

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1990

IV

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 – Tel. 47.23.54.32

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**The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
comprise two volumes:**

Volume III: Assembly documents.

**Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general
index.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
Seventh sitting	12
Texts adopted	15
Eighth sitting	21
Ninth sitting	24
Tenth sitting	26
Texts adopted	30
Eleventh sitting	34
Text adopted	37
Twelfth sitting	38
Texts adopted	42
Official report of debates:	
Seventh sitting	46
Eighth sitting	76
Ninth sitting	97
Tenth sitting	123
Eleventh sitting	151
Twelfth sitting	177
Index	190

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD

MM. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PCI
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MANZOLINI Gianni	Socialist
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist

MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio Chr. Dem.
 GRECO Francesco Communist
 PASQUINO Gianfranco Ind. Left
 RAUTI Giuseppe MSI-DN
 RUBNER Hans SVP
 SCOVACRICCHI Martino PSDI
 STEGAGNINI Bruno Chr. Dem.
 STANZANI GHEDINI Sergio Radical
 TRIGLIA Riccardo Chr. Dem.
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LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles Dem.
 Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle Soc. Chr.
 Mr. REGENWETTER Jean Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille Soc. Chr.
 KOLLWELTER René Soc. Workers
 KONEN René Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry CDA
 EVERSDIJK Huib
 Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Regina Maria PVDA
 MM. STOFFELEN Pieter Labour
 TUMMERS Nicolas Labour
 van VELZEN Wim CDA
 VERBEEK Jan Willem Liberal

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth Labour
 MM. DEES Dick VVD
 DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob CDA
 EISMA Doeke D66
 VAN DER LINDEN Pierre CDA
 MARIS Pieter CDA
 Mrs. VERSPAGET Joséphine Labour

PORTUGAL

Representatives

MM. CANDAL Carlos Socialist
 ESTEVES Antonio Socialist
 FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim Soc. Dem.
 MOREIRA Licinio Soc. Dem.
 SILVA MARQUES José Soc. Dem.
 SOARES COSTA Manuel Soc. Dem.
 VIEIRA MESQUITA José Soc. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. AMARAL Fernando Soc. Dem.
 BRITO Rogério Communist
 CONCEIÇÃO Fernando Soc. Dem.
 MOTA TORRES José Socialist
 PINTO Carlos Soc. Dem.
 ROSETA Pedro Soc. Dem.
 VARA Armando Socialist

SPAIN

Representatives

MM. ALVAREZ Francisco People's Party
 BORDERAS Augusto Socialist
 CUATRECASAS Llibert C.i.U.
 CUCO Alfons Socialist
 DIAZ Lorenzo Soc. and Dem.
 Centre
 FABRA Juan Manuel People's Party
 LOPEZ HENARES José Luis People's Party
 MARTINEZ Miguel Angel Socialist
 MOYA Pedro Socialist
 PERINAT Luis Guillermo People's Party
 de PUIG Lluis Maria Socialist
 ROMAN Rafael Socialist

Substitutes

Mr. GAMINDE Ignacio Basque nat.
 Mrs. GARCIA MANZANARES Blanca Socialist
 Mr. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel Socialist
 Mrs. GUIRADO Ana Socialist
 MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago People's Party
 NUÑEZ Manuel Socialist
 PALACIOS Marcelo Socialist
 PEDREGOSA José Manuel Socialist
 ROMERO Antonio United Left
 RUIZ Alberto People's Party
 SAINZ José Luis People's Party
 SOLE-TURA Jordi Socialist

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald Labour
 COX Thomas Labour
 EWING Harry Labour
 Dame Peggy FENNER Conservative
 Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG Conservative
 MM. GARRETT Edward Labour
 HARDY Peter Labour
 JESSEL Toby Conservative
 Sir Russell JOHNSTON Liberal
 Earl of KINNOULL Conservative
 MM. MORRIS Michael Conservative
 PARRY Robert Labour
 Sir William SHELTON Conservative
 Sir Dudley SMITH Conservative
 Mr. SPEED Keith Conservative
 Sir John STOKES Conservative
 MM. THOMPSON Donald Conservative
 WARD John Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David Conservative
 BANKS Tony Labour
 BOWDEN Andrew Conservative
 FAULDS Andrew Labour
 HOWELL Ralph Conservative
 Sir John HUNT Conservative
 Lord KIRKHILL Labour
 MM. LAMBIE David Labour
 LITHERLAND Robert Labour
 LORD Michael Conservative
 Lord MACKIE Liberal
 Lord NEWALL Conservative
 MM. RATHBONE Tim Conservative
 REDMOND Martin Labour
 Lord RODNEY Conservative
 Mrs. ROE Marion Conservative
 MM. ROWE Andrew Conservative
 THOMPSON John Labour



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
 2. Examination of credentials.
 3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
 4. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports on the agenda; Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1235).
 5. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of*
- and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1252).*
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
 7. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty: (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council; (b) WEU and the European Community (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1245 and 1250).*

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Observers

The President welcomed observers from Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia.

The President congratulated those representatives and substitutes from the Federal Republic of Germany who had been re-elected to their national parliament.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate had been proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely Mr. Sinesio.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Sinesio was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.

8. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports on the agenda

Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the session

(Doc. 1235)

The President informed the Assembly that the Political Committee had requested, in pursuance of Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure, that its report on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty – WEU and the European Community and, if adopted, its report on the conse-

quences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security should be placed on the agenda.

The Assembly agreed to place the items on the agenda.

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, thus amended.

The amended draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

9. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1252)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee ¹.

10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Scheer, Ahrens, Stegagnini and Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

11. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty

(a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1245)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Scovacricchi, Lopez Valdivielso, Amaral and Tummers.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 490) ².

(b) WEU and the European Community

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1250)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. de Puig, Malfatti, Moya, Perinat and Lord.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Stoffelen, Amaral and Soares Costa.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 491) ³.

12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 4th December 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.

1. See pages 15 to 18.

2. See page 19.

3. See page 20.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Colombo</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Manzolini <i>Stegagnini</i> (Mezzapesa) <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pieralli <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Rodotà) Sinesio	Spain MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Parry Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Speed) MM. <i>Lord</i> (Sir John Stokes) Thompson Ward
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Aarts) Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers Verbeek	
Italy	Portugal MM. <i>Amaral</i> (Candal) Esteves Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Brito</i> (Silva Marques) Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Kempinaire) Pécriaux <i>Noerens</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas) Uyttendaele		
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Collette Durand <i>Hunault</i> (Fillon) <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) Jung		
MM. Ahrens Müller Niegel Mrs. <i>Hoffmann</i> (Reddemann) MM. Scheer Soell		
MM. Benassi Caccia		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi Sarti
Mr. Chevalier	MM. Antretter Böhm Büchner Eich Hitschler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann	Luxembourg Mr. Regenwetter
France	Mrs. Luuk MM. von Schmude Unland Wulff	Netherlands MM. Eversdijk van Velzen
MM. Beix Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Italy MM. Gabbuggiani Martino Natali	United Kingdom MM. Coleman Cox Garrett Hardy

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 488¹***on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
operations in the Gulf²***

1. The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq's aggression against and occupation of Kuwait.

The Assembly welcomes the Council's readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council's decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

2. Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further **RECOMMENDS** that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

3. The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations' assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

4. Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU's contribution to support the United Nations' efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States' Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1243).

RECOMMENDATION 489¹***on European security and events
in the Near and Middle East²***

1. The Assembly welcomes the holding of an extraordinary ministerial meeting of the Council in Paris on 21st August 1990 to implement Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to co-ordinating member countries' action following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

It welcomes the fact that the Council invited the countries taking part in European political co-operation to attend its meeting and that Denmark and Greece were represented, as was Turkey.

It welcomes the fact that the Council placed its action in the framework of the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and asked the Security Council to define additional measures that would be necessary in applying an embargo on Iraq and the territory of Kuwait. It welcomes the fact that Security Council Resolution 665 meets this request and that it stresses the need to make maximum use of political and diplomatic measures, the first of which was the visit by the Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to Amman.

The Assembly notes that, in adopting without delay several Security Council resolutions on the first international crisis following the East-West rapprochement, the United Nations has emerged from the paralysis forced upon it by the cold war and the opposition between the military blocs to become the guarantor of peace and international order. It welcomes the fact that WEU, by the decisions taken at the extraordinary meeting of its Council of Ministers on 21st August 1990, affirmed the prestige and authority of the United Nations in the first major international crisis since the end of the cold war and just when a new international order is emerging.

Recognising the importance of co-ordination with the United States, it also welcomes the fact that the Council has expressed the will to support efforts by the Arab states to find a political solution to the conflict.

Finally, it welcomes the establishment of a system of co-ordination of member countries' naval and air action in the Gulf.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue the undertaking thus started and make the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait the prior condition for any settlement of the conflict.

2. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that useful consultations between member countries and the Soviet Union helped to ensure the adoption of Security Council Resolution 665.

It welcomes the fact that the Twelve reached agreement with the Soviet Union to adopt, at the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly on 27th September, a joint statement on the situation in the Gulf region.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue and develop these consultations in order to maintain and develop the cohesion shown by the international community in imposing respect for the embargo against Iraq.

3. The Assembly has noted with indignation the many violations of the law of nations committed by Iraq and in particular:

- the threat to use chemical weapons which is a violation of the " Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare " that was signed in Geneva on 17th June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February 1928. This threat is particularly serious since chemical weapons were effectively used during the war against Iran and, in particular, against the Kurdish people;
- many violations of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war;
- violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council use every means at its disposal to terminate these violations and bring Iraq to destroy its stocks of chemical weapons under international control and make

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th September 1990, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure.

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1242).

reparations for the wrongs inflicted upon foreign nationals detained in Iraq against their will and those inflicted on diplomatic representations in Kuwait.

4. The Assembly notes that the twelve EEC countries have announced their decision to afford economic assistance to Arab – and other – countries victims of the embargo against Iraq. It considers this to be a positive decision and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council consider the possibility of convening a conference on Euro-Arab co-operation bringing together the member countries of the EEC and of the Arab League.

It is gratified that the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Paris on 21st August provided an opportunity, on the same day, for a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs of the twelve European Community countries to examine the political aspects of the crisis and, in particular, the question of the hostages held by Iraq contrary to international conventions. It considers this to be a good example of task-sharing and close co-operation between WEU and the Twelve.

5. The Assembly considers that the weakness shown by the international community in ensuring that the Iraqi Government respects human rights is one of the sources of the conflict. Many eastern and western countries bear the responsibility for supplying Iraq with a powerful, dangerous military arsenal during and after the war with Iran.

It recalls that it has denounced the delivery of arms to Iraq and illegal transactions in advanced military technology by banks and producing firms in a few member countries of WEU and in the United States.

In Recommendation 475, it also made detailed proposals for terminating the arms race in Iraq and in all Middle Eastern countries.

It regrets that the Council's reply was hardly satisfactory and, in the light of current events, wishes greater attention to be paid to those proposals.

6. The Assembly regrets that, in many cases, the United Nations has been unable to ensure the application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. It fears that if this situation persists it may lead to new and serious crises.

The Assembly considers that, after Iraq has been made to respect the Security Council decisions and international law, the international community and the United Nations must demonstrate the same cohesion in employing all political and diplomatic means and adopting vigorous measures of economic and political pressure to obtain respect for Security Council decisions by confirming Israel's right to exist within sure, recognised frontiers and the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This would bring about the end of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Similarly, a political solution to the present conflict may help to create conditions favourable to a settlement of the Lebanese problem and the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council implement without delay the provisions of Assembly Recommendation 475 adopted in December 1989 which underlined the importance of convening an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

7. The Assembly strongly endorses the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, for immediate humanitarian assistance for the hundreds of thousands of refugees from different countries who are leaving or who have left Iraq via Jordan.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council ask the governments of member countries to take part in this humanitarian effort.

8. The Assembly notes that, for the second time, Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty has been the basis for co-ordinated action by member countries to foster the restoration of a peaceful order threatened outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty.

It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council maintain and strengthen in any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty the commitments in that paragraph and ensure that no country is asked to join WEU if it is not effectively prepared to fulfil these commitments.

9. The Assembly notes that none of the WEU member countries alone has adequate means of taking effective action in the Gulf.

It **RECOMMENDS** that the Council analyse the shortcomings that have thus emerged, particularly in regard to monitoring and data-processing, and speed up consideration of measures to be taken to remedy this situation on the basis of Recommendation 482 on observation satellites.

10. The Assembly welcomes the fact that arbitration by the revitalised United Nations, security through an alliance of WEU countries against aggression and, in Vienna tomorrow, disarmament may help the emergence of a new system of security and international co-operation.

Finally, to achieve this end, it **RECOMMENDS** that the Council make intensive use of all the prospects revealed by the dramatic crisis in the Gulf for achieving as quickly as possible an effective European defence organisation.

RECOMMENDATION 490***on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty***

1. (a) The Assembly, having noted the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council, considers them to be administrative documents that provide no real information about the activities of the WEU Council.

(b) It nevertheless welcomes the fact that, in 1988, 1989 and 1990, it received more substantial information from the United Kingdom, Belgian and French Chairmen-in-Office and from the Secretaries-General, in particular through their letters to the President of the Assembly.

(c) It therefore approves the second part of the thirty-fourth and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council.

(d) It intends to follow up the Secretary-General's proposal to address its committees as and when required.

(e) It strongly RECOMMENDS that the Council be more precise and helpful with its communications to the Assembly, in particular its replies to recommendations and to written questions put by parliamentarians.

(f) It also RECOMMENDS that the Council inform it, whenever possible, of the conclusions drawn from reports by the Special Working Group, the Defence Representatives Group and sub-groups whose work corresponds to the agendas of Assembly sessions.

2. (a) The Assembly has noted that the Council has started to examine the terms of a revision of the treaty, made necessary by the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

(b) It considers that events in the Gulf, the CSCE as well as in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989 and 1990 have made an even more detailed examination of the terms of such a revision necessary.

(c) It proposes to examine in due course the questions raised by this revision.

(d) At this stage, however, in regard to Article IX of the treaty, it PROPOSES that the Council adopt the following wording:

“ The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities to an assembly of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers appointed in accordance with the same criteria as representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. ”

In the same way, it would be valuable if national governments made a similar report to their own parliaments.

RECOMMENDATION 491***on WEU and the European Community***

1. The Assembly is the only parliamentary assembly empowered to deal with the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and regrets that, in spite of this, the Council did not inform it of important proposals made by a member country to associate Western European Union with the European Community.
2. It notes that the Commission of the European Communities is considering the inclusion in the Rome Treaty of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus separating it from the other provisions of the treaty although they are its essential complement, particularly in regard to relations between member countries and NATO.
3. It also notes that a resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposes that the reactivation of WEU be terminated so that it may be integrated into the Community, although some member states of the EEC are still opposed to developing a European concept of defence.
4. The Assembly considers that, if implemented, these various measures would weaken the Atlantic Alliance and Europe's ability to play a major rôle in international affairs.
5. It therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council pursue the reactivation of WEU so as to allow Europe to play a more effective part in NATO and to provide it with the wherewithal to act more effectively each time the security of Europe is threatened.
6. It also **RECOMMENDS** that the Council take no decision calling in question the modified Brussels Treaty without consulting it beforehand.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247; Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247

Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Dumas answered questions put by MM. Scheer, Caro, Beix, Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. De Decker, Speed, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Martino, Stegagnini, Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Lambie and Mrs. Hoffmann.

The sitting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.55 a.m.

Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

At the suggestion of the President, the Assembly agreed, in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, that speeches should be limited to five minutes.

Speakers: MM. Ward, Fassino, Scheer, Mrs. Roe and Mr. Caro.

The joint debate was adjourned.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following appointments of alternate members to fill vacant seats in committees proposed by the Italian Delegation:

– Political Committee: Mr. Colombo;

- Technological and Aerospace Committee: Mr. Manzolini;
- Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Manzolini;
- Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Andreis;
- Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Colombo.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Colombo</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Manzolini Martino <i>Stegagnini</i> (Mezzapesa) <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pieralli Sarti Sinesio	Spain
MM. Adriaensens Chevalier <i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire) Pécriaux Uyttendaele		MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra <i>Sainz</i> (Lopez Henares) Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg	
MM. Beix Caro Collette Durand <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) Fourré Jung Seitlinger Vial-Massat	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>De Hoop Scheffer</i> (Aarts) Eversdijk Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van Velzen) Mr. Verbeek	Lord <i>Kirkhill</i> (Coleman) Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Morris Parry Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Lord <i>Newall</i> (Thompson) Mr. Ward
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Brito</i> (Silva Marques) Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	
Italy		
MM. Benassi Caccia		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
Mr. Biefnot Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Büchner Eich Hitschler Kittelmann Müller Reddemann von Schmude Unland Wulff	MM. Gabbuggiani Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi
France		Portugal
MM. Bassinet Baumel Fillon Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Oehler Thyraud		Mr. Esteves
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Cox Sir John Stokes

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247; Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247

***Address by Mr. Chevènement,
Minister of Defence of France***

Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Chevènement answered questions put by MM. Scheer, Caro, Antretter, Stegagnini, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Castellina (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*), Mr. Jessel (point of order), Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Hardy, Romero, Martinez, Feldmann, Goerens and Scheer (point of order).

The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.25 p.m.

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

***Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region***

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments)

The joint debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Stegagnini, Pécriaux, Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Benassi, Sir John Stokes, MM. Colombo, Soell and Fourré.

Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Antretter and Martinez.

The joint debate was adjourned.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 5th December 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Fernandes Marques Moreira Soares Costa
MM. Adriaensens <i>Noerens</i> (Biefnot) Chevalier <i>De Decker</i> (Kempinaire) Pécriaux <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas) Uyttendaele	MM. Benassi Caccia <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Colombo</i> (Kessler) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Mezzapesa) Parisi Pieralli Sarti Sinesio	Spain
France	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Cuatrecasas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Caro Collette Durand <i>Hunault</i> (Fillon) Fourré <i>Lemoine</i> (Oehler)	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg) MM. Garrett Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston MM. Parry Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Thompson) Mr. <i>Bowden</i> (Ward)
MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Feldmann</i> (Hitschler) Irmer Mrs. Luuk MM. Niegel Scheer Soell	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (vanVelzen) Mr. Verbeek	
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) Esteves	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Kittelmann Müller Reddemann von Schmude Unland Wulff	Portugal
MM. Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat		MM. Silva Marques Vieira Mesquita
Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Spain
MM. Böhm Büchner Eich Holtz	MM. Gabbuggiani Malfatti Manzolini Martino Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi	MM. Borderas Perinat
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Cox Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Morris

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State (*Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States Ambassador to France*).
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments*).
5. Enhancing WEU's public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1246*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State

The address by Mr. Bartholomew was delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States Ambassador to France.

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments)

The joint debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Askin (Observer from Turkey).

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Lopez Valdivielso, Speed, Romero, Fioret and Sole-Tura.

Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Lambie.

The joint debate was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom

Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Clark answered questions put by Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Ward, Hardy, Speed, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, the Earl of Kinnoull and Mr. Garrett.

6. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments)

The joint debate was resumed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Veryvakis (Observer from Greece), Andjelkovic (Observer from Yugoslavia), Lord Mackie and Mr. Hardy.

The joint debate was closed.

The President announced that speeches which it had not been possible to deliver would be printed as an appendix to the proceedings.

Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the Political Committee, and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation in Document 1244.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others:

5. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving Iraq until 15th January 1991 to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and welcoming the fact that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks with Iraq and that the latter has accepted this proposal.”

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

6. In the draft recommendation proper, after paragraph 2, add a new paragraph:

“Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be transported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the requirements of such operations;”

Speakers: MM. De Decker, Stoffelen and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendment No. 4 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

7. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“, inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;”

Speakers: MM. De Decker and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Soell and others:

1. In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “which might take levels above the agreed limits” and insert “in the region”.

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Three amendments (Nos. 2, 8 and 9) were considered together.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Martinez and others:

2. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese problem on the basis of the application of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed by the nuclear powers;”

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

8. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“a settlement of relations between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions;”

Speaker: Mr. De Decker.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

9. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the evacuation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces;”

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Martinez (point of order).

The President proposed that the vote on the three amendments be deferred.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

10. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market;”

Speakers: MM. De Decker and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and others:

11. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“establishing more effective solidarity between Arab oil-producing countries and

those that lack the resources essential for their economic development; ”.

Speakers: MM. De Decker, Martinez and Ahrens.

The amendment was negated.

The Assembly returned to Amendments 2, 8 and 9.

Amendment 8 was withdrawn.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen and Pieralli.

MM. Jessel and Ahrens spoke on Amendment 9.

Amendment 9 was agreed to.

Amendment 2 was amended by leaving out the words “ and the Lebanese problem ” and the words “ signed by the nuclear powers ”.

Speaker: Mr. Ahrens.

Amendment 2, as amended, was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Martinez and Stoffelen:

3. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure the success of the embargo – and in particular the WEU member states – with the talks between the United States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution. ”.

Speakers: MM. Martinez, De Decker and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by MM. Pieralli and De Decker:

12. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace throughout the Near and Middle East before expiry of the time-limit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising recourse to force. ”.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Martinez.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 492)¹.

1. See page 30.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation in Document 1248.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Lambie:

1. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Lambie, Reddemann and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others:

3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “ Brussels Treaty ”.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, De Hoop Scheffer and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Lambie:

2. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Lambie, De Hoop Scheffer and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Martinez and others:

4. In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “ European forces ”.

Speakers: MM. Martinez, De Hoop Scheffer and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. This recommendation will be published as No. 493)².

7. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The proposal was agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.

1. See page 32.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Malfatti Manzolini Martino <i>Colombo (Mezzapesa)</i> Parisi Pieralli <i>Scovacricchi (Rodotà)</i> Sarti Sinesio	Spain MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas <i>Sole-Tura (Cuatrecasas)</i> Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
France	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
MM. Bassinet Beix Caro Collette Durand <i>Lagorce (Forni)</i>	Netherlands MM. <i>De Hoop Scheffer (Aarts)</i> Eversdijk Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger) MM. Stoffelen Tummers van Velzen Verbeek	United Kingdom Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. <i>Atkinson (Morris)</i> Parry Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Lord <i>Newall (Thompson)</i> Mr. Ward
Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Ahrens Mrs. <i>Hoffmann</i> (Böhm) MM. Irmer Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer	Portugal MM. <i>Brito (Candal)</i> Esteves Fernandes Marques Moreira <i>Amaral (Silva Marques)</i> Soares Costa Vieira Mesquita	
Italy MM. <i>Fassino (Filetti)</i> Fioret <i>Rubner (Kessler)</i>		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France MM. Baumel Fillon Fouéré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Federal Republic of Germany MM. Antretter Büchner Eich Hitschler Holtz Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. von Schmude Soell Unland Wulff	Italy MM. Benassi Caccia Gabbuggiani Natali Pecchioli Rubbi Luxembourg Mr. Regenwetter United Kingdom MM. Coleman Cox
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1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 492***on European security and the Gulf crisis***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendation 489;
- (ii) Welcoming the firmness and continuity with which member countries have pursued their action to promote the application of the embargo against Iraq decided upon by the Security Council in order to obtain, without prior conditions, the release of all the hostages held by Iraq and the evacuation of all Kuwaiti territory;
- (iii) Considering that WEU's contribution to the naval deployment to ensure that the embargo is respected is of considerable importance and allows the implementation of United Nations measures to be monitored satisfactorily;
- (iv) Noting with regret that it took longer than desirable to arrange this deployment;
- (v) Condemning with indignation the many violations of international law and human rights committed by Iraq and, in particular, the threat to use chemical weapons, non-respect of the 1949 Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of civilians on the territory of a belligerent country and violations of the 1961 Vienna Convention on the protection of diplomats;
- (vi) Considering that it is still possible that the firmness, solidarity, unity and political and diplomatic initiative of the international community will compel Iraq to obey the United Nations Security Council;
- (vii) Recalling that the Iraqi aggression was also a direct attack on the still fragile new world order that efforts are still being made to establish to replace the one that prevailed throughout the East-West confrontation and which must be based on respect for international law, co-operation and peace;
- (viii) Welcoming the fact that the Twelve, at the summit meeting in Rome on 18th October, stressed that the organisation of a peaceful order in the Near and Middle East implied agreement extending well beyond the setting of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait;
- (ix) Recalling its condemnation of the measures of repression used by the Israeli police in Jerusalem on 8th October and emphasising that a settlement of the Palestinian question, in accordance with all the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter, is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the region;
- (x) Condemning the crimes committed in Beirut following the surrender of General Aoun, but trusting that the end of the civil war in Lebanon should allow the militia to be disarmed and the armed forces of Syria and Israel to be withdrawn from Lebanon;
- (xi) Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving Iraq until 15th January 1991 to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and welcoming the fact that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks with Iraq and that the latter has accepted this proposal,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make a critical analysis of the establishment of WEU's co-ordination of forces sent by member countries to ensure respect for Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and its violations of the law of nations;
2. Follow up without delay Assembly recommendations urging it to set up a European observation satellite agency;
3. Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be transported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the requirements of such operations;
4. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member countries to continue their meetings and those of subordinate bodies in order to prepare forces for possible co-ordinated operations, providing inter alia for:
 - (a) co-operation in respect of transport;
 - (b) the definition of joint procedures;

- (c) the exchange of operational information;
 - (d) interoperability of the equipment and weapons of these national forces;
 - (e) common exercises;
5. Pursue the reactivation of WEU, inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
6. Ensure that the selective release of hostages does not weaken the determination of member countries to obtain the release of all hostages and the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
7. Use Europe's influence in the region to ensure that, after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, negotiations are started to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the Middle East, with a view in particular to:
- (a) an agreement between all countries in the region to renounce the possession of ABC weapons, subject to effective international verification;
 - (b) an agreement between countries in the region and arms-exporting countries to limit armaments in all countries in the region and to ban the sale of arms in the region;
 - (c) settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the application of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
 - (d) full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the evacuation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces;
 - (e) ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market;
8. Ask that the European Community afford assistance to countries in the region whose economy is seriously affected by the crisis;
9. Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure the success of the embargo – and in particular the WEU member states – with the talks between the United States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution;
10. Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace throughout the Near and Middle East before expiry of the time-limit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising recourse to force.

RECOMMENDATION 493***on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait:
continuing operations in the Gulf region***

1. The Assembly insists that the best peaceful solution for the Gulf crisis lies in the respect of the relevant United Nations resolutions, through the application of the present sanctions against Iraq, and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council seek to ensure that this principle continues to govern the actions both of member states and other allies.
2. The Assembly recalls its Recommendation 488, adopted on 20th September 1990, viz:

“ The Assembly approves the action taken by the Council in invoking Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as a result of Iraq’s aggression against and occupation of Kuwait. The Assembly welcomes the Council’s readiness to place WEU co-ordination in the context of the implementation of United Nations Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665.

The Assembly supports the Council’s decision, not only to convene the meeting of the Ministerial Council, but also to constitute an ad hoc group to cover the Gulf crisis and especially to call the first meeting, under direct WEU auspices, of the chiefs of defence staffs.

The Assembly believes that the Council should remain open to the idea of further co-operation and co-ordination at different levels over all aspects of operations in the Gulf area and therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the necessary steps be taken to formalise the Gulf ad hoc group to consider policy and implementation on a day-to-day basis, as long as the present crisis lasts, and urges all WEU nations to provide maximum information to the operational cell being run in the French Ministry of Defence.

Concerned that the proliferation of vessels in the Gulf area could lead to problems in the very near future, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that further consultations take place immediately at governmental level to establish common command and control in the various Gulf zones already agreed and further **RECOMMENDS** that urgent measures be taken to harmonise rules of engagement at least within each zone, and ensure that recognition procedures (IFF) are properly co-ordinated between all aircraft and naval units to assure the safety of friendly forces.

The Assembly considers that WEU could play a useful rôle in helping to co-ordinate (perhaps in conjunction with other agencies) logistic support, reinforcement and resupply for the Gulf operations and that WEU nations’ assets for sea- and airlift might be provided, in some cases where combat forces, for whatever reason, may not be available, and **RECOMMENDS** that the Council study the options for providing such assistance without delay.

Disappointed that the transatlantic presentation of WEU’s contribution to support the United Nations’ efforts to solve the crisis in the Gulf has yet to have an impact, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council establish forthwith a liaison office in Washington to serve as a channel for North American links and as a matter of priority to convince the United States’ Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present. The Council should make every effort to ensure that WEU is perceived as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. ”
3. The Assembly welcomes the fact that the Council, working through its special Ad Hoc Group, has already seen fit to implement at least part of the above recommendation and that WEU co-operation both at home and in the Gulf area has improved as a direct result. The Assembly believes that the arrangements for the naval application of the United Nations embargo are now well established and congratulates the Council on the measures taken.
4. The Assembly now considers that much more should be done to co-ordinate land and air operations and that all WEU nations should make appropriate contributions, and therefore **RECOMMENDS** that the Council discuss further national contributions to defensive land and air forces in the Gulf region and in particular should call for support in the areas of logistics and medical help (the idea of a hospital ship with a multinational WEU medical team on board deserves special consideration).
5. In the knowledge that France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the only WEU nations with combat aircraft in the Gulf region and concerned about the provision of adequate air cover for naval forces in particular, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the members of the Council take the decisions necessary to co-ordinate air cover and extend efficient air defence protection to all WEU nations’ forces.

6. Concerned that due consideration in the WEU Council has apparently not been given to the rôle of forces, especially naval forces, should tension mount in the Gulf region and conflict break out, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the necessary political consultations should now take place to enable the appropriate decisions on the rôle of naval forces in particular to be implemented without delay in the event of hostilities.

7. Convinced that the present situation admirably illustrates the case for creating a European centre for the prevention of crises and recalling in this context two earlier recommendations: 465 (Document 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré), on defining the conditions for setting up a European observation satellite agency in WEU, and 481 (Document 1223, Rapporteur: Lord Newall), on creating a European verification centre under WEU auspices, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council at its forthcoming ministerial meeting take the decision to set up such a centre to be used *inter alia* for crisis management and verification and equip it with the necessary technical means (including access to observation satellites) to enable it to function effectively.

8. The Assembly, believing that, even if the present crisis may prove unique as a model for European action, certain options for the future are worth studying immediately, both in the WEU Assembly and in national parliaments, **RECOMMENDS** that the Council emphasise WEU as the forum for out-of-area co-ordination, in keeping with the modified Brussels Treaty, and examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force.

9. Considering that special efforts are required to ensure that the public is kept fully informed regarding the rationale for the WEU presence in the Gulf region, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council should co-ordinate, through the Secretary-General's office, the presentation of WEU's rôle to the media and to the public and that links between national public relations organisations in member states' ministries of defence should be formalised and encouraged in a similar aim.

10. Noting that defence budget cuts in the majority of member countries are forcing an unco-ordinated reappraisal of defence priorities, the Assembly **RECOMMENDS** that the Council institute consultation within WEU on the optimum future structure of European forces, preferably before further cuts in national defence budgets are made.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Enhancing WEU's public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1246*).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1241 and addendum*).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1236 and addendum*).
4. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1255 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting had not yet been distributed and would be submitted for adoption later.

3. Enhancing WEU's public relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1246)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Roman, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Nuñez, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, MM. Lopez Henares and Esteves.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Roman, Rapporteur, and Sir William Shelton, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 494)¹.

1. See page 37.

Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1241 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Diaz, Müller, Lord Mackie and Mr. Niegel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Rathbone replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991.

The draft budget was agreed to unanimously.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and vote on the motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1236 and addendum)

The motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by

Mr. Rathbone on behalf of Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts for the financial year 1989.

The motion was agreed to unanimously.

6. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1255 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, on behalf of Mr. Lemoine, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. de Puig.

Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Scovacricchi, Bowden, Pachtas (*Observer from Greece*), Romero, Mota

Torres, Sole-Tura, Moya, Liapis (*Observer from Greece*) and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

7. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The proposal was agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 6th December 1990, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Luxembourg	MM. <i>Sole-Tura</i> (Cuatrecasas) Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya Perinat de Puig Roman
MM. Adriaensens <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Kempinaire) Uyttendaele	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
	Netherlands	
France	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Aarts)	
MM. Fourré <i>Lemoine</i> (Oehler)	Mrs. Haas-Berger MM. Stoffelen Tummers van Velzen Verbeek	
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
Mr. Ahrens Müller Niegel Reddemann	Portugal	Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) MM. <i>Howell</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) <i>Bowden</i> (Morris) Sir William Shelton Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Mr. <i>Rathbone</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes Mr. Ward
Italy	MM. <i>Mota Torres</i> (Candal) Esteves Fernandes Marques Moreira Soares Costa	
MM. Fioret <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) <i>Colombo</i> (Mezzapesa) Parisi <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Rodotà) Sarti Sinesio	Spain	
	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli Pieralli Rubbi
MM. Biefnot Chevalier Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Antretter Böhm Büchner Eich Hitschler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Scheer von Schmude Soell Unland Wulff	Luxembourg
		MM. Goerens Regenwetter
France		Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Caro Collette Durand Fillon Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat		Mr. Eversdijk
	Italy	Portugal
	MM. Benassi Caccia Filetti Gabbuggiani Malfatti Manzolini Martino Natali	MM. Silva Marques Vieira Mesquita
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Cox Garrett Hardy Jessel Parry Thompson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 494***on enhancing WEU's public relations***

(i) The Assembly notes with satisfaction the increased interest shown by the media, public opinion and in parliamentary debates in the rôle of WEU as a result of its action in the Gulf region following Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

(ii) This open debate nevertheless shows that a large section of the public, if not ignorant of WEU, still holds preconceived and mistaken ideas about it which, in member countries and across the Atlantic too, lead to a lack of credibility in the institution that does not correspond to the increase in its activities.

(iii) Conversely, the Assembly is gratified at being kept better informed of the Council's activities, in particular through the information letters from the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that their contents in no way commit the Council.

(iv) The Assembly notes with interest that, starting this year, numerous communiqués have been issued at the close of meetings of the Council of Ministers and several of its organs. It considers the Council is thus starting to keep the public better informed.

(v) However, upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and new threats emanating from regions outside Europe call for more systematic, coherent efforts to explain to the public the possibilities offered by the modified Brussels Treaty for establishing a new European security system; the Council must not, however, transfer the burden of these efforts to members of the Assembly.

(vi) The hesitation shown by the Council and member governments, failing to grasp the political importance of public relations or to agree on WEU's future rôle, might increase the now prevalent uncertainty among the public about how Europe's future security should be guaranteed and organised.

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Include information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the suggestions made by Mr. Pontillon in Written Question 285, with a view in particular to increasing the now inadequate financial means available to WEU and its Assembly in this area;
2. Work out, with the assistance of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, a communications strategy allowing the public debate on European security to be intensified and WEU's image to be enhanced in public opinion, not only in Europe but also in North America;
3. Support and extend the Secretary-General's public relations work and urge member governments to intensify their efforts to explain to the public WEU's work in helping to establish a new security system in Europe;
4. Inform the Assembly of measures taken to attain the abovementioned goals.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1990

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments*).
2. Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1249*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the two previous sittings were agreed to.

3. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (i), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and of the East-West confrontation and the progress towards democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries;

Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;

Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty in which all WEU member countries undertook to promote the economic recovery of Europe; ”

Speakers: MM. Ward, Martinez and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

2. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in Eastern Europe;

Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer the peoples of Europe new prospects and improved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-European co-operation;

Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments; ”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German problem has made it possible to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united in freedom, thus enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;

Considering that Germany’s undertakings in regard to recognition of its present frontiers with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation

of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the levels of its armed forces are exemplary measures that are likely to strengthen the confidence of all European countries;”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

4. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (iii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which would give the parliamentary dimension to the CSCE process as decided by the Paris summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;

Recalling that WEU has special responsibility in the establishment of a new European security concept based on the doctrine of sufficiency and taking account of the situation that will exist after the treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;

Considering the maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an essential factor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment;”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Caro.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

5. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Play an active part in building the new all-European system of co-operation and security and give it useful impetus based on the co-operation structures set up by member countries in the framework of WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance;”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

6. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Give strong impetus to the European Community's efforts to organise and co-ordinate assistance to the economies of the countries concerned;”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

7. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the consequences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progressive withdrawal of Soviet troops and define, in preparation for examination in the Atlantic Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of allied forces in Europe;”

Speaker: Mr. Martinez.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Brito and others:

8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraphs:

“ Follow up the intention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member countries in security matters so as to open the way for a possible European union associating the European Community, European political co-operation and WEU;

Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is set in the context of a European security dimension;

Work out, with due account for the specific nature of European security interests, a European position for revising the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain Europe's security in a new environment;

Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise out of area;

Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member countries;

Re-examine the rôle of deterrence in the new European security context;

Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency.”

Speakers: MM. Martinez and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 495)¹.

1. See page 42.

**4. *Konversiya – conversion
in Soviet military industry***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1249)*

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Moya, Elisseev (*Observer from the USSR*), Moreira, Mrs. van den Brink (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*), MM. Pedregosa and Atkinson.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 496)¹.

5. *Close of the session*

The President declared the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 11.40 a.m.

¹. See page 44.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	Luxembourg	MM. Borderas
MM. Adriaensens	Mr. Regenwetter	<i>Sole-Tura</i> (Cuatrecasas)
<i>Cauwenberghs</i>		Cuco
(Mrs. Staels-Dompas)	Netherlands	Diaz
Uyttendaele	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>	<i>Sainz</i> (Fabra)
	(Aarts)	Lopez Henares
France	Mr. Eversdijk	Martinez
MM. Caro	Mrs. Haas-Berger	Moya
Gouteyron	MM. Stoffelen	Perinat
	Tummers	de Puig
	van Velzen	Roman
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens	Portugal	United Kingdom
Büchner	MM. <i>Brito</i> (Candal)	Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing)
Kittelmann	Esteves	Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Dame Peggy
	Moreira	Fenner)
Italy	<i>Amaral</i> (Silva Marques)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Fioret	Soares Costa	MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Morris)
<i>Colombo</i> (Kessler)	Vieira Mesquita	<i>Bowden</i> (Sir William
Malfatti		Shelton)
Martino	Spain	Speed
Parisi	Mr. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i>	<i>Howell</i> (Sir John Stokes)
Sarti	(Alvarez)	Ward
<i>Stegagnini</i> (Sinesio)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Eich	Luxembourg
MM. Biefnot	Hitschler	Mr. Goerens
Chevalier	Holtz	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
Kempinaire	Irmer	
Péciaux	Mrs. Luuk	Netherlands
	MM. Müller	Mr. Verbeek
France	Niegel	
MM. Bassinet	Reddemann	Portugal
Baumel	Scheer	Mr. Fernandes Marques
Beix	von Schmude	
Collette	Soell	United Kingdom
Durand	Unland	MM. Coleman
Fillon	Wulff	Cox
Forni		Garrett
Fourré	Italy	Hardy
Galley	MM. Benassi	Jessel
Jeambrun	Caccia	Sir Russell Johnston
Jung	Filetti	Earl of Kinnoull
Oehler	Gabbuggiani	Mr. Parry
Seitlinger	Manzolini	Sir Dudley Smith
Thyraud	Mezzapesa	Mr. Thompson
Vial-Massat	Natali	
	Pecchioli	
Federal Republic of Germany	Pieralli	
MM. Antretter	Rodotà	
Böhm	Rubbi	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 495***on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe
for European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the adoption by thirty-four countries of the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and the signing of the agreement on the limitation of conventional armaments;
- (ii) Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and of the East-West confrontation and the progress towards democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries;
- (iii) Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;
- (iv) Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty in which all WEU member countries undertook to promote the economic recovery of Europe;
- (v) Recalling that implementation of the principles set out in the security basket of the Helsinki Final Act is an essential condition for advancing the entire CSCE process;
- (vi) Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in Eastern Europe;
- (vii) Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer the peoples of Europe new prospects and improved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-European co-operation;
- (viii) Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German problem has made it possible to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united in freedom, thus enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;
- (x) Considering that Germany's undertakings in regard to recognition of its present frontiers with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the levels of its armed forces are exemplary measures that are likely to strengthen the confidence of all European countries;
- (xi) Welcoming the fact that the states participating in the CSCE have decided to set up a conflict prevention centre which they consider to be a first step towards the creation of a true political instrument allowing them to settle all disputes that may arise between them;
- (xii) Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which would give the parliamentary dimension to the CSCE process as decided by the Paris summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (xiii) Recalling that WEU has special responsibility in the establishment of a new European security concept based on the doctrine of sufficiency and taking account of the situation that will exist after the treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;
- (xiv) Considering the maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an essential factor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment;
- (xv) Considering that, because of the imminent meeting of heads of state or government of the Twelve in Rome, the present report can present only provisional conclusions,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure, at the Rome summit meeting, that the requirements of European security in the new situation are guaranteed;
2. Play an active part in building the new all-European system of co-operation and security and give it useful impetus based on the co-operation structures set up by member countries in the framework of WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance;

3. Promote implementation of the decisions taken by the CSCE, in particular by:
 - (i) ensuring that the conflict prevention centre carries out its tasks in optimum conditions;
 - (ii) giving strong impetus to the monitoring of disarmament agreements, inter alia by setting up a centre for processing data obtained by observation satellites, and inform participating countries of its conclusions;
4. Give strong impetus to the European Community's efforts to organise and co-ordinate assistance to the economies of the countries concerned;
5. Propose to the CSCE the continuation of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and, after the Helsinki conference, promote further stages of disarmament and guarantee stability in Europe;
6. In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the consequences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progressive withdrawal of Soviet troops and define, in preparation for examination in the Atlantic Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of allied forces in Europe;
7. Keep the Assembly continuously informed of the progress of negotiations relating to the organisation of Western Europe and security and co-operation in Europe;
8. Follow up the intention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member countries in security matters so as to open the way for a possible European union associating the European Community, European political co-operation and WEU;
9. Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is set in the context of a European security dimension;
10. Work out, with due account for the specific nature of European security interests, a European position for revising the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain Europe's security in a new environment;
11. Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise out of area;
12. Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member countries;
13. Re-examine the rôle of deterrence in the new European security context;
14. Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency.

RECOMMENDATION 496***on konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the far-reaching changes taking place in the USSR, in particular since the Reykjavik agreement;
- (ii) Convinced that the doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in defence being introduced by the Soviet Union will have immediate repercussions on military production;
- (iii) Aware that the INF Treaty and the imminent agreement on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) will reduce even further the quantitative demand for military equipment;
- (iv) Considering that, through conversion, the Soviet Union is making a sincere effort to use for civilian purposes the human and material resources thus being released;
- (v) Aware that the Soviet authorities consider conversion to be an important means of improving the living standards of the population;
- (vi) Recalling that the preamble to the Brussels Treaty refers to economic, social and cultural ties as means for fortifying and preserving the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty;
- (vii) Recognising that it is too early to assess the full significance of economic and political reforms now taking place in the Soviet Union;
- (viii) Convinced that in the post cold war era strong social, economic and cultural ties between Western European nations and the Soviet Union will greatly contribute to reinforcing peace and security in the whole of Europe;
- (ix) Recognising that, in a first phase of the Soviet Union's transition to market economy, direct exchanges between companies, experts and politicians will be crucial;
- (x) Aware that, notwithstanding existing uncertainties, both the Federal Republic of Germany and France have recently concluded bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union on partnership and co-operation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to promote the extension of existing and the establishment of new exchange programmes so as to enable both Soviet and Western European experts to learn more about each other's social, economic and cultural systems;
2. Urge those member governments which have not yet done so to conclude formal bilateral agreements on good neighbourliness, partnership and co-operation, based on the new pattern of international relations in Europe and modelled on two such agreements as recently concluded by WEU member states;
3. Appoint a special committee of experts from national administrations with the task of studying conversion problems and exchanging experience and advice with their opposite numbers in the Soviet Union.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
8. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports on the agenda; Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1235).
9. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1252).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Martinez (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Martinez.
10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
11. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1245).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Scovacricchi, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Amaral, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Tummers, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
(b) WEU and the European Community (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1250).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Puig, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Malfatti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Moya, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Perinat, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lord, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lagorce, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Amaral, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Soares Costa, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 8th June 1990 at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 14.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President

The President (continued)

of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Is there any objection to ratifying these credentials?...

The credentials are ratified by the Assembly.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

5. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I, at this point, welcome the large number of foreign observers representing the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, attending our debates and interested in the work we do together. Virtually every European parliament is represented here today.

Nor, ladies and gentlemen, would you understand if I failed to take this opportunity to welcome and congratulate those of our colleagues from the Federal Republic of Germany who were re-elected yesterday.

On your behalf, I therefore welcome Mr. Antretter, Mr. Bindig, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Böhm, Mr. Bühler, Mr. Feldmann, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Hitschler, Mr. Holtz, Mr. Irmer, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Lenzler, Mr. Müller, Mr. Pfuhl, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Schmitz, Mr. von Schmude, Mr. Soell, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Zierer and Mr. Zywiets.

I am sure you will all join me, ladies and gentlemen, in expressing our pleasure at this satisfying result of the German elections; to those of our former colleagues unlucky enough not to have been elected I shall simply express our sympathy and appreciation of their past collaboration in our work.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Secretary-General, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, this session opens in a context that is particularly rich but also changing and fraught with uncertainty. One week ago, a few hundred metres from here, representatives of a hundred million men sanctioned, with the Charter of Paris, the end of an era and the start of something else, something full of hope that must now be fostered with realities. The Paris summit meeting marked the move from a process of disarmament to a programme of collective security.

For the first time in history, we are indeed witnessing a deep-rooted change in the Euro-

pean landscape that is not the consequence of a war or of a bloody revolution.

We in WEU have a place in this process now that it is less a matter of organising the balance of forces than of seeking a new form of solidarity based on shared values.

As an institution for collective security and European co-operation, WEU already plays an important part whenever it is question of reacting to violations of international law and of organising the united reaction of the community of nations.

You will have understood that here I am referring to the Gulf problem and the United Nations' decisions to the enforcement of which we are making a major contribution.

As you know, it was on 2nd August that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait brought storm clouds into the clear summer sky. It immediately became clear that WEU could not remain indifferent to this threat to international peace and, on 8th August, on behalf of the Assembly, I asked the Chairman-in-Office to convene a meeting of the WEU Council at ministerial level under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Subsequent discussions in the Presidential Committee and the other committees allow me to convey to the Council the Assembly's great satisfaction at three measures that it took, perhaps not immediately, but at least within a reasonably short time after the event.

First, it decided to meet effectively, at the required level – and for the first time since WEU was set up – to define the bases for concerted action. I would add that, in associating certain non-member countries with this meeting, the Chairman-in-Office showed better than ever before that WEU was not a closed institution and was capable, in case of need, of bringing together all European countries sharing one and the same concept of European security and its implications. This is a valuable indication now that a new peaceful order is being organised in Europe and thought is also being given to the specific vocation of each of the organisations around which a European entity is being shaped. In this matter, the WEU Council has shown that, whereas neither NATO nor European political co-operation was able to take firm initiatives, WEU could do so without separating the nine member countries from their partners in the Community or in the Atlantic Alliance.

The Council must then be congratulated for having, in these circumstances, found ways and means of co-ordinating action taken by member countries to participate in implementing the embargo against Iraq decided upon by the United Nations Security Council. This is not the first time, since similar co-ordination had been

The President (continued)

organised in 1987 to allow Europe to play an active part in mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation in these waters in spite of the war then being waged between Iran and Iraq. However, the events last summer led the Council, for the first time, to meet a request from the Assembly, i.e. to convene a meeting of chiefs of defence staff of member countries to study together the implementation of Council decisions. This initiative must now be followed up: in other words, this form of European military co-ordination must be institutionalised, first to draw lessons from the experience gained and then to allow Europe to react more swiftly and effectively if peace is again threatened or if collective assistance is required for humanitarian tasks, for instance.

Finally, I wish to thank the Council for associating the Assembly, better than ever before, with its activities. The two ministerial meetings were indeed followed by meetings between the Chairman-in-Office or his representative and the Assembly, represented either by its Presidential Committee or by its Political and Defence Committees, at which valuable information was given to the parliamentarians on the Council's action, after which our questions were answered in detail. It was also possible for the Presidential Committee to send a delegation to the Gulf to see how co-ordination was working on the spot and to establish useful contacts with the authorities of certain countries in the region.

My special thanks go to the governments of France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands, which allowed the delegation to be received on board their countries' warships, where they were given detailed, instructive information, after meeting, in Paris, the most senior military staff responsible for co-ordination. I would also thank the United States Government for authorising us to extend our mission beyond the limits of WEU and welcoming us aboard an American ship. The reports that are to be presented at this session by Mr. De Decker, for the Political Committee, and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for the Defence Committee, both members of the delegation, will allow the Assembly to assess the importance of this visit and the information obtained. I would sum up the situation by telling you that European participation in the naval operations – overall, 50% of the total operational strength – designed to apply the embargo has been of great importance and has allowed the peoples in the region to see Europe as an essential partner in organising the return to a balanced, lasting peace. The Presidential Committee's adoption of the reports by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 20th September enabled the Assembly to make a very useful contribution in helping the

Arab countries understand the whys and wherefores of the European presence in the Gulf.

I personally have endeavoured to ensure that the whole Assembly was kept duly informed of the activities of the Presidential Committee and the Council in this area. All the documents emanating from the Council have been sent to you very quickly and the Presidential Committee did not hesitate to resort to exceptional procedure to allow the recommendations adopted by the committees to be transmitted to the Council on 20th September, with the endorsement of the Presidential Committee. It has also arranged for new reports to be prepared providing material for our debates at the present session.

There seem to be two kinds of lesson to be drawn already from this affair which is not yet over. First, WEU is now, more than ever, the necessary channel for questions that cannot validly be handled in NATO or solved solely in the framework of political co-operation because they involve the intervention of armed forces. Second, setting WEU co-operation in motion is still too slow for both military and political reasons. Hence, the rôle effectively played by Europe was not properly recognised by international opinion and it did not enjoy all the political advantages that it might have derived from its military presence in the region. Today, the necessary changes must be made in WEU's methods so that it may act more quickly and effectively should the need arise again.

Since none of our countries is now prepared to allow its armed forces to be engaged in operations in which it has not decided to take part, it would be desirable for them all to agree, outside a time of crisis, to pre-assign some of their forces and means for possible operations outside Europe. This implies prior agreement on procedures to be implemented and on the measures to be taken in respect of transport and logistics, exchanges of information and interoperability of armaments that might be earmarked for co-ordinated operations outside Europe. Such measures of course would not affect each state's freedom to decide, in all circumstances, on the nature of its commitment, be it to ensure application of Security Council resolutions, the safeguarding of its nationals or any other peace-keeping action. However, such steps would considerably strengthen Europe's ability to voice its views when a conflict is in the offing and, consequently, avert any threat to international peace.

We must realise that, without WEU co-ordination, most member countries would not have been able or would not have wished to take part in military deployment in the region of the Gulf. However, such participation, even if only modest, was of vital political importance. It showed that Europe existed, not only as the sum of resources made available by countries pre-

The President (continued)

pared to act against Iraq but also as an expression of political will, separate from that of the Americans, although associated with them, probably more alive to the legitimate concerns of Arab peoples and states and also more anxious to act only in the framework of guidelines laid down by the only authority capable of expressing the point of view of the international community as a whole, i.e. the United Nations Security Council. Insofar as we hope that the application of the measures decided upon by the Security Council will still allow peace to be restored on a lawful basis, our co-ordinated participation in the deployment of forces in the Gulf is likely to have a strong influence on the course of events and to ensure that Europe plays its due part in settling the conflict.

The adoption of Resolution 678 by the Security Council on 29th November makes it urgent for the Council to meet again to decide how Europe would take part in the trial of force should Iraq's attitude make this necessary. A firm statement by the Council of Ministers on this subject at its meeting on 10th December would obviously help to strengthen the action by which the international community intends to ensure that Iraq evacuates Kuwait without recourse to force becoming necessary.

When I was in New York in November attending the session of the United Nations General Assembly, I was able to assess the progress that Europe had made in world affairs thanks to WEU because of the cohesion it showed in the Gulf affair. On two occasions, I met representatives of WEU member countries during my week in New York and discussed with them our views on the action taken by Europe to ensure that a concept of peace prevails, with due respect for international law, thus giving our presence in the Gulf its full dimension. I was also able to see that WEU was henceforth an aspect of Europe that had become a reality extending well beyond the periodical meetings of ambassadors in London.

The second prominent matter in recent weeks was the CSCE summit meeting in Paris from 19th to 21st November.

Its first task was to turn the page on a past marked by the East-West confrontation that had dominated international life for forty-three years. With the signing of the treaty on the limitation of conventional forces, the threat to Western Europe is diminishing so much that some are now wondering whether it is necessary to retain the forces and bodies which have ensured Europe's security for the last half-century. This doubt is heightened because the Warsaw Pact has practically disappeared, at least as a military organisation, Germany has been reunited around the Federal Republic and

within the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris summit meeting has issued a charter for a new Europe which sketches the guidelines for a new order of peace and collective security on our continent.

We all welcome these three events unreservedly. The end of an arms race, which weighed heavily on the development of our economies and the balance of our societies, was an aspiration which had always been endorsed by WEU and its Assembly which, it should be recalled, were set up in 1954 for the specific purpose of establishing a freely-accepted discipline between the member countries in this area. The reunification of Germany in a democratic state had, from the same date, been at the top of the list of aims that the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance set themselves in the London Agreements. Finally, the replacement of the confrontation between blocs by a collective security system had been the aim pursued by all European states since the Helsinki conference whose Final Act dates back to 1975. I do not think there are any differences between us on these three points.

Conversely, in preparing for the present session, I noted that different interpretations have been placed on this year's events and I have every reason to think that these will be at the centre of this week's debates.

Some consider that sufficient progress has been made towards a new security order in Europe to allow, here and now, a complete reappraisal of the institutions which, in recent decades, formed the basis of our security. They consider that the participation of the five members of the Security Council in the condemnation of Iraq and the institutionalisation of the CSCE are in themselves sufficient guarantees for the maintenance of international peace for any further European military deployment to be envisaged only to serve one or other of those bodies.

Others, on the contrary, are still keenly aware of the precarious nature of the majority in the Security Council opposing the Iraqi aggression and of the limits of the CSCE's authority. They are still concerned about the existence of a significant military and nuclear arsenal on both sides of the Urals, the threatened withdrawal of a large proportion of the American forces still stationed in Europe and the risks of an implosion in certain Central and Eastern European countries due to the combined effects of an unprecedented economic and social crisis and the reawakening of nationalism. Finally, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, the development of chemical weapons and the increase in the number of ballistic missiles mean that while, for many people, Europe's security is still a hope, it is not an established fact and still less a certainty.

The President (continued)

In present circumstances in Europe, I believe many people, aware of certain aspects of the new realities, have a reasonable view of the future but without grasping all the aspects. One of WEU's vocations is now quite clearly to contribute, within the framework of its responsibilities, to the new organisation of peace in Europe. Here, we cannot expect to replace the CSCE whose rôle is to clarify and develop the principles set out in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe and also to implement them in the bodies it has just set up, with a particular view to preventing conflicts. Yet today it is hardly conceivable that the thirty-four member countries of the CSCE can agree to impose the implementation of any principles it may define on countries which do not wish to do so. Nor is it conceivable for it to rely on national states to carry out this task, for security and peace in Europe cannot be guaranteed by the domination of one power. Because it is the only truly European organisation responsible for defence matters, WEU is also the only one able to back up the CSCE when the latter needs to deter one of its participants from infringing the principles it defines. This is a dimension of European security which our governments will have to bear in mind when they examine the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty in the coming year. Our Assembly should also be asked to play a full part in the exchanges of views which should lead to the definition of the parliamentary dimension of the CSCE.

In the context of this session, it is inevitable that the two concepts of European security that are upheld here will come to grips when WEU's rôle in future years has to be determined. This was evident when the Political Committee finalised the reports it is to present at this session and we should be grateful to it for having reached the necessary compromises so that the documents prepared by its rapporteurs will all – or so we hope – be presented for public debate. It is not by concealing differences or, one might say, varying sensitivities, that exist in European opinions but, on the contrary, by expressing them in unrestricted debate that we shall play the rôle assigned to the Assembly by the modified Brussels Treaty and affirm that vocation, which some now seem to wish to challenge, of being the parliament of European security.

Now the third dimension imposed on our session by current events: we are meeting on the eve of the Rome summit meeting which is to allow the twelve member countries of the Community to fix the next stages in their march towards economic and monetary union and political union. For several weeks, this last point has certainly been a focal point for quite natural hopes and some more questionable ulterior

motives about the place security should occupy in Europe of the Twelve. I must say, quite honestly, that the many speeches, motions and proposals emanating from various sides on this subject show neither legal rigour nor political clarity.

I do not believe there are any serious differences between us on fundamentals, i.e. that Europe should assume greater responsibility for its own security in future years and that the Community has become the pole around which future European union will be organised.

However, to attempt in the near future to place defence in the framework of the Community either by separating Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty from the rest of the treaty and including it in the Rome Treaty or by wrongly interpreting the Single European Act or, again, by remaining outside any form of treaty would, I believe, run counter to the very cause of European union. Moreover, the European Parliament felt this quite clearly when it adopted a resolution urging the governments to stop reactivating WEU to allow the Community to exercise WEU's responsibilities and the European Parliament to take charge of ours, which meant it preferred a paralysed Europe to European activity beyond its control.

We have a more demanding and more responsible concept of the building of Europe. We think that what is being done, what is being prepared in WEU, is a step forward for Europe whose union cannot be achieved merely through the absorption into the Community of organisations based on sound foundations such as the modified Brussels Treaty but by bringing together institutions such as the Community, political co-operation and WEU in a dynamic balance. The status and practice of each represent factual European co-operation. Where institutions are concerned, Europe is not a blank page, as the President of the French Republic recalled when opening the Paris conference on 19th November. I hope the Rome summit meeting will give priority to seeking converging views rather than giving in to facile false solutions which, while seeming to overcome the more apparent than real contradictions in the building of Europe, would in fact deprive Europe of most of its ability to act in the area for which we are responsible.

On the contrary, it is by making WEU better able to exercise its responsibilities that we shall further the advancement of the European cause. I will recall only for the record the proposals made several times by our Assembly for WEU to organise Europe's participation in the verification provided for in the CFE agreements. At a symposium organised by our Scientific Committee in Rome last April, we backed these proposals up with a strong case for the creation of a European agency to process data obtained by

The President (continued)

satellites. The decision is in the Council's hands and we would find it hard to understand any further delay now that the CFE agreement was signed last month. The Gulf affair has merely underlined Europe's need to have the satellite observation capability that it is lacking.

Even more important would be a decision by our governments to appoint permanent representatives to the WEU Council, as in the Council of Europe and NATO, so that WEU questions, which will be of increasing importance in the future, may be followed full time and at an appropriate level by governments.

All the matters I have just mentioned are on the agenda of our session. It will be for you to examine them in depth so that the message we convey to the Council, to the press and to public opinion is enhanced by our debates before being weighed up by our votes. Without further delay, ladies and gentlemen, I will therefore give you the floor so that a session may be opened which should be particularly important for the future of Europe in view of the events in recent months and others expected in the weeks ahead.

7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Our friend and colleague, Mr. Sarti, who is now Vice-President of the Italian National Assembly, has advised me of his resignation from the post of Vice-President of the Assembly, and we must therefore decide who is to take his place.

One nomination, that of Mr. Sinesio, has been received, in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I propose that the election of Mr. Sinesio as Vice-President should be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I therefore declare Mr. Sinesio duly elected Vice-President of the Assembly.

The Vice-Presidents of the Assembly in order of seniority are therefore: Mr. Sinesio, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soares Costa, Mr. Soell and Mr. Martinez.

8. Request by the Political Committee to place two reports on the agenda**Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the session**

(Doc. 1235)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before examining the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session, I

have to advise the Assembly that, under Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure, the Political Committee has asked that the following be placed on the agenda: first, the report on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty: WEU and the European Community; second, subject to its adoption, the report on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security.

Are there twenty members opposing the request of the Political Committee?...

There are not. The reports are therefore placed on the agenda.

The Assembly now has to vote on the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session, Document 1235.

Is there any opposition to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

9. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1252)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1252.

I call Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – May I first thank my colleagues in the Presidential Committee for kindly entrusting me with the responsibility of presenting the report on the activity of the Presidential Committee, now that our country and parliamentary delegation have had six months of full participation in the life of WEU, its Assembly and the committee.

I should like to begin by emphasising that the last six months have not been exactly uneventful. They have seen events of extreme importance not only for the whole world, Europe and our individual countries but also for WEU because they relate to WEU's field of responsibility. So, there has been nothing humdrum about the life of our Assembly during the period on which we are reporting; on the contrary, it has been a time of tension, reflected of course in the activity and work of the Presidential Committee.

Two major political events, to which Mr. Pontillon referred in his opening speech, have claimed the committee's attention, and they are of course well represented in the orders of the day of this plenary session. One relates to the Gulf crisis and the other to what is going on in

Mr. Martinez (continued)

connection with the development of the new European architecture, with its effects in the area of security, culminating recently in the CSCE summit held in Paris. We shall not discuss either of these two events in depth just now; this we shall do during the coming week. Nevertheless, a number of important comments are called for directly relating to the action taken about them by the Presidential Committee.

As regards the war that Iraq has launched against Kuwait, Iraq's aggression against the international community and the conflict in the Gulf, the Presidential Committee has held several meetings connected with the activity of the WEU Council of Ministers. In these meetings we were given accurate, detailed, last-minute and first-hand information by the French Presidency. With this information, the committee, on behalf of the Assembly, was able to provide well-informed support, see the satisfying consequences of the reactivation of WEU and play a more active and first-hand part in the process of reactivation. The information from the French Presidency also enabled the Presidents in the committee to communicate the information received to national parliaments, thus contributing towards fruitful debate in those parliaments and helping to increase the awareness of and esteem for Western European Union.

Activity with regard to the development of the European architecture is intense and fast-moving and though the question is certainly less dramatic and tense than the Gulf conflict it is perhaps no less important for the future. The Presidential Committee has been able to gather and disseminate information, have it discussed by the committee's members and then inform the national parliaments, their respective governments and the WEU Council of Ministers of the concerns the committee felt. Finally, it has been able to think about the place that Western European Union should occupy and the rôle it should play in the construction of Europe that is under way, as Mr. Pontillon also said a moment ago. There can be no doubt that, in this construction of Europe, security and a common security policy are quite simply essential if the plan is to advance.

The committee has fulfilled its budgetary responsibilities as stated in the written report of which you all have a copy, but I regret to have to inform you of the Presidential Committee's disappointment to learn that the expert committees that were asked to communicate their findings on this subject had not been able to satisfy, at least not fully, the proper demands of the Assembly and thus enable our activity to be extended as required by the presence of Spain and Portugal in WEU; neither have the experts

met our requirements enabling the Assembly to step up its activity to the level required by the reactivation of the organisation, as highlighted by the events referred to above. It therefore seems necessary to ask each delegation once more to urge its government's representatives on the Council of Ministers to understand the need for and approve the budgetary increase for the Assembly. Unless the additional resources are forthcoming, much of what is said here now and in the next few days will not produce any concrete result.

One minor point in connection with the work of our committee concerns the logo of our Assembly. Excellent work has been done on this by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations under the chairmanship of Mr. Ewing. This has been a triumph in that such a good result has been produced so cheaply. This logo should enable WEU to be more easily identified among other European institutions and by the public in our countries.

In conclusion, I should firstly like to express the satisfaction we feel at the high level of co-operation between the Presidential Committee and the Council of Ministers. I believe that in this co-operation a very great degree of agreement and trust has been attained and we hope to maintain and if possible improve it. Our thanks are also due to the French Presidency for its recognition of our common interest in achieving maximum flexibility and mutual trust.

But secondly, I must share with you the increasing concern felt by the Presidential Committee in connection with the events of the past six months, especially the Gulf crisis. We are concerned about the Assembly's lack of a representative organ able to meet at short notice, within days or even hours in certain circumstances, in order to analyse situations and express the views of the Assembly on certain events or actions that call for an immediate opinion from the Assembly, not after five months have gone by, which is what happened after the events of 2nd August of this year. In our view, there are two ways in which this gap could be bridged: by giving much wider powers to the Presidential Committee itself or by setting up an intermediate body between the Assembly and the Presidential Committee, similar to the Standing Committee in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. We believe that a body of this type is needed in order to overcome the hiatus that developed during this period. We are firmly of the opinion that this course is preferable to giving wider powers to the committee, even though we are aware that it implies a long and complicated process like all processes that involve changing regulations and statutes in organisations as well developed as WEU. In any event the Assembly, through the

Mr. Martinez (continued)

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, should take this matter in hand – we understand that it is already doing so – and submit its proposals as soon as possible.

In conclusion, I should like to thank the secretariat once more for its help in drawing up the document before you and my colleagues on the Presidential Committee for appointing me to represent them in this way at our meeting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Martinez, for that excellent report.

The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. Martinez is virtually proposing an intermediate group between the Presidential Committee and our parliamentary Assembly. Why should the Presidential Committee not be capable of fulfilling the tasks arising in exceptional circumstances like those which have occurred this year?

I really cannot see the point of such a standing committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to that statement.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – I have only one thing to say and that is that I am in complete agreement. Mrs. Lentz-Cornette has indeed recognised that we are following exactly the course she indicates to remedy the shortcomings which we have identified in our work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With regard to the report presented by Mr. Martinez, I take it that the Assembly agrees that we ratify the action of the Presidential Committee?

Is anyone against?...

The action of the Presidential Committee is ratified.

10. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I have pleasure in welcoming to this resumed session and now invite to take the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, your Excellencies, honourable members, it only

happens once in a blue moon, but this time your session precedes the autumn meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council by a few days. Thus exempt from commenting on its outcome, I shall focus today on the future prospects for European security.

A decisive decade in the history of the European continent is drawing to a close. Over this month of December 1990, first, the nine WEU member states on Monday next, then the twelve members of the European Council and Intergovernmental Conferences and finally the North Atlantic Council will be laying the groundwork for faster progress with the building of Europe in general and at the same time continuing to construct the European security bulwark.

No such bulwark could exist without being buttressed on two sides: on one, the European Union that is to come; on the other, the Atlantic Alliance. The European security identity derives its strength and *raison d'être* from this dual buttressing which has given us prosperity and peace. Situated at the interface, the reactivated WEU is all the better placed to serve as a model for the security dimension of the European construction process.

May I, Mr. President, take this opportunity to press home a twofold message prompted by a reading of the very pertinent reports by your Assembly's committees and your own condensed and impressive opening address. Let me get straight to the point and express two ideas, which I believe are fundamental not only to the discussions that will take place in this forum but also to WEU's medium-term future.

First of all, let us harbour no illusions: the European edifice will not have a credible security dimension that will maintain peace in our continent and worldwide if we skimp on the tools that will make our defence strong. This is the lesson that I personally have learned from an analysis of the geostrategic conditions of our security, the unfolding events in the Gulf crisis and the prospects opened up by the CSCE summit in Paris. Let us not dissociate defence from security, thinking that we can achieve the latter without having the resources for the former.

Secondly, the decisions on European union now in gestation and the current strategic review within the alliance will pave the way for a harmonisation of institutions, in which our organisation too – in both its intergovernmental and its parliamentary dimension – will be implicated. We cannot overlook the fact that certain deadlines are approaching and we must therefore be ready for them. The changes which have taken place this year in the WEU ministerial organs have illustrated this vital need for flexibility.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

The end of the cold war, closing the ideological divide that has separated the East from the West of Europe, has created a continental space where co-operation can flourish on a new basis. To a growing extent, this space will be dominated by a coherent European Community weaving a varied fabric of relationships with peoples who, now that the bloc has been rent asunder, are at last liberated from servitude. The faster Europe manages to organise itself, the more it will be able to exploit its assets.

The first challenge facing the European institutions is to succeed in associating Central and Eastern Europe with the future European union. The first stage is that formidable revolution, democratisation, which is inseparable from the introduction of a market economy. If successful, it will pay substantial dividends in terms of security.

The affirmation of European unity can only strengthen the process of democracy, which is the prerequisite for restoring creativity where excessive bureaucracy has led to penury. Perestroika comes from an awareness that democracy and the abolition of the party state are the only path for the Soviet Union if it is to remain a credible power. This process of questioning is revealing shortcomings and accentuating poverty, thus provoking setbacks.

Our Europe must bring everything to bear to ensure that they do not lead to confrontation in the Soviet Union or in Yugoslavia. One of President Gorbachev's close advisers has warned of the consequences of a possible "political Chernobyl": uncontrollable migration and a return to authoritarianism, with all the tragedies it brings in its wake.

Our countries can stave off disaster by giving generously of their aid and experience, as urged by Chancellor Kohl, for this is also an investment in our own future and in peace. The status quo may in the event be a far cry from the lasting stability we hope to see established.

Peoples are rediscovering their history and identity. Former solidarity is being recreated across frontiers often imposed in flagrant disregard of human realities. A new unity may arise from today's fragmentation, provided that Western Europe offers diversified and conditional assistance, which, in reducing the imbalances and promoting the requisite conversion, will make genuine partners of the countries of Eastern Europe.

If it is to be truly satisfactory, such a development calls for the European union to be built with tenacity but without undue haste. Two traps to be avoided are a return to narrow nationalism and starry-eyed optimism about a world order.

Not all the risks of unequal rates of development are in the East; they confront us on all sides. The disastrous situation in Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, is getting even worse, and the Gulf crisis is certainly not helping.

The danger of monetary disorder is no illusion. While it places pressure on Europe to put its own house in order, it also imposes a duty upon us to be able to contribute to the emergence of a new international order in this field.

Whatever soothing words we may choose to mask the dangerous realities, Europe is confronted with risks that are not just potential. It must draw the right conclusions in terms of its security. Saddam Hussein has at least the merit of reminding us that we should be ready for all contingencies.

Four months after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, I believe, Mr. President, that we can congratulate ourselves that WEU – the Council and Assembly – has so diligently and effectively rallied to the breach. Our organisation's communiqués and messages have helped to mobilise public opinion while, behind the scenes, naval, air/ground and logistic co-ordination has been set up to enforce the embargo.

The European Community and WEU member states are united in condemning the annexation of Kuwait and the grave, repeated violations of international law perpetrated by Iraq in the wake of this "coup de force". They are also united in their resolve to implement the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Their firmness reflects their determination to exhaust every means of exerting peaceful pressure. This does not mean that they are waiving the option of force which Saddam Hussein's criminal obduracy may oblige them to invoke. Paradoxically, the future of peace is in the hands of the aggressor.

By comparison with the 1988-89 operation, WEU has established itself in the field as a true partner to the Americans and to the Arab powers who have expressed the wish for direct aid from the international community. On this subject, you will find helpful details in the article I have just written for the November-December issue of the journal "Survival".

The time has not yet come to take stock of these actions by WEU, but at least we have now stated the problem of the mechanisms and means that our organisation should have at its disposal if it is to be able to play an effective operational rôle in the early stages of an out-of-Europe crisis.

Like you, Mr. President, and Mr. De Decker, I believe that Europe will have to have well-trained and well-armed intervention forces that

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

will enable it to defend its own interests in the world, though without seeking to be a world policeman. Is it realistic to believe that Europe could be satisfied with United Nations forces to act as buffers between warring factions or as humanitarian missions? The world is far from being governed by the principles that are starting to prevail in Europe through the CSCE process.

(The speaker continued in English)

These principles have just been successfully confirmed and expanded by the Charter of Paris. A new chapter has been opened in the momentous development of the CSCE process, which paved the way for the opening of the gates of freedom. Institutionalised ongoing co-operation, as well as the first practical steps towards effective conflict-prevention mechanisms, signal a new and welcome departure. However, the limitations of the CSCE process are obvious. The difficult task ahead of giving substance and life to the new bodies raises the broader issue of structuring the three levels of European co-operation in the field of security: WEU and the European union, the alliance and the CSCE process.

WEU and the alliance must ensure and reinforce their cohesion in order to remain the irreplaceable focus of stability for our continent. Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance remains as justified in its existence as ever. The transatlantic link binding Europe and North America is being reassessed and will be developed on a new basis in the wake of the CFE treaty. That is the purpose of the review of the alliance's tasks and the adaptation of NATO structures to a Europe soon to be free of over-militarised confrontation.

This leap towards a future where neither defence nor deterrence has become obsolete will guarantee the relevance of the alliance in three respects. First, it will be as a stabilising factor as long as – not least for the emerging democracies – the Soviet Union or even Russia retains overwhelming conventional and nuclear capabilities. Secondly, it will be as a forum where North America and Europe discuss common security concerns, evaluate risks and co-ordinate their responses; and thirdly, as an inspiration and model for possible further development of security structures in the CSCE framework.

The CSCE will operate most effectively at the level of principles and prevention. It cannot for the foreseeable future provide the firm defence guarantees for the whole of Europe which exist in the Washington and Brussels Treaties. WEU and the alliance will continue to be the basis for deterrence and defence.

Europe will effectively shoulder its increased part of the common security burden only if it develops its security co-operation – notably through the creation of multinational units able to integrate American reinforcements – and avoids the trap of a renationalisation of defence. Unilateral, unco-ordinated decisions would only undermine national defence efforts as well as Europe's credibility.

Within the alliance Europeans must now ensure that their positions are presented and explained so as to nurture an open-ended debate prior to any final decision. This is an essential element of a balanced two-way working relationship with North America. European countries must get their act together and engage in a process of bold and imaginative reflection, initiated in the WEU framework, to strengthen their contribution to the alliance and give it more coherence.

This will require more autonomy of action for Europeans, and even the definition of operational rôles – in verification and space observation, for instance. Such developments will be based on or stem from major steps forward in the process of achieving a European union, which is the commonly-accepted aim of the Nine of WEU or the Twelve of the European Community.

A gradual approach is being envisaged to that end. Several institutional formulae have been put forward. The vital prerequisites are, first, to retain the achievements of the Community – the *acquis communauté*; secondly, to build on the achievements of WEU reactivation; thirdly, to recognise that it will take some time fully to integrate a foreign policy and security dimension into the mainstream of the European construction process; and, fourthly, to address security as a whole rather than piecemeal.

Transfers of sovereignty in defence obviously can only be a step-by-step process. In the meantime, bridges will have to be built. WEU will be a useful instrument in that respect, since its vocation is precisely to build bridges with the community and with the alliance, paving the way for the long overdue emergence of a strong European defence identity as well as, what I call, a transatlantic security contract. New mechanisms for EC-WEU co-ordination may result from the intergovernmental conference which is to start in a few days.

Premature enlargement of WEU and the EC for the sake of symmetry should be avoided until the relationship between NATO, the EC and WEU has been reassessed and improved and until precise commonly-agreed criteria have been defined. However, the intensification of the information arrangements enjoyed by Greece and Turkey as well as their extension to other European NATO partners who are not in

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

the Community and who wish to enjoy the same opportunity may be considered.

As the Nine and the Twelve draw close together, WEU countries could start to define the content of future security contracts designed to reinforce their relationships with those countries which, especially given their geostrategic position, have a specific and major rôle in the collective defence. The aim of such an initiative would be to provide reassurance, expanding and better co-ordinating existing security assistance and co-operation under the auspices of the competent European security institutions. It would supplement, but not undermine or replace, commitments undertaken within the alliance.

I am confident, Mr. President, that Europe will move forward resolutely to give itself the necessary structures and means to shoulder to the full its ever-increasing responsibilities in the world. The 1990s will be the decade of progress in security, just as the 1960s were in economics and the 1970s in foreign policy co-operation.

For the building of Europe, security is inextricably linked to continuing prosperity, the latter reinforcing the former. I hope that your discussions will help to clarify the goals of European union, for clarity is all the more vital since success in the building of Europe depends so much on public assent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your highly informative and realistic address. I trust you will be prepared to reply to questions as usual.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I have three quick questions to ask. Two arise from the information letter covering May to August. On page five the Secretary-General talks about the institutionalisation of the CSCE, but he makes no reference to the proposed assembly of Europe. May we take it that he endorses the idea of an assembly of Europe?

Secondly, the Secretary-General talked about the four subjects which the institute is examining. May we take it that the conclusions will be made available to this parliamentary Assembly?

My third question is about a report which appeared in yesterday's Figaro and suggests that the Secretary-General is one of those who wishes to see his organisation disappear. Does he endorse what Figaro says or is it inaccurate, as so many newspaper reports are?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I gladly respond to Sir Geoffrey. All three points merit an immediate reply.

First, I certainly endorse the assembly of Europe, although it will probably have responsibilities outside WEU and this Assembly in the sense of security. However, at the same time – I stress that this is my personal conviction – it should be as identical as possible to the Council of Europe. We do not need another assembly in Europe standing entirely on its own. I know that there is a problem with the North American representation, but I hope that it can be resolved. I hope that there will be convergence. The assembly of Europe will primarily deal with the third basket of the CSCE process – the human dimensions and everything that can be done to strengthen human rights.

Secondly, we hope to inform the Assembly about the major findings of the seminars in the WEU Institute which, thanks to John Roper, got off to an amazingly quick start. It has already held three seminars on East-West relations with representatives of Eastern European countries, dealing with future European architecture and the situation in the Mediterranean. I am sure that Mr. Roper will be happy to make a summary available to the Assembly.

Thirdly, as is often the case with newspaper items, they are not entirely correct. Sometimes I have said that I am probably the only Secretary-General who, if everything goes as he wishes, in the end would not mind seeing his organisation merge into a wider context. In that context, I hope that my speech this afternoon was useful to the Assembly. I intended to demonstrate how I look at the process of convergence. We started with the economic dimension, then the foreign policy dimension was added in the 1970s. Ultimately, in the 1990s, I hope that other dimensions will join the process – the environmental and social dimensions as well as the security dimension. I hope that ultimately we can all merge in a European union. I have the feeling that somebody else will be the Secretary-General of WEU when that is realised.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In his statement the Secretary-General referred to the intervention forces that will be needed in future. My three questions are directly related to this.

First, why set up intervention forces now, of all times, at the beginning of the 1990s? Why are these forces deemed necessary now, when they have not been necessary for the last few decades and there is surely more scope for peace and détente now than in the past?

Second, how can this course, if adopted, be regarded as compatible with disarmament policy objectives? Our goal is surely to solve political problems by trying to eliminate their social and

Mr. Scheer (continued)

political causes peacefully, instead of adopting this kind of approach and possibly making the mistake that has been made – in different circumstances – several times in the last four decades, by actually creating the problem which must then allegedly be eliminated by a military potential?

Third, how does the WEU Council of Ministers justify out-of-area operations by Western European Union under the WEU treaty? I have read the WEU treaty several times, without finding anything in the text, purpose or reasons underlying its existence to justify the formation of out-of-area intervention forces. Can the Secretary-General refute my suspicion that this course of action would be in contravention of the WEU treaty?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I will begin with the third question, because I think it is the most important. I believe WEU has dual competence here. First, Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty says that the WEU Council may be convened if that is what a country wants, in connection with, say, a crisis, or political developments anywhere in the world, in other words, not restricted to Europe.

Second, we have already set out in The Hague platform that the most important question for us Europeans is that of our security interests in the world. So we are not restricted to one treaty area, as NATO is. All we are concerned about is whether there are European interests important enough to be protected by specific means, such as economic sanctions, or even, at the end of the day, military means. The WEU Council came to the conclusion in 1987 that we were able and also willing to use such means. We are prepared. We proved it in 1987, with the naval operation in the Gulf, and we are doing so again today in the crisis caused by Iraq's aggression. We are prepared to accept responsibility for protecting European interests. We do not want to leave everything to the Americans. Nor will this be possible in the future, because I do not think the Americans will co-operate if we Europeans shirk our responsibility. That would do serious harm to relations with North America.

That is the justification, in general terms.

You began by asking, why intervention forces? In my opinion, what is not possible today – the President and Mr. De Decker have said much the same thing – is a presence in the Gulf region that is based on more than naval units, that is to say, one that also includes land and air forces. Why not? Because we do not have

suitable equipment and because these forces have not had appropriate training. In the past most WEU countries have been geared entirely to an East-West crisis, to a major crisis, to a surprise attack. We hope this will no longer happen – and if it did, there would be a warning period.

My personal idea – we have not yet discussed all the details in the WEU Council – is that we in Europe should be capable of making some of the troops we already have, and can use, more mobile and training and equipping them better, so that they can be deployed outside Europe if that is the political decision we take. So the flexibility that everyone is now emphasising should also apply to these forces.

Your second question was whether this is compatible with disarmament agreements. Yes, of course it is. Why should it not be? As I told the Assembly in June, European willingness to integrate our forces into multinational units is conducive to stability and confidence building. We must work towards a situation in which multinational units are taken for granted in Europe, in which military power is not national power. I believe this to be entirely compatible with disarmament and arms control. So far, we have restrictions on tanks and so on, but it is to be hoped that there will also be ceilings on numbers of troops in our countries, even before 1992. But the deployment of multinational units in third-country conflicts will be entirely compatible with this agreement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am sure we all welcomed the initiative taken by President Bush immediately after the Security Council issued its ultimatum, in offering direct discussions with Iraq. I think we all hope this will lead to a political solution of this difficult problem. Having said this, I have the following questions.

First, how was WEU, or how were the countries that have sent forces to the Gulf region, involved in the American President's decision? Were there any consultations, or, if not, how was the decision communicated?

Second, are the discussions to take place after consultation with WEU or with its participation, or at least that of those countries which have sent forces to the Gulf region?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Ahrens has also raised two important questions.

In answer to the first, regarding contacts with the Americans, I can say that they have been very intensive. On the other hand, I was not

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

myself informed of this new initiative, although I very much welcome it, as does Mr. Ahrens, I cannot say for the moment which of the WEU countries had advance information, but that may be a good question for the speakers who will be here on Wednesday.

I would emphasise none the less that I think it very important that President Bush said, in the proposal to invite the Iraqi Foreign Minister to Washington, that these contacts might be continued in the presence of the ambassadors of the other countries participating in the Gulf operation. That is some indication that things are moving in the direction indicated in your question and which I, too, very much endorse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, in his statement, our President, Mr. Pontillon, kindly referred to what the Assembly of WEU and the committee of which I am Chairman have done with regard to relaunching the satellite agency for the control of disarmament. He also pointed out how useful the availability of observation and remote-sensing satellites is proving to be, among other things, in relation to the military activities in the Gulf.

WEU has gone some way towards meeting the wishes of this Assembly by arranging for a committee to be set up to study the problems surrounding the industrial and scientific co-operation there needs to be between the space agencies in order to achieve the desired objectives.

I would like to know what action the Secretary-General intends to take at the level of the Council of Ministers to ensure that a positive decision is arrived at.

I would also like to say that expectations in the scientific world and in the space agencies are high in this regard and that they are hoping for solutions enabling this project to be put into effect.

I would be grateful, Secretary-General, if you would answer my question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – It is with pleasure, Mr. President, that I can assure Mr. Stegagnini that that item will be on the agenda of the Council of Ministers on 10th December. We have made some progress in the ad hoc working group. We now propose a step-by-step approach in which ultimately some European satellites may be one possibility but where as a first step we shall probably start more

modestly. The idea at present is to start with a centre which will be fairly modest but will focus in particular on the analysis of satellite photographs, which are becoming available through other means. In the light of that experience we shall define the next steps. I do not know to what extent it will be possible at this stage to make a final decision in December but certainly in the spring the issue should be ripe for implementation. We shall certainly keep the Assembly fully informed of our progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Let me add that the Assembly's wish would be for a firm decision to be taken on 10th December, not postponed to next spring.

I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, you have said that, paradoxically, future peace is in the hands of the aggressor. Could you explain this paradox to me? So far, the aggressor has made no great display of pacifism. He wanted war otherwise he would not have invaded Kuwait.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – To a certain extent, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, you are quite right to criticise the expression. I hesitated to use it myself. But there is, indeed, a paradox, and my use of the expression was a way of pointing out that, with President Bush's recent initiative, we are all ready to take the road of peace and that it is up to President Saddam Hussein to show whether or not he is ready to go the same way, failing which we shall have to use military force. Hence the paradox that peace is in his hands. It is now his responsibility.

The American initiative is very useful in the sense that it will bring home to public opinion quite clearly that we in the West have done our utmost to avoid war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General.

11. Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty

(a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1245)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on two reports from the Political Committee concerning the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty and the votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1245 and 1250.

The President (continued)

We shall first consider the report on the reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council, Document 1245.

I call the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I begin by dealing with the first report – Document 1245 on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. Colleagues will see that the report was adopted unanimously by the Political Committee and that it contains several items of considerable importance. I shall deal with the last one first.

Colleagues will remember that for a considerable time there have been complaints that the burden of work falling on representatives is exceptionally heavy because everyone who comes to WEU is forced also to attend the Council of Europe. The treaty makes it clear that the representation here is identical to that at the Council of Europe. For a long time – to my knowledge for three years – there have been requests for a change to enable each parliament to decide for itself whether it wishes to send the same delegation, an entirely different delegation or a mixed delegation of some representatives who go to the Council of Europe and some who do not. Therefore, recommendation 2 (*d*) gives the Council of Ministers a clear signal that in the revision of the treaty – which they must make – they should enable each country to choose the method that it requires to select its delegation.

We were also critical of the fact that the Council does not give us sufficient information about its activities. I make it clear that we do not refer to the excellent letters that we receive from the Secretary-General. Those letters are a pleasant new development. They are excessively helpful and everyone owes a real debt of gratitude to Mr. van Eekelen for putting the letters into such substantial form. They contain proper views, not a mish-mash of diplomatic language which in the end means absolutely nothing. Any criticism that we made is not of the Secretary-General's letters. We criticise the type of "responses" that we receive from the Council of Ministers, particularly in answer to our questions.

I doubt whether any of us would accept such answers in our national parliaments. Any minister who tried to get away with such answers in our own parliament would soon cease to be a minister and would get short shrift. I am aware of the problem, that there must be consensus and that, therefore, we achieve the lowest common denominator. But nonetheless, as we say in the report, we are, after all, an assembly of representatives of all the national parliaments. We believe that we are rather more important

and, therefore, entitled to more substantial answers than we customarily receive.

We applaud the Secretary-General's proposal to address our committees and this has already commenced. It is a very helpful meeting for the Political Committee, and I hope that it will be repeated, but we have to judge the occasion so that we do not waste the time of either ourselves or of the Secretary-General. We are of one mind as to how that should be done.

We made the point clearly that the Council should make certain that the reports from its variety of groups correspond properly to the agendas of the sessions of the Assembly. We stress the four items in recommendation 2, which try to set out the need for revision of the treaty, not only to take into account the accession of Spain and Portugal, but to follow what has happened in Eastern and Central Europe.

That is as brief an explanation as I can give of the document and the details of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Scovaccicchi.

Mr. SCOVACCICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, though I refer in particular to paragraph 19 of the explanatory memorandum, it seems to me that the debate could easily be extended to cover all the subjects dealt with in the two reports, i.e. WEU and the European Community and the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. Allow me to put forward a few thoughts.

Since the time when many of us held the view that the first and only thing to do was simply to strengthen WEU, a new political and military situation has been taking shape in Europe that has enabled a new conception of intra-European relations to be envisaged guaranteeing security for all in the framework of the existing structures though perhaps also, in the event of enlargement or change, by bilateral agreement provided the phasing necessary to prevent imbalance being created is respected.

In its time, i.e. when it was being written, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report – in fact the two reports we are considering today – rightly merited unanimous approval. But now, as a result of the change I have referred to, the conviction is now to my mind full-grown that the strengthening we want could be better achieved by closer relations and, by the logic of things, subsequent de facto association between WEU and the EEC. WEU would provide the EEC with a basis on which to construct a single foreign policy among all the members of the EEC whereas the EEC could provide WEU with a

Mr. Scovacricchi (continued)

prestigious name, a kind of imprimatur, which would of itself constitute a substantial strengthening of our institution.

It is clear, Mr. President, that all this in no way affects the essential rôle of NATO as source and guarantee of cohesion between the two shores of the Atlantic. Although the ever-present threat of the East that had dictated NATO's constant state of vigilance has disappeared, the residual military might of the Soviet Union on both sides of the Urals argues for the maintenance of staunch Euro-American relations.

These points, of course, have nothing to do with the rôle of WEU in the Gulf which has a short-term time frame compared with the wider medium- and long-term perspective of the arguments I have briefly, and superficially perhaps, advanced. While commending the recommendation for the work that has gone into it, I therefore have reservations about it unless it is brought up to date.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think it would be best, Sir Geoffrey, for you to reply first to this question which raises many problems.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to defer my reply. Mr. Scovacricchi referred to paragraph 19 but, as he will know, there is a separate report on this issue – the second report, Document 1250. I shall reserve my remarks on that paragraph until we come to the second document, which I have not yet introduced. It would be helpful to separate the two items.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think, Mr. Scovacricchi, that Sir Geoffrey's proposal to reply in the context of the second debate is perhaps to the point because the recommendation is specifically concerned.

I call Mr. Lopez Valdivielso.

Mr. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO (*Spain*) (Translation). – I wish to comment briefly on Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report because its content causes me concern about a matter of importance: the future not only of this Assembly but of Western European Union itself. I should therefore like to speak about the content of the report rather than the draft recommendations, as this really is relevant to the report that will be discussed later.

The report deals, once again, with the need for Western European Union to be revitalised. The Gulf crisis has shown that even though much remains to be done, WEU has performed an important rôle – though one less important than it should have been. Nevertheless, WEU has done what it could, given its present consti-

tution as a political forum with no structure for military co-ordination.

However, if we believe in WEU and in the rôle that it can and ought to play in the future we should do everything possible to make it more operational and from that point of view I believe that paragraphs 1(e) and (f) of the recommendation are extremely important.

It is essential for relations and communications between the Council and the Assembly to be improved and for reports not to be treated as mere administrative documents empty of any real information on the activity of the Council. There is also need for an improved response by the Council to the recommendations from this Assembly.

On some matters, political discussion alone is not sufficient; in WEU we have to move on from words to action. I strongly agree with the Rapporteur about the three lines of action that should be taken by WEU during the coming years, as mentioned in the report and referred to by the Secretary-General in the speech he made on 9th October. Taking this together with the report we are shortly to debate – and I believe the two are closely connected – I wish to state that, although it is necessary to define a European policy on defence and security, I believe that the proposal that responsibility for this should be assumed by the European Community can only create confusion and would not help to achieve the aim in view. For one thing, at a time when we are trying to confer stability, content and importance on an institution we should not undermine that institution by proposing that it should be stripped of its powers, and for another I believe the Community is not the right body to have those powers, if only because not all of its members have the same commitment to our common defence.

It will not make possible a common European doctrine on security and foreign policy or progress towards political union. That will be considerably slowed down by what is happening in the East, greatly though we may welcome these events, and also by the depression. The economic boom we have experienced and which is now slowing down, was tending to accelerate the process. The depression may bring it to a halt. Unless progress is made towards economic union which would be a factor in facilitating political union, it is difficult to see how progress towards unity on defence is possible.

Lastly, I believe it would be unwise to create a separate institution rather than consolidate the existing one; it could jeopardise the progress already achieved within Western European Union. In a world of rapid political change where the future is uncertain, WEU provides the only instrument for uniting our efforts in the field of security and for maintaining our links

Mr. Lopez Valdivielso (continued)

with our friends on the other side of the Atlantic, without whom it is impossible to frame a doctrine of security that goes beyond fine speeches and high-sounding statements of principle. For this reason it is also very important, as the report insists, to define the concept of the two pillars of the alliance.

I know that I have anticipated the debate that is to follow, but there can be no doubt that what he has just told us has a very important bearing on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome what Mr. Lopez Valdivielso has said. He is absolutely right that we must build a structure and we must know where we are going. We must also recognise that, in defence, that structure is special because it involves not only the survival of individual nations, but the organisation to which they belong. That is what I have sought to say in both documents. I welcome the support that Mr. Lopez Valdivielso has given.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is with some emotion that I speak my first words in this Assembly and take this welcome opportunity to pay my respects to you, Mr. President; I have long had great regard and admiration for your political style.

But my pleasure is also due to my being able to put my first question to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg whose knowledge and political wisdom have been evident throughout the many contacts I have had with him.

May I therefore ask you, Sir Geoffrey, a question which at bottom is only a reaffirmation of what you yourself have said in all the meetings of the committee of which I had the honour to be a member.

Considering that the entry of Portugal and Spain and the Gulf crisis, the two items concerned in the recommendation proposed by yourself and now under discussion in this plenary meeting, although important and doubtless of much interest to the life of the Assembly, are not alone, considering the upheavals we have seen in Central and Eastern Europe, the end of one of the blocs and the possible break up of the Soviet Union, considering that in some sense Western Europe has lost the points of reference that had oriented its political thinking for more than forty years, considering the new rôle of NATO, considering that the frame of reference for European defence and

security has also changed, and considering that new prospects have opened up for CSCE, may I ask you whether this broadening of the outlook does not mean that we have to waste no time in changing our statutes in order to enable this Assembly to respond as effectively as possible to the new challenges resulting from the rapid changes taking place in Europe and thus to contribute more effectively to peace and security both in Europe and in the rest of the world.

Apart from this question, on which I should be glad to hear your views, may I say that I fully support the proposal that WEU should authorise national parliaments to choose the members representing them here. This would be an improvement, for one thing because it would facilitate the more frequent presence of parliamentarians whose duties include attendance at meetings of the Council of Europe. The dual rôle inevitably implies some inconvenience, especially for members from peripheral countries like Portugal since, even for just one day's work, every trip involves three days' absence.

Furthermore, if national parliaments were allowed to choose their own representatives this would increase the number of members of parliament with international contacts, with beneficial results for the parliaments concerned. Moreover, the latter would be able to pick members who would be better geared to the specific functions and particular objectives of WEU, which are somewhat different from those of the Council of Europe.

In view of the foregoing I support your proposal that national parliaments should be authorised to choose their representatives in WEU. I think this can only be beneficial.

I should also like to support your view that the statement made by the Italian Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the Communities is a serious attack on the concept I am advancing, with regard to the organs of sovereignty but above all the collective representation of our parliaments. If that statement were to win acceptance national parliaments would lose a most important function, that of pronouncing upon such important subjects as security and defence.

I should like to hear Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's opinion on these brief and rather bald comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you for your kind comments, Mr. Amaral. I have two points to make because basically you were fully in support of the document.

We have to examine the changes that are taking place. Paragraph 10 of the explanatory memorandum quotes what the Secretary-

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

General said to the Political Committee. We endorse what he said and point out that we have spoken about this in a variety of recommendations. Nothing stops us from producing reports on the dramatic changes that are taking place throughout Europe.

You say, Mr. Amaral, that it would be nice to have a quick change of the statutes, but that is a long drawn-out process. You will not mind me saying, dear friend, that although we persuaded ministers to change statutes to include Spain and Portugal, it took Portugal a long time to ratify them so that it could become a full member. We all must go through long processes after ministers have reached their conclusions. There is no likelihood of any swift changes of statute. We must work within the existing statutes – perhaps, by interpreting them as widely as a parliamentary assembly would do. That is why the Presidential Committee, for example, could approve a couple of proposals in the absence of the Assembly. That, in turn, is why next time some sort of standing committee, such as we have at the Council of Europe, will be proposed. It would be able to act swiftly in between meetings of the Assembly.

I shall deal with the third question when I come to the second report. It concerned the Italian proposition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would just like to take up the first remark the Rapporteur made, about the nature of delegations to the WEU Assembly. Until now the requirement has been that these delegations should be identical to the delegations to the Council of Europe. The Rapporteur wants the member states of the treaty to be free to send different delegations to the two assemblies, and the reason he gives for this is the pressure of work on the parliamentarians concerned. I have advocated in the past that the same delegations continue to be involved in the work of the assemblies, and I will do so again. Why?

There is a natural link between the Council of Europe and WEU. WEU is founded on social, economic and cultural stability as the basis of peace and security. In the 1930s we learnt that social, economic and cultural instability played a major part in persuading the public to follow warmongering politicians. In the 1950s, WEU transferred social, economic and cultural matters to the Council of Europe, but it did not say that it was no longer interested in these matters. This laid the foundations for the links between the Council of Europe and WEU. It is entirely in keeping with the Brussels Treaty that

WEU's interests should be looked after by those who are also members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Indeed, given the ideas that Mr. van Eekelen put forward earlier this afternoon about matters relating to the CSCE and so on, we should not only be approving of the present situation: it also amounts to a genuine dual mandate. With more specialised delegations there would be a danger of more specialised military activities being discussed here. That might conflict with the premises of the WEU treaty. Let me say once again: there is a reasonable, functional and natural link that must be maintained. Did Sir Geoffrey Finsberg take these aspects into account when considering whether or not to put forward the idea of different delegations again?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – That is an interesting point. I have two comments to make. Due to my normal brevity I did not give massive reasons for this. It was not just pressure of work. I have spoken to members of delegations from different parliaments and they all say that some of their colleagues are not interested in the work of WEU because they are not interested in defence. Some want to specialise in environmental and cultural matters. Although the modified treaty gave us certain powers and functions in those areas, many years ago we made it clear that we were handing those matters, particularly economic matters, over to the Council of Europe.

No one will force any country to change its system if it does not want to. If the Netherlands wishes to continue to have the identical delegation, that will be its choice. In a democracy it must be best to let each parliament decide the composition of its delegation. That is all that we are trying to do. We are providing flexibility.

I did not quite follow the point about delegates who might be militaristic, which would be in conflict with the treaty. Basically, we deal with defence matters. Whether they deal with convergence or not, they are still defence matters. I cannot see that a militaristic view would be alien. In many cases those who have had a military career are most anxious to find ways of peace. Perhaps it is wiser to provide this flexibility, which is all that we are trying to do. We are in no way saying that a country must change. We are saying to the Council of Ministers that each member country should choose its own composition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That concludes the list of speakers.

The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The report was discussed at length in committee. We adopted it unanimously. I call on the Assembly to approve it.

In particular, we took some considerable time over the last question raised by Mr. Tummers. In the process we were able to evaluate the experience of the new members from Spain and Portugal, when they were forced to change the membership of their delegations.

We believe our proposal will create the flexibility that will enable the parliaments of our member countries to choose the way that seems most appropriate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you for that recommendation, Mr. Ahrens.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1245.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

(b) WEU and the European Community

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1250)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the report by the Political Committee on WEU and the European Community, Document 1250.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to deal with the second report, Document 1250, which picks up the item in paragraph 19 of the first report.

There are two ways of looking at the situation, and there is no third way. The first is to be pragmatic and to look at the situation as it is, which is what the report tries to do. The report also states that circumstances may change; nothing is set in concrete. At this stage, especially in the

light of the comments by the Secretary-General, it would be wrong to make any premature promises about change.

I should like to quote from the letter written by the Secretary-General in September. The first quote is important in the context of the failure to get WEU understood as an organisation – something about which we have complained for years. He states: “The fact that WEU, in its own right, co-chaired the naval conference in Bahrain on 8th September along with the two United States and Arab states representatives is tangible proof that our organisation is indeed the only one competent to give practical expression to the European will to react concretely to the direct threats to peace and security in the widest sense.”

That is important, because we have never before been recognised in that sense. Nice things were said about us when we took part in the mine-clearing operation, but we have never co-chaired in that sense. It is important to make that point.

The Secretary-General stated: “With WEU, Europe has a nucleus around which to build a new European defence structure, a structure which must include operational responsibilities, particularly for intervention outside Europe.”

The Secretary-General was talking about the new geostrategic order and the increase in the areas of instability in Europe. I need not list those potential areas.

The Secretary-General stated: “On the question of the current review of alliance strategy, WEU member states must bring all their weight to bear in this process. Western Europe will in fact have to shoulder a greater responsibility for conventional defence and the new constraints arising from the implementation of the CFE treaty will call for much closer defence co-operation, which will undoubtedly affect the linkage between the component parts of the reorganised European defence posture. It is within WEU that specific proposals must be drawn up enabling Europeans to reply positively to the invitation from the United States for ‘partnership in leadership’ within the alliance and its politico-military bodies.”

That having been said, it would be folly for us to leap into some other idea.

In two places in the report we make the point that the only concrete suggestion for change came from Mr. De Michelis, but we have not seen the document. We do not know what he said. A couple of weeks ago, when we were in Rome for the human rights ceremony, I had the chance to talk to those involved and to ask whether there was a text that could be made available to us. I have not yet received that text. It would be helpful if one of our Italian col-

1. See page 19.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

leagues could get that text so that we could at least see what was said.

I hope that at this stage the Assembly will decide that it can endorse the document, which makes a few separate points. I should like to deal with them quickly. The document starts by making it clear that this is the only assembly entitled by treaty to deal with defence matters. That treaty does not expire until 1998. It can be denounced only by giving a year's notice thereafter. My reading of it is that, unless all states decide to get rid of it, it continues and that it cannot be denounced honourably by one state.

In our judgment, one cannot separate one item of the treaty when looking at the defence issue as a whole. We noted that there was a European Parliament resolution which proposed that reactivation of WEU should be terminated. Those who may have seen the BBC television programme "Dr. Who" will remember that the Daleks go about saying "Terminate" or "Exterminate" without defining what they say. We in this Assembly are drawn directly from our national parliaments. We are therefore able in our national parliaments to raise these vital matters of defence which Mr. Amaral and our friend from Spain, Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, said are very much within our sovereign competence under the treaty. The European Parliament does not have that same reputation because its members do not have seats in a national parliament.

The committee and I are convinced that, if we were to change the situation at this stage – I am not talking about what may happen after 1998; it will take a long time to make any major changes – it would, as Mr. van Eekelen said, weaken the effect that Western Europe has on the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. We are still the European pillar of NATO. It is desperately important that we remain recognised as such.

The committee said that we hoped that the Council would pursue the reactivation of WEU so that we can play a more effective part in NATO. We ask the Council not to take a decision that calls into question the treaty without consulting us beforehand. That point is made strongly. We do not want consultation after the event; we want consultation if there is a desire to make a radical change.

I hope that those remarks are sufficient to introduce the document to the Assembly. I should be delighted to deal with points as they come up.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Geoffrey, for the concise manner in which you present all your reports.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. de Puig to speak first.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – The report and the draft recommendation presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg constitute, as he himself has told us, a rejection of certain proposals that have reached us from some sectors of the European Community. They say no to any immediate linkage of WEU with the EEC but yes to the reactivation of WEU. If I am to vote for this draft recommendation I shall do so because I see it as a short-term text, one for this particular moment and dealing, in Sir Geoffrey's own words, with the situation as it stands without predetermining future possibilities.

Our thanks are due to Sir Geoffrey for his report with its interesting supporting documentation describing the legal situation and political developments on this subject, which together with further communications from him provide a perfect outline of the legal and political situation. This is not a conclusive debate, it is the first stage of in-depth discussions on the institutional future of what we have called the new European architecture in the area of peace and security and which includes the future of WEU. This is likely to be a wide-ranging debate that will repeatedly occupy us during the months and years to come. This is why I feel that the recommendation relates fundamentally to the present situation and that its recommendation to the Council is meant for today and for the present stage of existence of the European institutions and Europe's institutional development. If, in a few months' or years' time, we could vote upon a different kind of recommendation and move a few steps forward, I at least would welcome it.

I should like to explain the way I intend to vote. I am against the pure and simple abolition of WEU, for I think that it has an important part to play, as the Gulf crisis has amply demonstrated. It is the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It has certain responsibilities which Sir Geoffrey has just mentioned in relation to its own status and representation; we are members of national parliaments that are geographically limited. There is no other institution covering this area and this sphere in Europe. This seems to me to justify WEU's existence and to rule out any thought of its disappearance until the time when it can be replaced by a different formation in the European architecture referred to above. On the contrary I believe it should be given new strength, which would not prevent it from becoming part of another organisation in the future, in the new architecture. In any event, it will be a good thing to strengthen WEU. I must also agree with Sir Geoffrey that this is not the time for WEU to be handed over to the European Community. There would be no agreement on this at the present time either between countries or members of parliament. There is no current political proposal formulated in strictly legal terms in the European Community and it remains to be seen what decisions will be

Mr. de Puig (continued)

taken in the forthcoming intergovernmental conferences. As yet, there is no clear, agreed legal formula enjoying the general consensus.

This said, whilst I shall vote in favour of the draft recommendation, I must also make the following observations. European union will require the EEC to assume defence responsibilities; it is not possible to conceive of future political union without certain responsibilities for defence. I believe the time is approaching when a decision will have to be made on what these responsibilities are to be and at that time it would, I think, be in the nature of things for WEU and the European Community to come together. The same countries are involved, the same governments. Whilst it is impossible to imagine a European union that does not include a defensive sphere of peace and security, it is also impossible to imagine an EEC with responsibility for defence existing side by side with a WEU that is still alive and functioning.

This being so, we should be making a serious mistake if our vote today meant that we were shutting ourselves up in an absurd corporativism trying to stem the tide of history and failing to recognise that Europe is changing and that we must change with it. And although at this time we are answering a clear no to certain proposals that are neither well-reasoned, nor serious, nor legally-based, nor formulated with the necessary precision and which we think exaggerated – as, for example, the idea of WEU's simply being swallowed by the Community – our attitude must not be purely defensive. Our object is not to keep this institution in being, on the sidelines of European development, at all costs, but to serve the cause of European defence and security as well as possible, and when the situation changes, when in 1998 or some other year, as Sir Geoffrey said, there is a new political framework and some valid legal formulae, we shall have to take other decisions, probably very different from those we are taking today, and urge forward what I believe is the inevitable process of linkage, association and perhaps integration of WEU with the European Community. Now is not the time but it will come, and WEU should not simply follow in the wake of decisions made by others. We have to be able to put forward our own proposals when the time is ripe.

Therefore, I regard today's vote as an open one, not a closed or final one. Today we are voting against the linkage of WEU to the EEC, tomorrow we may very well be voting for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I can confirm to Mr. de Puig that there is no pre-emption. Future events will require us to have a

fresh look at the position. I did not go into detail because I am sure that everyone has read the report. One immediate problem is referred to in paragraph 13 of the explanatory memorandum. That matter must be resolved. One point occurred to me as Mr. de Puig was speaking. He said that the problem may be a subject for discussion at some of the intergovernmental conferences which will take place. The IGCs are government organisations. NATO is a government organisation. The Council of Ministers is a government organisation. One way to deal with the matter effectively may be to bring together a small group drawn from the North Atlantic Assembly, the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly simply to consider as parliamentarians how we see the future, rather than letting that future be decided for us by bureaucrats and ministers. The Political Committee may decide to examine that as a constructive way forward. I hope that I have reassured you Mr. de Puig that the matter will not be set in concrete but that we shall merely make a decision for the present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am pleased to see this gratifying convergence of view between Mr. de Puig and the Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think it would be stating the obvious to say that the international and indeed European situation is changing too fast for us to be content to draw a picture of the here and now; instead it prompts us to assess the future with realism and caution, but applying great imagination – on a par with the changing situation itself – and a resolutely forward-looking approach.

I would also, just looking at one feature of this change, like to refer to the now imminent European Council meeting which is to decide on the terms of reference for the intergovernmental conference on European union to be held in Rome from 14th to 15th December this year. The fact is that the central theme of European union at this conference will be foreign policy. Nor is it possible to conceive of a common foreign policy that does not include the subject of security and also therefore, in some form or other, the problems of defence.

Incidentally, it was the European Council itself at its Dublin meeting that underlined the two items of foreign policy and security to go on the agenda of the intergovernmental conference thus voicing its wish to establish terms of reference going beyond and above the provisions of Article 30 of the Single Act on this subject.

Let me now begin by recalling a number of fundamental principles from which, regardless of the juridical apparel in which we clothe the

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

process of our European construction, we must not depart in the area of security and defence.

European security can be ensured only in the NATO framework. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact does not imply any weakening of the continuing value of the Atlantic Alliance which must not and will not be called into question by us because of the changing international and pan-European situation. In the same way there must be no calling into question of the fundamental principle of the European countries' solidarity in defence as specifically stated in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty of WEU. More generally, I do not see why there should be any plans for abandoning this basic treaty.

It is also true, as I was saying, that we are living in times of very rapid change and I do not therefore see why, if everything is changing, we should not begin to look at how our various European institutions and their legal foundations might be changed and improved. The first positive step would be to apply the principle of convergence to our institutions. We all know that as things are there is, for example, an exclusive responsibility for defence, borne by WEU, and an exclusive responsibility for common trade policy, borne by the European Community and sanctioned by the Treaty of Rome.

We all know that "defence" and "common trade policy" are not two separate worlds: to see that this is true one has only to consider the problem of sanctions and the embargo and all that they imply for both WEU and the European Community.

There is a fact so obvious in substance that we cannot shut our eyes to it, namely that the process of creating a politically united Europe – in fact the aboutissement of the construction of European union – cannot be anything but unitary and convergent.

What is more, no one can say that the united Europe of tomorrow will not have more flexible characteristics than the Europe of today. I am thinking, for example, of the consequences of the further enlargement of the Community to include states that now have neutral status as full members.

We should not oppose the principle of this scenario nor should we resist more generally, in spite of these problems, the movement of convergence towards the final political goal of European political unity. What I mean is that if neutral states join the European Community, that does not mean that the European Community will be thereby condemned never to be able thereafter to develop, as a final phase, into European political union. It will merely mean

that we shall have to foresee institutional or inter-institutional adjustments to this new fact, in other words introducing – as I say – a certain flexibility.

That is why I think it would be a mistake to shut ourselves up in what now exists and simply take a photograph of it without trying to support or, as far as we are concerned, promote the movement of institutional convergence towards the unity that is so essential.

The next European Council will, as I said, decide the terms of reference of the intergovernmental conference with regard, among other things, to foreign policy and security. So if we want to move forward on this latter item from the, in my opinion, disappointing startline represented by Article 30, however it is done and certainly without encroaching on other institutions' preserves, we shall have to take on the task of finding a convergent and unitary answer even to questions of defence, which cannot fail to be involved as well if we want to construct the unity of Europe and move forward in this field and if, precisely, we wish to do so under this fundamental heading of common foreign policy.

It would be strange if we were to completely ignore the process of change that is at our door – we are literally on the eve of important decisions, international decisions, which may concern us – and if we simply claim the responsibilities and prerogatives we already have. If you prefer, ladies and gentlemen, we should claim these responsibilities but whilst opening our doors to change in a unified frame of reference. None of us can affirm, for example – and the Rapporteur himself does not deny it – that the modified Brussels Treaty would be seriously flawed or undermined and nullified in any way if it were placed under the aegis of the European Council as has already been done in the case of political co-operation and security. What is more, as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg the Rapporteur said – and rightly argued in his report – this possibility is admissible. But it should also be admissible, then, to take the opportunity to make changes and therefore, as far as we are concerned, to look into possible legal amendments in the light of the present situation.

I appreciate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's usual frankness, clarity and precision in this written report and verbal statement. However, with the same frankness, and perhaps – I do not know – the same clarity but certainly with sincerity, I must comment on what, in my opinion, is the excessively static nature of the report. As the debate stands at this particular time and in spite of the limited opening that he himself has pointed to in his report with regard to the European Council as a point of reference for our institution as well, I have to say that I shall be abstaining in the vote on the draft recommen-

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

dation that has been tabled. This follows a line of thought that is consistent with my argument in the report I made on 22nd March last year at the symposium that our Assembly held in Florence on the future of European security.

In conclusion, I repeat what I said in Florence. We urgently need a dialogue between our various institutions, not a dialogue of the deaf but a fruitful and positive discussion. At the practical level, we need to organise an inter-institutional dialogue as quickly as possible and forms of inter-institutional co-operation, in particular between our parliamentary Assembly, the European Parliament, their respective presidents, the secretariat of the Council, the secretariat responsible for political co-operation and our own secretariat-general. This is a problem which, if I am mistaken, our own Secretary-General has just raised with the Assembly in his excellent report, the object being to indicate more clearly the path to be taken on the road of convergence, with our common goal, namely the building of a politically united Europe, clearly in our sights.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am disappointed with what Mr. Malfatti has said. He spoke of changes, and said that NATO is now examining the situation. What NATO still cannot do, and what it is unlikely to do until it changes its treaty, is to act out of area. We have the opportunity, which we have demonstrated on two occasions, to do that. We must not throw that away until there is something better in its place.

I said to Mr. de Puig, and I say to Mr. Malfatti, that this document talks of the present. It is unlikely that there will be any accession to the Community before 1993. To make progress towards the Single Act will require a lot of detailed work, and I believe that 1993 is the earliest time at which new nations may be admitted. That gives us an opportunity to develop the idea that Mr. Malfatti had produced, although I believe that it has a weakness. I do not want this discussion to go on between officials. I think that we need to have a discussion an parliamentarians. What happened at Dublin was a matter for governments, not for us as parliamentarians.

If there are to be any changes – this report speaks about a modified Brussels Treaty – they must be unanimous, agreed and ratified in the appropriate parliament. We are looking at something that will not happen swiftly, but the window of opportunity is left wide open for changes to be made as the situation develops. I should be extremely surprised if, within two

years, there was not a further report to consider what has happened in this matter. That report would provide an opportunity for further proposals to be made.

I hope that I have been able to persuade Mr. Malfatti that his concept of flexibility and movement would not be achieved were he to abstain. If we wants to achieve his goal he should support the report which speaks of the present position and the changing world in which we live. There will, therefore, be an opportunity for changing the structure of, and responsibility for, defence. One cannot do that now as it would not be practicable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I congratulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on his report and I appreciate the opportunity it gives us to embark with him on a process that may take some time, namely a debate or series of debates on important questions affecting the future of our Assembly and the future of security institutions in Europe. I believe it is a debate on both substance and attitudes that we must pursue throughout this process.

There are four points I want to pick out from the draft recommendation and the main ideas it enshrines: First, the need for WEU to be reactivated as a security institution. Second, effective European participation in the alliance by strengthening the traditional rôle of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Third, what might be termed a certain reticence with regard to dialogue and future relations between WEU and the Community. Fourth, a proper prudence in the taking of decisions.

I believe that these ideas and the report as a whole underline the relevance and timeliness of this debate and bring to light a number of underlying questions. In my view there are at bottom three broad streams or three great issues all relating to our concern about the future of this institution. The first is the complementarity of WEU with the Atlantic pole and the growing awareness of the existence of the European dimension of that alliance. The second is WEU's ability to take effective action in conflicts and crises out of area where NATO is unable to act in the absence of statutory provision for such intervention. The third is the relationship between the functions and powers of WEU and the European Community.

The first issue relates to the traditional rôle of WEU as forming a European pillar of the alliance and the growing awareness in Europe of the need to strengthen this pillar in order to lessen the inequality between the two poles. This emphasis on making the alliance more European, about which so much has been said in

Mr. Moya (continued)

recent years by leading European politicians, is pursued in this report to good effect.

The second is about the lack of statutory provision for the alliance to act out of area, a subject also mentioned in the report. The Gulf crisis has clearly shown that Europe is able to respond to a crisis situation affecting its interests. There had been precedents during the conflict between Iran and Iraq, but it is only now that the successful co-ordination of the forces deployed to implement the embargo has raised expectations as to its future potential and perhaps its eventual development into an integrated operational structure. Here a phrase used by the President of the Assembly in a statement released a few months ago is relevant: he made the point that when there is a formal legal framework, an appropriate institution and also the components of armed forces, logistic support and so on, something new and important has been created.

The third and perhaps most important issue, given its future dimension, is that of the linkage, relationship or integration of WEU with the European Community. Whilst the solution is for the future, the time for planning is now. And if one had to define or map out the lines or positions that are taking shape around it there could be said to be the supporters of WEU as a distinct, differentiated body dealing with all the questions connected with the cohesion of the West – the redeployment of military forces, the formation of multinational armies, European participation in the verification of disarmament agreements, co-operation in matters connected with the arms industry, questions raised by out-of-area conflicts, and so forth – and the others who believe with me that there is an inevitable process of convergence between WEU and the European Community.

It is becoming evident that a policy of all-in joint security will be the basis of the political union of the Community and constitute the most important element in its foreign policy. It will be remembered that the document of The Hague platform of 1987 states that an integrated Europe will not be complete until it extends to security and defence. A political union worthy of the name will in the long run have to include common defence. So the debate between the two positions is not concerned so much with the aim as the means and the phases and stages on the way to it and the objective will be a Europe speaking with a single voice in international bodies and in the transatlantic relationship. This vision carries with it a far fuller conception of the Community, seeing it as a complete, homogeneous entity rather than simply one European institution among others. But this is something for discussion in the coming months or possibly years.

In closing may I make two points concerned less with substance than with attitudes. First, I believe that the time is not yet ripe for firm and final conclusions. It may be that what is valid today will have to be changed tomorrow – and this is a report for today. We may be in danger of drawing final conclusions without sufficient discussion. I believe that this is the time for a frank, sincere dialogue in the search for a definitive security framework, and I believe that in this dialogue there should be no precipitate attempts at dissolution and no defensive self-centeredness. Second, I also believe that we should continue to strengthen WEU institutionally, and this is not in conflict with the points I have just made because the strengthening of WEU will be good for the identity of European defence in both cases, i.e. if WEU is maintained as a body with a difference and also if a process of convergence with the Community makes headway and is concluded. I therefore believe that we should all approve this report, because it is a text that reflects the current situation without closing the door to the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful to Mr. Moya for his support. In his clear analysis he has covered the four main items of reactivation, our place in NATO and caution in our new ideas and relationships. Caution, however, does not mean no progress, but ensuring that we progress step by step.

In an earlier response I mentioned that one of the problems we must consider is paragraph 13, which deals with the expansion of the Community to neutral nations. Paragraph 11 is also a problem. Mr. Moya has spoken about a single voice on defence, but in the near future I do not believe that either France or the United Kingdom will allow someone to speak on behalf of their nuclear forces. That is another problem which must be examined. It cannot, of course, be examined quickly, but that does not mean that it cannot be examined.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Perinat.

Mr. PERINAT (*Spain*) (Translation). – I now, for the first time, have the privilege of addressing this Assembly on a really important matter and on a report that is undoubtedly of crucial importance.

For it is clear that in discussing the relationship between the European Community and Western European Union we are dealing with a fundamental problem not only for these two organisations but also in relation to the future structure of Europe. I therefore wish to offer my sincere congratulations to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for his report which gives a clear overview of the real situation of WEU in relation to the

Mr. Perinat (continued)

European Community with reference to proposals and initiatives aimed at integrating WEU into the future European Community.

Doubtless we are all agreed that it is impossible to create, or at least to sustain, a new political body without its responsibilities including security or defence. Therefore, the initial idea of strengthening the Treaty of Rome by including in it Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty might at first sight appear to be a sensible step. But further examination of the matter leads to the conclusion that in present circumstances, far from strengthening the principle of European defence, it would have the opposite effect. In reality the powers of WEU would be absorbed by an organisation, the European Community, which, under Article 223 of the EEC treaty, has no responsibility for security or defence. What is more, it appears likely that this inability to act in such matters, far from being changed by the European Community's assumption of responsibility for security, would persist or even be accentuated. The reason is very simple and has already been pointed out by my colleague from Italy. Whereas nine of the present Community member states are members of WEU, two others, Denmark and Greece, are members of NATO, whilst a third, Ireland, has neutral status. It is possible, indeed foreseeable, that in the not very far distant future a number of neutral countries may become full members of the Community whilst still retaining neutral status. Clearly, if this were to happen the attitude of the European Community towards defence would inevitably be considerably diluted.

Therefore, and in view of the present emphasis on the here and now, I believe that, pending developments in the European Community, it would be wise to continue strengthening WEU as far as possible as an organisation for co-ordinating the defence of its member countries, including that of any new members which might in future wish to sign the Brussels Treaty. We might also, if possible within the WEU framework, set up a multinational European intervention force and in any event strengthen WEU so that it could increasingly function as the European pillar in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*) – I have two points to make. I wholly agree that not to accept the report would weaken the defence of Europe. We are all of one mind that we cannot at this stage afford to do that.

Mr. Perinat talked about the accession of neutral nations. One way round that, which

must be discussed, is for nations with a policy of neutrality to have to undertake in a new treaty to abstain from any discussion or vote on defence matters so that they cannot block a defence issue and stop it being discussed by nations which want to take part in defence. Those matters must be considered and that is one way of considering the point raised.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome this excellent report and its recommendations, which I entirely endorse. With all the military happenings in the world it is tempting not only to widen any debate on this subject, but to start drawing premature conclusions and tampering with existing structures. Those temptations should be resisted.

Since reactivation, WEU has played an increasing rôle in world affairs. Its part in helping to enforce the sea blockade of Iraq has been crucial. Its rôle is not only growing, but is increasingly being recognised internationally. With the problems in the Gulf, it is important not to undermine existing structures. In any case, no action can be taken by treaty, as has been said repeatedly and as is stressed in the report's recommendations, until 1998.

With the changing face of Europe and the United States' rôle in defence matters, it is understandable that all European structures should be the subject of some debate. The change in Eastern and Central Europe, the unification of Germany, the enlargement of the Community and the reduction of United States' involvement mean that things cannot go on as they are indefinitely. These changes bring as many complications as opportunities and they must be studied with great care before being acted upon.

Last week in Rome, an interparliamentary conference – a curtain-raiser, perhaps, to the major conference of heads of government later this month – looked at the future of Europe in relation to economic and political union. The matter was discussed by members of national parliaments and the European Parliament. I attended that conference with members of parliament from the twelve members of the Community and I witnessed all the shades of opinion, national and political, which were held by the delegates, and I find it hard to conceive of any defence organisation that could be devised in such a way as to satisfy all nations and opinion, yet could act decisively in time of crisis. We shall have to wait and see.

There is a long way to go before any new framework can be established. Times could not be more perilous. When things are uncertain, it pays to hold fast to what one has. There is a similarity between our position and that of a person

Mr. Lord (continued)

using stepping stones to cross turbulent waters. It is a foolish man who moves from the firm stepping stone on which he is standing before he has carefully tested the stone on to which he plans to tread. For the immediately foreseeable future, Western European Union in its present form has a vital rôle and it should be supported as strongly as possible, as should the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I make two points in response to Mr. Lord. I was with him in Rome and I heard that discussion. As I said earlier, it would have been difficult to see a quick response in the Gulf in the light of what we heard in Rome. What Mr. Lord said was absolutely right. Do not give up what you have until you know what is the replacement and are certain that the replacement is as good, if not better. We went to Rome and, with reference to Mr. Malfatti, I would say, *festina lente*.

(*Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Today's debate on WEU and the EEC so effectively launched by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report – or rather reports – is clearly fundamental at a time when the international system is going through unprecedented changes and its traditional balances are being challenged. But I would like to go a little further than this excellent report and make a number of comments that it suggests to me though they will not perhaps have your approval, Sir Geoffrey.

One fact has to be accepted at the outset : the rôle and future of WEU, which is our special concern, depend essentially on the form and content to be assigned to the future Community. It is quite plain that to bring fully integrated Western European unity in defence into being the participating states have to share the same ideas on the future of the Community, whether it be a free-trade zone or the Delors project. They must also have the same perception of what constitute the main aspects of their security.

Any further integration of western defence with the object of forming a West European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance would imply that the states making up this security pole are ready to give up part of their sovereignty in the interests of a joint external policy and the division of labour in their armed forces. However, this would require some basic decisions and a qualitative leap into integration which must be primarily political. There would

also have to be federal institutions capable of overarching purely national patriotism and our governments are perhaps not yet ready to make these decisions and take such a leap.

And yet it is only when these decisions have been made that it will perhaps be possible to base WEU and the European Community in the same structure with their respective rôles and obligations set down in legal form. But is that what we want now or what we will want later on?

In order to maintain the defence alliance with the United States it will also be advisable – by a simultaneous revision of the North Atlantic and modified Brussels Treaties – to spell out legally WEU's rôle as the European pillar of a NATO refashioned to provide for the defence of the western nations in which there would be two great partners: one would be the organisation of North American states and their allies and the other the organisation of the states of the enlarged Western European Union because, in my opinion, it would be necessary to invite those member states of the Community not yet in WEU to join. At the same time the Council of Europe should itself be broadened to absorb the CSCE process, that is to say the thirty-four or thirty-five members and the three baskets.

This of course raises the question of national delegations, how they should be made up and appointed and the rôle they are to play. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg deals with this problem and I shall not dwell on it.

In this way, an EEC-WEU coupling in a federal framework would give WEU sufficient weight to make it a credible partner for North America and the rest of the world. It would also give economic Europe a political voice and a reality extending beyond its own frontiers. However, at the moment, these ideas are utopian given that the principal governments of Western Europe, as I say, are not yet clear about their idea of, or commitment to, political integration. On the other hand it has to be recognised that, in today's political environment, they no longer really have a choice; conversely they do have opportunities that are not going to come again. The fact is that we have to take full advantage of this situation of extreme instability in the present period of unprecedented change with all its implications for the security and hence the survival of the countries of Western Europe faced with the challenges of the contemporary world and not, of course, forgetting the countries of the third world.

These challenges, these grave problems directly or indirectly affecting every industrialised market economy country naturally call for worldwide solutions requiring at least some co-operation and co-ordination

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

between the leading powers on our planet. In view of the success that the EEC now is we can only hope that the member states will quickly agree on a joint political plan and make the qualitative leap that I referred to earlier in my statement. It is this which will make Western Europe together with WEU, its indispensable partner in the field of defence, a power in its own right on the international scene capable of confronting without fear the immense challenges of today and tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I do not know why Mr. Lagorce thought that I would not like what he said. What he suggested is one way forward in the vast discussion. There are many ways forward. Chairman Mao had a phrase for it. I do not disagree in any way with what Mr. Lagorce said, but it should be considered in the context of making progress. Everything is up for discussion with regard to the future. I should have thought that that was how we should consider all proposals, even the foolish one from Strasbourg that we should stop the reactivation of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). As I do not speak as chairman of a group but as an individual member. I shall continue in my own language, that is to say, Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – I should like very briefly to make three comments and to draw a formal conclusion. My first comment follows on from the concluding remarks made by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, whom I compliment on his report. It would be stupid and irresponsible to get rid of WEU. It would be stupid and irresponsible to stop using WEU as the one instrument we have in Europe that is genuinely formally competent and useful. It would also be irresponsible to stop reactivating WEU, because it is more useful than ever as an instrument for security in Europe.

There are two reasons for this. The first is a formal one. As I have said, WEU is the one institution with formal authority, the Brussels Treaty. The European Communities are clearly not in the same position. The Rapporteur has rightly referred to the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which rule out the possibility of the Community concerning itself with European defence.

There is a second reason. I would not mind betting that there is a terribly complex debate going on at the moment in all the national par-

liaments, but more especially in the European Parliament. It is generally noted that the Community takes a great deal of interest in economic policy and too little interest in the environment and the social situation of all those who are sadly no longer able to work. This means there is a debate on the further development of Europe. Is it to develop into a federation or into an inter-governmental structure?

Like many others, I am in favour of a development in which more and more powers are and must be transferred from the national governments and parliaments to the Commission and the European Parliament. Others think otherwise.

This debate alone is extremely intensive and takes up a great deal of time. One of the questions discussed is the precise meaning of EMU. We know that in 1993 international frontiers will disappear and that we will then have free movement of people, capital and goods. This means that not only will there be a European central bank but there must also be some form of common European monetary policy, co-ordination of the main lines of economic policy and means of preventing exchange rate fluctuations from either distorting the conditions of competition or leading to imbalance.

The Commission is currently engaged in drawing up many hundreds of directives. As some of you will know, I am the Chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the Council of Europe, and as such I have discussions with the Chairman of the European Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee. It would be foolish to think that the European Parliament can do more than consider a few of these directives at the moment, which means that many of them are being processed without anybody taking a closer look at them.

This in itself takes so much time and effort that I would go so far as to predict, although others may disagree, that, quite apart from the formal obstacles, the Community cannot possibly get down to discussing aspects of either European security or European defence in the next five years.

My second comment may seem to contradict the first, but it does not. I am firmly convinced that the EPU will go on developing. There will always be the spectacle of European leaders, with or without their foreign ministers, concerning themselves with almost every aspect of European security and with more and more aspects of European defence. It is, to say the least, quite conceivable that a new situation will exist in four or five years' time. We can already see a change in the views of Ireland. Nevertheless, I agree with the Rapporteur that no one can make a safe forecast. I think this is what should happen. I believe it is quite conceivable

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

that five years or more from now we will be talking about a possible merging of WEU and the European Community, but I cannot guarantee this, of course. I think it is something we must bear in mind.

My third comment concerns the CSCE. Anyone who considers the essence of the resolution adopted in November will see that there is certainty about the emergence of an assembly of Europe, at least where the first two baskets of the Helsinki agreement are concerned. As regards the treatment of the security aspect, the third basket, it would be very unwise to rule out any of the options. It is quite conceivable that WEU will be able to do some extremely useful work in this context. I am not saying this is the only option, but it is certainly one of many options and must not be ruled out. It is pure folly to write off WEU at this stage, as some members of the European Parliament are doing – and I say this with all due respect.

Mr. President, this brings me to my formal conclusion. This report and recommendation are rightly limited to an assessment of the present situation and a description of WEU's position, now and in the foreseeable future. With this in mind, I will say that this text has my wholehearted support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with Mr. Stoffelen's comment that it would be foolish to throw away what we have. He said that perhaps, in five years' time, Ireland and other groups may have changed their views. One possibility – I keep floating these ideas – is that if it were decided in due course to subsume the work of defence inside the Community, the Community will delegate specifically defence matters to WEU. That is one way of doing it. There are so many possible ways that, if one were to write a report to take account of all the possibilities, it would be fifty pages long and full of ideas, 90% of which would never come to fruition. All that one can do is to say: "Here are many ideas. As time goes by, one may be able to develop some into actualities."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Amaral.

Mr. AMARAL (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I should just like to make two small points, first to congratulate Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for the excellent work he has done and secondly to make a brief comment on the questions asked today and Sir Geoffrey's enlightening replies.

It is always very difficult to talk about the future. The Europe we envisage is in our minds

and thoughts and thought can never be static; it is changing night and day.

It has been well said that Europe is "the homeland of creative discord" and it is my belief that, given the speed at which things are happening, we must find a precise formula or concept for Europe as quickly as we can. Certainly concepts differ. The Communities, the Council of Europe, and we in WEU all have different ideas about Europe of the future.

But despite these differences and the new ideas that are constantly surfacing, we are hopeful and confident that before long we shall be able to reconcile these differences which, in any event, all stem from the principles underlying each of the international organisations I have just mentioned.

As I said in my previous statement, all these organisations have differing objectives. Because they are different, they are bound to have different attitudes and positions regarding the problems of the day and the forecasts they make of the future in so far as such forecasts can be made.

I think that your draft recommendation, Sir Geoffrey, squares with future possibilities within the context of present realities and current thinking.

This being so, and particularly because the attempt to amalgamate WEU, even in formal terms, with another international organisation of different aims and scope is not feasible, I have to say that in my opinion the draft recommendation you are putting forward fully meets the criterion of looking at future possibilities from the viewpoint of present realities. I shall therefore support and vote for the draft recommendation.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – My answer to Mr. Amaral is, I agree!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the last speaker on the list, Mr. Soares Costa.

Mr. SOARES COSTA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am gratified by the content, scale and scope of the debate we have held today on the second part of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report, the more so as it was I who raised the subject at the October meeting of the Presidential Committee of WEU. I am gratified because the proceedings in some of the other Community institutions, notably the Commission and the European Parliament, caused me some concern and convinced me that it was necessary for our WEU Assembly to state its position on this question. I am also gratified because in this report the Political Committee of the Assembly has been able to express itself on this matter with much greater clarity and wealth of detail than I was able to do at our meeting in October.

Mr. Soares Costa (continued)

But my present contribution is motivated mainly by what our Secretary-General and also our President said a short while ago in the opening speeches.

The Secretary-General stated here today that WEU is one of the bases of the security dimension in the building of Europe. And in fact, as the report before us recognises, it is on this basis that we are members of the only institution with specific authority to consider defence in Europe, that is to say, it is the only parliamentary assembly of its kind.

But our President has today presented us with a big challenge concerning the effectiveness with which this Assembly, during the present plenary session, will be able to formulate our views and position on the important issue of our relationship with the European Economic Community and the way in which we must make our contribution to the construction of Europe.

As our President stated, it must be built with pragmatism, a sense of responsibility and realism. But what in fact do these three words mean in relation to the problem before us today?

In the first place, said Mr. Pontillon, Europe must be built with pragmatism. Well, I think that "pragmatism" in defence has to do with three fundamental questions. As was said in the report that we approved here at our plenary session last June and is repeated in the document before us today, the first question has to do with how far WEU may be considered as the "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance. But on that basis, some other things become obvious – at least to me. These have to do with what WEU can or should be in the future.

Thus, in the first place, we have to think about the military alliances. After the events that have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, these alliances have totally changed their meaning and will have to change in attitude; and we are not talking about the Warsaw Pact, since NATO itself has stated that it is prepared to undergo change and to adapt itself to the new circumstances.

But, beyond that, it is clear that many voices in many European countries are beginning to stress the need to build a new security order in Europe. As I understand it, what is sought is a new order based on co-operation now that the area of confrontation between the blocs has ended. And obviously, co-operation must embrace the enlarged area which includes the twelve countries of the European Economic Community, the other Western European countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and we know that at least some of these countries have already indicated their interest in

co-operating with Western European Union, for instance as "special observers" with the same status as observers in the Council of Europe.

This then provides a vision of Western European Union which could in future become a solid nucleus for an enlarged organisation to serve as a practical channel for co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in security as well as other things.

Lastly, a third idea also connected with this pragmatic way of facing the problem is to consider the challenges and risks facing Europe but originating outside the European theatre. WEU already has the flexibility and capability for action out of area – something which, as we know, the Atlantic Alliance and NATO do not have. We would be in a position to develop a strategy of European defence against out-of-area threats.

The second matter on which our President spoke was "responsibility", and this is much more worrying to me because when we are thinking about building the new Europe we must realise that it is unacceptable for the various European institutions to use the present moment to claim powers and responsibilities which it is doubtful they could ever live up to. At this time of transition we must not make mistakes – or at least not the old mistakes.

It appears to me that the proposals of which we are aware, in particular those in Mr. Romero's report which was approved in the European Parliament on 9th October, are an attempt to remove powers and responsibilities from an existing organisation – WEU. The process of absorbing or deactivating an institution seems to me anything but responsible as a way to go about building Europe as we wish to do. It is very surprising in as much as the Communities have, in fact, chosen to go along the path of deepening rather than broadening their relationship, and we know that this is a consequence of the Single Act, which has to do with economic and monetary union and with future political union. The truth is that, as I see it, this organisation is facing a very different situation.

WEU has no need to deepen its organisation, but it may well need to widen co-operation to include other parts of Europe.

Lastly, I should like to refer to the problem of realism, and, on that score, of all the areas in which countries are possessive about their sovereignty the most sensitive is defence.

This being so, how is it conceivable that the countries which today constitute the European Economic Community could agree to make substantial transfers of power in defence matters to a supranational organisation of an integrated nature such as the EEC is at present?

Mr. Soares Costa (continued)

Without question this is a crucial issue. I believe that, as a number of members have said today, it will take some time before this becomes possible, if only because, as our Rapporteur also points out, there are problems connected with the fact that some members of the Twelve are not members of WEU. Examples are Ireland, which is neutral, Denmark, which is not a member of WEU, and Greece, a particularly sensitive case in the area of defence because under its present constitution it has certain links with NATO.

These therefore are questions that have to be approached cautiously, step by step, and very wisely lest they hinder progress towards our basic objectives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I have two comments to make. First, I agree with Mr. Soares Costa's ideas about there being yet another way to examine the situation. Certainly it was his item which came up at the Presidential Committee and gave rise to this swift report. Secondly, he is right that as the years go on, the concept of peace and stability will become much wider because it will embrace the whole of Europe, as I said at the beginning. I do not rule out the possibility of the Soviet Union perhaps requiring help to deal with particular problems within her territory. It must be in everybody's interests to ensure that we have stability throughout Europe if our peoples are to progress.

I wish to express my warm appreciation to Mr. Burgelin for the swift and efficient way in which he put together many of these facts to produce the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have only a few comments to make. Relations between the Community and WEU have been a matter of concern to this Assembly for some considerable time. I can remember the subject being discussed in this chamber seventeen or eighteen years ago. It became a particularly urgent issue after the first direct elections to the European Parliament, when the momentum created by those elections led the members of the European Parliament to believe that they could not only discuss but also take decisions on everything. We have been considering this subject since that time. Nothing has really changed since then.

If we decided to dissolve WEU today, it would mean two things.

First, we would destroy the European pillar of NATO. I do not think there is another organisation that could take on the task of bringing together European ideas and opinions and putting them to our North American partners and others. That would be particularly inconvenient – as Mr. Soares Costa has pointed out, and he is right – because NATO is also undergoing change and because it would be completely out of the question and unacceptable, in my opinion, for Europe's voice not to be heard in this debate.

Second, if we dissolve WEU, the matters we discuss here would not be transferred to another organisation but would revert to our national parliaments. That would mean the renationalisation of defence policy in Europe. I believe that too would do great damage. At the moment any discussion on this should result in a clear "No" to the demand that WEU be dissolved or its restructuring and revitalisation prevented.

Like any report, this one is merely a snapshot. It can do no more than summarise the discussions that can be held here and now. It does not, therefore, contain any thoughts on what might happen in five or ten years' time. I want to emphasise that. That is also the way we saw it in committee. We said we could neither know nor speak today about anything that might happen in the future. I am personally convinced – I share the optimism of my colleague, Pieter Stoffelen – that, despite all the difficulties, European union will come, and if it is strong enough, it will take on the important task of a European defence policy, but not for the moment. In the meantime, we need Western European Union. Just as we needed it yesterday and the day before, we need it today and tomorrow as well, or at least for a foreseeable period. That is what is in this report, that is what it is based on.

On the committee's behalf I should like to thank our Rapporteur, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, and especially Mr. Burgelin. They worked together extremely well. I should like to thank all the members of the committee, for playing a very active part in this debate, and all those here who have participated in the debate or at least shown their interest in it through their presence and perseverance.

I ask you to adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1250.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or

The President (continued)

more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

**12. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-

sixth annual report of the Council, Document 1247 ; Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)

1. See page 20.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247; Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Dumas to questions put by: MM. Scheer, Caro, Beix, Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. De Decker, Speed, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Martino, Stegagnini, Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Lambie, Mrs. Hoffmann.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait; continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee*, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, MM. De Decker (*Rapporteur of the Political Committee*), De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur of the Defence Committee*), Ward, Fassino, Scheer, Mrs. Roe, Mr. Caro.
5. Changes in the membership of committees.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247

Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the

Council, Document 1247; address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

May I welcome you as Chairman-in-Office of the Council. You have given us much evidence of your dynamic activity and also your concern to ensure a special quality in the relations between the Assembly and the Council. This is much appreciated by the Assembly, which awaits your address with interest.

May I ask you to take the rostrum.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council I am greatly appreciative of your words of welcome, for which I personally thank you most cordially. I am particularly grateful for your tribute to the Chairman's work during his period of office.

Mr. President, Secretary-General and ladies and gentlemen, France considers it a great honour to be holding the chairmanship of the Council of Western European Union at such an exceptional time in the history of our continent. I have already had the pleasure of speaking to the Assembly in the past about my country's position and ideas. Hence it is a renewed pleasure to have this opportunity of recalling the achievements of the first few months of this chairmanship and looking together at certain future possibilities. Afterwards I shall be very glad to answer your questions and thus deepen the discussion in the usual way.

1. See page 23.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

The beginning of the French chairmanship coincided with the crisis in the Gulf. Since I am talking to parliamentarians who follow these questions very closely I shall skip the details of the positions adopted by the member countries but I would, because it is important, recall members' unanimous condemnation of the attack on Kuwait and their very firm determination that the United Nations resolutions must be complied with.

Nor shall I go over the various steps taken by the member states to co-ordinate their action in implementing sanctions and exploring the opportunities for co-operation in logistics. The French Defence Minister, who will be speaking here this afternoon, will certainly refer to this.

However, there are two essential lessons I should like to draw. First, Europe, as such, is present in the Gulf. Secondly, WEU, facing for the first time a major international crisis – the first major crisis of the new world order – has shown itself capable of responding to the needs of the moment.

I should like to mention first the speed and quality of our co-operation. After the outbreak of Iraqi aggression on 2nd August, and at only very short notice, as you will remember, the Ministerial Council met twice. The military chiefs were able to agree a first outline for co-operation in the days immediately following the attack and effective co-ordination structures were very quickly set up combining diplomats and representatives of the armed forces.

Next I should like to say that the results achieved are remarkable in many ways. Co-ordination between the naval forces deployed by the member countries to implement sanctions is working excellently. This co-ordination has ensured rationalisation of effort in the various areas of action, and effective and constant mutual support. I make this point because I was able to see it for myself on the spot when I accompanied the President of the Republic on his visit to the area.

For the future, I draw two conclusions regarding WEU's ability to respond quickly and launch the effective co-operation that I have just described.

First, proof has been given – if such proof were necessary – of the importance of the WEU institutional framework. At the precise moment when the institution is under debate, we must remember this point in present and future discussions on European security.

Also, the member states have demonstrated their ability to act jointly to uphold international law and defend their interests. In these matters WEU has its own responsibility that

other organisations do not. Europeans should therefore make the most of it. Would it not be a mistake to try to build a strong European union if this economic and political entity, developing before our very eyes, was not able to defend worldwide its interests and its peoples? United Europe, in the form we see it, cannot be based on reliance on others.

WEU must therefore take an active part in the debate about what is being called the future architecture of European security. At the present stage this debate concerns the future of three institutions, the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance and the CSCE, and their respective rôles.

I shall begin with the last of these and refer first to the importance of the recent Paris summit that was held in a climate of remarkable consensus and helped to turn a page in European history. France is honoured to have hosted this exceptional event, symbolising as it did the end of the arbitrary division of Europe. Major decisions were taken to wipe the past from the slate: regular political meetings, the continuation of talks on disarmament and confidence and the beginnings of institutionalisation in the form of a secretariat and a conflict-prevention centre, all decisions that, in short, will help to give wider scope to co-operation between the member states of the CSCE, the essential framework for the stability of our continent.

As for NATO, recent developments in Europe and in East-West relations call for its adaptation without challenging its essential purpose. Surely it is now necessary to highlight Europe's contribution and achieve a stable, lasting and more balanced transatlantic relationship.

Alongside this heightening of the European profile, work on building the Community will intensify. Obviously, in defence and security matters, the process will be in stages, each stage corresponding to an increase of stability. But within this European framework, let us already draw all the benefit we can from WEU: the existing member states should be able to increase their own efforts whilst developing co-operation with their twelve partners wherever possible on all questions affecting their joint security interests.

I am thinking in particular of disarmament. The agreement signed on 19th November at the Paris summit was, as everyone agrees, an unprecedented and historic event. Its implementation will bring about a situation of parity and stability in military relations in Europe previously characterised by a confrontation of armed forces and an overwhelming imbalance in favour of the Soviet Union. Any surprise attack should now be impossible, and instead of rhetorical discussion blinded by ideology we shall now have dialogue, openness and understanding.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

This does not mean that our work is over. In fact it is only just beginning. Like it or not, the agreement of 19th November is still tinged with the sequels of the post-war period. But it is an essential bridge towards further stages that will strengthen stability and security in Europe. This is the work we still have to do.

For the moment, talks are about to begin on the strengths of the armed forces and preparations are to be made for the future negotiations between all the CSCE participants to follow the Helsinki meeting in 1992. During its period of office the French presidency will do its best to ensure that WEU makes an effective and decisive contribution to the definition of future negotiating positions.

I should also like to remind you of the importance that we attach to European co-operation in implementing verification procedures. For real disarmament there has to be confidence and therefore verification. At the next ministerial meeting of WEU it is intended that the ministers approve concrete proposals in this respect. This is one of the presidency's main concerns and I am sure that you are aware of its efforts to launch a special co-operative programme for exploiting satellite data. We were the first to raise this subject even before taking over the chairmanship. The French Defence Minister, Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, will be referring to this matter this afternoon.

In conclusion, before moving on to questions and answers and then travelling to Brussels where the Foreign Affairs Council is meeting today, let me raise the subject of the Institute for Security Studies which has just been set up and which we shall shortly be officially inaugurating. This could not come at a better time. Since we have to go on thinking about the subjects that I just referred to, what better place could there be than this institute? As you know, and I take no personal credit here, it is the result of a French initiative. Self-flattery is not the reason why I have reverted to this subject, quite the contrary, I simply wanted to say that in the minds of those who promoted the idea, as with those who accepted it, there were two essential tasks that we wished to entrust to this institute, and for once current events have proved their relevance.

The first of these tasks is to deepen our study of European security. This is essential to the debate on political union which is about to open in the next few days in Rome where, as you are aware, we shall be launching the two intergovernmental conferences scheduled for 1991.

The second task for the institute is to develop the dialogue between Western Europe and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. I am pleased to note that this dialogue is already in progress. At a time when the post-war security

structures are being completely rethought, it would be pointless for us "Western" Europeans to be considering the future of our institutions and our co-operative arrangements without heed for the concerns of the new European democracies. Europe would be walking on one leg and we know that this is not very satisfactory.

We are unlikely to find a quick and easy solution to these new problems facing us, which is all the more reason why we should start to think about them as soon as we can. In any event, work on dialogue and comprehension has now begun, in particular within the framework of our institution, so we should pursue it with determination and resolution – that is certainly what the presidency plans to do.

Ladies and gentlemen, before going on to questions and answers, I should like to emphasise the value, in the presidency's eyes, of the work that you are doing. This is not just an oratorical flourish or polite compliment for I believe that WEU will be called upon to play an essential rôle in the years to come.

One reason is that you represent millions of men and women who, as we know, are uneasy about the vast upheavals taking place today and who, in their heart of hearts, whilst feeling this anxiety, nurture the hope of a Europe at peace. That is what we are working towards. This gives the measure of your contribution to the essential point of discussion in the concluding years of the century, namely, the future security of the citizens of Europe.

Great progress has been made in this field since the major upheavals at the end of 1989, the high point being the CSCE summit in Paris. But let us be clear: more progress still has to be made and I urge you to go forward, inventively where necessary but always forward, because your rôle will be essential in the new age. I thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for these words of encouragement, especially on behalf of those who believe in the future of this institution. I should also like to thank you for your expression of confidence in this Assembly and your concluding words designed to stimulate its vigour and imagination.

You said you were prepared in the time-honoured way to answer questions from members of the Assembly. There are several who are particularly interested in your remarks and will no doubt wish to ask questions.

I call the first speaker, Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I have a question on the French position at the future disarmament negotiations. We all know that the French Government has not wished to participate and has not participated in the nuclear disarmament

Mr. Scheer (continued)

negotiations in Europe. Let me say straight away that to consider French nuclear potential without French involvement would not in principle be acceptable or right. But it seems to me that its active involvement will in fact be essential in the future, given the fundamental changes that have occurred.

In the 1970s and into the 1980s the French specified from when and under what conditions they might participate. Now there has been a fundamental change in East-West relations in Europe, and most of the conditions laid down at that time have, in fact, been more than fulfilled. The question is, therefore, when and on what terms the French Government will begin to play an active part in nuclear disarmament negotiations, not only with regard to Europe, but generally. This seems very important for the future.

My second question concerns the current Gulf conflict. Why, in the Minister's opinion, has precedence not been given in recent weeks to the idea of waiting a great deal longer for sanctions to take effect before issuing an ultimatum? From your view of the discussions at international level – I am referring not only to the French stance but to your own assessment, which I would like to hear – why is there not a great deal more talk about the European implications of a possibly precipitate war – its effect on European interests, in other words, and about the consequences of such a war in general? I believe a specifically European view is needed here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you wish to answer each question or take them in batches?

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In batches, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to thank you for your efforts as Chairman of the Council since the start of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. There is broad consensus, of course, for finding peace but there is unambiguous firmness that this has to be under the absolute terms imposed by the United Nations regarding withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of the hostages. Looking forward to the future and to what I hope will be years of peace and stability I should like to ask the Minister for his views on having an organisation in the Near and Middle East, possibly taking its cue from what we are trying to construct for Europe and stability in Europe, in order to contain the risk of any new crisis similar to the one we are now going through. Such an organisation, under demo-

cratic control and taking due account of human rights and, of course, the use of oil resources, would prevent these resources becoming a critical issue again and avoid the probability of their being used to blackmail the industrialised countries, with all the consequences that would have for the countries of the south and the dramatic developments still facing us there. Could we not have a kind of CSCE in the Middle East?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – My question concerns what you referred to as the future architecture of European security. The need to develop links of solidarity in order to improve European security is apparent and involves the somewhat magic structure of CSCE. But CSCE may have prolonged difficulties with the enormous economic problems of the countries of Central Europe. These countries will no doubt find it very difficult to cope with two requirements, the economic adjustment necessary for their development and self-defence, i.e. the means of ensuring their own security.

So CSCE could well be a debating chamber for decades with a kind of two-tier Europe: one consisting of some fifteen highly-developed countries, and the other made up of ten or so others lagging very far behind.

In this situation, how important, in your view, is the rôle of WEU? Are we on the way to an enlargement of the institution or towards greater military co-operation? The questions facing this institution include the numerical increase in multinational forces and closer co-operation between countries with nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall answer now so as not to let the questions go stale and while they are still fresh both in my mind and in those of my listeners.

Mr. Scheer asked me about future nuclear disarmament and the position of France. I can be very clear on this. France's conditions for participation in nuclear disarmament were set out in 1983 in a speech made at the United Nations by the Head of State. It is not true that my country refuses to take part in nuclear disarmament. It has simply laid down a number of commonsense conditions.

Why? First, because they take into account the specific nature of France's nuclear capability. Second, because they are based on a quantitative argument. Put briefly, France's nuclear potential, by comparison with that of the two world superpowers, is in the order of 4%. So France has not refused to take part in the discussion.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

The conditions laid down in 1983 still apply in both their restrictive and encouraging aspects and we shall await the results of the discussions on strategic disarmament to see whether things are moving in the direction that we hope – and we really do hope. Depending on the results, for which I understand, from both the Soviet and the United States sides, we may not have too long to wait, France will adjust its position.

The second of Mr. Scheer's questions concerned the Gulf. He asked me about the embargo and its effect on the passing of the last resolution.

Should we go on waiting? When Kuwait was invaded and this sovereign country, which is a member of the United Nations, was annexed by Iraq, the Security Council passed a number of resolutions. These resolutions call for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the freeing of hostages, the rehabilitation of Kuwait as a sovereign state and the restoration of the legitimate power.

Together with these principles, the Security Council also agreed on a number of restrictive measures including the embargo and economic sanctions. The experts considered that a period of five to six months would be necessary to see the real effects of these sanctions. We are near the end of this six-month period.

This, let it be said in passing, is one of the reasons why France, at the last debate, felt that the deadline for the Iraqis to evacuate Kuwait should be 15th January rather than 1st January so as to give the international community a last chance for sanctions to be effective. So, as you can see, we are roughly on time with the deadline that the experts thought necessary.

Thus the policy of the international community, which France fully supports, is twofold: to continue the embargo, which is beginning to bite and will have even more effect during the forty-five days between now and 15th January, and – whilst hoping for the best but preparing for the worst so that things are absolutely clear – to pass without further delay a resolution providing for coercive measures and the use of force in the event of the failure of sanctions or the continued refusal to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council.

There is therefore no contradiction in the sequence of measures taken by the Security Council and the international community; they compliment each other.

This is the spirit in which they should be seen, the idea and hope, of course, being that they will make the Baghdad Government see reason and that the preparedness to use force and coercion will lead to a peaceful and diplomatic solution of the Gulf crisis.

I also think that I can say that the same attitude prevailed in the minds of the countries submitting the resolution and those who voted for it, namely, to make provision for further measures of constraint for a given date, but in the hope that they would lead the Iraqi leaders to agree to comply with the resolutions passed by the Security Council since 2nd August.

In any event, the French Government does not believe it is biased in favour of using force. On the contrary, we prefer a peaceful solution but we realise, in accordance with the time-honoured formula, that we have to prepare for war in order to keep the peace. This has been said in very many ways, once in Latin, in the past.

Also referring to Kuwait, Mr. Caro spoke about unambiguous firmness. That is indeed the case, and I thank him for saying so. Looking into the future he asked whether we supported the idea of a CSCE formula for the Near East. I agree that in view of the increasing number of conflicts in this region of the world it is essential that the international community, the community of nations, should one day do something to bring about a global settlement of all these crises. We certainly do not want, for the moment, to link any of these conflicts with the Kuwait problem – it would be handing arguments to Saddam Hussein – but it is clear that this zone of turbulence needs some special approach. So when Mr. Caro asks why not have a forum on the CSCE model dealing with human rights and the use of resources, my answer is: why not indeed? But I would add that the handling of security issues in the region needs to be included.

This is why, in the proposals set out by the French Government on various occasions, we have said we wanted an international conference to be held that would take responsibility for these various conflicts and look into the points you have raised, namely human rights, the use of resources, control of disarmament in all these countries (we must not forget that, at the present time, it is in this region of the world that there is the biggest build-up of weapons of all kinds) and finally rules for security. This is something which, as we have often said, France would fully support.

Mr. Beix, repeating the expression I have used at this rostrum: "the future architecture of European security", asked me about the rôle of WEU. Part of the reply I gave in my address. When we say Europe we have to be clear which Europe we mean. I have the impression that ideas are getting mixed up. It is too easy to say Europe all the time.

What does this mean? It means, first of all, that we have to settle the problem of building the Europe of the Twelve within the framework

Mr. Dumas (continued)

of the European Economic Community: this is a first definition of Europe.

Then we need to look at what is happening in the other Europe, which is also Europe, namely Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of this region, or most of them, want to move, and are in fact moving, towards genuine democracy. But they are also beset by political, economic and social difficulties. They have not yet been able to find their balance or harmony. Things will no doubt develop differently in each of these countries with their new-found freedom, but we have to recognise that the European Economic Community cannot continue to enjoy its comfort and success without a glance at what is happening on its doorstep, for one thing because the way things develop may have its impact on life in the European Economic Community.

Just suppose that these democratic movements fail and destabilise the government in these countries. You can easily see that this would affect security in Europe. Just suppose that their many serious economic difficulties get worse; you can easily see that this would have social consequences, e.g. a flood of immigrants looking for a better life or just for work. The European Economic Community would then have to react in a disaster scenario, which it would be better to prevent than cure. Hence the idea that, with these eastern countries, we should have a structure enabling meetings and exchanges to take place in the years to come between the Community and each of the countries concerned. This is the confederation idea launched last year by the President of the French Republic. So this is the second idea to have in mind when Europe is on the table.

There is a third notion. When we talk about Europe we also have to consider the security that we wish to establish there. We speak about a Europe at peace because Europe has been the theatre of all the wars, and we hope to be entering a new period which is one of co-operation and peace; hence – security.

Security in Europe is at the moment assured through the work of CSCE. CSCE includes Europe, the United States and Canada. This is how it should be, and, in the present situation, alliances should continue because they help to keep a balance. As you said, CSCE is a forum which brings together the countries of Europe, with the exception of Albania – although this country attended at a small side table during the discussions – Canada and the United States, the latter re-balancing things in Europe.

Then there is WEU. WEU represents Europeans, or some of them. It is here in WEU that we have to think about our specific European security problems, there being no incompati-

bility with the Atlantic Alliance, which is essentially a military alliance, or CSCE which keeps the balance of security with our American and Canadian allies. This compels us, as Europeans in WEU, to think in depth about what we want in the area of security.

This rôle is an essential one and it is not to flatter the parliamentary Assembly that I say this again today. At the present time I know of no other organisation where we can discuss these security problems. So let us go to work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Let us now deal with the second series of questions.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Quoting experts is always a problem. The Minister has said that experts believe sanctions would take practical effect after five to six months. Other experts, including former American Secretary of Defence McNamara, have said sanctions will be most effective after twelve to eighteen months. They believe that without supplies of spare parts the value of the sensitive components of Iraq's weapons systems would be reduced by half, especially in the climate of the desert. Consequently, even should a military conflict be necessary, the firepower of Iraq's weapons systems would become far less effective. This means that here, too, we must take very careful stock and not allow the pressure of time to affect us.

I want to follow this comment with a question focusing on the debate on the future rôle of Western European Union. From the ranks of the Commission in Brussels we have a proposal for the inclusion of an article on a common security policy when the treaties of Rome are eventually amended to make way for a political union. Reference is made in this context to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, which requires the member countries to assist each other as a matter of course. What does the Minister think of this proposal? Will there not also have to be a change in the institutions, to enable the national parliaments, which are not the only bodies with the right to control the security policies of their countries, to exert an influence at European level, perhaps through the establishment of a second chamber or senate?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I go back to the Minister's architecture of Europe? He made no reference to the one organisation that already covers what I call Western, Eastern and Central Europe – the Council of Europe. How does he see its rôle in that architecture?

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

Second, when the Minister talks about the convergence of defence policies, is he saying that France would be prepared to put her nuclear power under the control or direction of the Community? Does he think that the United Kingdom would even contemplate that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In your address you stressed the need for NATO to adjust to the radical East-West changes that have taken place in Europe and you referred to a more specific European rôle within the Atlantic Alliance. As you are aware, NATO is currently discussing whether it should one day modify its geographical limits and be able to act outside what is known as “the NATO area”. I should like to know the view of the WEU Council of Ministers on this point and whether you share the feeling that such a process could hinder the definition of a specifically European concept of defence.

My next question concerns our presence in the Gulf. You emphasised the importance of WEU’s rôle, with particular regard to co-ordination of the naval forces in the Gulf. You also mentioned the fact that, naturally, our countries are present both on land and in the air. However, it is clear that there is a very great imbalance between the strength of the American and European presence on land and in the air. Do you not think that this imbalance, in the event of conflict, could weaken Europe’s independent power of decision?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – You have already referred, Mr. Dumas, to the transatlantic alliance. In terms of its credibility and the burden-sharing argument, it is important that the Americans are aware of the considerable forces – maritime and otherwise – that WEU has placed in the Gulf. Are you satisfied that the various embassies in Washington and the information services of France, the United Kingdom and the other WEU countries are presenting in as full a fashion as possible all the information about what WEU is doing in the Gulf? I fear that there is widespread ignorance about that in the United States, which is not good for the alliance or WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – May I answer Mr. Soell by saying that experts are experts. It is like professors of law. We all know that we can always find one professor of law to give you one

legal opinion and that it is always very easy to find another to give you exactly the opposite! It is the first thing you learn in a profession which I have exercised for a long time!

Generally speaking, the experts consider that sanctions start to have an effect after six months, but twelve months are better than six. However, beyond twelve months a complication arises relating to the climatic conditions in the Gulf. If there were to be armed intervention, it should take place within a given period of time which, of course, would reduce the time allowed to see whether sanctions would work. It is nevertheless true that most experts consider that after six months we should have a clear and definite picture of the results of sanctions.

It has to be pointed out that at present Iraq is no longer selling its oil, that the resources it draws from oil sales are falling and that it is having difficulty in buying spare parts for its military equipment. Admittedly, the current sanctions are not altogether watertight and are being circumvented with the complicity of certain countries; however, on the whole, they are achieving results. It is difficult to say what the public attitude is, but we can consider that in the first six months sanctions have already had a real impact. This must inevitably be taken into account.

Mr. Soell also asked me about political union and Article V. The article is still perfectly valid, but this is not where the difficulty lies! It is a question of implementing this Article V in the present context. This is one of the subjects for you to ponder in your wisdom.

Sir Geoffrey spoke about the architecture of Europe, rebuking me mildly for not having mentioned the Council of Europe. I did not mention it because it goes without saying. The Council of Europe is the oldest of the European institutions and no one would dream, least of all the Chairman of the Council, of denying the results of its work, quite the contrary. That said, the Council of Europe has no authority to concern itself with security problems. Its specific rôle is clearly defined both in the texts and in practice. It has played, still does play, and will continue to play, an important rôle in its own field, particularly in human rights where, as a result of its work, remarkable progress has been achieved, contributing to the changes that have taken place in the countries of the East.

The Council of Europe plays, and will continue to play, an essential rôle in welcoming in some of these countries. This has happened only recently and the countries concerned have found their proper place in this eminent Assembly, which is the oldest on the continent of Europe. The Council of Europe is doing what it should do and I think it will continue to play an essential rôle in our construction of Europe as a whole.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

Sir Geoffrey also asked me a question about the French nuclear force at the same time as he had the audacity to ask me a question about Great Britain... How embarrassing it would be for me if I took this question as an opportunity to reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Government! I shall not take that risk.

What I can say concerns my own country. The deterrent, as its name implies, was designed to prevent war, not to wage or win a war. It is therefore not conceivable that it should come under community or collegiate control as the final decision to use it rests with the head of state. He alone would have to determine whether, first, there was a major risk for his country and, secondly, whether it was right to press the nuclear button.

You will understand that these two conditions, by their very nature, make it impossible for such a deterrent to be placed under the command of a collegiate group, which would need to debate before making a decision, consequently robbing the deterrent of its ability to prevent war.

Therefore, whilst discussion on security or even defence problems and common interests in Europe can take place, it seems to me that because of its very nature the control of a deterrent cannot be transferred from one person, the head of state, to a group which would need to hold a debate – with all that this entails – before contemplating its use.

Mr. De Decker asked two questions. Yes, I believe in the part to be played by Europeans and we are here, moreover, to debate this matter, there being no incompatibility between having a more specific rôle for Europeans and the existence of the alliance. Some people see Europe's advancement within the alliance as being in opposition to Europe's own advancement, believing that what is given to Europe will be taken away from the alliance. I hold the opposite view. The clearer Europe's vision of its responsibilities in security and defence matters, the stronger the alliance will be.

Its geographical competence remained open to discussion. I think it was at a NATO meeting in Brussels that I said that France at present was not in favour of any major change in the Atlantic Alliance's area of responsibility. The alliance was born out of circumstances of history that we all are aware of and it has a specific vocation.

So I think it would be a mistake for the alliance to become the policeman of the whole world and involve itself in settling all conflicts throughout the planet. This is not the view of the French Government, although it remains open to discussion about changes to the Atlantic

Alliance in view of the recent events that we referred to this morning.

Mr. De Decker's second question obviously concerns the Gulf problems. He asked me whether the autonomy of decision-making was not affected by the co-ordination there: well this is very finely put! We obviously have to choose between the difficulties and we must know what we want.

If Europe wants a say in security and defence matters when its interests are involved it cannot react in random fashion. There has to be a minimum of co-ordination, which, as I said, functioned very well in the Gulf crisis. I went there personally and the information that we received from the military strengthened this conviction. But at the same time if you have co-ordination there has to be some sacrifice of individual control. A happy medium has to be found. And we look for it somewhere in the decision-making process which, in the present state of affairs and of our relations with others, is solely a matter for the sovereign states. Am I going to the Gulf or not? It is a matter of principle. Once this decision has been taken there is the question of putting it into practice and co-ordinating efforts, simply to avoid contradictions, duplications, wrong tactics, but also to increase effectiveness. This is exactly what is happening.

France, for example, retained its power of decision up to the last moment because the President of the Republic had recently stated that there would be no automatic implementation in the field of the resolution passed by the Security Council. This was a decision taken at the highest level. Once the decision has been taken there must then be the best possible co-ordination of the armed forces in the field. May I just point out that this is going very well. On the one hand, co-ordination within WEU is effective, and co-ordination between the units from the WEU countries and the forces of the United States is also working very well.

In saying this I have partly answered Mr. Speed's question on the sharing of responsibility between WEU and the United States. There is good co-ordination at two levels: that of the naval, air and ground forces in the area and also at overall command level. There is frequent, serious and effective contact between France and the other countries concerned. In this matter nothing further needs to be said.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now move on to the last set of questions.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask the Minister two brief questions. First, I wish to press him further on the question already raised by Mr. Beix and Mr.

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Soell about the future of our institution. Mr. Dumas said that the European Community intergovernmental conference in Rome will undoubtedly discuss that, in particular the absorption of WEU into the European Community. Some people have advocated that, notably liberal leaders at their meeting in Berlin on 23rd November, and others have discussed it. What exactly are the objections to such a course?

My second question is different. Mr. Dumas referred to the concentration of weapons in the Middle East when he discussed the Gulf. That concentration is one to which his country and, indeed, mine have made notable, although not exclusive, contributions. What thoughts does he have about the future control of the arms trade, particularly to areas of political instability?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have the feeling, Minister, that Europe is plagued by a syndrome of its time: new relations between East and West and North and South seem to be monopolising attention in our countries.

Even here in this Assembly where we are debating reports concerning the Gulf crisis, the serious problem of our future in terms of security if not defence seems to be pushed into second place.

After recent events it is my belief that the United States will no longer want to be involved following its decisive action in two world wars and the present Gulf crisis to uphold freedom and international law

In your view, Minister, are our countries fully aware of the difficulty of solving this problem, perhaps by means of operational and practical changes to the United Nations to render it capable of resolving the conflicts, difficulties and tense situations which now exist?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – You are certainly aware, Minister, of Italy's recent proposals for a conference on Mediterranean security. May I ask you whether, should this conference take place, you would support the idea of WEU taking part as the sole and supreme international body responsible for the problems of European security?

Also, what would be the position of France which traditionally has a highly important rôle in North Africa?

To my mind such a conference would represent a second step after the launching of CSCE and ought to attract close attention as it is pre-

cisely the North-South confrontation which raises the problems to which you referred earlier.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – Mr. Minister, as you rightly said, the Paris summit is a big and historic step towards stability and security in Europe, but recent events and the crisis in the Gulf have shown that the world is not just Europe and that peace and security in Europe do not bring peace and security to other parts of the world. What do you think is needed in the long run to achieve security and to secure peace and stability in the Middle East?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am a substitute for Mr. Ewing.

I should like to follow up the questions asked by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Speed about the European contribution to the alliance. The Minister of State spoke with pride about the fact that Europe was present in the Gulf. I put it to him that, if and when war breaks out in the Gulf, Europe will be present not militarily but in the sense that every country fighting will be using weapons supplied by European nations – Germany, France, the United Kingdom and especially the Benelux countries. Whether it is poison, chemical weapons, missiles, missile sites, tanks or guns, every country, including Iraq, will be fighting with European weapons.

The Minister is kidding himself, but he is certainly not kidding me. He is being slightly hypocritical when he suggests that there is a European alliance in the Gulf. How can he justify being proud of the fact that there is a European presence in the Gulf when there are half a million American troops and thousands of American planes in the area and Europe has only a naval presence at sea, where there will be no fighting? I put it to the Minister that, if there is a war in the Gulf, it will be decided by the United States, by United States weapons and guns, and that Europe will have no say in when that war starts and when it ends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Hoffmann.

Mrs. HOFFMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, I have a question, and I would like to make one comment on another issue.

The Minister said that the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, must, if possible, now be induced – this is our common goal – to accept a peaceful solution by the various measures that are being taken. That goes without saying. But I feel there has not yet been nearly enough discussion of a

Mrs. Hoffmann (continued)

very subtle question, which is undoubtedly being considered at international level and in the Minister's own country: this aggressor, Saddam Hussein, may have biological weapons and probably nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. Should this not be taken into account at the peace conference, to preclude the possibility of his posing a far greater threat to us in two, three or four years' time?

The Minister has already given an answer which I would just like to confirm with a brief comment. I consider it absolutely essential for there to be an international conference to discuss the other craters of a volcano that has existed in this turbulent zone, as you have called it, for many years. These negotiations must be followed by discussions on Lebanon's problems, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other issues.

Unless we tackle these two points together – the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, with its possible future developments, on the one hand, and developments throughout the region on the other hand – we shall not be able to arrive at a long-term peace settlement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, it is your privilege to draw conclusions from this last set of questions. You have the floor.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. President. We shall try to come to a conclusion. This means, perhaps, that I shall take the questions out of chronological order because some of them call for replies that lead more readily to conclusions, others being more factual.

Sir Russell Johnston again asked about the future of the institution; I have already given my reply. He spoke about the opening of the Rome Conference which is scheduled to begin shortly. He asked me about some ideas which are being mooted, namely whether WEU could be incorporated into the European Economic Community. Finally, he referred to the concentration of weapons in the Near East.

On the first subject, I am tempted to say that the difficulty is enough to make us give up. The European Community represents twelve countries, one of which at least has a special status, namely, Ireland. WEU, on the other hand, represents only nine, and two of the countries seeking to join are members of the European Economic Community: they are not yet in WEU and this may be a short-cut for bringing them in directly. I do not think, for the immediate future, that there will be any incorporation or a total merger, but the intergovernmental conference that will draw up its own terms of reference will

determine the best way for WEU to become in a sense what it already is today, namely, the forum for debate, reflection and action on the security problem.

On this question, and in conclusion, may I briefly say that the Rome intergovernmental conference will decide via the union what the Communities' common foreign policy will be. Now there can be no common foreign policy of the Community of the Twelve without in-depth study and the formulation of conclusions on security.

This is the problem that will face the negotiators and an answer has to be found. France's position, which you know well since I have often stated it, is that WEU should be used to achieve progress in the sphere of security, that a special link needs to be established – although this still requires to be defined – between the Community and WEU and that the instruments of rapprochement between the two institutions should be so adjusted that WEU and the Economic Community can advance in step with one another.

The concentration of weapons in this region of the world – I shall come back to this in a moment in my reply to Mrs. Hoffmann – is clearly a matter of great concern, and I think that if there has to be an international conference it should look at this problem, which will be one of the most serious remaining after the Gulf crisis.

I shall keep my answer to the questions from Mr. Martino and also from Mr. Stegagnini until the end because they will enable me to conclude.

Mr. Cetin, representing Turkey, asked me the following question on security: "Progress is being made in East-West relations. But, in Europe, is any progress being made in the region that directly concerns Turkey?" It is a question that we ask ourselves too. I think it can only be resolved through a major international conference. I shall come back to this shortly.

In his vehement intervention, Mr. Lambie, United Kingdom, pointed out that Europe was present in the Near East in two ways: it was present because it had sent troops to restore order; it was also unfortunately present because it had supplied weapons to most of these countries. What can I do about it? All I can tell you is that 80% of Iraq's weaponry was supplied by the Soviet Union.

But I think there is some contradiction in the question that he expounded at length. It is not possible to criticise the countries of Europe for having supplied weapons to these countries and at the same time reproach them now for making only a minimum contribution to the restoration of order and want them to take a more active rôle in the war when in so doing, in the end, they would be increasing their profits in every way.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

I think that this situation must be looked at very calmly, and with regret for the past. I myself was one of those in France who were critical of the arms contracts with Iraq. And this is not something entirely new. But I should really like to see every country make its confession in this matter. We should all be able to draw some lessons from this situation.

Coming to a more serious matter, we have to determine what would be the part played by the countries of Europe if war were to break out. It is quite incorrect to say that these countries have only sent naval forces and that, consequently, they would not take part in any conflict. The countries of Europe are present in the air, this is in any event true of France; they are present at sea – this is also true of Great Britain – and they are present on land on the frontier between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Reality cannot be distorted for the sake of argument.

This gives me no pleasure. I am no trouble-maker. I am not one of those people looking for war. I hate war. I know that it represents human losses, sorrow, death, misery and unhappiness. But I also know that it is costly not to act in time. I do not want to give any history lessons, but all of us here have certain events in our minds.

Mrs. Hoffmann brought up the question of a peaceful solution. Of course we all agree with this, and I am sure that this feeling is deeply shared both by the Assembly and by public opinion in all our countries. It is obvious, and there is no need to repeat it.

But she also raised the problem of the continuing threat by the aggressor. This is a genuine problem that leads me on to a conclusion and, at the same time, a reply to Mr. Martino and Mr. Stegagnini.

If the Gulf crisis is resolved as we hope, namely by Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, then there can be genuine discussion on the problems of the region, not only on the specific problems of the Gulf crisis, but also on its causes, which are clear but which we have somewhat forgotten following the attack itself. So, starting from the principle that no one individual or state has the right to take the law into his own hands, it will then be necessary to start to think about the problems of this region.

But you are right Mrs. Hoffmann to say that this solution can only be found through an international conference, which is an idea that is gradually gaining ground. Such a conference will need to propose solutions for the pacification of Lebanon, where the efforts of the government are out of all proportion with the results it obtains, namely, disarmament of the militia and the withdrawal of foreign troops – the Syrians in

the north and the Israelis in the south. It should aim to resolve the Israeli-Palestine conflict for which no solution seems at present possible and which is constantly getting worse, because the conditions imposed upon the Palestinians are daily becoming more unbearable and more threatening; I am thinking particularly of what has recently happened in Jerusalem or in the last few days in the occupied territories. The conference will also have to look at the Gulf crisis.

All these issues can be covered by an international conference, with a number of special sub-conferences on each of the conflicts that I have just mentioned. Their objective – as I have just said to Mr. Caro – would be to meet certain essentials, namely, respect of human rights, exploitation of resources, restoration of democracy, respect for the sovereignty of states – I have just mentioned Lebanon – and disarmament.

Coming back to the question put by the representative of the United Kingdom, whilst it is true that foreign powers have been guilty of supplying too many weapons in this particularly sensitive region, it would be a fair compensation for them to come to the conference table and reduce these weapons to the minimum needed for security. May I say that a number of major countries are thinking of this, including the United States, and that France intends to take part in such discussions.

Thus the proper way ahead is to hold an international conference.

To conclude, let me say that Mr. Martino has raised the fundamental problem facing us today, a problem illustrated through the Gulf crisis.

He spoke about the question of compliance with the law. He said at the beginning of his remarks that the United States no longer wanted to intervene. As I listened I was inclined to add that that was the view of the Soviet Union too which had also burnt its fingers in its various excursions beyond its frontiers.

We are in a completely new situation which contrasts with what is, or is about to be, behind us. Up to now, the balance of the world depended on the balance of the superpowers and the sharing of responsibilities. But if both sides no longer wish to police their area, we must draw one of two conclusions: if the world is not careful we shall move towards a system where regional anarchies flourish, where there are conquests, invasions and the annexation of the weak by the strong. Conversely, we can move towards compliance with the rules and principles of international law.

You rightly stated that, through the Security Council, the United Nations can play a rôle that it has probably not performed since 1945 because of the international situation that developed after the war.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

Shall we then be moving towards anarchy, creating conflict, disasters and perhaps, in the end, towards the risk of wider conflicts such as a world war or, on the contrary, are we, through the United Nations, moving towards a period of respect for law and the rules of law, in which case humanity may enjoy a period of relative prosperity, co-operation and peace?

But we must be careful. The Gulf crisis is important because it involves these two principles and not just because it is one of the regional conflicts such as we know in other regions of the world. There are, for example, fourteen conflicts going on in Africa. This is a reality, but it is not the only problem. What is going to happen to oil resources in the region is not the only problem. Whilst it is important I believe that beyond these considerations – I thank Mr. Martino for having asked the question – there is a much bigger issue which is going to dominate the coming years, namely, do we or do we not want the principle of respect of national sovereignty to prevail, or, on the contrary, do we want the rule of force to prevail, a force which in certain cases is relative: each one will choose his victim, will annex, and do what he wants in his area. We have to be careful. It is an issue which goes far beyond the considerations arising out of the present conflict, however serious that may be. These are considerations for the future. France would like to play its part along with other countries and ensure that law prevails over force and that international law should henceforth be the law governing the life of states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you for your address and perhaps even more for the answers that you have given to the questions from members which have made such a contribution to the debate we are about to have on European security and the Gulf crisis and on the future of this institution and the specific contribution that it can make to European security.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 11.35 a.m. and resumed at 11.55 a.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee

and the Defence Committee on European security and the Gulf crisis and the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments.

The joint debate will be continued this afternoon and tomorrow morning and will be followed by a vote on the draft recommendations submitted by the Political Committee and the Defence Committee.

I call Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In opening my address I should first like to thank Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur on this same subject, namely European security and the Gulf crisis, for the help and assistance he has kindly given me. In his report, Mr. Pieralli has thoroughly analysed the unacceptable act of aggression by Iraq against Kuwait.

Iraq has violated all the rules of international law by its attack on a sovereign state, taking hostages, violating embassies and threatening the use of chemical weapons.

After the end of the conflict of the blocs we were not expecting to be faced so soon with a crisis of such importance with such crucial potential consequences for our security and our economy.

As regards our security, it is very hard to accept that a country of eighteen million inhabitants, not yet equipped with nuclear weapons, but already having chemical weapons, can threaten our vital interests and defy the leading world powers.

This situation should open the eyes of those who believed or hoped that the demise of communism and the ending of the East-West confrontation would open the door to a peaceful universe from which armed conflict was permanently banished. On the contrary, everything seems to indicate that the new world we are discovering will be shaken by a mounting number of intensive regional conflicts and that collective security will be all the more difficult to ensure because a large number of irrational states will soon possess nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

But our security will be even further compromised if we lack the determination – now that the period of the veto in the United Nations as used by the major powers for the benefit of their protégés is over – to insist on compliance with international law and with all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Failing that determination, whatever it costs, the United Nations will meet the same sad fate as the League of Nations and the world will be like a giant western where the heroes will obvi-

Mr. De Decker (continued)

ously be those with the fastest trigger. What is at issue in the Gulf crisis is, above all, the supremacy of law and the triumph of the legitimacy of international law over the use of force.

Hence it is our Assembly's duty to ensure that law prevails over force, but at the same time to be resolved to allow the use of force if that is necessary for the rule of law to be victorious.

This does not of course mean that we should allow ourselves to fall into the trap being set with increasing skill by Saddam Hussein. When he attacked Kuwait the lot of the Palestinians was not in his mind at all. He invaded Kuwait to grab its oil and plunder its banks. It is only as an after-thought and, faced with the unexpectedly determined and intense international reaction that he made a play of linking Kuwait with the problem of the territories occupied by Israel, admitting in so doing the *de facto* illegality and illegitimacy of his own aggression and occupation.

So there can be no question of our countries' falling in with Saddam Hussein's wishes and agreeing that the settlement of the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis be linked with that of the difficult problem of security in the Middle East, the Palestinians' legitimate right to self-determination and Israel's right to ensure its own security.

This question will need to be settled by the international community, but only after Iraq has left Kuwait and freed the hostages. The Palestinian question is nevertheless the one where Europe has a specific rôle in this crisis. In the eyes of all the Arab states, Europe clearly has greater understanding for the unjust fate of the Palestinians than the United States which only seems to have thought of Israel's interests without sufficient consideration for the far-reaching consequences of the blatant injustice of which the Palestinian people are the victims even if it is true that the Arab states bordering on Israel are often guilty of a great deal of hypocrisy in the matter.

However this may be, recent developments in the Kuwait crisis and its management clearly show that firmness and the solidarity and unity of the international community are the only possible keys to a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the freeing of the hostages.

The interview which Saddam Hussein gave to the Franco-Belgian journalist Christine Ockrent the day before yesterday shows that force is the only language the Iraqi leader knows and understands. His intentions are wholly evil and his plan to turn the conflict into a cultural war is particularly disturbing. Saddam Hussein sees himself as the champion of the poor victimised by the rich, whereas if he had not devoted most

of his country's resources to fighting wars his people would be enjoying the same kind of prosperity as Saudi Arabia.

Saddam Hussein, who fought Iran under the anti-religious banner, now projects himself as the champion of Islam supposedly oppressed by the international community – although the vast majority of Arab countries and peoples dispute his legitimacy.

From my travels in the Gulf region and Cairo, I have been able to assess the determination of the Arab countries of the region in the face of the Iraqi President who is mainly felt to be a threat and alone responsible for the tragedies and misery that the invasion of Kuwait has brought upon hundreds and thousands of Egyptians, Palestinians and people from the Far East.

If time appears to be on the side of Saddam Hussein in the United States and in Europe, where public opinion seems less and less inclined to see the need for a possible armed conflict, it is not on his side in the Arab world and the Gulf where there is mounting awareness of the tide of tragedy that his crazy acts have set in motion.

The international community has reacted rightly by imposing sanctions through Security Council resolutions, a tactic which, although not totally effective, must surely sap Iraq's vitality, particularly in depriving the country of all financial resources. But we should not underestimate Saddam Hussein's ability to win back Arab support through his pro-Palestinian propaganda and we must also realise that this manoeuvre will be all the more effective and profitable if Saddam Hussein is able to hold on to the prestige he gets because of the size of his armed forces.

Nor must we ever forget that it will not be too long before Iraq has nuclear weapons which Saddam Hussein, as his past record proves, would not hesitate to use whether against his Arab or Israeli neighbours or against American or European forces.

After the present conflict, therefore, there has to be a general agreement to limit conventional weapons and a treaty on the denuclearisation of the region. Failing such agreement, and no one underestimates its difficulty in a part of the world so marked by bitter mistrust, any withdrawal of western forces, even after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait would leave the countries of the region in an unacceptably insecure position.

But to return to Europe. The Gulf crisis has demonstrated the usefulness and increasing effectiveness of WEU, but it has also shown how nationally the countries of Europe react when it is a matter of deploying their armed forces, even

Mr. De Decker (continued)

though they agree on objectives and know the importance of solidarity. Relatively easy as it was to give WEU the task of co-ordinating the European naval forces responsible for enforcing the embargo, it has proved almost impossible to co-ordinate anything involving the presence of European land and air forces in Saudi Arabia.

As regards land and air forces, France and Great Britain have gone it alone. Your Rapporteur has the strong feeling that France would have liked the British Government to agree to position its land forces alongside the French, and this, as we know, has not happened. This individualism of the European countries is apparent to all. And Saddam Hussein has already made use of it in his propaganda. In any event, this individualism and hence this division between European countries shows how tightly responsibility for defence and security matters is bound up with national sovereignty, how sensitive an issue it is and how illusory it is, in the short term to expect the countries of Europe to surrender this responsibility to a supranational European structure like the EEC.

The Gulf crisis, which has demonstrated that no one European state, however powerful, could have the slightest influence on this type of conflict, has also shown that at this stage only an intergovernmental European organisation like WEU could make any progress with a European defence concept. There also needs to be the political will to do so. Europe has specific interests to protect and its sensitivities in regional crises are sometimes different from those of the United States, even though we share the same values.

This is why your Rapporteur thinks it essential, if we do not want Europe for ever to have no other rôle than to follow and support American forces and policies, for Europe not to delay in equipping itself not only with a satellite observation agency but also with credible land and air forces that can be transported long distances to contribute to the restoration of peace in response to the appeals of the Security Council of the United Nations.

Setting up this mobile European force would not involve any new investment because it would be a matter of deploying mobile forces we already have as circumstances require. Nor would we have to form a European army as such. It would simply mean having existing national forces of the countries which so agree operating together by means of common logistic procedures and systems.

This modular mobile force which could, when our countries felt this to be needed, be placed under the authority of the WEU Council, would considerably increase Europe's credibility and

influence. It would also contribute to the durability of peace and stability in the world.

Only WEU has the intergovernmental capability at present to achieve this objective, which would bring us closer to political union. Let us seize this opportunity and ensure that this tragedy in Kuwait ultimately advances the cause of peace and the construction of Europe.

This is why, with the support of members of all the political groups in our Assembly, I have tabled amendments to the draft recommendation before us not only so as to allow for the most recent events, and in particular the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 678, but also in order to define more narrowly our European objectives. I should be grateful if, in this spirit, you would adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Decker, for the excellent presentation of your report and for the clarity of your statement. You have made it very clear that what is at stake in the Gulf crisis is the question of compliance with international law. You have also made it clear that it is the international community's responsibility to help solve the various problems causing such instability in the Near East. But this contribution from the international community depends on one condition i.e. that Iraq leave Kuwait and free the hostages.

(The President continued in English)

I now call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer to present the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1248.

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, you have the floor.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I have the honour to present to you this morning, as Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, is the twin of the report that has just been very ably presented by my colleague, Mr. De Decker.

The report is an updated version of a report that was adopted on 20th September by the Presidential Committee, acting under the emergency procedure, on behalf of your Assembly and mine. Basically, it covers two different themes. Firstly, it analyses how in the current Gulf crisis WEU has been able to do what we felt had to be done as regards co-ordination and co-operation, partly on the basis of the visit we were able to make to the region under the leadership of our President, Robert Pontillon. Attention is focused on the WEU countries' naval contribution in the Gulf, which, as Mr. De Decker has said, is a far better example than what is happening in the air and on land – and one that may be further improved – of what can be achieved in the way of co-ordination.

Another of the main thrusts of the report is that it takes a first look at the future. It considers

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

a number of the problems we are bound to face once the Gulf crisis has been resolved – peacefully, as we all hope. What lessons are there to be learnt from this crisis for our organisation? What is WEU's position in the European political and military arena, with particular reference, of course, to the rôle which WEU can and must play? This applies to what are commonly known as out-of-area problems. The end of my report in particular – I will discuss this at greater length in a moment – considers this type of problem and attempts to trigger a debate which the Defence Committee feels must be conducted within WEU.

When I look at the present situation as I seek to explain this first part of my report, I find that since it was written and unanimously approved by the Defence Committee, the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 678 has shown how important it is for the international community and, therefore, WEU to remain involved and to continue acting on the basis of the United Nations resolutions. WEU is not neutral in the military sense either, and is on the side of the community of nations in this respect. That is how it should stay.

Mr. President, when we look at what has been achieved so far and what remains to be achieved, we can see that some of the recommendations made in the previous report I presented on behalf of the Defence Committee have been followed up in the political sense, but that there are still a number of things to be done. My report urges that these things actually be done, that discussions continue and that thought be given to the possibility of better, integrated command structures in addition to what has already been achieved, because what has been achieved has been based on a situation of tense peace. As politicians we cannot afford not to proceed, in our opinions and our thinking, from a situation which is no longer one of tense peace, but one in which other consequences may occur in the Gulf and hostilities may break out unexpectedly – and I underline the word “unexpectedly”.

More can and must also be done with regard to WEU's naval presence in the Gulf region. A great deal of importance must be attached to WEU's relationship with its major ally on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The report therefore emphasises the importance of getting the message across, both to the public in the United States and to our fellow representatives on Capitol Hill, as to what WEU does in general, and not only at this moment, during the Gulf crisis. We must convince our allies that our contribution serves the same purpose as their own.

We can see that what has been achieved in the Gulf so far has been reasonably successful, as regards the enforcement, by the presence of ships from a number of WEU countries, of the sanctions announced by the United Nations Security Council. That must be emphasised. As I have just said, more must be done, but the enforcement of sanctions has been reasonably successful. More needs to be done, in particular, about the co-ordination of air and land forces. Here I agree with Mr. De Decker. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas, made a few comments on this. This Rapporteur also firmly believes that more can be done, just as more can be done as regards multinational contributions in the WEU context. One of the recommendations in the report therefore puts forward the idea of a hospital ship with a multinational crew. During our visit to the Gulf we were able to see that co-operation at sea – my report explains how this proceeds – leaves something to be desired in some respects and is satisfactory in others. One unsatisfactory aspect is the provision of air cover for the ships of the WEU countries that are in the Gulf. You will therefore see an appeal to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the countries with air forces in the region, for a major improvement in co-ordination with WEU in this respect too. There must, for example, be more than agreements among the Italian Tornado units on air cover for Italian ships: it must also be possible for air cover to be organised on a wider front and in a WEU context.

Mr. President, when I speak of a situation of tense peace, which may unexpectedly turn into other situations, it is quite clear that more is needed in political terms than a decision as to the rôle the WEU countries' ships will have to play if the situation I have just described actually arises. The Defence Committee realises full well that a debate of this kind cannot and must not be held in public. We also find that the ministers have not yet taken sufficient interest in such matters and that they will have to be a permanent item on the agenda. They will certainly have to be on the agenda when the ministers meet on 20th December.

Passing from the present situation to the political and military future, members will not be surprised to find that once again – I regret to say – my report emphasises the importance of crisis prevention and satellite observation. As this has often been discussed at length in this Assembly, it is disappointing that it should have to be raised again in a report. Your Rapporteur and the Defence Committee feel that the Gulf crisis reveals the relevance and political importance of the recommendations that have been made.

Mr. President, I also have this to say about the future. During the discussion with French

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

Foreign Minister Dumas we heard what he thought of the future of this organisation, particularly on the assumption that after the thaw in East-West relations the threats to Europe now and in the future will be more numerous and more varied than the threat we have been accustomed to in the last forty-five years. It is abundantly clear that the sound of this threat will be quite largely out of area, from regions that we have traditionally referred to as out of area. In the context of the report I have presented this morning, we will therefore have to consider the rôle to be played by our organisation, WEU, when it comes to out-of-area threats.

My report includes a recommendation to study the idea of doing more for naval co-operation. Marshalling national resources and considering some form of European rapid deployment force is not something about which the Defence Committee will say: "We will have that tomorrow". That is not the case. Hence the wording of this recommendation.

I will dwell on this a little longer, because amendments have been tabled to this recommendation, which I consider to be extremely important. We cannot evade this issue if we want to talk about the lessons WEU can already learn from this Gulf crisis. Even arguing from a negative angle, it must be obvious that, for reasons with which we are all familiar, the North Atlantic Alliance cannot take action out of area. Some people may say that it must take action, but your Rapporteur agrees with what the French Foreign Minister said about this this morning. A distinction must be made between what is desirable and what is possible for the North Atlantic Alliance in this context. If it can also be said that, as the integration of foreign policy continues, the Europe of the Twelve will certainly be unable to avoid problems connected with the integration of security policy – two aspects that are inseparable – your conclusion must be, whatever you think about it, that this will be a long drawn-out business. This is not something that can be settled overnight. Even if you adopt a negative approach, which I do not subscribe to, this brings you to WEU, where matters of this kind will have to be considered, if only because there is no other forum.

In conclusion, my report includes a passage concerning the defence budget cuts being made in many countries. It is, of course, for the national parliaments and governments to decide what they spend on defence. I feel it is our responsibility as parliamentarians gathered in this Assembly to urge our political leaders to prevent this from happening in an unco-ordinated way. When shaping future European defence structures, which is something else we face when we talk about lessons to be

learned from the Gulf crisis and its implications, "think before you act" should be our motto. We must first consider what structure the military forces in Europe should have, and then, your Rapporteur believes, it may be possible for further cuts to be made in defence budgets in a co-ordinated way. Let me make myself clear: I totally reject the suggestion that there can be no cuts in defence, but I believe we must consider this problem if we are justified in claiming to be an organisation that has a part to play in the shaping of a future European defence structure. That is why my recommendation, to which amendments have been tabled, says that the WEU Ministers must continue to play a part. That is the view of your Rapporteur and the Defence Committee.

Members of the Assembly will find an information document attached to my report. It gives a chronological account of the military developments, in particular, between the outbreak of the crisis in the Gulf and the presentation of my report. The Defence Committee thought it would be useful for this chronological account to be attached to the report.

When we talk about the Gulf crisis, we are talking about the political aspects, the associated military aspects and the Security Council resolutions, of which there are now a considerable number. President Saddam Hussein is being asked to do what he should have done long before. I will finish with a comment on a human, rather than a military aspect. Amidst all the other distress, political and military, we must not forget that the hostages in Iraq are in an extremely distressful situation. There are relatives of these hostages living in a number of our countries, and they are in an equally distressful situation. I just wanted to make a personal reference to this.

I will not trouble you further with my introduction, because it is the debate, not the rapporteurs, that will be important in the next few days. I hope the report I have presented on behalf of the Defence Committee contains sufficient material for discussion in the Assembly and will provide guidance as to how, along with future political lines, other lines can – and must – be plotted, more in terms of military co-ordination, which could give WEU the place in Europe it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for that presentation of the report on behalf of the Defence Committee.

There are already thirty speakers on the list for the joint debate on the Gulf crisis. I therefore propose to the Assembly, in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, that speeches in this debate should be limited to five minutes for each speaker, with the exception of the committee chairmen and rapporteurs.

The President (continued)

May I remind you that, under Rule 32, the Assembly votes on this proposal without debate.

Is there any objection?...

It is agreed.

I call. Mr. Ward of the United Kingdom.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. As the first speaker from the floor, may I compliment our two Rapporteurs not only on the detail they have included in their report, but on the speed of their reaction to the events. Their report is extremely helpful to those who want to take part in the debate.

I understand and sympathise with those colleagues who want to use the example of the action taken to deal with Iraqi aggression in the Middle East as a model for action by WEU to protect European security in the future. It is unlikely, however, that future crises will necessarily have the same characteristics of blatant aggression, a major threat to regional stability and a threat to the international community politically and economically. In other crises it may not necessarily be possible to resolve them by international intervention. Therefore it would be unwise to plan future structures designed to protect Europe based on the present action in the Gulf.

It would be unwise to assume that the United Nations will always act as promptly and in such a co-ordinated fashion as it has on Kuwait. In common with many others, I hope that we can look forward to a period of international co-operation at the United Nations, but we must also consider other scenarios.

All the allied nations are committed to ensuring the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. We must also ensure that a lasting solution is found to the problems posed by the invasion of Kuwait and the Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons and their possible future possession of a nuclear weapon.

We all hope, even at this late hour, that a peaceful solution can be found. There must be no weakening of the United Nations' stated position that Iraq must withdraw completely from Kuwait and unconditionally release all hostages. However, that is not enough. Iraq must be made to make full reparation for the damage done in Kuwait and pay compensation to the relatives of those killed, tortured or imprisoned by the Iraqis.

The latest initiative by President Bush may be the last chance for a peaceful solution. I hope that he will convince us, his allies, and Saddam Hussein, that there will be no retreat from the United Nations position and that any discussion

will end by 15th January 1991, when the latest United Nations resolution becomes operative and force may be used.

Many people, including prominent Americans, are concerned that Saddam Hussein sees further talks as a sign of weakness. That can be prevented if any meetings are used solely to explain to the Iraqis in the simplest terms and with the widest publicity that this is their last chance to comply with the United Nations resolution, on which there can be no negotiation.

I approve of the tactic of building up overwhelming military power in the Gulf while seeking a peaceful solution at the same time. The penalty for not resisting aggression is written in large letters in recent European history.

The best chance for peace in the Middle East is to convince the aggressor that, whether the conflict is in words or weapons, he will ultimately lose.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Ward for your contribution to the debate.

I now call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me say at once that I agree with the two reports and that I too congratulate the Rapporteurs for the clear and concise picture they have given us of both the military and the political situation. In particular, however, I am pleased to see reaffirmed the crucial and highly positive rôle of WEU with regard to a crisis which, although in an area outside Europe, has a considerable impact on our continent, now on the brink of an exceedingly difficult period in the economic and other fields.

It is for these reasons – in addition to those referred to a short time ago by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs – that I feel that the Middle Eastern problem has to be solved quickly because it is extraordinarily difficult to grapple with a military and an economic challenge at the same time. Europe in particular, confronted as it is by a grave economic crisis and the need to help the Eastern European countries in the serious difficulties they are experiencing, will have to take firm and swift decisions in the military and other fields, if and when this becomes necessary – though we hope that this is not required. The eighteenth resolution of the United Nations, which contains an ultimatum and a deadline, creates a state of alert. Even though we want peace and not war, we still have to do everything necessary to prepare for the latter. This morning the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, adapting an old Latin dictum, used the words “prepare for war if you want peace”.

Mr. Fassino (continued)

The recent apparent overtures by the Iraqi régime and the – more than apparent, we hope – possibility of a direct dialogue between the two chief adversaries must not divert us from our serious pursuit of the path of firmness, without which Europe would be weakened just when we want it to remain strong.

While we all certainly pray that the forthcoming meetings will result in a diplomatic solution as hoped by the United Nations, nothing should be left undone in our endeavour to defend ourselves at the diplomatic level and, more especially, on the other level where structures are still inefficient and above all disjointed. I have pondered on what the Rapporteur said this morning about the lack of co-ordination but in my view this has to be attributed not to the attitudes of individuals but to the physical lack of co-ordination between the forces working together in an effort to safeguard peace and to prepare, should it be necessary, for war.

We therefore await with hope the outcome of this unexpected, and we trust fruitful, break in the clouds between President Bush and Saddam Hussein. I fear that the latter will be reluctant to give up his pan-Arab leadership, and we should therefore be prepared for fresh outbursts of intolerance, fanaticism and irrationality to darken the sky again.

As the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, pointed out this morning, it is good to note that demonstrations in favour of Hussein in Arab countries have diminished. The Arabs are becoming aware that the threat of poverty to their countries is caused not by the West but by the person who wishes to become the leader of what is called pan-Arab civilisation. This is important because it may persuade many people to change their minds. Also it illustrates the power of democracy and the weakness of authoritarianism – an historical, philosophical and political lesson.

In the light of these principles I therefore endorse the position embodied in the recommendation which, in any case, draws on the United Nations resolutions. I believe that permanent consultation between the chiefs of defence staffs is desirable and that the idea that WEU should be consulted as one of the actors in this crisis is sound. It is also desirable that there should be a recognition procedure between the western naval and air forces deployed in the Gulf for safety reasons and to avoid incidents between friendly units – as has already happened and must not occur again.

I attach special importance to the establishment of a liaison office to ensure stable relations with the United States – in the words of

the report: “to convince the United States Administration that direct dialogue with WEU is possible and to be welcomed, particularly at present”. This must constitute an important point of reference, and this latter view was reiterated several times this morning by Mr. Dumas.

The draft recommendation therefore urges the Council to make every effort to ensure recognition of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. This principle must also be reflected in the implementation of effective solutions in terms of military technology including the crisis management centre, the observation satellite agency and the creation of a European military force.

I will conclude, Mr. President, by stating that the vital principle and central objective are those of a vision of WEU fulfilling an essential rôle as the European pillar whose task, in the present case, is to promote security throughout the Middle East. We consider that WEU must carry out an effective inspection of armaments in the Middle East, just as it did before in Europe.

I shall conclude with the hope that, to develop our strength, to encourage the spirit and idea of a specifically European defence and to reinforce the unity of Europe which could become one of the aims of the coming decade beyond present boundaries, these ideas of ours will succeed in creating the kind of Europe which we have so far failed to do for so many years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Fassino.

I now call Mr. Scheer of Germany to take the floor.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have to say that, unlike the previous two speakers, I do not agree with the general tenor of the draft recommendation. I would like to plead for a strictly peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis, not a military one. And I do not need anyone – I will say this straight away – to tell me what to think of Saddam Hussein. Two years ago, after Saddam Hussein had used chemical weapons, and violated international law and human rights: after he had perpetrated an act of aggression, and not for the first time, I called on my party's behalf for international measures, including sanctions and condemnation of Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. Sadly, there was absolutely no political reaction at that time, and so our governments went on supplying him with equipment and now share the responsibility for the situation in the Gulf. There is no denying this. But it also means that we have a political duty to our own people to seek a strictly peaceful solution, so that our men will not be shot down with weapons supplied to Iraq by our governments in the past.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

But that is not the only reason for avoiding military action. It is absurd – to be absolutely frank – not to rely on the effect of sanctions. Given the implications of military action, it does not matter in the least whether these sanctions continue for another six or nine or twelve months. When you begin making comparisons, it is obvious that sanctions are bound to work: Iraq, with a population of seventeen million, is economically half as strong as Belgium, and it faces a community of nations that is enforcing these sanctions with the United Nations. To have no faith in them is a sign of political weakness and nothing else.

The consequences of war are obvious: burning oilfields would cause an ecological disaster on an unprecedented scale, a drastic reduction in worldwide oil supplies would result in a dramatic rise in prices, making the price rises of the 1970s look insignificant by comparison. This in turn would increase the danger of a world economic crisis and the total collapse of the third world, which would then most definitely be unable to pay the rising oil bills, seeing that those countries were not even able to pay the bills resulting from the oil crises of the 1970s. The consequences throughout the Arab region would also be incalculable. Every attempt to find a political solution to the Palestinian problem and other problems, Europe's entire relationship with the new Arab identity, now described as Islamic fundamentalism, all this could be shattered for a long time to come. War simply leads to more tensions.

Any attempt to give preference to military solutions to problems which can only be solved politically, and which have not been adequately and appropriately solved in recent years, can only lead to chaos. That is why we must and I – along with others – shall oppose any attempt to seek a military solution rather than sanctions.

Second, the WEU treaties, which are supposed to give WEU its legitimacy, contain nothing to justify out-of-area operations in the future. WEU is concerned with defence in Europe. It must, of course, take an interest in political developments as regards security issues elsewhere. But to respond by forming a military unit would mean changing the purpose of the provisions governing Western European Union and would be just as wrong, as I have already said, as military intervention in the Gulf. This is the wrong approach.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Scheer.

I now call Mrs. Roe of the United Kingdom.

Mrs. ROE (*United Kingdom*). – First, I congratulate Mr. De Decker and Mr. De Hoop

Scheffer on their excellent reports relating to the Gulf crisis.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has rightly attracted the revulsion and condemnation of the rest of the world. Saddam Hussein's annexation of that small and virtually defenceless country was wholly contrary to international law and every tenet of civilised conduct. When he failed to achieve his territorial and political ambitions by bullying and threats, Saddam Hussein resorted to the use of force finally to achieve his aims. This is simply a case of unprovoked aggression and it throws into jeopardy the fragile peace of the Middle East. There is no doubt that Saddam has brought the region to the brink of war by his ambitions. The only way to avoid that war, with the terrible loss of life and destruction which it might bring, is for Iraq to end its illegal occupation of Kuwait.

Saddam's bizarre hope that the Arab world and the western world would acquiesce in his aggression has come to nought. How could the other threatened countries of the Gulf, from Saudi Arabia to Syria, possibly turn a blind eye to an act of aggression which puts their security into grave doubt? How could the western world possibly stand by and watch international law being flouted, a friend and ally annexed and a militant superpower threaten the whole of the Gulf region?

In an almost unprecedented show of unity, the United Nations condemned Iraq's occupation and called on Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops. I am surprised that Iraq has failed to meet the legitimate demands of almost all the nations of the world. History has, however, shown that dictators are indifferent to international law and wholly oblivious of condemnation.

In invading Kuwait, Saddam Hussein made a massive error of judgment. He believed that the rest of the world would indulgently ignore his conquest. He thought that the other Arab countries had neither the will nor the means to resist him. He thought that the Community and WEU countries would ignore the threat he posed to some of the West's staunchest allies in the Gulf. He was very wrong. With almost 500 000 troops from round the world in place in Saudi Arabia, he must be aware that he can no longer continue his occupation of Kuwait. At sea, an international armada is enforcing the blockade. The world reaction to the invasion has proved tangibly that Saddam's illegal annexation cannot be allowed to stand.

Although Saddam has had time to withdraw his troops, all he has done is reinforce his occupying armies and taunt the West with the obscene spectacle of hostages. Sanctions have clearly begun to bite, yet they have not as yet persuaded Saddam Hussein of the seriousness of

Mrs. Roe (continued)

the opposition that he now faces. The new United Nations resolution sets a firm deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. I am convinced that it is right to give Saddam Hussein until the new year to pull out of Kuwait, because it is clear that a war in the Gulf is in no one's interest and it is right that the allies should do all that they can to head off the risk of war. Ultimately, if Iraq tries to call the allies' bluff, it will be forced out of Kuwait, because it is clear that the army now gathering in Saudi Arabia is not some elaborate hoax designed to frighten but incapable of acting. I have no doubt that the will exists in the nations that have committed forces to the area to use those forces should the need arise.

I am no expert on military power, but I know that the quality and sheer size of the forces committed to the Gulf by the Americans, the British, the Syrians and the Egyptians and by many other countries – thirty in all – have the capacity to root Iraq out of occupied Kuwait. There is no question of an American president or a British prime minister and other political leaders sending their forces to war in pursuit of an unwinnable goal. If they have to go into action, Saddam Hussein should understand that they will win decisively.

Iraq's leaders made a monumental error in seizing Kuwait, yet even now that error can be reversed. My earnest hope is that Saddam Hussein will do so and save the region from war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much for your contribution, Mrs. Roe.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). – I call Mr. Caro who is the last speaker this morning.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and the eminent Rapporteurs, Mr. De Decker and Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, for two excellent reports which it was right to put together in this debate. They are indeed inseparable just like the two Rapporteurs who make a very good pair.

Obviously, I should like to see a very thorough follow-up to these reports. I am thinking in particular of all the data they give about the Gulf crisis and the military efforts of WEU countries in the context of the action envisaged and authorised by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

When we refer to defence, we also mean carrying out national decisions in the WEU framework. Here, though within the framework of the United Nations resolutions, we are concerned essentially with national decisions by the member states of WEU which have agreed,

under the modified Brussels Treaty, to co-ordinate their efforts in the application of those decisions through the Council, to which I pay tribute, and all the bodies which work with the Assembly, not to forget the inestimable contribution of the Secretary-General.

In this connection I should like our Rapporteur to tell us, at the purely military level of co-ordination, whether greater emphasis should not be placed upon the value of meetings of chiefs of staff of Western European Union member countries' armed forces. I take this very particular case – there are many others – because our debate today on the two reports raises two problems.

First, as a result of the crisis caused by the "Anschluss" of Kuwait and all that is now going on – rejection of the disaster of war with the proviso that war will be waged if necessary – the need for a stronger political organisation of Europe's defence and security becomes clear in our minds. We have our plan ready. The WEU Assembly has an unchanging doctrine in this respect and the address that you heard this morning by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council shows that the path that we have marked out is steadily being pursued; perhaps we shall be able to translate this very shortly into reality. I must say, especially after listening to Mr. Scheer, that as regards the catastrophic results of an armed conflict, we are all able to picture its terrible results both for man and his environment. War, alas, brings destruction and misery. There was a time, the second world war, when men were prepared to lay down their lives in equally apocalyptic conditions. The purpose of that war, too, was to enforce the law. This morning on the radio I heard statements by well-known European political figures who are beginning to say: the fight over there is not really for us Europeans. From Mr. Scheer's words I think I understood – Mr. Scheer will forgive me for taking him to task since others are using the same arguments – that we have to make a careful distinction between what we call the WEU area, the NATO area and out of area.

As democrats attached to the principles of law, it is right for us to say that when international and human rights are under threat from totalitarian governments, there are no in or out-of-area distinctions.

In what they are doing, the member states of WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and the United Nations are acting within their area of responsibility to defend human rights and the right of countries to live under the democratic régimes which we have encouraged them to acquire. The rule of law knows no barriers and I ask the committee to call upon the Assembly as a whole to affirm it, so as to cut short this attempt to trap us in this dualism, through the hope of a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Caro (continued)

We have a right to hope for negotiation because, as Mr. Dumas said, we all hate war, but we have no right to allow ourselves to be trapped: it is not because war is unthinkable that we should not be prepared to fight. What is required above all is that we and our institutions should defend what is right.

WEU would gain even more in stature by claiming its right to have its part in the discussions on the organisation of peace and security in Europe, and doing all in its power to ensure that the future institutions, in which we wish to play an important rôle, are consistent with this political option which we have always advocated and which, because of, or perhaps thanks to, the Gulf crisis, we can portray to the whole world with much more credibility than before.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Caro for your words and particularly for pointing out again that the rule of law is never out of area.

(The President continued in English)

It is now time to adjourn this joint debate. It will be resumed this afternoon and again tomorrow morning, when we shall vote on the draft recommendations presented by the Political Committee and the Defence Committee.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – The Italian Delegation has proposed the following appointments as alternate members of committees to fill vacant seats: Mr. Colombo to the Political Committee, Mr. Manzolini to the Technological and Aero-

space Committee, Mr. Manzolini to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. Andreis to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Mr. Colombo to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Is there any objection?...

The changes are agreed to.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Document 1247; Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council; Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

Replies by Mr. Chevènement to questions put by: Mr. Scheer, Mr. Caro, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Stegagnini, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Castellina (Member of the European Parliament, Observer), Mr. Jessel (point of order), Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Hardy,

Mr. Romero, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Feldmann, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Scheer (point of order).

4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee*, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Cetin (Observer from Turkey), Mr. Benassi, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Colombo, Mr. Soell, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Martinez.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the Council, Doc. 1247

*Address by Mr. Chevènement,
Minister of Defence of France*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of the first part of the thirty-sixth annual report of the

Council by the Minister of Defence of France, Mr. Chevènement.

Once again, Minister, let me say how pleased we are to welcome you to this Assembly, although in the circumstances this may be somewhat pointless since you already know the building well. We have already had much information, clarification and detail from you before. Today you are here as French co-Chairman-in-Office of the Council. This morning we were addressed by Mr. Roland Dumas, who replied very fully and to everyone's obvious satisfaction to the many question he was asked, and I know that you yourself have agreed to reply to questions after your address. May I therefore thank you once again for being here and without further ado invite you to take your place at the rostrum.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Secretary-General, ladies and gentlemen, it is only a few days since the Paris summit of the thirty-four member countries of the CSCE came to an end. As many heads of state, as well as the President of the French Republic, have pointed out, this summit will probably go down in history as the symbolic end of an era: that of the cold war and Yalta, which had divided Europe into two opposing blocs dominated by the two superpowers.

The Gulf crisis also belongs to a new world which does not fit into the bipolar pattern either, but shows the need for regional crises to be managed in a multi-polar context. Like many

¹. See page 25.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

current events in Europe, including the collapse of the Soviet fortress, the crumbling away of the Warsaw Pact and the re-union of Germany, the Gulf crisis is a consequence of the crisis in the Soviet Union, a point we can come back to shortly if you wish during question time.

The events of recent months are alive in all our minds: the democratisation of the countries of the East, German unification, recently accented by general elections for the whole of the united country, the upheavals that have not yet settled down and the big question marks hanging over the future of the Soviet Union.

All these upsets directly impact institutions designed to fit a strategic context that is now in a process of radical change: we have to face up to the fact that one chapter in European history has closed and another has opened. Examples are the new impetus in the process of European unification with political union its declared aim, the new dimensions now planned for the CSCE, particularly in the sphere of pan-European security co-operation, the imminent demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the increasingly apparent need for adjustment and fundamental change in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, all developments arising out of events occurring in the past year.

Finally, there is the issue of the possible co-ordination of European action outside the NATO area in a context where the East-West approach and its implicit solidarities no longer necessarily apply.

It is within this radically new context and against this background that I should now like to set what I have to say about WEU's possible contribution to the future security of Europe.

As you just said, Mr. President, Mr. Roland Dumas conveyed to you this morning how strongly the French Government felt that WEU had a positive part to play in writing this new chapter of European history.

As regards Europe, the challenge facing us can be summarised quite simply: a gradual transition has to be made from a balance of confrontation dominated by the United States-USSR strategic equation to a situation where stability will be more a matter of continental balance in a context of co-operation.

For forty years the opposition between the blocs has made equilibrium in Europe part of, and a consequence of, the global East-West strategic balance and for forty years the Europeans have greatly enjoyed the benefit of the United States commitment. At all events it has been a great comfort to them. Today the American military presence in Europe is going to change, first for budgetary reasons and, second, because it is

increasingly difficult to justify it to American public opinion for which the defence of Europe was primarily part and parcel of the global confrontation with the Soviet Union. Today, that has all gone. How thinking has changed in one year!

However, the United States-USSR détente is not going to correct the strategic imbalance in Europe implicit in the presence of a military superpower in continental Europe. This is the truth and there is a risk in the fact that the reduction of the United States' rôle in the defence of Europe and the relaxing of our own defence effort, if we are not careful, may lead to a strategic void in a fragmented Western Europe failing to assume responsibility for its own defence.

First, I should like to look at the problem of strengthening European co-operation in defence matters, because that would be an essential guarantee of the continent's long-term stability. At the same time, this strengthening of European co-operation would be part of the logic of Europe's progress towards unity.

The strengthening of European defence co-operation should help to strengthen the alliance and maintain links with the United States, a key element in European equilibrium. Some people have talked about a San Francisco/Vladivostok equilibrium. This is the whole question of setting up of a new transatlantic partnership in which Europeans would play a new rôle implicit both in progress with European unification and in the shouldering of essential responsibility for their own defence.

Speaking to you on what I think is at least the third occasion, I shall not repeat what I have said at other times, but clearly 340 million Europeans cannot go on for ever depending on 250 million Americans for their security. That is obvious. But we need to be aware of this for us to make the necessary arrangements in time.

Let me also add that in my view facilitating and encouraging this development is in the alliance's interest too. We must not cling to the past.

Greater responsibility for defining and providing their own defence is a necessary condition for Europeans to assume more of the burdens and risks and, if I have understood correctly, this is what we are being asked to do.

In my opinion, Western European Union has always had an essential part to play in this necessary reorganisation of defence solidarities between Europeans and Americans. I have never ceased saying this here and elsewhere and today the truth is more obvious than ever.

The Brussels Treaty provides the necessary legal framework for the achievement of European agreement on defence questions for

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

the organisation of specifically European co-operation at the military level compatible with the maintenance of a changed form of transatlantic co-operation.

It is in this spirit that we proposed to our partners to set up an agency for evaluating satellite data which should, in my view, be the first step towards the creation of a European satellite observation capability. The point here is that, whether for verifying disarmament agreements or studying crisis situations, satellites play a unique rôle by providing an autonomous observation capability not subject to overflight or visiting agreements that would not necessarily be respected in a crisis, i.e. just when observation is absolutely vital.

It seems to me that this opens up a vast opportunity for rational European co-operation for the benefit of security and disarmament which would itself serve the cause of peace in Europe. By combining our European resources we could have observation facilities providing us with the minimum of autonomy we need by comparison with the other space powers.

We should never forget that the Soviet or American effort is often ten, fifteen or twenty times what we are capable of as Europeans. And for the future of this space observation capability – I am thinking in particular of radar or infra-red observation satellites – we need to pool our resources and efforts.

This is not an aggressive position; it is one serving European interests which are peace and surveillance of disarmament agreements, and we must have the courage to go forward towards it.

On that score let me warn against making Europe part of an electoral platform if we are not prepared to make a number of practical arrangements to make it come true. How European we are can be measured by the yardstick of political will. This political will is either there or not there. We hope it is, and that this will give Europe a chance to become a fact.

I also welcome the news that the principle of the meeting of the chiefs of staff of our countries is now agreed. The first meeting is to be held in spring next year where, among other things, there will be an exchange of ideas on military developments in Europe, something that is very necessary now the Paris agreements have been signed.

The essential point remains that defence solidarity has to be based on a common perception of the way in which that defence is to be ensured. I am sorry to dwell on the obvious, but questions of doctrine and strategy are fundamental to any reorganisation of our defence system. Otherwise we could well fabricate an

empty solidarity within which narrow national approaches would remain or even grow stronger or make the development of the defence of Europe dependent on imported and inappropriate theories ultimately inconsistent with the responsibility connected with the defence of a country's or of a community's security interests.

And as there is no more serious requirement than to ensure the long-term security of our countries and of Europe, we need to know how we are going to prepare to cope with situations that, by definition, are evolving, changing and, I would add, unpredictable.

Western European Union can and must be part of the framework when this joint concept of European defence in conformity with European interests is developed.

Our long-term visions are not far off, as is clear from our adoption in 1987 of a joint declaration on European security interests and in the discussions held in the groups organised by this institution.

Of course, you will say, much has happened since 1987. This is true, but the relevance of a defence doctrine which can only be a long-term doctrine may be judged by the fact that the far-reaching changes that we have witnessed have not outdated its *raison d'être*. In the final analysis this seems to me to be true.

In my view, Western European Union also has a future because the Brussels Treaty provides for solidarity of outlook in the face of all those forms of aggression that are the reasons why the signatories to the treaty jointly consider how they should organise their defence in the perspective of the political union of the member countries of the Community.

This relates more particularly to the nuclear deterrent necessary to guarantee a stable balance of security in Europe. We also confirmed this principle in The Hague security platform.

Nuclear weapons, not least because of the rôle that they were said to play in the alliance strategy, are often considered by public opinion as theatre weapons, with the result that their rôle in the prevention of conflicts and maintenance of stability is not always clearly perceived. Wrongly, of course! But have we always made the necessary effort to explain this? The truth is that we have been running a practical exercise for forty years and we now need to show that it has been a complete success.

The deterrent achieved what it was meant to achieve; we won this cold war which is now a thing of the past because the deterrent showed itself to be effective, because in the final analysis it prevented war, because it guaranteed peace and because it made possible these great changes, which are now reality, through the

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

signing of the treaty on the reduction of conventional weapons and on confidence and security measures in Europe – the Paris charter for a new Europe.

To meet the problems implicit in its vulnerability in the face of this conflict, Europe needs to be able to rely on an adequate nuclear deterrent for its defence. You have only to think of the immense conurbations, the countless industrial installations and the dozens of nuclear power stations there are to picture the devastating effects of a conflict in Western Europe, even limited to conventional weapons. The Soviet Union and the United States with their vast open areas are vulnerable in a different way. It is this specific fragility, due to its small territorial size, density of population and degree of development and to the very nature of its society which means that Europe's objective can never be to fight a devastating and deadly war but only to prevent war. The nuclear deterrent with the threat of destruction that it holds for any aggressor is the only way to discourage any attempt at aggression by proving that the political and military mathematics of such aggression would be an absurdity.

The deterrent outdates war as a political instrument for settling conflicts, and with the ending of the cold war nothing would be worse than for us to go back to the Clausewitz logic that war could be politics as usual but in another form.

The presence of four nuclear powers on the continent of Europe has the strategic effect of locking out any possibility of large-scale conflict in Europe, and a dampening effect on possible crises.

We feel that the deterrent must be on the minimum scale: the purpose is not to win a war but to prevent one breaking out. Over-capacity designed for purposes of waging a nuclear war would be both unjustified and dangerous because it could be used or perceived as a threat. A minimum deterrent, however, has a stabilising effect because its use can only be envisaged to defend the vital interests of the countries sharing the same defence space and linked by the indissoluble ties of geography, as is our case.

Our objective must therefore be to make the doctrine of a country like France and that which appears to be emerging from the discussions of our allies complementary to one another. I am thinking in particular of the London conference; whilst it is clear that the doctrines there are not wholly in line, the question is: can they be made complementary? It is in this direction that our thinking should be aimed.

That brings me to the second solidarity forum in security matters, namely the CSCE.

Solidarity in security matters among the thirty-four countries of Europe forms part of the history and geography of the continent, and, now that the artificial barrier between the East and West has come down, the CSCE should be the vehicle for strengthening and developing this solidarity.

The continent of Europe must maintain peace and stability and the collective interests of all the peoples of Europe should take precedence over individual interests. But even if the military balance essentially related to the presence on European soil of the Soviet Union – which in any event will remain a major military power – is still an essential condition for maintaining stability and peace, pan-European consultation and agreement should bring about the concerted and co-operative management of the military elements that ensure this balance. This is the principle underlying the disarmament agreements and, on these grounds, they represent a success and a hope for Europe as a whole.

Indeed, the fact that the twenty-two member countries of the two alliances reached agreement on levels of armaments involving big reductions and that they will set up jointly a verification system and transparency measures gives positive hope for the establishment of new military relations between Europeans, based on transparency, trust and co-operation. WEU has its rôle to play in these relations, in so far as the Europeans have specific interests to uphold, particularly in the areas of verification and compliance.

Perhaps I should, at this point, draw your attention to the fact that there has already been a case of non-compliance east of the Urals where the Soviets have placed an impressive quantity of weapons. We also know that many countries in the West and in Central Europe are far from complying with the theoretical ceilings assigned to them. The measures that we see them taking in successive budgets do not point to such compliance with the result that there is some risk of imbalance, on which we have to keep a careful watch. But I do not want to play the pessimist. There have been sufficient major political events – the collapse of the Soviet fortress, the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops back to the USSR – for it to be considered that the one, to some extent, offsets the other. But we still need to be watchful about compliance with these agreements. We must not allow strategic imbalances and vacuums to develop, which could prove disastrous temptations. We should remember that the best guarantee of peace is our own vigilance.

At the same time, the decisions to organise regular political consultation among the thirty-four and to set up a conflict prevention centre shows a joint determination to promote

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

the means of ensuring stability and preventing and limiting such crises as may arise in Europe, which is a dangerous continent, as the past has shown. While this dialogue is primarily political, consideration of the military conditions of long-term stability is also implicit. Here again, WEU can contribute to this process with a view, more particularly, to the next seminar on military doctrines in 1991.

As you are aware, the two extraordinary WEU ministerial meetings in August and September were an opportunity for us to state our common views on the measures to be taken in response to the Iraqi attack on Kuwait.

Here is a situation report on co-ordinated action since the first ministerial meeting on 21st August. First there was a common ministerial directive on co-ordination of measures by WEU countries to enforce the embargo at sea. It was the first of its kind and was adopted at the end of August after the meeting of the chiefs of staff of our armed forces.

Next there were the naval "points of contact" meetings which defined the specific areas of co-ordination and enabled all the necessary information to be exchanged to ensure that the deployment envisaged by each of our various countries was coherent with the other. There is thus a unit monitoring the situation of "WEU" warships operating at naval headquarters in Paris and relaying information to the headquarters of member countries.

Finally, there is local co-ordination through the "conferences of commandants in the zone of the naval forces of the WEU member countries" which are held about once every month. It is in this framework that patrol sectors have been defined for our ships operating in the zone extending either side of the Strait of Hormuz. This has made it possible to organise a rota of member countries' ships so as to ensure a virtually permanent presence and particularly that of a logistic support ship in the area.

We are therefore very pleased with the various decisions that have been taken, which show that the co-ordination structures set up are playing an effective rôle. Six WEU countries are now permanently present in the crisis area. In total, for this embargo enforcement mission alone, our countries have deployed nineteen fighting ships and some twenty support, supply and auxiliary ships with the same embargo enforcement mission.

As for the deployment of land and air forces, after the ministerial meeting on 18th September, the ad hoc group set up to implement the ministerial directives concluded that co-operation between WEU member countries could chiefly be done in the logistics field. While some would

have liked to have gone a little further this was nevertheless what was agreed: there would be assistance with air and sea transport from the home countries to the potential theatre of operations, participation in the security of such transportation; escorts in the Mediterranean and Red Sea; technical, air transport and medical support in the crisis zone, etc.

At the practical level, a network of military points of contact has been set up similar to that of naval points of contact. Four meetings of the military points of contact have already taken place and the organisation of co-operation in logistics is making progress: the structures have been set up and there is a monitoring unit operating in the country of the chairmanship.

Finally, on the basis of the lists of needs submitted before the meeting by the British and the French, a number of areas of logistic co-operation have been identified and there have been many co-operative actions in these areas.

This list of WEU joint actions highlights the progress achieved in terms of specific co-operation between Europeans. At the same time it reveals how much remains to be done in providing the countries of Europe with the means of contributing collectively and effectively in the diplomatic and military fields to the stability of regions like the Gulf which are of crucial strategic importance to Europe. It requires us to pool our thoughts about the aims and instruments of European co-operation in defending our essential security interests both in Europe and elsewhere.

This is a major task and it is there for us to do. Many practical measures have already been taken. I have listed them, but much remains to be done. What we have done so far is a measure of both your will and ours to go forward so that this European security identity, to which I have often referred, can advance still further in the months and years to come.

I thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for the wealth of information and news of projects in your address and its clear illustration of the agreement there is between the Ministerial Council and the parliamentary Assembly in their hopes for the future.

Thank you also for agreeing to answer the questions of some of our members. Perhaps you would like to answer the questions in batches or possibly you would prefer to answer one question at a time.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). I would prefer to answer one question at a time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to ask the Minister if, when discussing the problems in the Gulf, his government considered the possibility that the pressure of time now under discussion may simply be due to the excessive deployment of troops now taking place in the Gulf. The daily costs are enormous in financial terms and too great a physical strain may be imposed on troops and weapons when the desert storms begin in the spring. So might the pressure of time be due solely to this, and not to any doubts about the sanctions working? It would be quite possible to wait longer than the deadline of 15th January for sanctions to take effect. As we have heard and read that the French Government has been highly sophisticated in its approach to this question – more sophisticated than many other countries – I would like the Minister to tell me, if he can, what discussions of a sophisticated nature have taken place in France.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What about these shades of opinion, Minister!

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – My reply will be very simple. Although there are always many shades of opinion when governments are debating, there cannot be any when action is required.

The embargo strategy was defined last August. As we know its effect can only be gradual but troops with an essentially defensive and deterrent rôle have been deployed at the same time.

Now that the United Nations resolution has been passed authorising recourse to further measures after 15th January, one may rightly wonder what will happen. Having sent 400 000 troops into the zone, the United States has indicated clearly that there is not really any question of them spending another summer in the region in such large numbers. So it seems that the countdown has in fact begun. But this is part of situation logic. Consequently, it is within this period that Iraq has to move and agree to go back on its annexation of Kuwait.

In a speech to the United Nations on 24th September, which is still perfectly valid today, the President of the French Republic called upon Iraq first to indicate its intention to withdraw from Kuwait and, secondly, to free the hostages.

Thereafter, in a second stage, the United Nations would be prepared to guarantee the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops, the setting up of an interim Arab force in Kuwait and the holding of free elections in that country, once the demographic balances had been naturally re-established.

Thirdly, the President of the Republic said the problems of the region – a veritable tinder box – would be considered. A few moments ago, I referred to the implications of the crisis in the USSR not only for Europe but also for this part of the world. It is clear that Israel hoped in some way to take advantage of the circumstances to consolidate its presence in Transjordan. Similarly, Iraq wanted to be in a position of strength to play a leading and decisive rôle within OPEC. Unfortunately, to do so, it violated the fundamental rôle of the sovereignty of states and in particular that of a state that is a member of the United Nations organisation, which is not acceptable.

A violation of the law is not acceptable on the grounds that the law is not universally applied. If it were, what would we do? In any civilised society one crime cannot be an excuse for another. So it is not acceptable to make the fact that certain United Nations resolutions have not been applied, whether they concern the occupied territories or Lebanon, an excuse not to comply with other resolutions. Without making these into global issues, as Saddam Hussein would like to do, we feel, as Mr. Dumas said this morning, that we now need to call an international conference to consider all the problems of the region, both the political problems and the military problems connected with a certain balance of armaments.

One possibility would be for Israel to undertake not to make first use of nuclear weapons; in exchange, naturally, the Arab countries – which are all still at war with Israel, with the exception of Egypt – would recognise Israel, while Israel itself would undertake to recognise the right of the Palestinian people to have a homeland and a state. This could not be done in a few weeks or months, perhaps not even in a year. But it seems reasonable to see it as part of a long-term peaceful settlement, which we hope is still possible.

However, France is not master of the world, a fact that no one regrets, ourselves included. We think that a dialogue is necessary, as far as possible, in this case to achieve a peaceful solution because we realise what a war and its consequences would mean. At the same time, we cannot just do nothing. We are caught between these two equally uncomfortable constraints. Faced with this apparent contradiction it is not possible to globalise the matter because one cannot make one act of aggression the excuse for another. Moreover, the law must obviously be the same for all. Two-tier justice is no justice, it is injustice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – My question to the Minister relates to the organisation of the defence of European security

Mr. Caro (continued)

in which we are nearing the end. The Assembly has always had a very firm doctrine in this matter. To personalise its identity it has always sought to have the foreign and defence ministers of the member countries working together. This is legitimate in the sphere of public international law for international organisations. Since reactivation in 1984, this has become a reality which gives us great satisfaction. It took the Pershing crisis and the installation of these missiles in Europe in 1981 to bring the governments to the realisation that WEU was useful and should be reactivated.

Then there had to be the Gulf crisis for another of the Assembly's requests to bear fruit, namely that the chiefs of staff of our armed forces should meet as frequently as possible. You have already referred to the unit at naval headquarters and, although they have been irregular, we have had meetings between chiefs of staff. In the future there will be a CSCE organisation within which WEU, thanks to the unparalleled advantages of the modified Brussels Treaty, intends to play its full part. This morning, the Minister of State, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, confirmed how advisable it would be to have such an organisation.

Can this identification of our organisation, with all the advantages it would present in terms of co-ordinating defence, armaments and the strategy to be applied in a crisis, be upheld in the negotiations on the institutionalisation of the CSCE?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister of Defence.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I am tempted to answer by saying that WEU will be what we make of it. It is our responsibility at all times. It is the succession of our actions that decide what is done.

As you mentioned, we have had the Pershing crisis and the Gulf crisis. Now there is the CSCE and the great question of balance in Europe.

It is fairly clear that in order to balance Soviet or, if you like, Russian power – nobody knows what the future will bring – there has to be a sufficiently permanent defence bulwark in Western Europe for confidence to reign on our continent. Imbalance in fact generates mistrust. It is balance that creates confidence and permits co-operation. The concern for this peaceful balance has to be our guide and prompt WEU to take initiatives to ensure that it is not disturbed. From this point of view, the meeting of chiefs of staff and the exchange of information on our respective defence policies will allow us to judge whether we carry enough weight, forgive me for the pun.

I note that Germany will not reach its theoretical ceiling; nor will Italy; nor will France for many areas. Several countries have been allowed considerable entitlements: Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey. These entitlements will probably not be reached and will remain theoretical. Conversely, under the rule of sufficiency, the Soviet Union will keep a little over a third of its military potential in the zone running from the Atlantic to the Urals. Large quantities of weapons will be transferred east of the Urals.

Will the balance be maintained? It is difficult to be certain. In 1918, Marshal Foch said: "Now that I am head of a coalition I admire Napoleon much less". We should not forget that there are thirty-four countries on the continent of Europe and that the Soviet Union represents a good third. We have to make sure that there is a reasonable balance between the interests of the Soviet Union and of Europe and those of all-Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to ask the Minister a question that is not connected with the Gulf. The day after tomorrow the parliamentary Assembly will be debating Mr. Tummers's report on conversion in Soviet military industry. For many years Mr. Tummers has been successfully promoting relations between the parliamentary Assembly and the USSR.

Against this background I want to ask the Minister if he can imagine supporting initiatives in our part of Europe – in WEU and in his own country – to promote efforts similar to the conversion of the Soviet armaments industry, which we now endorse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – First we have to reduce the asymmetries I have just mentioned. If we look at numbers of tanks, the Soviet Union is credited with 51 000. At the present time it has declared 24 000 between the Atlantic and the Urals and admits having transferred 8 000 to 10 000 east of the Urals, which it has agreed to destroy or convert. Germany has just over 4 000 tanks if we include those from the former German Democratic Republic in the Federal German total. France has 1 300. Italy has a theoretical entitlement of about 1 000 if I remember correctly. You can see the orders of magnitude that we are dealing with. When we have reduced the asymmetries we shall see what the situation is.

As far as my country is concerned there will be no difficulty in getting below the agreed number: it already has.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

We are also ready, for any WEU study or initiative, to supply all the data it needs to further its knowledge of the problems so that we genuinely feel we are contributing to greater security by co-ordinated, methodical, simultaneous reduction of weapons, as between East and West, and between the various powers of Europe in a way that avoids the creation of imbalances and the temptations they represent.

More specifically, you asked if we were contemplating converting our tanks. Obsolescence is the best way to disarm and we already have a fair stock of equipment in depots which we could no longer use.

There has never been disarmament agreement on cross-bows and arquebuses, and yet these weapons are now out of use. I would also point out that we had 7 800 aircraft in 1918 but only 450 today. It was not a disarmament agreement that brought about that spectacular reduction.

Life is a more powerful force than anything else and, in reality, it is life that is going to cause us, using our reason, to opt for lower levels of armament, provided of course that security is guaranteed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, January next year will see the expiry of the United Nations ultimatum to Iraq and the possible transition to the military option. If this undesirable situation comes about, what will become of our WEU?

So far the ad hoc group has, as you reminded us a short time ago Minister, been very successful in co-ordinating the various naval and air forces in the Gulf, both at the operational level including the patrolling of the area, and also at the logistics, data-transmission and telecommunications levels. But this activity is confined to monitoring the embargo and performing a deterrent rôle or, more simply, adjusting to a hostile, desert environment. To conduct an offensive operation, however, a joint and unified concentration of forces and, above all, integrated action by the military command would be required. Such conditions do not apply at the moment, nor can they apply with WEU in its present form. Since the United Nations has no real command structure those European countries wishing to implement the United Nations resolution would have no alternative but to place their own forces under American command and control.

What is your view of this eventuality, Minister?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A frank question for no doubt a no less straight-forward answer.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – This question was raised at the last Ministerial Council of WEU. I recall having proposed that the word "land" be added after "forces" and it was your Foreign Minister who was against this amendment.

So it was the WEU Council of Ministers which decided to limit WEU's participation to the forces required for enforcing the embargo, namely essentially naval forces. Certain countries have sent air force units. To the best of my knowledge only two WEU countries have land forces in the area and they, of course by comparison with what the American forces are now and, above all, will be in a month's time, can only be called supplementary potential. Thus, with no political will to do so, as was clear at the last WEU Council, I cannot really see any likelihood of our setting up a WEU headquarters. It would probably be desirable had we had the political will, but we have to admit that it has not been forthcoming.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – What, then, is the conclusion? From 1st January WEU will cease to perform the function which has to date been confined to monitoring the embargo. For military operations we have neither the equipment nor the capacity to proceed in the manner which might be requested by the United Nations Security Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Now that we have a United Nations Security Council resolution authorising additional measures as from 15th January, I ask this WEU parliamentary Assembly what it thinks. Should WEU act in this connection to enforce the application of the Security Council's resolution, which potentially implies a change of strategy as compared with the strategy of sanctions? But, ladies and gentlemen, it is not for me to replace the Assembly which is surely grown up enough to state its own views.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think your plea will be heard, Minister. An amendment has been submitted by several members asking the Council of Ministers to be precise in its behaviour and attitude on this specific point.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Many of us who are not Frenchmen have a warm regard for the Minister. He has rightly stressed the importance of the United States continuing to have a presence and influence in Europe, if not necessarily a military one. Does he believe that it is extremely important that the United States should continue to support the concepts of Western European Union being the European pillar of the alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Yes, I think that that is perfectly desirable. The United States has in fact made it known that WEU could be a useful framework. Now we have to look at the practical arrangements. What will actually happen both as regards the organisation of command and the organisation of the forces? This is something we could try to think about.

However, as my colleague, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said this morning, we should like WEU to be the security dimension of the European Community and the instrument used to give substance to the European pillar, the European defence bulwark. Of course, this implies big changes and to bring these changes about we have to evaluate the events which have occurred in Europe over the last year and a half.

The alliance clearly needs fundamental review and change. And, as I said earlier, Europeans must have greater responsibilities in this alliance if they are to take on a greater share of the burden. One possibility is that the WEU Council could have a similar rôle, with regard to the defence of Europe, to the Atlantic Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you. I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, special Rapporteur on the problems of European security in relation to the Gulf matter.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if the French Defence Minister is right in saying that Europe cannot go on depending on America for ever, what, in his opinion, should be the rôle of nuclear weapons in Europe, as European integration continues? I refer in this context to the intergovernmental conferences beginning in December and particularly to the conference on European political union. The French Minister has discussed this at length. Are we now talking about a continuing rôle for American nuclear weapons, about European nuclear weapons, about European decision-making powers, or about a Europe with French, British or Franco-British nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Thank you for this opportunity to revert to this question – a fundamental issue for geographical reasons which a look at the map of the world makes obvious.

Europe is a relatively small, urbanised, highly-populated and highly sensitive area where modern warfare, even conventional, cannot be contemplated. The only appropriate strategy for Europeans is that of the deterrent, the strategy of prevention. Hence the need for a nuclear force.

What form should it have? There are the American nuclear weapons, but they are the product of an American concept – which could itself change – ranging from a theory of flexible response to that of use as a last resort. Whilst this may have been politically relevant at a given point in European history, it now seems hardly logical as the right military response to what is possible in the way of new threats on the horizon. One can hardly contemplate using nuclear weapons after all others have failed. In any event this is not France's doctrine.

France's doctrine is strictly one of deterrence, the object being not to raise the nuclear threshold too high and thus prevent a possible aggressor from thinking that he could deploy conventional forces and gain considerable success on the battlefield before being confronted with the nuclear possibility.

The United Kingdom has an intermediate position in line with its geographical situation. This is why, being realistic, I just said that our doctrines were complementary rather than overlapping. I do not, for example, think that the United States would be prepared to move towards the French doctrine to the extent of guaranteeing absolutely the security of Europe.

The question you have asked goes further: can we, in the long term, talk about a European deterrent? It would presuppose the achievement of, or at least considerable progress towards, political union and, in any event, the emergence of a shared feeling about security whereby all the nations of Europe would feel under attack if any one were attacked. I can tell you that this is the attitude that we see ourselves taking for the future.

The fact is that we think it possible to define a non-aggressive European concept of deterrence. But, as I say, we are not trying to establish some sort of posture with the aim of changing the balances in Europe. These are now established because the agreements signed in Paris have, once for all we hope, drawn a map of Europe at least in terms of its political balances and frontiers. Naturally, life will go on; many more things will happen. But if changes do come about, it will not be by force, only by mutual consent.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

Consequently, we have to position ourselves in the context of co-operative management of pan-European security to define what would constitute a minimum deterrent in Western Europe capable of balancing the Soviet deterrent which, I would remind you, is formidable: 12 000 strategic nuclear warheads now or 8 300 once the START I agreement has been signed and applied, tens of thousands of tactical nuclear warheads and 1 800 launchers.

In other words, there is an arsenal. Without levelling any accusations at the Soviets, because I am sure their intentions are peaceful, I feel we have to take these facts for what they are, namely objective factors in our decisions: no one can control the future. We cannot be sure what will happen – whether it be for the best or the worst.

We think that we should maintain this sufficient, or if you prefer, minimum deterrent which even Mr. Gorbachev has recognised as a perfectly acceptable hypothesis from the Soviet point of view. But there is still some way to go on both sides to achieve this minimum and eminently political deterrent with the guarantee it offers of long-term stability on our continent and lasting peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Both this morning and this afternoon it has been our privilege and pleasure to have with us a delegation of three members of the European Parliament. May I welcome them on your behalf. At a time when we are all trying to define the contribution that our various institutions can make within a dynamic balance towards the promotion of a European defence identity, the presence of an important delegation from the European Parliament is most welcome.

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you on behalf of the Assembly.

Mrs. Castellina, who is a member of this delegation, would like to ask you a question. We see no reason why not. I hope you will agree to reply to a parliamentarian who, although a stranger to this Assembly, is a member of the large European family.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – With pleasure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Castellina.

Mrs. CASTELLINA (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*) (Translation). – On behalf of our delegation I thank you, Mr. President, for giving one of us the chance to speak. We are very pleased to be with you at this meeting.

Listening to you speak about the European and French nuclear capability, it seemed that the conclusion could be drawn that if Kuwait

had also had a viable atomic bomb it would have been able to deter Iraq. Should we conclude that a proliferation of nuclear weapons on the grand scale would be the answer to our nightmares?

This was not, however, the question that I wanted to ask you; it was simply a remark in reaction to your words.

(The speaker continued in Italian).

The American Defence Secretary has told the Senate that President Bush requires no further authorisation from the United States Congress to engage in war.

I would like to ask you, Minister, whether the ships, aircraft and in some cases European troops sent to the Gulf to enforce the embargo could also be used for another purpose, namely armed intervention, without this being voted on in their respective parliaments, just as the Americans can?

From what you have said it seems to me that you are suggesting that this Assembly should take a decision on this matter and, frankly, that would strike me as being constitutionally doubtful.

I should further like to ask you what practical relevance any decision of this sort would have, whether it were taken by WEU or the national parliaments, in the event that it proved different from that taken by President Bush, seeing that European ships and aircraft would both be involved in the case of an American decision on the Gulf.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – You referred to the unfortunate fate of Kuwait: we have no desire to experience the same, which is the very reason why for several decades we have tried to have a credible defence force.

We have reason to believe that this defence strategy has been effective, because there has been no major war in Europe. We have to ask why things have developed the way they have. Is it not because the prospect of a major war was so terrifying, so destructive, that it forestalled any kind of political gamble by those who might still believe that a war could still be advantageous and be an instrument of politics in another form? I think we ought to pursue the ideal, and maybe that ideal is a world without nuclear weapons.

But staying with reality, as I mentioned a few moments ago, means remembering that even after the implementation of the START I agreements, the United States and the Soviet Union will still have 8 300 strategic nuclear warheads, to say nothing of their tactical warheads. This is the reality.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

Here, we are in Europe and you belong to the European Parliament. So we have to concern ourselves with the future of Europe, its security and its margin of freedom. It seems to me that the existence of small quantities – a few hundred warheads – of European nuclear weapons is perhaps an advantage for Europe which can thus make its voice heard in the world. It is in any event a means of keeping us from under the wheels of the Roman chariot which was the fate suffered by the vanquished after the victorious campaigns of your consuls and generals. Without wishing to play the part of Vercingétorix, I should say that it is useful, from the point of view of European interests as a whole, that Europeans should maintain a deterrent-based defence posture.

Your question was of wider scope and relates to our attitude towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At present the only countries that officially have nuclear weapons are the five member countries of the United Nations Security Council, but we know that there are about ten so-called “threshold” countries which have, or are on the point of having, nuclear weapons.

This opens up the vast question of whether nuclear weapons can have a stabilising effect in other parts of the world as they have had in the global confrontation between the East and West or, on the contrary, will they lead to horrific wars? It is difficult to have a firm opinion on this matter. However, in view of the large number of unsolved political problems and the degree of irrationality in certain parts of the world – like the one you referred to in the second part of what you said – we must accept that the risk exists.

You also asked what would happen to the naval forces that countries had sent to the Gulf. I think that those countries deciding to apply additional measures would automatically find themselves involved.

The others would have to shoulder their responsibilities but it is doubtful whether ships stationed mostly between one thousand and fifteen hundred kilometres from Iraq's frontiers would run any great risk. Nobody, of course, is safe from acts of terrorism which can happen everywhere, even in countries where war has not been declared.

Finally, you asked what kind of decisions the parliaments could take. It is up to each country to determine its course of action in accordance with its constitution.

With respect to WEU, it is clear that what I referred to earlier could only be in the form of a wish – should you have a wish to make – and it is naturally up to the parliamentary Assembly of

WEU to express any such wish. But it cannot be a decision.

I hope this is a full answer. Have I satisfied your curiosity?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Castellina.

Mrs. CASTELLINA (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*) (Translation). – The question was possibly somewhat complicated: who is going to start the war or make the decision? But I confess that it is not...

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – It is like a game of poker in which two principal players hold the cards. Most of us are bystanders without a clear enough view to tell how many trumps each has in his hand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. In the interests of the safety and security of each of our countries, is not the question which we have just heard from a member of the European Parliament a good reason why we should never allow the European Parliament to have anything to do with our defences?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This interlude being provisionally over, let us continue the debate.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Chevènement opened his remarks by saying that the CSCE agreement had ended the old world order and opened the way to the new. Later he spoke of borders being fixed for ever. We must not forget the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which are still trapped in the old order and still denied the independence that was wrenched from them by an agreement between Hitler and Stalin. I should like to know what the Minister thinks can be done to help them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – It is a tough job to answer such a difficult question. France never recognised the annexation of the three Baltic states in 1940. As for WEU, I am not aware that it has adopted any stance on this matter, but there is nothing to prevent it from expressing a wish.

The redefinition of relationships between the fifteen republics forming the Soviet Union is one of the big tasks facing Mr. Gorbachev. Without wishing to complicate his task, we hope that he will find the right solutions, but they

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

may not necessarily be the same for all the republics. There are different cases: the three Baltic republics, the republics of the Caucasus, the republics of Central Asia and then the Slav republics, namely Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

If I may give a purely personal opinion, we are probably moving towards a variable geometry structure. We have to be prepared for change. Our British friends managed to create a Commonwealth in which I believe a number of countries regard themselves as independent and free, but full members. France – and this is still in our constitution – built what we call the Community. That was in 1958, and in 1960 the countries that were part of it became independent.

At the President of the Republic has sometimes said, you have to let time take its course. Some developments have to be given time. We must remember that the Soviet Union has to resolve problems that are not all that simple and we need perhaps to facilitate Mr. Gorbachev's task. But this is no reason for us to forget the fate of the Baltic states.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask two questions which are not entirely unrelated? First, does the Minister foresee Europe accepting in the next few years an obligation to world security and peace, leading to a structural organisation and an expenditure of resources that reflect the fact that, although the United States may well serve as the dominant policeman, we understand that its participation will reflect the degree of self-interest which it sees facing it in a particular situation?

Secondly, the Minister referred to the maintenance of adequate weaponry over the years ahead. He will accept, however, that historic change and political agreement mean that there is now, or shortly will be, a large surplus of weaponry in Europe. Does he believe that that presents the world with a problem? It is bound to encourage the arms trade and to create a desire to capitalise on the surplus, or obsolescence, of weapons. That will present a serious risk of instability in other regions and lead to a distortion of the economy of the third world which could contribute to future instability on our planet.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister of Defence.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – You referred to the rôle that Europe might play in the future to guarantee some form of world security and you asked whether the United States could continue to be the world's policeman.

In our opinion what has happened is positive because the United Nations has adopted a set of resolutions and thus laid down a legal framework for resolving problems that may arise in the future. In other words, if crises occur, they should be resolved in the framework of the United Nations. Naturally, it is desirable that Europe should be involved.

May I add that the USSR, which has profoundly changed its political orientation, and China are also members of the United Nations Security Council. We are thus certainly moving towards a multi-polar world and it is important that the United Nations should try to appear as the guardian of the law – a law which should be the same for all – if the United Nations is not to be seen in the future as an organisation of the countries of the North, the East and the West – countries that have achieved cohesion – whilst the countries of the South would be left out in the cold. The United Nations must win credibility and retain it.

I think that if Europe has a rôle to play, including the setting up of the security forces that you referred to a few days ago, Mr. President, it is that of helping a genuine rule of law to prevail at world level without any idea of a policeman in sole control of war and peace.

The second problem concerns surplus arms in Europe. I think I have already made it clear that given the volume of weapons and the difficulty that the Soviets are experiencing – for all kinds of physical and human reasons – in reducing that volume, we are not yet in a position to send all our material to the scrap-yard. This would be wrong.

May I also say that within the limit of the ceilings fixed, which are even so very high – 20 000 tanks on either side, with slightly over 13 000 for the Soviet Union – Hitler had 2 000 in 1940 – the race for quality is certain to quicken in the years to come. The fewer weapons there are, the more sophisticated they will be. Of course we could dream of an ideal world where humanity would not be governed by the law of the balance of forces, where it would in a sense escape from the force of gravity... I am speaking about the gravity of physics and not that of an assembly as serious as this one...

But obviously, we have not yet come to that point. What I should like to say is that we must carry out this reduction of weapons in a methodical and balanced way if we want to preserve security and, consequently, confidence. Clearly there is considerable risk of large quantities of weapons finding their way to the third world, which is, to some degree, what we are seeing, with the considerable concentration of weapons in the Gulf today. But there again, we hope that common sense will prevail and that

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

we shall be able to transplant arms control agreements in another form. We know that it will be much more difficult in the Middle East, because there is neither democracy nor confidence there. A state of war still exists. So there is a great deal to do, but it is an objective that would be reasonable to set ourselves if we want to avoid war. I am sure we all agree that it is better to avoid war if we can. All of this, however, inevitably takes time and requires both imagination and courage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are four members with questions to ask. Would they please be brief so as to keep to our schedule.

I call Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO (*Spain*) (Translation). – May I briefly ask two questions. The first relates to the future of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation. In order to provide it with a permanent establishment and means of verification we have to work towards shared security in Europe, and in my opinion we cannot make progress in that direction if we limit this security to one group of countries. In other words, it would not be fair to keep the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the waiting room for years without assuring them, now that the Warsaw Pact has effectively disappeared, that we have a responsibility before history to create a shared régime of security in Europe.

In my country, in Malaga, a Mediterranean city, there is a saying that “There is no favourable wind for a boat that does not know which port it is going to”, and it is very important for us to know in which direction we are going if we are to succeed in healing past divisions in Europe and achieve a shared security system. Moreover, since you have referred to the recent treaties on armaments and we are going to discuss here the conversion of the arms industry, from which something like twenty-five million Europeans directly or indirectly earn their living, we have to organise this conversion in a way that will guarantee security and give direction to industrial production.

Having touched upon the future of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation I now want to ask about the Gulf crisis. There is a United Nations resolution setting a fixed date without waiting for sanctions to take effect, in the hope that the ultimatum will not expire and war become necessary. But there are two arguments that are not acceptable to public opinion in Europe. One is that the United States troops deployed in the zone are becoming weary and that therefore Saddam Hussein has to be given a fixed time in which to evacuate Kuwait or face war. The other

argument which your colleague the Foreign Minister used this morning concerns the problems of climate and weather that will arise if there is a delay of twelve months which, according to some experts, is the time that will be needed for the sanctions to take effect. Those two arguments are not sufficiently weighty and consistent to cause us to favour the military option. My group is in favour of a peaceful solution, giving sanctions more time to work and to make Saddam Hussein leave Kuwait, discussing the problems of the area as a whole and avoiding war.

My specific question is that WEU countries do not have a general staff and that therefore the plans for action in the Gulf zone are NATO plans. France has said on more than one occasion that she reserves her autonomy regarding participation in a combat until the President of the Republic and the French Government so decide, but the plans that exist are NATO plans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Romero, I remind you that you are asking a question and not developing an argument.

I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – As regards the future of the CSCE, there must be guarantees for the countries of Europe as a whole. Obviously, they will vary, depending on whether they are provided by an alliance such as the Atlantic Alliance or by the CSCE, but perhaps it could be WEU's rôle to specify the conditions in which it considers the frontiers of these countries could be guaranteed.

First of all, who is threatening them? For the moment these countries cannot feel threatened since the occupying Soviet troops are going to withdraw. So the question is what about the future? There is only one reply and it is within ourselves. It resides in our ability to create a bulwark of balance so that Europe may, for a long time to come, be a stable continent where it would be in no one's interests to break the peace.

In this connection, there should be a combination of measures to achieve arms reduction, verification, transparency and at the same time the maintenance of a certain defence posture based on a stable balance of security.

This is what human nature is like, neither all light nor total darkness. It is made up of both and the management of balances requires from you – with your political responsibilities – a great sense of responsibility and vigilance. No one can be relieved of this responsibility by some invisible hand, some automatic mechanism, or some solemn declaration that time will not outdate. History has never witnessed this. Let us not relieve future generations in

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

advance from the responsibilities that will come down to them.

The proverb quoted in Malaga – if you do not know the port you are bound for you cannot plot your course – had already been quoted by Seneca. I see that it has got as far as Malaga, a very good destination.

You mentioned the problem of industrial conversion. It is a vast but very real subject for Europe. The future of Europe's defence industry, incidentally, is something for the IEPG to study. Here there are links to be set up with WEU.

Turning to the Gulf, it is true that 15th January is the deadline set by the United Nations for authorising the use of further measures, which have not been spelt out. This does not mean that the embargo will end on 15th January. It will continue. Let us say that this is another turn of the screw on Iraq. If Iraq does intend to move it will be between now and then. In any event that would be highly desirable.

I have tried to reason out how it could be possible for a political solution to materialise between now and 15th January. Iraq would have to state its intention to leave Kuwait. There would have to be a flexible link established with other problems that might arise. This could, for example, be in the context of a conference next year, that no one imagines could come to any immediate conclusions, given the complexity of the problems. But it is not possible to globalise everything. Iraq first has to withdraw from Kuwait and must be made to understand this. Plans have been drawn up but I must contradict you on this point: they are not NATO plans but those of the joint United States-Saudi headquarters, in co-ordination with the British, French and other commanders.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – The task of building Europe by means of political union on which all WEU member states have embarked under the auspices of the Community requires us to progress as rapidly as possible in defining and establishing a European security policy.

In Spain, with the exception of some marginal groups, the vast majority of political movements believe that WEU is a useful instrument for formulating this European security policy and it was precisely for this reason that our country recently applied for membership. As the Minister well knows, we are not founder members but applied for membership very recently, precisely because of our wish to build a united Europe. The decision was fully in line with other

decisions we have taken; it forms part of an overall strategy for building Europe as seen from Spain.

My question is, first, does the Minister agree that WEU really constitutes a useful instrument and platform where we can together work out as speedily as possible this common European policy on security?

Second, does the Minister understand that the action which has been taken precisely because of the Gulf crisis, namely the co-ordination at the level of naval operations through WEU, implies a certain practical and strategic contribution towards formulating a common security policy at continental level?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Naturally, it would surprise you if I answered your question in the negative. I have already said here that I believe WEU to be useful, but also essential, if we want to put our heads together on our security problems. This means that we must show political will.

The real problem of WEU is not a question of meetings and how useful it is. It is a matter of the political will of each of its member countries to use the organisation to promote WEU as the place for concrete achievements such as those that I have just referred to. In connection with the Gulf crisis, we have been able to call the committee of chiefs of staff together for the first time. A satellite data verification agency could be a further WEU initiative. Beyond that, WEU, in conjunction with the European Economic Community, could naturally play an important part at European level in the security of Europe.

The fact that Spain and Portugal have joined WEU is another essential contribution. Other countries could also join or obtain observer status. Clearly there are joint security interests outside Europe that we could look after better than we do at present. In the Gulf we are rather in the situation of being a support or buttress for the United States. We know that the buttress is essential to the cathedral, but it would be preferable for us to be able to play a greater rôle and act in accordance with our own criteria, more than is at present the case.

Here again the problem of political will arises and that of the military resources we are able to deploy at sea, in the air and on land.

I think that the best yardstick, the true barometer of our political will is to be found in what has happened. We have a number of large ships, a few aircraft, and land forces which, though not negligible, do not represent a decisive capability.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Can the Minister envisage the French Government seeing the Gulf crisis as a reason to review its policy on arms exports, and does he think there is any prospect of a common restrictive European policy on arms exports?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – As you know, in France you need a licence to export defence equipment. In principle it is prohibited. Government permission is necessary for all exports of this kind and exceptions have to be approved by a committee chaired by the Prime Minister.

Ours is not the only country to have exported weapons to this part of the world. True, we have supplied arms to Iraq, but at the request of all the countries of the region and with the agreement of all the western countries. We were a long way behind the Soviet Union as a supplier of weapons to Iraq. This was at a time when everyone believed that Iraq was a stabilising force holding back the tide of Islamic fundamentalism. It took Iran five years to accept United Nations Resolution 598, which opened the door to peace in 1990. At that time, we had no idea that Iraq would change from a stabilising to a destabilising factor. From 1st August, we placed a total embargo on any transfer of weapons and there are certain categories of weapons that we never shipped – particularly in the ballistic field, to Iraq. Other countries have transferred other technologies but I shall say no more about that.

The issue that you raise concerns the control of transfers of technology from developed countries like France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, the United States, of course, and the Soviet Union to countries in extremely unstable regions.

In the future it is probable or even certain that common rules will need to be established to achieve a balance in the level of armaments in this part of the world and to introduce arms control, and perhaps it may be necessary to assist it from outside by imposing stricter constraints on ourselves. These exist, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, in the form of the obligations under the non-proliferation treaty; as regards chemical weapons there is a convention that is under negotiation in Geneva. We hope this will be signed next spring.

In the ballistic sphere the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Régime) discussions could be reinforced. This is one way we could go, but in my opinion the problem of arms control cannot be divorced from the solution of political problems.

Indeed, this crisis may in the end serve some purpose if we are able to achieve more acceptance of the idea of mutual recognition in Israel, Palestine and all the countries in this area. What the region lacks most of all is a modicum of tolerance and mutual acceptance because, in its absence, I fear that all the controls that we might establish may be evaded. Naturally, these controls are necessary and we must try to resolve the political problems at the root. We know very well what they are called.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are now coming to the end of the debate. I call the last speaker, Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The question I should like to ask has already been raised by several members. I should like to revert to the possible transfer of Western European Union's responsibilities to the European Communities, which is a very serious matter.

Most of the major political groupings are promoting the idea of a transfer. Most of the foreign ministers, who are members of the Council of Western European Union, speak in the conditional about this matter here at the Assembly, but with rather more commitment outside this forum. You yourself have said that before any decision of this nature could be taken, there needed to be a clearer definition of what European union would consist of. Allow me to say that I fully share your opinions on this subject. So, is it not premature to have the question of whether Western European Union should be absorbed into the European Communities on the agenda of the next intergovernmental conference in Rome? In other words, do you share my view that merely changing the label will not resolve the fundamental problems of European defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I think our views are very close. I think we need to keep in tune with the rhythms not of nature but of political life. WEU has the great advantage of existing and if we were to give the European Economic Community responsibility for defence and security matters we would certainly raise problems once again that would probably be insoluble. This road is marked with the wrecks of past failures.

In my opinion we should be much more pragmatic and rely on what exists and try to advance the security dimension of Europe in WEU. I think that WEU is a framework in which we can notch up decisive progress. If that progress is made then perhaps the question of merging WEU and the EEC will come up. This at least is

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

my way of looking at things, which is essentially pragmatic as you can see.

I think this approach is firmly realistic. There are of course some very attractive pictures we could paint for the future, but why cling to illusions? It must surely be a waste of time to build fabrications that we know will never come to life. It is better to see things in concrete terms and try to go forward, as I tried to say a little while ago at the rostrum, by notching up points like the meeting of committees of chiefs of staff and the observation satellite agency. We must exchange information and make sure that each of our countries takes an overall view of the conditions for Europe's future security, be careful not to relax our defence effort too soon, retain some form of co-ordination, keep our guard up and act in a co-ordinated and constructive manner though at the same time in a spirit of friendship towards the Soviet Union because Russia forms part of the broader spectrum of European civilisation whilst not neglecting the essential factors of our security. This is how we shall best serve the cause of our peoples and the cause of peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for these concluding words.

Before closing the debate, I call Mr. Scheer to speak on a point of order.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I refer to the statement by a British member, who made some very controversial remarks about a question from a member of the European Parliament and denied that the European Parliament had any competence in security matters. The question put by the member of the European Parliament concerned an issue that traditionally pertains to democratic constitutions: parliaments have the right to decide on war and peace.

I must say to the member from the United Kingdom that long ago a king was beheaded there, because he had disregarded parliament's right to adopt a budget. The question here is whether the far more important right of parliaments to decide on war and peace is respected. This is a major question, and your remark did not unfortunately befit a parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The incident is closed. I took it upon myself to allow one of the representatives of the European Parliament to speak and she is responsible for what she said. Even so, let me say that the national parliaments whose direct representatives we are have exclusive and sovereign rights of decision in matters of peace and war.

It only remains for me to thank you once again, Minister, for your willingness to answer all our questions, which were indeed numerous.

Thank you also for your expression of confidence in the skill and qualifications of our members, and in the future of the organisation.

We shall now adjourn for a few minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.25 p.m.)

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the report of the Political Committee on European security and the Gulf crisis, Document 1244 and amendments, and the report of the Defence Committee on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf, Document 1248 and amendments.

The joint debate is resumed.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before I comment on the reports now under discussion, may I say that I find today's proceedings rather unsatisfactory. Why? We were able to talk to Mr. Dumas for two hours this morning and to Mr. Chevènement for two hours this afternoon. Of course, these are two fascinating personalities for the Assembly to talk to, but in my view the debate on the Gulf is now over and all we can do is discuss the reports by our two colleagues. I think it is a pity that we cannot discuss the Gulf problem in rather wider terms. I propose that this should be considered by the Presidential Committee. I would like to see a time-limit imposed on the ministers as well as our fellow parliamentarians. Members should be able to put only one question. I do not think these things should last any longer than twenty minutes.

I therefore believe we have all had just about enough of the Gulf, WEU and all the rest of it. But I do have a few things to say about the report. To my mind, there are two main issues. As a result of the Gulf crisis WEU is being seen from a completely different angle, not only by those who are concerned with defence, but also by those who had scarcely heard of WEU. All of a sudden WEU has become the centre of interest.

Yesterday we discussed Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report on WEU now and in the future, WEU and its place in Europe and WEU

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

in co-operation with NATO, the European Community and the CSCE. These are important questions, which I believe will continue to be discussed in the Assembly for a long time to come. I think it is equally necessary to discuss these matters and clarify our standpoint on them in our national parliaments.

Paragraph 8 of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report refers to some of the initiatives that might be expected of WEU. The question in this connection is this: can we "use" WEU in the future to operate outside the treaty area, in whatever way? I think it is of the utmost importance for WEU's future that we take a decision on this. When we decided to send forces, ships or whatever to the Gulf, was that action justified by the terms of the WEU treaty? Opinions on this still differ. I think our Assembly and the national parliaments must adopt a position on this before we consider whether it should happen again. I would like to see that established.

In my opinion, Mr. De Decker's report does not place quite enough emphasis on a peaceful solution. WEU's Political Committee certainly could have referred to a solution of this kind in a preamble.

I also feel that Mr. De Decker's report says rather too little about the background. As a rule we refer in the preamble to things which we welcome or condemn. I do not think the preamble to Mr. De Decker's report says enough about such things as arms supplies. We have heard Mr. Chevènement say today that France supplied weapons because the Soviet Union was doing the same. In other words, what one does, the other will do, too. So treaties on arms control, arms supplies and arms exports will certainly be needed in the future and not, if at all possible, in the distant future, particularly where this area is concerned. If this had been done, there would have been less need for hypocrisy. We now regard what is happening as very bad indeed – and it is, of course – but we cannot conceal the fact that our various countries, almost without exception, have helped Iraq to obtain weapons, just like the rest of the Middle East. I do not agree with Mr. Chevènement that we thought we should help Iraq to obtain weapons because that country was a stabilising factor in the Middle East. I have never regarded it as such.

I would not like to finish my statement without saying that every means must be used to prevent war from breaking out in the Middle East. I do not say this because I want to leave Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the position they are now occupying, or because I have any sympathy for the way in which Saddam Hussein has acted. As a person he failed in my eyes when he

misused children in a way that I saw as almost on a par with child pornography to convince the world of his good and philanthropic intentions.

We must prevent war, because the people who are being sent there are being manoeuvred into a situation where there is no clear view of the future. I also think it would be impossible for us not to become involved in the conflict. I therefore very much welcome the fact that, even though Resolution 678 has been adopted by the Security Council, President Bush is prepared to negotiate. I am glad that everything is to take shape within the United Nations, whatever we may do. This certainly also applies to any action taken by WEU and must at all events continue to hold good for the future.

(Mr. Sinesio, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I also wish to express my great appreciation to our two Rapporteurs for reports which are highly important not only in their thoroughness and in the presentation of the information they contain but also because of the political judgments made in them.

I must say that while the events in the Gulf have given rise to serious worries at international level some advantage has nevertheless accrued as far as Western European Union is concerned, and this point has been made by the previous speaker. Because of events in the Gulf, the work it is doing and the rôle it has taken on, Western European Union is drawing international attention to itself as a political body and an essentially European political forum for co-ordination, security and defence.

This is an important fact exerting considerable attraction. Today, for example, we see here several members of parliament who do not belong to WEU. Though not members, Greek, Norwegian and Danish deputies are associated with the WEU effort in the Gulf, thus symbolising in this forum and in this organisation a truly European capacity for action, co-ordination and political representativeness.

This is highly important as it could prompt other accessions. It is clear that Norway, which some time ago dissociated itself from the European Community, may, through its sympathy, ideologically, with what WEU is doing, though not itself a member, be the cause of other countries becoming members – of the Community as well – the result of which will be a wider and completer Europe.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

However, the firm solidarity there was at the start of the events in the Gulf and at the beginning of the occupation of Kuwait seems to have weakened with the passage of time. The fact has to be noted that, notwithstanding the efforts by ministers and by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and despite the wholehearted commitment of France at a difficult and sensitive moment and the back-up received from all the Community countries, it seems – I repeat – that our solidarity has weakened. The hostage question has given rise to different attitudes and created ill-feeling – I do not say distrust, but certainly resentment – between some European countries, more concerned about freeing the hostages, and others adhering more strictly to the formal undertakings not to fall for the tricks of Saddam Hussein in any way.

This is highly important as it brings home to us that the longer a solution to the crisis is delayed, the more easily will Iraq be able to overcome the solidarity and adhesion of the European and American allies.

And this is where we have to be careful. The United Nations was right to set a deadline – January 1991 – for taking final decisions on the occupation of Kuwait and on what the allies and countries bound by the decisions of the United Nations must do. In fact, however, in the long run the initial solidarity could well gradually evaporate, and divisions and friction arise, that are not wanted at such a difficult and sensitive moment.

I would now like to say something about the Federal Republic of Germany's specific contribution to the WEU effort. As you know, this country has not taken any direct part in the deployment of armed forces in the Gulf – nor could it do so, perhaps, because of the familiar constitutional problems which had already surfaced during the previous WEU mission in the Gulf four years ago. However, that country's contribution on the political and, more especially, economic levels is beyond doubt. As you know, the Federal Republic of Germany has decided to make available 1.7 billion DM to assist those countries in which the embargo is causing hardship and internal – even political – difficulties. I refer here to Turkey, Jordan and Egypt.

However, Mr. President, it would have been very good if this allocation of resources had been made through WEU. But no, it went via the European Community. This makes me think that the comments we heard again yesterday in this chamber calling for a rapprochement between WEU and the European Community by a kind of functional osmosis are not so greatly mistaken. It has in fact already happened

through the Federal Republic of Germany's action in the Gulf affair.

I will end, Mr. President, by thanking the Rapporteurs for drawing attention to the importance of our Assembly in relation to the creation of the satellite agency, which has been mentioned and confirmed here by both the President of the Assembly and the French Minister of Defence.

We are fully committed to this struggle to ensure that WEU has a fundamental rôle in disarmament verification – and extending to other sectors. We are sure that if we had had an observation facility during the Gulf events many problems would already be partly solved. My final hope is that the two reports on today's order of the day will win broad support as they are indeed extremely valuable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The easing, maybe the end even, of East-West tension inevitably had to lead one day or another to a reassessment of North-South relations and to an upward reassessment of what is at stake. It was also to be expected that the occasion would be the outbreak of the first major conflict in the Arab world and that it would pose a threat to oil supplies or challenge the existing balance of power in the region.

The economic and geostrategic importance of the Arabian peninsula and the overarming of most of its states, the demographic and financial disparities dividing its peoples and the long history of persistent, deeply-rooted conflict in the area, have long given cause for expecting the worst not only for the region itself but for the world as a whole.

Issues of concern to our own political world are the management of raw materials, the distribution of wealth, the crucial question of debt, the proliferation of weapons and the changing balance of power in the region.

In such a context, the Gulf crisis disconcerts us and confounds our would-be rational western logic. But so far with Security Council Resolution 678, following in the logical line of what has happened up to now, the international community has stood firm. The six-week deadline is intended to let Iraq think again and understand that the international community is ready to use force. Six weeks is not long, but six weeks is enough for the unpredictable Saddam Hussein, who got it wrong when he attacked Iran, who got it wrong when he invaded Kuwait and who guessed wrongly what the Soviet Union's attitude would be, to come to his senses.

If Iraq now withdrew from Kuwait its prestige would be enhanced in the Arab world.

Mr. Pécriaux (continued)

In applying the decisions of the United Nations – the first country to do so – Iraq would be a trend-setter.

It would induce other countries and other nations to resolve their conflicts in the same way. I am thinking of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict of course and the situation in Lebanon.

A negotiating process of the CSCE type is becoming urgently necessary in the Middle East in order to create a new political climate, new confidence and new forms of international co-operation there and to bring about disarmament or at least major reductions in the level of armaments.

Together with the Socialist Group, I therefore urge the WEU Assembly to reiterate its wish that a peaceful solution be urgently sought to bring the Gulf crisis to an end and to guarantee security in Europe.

May I add that during my visit to the Belgian naval force stationed in Fujayrah, a few minutes away from Dubai, I heard from high-level officials in the Emirates how favourably they had been impressed by the visit of our President, Mr. Pontillon, who happened to have been there a few hours before. I wished the members in this chamber to know this and extend my sincere thanks to Mr. Pontillon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I congratulate our two Rapporteurs on their valuable reports.

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was a serious violation of international law and was unacceptable. From the outset of the crisis, Turkey took a principled and determined stand against the Iraqi aggression by asking for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. To this end, Turkey has followed the embargo decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council against Iraq. Because of her geographical location, Turkey has been a key country in implementing the resolutions concerning the embargo. The recent events in the Gulf region have proved once again the importance of Turkey to the security and defence of Europe.

As a result of the embargo, the pipeline through which Iraq had shipped 54% of its petroleum exports has been closed. Turkey was the main road transit country from the West to Iraq; that has been stopped. Turkey was one of the biggest exporters of food products and construction materials to Iraq; that has been stopped.

Turkey's geographical location, which is important for the effective implementation of the embargo, has brought with it a heavy eco-

nomic and political burden. Turkey has first place among the countries most severely affected economically by the Gulf crisis. All our exports to and imports from Iraq which had an important part in our foreign trade have stopped. Our contracting companies, which used to carry out successful works in Iraq, left the country with big losses. Thousands of workers left their jobs and are now jobless. Because of the embargo, Iraq does not pay her debts to Turkey, and the increasing price of petroleum has affected our balance of payments.

Before the crisis, Turkey used to export more than 50% of Iraqi crude oil through two pipelines with a capacity of 1.6 million barrels a day. We used to receive all our crude oil imports through those pipelines from Iraq. We employed 40 000 trucks to carry Turkish exports and trans-shipped goods to Iraq. A total of 6 000 tanker trucks were used to import crude oil and oil products from Iraq. The whole set-up involved more than 100 000 families. Tourism has also been affected.

Of course, we must not forget the oil stations, motels, restaurants and repair shops which depended on the business brought by those activities. All those losses have occurred in the less-developed south-eastern Anatolian provinces. The annual cost of the Gulf crisis to Turkey, excluding indirect costs to the economy, is about US \$5 billion.

It is not because of those important economic and material losses, but because we believe in the life of the people and because of our peaceful policy that we do not want war. Our people do not want war. We want to have peace and peaceful solutions in the Middle East. Turkey is the only country represented in this room which has a border with Iraq. If war broke out, my country and my people would be in the heart of the war, which would be beyond our control. We must realise that we will not get peace in the Middle East through war. It is clear that the forces from other countries will leave the region after a certain period, but our people will have to stay there as neighbours with 370 kilometres of border and with many common interests with the Iraqi people.

The unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait is a precondition of a peaceful solution, but withdrawal alone will not bring real peace and stability to the region. There are many other problems in the region which will cause new crises in the future, including the question of Palestine, Lebanon, Israel and disarmament. Therefore, after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, negotiations should begin among the countries in the region to achieve stability, peace and security.

We must find a way to reach peace in the region, perhaps through the mechanism of a conference on security and co-operation in the

Mr. Cetin (continued)

Middle East. Without such an agreement among all the nations of the region it will be impossible to establish a lasting and peaceful order in the Middle East. But that should not be linked directly with the immediate problem of the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Benassi.

Mr. BENASSI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there are certain basic points which, for the sake of clarity, I would like to make at the outset: a forthright and unequivocal condemnation of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, the defence of international law, in principle and in form, enjoying uniform support within the United Nations and the call on the aggressor, Saddam Hussein, to free all the hostages and to withdraw unconditionally from the country which he has invaded and occupied.

In the last few days two new developments have hit the headlines: Resolution 678 passed by the United Nations Security Council which authorises the possible use of force to overcome the aggressor's stubborn resistance and President Bush's initiative which could give new life and energy to the attempt at a negotiated resolution of the conflict.

Somebody yesterday afternoon in this chamber asked whether the meeting proposed by the American President – in a move for which there is general support and praise – is a unilateral initiative or the outcome of an agreement with the other countries involved and with armed forces in the Gulf. This is a fair question as I too believe that apart from individual national peace initiatives, desirable though they may be, it must be the United Nations – and only the United Nations – which can be the proper forum for the management of the crisis in all its phases, particularly at a tense moment such as the present.

However, there is something else I wish to say, today more than ever after the United Nations' last resolution, namely that we have to continue the search with tenacity, perseverance and even greater conviction for a peaceful way out of the Middle East crisis. It would be tragic if in the minds of governments and peoples the military option came before a political solution, and it would also be tragic if the time still available for negotiation and for democracy were seen primarily as a period of waiting and preparing for an armed encounter and for war.

Today the question for all of us, our countries and Europe, is not what we should do in the event of war but what we must do with patience and conviction to bring about the defeat of the aggressor without the use of force and bloodshed of unimaginable proportions.

Mr. President, I am deeply convinced that war is no solution for the problems confronting the democratic world, not just because of the human and moral tragedy which war always brings but because I believe that the crisis and troubles of the Middle East do not begin and end with the Iraqi aggression. If an armed conflict broke out, other issues with a high risk potential such as the Palestinian question, the sovereignty of Lebanon, the integrity of the state of Israel and the pacification of the Middle East as a whole – though these are separate problems to be tackled at another time – might well assume dimensions which would be difficult to control.

These are the thoughts and concerns which I wished to voice dictated by a realistic and responsible view of a scenario which none of us can lightly dismiss should we really have to cross over from the justified embargo of today and a possible peaceful solution to the terrible and bloody sounds of armed conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Stokes.

Sir John STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – I was sorry not to be here this morning to take part in the earlier proceedings. I should like to congratulate both Rapporteurs on the excellent work they have done in their reports. Of course, in the past few days the situation has been tremendously changed by Mr. Bush's offer to hold talks with the Iraqis.

We have had a certain amount of excitement and political difficulty in my country caused by our former Prime Minister, Mr. Heath and others. Mr. Brandt has also travelled from Germany to see Saddam to try to bargain over the hostages. In my country the families of those hostages appear evening after evening on television in a highly emotional state. I fear that they are trying to alter the foreign policy not only of my government, but of that of the United Nations. All the efforts to try to see Saddam and to deal with the hostages have been a grievous mistake and only add kudos to him.

It is difficult for an honest person to see what there is to talk about with Saddam as Iraq appears to have no intention of withdrawing from Kuwait and making appropriate compensation for the appalling wrong and damage done to that country.

The reason why Mr. Bush has felt compelled to offer talks is the growing peace movement in Congress and among the American public. Yet if Saddam Hussein still refuses to withdraw from Kuwait what can Mr. Bush do? He will be in a difficult position if the United States Congress and people are unwilling to allow him to go to war. He must miss the support of my former Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, who, sadly, recently resigned.

Sir John Stokes (continued)

Saddam Hussein will try to prolong the talks for as long as he possibly can and he will bring in the Palestinians and other issues. We must not allow him to get off the hook for that reason, although I accept that the Palestinian problem must be solved as soon as Saddam has been put in his place.

If the United States fails to insist on the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, Mr. Bush will have allowed aggression to go unpunished and also fatally damaged the position of the United States as a great power. The fact that Iraq will soon have nuclear weapons adds to the awfulness of the situation.

Iraq is difficult terrain in which to fight. I know the country as I was there as a soldier for nearly a year during the war. If Saddam does not withdraw I believe, reluctantly, that war must become inevitable, awful though that thought is.

I think appeasement will not only be a fearful blow to the standing of the United States and our allies, but almost a mortal blow to the United Nations and the Security Council, which, for the first time in forty years, has shown itself to be strong and united. Those are the difficult facts which the peace party must face – I am afraid that some mistaken clergymen and others seem to forget them. Therefore, reluctantly, let us hope that the allies will strike and that their campaign will be short, sharp and successful and, after 15th January, the sooner the better.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Colombo.

Mr. COLOMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the collapse of the Marxist régime has marked the end of one of the threats to European security. Luckily, this danger had already been blunted by the separation of China from the Soviet bloc in the sixties and seventies. By acting in this way China not only weakened the Soviet bloc but also forced it to transfer huge military forces from the European theatre to the Far East.

There was reason to hope for a lengthy period of peace for the whole of humanity which could be used for the exercise of intelligence, determination and economic resources and to strengthen peace in its modern definition, i.e. development. But that did not happen: the boundary line of the danger to security merely moved from East/West to North/South. An ugly and dangerous war broke out in the Arab world.

Saddam Hussein's aim was not simply to occupy Kuwait but to pursue the logical consequences of this at military level, in other words to occupy Saudi Arabia and the other small Arab

states. Politically, his objective was to take over the leadership of the Arab world and, economically, to use oil as a means of holding the entire industrialised world to ransom. Together, these three interlinked objectives could make an explosive mixture of unlimited potency.

At the United Nations, with the resolutions that it has passed, democracy is fortunately gaining ground in international relations; President Bush's latest move and his readiness for direct meetings at diplomatic level is part of the picture. All the same, the great question of what is to be done in genuine concrete terms when we reach 15th January remains unanswered. It is an awesome question which requires an equally awesome – but certain – answer.

Other speakers have already addressed this aspect. For our part we want to draw attention to three fundamental problems that have to be considered for a policy embracing the whole of the Islamic world.

The first problem is that of Islam, a subject which demands deeper political and cultural insight. We used to think that the problem of the year 2000 would be the confrontation between western culture and Marxism, but instead it will be the culture, history and political strategy of the West in confrontation with those of the Islamic world. How should Europe and the West prepare for this confrontation? What is certain is that the military defence aspect is only one facet of the problem as a whole, and perhaps not the most important. It needs to be treated by means of a global approach as it represents not danger but a source of substantial enrichment for the whole community.

The second problem is the relationship between Europe and the Islamic countries on the Mediterranean coast of Africa which, with the exception of Libya, are the least fundamentalist in outlook and therefore more open to dialogue. Moves to strengthen the CSCE-type working group – in this case the CSCM since it is concerned with the Mediterranean region – need to be warmly encouraged.

Thirdly and lastly, there is the oil problem and its possible internationalisation. Our Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, has referred to the question with considerable caution, but it is a real one and it arises from the more general issue of whether it is reasonable and possible to leave a commodity – in this case a source of energy – on which the life and development of a large portion of humanity may depend to the whim of a small group. This calls for a qualitative leap in the way we think about development, economics, the function of ownership and the concept of solidarity, and the question is, of course, not confined to oil.

Mr. Colombo (continued)

It is not only up to us – and even less us here today – to produce a solution to these problems, which are universal, and specially not at a time when temperatures are raised as they are just now. But it is a task which nobody can shirk. This is certainly true of ourselves who have had the temerity to accept direct responsibilities in the difficult but exhilarating world of politics which Aristotle defined as the art of managing every aspect of the state. It is within the framework of a broader and more inclusive concept of this kind that it will be possible to find a true and lasting solution to the problems posed by the Gulf conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we should be particularly grateful to the two Rapporteurs for attempting to present the fullest possible picture of the problems in the Gulf and also for their efforts to gather information on the spot.

What first strikes me when I consider the analysis is that there is rather too much scepticism about the effects of sanctions. During this morning's debate with French Foreign Minister Dumas, I stressed that not only Mr. McNamara but almost all former American Secretaries of Defence, down to Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Carlucci, have said that sanctions must be given time to take proper effect, and this also applies to the spare parts for weapons systems, which are now suffering badly in the desert climate.

The criticism levelled at Jordan in Mr. De Decker's report is, I feel, somewhat unjustified. The sanctions are hitting Jordan hard. The Jordanian King, having had major internal difficulties in the last few months before the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, has tried to make the sanctions work. I did not therefore think it was a very wise piece of American diplomacy when President Bush and Secretary of State Baker ignored the Jordanian King on their visit to the region.

Mr. De Decker said that the Gulf region was of more vital importance to Europe than to the United States. In terms of direct economic dependence, I believe the Japanese are the most dependent on oil from the Gulf region. But the Americans are also highly dependent. They consume 30% of the oil produced in the world. Of this they produce only half in their own country and now import over half of what they consume, although they account for only about 5% of the world population.

Europe is more vitally affected by a different issue: the fact that we are greatly dependent, and shall be still more so, on whether certain fundamentalist tendencies gain the upper hand, or

whether the reasonable elements of the Arab world, of their political parties, their political class, their creative people, are still prepared for a European-Arab dialogue, which in many respects has not even begun. We have a genuine interest in seeing this dialogue proceed as peacefully as possible. We need only think of such problems as the population pressure on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. We have no interest in seeing hostilities break out there, although it may be impossible to avoid them because of Saddam Hussein's attitude.

I should like briefly to mention two other points. The first is the problem of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons. This problem cannot be addressed solely in relation to Iraq. It is obvious that the principle of non-proliferation has failed, particularly in the Gulf, but also in the Near and Middle East as a whole, because there are, of course, nuclear powers there which have not complied with the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty in any way. This is true not only of Iraq but also of Israel. Hence the desire of both Iraq and Libya to produce other weapons, which are less expensive and are also intended as a means of deterring Israel.

One last point: Foreign Minister Dumas said that the Europeans should not act as a world police force.

The report and recommendation call for a permanent group of WEU chiefs of defence staff to prepare for possible co-ordinated operations unconnected with the Gulf crisis. I do not think this is right, until it has been possible to install within the framework of the United Nations – and the United Nations is referred to in almost every article of the WEU treaty as the most important reference institution – what is demanded in Article 43, a military staff under the auspices of the United Nations, and a system for regulating the operational side of this military staff's activities. Until this has been done, all efforts focusing on the United Nations in this respect should certainly be supported. It would be wrong for Europe to form a permanent general staff of its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, no one will be surprised at my asking to speak in this debate on a subject of special concern to me and which I have been bringing up for nearly eight years now: the setting up of a European observation satellite agency. I thank the two Rapporteurs who also refer to the importance of establishing this European agency in their respective recommendations – paragraph 2 in one case and paragraph 7 in the other.

The fact is that co-operation in the area concerned, namely arms control, is impossible to

Mr. Fourné (continued)

imagine without the use of certain units essential for in situ inspection which, incidentally, is within the capacity of facilities that already exist in our respective countries, i.e. satellites.

The rôle of the European observation satellite agency as defined in the reports before you and unanimously approved two years ago would make for a considerable advance along the road of technical, technological and political co-operation and in the mobilisation of effort and resources.

We all realise the great potential importance of this European agency, and in the light of what the President has said several times, we all regret, given the events in the Gulf, that we do not have it. In the context of our calls for co-operation in the Gulf crisis, it would indeed have been specially useful for us to have a facility at our disposal enabling us to take co-ordinated action at European level before accepting dependence on the United States of America.

We need such co-operation; a moment ago we were all demanding it. Here we have the means of achieving it ready to hand. Why not set up this European observation satellite agency immediately? In his letter to the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General reminds us that an ad hoc group was formed and met on 24th and 27th November to finalise a report requested by the ministers at their April meeting. A ministerial decision was drafted, for submission to the enlarged Council late November. Unfortunately, there are various pointers suggesting that firm political will to go ahead with setting up the agency is not there. Yet, as I say, pragmatically and on a stage-by-stage basis, we have the necessary technical resources available and no extraordinary funding requirements would be necessary.

So what is going on, given the vigour and resolution with which this Assembly called for the agency to be set up? This is our question and we have to ask the Council of Ministers for an answer at its meeting on 10th December next, as the draft recommendation which I presented asking that we be notified of the conclusions of the study was adopted unanimously two years ago.

Mr. President, I asked to speak in order to recall that expression of our wishes and also the need for this agency which has your resolute support, and I am glad that the Rapporteurs did not omit mention of this very practical instrument of co-operation in their reports.

On a more general note and addressing the difficulties that lie ahead, I would like to quote from President Mitterrand's address to the

United Nations on the Gulf crisis. He said that in a world where interdependence was the common lot of all, even the most powerful amongst us, it was tempting to see self-dependence as an escape, as though the only means of asserting one's identity and distinction was to deny those of others and as though this need for identity could be satisfied by xenophobia or nationalism. The conclusion that is ultimately found to the crisis caused by the Iraqi aggression would be exemplary in this regard.

I hope, Mr. President, that it is not this need for identity, distinction or individualism which is preventing us from putting the co-operative project for a European observation satellite agency into effect.

(Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think that you, like me, will have derived some encouragement or at least heard some echo of your worries in the words of the Defence Minister.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Security Council's recent resolution leaves very little time to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Gulf. For the first time in the United Nations' history, the Security Council has been almost unanimous in condemning the annexation of a member country and demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

The fact that this is the first time the United Nations has applied the measures for which its charter provides in the event of a breach of the peace and acts of aggression is of tremendous historical importance. The modified Brussels Treaty states explicitly that the treaty may not be interpreted as – and I quote – “affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter” where international security is concerned.

The treaty on which our organisation is based thus indicates the limits to European co-ordination of the forces operating in the Gulf region. Now that the cold war is over, every effort must be made to prevent new fronts from forming, which might poison international relations. It is therefore tremendously important that the peace-keeping measures in the Gulf region are based on a United Nations mandate.

We must not allow ourselves to be driven into a situation in which our only alternatives are to rush forward into war, or to make a humiliating retreat. This has nothing to do with pussy-footing or appeasement. Let us not forget that two of our member countries, France and Britain, fell victim during the operation on the Suez Canal in October 1956 to the idea that a

Mr. Antretter (continued)

new Munich must be avoided at all costs. We all know where this outlook led.

So everything possible must now be done, with European participation, to sound out the last remaining prospects of an internal Arab solution. I therefore welcome the French Foreign Minister's announcement that he would be taking the relevant initiative to Baghdad. Even though the chances of an Arab solution are slim now that Morocco's initiative has failed, the countries united in WEU or the European Community still have time to test the possibility of a peaceful solution of this kind.

The agreement reached within the CSCE framework on arms limitation, conflict prevention and international supervision surely indicates how a regional peace settlement can be achieved. Is it not now up to the Europeans to co-ordinate the supervision of arms exports and weapons supplies to the Near East and so ensure that other countries do not one day follow Iraq's example and give expression to their lust for power with an arms build-up positively encouraged by European arms supplies?

Instead of playing war games with a European fleet of cruisers, as some parts of Mr. De Decker's otherwise balanced report do, the Assembly should call on the Secretary-General to initiate action whereby WEU and a reactivated arms control agency would co-operate with the national authorities in establishing European principles to govern the export of arms supplies and equipment that can be used to manufacture weapons in third countries.

Mr. De Decker criticises the inefficiency of WEU co-ordination in the Gulf operation. We too criticise the lack of political unity among the member countries of WEU. Why did the Europeans in the Security Council not speak with one voice? Why did they not adopt a co-ordinated position on the Soviet proposal for the reactivation of the United Nations Military Staff Committee under the United Nations Charter? The Iraqi aggressor must now be confronted with the international law of the United Nations. To ensure that this is done is up to WEU, which is, moreover, explicitly required to do so by Article VI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The age of gunboat diplomacy is over. Only if we now support the United Nations in its peace-keeping task of ensuring collective security will we be able one day to achieve in other regions what we have recently brought to a conclusion in Europe with the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Since 2nd August when Iraq invaded Kuwait we have had many occasions to speak about this conflict in numerous parliamentary forums. In the Assembly of the Council of Europe, in the Conference of the Interparliamentary Union and in our own national parliament we have analysed the situation, discussed the responsibilities borne by each of us and committed ourselves to the search for a solution to this conflict, the seriousness of which is clear to all. We are not here today to go over the details of previous analyses or to restate positions already adopted in the Presidential Committee and in the proceedings of the Political Committee where we have discussed the excellent report submitted by Mr. De Decker. In expressing my support for the text of the two recommendations before us and my intention to vote for them I simply wish to state a position of principle and to say something about the latest happenings in the conflict.

We have repeatedly said that invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq constitute naked aggression. It is a flagrant and extremely grave violation of international law and above all it constitutes a frontal attack by Iraq upon the new international order based on peace and co-operation, which we are just beginning to build now that the era of confrontation between the two blocs has ended. And to give the true measure of international concern, which we share, there is the disruption which Iraq's action is causing in world energy markets, exacerbated by speculation on the part of the big oil companies, with devastating consequences for national economies, particularly those of the poorer countries. If to all this we add the violation of human rights and of international rules constituted by hostage-taking, the siege of the embassies and the outrages of the invading army against the population of Kuwait, we have a picture of Iraq's conduct that is despicable from any civilised point of view.

Fortunately, the international community has reacted and is reacting appropriately to this aggression by Iraq. The response has been remarkably unanimous and firm, and above all it has been channelled through the organisation established for that purpose, namely the United Nations; moreover the response has taken the form of an intelligent policy, that of sanctions. In this response and in its implementation, it is very important that all that has gone before should not remain mere worthless scraps of paper.

Our countries have taken action to live up to their responsibilities. Our organisation, WEU, has been a useful and effective instrument; in this respect it has to be said that the response has come up to the expectations we had when we recently joined Western European Union. We thought it would be effective, and this has shown us that it is indeed so.

Mr. Martinez (continued)

Having said that, I believe it is important to unmask the diplomatic and political strategy that has been followed by Iraq, the sole aggressor, the sole warmonger in this whole conflict. Saddam Hussein has been acting systematically, perhaps surprised by the unanimity, firmness and scope of our response, with the object of sowing confusion and of disguising and distorting the truth, presenting it not as an attack by one Arab country against another Arab country but rather as an attack by the United States against Iraq, an attack by the West against the Arab countries, a part of the North-South conflict. Saddam Hussein's strategy has also endeavoured to divert blame in order to conceal his own, and to muddy the waters by mixing together different conflicts precisely in order to distract attention from his own aggression. The fact is that Iraq has been largely concerned to find flaws and destroy unanimity in the condemnation of its actions or at least in the unanimous call for the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein and his troops from Kuwait.

There is no doubt that some people through naïveté or interest, useful fools, or co-conspirators, have played the aggressor's game. Only very few have refrained from condemnation, though others have followed apparently strong condemnation by an immediate barrage of arguments and sophisms, seeking to place responsibility elsewhere and recommending actions that would in fact help to nullify the resolutions of the United Nations that they claim to support. Fortunately there are very few who have gone along with this strategy, when speaking here and in our national parliaments.

I think we can now say that the strategy of confusion followed by Saddam Hussein has failed. He has failed to break the unanimity of condemnation and response. I believe it is essential for us here to maintain and support the effectiveness of this action, as has been said by the two Ministers who represent the presidency of WEU. Mr. President, much is at stake for the world in the Gulf today, not just as regards the crisis itself, but above all for the future of the world. Yesterday one member said that this situation could not have come about during the cold war period, and perhaps he is right, but take care, for it is neither possible nor reasonable to draw nostalgic conclusions about the previous period, which was undoubtedly worse than the present. The conclusion to be drawn is commitment, it is to ensure that the fragile peace secured by a state of tension, the unstable equilibrium maintained by the confrontation of the superpowers, shall be replaced, now that that period of history has been closed, not by the law of the jungle and the law of the strongest, but by peace and a superior and more stable balance, based on confidence and co-operation.

I should like to make two comments in closing, Mr. President. First, we must pursue to the end our strategy of seeking a political and peaceful solution, of support for the United Nations and of a solution within and with the United Nations. In the words of an amendment that we have submitted to the draft recommendation, it seems essential to ask that our countries that have become politically and militarily involved in order that sanctions may work, and especially the WEU countries, should be associated with the talks that have been announced between the United States and Saddam Hussein, not pushed to the sidelines. Let us remember that we have said that the violation of international law and the crisis affect not two parties but everyone, and that the response and the solution must likewise come not from two but from all – or at least, all of us.

Secondly and lastly, may I express the hope that the United Nations will come out of the crisis strengthened in its authority and in its effectiveness as an instrument for solving this conflict, and above all for bringing about solutions to future conflicts in a new world order of peace and progress. May I also add that if we succeed in resolving the Gulf conflict in accordance with the rules of international law and on the basis of United Nations resolutions, we shall have gained great moral strength and also placed ourselves under the obligation to continue advancing with fresh energy to resolve conflicts like those between Israel and Palestine or that within Lebanon, as well as one much closer to us, indeed within our area, the Cyprus conflict, in accordance with the rules of international law and on the basis of outstanding United Nations resolutions.

Mr. President, we are committed to taking action towards these objectives, as is the overwhelming majority in the Spanish parliament. You may count on us, as we in Spain are sure that we can count on you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That statement by the chairman of the Spanish Delegation closes the first part of this afternoon's debate.

The joint debate is now adjourned. It will be resumed tomorrow morning followed by the votes on the draft recommendations presented by the Political Committee and the Defence Committee.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I now have some news, or more exactly a message, for you. I have just received a telephone call from the Under-Secretary of

The President (continued)

State, Mr. Bartholomew, explaining that he has had to stay in Washington on the instructions of the Secretary of State Mr. Baker because of the intense diplomatic activity in the American capital connected, of course, with the matter with which we too are unendingly occupied. Mr. Bartholomew presents his apologies to the Assembly and has asked Mr. Curley, United States Ambassador to France, to read his address in his place tomorrow. This will not of course be followed by a debate. That, ladies and gentlemen, is the message I had to give you.

I therefore propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 5th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State (Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States Ambassador to France).
2. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Com-

mittee, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).

3. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248 and amendments).
5. Enhancing WEU's public relations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1246).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State (*Delivered by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States Ambassador to France*).
4. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Askin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Lopez Valdivielso, Mr. Speed, Mr. Romero, Mr. Fioret, Mr. Sole-Tura, Mr. Lambie.
5. Address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Clark to questions put by: Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Ward, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Speed, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, the Earl of Kinnoull, Mr. Garrett.
6. European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political*

Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Andjelkovic (*Observer from Yugoslavia*), Lord Mackie, Mr. Hardy, Mr. De Decker (*Rapporteur of the Political Committee*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman of the Political Committee*), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur of the Defence Committee*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman of the Defence Committee*), Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Ahrens, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Martinez (*point of order*), Mr. De Decker, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Martinez, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Martinez (*point of order*), Mr. Lambie, Mr. Reddemann, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Lambie, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Martinez, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Sir Dudley Smith.

7. Change in the order of business.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 29.

3. Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, as I informed you yesterday evening before closing the sitting, Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State, who had agreed to address the Assembly in place of Mr. Baker, who was prevented from doing so by other commitments, has unfortunately himself been obliged to stay in Washington for talks of the highest importance connected with the problems which are the subject of our present debates.

Mr. Bartholomew's speech will therefore be read by Mr. Walter J. Curley, United States Ambassador to France, to whom I now extend both my personal greetings as a Frenchman in this forum and a welcome from the WEU Assembly.

Please come to the rostrum.

Mr. CURLEY (*United States Ambassador to France*). – Good morning, Mr. President, members of the Assembly, honoured guests, mesdames et messieurs, ladies and gentlemen. I am very grateful to you and I thank you very much for receiving me here today. While I am honoured to be in this chamber with you, I am here by a quirk of circumstance. As your President said, our Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, my very good friend, Reginald Bartholomew, was unable at the very last moment to come to France. He has asked me to stand in his place in the Assembly, and I am happy to do so.

I bring you warm greetings from President Bush, with whom I was in touch yesterday, and from Secretary of State Baker. My government appreciates the positive input, attitude and force that Western European Union brings to our common security. I was with President Bush when he stressed that point in his Boston University speech eighteen months ago.

I have taken the liberty, ladies and gentlemen and Mr. President, of summarising in my own fashion and as accurately as possible Under-Secretary of State Bartholomew's planned address to this Assembly. The full text of Secretary Bartholomew's remarks is being made available to you separately. As I said, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to be in this chamber. It is my first visit to the Assembly.

This meeting occurs as we near the end of a troubled century. The divisions of the cold war are behind us, but other challenges, as the Paris CSCE summit and the Gulf crisis show, lie ahead of us. Much remains to be done to build a new secure world order. As we help to build that new world order, the central questions of Americans and Europeans today are: how does the forty-five-year-old Atlantic relationship evolve? We believe that the relationship must take three aspects into account: a transformed NATO, still central to our security; a greater European security identity, which will strengthen NATO; and the new realities outside Europe, underscored of course by the Gulf crisis, which call for new patterns of transatlantic co-operation.

So much in Europe and in NATO has changed. First, we have the prospect of a reduced Soviet threat. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe and their signature on a conventional forces agreement are great and positive steps. Secondly, we have a promising political agenda in front of us. We must move beyond containment to a new security architecture in Europe and we must draw the Soviet Union into co-operative rôles and help Eastern Europe achieve security and well-being.

Some have said that those two vast changes – the decline of the Soviet threat and the rise of a new political agenda – mean an end to NATO's

functions, but those functions remain vital. NATO will continue to assure the security and defence of its members. It will promote democracy and stability in all Europe and it will maintain transatlantic co-operation. In short, NATO must be a central pillar of Europe's new architecture. As Europe changes, obviously NATO will change with it. In fact, NATO is already adapting its strategy and its forces. A smaller military structure will rely more and more on a multinational core. It will also rely less on nuclear weapons, making them truly weapons of the last resort. But, above all, NATO will continue to protect Europe by counterbalancing the Soviet Union or any other potential aggressor.

We cannot ignore the possibility in the unforeseen future of a hostile Soviet Union or a spillover of internal strife there or in other places in Eastern Europe. Responsible nations cannot base their security and independence on the restraint of others. In sum, we must be able to defend ourselves from any challenge and from any direction. Only then can we fulfil our political agenda.

NATO's leaders at the London summit spelt out this agenda. They knew that our political tasks are so big that we can deal with them only on the broad transatlantic basis which NATO provides. The initiatives agreed in London, which reflect this wisdom, were designed to find new ways to co-operate with the Soviets and Eastern Europeans. We started the process in Paris in November, when NATO and the former members of the Warsaw Pact signed a pledge not to use force in their relations. My country's rôle in NATO's transformation and in all the great events in Europe in 1990 shows that we intend to stay engaged in the alliance and in Europe as a European power.

Our rôle in two world wars and in the cold war teaches us that American and European values and security are inseparable. NATO's system of collective defence and of political co-ordination is a first-time success among free nations. The Atlantic community in the fullest sense binds us in ways unique to NATO. That is why we remain committed to Europe and why we will keep substantial conventional and nuclear forces here.

For much of the post-war era, the United States has willingly borne a leadership rôle in Atlantic defence and Atlantic security. At times, we chafed at this responsibility – it was irritating – but we recognised that our rôle was a consequence of the massive Soviet threat. Now, new circumstances and Europe's rising strength open the way to greater European weight in the Atlantic relationship. We regard that development, not as an excuse for us to do less, but as a source of strength to the alliance in the new world order. My government believes that a distinct and substantial European rôle in the alliance will bolster a sense of transatlantic com-

Mr. Curley (continued)

munity and strengthen the centrality of NATO. It will contribute to maintaining America's engagement in Europe.

The transatlantic relationship is rooted in shared values and hard-headed interests. An enhanced European identity should strengthen those values and interests. It will achieve that if the European dimension develops in the context of the Atlantic Alliance. The alliance is shaped by the basic objectives that we all share. Those objectives include maintaining the ability of all sixteen members to participate in matters which affect their security and strengthening the ability of alliance institutions to manage security challenges. Those security challenges include threats from outside Europe. The dangers in the Gulf, for example, are serious, as we all know. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological arms and the risk to vital resources concern us all. Iraq's aggression is so blatant that the world has been able to mobilise as never before. We are also blessed with a state of readiness created by the cold war.

However, future challenges may be more ambiguous. In this partnership of nations, we cannot afford to let ambiguity paralyse us. In confronting Iraq we have used all available mechanisms, including NATO and WEU. Although Europe is closer to the Gulf and her interests are as affected as those of the United States, United States forces are preponderant – a fact which underscores the need to enhance Europe's weight in out-of-area security matters.

Looking beyond the Gulf, however, we must consider the implications for NATO without a divisive out-of-area debate. As we aim high in our ambition, we must carefully guard against the unforeseen, as always. America looks forward to the future with confidence – confidence in the grand partnership that we have built together.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Assembly, ladies and gentlemen, please accept my gratitude for your courtesy in receiving me here today. On behalf of the United States of America and my President, I salute our partnership for the future and once again I thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Ambassador, for this message and the commitment it implies and for its recognition of the part played by our institution in the common security effort. Please convey our thanks to Mr. Baker, Mr. Bartholomew, the American Government and President Bush for your contribution to our deliberations. Would you also add that we still hope to welcome them in person at a future session.

Thank you again, Ambassador, for your contribution to our debate.

4. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee on European security and the Gulf crisis and the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments.

The joint debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Askin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. ASKIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – Mr. President, developing close relations with the western world in all domains and participating actively in the European political, social and economic integration process is one of the main priorities of Turkish foreign policy.

In fact, with her active membership of NATO, OECD and the Council of Europe, Turkey has demonstrated her strong interest in all aspects, as well as the democratic values and institutions of the European movement.

Turkey is an important bastion of Western European defence. She is a reliable partner in NATO. As a strong and stable ally in the southern region of the alliance, Turkey has a lot to offer to the creation of the future European security order. As a matter of fact, a European defence without Turkish participation is bound to be vulnerable. Against that background, we believe that the accession of Turkey as a full member of Western European Union will greatly contribute to the strengthening process of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Gulf crisis, which brought a region which neighbours Turkey to the threshold of war, is the major issue to be discussed during the present session of the Assembly.

The recent Gulf crisis has demonstrated once again the importance of Turkey to security and defence. We are confident that Turkey will take the place that it deserves in the new European security structure that is being created. For that reason, Turkey should be given the place that it deserves in the new European security structure by joining Western European Union as a full member. Turkey attaches great importance to its full membership of Western European Union.

(Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Valdivielso.

Mr. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Thank you, Madam President. May I begin by associating myself with the congratulations expressed to the Rapporteurs by all my colleagues and thank them for all they have done to keep this Assembly informed on such an important matter, and I should also like to thank all those who have helped in this task.

After the cold war was over many people in Europe jumped to the conclusion that armed forces should be drastically reduced, defence budgets cut and virtually all our security measures dismantled because the threat represented by Warsaw Pact socialism to our freedoms and to democracy had vanished. They failed to recognise that other potential threats exist – as the Gulf crisis has shown – and that therefore it would be wrong to assume that the West has no need of the military strength necessary to deter anybody who wanted to turn hypothetical threats into reality.

It is very easy to indulge in wishful thinking, but we should resist the temptation because, unfortunately, there are still rulers who, with the support of powerful armies, are capable of anything, as Saddam Hussein has clearly shown. As we have seen, pressure, condemnations and resolutions of the highest international organisations may mean little to a man prepared to invade a neighbouring country and destroy it by annexation, to use civilians as hostages and to threaten to use weapons of total destruction; nobody can sway such a man except with the backing of military force. So armies are still necessary as an instrument and an argument in international politics and the answer to those who with the best intentions but little realism were asking: "Armies? what for?" has come from Saddam Hussein.

If despite unanimous international rejection the United States had not brought their desert shield into play we should now be sorry and begging Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Saudi Arabia or heaven knows where else. And that prompts the thought that if Hitler had been stopped in Czechoslovakia the history of the last fifty years in Europe would have been different.

I would like to make the point in this European forum that once again the United States has set an example by facing up to the responsibilities of the rôle falling to them in our time, on this occasion in defence of the international order. And if the worst happens and war becomes inevitable I would like particularly to emphasise the fourth recommendation to the Council in this report, namely the need for member countries of WEU to deploy more ground and air forces in the Gulf area.

To make progress towards the formulation of a truly European doctrine of security we have to begin by banishing the thought in the minds of many Europeans, namely that we Europeans are prepared to defend freedom, democracy and the international order to the last drop of American blood.

I wonder: would we at this stage of the conflict have taken the decision to deploy military forces by ourselves in the Gulf?

It seems to me that the draft recommendation in the report, with which I am of course in agreement, is a kind of catalogue or index of faults, of unfavourable circumstances which become more serious as war – God forbid – appears increasingly inevitable.

The Council should take the necessary steps ... take them urgently ... consider the matter without delay ... act promptly ... take decisions. These are the key words in most of the recommendations in this report dated 7th November. It is now 5th December and given the latest resolution of the United Nations the situation is much more serious.

I have nearly finished, Madam President.

Let no one think that I draw any comfort from what has happened or from what may happen. Nothing is further from my thoughts. But there is no doubt that this must open many people's eyes. It shows that here in Europe we must move on from words to deeds.

Western European Union has played and is playing an important part in this crisis. But it must continue to become stronger and improve its structure because that is the only way it can become more effective.

At a time of endless discussions on the future defence and security structures, at a time when – in my view incautious – reductions are being made in the defence budgets of the various member countries, the content of paragraph 69 of the report on the importance of WEU, and recommendations 8 and 10, which are some of the most debated and amended recommendations in these reports, are extraordinarily important; they hold the key to the future of Western European Union and to the structuring of a European security system.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate our two Rapporteurs on their excellent reports. They deal with the Gulf crisis and set out some lessons for this organisation.

Saddam Hussein has waged effective psychological warfare. Some of us may have forgotten that, apart from killing, torturing and injuring many thousands of Kuwaitis, he has done the same to his own people in Iraq, and not just the

Mr. Speed (continued)

Kurds. Yesterday my colleague, Sir John Stokes, pointed out the cruelty and the violation of international laws that come with the taking of hostages. I go further. I have every sympathy with those taken hostage and their families, but we do not serve them or the cause of peace in the Gulf any good purpose by the constant stream of European and American politicians – most of them has-beens – going out there and trying to negotiate the freedom of some hostages. Saddam Hussein has ruthlessly exploited concern about the hostages, and every time we try to bargain for hostages in this way we are ensuring that dictators or terrorist organisations will take hostages in the future. They are there to be used, and I am afraid that we are conniving at that.

Recently we have had another United Nations resolution and Mr. Bush's offer of talks. I fear that Saddam Hussein will prolong the talks, release quite a lot of land but not all of Kuwait and then release the hostages on a phased basis. Then what? We have already heard in this Assembly siren voices saying "Peace in the Gulf at any price", and we know that in America and on continental Europe public opinion is, to say the least, wobbly. In a few weeks' time, Saddam Hussein will be left with important parts of Kuwaiti territory, having given up some other parts and released some hostages, and we shall then say that that is not worth fighting over. Yet the principle that aggression should not pay must remain uppermost.

As for the future of WEU, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's report are vital and should not be diluted. It is certainly worth studying crisis prevention, the satellite agencies and the whole business of a naval on-call force or the possibility of a European force d'action rapide. Those were mentioned by the President in his speech to the Assembly a couple of days ago and referred to in my report on European security eighteen months ago. We must ensure that WEU has a rôle in such events in the future, and we must look at making the European pillar of the alliance more effective than it already is. If nothing else comes of the Gulf crisis, that will be a worthwhile prize. The military and political necessity is there. All that we need to ask ourselves is whether we are willing, ready and able to carry it through. I hope that we shall endorse that principle along the lines of paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 and instruct our ministers to take action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, in order to clarify my position on the order of the day during this debate on European security and the Gulf crisis let me say

that both I and the group I represent hold that, for the sake of political honesty, all views, even those that are not in agreement with the majority, should be aired.

The reactions and analyses of governments in Europe and throughout the world, political movements and the media, show that a fundamental change has taken place, because of concern about an act of war that is no longer hypothetical but has become a real possibility within a specified period. The resolution in question allows any nation having units in what is known as the multinational force deployed in the Gulf to consider itself legitimately entitled to use force once the period stated in the resolution is over.

We are not party to any attitude that tends to devalue political and diplomatic initiatives, and therefore we take a serious view of the fact that the Council of Ministers has made no statement to the public in Europe or before the United Nations, presenting proposals and distancing itself from the intensive diplomatic activity over the last few months with only one object in view, the creation of an instrument, Resolution 678, that may lead to war.

We are convinced that it is necessary to continue patiently to apply sanctions whilst pursuing the diplomatic initiative. Economic pressure and diplomacy will take time to produce results, and this is the only way to avoid war.

United Left supports the proposal tabled by the SPD in the German parliament: "Maintain and increase political, diplomatic and economic pressure on Iraq and unconditionally rule out any military option". To set a term to a period for political and economic pressure is to switch the political coercion to the military sphere. Within this framework, it is absurd to believe that the function of the ships deployed in the Gulf has not changed. Once they are there there is no way in which an interpretation taken unilaterally by any of the present allies can fail to have a direct effect on the ships, either as logistical support or directly in acts of war. Therefore, as the French Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence stated here yesterday, each country will have to make its own judgment in the matter in accordance with its constitution and its legal and parliamentary rules.

To conclude, Madam President, the initiatives are as follows: first, to continue to support the embargo; second, to propose to Community and WEU countries an undertaking not to use military force as long as the frontiers of Saudi Arabia are respected; third, to propose that the European Community and the United Nations should discuss initiatives aimed at solving in the medium term all the problems affecting the area.

Mr. Romero (continued)

Because when the problems of the area were under discussion it was said that one international crime cannot be the excuse for the commission of another international crime. And when the authors of various international crimes against international law are known, public opinion asks that none should go unpunished.

Therefore, although one problem should not be linked automatically to another, a timetable has to be drawn up for solving all the problems of the East, including the Palestinian problem. There should also be a security organisation studying the export of arms to developing countries from Europe, the United States, or other countries of the North, and a global programme for demilitarising the area should be launched, in view of the military potential that is concentrated there.

Those are our positions, Madam President, and they are not marginal ones. We have two million votes in Spain and are the third largest political group. On the 16th of this month there will be a demonstration in Madrid attended by the two big trade unions, workers' committees, the UGT and a peace movement chaired by the Socialist Senator, Francisca Sauquillo. And there is a public opinion in Europe and in particular in Spain, where President Felipe Gonzalez has acknowledged that public opinion does not support a military option of this kind. Therefore, in all fairness to myself and all my colleagues, I have to give expression to our disagreement in this democratic forum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has brought home the precariousness of peace dramatically to world public opinion. Its preservation requires the vigilance of the whole world community; it cannot be left to a few global custodians. The illusion that the normalisation of East-West relations might have guaranteed a lengthy period of tranquillity has been dispelled by the Gulf crisis and its warning to governments that the threat will be there as long as the chequerboard of the world is crisscrossed with not just military but also political and ideological tensions.

The events in Kuwait have also illustrated another fact and that is the profound mistake of nourishing certain centres of conflict in order to limit or extinguish others. A strategy of this kind, which may have yielded results at other times, has turned out to be an incalculable and dangerous boomerang in the recent past.

Saddam Hussein's aggression, with the hostage blackmail in violation of human rights, is a barbarian act; to defeat it, in all its infamy,

will require a high degree of unity and international solidarity. But the Gulf question, while it requires the restoration of international law that has been violated in accordance with the United Nations resolution, also points up the urgency of correcting those dangerous imbalances in armaments allowing the hegemonic designs of the dictator of Baghdad to come to fruit.

Item 6 of the draft recommendation in Mr. De Decker's excellent report is highly relevant politically and an essential keystone of security in the Middle East and in Europe itself.

The opening of direct negotiations between the United States and Iraq certainly represents a significant and encouraging step towards making the threat of war more remote. But the restoration of international order will not automatically mean the destruction of the lethal arsenals in existence in the Middle East and other outrages against the weaker nations will take place with the same kind of unscrupulousness as that of Saddam.

The withdrawal of troops from Kuwait therefore needs to be accompanied by a security plan which in all solemnity establishes the inviolability of the frontiers of the Middle Eastern countries.

The suggestion of a CSCM conference for the Middle East on the model of CSCE should be welcomed and it is to be hoped that our Assembly will support the calling of such a conference in the near future. A system of international co-operation for the Middle East will enable principles and standards of behaviour to be laid down acceptable to all the peoples in the region and not only those who share the western system of values.

If the conflict in the Persian Gulf were to result in producing a feasible model for political systematisation in the Middle East, this would certainly be received by mankind with a feeling of relief similar to that which greeted the destruction of the Berlin wall a year ago, as the end of a destructive East-West conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sole-Tura.

Mr. SOLE-TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I believe that the Gulf crisis is a conflict that embodies and expresses all the political contradictions of the present time. As has been said, it is the first conflict after the official end of the cold war, the first to have taken place since the official disappearance of the two opposing blocs. It illustrates the need to define a new international order at a time when the available mechanisms are still those of the old order. This being so, I would emphasise that although we are confronted by a violation of international law, that is not the main problem. Besides denouncing the violation of international law we should also

Mr. Sole-Tura (continued)

urgently reconsider the basic concepts of international law that have hitherto applied.

This conflict also raises some other broad issues. One of these is a rethink of the nuclear strategy that was conceived as global deterrence between two equal superpowers. As was proved in Vietnam, and as, I think, is going to be proved again in Iraq, this strategy does not work in regional conflicts – and these are what we are likely to see in the immediate future. It also demonstrates the possibility that medium-sized powers, such as present-day Iraq, can utilise the present vacuum to commit acts of aggression and take up positions that may have widespread strategic and economic consequences. As I said before, this situation poses the problem of the institutions we need to reform the international system. The present ones date from the previous period and are demonstrably inadequate.

Certainly at the present time the United Nations has recovered some of its predominant rôle, but it cannot fully discharge that rôle, partly because it does not have any forces of its own.

Of course, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO, exists and there is no intention of dissolving it at the present time, yet it too has to be reformed because it was created for the situation existing when Europe was divided into two blocs, and that will not be the pattern of the future. And what we are discussing here is the future rôle of institutions like ours which express the wish and the ability of Europe to develop a policy of its own. At the same time I believe that we have an obligation to begin making preparations for a new kind of institution, already suggested or announced, such as CSCE-type conferences for the Middle East and for the Mediterranean, which are undoubtedly areas of potential conflict both now and for the immediate future.

Clearly, whilst the co-ordination measures we have adopted in WEU have been useful, they also show how limited is our scope, for we are confronting the Gulf crisis with forces still geared to the logic of the great powers, the logic of the previous phase. The countries of Europe and in particular our organisation do not and will not have a predominant rôle militarily, and yet we are following different policies. Nevertheless, I am broadly in agreement with the drift of the two draft recommendations, if not with their precise wording. I say this because I wish to express my support for the amendments that have been put forward and which I believe emphasise three very important aspects.

The first is that if the Gulf conflict is to be solved peacefully, so must the other problems of the region such as those in Palestine and Lebanon.

Second, the other countries taking part in the embargo, and especially the members of Western European Union, should not be called upon simply to support the military pressure; they should also have a voice and a vote in any discussions and negotiations that may take place in the search for a peaceful solution before the expiry of the ultimatum given by the latest resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

Third, the countries of the region should have a large say in the final solution.

In closing I wish to mention a matter that may appear to be secondary but which I believe to be extremely important. I believe that our Assembly should make a definite contribution to clarifying the real issues of the conflict. We should challenge misrepresentations aimed at presenting the Gulf conflict as the first step in a global ethnic or religious struggle, specifically a struggle against the rebirth or expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. I believe that that would be the worst outcome for everybody, and we should therefore make it clear that this is not a war of religion or a fight against any kind of religious fundamentalism, but a new kind of military and strategic conflict which calls for a redefinition of the international order. We must also be aware that behind the growth of those fundamentalisms lie serious problems to do with economic development and the gap between what we primly call the North and the South, because this aspect is crucially important to any lasting solution.

(Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I was one of the twenty-six members of parliament who, during the House of Commons' debate on the Gulf crisis, voted against the government's policy of United Kingdom armed forces participating in the Gulf operation and, therefore, against the policy of my party, the Labour Party, which supports the government on this. Although I am not speaking for the United Kingdom Government or even for the Labour opposition, I believe that I am speaking for more of the people of the world, especially the people of Europe, than many other representatives whom I have heard during our one and a half days' debate on these reports.

Nothing justifies the use of force in the Gulf. As many representatives have said, we should carry on imposing sanctions, get on with negotiations and reach a peaceful solution. I have noticed during our debate that colleagues whose countries are contributing little or nothing to the alliance and who are furthest from the point of conflict are more militant and warlike. I wish that more representatives had been present late yesterday afternoon to listen to the Turkish dele-

Mr. Lambie (continued)

gate's words of advice and appeals for a peaceful solution. Turkey shares a border with Iraq.

Yesterday, the Minister of Defence of France made some reasonable and honest statements. Both reports give the impression that the alliance is between the United States and Europe, but in reply to questions the Minister said that most of us were on the sidelines and that it was like a game of poker with only two players, the United States and Iraq. He also said that there was no political will within the Council of Ministers to commit more forces to the Gulf. That is the honest opinion of the leaders of the western alliance, rather than the opinions set out in both these reports. We are creating the feeling that Europe is contributing, when everyone knows that it is contributing little. I am sorry that the American Ambassador is not here. He mildly criticised the lack of support from Europe for the American attempts to get a military solution to the conflict in the Gulf.

What is the position? France has 4 600 land forces in the Gulf, but they are way behind the front line because they will not be put under American control. We are told that there is an Arab contribution and that Syria has 16 000 troops there, but they are also behind the front line because they do not know whose side they will be on. Egypt has 18 000 troops, away from the front line. The only troops on the front line, under a unified command, are the American and British troops. We are committing ourselves to providing 12 000 land forces – at present, about 7 000 are there. Even the British contribution to the 500 000 land forces in the Gulf is next to nothing.

This is not an allied attempt to solve the Gulf problem; it is solely an American attempt. Yesterday, my friend Mr. Martinez from Spain said that this action was not the consequence of the ending of the cold war. I say that it is. If the cold war had not ended and if the Americans had gone into the southern part of the Middle East, the Russians would have gone into the northern part and there would have been a stalemate. Now, because of the ending of the cold war, there is only one superpower and, unfortunately, that is the United States.

Many people here talk about human rights and say that we must protect countries from invasion by others. I have a longer memory than most people here. I remember the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Chile – which had a democratic government – Grenada and Panama. I remember all those invasions and attempts by the United States Government to interfere in the rights of independent sovereign countries.

I am a wee bit worried that we as Europeans are prepared to put no military effort into the

Gulf war but want to give full support to the Americans to lose their lives. I shall not listen to the voices that will be raised in the chamber today. I put it to members that, if they want war, they will get one. As everyone knows, one does not reach solutions by heading towards war. One of the strongest, most economically powerful countries in the world will fight against a third world country without any industry and with 17 million people. It cannot be defeated without help from Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and all the other countries whose representatives have spoken in favour of war.

There can be only one result – the Americans will win, and we will have American bases for ever more in the Middle East. Once we have solved this problem, what about Syria? President Assad is the "great white hope". One of the most obscene things that I have seen recently was the American President sitting side by side with President Assad. We know everything that President Assad has done and will do once the war in the Middle East ends.

We have to solve the problem of Palestine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Would you kindly conclude, Mr. Lambie, as you have gone well beyond your time.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I am just finishing, Mr. President. There has been no mention of Palestine and Israel. Let us throw both these reports out. Let us consign them to the waste paper basket, where they should be, and speak up for a peaceful solution. I say to the people who want war that their sons and their constituents will not be fighting. As the French Defence Minister said, they will be sitting on the touch line. They will be the hooligans on the football terraces shouting on the two teams in the fight. Let us get down to a peaceful solution and to negotiation and get some sense into the Assembly. Let us talk of peace, not war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I remind all members that, if the time-limits which we have set ourselves are to be respected, it is important that each speaker should make an effort to limit what he has to say to the agreed five minutes.

In his enthusiasm, Mr. Lambie has spoken for nine minutes. I hope that his example will not be followed too often.

Ladies and gentlemen, we shall now suspend the debate on the report connected with the Gulf situation and resume it later this morning.

**5. Address by Mr. Clark,
Minister of State for Defence Procurement
of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Clark, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.

The President (continued)

Minister, we are aware of the demands on your time and of the difficulties which the current situation presents for you and we are therefore all the more appreciative of your presence here today.

Without further delay, I ask you to take the rostrum.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – It is a great pleasure for me to address the thirty-sixth session of the WEU Assembly. I have listened to and drawn enlightenment from the contributions to the debate. It is particularly appropriate that the Assembly should be debating the Gulf crisis – that is, the illegal and brutal occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein – which provides an opportunity for WEU member countries to rally round and demonstrate European solidarity and commitment to playing a full part in the united response of the international community to this unprovoked aggression.

Just over four months have passed since the invasion of Kuwait. The international community responded swiftly by passing a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions condemning the invasion and setting in hand measures to deny Saddam Hussein support and to secure Iraq's withdrawal. The United Kingdom's aim, which I know you all share, is to resolve the crisis as soon as possible by peaceful means. We hope that, by using diplomatic and economic pressure within the context of the United Nations resolutions, Saddam Hussein will realise that the whole world stands against him and that only Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait's independent and legitimate government will secure peace. WEU must play an important part in that process.

From the outset of the Gulf crisis, a primary aim has been to deny trade and finance to Saddam Hussein by stopping any imports and exports reaching or leaving Iraq by sea. To this end, at their extraordinary meeting on 21st August, defence and foreign affairs ministers of WEU countries declared their intention to contribute towards enhancing the international maritime effort deployed in the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

In particular, they stressed that their aim would be to co-ordinate their operations in support of a naval trade embargo, always bearing in mind the importance of ensuring that such action should assist wider co-ordination with all nations deploying naval forces in the Gulf region.

The naval contribution made by WEU member countries is impressive. Of the 100-plus naval support vessels deployed by fifteen coun-

tries, the contribution by WEU nations amounts to over fifty ships deployed in the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean. Of those, the United Kingdom at present accounts for two destroyers, two frigates, six logistic support vessels – all armed – three mine counter-measure vessels and a support ship. In addition, the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft of the RAF are responsible for the key interception areas in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, where surveillance operations of potential sanction-breaking vessels are conducted.

Co-ordination of naval operations has developed at two levels. In the Gulf itself, following on from the Bahrain international naval conference on 9th and 10th September, naval co-ordination is by means of the monthly conferences of senior naval officers. They are the forum for drawing up a patrol schedule for operations in those waters, which can take into account national requirements in respect of permissible areas of operation and national tasks such as port visits as well as the primary task of maritime embargo surveillance. The United Kingdom believes that the distribution of vessels throughout those waters without restrictions on operating zones has maximised the flexibility and effectiveness of the multinational efforts.

The scheduling conferences also cover matters essential to the co-ordination of such a large number of vessels in one area, communications, IFF procedures and so on. The WEU conferences and plenary sessions, which bring in all other non-WEU nations, are working well. They have resulted in the effective and smooth co-ordination of the maritime effort in the Gulf. There have been regular meetings of the ad hoc group of defence and foreign affairs officials, established after the ministerial meeting in August and the meeting on 27th August of the chiefs of staff. The chiefs of staff meeting was, of course, the first in the history of WEU.

In addition, a naval points of contact group has been set up to discuss and resolve issues which are more appropriate to captains than naval commanders in the field. The regular meetings of the group provide an invaluable forum for exchanges of information and views on issues such as the content of operations, the rules of engagement for dealing with sanction-breaking merchant vessels and for the identification and resolution of common problems.

Even though the United Kingdom has had several years' experience of the Armilla patrol, we have found new problems in enforcing the trade embargo. Such problems include dealing with a potentially hostile Iraqi master and crew, taking control of sanction breakers who refuse to divert voluntarily and dealing with other such incidents, which are below the threshold of combat but present particular difficulties of decision.

Mr. Clark (continued)

We need to share experiences and find common solutions to such problems. WEU provides a unique forum for that and I welcome the way in which the naval points of contact and senior officers' co-ordination meetings have developed. We must facilitate both bilateral contacts and, most importantly, wider co-ordination with other nations.

Maritime embargo operations are only a part of the pressure being applied following the United Nations resolution. A multinational force of ground and air assets has been committed, the aim of which is to demonstrate that behind the peaceful pressures of diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions there lies the military option. I am convinced that only a demonstration of military resolve is likely to persuade Iraq to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and to fulfil the requirements of the United Nations Security Council resolution.

In September, the United Kingdom decided to send British forces to Saudi Arabia and to reinforce the RAF units already in the Gulf. On 22nd November, we decided to employ additional army personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia. That substantial additional commitment demonstrates our belief that the military option must be credible. The First Armoured Division is already an oversized division. It will bring to over thirty thousand the number of British forces committed in the Gulf. It contains over 220 main battle tanks, all supporting infantry in armoured personnel carriers, artillery which is additional to the normal establishment, and long-range rocket support and helicopter support.

The full operating cost of the British forces committed to the Gulf is some £3.5 million sterling a day. If we maintain our current level of operations – assuming that hostilities do not break out – our total costs are likely to exceed £1 billion sterling by the end of the financial year.

Several offers of support have already been made to the United Kingdom, for example, to assist with the transport to the Gulf of our military deployment and the provision of additional ammunition, which is vital to sustainability and high attrition rates. Many of those offers have been made in the context of a WEU military points of contact meeting, and all members have agreed to assist partners in deploying forces and to extend co-ordination in naval areas, particularly to logistic support for ground and air forces. The military points of contact meetings have proved useful for identifying areas of weakness and directing the efforts of allies to areas where a contribution of whatever size can enhance the multinational force to best effect.

We all hope that it will not come to it, but if hostilities cannot be avoided, there will inevitably be casualties. The numbers cannot be predicted. I stress that there cannot be too much medical support for troops of whatever nationality who are prepared to risk life and limb in the defence of democracy and freedom. Nor should we forget the spectre of Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons. The international community will hold personally responsible those who violate the Geneva protocol of 1945, to which Iraq is a party, which prohibits the use of chemical or biological weapons.

But we cannot hope that such considerations will prevail upon Saddam Hussein, whose record of brutality, even against his own people, would indicate otherwise. United Kingdom forces are properly trained and equipped, but it is important that the right medical facilities should be available, and this is another area where all assistance would be beneficial.

So far, despite the alignment of the world nations against it, Iraq has shown no sign of withdrawing from Kuwait. Instead, the destruction and looting that were so graphically described in last week's United Nations debate on the rape of Kuwait continue. In an effort to resolve the crisis by peaceful means, on Thursday the Security Council – for the first time in thirty years – passed a resolution permitting the use of whatever measures are necessary to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area. That resolution represents the latest and strongest bid for peace. We hope that it will bring home to Saddam Hussein the futility of his attempt to divide the international community and demonstrate to him that there is no ambiguity about what the United Nations Security Council requires. The withdrawal from Kuwait must be complete. There is no room for half measures or for compromise.

Whatever our narrower national considerations may be – events may be interpreted with slight variations in different chancelleries – it is essential that in this, our first real test outside the familiar and habitual confrontation with the ancient Soviet threat, Europe should present a completely united front. The future tranquillity and stability of the world order depend on it.

I thank you very much for the privilege of addressing you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your address, Minister.

You kindly said you would answer questions.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister will understand that not only British members but members from other countries of Western European Union read with great concern the allegations against him in the British newspaper *The Sunday Times*. Those allegations were that in the period before the invasion of Kuwait, when the United Kingdom along with other WEU members applied an embargo on arms or arms-related sales to Iraq, the Minister was aware of and connived at sales from the United Kingdom to Iraq of equipment which could be used for military purposes.

I hear people behind me muttering the word “disgraceful”.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Hear, hear.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I have not posed the question in an antagonistic fashion. It is a very important question, because *The Sunday Times* is a newspaper of European repute and what it publishes in such an overt fashion must be directly and openly answered. I certainly think that parents whose sons and, in some cases, daughters are in danger of dying in the Gulf will want to know very clearly, openly and directly from all ministers concerned in this enterprise that everything is being done and everything was done previously to avoid the supply of arms to Iraq. I was disappointed that the Minister did not make a direct reference to this when he spoke, because he owed it to us to do so.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Rubbish.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before asking the Minister to answer this question, I have a point to make. We are in an area where the line between the debate on internal policy and that on international policy is ill-defined. I would remind you that it is the business of this Assembly to concentrate on security problems in the general context of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the world. I therefore ask you all to make the necessary effort not to give in to the temptation to replace this main debate by others which have more to do with the internal politics of our different countries.

I now call the Minister, who probably wishes to reply to the speaker.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if you will allow me, I will remain seated to reply to questions but for this particular question I prefer to stand.

(The speaker continued in English)

I very much resent Sir Russell Johnston taking the opportunity of our meeting here to ask a question that relates to my personal conduct on

the basis of testimony – if you can call it that – which was derived from a team of researchers – if you can call them that – who never referred to me, never referred to my office, never referred to the Minister for Trade, never referred to the Department of Trade and Industry and never referred to our member here, Mr. Garrett, who represents Wallsend, who is a parliamentary consultant to the machine tools association.

I have a complete and total answer to these allegations, which are rubbish, trash and sensational, and in the fullness of time that answer will be presented. It certainly will not be presented – I shall try to restrain myself from any pejorative – to a member of parliament of little particular interest, status or concern to me in a forum where it is entirely inappropriate. But it did not escape my attention that he tried to introduce – I believe in contemptible manner – an emotive element into the question by referring to parents and others who have children and loved ones in the Gulf, so I am ready to tell him that I, too, am in that category. One of my sons is serving in the Gulf at the present time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – Is the Minister satisfied with the speed at which all the allies can get reinforcements to the Gulf area given the problems that may exist with shipping?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I do not believe that there are any problems in relation to reinforcement of everything that is air-portable. That includes all forms of equipment other than very heavy armour – artillery pieces, multiple long-range rocket systems and so forth. The airlift capacity is very strong and I see no particular concern about that. The shipping arrangements work very well and we are conscious that this affords a good example of speedy response and international co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister heard the speech of my colleague, Mr. Lambie. Does he accept that my party fully shares the view that there must be a complete withdrawal from Iraq? Will he also accept that we have repeatedly made clear...

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – From Kuwait.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, withdrawal from Kuwait. I am grateful to Mr. Jessel who is extremely competent at observing minor slips.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Does the Minister also accept that one reason for our continuing view that the military option must remain credible is that if it does not remain credible, the sanctions policy would not remain credible? Does the Minister also accept – I am sorry to go on but it is important – that the maintenance of sanctions must be accompanied by a degree of supervision, which is itself subject to public awareness? I am not referring to the matter raised by Sir Russell Johnston. If there is a significant breach of sanctions by any member state of this organisation, this organisation, not least in view of its importance and responsibility, should not be denied such information. Breach of sanctions should not be shielded by excessive confidentiality.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – That is a good point. The military option and the enforcement of sanctions are inseparable. All our available information suggests that the sanctions régime is working extremely well and there is no hint of any breach by the European states. There may be perforations in that régime along some of the vast frontiers, but I should not like to judge whether such breaches arise out of direct government connivance of the neighbouring countries or are caused by local conditions. The breaches are minimal in terms of the impact of the sanctions régime on the Iraqi economy and they are outside the knowledge of this organisation.

When sanctions are in place for a long time a resolution is put before cabinet. Once they are in place I accept there is a tendency to relax those sanctions at different levels and we must be vigilant about that in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister has referred to the considerable naval assets that WEU is providing in the Gulf – more than fifty ships. Since we have no WEU organic air cover for those naval assets, given that the French carrier is returning, is he satisfied that there is sufficient co-ordinated air cover for our maritime assets should hostilities break out? The Minister will be aware that there is a problem of command and control between the land forces and the ships. That is an important point for WEU to consider.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – Since 1981, when Mr. Speed most honourably

resigned from the administration, he has been one of the great protagonists for air cover for naval forces. I have great sympathy with his arguments and since being appointed a United Kingdom minister responsible for defence I have tried to introduce some of those arguments. I am in complete sympathy with the general principle that he is advancing. I am satisfied, however, that air cover – CAC as it is called – is in profusion. Indeed, air traffic control in a wider sense presents problems because of that cover. Air cover is the least of the problems that we are likely to face should hostilities break out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This sounds more and more like question time in the House of Commons.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Unlike one of my colleagues, I shall not lower the tone of the debate, but I have two questions to pose. First, has the Minister seen the report, carried exclusively on Sky TV news, that Saddam Hussein may be contemplating a withdrawal from Kuwait and the islands while retaining the oilfield? Does he agree that that would not meet the terms of the Security Council resolution? Does he believe that we are doing enough to make it clear, particularly to the United States, that Europe is making a substantial contribution to the Gulf effort? Does he also believe that the comments made by a certain colleague that denigrated the size of the European contribution do not help Western Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I entirely agree with Sir Geoffrey, whose argument has been echoed not only by the United Nations, but forcefully and uncompromisingly stated by our Secretary of State, Douglas Hurd, as recently as two weeks ago on the floor of the house. I am sure that Sir Geoffrey heard that speech. It is clear that any partial solution to the crisis is not acceptable. It cannot be acceptable that the aggressor should be allowed to profit from his venture and brutality. There is always a danger that after a long period of tension people forget the origins of the dispute and, because they want a solution, they believe that nine-tenths of a solution is better than a war and the shedding of blood. I caution strongly against such a view because of the precedent it would set and the problems that would spring from that in the future.

If people feel that by attacking, bullying and intimidating weaker neighbours they can, whatever the international outrage, end up with something out of the episode, we shall all be at a

Mr. Clark (continued)

greater risk. We must maintain a completely implacable front on the extent of the withdrawal. It must be absolute. There should be no opportunity for the Iraqi dictator to claim or to portray to his people that he has delivered something from the adventure.

I always enjoy Mr. Lambie's interventions and you, Mr. President, have already reminded us how evocative these proceedings are of the House of Commons, even down to the periodic and slightly contemptible attack that is sometimes a feature of debates in the House.

I enjoyed Mr. Lambie's contribution, but I do not believe that most of it made much sense. I accept that there is a certain amount of uncomfortable truth in what he said about the European contribution. The European contribution, except for that of the United Kingdom, is not of a scale that we should like. In such world crises it is not appropriate that Europe should allow the United States to play the predominant – not dominant – rôle. There are inherent instabilities in forfeiting and abandoning the European rôle – I accept it is not necessarily the rôle of equal, but Europe has a substantial contribution to make. The United Kingdom has played its part, but I should like to see our European friends and partners more involved. I am not denigrating what they have done or offered. I am not making a criticism. My tone is more wistful. I should like those partners to make a greater contribution and if the situation deteriorates, as it may, I hope very much that they will feel able to make a greater contribution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Earl of Kinnoul.

Earl of KINNOUL (*United Kingdom*). – I feel I must almost apologise for being the first representative to speak who is not a member of the House of Commons. I congratulate the Minister on his excellent and balanced statement which, I am sure, all of us appreciate. He referred to the effectiveness of sanctions. Can he give us any encouragement about how effective they are?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – They are effective in that they have effectively brought to a halt inward and outward traffic. Most of Iraq's foreign earnings are derived from its oil exports. According to any normal actuarial approach, Iraq could face acute balance of payments and overseas earnings problems already. Iraq had a colossal long-term and medium-term debt. Naturally, it no longer attempts to serve the debt. Despite what Iraq plundered from Kuwait, which was not an insubstantial amount, Iraq

must be approaching the position where it can no longer pay cash for what it needs, even if it finds supply channels. There is some evidence of supply along the southern seaboard of the Mediterranean of what it urgently needs in terms of immediate military spares. There are components in the hi-tech sector such as fuses, solenoids, microcomputers and chips which are portable and are needed to maintain weapon systems in a serviceable condition. One must pay cash for them. If they can find a supplier – there is always someone – they will not find the goods on credit. The constrictions on Iraqi export of oil will mean that Iraq will run out of hard currency soon.

Iraq is a closed, authoritarian society. Its internal arrangements are highly repressive and punitive. That extends the possibility of the administration surviving in terms of popular acceptability for a long term. I see certain bottlenecks approaching in the overall civilian supply of steel. If we are sufficiently patient, that will start to take effect. Sanctions are debilitating Iraq, but the judgment on how long only to use sanctions is a major political one and must be made by heads of government and the United Nations Security Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to praise your conduct from the chair this morning, Mr. President. You would make a good Speaker in the British Parliament. Your handling of what could have been an acrimonious matter deserves commendation.

As some of our European partners who are here this morning are reluctant to put any more combatant troops or forces into the Gulf, will the Minister consider making an appeal to those nations to consider bringing in non-combatant personnel, such as those who can contribute to medical care and even to other units, for example, transport and signals? Could the nations who are represented this morning press their governments to make some contribution in that way? Although we have had a statement from Sir Geoffrey this morning about Saddam Hussein's possibilities, we are still faced with the fact that that gentleman is still in place.

Finally, if the honourable member who attacked the Minister had been in the House of Commons on Monday, instead of frolicking around in Paris, he might not have asked such a silly question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CLARK (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I shall not refer again to that objectionable intervention. Mr. Garrett's point about contributions

Mr. Clark (continued)

is entirely valid. Contributions can be made at many different levels and certainly the medical field is one. The Assembly will be interested to know that Hungary has offered us a complete field hospital with its staff. That is significant and welcome.

I referred in my speech to the high costs which the United Kingdom is bearing. They are multiplied by a factor of twenty-five for the United States. If there is any kind of apparatus for a fund from which some of those costs could be drawn and into which the European nations could contribute, it would be extremely helpful. We are carrying burdens, not only of the possible tragic loss of life, but of distortions and expenses. These military deployments give rise to threats to resources. They can also be measured in terms of harsh expenditure. All forms of contribution are welcome. WEU could well apply its mind to finding formulae for such contributions. That would be most welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That concludes the questions.

Thank you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly for coming here and for your important contribution to the debate on the implications of the invasion of Kuwait, the problems of the Gulf and European security which we shall now resume.

6. European security and the Gulf crisis

Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee and votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of the Political Committee and the Defence Committee on European security and the Gulf crisis and on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region and votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1244 and amendments and 1248, addendum and amendments.

The joint debate is resumed.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Veryvakis.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – First, I congratulate the two Rapporteurs on their excellent work on the Gulf crisis. I want to make some political observations on the recent developments in the Gulf.

There were undoubtedly revolutionary changes in 1989. Now in 1990 the changes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait have established another world in the place of the one which we knew. Now we have new problems and threats. I have four observations to make.

First, in the transient period of history in which we live and in this momentous instance, the active defence organisation, WEU, has an important rôle. In addition to the declarations, which refer to the new world, we now want to establish a new system. NATO and WEU have a decisive rôle to play.

The declaration of Paris and the procedure of CSCE is the beginning of a new situation, of a new hopeful code of relationships between nations, of proceedings and new organs for the building of a new era. Nevertheless, the interim realities are stronger than the hopes, plans, and declarations of good aspirations. In this context, WEU reacted positively in recent times towards provocations – first, in 1987-1988 and later in the Gulf crisis. Nevertheless, WEU does not cover all the nations that belong organically in Europe and the Europe of the Twelve. The Danes, Norwegians and Greeks do not belong to WEU. In the new provocation...

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Veryvakis, would you bring your speech to a conclusion? You have already had five minutes.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – No one knows, in the new provocation of history, the completeness of the reaction of European defence. WEU is the only, but not the completely, purely European organisation...

The PRESIDENT. – You have had your time, Mr. Veryvakis. I am sorry, but you are taking time from other colleagues. You have had five and a half minutes already. Will you please resume your seat?

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I ask for just two minutes.

The PRESIDENT. – No, I am sorry, but you are being unfair to other people. Will you please resume your seat? Thank you very much.

The next speaker on our list is General Andjelkovic.

General ANDJELKOVIC (*Observer from Yugoslavia*). – Mr. President, distinguished ladies and gentlemen. I am glad to be able to greet this distinguished gathering on behalf of the Assembly of Yugoslavia. It is a special pleasure to stress that, for the third time this year, we are attending – for the present, in the capacity of observer – the sessions of the Assembly of WEU. This is also an indication of mutual interest in further developing co-operation on the part of the Assembly of Yugoslavia and of the Assembly of WEU.

General Andjelkovic (continued)

The moment at which this second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU is taking place is truly exceptional. International relations, European and global, are currently at a historic crossroads, at the end of one and at the beginning of a new historic cycle.

Democratisation, the reduction of arms and integration are asserting themselves as long-term tendencies in international relations. Concern is mounting over the awareness that the threats to the contemporary world have not been removed, one of which is at its very door, involving Europe as well. The Gulf crisis could slow European integration. The crisis will gravely affect the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, make their reforms much more costly and thereby endanger the initiated democratic processes. The countries hard hit by the crisis include Yugoslavia, with estimated losses to the end of this year amounting to about \$2.3 billion.

Yugoslavia consistently adheres to all the resolutions of the Security Council adopted in respect of the Gulf crisis and will continue to do so. It is our principled stance to oppose aggression and accept neither the occupation nor the annexation of sovereign and independent states. We are therefore in favour of the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from Kuwait. We support the resolution of the crisis by peaceful means because, given the concentration of temporary arms, a war would take a vast toll in human lives and material resources.

The PRESIDENT. – General Andjelkovic, you have ten seconds to finish.

General ANDJELKOVIC (*Observer from Yugoslavia*). – Once again, Mr. President, allow me to express our gratitude for the opportunity to take part in this important debate.

The PRESIDENT. – The penultimate speaker is Lord Mackie, who has five minutes maximum.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Schoolmaster, I shall endeavour to stay within my time. I shall not waste time congratulating the Rapporteurs – I understand that members cannot hear me. Shall I make the joke again?

The PRESIDENT. – It is in your time.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – The Rapporteurs have done a good job, but they have been congratulated enough already. They cover a wide field, I want to confine myself to the hostages. Mr. Speed and Sir John Stokes have spoken of them.

The brutal cynicism with which Saddam Hussein has used the hostages presents one of the greatest dangers that we face in dealing with

the future peace of the world. He has been enormously clever about it. The master stroke of releasing the wives so that they could go home and, naturally and rightly, plead for their husbands, has been of great benefit to him. The parade of senior politicians to Iraq has resulted in the release of only a proportion and kept his advantage going. It is appalling that these people, who were there purely pursuing their careers, should be put into the front line by this appalling dictator.

For the peace of the world, we must see that this tactic does not succeed. If it does, if we let him get away with it, every petty dictator and every big dictator in the world will use the same tactic. That is only one of the many reasons for getting rid of Saddam Hussein. My sympathy is entirely with the wives and relations. I appreciate the necessity of not letting him get away with it.

I heard a number of speeches today that very much remind me, at my age, of the speeches that I heard before the last war when the peace movement was as illogical as it is today. Of course, I am for peace. I am for success by peaceful means, but I fear that, unless Saddam Hussein is toppled, the peace movement will not succeed. I want it to succeed, and I want us to solve the problem by peaceful means, but it does not look likely unless he is removed entirely.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being such an obedient pupil, Lord Mackie.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to make a short speech, not least to reflect the view adopted by my party and expressed on many occasions in the House of Commons and at the annual conference. As I said in my question to Mr. Clark, the military capacity has to be credible. The Labour Party has made that view clear many times. But we see the military option as an essential accompaniment to the economic policy that is being pursued.

As I said to the Minister, if we do not have a credible military option there is much less likelihood of sanctions succeeding. That means that we should not use the military option if sanctions can be effective. The military option should be seen as the approach of last resort. This inevitably means a longer time-scale than some people might like, and there is, of course, the counter-argument that delay might permit Iraq to develop or deploy new weapons, perhaps nuclear or chemical. It is argued that delay might make the scale of conflict much more horrifying. However, although that risk cannot be denied, and in any case it exists, it should lead us to ensure that the sanctions are detailed and rigorous and that individual international financial pressure should be thoroughly exerted. At the same time we should emphasise the need

Mr. Hardy (continued)

for adequate public supervision and monitoring of international sanctions.

It would, of course, be foolish of us to announce that there are no circumstances in which force would be used, but it should be accepted that the main purpose of the military presence is as a political lever for the dislodgement of the aggressor. However, we must at all times present and maintain a broader view. This crisis should be seen as giving the world a historic opportunity to establish a modern and desirable precedent which can be developed and repeated to ensure that there is a permanent international barrier to aggression. That could be a precursor to global arrangements to prevent conflict. It means that we cannot pick and choose our United Nations resolutions.

Five steps are now essential: first, an individual acceptance that settlement of this and other Middle Eastern problems must be pursued; secondly, that the international community will provide an automatic guarantee to deter further military advances and adventures in that region and others; thirdly, that while Saddam Hussein's overthrow may not now be a prime or principal aim, we must at least prevent his becoming the head of an enlarged Babylonian empire of the modern millenium, especially if he is joined by the more fanatical Muslim extremists; fourthly, we must secure an extension and development of the United Nations structure to ensure that the capacity to respond to crises is not unduly protracted; and, fifthly, as a result of this crisis, there must be a vigorous and comprehensive pursuit of international agreements to restrict modern and chemical weaponry.

Those who dismiss that approach may regard it as being too idealistic. I remind the Assembly that it was only two or three years ago that those of us who sought to encourage the double zero option or the pursuit of international negotiations to secure a reduction in conventional weapons were accused of having an idealistic approach. I believe that idealism must be associated with this effort.

The PRESIDENT. – We now have a problem and I am taking what I think is the most practical course. We have two reports, two Rapporteurs, two Chairmen, sixteen amendments, and we have to finish at 1 o'clock. Therefore, I have interrupted the list of speakers and those who have been unable to make their speeches may, in the same way as we operate in the Council of Europe, hand in their speeches to the Table Office and they will be printed in the written proceedings.

We now come to the votes on the draft recommendation, and first we will take Document

1244 from the Political Committee. Before we do that, I ask the Rapporteurs and the Chairmen if they wish to speak.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*). – Will you ring the bell so that everyone knows that the order has been changed?

The PRESIDENT. – Yes, we will do that.

I now call Mr. De Decker, the Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – At the end of this very long and interesting debate I thank members for their remarks which have demonstrated how qualified our Assembly is to deal with the most critical questions affecting European security. I specially wish to thank those who have voiced their support for the work and recommendations of the Rapporteurs.

I must at once make clear that the report I have drafted has to be considered as complementary to the brilliant report recently presented by Mr. Pieralli. This I say in reply to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman who rightly regrets that certain questions raised in the report, including more especially the overarming of Iraq and its causes, are insufficiently analysed. This is due to the fact that Mr. Pieralli's report goes into the question in great depth, while my own report is only an extension. The two documents must be considered as together forming a whole.

At the conclusion of this debate I wish to draw your attention to the amendments which Mr. Pieralli and I, with the support of other Assembly members, have tabled to our own draft recommendation in order, precisely, to respond to the expectations and sentiments expressed during the debate.

This debate together with the address by the Chairman of the Council and the contributions by Mr. Dumas and Mr. Chevènement has clearly shown WEU's central rôle in questions related to European security and also that it can only grow increasingly important over the coming months and years. The events in the Gulf have unquestionably proved the ability of WEU to make progress in defining a European security concept and to react in dangerous situations such as crises like that now confronting us.

Unfortunately, as I pointed out in my introductory remarks, the Gulf crisis has also proved that, apart from the remarkable naval co-ordination which has been achieved in the Gulf, some division in Europe has appeared with regard to the presence of land and air forces in Saudi Arabia. This illustrates how difficult it would be in the present European context to transfer responsibilities for defence matters to a supranational institution like the EEC, and how particularly suitable is an intergovernmental structure like our own to perform this kind of rôle.

Mr. De Decker (continued)

The essential issue in this conflict and in this crisis is – as the debate has shown – compliance with international law. And I thank Mr. Caro for so excellently making the point that the defence of international law knows no geographical frontiers. It has to be defended everywhere.

Finally, in this debate I would like to refer to the division in this Assembly between the great majority, who believe that law must prevail and the rôle of the United Nations be strengthened even though this option may ultimately imply the use of force as a last resource and the smaller number, who argue the classical case for pacifism but thereby run the risk of legitimising Saddam Hussein's aggression and use of force. But nobody, as we have clearly seen, wants war. We all prefer a political solution, we all want sanctions to succeed. United Nations Resolution 678 and President Bush's initiatives are aimed in this direction.

I will end by speaking to the amendments, so that I do not have to intervene again as Rapporteur...

The PRESIDENT. – At the right time, please.

I call Mr. Ahrens, the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has considered the report very thoroughly on two occasions. We are pleased that so many members of the Assembly have spoken to this report. I will be commenting on the various amendments. I will now comply with the President's request and simply ask the Assembly to approve the report.

The PRESIDENT. – As the Assembly will be aware, according to the rules there is no time-limit on the speeches of chairmen or rapporteurs. However, I hope that they will be as succinct as possible.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking the many speakers who have taken the trouble to participate in the debate on this very important subject.

I want to mention a number of points in connection with this debate. First, a rhetorical question: why do we, as individual nations and as WEU, have troops in the Gulf? Because we stand side by side with the international community. We are not neutral, but we are also there because the Security Council has adopted many resolutions that call on us to do various things and on Iraq to meet requirements which it has completely ignored so far.

Security Council Resolution 678 is a resolution, not just a diversion for one or two countries. Let us bear that in mind. If the WEU countries decide to send forces to this trouble spot – that is one of the premises of my report – we must equip ourselves as best we can, with the appropriate command structures and the means to exchange information. We must ensure that our forces can perform their tasks in the Gulf as effectively as possible. I refer you to Mr. Speed's speech in this context. This is a part of my report which I am, of course, glad to say was not criticised by any of the speakers. I do not therefore need to linger over these recommendations. They stand, and no one has criticised them. Of course, there is still a great deal to be desired, such as verification and satellite surveillance, which have been referred to already. Here again, this will not be the last debate on the subject in this Assembly.

Looking to the future, Mr. President, your Rapporteur and the Defence Committee do not believe that we can now say: "So that's that!", whatever the outcome of the Gulf crisis. Our organisation, WEU, must not close the book on the serious problems we face in connection with out-of-area operations. Even after this debate, I am therefore firmly convinced that, if we, or more to the point, perhaps, if ministers are not prepared to enter into this debate, we are going down the wrong road. Once again, we cannot simply insist on WEU playing a part and otherwise just close the book.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. The last speaker in this section is the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The Defence Committee has adopted a positive and resolute approach to the matter. The report is positive and it deserves to be kept intact as a result of the vote today.

We heard several references in the debate to the problem in the Middle East. We should remember that, to return to basics, the problem was caused by a blatant and brutal act of aggression against Kuwait. The reason why troops originally went to Saudi Arabia was the apparent imminent invasion of that country by Saddam Hussein.

I share a detestation of war with probably everyone in the Assembly, but if in the long term lives are to be saved, some form of conflict may be necessary. As the British Minister said in his excellent speech this morning, partial solutions are not acceptable. Many people agree that it must be all or nothing.

The embargo and the participation of WEU countries in the Gulf patrols has been excellent. The sea embargo has been almost 100% effective, but there is probably seepage over land and probably by air. I belong to the school of

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

those who believe that we shall be placed in an impossible position if we are forced to maintain the blockade and retain forces in place throughout Saudi Arabia for a whole year.

When I came back from the Gulf my opinion was that war was inevitable. I have not changed that view, although I have prayed, in common with everyone else, for a climb-down on the part of Saddam Hussein. Somehow I cannot see him fulfilling the criteria we have put forward in attempts to solve the problem.

Peace at any price is always a shoddy and tatty cry and, over the centuries, it has always produced disastrous consequences. I believe that we must remain firm and resolute in the interests of the peace and safety of the world in the years to come.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Dudley. The amendments will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation, namely: Amendments 5, 6, 4, 7, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 3 and 12.

Amendments 2, 8 and 9 will be debated together.

Amendment 5, which has been tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. De Decker, reads:

At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“Considering the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 678 giving Iraq until 15th January 1991 to evacuate Kuwait before any force is used against it and welcoming the fact that President Bush has decided to take advantage of this respite to open talks with Iraq and that the latter has accepted this proposal,”

I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the amendment which I am tabling reflects developments in the regional situation arising from the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and the initiatives of President Bush.

The nature of the amendment is therefore purely descriptive, but our recommendation should nonetheless be based on the updated situation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has not discussed this amendment. As it adjusts the text of the report to recent developments, I recommend that it be approved.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I shall therefore put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Amendment 6, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker and others, reads:

In the draft recommendation proper, after paragraph 2, add a new paragraph:

“Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be transported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the requirements of such operations;”

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the debates we have had in committee and in this chamber have shown one of the present basic weaknesses of Europe in such a crisis, namely that it is not yet ready to project its political will out of area within the framework of the United Nations when it considers that peace is under threat.

It is for this reason that in this amendment it is proposed to:

“Ask member states to earmark or set up, each according to its means, a force that can be transported over long distances to help to restore peace in response inter alia to requests from the United Nations Security Council and to provide it with weapons and equipment commensurate with the requirements of such operations;”.

The object of this text is a European rapid action force ready for use, as and when required, by the countries which so wish. It calls for no additional military investment, but it does require that countries maintain and co-ordinate a force of this type to act within the framework of the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone want to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am sympathetic to the intentions of the amendment, but I believe that it contains problems. First, it is clear that its plea for a peace-keeping force is mostly related to the United Nations resolution, but, inter alia, it could relate to and include operational actions undertaken by WEU which were opposed to the stated position of the Security Council or undertaken in circumstances when the Security Council had not made a decision. That would be irresponsible. Secondly, we must consider all the circumstances of each event, for example, the region, or the possi-

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

bility of finding a peaceful solution. It is too easy and simple to give a blank mandate to an eventual peace-keeping force. Therefore, although I am sympathetic to the amendment I do not believe it should be supported.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. What is the view of the committee?

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – A similar proposal was put to the Political Committee in the original report, although it did not refer to the Security Council of the United Nations. This paragraph – without the reference I have mentioned – was rejected in committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I shall now put Amendment 6 moved by Mr. De Decker to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Scheer, reads:

Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Scheer to move the amendment. He is not present.

Amendment 4 is not moved.

Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:

At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“, inter alia by systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;”

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Our aim in paragraph 4 is to stress the need to pursue the reactivation of WEU. As you yourself, Mr. President, have been responsible for a report on this subject, you know better than anyone the great political significance of this aim within the framework of the relations between the European institutions.

The purpose of this amendment is therefore to specify more clearly how we consider that this reactivation of WEU should be pursued, notably by the systematic implementation of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the treaty.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone want to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee rejected a similarly-worded paragraph.

The PRESIDENT. – Let us get one thing clear, have they considered the amendments as such?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We did not discuss the amendments, but while discussing the report as a whole, we deleted a paragraph which was on the same lines as this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Soell and others, reads:

In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “which might take levels above the agreed limits” and insert “in the region”.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move the amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the first signature on this amendment is Mr. Soell's, but he has to be in Bonn today. I have also signed the amendment, and I can tell you why we are opposed to the insertion of the words “which might take levels above the agreed limits”. We therefore want to delete this insertion.

We believe there are already far too many weapons in this region. After all, many of the problems have arisen because of all the weapons that have been supplied. If the word “limit” was left out, sub-paragraph 6 (b) will still say enough. The intention is clear, and agreements can always be reached on the limitation of weapons.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has not discussed the amendment. I do not think it changes the wording of the recommendation to any significant extent. I therefore leave it to the Assembly to decide whether or not to approve this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I shall put Amendment 1 to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendments 2, 8 and 9. We shall debate these together. I shall ask each of the movers to make a speech, ask whether there

The President (continued)

is any opposition and then we shall vote on them separately.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Martinez, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer, reads:

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese problem on the basis of the application of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed by the nuclear powers;”

I call Mr. Stoffelen to move the amendment.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The amendment talks about the peace conference in the Middle East. It is particularly clear now that it is more logical to state openly that the main reason for such a conference is to attempt to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Amendment 2 is a better description of reality than Amendment 8 which speaks of:

“a settlement of relations between Israel and the Palestinians.”

It is indeed a case of

“settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Lebanese problem”

on the basis of not just Resolution 242, but all the relevant resolutions.

We all know what is at stake in the Middle East. We know the risk of atomic and nuclear weapons there. Therefore, we want to add the references to the application of Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty. Each party to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. In other words, the amendment addresses the real peace conference in the Middle East, including taking due care of the problem of nuclear weapons. I recommend its adoption.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 8, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“a settlement of relations between Israel and the Palestinians on the basis of implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions;”

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Pieralli and I, as Rapporteurs on this subject, have stressed in the explanatory memoranda of our reports how necessary it is when making a political analysis of the crisis in the Gulf to emphasise and focus attention on respect for international law and United Nations resolutions in every case where these resolutions relate to areas within that region.

It is therefore quite clear that in a report of this scope it is right to refer to the situation of the territories occupied by Israel while stressing, as I have done in my introductory remarks, that to my way of thinking there can be no question of dealing with the two problems – the Gulf crisis and the Palestine problem – at once. Be that as it may, the Palestine question must be dealt with by the international community immediately the issue of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has been settled.

In the amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer, which points in a similar direction, they would like the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons added to the amendment tabled by myself. In addition, however, their amendment states that the non-proliferation treaty was signed by the nuclear powers, which is not true. I do not believe that France signed the treaty. I could therefore, as Rapporteur, agree if the text proposed by Mr. Martinez, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Scheer were to end with the words: “of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons”.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 9, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty thanks to the disbandment of the militias and the evacuation of Lebanese territory by Israeli and Syrian armed forces;”

I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, like the previous Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. De Decker, the purpose of Amendment 9 is merely to record two political positions already unanimously adopted by our Assembly, in particular with the unanimous approval of Recommendation 475.

It reflects therefore a traditional position which the WEU Assembly has always voiced.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – On a point of order, Sir Geoffrey. The three amendments are absolutely complementary. It would be difficult for any of us to vote against any of them. We cannot vote on all three because that would be excessive. The wording about Lebanon is far better in Mr. De Decker's amendment. Our concerns about the nuclear question are better expressed by Mr. Stoffelen's amendment – the other does not refer to that. The Israeli-Palestinian case is also dealt with better in Mr. Stoffelen's amendment. Therefore, I appeal, on the grounds of common sense, to the Chair, whom I trust absolutely, to ask the movers of the amendments to combine the three of them, provided that it is the general consensus that these two or three matters must be introduced in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – The three amendments are each in order. I am perfectly prepared to defer this item while we deal with other amendments, if the three movers can get together and find a simple way of making the amendments more relevant without confusing the Assembly. Perhaps the movers could coalesce the amendments, if the Assembly would find that helpful.

Would that be helpful? It would. Therefore I ask the three movers to disappear rapidly. They have about five minutes to get the amendments into shape.

Amendment 10, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“ensuring regular supplies of oil for the international market;”

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Here it is just a question of strengthening the text by referring to a regular supply of oil to the international market. It is a straightforward and general comment aimed at a lasting solution to the problems of oil prices and supply.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

That is not the case.

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee rejected an identical paragraph in the draft report.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 10 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 10 is agreed to.

Amendment 11, which has been tabled by Mr. De Decker, Mr. Pieralli and Mr. Uyttendaele, reads:

At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph:

“establishing more effective solidarity between Arab oil-producing countries and those that lack the resources essential for their economic development;”

I call Mr. De Decker to move the amendment.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Our wish here, Mr. President, is that the often thinly-populated oil-producing countries should show greater solidarity with other countries in the region which are often more densely populated but do not have this raw material.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I am a bit embarrassed by this amendment and will abstain in the vote in any case. I do not think that it is up to us to tell the oil-producing countries in the Arab world to support the non oil-producing countries in that region. It is a bit presumptuous. I do not think this adds much to the resolution. I was very much in favour of the previous amendment, although it was defeated in committee, because that concerned us directly. It is not our most direct responsibility to organise inter-Arab solidarity.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martinez.

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The committee rejected a similar passage in the draft report for the reasons Mr. Martinez has just given.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 11 to the vote by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 11 is negated.

I am now able to return to Amendments 2, 8 and 9 and to tell you that Amendment 8 has been withdrawn. Amendment 9 stays and Amendment 2 is amended by deleting the last five words, “signed by the nuclear powers”. Are we adding the words that you have written down, Mr. Stoffelen, or is this just for my information?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – They are not being added.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 2 and 9?...

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – To clarify the wording of Amendment 2 the words “and the Lebanese problem” should be deleted as the Lebanon question is also referred to in Amendment 9. Otherwise, we would be referring to Lebanon twice. I am sure Mr. Stoffelen will agree.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a further agreement, and I think that we are all content with it.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 9?...

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – It seems to me that this amendment is not meaningful because it refers to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. But as Lebanon, in practical terms, is a country without a government, it is hardly meaningful to refer to its sovereignty. Therefore, I cannot support the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I now ask the Chairman of the committee for its view on Amendment 9.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, these amendments were not available to the committee, but we rejected similar proposals in the original draft report that referred to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. The idea underlying this amendment was not, therefore, originally approved by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall now put Amendment 9 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

May I now read to you Amendment 2 as amended by the agreement:

“Settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the application of the United Nations resolutions which have still not been respected, while strictly respecting the obligations of Article VI of the treaty governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;”

In other words, in line 1 the words “and the Lebanese problem” have been removed, and in the final line the words “signed by the nuclear powers” have been removed.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment as amended?...

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As I have already said, Mr. President, a similar passage in the original draft report was deleted.

If I may say so, I personally consider this addition appropriate, especially in the light of developments in recent weeks.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Martinez and Mr. Stoffelen, reads:

After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“Seek the association of all countries participating in the military and political effort to ensure the success of the embargo – and in particular the WEU member states – with the talks between the United States and Iraq following the United Nations Security Council resolution.”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – We regard this amendment as extremely important – perhaps the most important of those that we have tabled. Although it has been signed by myself and Mr. Stoffelen, it represents the views of the Socialist Group.

This paragraph must be considered in connection with Amendment 5, which regards as extremely important the fact that President Bush has launched an initiative for talks with Iraq with a view to using all possible opportunities to bring about the Iraqi withdrawal from the occupied territory of Kuwait before the date fixed in the latest United Nations Security Council resolution.

We have said that it is important. We must now complement it by asking that the measure be implemented without leaving other states, and WEU states, out of the process. That takes into consideration some of the comments that you made, Sir Geoffrey. The contribution of Europe and that of some Arab countries cannot be underestimated. It is a serious contribution. We have been committed politically by supporting the embargo. We must participate in the process, perhaps through joint action or consultations. We cannot be outside the process which started in the past few days and weeks. That is why we ask that countries which have been especially involved in military and political efforts to make the embargo a success be associated with the procedure launched by the President of the United States, whose initiative we praise elsewhere in our recommendations, thanks to the amendments that we have adopted.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martinez.

The President (continued)

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I do not really wish to oppose the amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez...

The PRESIDENT. – Either you oppose it or you do not.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Reluctantly I am obliged to oppose the amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez because, while it is vital to do everything in the search for a political solution to the conflict, it is not perhaps necessary to follow the suggestion of Mr. Martinez and Mr. Stoffelen that the member countries of WEU as such should be specifically associated with this, since WEU has recommended an Arab solution to the conflict.

Furthermore, every possible European political intervention has to be envisaged in finding a way out of the crisis rather than confining ourselves, as the amendment tabled by Mr. Martinez proposes, to participation in the bilateral talks between the United States and Iraq, which is not a wide enough framework. I therefore recommend that this amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee did not discuss this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Amendment 12, which has been tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Mr. De Decker, reads:

After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Use all the means at its disposal to promote a political solution to the conflict in Kuwait and to determine the stages for the restoration of lasting peace throughout the Near and Middle East before expiry of the time-limit set by the United Nations Security Council for authorising recourse to force.”

I call Mr. Pieralli to move the amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment follows on directly from Amendment 5, which we have approved as far as the part concerning the preamble is concerned.

Here we have a recommendation to the governments of our countries, which have in any case already begun to act upon it because there are reports in today's newspapers stating that the representatives of the twelve EEC countries are to meet the Iraqi Foreign Minister after the Washington consultations. So the purpose is to place on record an initiative which is already under way and to encourage our governments to use the time which we still have up to 15th January to get Iraq to pull out of Kuwait and release the hostages.

For these reasons I consider that the Assembly should vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pieralli.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

What is the view of the committee, Mr. Ahrens?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment was not available to the committee. It adapts the report to the current situation and conforms to the spirit of our recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 12 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 12 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It would be only reasonable to put the paragraph that we have just adopted before the previous paragraph in the final draft. The previous paragraph does not contradict this one, it is a consequence of it. It would also be reasonable to add the word “therefore” to the paragraph that we have adopted in order to link the two paragraphs.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. May I suggest that we leave it to our excellent Table Office to put the recommendation into a sensible grammatical order?

Before anyone leaves for lunch, I remind members that there is a second report with four amendments to follow.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation contained in Document 1244, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

We now turn to the draft recommendation presented by the Defence Committee in Document 1248, to which four amendments have been tabled.

The amendments will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation, namely: Amendments 1, 3, 2 and 4.

If Amendment 1 is agreed to, amendment 3 will fall.

If Amendment 2 is agreed to, amendment 4 will fall.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Lambie, reads:

Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Lambie to move the amendment.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – If the amendment is carried, it will take the guts out of the report, so it is an important amendment. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were children of the cold war. WEU, as the political voice of the North Atlantic Alliance and the corresponding body in the Warsaw Pact area, was necessary during the cold war. To use an old phrase, I believe that WEU should “wither away” because there is no longer any need for a body like it.

Whenever one talks about ending a body, one must consider the many vested interests that are involved. In this Assembly, we have all the delegates from their national assemblies. We enjoy coming to Paris, meeting people and talking to our counterparts in Western Europe. We enjoy the reports that are presented after journeys in Western European countries, the Far East and North America. When we talk about an organisation withering away, we are saying that all those journeys will stop.

Whenever we talk about an organisation withering away, we come up against the people who work for it. All the gentlemen whom we see here – there are not many with us now – will be made redundant. I recognise that that is a tremendous problem for them, but I am sure that, with the bureaucratic build-up of the EEC, there will be plenty of good, similarly well-paid jobs for them. I would put to them what conservative members

put to me when I complain about the withering away of my steel industry or shipbuilding industry. They say, “You must consider market forces.” Even if people lose their jobs, market forces will solve all their problems in the long run. I put it to those gentlemen who will lose their jobs – I am sure that all of you support these policies – that market forces will solve all their problems.

The recommendations call for the build-up of WEU “as the forum for out-of-area co-ordination” and involvement of naval and air forces. Instead of building up WEU’s activities, I foresee a winding up of that organisation. I propose that we delete paragraph 8 to start that winding up. If we agree to paragraph 8, we will build up this organisation and give more jobs to the gentlemen who work here. I have great pleasure in supporting the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Lambie.

I call Mr. Reddemann to oppose the amendment. May I say that, while you were not here yesterday, Mr. Reddemann, the President, Mr. Pontillon, conveyed his compliments to you on your re-election.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I oppose the previous speaker’s proposal. I believe Western European Union is still very much needed. Those who feel this organisation should be completely wound up would do well to set an example and leave this Assembly. That might be a way to prevent our being confronted with proposals like this in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the committee’s view?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The committee is against the amendment, for the simple reason – as explained by Mr. Lambie – that it takes the guts out of the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others, reads:

In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “Brussels Treaty”.

I call Mr. Stoffelen to move the amendment.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Due to circumstances, I shall, unfortunately, be extremely brief. The purpose of the amendment is to delete “and examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external

1. See page 30.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

operations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European rapid action force."

I have three points to make. First, you will remember, Sir Geoffrey, our discussions on your report on WEU and the European Community. We said that no one could predict the outcome of CSCE in the third basket. You said that WEU could be an instrument in that framework. It would be contrary to the decision that we took on the first day and it would be wrong to give such a clear signal, as though we already know the outcome of further discussions on CSCE.

Secondly, we have just adopted Amendment 6, dealing with a peace-keeping force. The majority of members accepted – I did not – the reference to Security Council requests. This wording of paragraph 8 does not mention the Security Council being responsible, so it is not in line with the decision that we just took.

Thirdly, we all hope that the United Nations Security Council will act as it has acted so far in the Gulf crisis. If there are further developments towards a United Nations peace-keeping force, we should not object to, obstruct or hinder those developments by propagating the idea of our peace-keeping force.

For all those reasons, we must object to this irresponsible, dangerous text.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Stoffelen.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer has the floor.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in my view, the text was worded with extreme care. The United Nations is not mentioned, and of course nothing unfavourable is said about the United Nations. Paragraph 8 calls for an examination for the longer term, but it does not say anything about command structures. This organisation is urged to take some political responsibility. In my opinion this amendment takes the heart out of the recommendation. I am therefore opposed to it.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the committee's opinion?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The committee considered the amendment and rejected it by a large majority.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Lambie, reads:

Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Lambie to move the amendment.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to delete paragraph 10 on the basis that it is an interference in the internal affairs of member states. At the end of the day, the United Kingdom Parliament, without any help or advice from any other body – the Assembly is a non-elected body as far as the United Kingdom is concerned – will make up its mind on the level of defence expenditure. We should delete paragraph 10 so that the United Kingdom Parliament can be the sole arbiter of the level of defence expenditure in the United Kingdom and need not take advice from any other non-elected body.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am also opposed to this amendment. All paragraph 10 of the recommendation says is that, if we feel that the Gulf crisis or other developments should result in our adopting a given attitude, we should do so preferably – and I underline the word "preferably", because that is what it says in the text as well – before further cuts in defence budgets are made, and that this should be done in a co-ordinated way. Hence these words in the text. It is, of course, for each national parliament, both Mr. Lambie's parliament and my own, to decide for itself.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the Chairman?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The committee rejected the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Martinez and others, reads:

In paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "European forces".

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Amendment 4 refers to the important aspect of instituting consultations within WEU "on the optimum future structure of European forces...". This is what counts. It is my feeling

Mr. Martinez (continued)

that the end of the paragraph adds nothing significant. Indeed, it seems even ludicrous to say: "... preferably before further cuts in national defence budgets are made."

I get the impression that an attempt is being made to press for or predict new cuts, which does not happen to be the case in all WEU countries. In my view, the final phrase adds nothing essential, it even diminishes the scale and importance of the co-ordination whose very aim is to define the optimum future structure of European forces.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone want to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in replying to Mr. Martinez I will use the same word as he has just used. I feel it would be rather ludicrous – I therefore entirely agree with Mr. Lambie on constitutional grounds – if these concluding words were not retained. They concern national responsibilities. What we are doing is appealing to our ministers and our governments to think first and then act. That is how I put it yesterday, and that is what is at stake here. Even if we accept Mr. Martinez's argument, it is simply impossible to leave out the concluding words, because we in the Assembly would then be taking upon ourselves responsibilities which the parliaments must take. I therefore oppose this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – What is the view of the Chairman?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The committee rejected the amendment on the grounds enunciated by the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negated.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 1248.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

1. See page 32.

7. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT. – I regret that there will not now be time for us to deal this morning with the last item of business, the debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on enhancing WEU's public relations.

I would therefore like to propose to the Assembly that this item be postponed and taken as the first item of business this afternoon.

Are there any objections?

The change in the order of business is agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Enhancing WEU's public relations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1246).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1241 and addendum).
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1236 and addendum).
4. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1255 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.)

APPENDIX

The following speeches were handed in to the Sittings Office:

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Secondly, the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait confirmed that although the East-West conflict has ceased, with the consequent ending of peril and threat, the cold war has not been extinguished. Sensitivity in other regions continues. The Mediterranean region has become an area of greater interest. The absence of Greece from WEU is unbelievable in the context of a coherent European defence structure.

Thirdly, the sudden attack upon Kuwait, with its consequent brutal violation of international law, showed what little weight was attached to the United Nations and its resolutions. If we are to manage the problems of the area we must take into account the relevant resolutions relating to Lebanon, Palestine and Israel and Cyprus.

Fourthly, we are at a moment in time when we should think not only of European defence but of European security. We ought to proceed step by step, approaching the various European organisations.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Although late in the day, we still have time to improve co-ordination still further. Perhaps nobody – not even we ourselves – has taken our institution sufficiently seriously, misled as we have been by an atmosphere of serene wellbeing and reassured by the powerful shield of NATO.

I support Mr. De Decker's report, especially as regards the European observation satellite agency.

This Assembly, thanks to the work of the Technological and Aerospace Committee culminating in the recommendations which we have approved, identified long ago this real strategic need, which will also be a gathering point for European countries.

Events in the Gulf have demonstrated just how forward-looking and appropriate those recommendations were.

At a time when the forces of the WEU countries are – with varying difficulty – establishing operational liaison "in the field", it is important that a collective and reliable source of information should be provided for them.

It is not a question of wishing to compete with our American allies but rather of guaranteeing that each of the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance has its own autonomous information system, each capable, if need be, of being checked against the other.

There are various suggestions in the recommendation which we can support: co-operation on transport matters, the establishment of procedures, exchanges of information and so forth. These are requirements which have been identified for some time and which the Gulf crisis, where the forces of various European countries operating in the area have to communicate together, has rendered more acute. But it is not merely a question of coping with one specific crisis, however grave. The lessons we shall learn will tomorrow provide the basis for a joint European force no matter what form the future institutional structures take.

There is much talk – and given the importance of being prepared in time it is quite right that there should be – about the future nature of the European institutions assigned to look after our collective defence, but it is important that, apart from the opinions we may all individually have on the subject, sight should not be lost of the concrete advantages implicit in interoperability.

What WEU is doing in spite of its weak structures is certainly positive.

The present exchanges of help and experience between the various armed forces in the Gulf area must surely constitute a basis of what we shall be setting up in the future and, with your permission Mr. President, may I briefly make the critical point that it would have been better had we begun the process of integration that is now under way before being forced to do so by Saddam's aggression and the United Nations' resolutions.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In congratulating both Rapporteurs on their excellent comprehensive reports, I want to enlarge upon Mr. De Decker's recommendations as to what I believe we should be seeking in the Middle East once the Gulf conflict is over.

One thing is already certain: the situation there will never be the same again.

If the United Nations is to remain credible, we must assume that sovereignty will be restored to Kuwait. It is only the means that remain to be determined – the force of argument, or the force of arms.

One positive consequence for the United Nations, in response to Mr. De Decker's recommendation in paragraph 6 (b) would be for it to become the internationally-recognised register for all future trade in arms.

As President Bush made clear at the United Nations on 1st October, and as was subse-

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

quently agreed at the Rome summit, new attempts to resolve outstanding regional problems must follow that of the Gulf. Mr. De Decker has referred to two of them – the Palestine problem, and the Lebanese problem.

Concerning the first, during my recent visit to Jordan, Israel and the occupied territories to prepare a new report for the Council of Europe on the Palestine refugees, in my meetings with Israeli ministers, Palestinian leaders including the PLO, and Crown Prince Hassan, I found a far narrower gulf between the two sides than I expected – as defined in the Shamir peace plan, and the PNC declaration of 22nd November 1988.

Both allow for the recognition of what each other seeks – the right of self-determination of the Palestinians, and the right of Israel to exist within secure and recognised frontiers – for which United Nations Resolution 242 provides.

It requires a catalyst to break the current stalemate and to commence the dialogue that is necessary. Mr. President, the resolution of the Gulf crisis can be the catalyst.

Similarly, in Lebanon where we are now witnessing, for the first time in more than ten years, the withdrawal from confrontation of the internal factions.

Surely, after the Gulf, it must be in the interests of all for an international presence to replace those of the occupying powers, Syria and Israel.

There is, however, a third outstanding regional problem which remains to be resolved to which the Rapporteur does not refer. It is that

of the Kurds. For as long as international recognition of their right of self-determination remains ignored, I fear there will always be a problem. That must be clear from the history of the last seventy years, since the great powers determined the frontiers of the Middle East after the first world war.

Since then, the Kurds have been persecuted, and have become refugees, most recently from Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons. Those who survived fled to Turkey. They have also become terrorists – again in Turkey, as the PKK. It must be in the interests of Turkey, of Syria, of Iran, of Iraq and of the Soviet Union – in whose countries the Kurds live – for their problem, too, to be resolved after the Gulf.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to refer to the “regional security structure” that it is being suggested should be an outcome of the Gulf.

In his address to us yesterday, Mr. van Eekelen referred to that “institutionalised ongoing co-operation towards effective conflict-preventing mechanisms” of the strengthened CSCE process. Could not the same principles apply to the Near and Middle East? Indeed, that is precisely what has been proposed by Italy – the CSCM – Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, including the Middle East.

I found both Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Nabakganu, and Crown Prince Hassan receptive to the idea. I am sorry that it does not figure in the recommendations before us today, and hope that the Rapporteurs will take note of it as a positive way forward to bring peace and stability to the Middle East, as it has clearly done in Europe.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Enhancing WEU's public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1246).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Roman (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Nuñez, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Esteves, Mr. Roman (*Rapporteur*), Sir William Shelton (*Chairman*).
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1241 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Rathbone (*Vice-Chairman*), Mr. Diaz, Mr. Müller, Lord Mackie, Mr. Niegel, the President, Mr. Rathbone.
5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1236 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Rathbone (*Vice-Chairman*).
6. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1255 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. de Puig, Mr. Müller, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Bowden, Mr. Pachtas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Romero, Mr. Mota Torres, Mr. Sole-Tura, Mr. Moya, Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
7. Change in the order of business.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soares Costa, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – The minutes of proceedings of the last sitting have not yet been distributed. Under Rule 21(1) of the Rules of Procedure, I will invite the Assembly to adopt these minutes as soon as convenient after they are distributed.

3. Enhancing WEU's public relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1246)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Roman of the report

of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on enhancing WEU's public relations, Document 1246, debate and vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1246.

I call Mr. Roman to present his report.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I have the honour to present comes at a time when public opinion in Europe is looking for clarification and new guidelines to guarantee security after the political changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe and after new threats have arisen from other parts of the world.

The debate on the European security and defence dimension has to centre upon the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty. That is to say, the goal must be both to guarantee the security of the citizens of member countries and to establish an order of justice, peace and security. The three factors in this new situation are: recognition that changes have taken place in Europe; the fact that unexpected threats have arisen from beyond the borders of Europe; the increased momentum towards European unity based on heightened public interest and the fact that this unity is seen as an undeniable political necessity for economic, social and cultural

1. See page 36.

Mr. Roman (continued)

reasons; and, finally, the fact that it must be achieved without risk, that is to say, without jeopardising the transatlantic link.

This being so, all sections of WEU should do their best to ensure that the public understands the rôle of WEU in this new situation. The public image of WEU fails to reflect the responsibilities placed upon it by the modified Brussels Treaty or its enhanced activities following its reactivation and enlargement. There are some plus factors relating to public relations that should be noted. For example, the Council of Ministers has, for the first time since 1987, resumed the practice of issuing press notices after its meetings. The Standing Committee has also begun to issue press releases as was proposed by the Assembly and in the present Kuwait crisis the President of the Assembly immediately condemned the invasion and called on governments to invoke the treaty to convene the Council. Other bodies reacted more slowly. But if we look at our relations with the press and the news of the annual reports of the Council there is no impression of any desire to develop a real education and public relations policy – you have to study the reports. Again, when Mr. Pontillon sent out a long, detailed question, No. 285, on public relations, the Council's reply arrived nearly a year later and then contained too many generalities and very few specific statements.

On the other hand, I believe that the creation of a logo, selected by our committee and approved by the Presidential Committee, was an important achievement of the Assembly and I should like to congratulate its young Belgian designer. The President's letter, too, is a commendable initiative that should be continued because it keeps members of parliament informed. After months of discussion about the problem of security and defence in the context of the political union of Europe, we have to admit that governments in general have taken up a wait-and-see stance with regard to the future of Western European Union. None of the member governments is making any effort to see that the public is better informed about WEU, although there is some talk about its potential for building or implementing the political union of Europe.

As regards specific measures, there seems to be an inclination to wait until the future rôle of WEU is clarified before taking any steps in any direction. On this subject I would refer to the answer given by the Federal German Government to the question asked by Mr. Antretter, in which the government said that it would have to wait and see what the future rôle of WEU is to be in the context of the changes now taking place in Europe before publishing an information leaflet on Western European Union.

With respect to the efforts made by the Assembly and its members and their action in national parliaments it is clear that there has been more debate in some parliaments as a result of initiatives taken by members of our Assembly. But this has not happened in all of the parliaments, and I would therefore urge you to make WEU known in all our houses of parliament, because getting our governments involved in the debate is the best way to increased public awareness of the issues with which our organisation has to deal.

In closing may I say that this is one of those debates where it is difficult to know what is best, i.e. whether, as Timothy Garton Ash has said, to lower the rhetoric to the level of reality or to lift reality to the level of rhetoric. To lower the rhetoric is to admit our impotence, but to lift reality requires more resources than, truth to tell and sad to say, are presently available to us. We have to admit that we are in a situation from which it is hard to escape, but which we shall overcome if we all do our best to strengthen Western European Union regardless of what its future may be. We parliamentarians have more experience than governments in working with high volumes of the unreal and the imagined, but I should like everybody to be clear that this statement is far from signifying acceptance of the present situation, because we are not going to give up asking for more material and human resources and adequate financial instruments. The Council has to realise that we lack the most elementary tools of communication and information that an assembly of this kind should have and which the European Parliament, the Council of Europe or our own national parliaments already do have. For these efforts to be made there has to be the necessary political will. Surely it is not too much to ask that this political will should be forthcoming at the present time in Europe?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roman, for presenting this extremely important report. It is important for the future of our organisation because, as you reminded us, some people may say that we must wait for definition of our rôle in the context of European security. I agree with your comment that enhancing WEU's public relations could also be a way of enhancing the definition of our rôle in the future. After all, we need full understanding of these issues by the people whom we represent. The draft recommendation recognises the efforts of our Secretary-General. He has made an important contribution in terms of our organisation's image.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Nuñez.

Mr. NUÑEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – The report that Mr. Roman has just presented gives us a conspectus of WEU policy on information and public relations, and also suggests new ways

Mr. Nuñez (continued)

of strengthening this information policy. It is a timely and necessary report, both as regards the present position of WEU as the only European organisation dealing with defence and security and also with public information about thinking on the future of WEU within the context of European union. As the Rapporteur has shown, there is clearly a lack of information about the activities of WEU, and we ought to be aware that this is a very serious mistake to fall into because, in the era of communication and information we live in, institutions that the public knows nothing about run the risk of being thought not to exist. That is why I believe this report to be necessary and timely. Timely above all at the present moment when the Gulf crisis is showing the rôle of WEU to be more important perhaps than ever before.

We wonder, for example, Mr. President, whether the public has been told that the general staffs of the armed forces of all member countries of our organisation have met for the first time since 1954 and that this is a fact of crucial importance in the changes under way concerning security and defence in Europe. Some politicians, including parliamentarians, have contended that Europe as such has, and has had, nothing to do with the co-ordination of the military forces currently deployed in the Gulf. In some cases there have been demagogic, malicious insinuations that the entire operation was under United States's orders. This is untrue; it leaves out of account WEU's important rôle in co-ordinating the military forces in the Gulf.

This is why we need to set up a new base to provide information about our Assembly and about WEU in general. Fortunately, since last July, we have had a very useful instrument in the form of the Institute for Security Studies. In my view, this institute ought to be more than a think tank about the activities and future of WEU; it should also provide information to the public with qualifications in this field. A start might be made by staging joint activities with other institutions such as universities and non-governmental organisations holding discussions, round tables and so on.

We also need to begin thinking about a policy on WEU publications as such, and this could also be done through the Institute for Security Studies. I believe that for this purpose it might be a good idea to begin with a publication saying what WEU is, e.g. a volume in the well-known French "Que sais-je?" series. I think it is important to begin with simple books targeting a wide public.

As has been said already by our Rapporteur and others, the adoption of a logo for our Assembly is an important step, because a picture is often better than a thousand words. And in

this case it is a cheap, simple and effective image. We should continue along this road because WEU is changing, and although that change is a task for politicians it is important in democratic countries like ours to carry public opinion with us. The public needs to know what we are doing and how important is WEU's function as the pillar of defence and security in Europe. We must avoid any divide between action by politicians and public opinion, and the best way to do that is to have a new information policy for publications, conferences and so forth. I believe that Mr. Roman's report is a good basis for a new and necessary step by our organisation and I therefore wish to congratulate Mr. Roman on its excellence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your contribution, Mr. Nuñez.

May I say that this proposal seems to me very relevant, because WEU could indeed run seminars or conferences in our member countries with the co-operation of the universities. I think this would be an important and effective way of making the aims of our organisation known among the future leaders of our continent.

I call Mrs. Garcia Manzanares.

Mrs. GARCIA MANZANARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, speaking for the first time in this Assembly I have much pleasure in supporting the report submitted by my colleague Mr. Roman.

I believe that the subject of that report is particularly relevant at the present time because discussion about security up to a few months ago was virtually the preserve of specialists. Now, recent important events, including the end of the cold war, the dissolution in practical terms of the Warsaw Pact, the CSCE summit and the Gulf crisis, have all combined to make security a widely-discussed subject in our countries and no longer simply a theme for experts, as we can see from the press and periodicals of the most varied kind. It has even become a topic in social conversation.

Therefore, the time would seem to have come to spread this debate to opinion-forming circles in our democratic society. This will mean strengthening co-operation with existing private groups, associations and institutions so as to enhance the interest paid to security matters in Western Europe, increasing co-operation and promoting debates and discussion in educational centres and universities as the previous speaker said and making WEU known through the various communications media. These activities and others could be performed by WEU's Institute for Security Studies which began work last July and could, as Mr. Roman's report informs us, be an extremely important instrument for disseminating information about

Mrs. Garcia Manzanares (continued)

security. Its activities should therefore be considerably stepped up.

I should also like to say something more about this enhancement of WEU's public relations, not institutionally in terms of co-operation with universities, but by involving non-governmental organisations. Late last September I had occasion to welcome a conference on the future of NATO organised in Spain by the Spanish-Atlantic Association which is one of the sixteen civilian associations there are in all the member countries of the alliance. It seems to me that the fact that a civilian, non-governmental association was supporting and publicising the aims of the alliance and stimulating discussion in society, was extremely important and I thought it might also be a good thing if similar non-governmental organisations of this kind could be established in member countries of Western European Union, in a co-ordinated structure, which would perform a useful service in making WEU more widely known.

I should also like to make special mention of the logo chosen by WEU and its young designer. In my opinion it conveys an attractive image of WEU, tuned to the younger public. If Western European Union really helps to popularise the question of how our defence and peace can be organised, it will have done good work, whatever its ultimate future proves to be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mrs. Garcia Manzanares, for a very interesting contribution.

I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my comments will be very brief, partly because I do not think it is necessary to emphasise the contents of Mr. Roman's excellent report. His report is so complete, comprehensive and compact that it leaves little more to be said. Nevertheless, I should like to touch on two points.

In the first place, it is obvious from the nature of our organisation and our convictions that in a democratic process any important decision affecting our political systems must carry public opinion with it, and few decisions are more important than those that affect national and collective security. This being so, it is indispensable for the public to feel that it has been informed, and if necessary mobilised, on matters of collective defence and security. For us this is a gap that must be filled, because we have only recently joined this organisation, so I hope you will excuse me if any of my remarks are ill-chosen.

It is often said that in past years WEU has been a sleeping beauty, despite the positive

action taken by this Assembly; that the defence of the western world has been practically taken over by NATO. We hear persistent demands for WEU's revitalisation, and for that it is essential to have the support of public opinion which is not likely to be forthcoming unless some information is published. I therefore believe it is a very timely moment for this report and the recommendation to be approved. The report shows how this information should be disseminated. Not only by frequent contact with the press and the media, though this, of course, is indispensable, but above all through contact with non-governmental organisations that are interested in defence, and with institutions that by their prestige and influence mould thinking in our countries, such as the universities and centres of learning, as well as with important organisations in society, such as the trade unions and employers' organisations. I repeat, Mr. President, that I believe this to be very necessary.

Finally, my second point is that defence policy must include the organisation and its operational strategy and the disposition of the forces available, whether for deterrence or for response, should the need arise. I believe that the education of public opinion forms an essential part of an effective collective security policy, not only in order to inform the public about what we are doing, but also because the deterrent capacity of our organisation – and of its member countries as a whole – will be based not only on their own military strength but also on the firm support of public opinion. In politics and in public opinion, that which is unknown effectively does not exist, and that is why an adequate information policy is so necessary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Esteves.

Mr. ESTEVES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, notwithstanding the lack of unanimity as to the way in which the future security of Europe can be assured, the Gulf crisis has shown that no other European institution was able to respond as promptly and effectively as WEU. Because of the part played by WEU its image has been projected to an international public audience which had hardly heard of it before. That is why the meetings promoted by this organisation were followed with a great deal of curiosity and interest, and it was seen how quickly its members reached a common position about the Gulf crisis.

When this serious crisis struck, the Brussels Treaty and its organisation sprang into action, and therefore Europe will in future depend upon this institution.

Nevertheless, we should realise that decisions taken by international organisations on matters as important as those concerning peace and

Mr. Esteves (continued)

security, can find acceptance only if those organisations enjoy high public regard. At the present time WEU is still virtually unknown to large sections of public opinion in Europe and the world, even those that have most access to modern channels of information. This being so, the draft recommendation presented by our colleague, Mr. Roman, is most timely and should be given high priority by our organisation in its endeavours to become more widely known to the public in Europe. I therefore congratulate Mr. Roman on the excellent report he has submitted and the clear way it points out the need for a change in WEU's public relations policy.

It is important to change our methods, but it is even more important to change the level of finance allocated to this purpose: the appropriations mentioned in the report are quite obviously insufficient to finance a credible public relations programme. Thus, whilst fully supporting the content of the draft recommendation to the Council and in view of the fact that we are approaching the start of a new budgetary period, our first priority should be to secure a considerable increase in the financial backing for a campaign to promote the WEU image in the national institutions of the various member countries and in the media and opinion-forming organisations.

Such an effort is essential to the achievement of a credible, effective link between WEU and the citizens it represents, so that in future the credibility of its efforts on behalf of European security is ensured. And whatever the doubts and uncertainties we are faced with in this permanently changing Europe, there is no doubt that at present WEU enjoys general confidence. We should therefore make every effort, and especially financial effort, to place WEU in a position to fulfil its responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT. – This morning the debate with the Minister from the United Kingdom seemed like a debate in the House of Commons, but in this debate we have heard contributions only from Iberian members of the Assembly. There is a good reason for that. Portugal and Spain are new members, so they are probably more aware of the need for a new policy to promote the image of WEU.

The list of speakers is concluded, and I now ask the Rapporteur to reply.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like briefly to thank those who have spoken and to bring out the points each of them has made.

Mr. Nuñez has, I believe, given us some very useful ideas which we shall discuss in committee, if Sir William Shelton agrees.

Mrs. Garcia Manzanares stressed the very important part played by intermediate, non-governmental organisations, of which the importance in any democratic system has been emphasised by thinkers from John Stuart Mill to Norberto Bobbio.

Mr. Lopez Henares spoke to us about the reawakening of the sleeping beauty that WEU has been, and of the need for public opinion to support any venture to be undertaken in a democratic society. Lastly, Mr. Esteves called for a real change, one that takes account of economic realities when the budget for Western European Union's information policy is being drawn up.

To conclude the debate, this is, in my opinion, the overall product of all the speeches and of the spirit of the report.

We must heighten public awareness of the importance of security and defence and of the need to reach a consensus at two levels: both within our countries, and in international organisations such as our own.

Consequently, unless we have adequate means of information and communication, it will be difficult to convey to the public the various elements of the debate we are carrying on here or in other forums; indeed, I doubt whether political institutions of any kind, and there are many in Europe, are aware of the way this debate is going, because a debate is anything but a fixed, immovable position. Therefore, we should make known the various provisional conclusions we reach as international circumstances change. We therefore need to allocate more money, equipment and personnel to this task. In my opinion the high aims of WEU amply justify the draft recommendation upon which we are voting today.

The PRESIDENT. – Does Sir William Shelton, the Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, wish to speak?

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to join in the general welcome that has been given to the excellent report, so ably done by my friend beside me, Mr. Roman. It is first class and was passed by a unanimous vote in committee. No amendments have been tabled and it is safe to say that it has been well received.

The Rapporteur and another colleague mentioned the budget. In paragraph 67 of the report it is clear from those parliaments that answered the question that their budgets for public relations are between 1% and 2%. The public relations budget of WEU is 2% of the total cost. The implication that could be drawn is that WEU's budget is adequate, but nothing could be further from the truth. I doubt whether the parliament of Westminster has any budget for public rela-

Sir William Shelton (continued)

tions, but we have constant television and press coverage every day of the week. Such a budget is therefore not needed, but WEU does not have that coverage and we shall not achieve such coverage without more money.

When people read the report I hope they will remember what Mr. Roman said, and the conclusion of the report, which states that we should have a bigger budget. We should not be misled by the fact that our budget appears to be average in comparison with that of other parliaments. Our budgets are not comparable.

The PRESIDENT. – The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has presented in Document 1246 a draft recommendation, to which no amendments have been tabled.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1246.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

(Mr. Pontillon, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1241 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1241 and addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone, who is standing in for Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee to present the report.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – First, I offer apologies on behalf of the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. Klejdzinski, who, unfortunately, due to recent elections in his country, cannot be with us this afternoon. He has asked me,

as Vice-Chairman of the Budget Committee, to stand in as Rapporteur.

We are discussing the budget of the Assembly for 1991, and I should like to refer the Assembly to document A/WEU/BA (90) 11 which, in a note by the Office of the Clerk, explains what has happened. In a nutshell, the draft budget put forward by the Assembly, approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration of the Assembly, has been reviewed by the budget experts in the Budget and Organisation Committee of the Council of Ministers and by the Permanent Council. That budget has not been accepted. They have not accepted the Assembly's request in particular for the budget to allow for the proper staffing of the Assembly's secretariat to meet the needs of the newest members of WEU – Spain and Portugal. We have disagreed on that major point.

The lack of approval of proper staffing to meet the requirements of Spain and Portugal is deplorable. It overlooks in every possible aspect the need of this Assembly to do its job properly in support of the activities of our governments in the pressing needs that they face, most particularly at this moment in the Gulf.

The second substantive point is what I fear can only be described as unwarranted interference by the Permanent Council in the legitimate rights and responsibilities of this Assembly to staff posts as required, both by experience and, on advice, by nationality, and to propose the sort of gradings of posts of Assembly staff which we deem necessary. Although it may sound like a technical point, we must take the Council's interference in our rights and responsibilities seriously.

There is a further point. It has to do with consideration for the Assembly and its committees in our responsibilities and working arrangements, which must be described as verging on the contemptuous. The Budget and Organisation Committee of the Council met in London only on 15th November to comment on the draft budget we had carefully put forward. The Committee knew that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration of this Assembly, of which I am proud to be Vice-Chairman, was meeting on 19th November – a meeting set a long time previously, in the hope of approving the draft budget prior to consideration in our ordinary session today. That was leaving too little time of itself.

Because of the lack of time and agreement on the part of the Council's committee, it was absolutely impossible to take any position during the meeting of the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. At that meeting, on Monday, 19th November, we stated categorically, from all sides of the political spectrum, the need to provide staff for the

1. See page 37.

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

advent of Portugal and Spain in this Assembly.

Following that inconclusive meeting, which was annoying of itself, the Permanent Council met on 29th November to consider the report of its Budget and Organisation Committee. The comments on the draft budget were received within the secretariat of this Assembly only last Monday. That in turn meant that the secretariat had to provide a briefing for this Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to consider those views at an early-morning meeting yesterday. We duly considered this. At that meeting, we were told that the Council had upheld the advice of its Budget and Organisation Committee in turning down the posts that we had requested. That was a sorry blow. It means that we come here today in a quandary. The draft budget which we had carefully prepared does not have the blessing of our Council of Ministers.

Two possible courses of action offer themselves. First, we could refuse to endorse the budget and demand that the Council of Ministers reconsider the matter. That was debated extensively not only in the Budget Committee of this Assembly, but in the Presidential Committee, which kindly met to consider this quandary during yesterday's luncheon break. Indeed, in my experience of WEU, to call a meeting in a luncheon break is a mark of urgency.

If we turn down the budget, we would enter 1991, which is only twenty-five days away, with no agreed budget. We would have to operate during 1991 on the basis of a one-twelfth per month budget based on 1990 figures. That would inevitably mean under-cutting the Assembly's ability to perform its increasingly important work properly next year, even more than the approval of the truncated budget would tend to do. Therefore, it was concluded in the Budget Committee and endorsed in the Presidential Committee that that would be a self-destructive step for the Assembly to take. It would not apply any greater pressure on the Council's committee to behave better or to consider our requirements better. Indeed, it would probably lead to animosity between the Council and ourselves which, in turn, would lead to a lack of satisfactory conclusion later in the year.

The alternative is, this afternoon, to pass the draft budget, but only on the condition – I accent this strongly – that a supplementary budget requirement, which is presently being prepared to meet the Assembly's most pressing needs, is considered urgently by the Budget and Organisation Committee of the Council of Ministers and, in turn, by the Council of Ministers as soon as possible, most particularly to meet the

requirements of our new colleagues from Spain and Portugal.

In addition, I should like to suggest to the Assembly that it requests that you, Mr. President, should respond to the Council's last message in the firmest terms, addressing your response not to the Secretary-General who corresponded with you, but to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. I accent that identification of addressee because I must express some doubt as to whether ministers are really aware of the full and extremely negative effects to which their permanent representatives' previous considerations and decisions have led.

In addition, following strong recommendations from members of our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and your Presidential Committee, I urge all members of this Assembly to approach their own appropriate ministers – whether in the foreign office secretariat or in the budgetary secretariat – to ensure that each minister of each of our nations is entirely aware of the reservations and the disgust of this Assembly at our treatment. I fear that they may not be aware of it. Those are the most important points that I should like to put to the Assembly in considering this budget.

We have discussed in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration the way in which our WEU salaries are established. They are part of a basket of salary agreements for a number of international organisations. Of course, we want our secretariat to be assured of fair and extremely good salaries for the hard work that its members do for us, but on the face of matters, salary increases of 8% to allow for inflation for those working and living in countries where inflation falls far short of 8% are not an illustration of best housekeeping. Our committee is looking into that.

That aspect hides the fact that, apart from salary increases, the increased funding for our ever-increasing work is a paltry 1.8%. I believe that the Council's behaviour in budgetary matters runs completely contrary to the closer co-operation between Council and Assembly to which you referred in your opening words on Monday, Mr. President. In that speech, you described our Western European Union Assembly as the accepted parliament of European security. As long as we have that important rôle – the importance of which has been accentuated by the Assembly's actions and debates this week on the critical position in the Gulf – all members of this Assembly must be equally served so that our Assembly continues to do that crucial work well and to provide parliamentary legitimacy to the actions taken by our national forces under the WEU umbrella.

In summary, I suggest to the Assembly that we endorse and accept the draft budget, but with the important provisos I have described.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Rathbone for your clear, precise and comprehensive presentation.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Diaz.

Mr. DIAZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is the first time I have spoken in this auditorium and I feel very proud. I congratulate Mr. Klejdzinski and his colleagues on producing this excellent and exhaustive report and Mr. Rathbone for presenting it so well.

Even a glance at this work shows the detailed effort that has gone into it. It is exhaustive to a fault, attending to every aspect in the minutest detail. It did not deserve the treatment it has received. Every cent has been contested, every expense placed in doubt, down to whether or not to appoint a chauffeur to the Assembly. It is all a little ridiculous.

After Mr. Rathbone's introduction there is very little more to be said, except to ask: are we not being put into a straitjacket that may hamper the progressive development of WEU? This is a problem that should concern us if we want Western European Union to play the rôle and have the strength it should at this time. We should give much thought to the budgetary aspects if WEU is to become a powerful force for international stability. We must put first things first. The budget should not inhibit action – it should facilitate it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when Western European Union was established, the intention was to give it a democratic cloak, the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union. One of the ancient fundamental rights of a democracy is that it is first and foremost the elected representatives of the people who decide on the budget. It is impossible to explain the history of democracy without reference to this fundamental right of the peoples' representatives.

Following the report and the presentation we have just heard, we observe that in our Assembly the right to determine the budget, this original democratic right, is subject to some restriction, in that the Council of Ministers ultimately decides how the money available for this Assembly is used. I regard this as inherently unacceptable. I feel that the fundamental democratic rights, especially those relating to the budget, should be greatly extended.

I have a few very brief comments to make on the budget. What strikes one about this budget – given the scarcity of funds – is that the largest

portion naturally has to be spent on the meetings and committee meetings and on maintaining the administration, and that very, very little money is available for what I would call operational activities. In fact the sums in question are scarcely worth talking about.

The previous speaker has just said that the Assembly of Western European Union and the alliance itself face new tasks. That being so, funds earmarked for operational purposes must, of course, be increased. I will just give two examples.

As we have been joined by two new member countries, the Assembly has been enlarged, but there has been virtually no change in the operational funds. Operational funds ought to be available, for example, to enable the President, the chairmen of the committees and the rapporteurs to undertake fact-finding missions, to gather information and to represent the aims of Western European Union vis-à-vis other organisations. The appropriation for this has remained the same, although no one can deny that the workload is growing.

The same is true of something that has frequently occupied us in the past, Western European Union's information policy. Here again, no change can be detected in the appropriations. This means that, with an increasing inflation rate, Western European Union's information policy will tend to be more limited in the future than it has been in the past. I therefore appeal to the Council of Ministers, which, if you like, is ultimately our master, to put down more operational funds in future planning, and provide more creative opportunities. I believe that only then can the Assembly really do justice to the new tasks assigned to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I begin with a genuine, not a formal, tribute to Mr. Rathbone. He stepped into his job at short notice and he has mastered the intricacies and ludicrousness of the procedure of the Budget Committee in an extraordinary manner. I see him bowing. He is right to bow because it is a great feat and he is a man of great abilities.

The work of the Budget Committee is an extraordinarily complicated process. The secretariat understands it but its members need to consult a mass of little red books to look up the rules for this and that before they can establish the procedure. As the Rapporteur said in his speech, the contempt with which the committee has been treated by the committee of the Council of Ministers is considerable. It is extraordinary that answers to questions on the whole budget are given on the day before the Budget Committee's meeting is due and even during the meeting of the Assembly.

Lord Mackie (continued)

I am a substitute member of the Budget Committee. The committee needs a dedicated chairman who understands the politics of the whole business and is prepared to give a great deal of time to the work. I am aware that the chairmanship is subject to negotiation between parties. I hope that they will consider the matter carefully and choose someone who can master the complicated details of the budget quickly, push the political point and ensure that the Council of Ministers is kept in its place. From the Rapporteur's speech, it is clear that there is much need for that. I trust that you will use your great weight, Mr. President, to ensure that the budget is accepted and that the supplementary budget receives the proper attention that it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Niegel.

Mr. NIEGEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me first pass on the regards of the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Mr. Klejdzinski, who is unfortunately ill. He very much wanted to present this draft budget and from the outset has voiced the same criticism as we have heard here today.

As a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration I should like to follow on from what the previous speaker said and describe the situation in rather more dramatic terms. The way we are treated here in this Assembly, and especially in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, is a tragedy. As Günther Müller has rightly said, a parliament's most important democratic right is the right to determine the budget. But what is the situation here? All I can do is repeat what the Bavarian comedian Karl Valentin once said: "Wollen haben wir mögen, aber dürfen haben wir uns nicht getraut." (We would have liked to want to, but we didn't trust ourselves to dare). For all practical purposes that is the situation here: we are playing at semi-democracy with the budget, but the Council of Ministers has the last say.

I would ask you, Mr. President, to look into these things during this period of office. So who is this Council of Ministers? Not the Ministers themselves, who concern themselves not a jot with these things, but the high-ranking budgetary officials, who simply pull out their slide-rules and say: "This is how it will be." So we are virtually puppets dancing to the tune of senior government officials in Bonn, London, Paris and Rome. But we are too good for that. Changes must be made, or else we shall put a stop to this farce! I want to make that abundantly clear. They advance us the money and let

us play around at democracy. That is all we get, and we are then dependent on these officials. So please have a serious talk with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the other ministers, and tell them: "You are parliamentarians yourselves, don't allow democratic rights to be abused like this!"

Secondly, I agree with what Mr. Rathbone said: if we had not approved this budget, we would have had only a twelfth under the old version and would not be able to do any work at all. So we are putting up with this budget, but rightly demanding that a supplementary budget be drawn up immediately and discussed as soon as today's sitting is over, and that it be the subject of tough negotiations with the Council of Ministers.

We do not want to throw the money out of the window, either. As Günther Müller has already said, there is no money available for operational activities anyway. At best, there is enough for us to pay the staff. Above all, it must be possible for appropriate working conditions to be created on these premises. And if we have the political will to accept new members – I am grateful to Mr. Diaz from Spain for speaking first – we should so provide the opportunity to give them due consideration.

I must also say a few words to the staff of this organisation. I want to thank them for the work they do. But – and I am now addressing the Clerk – we should also distribute posts fairly, so that we do not have some countries appointing numerous members of staff and others almost none at all. Staff posts should reflect the member states' contributions. I would add that people receive different treatment. Some are very highly paid, others very poorly paid. Here again, a fair balance should be struck, so that staff members who have been here a very long time are not forced to work at the lower levels of the A-grades, while other, young people coming in are appointed at A-4. I mean no offence to new members of staff, but when new people are employed, they should take their proper place in the existing hierarchy.

To summarise, I would appeal once again to the Council of Ministers, addressing them as fellow parliamentarians, who would not dream of tolerating this attitude towards the budget in their own countries.

We should also thank our colleagues for the work that is done here.

In conclusion, I would like to say that this is my last speech in this house. After twenty-two years as an active member of the Bundestag and a number of other international organisations, I am retiring from the Bundestag. I want to thank all the members and staff of this organisation for their co-operativeness and support. I wish the Assembly every success, and above all I hope it

Mr. Niegel (continued)

achieves its objective of becoming the parliament of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your interest in this debate. It is not usual for the budgetary, management and operational problems of the Assembly to attract such attention from parliamentarians.

I am pleased at the tribute paid to Mr. Rathbone for the manner in which he has performed the difficult task of setting out the problem and formulating proposals at such short notice.

I also support what Mr. Niegel has said about the staff of our institution. There are not very many of us and it is this small team whose devotion and loyalty enables this Assembly to function on a reasonable and respectable level with the meagre resources provided. It was right and proper, and desirable, that this tribute should be paid to them.

I have very little to add. Mr. Rathbone's presentation of the problem was excellent. There are three things which are unacceptable in the behaviour of the Council of Ministers. I say Council of Ministers because that is the time-honoured phrase, but in truth – as I confirmed again at lunchtime a little while ago – the ministers are actually rarely told about what is cooked up there by the bureaucrats and, in their haste and with their complex responsibilities, they end up supporting proposals which they have had too little time to study in any depth. This is unacceptable because their decision contradicts their political commitment and the encouragement we constantly receive from the various ministers who pay us the honour of addressing the Assembly and urge us to further develop both our efforts and our resources.

The decision also conflicts with the implementation of measures arising out of earlier decisions connected with the enlargement of WEU and prevents us from being able to honour our obligations to Spanish and Portuguese members.

The decision of the Council is also inadmissible with regard to promotions and recruiting because it implies the right to supersede the Assembly in responsibilities which are those of the Assembly alone. These matters are our responsibility, not those of the Council's finance committee.

Finally, as parliamentarians, I do not see why collectively in this European assembly we should accept what individually we reject in our national parliaments, that is to say to be subject to the decisions of bureaucrats with no democratic legitimacy. In all our countries the vote on

the budget is parliament's privilege. For my part, I see no reason why this right should be taken from the Assembly.

These observations are aimed in the same direction as Mr. Rathbone's remarks, and I therefore ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to give us your, if possible, unanimous support in this matter. In practical terms, I therefore ask for your support for the compromise solution put forward by the Budget Committee, and compromise is what it is. We do not want a public confrontation with the Council of Ministers because we do not feel that it would serve the cause of the institutions concerned. We accept the no-growth budget but, to be consistent with ourselves and true to the logic of our own ambitions, and those we are encouraged to assume, we ask for a supplementary budget to be passed.

I have written a letter – not yet posted because I wanted to hear the Assembly's decision first – which is along the lines suggested by Mr. Rathbone and informs the Minister both of our dissatisfaction and of what we expect as a result of his intervention.

The end of the letter reads as follows:

“ In these circumstances, the Assembly wished to avoid an immediate and possibly public confrontation with the Council. It therefore decided to accept the renewed budget, on which there is no disagreement, and to submit in a supplementary budget its proposals for adapting the structure of the Office of the Clerk to the enlargement and reactivation of WEU. This document will allow all the WEU bodies concerned to re-examine the problems to which the Council has offered only a very incomplete solution.

I hope you will be good enough to draw the attention of the Permanent Council to the importance of the draft supplementary budget which will be presented in order to allow the Assembly at last to have the wherewithal to carry out its tasks at this new juncture.”

I think that this clearly expresses the wishes of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and those of the Presidential Committee, which yesterday gave its backing for this solution.

I hope that in the vote that will now be taken the Assembly will support our initiative.

I call the substitute Rapporteur.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I do not wish to delay matters any further. I endorse the plea of my colleagues from Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom for increased funding and flexibility to fulfil the enlarged functions and the more important tasks which the Assembly faces. I suggest, Mr. President, that

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

you point out to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council that general funding has increased by only 1.81%. We wish to be masters of our own house, and we need the wherewithal to be effective masters. Will you also distribute copies of your letter, amended in that way, to all the members of the Assembly so that they in turn can follow up the matter with ministers in their own national parliaments? It is through such joint pressure that we shall achieve a satisfactory conclusion, not only to this budgetary impasse but to considerations of draft budget requests in the future.

I suggest that the Assembly approve the draft budget for 1991, as amended by the Budget and Organisation Committee and by the Permanent Council and that we add as a rider the submission of a supplementary budget to cover the points made during this debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Clearly the vote we are about to take must be accompanied by pressure from all of us on our governments to ensure that our joint effort results in ministers taking a favourable attitude towards our supplementary budget.

Although I know they have already been at work, I specially ask the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations to bring pressure to bear on their foreign ministers to ensure they realise that the absence of Portuguese and Spanish nationals on the staff of the Office of the Clerk is due to the refusal of the Council of Ministers to give us the necessary resources. It even has the audacity to say that the resources will be made available as soon as we have made savings in the management of our own operating budget, which is equivalent to ordering us to reduce our level of activity.

Ladies and gentlemen, I therefore request that you help us in what we are trying to do.

We shall now vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

We shall now vote on the draft budget for the financial year 1991.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft budget for the financial year 1991 is adopted unanimously.

The Assembly has therefore unanimously approved the conclusions of its Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and vote on the motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1236 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1236 and addendum.

I call Mr. Rathbone, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replacing Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – This is a short and somewhat official final step with regard to the Assembly's accounts for 1989. I should like to mention that they were audited for the first time by the Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes de France who has taken over from the Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes de Belgique who audited the accounts for the financial years 1986, 1987 and 1988. It is appropriate for the Assembly to express gratitude for his co-operation and efficiency, which should be greatly appreciated.

The accounts for 1989 are presented in the same manner as in previous years. The auditor's report scrutinises the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping. One comment was made about a more realistic assessment of initial estimates under each sub-head of the budget which would avoid large transfers in the course of the year. That was noted by the Assembly and account of that has been taken in the draft budget for 1991. I believe that that shows the alacrity with which this Assembly and its budgeting process respond to good advice from outside.

I therefore propose that the Assembly approve the motion presented in order to let you, Mr. President, finally off the hook for any further responsibility for the budget for 1989.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Rathbone, for your very British conciseness.

I have no members down to speak.

We shall therefore now vote on the motion to approve the Assembly's final accounts for the financial year 1989.

The President (continued)

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to unanimously.

6. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1255 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security, Document 1255 and amendments.

I call Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the Political Committee, on behalf of Mr. Lemoine, the Rapporteur.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report which you now have to discuss and vote on has gone through a good many vicissitudes and these have left their mark. After an initial, very thorough discussion, the committee asked the Rapporteur to draw up a draft recommendation to go with the report, which we intended to discuss at the committee's last meeting but one. This discussion could not take place, because the Rapporteur was prevented from attending the meeting. At short notice we then convened a further meeting of the committee, which was to be held at the time of the part-session of the Council of Europe ten days or a fortnight ago. But it was unfortunately impossible to reach the necessary quorum for this meeting. Only a few members were present, because several delegations had to return to their capitals at short notice.

During an informal discussion with the Rapporteur the committee members present, who, as I said, did not constitute a quorum, decided that the Assembly should receive only a very short and very cursory report, which was to be discussed in committee yesterday morning and to form the basis of a debate on this important subject here in the chamber. But, sad to say, our Rapporteur was again unable to attend yesterday morning, having been held up by the traffic.

The committee therefore decided unanimously yesterday morning to submit the report

to you today unchanged, in its cursory and very brief form. As Chairman of the committee I was asked to present it.

But we also agreed that some members from the various political groups represented on the committee should be asked to think about a supplement to this cursory report and to propose amendments, and they have done so. You have eight amendments before you. We should include these amendments in today's debate, or at least make sure that their contents are covered in our debate.

In the current situation in Europe it seems to me irrefutable that this Assembly, the only parliamentary body capable of formulating Europe's position on defence and disarmament, should now pronounce upon these vital questions.

Although formally the Warsaw Pact organisation still exists, in practical terms it has become a nonentity. The same is not true of NATO, but NATO too is rightly considering a change in its concepts and in its mandate. We think it is absolutely essential for these considerations to be reflected in the views of this Assembly. We would therefore be grateful to you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if we could formulate this opinion here and now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Ahrens for being so brief.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first pay tribute to Mr. Ahrens, who found himself in a somewhat delicate situation as this report proved controversial in committee and the debate was at times rather heated, so that the report had to be presented as it is today for debate in the Assembly. We appreciate his calmness in the discussions and his preparedness to present the report today.

This report, entitled "The consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security", suggests that it is a reply to the question: what are those consequences? And the answer is that the consequences are total, final and absolute. What has taken place in the East is an unprecedented historical change, a revolutionary change, which obliges us in the West to alter, and to alter gladly, our ideas regarding security and peace, and our objectives and strategies. This change is taking place at a time when we have just been given a very important history lesson, namely that things we thought impossible have become possible within two months. Supranational difficulties that looked insuperable have been overcome at a speed that nobody could have foreseen. Equally, now that we are asking ourselves what the future

Mr. de Puig (continued)

holds for us as regards peace and security, we should also realise that events may move far more rapidly than we could have imagined at one time, and it is clear that everything depends on the outcome of events in the East. What happens in the East will have repercussions on our own societies and on the policies of our governments, as well as on the workings of a future, newly instituted order of peace and security. Everything depends on that outcome, and because the process is beset by great difficulties, there are unknown quantities that cannot be dealt with as yet.

We can see that these countries in the East are demonstrating a clear will to do away with the old régime, both economic and political, to establish democracy, to join the West in security matters as well, and to become part of a united Europe. This is good, and we regard it as such, but it is not enough. We must analyse the processes in all their complexity, and that complexity exhibits three genuinely problematic dimensions: the economic dimension, that of maintaining the integrity of the states, and the political dimension.

As regards the economic dimension, you know that some of those countries are facing economic breakdown. They are in a desperate, life and death situation, and the collapse of the planned economy has been a basic reason for the change, as it may also contribute materially to eventual success. It will take time to establish functioning market economies and it remains to be seen what kind of market economies are established. There will be some unpleasant surprises for some of the citizens of those countries, now fascinated by the idea of a market economy and impatient for its arrival. They need to learn that it may take decades to achieve the levels of production and prosperity of our societies, and we shall see what happens to the fascination and the impatience.

There is also the problem of maintaining the integrity of states. In at least two countries – the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia – this problem is acute, and we cannot predict the outcome, whether these countries will adopt federal or confederal systems, or whether they will divide into separate states. This is a serious problem for the stability of security and co-operation in Europe, and in addition to the intrinsic problem of potential national or state demands, there is the problem of minorities, and in many cases of minority populations, within the nationalities which are demanding a state of their own. It is a problem of extreme complexity that may lead to instability and possibly even violence, and to tensions that may aggravate and complicate the process of change in the countries of Eastern Europe.

Finally, there is the strictly political problem, about which we may also harbour doubts and worries. For democracy has to be organised, while at the same time the economy must function and the problem of nationhood must be resolved. It is not enough simply to talk about democracy: democratic political forms have to be adopted. You know that democracy cannot be built by such means as the revival of anti-semitism, nor can it be built without political parties, in the manner of populist anti-party movements, nor by means of a populism verging on demagoguery. We are worried about some of these processes, because difficulties will arise if the economy does not work. We cannot even rule out a relapse into authoritarianism because of the impatience and tension caused by an economic depression that may last for a long time. Some might even be tempted into dictatorships introducing authoritarian solutions apparently acceptable to part of the population.

The political problem has not been fully solved. What can we do about these problems, and about this complicated process taking place in the countries of Eastern Europe? Whilst Europe is being built, and whilst a new system of peace and security is being put in place, our brief is to help. There are many institutions now, perhaps too many, but they all serve a purpose at present, and before we replace some of them by others we should finish working out the overall framework of peace and security that will be dependent at any moment upon what happens in each separate country in Eastern Europe and in those countries as a whole.

I believe that the institution we all think of when we talk of East and West, namely the CSCE, should be the main institution for defence and security. We say it should stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals – although when we are talking about the Atlantic and the Urals I like to recall that the Urals finish in the middle of the Soviet Union, indeed in the middle of the Russian republic, and that we shall have to see what happens beyond the Urals. A distinguished colleague from this Assembly, when commenting perhaps on the information given us yesterday by the French Minister of Defence, when he was talking to us about the conventional forces located beyond the Urals, spoke of the potential danger from China, since although there had been developments in the Soviet Union there did not appear to have been similar developments in China. Any logical design for peace and security could maintain a defensive system close to the Chinese border.

In any event, the CSCE should be the major institution – but at present it is only a plan. A few small bodies have been set up, but there is scarcely even a secretariat. There is very little in the way of integration. Remember that the next meeting of heads of state and foreign ministers

Mr. de Puig (continued)

of the CSCE is not due to be held until 1992. We are involved in a slow, long-term process, and perhaps the famous assembly that CSCE is to hold can be the instrument to inject some dynamism into the CSCE, which is now in a transitional, slow and incomplete stage. In any event, it must be the locus of the great commitments to peace and security, of the application of the new doctrines we are already discussing when we talk about self-sufficiency in defence, or shared security in defensive control and verification systems. It must, as a matter of course, be the institution in which those subjects are discussed and in which the basic security commitments between member countries are adopted.

I believe, Mr. President, that just as what happens in the East will undoubtedly influence the kind of agreements and institutions that will form the framework of peace and security in Europe, it is equally true that we can do much from within WEU to ensure that the changes taking place in the East are meaningful and are realised along the lines we would wish to see. Let us support only those changes which are realistic and in accordance with our three great objectives – peace, democracy and the building of Europe.

(Mr. Martinez, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to begin by considering part of the report which pleases us all and is extremely positive. It describes the developments in Central Europe last year. If we are honest, two or three years ago no one would have expected things to turn out like this. By this I mean the developments over the German question, once the pivot of East-West tensions in Europe and now finally resolved. Still very fresh in my memory is the discussion we had in the Political Committee in the spring of this year on whether there could be two different armies in Germany. No one could have foreseen the speed of developments, so that there would be only one army in a sovereign Germany, or, to take one example, that a unit of the Federal Air Force would be flying the Soviet Union's latest aircraft, the MiG-29. Anyone who had predicted anything like this a year ago would probably have been regarded as unrealistic, chasing after rainbows.

But this example demonstrates that history tends constantly to produce sensations. And we are all happy with these developments. As a German representative I would like to stress that we are glad these developments have been pos-

sible, that this sovereign Germany is still a member of the North Atlantic pact and of Western European Union, and that the area covered by Western European Union's treaty has been extended to include the five new Federal Länder, the former German Democratic Republic. That, too, could not be taken for granted, because there were many people, even in my own country, who had long been saying that a reunified Germany would be possible only if it left the western defence systems and charted a neutral course between the blocs. This is precisely what did not happen. But it is this development that is vital to European stability, because, far from resolving the German question, a neutral Germany, between the blocs, as it were, would have constituted an element of uncertainty for the future.

The two-plus-four agreement also made it clear – I would like to emphasise this particularly in WEU, because we have also entered into corresponding commitments to WEU – that the reunified Germany will not manufacture or hold any nuclear weapons, any biological weapons or any chemical weapons. That too is a major contribution to stability.

As part of the CFE process we will be reducing the German army, air force and navy to 370 000 men by 1994. And by 1994 – this is another point that is still causing some uncertainty – we will be seeing the withdrawal of the units of the Red Army still stationed in the territory of the five new Federal Länder – some 390 000 men. In this context we are not underestimating the serious problems the Soviet Union is having with these troops in the five new Federal Länder. It is not easy for the Soviet Union to withdraw them, because it does not know where to put them. The Federal Republic of Germany has said it is willing to provide thirteen billion Deutschmarks for the construction of suitable accommodation for these troops in the Soviet Union, so that they can actually withdraw.

I feel, incidentally – and I make no bones about it – that these troops might possibly withdraw before 1994, because the Red Army units in the five new Federal Länder are in a very difficult situation. The soldiers are badly paid, and discipline is declining. The fact that declining discipline and the poor pay of the Red Army soldiers is resulting in an extensive black market in Red Army weapons will not help to improve security in Europe.

In the two plus four agreement we also settled the question of the German frontiers. Poland and Germany will be signing a treaty. But I would point out in this context, again with reference to future security, that a treaty of this kind cannot be concerned only with frontiers, but must also settle the question of the rights of minorities in the territory of the Republic of Poland.

Mr. Müller (continued)

There has been an interesting development in this respect in the last two years. When a Council of Europe committee visited Warsaw in December 1989, it was presented with an official Polish Government paper which said that minorities counted for only 0.9% of Poland's population of 39 million. This referred not only to the German minority but also to the Lithuanian, Byelorussian, Ukrainian, Ruthenian and other minorities. We all know that these figures were not and are not correct. The minority problem has always been suppressed in Poland. It is crucially important to a policy of stability – I must stress this – that minorities in a nation state should have appropriate rights. After all, we want the minorities to stay where they are and not to emigrate. We also want them to be able to play their part in the construction of a democratic Poland. It is important – I repeat – for this matter to be settled by treaty.

When I speak of minorities, it is clear that we have this problem not only in Central Europe but to a far greater extent in South-Eastern Europe. If you are familiar with the situation in Romania or Yugoslavia, you will know that there is a powder keg of nationality conflicts in these countries that could explode any day. I was greatly depressed by demonstrations on Romania's national holiday a few days ago, when the crowds shouted highly nationalist slogans. This concerns both the Moldavians, who still form part of the Soviet Union today, and the Hungarian minority in Romania. And there are other minorities, such as the millions of gypsies in Romania. We are also aware of the minority problems and nationalist slogans in Bulgaria. And we are, of course, aware of the serious nationality conflicts in Yugoslavia, which constantly make one feel that there might be a military coup or something similar in order to maintain the unity of this multinational state at all costs.

All these, ladies and gentlemen, are signs that the resolution of the German question has not, of course, resolved all the conflicts in Europe, and that fresh conflicts may occur at any time. Our greatest concern – and this is also evident from amendments that have been tabled here – is that the huge multinational Soviet Union might plunge into an acute crisis, which might eventually lead to civil war, economic chaos or something similar. Any such development would have serious implications for Western Europe's security – there is absolutely no doubt about that – because economic chaos or a civil war would result in millions of refugees leaving the Soviet Union for the West. We must appreciate that such a development could, of course, also have direct repercussions on the member states of WEU and NATO.

I regret the nationalist slogans in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. I regret – as Mr. de Puig has already said – that new populist slogans of a racist nature, such as anti-semitic slogans – are being used in these countries, because all this contributes to instability rather than stability in Europe.

Now that the German question has been resolved, I can only hope that we will also be getting to grips with these other issues. At a recent international conference a Russian socialist put it rather succinctly: the German question had been resolved, and now the Russian question is on the agenda. I would not like to let this pass without comment, because of course it contains a grain of truth. We know that the nationality conflicts in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are an obstacle to future progress that we must tackle. This means that those countries with western values which have united in WEU for security reasons will have to observe the trends in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe in the next few years with particular care and commitment. They must do all they can to play a peacemaking rôle there and perhaps even to alleviate the effects of famine, so that Europe may look forward to peace in the next century as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scovacicchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have all observed – and it is something I wish to repeat because it seemed to me hardly possible – that something of extraordinary historical weight has occurred in Europe which has altered the existing scenarios.

It is the fact that the governments of Eastern Europe have themselves been signing the death certificate of the Warsaw Pact following its loss of the German Democratic Republic. Hungary and Poland especially, speaking through their Foreign Ministers – the former during his recent visit to Italy and the second at the NATO assembly in London – have said that the Warsaw Pact will be dissolved in a few months.

However, western authorities, and especially the NATO organs, point to the continuing might of Soviet military potential, which needs to be seen separately from internal developments within the USSR and the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact. Even if the Soviet Union were to be isolated, it would still, with its nuclear arsenal, be able to destroy the entire world.

So we should ask ourselves what has changed in Europe from the military standpoint. Let us try to outline briefly the salient points of these changes. First, the negotiation of the CFE agreement, which – if I understand it properly – partly corresponds to the MBFR in Vienna, has

Mr. Scovacricchi (continued)

very greatly reduced the possibility of a surprise attack with conventional forces.

Next, however, the Soviet strategic, and more particularly atomic, potential remains. This is another threat to the present internal stability of the Soviet empire already exposed to such grave economic, political and, above all, I would say, psychological trials.

Third, the risk of instability has increased enormously in certain areas of Europe. The shattering of the Warsaw Pact has been followed by the outbreak of national and nationalistic conflicts between the Hungarians and Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins and many others.

Not to mention the recurrent and persistent dangers in the Mediterranean area which have never allowed us to lower our guard. However, this issue is not part of the matter in hand this afternoon and I do not therefore propose to expand on it.

In conclusion, Mr. President, it seems to me to emerge clearly from the perceptive comments made by a large number of members and to need no further demonstration that we must ensure that the Atlantic Alliance survives and that the defensive structures of this old continent are maintained intact.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bowden.

Mr. BOWDEN (*United Kingdom*). – First, I congratulate Mr. Ahrens and his committee on their far-seeing and imaginative report. In June this year, when I had the privilege of addressing this Assembly, I expressed the view that President Gorbachev had only an even chance of surviving the next twelve months. I still hold that view. I fear that at best Mr. Gorbachev will find himself under enormous pressure in the coming months and the early part of next year. Most of us in the Assembly hope and wish that he will survive. The consequences of his departure could be grave for European security and stability.

President Gorbachev's rôle in the world has been outstanding. Clearly, he has forged himself a place in history which will be talked about for many decades to come. The way in which he has approached the reunification of Germany – it is now united – in particular will be remembered. Who would have believed a year ago that the Soviet President would agree that a reunited Germany should become a full member of NATO and a member of the European Community?

Those of us who in most, if not all, of our political lives looked forward to the collapse of the communist-socialist empire do not want Eastern Europe or the USSR to descend into

anarchy and chaos, nor to see a new military dictatorship rise from the ashes. The future will be decided largely by economic considerations. There is no question but that starving people can become desperate and unpredictable. However, the Soviet army is another major factor. Paragraph 13 of the report states: "Psychologically, it is certainly not easy for such a powerful body as the Soviet army to understand why the political leaders have made concessions to the West, particularly in regard to German unification, but this may also be true of other sectors of the Soviet leadership." Those are very wise words and thoughts.

The Soviet army is immensely powerful, but there are signs of change. In 1989, Soviet arms production fell sharply, with tank production being halved, fighter production falling by 12% and the cancellation of at least one major warship. However, the levels are still very high, with 1 800 tanks, 600 fighters, nine submarines, six major surface ships and 130 intercontinental ballistic missiles. We must not underestimate the Soviet strength.

Whether Russia and the Eastern European countries will be able to cope with their enormous economic problems quickly is highly doubtful, and there must be a major rôle for us in Western Europe and in other countries in giving them all the help that we can.

In a period of great uncertainty but exciting possibilities for new democratic régimes to emerge, as well as of freedom and human rights for millions of people who have for years lived under totalitarian governments, we must provide positive help of all types to protect their future as well as our own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pachtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PACHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – I first wish to compliment Mr. Ahrens on his presentation of this report.

We have seen the end of the confrontation between the blocs. The Warsaw Pact is fading away and the Atlantic Alliance is increasingly wondering what its purpose is. And yet it was the cold war that gave Europe and the world a form of stability for over forty years.

Today we have to show we are capable of setting up mechanisms for co-operation and security that provide greater stability still, based this time not on a cold war but on the strength of ideas, humanitarian considerations and values, political planning and social strategies. We have also to put institutional measures into effect that are based on freedom and give primary importance to dialogue, general consensus, the reduction of armed forces and the limitation of conventional weapons. We have to create real political instruments for settling disputes and

Mr. Pachtas (continued)

forestalling conflict by defusing military crisis situations and eliminating their causes.

European construction has to be a force for peace, détente and open collaboration with every country in a Europe equipped with its own defence system and security mechanisms. We have to lay the foundations of a new, collective security system that will convince all the countries of Europe that there are no longer any grounds for mutual apprehension since they would all be part of the same fabric made up of reciprocal guarantees, territorial integrity and the rights of all peoples – whether militarily and economically they are weak or strong – to determine their own future without foreign interference.

Today more than ever these principles must be made reality. The gap between Realpolitik and the politics of ideas must be narrowed and we must show that our words as politicians are translated into the acts of responsible human beings.

At a time when the eyes of every man and woman are riveted on the efforts of the international community to overcome the Gulf crisis, it is unfortunate that these efforts are not being helped by reference to the lessons of the past.

The United Nations resolutions on the problems of Palestine and Cyprus have long gone unheeded thus creating the impression that the principles of national independence and the sovereignty of nations are meaningless and may be violated by any aggressor strong enough to take advantage of the international situation.

We need to promote the institution of a pan-European security system based on the Helsinki process and to strengthen and institutionalise the CSCE process in the field of security. We also have to push for a parliamentary dimension to the CSCE process which would be a parliamentary organ guaranteeing democratic control, i.e. control by the people's elected representatives, of a process of co-operation which has hitherto been essentially intergovernmental in character. Arrangements should therefore be made for permanent parliamentary participation in the CSCE process by means of a parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, not by the creation of a new institution.

We have to show that we are capable of setting up a new mechanism for co-operation and security guaranteeing a high level of stability through CSCE and WEU. If we are to approach the problem realistically, the first thing to do is to intensify co-operation not merely between states but primarily between the groups of countries in the European Community and Western European Union. An enlargement of WEU to include all the member countries of the Com-

munity would enhance cohesion in policy decisions and reinforce the European identity in security matters.

In conclusion, I must point out that we should not lose sight of another essential factor, that is to say the social and economic dimensions of European security. Security will not become a reality until these problems have been solved as well.

We have complex social problems to overcome which are causing friction and dividing Europe. They include poverty, unemployment, environmental protection, social disparities, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences, cultural deprivation, the status of women, racism and xenophobia.

In the new conditions which demand a positive approach on our part and in which nations, civilisations, societies and economic systems must necessarily evolve, we need not only models but also values to fit the new realities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Romero.

Mr. ROMERO (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, to reach a judgment on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security I ask myself: what effect will these events have, or what effect are they already having?

In the first place, we should welcome this movement towards political and democratic freedom in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in order to build what has been called the "common European house". It is therefore very important that in building Europe we should have in mind what is psychologically speaking a new culture, covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, when speaking about Europe. For when we speak of Europe, we have a habit, an in-built defect, of speaking on the purely local level of Western Europe. The right framework is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. It is this framework that should be given the facilities, the support and the institutions needed to embody European security, if we are looking for continental security embracing all the countries of Europe.

We believe that the dissolution of the military blocs established during the cold war period, which have only a few years left to them will call for a period of transition. I am not referring to the Warsaw Pact, which in practice has been dissolved and will soon be dissolved formally; I am talking about NATO, which could plan to disappear in about eight, ten or twelve years' time and be incorporated into some security and verification arrangements, shared unselfishly on the part of Western Europe, and sharing its fortunes and its future with the countries of Central and

Mr. Romero (continued)

Eastern Europe. This model of shared security, based on new military doctrines of reasonable sufficiency in defence, with controls both on the size of the armed forces of every country in Europe, and on conventional and other arms, so that no army could constitute a threat to neighbouring countries and that the size of the armed forces in terms of personnel, type and pattern, in relation to gross national product, should then be subject to verification agreements and controls. This reasonable sufficiency in defence should be a doctrine accepted by all the armies of the nations of Europe.

In connection with the progress of the countries of Central Europe towards democracy, I suggested yesterday that it would not be acceptable for them to be kept waiting for a long time. There is no need to set high entry requirements; rather we should explicitly support the process of democratisation whilst aiming at supranational European mechanisms that would also strengthen democratic processes. As things are, these democratic processes are under enormous threat in some parts of Central and Eastern Europe because of the phenomena of disintegration and nationalism and other recent political, economic and social phenomena. Therefore, we should do well not to wait long before giving them supranational support with a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe with increasing powers, to which they could have recourse for the peaceful maintenance of their own plans for democratisation.

In closing, may I say that Europe's relationship with the rest of the world is very important. For example, no vision of European security should fail to include arrangements for co-operation with the other shores of the Mediterranean, with Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world. There are now two hundred million Arabs living between Egypt and Mauritania. This demographic pressure is very considerable. Unless there is co-operation leading to development and to new economic and social prospects, tensions may arise in the future. It is therefore very important for Europe to base its security on some new, co-operative relationships, not militarising international relations, but setting up appropriate mechanisms of co-operation for development with Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world.

And if we have the United States and Canada with us, and I think they should be with us, in this Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, we shall have a relationship within a new framework of pan-European security, with an Atlantic link, that does not imply a fortress of the countries of the north, differentiating them from the south, because in the future the challenge will be in the relationships established

between north and south as regards the problems of ecological resources, energy resources and raw materials, and in the need to progress towards a security shared not only among all the countries of Europe, but between Europe and the rest of the world. This is a major challenge, one which is shared by all the countries of Europe, and we believe that this is the way we should go; we should regard the European continent as a single regional entity in its relations with the world as a whole. The time has come to put in place wide-ranging instruments of co-ordination and not to speak small-mindedly of ourselves as member countries of NATO or WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mota Torres.

Mr. MOTA TORRES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report we are debating, dealing with the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security, throws much light upon the hopes we cherish for building a Europe that is democratic, progressive and secure in its entirety: it also throws light on the concerns we feel about the objective conditions in which this journey to democracy is being embarked upon, with its complications and hazards both internally and as regards the new international situation that forms the background of the changes that are taking place.

As things are, the whole of the policy of openness initiated and led by Mr. Gorbachev in the Soviet Union has had repercussions that are manifest in all the countries that were within the Soviet sphere of influence and have since put in hand measures for making their régimes more liberal and democratic and for effecting varying radical changes in their systems.

Without exception, however, they are wrestling with grave economic difficulties of social instability and political legitimation, all of which aggravate the situation and demand coolness and hard work to bring it under control.

Germany has been unified. Free and democratic elections have taken place in most of the countries concerned; new constitutions have been drawn up; there are calls for more participation and greater consensus; the ice of a cold war that put fear into our hearts for decades is breaking up; ownership laws are being changed; states ruled by law are being formed; the flag of the resolute defence of the rights of man is being raised; new relationships are being forged both in and outside Europe; Mr Gorbachev has proposed to the Soviet Union and to the world the building of a "common European house" and today, discussing a "new European architecture" we are conscious both of its inevitability and of the rôle we have to play in this

Mr. Mota Torres (continued)

enormous joint undertaking full of difficulties but also of desirable prospects.

Because of historical factors and the objective conditions it has inherited, the greatest difficulties in this long and complex process of transition face the Soviet Union itself, and it is Mr. Gorbachev who has the responsibility of steering his country safely across waters made dangerous by the storms of nationalism, an economic crisis of unimaginable proportions and national and factional unrest, not least of which is the position of the Soviet armed forces in this whole situation. No words of mine are needed to emphasise the attention and importance we should attach to this perilous journey, which we hope will be a short one, on the way to a safe harbour.

The signs of instability in the Soviet Union are public knowledge and are due by and large to the factors I have just mentioned. The Soviet leader is aware of these factors and has been introducing policy measures to enable him to overcome these difficulties, not only by taking the power he needs himself but also by winning the international political and economic support that is essential.

The security of Europe depends on the contribution in this field made by each of the countries of which Europe consists, so security in Europe can never be advanced by states acting on their own. It must result from a conscious collective effort to build a secure Europe based on attitudes and policies favouring the objectives on which we all agree.

Western European Union will also be an important moderating factor because it is not subject to conflicting interests alien to its founding principles. It has already demonstrated in the Gulf crisis that it can take joint action in defence of the values in which it believes, notably the defence and maintenance of peace.

This heightens the importance of the part that all European countries have to play in designing and installing a new system of security and defence to meet the new demands on Europe that now arise with the end of an East-West balance in which the equation was achieved by a logic of confrontation, not co-operation as is the case today.

We have good reason to believe that both men and institutions are capable of meeting these fresh challenges. And there is also reason to believe that the institutionalisation of the CSCE process and the building of pan-European structures of co-operation will provide a further essential medium for growing Eastern European participation in new forms of enlarged co-operation – as the Rapporteur has very well said.

For all these reasons there is hope.

A number of draft amendments have been tabled for reasons of logic and systematic arrangement, both in the preamble and the recommendations. Generally speaking, I am in agreement with these amendments which I consider necessary to ensure that the draft recommendation on which we shall shortly vote is clear and effective.

Meanwhile, I should like to emphasise the stimulus that these recommendations provide for the European Economic Community to organise and co-ordinate the assistance to be given to the economies of the countries concerned as an absolutely essential way of reducing and of lessening the tensions that economic crises inevitably generate and which I have already mentioned in this speech.

The critical dilemma with this report and its recommendations is that, though this may not be what we intended, we are either going to do very hastily something that needs to be carefully thought out or else we could be delaying something that needs speedy and effective action.

I believe that the report and recommendations represent a commitment – both to this Assembly and to Europe as a whole and to the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sole-Tura.

Mr. SOLE-TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think we are all aware of the importance of this debate. But I am not going to repeat what has already been said about the extraordinary pace and scale of the changes, the end of the two blocs and the need to define a new scenario and a new concept of stability.

I should like to base my remarks on a different aspect. I believe that although there have indeed been enormous changes and there are no longer two blocs in Europe, there are still two Europes. And this not only as regards the economy or the social aspect but also in terms of institutions and therefore security.

In Western Europe our security arrangements are still intact and our countries are protected by a diversified system of institutions and alliances. We are in the European Economic Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, WEU, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE. So, security problems have not changed very much for us. Even so, what has happened in our continent does undoubtedly mean that we have to reflect on our own institutions and on their future. Even though our security arrangements are still intact they can no longer function in the same way or be based on the same assumptions or, if you wish, we cannot use them as before. The enemy in Europe that made them all necessary has disappeared and therefore we have to set about rethinking our systems of strategy and security, because we cannot now aim them at the

Mr. Sole-Tura (continued)

same foe. But the problem is whether at this time we can go on thinking about world-level enemies. Is there likely to be such an adversary for Western Europe now or in the immediate future? I believe some people think there is some such enemy, or would like to invent one, either by postulating that the enemy may be outside Europe, in the Arab world or imagining that the changes in Eastern Europe are not irreversible, and that therefore the enemy has not disappeared at all. If we are logical, though, we have to make a complete change in our strategic thinking.

Instead of thinking in terms of a global adversary, I feel we should address our minds to new kinds of conflict that call for different mechanisms and responses. The Kuwait problem is a perfect example. I believe that this is what we on our side should be thinking about in this connection, but in the other Europe, Eastern Europe, the situation is not exactly the same. A massive security framework has disappeared. Whatever we think about the *raison d'être* of the Warsaw Pact, it was a security mechanism, and it no longer exists. In effect, the CSCE includes the eastern countries but it is not yet an adequate framework to give them the security they need, and bilateral disarmament agreements are what they are, bilateral disarmament agreements; in so far as the two blocs no longer exist, such agreements concern only two parties and not all parties. Consequently, a very large vacuum has opened up in Eastern Europe from the security viewpoint – a feeling of insecurity which we should understand. And it is not only military or strategic insecurity, it is a blend of several factors.

Clearly, the first of these factors is the complete economic change that all those countries have to make. It is a change without precedent and therefore without any signposts, a transition from a centralised, bureaucratic order in which everything was owned by the state, to a market economy. And, I repeat, there are no precedents for change on such a scale or at such a pace. It is therefore cause for great economic and social uncertainty and considerable doubt as to the intrinsic stability of the societies concerned.

The second factor, also clearly a factor of insecurity, is the territorial instability to which several colleagues have already referred, and which surfaces in the form of conflicts between nationalisms. In addition to that, however, we are seeing the breakdown of old imperial structures that had been kept in place by other means, as in the case of the Soviet Union. Here, too, we are faced with several unknowns. We do not yet know how stable the political map of Eastern Europe will be, we do not know, for example, whether Yugoslavia will still exist as a

single country in a few months' time. We do not know whether the Soviet Union will continue to exist as a single country. Even countries that appear to be more stable, such as Czechoslovakia, also have serious problems of stability as between their various parts. This is an extremely serious problem from the viewpoint of security and stability, but it is also of direct concern to us. Another question is whether the Soviet Union itself might not break up into a number of separate territories, and this in a country that has nuclear missiles at present under the control of a single authority, whose future is by no means certain. There is also insecurity inherent in the weakness of political institutions and governments. Make no mistake, the problem of those countries today is not the survival of the previous states or political systems, but their potential collapse and considerable weakness, because they have not yet been replaced by others that are stronger and have greater democratic credibility, and because they are, at very least, in a process of transition that is far from complete. This too, generates insecurity, the fact that no final balance of political power has been achieved. None of these countries yet has a stable system of political parties. Instead, as we can see every day, there are considerable uncertainties, alignments that are changing and will change again because they reflect a difficult transition. But as yet, there is no stable system of political forces enabling us to know either what to expect or, above all, how they relate to our own political power system.

These factors of insecurity, therefore, are not something we can regard as alien or of no concern to us, because ultimately if the concept of Europe has any meaning it is because we see ourselves as parts of one and the same complex, with a common history and above all a common vision of the future. But for that very reason we on this side have to create conditions that will help events to develop along those lines by overcoming present insecurities and intensifying co-operation and integration.

This is the direction in which I feel our debates should lead and, on that score, I believe that we have almost lost a good opportunity for having that debate, because the original draft of the document submitted to us did not encourage discussion. I have to say that this causes me some concern and dissatisfaction. At the same time I should like to thank Mr. Ahrens in particular, but also the other members putting their names to the amendments that have been tabled, for their efforts to make this document at least a viable basis for debate, enabling us to come to some conclusion. The document as presented did not allow this to be done and I believe that it was unworthy of the kind of debate we should have. Even now, not all the problems that this document presents have been

Mr. Sole-Tura (continued)

solved, for although the amendments constitute a distinct improvement as regards the draft recommendation, the document is a whole in itself and in the idea it embodies and it also contains an explanatory memorandum that has remained unchanged. This contains a number of mistakes that in my opinion seriously detract from its credibility. I shall refer to two of these mistakes in closing.

In paragraph 21 of the explanatory memorandum, with reference to developments in the countries of Eastern Europe, it is said that there are two groups of countries: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia already have democratic, non-communist governments "while Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia continue to be governed by communist régimes that have been reformed in very different ways". I believe that this is incorrect. It is not certain that these three countries are still governed by communist régimes reformed in different ways. The situation is far more complex and complicated, and we cannot accept that banalities of this kind, that furthermore are not only inaccurate but a complete distortion of the facts, be voiced in a body such as this Assembly.

In paragraph 27, referring to Romania, there are also several inaccuracies. I say this because I was recently a member of a special delegation from the Council of Europe visiting Romania in order to report on whether the country might be admitted to the Council of Europe with special observer status, and I believe that the statement made in paragraph 27 that "the revolution served only to change the leaders but not the former régime as such" misrepresents the situation. Also the statement that "Mr. Iliescu... obtained more than 85% of the votes cast, which led to counter-demonstrations in the streets of Bucharest in June that were repressed", etc., is completely untrue and at the same time leads us up a blind alley. These statements being in the report, I would not be happy with myself if I did not call attention to them because I believe that they weaken the credibility of the document.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This may be so, Mr. Sole-Tura, but you know very well that what we have to vote on is the recommendation. The report is the Rapporteur's work.

Also, the situation is changing so fast that what is written three or four months, or even a few weeks ago, may no longer wholly match the facts on the day when the report is tabled in the Assembly.

As you know, this report has been put back several times. The debate will naturally be concerned with the draft recommendation and it is on this that attention must be focused, for one

thing in order to avoid inaccuracies due to the passage of time. The fact remains that even then the text we adopt tomorrow may well be out of date a fortnight or month later.

Thank you, in any case, for your remarks.

Mr. SOLE-TURA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I take your point very well, Mr. President. That is why I drew the distinction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I shall confine my remarks to a few brief observations about developments in the countries of Eastern Europe with regard to the security dimension.

I agree with the special importance that the document, and obviously the amendments as well, attaches to the efforts made within CSCE with the object of creating a pan-European framework for security and co-operation. This framework would be an appropriate instrument for deepening the concept of joint security of which the corollary is the maintenance of a level of security and deterrence based upon the idea of sufficiency, and its construction would need full-scale development of arbitration facilities and confidence-building measures and the joint organisation of verification and control instruments. In this respect I wish to state my agreement in particular with what is said in the draft recommendation, and in Chapter IV of the report.

Although much remains to be done, a great deal has already been achieved in establishing a firm basis for strengthening a pan-European system of security and co-operation.

The signature in Paris of the CFE treaty largely brings to an end a deployment of forces whose massive build-up of offensive capabilities had effectively split Europe in two for half a century. The agreement removes one of the obstacles to East-West understanding of most concern to the European allies: the imbalance in conventional weapons, where the Warsaw Pact had always had superiority.

Today Europe is a continent with fewer arms. But we still need to redouble our efforts for future negotiations leading to new agreements at Helsinki in 1992, as urged in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation.

As some members have said, the pace of political change in East European countries has recently quickened. One of the main tasks of the report was to analyse these changes. But despite the speed and depth of the changes on the European scene there are still some unknowns. Even after the CFE agreements, the Soviet Union will still be a superpower, and the outcome of perestroika cannot yet be qualified as irreversible. Ethnic minority problems and

Mr. Moya (continued)

the upsurge of nationalisms mean uncertainties about frontiers. The transition towards the market economy will undoubtedly be accompanied by social unrest, and no type of change in political régimes that are not yet firmly established can be ruled out. It also has to be said from the security viewpoint that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has created a real structural vacuum with reactions and disagreements among its members, making it essential for these nations to be brought under the umbrella of joint and lasting security.

We need a stable framework into which to fit the changes now taking place in Europe and to absorb the tension and maladjustment they cause. The CSCE is performing and will continue to perform a highly important rôle in this process and deserves our support. I also believe that, as a European forum on matters of security, WEU can and should contribute to the success of this process by strengthening its instruments of action and reflection. This seems the right point at which to mention the contribution that could be made to this process by the recently-formed Institute for Security Studies and the help that WEU could give in organising the forthcoming conference on military doctrine scheduled for 1991.

Neither should I fail to mention the importance of setting up the conflict prevention centre as recently decided at the CSCE summit. I agree with the ideas on this subject expressed in the report. Its functions will consist of detecting abnormal military activities and will help to reinforce the communications network set up under the CSCE agreements and the confidence-building measures. In this connection I would like to point out that the peaceful settlement of differences, the central reason for the creation of this centre, relates not only to the prevention of disputes but also to the finding of ways and means of settling peacefully any conflicts that may in fact break out. In this connection it may be useful for WEU to play its part in deciding what positions should be adopted at the forthcoming meeting of experts to be held in Valetta early in 1991 on this question of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

One factor that is often said to contribute to the difficulty of creating a security zone, and the thirty-four countries belonging to the CSCE themselves make the point, is precisely its numerous and varied membership. And it is true that high numbers and variety place a limit on flexibility of operation in matters of security and do not make it easy to construct a functional, effective collective security system.

In fact, the CSCE is complementary to the existing security alliances, i.e. NATO and WEU,

not an alternative or a substitute, and this is stated in paragraph 56 of the report. Nevertheless, it is only by involving the countries of Eastern Europe in the joint task of finding collective solutions that we shall be able to lay the foundations of a lasting order of peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Liapis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Mr. President, Greece abides by the international peace and the principles emanating from democracy and international law. Today, as it has always done in the past, it is actively co-operating with the allied forces deployed in the Gulf. The participation of Greece in all the common western operations during the century was neither ambiguous nor hypocritical as it was for some other countries which lately have been fighting for democracy, peace and even for the European ideal.

Greece has participated and continues to participate in all the common efforts of the West, for the restoration of the international legacy, not only because it firmly and unconditionally believes in all those values that constitute the respect for national independence, human rights and international order, but because of its own painful experience, created in the past by the constant violation of the above principles. We firmly support the comment of the Secretary-General of WEU in his information letter that: "Aggression against one member of the United Nations is tantamount to aggression against all."

We believe, as does everybody else participating in this Assembly, in this international order according to the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. But, at the same time, we share the view that security and co-operation are needed in our continent, especially after the latest historical events in Central and Eastern Europe. There is an urgent need for Western Europe to play its rightful rôle in maintaining peace and international stability. That is why we consider that the mission of WEU is essential.

In addition, I believe that to strengthen its important mission WEU should approach the EEC in a spirit of closer and more fruitful co-operation. In any case and for the moment, WEU fills the existing vacuum in common EEC security and defence policy.

But we must never forget that our common dream is the creation of a supranational community and confederation with common defence, foreign and economic policy. When the time comes, the destiny of WEU is to be absorbed by the EEC. At that time, we shall have reached our ultimate goal – a united Europe based on our common origin, territory and religion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Although I listened with interest to the remarks of Mr. Liapis, his last remark was quite unacceptable. He is taking us so far ahead of the report which I presented yesterday, and which was accepted unanimously, that he must have intended to say that he wants this organisation to be absorbed by the European Community.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – In due time.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Well, it came over rather swifter and more utopian than that. If he is talking about beyond 1998, anything could happen, and, as I said yesterday, I have an open mind on that issue.

I wish to mention five or six problems. All of us were immensely heartened by the advent of democracy in Poland, and we all applauded the efforts of Solidarity. But I remember pointing out then that Solidarity was the umbrella under which it was possible for all segments of democratic Polish political thinking, together with the church, to unite. I also said that at some stage Poland, if she wished to pursue her democratic ideals, would have to recognise that in the real world of politics you cannot continue under an umbrella. We have seen the beginning and the disintegration of Solidarity, in the sense that many of its segments have been fighting the presidential election. In the elections for the lower house early next year there will be even more fragmentation.

That will apply throughout many of the countries that have left the rule of communism and are looking for the best route forward into a democratic world. It is all very well to have high ideals and to aspire to a market economy – all of which I thoroughly endorse – but until you have grass roots organisations down in the villages and towns that understand political thought and the segment to which they belong, people will feel cut off. They will see these orators appearing on television, they will recognise no connection between them and the orators, and they will not realise that they have a major rôle in ensuring not only the acceptance of democracy, but its continuation. It is very easy to achieve democracy; it is even easier for it to slip away.

Seven months ago I had the great privilege of addressing the Foreign Relations Committee of the Polish Senate. I warned it that the real danger would be the creation – in Poland, Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union – of fifty, sixty or seventy different political parties. That is the route to disillusion, disintegration and chaos. That, rather than a nuclear war, may be the problem that Europe will face over the next decade.

In that context, where does WEU stand and what can it achieve? I do not believe that we shall have a major opportunity to influence people. That is much more the responsibility of our sister organisation, the Council of Europe. Earlier today someone said that we must not thwart the desire of some countries to become accepted into Europe, but we must start with the recognition that the major priority is the endorsement of human rights. Until the principle of human rights is accepted throughout those countries, it is difficult to see how they will progress along the hard road to a democratic system.

It was a little difficult to accept the earlier speech of a communist member, who chided us on how we should reach democracy. The last people from whom I want lessons in democracy are the communists. I hasten to add that I do not mean all the communists in this Assembly. I find the views of the Portuguese and Italian communists much more acceptable than the views of many liberals whom I have met. It is hypocritical of other communists to talk about the need for democracy. I need not say which country I am talking about.

In those circumstances, how should we proceed? We have a duty to understand that our security system in Europe needs to be expanded. The sooner that this organisation is enlarged to bring in the countries that wish to join us – not merely those that are at present members of the EC, which is not the best criterion for joining this organisation – the sooner we shall have the opportunity to work out a pan-European security system based on countries of like mind and inclination. It will not be easy. As someone said earlier, we shall have to accept that for four decades it has been fairly easy to keep the peace in Europe because each of the two blocs – the Warsaw Pact and NATO – knew in its heart that if it started a warlike activity it would result in the annihilation of both blocs. Therefore, in a weird sense, that presented us with stability and a strangely uneasy peace.

The Warsaw Pact has gone, and there is a real prospect – I hope that it does not happen – of the Soviet Union breaking up. Within the confines of the Warsaw Pact, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the INF talks, it has been relatively easy to reach agreement with the Soviet Union about nuclear weapons. But if the Soviet Union breaks up, how can we have an agreement with, for example, the independent Russian state? For many years it will be impossible for it to become a member of the United Nations, and it will be extremely difficult to reach an acceptable agreement with the Russian federation. For the past forty years, the Russian federation has provided the bulk of the top officer echelons of the Soviet army, and there is a great preponderance of nuclear weapons in that state.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

For that reason alone, I endorse what my colleague, Andrew Bowden, said earlier. We must hope that Mr. Gorbachev not only stays in power, but can find a way of holding the Soviet Union together in the sense that agreements signed by him on external matters will hold throughout the Soviet Union.

That is the second danger that I foresee. Both dangers can be overcome but nevertheless they exist. Then we have to consider what organisation can provide the input that a democracy needs to have into decisions taken by governments.

Among the several amendments that will be proposed tomorrow is a crucial one reminding this Assembly of the need for a parliamentary assembly for the CSCE. We must work out how WEU will fit into that parliamentary assembly. The three Helsinki baskets are very distinct and we have little or no input into at least one of them. But at this stage discussions are taking place – in a somewhat unrealistic manner – on how we can produce the right answers.

If we cannot persuade all the countries of the CSCE that it is in their interest to have a parliamentary assembly, we shall have a major obstacle to overcome. We know from what has been said so far that the majority of CSCE countries, particularly those of Eastern and Central Europe, are in favour of such an assembly. Mr. Gorbachev said in Strasbourg that he recognised the need for the United States and Canada to remain involved in Europe.

The United States and Canada participate in CSCE. One must remember that E stands for Europe and we have the interesting paradox of some in the United States who do not want to join an organisation that has in its title the word Europe. How do we reach the ideal whereby the input that covers WEU combines with the input that covers the relevant baskets of Helsinki? We shall need all the influence that we can exert in the North American continent to try to persuade people that, without their input in such an organisation, it would be a less good organisation.

I am conscious that I am speaking for rather longer than usual, and I am also conscious of the fact that there is no time-limit. In conclusion, I want to address another issue that is relevant to my speech and which is, in human terms, the most difficult and most dangerous to address. What will happen to Europe after 1st January when many millions of Soviet citizens get passports and decide to move across frontiers? We shall be faced with the prospect of tens of thousands of Soviet citizens who may not merely wish to visit our nations on holiday, but to stay. Are we going to turn them back? Are we going to

put them into camps as my government has been forced to do in Hong Kong with those people who are not genuine refugees from Vietnam? That problem must be considered.

The German Government plans to abolish the need for visas for Polish citizens. Will that lead to a great influx of Poles into the German nation?

Sadly, we already know that there are many people in all our countries who are bitter and unreasoning and who hate foreigners. They will try to make life difficult for them. We may be faced with the spectacle – which the media will use – of people being brutally and roughly turned back or put into camps. At once, those people from Eastern and Central Europe will question whether our countries are democracies. I can imagine them saying: “We now have freedom to travel, but our freedom has been curtailed. How do we get into a different country?” I can almost foresee more bloodshed, trouble and people killed in the next decade as a result of this phenomenon than were killed in Europe in the past forty years.

I have no solution and I am not certain that this organisation is the right one to find it, but if we do not find one, we may feed the fires of nationalism. Those fires led to Sarajevo and that led to 1939. What ended in 1945 left us with some of the problems that were not solved in 1918 and some of the problems that caused Sarajevo.

We must find a way of making the last decade of this century and the beginning of the next century safe for our children otherwise they will curse us for having failed to understand that one does not necessarily die any more happily by conventional weapons than one does by nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The applause in the chamber is ample evidence of the interest members took in your address, Sir Geoffrey.

The debate is closed.

The Chairman of the Political Committee would no doubt like to make a few remarks to end the debate, and I therefore call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Chairman of the committee and also as Rapporteur, I would like to thank most warmly all those members who have spoken to this report, and especially for their leniency towards this very brief report.

The common thread in all the statements was the change in the situation in Europe, characterised until recently by East-West confrontation, by different systems, and by two military pacts arming against each other. Today

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

uncertainty in Europe has other, and different sources.

I will not go into what each and every member said. They all pointed out that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are now in a very serious economic plight, that there are enormous social tensions, which we are no longer used to, and, we might add, ecological problems on a scale that is also fortunately unknown to us. All these uncertainties of an economic and social nature could become politically explosive. It is certainly no exaggeration to describe some of these countries today as a powder keg which a spark might suffice to ignite.

Remember that in the Soviet Union thirteen thousand Red Army soldiers who used to be stationed in the former German Democratic Republic are having to live in tents this winter. This alone could result in a movement which would force the armed forces of the Soviet Union to take action that might easily get out of hand. That is only one of the possible sparks.

A second element of uncertainty has similarly been referred to again and again; the demise of the communist system of suppression has resulted in the strengthening of nationalist movements. We see this both in the Soviet Union and in other countries, and I will say quite frankly that in my own country, or in some parts of it at least, the thinking and the language are more nationalist today than a year or two ago. We must keep a very close eye on this.

What can we do now? I strongly endorse one demand that has been voiced. We need a system that embraces East and West, and we need the involvement of the United States of America and Canada, something else that was not disputed in the debate. It is entirely due to the United States and Canada that this "peace", this absence of war, has been preserved in the last few decades. We will continue to need them as guarantors of peace in Europe. And we must — this too has been said — talk more openly to one another — not about one another, but to one another.

We must also establish new rights for minorities, and the appropriate body for this is certainly not Western European Union but the Council of Europe. If we accept that all the frontiers in Europe remain unchanged, including those which seem absurd, even those whose creation entailed the violation of international law and human rights, we will be having minority problems in almost every European country in the near future.

So what we need is strong protection for minorities. Otherwise, if the minorities are unable to come into their own and develop

freely in their own way in the countries they are in and where they have to live, we shall inevitably see efforts being made to change frontiers, which will lead to international tensions.

I think I am right in saying that it was Margaret Thatcher who once said ice was at its most dangerous when it was melting. I believe she was right. We will have to keep a very close eye on these new elements of uncertainty in Europe.

Sir Geoffrey referred to another threat, the danger of further migrations within Europe from East to West. I recently read a Soviet source which stated that if perestroika does not succeed and a roll-back occurs in the Soviet Union, some twenty-three million people will leave the country for the West. Imagine what that would mean to us! It would be chaos.

As you can see in all your countries, wherever foreigners are concentrated, where they are perhaps more numerous than the indigenous population, nationalist tendencies are very pronounced and nationalist parties and citizens' action groups quickly formed. This is inevitable. So we must try to keep these people in the East.

That is why it is so important to help the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to survive the winter. In countries where the distribution system is collapsing it is a truly difficult task to eliminate famine by means of donations. Nevertheless, I believe we must try everything. For example, I am grateful to my government for sending to the Soviet Union the supplies stockpiled in West Berlin against a possible future blockade. I feel we should all be considering the opportunities for similar moves in our own countries.

Many speakers pointed out that, with East-West confrontation now a thing of the past, Europe will have to redefine its rôle in the world and will then have to play its rôle more vigorously than in the past. The image of the world still bears the stamp of Europe and even today the countries of Europe still carry a responsibility for this world. Many of the tensions in the world are the outcome of European policies. Speaking of Kuwait, as we have done today, we all know that the frontiers drawn for it were not exactly of the happiest, but they too were the outcome of a European policy.

We must take our responsibilities in the world more seriously. We will be able to survive in the long term and cope with the threats from outside only if we broaden our sense of responsibility and look beyond our own continent, large as it has now become.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in recent months I have paid numerous visits to a part of Germany which used to have a communist government. What depresses me most there is not

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

the backwardness of the infrastructure and the poverty that confronts one: far worse are the changes in people's attitudes. People who used to live in a system in which it was dangerous for them to have thoughts of their own, and in which private initiative made them suspect, cannot be expected to launch themselves straight into the market economy today. We must have patience, and we will need a great deal of imagination if we are to overcome the major difference that still exists between people in Europe today, even though the communist system has collapsed. Only then will Europe find peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Ahrens, I am sure I speak on behalf of all the members when I express our thanks not only for the work you have done these last few days but also for all that you have accomplished over so many years. I am particularly pleased to be in the Chair at the moment as it gives me the chance to tell you that during the time which some of us parliamentarians still have before us we shall think of you as a model to pattern ourselves upon in our efforts to improve our work as members of parliament and Europeans but, more especially, as right-minded people and right-minded democrats. Thank you Mr. Ahrens.

7. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Because of the progress that we have made, the orders of business for the two sittings tomorrow are very light.

As I know that many of you would be glad if we could end our debates tomorrow morning

I suggest that the order of business for this end of the session be amended to allow Mr. Tummers's report on the conversion of the Soviet defence industry to be debated immediately after the vote on the recommendation concerning the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security.

I understand that Mr. Tummers is in agreement.

Are there any objections?

The change in the order of business is agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 6th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1255 and amendments).
2. Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1249).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1990

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ward, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Caro (*explanation of vote*), Mr. Martinez, Mr. Ahrens.
4. Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry, (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1249*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Moya, Mr. Elisseev (*Observer from the USSR*), Mr. Moreira, Mrs. van den Brink (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*), Mr. Pedregosa, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Tummers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman*).
5. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the two previous sittings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1255 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security, Document 1255 and amendments. The debate on the committee's report was concluded yesterday.

Eight amendments to the draft recommendation have been tabled, in the name of Mr. Brito and others.

The amendments will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation, which in this case is the order in which they are numbered.

Amendment 1, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (*i*), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the end of the division of Europe and of the East-West confrontation and the progress towards democratisation and liberalisation in the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries;

Concerned nevertheless at the alarming decline in the economic situation in Eastern Europe in view of its possible unforeseeable repercussions;

Recalling Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty in which all WEU member countries undertook to promote the economic recovery of Europe;”

As none of the signatories is present, I call Mr. Ward to move the amendment.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – The amendments are signed by representatives of the political groups, so to that extent they should be easily accepted. Mr. Martinez, would you like to speak to Amendment 1, which Mr. Ward has moved formally?

1. See page 41.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I should like to suggest a procedure that will make for economy of time and argument. As you realise, the amendments have been signed by empowered representatives of the groups whose task it is to agree items that have already been discussed and adopted in the relevant committees. They deal with a text that has already been agreed. Yesterday, when we saw the text that was elaborated by the Rapporteur, Mr. Lemoine, we had the feeling that it was far too meagre and was linked too much to the current situation without taking into account a number of other considerations. Therefore, the recommendation of our Assembly would have been a bit weak.

The subject is very important – the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security. We should not come out with a meagre statement relating only to present circumstances. Therefore, we thought that we should give more substance to the items that have already been discussed and approved in the committee.

That is why I hope that it will be possible to adopt the amendments without having a full debate on each one. There is nothing very new in them. They merely complement the text about which Mr. Lemoine spoke yesterday.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martinez. We shall have to go through them briefly for the sake of form. Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1?...

That is not the case.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say anything?...

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not want to repeat what Mr. Martinez has said. The amendment deals mainly with ideas that were expressed here in the Assembly yesterday afternoon; the reference to the very poor economic and social situation in Central and Eastern Europe, which we must overcome together if we want genuine peace and balance in Europe.

On the committee's behalf I urge members to adopt this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 2, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Emphasising that European security would be threatened if areas of instability emerged in Eastern Europe;

Considering that the strengthening and institutionalisation of the CSCE process offer the peoples of Europe new prospects and improved security on the basis of a strengthened system of all-European co-operation;

Considering that the strengthened CSCE should henceforth be used as the principal forum for advancing disarmament and the limitation of armaments;”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2?...

That is not the case.

Does the Chairman wish to add anything?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – No.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 3, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (ii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Welcoming the fact that the final settlement of the German problem has made it possible to anchor Germany as a whole to the Atlantic Alliance and allowed the German people to be united in freedom, thus enhancing stability and security in Central Europe;

Considering that Germany's undertakings in regard to recognition of its present frontiers with Poland, confirmation of its renunciation of ABC weapons and the limit placed on the levels of its armed forces are exemplary measures that are likely to strengthen the confidence of all European countries;”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

That is not the case.

Do you wish to add anything, Mr. Ahrens?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – No.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Amendment 4, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after paragraph (iii), add the following new paragraphs:

“ Supporting the steps being taken to establish an assembly of Europe, on the basis of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which would give the parliamentary dimension to the CSCE process as decided by the Paris summit, while recalling its own responsibilities in all areas covered by the modified Brussels Treaty;

Recalling that WEU has special responsibility in the establishment of a new European security concept based on the doctrine of sufficiency and taking account of the situation that will exist after the treaty on conventional disarmament has been signed;

Considering the maintenance of United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe to be an essential factor for guaranteeing the future security of Europe in a new environment;”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – This is a very important amendment because it deals with the parliamentary dimension of the CSCE in which almost all of us have been involved. There are strong feelings about what the future should hold. We must not create institutions that duplicate work and expense. In creating the parliamentary assembly of the CSCE, we should use the experience that we have gained in our Assembly and in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, which brings together parliamentarians from almost every country in the CSCE and which will soon involve more.

Therefore, this paragraph is extremely important as it will help us to reach a reasonable settlement in our continuing debate. We must be united in our purpose in the coming months to achieve the reasonable solution foreseen in the text that will be adopted.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I note that Mr. Ahrens has nothing to add.

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I voted in favour of this amendment which, as Mr. Martinez has explained, is of considerable importance and I would like to explain why I voted for it.

In the first place, I look upon this as a part of the preamble and not the operative clauses. That is my feeling on the matter. There are two points I want to make in explanation of my vote.

The first is a position which I, and I am not alone, continue to defend. The adulthood which Europe has now reached in organisations like the Council of Europe, WEU and the Community entitles them to form the organisational, not to say institutional, centre of what is done within the CSCE framework. I therefore see the first paragraph of the amendment culminating in an assembly of Europe based on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I agree, but extended within that framework to those CSCE members who are not members of the Council of Europe, which is after all somewhat different. This is how I see it, but my vote is nonetheless in favour.

The second point concerns WEU, and Mr. Martinez drew attention to it a short time ago when he spoke in support of the amendment. We shall have another opportunity to discuss its institutional rôle as such in the debates on the organisation of the Helsinki process in the wake of the summit which has just been held and bearing in mind the relevant proposals which WEU has already made under this heading. WEU's institutional rôle is also something I have in mind.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 5, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Play an active part in building the new all-European system of co-operation and security and give it useful impetus based on the co-operation structures set up by member countries in the framework of WEU, the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance;”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 5?...

Mr. Ahrens has nothing to add.

I will now put Amendment 5 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

Amendment 6, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Give strong impetus to the European Community’s efforts to organise and co-ordinate assistance to the economies of the countries concerned; ”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – The amendment is the result of our discussions. We have already said that the economies of a number of countries have been badly affected by the consequences of the Gulf crisis and the embargo. We take responsibility for helping those countries to overcome their difficulties. We should make that clear in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. Ahrens has nothing further to add.

I will now put Amendment 6 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Amendment 7, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ In accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty, examine from a military standpoint the consequences of the reduction in tension in Europe following the progressive withdrawal of Soviet troops and define, in preparation for examination in the Atlantic Alliance, a new concept for the deployment of allied forces in Europe; ”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. Ahrens has nothing further to add.

I will now put Amendment 7 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

Amendment 8, which has been tabled by Mr. Brito and others, reads:

After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraphs:

“ Follow up the intention it expressed in Brussels to strengthen co-operation between member countries in security matters so as to open the way for a possible European union associating the European Community, European political co-operation and WEU;

Pursue its efforts to ensure that current thinking about the creation of multinational forces is set in the context of a European security dimension;

Work out, with due account for the specific nature of European security interests, a European position for revising the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance in order to maintain Europe’s security in a new environment;

Develop means of countering more quickly and more effectively any dangers which may arise out of area;

Examine the expediency of regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff of WEU member countries;

Re-examine the rôle of deterrence in the new European security context;

Take the decision to create an observation satellite agency. ”

I call Mr. Martinez to move the amendment.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – The paragraph is important as it states the main tasks necessary to implement the ideas that we have already discussed. It is an important paragraph to be included in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Does the Chairman wish to add something?...

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the committee I should just like to take this opportunity to thank members and the secretariat who have together taken the trouble to give the report some real substance in a very short time by adopting these amendments. This has enabled us to say something about the present situation in Europe and the tasks we face in the immediate future. I believe the Assembly can be happy with this report.

The PRESIDENT. – I will now put Amendment 8 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was taken by show of hands)

Amendment 8 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1255, as amended.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

The President (continued)

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

4. *Konversiya* – conversion in Soviet military industry

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote
on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1249)*

The PRESIDENT. – The final order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on *konversiya* – conversion in Soviet military industry and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1249.

I call Mr. Tummers to present his report.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before I present the report I want to make a point of thanking the committee which instructed me to draw it up. It entrusted this task to me because I have so often referred to the origins of WEU in committee and, to put it briefly, have backed internal stability and the stand against disastrous militarism as guarantees of peace and security in our countries.

I should also like to express my appreciation to the Supreme Soviet, which was my host when I visited the Soviet Union in connection with this report. I can say that my visit took place in the true spirit of *glasnost*. We had absolutely no difficulty in obtaining information. We were allowed to inspect the original documents on the spot, and we got straight down to business. I would add that, when we were not working, we were given the opportunity to enjoy the cultural side of the Soviet capital, from Tolstoy to Mayakovsky, and from the Kremlin monuments to the Sukov Tower. For this we are particularly grateful to our guide, Mrs. Tabarova.

We can now say that *konversiya* is a lively topical issue, which is attracting interest on all levels of society. Politically, this was apparent here when questions were put on Mr. Chevènement's statement. Members from both the Federal Republic and Portugal asked questions on this subject. In this morning's *Figaro* I read a page-long article by Mrs. Hélène Carrère, reporting a recent survey of the social dimension of the changes that result from the transition from the military to the civil sphere. In this case

the focus is on the army rather than on arms production.

Konversiya is, of course, occurring within the framework of the economic situation in the Soviet Union. But we resisted the temptation to write at length on this subject because that would really have exceeded our terms of reference and would also have covered a much wider area. That would not have been the best way to get to the heart of the matter. We are pleased, of course, that, apart from the treaties relating to economic aid which are referred to in the report, a treaty on economic aid was signed by the Soviet Union and Italy on 18th November, and that Spain has also offered a programme of economic aid, without concluding a specific treaty.

Besides the economic problems, the report describes both the opportunities and the problems involved in the transition from military production to the manufacture of consumer goods. The report bears witness to the desire for *konversiya* which we encountered during our visit to the Soviet Union in early September. With reference to this desire – and I want to emphasise this – I must add that a great deal has still to be done before it can be converted into reality. The change from the production of military goods to consumer goods clearly cannot be established on the right lines overnight. A great deal of effort will be involved, not only as regards programming or in technical matters, but also when it comes to the social implications of the conversion programme. The report therefore indicates the need for us to follow up the programme. I hope this view will also be supported here. In other words, we cannot say that the report makes a number of recommendations, and then pass on to the next subject. Precisely because it is necessary for us to co-operate in *konversiya*, we must try to make the facilities we have available to the Soviet Union. So we must stick to the programme, and see how matters develop in this area. This presentation is not the end of the story. We must also be prepared to take another look at the progress of developments in, say, two years' time.

As regards these difficulties, and especially those relating to the realisation of the intention to proceed to *konversiya*, we must appreciate that enormous numbers of people are involved and that the military industry has already begun to manufacture a whole range of consumer goods. So there are many commodities in everyday use which have been produced under the umbrella of the military production apparatus, thus escaping the stringent standards of the market place, which are, of course, needed to keep this transition to the market economy under control. So we do not know if the price of a refrigerator is attuned to its marketing

1. See page 42.

Mr. Tummers (continued)

potential, or if it has a production price linked to the options open to the military production apparatus for its manufacture, without any accurate check on what the market price should be. This may cause difficulties. Another point is that the military are running the military production apparatus. It will be very difficult initially to get these people to demonstrate the flexibility required in order to switch to other production methods. They will have to be imaginative and gear their management to be so as well, and they will also have to realise the necessity for this, which will pose quite a few problems in the general context of changes in the Soviet Union. When offering our help, we must therefore focus on young people wanting to specialise in management who are keen to discover the requirements of adjustment to the market. In addition, they must be keen to study the market economy as such, and the part they can play in it as businessmen. So when we talk about help, this is the kind of help we must offer first. In other words, retraining and in-service training will be needed before large sums are spent on specific enterprises.

Mr. President, if a proper start can be made on *konversiya* in the Soviet Union in a period of about two years, a period in which various things can be adjusted – I am not saying that everything will have progressed as far as we would like by that time – some assimilation will be achieved with what WEU is seeking: economic, social and cultural stability, as a sound basis for peace and security. That is an idea we can endorse.

To conclude my presentation, I want to point out that we now have to tackle questions relating to the definition of conversion used in manuals and text books in the Soviet Union. We have mentioned two of them on page 15. You will see that this refers not only to a number of technical requirements but also to the human dimension, to people's everyday lives, for which decent living conditions must be ensured and social and cultural opportunities provided. I particularly want to emphasise this, because looking to the future, all these things will have to be considered. We must be less hesitant in reaching out to the people who are at work.

There was speculation here yesterday about the economic *débâcle* and the ensuing chaos that might occur if certain measures were taken in the Soviet Union. We must, of course, do nothing to encourage such eventualities. The best way of avoiding this is to apply ourselves to the needs of the people in their everyday lives under decent conditions. We know that the Soviet Union recently signed the cultural convention of the Council of Europe, providing us with an additional link. This is somewhat

remote from the subject of *konversiya*, but these things are not all independent: they are, interwoven, related to one another. The cultural convention of the Council of Europe opens up opportunities. It will be possible in future to switch from military affairs to the social aspects of life and the manufacture of consumer goods.

Mr. President, I see that no amendment has been tabled to the report, which was completed some time ago. I hope this is not a sign of lack of interest in the report as such but an endorsement of the simple recommendations we have made. We could not have done more. I would remind you that there has been no immediate response to the idea of donating large sums of money, not even in the European Community. After all, no one knew precisely what structures there were, where the money would go, or what might be done with it. The aim of the recommendation is to support the plan to implement *konversiya* quickly. That is our primary concern. We must, moreover, keep abreast of events so that we can continue to give this support. This is the way to achieve satisfactory results.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers, not only for a fascinating introduction but an interesting report. Thank you for contributing to the skill of the committee, which has not called any amendments forward. You are to be complimented on that.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – I should just like to make a few brief comments on the excellent report presented to us this morning, the result of much hard and fruitful work. I believe that it contributes something new not only in relation to the conversion of the Soviet defence industry but also, *mutatis mutandis*, in terms of the light it may throw on the conversion of arms industries in other countries.

What I have to say follows the thread of the main argument of the report, but basically it concerns not so much the content, namely industrial conversion in the Soviet Union, but rather collateral aspects connected with the destruction of surplus material arising out of the CFE agreements recently signed in Paris.

First, something occurs to me that is not often considered, namely that we have to recognise the economic impact that a disarmament process has, at least in the short term, due to the cost of destruction and verification. That being so, I believe that the idea often entertained that disarmament will automatically lead to immediate budgetary savings in any country may be mistaken, at least in the short term and especially in countries more particularly affected by

Mr. Moya (continued)

the arms reduction quotas. I believe that this phenomenon will be true of many countries, and that, at least initially, we should not have any false hopes that disarmament will necessarily lead to immediate large budgetary savings. This may not happen because of the costs involved.

Secondly, I believe that the CFE agreements on the destruction of surplus equipment will affect the Soviet Union and its conversion operations more than it will affect many countries in the alliance, because the latter will have much smaller quotas. I shall not quote figures, but it is obvious that if the Soviet Union reduces its combat aircraft strength by approximately half, and gives up nearly 60% or 70% of its tanks, whereas NATO will have to destroy only a few hundred, there is a disproportion because of the disproportion that existed in the first place, given the asymmetry of conventional forces in Europe that was very much to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact. I say this because, as I understand it, one of the problems that will affect the future processes of destruction and verification in the Soviet Union will be, or is being, determined by the fact that, having moved vast quantities of military equipment to the other side of the Urals, the Soviets may not destroy as much equipment as might first have been thought. Indeed, as somebody has said, this transfer operation may be thought to be in breach of the spirit of the agreement. And although it is intended that a large part of the equipment moved to the Asiatic zone of the Soviet Union be destroyed, this destruction may not in principle be subject to the verification arrangements for which the agreement provides. This will no doubt be one of the thorny questions to be resolved by the future advisory committee charged with monitoring implementation.

Lastly, I would just refer to another point in the report – which has already been mentioned – about the effect on civilian research which to begin with will have priority over the armaments industry. On this matter I would simply say that although, of course, this will be the situation both in the Soviet Union and in other countries, I think that to a large extent some of these technological processes can be used for both civilian and military applications. In some degree the distinction between research for specifically military or specifically civilian purposes, which used to be clear-cut, is becoming blurred by the alternative uses that many of the products concerned are now beginning to have in industry.

To conclude, these were just a few remarks on a report which is generally excellent and complete, and which throws much light both on the process that will shortly be applied in the Soviet Union and on the parallel processes that may occur in other countries.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Moya.

I now call Mr. Elisseev, an observer from the Soviet Union, who I think is with us for the first time.

Mr. ELISSEEV (*Observer from the USSR*) (Translation). – I first wish to express our gratitude for giving us the possibility to attend this session. We are very interested in fostering co-operation between parliamentarians and consider this possibility to be a sign of your will to build jointly the political foundations for the harmonious development of the world.

Towards the end of the twentieth century, competition between the military powers of states exceeded acceptable limits. There are now, in the world, several times the volume of arms needed to wipe out our civilisation completely. Continuing the arms race merely increases the possibility of a disastrous trend of events.

The Soviet Union is now proposing to terminate competition and reverse the trend. This is the specific goal of converting our country's defence industry. The degree of conversion is determined by reasonable sufficiency for the security of the state. We hope the level of this sufficiency will decrease although we see that not all the participants in the arms race have decided to stop it. Many types of dangerous weapons are still being developed. This is a warning for us.

The report presented at the session today largely corresponds to our assessment of the course to be followed by conversion in the Soviet Union and the problems we shall have to overcome.

According to the plans that have been adopted, military expenditure in our country is to be reduced by 14% in 1990-91 and, by about 1995, its proportion of GNP should be reduced by one and a half. Conversion affects about 500 firms which are now organising co-operation with firms in France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Federal Germany and other countries and we are gaining experience with direct links between firms. There are certain obstacles to be overcome such as the negative influence of the restrictive Cocom lists.

We believe all countries have an interest in developing co-operation, which must become multilateral, and here Western European Union might play a significant rôle. In this respect, it would be very useful to organise consultations between representatives of WEU and parliamentarians from Eastern European countries.

The parliamentary charter invites us to pursue conversion in military, political and economic concepts. We hope this conversion will be a success.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that most interesting contribution, Mr. Elisseev.

The President (continued)

The next speaker is Mr. Moreira.

Mr. MOREIRA (*Portugal*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) signed in Helsinki in 1975 opened up new opportunities for scientific and technological exchange. In implementation of the conclusions of this conference a number of meetings took place between experts from the West and from Central and Eastern Europe, promoting personal contacts and political détente.

Unhappily, at the beginning of the eighties relations between the East and West again deteriorated and a period of tension due to the worsening of the international climate led to the freezing of various programmes of international co-operation, in particular the joint United States-Soviet Union programmes in the field of energy, transport and space research.

However, with the rise of President Gorbachev to political leadership in the Soviet Union the authorities of that country began to exhibit increasing concern about the deplorable state of the national economy at a time when military expenditure represented a high proportion of gross national product.

This significant change in Soviet policy announced and implemented by Mr. Gorbachev led to reductions in personnel and equipment in the Soviet armed forces, reductions which began after his speech in December 1988 before the General Assembly of the United Nations and which have continued up to the present time.

The freeing of budgetary resources, staff and personnel undertaken in parallel with reductions in military personnel and equipment enabled the Soviet state to begin converting its military industry and using the capacities thus released for civilian purposes.

In addition to this, from 1989 onwards opinion in Western Europe increasingly held that the threats to world peace were no longer coming from Central and Eastern Europe but were arising in certain countries of the South and the third world. This new trend of opinion in the West influenced the report submitted by the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the subject of a report on the arms trade and the rights of man, in which it was suggested that a Cocom (Co-ordinating Committee for the Multilateral Control of Exports) within which eastern and western countries were working together to prohibit the export of sensitive products to certain countries of the South, would be extremely useful.

Unhappily, the crisis in the Gulf which began on 2nd August last, came as a confirmation of

the concern of this body of opinion in Europe.

In fact, as I said earlier, more and more people in western countries have been coming to this conclusion as the Central and Eastern European countries have been ending the communist régimes under which they had lived for four decades and returning to democracy and to democratic freedom, or have taken decisive steps towards transforming themselves into democratic legal states and, economically, into market economies.

In addition to Mr. Gorbachev's political will and to the trends of opinion in Europe mentioned above, one should also mention that various domestic consumer goods such as colour televisions, audio and video equipment, refrigerators and sewing machines are now being almost entirely manufactured by the Soviet defence industries.

As early as 1971 the then Secretary-General of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, stated that civilian products represented 40% of the total production of the defence industry, and this percentage remained stable until 1988. According to information released by the Soviet authorities, it was due to increase to 50% in 1990, 53% in 1991 and 60% before 1995.

At first sight, and bearing in mind that the factories now producing domestic capital goods were dependent upon the nine ministries into which the great Soviet military defence complex was divided, it seemed easy to implement the conversion of the defence industry. This, however, did not happen in 1988 and 1989, a fact which led the military-industrial commission (the authority co-ordinating the defence complex) and the Defence Industry Department of Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) to initiate, together with the Ministry of Defence, a national programme of conversion of the defence industry covering the years 1991-95 under which the defence industry was to direct its effort of civilian production into the following three main areas: improving the living standards of the population; stimulating scientific and technical progress in industrial sectors and in the national economy as a whole; and lastly, developing new types of technological materials in civil production.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the well-constructed report of our colleague Mr. Tummers, whom I congratulate and thank once more, contains ample arguments to deserve our unqualified approval, as does also the draft recommendation, since international peace and security will be more secure and lasting the more countries and their people work together, become better acquainted and create bonds of mutual friendship and brotherhood.

The PRESIDENT. — Obrigado, Mr. Moreira.

The President (continued)

Before I call the next speaker, colleagues may be interested to know that the previous speaker, Mr. Elisseev, was one of the early Soviet cosmonauts. We congratulate him on what must have been a brave adventure.

The next speaker is Mrs. van den Brink.

Mrs. van den BRINK (*Member of the European Parliament, Observer*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to take the floor here for the first time as the representative of the European Parliament. I consider it very important for closer contacts to be established between the European Parliament and WEU. We will undoubtedly find ways and means of achieving this at the intergovernmental conference to be held in Rome in December.

It is a great pleasure for me to make a few comments on Mr. Tummers's report. I am not a little impressed by his clear analysis. As you can imagine, I have not yet studied the report in depth and there has been no opportunity to discuss it in the European Parliament. On the other hand, we have discussed it with three representatives of the European Parliament, and we certainly endorse its conclusions and recommendations. But, once again, I must add the qualification that the report has not yet been studied in depth.

Aid to the Soviet Union is, of course, an extremely topical issue. As you know, the European Parliament has discussed it at length and on many occasions, and a co-operation agreement has been signed with the Soviet Union. Yesterday, it was decided that a special ECOFIN Council meeting would be held on 12th December to discuss aid to the Soviet Union, which is based on four elements. Among other things, a long-term view of aid to and co-operation with the Soviet Union will be established and the existing agreement will be approved.

In the European Parliament we could regard Mr. Tummers's report as a guideline for the report we are ourselves drawing up on the reduction of arms exports and conversion (*konversiya*) in the region. I am therefore very pleased to be able to take this home with me. I would like it if Mr. Tummers could find a way to come and explain it more fully to us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much for that helpful intervention and constructive offer. I am sure that we need to avoid duplication, and if you can build upon what Nic Tummers has done it will help everyone.

I call Mr. Pedregosa.

Mr. PEDREGOSA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first congratulate

Mr. Tummers on giving us such an informative and finely-shaded report. Though this may be unfortunate for everybody, both our Soviet friends and ourselves, it is highly accurate and true. For the sake of brevity I shall only touch lightly upon some aspects which seem to me of the greatest importance and on which I am broadly in agreement with what was said by Mr. Moya.

Undoubtedly the most serious problem facing the Soviet Union is how to overcome an extremely serious economic crisis given the fact that its other tasks, such as the introduction of a democratic system, etc., are fundamentally dependent upon its ability to bring this crisis under control. The improvement of the country's industrial network or its creation in many cases is crucially important to economic reform and our immediate concern is with this area. The conversion of the Soviet defence industry is not simply a military matter, as might largely be the case in the West; in this country it is a problem of survival, for here conversion will always have a twofold meaning – disarmament and economic reform having to be put into effect in a situation of virtual paralysis.

With respect to agreements on disarmament may I remind you of the enormous cost of destroying conventional armaments, which nearly always implies a capital loss and which, as I see it, is very important since it will also have a negative effect on the conversion process. Moreover, the disarmament process involves verification and control, which does not come cheaply either. We shall have to ensure that the part of the defence industry which remains military can be used for this verification and monitoring function, which will have a civilian technological spin-off that fortunately can be utilised. I refer basically to space technology.

Although the Soviet Union has achieved spectacular progress in the area of defence technology, it has so far lacked effective civil applications, contrary to the situation in the West, where both lines of development have run in parallel. This being so, the conversion should apply not only to the heavy primary industries, but to the most technologically advanced sectors, because it is from these that the greatest benefit will come in manufacturing terms, and that the transfer of technology to civil industry can be most relevant.

May I in closing mention something that recently came to my notice. The Spanish firm CASA, which manufactures aeronautical products and is a world leader in carbon fibre components, was the first western aerospace company to visit a similar Soviet company Ilyushin, for the purpose of sharing engineering knowhow, with an eye to the future joint production of equipment exclusively for civil use. I believe this to be an extremely good way to help with the conversion of the Soviet defence

Mr. Pedregosa (continued)

industry, applying our knowhow, experience and investment for this urgent purpose and thus no doubt benefiting not only our Soviet friends but also our whole community.

The PRESIDENT. – The last speaker in the debate is Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Like you, Mr. President, I was particularly interested in this report by Senator Tummers, not least because of my experience as a Rapporteur when I presented the report on Cocom which was debated and adopted here exactly a year ago. I am delighted that so many of the report's recommendations have since been implemented. Mr. Elisseev will also be glad to learn that.

I, too, congratulate the Rapporteur on the thoroughness of his report. Thanks to the end of the cold war, the Soviet Union is not alone in facing the challenge of converting its swords into ploughshares. The peace dividend is presenting problems to many of the member states of WEU and NATO, and I am sure that my country is not alone in the depressingly familiar round of announcements of closures and redundancies in our defence industries. But, fortunately for us, our defence industries do not dominate our economy as they do in the Soviet Union. In addition, because our defence industries are mostly in private hands, they enjoy the freedom, flexibility and motivation to retrain, retool and diversify. That is what *konversiya* is all about.

It is quite simply because the opposite is true in the Soviet Union that *konversiya* is proving neither as quick nor as easy a fix as had originally been hoped in contributing to the reversal of a declining economy and to meeting the demands of the Soviet consumers. Although I fully support the recommendation that the West should share advice and expertise with our Soviet counterparts where it is prudent so to do, I am not at all enthusiastic about calling for western investment and involvement until the Soviet Union has undertaken the essential political and economic reforms that will enable *konversiya* to deliver. I mean the full-hearted opportunity for, and encouragement of, private ownership, a market economy and a pluralist society – in short, the practical realisation of the qualifications for full membership of the Council of Europe.

However, there is one area in which *konversiya* could improve the lot of the Soviet people immediately. That is in the redeployment of the manpower in the Red Army.

We must all be aware of the current food crisis in the Soviet Union as winter approaches. Rationing is now being introduced. That crisis is not just caused by an inadequate production of food – after all, the Soviet Union has produced

a record harvest this year. Between 20% and 30% of that food fails to reach the shops and it is clear that there are problems of distribution due to inadequate storage, inadequate transport and inadequate roads. It is a scandal that food is rotting in the fields and on the road sides in the country while people are going hungry in the cities.

The redundant Red Army could be put to good work immediately digging and picking the harvest and transporting the food to the distributors, the middle men, and on to the shops to prevent hoarding and corruption. It could also be used to improve the roads in the country and in the cities, where they are abysmal. I am sure that Senator Tummers found that as he was enjoying cultural activities in Moscow.

Such are the immediate needs of the Soviet people to which *konversiya* could respond. I hope that the report before us will make more than a passing contribution to solving what is fast becoming the biggest crisis facing our continent today.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Atkinson.

That completes the list of speakers. There is an interesting paradox for colleagues to consider. Today, we have had no time-limit on speeches, but virtually everyone kept within five minutes. Why is it that when we have a five minute time-limit almost everyone tries to exceed it? That is worth thinking about.

Does the Rapporteur of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Mr. Tummers, wish to reply?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to thank all the speakers for their contributions to this debate.

Three of them referred to the verification of developments. I think this should follow on from what I have said about keeping abreast of developments. I referred in this context to putting intentions into practice. I believe two years must pass before we can again consider how successful verification has been. Mr. Moya went off at rather a tangent. In my opinion, what he said in this context did not really have anything to do with this debate, but although the President ruled the subject out of order, I will address it briefly. The issues connected with the Paris agreements and the withdrawal of tanks beyond the Urals have nothing to do with this debate, unless the removal of the tanks beyond the Urals is connected with the self-destruction of the tanks as a result of poor maintenance and so on.

Mr. President, I am very grateful to our Soviet colleague for joining in the debate and for expressing the intention to proceed to conversion in such clear terms. In so doing, he placed added emphasis on what we have said in

Mr. Tummers (continued)

our report. I saw this as underlining the report, and I am happy about that.

I am particularly grateful for the follow-up opportunities, to which particular reference was made in the statement by Mrs. van den Brink of the European Parliament. I look forward with interest to seeing what happens on 12th December. I gladly accept her kind invitation to participate in what the European Parliament does on this subject. I welcome – endorsing the President's words – the fact that real co-operation can take place in this way.

There was a reference to unrest in the Red Army and developments that might lead to further demilitarisation. We have not enlarged on these aspects of the report. We have referred mainly to the social problem in businesses. We have not concerned ourselves with the details in other areas. For those interested I deliberately referred to an article in this morning's Figaro.

Reference was made to conversion in relation to the space industry. Discussions with our Soviet colleague outside this chamber have revealed that the intention is to make available to the medical world, for example, much of the technology developed by the space industry. So this will also be of immediate benefit to society as a whole.

Mr. President, Mr. Atkinson asked me if I had seen the corn rotting in the fields and so on. One can certainly pinpoint this and link it with the word "scandal", but I would point out that there are also many things in our part of Europe that are rotting, and to which we could attach the word "scandal". When all is said and done, we have cities half rotting away here and I find that scandalous. I will not put it that way in this case, mainly because it would detract from my intention to give the greatest possible support to the processes that have begun in the Soviet Union and would throw a spanner in my thinking works. This does not mean that I have no criticism to make, but I feel we should make a different use of our criticism.

Mr. President, I have been able to draw up this report – I have already expressed my gratitude to everyone involved – thanks to the committee as the production machine and especially to our committee secretary. My sincere thanks to him for his supervision and inspiration. I am also grateful to him for his critical marginal notes on the ideas committed to paper. I particularly want to emphasise this.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers.

Does Mr. Stegagnini, the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, wish to speak?

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of all the members of the Technological and Aerospace Committee I wish to congratulate Mr. Tummers and the secretary of the committee on this important contribution to our debate.

The report in question comes before the WEU Assembly at a very important juncture in international life from the standpoint of East-West relations and more especially the new relations between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

The presence today in this chamber and the participation in our debate of a Soviet parliamentarian, who has been able to contribute most pertinently thanks to his personal knowledge of aerospace matters – he was an astronaut – has given me great satisfaction.

Mrs. van den Brink, speaking as a member of the European Parliament, has told us that the topic we are considering has also been discussed in another European forum, so that we may be proud of having initiated a highly interesting and productive collaboration between different institutions.

The problem of the conversion of the defence industry affects not only the Soviet Union but also many Western European countries, as many speakers have pointed out. This raises difficult and sensitive questions not only in economic and social terms but also in relation to technological development and the availability of funding for research in the defence field, which has always led the way in relation to research in other areas.

I am pleased that Mr. Atkinson referred to the report on Cocom which we submitted a year ago to those in charge of this international body concerned with trade in technology and strategic goods and suggesting that they should modify their previous policy. This was done as we confirmed on our trip to Moscow last spring and in other meetings with Soviet political representatives.

A new collaborative relationship is also developing between some western countries – Italy, France and Spain – and the Soviet Union with regard to the conversion of the defence industry. Having set such a large-scale operation in motion the Soviet Union is now faced with critical problems, though I believe this will also stimulate market mechanisms in the advanced technology sector.

A feature at recent international aerospace exhibitions has been the active presence of Soviet industries which, to go by the quality of the products on show, is now appealing not only to its traditional markets in the satellite countries and those linked to the communist system, but also to western countries.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

This is a first example of market co-operation arising from industrial conversion.

I believe that the report in question is of great importance and is similar in this to the Cocom report of a year ago. I also feel it represents a major WEU contribution to knowhow and co-operation in the most important sectors of technology and the defence industry.

In this field WEU has behind it an outstanding tradition which is likely to be maintained and enhanced especially if, as seems probable, other European bodies are faced with the same problems. This would pave the way to integrating technology and scientific research into the overall European political scene.

I thank Mr. Tummers and the secretary of the committee for their contribution and I hope that the report will enjoy a large consensus of support as this is a document of considerable value both in its contents and the prospects which it opens up.

The PRESIDENT. – The Technological and Aerospace Committee has tabled a draft recommendation, to which no amendments have been tabled.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1249.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

5. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT. – We have now reached the end of the second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly. We would all agree that it has been a useful and informative session. We have debated a most current issue and I am sure that by the time we meet again in June we shall find that much has become clearer about intergovernmental co-operation, bearing in mind the Rome conference next week. In the light of it and the ministers' meeting on Monday, we may know more about the relationships between the various organisations. We have a full agenda for June.

I wish you all a happy Christmas and happy, healthy and prosperous new year.

I declare the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union closed.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 11.40 a.m.)

1. See page 44.

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

I – First part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session II – Second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session

	Page		Page
A			
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts		Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991	
Presentation of the motion to approve the final –	II - 161	Presentation of the report	II - 156-157
Vote on the motion	II - 162	Debate on the report	II - 158-161
Action by the Presidential Committee		Vote on the draft budget for 1991 .	II - 161
Presentation of the report	I - 53-55 II - 51-53	C	
Debate on the report	I - 55-56 II - 53	Committees	
Address by:		Changes in the membership of – ..	I - 75, 139 II - 96
The Provisional President	I - 44-45	Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	
The President	I - 46-49 II - 47-51	Presentation of the report	II - 162
Mr. Martinez	I - 50-51	Debate on the report	II - 162-176
Mr. Soares Costa	I - 51-52	Amendment 1 by Mr. Brito	II - 177
Mr. van Eekelen	I - 56-60 II - 53-56	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 178
– Questions and answers	I - 60-61 II - 56-58	Amendment 2 by Mr. Brito	II - 178
Mr. Eyskens	I - 76-81	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 178
– Questions and answers	I - 81-86	Amendment 3 by Mr. Brito	II - 178
Mr. Coëme	I - 118-122	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 179
– Questions and answers	I - 122-127	Amendment 4 by Mr. Brito	II - 179
Mr. Jeszenszky	I - 127-130	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 179
– Questions and answers	I - 130-134	Amendment 5 by Mr. Brito	II - 179
Mr. Atwood	I - 141-145	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 179
– Questions and answers	I - 145-148	Amendment 6 by Mr. Brito	II - 180
Mr. Dumas	II - 76-78	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 180
– Questions and answers	II - 78-87	Amendment 7 by Mr. Brito	II - 180
Mr. Chevènement	II - 97-101	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 180
– Questions and answers	II - 101-112	Amendment 8 by Mr. Brito	II - 180
Mr. Bartholomew (read by Mr. Curley)	II - 123-125	– Adoption of the amendment	II - 180
Mr. Clark	II - 131-132	Vote on the amended draft recommendation	II - 181
– Questions and answers	II - 132-136	Credentials	
Attendance lists	I - 16, 18, 20, 26, 31, 38 II - 14, 23, 25, 29, 36, 41	Examination of	I - 45-56 II - 46
B			
Budget (see: Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990)		D	
		Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	
		Presentation of the report	I - 178-179
		Debate on the report	I - 179-181
		Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 182

	Page
E	
Enhancing WEU's public relations	
Presentation of the report	II - 151-152
Debate on the report	II - 152-156
Vote on the draft recommendation	II - 156
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	
Presentation of the reports	II - 87-89, 89-91
Joint debate on the reports	II - 91-96, 112-121, 125-130, 136-140 149-150
European security and the Gulf crisis:	
Amendment 1 by Mr. Soell	II - 141
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 141
Amendment 2 by Mr. Martinez ...	II - 142
- Amendment to the amendment .	II - 144
- Adoption of the amended amendment	II - 144
Amendment 3 by Mr. Martinez ...	II - 144
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 145
Amendment 4 by Mr. Scheer	II - 141
- Amendment 4 not moved	II - 141
Amendment 5 by Mr. Pieralli	II - 140
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 140
Amendment 6 by Mr. De Decker ..	II - 140
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 141
Amendment 7 by Mr. De Decker ..	II - 141
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 141
Amendment 8 by Mr. De Decker ..	II - 142
- Withdrawal of the amendment ..	II - 143
Amendment 9 by Mr. De Decker ..	II - 142
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 144
Amendment 10 by Mr. De Decker .	II - 143
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 143
Amendment 11 by Mr. De Decker .	II - 143
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 143
Amendment 12 by Mr. Pieralli	II - 145
- Adoption of the amendment	II - 145
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	II - 146
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region:	
Amendment 1 by Mr. Lambie	II - 146
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 146
Amendment 2 by Mr. Lambie	II - 147
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 147
Amendment 3 by Mr. Stoffelen	II - 146-147
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 147
Amendment 4 by Mr. Martinez ...	II - 147-148
- Rejection of the amendment	II - 148
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	II - 148

	Page
F	
Future of low flying (see: The future of low flying)	
I	
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	
Presentation of the report	I - 148-150
Debate on the report	I - 150-154
Amendment 1 by Mr. Fourré	I - 154-155
- Rejection of the amendment	I - 155
Amendment 2 by Mr. Fourré	I - 155
- Amendment to the amendment .	I - 155-156
- Adoption of the amended amendment	I - 156
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	I - 156
K	
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet mil- itary industry	
Presentation of the report	II - 181-182
Debate on the report	II - 182-188
Vote on the draft recommendation	II - 188
M	
Minutes	
Adoption of the -	I - 76, 97, 118, 141, 168 II - 46, 76, 97, 123, 151, 177
N	
New rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly (see: The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly)	
O	
Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the sym- posium	
Presentation of the report	I - 135-137
Debate on the report	I - 137-139
Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 139
Observers	I - 46, 76 II - 47
Opinion on the budgets of the minis- terial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	
Presentation of the report	I - 182
Debate on the report	I - 183-184
Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 184

INDEX

	Page		Page
Order of business			
Adoption of the -	I - 53 II - 51		
Change in the -	I - 167 II - 148, 176		
Orders of the day	I - 12, 17, 19 24, 29, 36 II - 12, 21, 24, 26, 34, 38		
P			
President			
Election of the -	I - 46		
Address by the -	I - 46-49 II - 47-51		
R			
Reports of committees			
Re-enrolment of - on the agenda -	I - 53		
Enrolment of - on the agenda - ...	II - 51		
Report of the Council, Thirty-sixth annual (first part)			
Presentation by Mr. Dumas	II - 76-78		
- Questions and answers	II - 78-87		
Presentation by Mr. Chevènement .	II - 97-101		
- Questions and answers	II - 101-112		
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty			
(a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council			
Presentation of the report	II - 59		
Debate on the report	II - 59-62		
Vote on the draft recommendation	II - 63		
(b) WEU and the EEC			
Presentation of the report	II - 63-64		
Debate on the report	II - 64-74		
Vote on the draft recommendation	II - 74-75		
S			
Session			
Opening of the -	I - 44		
Adjournment of the -	I - 184		
Resumption of the -	II - 46		
Close of the -	II - 188		
T			
Texts adopted:			
Recommendations			
- 480: WEU in the Atlantic Alliance -	I - 21		
- 481: Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 27		
- 482: Observation satellites - a European means of verifying dis- armament - guidelines drawn from the symposium	I - 28		
- 483: Independent European Pro- gramme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 32		
- 484: WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence	I - 33		
- 485: Future of low flying	I - 39		
- 486: Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	I - 41		
- 487: Budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	I - 42		
- 488: Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf	II - 15		
- 489: European security and events in the Near and Middle East	II - 16		
- 490: Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty	II - 19		
- 491: WEU and the European Community	II - 20		
- 492: European security and the Gulf crisis	II - 30		
- 493: Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region ...	II - 32		
- 494: Enhancing WEU's public relations	II - 37		
- 495: Consequences of develop- ments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security ...	II - 42		
- 496: Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 44		
Resolution			
- 82: The new rôle of national dele- gations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 35		
Order			
- 76: WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence	I - 34		
The future of low flying			
Presentation of the report	I - 168-169		
Debate on the report	I - 169-177		
Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 177-178		
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly			
Presentation of the report	I - 158-159		
Debate on the report	I - 159-167		
Vote on the draft resolution	I - 167		

INDEX

	Page		Page
Tribute to Robert Edwards, a former Vice-President of the Assembly	I - 148		
V			
Vice-Presidents			
Election of -	I - 49-50, 75 II - 51		
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union			
Presentation of the report	I - 105-106		
Debate on the report	I - 106-117, 134-135		
Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 135		
		W	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	
		Presentation of the report	I - 61-63
		Debate on the report	I - 63-75, 86-96 97-105
		Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 105
		WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence	
		Presentation of the report	I - 156-157
		Debate on the report	I - 157
		Vote on the draft recommendation	I - 157-158
		Vote on the draft order	I - 158

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

I – First part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session II – Second part of the thirty-sixth ordinary session

	Page		Page
A			
Mr. Ahrens (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Mr. Atkinson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 85	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 149-150
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 104-105	Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 186
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ..	II - 57	Mr. Atwood (<i>Deputy Secretary of Defence of the United States</i>):	
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council	II - 63	Address by –	I - 142-145
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 74	Replies to questions	I - 145-148
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 139-140, 141, 143, 144, 145	B	
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 162, 174-176, 178, 180	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (<i>Netherlands</i>):	
Mr. Amaral (<i>Portugal</i>):		The future of low flying	I - 173
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council	II - 61	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 112-113, 141
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 72	Mr. Bartholomew (<i>Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State</i>):	
General Andjelkovic (<i>Observer from Yugoslavia</i>):		Address read by Mr. Curley, United States Ambassador to France	II - 124-125
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 136-137	Mr. Baumel (<i>France</i>):	
Mr. Antretter (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 86-87
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 94-95	Mr. Beix (<i>France</i>):	
Question put to Mr. Chevènement ..	II - 103	Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 79
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 119-120	Mr. Benassi (<i>Italy</i>):	
Mr. Askin (<i>Observer from Turkey</i>):		European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 116
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 125	Mr. Bowden (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 92-93
		Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 166
		Mrs. van den Brink (<i>Member of the European Parliament, Observer</i>):	
		Konversiya – conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 185
		Mr. Brito (<i>Portugal</i>):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 75
		Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ...	I - 133

	Page
C	
Mr. Caro (France):	
Accession of Portugal and Spain ...	I - 52
Action by the Presidential Committee	I - 55-56
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 73-74
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 81
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 160-161
Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	I - 180
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	I - 183
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 79
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 95-96
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 102-103
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 179
Mrs. Castellina (Member of the European Parliament, Observer):	
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 106, 107
Mr. Cetin (Observer from Turkey):	
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 82
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 101
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 115-116
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 124
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 84
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 115-116
Mr. Chevènement (Minister of Defence of France):	
Address by -	II - 97-101
Replies to questions	II - 101-112
Mr. Clark (Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom):	
Address by -	II - 131-132
Replies to questions	II - 132-136
Mr. Coëme (Minister of Defence of Belgium):	
Address by -	I - 118-122
Replies to questions	I - 122-127
Mr. Colombo (Italy):	
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 117-118

	Page
Mr. Curley (United States Ambassador to France):	
Address by Mr. Bartholomew, Under-Secretary for International Security Affairs, United States Department of State	II - 124-125
D	
Mr. De Decker (Belgium):	
Accession of Portugal and Spain ...	I - 53
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 95-96
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 125
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 82
European security and the Gulf crisis	II - 87-89, 138-139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (Netherlands):	
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 69-71
Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 89-91 139, 147, 148
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 105
Mr. Diaz (Spain):	
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991	II - 158
Mr. Dumas (Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, Chairman-in-Office of the Council):	
Address by -	II - 76-78
Replies to questions	II - 78-87
E	
Mr. van Eekelen (Secretary-General of WEU):	
Address by -	I - 56-60 II - 53-56
Replies to questions	I - 60-61 II - 56-58
Mr. Eicher (Belgium):	
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 122
Mr. Eisma (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 127
Mr. Elisseev (Observer from the USSR):	
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 183
Mr. Esteves (Portugal):	
Enhancing WEU's public relations .	II - 154-155
Mr. Ewing (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 84

INDEX

	Page		Page
Mr. Eyskens (<i>Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council</i>):		European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 128
Address by -	I - 76-81	Mr. Fourré (<i>France</i>):	
Replies to questions	I - 81-86	Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the symposium	I - 137-138
F			
Mr. Fassino (<i>Italy</i>):		Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	I - 179-180
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 110-111	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 118-119
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 92-93	G	
Mr. Feldmann (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Mr. Gabbuggiani (<i>Italy</i>):	
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 112-113	Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 147
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 111	Mrs. Garcia Manzanares (<i>Spain</i>):	
Dame Peggy Fenner (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Enhancing WEU's public relations .	II - 153-154
The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 155	Mr. Garrett (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 162-163	The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 150-151
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 135
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ..	I - 60 II - 56	Mr. Goerens (<i>Luxembourg</i>):	
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 61-63 102-104	Action by the Presidential Committee	I - 53-65
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 82	Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 111
Point of order	I - 122	H	
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 123	Mr. Hardy (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 145	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 93-94
The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 154, 155, 156	Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 146
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council	II - 59, 60, 61 61-62, 62	Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 108
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 63-64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74	Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 133-134
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 81-82	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 137-138
Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 134	Mr. Hill (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 173-174	Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	I - 178-179, 181
Mr. Fioret (<i>Italy</i>):		Mrs. Hoffmann (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 109	Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 84-85
Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ...	I - 133	Sir John Hunt (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
		The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 158-159, 166-167

	Page		Page	
J				
Mr. Jessel (United Kingdom):				
Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 126	Observers	I - 46	
Point of order	I - 156 II - 107	Election of the President	I - 46	
The future of low flying	I - 172-173, 177	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 65-67	
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 144	Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 70-71	
Mr. Jeszenszky (Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary):				
Address by -	I - 128-130	Mr. Lambie (United Kingdom):		
Replies to questions	I - 130-134	Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 84	
Sir Russell Johnston (United Kingdom):				
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 83	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 129-130, 146, 147	
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 83-84	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette (Luxembourg):		
Question put to Mr. Chevènement ..	II - 107	Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky	I - 132-133	
Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 133	Action by the Presidential Com- mittee	II - 53	
K				
Earl of Kinnoull (United Kingdom):				
Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 135	Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ..	II - 58	
Mr. Kiraly (Observer from Hungary):				
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 117	Mr. Lenzer (Federal Republic of Germany):		
Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the sym- posium				I - 135-137, 138
Mr. Klejdzinski (Federal Republic of Germany):				
Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 84	Mr. Liapis (Observer from Greece):		
Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the sym- posium	I - 137	Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 172	
The Independent European Pro- gramme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 151, 154, 155, 156	Mr. Lopez Henares (Spain):		
The future of low flying	I - 168-169 176-177	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 93	
Opinion on the budgets of the minis- terial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	I - 184	Enhancing WEU's public relations ..	II - 154	
Mr. Kosutic (Observer from Yugo- slavia):				
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 111	Mr. Lopez Valdivielso (Spain):		
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 163-164	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 99-100	
L				
Mr. Lagorce (France):				
Address by the Provisional Pres- ident -	I - 44-45	Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council	II - 60-61	
Examination of credentials	I - 45-46	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 126	
Mr. Lord (United Kingdom):				
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 71-72	Mr. Lord (United Kingdom):		
Opinion on the budgets of the minis- terial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	I - 182,184	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 71-72	
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 69-70	Opinion on the budgets of the minis- terial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1989 (revised) and 1990	I - 182,184	
M				
Lord Mackie (United Kingdom):				
Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky	I - 131	Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 69-70	
Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 145	M		
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 164-165	Lord Mackie (United Kingdom):		

INDEX

	Page		Page
The future of low flying	I - 175	Mr. Müller (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 137	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 89-90
Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991	II - 158-159	Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991	II - 158
Mr. Malfatti (<i>Italy</i>):		Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 164-165
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>b</i>) WEU and the European Community	II - 65-67		
Mr. Maris (<i>Netherlands</i>):		N	
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 68	Lord Newall (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
The future of low flying	I - 169-170	Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 106, 134
Mr. Martinez (<i>Spain</i>):		Mr. Niegel (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
Accession of Spain	I - 50-51	Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991	II - 159-160
Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ...	I - 131-132	Mr. Nñez (<i>Spain</i>):	
Action by the Presidential Committee	II - 51-53	Enhancing WEU's public relations .	II - 152-153
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	II - 110		
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 120-121, 143, 144, 147-148	P	
Point of order	II - 143, 145	Mr. Pachtas (<i>Observer from Greece</i>):	
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 178, 179, 180	Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 166-167
Mr. Martino (<i>Italy</i>):		Mr. Pécriaux (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 113	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 114-115
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 84	Mr. Pedregosa (<i>Spain</i>):	
Mr. Meisel (<i>Observer from the German Democratic Republic</i>):		Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 185-186
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 116-117	Mr. Perinat (<i>Spain</i>):	
Mr. Mezzapesa (<i>Italy</i>):		Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>b</i>) WEU and the European Community	II - 68-69
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 107-108	Mr. Pieralli (<i>Italy</i>):	
Mr. Moreira (<i>Portugal</i>):		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 63-64
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 184	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 140, 142, 144, 145
Mr. Morris (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Mr. Pontillon (<i>France</i>):	
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 68	Address by -	I - 46-49 II - 47-51
Mr. Mota Torres (<i>Portugal</i>):		Election of Vice-Presidents	I - 49-50, 75 II - 51
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 168-169	Observers	I - 76 II - 47
Mr. Moya (<i>Spain</i>):		Tribute to Mr. Robert Edwards ...	I - 148
The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 164	Mr. de Puig (<i>Spain</i>):	
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>b</i>) WEU and the European Community	II - 67-68	Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 113-114
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 171-172	Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (<i>b</i>) WEU and the European Community	II - 64-65
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 182-183		

Page	Page
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security II - 162-164	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 149
R	
Mr. Rathbone (United Kingdom):	Sir William Shelton (United Kingdom):
Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ... I - 130	WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence I - 157
Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1991 II - 156-158 160-161	The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly I - 159-160, 167
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 - the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts II - 161	Enhancing WEU's public relations . II - 155-156
Mr. Reddemann (Federal Republic of Germany):	Sir Dudley Smith (United Kingdom):
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance I - 64-65	Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union I - 134-135
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 146	Question put to Mr. Atwood I - 145
Mrs. Roe (United Kingdom):	The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly I - 161-162
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 94-95	The future of low flying I - 177
Mr. Roman (Spain):	Question put to Mr. Chevènement . II - 105
Enhancing WEU's public relations . II - 151-152, 155	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 139-140, 146, 147, 148
Mr. Romero (Spain):	Mr. Soares Costa (Portugal):
Question put to Mr. Chevènement . II - 109	Accession of Portugal I - 51-52
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 127-128	Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community II - 72-74
Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security II - 167-168	Mr. Soell (Federal Republic of Germany):
S	
Mr. Sarti (Italy):	WEU in the Atlantic Alliance I - 97-99
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance I - 72-73	Question put to Mr. Coëme I - 124
Mr. Scheer (Federal Republic of Germany):	Question put to Mr. Atwood I - 146-147
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen .. II - 56-57	Question put to Mr. Dumas II - 81
Question put to Mr. Dumas II - 78-79	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 118
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 93-94	Mr. Sole-Tura (Spain):
Question put to Mr. Chevènement . II - 102	Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union I - 114-115
Point of order II - 112	Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ... I - 132
Mr. Scovacricchi (Italy):	European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region II - 128-129
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council II - 59-60	Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security II - 169-171
	Mr. Speed (United Kingdom):
	Question put to Mr. van Eekelen .. I - 61
	Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union I - 108-109

	Page		Page
Question put to Mr. Jeszenszky ...	I - 131		
Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 146		
The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 151-152, 155		
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 82		
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 126-127		
Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 134		
Mr. Spiliotopoulos (Observer from Greece):			
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 101-102		
Mr. Stegagnini (Italy):			
Observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the symposium	I - 138-139		
The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 153,154,155 155-156		
WEU, research institutes and non-governmental organisations concerned with security and European defence	I - 156-157		
The future of low flying	I - 174-175		
Developments in command, control, communications and intelligence (C ³ I)	I - 181		
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ..	II - 58		
Question put to Mr. Dumas	II - 84		
Question put to Mr. Chevènement ..	II - 104		
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 113-114		
Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 187-188		
Mr. Steiner (Federal Republic of Germany):			
The future of low flying	I - 173-174		
Mr. Stoffelen (Netherlands):			
Accession of Portugal and Spain ...	I - 52-53		
WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 87-89		
Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (b) WEU and the European Community	II - 71-72		
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 140-141, 142 143, 146-147		
Sir John Stokes (United Kingdom):			
Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 110		
European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 116-117		
		T	
		Mr. Tummers (Netherlands):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 67
		The new rôle of national delegations in the activities of the WEU Assembly	I - 165-166
		The future of low flying	I - 171
		Revision of the modified Brussels Treaty (a) Reply to the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council	II - 62
		Konversiya - conversion in Soviet military industry	II - 181-182, 186-187
		V	
		Mr. Valleix (France):	
		Question put to Mr. Eyskens	I - 83
		Mr. Veryvakis (Observer from Greece):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 100-101
		European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 136, 149
		W	
		Mr. Ward (United Kingdom):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 102
		European security and the Gulf crisis; Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region	II - 92
		Question put to Mr. Clark	II - 133
		Consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security	II - 177
		Mr. Wielowieyski (Observer from Poland):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 90-92
		Mr. Wilkinson (United Kingdom):	
		WEU in the Atlantic Alliance	I - 68-69
		Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union	I - 106-107
		Question put to Mr. Coëme	I - 126
		The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Western European Union	I - 149-150, 152-153, 154-155, 156
		Point of order	I - 155
		Z	
		Mr. Zierer (Federal Republic of Germany):	
		Question put to Mr. Atwood	I - 148
		The future of low flying	I - 170-171