the conclusion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee which, at its last meeting in Geneva, adopted by a large majority a resolution firmly denouncing the situation and the violation of human rights in East Timor, alerting the international community to Indonesia's refusal to grant access to the country to the special envoys of the United Nations.

The unprincipled complicity of some western governments, notably Australia, Japan and the United States – which recognises the annexation of East Timor as a *fait accompli* – has, in the meantime, given the Indonesian Government so much room for manoeuvre that Djakarta was recently chosen – and what a grotesque irony this is – to host an international conference on human rights.

Ladies and gentlemen, emboldened by an attitude of international insensitivity to the suffering of the people of East Timor – where cutting off ears has become a common police punishment – the Indonesian dictatorship is now demonstrating its arrogance in Europe itself with thoroughly unacceptable behaviour. I will quote just one example: when visiting Paris – the very city in which we are now meeting – last November, General Suharto gave us a practical

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

demonstration, here in the French capital, of his idea of democracy and his way of respecting freedom. At one of the official ceremonies, members of the Indonesian secret police, on coming across Portuguese and Timorese immigrant workers protesting against the annexation of East Timor and the most recent violence committed there, tore banners and placards out of the hands of the demonstrators and even attacked some of them. Djakarta does not even respect French sovereignty in Paris.

Approval by our Assembly of the draft resolution on East Timor will be an important act of solidarity by WEU with a people who are the victims of monstrous acts of violence by the Indonesian state, a people who have been struggling for eighteen years for their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, which has been expressly recognised in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Aguiar.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to congratulate Mr. Roseta on his excellent report and to express my agreement with the draft resolution on the situation in East Timor which highlights the importance of this tangible expression of solidarity and the vital support it lends to the people of East Timor in a world where men continue to die for freedom, but where hope is still alive.

Dialogue, peace-making, and a return to self-determination in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations and other international organisations are all requirements which universal law and the principles of justice and fraternal solidarity tell us we must never abandon.

Those who claim that the Timorese question is simply a matter of human rights and accept the annexation by Indonesia as a *fait accompli* in return for a promised end to repressive practices are deluding themselves. Their interpretation of the situation is the very opposite of the truth – which is that the innocent party takes the place of the criminal and vice versa, as in the case of Xanana Gusmão, Ma'Huno and all the freedom fighters condemned or imprisoned by foreign aggressors.

Giving them Indonesian nationality by force, they leave them at the mercy of the laws of the oppressor, which define their legitimate resistance activities as high treason. They should instead be denouncing their conviction as an attack on the inalienable rights of the Timorese people. East Timor is not Indonesian. East Timor is not in a position to decide, as the United Nations Charter requires, its own

national future. It is not only Xanana, therefore, who is unlawfully sentenced to life imprisonment. In a manner of speaking, all Timorese people are prisoners in their own occupied country.

Until April 1974 it was a colony, it is true, but people were living in peace, with a small military presence of a few hundred soldiers at the very most. Decolonisation was under way when Indonesia invaded with an army of 20 000 to 30 000 men, according to estimates given in a United Nations report. East Timor not only remained a colony, albeit under a different colonial power, but became one huge concentration camp, while armed resistance continued only from the relative safety of the mountains.

In this context, the Timorese people's right to self-determination is fundamental and inalienable, regardless of its positions or errors or those of others, and regardless of the vicissitudes in the course of the decolonisation process interrupted by the Indonesian occupation.

Let us tell the Timorese people then that, after eighteen years we will not tolerate a policy which presents us with a *fait accompli*, or the crushing of its very identity and will by the belligerent strength of a great power, that we will not forget the extermination of almost one quarter of its whole population – over 200 000 people – or the general climate of terror in which the whole country lives, shut off from contact with other countries and that we know about the massive influx of Javanese into East Timor in keeping with the strategy of reducing its population to the size of an ethnic minority, culturally and economically dominated and controlled by military and police forces.

In conclusion, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure that in approving the resolution under discussion we will add dignity to our Assembly and our decision will rank with our most noble philanthropic and universal traditions. At a time when in some parts of Europe war is spreading tragically, it is even more important to demonstrate that we are equally concerned about the fate of the men and women of a small and distant land on the other side of the world, the Timorese people.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Vassiliades, Observer from Greece.

Mr. VASSILIADES (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the essential factor in relation to the East Timor question is to step up the pressure on the Indonesian Government to re-establish a meaningful dialogue between the Portuguese administrative authority, Indonesia, which has occupied and annexed East Timor, and the East Timorese people. At present, any representations made fall on deaf ears because Indonesia will not accept that East Timor has a right to self-

Mr. Vassiliades (continued)

determination. The United Nations, the Security Council, the Council of Europe and the WEU parliamentary Assembly have all repeatedly made representations to Indonesia to soften its attitude and comply with United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian armed forces from East Timor and consultation with the people to enable them freely to decide their own future.

More than 200 000 lives have been lost as a result of the occupation of East Timor – a figure confirmed by Amnesty International, the Catholic church and the United States Department of State.

Human rights violations must be brought to an immediate halt in advance of the results of any consultation exercise that may take place. There has been strong public reaction to the horrendous television footage broadcast by CNN which showed hundreds lying dead, mostly young men, and to the torture inflicted on Xanana Gusmão and other East Timorese public figures who have been tried and imprisoned on political grounds.

Pressure from the international community is the only thing that will force Indonesia to agree to a dialogue and ensure the release of Xanana and the other prisoners. Such pressure is crucial in bringing about a change of heart on the part of the Indonesian Government and persuading it to achieve an acceptable solution to the problem.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

That concludes the debate.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*). – I thank Lord Finsberg warmly for his strong support. It is important to us. The alliance between Portugal and the United Kingdom is the oldest alliance that has ever existed. Furthermore, your country's importance throughout the world today is great, and your personal authority is very strong. Therefore, I thank you very much. I agree with what you said.

(The speaker continued in Spanish)

(Translation). – Many thanks to Mr. Fabra for his clear and positive comments. The support of our friends in Spain is extremely important because of the friendship between our two peoples and because Spain, with her very considerable influence in many parts of the world, may be able to use her good offices to create an awareness of the problems surrounding the East Timor question.

(The speaker continued in Portuguese)

I would like to say to Mr. Brito that I agree with him, including his comment that it is not enough to call for the release of all prisoners and to impose an arms embargo and suspend military aid. I also agree, obviously, that we must not forget the economic aspects.

But as he is aware – and the Political Committee can bear witness to this – this is a matter which, for formal reasons I believe, does not have the agreement of everyone because it falls within the competence of other organisations.

WEU has no competence in economic affairs. It is the responsibility of our colleagues in organisations with competence in these matters to approve this type of resolution.

That is why, in accordance with the wish of the majority I believe, the text does not include a clause calling for economic sanctions or embargoes. Obviously, I speak in my capacity as Rapporteur on behalf of the Political Committee, which so decided.

To Mr. Rodrigues and Mrs. Aguiar I would say that the compliments you have paid my report – which is sober and factual and will, I hope, consequently be unanimously approved – are more motivated by your friendship and agreement with the basic elements than by any other motives.

Nevertheless, I must draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that one or more speakers added important views and arguments to this resolution which I, obviously, did not have time to raise until the end, because I did not wish to take advantage of your patience.

I think, then, that one or more speakers added some very important comments concerning the arguments and the explanation of what is at stake. I hope you will forgive me if I do not repeat what they said; the comments will appear, of course, in the official report of this part-session.

(The speaker continued in French)

I should like to thank Mr. Vassiliades for his kind words of support. I am obviously very pleased to hear a Greek view expressed for the first time in this Assembly, as well as in the Council of Europe. As the cradle of democracy thousands of years ago, Greece's support is vital. I would hope to see the Greek Government act accordingly, and many other governments besides, as well as those of WEU member states – for example the governments of countries on the point of accession to WEU and of other special guest and observer countries.

I therefore trust that this resolution will be approved unanimously – as on a previous occasion eighteen months ago – because basic principles are at stake, as certain speakers have noted. International law has been violated and

Mr. Roseta (continued)

security is being threatened by a war that affects us closely, even at a distance of many thousands of miles. We are all increasingly conscious now of the world as a global village. Thanks to television and satellite communications we know exactly what is going on right now on the other side of the globe. Above all, people now see themselves as belonging to a single world community. We cannot write off the 200 000 people that have died over the last eighteen years. We cannot be indifferent to violations of people's rights and the plight of those deprived of fundamental human rights such as the right to life, to education, rights of free association and expression, the right to vote, to a free press etc. Prompted by the memory of those deaths and our demands for justice for the living, the Assembly must follow the advice and example of the Political Committee and adopt this resolution unanimously, as the committee itself has done virtually to a man. I shall finish, ladies and gentlemen, by thanking you in anticipation for your vote and your support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roseta.

Does the Chairman of the Political Committee wish to say anything?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I thank the Rapporteur. I have just one remark to make. It does not relate specifically to delegates, but I make it to avoid misunderstanding.

The report on the situation in East Timor is not a report on the Portuguese or the Spanish. It is a report on the right of people to self-determination and independence. It is a report on respect for human rights. It relates to the need for the decision of this Assembly to be consistent with the decision that it took in December 1991. I hope sincerely that the Assembly will support unanimously this solid, clear and fundamental resolution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen, for your comments and for your customary brevity.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 1380.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

We congratulate Mr. Roseta and the Political Committee.

I call Lord Finsberg.

Lord FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Can we now transmit the report to the Indonesian Ambassador in France so that he is made aware of it?

The PRESIDENT. – That seems a good idea. Unless anybody objects violently, I shall ensure that the secretariat carries out that suggestion.

Does anybody object?...

It seems not.

The suggestion is agreed to.

I should like to thank those who have stuck it out to the end of this very important debate.

8. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT. – Members of the Assembly, we have now completed the business set down for the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly.

I accordingly declare closed the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

(The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)

1. See page 56.

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