



Assembly of Western European Union

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1992

II

**Minutes
Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
CHEVALIER Pierre	SP
KELCHTERMANS Lambert	CVP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
SARENS Freddy	CVP
SEEUWS Willy	SP

Substitutes

MM. DE DECKER Armand	PRL
GHEsqUIÈRE Ferdinand	CVP
LAVERGE Jacques	PVV
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
OTTENBOURGH Yvan	CVP
THISSEN René	PSC
WINTGENS Pierre	PSC

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
AUTAIN François	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GAITS Claude	Socialist
de GAULLE Jean	RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUlt Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
Mr. BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU

MM. BÜCHLER Hans	SPD
BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MENZEL Bruno	FDP
MEYER zu BENTRUP Reinhard	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TERBORg Margitta	SPD
Mr. VOGEL Friedrich	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. JUNGHANNs Ulrich	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LUMMER Heinrich	CDU/CSU
MAASS Erich	CDU/CSU
MARTEN Günter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. MASCHER Ulrike	SPD
MM. MATSCHIE Christoph	SPD
MICHELS Meinolf	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
PROBST Albert	CDU/CSU
REIMANN Manfred	SPD
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHLUCKEBIER Günter	SPD
Mrs. von TEICHMAN Cornelia	FDP
Mr. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. BENASSI Ugo	PDS
CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FALCUCCI Franca	Chr. Dem.
MM. FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	PDS
MANCIA Tommaso	Socialist
MANZOLINI Gianni	Socialist
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	PDS
PIERALLI Piero	PDS
RODOTA Stefano	PDS
RUBBI Antonio	PDS
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CAPANNA Mario	ProL. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
COLOMBO Vittorino	Chr. Dem.
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	PDS
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	PDS
MESORACA Maurizio	PDS

MM. NEGRI Giovanni PASQUINO Gianfranco RAUTI Giuseppe RUBNER Hans SAVIO Gastone SCOVACRICCHI Martino TRIGLIA Riccardo ...	Radical Ind. Left MSI-DN SVP Chr. Dem. PSDI Chr. Dem. ...		
LUXEMBOURG			
Representatives			
Mrs. ERR Lydie Mr. GOERENS Charles Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Workers Dem. Soc. Chr.		
Substitutes			
MM. DIMMER Camille KONEN René REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Chr. Dem. Soc. Workers		
NETHERLANDS			
Representatives			
Mr. AARTS Harry Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob EISMA Doeke STOFFELEN Pieter van VELZEN Wim VERBEEK Jan Willem	CDA Labour CDA D66 Labour CDA VVD		
Substitutes			
MM. DEES Dick EVERSDIJK Huib JURGENS E.C.M. van der LINDEN René Mrs. SOUTENDIJK van APPELDOORN Marian H.J. Mr. TUMMERS Nicolas Mrs. VERSPAGET Josephine	VVD CDA Labour CDA CDA Labour Labour		
PORTUGAL			
Representatives			
MM. AMARAL Fernando BRITO Raul Fernando CANDAL Carlos FERNANDES MARQUES Joaquim MACHETE Rui Manuel PINTO Carlos ROSETA Pedro	Soc. Dem. Socialist Socialist Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem.		
Substitutes			
Mrs. AGUIAR Maria Manuela MM. ALEGRE Manuel CURTO Abilio Aleixo MARTINS Alberto de Sousa POÇAS SANTOS João Alvaro REIS LEITE José Guilherme RODRIGUES Miguel Urbano	Soc. Dem. Socialist Socialist Socialist Soc. Dem. Soc. Dem. PCP		
		SPAIN	
		Representatives	
		MM. ALVAREZ Francisco BORDERAS Augusto CUCO Alfons DIAZ Lorenzo FABRA Juan Manuel HOMS I FERRET Francesc LOPEZ HENARES José Luis MARTINEZ Miguel Angel MOYA Pedro PERINAT Luis Guillermo de PUIG Lluis Maria ROMAN Rafael	People's Party Socialist Socialist Soc. and Dem. Centre People's Party C.i.U. People's Party Socialist Socialist People's Party Socialist Socialist
		Substitutes	
		MM. BARRIONUEVO José BOLINAGA Imanol DIAZ DE MERA Agustin Mrs. FRIAS Milagros MM. GARCIA SANCHEZ Daniel GONZALEZ-LAXE Fernando Mrs. GUIRADO Ana MM. LOPEZ VALDIVIELSO Santiago NÚÑEZ Manuel PALACIOS Marcelo RUIZ Alberto VAZQUEZ Narcis	Socialist Basque Nat. People's Party Socialist Socialist Socialist Socialist People's Party Socialist Socialist People's Party United Left
		UNITED KINGDOM	
		Representatives	
		MM. ATKINSON David BANKS Tony COX Thomas Earl of DUNDEE Mr. FAULDS Andrew Dame Peggy FENNER Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG MM. HARDY Peter JESSEL Toby Sir Russell JOHNSTON Lord KIRKHILL MM. PARRY Robert REDMOND Martin Sir Dudley SMITH Mr. SPEED Keith Sir Donald THOMPSON MM. THOMPSON John WARD John	Conservative Labour Labour Conservative Labour Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative SLD Labour Labour Labour Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative
		Substitutes	
		MM. BOWDEN Andrew Sir Anthony DURANT Baroness HOOPER MM. HOWELL Ralph HUGHES Roy Sir John HUNT Mr. LITHERLAND Robert Lord MACKIE of BENSHE Lord NEWALL Miss NICHOLSON Emma MM. RATHBONE Tim ROWE Andrew	Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Labour Conservative Labour SLD Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative



I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session (Doc. 1300).
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1312).
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Composition of political groups (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order*, Doc. 1311).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Tributes to two former members of the Assembly

The President notified the Assembly of the deaths of Mr. Pontillon, former President of the Assembly, and Mr. Sarti, former Vice-President of the Assembly.

The Assembly paid tribute to their memory in observing a minute's silence.

5. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly.

6. Observers

The Provisional President welcomed the observers from Austria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey.

7. Election of the President

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely, Mr. Soell.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Soell was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Soell took the Chair.

8. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

9. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates were proposed for eight posts of Vice-President, namely, Mrs. Err, Mr. Fourré, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Kempinaire and Mr. Machete.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mrs. Err, Mr. Fourré, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Kempinaire and Mr. Machete were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

10. The situation in Yugoslavia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1316 and 1317)

The President announced that a request for a debate and a motion for a recommendation on the situation in Yugoslavia had been tabled by MM. Caro, De Decker, de Puig and others with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 44 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided to examine this request for urgent procedure immediately after the adoption of the draft order of business.

11. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1300)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was adopted.

12. The situation in Yugoslavia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1316 and 1317)

In accordance with Rule 44 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Yugoslavia.

Speakers: MM. De Decker and Martino.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The debate would take place on Tuesday, 2nd June, in the afternoon.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Defence Committee

Belgium

- Mr. Kelchtermans as a titular member and Mr. Sarens as an alternate member; Mr. Laverge as an alternate member;

Spain

- Mr. de Puig as a titular member and Mr. Moya as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Thompson and Lord Newall as titular members; MM. Hardy and Ward as alternate members.

Political Committee

Belgium

- MM. Wintgens and Seeuws as titular members; MM. Chevalier and Kelchtermans as alternate members;

Spain

- Mr. Moya as a titular member and Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Speed as titular members; MM. Redmond and Bowden as alternate members.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

Belgium

- Mr. Sarens as a titular member; MM. Monfils and Kempinaire as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Litherland and Sir Donald Thompson as titular members; Mr. Cox, Miss Nicholson and the Earl of Dundee as alternate members.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Belgium

- MM. Thissen and Biefnot as titular members; MM. Ottenbrough and Pécriaux as alternate members;

Spain

- Mrs. Guirado as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- The Earl of Dundee and Mr. Thompson as alternate members.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges*

Belgium

- Mr. Ottenbrough as a titular member and Mr. Biefnot as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Baroness Hooper as an alternate member.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations*

Belgium

- Mr. Ghesquière as a titular member; MM. Wintgens and Monfils as alternate members;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Hardy and Sir Anthony Durant as titular members; Mr. Banks and Baroness Hooper as alternate members.

**14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,
Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Rathbone, Stegagnini, Caro and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

**15. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Fernandes Marques Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Machete) MM. <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto) Roseta
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kelchtermans Kempinaire Pécriaux Sarens	MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Benassi) <i>Fassino</i> (Caccia) Mrs. Falcucci MM. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Savio</i> (Foschi) Martino Mezzapesa Parisi <i>Colombo</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli <i>Mesoraca</i> (Rodotà) Rubbi Sinesio Stegagnini	Spain
France		MM. <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
Mr. Bassinet <i>Gaits</i> (Beix) Caro Durand Forni Fourré <i>Lagorce</i> (Jeambrun) Jung Masseret Valleix	Luxembourg	
Germany	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) <i>Marten</i> (Bühler) Holtz <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Lenzer</i> (Kittelmann) <i>Maas</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Reddemann <i>Probst</i> (von Schmude) Sprung Steiner Vogel	Netherlands	MM. Atkinson <i>Litherland</i> (Banks) Cox <i>Rowe</i> (Earl of Dundee) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Russell Johnston Lord Kirkhill MM. Parry Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Rathbone</i> (Speed) Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
	MM. De Hoop Scheffer <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens) Stoffelen van Velzen <i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)	
	Portugal	
	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral) Brito Candal	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot Seeuws	Mr. Menzel Mrs. Terborg	MM. Aarts Eisma
France	Italy	Spain
MM. Baumel Collette Galley Gouteyron Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. Gabbuggiani Mancia Manzolini	MM. Homs I Ferret Perinat
		United Kingdom
		MM. Faulds Jessel

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1312*).
2. Composition of political groups (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1311*).
3. A new security order in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1309 and amendments*).
4. WEU after Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1308*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Technological and Aerospace Committee proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- MM. Colombo and Savio as titular members in place of MM. Stegagnini and Malfatti.

4. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1312)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Caro, former President of the Assembly.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

5. Composition of political groups

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1311)

The President informed the Assembly that Mr. Pieralli and nine of his colleagues had tabled a motion for a decision on paragraph 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1318.

In accordance with Rule 52 (2), the motion was referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Pieralli.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 81)¹.

6. A new security order in Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1309 and amendments)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur.

¹. See page 19.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Hardy.

Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Jankowitsch (*Observer from Austria*), De Hoop Scheffer, Vacaru (*Observer from Romania*), Rubbi, Atkinson, Müller and Roseta.

Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Rockenbauer (*Observer from Hungary*), Feldmann, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Caro, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. At the end of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add:

“and suggesting that increased concentration should be directed to these approaches.”

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Caro.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

3. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “effective”.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, Hardy, Caro, Stoffelen and Hardy.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Atkinson:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbitration and peace enforcement.”

Speakers: MM. Atkinson and Caro.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 516)¹.

7. WEU after Maastricht

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1308)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur.

Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antretter and Fioret.

The debate was adjourned.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd June 1992, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

¹. See page 20.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Fioret <i>Savio</i> (Foschi) Mancia Martino Mezzapesa Parisi <i>Colombo</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli Rodotà Rubbi	Spain
MM. Biefnot Kempinaire Pécriaux Sarens		MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares <i>Nuñez</i> (Martinez) Moya <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Perinat) Roman
France	Luxembourg	
Mr. Bassinet <i>Gaits</i> (Beix) Caro Durand <i>Lagorce</i> (Jeambrun) Valleix	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. Böhm <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) <i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) <i>Maas</i> (Meyer zu Bentrup) Müller Sprung Steiner	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Eisma) MM. <i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens) Stoffelen van Velzen	MM. Atkinson <i>Litherland</i> (Banks) Cox <i>Rowe</i> (Earl of Dundee) Faulds Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Hardy Miss <i>Nicholson</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord Kirkhill Mr. Parry Sir Dudley Smith Lord <i>Newall</i> (Speed) Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
Italy	Portugal	
MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Benassi) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Caccia) Mrs. Falcucci	MM. Brito Fernandes Marques Machete <i>Poças Santos</i> (Pinto) Roseta	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Netherlands
MM. Chevalier Kelchtermans Seeuws	Mr. Bühler Kittelmann Menzel Reddemann von Schmude	Mr. Verbeek
France	Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	Portugal
MM. Baumel Collette Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jung Masseret Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Italy	MM. Amaral Candal
	MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Manzolini Sinesio Stegagnini	Spain
		MM. Homs I Ferret de Puig
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Redmond

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 81***on the composition of political groups***

The Assembly,

INVITES the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine whether there should be a change in the minimum number of representatives or substitutes required to form a political group, bearing in mind the ratio to be established between this number and the total number of representatives to the Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 516***on a new security order in Europe***

The Assembly,

- (i) Concerned about the revival of ethnic, territorial, nationalist and other conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe;
- (ii) Aware that the young and still fragile democracies in this region are all encountering serious economic crises resulting from the transformation of their societies and economies;
- (iii) Recalling the principles of the November 1990 Charter of Paris in which all signatories confirmed their intention to maintain freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities;
- (iv) Regretting the failure of CSCE attempts to solve conflicts, but noting the efforts being made at the Helsinki follow-up meeting to enhance the capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts and suggesting that increased concentration should be directed to these approaches;
- (v) Welcoming the Treaty on European Union which should allow the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and security policy, which might in time lead to common defence;
- (vi) Noting that the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit give the WEU Council the ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;
- (vii) Underlining that the common foreign and security policy, and the accompanying further definition of WEU's rôle and the development of a common European defence policy will in the future also help to prepare Europeans to assume their responsibilities and contribute to the management of international crises and contingencies in which military assets could be required;
- (viii) Recalling that the positive aspect of the two Gulf exercises in 1987-88 and 1990-91 has demonstrated that WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation and practical co-operation among member countries in crisis situations in which their security interests are affected;
- (ix) Considering that Western Europe has a vital interest in present developments in Central and Eastern Europe insofar as the foundations are now being laid for parliamentary democracy and a market economy in nations which should eventually be able to join the European Union, in order to give greater assurances of peace and security for the whole of Europe;
- (x) Recalling Recommendation 500 on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern Europe for European security, adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Starting this year, associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland with WEU;
2. Conclude a peace-keeping agreement with those countries and accordingly hold, at least twice a year, a meeting of the Council enlarged to include their ministers for foreign affairs and defence;
3. Also hold, at least once a year, consultations at ministerial level extended to the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania;
4. Establish in WEU an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe;
5. Endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions in consultation and co-operation with NATO and, where necessary, effectively to implement ad hoc contingency plans, tailored to possible theatres of operation, including those within Europe;

6. Take all preparatory measures needed to provide WEU peace-keeping and peace-restoring forces at short notice if they are required for CSCE or United Nations operations on European territory and for WEU operations in the framework of agreements as mentioned in paragraph 2 of this recommendation;

7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbitration and peace enforcement.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council (*Presentation of the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Doc. 1315*); Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. WEU after Maastricht (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1308*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Doc. 1315

*Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Germany,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Kinkel answered questions put by Mr. Hardy, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Aguiar, MM. Müller, Lopez Henares, Mrs. Blunck and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.*

4. WEU after Maastricht

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1308)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: Mr. Roman, Mrs. Özver (Observer from Turkey), MM. Müller, Tummers, Parisi, Liapis (Observer from Greece), Machete, Toskay (Observer from Turkey), Roseta, Pahtas (Observer from Greece), Tarschys (Observer from Sweden), Eisma, Wielowieyski (Observer from Poland), Giagu Demartini and Caro.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 517)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 82)².

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.

1. See page 24.

2. See page 26.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Mrs. <i>Aguiar</i> (Candal)
MM. Biefnot	MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Benassi)	MM. Fernandes Marques
Kempinaire	<i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Caccia)	Machete
Pécriaux	Mrs. Falcucci	<i>Reis Leite</i> (Pinto)
Sarens	MM. <i>Rubner</i> (Filetti)	Roseta
	Fioret	Spain
France	<i>Savio</i> (Foschi)	MM. <i>Ruiz</i> (Alvarez)
Mr. Bassinet	Mancia	Borderas
Baumel	Martino	Diaz
<i>Gaits</i> (Beix)	Mezzapesa	Fabra
Caro	Parisi	Lopez Henares
<i>Lagorce</i> (Collette)	<i>Colombo</i> (Pecchioli)	<i>Nuñez</i> (Martinez)
Durand	<i>Mesoraca</i> (Rodotà)	Moya
Masseret	Rubbi	<i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Perinat)
Valleix	Sinesio	Roman
	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. Err	United Kingdom
	Mr. Goerens	MM. Cox
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	<i>Bowden</i> (Earl of Dundee)
Germany		Faulds
Mr. Antretter	Netherlands	Dame Peggy Fenner
Mrs. Blunck	MM. Aarts	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler)	De Hoop Scheffer	MM. Hardy
<i>Marten</i> (Bühler)	Eisma	<i>Howell</i> (Jessel)
<i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz)	<i>Tummers</i> (Jurgens)	Sir Russell Johnston
<i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer)	Stoffelen	Lord Kirkhill
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Kittelman)	van Velzen	MM. Parry
MM. <i>Maas</i>	<i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)	Redmond
(Meyer zu Bentrup)		Sir <i>John Hunt</i>
Müller		(Sir Dudley Smith)
<i>Probst</i> (von Schmude)	Portugal	Sir Donald Thompson
Steiner	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral)	MM. Thompson
Mrs. Terborg	Brito	Ward
Mr. Vogel		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Seitlinger	MM. Pieralli
MM. Chevalier	Thyraud	Stegagnini
Kelchtermans	Vial-Massat	
Seeuws	Germany	Spain
	MM. Böhm	MM. Cuco
France	Menzel	Homs I Ferret
MM. Forni	Reddemann	de Puig
Fourré	Sprung	
Galley		United Kingdom
Gouteyron	Italy	Mr. Atkinson
Jeambrun	MM. Gabbuggiani	Banks
Jung	Manzolini	Speed
Oehler		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 517***on WEU after Maastricht***

THE ASSEMBLY welcomes the fact that the treaty drawn up in Maastricht in December 1991 permits the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and security policy;

It wishes this treaty to be ratified by all member countries;

It is satisfied to note that the strengthening of WEU and the development of its activities are taking their place in the process of setting up the union;

It considers, however, that the wording of the declarations by the nine member countries of WEU is not precise enough;

It notes that the WEU Council will consequently have to take forthwith a number of important decisions;

It also notes with satisfaction that the decisions taken in Maastricht give the WEU Council the ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters;

It recalls that the Maastricht Agreements are but one stage in the building of the European Union and that priority should still be given to setting up a union with substantial powers in the area of external and security policy;

It further recalls that no time-limit has been set for the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty;

It emphasises that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an instrument for maintaining peace throughout Europe;

IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Implement without delay, in areas within its purview, the decisions contained in the nine-power declarations in Maastricht and to this end:

1. Make it known that the modified Brussels Treaty remains one of the juridical bases of the union and that WEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamentary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of the European Union, a part which will have its place in the European structure;
2. Decide without delay the points to be considered in negotiations leading to the accession to WEU of each of the member countries of the European Community that apply for membership so as to ensure that accession signifies that new members adopt in full the principles guiding the joint foreign and defence policy, thus allowing WEU to intervene, if necessary, to apply them;
3. Explain what is meant by the status of observer for those countries if they do not accede to WEU;
4. Explain what is meant by the status of associate member of WEU for countries which are not members of the Community;
5. Draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in some of WEU's operational activities;
6. Make it abundantly clear to what extent accession to the Community may be granted to countries which do not intend to join WEU;
7. Arrange forthwith the synchronisation of dates and places of meetings and the harmonisation of WEU's working methods with those of the European Union without, however, reducing the number and importance of specifically WEU ministerial meetings;
8. Proceed here and now with installing the Permanent Council in Brussels and specify which responsibilities will then be assigned to the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO and to the European Community respectively;
9. Continue to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in force;

10. Examine how it is possible to organise the development of effective methods for conflict prevention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes for use in the framework of the CSCE, the European Political Union or the United Nations;
11. Have a directive drawn up and adopted on exports of armaments by member countries in the light of the decisions taken by the European Council in the context of joint foreign and security policy;
12. Follow up quickly the intention expressed in Maastricht to set up a European armaments agency in the framework of WEU, associate the activities of the IEPG closely with those of WEU in this area and, with this in mind, continue to transmit to the Assembly the annual report of the IEPG;
13. Associate the European Commission with the activities of that agency;
14. Set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU;
15. Instruct a working group to examine Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in the new circumstances with a view to defining a European concept of the rôle of nuclear weapons and developing consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons;
16. Seek agreement with NATO on adapting to the new European security requirements the application of reciprocal "transparency" between the two institutions in accordance with the principles laid down in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in both political and operational matters;
17. Specify the conditions for "complementarity" between WEU and NATO, in particular in regard to exchanges with countries which are not members of these organisations, in connection with possible operations designed to maintain peace inside and outside Europe;
18. Establish procedure for consultations at an appropriate level prior to NATO ministerial meetings on matters on the agenda of those meetings;
19. Pursue exchanges with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish with a view to ensuring that the progressive rapprochement of those countries with the European Union is extended to include defence matters;
20. Ask signatory states to correct the error in paragraph 6 of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty noted in its reply to Written Question 297 before the text is submitted for ratification;
21. Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council considers the starting date is 1948,

THE ASSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES

That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration.

ORDER 82***on co-operation between the Assembly of WEU
and the European Parliament***

The Assembly,

Welcomes the fact that the heads of state or of government of the member countries of WEU, meeting in Maastricht, decided to encourage "closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament";

Considers that such co-operation is necessary and that it can be based only on the principles of equality between the two assemblies, the granting of reciprocal advantages and respect for responsibilities and procedure specific to each of them;

Believes that periodical meetings between committees of the two assemblies responsible for political affairs would allow useful exchanges of views on matters of common interest,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

1. To examine, with the President of the European Parliament, the conditions in which such co-operation might be organised by the two assemblies;
2. To inform the Assembly of the conclusions of that exchange of views so that, accordingly, the Chairman of the Political Committee may take appropriate follow-up action.

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. WEU: the operational organisation (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1307, addendum and amendments*).
2. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1319 and amendment*).
3. Arms export policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1305*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. WEU: the operational organisation

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1307, addendum and amendments)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Steiner, Lopez Henares and Caro.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (vii).

Speakers: MM. Moya, Caro and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) and insert:

“deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport and training and considering an eventual mandate for action;”

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after “production” add “and reduction”.

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7.

Speakers: Mr. Moya, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was negatived.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen.

In accordance with Rules 35 (2) and 36 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to vote by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was

agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 34 votes to 23 with one abstention. Fifteen people who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 518) ¹.

Speakers (explanation of vote): Mr. Steiner, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Stoffelen, De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Caro.

4. Application of United Nations Resolution 757

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1319 and amendment)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Stegagnini, Tummers, Caro, De Decker and Rodrigues.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Haekkerup (*Observer from Denmark*), Roseta, Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*) and Martino.

Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Parisi, Scovacricchi, Eisma, Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Savio.

The debate was closed.

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Feldmann:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992. ”

Speakers: Sir Russell Johnston and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to, (This recommendation will be published as No. 519) ².

5. Arms export policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1305)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Gonzalez-Laxe and Poças Santos.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 520) ³.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd June 1992, at 10.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.

1. See page 31.

2. See page 33.

3. See page 34.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Parisi <i>Colombo</i> (Pecchioli)	Spain
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Chevalier) Kelchtermans Pécriaux Sarens	Pieralli Sinesio Stegagnini	MM. <i>Ruiz</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco <i>Garcia Sanchez</i> (Diaz) Fabra <i>Gonzalez-Laxe</i> (Homs I Ferret) Lopez Henares <i>Nuñez</i> (Martinez) Moya <i>Diaz de Mera</i> (Perinat) Mrs. <i>Guirado</i> (de Puig) Mr. Roman
France	Luxembourg	
Mr. Caro	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck MM. <i>Reimann</i> (Büchler) <i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz) Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Kittelmann) MM. Meyer zu Bentrup Müller <i>Zierer</i> (Reddemann) Steiner Mrs. Terborg Mr. Vogel	MM. Aarts De Hoop Scheffer Eisma Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Jurgens) Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. <i>Soutendijk van</i> <i>Appeldoorn</i> (van Velzen) Mr. <i>Tummers</i> (Verbeek)	Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Atkinson) Mr. Cox Earl of Dundee Mr. Faulds Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Lord Kirkhill MM. Parry Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Rathbone</i> (Speed) Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward
Italy	Portugal	
MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Benassi) <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Caccia) <i>Rubner</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Savio</i> (Foschi) Martino Mezzapesa	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral) <i>Poças Santos</i> (Brito) Fernandes Marques Machete <i>Reis Leite</i> (Pinto) Roseta <i>Curto</i> (Candal)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Masseret Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Valleix Vial-Massat	MM. von Schmude Sprung
MM. Biefnot Kempinaire Seeuws		Italy
France	Germany	Mrs. Falcucci MM. Gabbuggiani Mancia Manzolini Rodotà Rubbi
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Collette Durand Forni Fourré Galley	MM. Böhm Bühler Irmer Menzel	United Kingdom
		MM. Banks Hardy

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on WEU: the operational organisation (Doc. 1307)¹.

Ayes	34
Noes	23
Abstentions	1

Ayes

MM. Aarts	MM. Savio (Foschi)	MM. Diaz de Mera (Perinat)
<i>Ruiz (Alvarez)</i>	Goerens	<i>Reis Leite (Pinto)</i>
Baroness Hooper (Atkinson)	Lord Newall (Jessel)	<i>Zierer (Reddemann)</i>
MM. Poças Santos (Brito)	Lord Mackie of Benshie	Roseta
Caro	(Sir Russell Johnston)	Sarens
<i>De Decker (Chevalier)</i>	Mr. Kelchtermans	Sir Dudley Smith
De Hoop Scheffer	Mrs. Fischer (Kittelmann)	MM. Rathbone (Speed)
Earl of Dundee	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	Stegagnini
Mr. Fabra	MM. Lopez Henares	Sir Donald Thompson
Dame Peggy Fenner	Meyer zu Bentrup	Mrs. Soutendijk van
Mr. Fernandes Marques	Mezzapesa	<i>Appeldoorn</i>
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Müller	(van Velzen)
		Mr. Ward

Noes

Mr. Antretter	Mrs. Err	MM. Nuñez (Martinez)
Mrs. Blunck	MM. Faulds	Moya
MM. Borderas	<i>Pfuhl (Holtz)</i>	Parry
<i>Reimann (Büchler)</i>	<i>Gonzalez-Laxe</i>	Péciaux
Cox	(Homs I Ferret)	Mrs. Guirado (de Puig)
Cuco	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman	MM. Roman
<i>Garcia Sanchez (Diaz)</i>	(Jurgens)	Steiner
Eisma	Lord Kirkhill	Stoffelen
		Mrs. Terborg

Abstentions

Mr. Tummers (Verbeek)

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 518***on WEU: the operational organisation***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming and endorsing the WEU declaration made at Maastricht on 10th December 1991, whereby member states agreed on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters;
- (ii) Pleased that member states are decided to strengthen the operational rôle of WEU in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence;
- (iii) Delighted at the reaffirmation, therefore, of WEU's paramount rôle as the unique instrument to express Europe's defence identity, and determined to continue to provide the parliamentary dimension required to oversee WEU's operational responsibilities;
- (iv) Confident that the setting up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón will enable WEU to play a fuller operational rôle in co-operation with all other bodies concerned with verification, crisis management and environmental control;
- (v) Recalling recommendations:
- 456 on naval aviation;
 - 469 on the state of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north;
 - 488 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf;
 - 493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region;
 - 498 on the Gulf crisis: lessons for Western European Union;
 - 502 on arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units;
 - 505 on the rôle of women in the armed forces;
 - 512 on operational arrangements for WEU – the Yugoslav crisis,

as well as Written Question 294 put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 17th December 1991;

- (vi) Gratified that so many of its recommendations above have been accepted by the Council, at least in part, and trusting that all its recent recommendations, touching on the operational aspects of WEU, will now be re-examined with a view to implementation within WEU's new operational context;
- (vii) Conscious that as long as a minimum nuclear deterrent is to be maintained by any WEU member state it should remain effective and credible;
- (viii) Considering that Europe's arms procurement needs would be best served by creating a European Armaments Agency which would associate all European countries so wishing,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take the necessary decisions at the next ministerial meeting to give substance to the WEU declaration at Maastricht by:
 - (a) agreeing the arrangements for setting up a WEU military planning cell with appropriate and detailed terms of reference;
 - (b) deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport and training, and giving the necessary mandate for action to the relevant WEU bodies;
 - (c) confirming the need for a committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and considering the creation of a WEU military committee;
 - (d) progressing the idea of earmarking certain forces for WEU and giving particular consideration to the creation of a European rapid action force to comprise elements of the future European corps and airmobile units from those WEU member nations possessing such forces;
2. Investigate as a matter of priority the various areas for possible WEU action once an operational organisation is in place;

3. Define the status and responsibilities of associate members and observers to include the possibility of participation in WEU's operational activities (notably the work of the Torrejón Centre) and also give due consideration to including other NATO states or European Community associates in WEU operations on an ad hoc basis;
4. Ensure that the WEU satellite centre in Torrejón establishes firm links with:
 - (a) the WEU military planning cell to be established in Brussels;
 - (b) NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee;
 - (c) the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre;
 - (d) the Open Skies Consultative Committee;
5. Set up a defence representatives procurement sub-group to examine ways to bring WEU and IEPG closer together, instituting a special liaison with the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon;
6. Include co-operation on armaments production and reduction on the agenda for discussion with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe;
7. Encourage France and the United Kingdom in co-operation if possible to maintain an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reiterated in the Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament and anti-proliferation measures;
8. Ensure that all arrangements aimed at giving a stronger operational rôle to WEU are discussed with the Atlantic Alliance to make them fully compatible with present and future military dispositions designed to safeguard allied collective defence and institute channels of communication to maintain such transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU.

RECOMMENDATION 519***on the application of United Nations Resolution 757***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis;
- (ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia;
- (iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on Saturday, 30th May 1992;
- (iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective;
- (v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty,

URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appropriate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect;

Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992.

RECOMMENDATION 520***on arms export policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalls the international public debate during and immediately after the Gulf war expressing embarrassment regarding earlier large sales of arms to Iraq and calling for reductions in the international sale of armaments;
- (ii) Is preoccupied that continuing uncontrolled international armaments transfers might worsen existing tensions and latent conflicts in a number of world regions;
- (iii) Also fears that economic difficulties among the members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact may encourage the development of the black market in armaments because of the large stocks that exist;
- (iv) Welcomes therefore the declared determination of the CSCE member countries to support the new United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers and to provide it with comprehensive information;
- (v) Underlines the rising danger of nuclear proliferation and know-how and the imperfection of existing international régimes responsible for preventing the dissemination of chemical and biological weaponry and of missile technology;
- (vi) Welcomes therefore the decisions of France and the People's Republic of China to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and of North Korea to join the nuclear safeguards agreement;
- (vii) Also welcomes the decision of the European Community, the United States, Russia and Japan to establish an international Science and Technology Centre in Russia in order to discourage scientists of the former Soviet Union from selling nuclear, biological and chemical know-how to third countries;
- (viii) Recalls the need to restrict arms exports and to harmonise arms export policies and regulations governing dual use items within the European Community prior to the abolition of frontiers and internal controls on 1st January 1993;
- (ix) Also recalls the special responsibility of Western European Union in the arms export area since it has implications for the defence and essential security interests of its member countries;

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Elaborate and implement the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in Luxembourg;
2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order:
 - (a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by sanctions;
 - (b) to call on all United Nations states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safeguard agreements making the United Nations Security Council responsible for supervising their observation;
 - (c) to strengthen the IAEA's rôle by increasing its budget, giving it the power of sanctions and placing it under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations;
 - (d) to draw up an international convention in order to complement the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and to prevent the export of nuclear know-how or technology;
 - (e) to call for the early conclusion of a worldwide convention on chemical weapons and to make the chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide exportation ban list under United Nations supervision;
 - (f) to make the missile technology control régime a worldwide régime;
3. Call upon the next Munich economic summit to held in July 1992 to support vigorously the strengthened rôle of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export régime ;
4. Urge its member countries to provide financial contributions for establishing and operating the International Science and Technology Centre in Russia.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1303*).
2. New Euro-American relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1310 and amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1303)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Lord Mackie of Benshie, Rapporteur.

Speaker: Mr. Rathbone, Chairman.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 521)¹.

Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. New Euro-American relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1310 and amendment)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antretter, Rodrigues, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Fabra, Machete, Nuñez, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Caro, Roseta, Mrs. Terborg and Mr. Lamminen (*Observer from Finland*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Soell, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Speaker (point of order) : Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward:

1. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add:

“insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht Agreement, the Franco-German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must strengthen the alliance military structure;”

1. See page 38.

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, Soell and Stoffelen.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 522) ¹.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.

1. See page 39.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti)	MM. Machete
MM. Kelchtermans	Fioret	<i>Reis Leite</i> (Pinto)
Pécriaux	<i>Savio</i> (Foschi)	Roseta
Sarens	Mancia	
	Martino	Spain
France	Mezzapesa	MM. <i>Ruiz</i> (Alvarez)
MM. Baumel	Parisi	Borderas
<i>Gaits</i> (Beix)	<i>Colombo</i> (Pecchioli)	Cuco
Caro	<i>Rubner</i> (Rodotà)	Diaz
Fourré	Rubbi	Fabra
<i>Hunault</i> (Galley)	Sinesio	Lopez Henares
Valleix		<i>Nuñez</i> (Martinez)
	Luxembourg	Moya
Germany	Mrs. Err	<i>Lopez Valdivielso</i>
Mr. Antretter	Mr. Goerens	(Perinat)
Mrs. Blunck	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	<i>Palacios</i> (de Puig)
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Böhm)		Roman
MM. Büchler		
<i>Pfuhl</i> (Holtz)	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Müller	MM. De Hoop Scheffer	Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Atkinson)
Reddemann	Eisma	Lord <i>Newall</i>
Soell	Stoffelen	(Dame Peggy Fenner)
<i>Zierer</i> (Sprung)	<i>Eversdijk</i> (van Velzen)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Steiner	<i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)	Lord <i>Mackie of Benshie</i>
Mrs. Terborg		(Sir Russell Johnston)
Mr. Vogel	Portugal	Lord Kirkhill
	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral)	Mr. Parry
Italy	<i>Curto</i> (Brito)	Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. <i>Fassino</i> (Caccia)	<i>Poças Santos</i> (Fernandes)	MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Speed)
Mrs. Falcucci	Marques)	Thompson
		<i>Rathbone</i> (Ward)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Germany	Portugal
MM. Biefnot	MM. Bühler	Mr. Candal
Chevalier	Irmer	
Kempinaire	Kittelmann	Spain
Seeuws	Menzel	Mr. Homs I Ferret
	Meyer zu Bentrup	
France	von Schmude	
MM. Bassinet		United Kingdom
Collette	Italy	MM. Banks
Durand	MM. Benassi	Cox
Forni	Gabbuggiani	Earl of Dundee
Gouteyron	Manzolini	MM. Faulds
Jeambrun	Pieralli	Hardy
Jung	Stegagnini	Jessel
Masseret		Redmond
Oehler	Netherlands	Sir Donald Thompson
Seitlinger	MM. Aarts	
Thyraud	Jurgens	
Vial-Massat		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 521***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial year 1992***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that:
- (a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels;
 - (b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial implications of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature;
 - (c) credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria;
 - (d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year;
 - (e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective;
 - (f) problems relating to staff policy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increasingly important;
- (ii) Welcoming the fact that the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are presented clearly and efficiently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which, although transitional, is no less important and complex;
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken in respect of staff not wishing to be transferred;
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions taken in regard to staff policy in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme.

RECOMMENDATION 522***on new Euro-American relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Agreeing that the development of a European security identity and defence rôle, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and that the enhancement of the rôle and responsibility of the European members is an important basis for transforming the alliance;
- (ii) Noting that NATO's Rome declaration on peace and security calls for a new security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other;
- (iii) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will be of lasting value as long as it provides the essential transatlantic link, demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe;
- (iv) Recognising that the development of WEU as the instrument for a common European security and defence policy is a logical and inevitable consequence of a determined effort by European countries to achieve greater integration;
- (v) Convinced that the creation of genuine multinational forces in a European framework, which could be deployed in both NATO and WEU operations, is the best guarantee for future security in Europe, insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht agreement, the Franco-German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must strengthen the alliance military structure;
- (vi) Considering that in some quarters in the United States there is still uncertainty due to lack of insight into and understanding of the motivation of Western European nations for developing a specific European security and defence identity, notwithstanding the multiple exchanges and consultations taking place in the different existing organs and institutions of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (vii) Recognising the useful rôle being accomplished by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European views known to the foreign policy and defence community in the United States;
- (viii) Aware that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by the present American administration, there is uncertainty over the level and corresponding effectiveness of American troops based in Europe;
- (ix) Recalling that, in Rome, all NATO member states pledged to support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and to give practical assistance in helping them to succeed in this difficult transition;
- (x) Considering the apparent growing anomaly between the determination of the United States to exert political influence on developments in Europe and its diminishing will and ability to maintain a military presence and financial-economic commitments in Europe;
- (xi) Considering that notwithstanding the recent Canadian decision to withdraw all its forces from Europe, Canada remains committed to NATO and Europe's security by retaining the ability to send contingency forces and must therefore be included in the transatlantic dialogue with WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Define more clearly, in consultation with its transatlantic allies, the respective rôles of the armed forces of NATO, WEU and the United States in maintaining security and peace in Europe;
2. Establish with the United States more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of United States forces in Europe;
3. Continue to support the rôle of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European views on security better known across the Atlantic, also by publishing and disseminating more widely the results of its work;
4. Co-ordinate more closely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe, while recognising that, for the moment, no formal security guarantees can be provided;

5. Take account of the fact that a new concept of security means developing capabilities allowing the deployment at the appropriate time of political, as well as diplomatic, economic, financial and military means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring;
6. *(a)* Reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis prevention, a joint assessment can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action;
(b) Establish a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military experts in order to make up-to-date threat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to such threats.

SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany. | 3. The development of a European space-based observation system (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1304 and amendments</i>). |
| 2. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France. | |

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

A candidate had been proposed for one of the two remaining posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Martinez.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Martinez was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

4. Address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany

Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Rühle answered questions put by Baroness Hooper, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Borderas, Fioret, Stegagnini, Lopez Henares, Caro, van der Linden and Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*).

The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 4.15 p.m.

5. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France

Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Joxe answered questions put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Stegagnini, Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), van der Linden and Martinez.

The sitting was suspended at 5.15 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.

6. The development of a European space-based observation system

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1304 and amendments)

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Borderas and Fourré.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "WEU Satellite Centre" add " , a first step towards the future creation of a European agency for verification by satellite, ".

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Valleix and Lopez Henares.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "experience" add, "on

the one hand, ” and, at the end of the paragraph, add “ and, on the other, of national agencies ”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Lopez Henares.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation ” and insert “ any other organisation ” .

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Stegagnini and Valleix.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

4. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following paragraph:

“ Reaffirm its will to set up in successive

stages, of which the Satellite Centre is the first step, a European agency for verification by satellite. ”

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Lopez Henares.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 523)¹.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th June 1992, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

¹. See page 44.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance:

Belgium	Italy	Portugal
MM. Biefnot Kelchtermans Sarens	MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Benassi) Fioret <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Gabbuggiani) Martino Mezzapesa <i>Rubner</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli Stegagnini	MM. <i>Rodrigues</i> (Amaral) <i>Poças Santos</i> (Fernandes Marques) <i>Reis Leite</i> (Pinto) Roseta
France	Luxembourg	Spain
MM. Bassinet Caro Fourré Valleix	Mrs. Err Mr. Goerens Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	MM. <i>Lopez Valdivielso</i> (Alvarez) Borderas Cuco Diaz Fabra Lopez Henares Martinez Moya de Puig Roman
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Böhm) MM. Büchler Meyer zu Bentrup Reddemann Steiner Mrs. Terborg	Mr. Aarts Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Jurgens) MM. Stoffelen <i>van der Linden</i> (van Velzen)	Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Atkinson) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Lord Kirkhill

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Bühler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Menzel Müller von Schmude Sprung Vogel	Portugal
MM. Chevalier Kempinaire Péciaux Seeuws		MM. Brito Candal Machete
France	Italy	Spain
MM. Baumel Beix Collette Durand Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Masseret Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	Mr. Caccia Mrs. Falcucci MM. Filetti Foschi Mancia Manzolini Parisi Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio	MM. Homs I Ferret Perinat
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Mr. Antretter Mrs. Blunck	MM. De Hoop Scheffer Eisma Verbeek	MM. Banks Cox Earl of Dundee Mr. Faulds Dame Peggy Fenner MM. Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston MM. Parry Redmond Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir Donald Thompson MM. Thompson Ward

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 523***on the development of a European space-based observation system***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcomes the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the fact that the management team to study conditions for developing a European space-based observation system has started work;
- (ii) Emphasises that this first multinational effort to make use of space to establish a control system for international peace-keeping and security is unique in the world;
- (iii) Underlines the importance of obtaining public support in order to carry out the planned project;
- (iv) Considers the definition of the tasks of the system requires a more intensive, regular dialogue between the Council and the Assembly than has been the case hitherto;
- (v) Recalls its Recommendations 465 and 466;
- (vi) Welcomes the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty and trusts it will be ratified as soon as possible by all the countries concerned;
- (vii) Is convinced that, in setting up the observation system, WEU should take the fullest possible advantage of the services and experience, on the one hand, of the European Space Agency (ESA) in carrying out earth observation programmes and, on the other, of national agencies;
- (viii) Recalls the work carried out by the IEPG in the context of the Euclid programme on radar technology and satellite observation;
- (ix) Considers it essential for the principle of transparency to be applied to the interpretation of satellite data and for all aspects of the activities of the Centre and observation system as a whole to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny,

THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Design the planned system in such a way as to serve the security of WEU member countries and also to be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation;
2. Inform the Assembly regularly
 - (a) about each stage of the entry into service of the Satellite Centre, its organogram and the progress of feasibility studies;
 - (b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the Centre and establish the observation system;
3. Define
 - (a) the consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the WEU Satellite Centre;
 - (b) the exact significance of the expression crisis observation and the consequences of closer WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the Centre and of the space-based observation system;and submit its conclusions to the Assembly;
4. At the earliest possible opportunity, contact the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to work out with it the possibilities for co-operation between WEU and ESA in space-based observation and arrange to be represented at the next meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Spain in November 1992;
5. Contact the IEPG to co-ordinate the work carried out by that group on space technology in the context of the Euclid programme with WEU's activities in this area;
6. Keep the public better informed about its space policy.

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th June 1992

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden.
2. Arms control: CSCE and WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1306*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Examination of credentials

The President informed the Assembly that he had received the requisite documents from the Dutch Parliament, informing the Assembly of a change in the credentials of the Netherlands Delegation, to the effect that Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman became a representative in place of Mr. Jurgens, who became a substitute.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the credentials of these members of the Netherlands Delegation, whose ratification had not been communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, subject to conformity with their subsequent ratification by that Assembly.

4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

A candidate had been proposed for the last remaining post of Vice-President, namely, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Machete, Mr. Fourré and Mrs. Err.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Spanish Delegation:

Political Committee

- Mr. Homs I Ferret as a titular member.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

- MM. Gonzalez-Laxe and Lopez Henares as titular members;
- Mr. Lopez Valdivielso as an alternate member.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

- Mr. Diaz de Mera as a titular member and Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe as an alternate member.

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

- Mr. Homs I Ferret as an alternate member.

6. Address by Mr. Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden

Mr. Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Björck answered questions put by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, Valleix, Stoffelen, Steiner, Stegagnini, de Puig and Martinez.

7. Arms control: CSCE and WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1306)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Moya.

Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Fabra.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur, and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 524) ¹.

8. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 11.55 a.m.

¹. See page 48.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
Mr. Sarens	MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Benassi)	MM. Stoffelen
	<i>Rauti</i> (Filetti)	<i>Eversdijk</i> (van Velzen)
	Fioret	<i>Dees</i> (Verbeek)
	Mancia	
France	Mezzapesa	Spain
MM. <i>Pistre</i> (Beix)	<i>Rubner</i> (Pecchioli)	MM. Cuco
Caro	Pieralli	Diaz
Masseret	Stegagnini	Fabra
Valleix		Lopez Henares
	Luxembourg	Martinez
	Mrs. Err	Moya
	Mr. Goerens	de Puig
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	Roman
Germany		
MM. Antretter	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Reddemann	Mrs. <i>Soutendijk</i>	Baroness <i>Hooper</i> (Atkinson)
<i>Zierer</i> (Sprung)	<i>van Appeldoorn</i>	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Steiner	(De Hoop Scheffer)	Lord Kirkhill

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Holtz	MM. Candal
MM. Biefnot	Irmer	Fernandes Marques
Chevalier	Kittelman	Machete
Kelchtermans	Menzel	Pinto
Kempinaire	Meyer zu Bentrup	Roseta
Péciaux	Müller	
Seeuws	von Schmude	Spain
	Mrs. Terborg	MM. Alvarez
	Mr. Vogel	Borderas
France	Italy	Homs I Ferret
MM. Bassinet	Mr. Caccia	Perinat
Baumel	Mrs. Falcucci	
Collette	MM. Foschi	United Kingdom
Durand	Gabbuggiani	MM. Banks
Forni	Manzolini	Cox
Fourré	Martino	Earl of Dundee
Galley	Parisi	Mr. Faulds
Gouteyron	Rodotà	Dame Peggy Fenner
Jeambrun	Rubbi	MM. Hardy
Jung	Sinesio	Jessel
Oehler		Sir Russell Johnston
Seitlinger	Netherlands	MM. Parry
Thyraud	MM. Aarts	Redmond
Vial-Massat	Eisma	Sir Dudley Smith
Germany	Portugal	Mr. Speed
Mrs. Blunck	MM. Amaral	Sir Donald Thompson
MM. Böhm	Brito	MM. Thompson
Büchler		Ward
Bühler		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 524***on arms control: CSCE and WEU***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the signing of the Maastricht Agreements which give new impetus to the building of the European Union and offer prospects of future joint defence;
- (ii) Aware of the challenge to WEU raised in the Maastricht agreements which make WEU an integral part of the European Union and, in the long run, the instrument of a joint defence policy;
- (iii) Pleased that the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration confirm the rôle of WEU and therefore of its parliamentary Assembly as Europe's paramount defence body both at present and for the foreseeable future;
- (iv) Congratulating the Council and the Secretary-General on the various initiatives taken by WEU in the realm of arms control, notably over verification and for open skies, and pleased generally with the fuller and more constructive answers given to Assembly recommendations;
- (v) Taking into account the development of the peace and disarmament process now under way in Europe and in particular welcoming the 1992 Vienna document as a major contribution to this process;
- (vi) Aware of the importance of current negotiations on European security and arms control being held in the framework of the Helsinki meeting;
- (vii) Following attentively the process of political and military restructuring in the states of the former Soviet Union;
- (viii) Convinced that WEU must take part in the system of peace and security outlined by the organisation and operation of the new CSCE structures and that consequently our own Assembly should take every opportunity to support the development of the CSCE Assembly, both politically and practically;
- (ix) Considering that there should be much greater co-operation between the CSCE and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, even to the extent of combining the two;
- (x) Recalling Recommendations 481, 513 and 514 and restating in particular two recommendations which it urges the Council to tackle without further prevarication:

“Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of recent changes but which safeguards European interests;

Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environmental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important domain;”

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pursue its action to promote peace and disarmament in co-operation with all international organisations dealing with security problems, in particular by encouraging close co-operation between the member countries of WEU so that they may express a joint position during the negotiations at the CSCE conference in Helsinki and future conferences;
2. Afford political and practical assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries in overcoming problems linked with military and strategic reorganisation by helping to speed up the implementation of decisions essential for their full integration in the collective security system being set up in the framework of the CSCE;
3. Establish contacts with the “neutral” countries applying for membership of the European Community so as to examine jointly the evolution of the present situation, the future of European security and progress to be made to meet the commitments entered into in Maastricht;
4. Establish co-operation links with Central and Eastern European countries so wishing;
5. Contribute to the adoption and application of the new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to be included in the Helsinki final document by co-ordinating member countries' action in this area;

6. Promote the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its immediate application to all the CSCE countries, in particular the new states of the CIS, by taking part in the name of WEU in procedure for information, control and verification of disarmament;
7. Help to apply the Open Skies Treaty by offering the support and means available to WEU, for instance the Torrejón observation satellite centre;
8. Through its deliberations, contribute to planning the future European defence system and the reduction of armed forces to allow the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new geostrategic situation of the European continent;
9. Resolutely support plans to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons, by adopting joint positions, bearing constantly in mind the strict application of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), encourage the establishment of a register of arms transfers by the United Nations and complete this initiative with measures aimed at limiting arms exports at world level;
10. Take the following immediate steps, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office:
 - (a) continue the WEU consultations in Vienna which have proved so effective an impetus for NATO action in the domain of arms control;
 - (b) ensure that such consultations bring a positive approach to helping refine disarmament discussions among the Twelve in Helsinki;
 - (c) further specific arms control initiatives already begun with certain CIS states, notably Russia;
 - (d) include discussion on a possible CSCE security treaty and on open skies co-operation at the forthcoming ministerial meeting between the WEU Nine and the Central and Eastern European Eight;
 - (e) consult the non-WEU members of NATO with a view to establishing the NACC as part of the infrastructure of the CSCE.

II
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1992

SUMMARY

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Opening of the session.2. Attendance register.3. Address by the Provisional President4. Tributes to two former members of the Assembly.5. Examination of credentials.6. Observers.7. Election of the President.8. Address by the President of the Assembly.9. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">10. The situation in Yugoslavia (<i>Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure</i>, Docs. 1316 and 1317).11. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1300).12. The situation in Yugoslavia (<i>Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure</i>, Docs. 1316 and 1317).
<i>Speakers:</i> MM. De Decker and Martino.13. Changes in the membership of committees.14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
<i>Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by:</i> Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. |
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The sitting was opened at 11.35 a.m. with Mr. Lagorce, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is with sadness that I open the session of our Assembly today as Provisional President.

We had all expected to renew Mr. Pontillon's term of office so that he could preside over our work for a third year. But he took his leave of us before the end of his second term, shortly after

the death of Mr. Sarti, who had long been a Vice-President of our Assembly.

I shall not reiterate what Mrs. Lentz-Cornette said about them at the opening of the Berlin symposium nor the tribute I paid them at the Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. I should simply like to say today how sorry I am that Mr. Pontillon was not personally able to complete the task he was so attached to. I should also, however, like to confirm my conviction that his successor whom we are about to appoint and whom I wish every success, will be able to inspire in this Assembly the drive and courage to make ambitious plans and the wisdom to put them into effect.

His task will not be easy. We are entering an era where forces that had long been at work but which we had generally failed to appreciate are setting a new scene before us, whose broad features need to be defined.

We thought that Europe had learnt the lesson of two world wars and cast out the evil spirits of nationalism. But now these illusions are gone. Barbarism is again knocking on the door. Shortly after signing the Paris Charter which was destined to found a new order of justice and peace as regards respect for human rights and those of the citizen, people are at each others' throats and massacres are taking place before our very eyes, whilst we just look on, incapable

1. See page 15.

The President (continued)

of finding the right answer in a situation for which we were unprepared.

At least these problems in Europe are of a limited nature but that is not true of the threats to our civilisation from certain wide-ranging trends whose progress has the inexorability of geological change.

The steady increase in the world's population, with tragic effects in certain regions, the growth of pollution and the spread of famine and disease in certain areas of the world throw doubt on whether we can preserve our islet of prosperity on a planet where most societies have not been able to cope with the revolution brought about by modern technology.

Lastly, there are fresh threats arising from the increase in ethnic or religious fanaticism combined with the problems brought about by the inability to manage growth in both population and industry.

Yet our development is the consequence of rational progress involving the simultaneous evolution of technology, the economy and society.

There is everything to fear from a world where logic is disregarded because irrational forces are unleashed. Modern science, for example, is employed to realise dreams of ethnic, ideological and religious hegemony. The dangers of the proliferation of the technology of producing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery must be accorded all our vigilance because we in Europe, with the twelve years that the Nazi régime lasted, have had experience of the vast disasters that such a sickness can bring to our societies.

Faced with these new dangers, we have to find new solutions. Deterrence based on ranges of weapons that include arms of mass destruction and large military forces does not seem appropriate for warding off the threats just mentioned and preventing fresh risks. But before devising new equipment we must define the ends we have in mind. The aims that we would have liked so often to define are now thrown into doubt. It is the very object of our political resolve that we have to reconsider.

As a result, new divisions are surfacing among Europeans. Our ideals are identical, but the guiding principles of the policies to implement them differ materially. Some of us believe that the European Union should become a new centre of decision and that its aim, in accordance with what has already been stated in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, should be universal. As long ago as October 1954 in Paris, our countries, they recall, were already deciding to take the necessary steps to promote unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe. Others believe that, on

the contrary, we should restrict the field of responsibility of the European Union to avoid creating a split in an Atlantic Alliance, of which it is an essential part. Yet others would prefer to see this union enlarged to meet the expectations of the many governments wanting to join the nucleus around which the new Europe is being built. Lastly there are others who are particularly sensitive to the need to enlarge gradually in order to preserve enough homogeneity in the union for it to constitute an effective decision centre.

We can still go forward, however, taking the necessary steps enabling Europe to establish its identity as time goes by. We simply have to avoid arguing about the principles that guide us and remember that we share the same ideals. Concrete agreements will then enable the countries which wish to act to do so. The others must be careful not to be an obstacle. What cannot be done by Twelve should be done by Nine and we must allow those of the Nine wanting to equip themselves with the means of joint action to make their contribution in that way to the implementation of decisions taken in the wider context whose credibility their initiatives will enhance.

The declaration published by the Nine in Maastricht stressed the operational nature of WEU. It is on this basis that we can build the instrument of political security. The very existence of this means of action will be an encouragement for the definition of a bolder policy and the strengthening of the joint will. If Europe had shown its will to act in Yugoslavia, the bloody events that we are witnessing would perhaps not have taken place. Today, the ability to intervene, when it comes to the violation of human rights, is an essential deterrent factor.

There is consensus among Europeans on the creation of an order of justice and peace in Europe, whatever our differences of view on what the principles of a European security policy should be. But it is primarily on the shoulders of Western Europe that the heavy burden of creating the most effective instruments for achieving this aim falls.

It is all the more important that the discussions we are about to start should lead to recommendations giving clear expression to the voice of the European assembly, the organisation responsible for security and defence. Rarely will a message – if we manage to word one – have so much effect.

4. Tributes to two former members of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I ask you to stand in silence for a few moments in memory of two former members of this Assembly, Robert Pontillon and Adolfo Sarti.

(Members rose and observed a minute's silence)

5. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our last session whose names have been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, may I extend a welcome to the observers from Austria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey.

I welcome them and at the same time the members of the Permanent Council attending this part-session.

I also extend a cordial welcome to the members of the European Parliament who are following our work.

7. Election of the President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10 (2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives, and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Soell. The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. If the Assembly is unanimous I propose that Mr. Soell be elected by acclamation.

Is there any opposition?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore proclaim Mr. Soell President of the Assembly of Western European Union. May I offer him my congratulations and call upon him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Soell then took the Chair)

8. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, first and foremost, I must convey my sincerest gratitude to you for the honour you have done me and the confidence you have placed in me by electing me to preside over your work. This has always been an important, delicate task. It will be so more than ever during the session now starting, since we shall have to draw the full consequences of one of the most important and also, it must be said, the least well thought-out aspects of the Maastricht agreements: the security of Europe. You may be sure that I realise the full significance of the task with which you have entrusted me and that I shall do everything in my power to ensure that our Assembly continues usefully to guide government action, as it can flatter itself on having done throughout the period of WEU's reactivation.

However, it is with sadness that I embark upon this task which would have fallen to Robert Pontillon if a cruel illness had not prematurely cut short his presidency. I do not wish to repeat here the words of his predecessor, our friend Charles Goerens, when he spoke on our behalf at Robert Pontillon's funeral or those of the President of the Berlin symposium, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, but I must recall how much energy he devoted, literally until the last day of his life, to carrying out his presidential mission and ensuring the success of his last two tasks. First, there was the Berlin symposium on relations with Central and Eastern Europe which he would so much have liked to carry through to the end and which the cruelty of fate did not allow him to preside over when he had done so much to promote it. The symposium was in fact of considerable importance and will help to guide our work in the years to come.

The session starting today is also largely his work. It was he who radically changed the programmes drawn up by the Assembly committees so that the session might be devoted entirely to action to be taken on the Maastricht agreements, thus allowing us to convey as pertinent a message as possible on what is the centre of the political debate today.

It is therefore with modesty that I undertake to continue the work that was initially his because I believe that this is why you elected me and because the prospects it offers seem very largely to meet the requirements of the situation and I consequently endorse them.

The President (continued)

The undertaking of devoting most of this part-session to the Maastricht agreements is nevertheless a delicate one, for two reasons.

First, the agreements are now at the heart of debates in our parliaments, either about the ratification of the treaty itself or on the occasion of constitutional revisions that several of our countries have had to make in order to be able to progress towards ratification. This is no small matter and, in some parliaments, fundamental questions are raised leading to very heated differences of view.

However, we know – and the Council confirmed this in its answer to a written question put to it at the beginning of the year by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Committee – that the section of the Maastricht agreements that directly concerns WEU is not part of the treaty proper that has to be ratified in our countries, although it is very closely linked with it, as was stressed by Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, when he received the Presidential Committee in Bonn in January. Hence we must be careful that our assessments of the two declarations adopted by the nine member countries of WEU do not appear to be judgments on the treaty itself and that these assessments do not spill over into debates which do not directly concern these two texts.

Furthermore, it is clear that the heads of state or of government, while wishing to launch a defence Europe, thus confirming the decisions taken in the last eight years in the context of the reactivation of WEU, did not take a final decision on what that Europe would be or how it would fit into the European Union that they were preparing. They were probably divided on this matter and therefore postponed, perhaps until 1996 or 1998, taking the decisions that they could not take in 1991.

We must not just take note of these hesitations. On the concrete questions that have arisen, our rôle, after debates which will no doubt be lively and controversial, is to draw conclusions that are as precise as they can be on the basis of the guarded, tardy information that the Council gives us about its own work. Our debates must bring to the fore the expression of political will that alone can give substance to the "European security identity" our governments have decided to create, while setting strengthened transatlantic relations on a new footing.

Our first task will obviously be to examine the institutional and operational provisions adopted in Maastricht and how the Council has started to implement them. Now is an appropriate time to do so since in a few days' time the Council is to meet at ministerial level to review what has

already been done and to decide on the implementation of what has not yet been done. It will therefore receive our recommendations at the right moment to be guided by them.

The reports listed on the order of business for this part-session show that this review will, to say the least, be provisional and that much remains to be done. We should probably first pay tribute to the steps taken by the military authorities in our countries to make progress in the areas attributed to them by the governments in Maastricht. The efforts they have made in considering the security of tomorrow's Europe, in spite of all the uncertainty about the evolution of risks to international peace, in spite of the general reduction in defence budgets in our countries and in spite of the new technological requirements of a defence no longer polarised on a specific threat, are quite remarkable and afford every reason to be optimistic about Europe's ability to adapt itself to an entirely new situation. The reports adopted by our Defence Committee and Technological and Aerospace Committee record this and show how we believe these efforts should be pursued.

Conversely, implementation of the political and institutional decisions taken by the Nine in Maastricht seems very slow, probably because, in our particular area, decisions by the heads of state or government have been insufficiently thought through. It also stems from the fact that many of these decisions involve other countries whose options are not always adopted clearly enough, be they members of the European Community hesitating about the requirements of participating in joint defence, our transatlantic friends and allies who are wondering about Europe's place in their own security concerns or our friends in Central and Eastern Europe who, very understandably, find it hard to assess how important security matters are for them because of the pressure of urgent priorities. Hence it is not surprising that the reports by our Political Committee which deal specifically with these aspects of the situation are more reserved about the decisions taken by the Nine in Maastricht and their implementation. In particular, it should be noted that the Council has had to postpone until the middle of this month the vast meeting of WEU Ministers and those from any Central and Eastern European countries who wish to attend to examine the requirements of a security system covering the whole of Europe. Here it should also be noted that, by holding the Berlin symposium, the Assembly preceded the Council by taking an initiative which is fully in line with the Maastricht decisions.

I think the message which our Assembly has always addressed to the governments and whose terms are to be found in the texts proposed by the committees, can be summed up in one phrase: a true European security identity

The President (continued)

depends on the will of the peoples and governments to apply the treaties and, in particular, the modified Brussels Treaty. It is understandable that, in the uncertainty of recent years in Europe, one might have wondered whether there were not a better basis for establishing a joint security policy. This can no longer be confined to organising a defence system. It also embraces joint diplomatic and economic efforts to ensure peace on our continent and to overcome the crises arising there. The assistance being given by the European Community to the new democracies in the Centre, East and South-East of Europe already fits into the framework of a security policy conceived in this way.

Also, about to open the Assembly's debates as I am, I must say something about the military conflict now going on in the former Yugoslavia.

First, this fighting is not just a tragedy for the people in that region. It is already a European tragedy. It may even become a disaster for the development of the whole of Europe if this negative example is followed and if we fail to react in an appropriate manner to the massacre of thousands of innocent people, the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of others and the systematic destruction of the economic foundations of the states recently created by the international community. Should the sanctions decided by the Security Council not lead quickly to an effective cease-fire, our governments should then, together with our American friends and our partners in the alliance, examine as a matter of urgency whether it would not be possible to create, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in certain parts of Croatia, safe havens for civilians like those set up in northern Iraq. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of taking action by air and by sea to neutralise the heavy artillery that is causing such serious destruction in these regions. The preparation of measures of this kind is perhaps already inducing the responsible authorities to revise their policy.

However, the Maastricht decisions reveal hesitation by governments about the balance that will have to be ensured between the various aspects of this policy.

However, we have to note that, in its present form, the modified Brussels Treaty offers the possibility of considerably increased co-operation in armaments matters and the organisation of forces, provided Europeans want this. It allows such co-operation to be extended to others if they share this resolve. It offers a useful instrument for the establishment of peace based on the recognition of states and frontiers, respect for the rights of minorities and freedom of exchange of all kinds throughout the European continent, because it safeguards the

possibility for nations to determine the nature and extent of their commitments.

Our Assembly has always opted very firmly in favour of a union of Europeans round what, yesterday, was the Community and has now become the European Union. It welcomes unreservedly the progress of this Union on the occasion of the Maastricht agreements and the fact that the twelve governments agreed that WEU is playing a full part in the process of European Union. However, noting in particular that, from the economic and defence standpoints, the nations of Europe were not all adopting the same approaches or advancing at the same rate, the Assembly has endeavoured to warn public opinion and the governments not to be too hasty in aligning the institutions of a Europe which will be a long time in the making even if this means not tackling each problem according to its own criteria. Accession to the Community must correspond to a will and to economic capability. Accession to WEU can be achieved only through accession to the modified Brussels Treaty and all it implies. The essential coherence between a joint defence and security policy pursued in the framework of the European Union and the joint organisation of defence in that of WEU will be achieved better by respecting the responsibilities of each organisation than by a mechanism that gives artificial priority to an institutional edifice.

No one is more aware than I am of the need to proceed rapidly to ensure, in all areas, the security needed by all the European countries which are at present picking their way through the dangers in a situation beyond their grasp. There is indeed no guarantee that the factors that can advance Europe along the road to peace, stability and progress now will still be there tomorrow. However, it is precisely because it is urgent to act that we must start without delay to offer effective co-operation to countries in the east of Europe and to integrate them in our economic system as well as our security system. This is also the reason why each question must be handled on its own merits. The time which one way or another will be necessary for achieving a harmonious European Union does not mean that Europe of the Twelve, in areas within its purview, or that of the Nine, for matters that concern it, should delay implementing the integration of Europe as a whole. There will be time later to examine how to give a satisfactory shape to something which can at present be seen only vaguely. Of course, the undertaking on which we are embarking for a whole continent is unprecedented. However, the lesson can be learned from the history of nineteenth century Germany that such an approach may be wider and more effective than an approach which is perhaps more organised but does not base the institutional system it aims to establish on the solution to problems now

The President (continued)

arising, and which will inevitably continue to arise for a long time to come, because of the complexity of European society.

In short, the institutional work started long ago by the members of the European Community, continued in Maastricht but still far from complete, must not be given priority over the necessity and urgency of an undertaking that concerns Europe as a whole and which leads to all countries which really wish being progressively associated with what we are in the process of building. The sooner each nation is called upon to play a part, however modest, in this edifice, the better we shall be safeguarded against the risk of part of Europe feeling left on one side by a European Union offering it only one choice: to join or not to join.

In the light of these considerations, I would like to sketch out the tasks I now have to shoulder.

First, I shall naturally continue the work started by the Assembly by devoting this part-session to the follow-up to the Maastricht agreements. The months ahead will be crucial because all our countries have to pursue the debate already started in most of them on the ratification of the treaty. Our Assembly can but be satisfied that France has already taken a decisive step towards the revision of its constitution made necessary by the implications of the Maastricht Treaty and that the House of Commons in the United Kingdom has voted in favour of ratification. While it is to be hoped that the treaty will be ratified everywhere, it is already clear that the questions which have arisen during this debate go well beyond the text submitted for ratification and concern the way each of our nations views its participation in the Europe of tomorrow. We shall certainly have to give further consideration to the aftermath of Maastricht in the parliamentary year now starting particularly as, where WEU is concerned, the Council will have to give positive substance to the not very well thought-out decisions included in the two declarations by the Nine. This will provide me with an opportunity to strengthen the dialogue between the two WEU institutions.

Furthermore, one of those declarations contains a wish by the governments that our Assembly develop its relations with the European Parliament, probably so as to emphasise the place WEU should occupy in the process of European Union. The establishment of exchanges between the two assemblies seems to me desirable from every point of view and I intend to make every effort to that end.

However, such relations require prior clarification, on the one hand about the Council's intentions and on the other about what is expected of the European Parliament.

On the Council side, it merely has to confirm its will to continue to apply the modified Brussels Treaty in full, including Article IX, i.e. to consider WEU as a whole of which our Assembly is a legal part. Such confirmation appears necessary in view of certain ambiguities that we have noted in the governments' conduct in regard to the Assembly and the increasingly lax way in which they seem to interpret the commitments they entered into in 1954, in particular as regards the future of WEU, its enlargement and the rôle of its Assembly.

Regarding the European Parliament, the purpose is to ensure that exchanges are held in a manner that respects the vocation, responsibilities and rights of both assemblies, each based on its own treaty and, although their representation is different, each the result of elections in member countries in conditions adapted to the specific nature of each one. In other words, our dialogue should be based on a footing that ensures equality and reciprocity and avoids the exchange of ideas leading to a confusion of responsibilities, particularly in the eyes of the public, not always adequately informed of the functional complexity of parliamentary Europe.

Finally – and not the most pleasant of my tasks – I shall have to pursue with the Council the tedious effort of getting it to understand that the reactivation of WEU, the opening of increasingly extensive relations with a growing number of countries and their parliaments have budgetary implications which, although not great, are nevertheless such that the Assembly is no longer able to respond to the requests addressed to it from all sides. Our requests are moderate. They do not seek to place us on the same kind of footing as the European Parliament or even that of our national parliaments. We merely wish to be able to respond to the most urgent requirements of the situation. However, I shall certainly not manage to win the Council's acceptance unless each one of you approaches his or her own government and helps to convince it that an effort in this matter has become essential.

These are the main concerns I have in mind in accepting the mission you have given me. They will not be unbearable if you are good enough to maintain the confidence that you have just shown in me. The substance of our debates, at recent sessions and in committee, allows me to believe that we shall be able to continue together to pursue a task that is useful for Europe and effective for the peace that we hope will henceforth be more firmly established in Europe as a whole and in the rest of the world and to tackle with optimism the questions raised by the future of WEU.

It is therefore with great confidence in the future of Western European Union and its

The President (continued)

Assembly that I propose moving on to the business of our thirty-eighth session.

9. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10 (2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Six nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

They are, in alphabetical order, those of Mrs. Err, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Foschi, Mr. Fourné, Mr. Kempinaire and Mr. Machete.

The other places will be filled later.

If the Assembly is unanimous, as I hope, I propose that these Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare them elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

10. The situation in Yugoslavia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1316 and 1317)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have to tell the Assembly that I have received a motion for a recommendation on the situation in Yugoslavia with request for urgent procedure from Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. de Puig and more than ten others, and a request for a debate under urgent procedure on the situation in the former Yugoslavia from Mr. De Decker and ten others, Documents 1316 and 1317. The latter proposal has not yet been circulated.

As the motion for a recommendation is more specific than the request for a debate under urgent procedure and covers the same subject, I propose that the Assembly should vote on the motion for a recommendation immediately after the adoption of the draft order of business.

11. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1300)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session. The draft is to be found in Document 1300 dated 27th May 1992.

Before calling on the Assembly to adopt this draft, I must tell you that if the Assembly accepts the motion for a recommendation with request for urgent procedure on the situation in Yugoslavia, I intend to propose the following changes to our orders of the day. The debate under urgent procedure would take place tomorrow afternoon after the debate on Sir Dudley Smith's report, WEU: the operational organisation. The opening of the debate on Mr. Goerens's report, WEU after Maastricht, would be brought forward and would come at the end of this afternoon's business. The debate would continue and, if possible, end tomorrow morning. Lastly, the debate on Mr. Aarts's report on arms export policy would take place after the debate under urgent procedure and hence at the end of business for tomorrow afternoon.

For the moment, however, I invite the Assembly to adopt the draft order of business as it stands.

Is there any objection?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

As the order of business for this part-session is particularly full, I propose to the Assembly that, under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, there should be a time-limit of five minutes for each speaker in all our debates, apart from chairmen of committees and rapporteurs.

May I remind you that, under the same rule, this proposal has to be voted upon by the Assembly without debate.

Is there any objection?...

It is so agreed.

12. The situation in Yugoslavia

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Docs. 1316 and 1317)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We come now to the motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure on the situation in Yugoslavia, Documents 1316 and 1317.

This request, in accordance with Rule 44 of the Rules of Procedure, has been made by at least ten representatives. May I remind you that only the following may speak: one speaker for

The President (continued)

the request, one speaker against, and one representative of the Bureau speaking on its behalf.

Under Rule 32 (7) no representative may speak for more than five minutes.

I call Mr. De Decker to give the reasons for this request.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as you yourself said in your address, the situation in Yugoslavia is growing more critical every day. I feel it would be wholly unthinkable for our Assembly to meet for this part-session without an urgent debate on the Yugoslav question and the measures that should possibly be taken by our organisation to bring peace to this situation, calm warlike minds and bring help to civilians.

Article VIII of the treaty very clearly states that the Council of Ministers of WEU may meet whenever the security of Europe is threatened. The motion for a recommendation which has been tabled and signed by members of the three main groups in our Assembly refers to that article.

For my part, and on behalf of all the signatories, I should simply like to ask that, in accordance with our Rules of Procedure, we should apply the urgent procedure so that tomorrow, as you have already pointed out, Mr. President, after discussing the matter in the Defence Committee, we can have an urgent debate on this tragic Yugoslav question.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to raise a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I request that the question requiring urgent debate be referred to the Political and Defence Committees first so that they can prepare the ground for the debate on the situation in Yugoslavia.

I think that the Assembly and the presidency should rule first on this request because, in my view, it is essential that tomorrow's debate should be effective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this request?...

Does the Chairman of the Defence Committee wish to speak?...

Does any representative of the Bureau wish to speak?...

We shall now take the vote on the request for debate under urgent procedure.

I propose, should the latter be adopted, that the motion for a recommendation be referred to the Defence Committee.

We shall now vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The urgent procedure is adopted.

I propose that the debate on the subject be held on Tuesday afternoon after the vote on the report by Sir Dudley Smith on WEU: the operational organisation.

I therefore propose that the draft order of business be amended as I suggested earlier.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the changes in the membership of committees contained in Notice No. 1 which has already been distributed.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

14. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I invite to the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Before I come to my report, Mr. President, may I offer hearty congratulations on your election as President of the WEU Assembly. I am sure you will capably carry forward the work of your predecessor, Senator Robert Pontillon, whose untimely death we lament.

I look forward to our future co-operation. The first occasion may well occur soon in London if you present the political guidelines of the draft budget for 1993 to the Council.

(The speaker continued in English)

Mr. President, parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen, tomorrow Denmark is set to ratify the Maastricht Treaty by referendum. The Danish people will thus be the first in the European Community to sanction by universal suffrage their leaders' commitment and their parliament's approval for a process which began with the Single European Act in Luxembourg and whose objective is European union. The emergence of a European sovereignty endorsed

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

by our peoples is the sine qua non for the framing of an effective foreign and security policy, i.e. one which has a defence arm. The all too numerous flashpoints in the eastern part of our continent and the bloody convulsions in the former Yugoslavia are a daily reminder of how urgent it is to make rapid progress towards a common European security and defence policy. Since the Maastricht declarations, the intergovernmental organs of our organisation have made every effort to lay the foundations for this long-haul enterprise.

The work of your parliamentary Assembly over this same period testifies to a particularly encouraging convergence of ideas throughout our organisation. Here I pay tribute to both the quality and direction of the reports which we will be debating this week.

On 10th June next, the WEU Council, enlarged to include the political directors and their counterparts from the defence ministries, will meet in London for a final examination of the draft political declarations and mandates which are to be submitted to ministers on 19th June in Bonn.

I should like to make just a few comments on three key items which will be on the ministerial agenda: first, relations between WEU and the other European member states of the European Community or the Atlantic Alliance; secondly, the development of WEU's operational rôle; and, thirdly, relations between WEU and the countries of Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

WEU is an integral part of the process leading to a European union. At the same time, it is firmly anchored in the Atlantic Alliance. Institutional relationships will, therefore, be tailored to the specific characteristics and needs of these two fundamental elements of European security. Finding itself at the heart of a dynamic twofold process, WEU will assert itself both as a partner and as an active player – the more so as soon as its ministerial organs are in Brussels.

WEU is now beginning to develop structures which will be both complementary to and compatible with those of the alliance. The necessary practical arrangements will have to be worked out between the alliance and WEU as these operational structures are set up.

This working relationship will allow for the intensification of WEU member states' co-ordination on alliance issues, with a view to introducing WEU joint positions into the alliance consultation process for further discussion. The synchronisation of meetings, the harmonisation of procedures and close co-operation between the WEU and NATO secretariats will help bring this about.

The formulation of joint positions will be undertaken by WEU's Permanent Council and its various working groups. Their initial introduction into the alliance consultation process is likely to be entrusted to the representative of the WEU presidency.

As regards co-operation between secretariats, the purpose will be to ensure a full and regular exchange of information as well as the smooth running of synchronised meetings. Concrete steps to meet these requirements are being worked out and will be further discussed with NATO. Because WEU and NATO share the common purpose of ensuring collective defence and will have to co-operate in a very practical way, the answers will probably be among the easiest to work out once the WEU Council and secretariat have settled in Brussels. It may not be so easy with the European institutions as the answer will largely depend on the future division of labour between the European institutions and WEU for the implementation of the forthcoming common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

On WEU's relationship with the European Union, the Maastricht declaration is unambiguous: "The objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the union which have defence implications."

Thus, a triangular relationship will evolve which will generate a specific European strategic culture and gradually lead to the setting up of the institutional mechanisms needed to develop the defence component of the European Union. In a WEU framework to start with or after 1996 under a different name within the evolving European Union institutions, all elements of European defence will always simultaneously constitute the European pillar of the alliance.

WEU's enlargement to the three other members of the European Community and, in parallel, the acceptance of associate status by the other European members of the alliance will be crucial to the meaningful and concrete development of WEU's relations with both the European institutions and the alliance.

The problems of WEU's future enlargement are by far the most sensitive it has to solve in implementing the Maastricht declarations. The creation of a new status of associate member is something of a novelty for a security organisation. But it is crucial to achieve our goal of completing the construction of the European pillar and strengthening Atlantic solidarity.

Relations between member states and associate member states will be based on two fundamental principles. The first principle is the settlement of mutual differences by peaceful

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

means, in accordance with the obligations resulting from the modified Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the commitments entered into under the terms of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, and other generally recognised principles and rules of international law. This implies refraining from resorting to the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

The second principle is that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the treaties which bind the member states within Western European Union and within the Atlantic Alliance are mutually reinforcing. They should, therefore, not be invoked in disputes between member states of either of the two organisations.

An associate member, while participating fully in meetings of the WEU Council, will not vote. It will be able to support a decision but not block a consensus. At the request of a majority of member states, meetings may be restricted to full members. Liaison arrangements are envisaged for future WEU operational activities. As for observers, the detailed provisions are being finalised.

Member states of the European Community which have accepted the invitation to accede to WEU will be asked to subscribe to the same undertakings as previous candidates, and also to the two commitments emanating from Maastricht, namely: to develop WEU as the defence component of the future European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; and to endorse the status of associate members and observers.

Agreement between the Nine, which is expected to result from the ministerial meeting on 19th June 1992, is a prerequisite for the start of negotiations on accession. Discussions with all categories of applicant states will begin and be concluded at the same time.

By demonstrating its commitment to NATO's essential functions, its willingness to shoulder new responsibilities and to involve all the European allies in its activities, WEU has succeeded in assuring the United States that its fear of being treated as an ally of last resort, to be called upon in the event of disaster, was groundless. I believe that now most Americans understand that the affirmation of the European defence identity and the definition of military capabilities answerable to WEU will also underpin and strengthen their commitment in Europe.

What force level will the United States public consider acceptable without feeling that Washington is more concerned with European security than with the Europeans themselves?

That answer is still awaited. Will the likelihood of continued instability in Eastern Europe and beyond the Urals be enough to sustain America's will to maintain forces at a truly deterrent level on our continent? Realism must convince us not to bank on an indefinite extension of the reprieve which we currently enjoy.

A second set of questions to be addressed relates to the scope and instruments of WEU's future operational rôle.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – The central question here is: should a European command structure be created, and how would it relate to the alliance's changing military structures?

WEU has shown itself to be a useful instrument for out-of-Europe contingencies. Europe needs to develop and maintain capabilities for intervention when and where the political will to intervene exists. Accordingly, European multinational forces should be structured so that they can be used by NATO in collective defence scenarios and by WEU in European contingencies as well as out-of-Europe.

WEU cannot be relegated to an "out-of-Europe" rôle only. The strengthening of NATO depends both on a clearer definition of the respective rôles of the Europeans and the Americans and on a WEU contribution to collective defence on the European continent.

It is quite clear that, unless it becomes more operational, WEU cannot be an asset to the alliance nor develop into the defence arm of a European political union.

Various types of action can be envisaged at a pre-contingency planning stage within WEU. All the mechanisms set up at the time of the Gulf crisis could be reactivated at very short notice. But this is not enough.

The creation of a planning cell responsible for contingency planning and for matching the forces answerable to WEU to its missions as defined by the Council of Ministers will be decided in Bonn on 19th June.

The planning cell will mainly be responsible for: preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices; preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements; keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be assigned to WEU for specific operations; preparing exercise plans; contributing to the wider debate on the development of a military capability for WEU.

Work on setting up the satellite centre on the basis of the implementation plan adopted last January has continued. Much progress has been

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

made in staff recruitment, building refurbishment and equipment procurement. The centre should begin operation towards the end of the year. On the recommendation of the study management team, the contract for the main satellite system feasibility study has been awarded to a consortium of firms from WEU member states, headed by Dornier. This study will cover the operation of, and timetable for, the establishment of the space and ground segments.

Lastly, the Maastricht declarations opened up the prospect for convergence between WEU, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Eurogroup. I hope that the relevant decisions will be taken by the end of the year; this would promote the standardisation and interoperability of equipment and logistic support.

A strong transatlantic relationship, where economic competition and security requirements must be kept separate, is vital for the future of European defence, but WEU member states are also concerned to develop specific links with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of consultations and, from now on, regular exchanges of information.

A series of fact-finding missions, initially to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and then to Bulgaria and Romania and the three Baltic republics, gave an insight into these countries' security concerns as they move towards pluralist democracy and a market economy. WEU will endeavour to bear these concerns in mind when framing its own positions, especially on arms control and disarmament.

The new democracies of Central Europe do not always wish to air their views on security in the widest framework. WEU offers a more restricted forum for co-operation, particularly to those countries which have already signed an association agreement with the European Community. Faced with their legitimate expectations, WEU cannot shy away from establishing a security co-operation link, and that means giving thought to criteria for a special relationship.

The countries of WEU see the strengthening of their dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as making a significant contribution to the new peaceful order emerging in Europe. That requires an interaction between the European institutions, NATO and the CSCE to establish a partnership which will be as much pan-European as Euro-Atlantic since it will span a geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. That partnership will embrace the political, military, socio-cultural, economic and environmental aspects of security. Stability, a

prerequisite for a more balanced development, depends on Europeans getting ambitious co-operative measures off the ground in all these areas. But success will be more likely if these projects are based on a range of regional initiatives. The parliamentary Assembly and the Institute for Security Studies will continue to play an important rôle in developing these contacts.

The humanitarian nightmare in Yugoslavia is worsening. I am pleased that you, Mr. President, decided to have a debate under urgent procedure. You know my feeling that Western Europe should have reacted more forcefully to the succession of broken cease-fires and aggressive acts against the civilian population. Admittedly, our countries could not become enmeshed in an uncontrollable situation without having clearly defined their common objectives. In 1945, Europe outlawed war. Since July 1990, the credibility of the European enterprise has been severely tested by the escalating conflict in the Balkans. Without an independent operational capability, Europe's diplomatic efforts are likely to remain ineffective.

I am sure that you share with me a feeling of frustration and anger at the way the last communist régime in Europe has trampled underfoot the principles which have served us so well in fostering change through the CSCE process. Attempts to control territory by force, to create new borders unilaterally and forcefully to expel minorities cannot be tolerated. The Community and the United Nations have rightly agreed on economic sanctions. WEU should be prepared, if mandated, to support their enforcement. It should also consider possible military implications, using its experience of humanitarian actions and embargo enforcement.

Let us not forget the lessons of history: to seek peace without demonstrating the resolve to create it or safeguard it means in the final analysis – and to paraphrase the words of Arthur Koestler – having to be content with just being left in peace. But for how long?

May I conclude by conveying to you my astonishment at the all too frequent and surprising comments made by quality newspapers about the future of WEU. On 16th May, for example, one of the leading London dailies stated, in the same breath as it were, that WEU was destined to be the nucleus of a future European defence identity, but had an uncertain rôle. Such contradiction demonstrates that we must not let up in our public awareness campaign. All in all, the initiatives taken in this field by your Assembly, the Secretariat-General and the Institute for Security Studies are considerable, especially if we remember just how modest the resources available for this purpose actually are.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

The Maastricht summit confirmed WEU's dual mission to be the embodiment of the European defence identity and the European pillar of NATO. Clear evidence that the European defence identity really exists is provided by events, starting with WEU's reactivation, its involvement in the Gulf crisis and its enlargement to Spain and Portugal. It has been recognised by our North American allies, who are closely following our work and reacting to the decisions which give substance to that identity. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Copenhagen and then in Rome, acknowledged the fact that it is a key element in our common security. WEU's rôle is quite clear. Its dual responsibility is to act as a melting pot for ideas and framework for action regarding the defence structures which will be available to the European Union; in so doing, it will strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.

Admittedly, we are only in the early stages of realising this ambitious project. The adjustment of the decisions taken in a bilateral framework and in the context of intergovernmental and multilateral co-operation in WEU will be achieved progressively. This will also be so for the smooth-running of the mechanism of WEU and NATO in the framework of the alliance.

The success of our endeavours will largely depend on the spirit in which we conduct our day-to-day work. I hope that it will fall to me to reach the goal to which I attach such great importance and to succeed in convincing the remaining sceptics on both sides of the Atlantic of our deep commitment to a Euro-Atlantic security relationship and a European defence.

All those who see the realisation of European union by the end of the century as a priority task can take pride in the achievements chalked up since 1986. Those achievements should also fill us with confidence in Europe's ability to respond to the formidable challenge of bringing back into the fold, by peaceful means, those peoples who have been left outside for fifty years and helping them to prosper in a democratic environment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address. I am sure you will not mind answering questions from members of our Assembly.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to ask the Secretary-General a question on what he said about Western European Union and Yugoslavia. He talked about what he sees as Western European Union's task in the implementation of measures that it may take under the treaty. On the BBC's Newsnight programme on 22nd May

he referred to this as a European operation. Would the Secretary-General explain what he means when he calls on WEU in the context of Yugoslavia to do its duty and take action?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – My answer to Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman is that I explained in my statement this morning what I see as the main problem. Firstly, principles that we have adopted as pillars of our policy not only in Western European Union but also in European political co-operation are being violated in this case. Secondly, I stressed that Western European Union can only function in connection with political decision-making.

Political decisions should be taken either in the United Nations or within European political co-operation itself. For me, the main point is the example we set at the time of the Gulf war. First there was an embargo on Iraq. At one time there were thirty-nine ships from WEU countries involved in enforcing the United Nations embargo. This was followed by joint action by WEU countries to help the Kurds with their humanitarian problem.

What I see as WEU's task is this. A decision should be taken that can be seen as a mandate for the members of Western European Union. If necessary, this mandate might be followed by a demonstration of military capability. Military capability is often intended to deter rather than as an offensive element. WEU would thus be demonstrating a capability that would make operations more credible. It does not matter whether this is a monitoring operation or a peace conference or some other kind of mediation. In this way strength can be added to the embargoes imposed by the European Community or the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by paying tribute to the Secretary-General's efforts. First, he has raised the profile of Western European Union in the minds of nations and ministers around the world. Secondly and more specifically, he has attempted to seek a more dynamic rôle for Western European Union to help alleviate the tragedies developing in Yugoslavia.

I also wish to ask a question. The Secretary-General drew attention to various aspects of the future rôle of WEU. He referred to the rôle that the Assembly has often taken in leading WEU to assess its future rôle, and mentioned the limited resources available to ensure future security in Europe. What would the Secretary-General con-

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

sider to be a helpful step for him and this Assembly to take to persuade our political masters of the political importance of our debates, conclusions and recommendations for action that will be crucial to the future security of our continent?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Like Mr. Rathbone I very much endorse the leading rôle that the Assembly has played on several occasions, especially in relation to our contacts with countries in Central and Eastern Europe. At a time when it was not possible for the Council to do so formally, the Assembly took many initiatives which have since been taken up and endorsed by the Council of Ministers.

One of the most useful strategies that we have recently devised is that of a meeting between the President of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Budget Committee, before the budget is drawn up, to establish the budget's strategic guidelines and explain the possibilities and constraints and, above all, make clear what together – Council and Assembly – we hope to accomplish. When congratulating President Soell on his election I mentioned that I thought that the first chance – hopefully before the summer – for a meeting between the Permanent Council in London and the Chairman of the Budget Committee of the Assembly could be in that vein. We would have the discussions that we once had with President Pontillon and which we both found useful. Those discussions can certainly deepen now that Maastricht is behind us and we have a clear vision of the future. Together, the Council and the Assembly are taking practical decisive steps.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I do not think you made any reference in your speech to the Franco-German summit held at La Rochelle on 21st May.

What are your views on the Franco-German decision taken by the two countries on that occasion at the highest level of responsibility?

The La Rochelle summit drew a number of protests from the United States, which may perhaps be exaggerated but have undoubtedly created a climate of suspicion there about the reality of European solidarity – that of Europe as a whole and not merely of a few allies – and about the European resolve to maintain a strong common defence.

I feel therefore that it would have been helpful if you had given the Assembly your own views as the person responsible for the organisation's policy. I would be grateful if you could let us have your personal opinion; I am not referring, therefore, to the views of the Council of Ministers which will certainly be voiced in more appropriate places at meetings held on the subject.

The matter is also important for another reason. On 1st July, as you know, Italy will be taking over the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers and on the same day the United Kingdom will be taking over the chairmanship of the European Community; the position of Italy and the United Kingdom is not the same as that of Germany and France.

WEU should adopt a clear stance mediating between the approach of the countries which are about to assume responsibility at the highest level in Europe and that recently given expression in the Franco-German decision.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I did not speak about the Franco-German corps. I thought that, as the two ministers immediately involved are to address the Assembly on Wednesday, it would be better to leave the issue to them. Mr. Stegagnini asked me my personal opinion and, with all modesty, I am prepared to give that.

I have always supported the idea of the Franco-German corps, but in a wider context. The initiative is too important to leave to two countries, crucial as they may be to Europe's defence. Clearly, without Franco-German reconciliation, the position in Europe would have been very different.

My reasoning is, first, that France has taken the idea to state clearly that it is prepared to contribute forces to a new, multinational framework and is departing from its policy of seeking independence for its forces except in extreme cases. It has shown that it is now prepared to contribute specific units to the Franco-German corps.

Secondly, if the new framework gives us a justification – as a result of public opinion in both countries – for maintaining French forces on German territory, there should also be some German forces on French territory.

For those reasons, I feel quite positive. My only concern – and the La Rochelle communiqué has allayed my fears considerably – is that it is unclear for which bodies that European corps will be available. Could it be used independently by a country without links with NATO or WEU? In that respect, I have found nothing objectionable in the La Rochelle

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

communiqué. That important initiative brings our countries closer together. The European corps will not be the only force answerable to WEU. I believe – indeed, the British Secretary of State for Defence has said that he is prepared to do so – that we should make certain forces answerable to WEU. We expect Portugal to make an announcement in the meeting on 19th June and I hope that all member states of WEU will clarify what military forces will be made available and, in the wording of the Maastricht Treaty, which of them will be answerable to WEU.

The European corps will be an important element but not the only one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – May I, Secretary-General, in turn congratulate you on your address and applaud your tireless efforts not only in maintaining WEU's position but also, through the organisation, in strengthening the idea of an active European identity in defence matters.

In your report, as at our last session, you referred to the grave situation in Yugoslavia, of which we are conscious in all our work and in all the material that we write.

In one part of your speech, you very rightly say that without an independent operational capability, European diplomatic efforts are doomed to failure. Unfortunately, we still have no such independent operational forces which means, without wishing to take your words too far, that everything we do is useless.

It is a sad thing to say, and I do not wish to make too much out of this thought of yours, but in public opinion that is the way things are. The work of information that you urge we should perform must therefore be pursued with even greater energy.

The question I should like to ask is this. If we obtain the operational forces, which fortunately we are all asking for now, can we be more useful?

As you well know, Secretary-General, if we had had these forces in August 1991, we could not have intervened because it was not an international conflict. The whole arsenal of diplomatic law allows us to intervene only in interstate conflicts. Since this conflict was internal to one state, the independence of Slovenia and Croatia being far from recognised, we were up against a legal barrier: there could be no intervention, only humanitarian action on a small scale.

Do you not consider it urgent for WEU to start work to set up a legal and diplomatic "arsenal" – to stay with this word – of universally-recognised instruments and not solely based on resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which would enable us to use this form of intervention that everyone is talking about and make it credible? We would then be able to act immediately, without having to wait for the Security Council or even, as some request, the CSCE, to give Europeans instructions to do something.

Without the existence of legal status, formulated and recognised at world level, WEU will have no means of intervening in the future. May I therefore ask you this question: do you intend, Secretary-General, to ask the Council of Ministers to embark on useful work in this field as soon as possible?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am very grateful to Mr. Caro for his kind words and also for giving me his place in the order of business for which I apologise.

As regards his question, my reply is unequivocally yes.

Moreover, I must say that provided the political will is there WEU is already able to act. We proved this during the Gulf crisis. We mounted an operation in a few weeks consisting, at one period, of thirty-five ships to enforce the embargo on Iraq. In September and October, I personally was in favour of similar action, not to get involved immediately in the fighting, but to show that we do have a certain capability. With a fleet in the Adriatic, outside territorial waters, I am convinced that the bombing of Dubrovnik would not have happened. And that situation still exists.

With some land force capabilities, we also perhaps might have been able to help bring about a situation where a cease-fire or an agreement between the parties could have been contemplated. Things have probably gone on too long now, but that is a matter of history.

As regards your specific question, the reply has already been given to some extent, since the states concerned have been recognised. The earlier argument of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country no longer applies, at least not to Bosnia and Croatia. It could apply to Kosovo if civil war were to break out and I am rather pessimistic about the situation there.

Nevertheless, it is my impression that in the CSCE and the United Nations some rights of intervention are in the process of becoming recognised. Already, the measures set up by the CSCE in Helsinki go much further, without the

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

agreement of Yugoslavia but fortunately with the agreement of all the other countries. So there is already some movement towards recognising the right of intervention but this is certainly one of the problems which we shall need to discuss together, preferably in Helsinki, and WEU should formulate a position of principle on this subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In the middle of his excellent speech, the Secretary-General made a throwaway remark about a reprieve in the stationing of American forces in Europe. Can the Secretary-General elaborate on that and say whether he thinks that it is likely to be a short reprieve or whether the result of the presidential election, either way, might release the next President to say “No more”?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Sir Geoffrey raises an important question and, of course, I do not have the answer. When I make speeches in member countries I always point to 1994 as a crucial year. I hope that by the end of 1994 all Russian forces will have left European countries. They may not have left the Baltic states, but they should have by then. Certainly, they will have left eastern Germany and Poland. For our public and the American public that will point to a new situation. The question then becomes pressing: is the present force posture still necessary or can we reduce it?

I think that it is likely that some American presence will remain, although one of the three presidential hopefuls may have a different view. My recipe has always been that it is time to conclude a clear arrangement – sometimes I even call it a transatlantic bargain – in which we Europeans make it clear what we can and will do for our own security and point to the functions that, at least until the end of this century, we cannot fulfil and where we need an American contribution. I hope that, to complement our rôle, the Americans would be able to fulfil such functions as we Europeans may need help with.

It is not for us to dictate anything to the Americans or for them to dictate anything to us. Therefore, it must be a dovetailing exercise. That would enhance enormously our capabilities and could provide a meaningful argument to Congress as to why the Americans should remain in Europe. That is important and the Council and we parliamentarians still have some work to do in explaining to the Americans that we want them to remain in Europe, that we want to preserve the alliance and that the work of WEU is of the essence, not only for Europe but for the alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your speech and for your replies.

15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Document 1312).
2. Composition of political groups (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Document 1311).
3. A new security order in Europe (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1309 and amendments).
4. WEU after Maastricht (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1308).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Monday, 1st June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Changes in the membership of a committee.
4. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1312*).
Speaker: Mr. Caro (former President of the Assembly).
5. Composition of political groups (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1311*).
Speakers: Mr. Thompson (Chairman and Rapporteur), Mr. Pieralli.
6. A new security order in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1309 and amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Caro (Rapporteur), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Jan-kowitsch (Observer from Austria), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Vacaru (Observer from Romania), Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Müller, Mr. Roseta, Mr. Rockenbauer (Observer from Hungary), Mr. Feldmann, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece), Mr. Caro (Rapporteur), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Caro, Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Caro, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Caro.
7. WEU after Maastricht (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1308*).
Speakers: Mr. Goerens (Rapporteur), Mr. Antretter, Mr. Fioret.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Changes in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly must approve the following changes in the membership of the Technological and Aero-

space Committee proposed by the Italian Delegation:

Mr. Colombo and Mr. Savio as titular members in place of Mr. Stegagnini and Mr. Malfatti.

These changes have been published in Notice No. 2 which has been circulated.

They are submitted to the Assembly for ratification under Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

4. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1312)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1312.

I call Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I again congratulate you on your election. You will be following in the footsteps

1. See page 18.

Mr. Caro (continued)

of our friend Robert Pontillon as a result, unfortunately, of his death, but you are one of those most gifted with the authority and knowledge needed to enable our Assembly to pursue the work begun by your predecessor and to guide it along the exciting but difficult road before it at the end of this century: namely that leading to the construction of political Europe. You may rest assured that you will have the most active support of the majority, if not all the members of this Assembly.

Our friend Robert Pontillon has taken his leave of us. We shall long remember this President who, with his friendly courtesy and devotion to the cause of Europe, gave himself so fully to the work of this Assembly and chaired the Presidential Committee on whose behalf I have the honour to present this report. The vacant chairmanship of the committee was occupied at short notice by Mr. Sinesio, one of our friends and colleagues but no longer a member of the Assembly because he did not stand for re-election to his national parliament. On behalf of my colleagues I should like to thank him for all the work he did and the masterly way he presided over our proceedings.

The report by the Presidential Committee is simple and need not call for any in-depth debate. In summary form it gives a general picture of the activities of this body with its wide-ranging responsibilities, being both political and administrative.

As you will see in part I of the report, its political action has mainly covered the organisation of the work not only of the plenary Assembly but also of its committees and staff, including the Assembly secretariat, the information service, which is providing us with increasingly efficient help, and in fact all the personnel working for us.

The biggest task, of course, was to try to concentrate our activities on the major political event constituted by the Maastricht agreements and to present to the Assembly – in the form of the order of business which we adopted this morning – the most coherent procedure possible. I can never sufficiently stress the importance of the coherence of the work performed within our Assembly and I am sure that all of you, ladies and gentlemen, will readily recognise the common thread linking all the reports before us. It is clear at this part-session even more than before that one report cannot be read without the others. If there are any lessons to be drawn from this part-session, they will need to be drawn globally, whether the problems are those of arms control, institutional organisation, greater Europe waiting at the door of Europe of the Nine, and our relations across the world.

Our action therefore has and must have an even wider audience in the Europe of the future where we shall be both a full member of defence, the alliance and Atlantic security, and the spear-head of the European identity as a political unit. As such WEU will be an appropriate institution for debate with our friends of Central and Eastern Europe who, freed of the constraints of the communist organisation, are setting out on the thrilling adventures of freedom and parliamentary democracy; they too like us need the guarantee of security in every field.

This is the spirit in which the work of the Presidential Committee has been done. One illustration is the Berlin symposium on Central and Eastern Europe, which most of you went to. With the wide-ranging attendance of this symposium it was possible to list the many problems arising in the new European situation and to help find common ground in the different countries' interests: namely, common political action to fit in with the objectives that the member countries of WEU have set themselves, the enlargement of WEU and of the Community of the Twelve and relations with countries turning, in their positive attitudes, towards our organisation of Western Europe.

Both in relation to the Berlin symposium and, more particularly, with regard to the presidency of the Council of Ministers of WEU I should like to pay a particular tribute to our German colleagues to whom we owe our thanks for the faultless organisation of the symposium and to the Chairman-in-Office whom, alas, we shall not see with us again. I hope that the absence of Mr. Genscher, who has rendered invaluable service to Western European Union, is only temporary.

The big issue, of course, has been the tragedy in Yugoslavia which weighs on our thoughts, eats at our hearts and leaves us at a loss, because we have no way of stepping in. It continues to grow in importance and gravity. It began last summer, in the first few days of August to be precise, when we saw the first warning signs of what was to become an interethnic flare-up within the former federation. At the present time, it represents the quintessential question for Europe and for WEU in particular. It is not my responsibility to go into this problem in detail. We shall have an opportunity to speak on this subject in connection with the reports that are to follow, but I wanted to make it clear that the Presidential Committee has had this issue constantly in mind.

Our relations with the European Parliament and also with the Assembly of the Atlantic Alliance are one of our main concerns. The reports to be presented, in particular that by Mr. Goerens, will afford an opportunity to discuss them again. There will also be the dis-

Mr. Caro (continued)

cussion on WEU after Maastricht and the excellent report by Sir Dudley Smith when we will be able to consider relations with the North Atlantic Assembly. The Presidential Committee sees increasing coherence in the co-ordination with these two parliamentary bodies as essential.

Discussion is under way about the CSCE Assembly. It has not yet been set up. It will be our Assembly's task to reach a joint, coherent position with the Assembly of the Council of Europe in order first to avoid duplication and second to lay down procedures and methods of work enabling Western European Union to remain what I referred to some time ago as the European spearhead in security and defence matters.

As regards administrative matters, the Presidential Committee has taken particular care to monitor the work of our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and has given it every form of support wherever possible. When discussing the report on budgetary and administrative affairs, to be presented by our eminent colleague, Mr. Rathbone, we shall be able not only to consider the factors involved in the preparation of our budget, especially for 1992, but also the light in which the Assembly sees its relations with the Council. We cannot confine our rôle merely to receiving papers brought out after meetings of budget experts. We wish to be involved at the level of political decision-making and not left to discuss things once all has been settled among the governments in the Permanent Council.

In this connection, the Presidential Committee is happy to record the efficiency of the Assembly secretariat. Whenever possible we try to improve it. You have no doubt noted that in spite of the budgetary constraints imposed upon us, which delayed decision-making, we have finally been able to offer our Spanish and Portuguese friends an administrative post, and, although this probably falls below their expectations, it is a start. We shall have to take up these matters again so that every one here, whether a member of the Assembly or of the staff, can feel to be in his proper place with equality of rights for all, and in a position to be the credible spokesman for public opinion with governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I assume the Assembly agrees that the committee's action be ratified.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

5. Composition of political groups

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1311)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the composition of political groups and vote on the draft order, Document 1311.

I take this opportunity to inform the Assembly that Mr. Pieralli and nine of his colleagues have tabled a motion for a decision on paragraph 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Thompson, Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate you, Mr. Soell, on your election as President of the Assembly. I am sure that you will carry out your duties in the same fashion as your eminent predecessor.

The Assembly decided that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should examine a matter raised in a letter from Mr. Benassi and other members of the Assembly. It requested that the committee consider an amendment to Rule 39, paragraph 4. The amendment reads as follows: "A group shall consist of not less than six representatives or substitutes." The committee met on 13th May to consider that issue.

The letter from Mr. Benassi explained that the reason for the request resulted from the recent parliamentary elections in Italy. The letter also suggested that the proposal had the aim of guaranteeing the maintenance of the Unified European Left Group of the Assembly.

Before commenting on this proposal on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, I feel that the Assembly deserves an explanation as to why my name is included as a sponsor of the motion. When I was informed of the letter from Mr. Benassi, it had been signed by only nine members of the Assembly. According to Rule 52, paragraph 2, "Motions for decisions to amend the Rules of Procedure may be tabled by ten or more representatives". It would have been possible under this rule to refuse to accept the motion on a technical point. I felt, however, that it was more appropriate for the committee to debate the issue and present a recommendation to this session of the Assembly. Therefore, I added my name to ensure that a decision could be made by the committee and the Assembly.

The Assembly has always recognised the value of political groupings which assist the organisation both in administration and in developing policy. To support those activities, a budget to

Mr. Thompson (continued)

allow groups to carry out their duties is included, based on a fixed sum, plus a further sum calculated on the basis of the number of members in each group. The accounts are subject to audit.

The content of the motion rested entirely on the changing political situation in one of the member countries, and was an attempt to ensure the maintenance of the Unified European Left Group in WEU. While recognising the value of the group's contribution to the Assembly's work, the committee felt that, if such a request were acceded to, it might lead to requests to amend the Rules of Procedure each time developments in the political situation in a member country led to changes in the political composition of its delegation.

The committee also felt that any future enlargement of WEU would necessarily involve changes in the structure of the political groups that were difficult to foresee. Representatives will be aware of the possibility of significant interest by other European nations in eventually applying for membership of our Assembly. As and when those applications are considered, and possibly accepted, there will be an increase in the number of delegates, who will in turn probably join a political grouping. That possible increase in membership will affect the future structure of the Assembly and its political groups.

The examination of the issue has been of value as it has highlighted the structure of political groups in the Assembly. The rule to fix the minimum number of members of a political group at nine was, I understand, based on 10% of the Assembly's total membership – at that time numbering eighty-nine. Our membership now numbers one hundred and eight, and if the 10% policy is to continue to apply, we must consider increasing the minimum membership of the political groups. The committee will be discussing that issue in the near future.

As a principal pillar of European democracy, our Assembly provides full opportunity for representatives to raise issues either in committee or in the Assembly. The power of argument in debate can persuade the Assembly to accept a point of view – the most important facility available.

In view of the very important issues raised, the committee unanimously agreed to recommend to the Assembly that it should reject the application to change the rules and I therefore move that motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As a signatory, along with other members of the Italian democratic party of the left, of the motion for a decision that Mr. Thompson is

asking the Assembly not to approve, I should like to make a brief statement.

I understand, though I regret them, the reasons prompting the Rapporteur and the committee not to accept our proposal. We have therefore decided to withdraw it.

I should like to inform the Assembly that, along with other Italian parliamentarians belonging not only to my group but also to other political groups, we have drawn up a new motion for decision that the committee can examine later and give its reply at the second part-session in December. This text makes no change to the quorum called for in the Rules of Procedure but lays down that the Assembly can authorise the Presidential Committee, in exceptional cases, to waive the requirements of Rule 39 (4). The Presidential Committee's decision must be unanimous and would be valid for a year only and apply solely to an existing parliamentary group.

For the moment I shall not explain why we have specified a time-limit of one year or why we recommend, in order to reassure the Assembly, that the decision should be taken unanimously by the Presidential Committee.

I simply hope that at the next session I receive a positive reply from the Committee on Rules of Procedure on this particular point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I repeat that your proposal will be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges which will report back as laid down in Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1311.

Under Rule 35, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted¹.

6. A new security order in Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1309 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee

1. See page 19.

The President (continued)

on a new security order in Europe and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1309 and amendments.

I call Mr. Caro, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it is my task on behalf of the Political Committee to present the report on the new security order in Europe. It is very much a current topic and one within which all the issues have to be embraced. This report may obviously leave some of you dissatisfied given the pace of events and the diversity of our possible reactions.

The real issue is whether we, as Western European Union, are able to respond to the general expectation of direct action by us to improve the chances of peace in Central and Eastern Europe and to equip ourselves effectively for the purpose.

Clearly, in the event of a crisis directly or indirectly affecting one of our member countries, we have to apply the treaty. As we know, Western European Union, which forms part of the Atlantic structure, has out-of-area territorial responsibilities – outside, that is, the area of influence of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is limited to the territories of the member countries of the alliance – and is thus responsible for dealing with problems that could arise outside the national territories of these member countries, as required for one thing by Article VIII of our treaty.

With the terms of the security problem now entirely changed with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the progress towards democracy and international personality of the countries of the former communist bloc, what pattern can the European security effort take to be in harmony with these countries and bearing in mind what we can contribute from our experience or in terms of the effectiveness of the agreements or treaties that we are party to?

In this matter it is possible, theoretically at least, to imagine a whole series of measures. Among these in particular is the large-scale operation of the CSCE from Vancouver to Vladivostok, though this is not, properly speaking, the territorial sphere of such action as could be mounted by WEU-CSCE which began with thirty-two members and has now fifty-four.

When we see, particularly after the remarkable address by our Secretary-General this morning, the complications that we encounter, even as nine, in achieving a political consensus among our governments on action to be taken, we can easily imagine that at CSCE level such agreement could well become more complex,

and that, without prejudging the political will of the CSCE member countries, puts it mildly.

But we do belong to CSCE and I think that one of the factors that we could remember in debating all our reports today is the essential rôle of WEU, whatever the institution or organisation responsible for organising or safeguarding the peace, and therefore for planning and, if necessary, intervening. WEU can and must act in the CSCE framework with a rôle that we define.

Another field calling for imagination is that of bilateral and multilateral consultation and agreement. We are already aware that in the context of the Atlantic Alliance or in the more limited area of external policy and, of course, at the economic level, there are discussions going on which, for the EC, involve the great debate on enlargement. These are political discussions and diplomatic negotiations, I might say exercises of style that are absolutely essential if we are to prepare, forestall and codify.

As far as we are concerned, the report that I am presenting today takes us into a more concrete area: that of the practical methods we could define and the means to use and the objectives to be attained. It takes a practical approach and is the outcome of a formal request initially made by three governments of Central Europe: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, now generally known as the "triangle" of countries.

These three countries, having experienced similar vicissitudes, through a democratic process that was not the same but led on to the same new life as sovereign democratic countries with a pluralist parliamentary democracy, have started talks amongst themselves and established close permanent relations to co-ordinate their action, particularly in the spheres of security, trade and relations with the western countries.

These three countries have asked the Atlantic Alliance countries, and hence WEU, for a solid guarantee of their security. The starting point, the key word, is this request for a guarantee. We have to help them define the request, but we also have to respond to it. You know the path followed by this request. In reality it was a request for American support, i.e. to be covered by the Atlantic shield. The reply given was that, for reasons clear to all, links between these three countries and the Atlantic Alliance were not as simple to organise as could be wished, but that there was surely a formula more within their – and therefore our – grasp, namely to try to organise relations to achieve this security guarantee requested by the three countries in the form of closer links with Western European Union.

That is the basis of this report. All the preamble and all the proposals are built on this

Mr. Caro (continued)

exchange among the three countries making the request. Our Assembly set to work with the political will to reply positively to the request. Once we crossed this threshold, the question was what method to propose to our Council of Ministers.

What appeared to be the simplest is association, keeping the most relevant features of our treaty. The idea is to organise co-operation between these countries and all the subsidiary bodies of Western European Union, excluding, of course, full participation in the governmental or parliamentary political organs, since that full participation in the two bodies would be tantamount to joining.

But for the time being we are talking not about accession, but about co-operation and methods. For the time being, we are confined to studying this notion of association which you will recall we tackled at the mini-session of our Assembly in Palermo, which is where this notion of association broke surface.

What can be done to give these countries the feeling that Western European Union has taken their need for guarantees on board without at the same time prejudging any form of accession?

The method adopted was inspired by the precedent set by the Council of Ministers at the time of the Gulf war. Then the Council of Ministers held its meetings in the presence of representatives of states that were not members of WEU but were intimately concerned in the conduct of operations in the Gulf, members who were all part of the alliance and were invited regularly. It is true that the Council's organisation of these meetings, enlarged to include non-member observers, was designed to deal with a particular event, namely armed conflict.

Here we are reasoning, situations of armed conflict aside, to attempt to establish rules and regulations tailored to the situation of the three countries which made their request as one of a series of proposals to do with the development of their own countries, particularly economic and social development, as we well know.

Hence this report makes the proposal that these three countries have representatives at ministerial level as a basis for Council meetings enlarged to include these countries. The ministers would of course be ministers for defence and foreign affairs. A peace-keeping agreement between WEU and these three countries is foreseen as a basic step. This agreement would, for both Council and Assembly, be a permanent foundation, not in conflict with the precedent applied during the Gulf war, for the closest co-operation possible with the three countries.

It is clear that – to be frank – only Article VIII at the political and military level could be invoked because Article V only comes into force after accession. This does not mean that these peace-keeping agreements could not relate to a whole series of points covered by the solidarity between members of WEU, which would enable us to move forward and thus create a model that we could offer to all who wish to join WEU, without becoming members straight away. This means we have to consult, at the Atlantic level of course but also at the level of Central and Eastern Europe, because countries other than these three are also interested. I am thinking in particular of the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania. At present, we are at the first stage of this rocket of co-operation in Central and Eastern Europe, though in no way predetermining what political follow-up we should take to our proposal. The report to the Assembly attempts to prepare this model and requests that it be considered at ministerial level.

If need be, I am of course available to the Assembly to reply to questions on the possible content of such a co-operation agreement and on setting up this enlarged co-operation council. For the time being I prefer to confine myself to the principle which, of itself, is already sufficiently important to command the attention of the Assembly in its discussions today. May I, as a reminder, make one simple observation which we could later come back to in the various discussions: it concerns the word association.

Please, let us have no academic debate on whether we should use the term associate, co-operator, etc. Let us keep things clear. Under the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, we know that by the end of the year we are required to accept new members which are the three of the Twelve which are not yet of the Nine: Denmark, Ireland and Greece. Among these countries there could be one or more which for the time being sets such conditions that it would not, at least in the eyes of the Assembly, be acceptable as a full member but only as a part-member with a part-agreement excluding certain articles of the treaty. It could be a kind of association. We cannot place all of them on the same footing in this case. A new name would be needed in each case. It is a relatively minor problem of semantics, I think, or political vocabulary. We could return to this question once the substantive political debate is over.

As regards Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic countries referred to in the draft recommendation, we should have the closest possible relations with them as was the case with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and we must inform them of our way of thinking on the basis of the proposals I have the honour to put to you, so that they can put forward proposals to us, if they so desire.

Mr. Caro (continued)

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation repeat, in rather more up-to-date wording, proposals that we have already made. They are more specific, in particular as regards the operational rôle of WEU. We shall no doubt refer to them in connection with other reports; we cannot allow serious crises that threaten European security to pass without doing something; we need universally adopted principles allowing WEU to intervene when it is the political will of its Council, without being delayed by procedures, to provide further cover or consent. All this has to be organised in advance.

If we wish to take preventive action we must be able to move very quickly. If we are unable to take such action it has to be said that the means at our disposal are inadequate. It is with this in mind that we repeat the request for suitable operational instruments, in harmony with any action that may be taken by the Atlantic Alliance and, of course, with such action as is open to us under the treaty governing our activities.

I should like to add that we must not now be afraid to face up to what Mr. Genscher said in reply to the following question that we put to him in our rôle of interpreters of public opinion, namely, how is it that, on the one hand, Maastricht was accompanied by activity, imagination and texts in plenty, whilst at the same time the tragedy in Yugoslavia unfolds without our political power concentrated on Maastricht being able to stop it? The reply by the Chairman-in-Office was: "It is very sad to say, and very painful for us, but we have been overtaken by events."

However, the Assembly cannot be reproached with failing to anticipate this when there was still time. The tone and demands of the Assembly's proposals may now perhaps be more firm and certain than they were last summer, but as regards the essential they converge on the same requirement: namely, political Europe can only come into existence if it shows the public that it is capable of preventing tragedies such as those occurring in Yugoslavia.

I am quite happy to join the members who criticise the Council, but I should also like to tell the Council, with them, that while each individual member state has demonstrated its political will to do all in its power to stop the conflict, taken together they have forgotten one thing – or if they have not forgotten it they have not attached to it the same logic – and that is that rooted in the ability to intervene politically, and if necessary militarily, is the reality of Europe's political existence; the failure to act and to intervene deals a fatal blow to the idea of the political Europe of tomorrow.

What purpose does it serve us to approve the development of political union and the organisation of European security, as we have already done in a first stage in the French Parliament or as our British colleagues have also done, if we have no reply to give our colleagues who are less enthusiastic about Europe and afraid about sharing power and who accuse us very often of selling national sovereignty cheap, whereas instead the object is to set up a complementary body for the better exercise of national sovereignty? How can we counter their fears if we do not at the same time show that a new and more effective way of keeping the peace is inherent in our position? How can we resist the impact of their contradictions, giving hesitant and sometimes embarrassed replies when they show us we are simply being politicians while the people and public opinion, for their part, are still unconvinced?

As the Secretary-General said this morning, the need to inform is vital. I take my hat off to our Institute which is making considerable efforts in this field but we have to work on public opinion in the towns, villages and local associations. Are there any of us who have not noticed that when we want to hold public meetings simply on the subject of Europe or security, or even disarmament if we are very courageous, apart from a few specialists, university professors and others with political interests, it is difficult to attract ordinary people who trust us and want to understand?

The future of Europe cannot be built without them. As you know, we went to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. We also went to other countries and everywhere we were struck by the fact that these people – as was the case earlier in Spain and Portugal – see democratic renewal and rediscovery of Europe in terms of rejoining Western Europe. For them it is a popular, deep-rooted notion, and we should learn from them. Europe is not just a matter for the élite.

We still have a long way to go. Let us try to get there fast. We have lost all too much time since August 1991 because, despite all our asking, we have remained uncertain though hopeful.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you very much, Mr. President. I should like to welcome you to your position.

This is an informative and relevant report. By and large, the Political Committee's Rapporteur commended it. I do not propose to make a long speech, but there are two amendments in my name which are straightforward and which were substantially supported this morning by the

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Socialist Group. I shall give the arguments for them this afternoon. I think that that would relieve me of any obligation to trespass on the Assembly's time, as I do not for one moment think that anyone would object to them. I trust that in due course the committee will signify its acceptance of them.

In the first two paragraphs of the preamble, the report recognises the major problem facing Europe and the fragility that it presents to the new democracies of the East – the problem of militant nationalism, a nationalism that may be dismissive of external hostility or opposition. Few members of the Assembly would dissent from the assessment of the situation in the report and fewer still would dissent from the view that the major purpose of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe must be the pursuit of peace, the resolution of conflict and the building of co-operation.

In a relevant debate in Strasbourg a month ago, a number of pointed remarks were made about the CSCE – which, in terms of its fundamental responsibility, could not possibly claim to have achieved great success. It was pointed out that it would be wiser for the CSCE not to seek to extend and broaden its interests and responsibilities and that it should concentrate more vigorously on its major rôle of building upon at least the first basket of the Helsinki Accord. The duplication that may be developing is likely to be wasteful of the energy that could be used more wisely for purposes for which Europe is crying out.

Without being unduly militaristic, I think that we could all accept the aims espoused in the draft recommendations – the establishment of forms of military co-operation and joint planning and the acceptance of responsibility. WEU should accept that it has a rôle in the management of response to crises. As Mr. Caro proclaimed, our interest in the stability and peace of the whole of Europe must remain fundamental. For that reason, I accept the recommendations. They could lead not so much to action after the development of a crisis as to a contribution towards prevention. It would be better to learn how to unfurl an umbrella before a storm, rather than subsequent to saturation.

As I said, I have tabled two amendments. The first would remind the CSCE of the present reality, to which I have already referred. The second would delete the word "effective" from the reference to WEU's rôle in the Gulf crisis. As I have said previously in this Assembly – perhaps rather too colourfully – there was an excess of self-congratulation after the Gulf conflict. I did not believe that it was justified then, and in hindsight the termination of exercise Desert Storm hardly justified that self-congratulation.

In any case, it is not for us to claim effectiveness – that is for the verdict of the external observers and, above all, of history. An excessive claim could be counterproductive, and I would prefer that it were not made.

If real progress is made in the establishment of the new order referred to in Mr. Caro's report, we shall not need to make claims of virtue. The fact of peace and the achievement of stability can and will speak for themselves. It is at that point that we should request Mr. Caro to accept the amendment so that we can avoid the triumphalism to which some people seem prone.

(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jankowitsch, Observer from Austria.

Mr. JANKOWITSCH (*Observer from Austria*) (Translation). – Your kind invitation enables a member of the Austrian Parliament, representing the national parliament of a neutral country, to address this Assembly for the first time in its history.

The reason why we accepted without the slightest hesitation is that we recognise the importance of this Assembly and are aware of its central and traditional rôle in the formulation of security policy in Europe.

But we also thought that it was important to seize this opportunity to open a new dialogue on a subject of equal importance to the countries attached in one way or another to the Atlantic Alliance and those which have taken and are still taking a different direction in their security policy: namely, independence and, for most of them, like Austria, a European form of neutrality.

This dialogue we feel is particularly important at a time when the end of the East-West conflict and the simultaneous appearance of other sources of tension call for new thinking and new departures in the organisation of European security.

It is clear that a country like Austria, a member of the community of western values, a parliamentary democracy and a country on the threshold of joining the European Community does not wish to – and cannot – be absent from this thinking which affects our future community of joint security, because the security of Europe and our own security is something we believe in.

We also know, Mr. President, that this wish to participate in your discussion – a direct result of our choice of Europe – may prompt a number of questions among the members of this Assembly.

You may well ask what a country which has been practising an advanced and even open

Mr. Jankowitsch (continued)

form of neutrality from the days of the cold war has to offer for European security or rather new inter-linked and – we hope – complementary systems of security built on the ruins of the old East-West system.

Should we not, before entering into the discussion and before formulating any contribution, abandon this policy of neutrality which many in Western Europe consider out of date and irrelevant since the collapse of the Berlin wall and therefore destined to disappear?

I must tell you, Mr. President, that Austrians today are familiar with this dilemma as they are with the contradictions that may arise between Europe's new security systems, in which your organisation will certainly have a major rôle to play, and the practice of neutrality inspired by another age, or at least another part of the century.

Since there are these questions and doubts, it is important to explain a security policy like that of Austria which has never refused to accept, even at the height of the cold war, a number of basic commitments which, even at that time, far exceeded the limits of conventional neutrality and were inspired by a spirit of solidarity, a spirit of sharing the common burden, but also a European spirit.

I refer principally to Austria's commitments under the United Nations' system of collective security, the most recent illustration being my country's participation in the action of the United Nations against the Iraqi aggressor.

It is my country's habit to join with others in common political security, witness the fact that, up to now, 30 000 Austrian soldiers have served with the troops of the United Nations peace-keeping forces. My country already has lengthy experience in joint actions to maintain peace and international stability.

Hence it is on the basis of these commitments, this attitude of openness and solidarity towards the safeguarding of peace and stability and the rejection of aggression and violations of international law, that we shall review our future rôle in the new joint security system in Europe. As I have already said today this review will concern both our security as Europeans and the security of Austria itself.

May I ask you then, Madam President, to consider Austria as a partner for whom the word solidarity is no empty concept but, above all, a challenge that we should like to meet in company with you, and other countries of Europe inspired by the same ideals.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Madam President, if the temperature in this chamber was indicative of the debate, we could have something to look forward to.

Madam President, the report that we are discussing here this afternoon that was so eloquently presented by the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, is really the signal for the debate we will be having later this week. The debate also concerns the reports by our President, Mr. Soell, Mr. Goerens and Sir Dudley Smith. This morning in our Federated Group, led by our esteemed Rapporteur, but then with a different hat on, we said we should really have an opportunity to discuss these reports together. But that is not to be. So I would ask you to regard my comments as an introduction to what will be coming tomorrow or the day after.

This report, too, reflects the current situation very accurately. As I think the Rapporteur rightly said in his introduction a few moments ago, we must beware of conducting this debate too much in terms of theoretical models. What was once Yugoslavia shows only too clearly that that will not get us very far. We talk for a long time, and we talk a great deal, but – as Mr. Caro has quoted the Council of Ministers – we have certainly not achieved a great deal.

What has happened in the past week? We Europeans have talked a great deal within this Assembly, in the context of WEU and of the Europe of the Twelve, but – and I have no pleasure in saying this – it was the American Secretary of State, James Baker, who said less than a week ago: we Americans are slowly losing patience. For me, as a Dutchman and above all a European, that was a sign that some rethinking is needed: we will surely have to do a great deal more than we have done so far. In other words, we have been warned to beware of theoretical models. It is a good thing that we are having a separate debate on Yugoslavia tomorrow afternoon, because we can discuss it at rather greater length.

I hasten to say that the report we are discussing here this afternoon is both clear and good, and I shall argue strongly in favour of it. I feel that Mr. Caro's report and recommendations appeal for a selective policy. What do I mean by that? What Mr. Caro proposes as regards the association of the Visegrad countries with Western European Union does something that, I feel, has not been done enough in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to date: it makes a selection. What do we see in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council? All the countries on a level, no selectivity: Kyrgyzstan is in the same position as Hungary. What is important about this report, in my opinion, is that it does not make the same mistake. I feel – and I have

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

already agreed to this in the Political Committee – that our Rapporteur should be complimented on this. This selectivity must be maintained. In this respect it is a good thing that a start is being made with the three Visegrad countries and that a cautious approach is being adopted as regards Bulgaria and the Baltic states and, later, Romania. Let us wait and see what the elections in Romania produce, if they are held as planned, and then pass judgment. I look forward to hearing what our Romanian colleague has to say in a moment.

Secondly, if we are going to talk about a new security order in Europe, the link with NATO and the United States is essential. I am glad that the Rapporteur makes no bones about this in his report, because they are two sides of the same coin. Either we say in Europe: we can and will do the rest ourselves. That is not what I think, Madam President, but others do. Or we say: we want to keep you Americans involved in the defence of Europe in some way. This seems to me to be the obvious line to take and the one that is accepted here. We will be reverting to this in the next few days, when we will undoubtedly be discussing the reports on and reactions to the organisation of the Franco-German corps. As I see it, this raises more questions than it answers.

Madam President, there is not enough time for me to comment on our rôle with respect to Yugoslavia and three vital elements in this context: legitimacy, vital interest and the rôle played by public opinion. I hope to revert to this tomorrow afternoon, when we discuss Yugoslavia.

All that is left for me to say is that the Europe we are living in at the moment is a Europe that combines opportunities and risks, where one massive threat has been replaced by all kinds of other threats. It is a Europe that is forcing us – as Mr. Caro rightly does in his report – to look first at the substance of the policy and only then at the institution, the organisation that has to implement that policy. We in this Assembly, in Western European Union, should also take this to heart. Mr. Caro's report makes a start in the right direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vacaru, Observer from Romania.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen. The meeting of the thirty-eighth session of the Assembly of Western European Union is taking place at a vital moment for the future of our continent, as underlined by both the subjects and the content of the reports on the order of business. So I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur and especially Mr. Caro,

who has produced a detailed text and who bases relevant conclusions on in-depth analysis.

In our opinion, European security can only be conceived as indivisible and at the level of the continent as a whole. Any tendency to create new distinctions based on geographical, political, economic, cultural or other criteria represents a kind of conditioned reflex that we must get rid of if we wish to avoid erecting new walls – even if they are only psychological ones – and reliving the sad past of our divided continent.

We should also avoid the temptation of introducing selective criteria which, after the events of 1989-90, could only be relative. Security on the continent of Europe is indivisible, and any discrimination would cause new sources of tension to spring up.

Romania feels these facts very strongly in view of its geographical position in a zone where at present tension is rising. On the one hand, there is the break-up of Yugoslavia, with its negative impact on the situation in the Balkans, and on the other, there is the armed conflict in sectors of the left bank of the Dniestr in the Moldovan Republic with its direct implications for the political and military stability of this area of Europe and for the process of democratisation and reform itself.

The Romanian Delegation calls upon the parliamentary delegations at this session to support the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Moldovan Republic so that all actions directed against a sovereign and independent state are brought to an end.

Ladies and gentlemen, the construction of a Europe of peace, democracy and unity implies there be equal access for all states to existing institutions and understandings. Unfortunately, we are still far from achieving comparable levels of security since some countries enjoy a double or even triple layer of security, whereas certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe are only protected, apart from their own defence capabilities, by structures now being set up within the framework of the CSCE.

This is one reason why the countries of Eastern Europe have over the last two years voiced their wish for closer contact with the structures of NATO and WEU.

With the prospect of European Union opened up by the Treaty of Maastricht and having in mind the fact that negotiations on the association agreement between Romania and the European Communities began on 19th May of this year – Bulgaria is also negotiating its association agreement – I feel that the two-speed treatment proposed by the draft recommendation in items 1, 2 and 3 could have a negative impact on the development of security and the strengthening of confidence in the east of the

Mr. Vacaru (continued)

continent. In fact, the proposals contained in the paragraphs I have just mentioned do not entirely reflect the concern and difficulties rightly pointed out in the first two sections of the preamble.

In my view, they are even likely to accentuate the feeling of insecurity in certain Eastern European countries which, because of the consequences of the Yalta Agreement, have had to provide, like the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland and in spite of the will of their people, what political experts have named the cordon sanitaire between Western Europe and the former USSR.

I can confidently assert that my country has never been a factor of insecurity; it has never attacked another state at any time. The history of my country is simply one of its own defence.

I should like to emphasise how greatly the Romanian people suffered as a result of the systematic disregard for human rights under the communist régime. It was in order to enshrine our irreversible commitment to respect for the dignity of the individual in law that Article 20 of the new constitution enacted by the Romanian Constitutive Assembly reads: "If there is conflict between the pacts and treaties on the fundamental rights of man to which Romania is a party and internal law, international law shall take precedence."

I think this is a strong reason for suggesting, as I do, that in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation we should use the exact wording of the Charter of Paris to which reference is made, namely to maintain freedom of expression for all as well as "the rights of persons belonging to national minorities".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Vacaru, you have run out of time. Would you please end your statement.

Mr. VACARU (*Observer from Romania*) (Translation). – To conclude, and referring to the present situation in Romania, I would like to point out that the forthcoming legislative and presidential elections will mark the end of the second transition stage when the votes of the electors will enable government to function normally and the democratic institutions of Romania to develop.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – A new security order must be established first and foremost to deal with these threats. The question is, who should put it together and where? I greatly appreciate the Rapporteur's efforts to identify in Europe and for Europe the centres

where this order should be established. I think, however, that a prior question is the rôle which the United Nations should play in ensuring the collective security system which the world needs today and which could provide the umbrella for regional systems, like the one we wish to set up in Europe. I have to say that I feel there is some reluctance to discuss this.

During a recent visit by an Assembly delegation to Washington the problem was raised with our American hosts but the impression gained was one of marginal consideration, if any, of the rôle of the United Nations in working out strategies for the situation which came about with the end of the cold war. And yet the most recent crises in the Gulf and in the former Yugoslavia tell us that the United Nations is the right place for the adoption of instruments for international action.

So if we really wish to dispel the fears of single-state dominance in the control of world and regional processes, the only way is to rely on the authority of the United Nations, a principle we must also observe in working out the new architecture of Europe. In a similar way, security structures in Europe should revolve around the CSCE, understood as a "regional agreement" as proposed by Mr. Genscher some time ago.

The CSCE should therefore become the focal point of the collective security system which needs to be set up in the new Europe. In that case, however, it must be given wider powers and new machinery enabling it to act to prevent conflicts, manage crises and resolve tensions peacefully.

Clearly, however, we shall be obliged to stay with the existing structures at least for a long time to come, as Mr. Caro said. The problem, therefore, is how to resolve security and defence problems through those structures, and how to co-ordinate this action in accordance with the general aims of the United Nations and of the CSCE.

A new security order in Europe needs both the Atlantic Alliance and a Western European Union which should become for all purposes the military arm and defence policy component of the EC.

I would stress that our Assembly must declare itself with conviction on two points which are the source of the doubts which are still with us and our differences of opinion.

The first concerns our relations with the United States and NATO. There is no intention of loosening these ties which go beyond the simple grounds of alliance. There is no reason for fears of this kind to persist across the Atlantic.

The second point is the issue of the progressive political transformation of NATO as

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

mentioned at the Rome summit last November and of the new links of complementarity and co-operation with the European defence structures as provided in the Maastricht Treaty.

There can be no denying a specific European dimension in foreign and defence policy. The process of political union would itself remain defective and incomplete. But common European defence can only be achieved by agreement and effort involving all its member countries. If the Franco-German initiative moves in this direction there is no reason for harbouring suspicions.

In conclusion, I believe that on this point also the Assembly must give clear and reassuring answers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro, on once again producing a most clear and effective report, this time bringing together many of the current views on the enhancement of Europe's security, most notably those expressed at the Berlin symposium which, unfortunately, most of the British Delegation could not attend because they were seeking re-election to our parliament.

The opening paragraphs of Mr. Caro's explanatory memorandum remind us, as our Secretary-General did this morning, that despite the end of war in Europe in 1945 and the end of the cold war in 1990, while we are sitting here Europeans are killing Europeans and our European heritage is being destroyed, and we have no effective means thus far to bring to an end such death and destruction.

As we will be reminded in greater detail in tomorrow's emergency debate on the situation in Yugoslavia, during the past year we have seen attempts by Serbs to deny self-determination first to Slovenia, then to Croatia, now to Bosnia-Herzegovina and, I have no doubt, shortly to Kosovo and Vojvodina, which may yet involve the intervention of neighbouring states, as has happened before.

So far, every attempt to bring peace by the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations has failed. In addition, we are seeing civil wars in Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Russia, which may yet involve war between some of those states. Again, despite the commitments of all those states to uphold the Helsinki principles of resolving peacefully such disputes between nationalities and of protecting minorities, it is now clear that the CSCE process is not yet working as intended.

Although there is no shortage of ideas in Mr. Caro's report, there remains a complete void on recommendations for effective action, which is why I will propose Amendment 1 later. It would add a new recommendation that our leaders be urged at the Helsinki summit next month to stop the talking and to establish the means, first, to avoid and secondly, if necessary, to end any such future conflict in Europe.

My proposals are based on several of those put forward at the Berlin symposium and refer to Mr. Caro's explanatory memorandum. They are for all fifty-one CSCE-participating states to agree a process for binding arbitration to which all national and ethnic disputes should be submitted, either by the parties concerned or, as at present under the existing machinery, by third parties. Such machinery can provide for referenda to establish demand for self-determination by democratic means. It can recommend the peaceful change of frontiers, as provided for under the Helsinki process. Both represent a logical extension of our existing CSCE machinery and institutions.

It must now be clear that such a process will not be effective without that final authority of peace enforcement as a last resort, which to date no one has dared propose, although there are plenty of offers to supply such a force from NATO, the French and Germans, and/or through WEU.

It is this, the means of peace enforcement and peace-making in Europe, not just peace-keeping, that must be decided by the Helsinki summit next month. However, that is not yet on the agenda. The object of my amendment is to ensure that it is on the agenda, so that henceforth no petty Balkan Saddam Hussein – no local Serbian warlord leading so-called irregulars – intent on the death of fellow Europeans, the destruction of our heritage, such as in Dubrovnik, or on the enforced displacement of peoples, such as is taking place, will be tolerated.

If our CSCE leaders do not face up to what is happening in Europe today and if they fail to act accordingly in Helsinki next month, we should all fear for the future security of our continent. For that reason I hope that the Assembly will support Amendment 1 later this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – The simple world of security policy that we have known for decades in a bipolar system in which friend and foe were clearly labelled, with a few neutrals in between, has ended. We now find that century-old situations, which we believed would determine events for decades to come, have practically vanished from the maps and history books. I am thinking of the Yalta Conference, which in essence founded the bipolar

Mr. Müller (continued)

system in Europe, but I go even further back, to the treaties that followed the first world war, to Versailles and the other local treaties, and to the collapse of the former empires, the tsarist empire, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Ottoman empire. All of that has reappeared and become reality at the present time.

We are finding that ethnic and nationality problems are back on the agenda and that the simple ideological differences have, as it were, disappeared. We are finding that the CSCE system, in which we placed great hopes and which has made a positive contribution to developments, is not yet able to handle the current problems, for otherwise the events in the Balkans and particularly in Yugoslavia could not have taken place as they have.

We are also aware that at present perhaps only the United Nations is in a position to deal with this situation. We saw that in connection with the Gulf conflict. The question of the extent to which regional bodies, among which WEU might perhaps be included, play a part under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations is one that must be carefully examined. In any case, it was not possible to prevent the horrible events in Yugoslavia with the aid of the CSCE. And it seems that only now, when the United Nations has made up its mind to adopt a tough resolution and impose sanctions, has any real effect been achieved.

For us in Western European Union this is a clear demonstration that, if a peace-stabilising element is to be created in Europe, this can only be done with a united political posture and with a European Political Union which has its own defence arm. This of course means WEU. However, it seems to me that this line was not unequivocally adopted at Maastricht, and that far too much attention was paid to questions of economic policy, the market, and currency, and too little to the important questions of European Political Union and security policy.

It seems likely that we can solve this problem, even within Europe, only by arriving at a two-speed policy. With the Franco-German Eurocorps as a starting point, followed by the creation of WEU as the real instrument of security and defence policy of a European Political Union – this is the way to create guarantees in Europe against conflicts that would be settled by force.

Sarajevo has already stood as a very bad example in the history of Europe, for the first world war was triggered by the murder committed there. I cherish the hope that the bad example of Sarajevo will convince us Europeans in 1992 that only a common security and defence policy, in which all the partners carry

clear responsibility, can in the long term prevent fresh conflicts from breaking out in Europe.

With this in mind, we should welcome the report of our colleague, Mr. Caro. But we should not forget that we have to act promptly. We have not much more time for debate. All Europe's problems are perfectly obvious. Now that the systems have broken down we need only take a look at the map.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Madam President. May I congratulate Mr. Caro on his excellent report which I think gives a superb introduction to the reports under discussion in this first part of the thirty-eighth session. The same can be said of Mr. Goerens's, Mr. Soell's and Sir Dudley Smith's reports and also with regard to other equally important reports in December on European security, as for instance Mr. Martinez's report on security in the Mediterranean. But I shall return to this point.

The East-West conflict has ended, but it is clear that this did not betoken the end of tensions, and even less the end of history. All these are optimistic illusions that have often prevailed at different times during human history when people have thought that solving a problem opens the gate to heaven. New sources of tension have arisen; nationalisms that had been suppressed for decades have flared up, and this situation calls for a new order of security and for a fresh common effort to prevent Europe from regressing seventy years in its eastern part, which would be truly lamentable and dangerous from every point of view.

Therefore the first step is to reflect on our joint security, and we made a very good start at the Berlin symposium. I should also like to congratulate Mr. Soell on his election to the presidency and for the active part he played in that conference with the whole German Delegation, as well as for the way in which we were welcomed. That initiative constituted a very useful point of departure for this reflection on the new order of security in Europe.

I agree with our Rapporteur that we shall now place the accent on conflict prevention.

I believe that Europe cannot risk seeing a repetition, as in Yugoslavia, of conflicts leading to violence. The solution must involve the creation of conflict-prevention mechanisms at different levels and in concentric circles, as has already been mentioned, thus avoiding our having to react to crises after they have arisen. It was realistic of our Rapporteur to propose this in paragraph 4 of the recommendation.

Meanwhile the main theme of the reports to come is the emphasis that should be placed on

Mr. Roseta (continued)

preventing conflicts from breaking out. This must always be in our minds and, indeed, in our actions. Here I would point to the need to pay attention not only to the political and military realities and to the nationalisms of which I spoke, but also to associated questions affecting security, whether of an economic or social nature and questions relating to the rights of minorities and to human rights because if these are not considered and, where possible, resolved they are time-bombs that will sooner or later go off.

CSCE is important in conflict prevention, but it is not sufficient. On the other hand neither do I think that it will be completely possible for an organisation so large that it stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostock to promote human and minority rights; I do however think it should be possible for us to put complementary concentric circles into operation even in the field of conflict prevention.

I should like to emphasise two further points. I believe that, as is in fact proposed, when a conflict breaks out WEU should be able quickly to consider the situation. To this end, it should set up a specific mechanism of its own enabling governments to consult immediately about emergency situations. In my opinion this idea has much merit and I should like expressly to indicate my agreement with it.

With regard to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the recommendation, it is clear, at least to me, that a neutral country could not possibly be admitted as a member of our organisation. It would be like squaring the circle – it would be irrational and completely illogical for an organisation dedicated to promoting joint security to have neutral countries as members. It would not make sense, indeed it would be logically impossible.

Therefore I think it is only elementary logic that neutral countries cannot be admitted to full membership.

This being so, as regards those countries that are unwilling or unable to change their present status, or are far from our area or have different traditions, close to neutrality, I believe we can progress to a situation in which they could have associate status as is proposed in the cases of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland.

I should be glad if our thinking about neutral countries could be extended to other countries such as Austria; perhaps our Rapporteur has not developed this aspect, but we shall be able to do so when discussing other reports. I should like to congratulate my friend and representative of that country, Deputy Jankowitsch, who has spoken here for the first time. What I mean is that for the purposes of our discussion he could

in some way also take part in our work even before his country has joined the European Community.

Lastly, with reference to Mr. Martinez's report, may I say that this does not exhaust the question of European security; it is a good report but, as is obvious, it could not deal with everything and it is not complete. European security has much to do with the Mediterranean and there is no doubt that in his various capacities our Rapporteur will undertake to make this connection with the security of the southern shore of the Mediterranean which is as important as, if not more so than, the security of the eastern front of our continent.

(Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rockenbauer, Observer from Hungary.

Mr. ROCKENBAUER (*Observer from Hungary*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a glance at the map of Europe reveals a picture of a continent of two parts: the west where frontiers between states are fading away, and the east where, on the contrary, new frontiers are emerging. Whilst the Maastricht agreements are helping to found European Union, the Balkans are deep in bloody combat, the Caucasus is still a theatre of war and there seems to be no guarantee of full control of the ex-USSR nuclear arsenal.

Admittedly this instability is relatively new because it only arose with the collapse of the communist régimes. The federal states were united by the single party, the minorities did not fight each other and nuclear weapons were under central command.

One might wonder whether the bipolarity of yesterday was not better than the disorder of today. You who have always known democracy certainly cannot regret the disappearance of these régimes; those of us who have had to live under these dictatorships regret it still less.

But must we resign ourselves to anarchy growing out of the ruins of dictatorship? I think not. And I do not believe I am wrong in saying that if the question were put to our Portuguese, Spanish or Greek friends they would take the same view.

Have we then to conclude that the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are incapable of living in a democracy? Obviously not, and we are all able to advance many explanations for the instability now affecting Central and Eastern Europe to varying degrees.

The fundamental question that we must really answer is whether the instability in Eastern Europe is unavoidable. The question is all the more relevant, I feel, because security in this

Mr. Rockenbauer (continued)

region is essential for Western Europe. My personal conviction is that the stability of the east is necessary for the prosperity of the west. As for the new democracies, they cannot hope to solve their economic problems or become part of Western Europe without effective security. It is the whole of the continent of Europe which shares this need for security.

The events taking place in the former Yugoslavia must inevitably serve as a precedent, particularly to the countries in that region. The fact is that the crisis in Yugoslavia may well teach that a war of territorial conquest can be waged in the east of Europe, human rights denied and voices of minorities stifled, or, alternatively, that all these affronts to the rule of law will not be tolerated on our continent.

If nothing is done to halt this crisis, the whole of the area could be drawn into a process of disintegration. In fact, the different local crises feed each other: this type of link can be shown to exist between the Balkan crisis and the one in Karabakh.

The danger is perceived by a growing number of western observers and we are very pleased to see the increasingly active efforts being made internationally to solve the Balkan crisis.

However, the pressure being exerted to ensure respect for international law is only one aspect of responding to the crisis. In addition to coercive measures, I think that what is wanted, if a lasting and global solution is to be found, is to further the integration of countries undertaking to comply with a number of conditions.

It is to that end that the three Visegrad countries have concluded association agreements with the EC which should, in the not too distant future, lead on to full membership when the necessary conditions are met. I am convinced that, if this comes true, it will encourage others to go up the road of greater respect for international rules.

The same is true of security questions.

The Maastricht agreements significantly strengthen the rôle of WEU by making it a key component in the defence of the European Union, which is why Hungary, having signed an association agreement with the European Community, wants to become an associate member of WEU as a step towards becoming a full member. We feel the proposals in Mr. Caro's document offer great encouragement. We hope they will be accepted by the Assembly.

According to the Maastricht Treaty, NATO members are invited to become WEU associate members. I think it important that WEU study the possibility of extending this status to the three signatory states of the Visegrad treaty and

that the WEU Assembly conclude association agreements in the short term with the parliaments of the three Visegrad countries. These agreements would withhold voting rights from the newcomers but enable their participation in WEU's work to be more active, for we would have the greatest satisfaction in participating in the work of the WEU committees.

The Defence Committee and the External Affairs Committee of the Hungarian Parliament have for some weeks been discussing Hungary's defence doctrine. All parties represented in parliament agree on the need to maintain the closest possible relations with all international organisations. It seems all the more important to intensify our relations with WEU because its rôle is becoming increasingly significant.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – May I begin by congratulating my colleague in the Bundestag, Hartmut Soell, on taking over this important office at a very interesting time. I wish him the best of luck and the necessary support from those concerned in his tenure of office.

May I also associate myself with the congratulations to Mr. Caro on the recommendations he put forward on behalf of the Political Committee for a new security system in Europe. It was a good piece of work and, as he himself said, a realistic one, giving a good overview of the existing opportunities for creating a new security system in Europe. It is, of course, saddening that the previous speaker from Hungary had to ask, even rhetorically, whether the bipolar world had not provided more security for the East European countries than the security order which was now crystallising so very slowly in Europe. What we need is a pan-European security system, not a purely Western European or a purely Atlantic security system. We do not want the East Europeans to fall into a security gap in which anarchy reigns.

The images of three concentric circles selected and conceived by Mr. Caro describe the whole situation very vividly. I greatly welcome his clear advocacy, as Rapporteur, of an active rôle for the CSCE in securing peace in Europe. The conflict-prevention framework, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, is very important, but it is equally important that the principle of consensus should be transformed into a principle of action. We now have to some extent the consensus principle minus one. We must get away from a community of values alone and develop into a community of decision and action. You have put forward many ideas on this subject and indicated many new approaches, Mr. Caro. But we must all go away and think much harder about the range of

Mr. Feldmann (continued)

instruments with which we can ensure that the CSCE is capable of action. The CSCE must be able to show that it has teeth, even if they are NATO's teeth, or those of WEU, which have yet to grow. The CSCE must not only take decisions, it must also be capable of implementing them.

The example of Yugoslavia is repeatedly mentioned, as it was in today's debate. It is of course saddening to see how little we have been able to do, but I think it would be wrong of us, as Europeans, to keep on giving the impression here that we achieved nothing in Yugoslavia. We brought peace to Slovenia and, in fact, even to the greater part of Croatia. Thank heaven, armed conflict has not broken out in Kosovo, though people there are, of course, suffering. So we did manage to achieve something. We must always be thinking: what would have happened if we Europeans had taken no hand in the situation?

When we are talking about military attacks, we must realise that a military attack in a civil war is a very delicate and complicated matter and one with wide repercussions. It is, of course, high time for us to deploy and exhaust all possible means of political pressure in Bosnia-Herzegovina – we Europeans possess such means, as do the Americans – before military power is unleashed, with all its unpredictable consequences. Tomorrow morning's debate will give us the opportunity of discussing that in more detail.

Mr. Caro describes his second circle as being NATO and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, which could bring in the Americans and the CIS states.

Western Europe of course appears as the third circle. Mr. Caro drew this circle very large, going far beyond the restricted circle of this parliamentary Assembly of WEU. Maastricht of course provided us with the big breakthrough, as Charles Goerens's report shows.

I fully agree with the ideas that Mr. Caro expressed about association. What he said on this subject is worthy of close attention. WEU gained strength from Maastricht with reference to association as well.

There is perhaps one more thing we should do. We should give more weight to a common restrictive European arms export commission. A new security system should also include a policy for the control of arms exports. We must introduce more openness and transparency into this field. We must agree upon joint rules on arms exports, and joint prohibitions. This is urgent, because only next year, in 1993, we shall have a single internal market in Europe, with all the complications this may entail for the export of

arms. Perhaps Mr. Caro could say something more about that.

In closing, may I refer briefly to the Franco-German army corps. That is not just a Franco-German initiative. Nor should it give rise to any opposition between Europeans and their Atlantic colleagues. We have been reproached today with doing too much theorising in this Assembly. That corps is the concrete expression of the common defence policy, the nucleus of a European policy on defence. As I said, it is not and must not be simply a Franco-German initiative. It is in fact a brick in the common European security edifice. In 1995 this army corps is due to be expanded, with the participation of as many Europeans as possible. I am very glad that the Belgians have expressed their support for this, and I hope that the Spaniards will do so as well. Why should we permit many co-operative projects between Europeans in the field of armaments, but be very suspicious of them at the military level?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your speaking time has expired, Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Germany*) (Translation). – I have nearly finished, Mr. President.

Even though there may be many overlaps in the three circles about which Mr. Caro spoke, and some lack of clarity about the various tasks, the important thing is that things are going along the right track. The direction is right, as you have rightly said. We are all pulling on the same rope, but it is even more important for us to pull in the same direction on the same rope, if we are to achieve a security system in Europe. In this European security framework, we can have security only with one another, not against one another. I therefore welcome Mr. Caro's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall start by complimenting Mr. Caro on his remarkably interesting and full report. It gives us the opportunity to set in context the issue of a new security order. I also enjoyed listening to my friend Mr. Roseta's speech as so much of what he said was good, solid, Portuguese common sense. It is refreshing to listen to that sometimes, instead of the high-flown rhetoric that we often hear in this chamber. I found it somewhat difficult to take Mr. Feldmann's speech. I do not think that he understands the real dangers of the Franco-German Eurocorps but I shall come to that tomorrow when we debate Mr. Soell's report.

Everyone in this chamber should hang their head in shame over the issue of Yugoslavia. While we have been wringing our hands and saying how terrible the situation is, tens of thou-

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

sands of people have died because none of our countries was prepared to take action. I noted what Mr. van Eekelen said this morning – if we had had the guts to do it, we could have blown out of the water the Yugoslav ships that were shelling that wonderful city of Dubrovnik and shot out of the air those planes that were murdering innocent civilians. However, we preferred to say, “Oh, well – we must not interfere.” While we did that, people died. I shall say no more, but none of us has the right to be proud of the present position.

I share Mr. Caro's concerns about Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic – all those countries are anxious. They would not wish to see the tragedy in Yugoslavia unfold in their part of the world. That is why I very much welcome the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, which I believe will help to create an atmosphere to help those democracies. Once again, NATO is the natural and best security partner for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The NACC is an interlocking network in which institutions such as the CSCE, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community, the Council of Europe and WEU complement each other. That is surely the best safeguard for the freedom, security and prosperity of all European and North American states. If that is what the NACC is all about, we must pay more attention to it. We need to examine it in more detail than we have had the opportunity of doing. In setting the stall out, Mr. Caro has ensured that we should consider the organisation further and develop it. That is the way to prevent another tragedy such as the one currently unfolding in Yugoslavia. As all of us know, there is more than a 50:50 chance of just such a tragedy happening again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – May I congratulate you on your election, Mr. President. We are sure that you will be an excellent President and we wish you every success.

I should also like to congratulate Mr. Caro and to thank him for his most interesting and important report which gives us food for thought on the development of a new security order.

Quite clearly, the political changes which have put an end to the cold war and the hegemony of defence systems are having major repercussions in all areas of international life and open a new page in history. The time has come for us Europeans to redefine our objectives and policies and to take greater responsibility for the security and

defence of Europe. We have to go forward both in formulating a policy and in the matter of security, failing which it would be illusory to talk about a common foreign policy.

One requirement for achieving our aim is clearly to strengthen the institutions of the CSCE and to provide it with the instruments and means of action needed to create permanent machinery for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes in order to promote peace, security, development and co-operation in the regions so that more disputes like the present Yugoslav crisis no longer break out on our continent and so that it will be possible to intervene constructively in resolving other world problems such as the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Kurdish or Cypriot problems.

An essential requirement for putting an end to ethnic quarrels is the definition of a statute for minorities within the CSCE because, as the Rapporteur stresses, the policy of encouraging the principle of self-determination for all minorities would only create more problems in an already unsettled area in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

The CSCE is the most appropriate organisation for determining how the rights and protection of minorities are to be reconciled with state sovereignty so that those rights can be protected within existing state frontiers. A court of arbitration set up within the CSCE could play an important rôle in preventing or resolving conflicts and crises.

Clearly any extension of the powers of the CSCE can succeed only if it goes hand in hand with the revival of the European social space, the definition of new priorities, the convergence of economies and living standards and the removal of regional inequalities. That is another aspect of the problem which must be taken into account.

The long-term aim of the development of a European security and defence policy within the European Union must be the establishment of a pan-European security system acceptable to all the member countries of the CSCE.

As things stand at present, however, the creation and development of a Community security and defence policy may offer the only means of dealing with the urgent problems. The most effective way to bring this about is the immediate extension of WEU to countries belonging to the European Community and wishing to join.

At the same time there is an urgent need to study and create a European security zone extending beyond the WEU area embracing a number of countries in Central Europe and the Balkans, and not only to associate them in

Mr. Pahtas (continued)

European security but to conclude with them an agreement for the maintenance of peace and continuous co-operation. Our Rapporteur's proposals to that end in the draft recommendation are to be welcomed.

We must therefore take steps to establish a new type of relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans aimed both at consolidating peace and security in the region and promoting economic development.

Mr. President, we must press forward with the construction of Europe. Political union cannot be achieved by monetary union alone. We also need a common defence. As the defence component of European Union, WEU must play its rôle in bringing this about. If it fails to do so we shall be left with our documents, speeches and meetings while others will be taking action and making decisions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should like to thank all the speakers for their comments on the report.

I have taken good note of the points made by Mr. Hardy, whom I thank of course for endorsing the report. I understand very well the concern he expresses through one of his amendments, that any self-satisfaction or self-congratulation should be avoided. The psychological handling of a report is just as important as its vocabulary and ideas. I should just like to suggest a small change, but I think that we shall be able to agree on his second amendment which I can accept without difficulty.

To Mr. Jankowitsch I should like to say only one thing, which comes from both mind and heart: there is nothing against Austria speaking to us or taking initiatives concerning us in the European security organisation. The reason we have not been able to do more as yet is to be found in attitudes of which we are all aware and which have kept Austria a little on the sidelines of the creation of Europe. Everything has changed so much, however, that I think I can say that all our countries look upon Austria as a member entitled to take a full part in all European activities.

My thanks also go to Mr. De Hoop Scheffer for his support. One of the points on which we can feel most firmly agreed is that a pragmatic approach is needed for us to be effective, taking our lead from observed facts and not assumptions. What is quite certain is that, applying these principles to the practical problems facing

us, we are now in a position to go about the first stage in the construction of European security with other countries which have recently achieved democracy and are part of our family because Europe is first and foremost a matter of a shared culture.

I thank Mr. Vacaru for his speech because the participation of non-member countries from Central and Eastern Europe is of the greatest importance for us. In the friendliest way possible I should first like to advise him to speak directly and frankly as this will enable us to move ahead. This allows me to speak frankly and directly to him and to ask if he is not mistaken about our action. When I spoke a short time ago I explained that this action was taken at the express request of a group of three countries which consulted together and after long negotiations have finally posed the problem of Western European Union in political terms of working together, co-operation or membership. As I said when I spoke earlier, let no one misunderstand us and make us say what we are not saying and will not say, particularly in the case of Romania.

Developments in Romania have been as they are. We are aware of them and are also following them in the Council of Europe which has been extended to include Romania. Here in Western European Union we do not confine ourselves to geopolitics; we are also concerned with collective security, controlled through a democratic system guaranteed by our treaties to which the countries of Central Europe are acceding by way of free elections after years of obscurantism which sometimes destroyed even the spirit of their people; now, however, they are acting with us again and moving in the same direction. This does not mean that we have not used somewhat different or, in modern parlance, selective methods as and when appropriate. The aim, ladies and gentlemen, is, however, the same. I hope that you will not continue in trying to persuade the Assembly that the adoption of the report I have presented would be interpreted as a negative move. I do not think this is the way in which we can go forward together.

In response to the amendment which you suggest but cannot in fact table, concerning members of minorities in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, I fully accept the spirit of your proposal. But as we ask that these rights shall be for all which includes all citizens and all individuals including minorities, I think that your point is answered when the two ideas are taken together. My explanation should meet your point.

To Mr. Rubbi I would say again that his concern to maintain a European military instrument in Europe responds to a need which is vital for affirming our identity and providing the resources to back a common political intent.

Mr. Caro (continued)

At this session we shall be talking about this again in connection with various reports and from angles which will not necessarily be the same as this afternoon, but will enable us to work out convergent positions and I note that this morning we heard our Secretary-General taking the same line. This is the direction we must take and I shall come back to this in my replies to other speakers including Mr. Atkinson in particular.

I thank him for his amendment which raises no problems whatsoever. He could have tabled it in connection with one of the other reports dealing perhaps more directly than mine with the CSCE. Nevertheless, with his permission, I should like to interpret his amendment as calling on WEU as well. A request to the leaders of the CSCE to set up machinery for the prevention of conflict and for security measures is an excellent idea. This is why I agree with the member. If the depth and interest of the reports produced by WEU, which has authority for defence and security in Europe and military responsibility for what we call the area outside the Atlantic Alliance, were recognised by all international organisations I believe that this recommendation would apply to us also, and I am sure you will agree with me, Mr. Atkinson, that if the leaders of the CSCE do not create the machinery we suggest they should establish, we should ourselves do so as quickly as possible so as to say to them: "If you do not know what to do we will tell you." This is one of the guarantees we can claim for WEU in the relationships we have to establish.

A moment ago Mr. Feldmann spoke of us as the heart of all these concentric circles. It is WEU's rôle to be closely involved in all organisations or bodies which deal at varying distance with the problem of security in Europe. This applies to the European Union - Maastricht gives the right to these demands - it applies also to the CSCE but we have not yet reached that point; and of course it applies to the Atlantic Alliance of which we are a part while wishing to retain our separate identity.

Mr. Müller, with his way of describing the unpleasant memories of history, again spoke on the advice to be given to the Assembly and to our organisation in this part of the world which is particularly unsettled. It would be possible to go on for ever discussing the consequences of the end of the reign of the Hapsburgs and the uncertain and probably threatening future of this interface between the influence of the Ottoman empire and that of the Austro-Hungarian empire. We are in an area where one day it will be necessary to go beyond the stage of inter-ethnic relations and to ensure that the factors that bring such groups together take prec-

edence over these relations and conflicts of interest.

This reminds me of the debates we have had elsewhere and particularly in the Council of Europe discussing the Palestinian problem with the Jews and the people living in Israel. How many times have I, as a Deputy for Alsace, said, with colleagues, to both Arabs and Jews seeking the answer to an uncertain future: look at Alsace, look at the French and Germans who have killed each other for years and were enemies for centuries because of their undying hatred! What have they done? They have shaken hands and have replaced hate by fraternity. It is on the basis of such brotherly feelings that Europe can look for unity around the French and Germans. Every time an advance is possible French and Germans are at pains to prove to their colleagues, partners, members of parliament and ministers, and not in vain, that it provides security and a guarantee for progress. Well, tomorrow we must hope that Croats and Serbs, and Romanians and Moldavians speaking Romanian and Russian will understand that there is something else which we are perhaps alone able to prove at the moment because we have put behind us the horrors of conflict and hatred and now preach the message of union and fraternity. In this respect the last years of the 20th century will prove that our countries are doing a great deal for civilisation.

I should like to compliment Mr. Roseta, to whom I always listen with great interest in this Assembly. However, I shall pick out the word neutrality from his speech. We are now at a point in history when neutrality is no longer possible. It no longer means anything and it is perhaps a reason for remaining loyal to our countries, which have taken different positions, to which we should attach only relative, I almost said historic, importance. One cannot be neutral about human rights. One cannot be neutral about protection of the earth, about development and about security under democratic control. The old ideas of neutrality are therefore perfectly respectable and indispensable in the formulation of our doctrine for the modern world, but the progress Europe is now making and the new security order in the world, which is the title of the report I have introduced, can only be achieved by people in the committed countries. In this area neutrality is no more than a temporary refuge and only the committed will be able to clothe these ideas in a reality acceptable to our peoples. I thank Mr. Roseta for having touched on one of the most important points of current international politics.

I should like to thank Mr. Rockenbauer for supporting the Political Committee's proposals. It is essential that our Assembly should be able to develop continuously with the representatives of your parliaments or at least of the three

Mr. Caro (continued)

Visegrad countries. This is a test for us. We are, in some measure, the people who have to implement a political will expressed by this Assembly but also, in the sight and eyes of the whole world, a laboratory in which this new form of co-operation with Central and Eastern Europe will be worked out.

My only regret, possibly because we are not well-organised, is that we do not see among us enough of you Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Poles with whom we want to build this new form of security in Europe. Please broadcast this appeal. We make appeals to each other. I have received yours, please take up mine and ask your three neighbouring countries to send large numbers to discuss these problems with us. This will be easy in committee soon. Then we shall go on with this discussion at public sessions, beginning in December, with as many colleagues as possible from Central Europe.

I can accept almost all Mr. Feldmann's proposals but I spoke earlier about the Franco-German issue differently even if Mr. Feldmann's point of view should be borne in mind. First and foremost we share the same values, and it is only on their basis that we can join together to intervene. We do not act as police for the sake of being police or guarantee security for the sake of security. We act in accordance with the values which we cherish and are at the very root of our civilisation. On this point Mr. Feldmann has corrected my report to positive effect and I wish to thank him.

By his insistence at each meeting on recalling the integrity of relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, whatever the areas where we have responsibility for security, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has enabled me once again to call upon everyone, including our governments, the general public and the media, to drop the implication that WEU and others wish to leave the Atlantic Alliance.

For us the Atlantic Alliance is not only the origin but also the framework in which security was hammered out to give us almost half a century without warfare despite various alarms and crises. In the light of this performance what statesman or parliament would try to bring down so strongly-built a house, capable as it is of adaptation and development? In WEU when we speak of Europe it is automatically of the alliance. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has given me the opportunity to say this yet again.

To Mr. Pahtas, I say yes to enlargement; it is on everyone's lips and mentioned in the Maas-tricht Treaty. We know that we are moving towards the extension of our area which will be defined when the time comes; I believe that the big intergovernmental conference of 1996 will

enable us to set the main lines. I fully agree about association and co-operation but either way on an equal footing. Equality of rights and treatment is at the basis of our understanding and co-operation. Because you have pleaded most eloquently that the entry of new members will make WEU more effective, I should like to launch through you an appeal and to ask you to think about this idea which is fundamental for us. Anyone who becomes a full member is a member for both rights and obligations of the whole treaty. Our treaty is a single whole; it is on its basis that we have succeeded in obtaining the right for WEU as part of European construction to play a full rôle in political union. It is my dearest wish that all new members should tomorrow accept all the articles of the treaty. If they cannot they will be associates but speaking to a country like yours, you may well imagine that I think maximum, not minimum.

I will conclude with a few words about our former colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, who has sent us a very interesting note now being distributed. I beg all members of the Assembly to read it. In particular it includes a very interesting recent letter from Professor Antanavicius, Chairman of the Standing Committee for the Economy in Vilnius, dated 7th April 1992, in which he explains Lithuania's basic needs.

This will be the second stage in our reflections if, ladies and gentlemen, you can approve this report which, as you have all recognised, had the sole purpose of serving as a kind of political anticipation, providing us with the means of resolving the great problem of security and establishing a new order in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Caro, for your very full reply, particularly on the history of Franco-German relations.

Three amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation in Document 1309. They will be taken in the following order: Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Hardy and Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Atkinson.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads as follows:

2. At the end of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add:

“and suggesting that increased concentration should be directed to these approaches”.

I call Mr. Hardy to move his amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I said during my speech that my remarks would cover the argument in favour of the two amendments which I tabled. As Mr. Caro takes an extremely acceptable view of this amendment, which I trust is shared by the overwhelming majority of members of the Assembly, I need not detain the

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Assembly any longer. I shall formally move the amendment and trust that Mr. Caro will respond appropriately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Hardy reads as follows:

3. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “effective”.

I call Mr. Hardy to move his amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – There is a slight problem with the amendment, not so much its content as what it shows. It demonstrates that we are still some way from the ideal of European unity. I think that Mr. Caro approved of the amendment in its English version but found the French text somewhat different – it is one of those little problems of linguistics which crop up from time to time.

As the Assembly may recall, I did not want it to approve the report while that report contained a word that may have been overconfident, complacent or excessive in some way, and I suggested removing the word “effective”. The amendment is as simple as that. I think that most people would approve of the English version, but, unfortunately, the French translation presented some difficulty for the Rapporteur. I did not wish to cause Mr. Caro great difficulty, and I think that he has a form of compromise that will overcome that difficulty. I would be perfectly happy to accept his compromise, as it meets my objection to the text of his report in its English form.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I want to speak against the amendment because I want to ask Mr. Hardy to think again and withdraw it. I shall tell you why. We have been battling hard to persuade the Americans that this organisation made a major contribution in the Gulf war and in the Iran-Iraq war. If we take out the word “effective”, we play into the hands of those in Congress who say: “You Europeans have done nothing at all.” We know that we did an enormous amount. That was recognised by President Bush.

If you take out this word, Peter, you will undo all the good that we did and we will shoot ourselves in the foot. I hope that you will agree that this is not being complacent; rather I am trying to emphasise that we played a constructive and effective part. I appeal to you to withdraw the amendment for that reason.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – In the light of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg’s request to Mr. Hardy may I, before stating my view, first ask Mr. Hardy whether he maintains or withdraws his amendment?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Sir Geoffrey places me in great difficulty. Those who heard my speeches during the Gulf debates will recall that I was strongly in favour of support for the United Nations forces. Indeed, I criticised a number of member states that did not make any notable contribution. In the debates that followed the Gulf war, there appeared to be a general slapping on the back in every member state, including those that made little contribution, and that is why I think that the word “effective” is not justified. I do not like such over-smug, complacent and arrogant expressions of satisfaction.

However, I would not wish to weaken the position of WEU vis-à-vis the United States – which I believe ended the Gulf war at least forty-eight hours too soon and in a manner that was both inglorious and dishonourable. I should very much prefer the compromise that has been suggested, which I accept is necessary at least for linguistic reasons if for no other reason. I should prefer to accept the compromise suggested by Mr. Caro rather than withdraw the amendment. If I withdrew it, not only would that be embarrassing, but it would appear to support the rather excessive view that many people in this Assembly took after the Gulf war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Now I am embarrassed, Mr. President. The compromise I had worked out with Mr. Hardy was a sound one but the exchange of views which has just taken place on a question of substance is of the greatest importance. Our document is, in fact, public and everyone has read it or can read it. It has appeared in the media. A decision to delete the word “effective” in relation to WEU’s military action in the Gulf becomes a matter of great political importance and I cannot give my support. I would say to Mr. Hardy, and I hope that this is what Mr. Stoffelen, our Chairman thinks too, that the

Mr. Caro (continued)

Political Committee would very much like Mr. Hardy to withdraw his amendment. Otherwise, in the light of the debate we have had on the question of substance, I would be obliged to keep to the wording of my report and to ask that we all approve it. After what has been said, Mr. Hardy, please play the game and withdraw your amendment and we will resume the debate on this form of words another time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – This is a formal statement. The committee did not have an opportunity to discuss the amendment, so it does not have an opinion on the proposal to remove the word “effective”. The draft recommendations have been unanimously accepted by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – To avoid great embarrassment to the Rapporteur, who had agreed a compromise, and to the Chairman of the committee, who was a party to the amendment this morning, it is with misgivings and regret that I withdraw the amendment.

I trust that people will take rather more care before making agreements than appears to have been the case this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 3 is therefore withdrawn.

Mr. Atkinson has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the prevention of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a process of binding arbitration and peace enforcement.”

I call Mr. Atkinson to move his amendment.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – During the debate, speaker after speaker deplored the lack of effective action to prevent the present wars in our continent of Europe in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Speaker after speaker also spoke in favour of a peace-making force – perhaps a WEU force – within the context of the CSCE process. My amendment urges that those views be brought to the attention of the leaders of the fifty-one participating states who will meet at the Helsinki summit next month. They should agree an effective means of finding arbitration to resolve

such disputes decisively and to establish a means of enforcement – the teeth of which were called for by Mr. Feldmann. I am delighted that Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur, supports my amendment. I hope that the Assembly will do the same.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as the committee has been unable to look at this amendment it has no formal opinion. My personal view is that it fits in with the ideas contained in the report and those expressed in committee. I would repeat what I said a short time ago that there is no request but a commitment resulting from the work of our Assembly. If we had had the time I would have amended the amendment to read: “proposes to furnish the CSCE with adequate means,” but that is another matter.

In taking this decision, Mr. President, I would hope that if the Assembly could agree it will itself check whether what is requested in this paragraph will be done at the CSCE, because the Council will have to give us a fairly speedy reply. The matter is urgent and we cannot simply ask other organisations to do things which we can offer them ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 1309.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

7. WEU after Maastricht

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1308)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU after Maastricht, Document 1308.

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to congratulate Mr. Hartmut Soell on his election as President of our Assembly. I join with all previous speakers who have praised his many qualities which, I am sure, will guarantee the success of everything he does in the interests of the Assembly and for the benefit of European Union.

It now falls to me to introduce the debate on Western European Union after Maastricht.

With the unanimous support of the committee it gives me much pleasure to present to you the result of our work on a subject of primary and immediate importance, since the ratification procedure is already under way in most countries of the European Community. Another reason why it is of crucial importance is that Western European Union is at the heart of the debates on the future of European security, of the Nine, of the Twelve and, therefore, of the European Community and even of Europe as a whole.

Its starting point, of course, is to be found in the articles of the European Union treaty concerned directly with security and defence, not forgetting the nine-power declaration annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty. It then goes on to deal as fully as possible with the political aspects of WEU's new deeply-involved rôle in the establishment of the European Union.

WEU has been given an important task but the means available to it under the modified Brussels Treaty do not always match its ambitions. Western European Union is called upon to take part in the development of a European Union comprising its nine members, together with three others, two of which are members of the Atlantic Alliance, and a third country, Ireland, which has always been neutral.

Let us add a few complications; this European Union is very much in the sights of countries exploring the possibility of co-operating with the Twelve in a wide variety of ways ranging from simple dialogue to association and even going as far as full membership.

Furthermore, the task of Western European Union is not made easier by the fact that it has to establish its position among a number of organisations with responsibility for security and defence.

Ordinary people – and how could it be different – also find it very difficult to identify the distinguishing features of the Atlantic Alliance, NACC, the CSCE and Western European Union, and of the Franco-German initiative setting up a joint army corps but leaving it open to others

without prejudice to undertakings given in other organisations.

I think it fair, therefore, to say that confusion reigns even in our own parliaments. This being so, it is necessary to list the problems.

Let us begin with the treaty itself. It must not be forgotten that a feature of the discussions which preceded the signature of the Maastricht agreement was a debate on the federal character or otherwise of the European Community. The debate was not resolved because some countries regard federalism as extreme centralisation. By contrast, the version reported by Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was then the German Foreign Minister, took it to be synonymous with a decentralised Europe. In the absence of agreement on the content of the expression, federal character, the differences were glossed over by using the term European Union in the treaty submitted to the parliaments and peoples of our countries for approval.

In this treaty some chapters are more specific than others and here I refer particularly to chapter 1 for which there is a precise timetable with clearly defined criteria. This does not apply to the chapters on the implementation of security policy, called for by the signatories of the Maastricht Treaty or to the new policies giving the Executive Committee in Brussels a right of initiative.

What is to be covered by parliamentary ratification? The treaty and its additional protocols, of course, but the question we had to consider in the Political Committee was whether the declaration of the Nine, made known to the Twelve, falls within the constitutive part of the treaty or not. In seeking to clarify the position I sent a written question to the Council whose reply, may I say, does not err on the side of clarity. It reads: "The declaration is politically linked to the constitutive part of the treaty."

We were left in the dark as to whether it is to be ratified or not, i.e. whether the declaration of the Nine annexed and linked politically to the treaty is to be ratified in Ireland, Denmark and Greece, which are not yet members of WEU, and in the nine parliaments of the other countries which now form the European Union.

We must not over-complicate things, however. I just wanted to show, with this example, that politics is not an exact science and that clarification will require further questioning by the Council.

I should like to read paragraph 22 (a) of my report, which quotes a section of the treaty: "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence." Here again, I do

Mr. Goerens (continued)

not know whether ordinary people or even ordinary members of parliament will understand much from this. What difference is there between a common defence policy and a common defence to which that policy might lead in time? This example proves that everything has not yet been settled or worded with the necessary precision and clarity.

May I also quote paragraph 29 of my report which refers to the treaty: "Paragraph 6 says that 'with a view to furthering the objective of this treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this article may be revised... on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then'." I, together with the members of the Political Committee, would point out that the Brussels Treaty has only ten articles, so how is it possible to refer to Article XII? This paragraph of the treaty which at first sight seems anodyne no doubt also conceals some afterthoughts among the authors. If I am looking at the Deputy Secretary-General of Western European Union, this does not mean in any way that I am accusing him of this inaccuracy, because he did not draft the treaty. It is simply because I know that he is deeply involved in this question and because I did not wish to pass over this extremely important detail in silence.

What is the point of the question I have just raised? It is Article XII of the Brussels Treaty modified by the 1954 Paris Agreements. That is why we asked the Council to share our concern and have asked the authors of the Maastricht Treaty to correct the mistake. The Council says that it is a minor one, but we cannot accept this view. Where a treaty is involved absolute accuracy is essential as we are required to comply with it in both letter and spirit as fully as possible.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the question of the possible enlargement of Western European Union to include other countries and in other forms is no clearer. For the sake of simplicity I will put the countries which might co-operate with Western European Union in one way or another into a number of categories.

Let us take first the countries which already belong to the European Union but are not members of Western European Union; these are Ireland, which is neutral, Denmark and Greece, which are members of the Atlantic Alliance. The treaties and declarations allow these countries to apply to join Western European Union. A reply should be given before the end of this year to any application which may be made. Only one country, Greece, has applied; the others have not yet made the slightest move.

There are other countries interested in Western European Union. Turkey is a case in point. Mr. Özal and all the Turkish representatives who have spoken either here or in Palermo have always said that there was only one possible form of future relationship between Turkey and Western European Union and that is for Turkey to be a full member. These declarations and attitudes are not designed to simplify the task of the political authorities who have to deal with these problems.

What is the answer? I recall that when Western European Union was extended to include Spain and Portugal, the basis for doing so was the so-called Cahen doctrine of first opening membership to countries already actively involved in the construction of Europe. This, of course, presupposes that these countries already have the opportunity to take part in the construction of Europe. This was indeed the case for Spain and Portugal.

The texts are clearer for some other countries. They do not allow them to join as full members immediately unless there are relations between them and the European Community in another form. It is for us to raise the question and for the European Community to give an answer.

Then there are countries which want to be members of both the European Community and Western European Union. This is the case of the three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which signed the Visegrad agreements, and Romania and Bulgaria all of which are not going to be joining the European Community in the near future. Nevertheless, the Assembly has looked at the future position of these countries because we are aware that the European Community will be keeping them waiting. The three countries bound by the Visegrad agreement and Romania and Bulgaria, to which we should add the Baltic countries, call for special attention because, unless the European Community gives the signal, they may be faced by additional difficulties. The prospect of a signal from the European Community combined with the austerity policy applied by the governments of those countries, which offers the only means of joining the market economy, is the only way of making their peoples understand that the sacrifices they are called on to make have some meaning.

It has to be added that even if these countries want to join the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union there is no way they can join the European Community in the immediate future. For obvious reasons, the fact that their economies lag so far behind those of the members of the European Community holds them back.

There are other countries where the situation is the reverse. These are the countries which

Mr. Goerens (continued)

would find no difficulty in operating within an economic Europe and a single market but would have to overcome a number of obstacles as regards security and defence. I am referring to the neutral countries with a high standard of living unwilling to abandon their neutrality. I believe, however, that if any country wishes to become a member of the European Community and of the European Union, and to be represented in all the areas required for that community to be a genuine political and economic entity, including foreign and security policy, initiatives must extend to all areas because any political entity is bound to fail in the end if it has no clear strategy for defence and security.

You will find in my report practical decisions which are already planned or are the subject of consultation in the Assembly, the permanent secretariat and the Council of Ministers of Western European Union. I will spare you the details, and would simply ask you to take another look at the relevant sections in my report.

In connection with this report, let us also consider the relationship between Western European Union and NATO. I believe I am not alone in regarding the presence of the United States in Europe as a fact, and as a fact essential for the maintenance of our security. The Political Committee is, in any case, unanimous on this point and I hope that the Assembly is also unanimous.

So it will be necessary to determine as clearly as we can what relationships will in future be established between Western European Union and the European Community on the one hand and between Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. One of the objectives which is not denied by either the facts or the Maastricht texts is the development of Western European Union as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Atlantic Alliance may itself have to change some of its habits in its relations with the European Community and, above all, with Western European Union. In the briefest terms I believe that clarity, complementarity and the willingness to exchange information are required in these relations.

Let us also consider relations between Western European Union and the European Parliament. When I had the privilege of presiding over this Assembly in 1987, 1988 and 1989 I was able to form some idea of the relationships that existed or, rather, did not exist between the European Parliament and our Assembly.

I have made even greater efforts than my predecessor in trying to establish a dialogue with

the European Parliament but without much success. Yet the treaty is fairly specific about the way work should in future be divided between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly. To quote from the declaration of 9th December 1991, adopted by the Nine: "WEU will take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the European Union... encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament." This opens the way for our two assemblies to act together in co-operation. On this point also I refer to the draft order attached to the report which instructs the Presidential Committee and the President to approach the European Parliament with a view to agreeing a division of work which cannot fail to benefit the two assemblies in the interests of the European Union which we all desire.

It seems to me appropriate, therefore, to point out that the Political Committee was unanimous in calling on all the parliaments and countries of the European Community to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in spite of all of its imperfections and all the question marks hanging over it. We arrived at this conclusion because we share the view of those who believe that Western European Union is taking on an important rôle in the construction of the European Union. We believe that the Council must re-double its efforts to define and specify the practical arrangements required in these circumstances. We stress the power of initiative now vested in the Council of Ministers of Western European Union, in the Permanent Council and in our Secretariat-General, and we declare that the Maastricht agreements are only one stage in the construction of European Union.

I should also like to stress that no time-limit has been set for the modified Brussels Treaty and that the jurisdiction of the European Union will in future be extended to include the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Paris Agreements, and this is bound to have consequences for the relationship between our Assembly and the European Union. I said this a short time ago and I have no need to repeat myself.

For all these reasons the Political Committee decided in the report I am now presenting to call on the Assembly to recommend that the Council give further consideration to the terms for association between Western European Union and the countries given associate status.

The same applies to the definition of observer status as well as the status of associate member of WEU for countries associated or to be associated with the European Community. We therefore call on the Council to do everything possible to arrange the synchronisation of dates for meetings between the Presidents and Chairmen-in-Office of the European Com-

Mr. Goerens (continued)

munity and the Council of Western European Union.

In order not to prolong the discussion unduly, Mr. President, I should now like to give you my conclusions and say that an immense field for action is opening before us. Everything that Western European Union does now forms part of the logic of the integration of twelve-power Europe. It forms part of a relationship of trust and transparency and complementarity with NATO – at least that is our wish and let us hope that there will not be too many hitches.

Let us not be satisfied with words as regards security. As I say, Maastricht did not err on the side of clarity. This is welcome or to be regretted according to whether one is an optimist or a sceptic or even a pessimist. Personally I think the glass is half full. The greater the number of points that still have to be clarified the more the treaty will require the political leaders to face up to their responsibilities.

In making this point I think I also speak for my colleagues who have called attention in the Political Committee to the sometimes vague and evasive nature of the forms of words used in the Maastricht Treaty.

Let us be optimistic, however. The Western European Union of the year 2000 will be different from that of 1992 which already differs in great measure from the Western European Union of 1984, the year it was reactivated. This Western European Union of the year 2000 will not be an end in itself. It will be an organisation serving the security of everyone; it will no doubt be more operational than it is today. It will be more than the simple sum of the number of tanks, fighter aircraft and soldiers and officers available to the nine, ten or twelve countries belonging to the union by then. I think that I can say with equal certainty that this Western European Union with an operational dimension will total fewer tanks, fighter aircraft and troops, but will, to repeat what the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, said to us, have two kinds of rôle: that of the blue berets and that of the green berets. The blue berets will be available for security purposes under United Nations orders while the green berets will be on hand to deal with ecological disasters.

These are two noble tasks for this Western European Union called on to play an active part in establishing the European Union we all desire.

This Western European Union will be an instrument for peace, opening wider horizons for its citizens, allowing them to make their purchases with a single currency and to travel around freely within one vast area open, we hope, to others. It will not be inward-looking.

I have shared this optimism with my friends or they have made me share it. We have achieved an identity of views through good will on all sides, thanks to the ability of Mr. Burgelin, to whom I pay tribute, to analyse and summarise and thanks to the serious approach taken to its work by this Political Committee, which I love, as our Chairman would say.

Mr. President, I have tried imperfectly to outline the way in which our Political Committee now sees the identity of Western European Union. It may not all be perfect but I would say that this is because there is still much to be done. Let us, as the WEU Assembly, devote our efforts to this end. I would remind you that the dual political mission of control and political initiative is in no way called into question by the Maastricht Treaty.

(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I congratulate my colleague, Mr. Goerens, on his excellent speech, but regret that I must again address some critical remarks to the Council.

The Maastricht Treaty contains a number of vitally important regulations regarding the future rôle of WEU. In such a decisive phase of political developments in Europe, it is more important than ever for the Assembly to receive reports in good time. But instead of this, the Council on this occasion transmitted its activity report to the Assembly only at the end of May, half a year after Maastricht, leaving no time for the report to be considered in any of the committees. I consider that the Council is out of order in reporting to the Assembly so late.

For it means that we have only just heard about a United Nations document containing a declaration by WEU member states about the completion of the mine-clearance programme in the Gulf. The report also mentions a military planning group in Metz, but we have received no further details about its tasks.

In connection with the Mediterranean Working Group there is mention of a "five plus five" group, but no explanation about that group. Several subjects are mentioned on which the WEU Institute for Security Studies has made reports to the Council. The Assembly has no knowledge of these texts. There is a lapidary statement to the effect that the Agency for the Control of Armaments continues to exist as a one-man operation, and no further details on this subject are given.

It is hardly possible, on the basis of such sparse and belated information, to conduct a serious dialogue with the Council, and correctly

Mr. Antretter (continued)

to assess the situation of WEU after Maastricht. And yet we have the task of examining the treaty to see whether its references to security policy are formulated clearly enough.

Nevertheless, thanks to the thorough analysis contained in Mr. Goerens's report, we have a sufficient basis for discussion. Its most important finding is that European integration in security and defence policy cannot be an end in itself, but should increase the security of citizens in Europe without presenting a security risk to others – as indeed the Rapporteur has just said in similar words.

The preamble to the WEU treaty contains some valuable indications which are of very topical interest just now. There are references to human rights, the duty of assistance and the undertaking to maintain international peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and to resist any policy of aggression.

On the other hand, the outline and aims of the security identity of European political union are still not clearly defined. It was certainly a wise decision at Maastricht to place responsibility for policy on security and defence in the hands of WEU.

Regrettably, however, it was not made clear that the WEU treaty will form part of the legal basis of European Union. Instead of that, everything has been based on the incorrect hypothesis that the WEU treaty expires in 1998.

I am extremely grateful to the Rapporteur for his clear reference to the danger of trying to found political union in regard to security on the disappearance of WEU, without knowing on what basis the security of Europe will rest.

I should like to say something else about the future of our Assembly. I have the impression that many people – including many of us – have not yet recognised clearly enough how poorly this future is assured. In this respect I can wholeheartedly support the Rapporteur's analysis, and also his proposal to build up parliamentary control within the political union on the basis of a bicameral system.

However, according to the latest information on the intentions of the European Parliament, I have doubts as to whether that body will be prepared to distribute the work in that way. I believe we shall have to pay much more attention to this problem and produce in good time a clear concept of the parliamentary structure of the political union, so that it would really be shaped and moulded by parliamentarians and not by executives, councils and diplomats.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, history has the power to set men's calculations at naught and to bring about the triumph of true ideas even if incidental circumstances sometimes delay their coming to fruition.

For effective European defence, the basic aim is still the creation of a European defence community of the kind which was planned long ago in the fifties but was set aside because of the fear that a peoples' Europe might overshadow the prestige of Europe of the fatherlands.

The result of this strategic myopia was that Europe lost any major rôle in world balances and also the ability to safeguard peace even in the heart of the continent, as the present fighting in what was Yugoslavia shows with a clarity that I have no need to stress since the explicit call by the Serbian President, Mr. Milosevic, to the United States and Russia to intervene to bring about a cease-fire in Croatia and Bosnia.

European statesmen who mistakenly thought that they could, in the Yugoslav tragedy, resurrect the old policy of zones of influence have had to think again and recognise that such policies went out with the second world war, and that, in any case, they provide no key for solving the crisis in the Balkans.

However, if Europe has been incapable of promoting an armed peace it can still sketch the lines of a political peace by suggesting to the peoples fighting each other a model based on the European Community within which peoples with different languages and traditions have found common ground for economic – and later political and military – agreement.

In order to further this development in the circumstances now existing, WEU should therefore be strengthened as the appropriate forum for renewing the proposal for the creation by the necessary gradual stages of an integrated defence force, as the essential requirement for rescuing Europe from its present subordinate status.

The Franco-German initiative of 21st May for the formation of an army corps may help to speed up progress towards an integrated European force, if it is included within the scope of the WEU treaty.

On the other hand, the La Rochelle agreement would mark a material reversal of a trend if it were based on the logic of traditional bilateral agreements between states.

After Maastricht, therefore, WEU will have to take on the character of a military instrument operating a less uncertain, less confused and less hesitant European defence policy.

Our countries and governments must realise that the time for delegating to others duties which are the province of Europeans as they involve interests vital to the future of our peoples is past.

Mr. Fioret (continued)

If we do not discharge these duties, others will fill the political spaces which Europe, in the name of a historic past which belongs to us and which must be revived at the present difficult stage of world balances, has represented until now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, the debate is adjourned.

***8. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the second part of the

thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 1315; Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

2. WEU after Maastricht (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1308).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Doc. 1315; Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Kinkel to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Aguiar, Mr. Müller, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mrs. Blunck, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
4. WEU after Maastricht (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1308*).
Speakers: Mr. Roman, Mrs. Özver (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Parisi, Mr. Liapis (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Machete, Mr. Toskay (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Roseta, Mr. Pahtas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Tarschys (*Observer from Sweden*), Mr. Eisma, Mr. Wielowieyski (*Observer from Poland*), Mr. Giagu Demartini, Mr. Caro, Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.20 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council – presentation of the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of the Council, Doc. 1315

*Address by Mr. Kinkel,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of the second part of the thirty-seventh annual report of

the Council, Document 1315; Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Minister, the Assembly of WEU will listen to your address with great interest since Germany has held the Chairmanship-in-Office of our organisation for almost a year, having taken over this responsibility at a decisive moment when preparations had to be made, as regards security and defence, for the twelve-power summit in Maastricht. We all know of its vital rôle in the drafting of the texts adopted in our field. Without the work it then did, we would clearly not have arrived at so firm a statement of the European defence identity. It is equally clear that Germany has made an influential contribution to the definition of WEU's new rôle and to the first moves in initiating a European security policy.

Over the long period he was at the helm of foreign policy in the Federal Republic, your predecessor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proved himself to be a faithful and firm friend of WEU and its Assembly. It is chiefly to him that we owe the new relations that have developed between the ministerial organs of the Assembly, and your presence with us today encourages us to hope that you will be following in his footsteps and show the same consideration for the work of an Assembly, which has always believed its task, on an equal footing with any other European assembly, to be to work in its spheres of responsibility for the future of the European Union that the Twelve launched at the Maastricht summit.

1. See page 23.

*The President (continued)**(The President continued in German.)*

Minister, in case you and many of my German colleagues were thinking I had forgotten my own language, I will add a few comments in German. I would like to extend a heartfelt welcome to you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly. I know that in the various political posts you have held in your career and in the various rôles you have played in the past you have developed an understanding of foreign policy that is not limited to traditional diplomacy but has also taken very careful account of the extent to which foreign policy issues have today become part of internal policy – especially European internal policy – and developments in the internal policies of the various countries of Europe have become relevant to foreign policy. Through the various rôles you have so far played you have made excellent preparation for this intertwining of policies. This being the case, we are very much looking forward to your statement, which is accompanied by certain expectations in the Assembly. As you are at governmental level, so we are all under pressure, not only to find solutions to long-term problems but also to answer highly topical questions. I refer in this context to the debate under urgent procedure that this Assembly will be conducting this afternoon on Yugoslavia and the conflict there.

I would ask the Minister to address the Assembly from the rostrum.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your kind welcome. Forgive my late arrival; having been in office for only a few days, I have had some domestic upsets to deal with. Unfortunately I cannot be with you for long, which I greatly regret. I hope it will also be said of me – as you, Mr. President, have just said of my predecessor, Mr. Genscher – that I am a friend of WEU. To this end, I promise you that next time I shall also be available to answer questions. So please bear with me for leaving a little early this time. I am currently under extreme pressure.

The historic upheaval we are experiencing in Central and Eastern Europe has not only dramatically altered the political landscape from Central Europe to Vladivostok. It has also given the Atlantic and European post-war institutions a new appearance. This applies equally to Western European Union.

In Maastricht, this organisation was assigned a clear function – that of the defence component of the European Political Union. This decision was taken in the awareness that the new Europe must be more than a vast free market for goods

and services reaching from the North Cape to Sicily. The new Europe must be a community of nations with a shared destiny. This also requires it to assume responsibility for its security.

That is why the Twelve agreed in Maastricht to establish a joint foreign and security policy as well as a common defence at the appropriate time. That is why, together with France, we have formed the core of future multinational European forces. With the common European foreign and security policy we have finally drawn a line under an unhappy chapter of the centuries-old fraternal feud in Europe.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am glad to have the opportunity to continue the tradition established by my predecessor in office and to report on the second half of the German presidency. I attach importance to carefully pursuing this dialogue with you in future. Only with your parliamentary support can we implement the ambitious reform programmes of this organisation.

The German presidency of WEU set itself three goals: first, the strengthening of WEU's rôle in the process of European unification; second, the generation of impetus by WEU for disarmament and arms control; third, the building of bridges by WEU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

As I see it, in all three areas considerable progress has been made. I believe that this will be confirmed by the Council of Ministers in Bonn on 19th June. On 4th December 1991 you were informed about the first half of the presidency by my predecessor, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. I should now like to report on the most recent developments.

The second half of Germany's presidency was marked by the implementation of the Maastricht decisions. The results achieved will be submitted to the Council of Ministers for decision in Bonn on 19th June. I hope you will appreciate that, prior to the Council meeting, I can only give you a brief outline of the main progress achieved. I can go into the details only afterwards at the meeting of your Assembly's Presidential Committee in Bonn at the end of June.

The core of the implementation of Maastricht is, of course, WEU's relations with the European Union on the one hand and the alliance on the other. Relations with the European Union will be concerned above all with close co-operation between the Councils and the Secretariats-General, the co-ordination of conference dates and venues as well as the harmonisation of working methods and the order and duration of the presidencies.

In our relations with the alliance, we are striving for the closest possible degree of

Mr. Kinkel (continued)

co-ordination. In future, it should be possible to introduce joint WEU positions into the alliance consultation process. It goes without saying that, after the Council in Bonn, we will first of all discuss our proposals with the alliance and take decisions only in agreement with it. This common approach must also apply to our dealings with each other. Thus openness and transparency will remain our guiding principle. This will be made considerably easier by the relocation of the WEU Secretariat-General from London to Brussels envisaged for 1st January 1993.

Regarding the enlargement of WEU, a solution has been found, which takes account of the interests of both existing members and newly acceding states. The definition of the various rights and obligations is appropriate to their respective status as full members, associate members or observers. As a rule, the future associate members will be able to attend all meetings of the Council and its working groups and will also participate in future military planning under a liaison arrangement. Negotiations with the interested states should be completed by the end of the year.

The Bonn Council of Ministers will presumably also be able to decide on the establishment of a military planning cell. Although this cell will not have a command function, through it WEU will acquire an important element of military infrastructure, which is a step in the direction of a European defence system.

A report on the assignment of military units will also be submitted to the Council of Ministers in Bonn. It is guided by the precepts of Maastricht under which European Union is entitled to ask WEU to draw up and implement Union decisions and activities with defence implications. The WEU member states are called upon to designate military units from the entire spectrum of conventional forces for European military tasks. Humanitarian and peace-keeping assignments are also a possibility. Account will be taken of the complementarity with NATO agreed in Maastricht.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am aware that the decision taken at the Franco-German summit in La Rochelle on the creation of the European corps has not only raised hopes, but has also given rise to doubt and concern, among both our North American friends and a number of our European partners. I entirely understand our North American friends' concern for the strength and continued existence of the North Atlantic Alliance, about whose future indispensability there is no doubt whatsoever. What are the issues?

Since the Copenhagen meeting of the NATO foreign ministers and the meeting of the CSCE Council of foreign ministers in Berlin, at the latest, there has been a consensus among all alliance members that in the years to come, European security must be organised on three complementary levels: a European level, consisting of European Political Union and WEU, an Atlantic level, consisting of the Atlantic Alliance, as well as a more comprehensive pan-European level consisting of the CSCE and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

The Copenhagen meeting of foreign ministers, and the two German-American communiqués of 10th May and 2nd October 1991, expressly underlined the compatibility of Europe's own security identity with its alliance commitment.

In the joint declaration of 10th May in Washington, Secretary of State Jim Baker affirmed that "the United States is ready to support arrangements the European allies decide are needed for the expression of a common European foreign, security and defence policy". In Maastricht, not only was the integration of WEU into the process of European unification agreed; at the same time the European Council assigned to WEU the function of a bridge between the alliance and European Union. This dual function of WEU as an independent instrument of European security and as the European pillar of NATO manifests the indissoluble security link between the European and the North American democracies.

This, in our view, forms the basis of our security policy. Nor will it be changed by our resolve to seek ever-closer co-operation with France and other European partners in the field of security and defence. Like WEU, the European corps is aimed at strengthening joint security and not at weakening it through irreconcilable parallel structures. Also as regards alliance security interests, this corps offers more and not less scope for action. The German units envisaged for the corps will remain assigned to NATO. They will continue to meet NATO standards with regard to planning, availability, training etc.

The corps' primary mandate is to contribute to the allies' joint defence. The corps will also perform peace-keeping and peace-making tasks, as well as humanitarian assignments. Through these additional tasks, which are new to the German corps units, we have assumed additional European responsibility in the fields of conflict settlement and crisis management – as constantly called for by our North American partners – thus strengthening security on both sides of the Atlantic. Of course, a number of questions remain as regards the European corps' relationship with NATO. But I am sure that the practical arrangements yet to be negotiated between NATO and the European corps will

Mr. Kinkel (continued)

demonstrate that an independent European defence is not an obstacle, but a basic condition for ensuring that the security link across the Atlantic remains unshakeable in future.

Ladies and gentlemen, the bridge-building by WEU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was another focus of Germany's presidency. The fact-finding missions by the presidency and the Secretary-General to those countries were continued. Together with the Secretary-General, a representative of the German presidency visited the Baltic states as well as Romania and Bulgaria.

On the afternoon of 19th June, following the regular nine-member Council of Ministers, for the first time in WEU history a special Council will take place with eight Central and Eastern European states, where the contacts initiated between WEU and these states are to be developed. WEU offers these countries a further forum for security dialogue. For states with definite prospects of accession, this meeting also offers a chance of getting closer to the work of the Community and thus of preparing the way for full membership later on.

Ladies and gentlemen, you and, in particular, President Pontillon, who died recently, have devoted great energy to building this bridge between WEU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Berlin symposium held last spring was a high spot of these activities. Thank you for your efforts.

The Institute for Security Studies, too, has made special efforts in this regard. I should like to mention in this context the seminar held in Budapest last May – the first of its kind in Central Europe. May I convey my warm thanks to the Hungarian hosts for their efficient organisation of the seminar.

In the arms control sector, too, important initiatives were developed. Co-operation among the open skies experts within the WEU framework has led to consensus on an aircraft pool for WEU member states. At present, various options on this are still being examined, including the possibility of co-operation with third countries, such as Russia.

In his capacity as WEU Chairman-in-Office, my predecessor Hans-Dietrich Genscher appealed personally to the foreign ministers of the Soviet successor states to ensure the timely ratification of the CFE Treaty. The chances of this have increased following the Tashkent summit of the CIS states. This is also significant for the final phase of the CFE 1a negotiations.

In the nuclear sphere, overriding importance attaches to the development and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The nuclear

non-proliferation treaty is an essential instrument for safeguarding peace and international stability. We seek the treaty's unlimited extension beyond 1995. In this connection, we welcome the initialling of the agreement between the EC, Russia, the United States and Japan in Lisbon on 24th May on an international centre for science and technology. The proliferation of nuclear know-how must also be stopped. With regard to chemical weapons, I am confident that we will succeed in Geneva in achieving, by the end of the year, a world-wide, comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons ban.

The disarmament process must continue to be linked to political developments. Political credibility must pass the test of civic scrutiny in this area.

The agreement to open up national inspection teams to participation by WEU partners within the framework of the CFE Treaty is a further element of confidence-building. A whole series of trial inspections has already been conducted successfully on this basis. With the "set of rules on co-operation among multinational inspection teams" prepared on the presidency's initiative – which has now also been adopted within the NATO framework – WEU has once again implemented a successful initiative in the highly important area of confidence building.

We have also taken an important step towards our goal of an autonomous European assessment of foreign and security procedures at global level. Torrejón near Madrid has been designated as the location of the satellite centre. A British national was appointed as its first director. Equal progress has been achieved in parallel study programmes on the possible establishment of a European space-based observation system.

Extensive, detailed work has enabled a plan for the studies to be prepared. A further major event in the second half of the German presidency has been the 4th European Seminar for Security Studies in Ebenhausen and Dresden in March. In addition to the rôle of WEU in the new European security architecture, arms control and disarmament were the main issues.

Pursuant to the ministerial mandate of 18th November 1991, contacts between WEU and the Maghreb states are currently being examined. Thus WEU is addressing the security issues arising in this area, with its close European links.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the brutality and human suffering going on in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are horrifying. And, as I stated quite clearly at the Lisbon meeting on aid to the CIS countries, we Europeans must confess with complete candour that Europe has not yet reached the point where it can cope with

Mr. Kinkel (continued)

this new kind of challenge, although this is essentially a European problem which concerns us all. But the consequence cannot be to put an end to efforts to create a Europe capable of action. On the contrary: the only rational alternative is to progress even more rapidly and to put the European institutions in a position to assert the common values of the Charter of Paris so as to prevent a relapse into nationalism and violence.

First and foremost, the procedures agreed in Maastricht for an EC common foreign and security policy must now be actively put into practice. An important institutional starting-point for this is the adoption of majority decisions. European integration must retain its momentum. Only by simultaneously reforming its internal structures can the Community open up towards the European reformist states through co-operation, association or full membership.

Only through ever-increasing common ground can the dangers of resurgent nationalism at our borders be combated. Only a Community of internal strength and efficiency can actively contribute to a just, lasting order linking North and South in this one world. The alliance, too, has, by changing its structure and its strategy, played an active part in shaping the new Europe. By establishing the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and extending it to a total of 36 members, NATO has obviated the emergence of a security vacuum in the area of the former Warsaw Pact.

The Oslo meeting of NATO foreign ministers will clarify the question of co-operation between CSCE and NATO in peace-keeping operations. For WEU, too, new prospects for burden-sharing with the alliance and the CSCE will arise in this context. To this end, however, as we have requested time and again, the CSCE must assume the tasks and responsibility of a regional arrangement within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. And WEU must create its own structures for this purpose. And let me add that we Germans must take internal steps which enable us to participate in peace-keeping and peace-making missions under the auspices of the United Nations. This is also my own personal, emphatically-stated view.

The EC trade embargo against Serbia has now been followed by comprehensive sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, including the oil embargo we have been calling for again and again, since the middle of last year. The Serbian authorities and army must be made to realise that, if further blood is spilt, they will have to pay a very high price.

On my first trips at home and abroad in my new position, I have frequently emphasised that

we must jointly ensure that things are made less easy for the Serbian leaders, and the army in particular, and that we in Europe, above all, must bring this terrible slaughter to an end as quickly as possible. I hope the sanctions will work. We must wait and see. Of course there must be supervision to prove their effectiveness. Let me also clearly state that ultimately the use of military expedients cannot and should not be excluded. But – let me add – I sincerely hope this will not be necessary.

The presidency has called a meeting of the Council for Thursday to verify the implementation of the naval embargo, should this prove necessary. In conclusion I would like to repeat that military measures should not and cannot be excluded, but they should really be a last resort. I appeal for a waiting period while we see whether sanctions are working as we hope.

My apologies, once again, for having relatively little time available for these questions, and I promise to be available for as long as you wish next time. At present I have to deal with some trying home affairs. Thank you again for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister.

Seven members have asked to speak. I propose that we begin by hearing three speakers in succession and that the Minister then answer the first three questions. We could adopt the same procedure for the remaining four speakers.

Mr. Hardy, you have the floor.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Kinkel will have noted that the Assembly listened to him with marked interest. We appreciate that he presented a broad assessment. I hope that he will not think that I am seeking to tempt him to stray far from his brief, when I ask him to comment on the following point. We are now facing the summit in Rio, which has implications for international peace and stability. If we are to assist the poor areas of the world, which is essential, I hope that we will not seek to add to their burdens by unloading on to them in the next few years, as we have done so frequently in the past, the obsolete and the surplus from our military armouries. Does he accept that a more intelligent approach to the international arms threat needs to be urgently developed? Although we all agreed with the passionate and necessary words that he uttered about Yugoslavia and the areas of difficulty and destruction in that unhappy part of Europe, does he accept that the evidence now emerging from that experience demonstrates that there should be a great deal more care and control of the arms trade? Otherwise, where are the weapons of destruction coming from?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I agree entirely with Mr. Kinkel's condemnation of the shelling of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik, in the same way as Vukovar and Osijek were shelled before, and the wish to place the maximum pressure on Serbia, not excluding an air and naval blockade, which the Assembly discussed many months ago. May I draw his attention to the situation in Kosovo? There has been no violence but a positive policy by the 90 % Albanian population to avoid violence, so they get no attention. Our western governments are bad at responding to people under occupation, as in Kosovo, unless those people take violent action. We must in some way recognise the position of those in Kosovo and hold out hope for them. Otherwise, violence will break out there, too.

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – I call Mrs. Aguiar.

Mrs. AGUIAR (*Portugal*) (Translation). – The recognition of the independence of Croatia and of other republics of the former Yugoslavia was followed by a horrendous war, to which there appears to be no end. The number of dead, injured and homeless in these countries is growing, as is the number of refugees to neighbouring countries.

The German Government sought and played a decisive part in the process of international recognition of the independence of Croatia.

Will the German Government now play a similar rôle in the field of humanitarian aid, and granting rights of refuge and asylum?

Will it, for instance, welcome unreservedly the thousands of citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are at present taking refuge in Croatia, a country which is not itself in a position to help and accommodate them as they deserve?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If the Minister would now like to answer the first three questions.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was first asked if I did not agree that there is an urgent need for regulations against the international arms trade and whether the arms trade issue is not particularly important in the context of the Yugoslav problem. That was the question: where are the weapons of destruction coming from? All I can say is that of course I fully share the opinion expressed that we must do all we can as a matter of urgency to bring the international arms trade – at least on the scale on which it is still being

conducted – to an end. Where the present sanctions are concerned, of course, it must be ensured in particular that weapons do not continue to reach Yugoslavia. The routes are known, the supplier countries are also known. I do not think we need to discuss this aspect further.

As regards Kosovo, I will say that everything possible has been included in the international efforts to achieve peace. We are trying to help to restore peace there too as far as we possibly can. Kosovo is definitely not excluded from international and especially not from European peace-making efforts.

I now come to the third question. I do not know if I have understood the question. Croatia has been recognised so, as I see it, it does not need to be recognised again.

As for the right of asylum, we have in the Federal Republic what I consider to be a particularly well-defined right of asylum. We are really doing everything we can to help the refugees. However, where Bosnia-Herzegovina and the refugee problem are concerned, we are still insisting for the moment – and I am convinced this is the right approach – that visas be obtained. Despite this, the Conference of the Home Affairs Ministers of the Federal Government and the Länder in the Federal Republic has considered every conceivable humanitarian measure very carefully. Quite a lot is happening in this area at the moment. I believe that we in the Federal Republic are acting in an exemplary fashion in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – When the Minister mentioned the Franco-German corps in his statement, he said that its task consisted not only of humanitarian missions but also of restoring the peace.

Now it could easily happen – as the Minister himself has mentioned – that a last resort will be necessary in connection with the conflict in Yugoslavia.

Can the Minister assume that, if Western European Union decided, for example, to impose an air and sea blockade on Serbia, it would really have the co-operation of all the members, or must it be assumed that certain members of Western European Union would not be prepared to play an active part?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I should first like to congratulate you, Minister, on your address and the great hope it inspires in the organisation. As you well know, the modified Brussels Treaty states that the

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

purpose of this organisation is to maintain international peace and security and resist any policy of aggression. Article VIII lays down that, if a request is made for a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the latter will be immediately convened in order to permit the high contracting parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise. Now we have the experience of the former Yugoslavia: although, here in this Assembly, we raised several times the possibility of acting in advance, we are now being criticised on the other side of the Atlantic for acting too slowly in Europe.

My question is this: in view of the great changes that you have referred to, do you think that the time has now come for Europe to have a very clear security doctrine so that we can act before rather than after events?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, how will it be ensured that, firstly, the arms procurement programmes needed for the Eurocorps are shown openly in the national defence budgets, rather than being hidden away in some departmental budget or other, and that, secondly, the procurement programmes will not be implemented only by the military and the government, without the parliamentarians or parliament being involved?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask the Minister a simple question? In his speech about the Eurocorps, he said: "The German units envisaged for the corps will remain assigned to NATO." Can he say without reservation that those units will come under the control of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please, Minister, your answers.

Mr. KINKEL (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I will try to be very clear in my answer to the first question: I take the view that, if at all possible, the deployment of German troops of the Bundeswehr in Yugoslavia in any form should be avoided on historical grounds. I assume that is what your question was referring to.

The second question: WEU – a clear-cut security doctrine? Answer: yes; it is being prepared and it is urgently needed.

The third question: the Eurocorps, arms procurement. So far we have only taken the political

decision. Where decisions on arms procurement are concerned – if more are needed – they will be taken in the future. For me there is absolutely no question of these decisions being taken other than by the proper parliamentary process, without bypassing parliament, let alone the appropriate committees, especially the Budget Committee.

As for the last question, concerning WEU: yes, very much so. If that is what is wanted, it can be done.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Next time I hope you will manage to take as much advantage as possible of the time available, as you have assured us you will do. The next opportunity will be on 25th June, when WEU's Political Committee and Presidential Committee will be meeting in Bonn to discuss the outcome of the Council's meeting on 19th June.

Thank you once again for coming here. We all know that – precisely because you are new to this office – you have taken on many additional commitments and still have old ones to honour.

(*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly took the Chair*)

4. WEU after Maastricht

(*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1308*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU after Maastricht and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1308.

In the debate, I now call Mr. Roman.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is not easy to take the floor after a minister. Nevertheless, I will briefly give my opinion on the report which Mr. Goerens has presented.

Six months ago, we were in the position of debating alternative proposals which tended, in one case, to subordinate WEU to the European Community and, in the other, to have WEU still playing an active rôle as the European pillar of the alliance. Although these were frequently presented as opposing and irreconcilable proposals, in practice it was shown at Maastricht that fundamentally they were similar. I share the belief that what was agreed at Maastricht requires the most important qualitative and quantitative change for the Community since the signature of the Treaty of Rome.

Mr. Goerens's report sets out what the Council will need to do to achieve the objectives

Mr. Roman (continued)

in view. We have a timetable and a set of actions taking us up to 1996 to complete the reforms provided for in the treaty, including the revision of the Brussels Treaty: to formulate a common defence policy with the ultimate aim of jointly defending ourselves.

Mr. Goerens, I do not find paragraph J.4 so difficult to understand. It involves progressing from theory to practice, from definition to reality. I am in no doubt that a realistic, reasonable and well-balanced consensus has been reached, since WEU is retaining its autonomy. This does not weaken NATO, but complements it, and, moreover, it is agreed to develop WEU's operational function. Some recent initiatives have seemed to create internal conditions, or rather contradictions, but we must see it as two ways of achieving the same aim, namely to provide WEU with an effective operational structure. There are many ways of achieving this, but really the important thing is to do it.

Mr. Goerens's report is fully acceptable and I congratulate him on having been the first to deal with the intricacies of this treaty. I do believe, however, that we must be wary of meetings which require agreements to be reached in a very short time on too wide a range of subjects. Of course there will be omissions, errors and inaccuracies, but this does not mean that these cannot be corrected.

What I would avoid are false debates. These we must avoid, because they will hold up progress towards European Union. There has been some talk of a loss of national sovereignty, but neither the character, institutions nor personality of any of our nations is in danger. There has also been talk of transferring sovereignty, when we all know that the sovereignty which is being transferred is not going to some third party, but will be shared amongst us to be administered by us all, so that together we can define our common destiny.

Another way to oppose progress towards the construction of Europe is to set a maximalist objective: to sweep in and want to build a federal Europe or a European confederation tomorrow, or to aspire to an efficient organisation which, from the very beginning, includes all the countries of Europe. For such people the Maastricht Treaty is already outdated and outstripped, but I believe in going forward step by step, be the steps large or small. I do not believe in jumping into the void or getting nowhere fast.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Roman, would you please conclude.

Mr. ROMAN (*Spain*) (Translation). – We are – and I am just about to finish, Mr. President –

faced with revitalising WEU to enable it to fulfil its mission of developing and implementing defence policy for the European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Roman.

I call Mrs. Özver, Observer from Turkey.

Mrs. ÖZVER (*Observer from Turkey*). – I congratulate Mr. Goerens on his excellent report.

As was clearly indicated during the Rome NATO summit meeting of heads of state in November 1991, security challenges in the new Europe cannot be addressed by one institution alone – there must be a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions. According to the new European security architecture, NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other. Agreements reached in Rome, as well as in Maastricht, represent the basis of new relationships between NATO and the emerging European security and defence identity. Declarations to that effect stress the need for transparency and complementary relationships between WEU and NATO.

At Maastricht, it was decided to invite Turkey to join WEU as an associate member, to participate fully in the activities of the organisation. It is obvious that the European security and defence architecture would be incomplete without Turkey. Turkey's orientation, location and the political and security interests of our continent necessitate a close integration between Europe and Turkey. We therefore consider the Maastricht decision on associate member status for Turkey as a manifestation of WEU's desire that Turkey be fully integrated into the European effort for collective security – tempered only by the fact that Turkey is not yet a full member of the European Community.

Turkey attaches the highest importance to the outcome of the negotiations to allow Turkey to become an associate member, and it wishes to participate fully in WEU's activities. The Maastricht commitment to full participation for associate members must be implemented. They should have the right to participate fully in all WEU meetings and activities and in the implementation of its decisions. The status of the parliamentarians of an associate member country should be revised and upgraded to the status that it deserves, commensurate with the principle of full participation.

I want to underline once again our determination that Turkey should not share only the benefits of European solidarity, but assume its share of obligations within that. No one should have any doubts about that as Turkey has contributed to NATO for four decades and will now contribute to WEU, taking all the necessary responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs Özver.

The next speaker is Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin my statement by thanking Mr. Goerens for his report. I do not mean this as one of the compliments that are normally paid to a rapporteur. I believe in fact that Mr. Goerens has given a really excellent account of the problem Western European Union faces and the rôle that the Assembly is playing in this debate.

I would like to hark back to one of yesterday's speakers, Mr. Antretter, who is not a member of my group. In his criticism of the part played by the Council of Ministers he said some things that I can fully endorse and approve.

In the context of this debate I said at a private gathering yesterday that the present differs quite significantly from the 19th century. At that time politicians, diplomats and ministers like Talleyrand and Metternich negotiated treaties that were very clear and left no one in any doubt.

Today we find that, in the Maastricht agreement, say, we have a treaty whose clauses are not yet ready and will have to be supplied later, as it were. As Mr. Goerens states very clearly in his report, we also find that a smokescreen is being put up, that doubt is in fact being created, where the WEU treaty is concerned, as to whether it runs until 1998 or until 2004. Paragraphs are being moved about, which creates further uncertainty. They leave quite a few things in the dark.

That is precisely what we can do without in a European security and defence policy. We must have clarity.

I feel one of the main problems is that parliamentarians – whether at the level of national parliaments or of the various assemblies, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly and even the European Parliament – are no longer creative forces, as should be the general rule in a parliamentary system. All they really have to do is to reconstruct something that has often been drawn up and presented in a very unclear and slapdash form – I must emphasise once again – by ministers, governments and diplomats.

What is needed today is a genuine European constitutional debate, laying the foundations for a real political union and for a common European security policy, and we need to remove the uncertainty we find today in many areas of the policy on European unification.

To conclude, let me mention something that is causing me considerable concern. I believe the policy on European unification in relation to

security policy will be jeopardised in the long term by our enlarging the European Community too quickly. I am convinced today that it would have been better in the past to have pressed ahead with the old core of the European Community, to have established facts, and not to begin by placing the emphasis on enlargement.

I am afraid that the current phase, with a line of candidates waiting, as it were, in the European Community's anteroom to join the Community, will create renewed uncertainty rather than renewed certainty in the security policy sphere.

When I think of the Scandinavian countries, of Austria, of Switzerland, with all their specific problems of neutrality and regarding other plans, I have many doubts about the possibility of a security policy in Europe in the next few years. There is more likely to be greater uncertainty, there is more likely to be more doubt. I deeply regret that we are getting into such a situation.

I can only hope that the critical remarks Mr. Goerens has made in his report are read and noted by governments and ministers, because I am afraid – and this is something else Mr. Goerens said in his report – that sometimes the reports adopted here are not read by the ministers and the Council. That is not in keeping with the rôle of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although I live very near Maastricht and studied in Maastricht, I have never heard the name of this town mentioned so frequently or in so many different accents as in the last few months. Without indulging in repetition, I must say that I heartily agree with what Mr. Antretter has said.

I would like to refer to something that might be included in the draft order: the rôle of the national parliaments has not proceeded on set lines, according to Mr. Goerens's report. Nor is it a question of the relationship between this Assembly and the European Parliament. For the decisions that will have to be taken in the future and are of importance for the continued existence of this Assembly it seems to me important that paragraph 2 of the draft order should include a reference to the co-ordination of activities in the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. The know-how and experience gained in the network of contacts with the national parliaments and the European Parliament must play a part.

If the Rapporteur says he considers this to be a logical step, I do not need to table an amendment to this part. His approval will be enough for the draft order to be supplemented

Mr. Tummers (continued)

along these lines. I congratulate Mr. Goerens on his report.

Mr. President, in paragraph 88 of his explanatory memorandum, the Rapporteur, Mr. Goerens, says that there must be an open debate between the United States and Europe on the rôle to be played by Western European Union. The Americans' hesitation, which is also referred to, must be discussed. What can the United States and Europe expect of each other in the new security situation? Does the United States consider regional conflicts in Europe to be a threat to its own security and interests? Those are questions which have to be discussed by the two partners and to which answers must be found.

Mr. President, the recent development of the Franco-German Eurocorps is important in this context. We will be discussing this in greater depth later, but I would say at this stage that this development should be welcomed by WEU, rather than the WEU countries showing reluctance to join this Eurocorps. If larger Community countries agree on defence, that is an advantage for the smaller countries, including those in WEU. But it does mean that the smaller countries in WEU must be involved, or they cannot bring any influence to bear in an attempt to have this Eurocorps set up in a WEU context.

Mr. President, it is also very important to bear in mind – and I hope the WEU Council of Ministers will be deciding on this and on the Eurocorps on 19th June – who is to become a member of Western European Union, who will be associates and who will be observers. If we confine ourselves to the present Community countries, we feel Greece could become a new member and observer status could be granted to Ireland and Denmark.

The PRESIDENT. – As always, Nick, that was a very good contribution.

I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as our Rapporteur has shown in his usual expert manner, Europe is now living through one of the most important periods since the war and possibly in its whole history.

The old deep-rooted antagonisms between European countries are disappearing; these antagonisms had shaped the history of the last forty years in a manner which appeared to be beyond change, had inspired ideas and strategies of distrust and even fear and had therefore formed the basis of every fundamental assessment of military strategy.

Clearly, therefore, we have to rethink our strategies for the defence of Europe but not forgetting the long-established Atlantic solidarity which cannot and must not be weakened and can and must be adapted to the new times.

A new security order must be established in Europe and, as the Rapporteur has stressed, this first requires the conclusion of agreements with those countries in Eastern Europe which appear to have gone furthest towards establishing democracy and freedom on a firm basis.

In addition, fresh thought must be given to the rôle of the existing institutions including our Western European Union. As was made clear in the treaty signed at Maastricht last December, WEU remains a fundamental and indispensable point of reference for the construction of a new defence order in Europe. The reason why WEU has come to the fore at this point in its existence is primarily the method of collaboration it has provided in a variety of contexts, making it a multilateral forum for formulating strategies and identifying means and methods of action.

The road is certainly long and tiring and no immediate results can be guaranteed, particularly in the present circumstances which require a capacity for imagination and invention and for looking to the future rather than trying to preserve the past.

For these reasons I think that a number of priorities called for by the facts have to be respected. The road before us must be followed in a logical manner; the first step must be to overcome the difficulties resulting from the fact that three member states of the European Community are not yet members of WEU. It seems to me that there are encouraging prospects for opening negotiations for their entry.

A second problem is that not all the countries of the EC and WEU share the same ideas, at either government or popular level, regarding the maintenance of security and the use of force. There is a need for generally-accepted beliefs. A prolonged and laborious effort of negotiation and persuasion will be needed and over-hasty and partial initiatives are no substitute.

While praise is due for the move by two European countries to establish a mixed army corps, many points have still to be clarified before it can be understood how this initiative can be reconciled with the common road which, through difficult and slow but unavoidable multilateral negotiations, we are all following within Western European Union.

We need therefore to confirm and reiterate that the road to European defence policy is through WEU. The relationship between the Franco-German corps and WEU must therefore be clearly defined, trusting that it is a contribution by France and Germany to WEU's future

Mr. Parisi (continued)

common force. I have to say honestly, however, that while what Mr. Kinkel said this morning goes some way to meeting the concerns stressed by several speakers, it does not entirely dispel them.

It is my belief, therefore, that it is only by proceeding along the road called for by many members, and which I have stressed, that we shall be able to move most speedily towards a solution to the problems of Europe's defence. At this time, when events in Yugoslavia are of such great concern, a strengthened and appropriately-structured WEU could, heaven knows, provide a powerful means of action.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Liapis, Observer from Greece.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Mr. President, it is not constructive when an observer does not have the right to participate in the committees where the reports are being drawn up. In addition, it is not pleasant when the Rapporteur makes unflattering remarks about an observer's country. Although I have strong reservations about the Rapporteur's remarks about Greece, I congratulate him on his hard work.

I shall make some comments on part II (c) of the report. Instead of warmly welcoming the accession of a member country of the EC to WEU – a decision made at the summit in Maastricht – the Rapporteur gave the impression that he had a negative approach towards Greece and its application. Greece is a country with a great history of strong but painful participation in all the struggles for freedom in Europe.

Why such biased behaviour? Is it appropriate to refer to a European country and its national goals by the phrase that Greece has "brought pressure to bear on the Twelve by threatening not to accede to the Maastricht Treaty... if it was not admitted to the organisation"?

Greece, dear Rapporteur, does not threaten, blackmail or beg. Greece asks, as do all the other member countries when they wish to support their national interests. Must I list all those countries that have blocked EC decisions or made serious bilateral compromises? Must I remind the Rapporteur how many times the big countries of the EC have postponed Europe's integration? Naturally, no one says that those countries were wrong. They were just protecting their people's interests.

Greece applied for membership six years ago and the leaders of the Maastricht summit made a decision of their own free will. It is, therefore, unacceptable for the report to describe the Maastricht decision as being a result of Greece's threat.

Paragraph 42 is also unacceptable. It refers to Greece's foreign problems in a way that not only violates the truth but gives the impression that she is wrong – that she is serving injustice and aggression.

We must be more cautious and objective in our remarks – not to mention, on the other hand, the absolute ignorance of the common attitude of the Twelve toward the recognition of the so-called "Republic of Macedonia". How can the Rapporteur say that Greece prevented "the Twelve from jointly recognising the Republic of Macedonia, as the other eleven members wanted" when the European Community unanimously adopted a common stance towards that republic?

I am also afraid that the remark that the attitude of Greece "shows another major difference between Greece and its partners on an external policy matter" shows not a difference of approach but a lack of historical knowledge. Greece was the only country in the EC and WEU that for decades had three communist neighbours, but she stayed firmly there, throughout all those difficult years, supporting the interests of the West and spending enormous amounts of money on her armed forces and the security of the free world.

Why does the Rapporteur apply two measures and two standards? During the cold war period, Greece was a good ally; now that communism has collapsed, Greece is not so important.

My last remark – but not the least – is about the accusation that Greece wants to use her accession to WEU only to strengthen her international position. What is wrong with that? Every country in the EC, WEU, NATO or in any alliance on earth wants to ensure its state interests and improve its international position. It is lawful, especially when that country is situated in an inflammable region and when it has a history of giving rather than taking.

Furthermore, I cannot understand the Rapporteur's point that Greece, by her accession, will change WEU's orientation when she is already a member of the EC and NATO and has not, until now, changed their orientation.

Greece has many difficult tasks to fulfil. One of the most important is the maintenance of peace in the Balkan peninsula. So anything that weakens Greece's position in the international community weakens at the same time stability and security.

The PRESIDENT. – You have ten seconds left.

Mr. LIAPIS (*Observer from Greece*). – After all, is not solidarity the cornerstone of our organisation?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Machete.

Mr. MACHETE (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Questions of security and defence constitute the main core of matters coming within the competence of governments, and such questions must therefore remain under the control of national parliaments. On this specific point the democratic nature of the Assembly of WEU stands out as compared with the European Parliament because the national parliaments give it democratic legitimacy, and for this reason it must be taken into account. Furthermore, as the Rapporteur has pointed out, there is also the very particular circumstance that, when the final structure of the European Union is being decided, we must make sure to make it more democratic by giving it a bicameral structure.

The bicameral structure and the rôle in the future development of an assembly which will result from the development of the Assembly of WEU may also prove to be important where the difficult question of third countries is concerned. In other words, we must bear in mind that precisely because defence policy is of fundamental importance to governments and, as an element of national policy, must be under the control or supervision of national parliaments, it is important because, for third country governments to be able to influence such policy in their own national interest, they in turn must become members of WEU.

In my view, the only criticism which can be made of the report in this respect is that this very important matter was dealt with in the context of relations between the Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament and not as a separate matter. In any event, we agree with the comments that have been made and believe that greater emphasis should be given to them.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Toskay, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. TOSKAY (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by congratulating Mr. Goerens on his excellent work.

The overriding aims of Turkey's foreign policy are to develop relations with Western Europe and to participate actively in integration in Europe. Through its active membership of NATO, the OECD and the Council of Europe, Turkey has already proved that it respects all viewpoints and all democratic values, and that Turkish society feels it has close links with the European movements.

Europe can be unified only if stable security is achieved. There is no doubt that Turkey will make a valuable contribution, as a powerful ally, to the future establishment of the European security order. Indeed, European defence without Turkey's contribution is bound to be weak.

The new risks and challenges that have arisen as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the developments in the Gulf and North Africa make it clear that the institutions and concepts accepted for the defence and security of a fragmented Europe and a cold war need to be reconsidered.

Conditions in the Balkans, the south of Russia, the Caucasus, the Gulf, the Middle East and the Mediterranean are making it clear how important Turkey has once again become where security in Europe is concerned.

During the Gulf conflict and the subsequent developments in our area, it was obvious once again that Turkey has an important rôle to play in the general defence and security of the West and of Europe in general. In principle we believe Turkey has its rightful place in the European security structure that is now being shaped.

At the Maastricht summit it was decided that Turkey should be invited to become an associate member and that it might participate in all the activities of Western European Union. We had hoped this invitation would be extended as if Turkey were a full member. That would be in keeping with Turkey's contribution to the defence of Europe. On the grounds I have already mentioned, we would like to see this decision as a step towards Turkey's full membership of Western European Union.

The Turkish parliamentarians repeatedly emphasise that Turkey is a trustworthy ally, making its contribution to peace, security and stability in Europe for more than forty years, and that it also continues to play its part in Western European unification, while enjoying a status close to full membership.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I would like to begin by congratulating Mr. Goerens on his report. Although I had some reservations on the initial criticism of the treaty, which I felt was too extreme, I can now say that it is a well-balanced report and that the recommendation is extraordinarily positive – it opens up new avenues and gives ideas on the important rôle of this organisation in the context of the future European Union.

I would like to reaffirm my belief that the Maastricht Treaty is an important step in establishing this European Union. It cannot, in itself, be considered as something final or complete; it provides for a review in the short term, within four years in 1996, and I believe that this realistic, step-by-step approach is a characteristic of the building of Europe.

That is also why it cannot be compared with any past union of which there have been many throughout history, whether in the form of a

Mr. Roseta (continued)

confederation, federation, personal union or a real union. It is none of these, it is a voluntary and progressive structure leading to a union which is not closed, which has no pre-ordained pattern and which, therefore, is not determinist, but is dependent on the will of the people and on changing circumstances.

It is important that our Rapporteur should have recognised this, and I believe therefore that his initial criticism was rather extreme because he was forgetting that Rome was not built in a day and that this progressive and sound evolution is the principal characteristic of the building of Europe: I am therefore very pleased to see this new version and the draft recommendation, which is very constructive and realistic.

Maastricht's recognition of WEU's rôle in the past and the certain knowledge that any development of a European security policy must be through WEU deserves emphasis but to me it is obvious. Anything else would be unthinkable, even absurd. How could any other organisation allow the experience of decades to be forgotten, or that the Brussels Treaty was one of the foundation stones in the building of Europe, long before there was any talk of the Coal and Steel Community, as long ago as the 1940s? How could the experience of half a century be forgotten? In my view, it would be unthinkable, absurd and, fortunately, it did not happen.

In conclusion, I would like to give my full support to what my colleague, Mr. Machete, has just said. Defence policy is one of the essential features of sovereignty. It has to do with the very basis of the state and political power, and must therefore come under the control of national parliaments. The democratic nature of this Assembly must be stressed: it is composed of directly-elected members who are members of national parliaments and it is, in my view, the most appropriate starting point for the future bicameral structure of European Union. I do not imagine that a second chamber will be invented – whether it be called a senate or anything else – forgetting that there already exists an embryo second chamber for the future European Union, the Assembly of Western European Union.

I would like to refer to the question of co-operation and complementarity with NATO. I believe that the proposed wording of paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the recommendation should be given express support and, without repeating the text, I would like to associate myself fully with it.

Finally, I will say that both the Council and the Assembly of WEU are given great responsibility in the Maastricht Treaty. The Council of

WEU has the ability to take initiatives in the area of security policy and external policy. I am certain that the Council and the Assembly will be capable of meeting this challenge and proving that we really do have democratic legitimacy and both the competence and the history to respond positively to this important step along the road to European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should also like to thank Mr. Goerens for his important and highly interesting report under discussion today. We do have differences as regards paragraphs 40 to 44, but the report is excellent and the Rapporteur's profound thinking essential for the future of our organisation in the light of the Maastricht decisions.

Today Western European Union is clearly the only European body with responsibility for defence matters and its treaty and its experience give it a considerable advantage. WEU bears responsibility for defence in the event of an attack by a third state and for joint defence within the European Union. The modified Brussels Treaty therefore remains the cornerstone of European defence. This is the only basis on which any process concerning relations between WEU and the European Union can be contemplated. Our position should be to make WEU an integral part or organ of the political union. Governments too have to agree on the definition of what this European defence which all say they want is to be.

The real problem, as our Rapporteur has pointed out, is whether the governments, our countries and our peoples, are prepared to entrust the responsibility for their foreign and defence policy to a joint authority, as they have decided to do for the management of their economy.

If Europe is to be built then a Europe of defence has to be created as part of an indivisible whole. So the future has to be planned both in the defence policy sphere in order to define common positions, and also in the more strictly operational sphere.

The formation of the Franco-German army corps will give the European Union its own military capacity enabling it to have a joint defence policy, in the context of the European Union, with which to cope with urgent problems.

The development of a community policy in the sphere of security and defence will become more effective with the imminent enlargement of WEU to include member countries of the European Community that clearly wish to accede. This will not be a complication for the future but, on the contrary, a strengthening of our European position. Moreover, the creation,

Mr. Pahtas (continued)

by associating a number of European countries, of a European security zone beyond the WEU zone, is also necessary and urgent.

Our Rapporteur has referred to Greece's difficulties with its neighbour, Turkey. Our relations, it is true, are coloured by the Cyprus problem. But it is not just a bilateral affair. This problem concerns the whole European Community and even the international community. Indeed, several resolutions have been passed on the subject by the United Nations, the European Community, the Commonwealth countries, the non-aligned countries and the Council of Europe specifically requesting Turkey to withdraw its invasion and occupation force and to cease altering the demographic structure with settlers brought in from Anatolia.

This problem therefore concerns us all because the principle of respect for international law must not be followed selectively. Otherwise it loses its value and foundation. I think we are all agreed on this point. Consequently, although this question has to be solved, it should have no effect as regards the enlargement of WEU and the strengthening of a joint European defence policy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Pahtas.

I now call Mr. Tarschys, Observer from Sweden, who is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish Parliament.

Mr. TARSCHYS (*Observer from Sweden*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen. Let me first thank you cordially for inviting Swedish parliamentarians to address this Assembly for the first time. It gives me great pleasure to be the first Swede to do so, and I shall be followed in a couple of days by the Defence Minister of Sweden, Mr. Björck, with a longer statement.

Sweden is still a non-aligned country. We are committed to defending our vast territory. It is equally clear that we want to share in the joint effort to create a new peace order in Europe and we want to participate in co-operation on security, as on other matters. For many years, Sweden's foreign policy was described as a policy of neutrality. We no longer find that label appropriate, preferring to emphasise the European identity of Sweden and our wish to take part in European co-operation.

Maastricht, which was dealt with in Mr. Goerens's excellent report, is a challenge to the parliaments not only of member states of the Community but of applicants. In applying for membership of the Community, the future union, Sweden is prepared to take part in all aspects of European co-operation. In an important decision last week in Sweden, a unan-

imous parliament, with the exception of the ex-communist party, declared that we wished to take part in all aspects of European co-operation. It is clear that we will work together with all of you in that important direction.

Geography is constant but history evolves. In today's Europe there is no place for isolation. Swedes understand that, and we want to be full partners in the emerging European Union making our contribution to European stability and sharing in the joint efforts to create a lasting peace order in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although Mr. Goerens's excellent report concerns European Political Union and Western European Union, it is the relationship between Western European Union and NATO that is of primary interest. The tendency that now seems to be emerging is very important in this context: NATO may become the military arm of the CSCE, and WEU will then become the European Community's military arm. The European military divisions that form part of NATO may then also be used, whenever necessary, as part of WEU. This is the famous concept of the double-hatted forces, forces that can be deployed in both a WEU and a NATO context or possibly an ad hoc coalition. This also applies to my own country, which is developing mobile air brigades that in our opinion should operate similarly along these lines.

NATO's military integration, including its headquarters, must be accessible to WEU. To some extent this is already the case. WEU's structure may therefore signify a kind of Europeanisation of NATO. We do not think that Europe, even after Maastricht, should build up anything new outside NATO. It must gradually take over NATO, and one day the European defence identity will be there. All at once it will be a fact. Nor is it inconceivable that the American contribution to NATO will decrease to such an extent that on that same day NATO will exist only in name.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wielowieyski.

Mr. WIELOWIEYSKI (*Observer from Poland*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to thank Mr. Goerens for his remarkable report, although this does not mean that everyone will find it sufficiently clear and convincing. Indeed, the interests and approaches it brings up are sometimes contradictory, but it is strong evidence of the very complex situation that Europe as a whole is in.

Here we are debating the future of European structures and the sovereignty of nations and states. That is also happening in Poland, where

Mr. Wielowieyski (continued)

we are discussing the ratification of the treaty of association with the Communities. All the arguments about safeguarding national sovereignty and identity are brought up, just as they are in the debate on the Maastricht agreements.

But there is a fundamental difference between the debate in the WEU countries and that in the three Visegrad countries. We are sensitive to the problems of national sovereignty, but integration in Europe appears to us – as it does, no doubt, to certain medium-sized and small countries in Western Europe – to represent a guarantee of independence and normal development that is even more important. Economic problems are crucial, but they do not come first. For the countries of Central Europe, effective political co-operation within the economic community and security are the most important needs. The choice is to be or not to be. We are sandwiched between two major nations, the Germans and the Russians. For generations, our people have been threatened and these threats from two major powers and their unrestrained expansion and domination have cost us many lives.

This explains why we are in favour of the European Union as a guarantee of our independence and a framework for co-operation between strong and weak and why we shall make a great effort to adapt ourselves to the requirements of the Communities. We wish the Maastricht policy success.

The WEU Assembly plan to associate the Visegrad countries with WEU, the subject of one of our debates yesterday, and to create machinery for the active control of threats of aggression is good. It is one step towards a wise and sensible future. I am very grateful to Mr. Caro for his report.

I also welcome the fact that the criticism I made of the report by our President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, a year ago is now being taken into consideration.

In his otherwise very well constructed report, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg recommended more of a wait-and-see approach to the problems of security in Eastern Europe. Today I am able to express my profound satisfaction that, after the painful experience of last year, we are moving forward. I believe we can effectively avert the dangers to come. As was said in our discussion with Mr. Kinkel this morning, I hope that now the countries of Europe can avoid being caught by surprise and overtaken by dangerous events.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Giagu Demartini.

Mr. GIAGU DEMARTINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The Maastricht Treaty inexorably and unavoidably dominates the general debate in the European organisations which then takes different directions because so many areas and countries are involved and affected.

Those of us from Italy know that political events in our country today are conditioned by the results and choices of the rendezvous at the end of 1992 and know also that any failure can have the most serious consequences. Everyone realises that there is no more time for distractions and that, for those that keep putting things off, the day of reckoning will come.

As I have just said, this applies in particular to the situation in Italy but it is also true elsewhere and for us, too, who meet in the WEU Assembly in which we believe in the context of what it is capable of representing in European Union; it should be extended, strengthened and used to the full as the essential operative element in a policy of defence and security and therefore of peace.

I believe that the report introduced by Mr. Goerens is an extremely important, well thought-out and well-informed document with findings which cannot be set aside or ignored at any level.

This Assembly has for years been working and discharging its duties in a most praiseworthy manner and today has again produced a precise analysis which looks realistically and from a different angle at past and present, at previous experience and at past achievements and which safeguards in particular the basic values of an established alliance which saved Europe – and not Europe alone – in difficult circumstances in years gone by.

This, it must be said, stems from two approaches which are not very easy to define clearly. There is the line taken in the Anglo-Italian declaration of 4th October 1991 on security and European defence, which is very clear: the Atlantic Alliance is the key to European identity. The reform of NATO and the development of foreign policy and common security go hand in hand in political union. The transatlantic relationship becomes an integral part of the wider concept of Europe and extends to the CSCE as an essential element in developing the security system of Europe as a whole. It is the function of WEU to develop the European dimension of defence including the defence of the political union and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; it acts at the instigation of the European Council and the Atlantic Alliance, taking due account of the difference of its structures. Consultations and complementary decisions and the establishment of a reaction force are the basic rule.

Mr. Giagu Demartini (continued)

Then there is the line taken in the Franco-German declaration and the letter of 14th October 1991. The declaration calls on WEU to formulate and implement decisions and action towards union in respect of defence. The Council which adopted the Maastricht Treaty is to work out practical arrangements whereby a strengthened WEU becomes the defence component of western union. Basically, progress is to be made through an organic link between European Union and WEU with the staff of the two organisations closely linked, the setting up of a chief of staffs co-ordination and planning group and closer military collaboration to include and develop that already existing with the Atlantic Alliance.

The guiding principles of the report are transparency and complementarity; then regular links with the chiefs of staff of WEU countries are considered to be essential for preparing the European armaments agency and the security and defence academy.

The last proposal is for greater co-operation between the countries of continental Europe and their forces.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry, Mr. Giagu Demartini, you really must conclude your speech as you have had more than your allocated time.

Therefore, with great respect, I feel that it is now time for Mr. Caro, whom I now call.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – While congratulating Mr. Goerens, I would like to dwell a moment on a part of the report dealing with co-operation between our Assembly and the European Parliament, an area where I feel there is room for improvement. We know that in the Council of Ministers the need for better relations between the Assembly of Western European Union and the European Parliament is well understood. Mr. Genscher himself said so at the meeting between the Presidential Council and the Chairmanship-in-Office at the last meeting in Berlin. So the political will is there. The question is how to do it.

I think that the best way is for our Assembly to be on an equal footing with the European Parliament, at least as far as the committees are concerned. The rest is a question of letting things develop. The European Parliament has a Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, while our Assembly has a Political Committee, a Defence Committee and a Technological and Aerospace Committee, just to mention the three committees of a political nature. The dialogue needs to run between the committees, and I feel we should avoid having different levels of contact. The proposal has already been made that meetings between our committees and the

committees of the European Parliament should take place at the level of the European Parliament's sub-committee responsible for security problems alone.

I for my part cannot accept this arrangement, but it does not matter much. What is important is to organise this dialogue without delay and to meet as often as possible for genuine working meetings, not just to have observers attend debates and report back to their respective committees. This co-operation should result in the definition of joint positions.

So you can imagine my surprise to see a working paper of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security end with the following conclusions:

“Parliamentary control over the activities of the WEU Council must be carried out by parliament, the only democratically-elected body. This means that to all intents and purposes the European Parliament must replace the WEU parliamentary Assembly, which consists of members who, according to the statutes, must be members of the national parliaments and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In view of this the European Parliament should enjoy the same rights of initiative and control that it has vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission – questions, recommendations, etc.”

This text finishes by calling for members of the Council of Ministers of WEU to be heard by the European Parliament. These are proposals for the future and part, in any event, of the process of evolution of the political union, but they are diametrically opposed to the positions we defend here in WEU.

Our intention is not to engage in conflict with members of the European Parliament, whom we greatly respect. They hold a key position in the monitoring of the treaties, and we attach considerable importance to the European Parliament.

But we do, of course, ask for reciprocity.

However, what appears to be more obvious is that statements of this nature imply hard-working – I might say intensive – co-operation and research to prevent distortions in the forecasts of the medium-term future of the political union from generating disagreements and splits in the European public opinion that we represent, just as much as the members of the European Parliament do. May I also add one comment – and this is less for the ears of members of the Western European Union Assembly than for those of our friends in the European Parliament – which appears fundamental to me: whatever the outcome, which I personally hope will be very favourable for the European Union and the organisation of

Mr. Caro (continued)

common defence – I mean the common defence of Europe – it is clear that for some period of time, no doubt as yet uncertain, the sectors of defence and armaments, not forgetting the nuclear dimension, will remain a matter of unshared national sovereignty. During that period, we shall have to go on living with the intergovernmental system, i.e. WEU. The principle I want our colleagues of the European Parliament to uphold with us is this: we must discuss and work together, and I hope that this can happen at the level of joint responsibility.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Caro.

The debate is now closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Let me first say how pleased I am that all or at least most of the speakers agree with the critical analysis in the report I have had the honour to introduce.

I begin with yesterday's first speaker, Mr. Antretter, who welcomed the critical approach chosen by the Political Committee in tackling the problems created by the Maastricht agreements. The next speaker voiced the same view.

I will now reply briefly to the more specific remarks and questions.

This morning, Mr. Roman raised a point on an aspect about which a question had been asked in the Political Committee, namely the difference between joint defence policy and joint defence itself. I took the opportunity in the report to point out certain passages from statements by various members of the WEU Council to the press and otherwise, and other thoughts expressed before the discussions and decisions adopted at Maastricht by one or other of the parties to the treaty, and my final conclusion was that we have to approach all the problems posed by the Maastricht agreements with an optimistic attitude. We must start from the idea that Maastricht is a bet on the future. The reason I am so optimistic is that internationalism has made clear progress in the last few years with the growing authority of the United Nations and the European Communities, and the co-operation developing throughout Europe and beyond. There is no reason to imagine that this extremely positive attitude will not persist.

Mr. Müller also welcomes the critical approach. He contrasts the treaties negotiated by Talleyrand and Metternich in the last century with the Maastricht Treaty. Those of the last century were very precise whereas the Maastricht Treaty contains a fair number of ques-

tionable and vague points. I shall not repeat them. The draft order and the draft recommendation attempt to dot the 'i's and cross the 't's and to invite all those involved in the process of the European Union to face up to their responsibilities.

Mr. Müller also says that parliaments are monitoring events. I do not entirely agree with him. As I recalled yesterday, our Assembly has a dual mission. The first is one of control, which is spelt out in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and confers on our Assembly of national representatives the right to inspect and monitor the work of the Council. Each year the Council submits an annual report which we split up into different parts corresponding to the work and mission of the permanent committees of our Assembly and each time we deliver a critical and responsible opinion on the work of the Council.

The second of our Assembly's tasks is to provide political initiative. The list of its successes is considerable. I shall mention only one: the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal. The Assembly had been calling unanimously for this enlargement since 1984 – the year of reactivation. Ultimately, we reached agreement with the Council that these two countries should join and thus fill part of the gap in the western defence system.

The same will be true of the report that I have had the honour of presenting on behalf of the Political Committee. If the Assembly adopts the draft recommendation submitted for your approval, the Council will definitely follow up the suggestions put forward in the report. In the larger WEU family, the aim of the work of the Institute for Security Studies – whose director I welcome here – is similar to that of the work of our Assembly. We can add together our efforts to promote this idea of European defence, performing the rôle laid down in the Maastricht agreements and their annexed declarations and which, according to the reply given by the Council, are politically linked to the treaty itself.

Mr. Tummers pleads for closer co-operation between the parliaments and he calls our attention to the democratic deficit. We may indeed feel some frustration at the practice which has become established, but I wonder about the alternatives to the way of negotiating international treaties. I greatly fear that if we had not left the right of initiating negotiations to our various governments we would not yet be where we are. There is a noticeable reaction in most of our national parliaments where the majorities seek to play a more active part in the discussions preceding negotiations for international treaties.

Mr. Parisi, who analysed the situation arising from the end of the bipolar era, also urged us to

Mr. Goerens (continued)

rethink the democratic rôle of our countries. He shares the Assembly's view that WEU should be recognised as a basic point of reference in the design and improvement of the western defence system. He rightly points out that certain difficulties, mentioned in our report, have to be overcome, namely the status of Ireland, Denmark and Greece, which still differs from that of the Nine making up the hard core of what is to be one day the joint defence of the European Union. Naturally, he regrets the absence of any definition of strategy and common ground. It is a measure of the size of the task awaiting us. To the question that he raised about the setting up of a Franco-German corps I can reply positively by referring him to paragraph 14 of the draft recommendation, the terms of which will give him all the necessary reassurance. The Political Committee was unanimous about this way of approaching matters. As you see it recommends that the Council "set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU".

Not that any of this needed saying. Those who took the initiative for the Franco-German division, referring to the setting up of a joint army corps, presented the idea first of all to Mr. Lubbers, President of the European Council. I think if we confine ourselves to the purely formal aspects of this initiative, it can be seen to fall within the plan for the future sketched out up to now by our Assembly and Political Committee.

I should also like to thank all the observers who took their chance to speak. The parliamentary Assembly does not meet twice a year just to inaugurate or organise exercises in oratory. All speakers must be entitled to express their point of view; Mr. Liapis did so and laid claim to a right that I also claim myself. I agree with him on the point that he raised concerning the recognition of Macedonia by the European Community. I agree with him that, in the end, it was the whole of the European Community that rallied to the proposal that he outlined, but at the time my report was being written this point was not quite so clear. He finds unacceptable the criticism made in paragraph 42 of the explanatory memorandum and accuses me of gaps in my knowledge of history, reminding me that only a few years ago, Greece had been surrounded by communist countries. I thank you for your superfluous reminder of a point that, obviously, I was well aware of.

Mr. Liapis finally claims that our Assembly applies two standards and two measures to his country. If you have read carefully – and I would recommend you to do so – paragraph 42 of the report, you will see that we too are very critical

of the Council and call upon it to concede nothing and undertake nothing that might cast doubt on the meaning of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. In this connection, the report quotes an Agence France-Presse despatch from Athens dated 4th March 1992, where reference is made to a visit by Mr. van Eekelen, former Netherlands Minister of Defence, who apparently underlined at a meeting organised by a Greek economic review that Western European Union was going to adapt certain key rules such as that of military assistance to member countries in the light of its links with NATO and the new international situation.

In presenting my report yesterday I said that ordinary mortals could no longer sort out all these organisations dealing with security – NATO, the CSCE, the NACC, Western European Union, the Franco-German corps now being set up – not at least in the definition of principles; ordinary people and even the average parliamentarian are no longer clear. I challenge you to take a poll in your parliament and ask your parliamentary colleagues about the specific nature of each of the organisations I have just mentioned. If WEU has a mission that is complementary to the Atlantic Alliance, it is precisely because of Article V. This Article V used to be full of common sense. May I recall, Mr. President, that it was an additional legal guarantee to show that France, which had a particular status within NATO, was firmly anchored in the western defence system. What was true of the past is true today. If there is one point on which one can argue for WEU's originality and its complementarity with NATO, it is precisely Article V, which, if not everyone, then certainly the majority feel should not be diluted in any way. For the WEU Assembly this is sacrosanct since otherwise Western European Union will lose all credibility.

I hope that the enlargement of WEU to include Greece can take place within the time-scale set in the Maastricht Treaty, namely before the end of the year, and that Greece can join WEU, accepting the union as it now is. You know that there are problems in your region and that Greece, as part of that region, cannot remain indifferent to them. One has only to read what has appeared in the press. We must not forget Turkey either which has vigorously expressed its desire to join the European Community and WEU. It is not for the WEU Assembly, as the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, to postpone Turkey's possible accession to this Assembly indefinitely. We are all aware of Turkey's important rôle within the NATO system and that, so far, that country has always been a faithful member; one cannot erase the past and leave these evident truths unsaid. I feel the Turkish observer who spoke showed a spirit of compromise by welcoming the association status proposed for Turkey. He is right to ask for

Mr. Goerens (continued)

a precise definition of that status. I hope that, these few remarks having been made, we can in the future perhaps tackle this problem with greater calm.

Mr. Machete spoke about the two-chamber system also referred to in our reports. If I mention this system it is in particular to fill the democratic deficit, an attitude or way of seeing things shared by most of our colleagues.

Mr. Toskay stresses the developing nature of the European Community to include WEU in which case, naturally, Western European Union has a major rôle to play. Needless to say, this is not a final stage, not the close of negotiations but the start of a movement that will take concrete shape in the coming weeks, months and years.

Mr. Roseta welcomed the final version of my report, finding the first too critical. I should like to tell him that perhaps more stress was put on the need for our national parliaments to realise how many queries there were when it came to analysing the Maastricht Treaty. He does not agree with the two-chamber system. He suggests we should not complicate matters further because we already have a European Parliament and a second chamber exists in embryo. I entirely share this view of things, but I would point out that an embryo is intended to develop, or otherwise be stillborn. I should not like to see our Assembly condemned to that fate. Its powers and responsibilities must be developed. Need we recall that we are the only international European assembly empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security matters. I fully share the views expressed by Jean-Marie Caro, namely, that to escape from this sterile quarrel, this institutional imperialism, we have to have a division of responsibilities and a dialogue between the two assemblies, as called for by the Maastricht Treaty.

Mr. Pahtas agrees on many points and his tone was more conciliatory, if I may say so. He referred to relations between Greece and Turkey, and the Cypriot problem that we were unable to deal with. Obviously, the whole of the international community is concerned but primarily Turkey and Greece.

Mr. Tarschys said some significant things including the fact that his country was now interested in participating in all aspects of European co-operation. This is part of the reply to the question I put in my report when I said that enlargement to include many neutral countries could create problems. If all the neutral countries took a similar attitude to that of Mr. Tarschys, I think it would be a great help in preventing any one country being isolated in the process of European construction.

Mr. Eisma finally shares our analysis by insisting on the need to clarify relations within the Atlantic Alliance. This would be in the framework of the transatlantic dialogue on the rôle played by the United States in Europe and on the way that country perceives regional conflicts in Europe, and whether it feels its security to be directly or indirectly threatened by these conflicts. He is quite right to raise these problems and I hope there is no suggestion in the analysis that I have been able to make in this report, that I agree with those who forecast or assert that a conflict between WEU and NATO, and consequently between Europe and the United States, is already programmed. I hope that the pessimists are wrong and that events will show that this way of seeing and approaching problems is wrong.

Mr. Wielowieyski – I am sorry I cannot pronounce his name – representing Poland welcomes Mr. Caro's report, agrees with the general view and backs the rapprochement which is sought by our Assembly between the three Visegrad countries and WEU.

Mr. Giagu Demartini also stressed the volume of work in front of us. There was a great similarity in the views expressed by the various speakers.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think that the Political Committee was very wisely inspired by the strength which finally led to unanimity. Mr. Stoffelen is always saying, I like this committee. I think that he is quite right. He is not the only one to like this Political Committee where he does such good work. From the clash of ideas, light emerges. May the same light also guide all the members of the Council forward in the process of forming the European Union.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I will be brief. I wish to make three comments and give one compliment, and I shall start with the compliment. It is the usual one, but it is still a pleasant duty to compliment Mr. Goerens on his excellent and, as always, thorough work.

We had extremely animated discussions in the committee, where we had to face two facts at the same time. First, we have reason to be pleased with the Maastricht Treaty and the nine-power declaration. There will be European political union. The treaty permits member states to take a decisive step in that direction, to come to a foreign and security policy and, as Mr. Goerens said, we invite every national parliament to ratify the treaty as it is. It is not Europe à la carte; one must accept the treaty as it is.

Secondly, we can put critical questions and ask the Council of Ministers to clarify, elaborate and implement. We can have worthwhile discus-

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

sions with the European Parliament, and here I come to the remarks by my colleague, Mr. Tummers. Of course, there should not be a battle between our Assembly and the European Parliament. That discussion can be based on the facts of Maastricht. With European Union comes security and a defence identity. Whether one likes it or not, that is the reality. If we have discussions with the European Parliament it is, of course, relevant to inform, to have contact with and to work in co-ordination with all relevant committees of this Assembly, including, of course, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

There is a desperate need, which I sensed in every contribution, for the Council of Ministers to elaborate on a joint foreign and security policy. In almost every debate there has been an emphasis on the urgent need to develop the ways and means of preventing conflict, to develop crisis management and to bring about a peaceful settlement of disputes.

There is an urgent need for further clarification of relations with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and with NATO, and to find out how we can make Europe safer. We are not playing military strategy but thinking about the subject on which our friend, Mr. Antretter, spoke. We all have the same feelings – this is a subject for another debate – of fury and shame at the fact that apparently we – not just the Assembly but the Council of Ministers – have not been able to prevent the murder of people in Europe almost every minute. There is an urgent need for all of us to be prepared to prevent that murder and to make Europe safer.

The Political Committee will go along with attempts to promote the development of a joint foreign and security policy. I ask colleagues to do the same as the members of the committee and to adopt the draft recommendation, if possible unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Pieter.

The Political Committee has presented in Document 1308 a draft recommendation and a draft order to which no amendments have been tabled.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1308.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or

more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1308.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is adopted².

My compliments to Mr. Goerens and Mr. Stoffelen.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU: the operational organisation (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1307, addendum and amendments).
2. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1319 and amendment).
3. Arms export policy (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1305).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)

1. See page 24.

2. See page 26.

FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. WEU: the operational organisation (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1307, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Moya, Mr. Caro, Sir Dudley Smith, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Dudley Smith, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Moya, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Stoffelen; (explanation of vote): Mr. Steiner, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Caro.
4. Application of United Nations Resolution 757 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1319 and amendment*).
Speakers: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur*), Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Tummars, Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Rodrigues, Mr. Müller, Mr. Haekkerup (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. Roseta, Mr. Soysal (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Martino, Mr. Parisi, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Eisma, Mrs. Blunck, Mr. Savio, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (*Rapporteur*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman*), Sir Russell Johnston, Sir Dudley Smith.
5. Arms export policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1305*).
Speakers: Mr. Aarts (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe, Mr. Poças Santos, Mr. Aarts (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lopez Henares (*Chairman*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. WEU: the operational organisation

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1307, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee

on WEU: the operational organisation and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1307, addendum and amendments.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, to present his report.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – There is a great temptation for anyone professionally involved in politics to use an opportunity to address the Assembly to talk about WEU in its new, invigorated form, to tear up the official script and the remarks that one should make and instead to really push the new views.

That is especially so for me because there are various reasons why I may or may not remain a member of the Assembly for much longer, although I was most grateful to the Defence Committee for re-electing me for a fourth and final term this morning. I note that one of my British colleagues is smiling cynically because he has seen it all before.

On such occasions as this, of course, we start off invigoratingly, but then we get deeper and deeper into the mire and dig tank traps for ourselves. There is no more unedifying a spectacle than an elderly politician trying to extricate himself from those tank traps towards the end of his speech. Therefore, today I will not be throwing caution to the wind or trying to be anything other than possibly marginally dull. I shall cite the facts as I see them about the paper

1. See page 29.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

that the Defence Committee has prepared, and which it proudly feels is apposite to the present moment. It certainly calls for detailed attention by those who are present this afternoon. At the end of the day I shall be safeish in my remarks, but I hope that I shall spark off a few ideas in the minds of those who are present.

Mr. President, I am glad to be here under your presidency. We all wish you the very best of good fortune in the year ahead. All the recommendations in the report are very straightforward and are a reflection on the present position. The report also contains a series of parliamentary suggestions, designed to create a more efficient and cost-effective organisation for all of us. Ultimately, whatever our political divisions, we are here because we believe in Western European Union and believe that it should be worthwhile and effective.

As a result of the Maastricht agreement, our governments feel that they have subscribed to a new phase in European defence arrangements, which is very much the case. I have been fortunate to be a member of the organisation for thirteen or fourteen years. When I joined it, it was extremely moribund and no one took much notice of it – indeed, very few people had heard of it. I can speak only for my own country as I only ever listen to the news in English, but it is extraordinary how often WEU is mentioned today. It is beginning to be noticed not merely by politicians, but by outside opinion-formers and others. Therefore, it is right that there should be a new phase in European defence arrangements, and it is important for us to consider them.

Our Defence Committee has taken full advantage of the current climate to ensure that all the former neutral countries had the opportunity to express their views. I am sure that you, Mr. President, would wish to join me in expressing our pleasure at welcoming here observers from Austria, Finland and Sweden, some of whom I had the good fortune to talk to this morning. It is also a pleasure to see many Central and Eastern European nations present at this session of the Assembly. Several of us have had the chance to talk to their representatives, whose attendance we appreciate.

The operational organisation of WEU is virtually agreed by all our governments. We must be pragmatic in our arrangements and tailor them so that they are cost-effective, which is what is happening now. The next item on our agenda is an emergency debate on the position in Yugoslavia and it is worth recalling that any operational arrangements should be devised primarily to preserve European security and to bring about lasting peace on the territory of the former and very much troubled Yugoslavia.

I am presenting this report on WEU, the operational organisation on behalf of the Defence Committee, and it is appropriate to underline a number of issues that we debated in committee. We admired the move of the Dutch Defence Minister, Mr. Ter Beek, to establish defence as a shared European responsibility. The Dutch white paper on defence published last year emphasised that element when it asserted "that the Netherlands will always act solely in conjunction with other countries, that is, in some form of international alliance. The participation of the Netherlands will therefore always be of a complementary kind: an addition to the military units of other countries". We welcome that, but we must be realistic as few other countries are likely to follow that lead, certainly in the immediate future. We must make practical arrangements as soon as possible to be able to face crises as they develop. That is what we are trying to do in WEU. We have already heard this question several times during the Assembly: why did we – all the countries, particularly the nine nations of WEU – not heed the warnings on Yugoslavia and act before the bloody warfare broke out?

Our committee was struck by a general all-party consensus on defence principles in many of our countries during the past six months, which is a refreshing and interesting development. However, it is obvious that, on some specific items, it is still possible for us to remain poles apart in our approach to defence matters. It is important and only fair to describe the different nuances, which is what our report tries to do. It also tries to be fair.

Consultation with other parliamentary organisations is absolutely essential, particularly with national parliaments. That is also the case with the European Parliament and the new CSCE Assembly.

Since the early 1970s the Defence Committee has had regular meetings with the North Atlantic Assembly's Defence and Security Committee. I am pleased to report that the relationship is flourishing and in good fettle. It gives substance to both the Rome and Maastricht declarations. At Mr. Sinesio's request, before you, Mr. President, assumed office, I represented Mr. Sinesio, the Acting President, at a recent meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly.

I did my duty and attended nearly all the sessions to which I was entitled to go. Virtually every speech that was made by the members of that assembly and by many of the observers referred to WEU and its future rôle, which was extraordinarily significant. I am glad there is at least one NAA observer here today, a politician from Denmark.

Whether we like it or not – we do not boast about it, but it has occurred through a series of circumstances – we occupy the centre stage of

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

European defence at present. We should ensure that we capitalise on that, not for our own aggrandisement but for the better health and success of the correct defence for Europe and all the people whom we, as politicians, represent.

We are pleased to see so many other representatives from various countries here today as that bodes well for the future. Likewise, we are happy to welcome a number of observers from NATO headquarters and command, who are always so welcoming and helpful when we visit them on our fact-finding missions. Anyone who has been there will subscribe to that view. That gives substance to the link that has been forged between WEU and NATO.

I am particularly keen to bring colleagues as up to date as possible on recent developments affecting the setting up of WEU's operational organisation.

It is available now through the main report that the Defence Committee has drawn up and the addenda that have been circulated today. A series of important meetings and announcements will have a far-reaching effect on the operational arrangements now being implemented. For example, on 14th May the new British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Malcolm Rifkind, speaking at the Centre for Defence Studies in London, gave particular and positive British support for WEU's operational vocation by announcing a scheme whereby national units might be earmarked for WEU.

At their meeting under German chairmanship in Bonn on 20th May, WEU chiefs of defence staff reached broad consensus both on their own rôle and on the terms of reference and staffing for the WEU planning cell to be established in Belgium this autumn. Sometimes what we say precedes what actually happens and what is announced. Only this morning my attention was drawn to an article in the most recent issue of *Defense News* – that well-known trade publication in the United States – under a Paris byline, which reads: "Top European military officials met discreetly in Germany last week to discuss defence co-operation initiatives that could overshadow the establishment of a Franco-German army corps, according to European officials... The establishment of a joint planning staff, and closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance were discussed by the chiefs of the defence staffs of the nine members of Western European Union (WEU) when they met in Bonn, Germany, on 20th May."

Although it was said by a French defence spokesman that it was not an opportunity to

discuss the conclusions that had been reached, the publication says that:

"One recommendation calls for WEU to establish a joint planning staff, comprising about forty officers from all nine countries, headed by a three-star general.

Based in Brussels, Belgium, the staff should begin working in October and be fully operational next spring, according to a WEU official. It will be answerable to the WEU Council, the organisation's ruling body, and 'will be responsible for developing plans for operations in which WEU forces might be involved', according to a WEU report released on 21st May."

That is the report that we are discussing and voting on this afternoon. Magnanimously, the article continued:

"Drafted by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly's Defence Committee, the report adds that the staff should establish the relevant requirements in command, control, communications and intelligence, and that an appropriate protected communications system is necessary to link the planning cell to other WEU units."

In other words, it is wrong to say that we have revealed information being discussed privately at that planning meeting. We accept the implied congratulations. However, we maintain that we have not leaked secret information or published anything that we are ashamed of or on which we could be challenged as to it being a secret document. Many of the items have appeared in various newspapers and are an intelligent putting together and amplification. But it shows that *Defense News* in America and people elsewhere are beginning to pay attention to what we are trying to achieve. I throw in, perhaps for the interest of *Defense News*, the fact that I understand that an Italian officer, General Marcello Cantabiano, is likely to be appointed director, with a French general as his deputy, of the organisation that I have mentioned. I am giving away no secrets although that information is not widely known.

The chiefs have discussed the creation of a military advisers group for the Council. That is to be commended.

Adding to the points that we make in the addendum, on 21st May we saw the first formal meeting between the permanent representatives of WEU and NATO, thus giving substance to the declarations made in Rome and Maastricht and beginning the process of transparency and complementarity called for by the report's draft recommendations. We have already heard during this Assembly about the Franco-German summit held in La Rochelle on 21st and 22nd May.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

That resulted in a major declaration from President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, in which they formally announced the creation of a European corps and invited other members of WEU to participate. The two leaders stressed the European corps' rôle at the service of both WEU and NATO. From what the Defence Committee has learnt about the likely status and composition of the corps, your Rapporteur believes that we should congratulate both French and German Ministries of Defence on the practical steps being taken to implement the over-arching political decision. France, in particular, has not received due credit for the significant progress made in moving towards a possible reinsertion into NATO operational arrangements.

On 25th and 26th May other significant meetings were held: Eurogroup ministers in Brussels seeking a link with WEU, NATO defence ministers in Brussels to consider putting NATO at the disposal of the CSCE, and EC foreign ministers in Lisbon to consider measures designed to help end the conflict in the states of the former Yugoslavia:

The Eurogroup members of the Defence Planning Committee were particularly enthusiastic about bringing Eurogroup under the aegis of WEU and found a particularly felicitous formula to ensure that "Eurogroup members who are not members of WEU (have) the possibility to participate fully in its activities, and to retain the same rights and responsibilities as they currently enjoy for any functions transferred to WEU from other European security organisations".

The Defence Planning Committee agreed on the principle of making NATO's resources and organisation available for peace-keeping on behalf of the CSCE. However, this idea would require agreement by all sixteen allies and the test will come this Thursday when the complete NATO Council meets in Oslo to examine such considerations as well as to redefine NATO's command structures.

The European Community's meeting in Lisbon on 26th May decided to seek specific United Nations sanctions against Serbia over the continuing fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Obviously such sanctions are to be economic and political to begin with, but the use of military force has not been ruled out.

Speaking on the BBC Newsnight programme on 22nd May, the WEU Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, called for the necessary military planning to enforce such an embargo in general and in particular to keep open Sarajevo airport to allow humanitarian relief to reach its destination. I concur with such sentiments – I believe

that most WEU members do, too – and believe that, with a comparatively minimal engagement of sea and air forces, it should be possible to bring the various belligerents to their senses and at the same time demonstrate Europe's resolve for action. It will be for the Assembly to decide the course of action it believes WEU should now be pursuing – even before the permanent operational organisation is in place. Are we pragmatic enough to tackle the problem?

In conclusion, on a personal note, it would be remiss of me as the Rapporteur not to acknowledge the considerable help and specific briefing furnished by the German, British and French Ministries of Defence for the preparation of our document. Bonn, which has held the Chairmanship of the WEU Council recently, has been more than punctilious in its courteous treatment of WEU's parliamentary Assembly in general and our Defence Committee in particular. It deserves particular congratulations from us all for carefully guiding ideas on WEU's operational organisation from conception to the present near-realisation. I hope that the official representatives from Germany who are present today will take note of that. It is all too easy to make such comments, but we truly feel that and should like those comments conveyed back to the sources who have been of great help to us.

It would be churlish of me as the Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, of which I am lucky to be Chairman, not to acknowledge the enormous help and research on the preparation of the document as well as the incisive approach to the problem of Mr. Colin Cameron, the clerk of the committee. One should not always pay tribute to officials who work for the organisation, but where they merit it, it is wrong not to do so. Mr. Cameron is peripatetic and indefatigable. He works hard and with great good sense. I thank him very much.

We all seek a cohesive, credible, defence strategy for WEU. By and large, we are moving towards that. Therefore, I commend to the Assembly the Defence Committee's report and I hope that we will vote unanimously in favour of it to show the solidarity that we are anxious to express.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, the first speaker on the list.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have a few comments to make on the report by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of my committee.

There has been a great deal of discussion in Europe on European security in recent years. Certainly since Maastricht we have constantly been faced with it. There is still a good deal of

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

confusion about the form that European security and European co-operation should now take. The confusion about NATO's view of its new task forms part of this, and the various European countries have their own ideas on the matter. But what we do not manage to do is to express the importance of European security. In my opinion we are still focusing too heavily on security in Western and Southern Europe. When we speak of Europe, we have assumed for the last forty years that it consists of Western and Southern Europe. But since the cold war came to an end and the wall fell, we have had to think in terms of a different Europe, a Europe in which a greater rôle must be allotted to its own security. By this I do not mean that the links with the United States should be completely severed. But if Europe wants to be independent, the links with the United States will certainly have to be loosened to some extent. France will have to emerge from its present isolated position, and a united Germany will have to spend less time "limping on two legs".

In the economic and monetary union that Europe will eventually become it seems impossible that a security or defence policy will also be established. In my opinion Western European Union will have to play a more distinct rôle in this context, in defining what we mean by European security and defence. I would also remind you of the speech that the Netherlands Defence Minister made on 31st May, in which he at least outlined the future of Dutch defence. In his report Sir Dudley Smith says that the Minister did so primarily for economic reasons, which is only partly true, because there was also undoubtedly some vision behind it. The Minister adopts a very clear position against a form of defence that is exclusively in the national interest in a future Europe.

As regards the economic aspect, I do not think it is certain that, even if our own and other European armed forces are reduced in size, there will be any money left over for what will then be called defence. I believe a great deal will have to be spent on verification. A great deal of money will have to be invested in the Prevention Centre in Vienna. Money will also have to be spent, to my mind, on the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. If these things are counted as part of joint European security, the money will have been well spent, and we may save on the total defence budget in the long term.

Finally, I have an appeal to make to my fellow parliamentarians. The magic word Maastricht has again played an important rôle in the debates we have had here in the last few days. By and large we are acting as if everything has already been settled. But all the governments did

at Maastricht was to conclude a treaty. The details have yet to be worked out in each of the national parliaments, because not one country has yet ratified it, and I would point out that an important referendum on it is being held in Denmark today. We hope, of course, that the result will be in Europe's favour. While the details are being worked out, we parliamentarians must keep a close eye on the governments in international bodies and also in our national parliaments. Then we should put forward proposals about what they are discussing among themselves otherwise and in general.

Europe is growing, but it is also becoming more complex for parliamentarians. The European Parliament still does not have enough democratic power to control the governments. It is for us to continue keeping a check on governments and other bodies, such as the military, which is a very important factor within the general framework. It is necessary for all this to exist, but it is above all necessary for there to be continuing parliamentary control.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this report on Western European Union as the operational organisation for security and defence policy measures must be seen in the context of the reports which Mr. Caro and Mr. Goerens have presented and which we have already approved.

We have already considered Sir Dudley Smith's report in some considerable depth at two meetings of the Defence Committee, where, I will tell you frankly, we also voiced a number of criticisms. Despite in-depth discussions, and constructive proposals as well, we did not unfortunately succeed in presenting a draft recommendation on which there was unanimous agreement. I very much regret this, especially as I feel it is important at this particular stage to send the Council clear signals on this subject, on which, above all, a consensus can be achieved.

The Maastricht decisions enable the Council to take initiatives on aspects of a common foreign and security policy. We should now have been presenting our political arguments to the Council of Western European Union as it elaborates the Maastricht decisions.

If we are to be taken seriously at the present time, with security policy changing radically, we must proceed with particular care and also take particular account of the sensitivities of the new Central and Eastern European countries. We must not approach these tasks arrogantly, but must ensure that our involvement is well organised, finely-tuned and non-violent. Only then can security be guaranteed in and for the whole of Europe.

Mr. Steiner (continued)

I believe the overriding task for all European political organisations in the years to come will be to contribute substantially to ensuring that the reformist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union become part of a pan-European structure. Helping these countries to develop democratic structures with as little friction as possible, but as quickly as possible too, will make a more effective contribution to peace than intervention forces, however perfectly organised and equipped. Even in democracies, of course, there will always be conflicts of interest, but democratic societies allow conflicts of interest to be resolved by non-violent means. Although democratic forms of government are no guarantee of peace, they represent the essential conditions for the achievement of security through co-operation and organisation.

I feel that if our joint work here in the Assembly is based on this consensus, the aim must be to maintain or, if we think fit, to develop or expand provisions against risks during this difficult transitional phase. But we must proceed gradually. As members of this Assembly, we must begin with a political risk description. We must specify the risks to which we might be exposed now or in the near future. The second step would then be to describe the instruments we parliamentarians consider appropriate to enable Western European Union to perform the tasks assigned to it at times of crisis or even conflict.

I do not believe the report before us and the recommendations it contains adequately provide for the system that I consider necessary. I do not mean these criticisms personally: It must be possible for friends to criticise each other from time to time.

Following on from what I have said, it would have been easier if we had designated the possible military mandates, whether of a humanitarian nature or as a last resort in the event of conflict, from the viewpoint of a future European Union. Preparations, that is the planning of the fulfilment of mandates, should then be left to those who have been specifically trained for it. Our task is to define clear political precepts. But decisions on the deployment of military forces must continue to be subject to the agreement of the appropriate political bodies, with respect for national constitutional limits and for the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first I would like to offer my sincere congratulations to Sir Dudley Smith for

the magnificent report he has presented to this Assembly; it is brief, but full of detail. We have become accustomed not only to the high quality of Sir Dudley Smith's reports but also to his brilliant presentation of them. I would like to congratulate him most heartily because it is, in addition, a most timely report, Mr. President, since we are meeting in this Assembly for the first time since the approval of the Maastricht Treaty on 7th February. This treaty provides for the institutional transformation of our organisation, considering it to be the appropriate organ for the defence policy of the European Union. We have clearly been enthusiastic about this, happily, in the Assembly, and the various reports which are to be presented here, including of course Sir Dudley's, are influenced by their evident timeliness.

All organisations, Mr. President, must be efficient if they are to remain in existence, and this is even more true of defence organisations; a defence organisation which was not efficient would be a contradiction in terms. I must say that I am in complete agreement with my honourable predecessor, and in view of the division of opinion, may I say that I fully agree with the entire report and the draft recommendation. I would simply take this opportunity to make a brief comment, Mr. President, as we have with us the Secretary-General of the organisation and distinguished members of the Council, and ask that these recommendations be put into effect with some urgency.

Some of these recommendations are purely political, others are military in nature, such as the "military planning cell" and the meeting of the chiefs of defence staff leading to the possible constitution of a military committee. Mr. President, we believe that if our organisation is to be efficient and well organised, it is absolutely essential that it should have the necessary effective tools as soon as possible. Although this may seem obvious, I do feel it needs to be said, not because we wish the organisation to have an aggressive character, which indeed it does not have, but because it is an organisation for peace, and above all an instrument of dissuasion. Reference was made to this this morning, and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs also referred to it as an element of dissuasion saying that the organisation would be more effective with such instruments.

Let us not forget – and I am about to finish, Mr. President – that our organisation has two main objectives, which at times we are liable to forget. First, it is a defence alliance, but also – and this is contained in the revised Brussels Treaty – it is an instrument for the construction of European unity. Well, although these days there seem to be varying opinions regarding the degree of political or economic unity, nevertheless, in my view, Mr. President, the

Mr. Lopez Henares (continued)

greatest victory for Europe is achieving peace throughout the whole of a continent which has been distinguished by the very opposite. That is the great victory, and let us make no mistake about it; the instruments for consolidating this peace and making the WEU organisation more efficient will need to be increasingly powerful, progressive and effective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – May I begin by congratulating my colleague and friend, Sir Dudley Smith, for the excellent report he has given us on behalf of the Defence Committee and for his extremely important contribution to the Assembly's debates this session. This report covers all the issues of concern to us.

I hope the draft recommendation will be adopted by the largest possible majority. Out of a number of extremely important paragraphs there is one on which I wish to comment because I consider it to be particularly important at the present time. It deals with the planning and preparations for the construction of political union and of the organisation of European defence, in accordance with the decisions taken at Maastricht last February. I refer to paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation. This paragraph encourages the United Kingdom and France to co-operate in nuclear affairs, and makes proposals for doing so which I consider to be extremely clear.

In reality the first part of the Treaty of Maastricht lays down a programme and procedure for organising the Union and for establishing European security and the institutions needed in support. These institutions will be launched as of 1996 by the next intergovernmental conference for which we are all now preparing and which, under the terms of the treaty, should result in the organisation of a common defence. Apart from currency, which is dealt with in the other very large new part of the Maastricht Treaty – a single currency which I hope one day to see – there is the other side, the defence component. Currency and defence are the two vital features of national sovereignty.

As regards currency, three phases are planned, and in the third our powers would be pooled in, I hope, an irreversible manner.

As regards defence, the other essential feature of sovereignty, how can the member states of the Twelve, beginning with the Nine of WEU, organise the sharing of power? Should their model be that used for economic and monetary union and the common currency? Probably not. There is no institutional model for the political organisation of Europe. We have to make up this model bit by bit, incorporating our history,

traditions and customs. I would even add our inertia. For these things exist.

But under this national sovereignty heading, when it comes to defence, apart from the fact that this is an area in which no country is at present willing to delegate in any way an authority outside its own complete control – if only on account of defence objectives linked to foreign policy – there is also the nuclear element.

The Maastricht Treaty says nothing about nuclear weapons, and this could possibly be a mistake but we believe that the authors and those taking part in the next intergovernmental conference will prove that this is not so. I know that everyone is fully aware of this.

But it is essentially up to two member states of Western European Union, Great Britain and France – each having nuclear weapons, one allocating them to NATO and the other using them with NATO, the choice in either case simply being a problem of national will – to make WEU the necessary framework to take on this responsibility in a spirit of European co-operation for the common defence and in accordance with the principles laid down in The Hague platform which constitute for the moment our book of rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Defence Committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a short but useful debate. I am grateful for the general support expressed by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. I know that she has some reservations, which she expressed frequently in committee. However, it is always helpful to have intelligent dissension. I note what she said about the Dutch defence vision. We interpreted that in the way that we did, but I note her remarks about the real intention behind it.

Mr. Steiner said that the matter had been extensively debated in committee, and how right he was. He was fairly critical in committee, and was so again today. Being a democratic organisation, there is room for those who do not agree to say so. I am full square with Mr. Steiner about political decisions over intervention. If I understood the interpretation correctly, he was saying that before any sort of intervention the organisations and governments concerned must be in harmony about it. If there is dissension, the enterprise will not succeed.

I am grateful to Mr. Lopez Henares for his congratulations on the report. As he said, it is timely. One of the advantages of this Assembly is that from time to time – perhaps more by luck than by judgment – we produce a report that is germane to the present position, and fortunately that is so this afternoon.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

I thank Mr. Caro for his remarks. An amendment has been tabled to paragraph (vii) of the recommendations and we shall deal with that in a few moments. I agree with many of Mr. Caro's comments, which could form the basis of a future report. The matter needs to be developed and brought out by WEU. I hope that that will happen under the aegis of one of WEU's committees, even if it is not the Defence Committee.

I hope that we can now proceed to the amendments and then vote on the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Four amendments have been tabled to this report. They will be considered in the following order: Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Moya, Amendment 1 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Amendment 2 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Moya.

Mr. Moya has tabled Amendment 3, on behalf of the Socialist Group, which reads as follows:

3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (vii).

I call Mr. Moya to speak to Amendment 3.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if you have no objections, I could submit the two amendments together because they are quite clearly related; indeed, the content of the two amendments I have signed is very similar and I could submit them both at the same time so as not to prolong the debate unnecessarily.

These two amendments are deletions; one of them calls for the deletion of paragraph (vii) of the preamble and the other is for the deletion of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper. Both of these amendments have the same intention and content.

In these amendments, in both paragraphs of the draft recommendation, explicit reference is made to a subject which I feel – indeed, which the Socialist Group feels – is not needed in the report because it could – in fact it did – introduce an element of conflict concerning which there might be some difference of opinion, even between the parties involved themselves. Moreover, it adds nothing of importance to the report as a whole, so it could have been left out without affecting the substance of the report. What I am talking about is deleting the reference to the rôle of nuclear forces of individual states within WEU, namely the references to the nuclear strength of Britain and France. We believe that this is a very specific point which could be debated separately; indeed, it has been dealt with in other reports in greater depth, where necessary – more comprehensively – and we believe that this specific reference to the nuclear policies and the nuclear

rôle of the nuclear forces of England and France is unnecessary in the report as a whole. This is why we are asking for it to be deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as my last speech was on this subject, I shall simply add some supplementary remarks and shall refrain from entering into a substantive debate with our colleagues who are speaking on behalf of the Socialist Group, knowing that The Hague platform was approved by all WEU parliamentary representatives and by all WEU governments, whether left or right.

Our colleague asserts that this paragraph should not be where it is in the draft recommendation of the Defence Committee. In all modesty, I should like to state exactly the opposite.

Remember, ladies and gentlemen, that in 1996 we have to prepare the political stage. Our governments have all signed, and I believe that most of our parliaments will ratify, the treaty. But if governments are to be able to begin this second fundamental phase in 1996, we have to prepare the way for it at the parliamentary and democratic level. Leaving this task solely to governmental experts would be incompatible with our idea of democratic control which involves two requirements – to monitor the actions of the executive and to retain the initiative in preparation.

We have practically two years before the preparatory files for the 1996 conference are to be ready and submitted at the level of the experts of our nine countries, and therefore the Twelve.

I beg you to bear in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that this is the very image of this sitting's debates that we are giving here, in June 1992 in the middle of the Yugoslav crisis. In the immense task of building Europe we must make it plain to public opinion in Europe and beyond that what we are doing is preparatory work. Fortunately we are not operating under the pressure of a political crisis. Let us, I beg you, seize this opportunity to work in advance and decide that these few lines in the report of the Defence Committee are fully in harmony with the responsibilities of our Assembly. I fully share your opinion that the subject really needs another debate, but at least in this way we are starting on it within a general context.

I would therefore be most grateful, in the interests of the whole Assembly and in the hope that we can reach unanimity, if you would kindly withdraw your amendment so that we do not have to vote against it, which is neither your aim nor ours.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry to advise the Assembly that the committee, which had good results on most of the amendments, both those originally tabled and those proposed during the debates on the subject, was split down the middle on this one. There was no consensus on an opinion to give to the Assembly. In those circumstances, it is impossible for me to give advice.

In deference to my friend Mr. Moya, it is fair to say that, strictly speaking, the matter is not absolutely relevant to the report, which could well be accepted without it. But I share many of Mr. Caro's reservations, which is why I said earlier that the subject could probably be better dealt with in a stand-up debate on the subject of the French and British initiatives on nuclear defences. I hope that that can take place. In the circumstances, we must leave it to the Assembly to vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negated.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) and insert:

“deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport and training and considering an eventual mandate for action.”

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move her amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I said just now in my short statement, I feel that parliamentarians have a responsibility of their own and should always be very critical of their governments. While he was arguing against Mr. Moya's amendment just now, Mr. Caro said that governments had approved The Hague platform. Right across the board, he said. But, Mr. President, in a parliamentary democracy that is not the whole story. Parliamentarians have their own views in a parliamentary democracy, and fortunately they are able to oppose their own governments.

As regards my amendment, sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 in the draft recommendation refer to a WEU military planning cell, a committee of WEU chiefs of defence staff and a WEU military committee. I would not recommend this to the Council of Ministers. I feel

the Council of Ministers must take this decision and that we must then monitor it. Whatever happens, I do not want to recommend too many military committees, cells or whatever they are called. As a parliamentarian I would therefore like to see this paragraph changed as proposed in Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with some of Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's objections, but I do not agree with her on this matter. I am sorry to disappoint her, but I recommend that we should reject the amendment, which goes to the heart of some of our recommendations.

I took some time trying to explain, perhaps inadequately, what happened in relation to the planning side in 1 (a). That is now a reality. The Council is keeping up with us and vice versa. The amendment gets rid of (a), (b) and (c) at the same time. In the past, as a committee we have always unanimously supported the proposals contained in those sections. We believe that they constitute a progressive and sensible way forward. It would have a greatly negative effect were we to dismiss those proposals and substitute Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman's amendment.

There is nothing sinister about this. There is no great ideological principle at stake here, as there may have been on the previous vote. In those circumstances, I strongly recommend to the Assembly that we reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after “production” add “and reduction”.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman to move her amendment.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not think this amendment needs much explaining. If we all sit down to discuss matters and co-ordinate them, I feel it is logical for the words “and reduction” to be inserted after “production”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The theme behind the amendment is adequately covered in the report by Mr. de Puig that we will discuss later. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman knows that I am nothing if not conciliatory. If she would like this amendment, we have no real objection to it. By and large, the committee would go along with it and we would accept the word “reduction”, too. In those circumstances I willingly accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group reads as follows:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7.

I call Mr. Moya to move the amendment.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – The same arguments apply. I would repeat that the amendment to delete paragraph 7 is intended to promote specific debate on a subject which is controversial and which needs to be discussed in greater depth, without prejudging the outcome of this debate. I therefore think that, if this Assembly is to make a statement about doctrine and thinking on nuclear matters, there have been reports on this in the past and there are at this very moment reports dealing with the subject in depth. If we are to make specific reference to the rôle of the nuclear strength of individual countries such as Great Britain and France within WEU, this needs to be dealt with in detail and therefore should not be buried within this report. I therefore repeat my request for deletion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In a way Mr. Moya has just demolished his own argument. In the original report we are being asked to agree the continuation of The Hague platform. I remind Mr. Moya that the last two countries to join WEU were Spain and Portugal and that one of the conditions of joining was that they accept The Hague platform. It was accepted by the socialist Government of Spain and ratified by the Spanish Parliament, yet now Mr. Moya attempts to go back on a precondition of entering WEU.

I understand Mr. Moya's point about wanting a full debate on the matter, but the way to proceed is to table a motion for a recommendation, and for the subject to be referred to a committee for a full debate, rather than in this hole-in-the-corner way which would omit a

point of established policy of this Assembly. I urge the Assembly to reject this amendment, as it rejected the earlier one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The committee was divided on this issue. I subscribe to the argument that there is a need for a much wider, more substantial debate on the subject. That is the best way to deal with the matter. There is no harm done by mentioning this on the report. My personal feelings are that it is good that this has been mentioned. It would be wrong of me, as the Chairman, not to say that the committee was strongly divided and that the vote was almost a dead heat.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negated.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – What has just happened is contrary to the good experience of the past years of a willingness to form a consensus. Many essential amendments have been rejected, and not because they run contrary to The Hague platform. It includes a minimum nuclear deterrent for NATO, not the nuclear arms of two countries. We know that we are divided on this. I would have respected the opinion of adults. I would have expected adults to respect our opinion. For that reason I want to see where personal responsibility lies and I have to ask for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is your request supported by four other representatives?...

I see that that is the case.

The vote will therefore be taken by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Meyer zu Bentrup.

I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, is it possible under our Rules of Procedure to make a personal statement before the vote is taken?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are already in the process of voting. I would ask you to make your personal statement after the vote.

(The President continued in French)

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	58
Ayes	34
Noes	23
Abstentions	1

The amended draft recommendation is adopted².

I call Mr. Steiner for an explanation of vote.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would have liked to speak before the vote was taken, especially as I am sorry to say that I cannot approve this report, which came from my committee, the Defence Committee. This morning it still looked as if we had found a minimum of consensus. We considered the report once again this morning and took a vote in which a significant majority agreed that paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation should be deleted. I believe that was the minimum consensus that might have helped to ensure a larger majority in favour of the report today. I very much regret the failure of the Rapporteur, who is also the Chairman of the committee, to provide this information in this form before the vote was taken. I am very concerned about this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps I might explain my vote. Mr. Stoffelen said that he would have liked more consensus. I remind him that, of the two amendments put down by individuals, one was carried; both of the two tabled by political groups were rejected. If Mr. Stoffelen wants amendments to be carried with a consensus, he will not achieve that if a political group puts down an amendment that at once makes everyone else think: “What do the socialists want to do?” Had the amendment been put down in Mr. Moya’s name alone, it might – I do not say that it would – have carried

more sympathy. It certainly might have got more votes. To do otherwise continually makes the rest of us automatically think that, if an amendment is in the name of a political group, we had better oppose it. I would never want to see our federated group table an amendment in our name. In my judgment, that is not the business of this Assembly. That is why I voted as I did.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – This Assembly is trying to act more and more like a parliament. It is the same with parliamentary groups. It would be childish and completely unrealistic to think that in any parliament – I do not speak about the House of Commons – a proposal would be accepted if it were tabled by an individual, a secret person who did not belong to any party, but it would be rejected if it were tabled by only half a group. Is that the way to treat each other in a parliament? In a parliament parliamentary groups should respect one another.

I know perfectly well that Sir Geoffrey belongs to a party, to a group – there is no problem with that. There is no need to love each other, but at least we should respect each other. What happened in this case was that one essential element was not tolerable to almost a majority. I have seen the Assembly growing and the members trying to meet each other’s views, as happened in the Defence Committee. It would have been possible for the whole proposal to be adopted by almost everyone.

I very much deplore the fact that I had no option other than to call for an organised vote, as in any normal parliament. We are not inanimate individuals; we belong to a party. Sir Geoffrey is proud to belong to his party, I guess. I am proud to belong to the Socialist Party – not just to the party in my country but to the whole group.

We should try to learn that, if we want to have an assembly, we should act as parliamentarians, not just individuals. For all those reasons, I had to vote against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*). – One reason why I voted in favour of this report is that the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Defence Committee, Sir Dudley Smith, acted justifiably in separating the two responsibilities. I would not have taken the floor had not my colleague, Mr. Steiner, made his explanation. Sir Dudley has leaned over backwards and given a fair impression and evaluation of what happened this morning in the Defence Committee, at which I was present. That was one reason for my vote in favour.

1. See page 30.

2. See page 31.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – I voted against because as a parliamentarian I have looked at the content of this motion. As a parliamentarian I claim that as my foremost right. I am shocked that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is not concerned with what a motion says, but with who has tabled it. As a parliamentarian I reject that. I examine every motion for its content. That is why I voted against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mrs. Blunck, let us try to calm things down a little. I would appreciate it if explanations of vote were not used as an opportunity for criticising other members.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – My vote is quite clear in that I saw nothing revolutionary in this paragraph in relation to the attitude of the Assembly up till now. If there is anything new, it is the fact that it appears in this recommendation.

The second thing is that the Chairman and Rapporteur repeatedly said on behalf of his committee that we would have a debate. If I am not mistaken, he even said that a separate report should be written on this subject before long.

That is something that everybody would like. May I recall that during our discussions at The Hague, Secretary-General, you were, at the time, in government. The whole of the Assembly was very pleased with The Hague platform. I do not see why this paragraph poses any problem of substance. As Mr. Stoffelen said, the only problem is the fact that some of our colleagues do not wish to see this wording included in the document.

I therefore ask you to minimise the discord caused by all these explanations of vote. Basically, I am well aware that in the debate for which we are preparing we shall in the end arrive at the consensus that is absolutely necessary when the time comes to implement Maastricht and when we have to succeed. Please let us not inject any venom into this debate. I am sorry about this, Mr. Stoffelen, because you are Chairman of the Socialist Group. I had made this request in all modesty of the Socialist Group, asking it to withdraw its amendment in exchange for the Chairman's promise that a debate would be held. I am sorry it did not attract your attention more than it did.

I have regrets of my own, but no bitterness, and I am sure I can rely on you for your continued co-operation.

4. Application of United Nations Resolution 757

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1319 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on the application of United Nations Resolution 757 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1319 and amendment.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*). – Where do we stand and what should be done urgently to end the terrible suffering to which so many thousands of men, women and children are exposed in what we used to call Yugoslavia? What is the high price, to quote Bundesausserminister Kinkel's speech this morning, that Serbia and the militias dependent upon it must pay to stop the massacre? How can we prevent Kosovo and possibly Macedonia giving this already bloody war its much feared international dimension?

Albeit with the benefit of hindsight, I think that there is not much reason to be proud of ourselves – and I mean as Europeans – in the way that we view the present state of affairs in a conflict that is so close to our doorsteps and which could have the most serious international repercussions, apart from the tragic human dimension.

It cannot be denied that the Assembly showed a little more foresight and readiness last December about the way further bloodshed and suffering might – and I stress that word – have been prevented, by at least discussing a possible WEU naval and air operation against the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of cities such as the now disappeared Vukovar and the city of Dubrovnik. L'histoire se répète is the sad conclusion for Dubrovnik, where the shelling is not only a war crime but cultural barbarism.

The regrettable lack of foresight and preparation in trying to solve what is in the first place a European problem cannot, of course, be the framework for our further action in WEU. That is why the Defence Committee this morning unanimously supported and adopted the draft recommendations tabled yesterday by Mr. Caro and many others from the different political groups. It is on behalf of the Defence Committee that I have the honour briefly to introduce the recommendations this afternoon.

I return to the question "What should be done?" First, in the opinion of the Defence Committee it is of the utmost importance that the Permanent Council, at its meeting scheduled for later this week, instructs the ad hoc planning group to reconvene at the shortest possible

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

notice to work out arrangements for a possible WEU naval and aerial participation in securing the all-out embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on the basis of Resolution 757, if a Security Council resolution asks for such action.

With due respect to Bundesaussenminister Kinkel, in preparing those sorts of measures we cannot wait until 15th June, when the Secretary-General of the United Nations presents a report to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 757. From experience gained during the Gulf crisis and war, we have learned that early political decision-making and planning are vital for any successful operations of this sort. We now have the legitimacy, based on Resolution 757, to show that WEU can also play a rôle in making United Nations measures effective in the European theatre. Such a resolution creates political obligations. Let us not shirk our responsibilities; let us not invite the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Baker, to tell us again that we do not do what we should do – a comment, by the way, that the United States could address to itself.

It is up to us as politicians and to the Assembly to tell our electorate and to convince our public opinion that Security Council resolutions such as 757 are not adopted for free. Let us call on our ministers and governments to act not only in the way that I indicated earlier, but to prevent the further spreading of this violent war virus into Kosovo and other areas where people wish only to be left alone and to live in peace. Let our ministers also give Mr. Milosevic that message.

The Defence Committee this morning adopted one important amendment to Document 1317, the draft recommendation. Colleagues will have read it as it has been distributed. It rightly calls for further measures if Resolution 757 should not have the desired effect. In my opinion, that implies that European ministers, be it in their WEU or their EC capacity, should not only closely follow the implementation of Resolution 757, but should show readiness to participate in measures enforcing the embargo by naval and aerial military means if the Security Council so decides. In other words, political action to make such follow-on resolutions possible should not be excluded, but stimulated.

Mr. Feldmann has tabled a second amendment on war criminals and the way that they should be brought to trial, which has also been distributed. I gladly accept that amendment, but I hasten to add that it has not been debated in the Defence Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I propose that the Assembly allow the first speaker of each political group to speak for ten minutes.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – We are late in the day. There are so many dead, so many grieving mothers, fathers and lovers. The most obscene characteristic of the conflict has been the way in which the Serbian armies have stood back from defenceless cities and pounded them to pieces, killing indiscriminately and using aircraft for like purposes. For some, it has almost been worse to remain alive.

I remember just before Christmas, after our last plenary session, going to Cisak which is about sixty kilometres south of Zagreb and on the border – perhaps I should say front, as one could hear the crackle of gunfire. I visited a hospital there, and its distinctive feature was to house large numbers of young men with no hands, arms, legs or feet. A leg looks funny without a foot at the end. The hospital housed not only young men. I was taken to a bed in which lay a man of my own age who was a farmer. He told me that he was crossing his yard when what he was later told was a rocket, struck. He awoke in hospital and was told that there was no trace of his wife, three sons and two grandchildren. The doctor drew back the bed-clothes and I saw that the farmer's body stopped just below his trunk. "What will I do?" he asked. I had no answer, not even the beginnings of one.

I also had no answers for the group of refugees from Sarajevo – by every account the most tolerant and open city in what was Yugoslavia – when they came to the House of Commons in the United Kingdom earlier last month. What could I say to the emancipated, rather beautiful Muslim lady who was married to a Serb and who happened to be a television presenter? She said: "I do not know where my husband is. I know our house is flat to the ground. I do not know whether my parents are alive." She then added: "Ours was a very friendly city."

Here in the Assembly of WEU we talk of force dispersals, weapon types and command structures, and debate resolutions that are decent, carefully contrived, suitably amended and consensual. The reason why the West, the European Community and, within its ambit, WEU, did not act, was not through lack of resources or the absence of structures – though it suffers from such problems – but because of a fundamental lack of will. It did not have the will to identify the aggressor and take action against him. Such awfulness could have been prevented.

It is true that, perhaps, we could not have prevented the bandit warfare, but the mindless, mad destruction of peaceful cities could have been prevented. On 3rd December last, on the

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

Tuesday of our plenary session, a letter of mine was published in *The Times* in London. I wrote it not just for myself, but on behalf of many other people in other parties. The last part stated: "If I were in a decision-making position I would say to the Serbs... 'we want a cease-fire by midday tomorrow and if it does not happen, aircraft will attack your positions round Osijek and take out any heavy tanks and artillery they see because only you have them'. If we did that the war would stop before any action was taken: if we do not Osijek too will be destroyed" – this was after Vukovar – "and there will be more pictures of horror and death". Now we are six months on, and the position has not changed much, has it?

I shall give a second quotation from a letter that I received from the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, on 15th May, in response to a letter from me on 22nd April urging an aerial blockade in the terms used by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. I am not picking on Douglas Hurd – what he wrote certainly reflected the position of the European Community and WEU. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas, would not have disagreed, particularly in the light of the recent views of the French on sanctions. I do not believe that Mr. Kinkel would disagree, although at that time that post was filled by Mr. Genscher. That letter was a classic one, expressing the futility of indecision in which Europe has writhed.

The letter began, "I share your concern". When ministers say that, one begins to worry. It continued: "The central point is that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been recognised as an independent state: it is therefore not acceptable that the Yugoslav army or Serb or Croatian irregulars should intervene, provoking civil war. In the end, however, the answer is in the hands of the peoples of Bosnia itself and of Bosnia's neighbours. The fighting cannot actually be stopped from outside and I do not think that an aerial blockade of Serbia would be right. There is no legal basis for such action and it could be construed as a simple act of war" – no comment on what was happening there. "What we have to do is to make it clear that only by peaceful negotiation can a lasting peaceful settlement be reached so that Bosnia's intermingled national communities can live in peace. That is why we shall persist in our efforts; we cannot let Bosnia be dismembered but I do not expect the fighting to end until the factions lose their appetite for war. We are backing the efforts of the European Community and the Yugoslav peace conference under Lord Carrington to bring about a cease-fire and the beginnings of a peaceful solution." The letter has a classic ending: "The consistent deterioration of the security situation makes progress in these talks increasingly

uncertain and casts doubt on the viability of any agreement reached in them. Yours ever, Douglas."

Notice that he did not even mention the possibility of sanctions. The letter epitomises the emptiness and lack of forethought of the European position, which shames us now and will shame us even more in the archival judgments of tomorrow's historians. Mr. De Hoop Scheffer spoke about that this week.

This recommendation, initiated by the Liberal Group, is good but the message that should ring forth from the Assembly to our governments should be even more decisive and determined. We should tell them that we support wholly the remarks of our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, who said that we should tell Mr. Milosevic that we are prepared to use aircraft and a naval blockade to stop his murderous actions and that we will, through the United Nations, find a way to do so – and quickly, because Sarajevo and Dubrovnik are, even as we debate this issue, being shelled once more.

As I said to Mr. Kinkel this morning, we must also not confine our message to the endorsement of sanctions. We must look ahead to the conference that will finally come about to settle the Yugoslav crisis in a more democratic and secure way than in 1919. That must mean the recognition of Macedonia, as our Rapporteur said. I say to Greek observer colleagues that to block that simply on the name cannot be sustained. It must also mean enabling Kosovo – 90% Albanian and only 8% Serb – to determine its own future, I suggest by a plebiscite such as France agreed to in the Saar in 1935.

As I saw in Pristina a week ago last Sunday, the suppression of human rights there is indefensible. Nor can we expect Dr. Ragova, the Albanian democratic leader, to hold his people on the path of peaceful protest unless he is given a firm assurance of support. After all, they will suffer most from sanctions.

I have been harsh – justly so – but our admission of ineffectuality can spawn the beginning of a new approach. The countries of Western European Union and the European Community as a whole, in addressing the Yugoslav tragedy, have been inexcusably hesitant and slow. However, I believe that a profound change is under way. The recommendation moves that still further forward and I recommend it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when two years ago my friend, Mr. Martinez, and I went to Yugoslavia for the Council of Europe in connection with Yugoslavia's possible entry to the

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

Council, I would never have believed that so soon after I would be speaking to support a recommendation aimed at saving that unfortunate country which used to be Yugoslavia from final disaster.

Why, I wonder, is the war in Yugoslavia continuing to escalate so dramatically in spite of the repeated efforts of the European Community which, as you will remember, sent observers hoping to separate the two sides during the fighting in Croatia? It is still going on while some 14 000 United Nations troops are having to withdraw to Belgrade without being able to stop the fighting or even to interpose themselves between the opposing sides. The truth is that Yugoslavia and the warring parties including not only Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia but other countries as well, have so many arms and munitions that they can go on fighting not for a few days or months but for years.

It is impossible for us to intervene in the war whether as Europeans or at international level because I do not believe that either the Americans or a United Nations force of 100 000 or 500 000 men could secure peace by force or by keeping the belligerents apart. It is sufficient to recall that during the second world war something like a million German and Italian troops were held in check by Yugoslav fighters; given the difficult and unusual geography of the country and the fighting spirit of the Yugoslavs there is no way of imposing peace by force.

My next query is how is it possible for this fighting to continue so actively and on such a scale if no supplies are coming in. I believe that the United Nations were right to impose an embargo which at least tends to prevent new armaments and munitions from getting into the country. For such an embargo to be effective there must be surveillance. We have the recent experience of other embargoes in the Gulf and in areas close to us. Europe and WEU must provide the means to ensure the effective application of Resolution 757.

I therefore believe that we should make it possible for the embargo imposed by the United Nations to become really effective by preventing supplies reaching the conflict which I believe will go on for a long time yet with more fighting and destruction in the country.

The surveillance proposed by the Secretary-General and likely to be discussed at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers would be a step in the right direction. But will it be sufficient? We shall see; in the meantime it is a first move. The proposal is for naval surveillance which should prevent unknown or even known countries from continuing to keep the war going by supplying arms and munitions. Let nobody

tell me that this has not happened while the fighting has been going on. The fact is that after two years of fighting, national reserves of arms and munitions ought to have been exhausted but this has precisely not been the case. I would say instead that after a pause, just when it seemed the fighting was dying down, it has flared up more violently with greater determination and an increased capacity for destruction.

Will surveillance of the Adriatic, as has now been suggested, be enough? Naval surveillance will certainly prevent vessels flying dubious flags from continuing to feed in arms and munitions for the war and the suggested surveillance from the air will, I think, help prevent deliveries by air if they become impossible by sea.

Will surveillance of the Adriatic be enough? I am not convinced that it will. Who can say that the fighting will not be kept going from elsewhere, for example across the Aegean or – why not – from the Black Sea via the Danube? Indeed, I can state quite categorically that we have worrying news of arms and munitions arriving from the Black Sea via the Danube where the riparian countries like Romania cannot check illegal cargoes because of a treaty which exempts Soviet or ex-Soviet vessels until 1999 from customs checks in the countries through which they pass along the Danube. I would not want us to be applying controls while at the same time the embargo is broken and the war is allowed to continue by the use of other routes.

All countries must maintain the closest solidarity; it must be possible to guarantee the effectiveness of the embargo. More than any other country, Italy is seriously concerned at the gravity and ferocity of the fighting. We are already paying a high price as we share a border and the Adriatic coastline with the former Yugoslavia. We have already taken in thousands of refugees and will most probably take in many more. Italian soldiers have lost their lives during the previous European Community mission when they were the victims of a violent attack. We have also paid in economic terms; the Adriatic coast where many Europeans traditionally take their holidays will probably not see too many this summer. But this is of little account as compared with what is happening on the other shore of the Adriatic.

We are prepared to accept our responsibilities provided there is real determination to put an end to the fighting.

Mr. President, I believe I can support this recommendation for myself and also, I think, in the name of the Italian Delegation which, more than any other, wishes to put an end to these tragic events.

I hope that the decisions to be approved will be taken up speedily and in earnest, with the

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

greatest determination and above all with the realisation by the whole of Europe that the fighting in Yugoslavia affects not just the Yugoslav countries and republics but every country in Europe and Europe's security as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on 15th October 1991 the Political Committee and the Defence Committee of our Assembly had a joint meeting to discuss the problem of Yugoslavia. One of the issues considered was how to bring about a cease-fire and how to impose an arms embargo. I pointed out that, if both these measures were successful, the aggressor was likely to look around for other ways and means of aggression and destruction. I therefore pointed out that we must be aware that not only would buildings, monuments and towns be damaged in the fighting, but that the cultural heritage itself, in the widest sense, would be used as a weapon and a target in the new fighting.

At that time the Chairman of the WEU Council responded positively to my recommendation that WEU should join with the Council of Europe in appointing to the peace-keeping force that was then to be formed, specialists in the recording of accidental damage and wilful damage, the deliberate destruction of the cultural heritage. Unfortunately, it was at this time that co-operation between the Committee of Ministers and Yugoslavia, governed by various treaties and conventions, broke down, and Yugoslavia was allowed to evade commitments it had entered into.

The treaty on which WEU is based certainly gives us the right to talk about the fate of the cultural heritage in this context. To do this does not in any way mean that the fate of human beings is being subordinated to that of the cultural heritage. The modified Brussels Treaty says that the High Contracting Parties want to strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are united so as to preserve personal freedom, political liberty and the dignity and worth of the human person. Article VIII of the treaty also falls within the scope of these aims.

Mr. President, as I have said, the Red Cross comes before concern for monuments. But we must realise that during the cold war we were not conscious enough of what might burst out of these latent areas of conflict in our part of the world after the cold war. What is happening in this area of conflict is not – as Mr. Caro seems to feel it is – comparable with what took place in the history of Alsace. We must not misjudge ethnic characteristics. Misjudging ethnic charac-

teristics is not commensurate with the respect for human values alluded to in our treaty. I say unequivocally that taking a hostile view of ethnic qualities is not in the spirit of the treaties on European unification and is a threat to our continent. We must not just point this out: we must rediscover ways and means of applying peaceful solutions. That is our dilemma.

So far there have been expressions of regret about the damage that has been done to the cultural heritage, but it has not been made sufficiently clear that the destruction of the cultural heritage is an attempt to destroy an identity. That is the closest thing to the dignity and worth of the human person, as referred to in the treaty. The recommendation we are now discussing follows on from United Nations Resolution 757. If we feel so close a link with the United Nations, we cannot ignore the close relationship with UNESCO, and UNESCO's attitude. UNESCO is hesitant and indecisive. Although Yugoslavia is a member of this United Nations organisation for education and culture, UNESCO is letting things slide, even though Dubrovnik and Split are on the list of places of major historical value, not part of the local or national, but of the world heritage.

Mr. President, referring to what I said at the beginning of my statement, I would remind you that the Chairman of Western European Union's Council has recommended and accepted co-operation with the Council of Europe in this regard. I will therefore conclude by referring to Council of Europe Document 6612 of 5th May 1992, which is Written Question 343, signed by the French parliamentarian Jacques Baumel and myself. I hope that the early implementation of the recommendation we are discussing today will be accompanied by what I have said in my statement. Let us then devise some better, more astute and more inventive activities to cope with this kind of problem, which can be expected to arise in other latent areas of conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully agree with the draft before us. I countersigned it, though I believe that the only way in which WEU can find a means of action is by reference to Article VIII of the treaty. I shall say no more on this point; we have both dealt with it already. Apart from that, we cannot say there is any political will that is operational. We recently approved a report on WEU as an operational organisation. This is bound to depend on political will which – to be expressed – has to be based on the treaty.

I was happy to see such a wide consensus on these benches agreeing with the Secretary-General's remarks on this subject when the session began, but I am sorry that it is not in evi-

Mr. Caro (continued)

dence today. Of course we had to work our way through a great many hesitations and much seeking and finding; regrettably, of course, we had to see this accumulation of human suffering to open the eyes of the political decision-makers in our countries whereas the public needed only a few moments to realise the dreadfulness of the calamity taking place a few hundred kilometres from their homes. I am in no way proud of it but I would like to remind you that on 6th August 1991, I told the President of our Assembly of a proposal for an emergency meeting of the governing bodies of our Assembly, and also for a meeting at ministerial level on the basis of a memorandum which is on the files of our Assembly, though it has not been published. In it there is a suggestion – I quote from paragraph 11: “WEU is in a position to form immediately a joint military intervention force to be interposed between the belligerents.”

The idea was to form the force, display it and hope it would not have to be used. That is the very basis of the policy of military deterrence, the doctrine of non-war that we have applied everywhere for decades. The reply we received was that the WEU Council of Ministers had decided to continue to monitor the development of the situation in that country, hoping that the cease-fire announced would be sustained; this was August 1991. The President of the Assembly informed me that he hoped that in the end reason would prevail and that, bearing in mind the problems of the holiday season, he thought it would be difficult to bring the members of the Presidential Committee together and that we should have to wait until the ordinary meetings scheduled for September.

Knowing as I do the difficulties I might run into and involve my colleagues in, in view of our slender resources, especially since I was informed in a letter from the Clerk of the Assembly that it would be difficult for the President, without being rash, to come away from these discussions with any conclusions much more specific than those already voiced by the Council, I gave way. Rash... what a word! Despite the awfulness of events in Yugoslavia, if we, elected representatives of the people, demand action, if we counsel firmness, we are told: be careful. If we let you speak, we might hear proposals that could be rash. But who is to be the judge of rashness save those that come after us? What does it matter if I have to fight in order to convince. The fact remains that in 1991 we might perhaps have been able to take another road. I know the difficulties in the procedures of our assemblies and those of our governments seeking to define a common will, bearing in mind a past that did not give them similar possibilities. A new pattern of intervention, as it were, had to be invented.

In December 1991 I was unable to attend the part-session of the Assembly. I was in Yugoslavia on a humanitarian mission to various places including Dubrovnik, Bukovar and Osijek. I and other colleagues came under bombardment by Serbian guns. We saw an ultra-modern hospital full of sick people destroyed before our eyes. We witnessed the house-by-house destruction of a village situated one hundred metres from the line of fire. Even the animals were killed in the farmyards. The sight reminded me of another I had seen when still a young man and which remains graven in my memory, that of Oradour-sur-Glane. It showed us how monstrous was the hatred and desire to kill in their most atrocious expression.

I was there as a Frenchman, not a European delegate. At Dubrovnik, in company with my colleagues, I had a talk at one headquarters of the federal forces on the Dalmatian coast. As you probably know, the town was not bombarded from the land or the hills where batteries of artillery were posted but from the sea where a whole lot of low-grade, dirty and rusty patrol vessels, manned with non-uniformed gangs bombarded with rockets a Dubrovnik that had been declared a protected zone. When we talked – in a safe area naturally – with the federal army commanders they told us, privately of course, as I have reported to the press, that if there were a deterrent force, a show of military force somewhere in the Adriatic, Belgrade would give the cease-fire order the same day. They even gave us an example: imagine the Clemenceau barring the entrance to the Adriatic and a squadron of Mirages based on Bari opposite, watching for the smallest shot at Dubrovnik to carry out reprisals on one of those patrolling vessels.

I did what I could with my colleagues at the French level but we were automatically implicated in European business for which we needed the common European will. And today I hear all our friends, including the Secretary-General, referring to this European zone in which our Article VIII might justify an immediate reaction in the eyes of the world to protect civil societies, perhaps not, as was rightly said yesterday, to fire, should it be possible to set up a protected area as you yourself, Mr. President, said. But as you well know, a show of armed force ready for action is even more of a deterrent than destruction or wounding and possible death of a fighting man, because it reaches the minds of those who have political power.

August 1991 to May 1992, what a difference – in the new diplomatic problems, texts to be voted upon in the Security Council, conversations and changes of mind and in the rebirth of a European civic spirit. Were not some people saying: “I do not want to have young conscripts in my constituency stopping bullets to save Dubrovnik.” That was even being said publicly

Mr. Caro (continued)

in one or another of our assemblies. What a change of heart between what I hear said now and what we heard yesterday.

But this time reality compels us to recognise that, independently of the right of ancient republics of the former Yugoslav Federation to exist, an operation aimed at domination is being mounted by a nation that we French once loved, but who under the power of the force introduced by the former communist régime led by Milosevic, has formed armies of invasion and conquest and whose first step was to refuse first autonomy and then independence to republics now recognised by the international community. It is because the Belgrade government did not want Slovenia to become independent that it began the bombardment. At the time, you may remember, it was by air raid.

Today, ladies and gentlemen, let us simply acknowledge one thing: the step we are now taking, standing upright and having the courage to ask what we do ask may not be enough. But, as representatives of our people, elected by direct universal suffrage, and conscious of our responsibilities, we must put pressure on our governments. That is how a member of parliament is justified in carrying out the task entrusted to him. As long as we have this task, we must be able to carry it out, but this time we must not give an inch!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I thank the Assembly of WEU for having placed this emergency debate on the agenda on the proposal of the Liberal Group. It provides an opportunity to discuss the text of a recommendation tabled by the main groups, much to my satisfaction.

I shall not repeat at length what has already been said about the dreadful events now taking place in the former Yugoslavia. Sir Russell Johnston and Jean-Marie Caro have just given us accounts far more telling than anything I could say.

I would simply draw your attention to the fact that a major step has been taken in the process of international law towards a possible settlement of the Yugoslav crisis by the United Nations Security Council's decision to apply a total economic, trade and oil embargo on the former Yugoslavia and to suspend all air links with this territory.

When the decision was taken we heard Mr. Milosevic declare that the United Nations measures were ridiculous. If the Serbian President believes that United Nations decisions are ridiculous, it is our duty today to consider the use of

force to ensure the decisions of the Security Council and the European Community are applied.

As our Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, has said, it is unacceptable that states on our doorstep should try to control territories by force with the aim of redrawing frontiers unilaterally and expelling minorities.

I believe that in such a situation Europe has a duty to intervene in order to make sure first and foremost that human rights are respected, that international law is obeyed, in this case the decisions of the European Community and of the Security Council of the United Nations and that the cultural heritage of mankind embodied in the cities of Dubrovnik and Split is protected.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is the message we must convey to the only authorities able to take the practical decision to bring military force into action: the members of the WEU Council of Ministers.

The embargo must be backed up by air and sea support, in which connection we would stress the heavy responsibility falling upon all member countries and would-be member countries of WEU for the implementation of the sanctions.

Here I turn especially to our Greek friends. They know how much I am basically in favour of Greece and later Denmark and Ireland becoming full members of WEU as suggested at Maastricht. But it is bound to depend upon how conscientiously the Greek Government in particular applies the sanctions or ensures they are applied in spite of the difficulties it faces in this matter – difficulties that we fully appreciate – because of its geographical situation.

If the embargo fails to induce the warring parties to observe a cease-fire and begin to settle their differences politically, then other, military, intervention will be necessary to enforce respect for international law, human rights and the preservation of the human heritage.

This could consist mainly of aerial and naval action designed to discourage resorting to force. It would, of course, imply complete control of Yugoslav airspace, the protection of Dubrovnik and of all historic sites forming part of the human heritage, and the creation of safe areas for populations threatened by aggression on either side, responsibility in this respect being sometimes shared.

I shall conclude by saying that we have a duty to ensure that our governments and the Council of Ministers of WEU clearly understand what we want. So far they have been far too concerned about the political and diplomatic difficulties and the military risk involved. It is my belief that Europe cannot possibly retain its

Mr. De Decker (continued)

credibility, nor WEU its own as the military arm of European political union, if we do not have the political will to secure respect for international law and human rights.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our colleague, Mr. De Decker, said yesterday that it was pointless for WEU to discuss security in Europe at this session unless the agenda included an item on a subject which affects every one of us; I am referring to the bloody drama which is being enacted in the former Yugoslavia.

Events there are an affront to the logic and rationality of life; they could have come from the pages of a Greek tragedy, and yet the crimes of the Serbian Government and army are very real. The slaughter – for that is what it is – has been going on for months while we stand by and watch, helpless. We have been unable to stop it. Yesterday, in this Assembly, it was said that we must stop talking and act. But what action should we take?

We have not yet found a satisfactory answer to this question. We have not yet reached agreement in Europe on what can be done, apart from what needs to be done; however, I believe it is a matter of some importance and urgency that we determine what should not be done – the borderline which must not be crossed.

I do not think that Europe should respond to Serbian barbarism in a like manner. War is barbaric, whatever form it takes; and war is now being incautiously urged as a final solution.

It is true, as our President Hartmut Soell said yesterday, that throughout this tragedy we have failed to react appropriately to the massacre of thousands of innocent people, to the exodus of entire populations and to the systematic destruction of the economic bases of the new states which are growing up in the area which was once Yugoslavia. I support the proposal to create protection zones for the civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Croatia. That would be a good start. If such zones were firmly maintained, free from violence and fratricidal madness, perhaps the necessary conditions would be created for them to play a very important rôle, hastening the end of this tragedy; to this end, they would be assisted, of course, by strict observation of the embargo contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution 757.

I also believe, however, that we should reject at once the idea of resorting to air and naval bombardment. This would simply aggravate the situation, increasing the extent of the tragedy

with the most terrible unforeseeable political and social repercussions. I think that we should all heed the wisdom expressed here today by the German Minister Klaus Kinkel, when he said that the legacy and memory of the war were still very present in this region and it was necessary to avoid German troops intervening in the territory which was once Yugoslavia under any circumstances. We must banish war from this planet, the home of all mankind. Civilised nations cannot resort to war to resolve conflicts, however noble the aim.

Finally, I believe that if we aspire to resolving the problems of European security, we must leave in European hands those matters which are the sole responsibility of Europe. It would be a serious mistake to involve the United States or NATO forces themselves in the Yugoslav conflagration, even under the mandate of the CSCE. We shall not achieve our long-sought European security identity if, at such a harrowing moment in our history, we call in the United States, whether directly or indirectly, and they once again assume a responsibility in Europe which should be borne by Europeans. We must not, because of our own inadequacy, ask the United States to take on a rôle which United States congressmen have repeatedly stated to be outside their competence. This will do nothing towards improving our relations with our American friends.

We all bear guilt for the Yugoslav tragedy. We need only recall that most of the weapons which the peoples of the former Yugoslavia are using to kill one another were manufactured in the Europe of the Twelve.

We have been unable to avoid the tragedy. We have lost the battle to prevent the crime. But it would be unforgivable if we heaped new mistakes on old ones, committing one crime in the hope of preventing another one. The challenge of the Yugoslav tragedy affects each one of us and touches the whole of humankind. Nevertheless, I believe that WEU should reject the idea of military intervention of any kind and should stand firm in the correct application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 757.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when the Berlin Congress sat at the end of the last century, the then German Reich Chancellor Bismarck, who was occasionally used as an honest broker, said at one of the conferences that the turmoil in the Balkans was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer. At that time he assumed that it was for the empires which then existed – the imperial and royal Austrian

Mr. Müller (continued)

monarchy, the Ottoman empire – to ensure order in the Balkans, whose ethnic minorities he regarded as sheep-stealers, incapable of governing themselves.

This nineteenth century view can no longer be applied to the present. Human rights in the Balkans, the right of the peoples there to self-determination, must be honoured.

For many months now we have been witnessing a conflict in the territory of what was once Yugoslavia, a conflict that grows worse from day to day and shows that WEU's rôle of onlooker, and especially the West's policy of appeasement, are again contributing to the outbreak of wars, creating situations that are more critical than was originally thought possible.

If we recall last December's part-session, when the Greek Prime Minister and the Czech Foreign Minister spoke here, both showing considerable sympathy for Serbia, drawing certain parallels with a period during the second world war and blaming fascist Croatia, we now realise that all they were doing was advancing ideological arguments in support of certain interests which could not be squared with reality.

We are now witnessing the biggest conflict since the second world war. We are witnessing the greatest expulsion of people since the second world war in Europe, and we are witnessing a so-called civil war, which has long been out of control and may lead to a more widespread war.

The Hague Land Warfare Convention and the Geneva Conventions are not worth the paper they were written on. They are not being observed in this area. We are now seeing and will continue to see in the next few months neighbouring countries being implicated. Hungary and Romania, even Turkey and Albania could be affected. In the last few days, in fact, Turkey and Albania have signed a mutual assistance pact.

In this situation Europe – WEU – again stands there like a paper tiger. I am sadly reminded of the policy of appeasement before the outbreak of the second world war. In Goebbels's memoirs you can read how worried Hitler was, when he ordered German troops into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland, that France might mobilise and send a few troops to the border. He let Goebbels know that he would then have immediately withdrawn the order. If France had mobilised at that time, the dictator might have been put in his place. I believe what the generals of the Yugoslav federal army said, as Mr. Caro has pointed out: if military units had been deployed – whether from the air or from the sea – with a view to preventing the shelling of Dubrovnik simply by being there, we might not have been prepared to take this step.

History constantly repeats itself: the same mistakes are made time and again. Pacifists throughout the world, whose arguments are based on emotion rather than understanding in these matters, help to ensure that not hundreds and thousands but tens and hundreds of thousands of people die.

If we had taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's case over a year ago, if we had made it clear that we are not prepared to accept whatever comes, then thousands, even tens of thousands, of human lives could probably have been saved. That needs to be made absolutely clear.

You cannot tell people in Europe that you are prepared to become involved when oil in the Middle East is at stake, but not when it is merely a question of old people, children, babies, patients in hospitals. Then we look on, and keep quiet. Europe's young people, too, can no longer understand these double standards.

In conclusion let me say this: it is not just a question, as Mr. Tummers said, of cultural assets, it is not just a question of people, it is not just a question of the Geneva Convention and The Hague Land Warfare Convention. The point is that if Europe wants to retain security and not abandon it – as William Pfaff wrote in an article in yesterday's Herald Tribune – Europe must act. It must create zones, withdrawal and protection zones for the civilian population. It must be prepared to ensure that the sanctions are observed at sea and in the air.

If Europe is not prepared to make this commitment, if certain countries, certain political groups – as Mr. Karsten Voigt has already said in Bonn – want to evade such action, they will once again assume an enormous burden of guilt.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Haekkerup, Observer from Denmark.

Mr. HAEKKERUP (*Observer from Denmark*). – First, as I come from a country that is not a member state and am only an observer, I should like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to address the Assembly of WEU. As you may know, we in Denmark have been very occupied with what has been happening in Yugoslavia. There are almost one thousand young Danish boys in the United Nations forces in that country, helping in the efforts to re-establish peace.

I should also like to call attention to a striking paradox. Parliamentary observers from not just Denmark, but Croatia, are invited to this Assembly. It seems paradoxical that, when we discuss Yugoslavia, the Croatian observers are not allowed to express their view. To all of us, especially those from countries which have stationed forces in Croatia, it seems essential that the Assembly should try to find a way of allowing Croatian observers to address it on this major subject.

Mr. Haekkerup (continued)

Secondly, I shall comment on the political activities in the former Yugoslavia. Two years ago, I was speaking to the North Atlantic Assembly, and saying: "Yugoslavia is next on the list – it is the test case. Let us see how we and Europe handle it." When I consider our actions over the past two years, they seem negative – an example of lack of political will on Europe's part. It is not a matter of qualified majority voting or a military arm, but about whether we in Europe and Western European Union have the political will to form a consensus and go forward. What we should have done, and should continue to do in future, is to reach a common conclusion, draw a line in the sand and say: "If you cross this line, Serbia, it will lead to the following consequences." If we do not do that, the problems will continue.

The problems of Yugoslavia do not involve western weapons or weapons export. The weapons used in Yugoslavia are Soviet ones, and are used against a population that has expressed its own free will during democratic elections. However, we in Western Europe are still leaning back and watching what is happening without taking firm action.

So far, the problems have involved Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the recommendation does not even touch on what is to come. Next, the problems will arise in Macedonia and Kosovo. What is the European Community's policy towards those countries? My view is simple: if people by their own free will in democratic elections want sovereignty; we should support that and, although we did not do so before, we should draw a line in the sand and say that if the Serbs do not respect those basic principles there will be certain consequences. It is not just a question of sanctions. We must go further than that. Sanctions are essential but are still a long-term perspective that will take one, three or five months to work. Nevertheless, we shall see what happens in the next few months. There will be more bloodshed in former Yugoslavia while we still lean back and do nothing, rather than tell the Serbs that their actions will have certain consequences.

Lastly, may I call the attention of the Assembly to the fact that 2nd June is a special date in Denmark because we are having a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. I have been out campaigning actively for a yes vote and I am confident that tomorrow I shall be able to tell the Assembly that there was a clear yes from Denmark. However, we must wait for the result. I am hoping for such a result tonight.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – I would like to begin by saying that, as I think is

obvious, I fully support the resolution, of which I was one of the signatories. First, because I approve unreservedly United Nations Security Council Resolution 757, which happily, if belatedly, was passed a few days ago; and secondly, because the bombardment of towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which has caused such terrible suffering for the people of those countries, must stop immediately. Ten thousand people have been killed, there are countless wounded and hundreds of thousands of refugees – the biggest exodus for fifty years in the continent of Europe, since the second world war, that is.

Even the Red Cross, which has been respected in other wars and even in other continents, has not been able to operate effectively.

In Dubrovnik and other cities there has been widespread destruction of the medieval heritage; an attempt is being made to destroy the economic structure of the new states; tourism, which was once an important source of income, especially in Croatia, has all but dried up.

The Portuguese President of the European Community has been trying to confront this situation within his area of competence and has, in fact, after strenuous efforts, achieved several cease-fires. In January he also contributed to the recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia and, later, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the cease-fires are systematically violated by the militias in general, and by Serbia in particular.

To me this shows that, in future, we must pay particular attention to conflict prevention, starting with those areas which demonstrate an aggressive nationalism which has been held in check by a well-known dictatorship and which is now in the process of expansion.

We must also, by means of agreements, persuade certain over-armed countries to reduce their stock of weapons. The army of the former Yugoslavia was out of all proportion and vastly over-equipped.

Moving on to what can be done in this situation, including to what extent we should intervene, a matter which our colleague Mr. De Decker also touched upon, I must say that I do not believe that peace can be imposed by force, for the reasons so eloquently expressed by our colleague Mr. Stegagnini, who is familiar with the local situation and who said that we could be opening a Pandora's box. We would have no way of knowing where this would lead us. Let us not forget the situation on the ground – the existence of a fanatical, over equipped army, plus the fact that there is no continuous front line to enable an engagement to take place. No such line exists, there is merely a series of enclaves and towns split into areas dominated by opposing forces. Much needs to be done to

Mr. Roseta (continued)

assure the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities, but I do not believe armed intervention is necessary.

First it must be stated, *urbi et orbi*, that human beings are not the property of the state and that the state must acknowledge responsibility for its actions before the international community. Simply being a citizen of a particular country does not mean that a person belongs to the authorities of that country, and from this we can draw our first conclusion – that these conflicts must be prevented or avoided and that countries – not just the Serbian authorities – must be made to understand on a political level that in this day and age, in the twenty-first century, conflicts are not resolved by massacre and that this situation is intolerable.

Secondly, any country likely to find itself in a similar position must be made aware that very severe sanctions will be imposed upon it, as are now being applied in this case. There has been talk of a trade and air embargo and an embargo on oil supplies to Serbia and Montenegro, and I would like to say that these sanctions ought to be extended and continued until supplies run out, with the sole exception of foodstuffs and medicines.

Thirdly, I think it should be made quite clear that the international community, following on from what I was saying earlier, will demand both financial and political reparations.

Fourthly, and finally, I will mention the need for a strict air and naval blockade with a United Nations mandate and an effort to create protection zones for the civilian population. At some time in the future we must call for a conference on security and co-operation in the Mediterranean, along the lines of the CSCE model, to prevent such conflicts so that, by all these means, we can avoid massacres such as this which bring nothing but dishonour to the human race.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soysal, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. SOYSAL (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – I congratulate the members signing the motion for debate under urgent procedure, and those who signed the motion for a recommendation; both relate to subjects that the Assembly has a right to debate.

What, after all, are we discussing in this Assembly? We are discussing the need to establish security arrangements, and this means forming an army and hence a group of young people prepared to risk their lives for shared interests and values.

Yesterday the Secretary-General of WEU said something very interesting; he asked why the

fleets of member states of the union were not already in the Adriatic with the object of enforcing sanctions.

There could be different replies to that question. The cynics would say that in Kuwait's case there was a specific interest: oil. In today's case this does not apply. But are there not values we all share that need to be defended by force, such as human rights and the right of the people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina to live like human beings? Does not that call for military intervention or the use of force to impose sanctions? The more so as Europe's responsibility applies to the universality of human rights. If human and community rights are universal they must be protected without discrimination on grounds of religion, be it Christian or Islamic.

Europe also bears a special responsibility because of the differing intervals at which it has recognised the different states born of the former Yugoslavia. This is one of the reasons for what is going on now in Bosnia-Herzegovina and may happen tomorrow in Macedonia, as our Observer from Denmark has just pointed out. I do not wish to enlarge upon what caused the states of the Union to apply this differential timing, or the factors that were taken into account; but whatever their nature, WEU should now reflect on how valid they are compared with the danger represented by the risk of civil war or Serbian invasion to which certain new states are exposed by this staggered timing which, in the view of the Serbs, implies differing degrees of legitimacy which may encourage them to commit the deeds that we condemn.

We, as members of parliament in a country waiting for a decision and whose membership of the Community or of WEU may be postponed indefinitely, as one speaker said this morning, with no regard for our status, have two reasons why we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the Balkan countries.

The first is historical: who are the Bosnians? They are Serbs who have adopted Islam as their religion. They were not forced to do so since other Serbs chose to remain Christians under the Ottoman Empire. But it is because we were present in this region of Europe. So we bear some historical responsibility for the fate of these people who converted.

The second reason, Mr. President, stems from the presence of at least three million people of Bosnian origin, now Turkish citizens and living in Turkey. We, as members of parliament, cannot remain indifferent to the problems of these people.

That prompts me, Mr. President, to point out that we, the Turks of the empire, were a source of concern to Western Europe throughout the nineteenth century over what was happening to the countries of the Balkan peoples. I am not

Mr. Soysal (continued)

talking from the viewpoint of historical revenge but as a member of parliament convinced that decisive action should be taken against the present violations. We Turks, whatever status you eventually give us, are ready to take part in any action designed to achieve this.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, with some difficulty I recall certain figures I found over twelve months ago in the report on military balances produced annually by the Institute for Strategic Studies. They were in the report for 1990 which gave some information that I feel is significant.

Despite belonging to the group of non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia was, at the end of the eighties, spending something like \$1 576 million or 3.8% of gross domestic product to equip an army of 188 000 men.

These dry and apparently sterile figures are the explanation for the epoch-making suffering which today's historic events have unfortunately brought home to all of us in vivid terms.

With the breakdown of the illiberal and undemocratic ideology holding the country together, ethnic and religious divisions between new and old cultures have erupted with explosive force and blood has been shed. Memories of events of the mid-century come back to us and we remember Chetniks, Druze, Ustachi, and the awful tragedy which at the time seemed to have no end.

Today's tragedy also seems to be without end and inhuman in the countless pictures which the television news and the real-time media bring into our homes. But by some kind of acceptance or through being inured to events, this tragedy no longer hits us with the distressed amazement which would have caused firm decisions to be taken by politicians and governments in the democracies.

Our words are becoming mere babble and noises in our throats. We seem to be stumbling on and on through a world in ruins strewn with thousands of dead men and women, children and old people which a kind of barbarity we would never have believed possible is dumping on the road towards a Europe of peace that recognises the basic human rights to life, freedom and security.

Here I am expressing our deep sense of frustration which stems from what often appears to be the futility of our work. This evening our Assembly will adopt an urgent recommendation; once again the reference to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which calls on the high contracting parties to take immediate

action under terms drafted by just and free men at the end of the second world war, and the recommendation in question may seem to be providing a way of salving our consciences.

But that is not so, Mr. President. When we approve this draft recommendation every one of us in the depth of his being will in fact have made a promise and sworn a real and responsible oath; each one of us will have sworn never to cease working by every possible means for peace in freedom and security for all people of good will.

(*Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Parisi.

Mr. PARISI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the events now taking place close to our borders and Serbia's aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina are matters on which it is not easy to speak in reasonable terms, horrified as we are by the atrocities and massacres perpetrated without regard for the civilian population and without even the most elementary considerations of humanity which would at least spare women and children.

It is, however, our moral and civil duty not only to express our sense of shock and to condemn what is happening categorically and explicitly but also to study the most effective ways of ending these atrocities and the mad plans for domination they are designed to serve.

Every resource of international law must be used to force the attacking army to withdraw immediately. When I say every resource I exclude none. I mean that if political and economic sanctions prove ineffective, international law authorises the international community or certain states under United Nations mandate to use armed force as the ultimate solution in accordance with what Mr. Kinkel said this morning.

In fact, I see in the events which have been going on for some time in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, signs of the same mad craving for power which led Saddam Hussein, as other speakers have said, to attack an unarmed Kuwait and systematically massacre the Kurds. Just as, when faced by this mad folly, the international community saw why it should and how it could take united action to impose respect for international law and to alleviate the sufferings of the oppressed peoples, it now has the legal and moral duty not merely to intervene on humanitarian grounds in order to help the refugees and the wounded – as indeed Italy is already doing on a large scale – but also to resort to discussion by armed force if there appears to be no other way.

Mr. Parisi (continued)

I therefore approve Mr. Caro's initiative and Resolution 757 adopted on 30th May. The draft recommendation comes at the right moment and I give it my full support.

I must, however, stress that this Yugoslav problem – and how belittling it is to refer to the sufferings of human beings as a problem – is essentially a matter for Europe, firstly, as several speakers have said, because the territories of the now non-existent Yugoslav republic are European territories, secondly because the problem has its roots in the history of Europe as a whole and lastly because there will be no way of building a peaceful and prosperous future for Europe as a whole if even just one of its nations clings to the mad belief that its own growth can be achieved at the expense of the others.

For these reasons, it is my firm belief that WEU will finally do everything in its power to help put an end to this pointless and horrifying massacre.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scovacicchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the debate may appear complicated and many faceted but it seems to me that the essential points of reference are very simple.

May I, as someone living in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region, which is the only one of our provinces sharing boundaries with Slovenia and Croatia where the fighting has been and still is taking place, be allowed to give my personal experience of this problem which, as you know, affects most acutely the lives of people physically closest to the sounds of the shooting.

Let me say, then, that it is already late for Europe – which is always pointed to as having a leading rôle to play in the areas within its purview – to take the action suggested in the document now before us; furthermore, in my view this is simply a motion for a recommendation casually tacked onto a United Nations resolution. In fact there was no need to refer to that resolution: the old continent, directly affected as it is by the crisis in the crumbling Yugoslav federation, would still retain its full responsibility.

I do not need to repeat that this crisis is a factor of instability and anxiety, psychologically as well as otherwise, for the whole of Europe and the world as a whole – given the new approach to foreign policy already tested in Iraq – and it seems to me that Mr. Parisi had that aspect in mind.

We must get away from the old patterns of strategic doctrine. No solution can be found by

using force, i.e. going to war with the former Yugoslavia and its large and battle-hardened army. I fought in Bosnia with the Italian second army until the victory of the dictator Anton Pavelic and even thereafter. In that war which was under cover but sometimes explicit and open as well, I learnt the tricks of a way of fighting in which numbers were irrelevant. Nothing, it seems to me, has changed; guerrilla action plus armoured strikes are virtually impossible to monitor, e.g. by newcomers to the scene with their blue berets and uniforms fresh from the steam-press.

So before it is too late I think we should give the fullest possible support to the embargo, particularly that on arms, and to all the measures which have been mentioned here. That we must do in order that we are not forced by today's indecision, which has already gone on for too long, to take military action with the gravest economic and social consequences and causing bloodshed that will add to the number of Europeans who have already lost their lives as the price of solidarity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we can but say that the European Community has adopted a passive attitude towards Serbia-Montenegro, particularly in recent months. It has followed the course of recognising the part-republics and of Lord Carrington's peace conference for too long. These measures did not have the strength to call a halt to Serbian aggression. It has taken far too long for the Twelve of the Community to decide to impose sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro. And once the decision was taken, far more stringent measures – bans on sport, trade, oil and air transport – were decided in the United Nations context under the influence of the United States. What the Community's Council of Ministers intended to reaffirm tomorrow will have to be adjusted again at its meeting. Instead of being the front-runner, the Community, potentially the leading actor in the – European – Yugoslav conflict, has become a follower. This is regrettable, now that work is being done on a common foreign and security policy in the Community context.

Mr. President, the most important part of this draft recommendation is the sentence: "Further measures should be considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect." Western European Union could intervene militarily only if so instructed by the United Nations Security Council. This premise is not to be found in the recommendation, but it is stated by the Rapporteur, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, in his explanatory memorandum. It would help if he stressed the need for a United Nations Security Council resolution in his reply.

Mr. Eisma (continued)

Even before any measures were taken at this level, the WEU Council of Ministers, which is due to meet shortly, could also take other initiatives. I feel it could also suggest to the CSCE countries that they meet as soon as possible at foreign minister level, to see if a general political arrangement might be made in that context and at that level. The WEU Council of Ministers could also call on the CSCE to ask the International Court of Justice in The Hague to set up a special tribunal to consider crimes against humanity.

Mr. President, to conclude, I would like to say something about the sanctions the United Nations has now imposed. It is not for nothing that we have Greece among us as an observer. I call on the Greek observers in this Assembly to ensure that the sanctions are enforced. The ban on air traffic must not be evaded because the bureaucracy, in this case the Greek bureaucracy, has not yet coped with it. Let this be a message to our colleagues here, for them to transmit to the foreign minister and the other members of the Greek government.

Mr. President, it will be clear that, subject to these comments, I strongly endorse the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Blunck.

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to support the recommendation. I would not have asked to speak if a quite crucial sentence and, therefore, the substance of this recommendation had not changed since last night. I mean the sentence: "Further measures should be considered."

This means war. This means more destruction, more deaths and endless suffering for many innocent people.

Have we then really learnt nothing at all from all the dreadful wars in the past, from the first world war, the second world war, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, the Gulf war? We have all assumed a terrible burden of guilt. Surely we here do not want suddenly to distort the truth and label those who are opposed to the use of force, the pacifists, as perpetrators or as criminals? It is high time we made provisions, we must act, before something happens.

First we produce weapons, then we sell them to trouble spots. With the proceeds we bring up our sons. Then the violence escalates in the trouble spots and we send our sons there to kill and possibly to be killed. This is cynical.

None of those here who support brutal violence tell us how we are to avoid escalation and, if possible, emerge from this escalation. Just think of Vietnam and what happened there.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Germany*) (Translation). – Sarajevo!

Mrs. BLUNCK (*Germany*) (Translation). – I have the feeling that at the moment we are setting ourselves up as judges without really knowing the facts. I ask myself, and I ask you: do you believe the Serbs? Do you believe the Croats? Do you really know what is happening there? Can you really know who is the guilty party there? Do you really want us to send our sons there? Do you want to take violence there? I do not.

I therefore call most urgently for separate votes. I would like to support the recommendation, apart from the sentence I have quoted. I cannot support that sentence. I am not in favour of more suffering. I am not in favour of more destruction. I am not in favour of more deaths. I would at last like to see provision being made. The violence should at last be brought to an end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Savio.

Mr. SAVIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we have already witnessed two exoduses in this span of the century: one from 1947 to 1950 before this important Western European organisation existed, and the second now and close to our frontiers as a result of what is happening in Yugoslavia. The first time it was people of Italian origin leaving their country. Europe had only just emerged from the second world war and looked on virtually unconcerned at what was happening in Istria to make Italians emigrate.

The end of the Berlin wall had a different effect, stirring up ethnic feelings in neighbouring Yugoslavia and finally, with reason failing to bring about the outcome sought by the democracies, triggering off the conflicts that are now terrifying and stupefying us because of their gravity and ferocity, the way they are being fought and finally the recurrence of a situation bringing today the inflow of refugees or tomorrow – though heaven forbid – involvement in situations which may get out of control. This problem concerns us Italians and in particular us Venetians; I am a Deputy for that part of the country and can vouch for the facts.

That is why we approve the whole of the motion now before us in the form proposed, with its reference to Article VIII and its call on the Council to meet as a matter of urgency and set up the machinery needed to put that part of United Nations Resolution 757 into effect that imposes an embargo designed to halt the action which Mr. Milosevic is determinedly pursuing, regardless of appeals for a solution to be formed respecting the peoples, their wishes and their determination to be independent. I am referring in particular to Bosnia.

Mr. Savio (continued)

The embargo will certainly create difficulties for us Italians. Indeed, it will have a particularly decisive effect in the Adriatic because Italy's coastline faces that of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Italy is one of the leading countries as regards trade with Yugoslavia.

All this will mean hardship in Italy because many Italian firms are involved, and here I refer in particular to the finished and semi-finished goods they import from Yugoslavia.

We nevertheless believe this sacrifice to be necessary because the stakes are very high and Italy wishes to make as great a contribution as other countries at this time to peace and democratic self-determination for the peoples of Europe. Our contribution will go further still and take on board what the United Nations decided in its resolution. It is our hope that the experts who will be called upon to decide on immediate action to make the embargo an effective deterrent will find some means of monitoring the system in detail so as to distinguish those countries that have helped Yugoslavia up to now from those that unfortunately have been lookers-on.

I am sure that, as soon as a government has been formed, the Italian Parliament will debate the motion signed by no fewer than three hundred and sixty-seven deputies drawing attention to what is happening in Yugoslavia and outlining to the Italian Government, so that it will raise the matter in WEU, the kinds of action which we today consider appropriate and important in order to discourage anyone now claiming, in superficial and arrogant propaganda for Mr. Milosevic, that if we intervene in any other way they will meet fire with fire.

This means that under the embargo every form of action must be taken to prevent the arrival of fresh supplies, with the exception, of course, of food and all medical supplies that can be used to treat the wounded. The purpose of such action must be to bring about the end of the fighting.

We hope that this can be done: we see it as a first significant act for WEU to take and one which has our full support.

In conclusion, I repeat that Russia should be told that for a very short but appropriate period it should be possible, as Mr. Stegagnini said, to nullify agreements allowing arms to pass up the Danube without any check of the vessels in transit. These agreements would in fact make the embargo on the Adriatic pointless. I should like to put this recommendation to you, Mr. President, so that the possibility of immediate measures to that end can be looked into, possibly including a resolution which we could draft and then vote on here and now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, the Rapporteur.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation) – Mr. President, as it is getting late, I can be very brief. Your speech yesterday morning, the statement by the Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, and the statements by almost all members this afternoon – I will revert to the one exception in a moment – show that, where the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is concerned, this Assembly wants more than has been done so far. This has been indicated by all the members in more or less the same words.

To those who have reacted critically to the draft recommendation I would say: what is the objective? The objective is to restore the legal order. That was the aim in the Gulf war, Mrs. Blunck, that is the aim in Yugoslavia. The aim is to restore the legal order, to restore law and order. That is why the United Nations Security Council, the highest body representing this legal order, has adopted a resolution that imposes strict sanctions. That is why the amendment unanimously adopted by the Defence Committee this morning calls for further measures if the Security Council's resolution does not have the desired effect. Further action must then be taken by the United Nations, as was the case in the Gulf war, to restore law and order.

And while we are talking about facts, let me refer you to the statements by Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. Jean-Marie Caro. They were extremely eloquent in their description of the facts in Yugoslavia. There are people without arms and legs, many people have died unnecessarily. Those are the facts, and it is our duty as politicians gathered here together to ensure that law and order are restored – that is what this resolution is about – so that the unnecessary bloodshed may stop. That is the aim of this debate, and, as I intimated earlier, that is why this morning the Defence Committee unanimously approved the sentence that has been added to the recommendation.

We have our commitments to other organisations and bodies when it comes, for example, to the cultural barbarism I have referred to. Let us simply let UNESCO know what we have said here this afternoon and of the recommendation we have adopted. Then we cannot say later – we would have to say this to ourselves as well – that we knew about it, but we did not do enough. There have been numerous statements about this. We cannot allow this to happen again. Our ministers cannot allow this to happen again. That is the aim of this debate, and of this recommendation, which I sincerely hope can count on very wide support in this Assembly as well, following the meeting of the committee. Then we

Mr. De Hoop Scheffer (continued)

can move ahead. This is not, after all, the end of the road – unfortunately, I have to say – but probably the beginning of the road, in the interests of law and order throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Because of the lateness of the hour, I shall be brief.

As the Rapporteur has just said, the committee supported the recommendation unanimously. It is a difficult and complicated matter and it is so easy to get it wrong, as we are all aware. Practically everything that needs to be said about the unhappy and disastrous Yugoslav situation has been said. May I corrupt an old English – or perhaps universal – phrase and say that the only way that evil can triumph is for men of good will to stand aside and do nothing.

In my view and that of the Defence Committee that I represent, Europe needs its peace-keeping credibility. The motion before us, so ably conducted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, points the way and I hope that action will be taken upon it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – To the draft recommendation in Document 1319, one amendment has been tabled by Mr. Feldmann. It reads as follows:

1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992.”

I call Sir Russell Johnston to move the amendment.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I put forward this amendment on behalf of Mr. Feldmann, who has had to return to Bonn. It refers to a proposal for an international court to judge war crimes. The proposal was put before the Council of Europe earlier this year, and Mrs. Haller of Switzerland was the Rapporteur. That, in turn, called in support the precedent of a unanimous vote of the Santiago conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in October last year on a resolution dealing with genocide. In essence, the argument was for the establishment of an international criminal court and the report urged that member states of the Council of Europe should “act through the United Nations to secure the convening of an international conference to prepare a convention on the setting up of such a court”.

The amendment is designed to make it clear to persons acting in a fashion that could be determined as a war crime that a means of bringing them to justice is to be established. There is no doubt that that war, apart from the general horror produced by mass shelling – I do not understand how Mrs. Blunck can watch Yugoslavia being reduced to rubble and say, we are not sure who is to blame – has also produced many individual instances of what can only be called barbarism.

I mentioned in my speech earlier that I have heard from refugees from Sarajevo. I did not say that they also showed us a video of fifteen men lying manacled on the ground, obviously having been beaten before being shot. Those responsible for such atrocities should be brought to justice and this amendment is designed to express the intention that that will happen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I do not rise to speak against the amendment but simply to explain the situation. Mr. Feldmann introduced the amendment not in written form but colloquially, towards the end of the meeting before we began the main sitting. He appreciated the fact that there was not time to discuss it and we had only a few cursory words about it. I talked to the Rapporteur, who is not against it but who cannot see too much sense in it. Listening to Sir Russell Johnston, who always speaks sensibly and convincingly about those matters, I am a little worried about the practicalities and whether it would work. We have no fundamental objection but it would be impossible for me to say what the committee's view would be. We shall need to debate it. Therefore, to be fair, I must leave it to the Assembly to decide.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

1. See page 33.

5. Arms export policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1305)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on arms export policy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1305.

I call Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the arms export policy is a complex and sensitive political issue at both national and international level. A great deal of thought should be given to this policy, more than it is receiving in this chamber at the moment. Thought should be given to the arms export policy because it has to do with national security and defence, with the economy and employment, with technology and industrial policy, with international competition and co-operation within the alliance.

On the other hand, ethical and moral values are also involved, because weapons are, after all, designed to put people out of action and to cause devastation. We have been hearing almost all day today what effects weapons can have. We need only look at the television pictures from Bosnia to make further explanation superfluous. What is more, the constant advances in technology, improvements and refinements are making weapons increasingly efficient.

A review of the arms export policy is therefore urgently needed. It is impossible to think of most Western European countries without arms production. It forms an important part of the industrial apparatus, with branches stretching throughout society, to universities and research centres. In addition, military inventions have often gone hand in hand with civilian applications.

For several decades the East-West conflict was the cause of a major arms race, both conventional and nuclear. Defence budgets grew each year and, with them, military production. A recent study by SIPRI in Stockholm says that in 1985 arms factories in European NATO countries employed one and a half million people. The cold war fortunately resulted, according to this study, in three hundred thousand jobs being lost between 1985 and 1990.

There has been another major factor in the spread of the feeling among many people that things could not go on as they were and that there must be an end to the unchecked sale of weapons. This was the coalition's confrontation during the Gulf war with an unrivalled war

machine, a very considerable proportion of which originated from our countries, by which I mean the countries we represent here. I refer you to the tables in my report on arms sales, to Iraq, for example.

After the Gulf war the alarm was sounded from many sides. Ideas were put forward. But there is bound to be a fear that, if we fail to reach international agreement quickly, this restraint will be forgotten again and trade, even with regional trouble spots, will again become attractive. We politicians know that there is considerable demand for weapons. A great deal of money can be made from them. Although employment in the arms industry has declined sharply in recent years, production in the countries concerned is extensive enough to far outstrip domestic demand.

What is more, defence budgets will be reduced in every country in the future. There will therefore be, as indeed there already is, a tendency to look for new markets. They will be found all too easily in third world countries. So the paradoxical situation we see emerging is that western countries are offering aid with one hand and selling arms with the other. This refers less to conventional weapons than to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and to technological know-how.

In my report I have tried to paint as accurate a picture as possible of the complexity of the problems relating to the international context in which the arms trade takes place and of the existing multinational control systems. I have briefly reviewed each member country's policy and given some specific figures, uncompromising though they may be. I conclude my report by making a number of suggestions for the improvement of the existing régimes.

An effective policy geared to reducing and monitoring arms exports will always have to be an internationally co-ordinated policy. The criteria will have to be harmonised. Control mechanisms will have to be developed. Whatever the issue, this can be done at world level, through, say, the United Nations, under specific treaties or conventions, under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or through existing regional associations, such as the European Community.

The report lists the most important treaties and draft treaties in this sphere. They will have to undergo further development and improvement.

First, provisions concerning the export of nuclear technology will have to be added to the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty must be given a sound financial basis. It should also be placed under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Aarts (continued)

Second, the future of Cocom is under discussion now that the relationship between East and West has changed and democracy is developing in the countries of the East. One idea might be that Cocom should be transformed from an East-West into a North-South embargo organisation. Or should Cocom be replaced by a European export régime?

Third, the chemical weapons convention is still not ready, even though this is precisely the kind of weaponry that must and can be banned. Fortunately, there is now the Australia Group, which has set itself the goal of preventing the export of certain chemicals and has developed for this purpose an export warning list featuring fifty chemicals. All the countries we represent belong to this group. The proposal is that this list should be transformed into a worldwide export ban list under United Nations supervision.

Fourth, the MTCR – the Missile Technology Control Régime – which was established in 1987, is not a treaty yet, but an informal agreement prohibiting the export of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles and related technology. The importance of this régime, though not widely known, as I have found, should not be underestimated in view of the weapons we are talking about in this case. But the number of participants is small. There are still no means of ensuring enforcement.

Fifth, the United Nations can and must play an extremely important part in the control and monitoring of arms exports. Above all else it should achieve this by using its power to impose mandatory arms embargoes. It has done so in the case of South Africa, Iraq, Somalia, Libya and Yugoslavia. The inspection and enforcement of these embargoes has not always been as good as it might be. Quite the contrary. But we did find that it was better in Iraq's case than in others.

In 1991 the General Assembly of the United Nations took a very important step towards a worldwide surveillance system for conventional armaments transfers by establishing a register of international conventional arms transfers. This was intended to make the international arms trade transparent. We will have to wait and see how well the members of the United Nations keep to the agreed rules. Judgment cannot yet be passed because the first registration date is 30th April 1993 for the calendar year 1992. I realise this registration is only a first step towards the worldwide control and monitoring of the arms trade, but it is nevertheless an essential step.

To conclude, I would like to discuss two points, the relevance of Maastricht to the control of arms exports and the position of the

national parliaments. In December 1991 the European Council decided to include matters concerning nuclear non-proliferation, technology transfers to third world countries and the control of arms exports in the category of issues for which common actions must be prepared and on which decisions will be taken by a qualified majority. This is a major step forward, but it will only mean anything if Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome is repealed or amended at the same time. This article makes such matters as arms transactions a national responsibility. At the Maastricht conference no mention was made of an amendment to this article. This is not only inconsistent but also extremely dangerous against the background of the single European market that will soon come into being, because the member state with the most liberal export régime could become Europe's arms export centre, unless the national arms export régimes are harmonised under and against the background of a common foreign policy. We therefore feel political action is urgently needed.

I would also like to say something about the position of the national parliaments. It will come as no surprise that while I was studying arms export régimes in the member states, I was forced to reach the general conclusion that the parliaments still have little influence or authority over arms exports. There is no denying that progress has been made. In various countries far more information is supplied to the parliaments, and discussions with the ministers responsible have become more common. In special cases parliamentary debates are followed by decision making, but this only happens in cases where there is a national political motive.

The question is, then, how the national parliaments can be given a greater opportunity to exercise control. It is difficult to lay down general rules on this, because each country has its own parliamentary rules and traditions. The aim in each country should be to enable parliament to check whether the government's licensing policy complies with the criteria that have been agreed with parliament. I am not therefore generally advocating direct decision-making powers for parliaments in the matter of arms export licences, but the opportunity for criteria to be established in consultation with the government and for the policy to be compared with these.

Mr. President, I realise that any report on this subject is very quickly out of date. Developments in the world occur very quickly, in both the positive and the negative sense. The world situation can change completely in six months. It will therefore be necessary for a follow-up report to be written in the not too distant future, partly because all the régimes I have discussed

Mr. Aarts (continued)

and the many conventions and treaties under consideration are making progress. We will have to assess this progress.

Mr. President, it will be worth considering this subject again in a while. A halt must be called to excessive trade in weapons of all kinds. I am particularly happy that Germany's Foreign Minister emphasised this once again this morning and that he said much human misery stems from excessive arms production and sales. This must be stopped, partly because the vast sums of money concerned can be spent on far worthier causes, but also, above all, because of the evil that is done. Controlling and reducing arms exports is a form of political civilisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe.

Mr. GONZALEZ-LAXE (*Spain*) (Translation). – We are faced with a truly transcendental question concerning the operational area of WEU's activities and the various national policies in a global context.

Arms export policy can therefore be dealt with from differing points of view, so what is required is the harmonisation of joint action by all countries. If we analyse this, we can say that in some countries there is a division between policies designed to liberalise exports on the international market where this is of importance for the economic development of industrialised countries, because private firms sell arms, compared with the situation where industry is completely under government control.

Second, there are many ways of controlling the export of arms; there are cases where the export licence is granted by just one ministry, or by interministerial committees or by special agencies; all of these require different frameworks to deal with the different political circumstances of each country.

Third, the difficulty of finding uniform solutions for the transfer of not only nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, but also conventional weaponry, calls for a wide variety of policies and, consequently, different courses of action on the part of governments. This, together with dual-use products, constitutes an additional area of concern to be taken into consideration in the formulation of such a common policy.

This is the situation we are faced with, underlining the lack of a harmonised common European arms export policy, which obviously constitutes a high degree of potential risk for international security. It is therefore necessary to establish two basic elements to correct the situation since in recent years world exports of

arms have fallen by around 30%, although, in actual fact, they have been concentrated in certain countries – a matter of considerable international concern given the continued existence of situations of conflict throughout the world.

These two basic elements can be summed up as follows: the first concerns the need to define a common arms export policy and the second, the definition of an effective export control régime. These two initial rules governing the new international conduct constitute a step forward in that we can be reasonably satisfied with the new agreements signed between different countries which will finally put an end to the clandestine sale of the weapons of war, the first step in the establishment and maintenance of a lasting peace.

Mr. Aarts's report presents an excellent summary of the global situation as regards arms export policies, but it also underlines certain difficulties being encountered at present in controlling, verifying and co-ordinating international action. The International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for verification alone and cannot impose sanctions; one of Cocom's objectives is to control the proliferation of products derived from nuclear energy but consists of merely an official co-ordination agreement; the Australia Group is self-regulating in respect of chemical weapons; the missile technological control system is not an international treaty. These, along with other bodies, reveal the complete lack of an overall control and verification of arms export policy. Consequently, it became an international aim to find a system of monitoring such transfers and achieving greater transparency, so that the responsibility of governments can be documented. So much so that, as Mr. Aarts said, the United Nations General Assembly created a universal register of conventional arms transfers in January of this year. All information in connection with these matters must be supplied to the register and this could obviously help to assemble the criteria for harmonisation of national requirements regarding both the combination of external policies, such as defence, on the one hand, and the combination of financial, economic and commercial policies with defence and external policy, on the other hand.

The Maastricht summit has taken a step forward in this complex matter and one of its objectives is the control of arms exports, requiring the ministers for foreign affairs to make a start on preparatory work to settle this controversial matter. For instance, the transfer of armaments will remain under national control in accordance with Article 223 of the Rome Treaty. However, it is reasonable to hold that despite the requirement of free movement of goods throughout the Community, arms export policy should not be based solely on commercial considerations, but on a common policy

Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe (continued)

harmonising the interests of all member states in the area of security and national defence. And while this is being formulated, it will be the remit of WEU, as the body responsible for defence policy after the Maastricht summit, to work on the determination and adoption of final decisions for the control and verification of the arms export policy.

Mr. Aarts's report suggests the possibility of creating a European arms agency which would have responsibility for such control, and in this way we could fulfil the basic requirement for transparency and verification of the arms trade to foster global security. The drafting of international rules and directives by the United Nations would also result in an improvement in the monitoring of such arms exports. It is along these lines that we should continue to work, and for this reason I support Mr. Aarts's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Poças Santos.

Mr. POÇAS SANTOS (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the arms trade, like the drugs trade, is one of the most reprehensible activities because of the harm it causes to humanity. We know, however, how difficult it is to turn words into actions in controlling this phenomenon. The enormously high financial stakes involved often mean that political decisions taken by international institutions and national governments are rendered ineffective.

It is true that some progress has been made in this area since the end of the cold war and the collapse of the former Soviet Union as a super-power. However, a number of very black clouds have cast a shadow on the world panorama, which we would all like to see more peaceful. Unfortunately regional conflicts, civil wars, inter-ethnic struggles and the violent disintegration of some multinational states seem to be not only continuing, but on the increase in recent times. This gives rise to a growing concern that the exports of arms should be controlled. It would be extremely useful if, when arms are sold – the prohibition of arms, sadly, being merely a utopian dream – their final destination and end use could be known.

There is, however, one area where international co-operation is essential, namely arms trade for military purposes. There is absolutely no prospect of reducing this scourge if our efforts do not result in joint action, at least by the main exporting countries. Without this, we would have a situation where those countries which observe international law and morality would be at a serious disadvantage, because other countries might be standing by to take their place as arms sellers.

This would give rise to a very unfair situation; the defence industries and the economies of the countries which respected international law would be needlessly sacrificed without any subsequent benefits for world peace. A concerted effort by governments to achieve disarmament is, then, a condition sine qua non if we are to succeed in this area.

It is in this context that Western European Union, at a time when it wishes to be seen as dynamic and revitalised, can play an important rôle, providing a forum for reflection, debate and to some extent, decision on these matters, at least as far as Europe is concerned. This was one of the points made in the declaration of the Council at Maastricht, from which more specific results at the next meeting in Lisbon are hoped for.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft recommendation we are discussing could perhaps be described as rather restrained, but it is a first step towards solving this problem within our Assembly and it provides a strong incentive for the WEU Council to reflect on this very important matter. Approval of this recommendation would constitute explicit recognition that Europe cannot and must not be deflected from maintaining peace and security in the various parts of the globe, whether internal peace – violated in such a shocking way in Yugoslavia, or in parts of the world which, though more distant, cannot be simply forgotten.

In spite of the damage to the arms industries of each of our countries which any decision might have, we believe that, in the long term, we will all benefit from a reduction in current levels of arms production and consumption.

We do not expect great results in the short term. Nevertheless, we believe that it is important not to stand idly by when so many men, women and children are suffering the pain of war, terrorism, crime and organised banditry. In cases such as these, no weapons should be considered as being in safe hands.

What I have said does not mean a lack of hope in the future, but is simply recognition of the fact that, unfortunately, the various instruments of international control have not worked as intended, frequently through a lack of political will to put them into practice. Nevertheless, without being over-optimistic, it is possible to make greater progress than has so far been made. Everything to do with the machines of war is complex, but that is no excuse for inaction.

Ladies and gentlemen, in presenting this report Mr. Aarts, to whom we must say a word of appreciation for the work he has so excellently performed, urges us to show a new and increased interest in questions concerning restrictions on the export of arms.

Mr. Poças Santos (continued)

I very sincerely recommend that we approve and explore further the suggestions which have been put to us, certain that this is the only way which can promote real integration of policies in this area, first at European level and later on at a global level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my sincere thanks to the two members who have spoken at this late hour, and shown that they have studied the report thoroughly, for the support they have given to the report and recommendations. I assume the list of speakers was not longer because of the quality of the report, which did not leave any room for criticism by members. As not many questions were asked, I will be brief, if only because of the time.

Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe pointed out that in many countries arms manufacture is controlled by various people, sometimes by the government, sometimes by private companies, sometimes by a mixture of the two. In some countries there are also certain régimes in which licences, exemptions and all kinds of other export arrangements are important. This means that the same arms export régime can never be imposed on everyone from above and that every country remains responsible for ensuring the enforcement of international laws and treaties, taking account of its own legislation and its own situation. This simply increases the responsibility of national governments and national parliaments.

Mr. Gonzalez-Laxe also referred to one of the most serious problems facing us where arms exports are concerned: the black market. This is a separate problem, if only because there are no satisfactory statistics on the subject. It is difficult enough to obtain statistics on the normal arms trade, even if all the information is in the hands of governments. It is absolutely impossible to say even roughly what amounts are involved in the illegal arms trade. We know that large numbers of weapons are coming on to the black market from the East, where weapons are in abundant supply at the moment. I have tried to obtain some information on the black market from SIPRI, but that was completely impossible. They did not dare to quote any halfway serious figures. They even said there are probably far more weapons on the black market at the moment than we can imagine. This means that the arms trade is probably comparable to the drugs trade: a very dangerous business, with a lot of money doing the rounds and a lot of money to be earned, because the trade is carried

on in an atmosphere of secrecy. It would be a good thing for this aspect in particular to be taken into account in the monitoring of national imports and exports of weapons.

Mr. President, Mr. Poças Santos said this was a difficult problem. I will conclude with this. If you study this difficult problem, you constantly have to suppress a feeling that you have quite often in politics, but certainly in this case, a feeling of despondency. You have to suppress the feeling of wanting to give up because nothing can be done. Clearly, human weakness in this respect is so pronounced that we always find ways of excusing ourselves for production being so high or for the issue of licences for exports to countries or regional trouble spots to which arms should not be supplied. As politicians, we all play a part in this in our own countries. But we must not become despondent. After all, if we politicians become despondent, who will take charge? I feel we must realise that any step we take is an important step in a growing awareness of the responsibility of politics for an arms trade that has become extremely extensive – so extensive that there are many countries where weapons are available in abundance, while people are going hungry and having to do without housing and medicines. We politicians must tackle this imbalance between the billions of dollars spent on weapons and the billions of dollars needed for the development of the third world and Eastern Europe. It can only be done in small stages, but it has to be done nonetheless.

Thank you for the support you have given me. I assume that the recommendation will be adopted as it stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I have to inform the Assembly that the draft recommendation was approved unanimously by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1305.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

1. See page 34.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd June 1992, at 10.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1303).
2. New Euro-American relations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1310 and amendment).

Are there are objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1303*).
Speakers: Lord Mackie of Benshie (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rathbone (*Chairman*).
4. New Euro-American relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1310 and amendment*).
Speakers: Mr. Soell (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antretter, Mr. Rodrigues, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fabra, Mr. Machete, Mr. Nuñez, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Caro, Mr. Roseta, Mrs. Terborg, Mr. Lamminen (*Observer from Finland*), Mr. Soell (*Rapporteur*), Lord Mackie of Benshie (point of order), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. Soell, Mr. Stoffelen.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.40 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

I extend a warm welcome to Mr. Haekkerup and Mr. Sonderby as parliamentary observers.

The Presidential Committee met this morning and discussed the situation created by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people. While respecting their decision, the committee recalled the recommendation approved by the Assembly yesterday with Mr. Goerens's report and qualified the situation thus created as regrettable. It found that the referendum had no direct implications for WEU but thought that the new situation would have some indirect implications for our organisation.

It therefore decided to monitor closely government decision-making in response to this situation so that the necessary measures could be taken when the time came.

3. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1303)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1992 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1303.

I call Lord Mackie of Benshie, Rapporteur.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – It is my pleasure to present this report on the instructions of the Assembly, whose rules state: "The Assembly shall express its views... on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated." Unlike most parliaments, we do not have to approve the budget, we merely have to express an opinion on it, and that we can do. Colleagues will obviously have read the report. I pay great tribute to Mr. Cannizzaro, who has done a great deal of work and produced a document that covers all the points – even to the extent of showing how, by domestic savings, one section has been able to buy a new motor car. That is the sort of budgeting in which most families indulge.

1. See page 37.

Lord Mackie of Benshie (continued)

The whole art of budgeting, whether in business or elsewhere, relies on a set of criteria and a set of historical figures from which we can forecast the budget for the next year. That is enormously difficult in a time of great changes, as is the case now. The budget survey actually covers only two bodies – the Secretariat-General and one other – which have been established for a long time. That makes it possible to cover those bodies. The two new bodies have not yet presented their budgets, so we cannot criticise them.

I do not want to take too long on this matter. On the question of the Secretary-General's budget, it is important that there is some flexibility during a time of change and when a move to Brussels is taking place. We were glad to note that an increase had been allowed for, but that part of it had been frozen. I am not sure what that means, but I suspect that it is that that body has to apply again if it wants that portion of the increase. That is a sensible device if it is used properly. Indeed, the Council might consider it for the Assembly's budget. Last year, the Assembly had great trouble financing the accession of Portugal and Spain. If it had had a reasonable forecast and a frozen budget, it could have applied for those funds as soon as it needed to spend money. Instead, we were put to great trouble and it required great skill by the officials to keep within the budget.

The freezing measure that has been devised could be usefully employed in future. There is no question but that, with the move to Brussels and all the changes taking place, it is impossible to forecast exactly what sensible increases are needed. That issue has been well covered in the report. The total increase is 1.62%. It is misleading in that some non-recurring expenditure that occurred last year is not accounted for, so the increase is actually greater – but it is good, tight budgeting. Budgeting must be related to the political position and the changes taking place.

The pensions budget – with any necessary increases and decreases – should be absolutely automatic and should have nothing to do with the general running of affairs. It should not be related to the organisation's general expenditure. Supplementary budgets will, of course, be needed. As we say in the report, the budgets are tightly calculated and everything has been properly taken into account.

Paragraph 29 of the report states: "The Secretary of the committee, during a talk in London with the administrative staff of the Secretariat-General, held in a co-operative, cordial atmosphere, was able to obtain all the information he requested with a view to drafting the present report." We shall always meet in a cordial atmosphere as it makes it much easier to get along.

A chat over dinner will probably achieve a great deal more than passing acrimonious minutes between the organisations.

Another question is whether the civil service in European organisations should be seconded or join the permanent European civil service. I agree with Mr. Keith Speed to a large extent, but as Britain has been an island state for a long time and its citizens find it difficult to relate to Europe, it might be useful for people to move to and fro between the services.

The figures are all contained in the report and I thank you for listening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Nobody has asked to speak in the debate.

The Rapporteur does not wish to speak again.

I call Mr. Rathbone, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I have nothing substantial to add to what the Rapporteur has said in his excellent report and introductory speech, except to say that we have had our past budgetary difficulties. Present difficulties include insufficient staff to maintain the Assembly's ability to do the job with which we have charged ourselves and with which we are charged in representing our national parliaments here in WEU. If anybody doubts that, please walk along the first floor of this building and see the extremely cramped quarters in which our Assembly staff have had to work this week. They will have to continue to work in those conditions to do the job that we ask them to do on our behalf. I pay tribute to them for the work that they do, even under those difficult conditions.

We have initiated better budget-setting procedures in our relationship with the ministerial committee. I look forward to working with you, Mr. President, having established earlier this year our budget for 1993, which will be a year of change for our Assembly in all the tasks that we shall take upon ourselves in this post-Maastricht era.

Looking at 1992, I hope that I can reassure colleagues that we shall be able to do the minimum job necessary, although not all of the jobs that we should like to do. I hope, nevertheless, that we shall be able to do those in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1303.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

(Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

4. New Euro-American relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1310 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on new Euro-American relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1310 and amendment.

I call Mr. Soell, Rapporteur.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – The report before us deals chiefly with opinions, ideas and plans in the United States after the end of the cold war. Its starting point is an enlarged conception of security that contains political, economic, financial and military elements. All of us who travelled to the United States for the Political Committee in February of this year realised that, in a presidential election year, it was bound to be difficult to obtain definite answers to each of our questions. We have therefore elected to present a broad picture of the various aspects and subjects as well as of the opinions that we encountered.

My main objective in the first part, as should be obvious, was to recall our shared values and our common history as regards the stabilisation of democracy. I have mentioned this here again because, as one learns in politics, even obvious facts need constant repetition.

Next we have tried to bring out the fact that the prevailing tone of the declaration made by the American President about the treaties after the Maastricht summit was very positive. It is true that in the last part of this declaration he indicated certain differences, especially in connection with the Uruguay round. But reading between the lines, one senses that the United States has some difficulties with an economically and politically strongly integrated Europe, because of course such a Europe might engender competition between us, and this would undoubtedly call for fresh thinking by the Americans.

We gained the strong impression during our discussions in the United States that there are

still considerable differences of opinion on this subject in the various parts of the administration. And of course this applies to Congress as well to a considerable extent. For this reason the next few paragraphs deal intensively with certain drafts and plans within the Pentagon, even though we are aware that criticism of plans of this kind surfaced very quickly, both in American public opinion and in Congress, in fact resulting in modifications to those plans; nevertheless, such opinions exist. Since then a new version has appeared, particularly of the parts of these Pentagon papers published in the form of a first draft, so this section of the report must naturally be viewed in a new light.

The following paragraphs deal very intensively with the Uruguay round and the GATT negotiations. Since this subject was very strongly emphasised by the American Vice-President and some senators at the security conference in Munich last February, we must discuss the subject very thoroughly, in the light of the fact that the economic and financial questions referred to earlier are achieving greater prominence both in American public opinion and in Congress.

Not very much is said about the relationship of Europeans and of the United States with the third world. Against a background of the conference that has now begun in Rio, we have touched mainly upon ecological problems. We are aware that in this particular area problems will be increasing on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite certain agreements on principles, there is still a considerable gap as regards the exact data for certain measures in the area of climatic protection, the protection of species and, in particular, divergent opinions on the financing of the funds dedicated to the protection of the rain forest and many other things in third and fourth world countries.

We also have to consider a subject that is claiming increasing attention in discussions in the United States as well, namely quite specific practices and attitudes in international trade, which undoubtedly play a part in connection with GATT, but also in bilateral relations both between the United States and Japan and also between Europe and Japan. I believe that there are several common interests that have not so far been recognised as such. Certainly one can see attempts to deal with this subject mainly in bilateral terms in American-Japanese relations, but I believe that there are considerable common interests in this field, especially as regards the opening of particular markets. I am not thinking so much of the opening of markets for visible trade, where there are relatively few obstacles, but rather the internal make-up of the Japanese economy, which makes it difficult for both Europeans and Americans to enter the finance and insurance markets and to create

1. See page 38.

Mr. Soell (continued)

markets for certain products. In wide sectors of the economy there are quasi-cartels. This, too, opens up possibilities of co-operation between the United States and the European Community in the context of an enlarged concept of security.

Another section of the report is mainly devoted to the subject of "NATO and European Security". The Rome declaration provides the occasion for a further discussion of the rôle of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council. We know that there is no formal guarantee of security for the countries of Eastern Europe. That matter was also discussed in connection with Mr. Caro's report. But this debate on both sides of the Atlantic must be carried on in the awareness that military conflicts there are bound to affect the western countries. This of course is especially true of the very topical case of the former Yugoslavia.

For this reason the recommendations, which we have phrased very modestly, contain a call to define much more accurately the new threats we are now facing after direct threats have diminished, even though of course they have not completely disappeared. This applies to the wide area of the structure, training and mission of future armed forces, but also of the planned rapid action formations. Here we truly need a definition of the threats and a common assessment of the way in which we should react to them, but we also need an accurately defined distribution of tasks.

Proposals currently exist, particularly in the United States, for developing global protection against limited nuclear strikes. At present too little is known about the content of the individual plans.

There are additional reasons for us Europeans to hesitate before becoming involved in these plans. According to information in my possession, in the last few days a new American proposal has been put out, the details of which I must confess I had not previously known. At any rate I think that these American plans, also on offer to Europeans, call for intensive discussions.

We have also tried to pay attention to Canada's problems and Canada's share in European defence and joint security. The wish for Canada to continue to be very visibly committed to the security of Europe is expressed very clearly in our report. However, our certainty that Canada maintains this attitude is fading. All the same we have expressed our hope that notwithstanding the almost complete withdrawal of Canadian troops which is planned for the next two years, Canada will continue to show interest in joint transatlantic security in its

public opinion, its government and parliament, and that an intensive dialogue with Canada will be continued.

In closing permit me to add the following, after a long debate in the Political Committee: there have been several versions of this report. During this debate it has become very clear to me that different generations grasp and evaluate many facts and issues differently. There has been a very lively debate about several of the Rapporteur's assessments. And the Rapporteur himself has learnt much during this debate, since quite clearly there are different views, and there is a constant need to re-emphasise things that are really self-evident.

May I make an earnest request: at a time when new attitudes are called for, an intensive discussion is needed both about threat appraisal and the distribution of tasks. The tasks do not have to be redistributed completely afresh, but there must be a discussion about future threats, and a redistribution, and this discussion should as far as possible be carried on without prejudice and suspicion.

It is perhaps only a pious hope to say that the discussion should be carried on without prejudice and suspicion, but this appeal is directed to all of us, and of course to our friends and partners in America as well. Precisely because the direct threat has disappeared, there is an undoubted tendency, both here and elsewhere, to get into substitute action and find substitute opponents.

To make this debate fruitful for transatlantic relations we should keep the discussion free as far as possible from such prejudice, suspicion and substitute actions. I cherish the same hope for today's debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTTER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I hope you will not interpret the brevity of my speech as a measure of the importance I attribute to Mr. Soell's report. I believe that this report and Mr. Goerens's report are the two most important documents of the present session. I believe this one to be an important document because it makes clear that fresh light has to be shed on some major points in the area of security and defence and in Atlantic co-operation. I also believe it to be an important document because it clarifies the interests of our friends across the Atlantic by reporting on American political attitudes. Much has accordingly become more understandable.

Against this background, I wish to refer to only one aspect in detail – the Franco-German corps. My first reaction when I think about the agitation over this Franco-German corps is to

Mr. Antretter (continued)

remind myself that some five years ago there was a similar flurry when plans for the creation of the Franco-German brigade and the formation of a Franco-German security council became public.

At this time – if I may quote myself – I issued from this place a warning against annoying others by creating something on which no clear agreements yet existed and no clear information could be provided.

A similar situation has now arisen, since the President of France and the German Federal Chancellor announced at La Rochelle the formation of a Eurocorps.

To do this without at the same time publishing the agreements inevitably opened the doors to all sorts of interpretations and rumours, and this at a time when there are in any event differing ideas about a redefinition of task distribution between NATO and WEU. I am sure that many doubts and misunderstandings can be cleared away; but one thing should be avoided: the creation of new permanent command structures for a unit in which perhaps several countries may soon be participating, and which is under the command neither of NATO nor of WEU.

For then there would in future be three different security structures. It is therefore desirable for both the states involved to bring the project into WEU.

There is already too much mistrust within the overall alliance with regard to the intentions and ulterior motives of individual partners, and in fact this is particularly noticeable on the American side. It is in nobody's interest for this mistrust to be intensified, and we may therefore be thankful that the communiqué issued at the Elysée Palace on 22nd May 1992 expressly states that the corps will help to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. I believe, however, that a somewhat clearer gesture on the part of France, explaining this sentence and making it more specific, would have been helpful and desirable.

With the aid of some documents from government offices in America, of which one at least is described by the Rapporteur as being very significant, the report establishes that considerations are being raised in the United States with regard to relations between the United States and Europe which can only irritate and are bound to give rise to much concern in view of the demand in one of these documents that, "to avoid a competitive relationship from developing", the United States must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO.

But this is contrary to repeated advice to Europeans by the United States and, indeed, makes it downright ridiculous. For example, President John F. Kennedy wanted WEU to be regarded as the European pillar of NATO. Only very recently the United States and Europe agreed in Rome that Europe should develop a European security identity within NATO. I think it would be a good thing if today's debate helped to create clarity on these points. This is what makes many, if not all, Europeans regard NATO and the alliance purely as an instrument of American policy, through which the other partners to the treaty are dominated.

Such a view may be understandable, especially in the light of a number of American documents cited in the report, but it should not become the mainspring of our political activity. For thinking in hegemonies is not confined solely to NATO, but is repeatedly met within Europe itself, as for instance in warnings that Europe will in future be dominated by the Germans.

The alliance and European Union must rely primarily on mutual trust and on the common values that we wish to develop and defend. Our main concern should be to work at this rather than invoking the dangers of hegemony.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would remind speakers that the time allowed for each speech is five minutes.

I call Mr. Rodrigues.

Mr. RODRIGUES (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, colleagues, the report we are discussing has aroused a fascinating debate in the Political Committee. That is only to be expected.

Euro-American relations are at the very centre of the problems of European co-operation and security. And yet the subject is seldom dealt with openly or in any depth because dealing with delicate matters almost always gives rise to misunderstandings.

Hartmut Soell has taken up the challenge. In his report, and in the recommendations, I recognise work of the highest quality, of which we should be proud. It enhances the image of WEU. It has the breadth and significance of a paper which encompasses the political, economic and historical aspects of the new Euro-American relations. By setting these into the historical context the report also becomes a work reflecting on the path of man as he enters the twenty-first century.

Rather than avoiding the difficulties of a thorny problem, Mr. Soell has faced up to them. The first of the many merits of the report is perhaps the courage shown in rejecting the pious and hypocritical untruths which continue to surround the Euro-American dialogue, giving a mythical vision of the United States and its policies.

Mr. Rodrigues (continued)

For two hundred years the people of the United States have made a significant contribution to the progress of mankind, and the respect which this contribution inspires brings with it the need to speak clearly when the global strategy of the government of the Great Republic sometimes clashes with the democratic North American tradition.

In his report, our colleague, Mr. Soell, faces us with a number of disturbing contradictions.

On the other hand, President Bush, first after the Rome summit and again after Maastricht, issued a statement firmly supporting European Union. He urged WEU to assume even greater responsibility for defending our continent. And yet, in contradiction of these and other similar calls, it transpires that those responsible for defining the external policy of the United States insist on a highly self-centred, unilateral strategy.

One manifestation of this tendency is the now famous Pentagon document – to which Mr. Soell refers – which was revealed in March by the Washington Post and the New York Times.

In justification of the effort to prevent other powers, notably Japan and Europe, taking a fundamental rôle in world security, the Pentagon says – and I quote – “that they need not aspire to a greater rôle or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests”.

And why is this? The Defence Department intends that the United States – I quote – “must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order”. Documents such as this – and there are many – reveal a determined devotion to the dangerous myth of the redeeming nation, the myth of the founding fathers, taken up again recently by Presidents Reagan and Bush, whereby the United States alone can carry out the divine plan for the salvation of mankind.

Mr. Soell's report is not – could not be – anti-American. It is a report which dispassionately throws light on reality. In this it reminds us that the United States, in the grip of a long recession, is not in a position to support financially the ambitious strategy of world hegemony to which a large sector of the administration aspires. It is sufficient to remember that the intervention in the Gulf in 1991 was paid for primarily by its allies. This year the budgetary deficit alone is expected to exceed \$400 000 million.

Mr. Soell also reminds us, in a timely comment, of the existence of Asia. For instance, the Japanese economy alone amounts to twice

that of Germany, the giant of Europe. Japanese dynamism is such that, if the present rate of growth continues, the production of goods and services in Japan will, by the end of the century, have to aid the United States economy, despite the fact that the population of Japan is half that of America. To my mind, the most important pages of Mr. Soell's report are those which analyse and reflect on mankind in the world today.

The security of Europe is inseparable from the security of the planet as a whole, in other words, from the destiny of mankind. Therefore our partnership with the United States can be harmonious only if it is a partnership between equals. So far, unfortunately, this has not been the case.

Allow me to quote a fine passage from the conclusion to the report to justify this frankness: “Possible tensions in the long-standing Atlantic relationship can be averted only if the causes, possible consequences and related issues are discussed in an atmosphere of openness and without mutual recriminations.” That is what Mr. Soell has said.

I repeat: WEU has every reason to be proud of the report produced by its President which we are studying today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to comment on two points in the report. First, I should like to compliment Mr. Soell on an extremely good report in the version which we have now, together with the recommendations. It gives us a solid basis for re-examining our relationship with North America.

I should like to look briefly at two angles. I deeply regret the apparent decision in Canada to withdraw from what I call the first rank of nations and to retreat into what we saw before the last war in America – virtual isolation from the world. I do not believe that this is the genuine wish of the Canadian people, but I am not sure that we have been able to let the Canadians know how much we as Europeans really value their participation in the North Atlantic Alliance.

I am afraid that, all too often, we have talked about America instead of North America. I have always taken great care to talk about America and Canada. We desperately need to keep the Canadians involved because of what has happened in two world wars. I appeal to Canadians to think again. Perhaps, if they can solve their constitutional problems, as now looks to be a possibility, we can readdress ourselves to the linkage.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

On the United States, I think that we are yet again in the cycle in which the Americans ask: "Why should we involve our manpower and our money in Europe?" There is no longer the menace of communism or of the Warsaw Pact. All now looks simple. New democracies have been established. Of course, the Americans rightly chide us as Europeans for allowing tens of thousands of people to be murdered in Yugoslavia by a state that manifests such savagery. Let no one say that there is any civilisation left in the Government of Serbia, because it is behaving in a brutal, savage way – in a way which, frankly, has not been seen in even some of the worst excesses of African dictatorships.

And yet the Americans say to us: "Why have you done nothing?" We heard yesterday all the reasons, none of which I accept. It was possible six months ago, to have stopped 90% of the deaths if any one of our countries had been prepared to do it. It is too late today.

What we now have to do is to work out, as Europeans, what we believe we require for the defence of Europe, for the defence of the new democracies against, who knows what? Iraq has, perhaps, no longer a nuclear weapon capability, but has North Korea? How many other countries have such a capability? That is why we cannot give up nuclear deterrence. I accept that Russia is no longer the enemy, but other countries could be.

We must work out what we require for Europe and what we are prepared to pay for that. It is rather like WEU budgets, when we gaily go ahead and want to spend more than we have in the budget. We must work out our budget and what we can afford to pay and then say to the Americans, as our partners: "We need to get as part of our security, which is your security, these items." If we do it that way we can get the message over to the new American Congress on how that can operate. If we continue to believe that America will automatically give us support we will be making a great mistake. No one can predict who is likely to win the next American presidential election. We all have our own views but it would be dangerous for Europeans to state them. I say to the Americans that we should work out what we need and sit down and talk it through.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fabra.

Mr. FABRA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, owing to the important changes which have taken place in the world and especially in Europe, it is now more than ever necessary to create a new architecture for world security as demonstrated by the need to strengthen the European pillar, because we cannot, nor would

we wish to, continue without our allies on the other side of the Atlantic.

What I had intended to say at this juncture has been rendered unnecessary by the presentation and approval in committee of the amendment tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward and touched upon by Mr. Caro. Consequently, if we ensure that the Franco-German corps is placed under the authority of WEU and that all of this contributes to strengthening the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, then I have nothing more to say, except to vote in favour of it.

Mr. President, clearly these recommendations should have an objective, but some of these paragraphs in the explanatory memorandum do not appear to me to be best suited to accompany the draft recommendation if it is to be received in the United States and Canada as we would wish it to be. I am not referring to the twenty-four paragraphs which have been deleted altogether, nor to those others which have been substantially altered. There are still a number of paragraphs which are pure speculation or value judgments and are quite divorced from reality, or which pass judgment on deeds or ideas of two hundred years ago. In doing this, we are merely passing judgment on ourselves. In criticising the idiosyncracies of the North Americans are we not also criticising ourselves? Is the American way of conducting oneself anything more than the combination of French pride, British efficiency, German industry, Dutch, Belgian or Luxembourg astuteness, the Italian sense of community, Portuguese spirituality or the Spanish ability to improvise? Mr. President, the truth is that I would not like our friends and relations across the Atlantic to believe that that is what we think of them.

Mr. President, I recognise the effort Mr. Soell has made in agreeing to changes in a text which is his, and his alone. Perhaps I am the one who is mistaken, and the majority of those present share the view, past and present, of our allies as they are reflected in the explanatory memorandum; if this is so, they should understand that the only possible and plausible way out for the United States and Canada is a return to the Monroe doctrine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Machete.

Mr. MACHETE (*Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in my view the report which Mr. Soell has presented on the new Euro-American relations is a good summary and contains many interesting suggestions concerning future developments. It sets out clearly the complex nature of the present situation and the doubts and hesitations which both Americans and Europeans are experiencing faced with the upheavals taking place in Europe.

Mr. Machete (continued)

Moreover, it is – and this should be stressed – not only a report on questions of security, but also on the more important aspects of Euro-American relations. One of its most significant attributes, already pointed out by my Portuguese colleague who spoke before me, is that it is a balanced report which, while drawing attention to American idealism – which gave us the declaration on human rights, Jefferson's declaration of independence and the entire history of the United States justifying its struggle for freedom – does not on the other hand neglect the fact that the United States is now the only superpower in the world, from which it has acquired a certain philosophy of power which also permeates its international relations and its international policies.

This latter point has particularly clear repercussions especially for the Uruguay round in the renewal of GATT.

Let us hope that the recent reform of the common agricultural policy will in this case point to a new way out of a particularly difficult situation. This is also true in relation to NATO, and the difficulties which this organisation has encountered in coming to terms with the new situation in which we are living, and in understanding clearly the negative reactions to the Franco-German military corps.

This leads us to recognise that we have to make an increased effort in order to continue to enjoy American interest and support in matters concerning the defence of Europe, which is vital, and which is symbolised in particular by the presence of troops. This is fundamental for the pursuit of European security policy – and we must not forget that, for our part, it is our right and our duty to achieve more self-reliance in defence matters.

I believe that the creation of a high-level, mixed group, as is proposed at the end of Mr. Soell's report, is a first step towards this, but naturally it is a very small step, because within NATO we had an arrangement able to deal with any problem which will be dealt with by that group.

It is essential to point out that we must compel – if you will forgive the expression – our American friends to take an increasing interest in Europe, and also that Europeans are capable of assuming responsibility for defence policy and overcoming the difficulties of building European unity – demonstrated yesterday with the negative result of the Danish referendum.

These two efforts must go hand in hand, and it is essential, given what is at stake, that we do not relax our efforts to achieve speedy and tangible results.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Nuñez.

Mr. NUÑEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Soell's report raises the question of the urgent need for a calm and thorough dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic Alliance on the construction of a common European policy. In my view, such a debate should be given a wider framework, in the context of the need for new political, diplomatic and economic relations between the American and European allies. Just now when all relationships, both human and international, are so closely interconnected, no single country or organisation can claim to possess the solution to the world's problems. No one can resolve all of the problems alone. For this reason Euro-American relations must be considered on the basis of postulates which are free from the prejudices that have existed between the European and American allies as a consequence of over forty years of cold war.

Our American allies should understand that we in Europe are in a period of institutional change and that the desire of Europeans to create a European defence and security policy is only one more consequence of the European desire to build the European Union. Our American allies should understand, therefore, that this is compatible with the existence of NATO and military forces which are under the flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and of course the Maastricht summit left no doubt about WEU's dual vocation, namely to constitute the European defence and security identity and, at the same time, to serve as the European pillar of NATO. Our American allies must understand this dual vocation because relations between Europe and North America must be based on two fundamental principles: the respect of each party for the identity of the other, without which the common fruits we all desire will not be forthcoming, and, at the same time, the need for mutual complementarity. But we must start with the respect for each other's identity. And I believe I can say that I am, to a large extent, in agreement with what my colleague Mr. Fabra has said. We must avoid mistrust, but we must also have clear ideas and proceed on the basis that each has its own identity.

Europe has its own identity which is different from the American identity. This does not mean that there are no common roots, and there must be complementarity, but starting from the separate identity of each of the parties on either side of the Atlantic. It is unfortunate that in this particular instance there is no understanding or awareness on the part of the Americans of this new European reality.

When our colleague Mr. Lopez Henares presented his report, we drew attention to this lack of awareness and understanding and the need to

Mr. Nuñez (continued)

remedy it in connection with the necessary parliamentary relations between Europe and Latin America. We are living in the age of information when not to be known is almost not to exist. We in Europe must be aware that many Americans do not know in which part of the world Europe is situated and there are some American congressmen who are not aware of the existence of WEU; it is from this basis that we must start to strengthen our collaboration and our ties.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope that after the elections in the United States there will be a clarification and strengthening of our links, and I am certain that given the intellect, the sense of balance and enthusiasm of our new President, Mr. Soell, whom I congratulate personally and publicly on his appointment, collaboration between Europe and America will also bear important fruit, based on respect for each other's identity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHE (United Kingdom). – I congratulate Mr. Soell on the enormous amount of work that he has done. I read the report with tremendous awe, and am glad that we have a new President who is prepared to put in the hard work to provide such a wide survey.

I shall concentrate on the simple matter of defence and our approach to the United States. I went to the United States with the Political Committee and found it absolutely fascinating. Apart from the representatives from the National Heritage Foundation, an organisation with right-wing leanings, we met some other admirable people. Those in Washington understood the world, Europe and the problems.

However, I also gained the impression that I was considered a barbarian from the far north of Hadrian's wall who had arrived in Rome, where I was seen rather as a creature from outer space might be seen, a supplicant in that great imperial capital. Perhaps that is true, but the snag about going to the United States is that all the parliamentarians are so busy doing their work one can never meet them, and sees them only occasionally. The same is true of our parliaments. We should get a bunch of congressmen over to Paris. It was not long ago that every American hoped to die in Paris. It is extraordinarily remiss of the French to have let the relationship slip so far that there is now some hostility between the two. The French have not displayed their usual cunning in using their cultural heritage in international relations.

Over here, we have a good chance of getting everyone to listen and understand our problems

in Europe. We should work towards that, rather than visiting the United States as a body – just one of the hundreds of organisations that go there to put their case.

It is vital that we get our own act together. If I were an American looking at the result in Denmark, narrow though it is, I would say that those people do not know where they are going. If I were an American looking at the formation of the Franco-German corps, I would ask what sort of arrangement invites other people to join. Surely any arrangement should be by mutual decision.

If Europe got its act together and spoke with one voice, the Americans would listen. But as long as we do not know where we are going, they will have great doubts about what they should do. We have heard many examples – Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has already mentioned our shame about doing nothing to resolve the Yugoslavian crisis. Let us get our act together in Europe so that we have some influence. We can then preserve NATO as a real force for world peace in a world that is still dangerous.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (France) (Translation). – The report by our colleague and President, Mr. Hartmut Soell, presents a number of thoughts and a draft recommendation which, even if some of us might not altogether agree with what it says about the way to talk to our American friends, provide an overall statement with which I am in agreement.

We are presently discussing the first and second versions of Mr. Soell's report. A few days ago I was in Washington with a delegation from the French National Assembly and, after our talks with members of Congress, my overall impression was that mutual understanding with them depends upon the use of direct, frank and fair language, to speak in diplomatic terms. I must also say that just then the French position was front page news. The use of hollow language, saying we are still friends, references to La Fayette and French cuisine to ensure a friendly reception are clichés no longer serving any point except as a reminder that when it comes to human rights the Americans and the French are in the forefront of the battle.

It is true, as Mr. Soell reminds us, that with the Americans, moral duty governs all major decisions on the international scene, whatever they be, and that we Europeans, out of a kind of modesty or even shyness, tend to consider these references to the great values as being so obvious that they are better left out. That could be a psychological problem due to the differences in language and attitude on the two sides of the Atlantic.

Mr. Caro (continued)

To my mind, contact with the United States is essential for European development in conditions of coherence, complementarity and mutual understanding. Therefore, though approving the draft recommendation and the amendment tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward, I and my colleagues, on behalf of the federated group which I have the honour to chair, intend to propose to the other members of the political groups of the WEU Assembly that we suggest to the Presidential Committee that it put on its agenda the idea of setting up an official body for liaison between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of the United States and Canada. This permanent institution, which would not need to be eternally meeting, would have the political advantage of being in existence. By utilising the qualifications of the members of such a body, whatever the method used, meeting together, corresponding or using modern techniques such as tele-conferencing, we could demonstrate to the public that WEU realises that the objective it has in view, via the Maastricht Treaty and other means, can only be achieved through close co-operation with the United States and that WEU is concerned to dispel misunderstandings and seek whenever possible a common political will.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Roseta.

Mr. ROSETA (*Portugal*) (Translation). – May I congratulate our President, Mr. Soell, most warmly on his excellent report on the most important aspects of Euro-American relations. My colleague and friend Mr. Machete has already dealt with some of its main points and, as I am in complete agreement with what he has said, I shall refrain from repeating it.

I would simply point out that the report contains an excellent historical exposé incorporating both political and economic aspects, as my compatriot Mr. Rodrigues said, and presents an accurate picture of the complexity of the world today. I would also like to congratulate Mr. Soell on being so open-minded throughout the lively and interesting debate which took place in the Political Committee, enabling some aspects which I and various other colleagues felt to be rather too critical to be re-examined.

This final version of the report is, I think, well balanced, even though it still contains some criticisms. The alliance does not exclude criticism; I believe that it even calls for it. A true alliance, obviously, would call for each of the allies to be critical of the other.

There is much to be said for moderation in all things. Whatever thoughts the Pentagon may have had – and I consider that too much attention may have been paid to them, even

though obviously they needed to be criticised – the American administration and representatives, and in particular the Senate, will understand that Europe has both the right and the duty to be free to build its own identity, now and in the future, especially in the field of defence, security and global foreign policy, without detriment to national identities.

I think that our American friends are realists – they know who today has the resources to sustain policies and even operations, such as the intervention in the Gulf to which reference has already been made – and as realists they understand that Pentagon documents designed primarily to obtain funds for a particular department are not going to dominate the foreign and security policy of the United States, particularly as regards relations with Europe in the coming decades.

I would like to stress that I agree with the recommendation to define the respective rôles of NATO and WEU as regards security and peace in Europe in this new world situation.

For the Portuguese people, relations between the partners on either side of the Atlantic are still very important. We all know that, without detracting in any way from our interest in security in Europe in general and our concerns regarding the Mediterranean, the defence of the Atlantic is just as important. Consequently, we would be less than honest if we did not at this point stress the importance we attach to transatlantic links, not only with the United States but with Canada and other countries, in particular Brazil.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate my congratulations to the Rapporteur and say that, together with other colleagues, I expressly support the amendment tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward, which I think is relevant and timely and will, therefore, have my vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Terborg.

Mrs. TERBORG (*Germany*) (Translation). – When I read the report of our President and Rapporteur, Mr. Soell, about new relations between Europe and America – thoroughly, with all its points and conclusions – I had to admit that he had managed to draw a very full portrait of the conduct of transatlantic relations. It was not only his grasp of history that brought me to this recognition. I was fascinated by the long list of actual and alleged irritations in relations between Western Europe and the United States, between the United States and Asia, between Europe, the United States and the CIS.

The report told me about the efforts of the alliance partners to define their attitude to all

Mrs. Terborg (continued)

parts of the world, including the ecological dimensions, in such a way as to gain much influence but assume as little responsibility as possible. I found my suspicion confirmed that in the search for constantly new compromise formulas the cracks between interests were being plastered over. Therefore I struggled through the two hundred and eighty six numbered paragraphs of the report, instead of reading only the recommendation at its head.

This led me to the conclusion that the search for new security and defence architectures – or even identities – is a comparatively inconspicuous aspect compared with the great task of developing new architectures of trust and co-operation that will help to avoid economic wars – a danger that is far from over – which will allow our earth to survive – and Rio will show how clumsily and selfishly we approach that problem – and will create real solidarity, both with Eastern Europe and with third world countries. As yet I have detected no convincing steps in this direction.

After studying the report I asked myself: what can WEU really contribute? How creative can and should it be in preventing a failure in the areas mentioned above from finally involving us in helping to settle the contradictions of this world in a plethora of local, regional and other conflicts by means of a modernised military architecture?

At that point I decided that I should have to ask you this question, and I knew beforehand that I should be thwarted by the preconception that here was somebody trying to introduce pacifist thinking. Why so? Surely because we all lack a predictive architecture that is humane, mutually supportive and to some extent necessary even for the survival of humanity. May I remind you of yesterday evening? After we had painstakingly worked through the crisis in Yugoslavia, the last proposal was to threaten military intervention. As long as that is the last resort of civilised humanity, it is a pathetic alternative and one of which our Assembly has no reason to be proud.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lamminen, Observer from Finland.

Mr. LAMMINEN (*Observer from Finland*). – Mr. President, fellow parliamentarians, on behalf of the Finnish Parliament I wish to express our appreciation for your invitation to attend this meeting as observers. As you know, Finland applied for membership of the European Community in March this year and that, of course, means that it is important for us to follow developments in WEU.

I should like to use this opportunity to say a few words about current attitudes in Finland

towards European Union. The Maastricht Treaty establishes a common foreign and security policy for the European Union and provides for the development of a defence dimension and for a rôle for WEU. In seeking European Community membership, Finland approves the *acquis communautaire*, the content of the Maastricht Treaty and the *finalité politique* of European Union. Finland accepts all the obligations of the treaty and is prepared to participate constructively in its implementation, as agreed in Maastricht.

Finland has always pursued a policy aimed at stability and security in northern Europe. For the time being the core of the policy of neutrality in the Europe of today may be characterised as military non-alignment and independent defence. We intend to maintain an effective and credible national defence capability commensurate with our security environment.

At present membership of WEU is not a condition of membership of the European Community. Finland's future decisions in that respect will depend on how WEU develops in the next few years and on the rôle that WEU will assume in carrying out the foreign and security policy of the European Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Soell, the Rapporteur.

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am pleased that Mr. Antretter has welcomed this report. I underline what he said about the Franco-German corps, and in particular what he said about the information policy that accompanied the resolutions relating to this Franco-German corps.

I believe that in our new situation, in which there are many irritations, it is essential to a common policy that we should not add to the number of these irritations. The problems we already have will give us enough to do.

Mr. Rodrigues said that in the past the partnership between Europe and the United States based on equal rights has not been properly recognised in some quarters. In this connection we must of course remember that the often confusing multiplicity both of public opinion in individual states and of the pronouncements of European bodies are not always fully comprehensible to American public opinion and American politicians. I believe that this point was emphasised by many speakers as a necessary piece of self-criticism.

I particularly support Sir Geoffrey's appeal to the Canadian Government to reconsider once more its decision to withdraw practically all its troops from Europe. We made a similar point in referring to this matter in the report and recommendation.

Mr. Soell (continued)

In connection with attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic I should like to say something more about the conflict in Yugoslavia. You know that even in connection with the Gulf conflict, European public opinion was claiming that a double standard was being established in international relations.

Even as I refer to this opinion, I do not think it is a fair one, because in fact Europeans are primarily responsible for taking the necessary steps in their own area; that is increasingly the theme of European domestic policy. If there had been relatively early and sufficient awareness of the conflict before the first shot had been fired and the first blood shed, we should of course be in a considerably better position.

Now I should like to deal with Mr. Fabra's criticism of the report. He thought that much of its content might well cause the United States to fall back upon the attitudes of the Monroe doctrine. I do not share this scepticism – indeed I believe that plain speaking by both sides, together with the necessary self-criticism, is more likely to lead to a joint definition of future policy.

Mr. Machete expressed certain fears that there is a kind of power philosophy marking the attitude of the United States, for instance in the GATT negotiations. We all know that the United States faces considerable economic problems. However, we should not rejoice at these misfortunes but simply show awareness of them, just as we expect the Americans to take account of such things as the big structural problems of European agriculture.

At all events Mr. Machete emphasised the need for the proposal which forms part of the draft recommendation, namely to set up a high-level working group to make threat assessments and define the distribution of tasks.

We do not wish to pursue these contacts exclusively as Western European Union and the European Union. We know of course that this discussion is also being conducted in the framework of NATO. However, it is conducted only between individual nations and their governments within NATO. We want to venture upon a new step, namely that this European Union which is coming into being should, as it were, define the problems in the sphere of foreign and security policy jointly with the United States and Canada.

Former Foreign Minister Genscher has proposed a transatlantic treaty. Perhaps we should include this idea in the proposal made by Mr. Caro for the creation of a permanent liaison body between the American Congress and the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, because there are still many problems in

this area and in particular our work is not yet sufficiently widely known.

Mr. Caro has already given some interesting information in discussions in the Political Committee – and as a member of my national parliament I have had the same experience – about the fact that in the American Congress people are more likely to be given a hearing as members of a delegation from a national parliament than as members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union. This is another reason for my previous observation.

Lord Mackie made a brief reference to our discussion in the National Heritage Foundation. That of course was not fully in the mainstream of the rest of our discussions. In the State Department itself we were given very full and pertinent answers which in fact differed from what we were told in the National Heritage Foundation.

I think we should bear in mind that a certain section of public opinion, which is still reflected in the Pentagon's thinking, persists in the old view that the Americans want to negotiate with the individual European nations and their governments in the first instance. They expect the Germans to influence others in the field of economic and agricultural policy, and they expect the British to act in harmony with the American attitude in the area of security policy. And there is an old love affair with the French.

We are not yet in a position to provide evidence for a new transatlantic love affair between Europe and the United States, because the history of these relationships is still relatively short. But there is real need for a great effort, Lord Mackie, to make it clear to the American public and American politicians that it will cost a great deal to promote a common European foreign and security policy, and that we cannot continue with the multidimensionality of the old ways. I believe that that was the burden of nearly all the contributions to the debate, and of course it presupposes much greater unity between us Europeans.

May I in closing refer to another point. Mrs. Terborg raised an issue that must affect us all very much, against the background of the current crisis in Yugoslavia. Our predictive architecture is still underdeveloped. That I admit. However much our perception of this or that conflict may differ, we naturally want all conflicts to be perceived as early as possible, before military activity breaks out. Furthermore, we must be aware that there are also massive cultural and economic differences, and that many historical conflicts still existed even among the Twelve, because national diplomacies naturally often drew upon their own fund of experience. It is still true that the road back to Sarajevo is comparatively shorter than

Mr. Soell (continued)

the road towards overcoming Yalta, as we have found during the past year.

As a historian I can well understand people having recourse to their national fund of experience. However, if we wish to structure policy for the future, if we want to perceive crises and conflicts in good time, we must try to define our common interests as soon as possible. That applies to Europeans among themselves, and it also applies to American-European relations. That will enable us to make a better job of creating the predictive architecture, the lack of which you have rightly deplored.

I thank you for your suggestions in the debate and ask you to vote for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie of Benshie, on a point of order I presume.

Lord MACKIE of BENSHEIE (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps I was not heard correctly. I said that, “apart from” the National Heritage Foundation we had highly intelligent conversations of a hopeful nature.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Political Committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – As many colleagues said, the Political Committee had a very successful visit to the United States and Canada. It was fascinating not so much because we had extremely lengthy contacts with American colleagues, but because the discussions were so fruitful.

I wish to make two more remarks. First, I compliment the Rapporteur. He knows better than anyone how difficult it can be to write a report – and the report is the property of the Rapporteur – and produce a document that makes the committee happy. As last, he presented a text that not only had his signature on it but caused a pleasant feeling in the committee.

Secondly, it is easy to speak critically of the mistrust and lack of understanding in the United States. When we were there we made it clear that there will be political union – and I reiterate that today, despite the results of the referendum – and that there will be a security and defence identity and a common European security and defence policy. We said that that was the reality, whether people liked it or not. It will happen, and sooner than many people think.

We must also realise that we cause many, many problems. People have said that matters are difficult to explain, and that was shown in the reaction of Mrs. Terborg. I am not speaking in a personal way; I am reflecting the feelings of

the committee. If I see people suffering, dying and asking for help, I cannot simply tell them that it is the fault of the arms exporters, although to some extent it is. It is also due to the miserable lack of courage of European governments. There is a cry for help.

Almost everyone here is willing to build up a security identity to help people and to keep or restore peace. Our discussions with the United States must continue; just one visit is not enough. I agree with the proposal that has been put forward, but we must develop ways and means to have constant discussions with our friends in the United States and Canada.

The Rapporteur and the committee deserve the Assembly's approval of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On this text I have been informed of one amendment, Amendment 1 tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add:

“insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht Agreement, the Franco-German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must strengthen the alliance military structure;”

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to speak to the amendment.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – There is really only one issue, and it is the one set out in my amendment. On 22nd May the La Rochelle meeting produced no details, although they had been promised for a long time, about the Eurocorps. We need to know what will be the real relationship of the corps both to WEU and NATO.

It is interesting to note that the Belgian Government has highlighted two issues that give substance to my amendment. First, it says that the Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority; and, secondly, that it must involve no weakening of the alliance structure. The information so far available appears to show that those conditions may not be fulfilled, although yesterday Mr. Kinkel was more positive. I was also delighted to have Mr. Antretter's support for my proposal.

France has already clearly stated that the political authority of the corps will be the participants, not WEU. Availability to WEU is only one option, at the discretion of participating partners. In that case, its command will be uncertain. Meanwhile, France and Germany continue to speak as though the Eurocorps will

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

eventually expand into a European army that will become a third structure under the European Union, outside NATO and WEU. Again, that was what Mr. Antretter said earlier. That is directly contrary to the agreement in Maastricht that WEU would be the vehicle for non-NATO European defence.

The corps could have serious implications for the NATO integrated military structure because German units will have the corps and not their NATO formations as their primary assignments. Under the decision-making arrangements, in effect, France will decide whether the German elements are deployed as part of the corps or in their present NATO rôle.

The availability of the corps units to NATO will be complicated by additional agreements and political decisions, in addition to NATO's well-tried procedures. The primary task of the corps – the defence of NATO territories – unnecessarily duplicates what all of the allies have agreed, and most recently at Rome, as the responsibility of the alliance.

As I said, in practice it may be different, but we have not had any details. That is why it is essential that we are all aware of our policy as an Assembly, which is to have WEU as the bridge between the EC and NATO. We must ensure that we remain true to that and to what was agreed at Maastricht. We need to agree the amendment – which, as I am sure the Chairman will say, is approved of and supported by the Political Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am going to use a procedure, well known in our parliaments, in which one can always find a touch of humour; as a French member of parliament, I am going to speak against the amendment in order to say that I am in favour of it.

What I want as a Frenchman and a European is that this army corps should strengthen not only the military structures of NATO, as Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has said, but also – obviously – Western European Union, which we want to see performing the rôle of defence organ of the European Union.

Clearly, although this is currently a bilateral treaty, the option is European. When the construction of Europe first began, the Germans and French launched the European Coal and Steel Community which started the building process. Today the French and the Germans are offering Europe this first possibility of having

a European military structure by joining their forces.

In my view, this is a European option, and it is in this spirit that I support Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Caro has just made use of a rule which he knows very well because he has been President of this Assembly under somewhat unusual circumstances. I am sure he will allow me to ask if anyone else wishes to speak against the amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

Nobody wishes to speak.

What is the opinion of the committee?...

Mr. SOELL (*Germany*) (Translation). – Since in the draft recommendation of Mr. Goerens's report – I refer to paragraph 14 of the recommendation proper, a proposal made jointly by myself and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg – we said something similar to what is now being restated in detail, I have no objection to the recommendation being amplified as proposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). The committee decided by an extremely large majority to express a favourable opinion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I especially thank the Rapporteur, President of our Assembly, and the Chairman of the committee.

1. See page 39.

**5. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany.
2. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France.
3. The development of a European space-based observation system (Presentation of

and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1304 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany.

Replies by Mr. Rühle to questions put by: Baroness Hooper, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Fioret, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Caro, Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece).

5. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France.

Replies by Mr. Joxe to questions put by: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Pahtas (Observer from Greece), Mr. van der Linden, Mr. Martinez.

6. The development of a European space-based observation system (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1304 and amendments*).

Speakers: Mr. Valleix (Rapporteur), Mr. Borderas, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Valleix (Rapporteur), Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman), Mr. Fourré, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Lopez Henares.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now inform the Assembly that I have received the nomination of Mr. Martinez for one of the two vacant posts of Vice-President of the Assembly.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of this Vice-President be by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Martinez elected Vice-President of the Assembly.

4. Address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Rühle, Minister of Defence of Germany.

(The President continued in German)

Minister, allow me to welcome you to this Assembly in our own language. Since Western European Union was reactivated, it has become the fine custom for the defence ministers, too, to address this Assembly. It would in fact have been appropriate if this had been done before 1984.

As you know, this Assembly has great expectations as regards the details that will be added to what the governments of the nine member states decided in Maastricht. But let me begin by making a comment concerning you personally. As a parliamentarian, you have gained wide-ranging international experience, especially in European-American relations. This is a time of

¹ See page 43.

The President (continued)

radical change and reorientation. In the few weeks you have been in office you have laid down the first markers at national level for the fulfilment of the requirements of this reorientation.

The challenges at international level are even greater. I have just referred to the declaration of the Nine in the context of the Maastricht Treaty. At this part-session we have adopted two recommendations, one concerning the Eurocorps. It shows that we expect the Eurocorps to be firmly planted in the institution that is Western European Union and generally to strengthen the political and military cohesion of the alliance.

As regards the sanctions designed to bring the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to an end, the Assembly decided yesterday after a debate under the urgent procedure to recommend the Council of Ministers to take the necessary measures as soon as possible to give effective support to these sanctions.

I put forward these briefly summarised expectations with you in mind. May I now ask you to address the Assembly.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, after the visit of my colleague, Mr. Kinkel, at the beginning of the week you are now seeing a second new face from Germany. I must say I am happy to be here. I am looking forward to working with you, and what I would like to do today is discuss new aspects of European defence policy with you. This debate is taking place not only at the end of the German presidency, but at a time that is generally important for WEU's development, shortly after the Franco-German summit at La Rochelle and NATO's spring meeting and shortly before the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 19th June.

Addressing the Assembly of Western European Union on the subject of European security and defence policy, I am well aware that I am carrying coals to Newcastle. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a few significant points.

The failure of socialism and the fact that the division of Europe and Germany has been overcome have wrought a fundamental change in the political geography of Europe. The one-dimensional threat of the East-West conflict is a thing of the past. But its place has been taken by new and less definite dangers and risks. Today, conflicts are bursting out in Europe which had been kept under the concrete lid of communism but have never been settled: border disputes that remain to be solved, ethnic conflicts, social and economic problems.

And finally, it is not only security in Europe which is at stake but also security for Europe.

The task of safeguarding peace in freedom for all Europeans requires not least a broad range of precautions against developments fraught with crisis and conflict in other regions of the world, precautions for which we have to use all political and economic instruments available to us.

Years of continuous transformation are lying ahead. This transformation must be structured and controlled by us. Having won the cold war, we are now facing the challenge to win the peace. In this era, there is no clear-cut architecture of security in Europe. The landscape of security policy has become fluid and will not crystallise into new, solid structures for years to come.

In this situation it is an advantage that there are NATO, CSCE, the emerging Political Union of Europe, and WEU, institutions that provide us with a set of instruments to use in safeguarding our security interests.

Many questions concerning the mutual relations of these institutions are as yet unanswered. But if there is a collective political resolve guiding our actions, then we shall answer these institutional questions. Conversely, however, the following is true as well: institutional arrangements, let alone military structures, cannot take the place of political consensus.

Let me add just a few sentences about the institutions of security which we have. NATO, in its capacity as a security and defence alliance, continues to provide the basis of our security. Being the only functioning alliance, it is the guarantor for peace and stability in Europe. In forty years, the Atlantic Alliance and the presence of American forces have come to be an integral part of what I would call the European security culture. The United States is and will continue to be an Atlantic power, present on both sides of the Atlantic. This fact is not only indispensable for maintaining the security balance in Europe; it is also preserving the political weight of the United States in Europe.

To enable the alliance to accomplish its mission, it must not be overstressed, for instance by far-reaching security guarantees for the CIS states giving rise to conflicts within the alliance that would be beyond control. All the same, NATO will extend its political rôle to include that of a security system for Europe as a whole. The establishment of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council has provided a forum for dialogue and co-operation with the eastern partners. This puts into practice what the NATO foreign ministers formulated as follows at the Copenhagen meeting in June last year: Our security is indivisible from that of all other European states.

Moreover, I consider it conceivable that NATO may make available to CSCE, on a case-

Mr. Rühle (continued)

to-case basis, its resources for peace-keeping measures. But one thing must be understood clearly: NATO's main mission will continue to be the protection of the alliance, the preservation of the security and integrity of its member countries. Only when NATO accomplishes this mission will it be able to act as an anchor of stability for Europe as a whole.

Not least the conflicts raging in the former Yugoslavia have made clear that there are situations of crisis for European security in which NATO is neither in a position nor willing to intervene. This sober analysis forces the Europeans to shoulder more responsibility for their security. And Europe must not be incapable of taking action when it is a matter of preserving peace and freedom. The Europeans must therefore provide the instruments required to enable them to safeguard their own best security interests. This is why the decision of Maastricht to strengthen, with the assistance of WEU, the common European identity in the domain of security and defence is of strategic importance.

The mission devolving on WEU in this context is to co-operate in the development of a common defence identity in its capacity as an integral part of the European Political Union. WEU is to be in a position to develop and implement decisions of defence policy. The German presidency has been active in all these domains. Special importance attached to the Bonn meetings of the chiefs of defence staff held on 27th January and 20th May. At those meetings, the chiefs of defence staff talked about how to concretise the operational rôle of WEU and prepared the necessary political decisions. In the future they will – so it was decided – meet regularly before ordinary meetings of the ministerial Council, and additionally whenever required.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Eurocorps, whose establishment was agreed upon at the Franco-German summit in La Rochelle on 22nd May, is an important addition to the European security scene. The activation cell will start to work in July, and by 1995 the corps is to be operational. In the perspective of the European Union, the corps is then to be able to accomplish three missions, doing so within the scope of national constitutional provisions and in compliance with the United Nations Charter: missions in the framework of collective defence of the allies in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or with the Brussels Treaty; missions aimed at maintaining or restoring peace, and missions for the purposes of humanitarian aid. The decision on its commitment will rest with the respective governments.

WEU, as the link between NATO and the emergent European Political Union, is the pol-

itical roof of the Eurocorps. I am confident that very soon other countries will participate in the Eurocorps which began as a Franco-German initiative, whose perspective is however that of a really European corps.

The process of building European security structures, however, must be pursued together with, not against NATO. But the United States, too, has a vital interest in a stronger European partner who will assume more responsibility for its security. What is decisive is for the Europeans to take these steps in consensus especially with the United States, and to beware of communicating the wrong signals. The shaping of European security structures must be guided by the principles of transparency and complementarity. The United States and Canada are and continue to be indispensable partners in stability and guarantors of a lasting, peaceful development in Europe.

In this regard I feel it is essential that the German forces foreseen for the Eurocorps will not be withdrawn from their NATO assignment. They will be faced with an additional mission, but will remain fully available to NATO. In the press release on the meeting of the Franco-German Security and Defence Council at La Rochelle, too, we have once more made clear that the national contributions to the Eurocorps do not prejudice any existing commitments to other organisations.

Moreover, the missions of the Eurocorps provide for a significant contribution to joint operations at NATO level in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Against this background, the relationship between the French units in the corps and the alliance assumes a new quality. Like other national and multinational forces, the European corps may be employed in the WEU framework as well as in the framework of NATO in the function of a special European contribution. Under this régime, France will make available the troops it contributes to the corps either to NATO's reaction forces or to its main defence forces, as the situation may require. This is a step forward.

Germany has only been able to agree to the Eurocorps' mission subject to what its current constitutional situation permits it to accept. As regards this, we Germans are facing the question to what extent our security policy is capable of assuming a European dimension. The united and sovereign Germany must not be permitted to play a special rôle and isolate itself in the domain of foreign policy. Being a normal state, Germany must be in a position to exercise all of its rights and fulfil all of its obligations in safeguarding and restoring peace and international security.

In Cambodia there are now almost 150 men of the medical corps of the Federal Armed

Mr. Rühle (continued)

Forces who provide medical support to the 22 000 military and civilian personnel of the UNTAC mission of the United Nations. The challenge facing UNTAC in Cambodia is not confined to the task of guaranteeing the ceasefire. Until the time when free elections will be held, UNTAC will practically govern the country, must prepare these elections, and not least repatriate nearly 400 000 refugees.

I am fully convinced that the success or failure of this operation will signal the future political weight of the United Nations Organisation in the world. Therefore, it is of great psychological importance that Germany has committed itself to that operation. This is a big step for Germany, though for others, looking at it from outside, and comparing numbers, it may be a small one. From the German standpoint it is a big step towards assuming greater responsibility under the United Nations. We are, however, well aware that we cannot stop at such humanitarian missions. The next step to be taken by us Germans must be participation in blue-helmet actions. Today, more than 40 000 blue helmets are operating worldwide, and it would be bad for Germany's international reputation if we disappointed the expectations of our friends and partners. In the Bundestag, such missions are already accepted in principle. I shall therefore make an effort to establish – in discussions with the political parties represented in the Bundestag – the conditions requisite for employment of German servicemen in the framework of blue-helmet actions of the United Nations, and I shall try to do so before the end of this year.

On the other hand, however, it is not possible to get rid of and transform overnight forty years of experience and accumulated instincts in foreign policy. Nor of course can they be ordered away from the top down. United Germany's assumption of greater international responsibility must be an organic process, which takes time. This applies in particular to the participation of German soldiers in combat operations, a situation that is also understood by our allies.

Ladies and gentlemen, the CSCE provides the framework for building a peaceful order from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It provides the framework for comprehensive co-operation in politics, economy, environmental protection, society and culture. In the Charter of Paris, all European countries entered for the first time into a binding commitment to the principles of democracy, human rights and market economy, and decided upon a working programme for the establishment of an enduring and just European order of peace.

We want to open up to CSCE further options. CSCE should in particular be strengthened by

developing into a regional arrangement in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

It is one of the primary interests of all Europeans in the domain of security policy to have the Vienna Treaty implemented as soon as possible. After discussions with our allies, I have decided that in the middle of the current year we shall start unilaterally to destroy about 10 000 weapon systems that come under that treaty. By doing so, we set a signal to encourage early ratification of the treaty by the CIS states; for, in a European security system, the contribution of disarmament and arms control towards equilibrium and stability and towards mutual confidence is indispensable.

Let me also mention here expressly the contribution made by Western European Union to disarmament and arms control in Europe. The Open Skies Group of experts has arrived at initial results, and another matter which WEU has urgently advocated is the coming into effect of the CFE Treaty before the CSCE summit to be held on 9th and 10th July – a goal which we support with all our might.

In the network of European institutions of security, it would be wrong to narrow the spectrum down in an era of change. We need flexibility and a variety of options. The European and transatlantic institutions of security cannot be substituted for one another. But they can complement each other provided they are supported by the foundation of a common political objective.

For this political process we need your support, too. The Assembly of Western European Union in its capacity as a parliamentary body must and – I am convinced – will have a say in, and make available its unique experience to, this process.

I do not want to come to an end without recalling Robert Pontillon, who fulfilled his duties as President of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU with exemplary dedication. At the same time I congratulate the newly-elected President, Professor Soell, whom I know and have learned to value from our work together in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, and wish him much success in his work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your statement, Minister. I assume that you will be answering member's questions. So that we know where we stand, I have noted the names of eight members wanting to put questions to you: Baroness Hooper, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Borderas, Mr. Fioret, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Caro and Mr. van der Linden.

I call Baroness Hooper.

Baroness HOOPER (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Minister for his fascinating contribution. May I ask him what he considers to be the prospects for Germany continuing to support the development and production of the European fighter aircraft?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – As I cannot answer every question in the speaker's own language – I could do so in English – and as I want to treat everyone the same, I will answer in German.

When I left Bonn, I thought, or at least hoped, that I would not be asked this question for about half an hour. I can understand, of course, that it is the very first question.

We find ourselves at a very difficult stage in our decision-making, because this project was essentially designed in the mid-1980s and, to my mind, is now quite disproportionate to the changed security situation. As everyone knows, Germany is also in a very difficult financial situation, not least because of the process of unification. Many of our foreign colleagues are constantly warning us not to impose too much of a burden on the international capital market and to reduce our public spending.

When this aircraft was designed the real growth rate in our defence budget was between 3% and 4%. Now we have a very sharp drop in the defence budget, which is creating a situation that may lead to serious displacement effects. My initial analysis is therefore a military one: if I want to prevent the agreements laboriously negotiated by the Federal Chancellor and Mr. Gorbachev, allowing the German armed forces a strength of 370 000 men, from being undermined financially by the displacement effect of a given system, I have to take a responsible decision at this juncture. At 230 000 men, Germany's land forces are already very numerous, and this will continue to be so in the future. I have to ensure that the army can be kept up to date across the board, and whatever happens, I must avoid a displacement effect.

A number of other aspects, such as aspects of industrial policy, will rightly be addressed. All I can say is that when looking through my budget I have not discovered a title for them so unfortunately I cannot take account of them in my budget. Instead, I have to try to keep the German armed forces as a whole up to date on a shrinking defence budget.

I also have to ask myself what threats we may face after the year 2005 up to 2030 or 2040. In this case I have to try – after 2005 at least – to relate an airborne component, a fighter aircraft – we need a successor to the Phantom – to a possible threat in the form of missiles. I also have to

relate it to the need to create European air transport capacities for a more mobile army for deployment outside Germany but in the NATO area, and in the long term generally for a more mobile army to perform the tasks expected of us in the international arena. In other words, all these military considerations must be related one to the other.

These are just a few of them. The British Prime Minister, John Major, will be coming to Bonn on Friday, and we will then have an opportunity to discuss the matter. It will be a difficult decision, but the Defence Minister has expressed his views. It is a decision that has to be taken by the whole of the German Government and ultimately in the German Bundstag. I believe this will be done in the very near future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Will the Minister clarify without reservation, if he can, the German Government's position on the Eurocorps? Are we correct in assuming that it will be both under the control of WEU and within the alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – As I quite deliberately said in my statement, which is also available in writing, this corps will be under WEU's political control. I agree with my British colleague, Malcolm Rifkind, that this should not be the only instrument, that others too are conceivable: an Anglo-Dutch amphibious formation, possibly even a multinational division, which should similarly be kept in readiness under the heading of forces answerable to WEU.

As regards the relationship between the Eurocorps and the alliance and the sequence that has been agreed for them, I have said that the first task of the Eurocorps is to take action under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. If there is a NATO situation, in other words a case in which a comprehensive defence is needed – this is something else we can achieve – the deployment of the whole corps will have priority. The terms in this respect will have to be negotiated by the Eurocorps and SHAPE. Our idea is that this agreement can ensure that, if the Eurocorps is deployed in a NATO case, it would be placed under the operational control of SACEUR in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, not under NATO's full command, because that would mean complete integration into NATO, but under SACEUR's operational control.

Mr. Rühle (continued)

It is quite clear that, if this is the agreement reached, it will be NATO that profits in a NATO case, because the French units have so far been held back in a kind of reserve position for use as a last resort. So I believe that what we have decided will strengthen the European component if NATO is unwilling or unable to react, but that, if there is a NATO case, it will also strengthen NATO.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. Volker Rühle, Baroness Hooper has asked the very question I was about to put to you; consequently my question will be much more brief because it has, in part, been answered and I heard your reply very clearly.

Nevertheless, I must say that in political defence circles in my country and in the Ministry of Defence itself, there is concern about the state of opinion as regards the EFA, the European fighter aircraft. To date my country has invested over 70 000 million pesetas, around \$ 700 million, because Spain is contributing some 13% to this project.

Minister, you have assessed the repercussions which this project has, in our countries, on investments by the state and by private firms and on the future of European air defence itself, and I should like to know what you think in view of the fact that currently Spanish opinion appears to favour prolonging the production period so as to be able to spread the cost over a larger number of annual budgets so that we can continue with this programme.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – This is not domestic policy: this is European policy, so I have some sympathy for the questions.

Costs have been incurred everywhere, including Germany. We have given an assurance that the development of the aircraft will be completed in any case, but it was agreed from the outset that each country would be free to decide whether or not to join in production. So the situation we are now facing is by no means new.

Where Germany is concerned, the government set up a working group in 1991 to prepare the way for a decision on whether or not to go into production and also to examine other options. If you look at the facts, you will find that there is nothing at all surprising about the present German debate. In fact, everyone has known for several years that development would

not automatically lead to production. In line with the agreement we are now making up our minds whether or not to go into production. This is a difficult decision. Nor will it have escaped you that Germany too is having difficulty in taking it. It also, of course, has major implications for certain regions. That is why it will ultimately be a decision that has to be taken by the whole government. It goes without saying that concern with the alliance and Europe also plays a major part in the deliberations. But everything I have said is also very important in a quite specific situation.

If I might be permitted a personal comment, I believe that, if the reaction in 1990, when there were signs of very significant changes in Europe, as I have just said, had been to stop work on an aircraft of this type and to say we will go for sufficiency, for an adequate rather than an ideal solution, if we had reacted to the new political situation in the world, there would have been greater acceptance today and the necessary funds would have been available. And if I may be permitted to say so, I would add that the financial situation in Germany is particularly difficult, but I sometimes have the impression we are at the moment the only poor country in Europe. There may be one or two people behind us who should be asking themselves whether they are really in a position to finance all the aircraft they once talked about. In Spain's case it was supposed to be one hundred, but I believe they have already reduced that to eighty-seven. Italy wanted one hundred and twenty. I feel that if you take a closer look you will find that it is not only in Germany that there are financial problems. But we face a quite specific situation because we are transferring resources to the value of one hundred and forty billion from West to East each year, so our position is particularly strained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Fioret.

Mr. FIORET (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, the creation of an integrated force presupposes the adoption of standard armaments with obvious consequences for the training of troops and the equipment of armouries and for the industries which support the integrated armed forces.

France and Germany argue – as you repeated this morning – that the army corps created by the agreement of 22nd May is an armed nucleus designed to speed up the integration of Europe's defence forces.

Do you think it possible, Minister, that the chiefs of staff from WEU countries not involved in the La Rochelle agreement can accept an already established situation in which they have not been involved in the operational choices?

Mr. Fioret (continued)

Does it not seem to you that the Franco-German initiative, which basically offers the other WEU countries the choice of take it or leave it, is a move in the opposite direction as compared with what you said in your speech, which to me is reassuring in form but unconvincing in substance about the function of the Franco-German army corps?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – After the President of the French Republic and the Federal German Chancellor set the ball rolling last October, it was clear that this matter would be open from the outset. This has also meant that a number of countries may be about to take a favourable decision. But seen through both German and French eyes it was always clear that it should be a genuine Eurocorps, and I, too, am very hopeful.

But I am sure we are all familiar with situations in domestic politics, and in foreign politics too, where somebody has to set the ball rolling and it is not possible for everyone to be involved straight away. This, for example, has been a Franco-German initiative. But I am really very confident that the name Eurocorps will be justified in the not too distant future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, please forgive me but I would like to come back to the question of the European fighter aircraft for which the German Government is getting ready to announce cancellation of the programme. Our Spanish colleague raised the matter first and I am now speaking as an Italian and also as the person who, for three years in this Assembly, was responsible for one of the biggest examples of military-industrial co-operation within WEU; four countries are involved in that programme which is considered to be vital for Europe's aerospace industry and also a first priority from the military standpoint.

Yesterday we heard the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Rifkind, announce that the programme will have to go ahead anyway even at the cost of serious economic sacrifices; the economic situation in my country is certainly worse than that of Germany.

It seems to me that the problem is not only economic but also political and technological and to do with European co-ordination. Furthermore, in my opinion, there are other reasons

– at which you hinted in your speech a short time ago – and I would not like it that in response to the unfair accusations levelled in some measure against your country by the Americans, Germany should do any favours, to General Dynamics, for example, because by the end of the century the German Phantoms are bound to have to be withdrawn. So we have the device of buying American aircraft in order to refute the unfair accusation of being anti-American or anti-Atlantic which has recently been heard following the summit at La Rochelle.

I would not wish to seem to be fantasising or harking back politically but this decision coming after La Rochelle certainly leaves us in doubt.

Minister, the European fighter aircraft programme is essential not only for the credibility of European co-operation in the matter of aeronautics and technology; but it has been asked what future Deutsche Aerospace will have if this programme is cancelled, and this also applies to Italy's Alenia and to British Aerospace; what international credibility shall we have for the industries which are of fundamental importance, particularly if they are co-operating because while individually they have the required technological and intellectual resources, they are not individually strong enough to carry through such a complex major programme. The withdrawal of Germany is therefore a matter of great concern to us, both for the political reasons which I hope are untrue and for the economic reasons which are serious for Germany and also for the other countries of Europe, including the United Kingdom which we know is facing very serious difficulties, and without mentioning Italy which has terrible difficulties.

And so when the British Prime Minister, John Major, visits Chancellor Kohl, I would ask you to argue on behalf of our Assembly and of all of us here working for genuine co-operation in WEU in the field of military technology, that the programme should not be abandoned and that other means should be found of going ahead with the project which, while there may have been changes as regards military strategy and international politics, there have been no changes as regards technology and the enormous possibilities for co-operation in such an important and vital sector as that of European aerospace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I realise, Minister, it is not exactly easy to respond to a comment like this; it is more than a question.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – I have also had to have intensive discussions with the representatives of the aerospace industry, of course.

Mr. Rühle (continued)

Let me begin by saying that the Federal Government has not taken a decision: we are still in the process of discussing this issue. The Defence Minister has considered the environment in which a decision has to be taken. The Eurocorps really has nothing to do with this.

The European fighter aircraft has been the subject of a critical debate in Germany for several years. Certainly since 1990 it has been quite clear that no decision has been reached on this aircraft. At that time none of us yet knew anything about President Mitterrand's and Chancellor Kohl's initiative.

I would ask you to believe me when I say that this discussion is not a cover for any ulterior motives in the foreign policy sphere. It all has to do with what I said about reunification, the change in the security situation, the particular financial situation facing Germany and the need to keep 370 000 men up to date and to prevent a displacement effect.

I emphasise the importance of European co-operation on armaments. The problem is simply that this project dates back to 1984 and meets the tactical requirements of 1984. That is why difficulties have arisen. I have told you what I personally think might have been done to put things right.

What is more, if it should be decided not to go into production, American aircraft are by no means the only alternative, although I would have no objection to them: I referred to the Atlantic Alliance and its importance just now. There would also be European aircraft to choose from.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

The next question will be put by Mr. Lopez Henares.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Minister, today the members of this Assembly have been disappointed to hear the result of the referendum in Denmark, with the greatest respect, of course, to the Danish people whose decision it was. This negative result for those of us who are so enthusiastically monitoring the construction of Europe and the debates taking place in Europe as a result of the Maastricht agreement suggests that, in future, we may have to expect progress in matters both political and social to be rethought and possibly implemented with greater caution or less haste. At the same time, however, the so-called European defence identity to which you tellingly referred in your address and which we so frequently discuss, is one area where we cannot, nor must we, have any doubts. We should not delay in this matter, but should speed up work on the mechanisms

for this defence identity to the greatest possible extent, while maintaining the perfect transparency you so aptly referred to and without arousing the slightest mistrust on the part of our great ally on the other side of the Atlantic.

Minister, as a Minister of Defence with acute political awareness – with which I am familiar, having last met you at a seminar in Madrid before you became Minister of Defence, when your considerable knowledge of the subject was already obvious – do you not believe that the WEU Council and the European ministers responsible for these executive bodies must greatly speed up the establishment of arrangements for a European defence identity; that this is one way of demonstrating our political will, and that in spite of the caution we have to show in this area, there can be no doubt that to strengthen the union for defence and security would constitute a great achievement?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – Firstly, as regards Denmark, we all have the same concerns. But we undertook to proceed consistently with the implementation of the decisions taken at Maastricht.

Where the European security identity is concerned, I agree that we must work more quickly. We will be setting the planning cell up in Brussels this year. I see that as a very important step.

But the example of Yugoslavia, which has been discussed here, shows that there are new kinds of crises which we are not in a position to deter. Much of what is now being discussed is far too late. We must prepare ourselves for crises of this kind.

On the other hand, I must recall what I said in my introductory statement: the finest structures and organisations are of no use if we cannot agree on the political analysis. I would remind you in all modesty that a year ago the European nations – and they were not alone in this – differed very widely in their opinions on the situation in Yugoslavia and on whether there was any chance of preserving the central government or whether it would not be wiser to bring pressure to bear with the aim of finding a co-operative, confederative solution. The analyses of the situation differed very widely. Not even the best planning cells and other ideas are then of any use. The two things have to go together. If we are honest and self-critical, we have to admit that that was how it was in Yugoslavia's case.

But I also have to say – I hope I may be quite frank here in the Assembly – that some of those who are now saying that particularly tough action should be taken expressed precisely the

Mr. Rühle (continued)

opposite view of the situation at that time. I at least have been reading Mr. Milosevic's speeches since 1987. I believe quite a lot was foreseeable even at that time. If pressure for a confederative solution had been exerted, there might have been a chance – I cannot say for certain.

If we analyse the present situation as Europeans, we should be self-critical. This also applies to my own country. As a parliamentarian I had a heated discussion with my own Foreign Minister – at that time; the situation is quite different today.

We should be self-critical and admit that in the analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia we did not reach political agreement on the future of the central government. So we failed to exert political pressure as we should have, which might have saved us various problems.

So I entirely agree with what you have said. We must speed up the development of the European defence identity, but we must also improve our common political analysis. Otherwise military instruments, however good, will be of no use.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

The next speaker is Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your very frank reply. I should like to speak about Yugoslavia. You are no doubt aware that yesterday the Assembly approved a very important recommendation, which incidentally supports the view expressed by our Secretary-General calling for the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty so that the Security Council resolutions are implemented.

My question follows from this insistent demand, so far unanswered, for a European intervention force in the framework of WEU in particular. Unless I am mistaken, some six weeks ago Mr. Genscher asked Mr. Cyrus Vance about possible intervention by WEU armed forces in Yugoslavia in support of the Security Council's action if this were necessary. If this information is correct the request has unfortunately come to nothing. Nevertheless as things stand at the moment the problem is urgent, particularly as regards preventive action.

If this did happen and urgent action became necessary, could German forces take part immediately without Germany being obliged to amend its constitution first?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – As in my previous answers, I

will express myself very clearly: I would never deploy German units in Yugoslavia, even if the legal provisions to do so existed in Germany. There is a variety of reasons for this.

What you have said is not, to my knowledge, correct. Mr. Genscher did not make that offer. To my knowledge, Mr. Vance asked Mr. Genscher whether, given a United Nations decision to despatch a peace-keeping mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be possible for WEU also to be involved. But that is not what happened subsequently.

We have always pressed for sanctions to be imposed. The embargo that has been announced must now be enforced. The necessary action must be taken to this end. I believe it has come rather late in the day. None the less, I hope it will have an appropriate political impact.

Nor, seeing that German units will not be participating, do I consider it right in my capacity as Germany's Defence Minister to speculate on a military response. If the constitutional requirements exist in Germany in the future, we will consider very carefully whether it would be productive or counter-productive for German troops to be deployed in a given region. I believe that anyone who takes another look at history will appreciate that – even if the constitutional requirements were satisfied – it would be counter-productive to deploy German troops there. I am totally convinced of that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next question will be put by Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was very taken by what Mr. Rühle had to say about the implications of the result of the referendum in Denmark. I am happy with his expression of political will. But I am afraid it is not as easy as that and that we will not be able to make do with an expression of political will. The consequences we face will be more far-reaching than now seems likely.

Mr. President, the press release on the Franco-German discussions of 22nd May says: "France and Germany invite as many member states of WEU as possible to participate in the European corps." I want to ask the Minister what this participation entails. Does this complete decision-making power also extend to determining the course to be taken by the Eurocorps in the future? What interest might member states have in participating in the activities of the Eurocorps? In this context the press release states: "It may also be given peace-keeping or peace-restoring missions..." Minister Rühle has said that this means deployment within the United Nations framework – blue helmets. Does this not mean that Germany's credibility is coming under some pressure in this respect? After all, the Minister has said that Europe must

Mr. van der Linden (continued)

assume responsibility for itself. But in this respect Germany would be placing more confidence in the United Nations than in its European partners.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – Anyone who participates in the Eurocorps will have completely equal rights and will be involved in all the structures.

When I was referring to the agreement by the defence ministers just now, I made it clear that Germany has reservations on constitutional grounds. This means that, if the corps already existed, Germany could not participate in certain missions.

The corps will become operational in October 1995 if everything goes according to plan. I cannot yet give you a guarantee that we will have created all the constitutional provisions by that time. It is a question of taking action to restore peace not only for the United Nations but, of course, on behalf of European bodies. I cannot give you a guarantee. Germany might not be able to participate in every mission.

On the other hand, it is clear from this – and I say this to the members of the opposition in Germany, who are very welcome – that we would eventually lose our credibility as a European nation if we failed to meet the constitutional requirements for the deployment of German armed forces on behalf of such European bodies as WEU and European Political Union.

There is not yet a majority of the members of the Bundestag in favour of the necessary amendment, but we are working on this. With the help of our pro-European colleagues, we may succeed in gaining the support of a majority in the Bundestag by October 1995.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

The last question will be put by the Observer from Greece, Mr. Pahtas.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – In your speech, Minister, you referred to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and to Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. WEU's mission complementing that of the Atlantic Alliance stems precisely from Article V, which the great majority of people believe must not be weakened in any way, as otherwise the European Union will lose all credibility in the matter of common security.

Minister, what is your view about the problem of maintaining Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty having regard to the different

statutory positions which would result from the creation of a geographical area for co-operation in security and defence outside the WEU area?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RÜHE (*Minister of Defence of Germany*) (Translation). – The WEU Brussels Treaty is stronger on the automatic nature of the commitment to assist other member states. As I have said before, the Eurocorps's first task will be deployment to ensure the joint defence of the allies in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or with the Brussels Treaty.

But if I understand you correctly, you want to know about other countries joining Western European Union. That is, of course, a subject that has to be discussed. There is some differentiation, including associate membership, and there is talk of a third status in addition to normal membership. I feel we must pay attention to this as developments continue and that the final word has not yet been spoken. That is why my answer is rather vague.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. If I might say a word about the last point, we cannot, of course, expect you to be fully informed on the state of all the discussions, like the one concerning Greece's desire to become a member of Western European Union.

None the less, I would like to thank you very much for your very full answers. You will have noted that we have a very critical and very lively debating atmosphere here. I hope this will not deter you from participating but in fact encourage you to join in the future work of our Assembly and its committees. The first opportunity for this will be in Bonn on 25th June, when the Presidential Committee and the Political Committee will be considering the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 19th June.

Many thanks to you, and I wish you a pleasant return journey to Germany.

(The President continued in French)

I am informed that Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France, will be arriving very shortly. This being so, I propose to adjourn the sitting for a few minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.10 p.m. and resumed at 4.15 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

5. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France.

The President (continued)

Minister, our Assembly always listens to you most attentively because we remember the important address you gave us just a year ago. On that occasion you announced the generous proposals which have very largely opened the way for a space policy for Europe geared to the requirements of a defence adapted to the challenges of the most advanced technology. This was the origin of the decisions taken later by the Council of WEU and we are very pleased to note that since the beginning of this year they have moved forward to practical implementation.

We are particularly grateful to you for coming back today. We are well aware that the future of a policy for the defence and security of Europe is still beset by many problems. The decisions taken by the nine members of WEU at Maastricht show the direction in which our governments are seeking a solution but there is still room for widely-varying interpretations.

It would of course be a mistake to expect any government to tell us what decisions the Nine or the Twelve will take. But France's vital rôle in the formulation of a European security policy, its determination to find solutions for the problems created for us by a completely new situation and its anxiety to co-operate closely with its partners, and Germany in particular, give the greatest weight to your remarks.

May I add that the part you are playing personally in studying the new security conditions and the requirements of a defence geared to present circumstances give you great authority to speak on these questions. We are all expecting a great deal from the ministerial meeting of WEU to be held on 19th June and we are sure that you will play a major part in formulating the decisions it will adopt on operational questions.

For all these reasons, we shall be listening to your remarks and your replies to our questions with great interest and close attention.

Mr. JOXE (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I was very happy to accept the invitation from your Assembly of which I was a member myself some years ago and where I am pleased to meet again, if only very briefly, people and colleagues I have known elsewhere. Today, the list includes my colleague, Mr. Rùhe. Now that WEU has a bigger rôle to play as a result of the decisions taken at Maastricht in particular, participation by the elected representatives of the member countries in discussions about the construction of a European defence system is more than ever essential and desirable.

I shall shortly be meeting again some of you who are invited to attend the exercise with the pretty name Farfadet which will be taking place

in the south of France in a few days' time with the involvement of French, Italian, Spanish and British forces.

Europe's identity in the field of security and defence is steadily gathering strength and I thought I might usefully review progress here.

Following the important texts which marked the reactivation of WEU during the eighties, first in Rome and then at The Hague, the organisation has, since 1990, developed as never before both in military co-operation and in its institutions and policies.

The political framework has now been set up with the treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht. As you know Article J.4 states that Western European Union "which is an integral part of the development of the Union" shall "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". The member countries' declaration annexed to the treaty enlarges on the tasks assigned to WEU, the strengthening of its operational rôle and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Here we have a new scenario.

Almost at the same time, military co-operation is benefiting from the impetus given during the Gulf war by the decisions taken in 1990 on logistic co-operation and the co-ordination of naval forces in particular as I myself witnessed on the spot in the Gulf. The ministerial meeting of 19th June which you have just mentioned, Mr. President, will provide an opportunity to review what has already been done to strengthen WEU's operational capability in accordance with the Maastricht guidelines and decisions.

Here are a few examples of the progress achieved: the planning cell to be staffed by officers from the nine member countries will be set up in Brussels next October. This unit, which is clearly essential for WEU to have credibility, will provide the organisation with genuine military expertise. The chiefs of staff of the WEU countries will be meeting regularly from now on, providing for consultation between the highest European military authorities; at their recent meeting in Bonn on 19th May they made excellent preparation for the forthcoming ministerial session. The WEU satellite centre proposed by France and encouraged in your report will be set up at Torrejón in Spain this autumn to provide us with a joint observation capacity.

All these are moves in the right direction. I am glad that some of them have been suggested by France and I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the vigour displayed throughout this year by the German presidency which will shortly come to an end but has seen major progress.

Mr. Joxe (continued)

At the meeting on 19th June we shall also be discussing the question of the assignment of military units to WEU in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Maastricht declaration. The decision and therefore the proposal made by France and Germany at La Rochelle on 22nd May last to set up a European army corps fits in with this. Furthermore I note that the proposals announced by my British colleague, Mr. Rifkind, concerning his country's participation in strengthening the operational rôle of WEU can be seen as part of the same pattern.

The proposed European army corps will benefit from the experience of the Franco-German brigade, a unit where young Frenchmen and young Germans live side by side and will move even closer to each other in the future.

The European army corps differs fundamentally from this Franco-German experiment which has already been going on for some years and has not even been carried right through yet. The European army corps corresponds to a global concept which associates not only France and Germany but is open from the outset and by its nature to the other member states of WEU. It is based on the establishment of a multinational general staff for operational planning with the principle of multinationality applied at general staff level. Each participating state will make such contribution as it deems appropriate to the army corps.

So the intention behind the European army corps is not that it should be "a European army" as suggested by some commentators, mostly in opposition to the plan. It is in fact one of the units capable of acting within the framework of WEU. I repeat that it does not therefore exclude other proposals for the assignment to WEU of other European units whether or not linked with NATO.

Furthermore a number of countries have announced that they intend to assign to WEU some of their units now assigned to NATO. This is a positive sign of support for the European organisation. I welcome this and we shall clearly be talking about it in a fortnight's time in Bonn.

It is our hope that the countries which have expressed interest in the proposed European army corps should join with France and Germany as soon as possible. We shall have to work out together how the corps is to be assigned to WEU, of which it is of course a natural extension.

I should like to touch briefly on the very close links which the Eurocorps will have to maintain with NATO.

The corps' first mission is to be available for commitment for the common defence of the

allies in case of aggression, on the basis of Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington and Article V of the Brussels Treaty. In such circumstances the Eurocorps would intervene, in current NATO parlance either as the "main defence" or for "rapid reaction missions" on the flanks of the alliance, for example. I think that the extent to which France and Germany have taken account of the alliance's interests and operational requirements could not be clearer.

It will be necessary – and the general staffs concerned are already looking at the question – to define exactly the conditions and practical arrangements for commitment of the corps and its placing under NATO command. To this end, an agreement will have to be discussed, studied, drafted and signed by the authorities responsible for the corps and the competent NATO authorities.

As you will see, the corps will therefore be called on to intervene at both European and Atlantic level. It is a logical consequence of the proposal for a European Union and as such is linked with WEU; in addition it is a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance.

Contrary to what has been written and said in certain quarters, there is no question in our mind of a new structure competing with WEU or NATO.

The next point is that co-operation under WEU auspices must also progress in the matter of armaments. We must now organise this sector better in order to meet the objectives set at Maastricht.

What is the present situation?

First, there is the informal group, the IEPG, in which we met in Oslo. Through this group, which includes many European countries but has no legal status, permanent links have been established between the armaments directors of the various European countries and experience which must be turned to account has been acquired.

Second, we have the rôle of Western European Union as the organ for the formulation and implementation of the future common defence policy and, as one of the objectives set by the Maastricht agreement, the creation at the appropriate time of a European armaments agency. This idea, originating from a Franco-German proposal, is now a benchmark for the debate. I think that its content should be specified in detail. It is an important subject for discussion and thought by the WEU authorities which will have to deal with armaments questions.

One way of turning the IEPG's experience to account and at the same time exploiting the new prospects opened for WEU, might naturally be

Mr. Joxe (continued)

to bring the two bodies together. This was proposed on 6th March at the Oslo meeting of IEPG defence ministers I mentioned earlier and the idea is now being studied. It is a question we shall be looking at on 19th June.

After this brief look at progress with the construction of Europe I should like to turn to the matters which are now preoccupying the authorities responsible for the defence and security of the European continent. The tragic example of Yugoslavia is daily evidence of the perils to which Europe is exposed.

Against this background how could we fail to hear the anguished cries of our Central and Eastern European friends? How can we be deaf to the anxieties of those in Prague, Budapest, Warsaw and the Baltic states who fear the consequences of the chronic instability and break-up of states in the Balkans and along the borders of the former Soviet empire?

I have recently met and am still meeting defence ministers from these Central European countries. I can tell you that they are delighted by our invitation to attend the meeting to be held on 19th June. That day the ministers from the WEU countries will for the first time be meeting their opposite numbers from the Baltic states, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. I recall that France proposed such a meeting twelve months ago. I believe that the countries of Western Europe must establish bilateral and multilateral relations and links with these new democracies as they are essential first for better understanding, and then for greater co-operation in the security and defence of Europe.

At the beginning of April your Assembly organised a symposium in Berlin and invited me to attend. I accepted the invitation but at the last moment I was, to my regret, unable to go for reasons which you understand. I have looked at the declarations made there by the representatives of the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak and Polish Governments. We must listen to their call for European solidarity. This is true for everyone but in particular for the three countries I have just named which are now linked to the European Community by an association agreement.

I believe that we shall be able, in Bonn, in a fortnight's time, to agree on the development at all levels, including ministerial level, of regular permanent relations with the countries invited. The states which will be joining the European Union and already have associate status should, I think, be given special treatment. I know you have discussed this question yourselves. I shall do my best to work to that end.

Finally, there is one area where specific co-operation could be developed in WEU and I

say be developed because it exists already; I am referring to peace-keeping operations. French units are already deployed in Krajina side by side with Czechoslovak troops while Belgian units are operating with Polish troops in another sector. Why not encourage practical measures for training, instruction, planning and logistics geared specifically to this sort of operation, which we have every reason to believe will continue on an increasing scale. They are significant and might even be symbolic of the conversion of these armies from the Eastern European countries to new tasks.

Of course our Europe of today presents a very contrasting picture of fears and hopes and of successes and failures. I believe, however, that even more than today the European Union will tomorrow be a pole of attraction for the whole continent. It is for us to give it its full dimension in the matter of security and defence and to provide it with the means to match its responsibilities, and for that to be achieved the debate and the discussion must spill over from the circle of ministries or general staffs and be carried into the parliaments and in particular into an Assembly like yours where all the parliaments of these European countries have been represented for many years and have gained experience, of which you are the very rare possessors, of international debates on defence and security questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address. I am sure you will be prepared to answer questions from the members of the Assembly. Four have put their names down.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Joxe, you referred to the British Secretary of State's comments on the British-Dutch proposal, which you said was one of the ideas being considered by WEU. You then mentioned the Eurocorps. Is it not true that, whereas the British-Dutch proposal starts by firmly declaring that the Eurocorps is to be totally within WEU, you have just said that how the Eurocorps fits into WEU has still to be worked out? Is that not why the confusion which we hoped would be dispelled after the La Rochelle meeting has still not been completely cleared up?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JOXE (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I am not sure that I can put my finger exactly on who helps to create confusion on the subject at one point, or who helps to dispel it at another. I hope that I have not added to the confusion but neither am I sure that I can dispel it. What is certain is that one of the problems arising is the assignment of units which have already been assigned in some cases

Mr. Joxe (continued)

as part of an earlier project; I am thinking of the Anglo-Dutch unit.

I recall very well that my British colleague said: "Basically we know all about the European army corps, we have had one for a long time".

That is true. I have also talked to my Netherlands colleague about it. It is true that the existence of this Anglo-Dutch unit is a fine European achievement. Its composition is European. It can also be said that its purpose is European because the conditions for using it were linked to the defence of Europe.

Why does the proposal for a European army corps create confusion or seem to do so?

I think this is because it has been represented in some quarters as a hostile move; I am thinking in particular of what the United States Defence Secretary said, describing it as an operation that could undermine the Atlantic Alliance. The least that can be said is that this was not only a negative but also a somewhat aggressive description.

Now that the proposed European army corps is open to all European countries wishing to join, those countries clearly have a problem about the forces they could assign to it. Here I can only speak for my own government – a number of European countries which can accept the European army corps in principle are not clear about the conditions under which they could assign units to it, because the greater part or even the whole of their forces are already assigned to the Atlantic Alliance.

In my view, what my United Kingdom colleague said concerning the Anglo-Dutch unit does not lead to any confusion. It shows that in Great Britain as elsewhere there has been movement on European defence and security policy. I believe that the discussions due to continue will, as has already appeared likely for some days, produce a formula showing that dual assignment is possible.

I suppose – I was going to say I am afraid – that changes in the situation on the ground over the coming weeks and months in certain parts of Europe are going to focus thoughts more sharply on this question.

I will take one example. Many European troops are now in Yugoslavia but so are others. There are troops from other continents including America. I am thinking of the Canadians. Nevertheless, the European forces and not only those from France are clearly, so to speak, the backbone and above all the guarantee of this very tardy peaceful intervention in Yugoslavia.

What is the only occasion when this question was discussed, though without any decision being reached because unfortunately this was ruled out from the outset? It was exactly one year ago, i.e. last June, when the WEU ministers met.

Admittedly, the discussion was not very productive and revealed wide differences. It produced a decision which in truth was not a decision, namely to study various possibilities: a first was minimal, a second went a little further, but in the end, a few months later, neither was adopted. To name only a few countries, situations or positions varied over the whole range from the United Kingdom, which stated its outright opposition, to Germany, which explained that it was legally difficult or impossible for it to participate, via France, whose attitude was positive and a number of other European countries which were willing to participate. This is the only place where the question was discussed in advance, that is before tension burst into crisis and a mixture of civil and international warfare. It was in a European forum: WEU.

Looking forward twelve months I would not like to make any bets but it can be predicted that minds will be focused more sharply by the pressure of events and that it will then be realised that discussions must start between the countries of Europe even if the decision is, as it quite rightly should be, taken in the United Nations. Furthermore, many of the plans for intervention under the United Nations banner are the result of operational studies spanning several months in WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to begin by thanking you, Minister, for the contribution you have made to our Assembly in the project for the satellite centre. You took part in our symposium in Rome and your political contribution as regards solidarity and commitment in your country was considerable.

I should like to touch on two points which still leave us with doubts concerning the Franco-German army corps. You said that it would be possible for agreement to be worked out between the multinational European army corps and NATO, giving the impression that the army corps will have international legal status so that WEU, though it stands over the army corps, will not conclude such agreements as it rightfully should. In practice, as you said, the possibility that the commander of the army corps may conclude those agreements indicates that it is not the international organisation responsible for and standing above the military units which will have authority to conclude international agreements. This is the source of some confusion.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

You also said that the army corps will be made up of divisions and that its general staff will be integrated and therefore international, with the possibility therefore of including officers from other countries having units in the army corps.

If this is correct and valid for a unit at army corps level how do you think command can be exercised at divisional level? As a rule, command at that level is not integrated but national. It is planned that some divisions of the army corps shall be multinational because it is unthinkable that a small country could assign a whole division to the army corps; the likelihood is that it will be able to assign only a few battalions for units at battalion level. So, you anticipate for these divisions something that has never happened before, the formation with some difficulty of an integrated general staff which leaves one wondering what will happen in the matter of telecommunications, command and control, operational techniques and so on.

The problem you were trying to simplify has been complicated by your speech. I believe that integration should be at army corps level and that units should be national at divisional level. Or if divisional level is not possible, brigade level should be planned; but below army corps level it seems to me that it would be very difficult if not impossible to set up integrated general staffs.

I would therefore ask you for further information on two points: firstly, the formation on the general staffs which are essential for participation in an international army corps, and secondly, what powers the commander of the army corps general staff would have in the matter of international relations in agreements with other countries or international organisations such as NATO and the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JOXE (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – What is this political authority? It is the authority represented by WEU. However, if nobody wants it this will not happen. Why talk about it so much? We two will continue to talk about it. We shall have fewer problems.

Is it useless? I have some limited military experience from thirty years back. I do not want any repetition. It was during the war in Algeria. At the time military service in France lasted thirty months. I have a more recent experience dating back twelve or fifteen months. So far I have known only multinational operations.

I arrived at the defence ministry when the Gulf war was at its height and there were French

regiments in a French division with American and British elements alongside integrated into a group under Franco-American command with the whole force under American command. The question was resolved.

After the end of the war I visited several French naval units in the Gulf which were taking part in mine-sweeping as part of a completely integrated system. This was at WEU level. There were also Italian vessels.

I could give you a whole list of the operations I have had to prepare, on which I have had to take decisions personally or to propose decisions for the President of the Republic to take. At Kinshasa we took part in a peace-keeping operation with the Belgians. They did not fire but they were fired on and there was even one death. This was a Franco-Belgian operation. In Kurdistan there were Americans, British and French in co-operation with the Turks from whom permission had to be sought to use their bases – and there were also Dutch troops. In Yugoslavia, about which I spoke a moment ago, there are to date troops from at least twelve or fourteen countries.

Over the past twelve months my only experience has been of operations to which several countries contribute though the proportions differ widely in some cases.

With the Americans playing the leading part in some cases and Europeans in others these problems are always with us and will continue to be so. In what form? I do not know what the exact figure is for the Anglo-Dutch unit but I do not think that it amounts to a division. The Franco-German brigade is an integrated unit at brigade level with each regiment retaining its autonomy. The proposal for a European army corps makes express provision for a multinational general staff and national units. Theoretically, the unit is to be a division but how could one say no to a country unable to assign a division to the corps through lack of resources, the political will or the legal capacity to do so because of its existing commitments? Is it going to have to accept that it cannot participate with less than a division? Of course not. To refer to one country in particular, I know that Belgium has expressed interest in the Eurocorps and has spoken of the possibility of participating though it has also raised the problem of co-ordination with NATO. In any case it will not participate at division level. I think that a more pragmatic approach is necessary with a multinational general staff, an international political authority and national or sometimes mixed units. I sincerely hope, however, things do not come to an extension, not to say generalisation, or systematic adoption of a practice that we are beginning to see over a very wide field. We often find ourselves in a situation of improvisation, a word I would prefer not to use as it is dispar-

Mr. Joxe (continued)

aging in French in relation to administrative or military questions, though not in musicology where it may carry undertones of greatness.

From the information which I receive daily I can tell you that the French units currently deployed in Yugoslavia have to improvise every day because a number of the conditions set for the deployment of elements by other countries have not yet been carried out. They are constantly adapting and, with the planned co-operation of the defence minister, the Czechoslovak units near the French are continuously improvising forms of organisation to deal with all the difficulties you have mentioned as regards transmission, logistics, equipment and fuel. Yes, that is the way things are going more and more. I do not see why we should not try to be more systematic. Naturally, if by chance when a perfectly adapted structure is worked out it all proves to be useless and there is no one to use it, a possible conclusion would be to say that it is precisely because we invented and designed it and set it up that it has proved unnecessary. Just imagine not that we had deployed but that we had marshalled and announced a European force of 15 000 men capable of intervening very quickly in Yugoslavia last June or even July. History cannot be rewritten but there is a good chance that events would not have unrolled in August, September, October, December and even still today in the way they began. That is all I can say.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Excellent !

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pahtas, Observer from Greece, wishes to ask a question.

Mr. PAHTAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – We are all agreed here that Europe must provide itself with all the instruments and means of action necessary to create a permanent institution for the conflict prevention, crisis management and above all the peaceful settlement of disputes as in Yugoslavia.

Minister, I ask my question in the context of the historical bonds of friendship between the French and Greek peoples and the peoples of Yugoslavia. You know how greatly concerned we are about the crises and the conflicts causing the former Yugoslavia to be torn apart by several civil wars or just plain war. Your colleague, the German Defence Minister, spoke of too critical an attitude and of a policy designed in principle to promote self-determination for all who want or claim it.

Do you believe that a more flexible confederation for those remaining in Yugoslavia is still likely? Are there to be still more civil wars? Do you believe that the embargo will be final and effective or simply a step towards a change in

the situation? We hope not but that is my question, Minister.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JOXE (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – An embargo is an instrument essentially of economic but also of political pressure. It expresses severe disapproval and is a condemnation. Its pressure is firm and peaceful and its purpose is to express severe disapproval. It is not merely symbolic; it has a practical effect. Will it be effective? It certainly proved to be so immediately afterwards because the authorities hit by the embargo seemed to acknowledge this in their declarations. Unquestionably what is happening at present in some parts of Yugoslavia is totally unacceptable in terms of all our ideas about civilisation generally, not just human rights and the concept of humanitarian behaviour. Consequently the democracies must clearly make use of every form of democratic action to put an end to it.

Formal condemnation is a political act. An embargo added as a penalty to this verbal political condemnation, which is in some measure ethical, is another political act. It must be hoped that it will first slow down the violence at least and ultimately bring it to an end. It is only afterwards that other political moves may be thought of at international level. Can action be taken to separate the combatants? The United Nations' Secretary-General has said this several times – it is a question we have been facing for months – interposition between the combatants is possible only if there is at least a cease-fire and if the parties accept. Beyond this stage which we all want, is it possible to imagine that another type of political relationship can be established between the countries concerned? Let us hope so.

Will this result in a confederation? Who can say? We have not yet reached the point at which we can think about the kind of institution which might put an end to the tensions between the different communities. We are at the very first stage, i.e. that of the need to start with at least political action to call a halt to a truly barbarous situation.

Naturally, when we who believe that understanding and co-operation between the countries of Europe should develop into a political structure see on the one hand progress towards the political organisation of Western Europe and on the other the simultaneous break-up and sometimes division and sub-division of the Eastern European countries, we can only hope that they will ultimately find a form of political co-operation within which the rules of democracy can operate. This is called respect for minorities and for law and begins with the framing of legislation in conditions of demo-

Mr. Joxe (continued)

cracy. There are minorities in many countries. In Switzerland, for example, one of the countries seeking to join the European Community, widely differing ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have lived together for centuries in the Helvetic Confederation. So there is no reason why widely differing ethnic groups cannot be united in a single country.

One of the Swiss cantons is so divided between catholics and protestants that an internal system has been created there. The memory of wars of religion has produced highly specific legal machinery, little known elsewhere and dating back to Europe of long ago.

What is now happening in some parts of what used to be Yugoslavia calls to mind what we were taught about the wars of religion, the thirty years war, truces declared but then broken, cease-fires which last a week, declarations made to gain time, deceive the enemy and regroup and political manoeuvres allowing reinforcements, food, munitions and reserves to be brought up. We all know that the sufferings of war one day end in a political solution. Let us hope that the events now shattering Yugoslavia do not last thirty years. It is our countries which by intervening, exerting pressure when that becomes possible and separating the adversaries can help in reaching a point, as we hope, when the political problems will be settled internally. Unfortunately we have clearly not yet reached that stage.

Mr. President, after taking one more question I may perhaps be allowed to return to another Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. van der Linden and Mr. Martinez would like to ask you a further question. I ask them to be brief.

I call Mr. van der Linden.

Mr. van der LINDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister the following question. If Belgium were to join the Eurocorps, could it play a full part in the Eurocorps' decision-making process? Would such participation entail a restriction concerning decision-making on the Eurocorps question?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*) (Translation). – Minister, you will appreciate that, given the hitches in ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and in particular the result of the Danish referendum, the Assembly is perplexed, pessimistic and even somewhat discouraged by the news.

For some of us the bell for Maastricht has started to toll. I would like to hear what you think. Does it mean a halt to the reactivation of

WEU as a platform for defining and implementing a common security and defence policy or on the contrary should we persevere and forge ahead so that the reactivation of WEU can help reactivate the treaty or the spirit of Maastricht?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. JOXE (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – My answer to Mr. van der Linden is that any country participating even on a limited scale in the project for a Eurocorps would naturally participate fully in any decisions regarding its use and before that in all decisions concerning its organisation and entry into service.

Why do I say naturally? Because otherwise the project would not make sense. The reason you ask the question is perhaps that right from the start this project has been misunderstood, badly presented and possibly even badly received. Part of the reason I expect – and this may sound like a tale but it is a fact – is that the project for the Eurocorps was referred to in a postscript to the Maastricht declaration and caught the eye of the press. The result was that minutes afterwards the first and possibly only item of news put out was the idea of setting up a Franco-German army corps. This message reached Mr. Hurd – whom I know well as a friend because he was Home Secretary in the United Kingdom when I had the equivalent post in France – attending a meeting of Commonwealth countries in Zimbabwe. After reading it he said, looking somewhat unhappy, I do not think this is very good news and I do not think it is what we really need. After that another press report went off to Paris, Bonn, Washington and so on, saying that the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary had reacted very negatively to the Franco-German proposal.

This is how the whole thing moved into the realms of bitter argument. Many people who have never read the Maastricht declaration have criticised the idea. Even now, many people who have not yet had occasion to look at the project for a Eurocorps criticise it.

That is why I say that “naturally”, any country taking part in setting up the European army corps would take a full part in doing so. You may perhaps be thinking of asking what will happen or if there will be proportional voting. No way! This kind of action requires total political agreement. Again, what type of mission is envisaged in the joint text worked out by France and Germany and proposed to the other WEU countries? There are three types, namely defence of the alliance, humanitarian action and peace-keeping duties. All this presupposes joint discussion at European level even if some countries do not take part.

Mr. Joxe (continued)

The fact that you ask the question is both serious and revealing. It shows the need for further explanation. At the meeting on 19th June it will therefore be necessary to arrange for the formal and, why not, complete content of the Eurocorps document to be circulated and commented on.

Mr. Martinez asked what the consequences of the no-vote by the people of Denmark will be. I am in no position to measure exactly the international or national political and legal consequences of this decision in every country, even including France. Clearly it was not unforeseeable. The possibility was anticipated. I firmly believe that, however important and far-reaching this event and its implications may be, it will be seen as no more than a passing phase in the years to come. Many West European countries wish to join the European Union or hope to belong to it. In a few year's time, therefore, all this will be looked upon as a mere incident. I do not say hiccup because I would not speak slightly about the Danish people's choice.

I was a student when the Treaty of Rome was signed. I remember it well. There were six founder countries and the European Free Trade Association had been set up. At the time the top professors, in Paris at least, did not give the common market much of a chance. I spent many hours at lectures by very distinguished people, some of whom are today members of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in Paris. So they have been more successful in their careers than in their ability to see into the future twenty-five years ago.

I also remember very well the London agreements, of 1954 I believe. Before that there had been the Paris agreements which I had also heard about.

The problems of European defence have changed so much. Just think that WEU originated from a situation that was totally different from the situation today. There is an organisation which includes a parliamentary body where these problems have been discussed for decades and this must continue. You mentioned a satellite centre. Clearly this is a very important idea which is gaining ground and will, I believe, be implemented because its purpose is to prevent crises.

Briefly, to answer your question, I believe, not more than ever but as always, that reflection and debate and also action have to go on in this context. That in fact is what we shall be doing in a fortnight's time. We shall then realise that further progress has been made.

Mr. President, I should like to leave, with your permission. If you do not grant it, I shall be very embarrassed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your replies. Speaking for our Assembly, I hope that you will continue to discuss the current problems of European security with us.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 5.15 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

6. The development of a European space-based observation system

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1304 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the development of a European space-based observation system and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1304 and amendments.

I call Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first say that it is unkind to ask the Rapporteur of the Technological and Aerospace Committee to speak after two addresses by ministers, which have taken up most of the afternoon and, as we have seen, have held the general interest. I am all the more grateful to those of you who have remained.

What are the original features of this debate – I shall be very pleased if there is one – or at least of this presentation?

To make matters clear, I must first say that Mrs. Blunck, the co-Rapporteur, has had to return to Bonn this afternoon. We were talking together only this morning. I make the point not only out of elementary politeness but also so that it is clearly understood that we are in complete agreement in this report. Moreover, we both had a special opportunity to expand on these views together with the committee secretary, Mr. Burchard, during a visit to Friedrichshafen in Germany, where we were able to confer with the Dornier company. I shall be coming back to this point.

Mrs. Blunck asked me to give you her apologies. If she could have been present she would also have spoken.

What is the question at issue? Since you have the elements available, I shall omit the more technical aspects which some may find complex and which have been dealt with in serious and detailed studies, to dwell on some more political matters.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

As regards the development of a European space-based observation system, I should like first to emphasise what is involved, and then the original features of this undertaking, the tasks it is destined to fulfil and be applied to, and finally certain aspects of co-operation and co-ordination in what needs to be done.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what is the matter at issue? It is an old issue, very dear to WEU. I should like to emphasise, so that the press may also be aware of it, that everything concerning space – first aeronautics and then, very speedily, the space segment itself – has been of great interest to WEU, which has advanced a long way in these matters. This was true as regards Ariane and Arianespace, but is also true of everything concerning the space segment. For many years we have been dealing very specifically with these subjects.

At this Assembly in 1987 I presented a report on the future of space in Europe up to the year 2000. We have a passage from it here, concerning verification satellites. In 1988 Mr. Fourré – whom I thank for being here today – presented a report on verification – a future European satellite agency. Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Lenzer have also dealt with these subjects under various headings such as “The scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite” and “Observation satellites – a means of verifying disarmament”, using information drawn from the symposium organised by our colleague Mr. Lenzer.

Thus there is a continuous thread of work leading to the interesting aspect of this particular report namely, that now some of the relatively theoretical approaches have to be put into practice.

The WEU satellite centre was set up some months ago at Torrejón, near Madrid, in premises formerly used by NATO, and the question of setting up a group to study the feasibility of establishing a medium-and long-term space-based observation system is also being considered.

Two decisions, one made in June 1991 and the other in November 1991, are thus now being implemented. The Torrejón centre is being fitted out under its Director, Mr. Blaydes, and feasibility studies are being carried out by a group of industrialists appointed for this purpose. Dornier, which is responsible for the operation, reached its decision as recently as last May, so we are fully up to date and the work is going ahead.

As regards the original aspect of the system, may I stress its concreteness. I apologise for borrowing the term from Mr. Senghor, but we are indeed at this stage. We are no longer just

making proposals. WEU has already committed funds to a space study centre for interpreting satellite data and training WEU personnel, and the pilot study team, led by Mr. Blaydes on behalf of the centre and by an Italian, Mr. Gagliardi, as regards the team itself.

This then is the instrument we submit to you for adoption. Decisions have been taken and they correspond precisely with our wishes but now the measures for their implementation are there to be followed, and possibly controlled in the performance of our future parliamentary mission. I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General on this occasion. On this issue the Assembly may sometimes have appeared relatively impatient and disruptive in the eyes of the Council of Ministers. The Assembly is grateful to the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General for having taken both operational and practical steps. Only a few months have passed since this decision of principle and today the instrument is already in place.

As regards the original nature of this initiative, we must refer to the historical fact that did so much to speed up this matter, namely the Gulf war. As Europeans, however well-intentioned, however much committed to this system, we perceived how few effective means of observation were available to us, resulting in dependence on our great American allies. Within the family everything ran relatively well, but it sharpened our awareness of a need for greater independence so as to provide a truly European force with independent sources of intelligence which are essential to action in the field.

Again, as regards the originality of this initiative, may I stress a point which is not always brought out and which we parliamentarians believe to be of prime importance – I am speaking in the name of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU – namely, the need for links with public opinion. This is a difficult area that involves finance. At present, nine million ecus have been invested in the centre and pilot study team. This is a three-year programme, which presupposes funds to cover future developments. This is important to remember at a time when it is fashionable to consider that peace reigns in spite of the dramas we have been talking about, the nearest theatre being Yugoslavia. It is all very well to talk about peace dividends, but these dividends must be earned every day and consequently we have to have the proper means, including finance. Hence we must ensure both as regards government action via the Council of Ministers, and also at our own level as a parliamentary Assembly, that we find links with public opinion to support the present effort and ensure proper future development.

The actual tasks are in the process of being defined, because they have been put together

Mr. Valleix (continued)

step by step, pragmatically. Referring to the work of Mr. Fourré, Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Lenzer, it is clear that the first issue is surveillance, verification of disarmament agreements. For this surveillance, there is nothing more suitable than satellites.

Out of sheer necessity, and I am referring to the Gulf war, we quickly recognised that there was a kind of continuity between verification and surveillance at a time of crisis. These are developments which are easily observed.

I call the Secretary-General to witness by quoting his statements to the House of Commons in January 1992, where he explained that the first three years, 1992 to 1994, covered on-going programmes. They were to be used for training analysts in the interpretation of satellite imagery and for demonstrating the technology, using the means currently available. This would be done by using data gathered from the SPOT, Landsat and ERS satellites which, of course, would be enriched by the potential of Helios which was under development by France, Italy and Spain. Mr. van Eekelen nevertheless pointed out that these observation facilities should not prevent WEU, at the appropriate time, from having more independent facilities.

As regards the objectives of the pilot study team, the Secretary-General's statement followed the same lines.

Missions could be developed and should not stop there. We can come back to this when the Rio conference opens. Environment is not within the purview of WEU, but we have unbroken technological continuity in this area. Our structure will in the future contribute to protecting the environment by a better analysis of soils by satellite. Thus we have defined the missions that we can accept at the present time, but taking a constant pragmatic development into account.

Moreover, this enables me to bring up another point that you will find in the draft recommendations, the open skies agreements between members of the former Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliance. In this area also agreements have been concluded.

Finally, Maastricht is also involved. Without prejudging future repercussions, since this question is also highly topical – which shows, as I said at the beginning, how closely our subject is related to the real problems of the present – Maastricht, through its reference to the defence of Europe, is looking towards both crisis surveillance and also what is called strategic surveillance.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are the points that I wished to make, to clarify the objectives.

My fourth point concerns the co-operation which will be essential to make this action as effective as possible. This is mentioned in the report. Obviously, it is a question of working in close co-operation with the European Space Agency, which is in reserve. In order to be effective, this initiative needed to be set up, without necessarily establishing all possible connections from the beginning. But now that the project is under way, it is important to create closer co-operation by asking each possible partner with similar objectives to provide the best he can. This applies to the European Space Agency, the IEPG, and probably other structures as well.

In this connection, in a parallel direction and anticipating the future – you will find a reference to this in paragraph 63 of the report – I should like to mention the work of Eurosat, particularly on the European Space Agency's verification satellite project. I do not think I am wrong to emphasise that the interest of Mr. Fourré in this subject, if not unique, is certainly of prime importance, since he was virtually its inventor. We may be in a specific area here, but who is to enable us to forecast future developments today, in other words why not have such an agency? Is there to be talk of verification, surveillance satellites? This may perhaps be anticipating the definition of the term, but the idea has been launched and will certainly spawn others and we shall need to examine it in detail. Similarly, I do not think that I am misrepresenting current thinking in our various organisations, both at the Assembly and the Council of Ministers when I say – and I think this is something that the Secretary-General has referred to – why should WEU not launch a satellite itself one day? On the basis of the definition of the missions that are very specific to our responsibilities, we could in fact hope to do this in order to fulfil the missions thus defined.

These then are the actual data of this rather unique and totally multinational advance in matters of defence technology and which, as you will have noted, having regard to its degree of technology, makes it very difficult to determine where the line between civilian and military is crossed. The difference may be a matter of intent.

As you are aware, in world agreements space must normally be a civil matter; hence we speak of verification, surveillance, observation, but never aggression. But civilian equipment can supply military information from the moment when such a use can be derived from it, so we have to be careful, but our rôle is to control this action. We are ready to take this on. I would add that, equally, military undertakings may have ecological or environmental applications in the future. In our dialogue with public opinion this is a line that we should attempt to convey, or at all events share, to create a better understanding

Mr. Valleix (continued)

of the human aim of our defence activity, which is not only the security of the men and women of this planet, but also possibly their better quality of life.

In concluding the presentation of this report, I think our committee was unanimous on the final vote. Interesting amendments put forward by Mr. Fourré will shortly be examined; I regret that he has not been able to take part in all our work. We agree on the final objective, but the committee has not been able to meet since he submitted them. We shall have an opportunity to come back to this point when they are debated.

I thank you for your attention and hope that you will approve the draft recommendation which proves how long our Assembly, working with the Council of Ministers along parallel and highly productive lines, has been actively engaged on a course which is now taking on a very concrete and European dimension. I almost said a universal dimension.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Borderas.

Mr. BORDERAS (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall make my initial remarks in French so that they can be produced in full in the official report. I should like to congratulate Mr. Lopez Henares on his election to the chairmanship of the Technological and Aerospace Committee which has produced this report. It is a great satisfaction for the Spanish Delegation to have one of its members appointed Chairman of such a committee.

I will now continue in Spanish.

(The speaker continued in Spanish)

I will now comment on the conclusions of your report, Mr. Valleix, where it says in paragraph 87: “ a European space-based observation system, WEU has launched a project which, by its nature and magnitude, exceeds anything the organisation has done since its creation. ”

Mr. President, what the Rapporteur means in his resumé is in the text of the report itself: this project for a WEU satellite centre is to be implemented at the Torrejón de Ardoz air base, about twenty kilometres to the northeast of Madrid; it has a budget for the first three years totalling 38.25 million ecus, giving a budget of around \$ 55 million; eighty-five firms from the various WEU member countries are to take part in it; its director is Mr. Barry Blaydes, whom I had the pleasure of meeting in Berlin in April and again here two days ago and who is now here with us; work has started on the infrastructure and actual construction is expected to be completed

towards the end of August this year. The most recent news I have from Mr. Blaydes and my own government is that it could be inaugurated this autumn, possibly in October. The initial work on the infrastructure will cost nine million ecus; the first twenty of the total of fifty technical personnel who will make up the staff have been contracted and the organisation chart for their activities will be divided into five sections: operational, information, staffing, finance and scientific and technical development.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to record my interest, the interest of my delegation, of my government, of my country, in supporting this project and would like to acknowledge the interest taken by Mr. Fourré, Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Lenzer, both in this Assembly and in the Assembly of the Council of Europe in January this year, in the initiatives in this matter.

Some of you may be wondering what will be done at this centre. Well, as Mr. Valleix has explained, it will first carry out verification of the disarmament agreements using European resources, in particular after the Open Skies Treaty dated 24th March of this year. Second, it will be involved in crisis monitoring and, particularly for my country, Spain, it will be monitoring problems in the Mediterranean, which are of great concern to all but especially to the countries of southern Europe; at this very moment there is in this area the whole problem of the Yugoslav conflict. Third, there is the monitoring and identification of environmental phenomena which are increasingly worrying, increasingly threatening and imminent and therefore a matter of great public concern.

Ladies and gentlemen, for Spain in particular the implementation of the WEU space programme constitutes an attractive technological challenge and will ensure the development of some very advantageous industrial activities through our collaboration. In this respect, our country already has experience of the Helios programme involved in the ground component of that programme.

To sum up, Mr. President, we fully support this report and its Rapporteur, Mr. Valleix; this problem may be of concern to everyone, but for the Spanish people it certainly constitutes a responsibility and a great challenge.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank and congratulate our Rapporteurs, in particular Mr. Valleix, who has just given us a particularly brilliant report, as he usually does, on a question with which I am especially familiar. I should also like to thank the former Chairman of the committee, Mr. Stegagnini, who is with us here and who, with

Mr. Fourré (continued)

others, of course – as Jean Valleix mentioned – has been one of the promoters of this project which Mr. Lopez Henares is to take in hand. I should like to assure him also of my full support in our common aim, to promote the European agency for verification by satellite, which I have called by this name since 1982. I think one should also remember the perseverance of those parliamentarians who had ideas and finally managed to see them brought to fruition.

I should like to take this opportunity to recall why and where this idea arose. It has to be compared with France's initiative in 1978 at the United Nations when it sought to create an international satellite verification agency. This ISVA did not come into being for a simple reason: space observation at the time was essentially under the military control of the United States and the Soviet Union, and at that time these two countries used their veto to prevent the international agency being set up.

Thereafter, a number of study groups tried to think up more regional responses. I launched this idea in 1982, when I was a member of the Council of Europe and serving for the first time on the Technical Committee. Of course, it ended up again, naturally enough, in this organisation because it was primarily a matter which is a WEU responsibility, namely defence. Here in the Technological and Aerospace Committee we began putting this idea forward in 1984 and it finally reached the stage referred to a moment ago by Mr. Valleix. It was a matter of great satisfaction for us parliamentarians to see in 1988 a Council of Ministers approving unanimously one of our recommendations aimed at promoting concrete measures to mobilise Europe behind a strategy of disarmament and in particular of crisis verification.

Obviously, this concrete advance referred to by Mr. Valleix prompts us today to want a progress report. This was even included in Recommendation 465 to which I referred a moment ago. In it we asked the Council of Ministers to give us a phased programme. It is true that it took a parliamentary initiative for us to be specifically informed of what had been done. I thank the committee for having taken this initiative and I regret that it was not the Council of Ministers itself that took it.

So far, then, the balance is positive, but this is only one stage. It is a first phase and does not go far enough, although it is of considerable importance. We now have to plan further stages and they will require more finance. The technological and economic requirements we already have in our ability to mobilise Europe's space capabilities.

The number of companies already specialised in all areas is large and we can therefore con-

ceive of a specialised European space segment. One day in the future why should we not have a WEU European satellite verification agency? This perhaps would mean that the Helios experiment would have to be the very basis of the concept. Nothing is impossible. Hence, Mr. President, Mr. Rapporteur, we have to consider this as a first stage towards a global concept.

Personally, since 1982 I have always called it European satellite verification agency. Make no mistake, I am not personally attached to the name, and I could well think up another. Nevertheless, as regards the impact on public opinion to which our Rapporteur referred a short time ago, we need to insist for the subject and the concept to be properly recognised. I agree that the word verification may be less suitable for the environment than for disarmament. It will depend on the missions one day assigned to this agency. That is not the fundamental problem. The basic problem relates to the technological and economic capacity that we develop in conjunction not only with the European agency, but also with national agencies and even the IEPG. Henceforward, we must strive to mobilise all our partners. Without a firm political will and all our confidence, we shall not succeed in this ambitious but hugely promising project.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be brief. I should first like to thank Mr. Borderas for the additional details that he has supplied and his enthusiasm for the setting up of the Torrejón centre and the initiative that we are discussing. I also extend these thanks to my Spanish friends because we will then have a base where some serious work can be done and high-grade personnel trained, both things that will help equip WEU in the way it needs to perform its missions.

I gladly allow Mr. Fourré his right to take an initiative. I have no wish to engage in a battle of author's rights, but I do feel somewhat irked at the late arrival of his amendments which puts us in a rather complex position because, as Mr. Stegagnini can testify, a great deal of work was done in committee on this subject right up to last week.

Since I have mentioned Mr. Stegagnini, let me take this opportunity to pay him a tribute since he will shortly be leaving the Assembly. I thank him for his work in the committee which he shepherded to the Bordeaux area where we were able to discover some enjoyable products of the earth and some highly technological advances in space. I also welcome his successor, Mr. Lopez Henares, who will, as I well know, take up the reins with equal enthusiasm.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

As for Mr. Fourré's amendments which we will look at in a few moments, I can already say that as regards the final objective we are in full agreement. I found the documents that he passed on to me extremely interesting. I know that you will continue to be active not only in the Council of Europe as regards the civil side, but also in this Assembly as regards our specific mission, and that you will go on affording us your support and innovative ideas.

I shall say no more because I expect the Chairman of the committee wants to present his conclusions before taking the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I have to tell you that we convened the committee this morning to consider any amendments. None came in and therefore I cannot offer the committee's opinion to the Assembly.

I can therefore only give my personal opinion of Mr. Fourré's amendments which show his long-term and undeniable knowledge of this question and also the interest and enthusiasm that Mr. Fourré has always shown for these important subjects. I must also congratulate him on the courage that he has always shown in this area.

Amendments 1 and 4 cannot be accepted because, as I say, they have not been considered by the committee. They relate to a future European satellite verification agency. The word verification troubles me because the satellites are primarily for observation, intelligence and surveillance. Verification is something done by employees, civil servants and office staff. The idea is good but, as I should like to stress, it needs to be considered by the committee and this has not been done.

Amendment 2 would appear to be acceptable because it is in line with the attitude of the committee and the wording is satisfactory.

As for Amendment 3, Mr. Fourré is well aware that it applies to a part of the text arrived at after long discussion, a compromise having been reached by the committee with the help of several of its members.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Technological and Aerospace Committee has tabled the draft recommendation in Document 1304.

I have four amendments to this text from Mr. Fourré and they will be examined in the following order: Amendment 1, Amendment 2, Amendment 3 and Amendment 4.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "WEU Satellite Centre"

add "a first step towards the future creation of a European agency for verification by satellite".

I call Mr. Fourré to move his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – May I tell Mr. Lopez Henares and Mr. Valleix that I would have liked to present these amendments and debate them in committee, but unfortunately I am no longer on this committee though having been a member for nearly ten years.

As regards a European agency for verification by satellite, I agree that neither its title nor content have been discussed in the committee. I should nevertheless like to remind you that in 1988 when we adopted our two recommendations the principle and concept of such an agency were accepted. Moreover, my report was entitled: "A future European satellite agency". It is true that the term verification can be open to various interpretations, but if one looks at the content of the missions referred to in Mr. Valleix's report, namely disarmament verification, crisis monitoring and the environment – which we have now integrated – we see that this notion can be very broad.

I would like to stress this point because the reference to an agency is also not new and because I think it is useful to remind the Council of Ministers that while this satellite centre is a good initiative it is not sufficient. It is the first step towards a European satellite verification agency, it being understood that we could opt for another title in the future, but the concept itself has already been unanimously agreed. I would hope that the committee will have further occasion to work on this project and will then be able to find a more suitable name.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – You can see the dilemma I am in because, under the rules, Mr. Stegagnini cannot speak after Mr. Fourré who has spoken to his amendment and because this text has not been considered by the committee. So there was no way for us to make any possible changes to include this idea.

The actual purpose of the amendment does not contradict the general trend of the recommendation, but to incorporate it, apart from the use of the word verification, would seem to imply that the first step is the one we are dealing with now and that a second step would be the setting up of the agency.

I think that it may be an agency, but it could perhaps be something else. Let us not guess at the post-1994 programme in advance which, as I said a moment ago, is referred to in the information provided by the Council of Ministers. Between now and then, we shall ourselves have to study the project and, by then at the latest,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

step in again to define new objectives. Otherwise we would be failing our duty.

Similarly, we do not know whether we shall then propose to our Assembly and the Council of Ministers the production of a satellite related to the definition of the specific missions that we would have agreed with the services, or whether we shall be headed straight for a European satellite agency, which is indeed one of the foreseeable outcomes of our activity. It is difficult to look ahead today, because it might mean confining ourselves to this one path which, though it may appear natural, may not be the only one possible.

Finally, I have pointed out that it was very desirable to plan for close co-operation with existing organisations so that there is no rivalry and above all no counter-moves. I am thinking, for example, of the European Space Agency, whose nature is not specifically the subject dealt with by our colleague Mr. Fourré. This would at the very outset lead to risks of difficulty and rivalry, whereas we are at present seeking closer relations rather than inviting the risk of misunderstandings between us.

Mr. President, these are the reasons of both substance and form why at present, with my regrets to Mr. Fourré, I cannot see any possibility of inserting his proposed amendment in the text that we have tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – As I have already said, I agree with the Rapporteur. But I shall take this opportunity to say to Mr. Fourré that the history of this question is not yet over.

I can assure you, Mr. Fourré, that we shall continue to look hard at any way there is to increase the chances of obtaining this European agency. But to my mind there seems no way to accept your amendment if the committee has not considered it.

I repeat, Mr. President, that in both my view and that of the Rapporteur, we can accept only Amendment 2.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We shall now move to Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Fourré, which reads as follows:

2. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "experience" add, "on the one hand", and, at the end of the paragraph, add "and, on the other, of national agencies".

I call Mr. Fourré to move his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be brief because my amendment has been accepted by the committee. It is obvious that we agreed the whole concept of a European agency for verification by satellite – excuse me but I still persist in thinking that this is what we should call it – in 1988. That, no doubt, is what our colleague Mr. Stegagnini wanted to say. And now we are going back on our decision. I find this very serious. I shall come back to the matter when we take Amendment 4.

The purpose of Amendment 2 was simply to point out that the European Space Agency should rightly be associated with our work but that we also have national agencies that could be put to work on this project.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – Agreed, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We now move to Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Fourré, which reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation" and insert "any other organisation".

I call Mr. Fourré to move his amendment.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – The Chairman of the committee has explained why he personally was against this amendment. I was not present, with good reason, at the discussion in the committee to which he referred. I agree that the proposed wording did seem rather confused to me. Indeed, the notion of universality naturally already includes the two previous ones. Rather than making distinctions between the different "vocations", I thought that we could simply say "to any other organisation", a wording that sums up the idea. But if there has been discussion and consensus on this wording, I am prepared to withdraw my amendment if it poses a problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to take over Amendment 3, withdrawn by Mr. Fourré and to recommend it for approval.

I think that the points raised in the amendments tabled by Mr. Fourré are correct and apposite. Since Maastricht, WEU is not an

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

autonomous organisation as it was in the past, particularly as regards relations with the European Community which, through the Commissioner for Research, is given powers to intervene in the field of scientific and technical research, including powers in respect of funds. This means that these amendments could create a two-sided, direct relationship permitting an increase in the limited funds available to us for our ambitious projects.

In addition, I am pleased that reference is made to Atlantic organisations because the Independent European Programme Group, IEPG, is an organisation under NATO but will shortly pass under WEU control, although this has not happened yet.

As regards the other world organisations, who can say that an international space agency could not devise forms of co-operation with our project, with the prospect also of a European agency? That is why I have supported these amendments.

As I have the floor, Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Valleix, Mr. Lopez Henares, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Lenzer and all my friends who have helped me with this work over the last three years, and have contributed decisively to the pursuit of these objectives. I hope I have not forgotten any colleagues who have worked with me but I would like to record in particular my sorrow at the recent death of Mr. Malfatti. With their unflagging ability and determination, they have worked unremittingly to further, on behalf of the whole Assembly, this most ambitious project of such importance for the future of Europe and for the effective contribution of a WEU presence to its achievement. In this respect, WEU must play a privileged rôle as part of the alliance and as the centre of the Community's security and defence policy.

I should like to thank members for the kind things they have said about me. This is certainly the last session I shall be attending and it is with emotion, Mr. President, that I offer you and all my colleagues my warmest thanks and affectionate regard. The seven years I have spent in this Assembly have been of the greatest importance; we have shared moments of great emotion and tension; for me they provide a wealth of memories which I will carry away to my future both inside and outside politics.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Stegagnini. I too wish you well in the future.

What is the opinion of the committee?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The committee's opinion, Mr. President, has already been given by the Chairman, Mr. Lopez Henares.

I should simply like to say that I appreciate Mr. Fourré's willingness to be co-operative and withdraw the amendment for reasons internal to

the committee as Mr. Stegagnini will confirm. He complicates my task with an emotion that all of us of course will share. In France we say: I am in a Cornelian situation and our English colleagues would probably use the word Shakespearean. We all have our own word for it. In short, ladies and gentlemen, we all are headed in the same direction.

Mr. Fourré wanted to simplify the expression by making it more general. I do not think that I am misinterpreting him. He thought that three or four words were simpler than just one.

Mr. Stegagnini, it happens that our committee that you presided over found itself with the beginnings of a list which was embarrassing because it was restrictive. However, we are all pulling in the same direction, namely that WEU should make the best use of its information in the interests of all and possibly in the interests of the whole planet; we were talking about this a short time ago.

But secondly, and you were right to make the point, there should be a fair return on this effort and investment and therefore expenditure, possibly by trading the information. This is your approach and, although not necessarily the overriding approach, it may have its positive side.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to give due weight to the discussion in committee. The Rapporteur has to regard himself as the official recorder of these debates, which is what I am trying to be. This in no way affects my friendship for Mr. Fourré nor my admiration and loyal friendship for Mr. Stegagnini, but, in brief, I am against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Mr. Fourré has tabled Amendment 4, which reads:

4. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following paragraph:

“Reaffirm its will to set up in successive stages, of which the Satellite Centre is the first step, a European agency for verification by satellite.”

I call Mr. Fourré to move Amendment 4.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, I am of Breton origin and the Bretons are reputedly stubborn. I therefore continue to think that we are making a mistake by not introducing the idea into this recommendation that for us this is only one stage. There is nothing in our present recommendation which makes it clear to the Council of Ministers and the public that we are concerned with a first stage. This concerns me deeply. It also concerns

Mr. Fourré (continued)

me because the work of the WEU Assembly has to be planned ahead.

I, like Mr. Valleix, recalled a moment ago the history of the satellite centre and space observation that we are recommending. I repeat; in 1988 in two reports jointly presented by the Defence Committee and the Technological and Aerospace Committee we decided to "define the conditions for setting up a European satellite agency in WEU" – and most importantly – "on the basis of the guidelines in the present report". We voted this unanimously.

What did the report say? It set out the three stages that I have just mentioned for creating such an agency. The first of the three was the setting up of a satellite centre. I should like it to be pointed out to the Council of Ministers that we are at the first stage and that we have a collective ambition to go further, even if, and here I agree with you entirely, we have to redefine the missions of this European verification agency. Of course we have to draw on the experience of the present, developments in technology, and the mobilisation of the social partners. But we should say so.

At the moment, there is nothing that tells the public that we are indeed going to pursue this plan which was voiced in 1988 but had been there a considerable time before.

Without going further into the definition of the agency's missions, I would like it simply to be pointed out that this is the first stage towards a European satellite verification agency.

My apologies for defending this case so intensely but I believe in it very strongly. I hope that the Chairman and Rapporteur understand the purpose of this amendment and approve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LOPEZ HENARES (*Spain*) (Translation). – I agree that you are persistent, Mr. Fourré. It is a pity that you have not been convinced by what we have said. We still prefer to keep the original text. I ask for your understanding of the position of the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee out of respect for both the committee and the plenary Assembly.

Rule 31 states that: "Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay." In a spirit of conciliation we allowed you to table your amendments at the last moment.

I should like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, to make a suggestion to the Clerk of the Assembly. In the future, it would be a good idea to have a register of amendments, as in all

other assemblies, to record their date and time handed in. It is difficult to study an amendment, submitted late in the morning, for an afternoon debate. I do not doubt that you handed in your amendment early enough, but, in the future, complicated amendments could be submitted and the Assembly could find itself in an awkward situation.

It is for this reason and as a matter of principle that I repeat that while I am not against the earlier recommendations, I cannot accept this amendment without hearing what the committee has to say. The Assembly will decide. But I personally, like the Rapporteur, am against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Normally, the interpretation of the Rules of Procedure is the province of the President and of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure. All amendments have to be submitted within the prescribed time-limit.

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation, as amended.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 4th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden.
2. Arms control: CSCE and WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1306).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.)

1. See page 44.

SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th June 1992

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
 2. Adoption of the minutes.
 3. Examination of credentials.
 4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
 5. Changes in the membership of committees.
 6. Address by Mr. Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden.
- Replies by Mr. Björck to questions put by:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. de Puig, Mr. Martinez.
7. Arms control: CSCE and WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1306.*)
Speakers: Mr. de Puig (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Moya, Mr. Fabra, Mr. de Puig (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (*Vice-Chairman*).
 8. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Soell, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would like to propose, under Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, that the Assembly now ratify the change in the credentials of the Netherlands Delegation to the effect that Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman becomes a representative in place of Mr. Jurgens who becomes a substitute.

The necessary official documents have been received from the Netherlands Parliament. The

credentials, under Rule 6 (2), are subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Are there any objections?...

The credentials are therefore ratified, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We must now proceed to the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly. I have received the nomination of Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman for the last remaining post of Vice-President.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of this Vice-President be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman elected Vice-President of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Kempinaire, Mr. Foschi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Machete, Mr. Fourré and Mrs. Err.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the changes in the

1. See page 47.

The President (continued)

membership of committees proposed by the Spanish Delegation which have been published in Notice No. 7.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

**6. Address by Mr. Björck,
Minister of Defence of Sweden**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Anders Björck, Minister of Defence of Sweden.

This, Minister, is the first time in all its history that the WEU Assembly will be addressed by a Swedish minister. It is not a matter of chance but the logical outcome of the changes affecting Europe over the last three years. Concerned as it was to preserve its policy of neutrality at the time when the East-West confrontation dominated European affairs, Sweden like some other countries feels, because of the new situation in Europe, it must take a more active part in the new organisation of peace throughout Europe. Having decided to apply to join the European Community it felt the wholly natural wish to set out to us its views on security matters through the mouth of its Defence Minister, once the Twelve in Maasticht confirmed WEU to be an integral part of this process of European Union to which Sweden has decided to associate itself. You may be sure that none of the significance of your gesture in visiting us here today is lost upon us.

But this does not mean that you yourself or your country are strangers. For decades, we have been meeting together in the Council of Europe where, up to the end of last year, you held the office of President of its Parliamentary Assembly with an authority and skill which we all admire. For most of us, therefore, you are an old friend we are pleased to see again and we are going to listen to you from both these stand-points. They prompt us to pay keen attention to what you are about to say on the way in which your country, without betraying its history, envisages integration in a European system no longer limited to economic community and on what it expects from its new partners. For our part, we have always given close attention to the problems of the north of Europe and, as you know, we have opened relations with the Baltic republics. But no one is better prepared than you to explain to us the security problems which now arise in the Baltic area.

I am therefore delighted to have you with us, Minister, in what is for you a new context with new responsibilities. The questions that will, with your permission, follow your address will

enable us to renew a dialogue which now, in our eyes, takes on a fresh importance.

I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – First, I thank you, Mr. President, for your warm words of welcome and I thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for inviting me to give this address to the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. It is the first time that a Swedish minister has appeared before the Assembly and is a clear sign of the sweeping changes that have occurred all over Europe, including Sweden. The rapid changes which have taken place in European security policy have made it possible for Sweden to participate fully in the building up of a new European co-operation.

In the new Europe, there is a striking contrast between the stability of the West and the unsettled situation to the East. WEU, NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Community have demonstrated considerable capacity for adaptation in the face of changing prerequisites. Today, I think that we can all agree that war in Western Europe is inconceivable, largely thanks to these structures. When people say that co-operation among the European nations is evolving slowly, they should not forget what we have already achieved: a war between the western democracies is no longer possible.

One reason I came to address the Assembly is that, in the north of Europe, changes in the strategic situation have been less comprehensive and less unambiguous than in Central Europe. The fundamental security interests of the great powers will remain intact for the foreseeable future in the North.

The reductions in military forces which have occurred in Central Europe in recent years have not yet spread northwards. On the contrary, there are significant indications that the former Soviet Union and Russia have reinforced their capability in qualitative terms, primarily their air and naval forces on the Kola Peninsula, to where troops from Central and Eastern Europe have been moved.

As far as Russia and the former Soviet Union are concerned, the Baltic Sea has always been a vital strategic area for the protection of military and civilian centres, for example the St. Petersburg region. For very obvious geographical reasons, this situation continues to apply, even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

For some considerable time, the security policy situation in the north of Europe – and hence for Sweden – will be dominated by developments in a Russia that is in a state of economic, political and military disintegration. This is a paradox: the breakdown of the Soviet

Mr. Björck (continued)

Union opens up promising opportunities for peace and democracy but, at the same time, there is considerable uncertainty and a major risk that developments will backfire. Perhaps Sweden feels that more than other countries that are further from Russia – geographically and in other ways.

Let me also mention Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, countries which are particularly important to Sweden, since they are close to us in various ways.

Although those three countries regained their independence after the failed coup d'état of August 1991, they still have serious problems. Russian troops are still stationed on their soil and the Baltic countries will not have achieved full independence until these troops have been withdrawn. This is not exclusively a Baltic or Russian problem – it is also a security problem in a European context. There are not only many conventional Russian troops there, but many military installations from the former Soviet Union.

Sweden feels responsible for helping the Baltic countries in a number of different ways. Our efforts to assist former communist countries in Eastern Europe will obviously be focused on the Baltic region. That does not mean that we shall not also try to do what we can in other areas of Central and Eastern Europe, even though we are a small country. But there is no doubt that we feel a special sense of responsibility towards the three Baltic republics.

Since I became Sweden's Minister of Defence last autumn, I have been asked from time to time: "How can Sweden be neutral when there are no longer two military alliances between which to maintain your neutrality?" That is a good question, which has become increasingly important in the light of Sweden's application for membership of the European Community. The EC is developing in the direction of a European Union, with a common security and foreign policy, and possibly a common defence policy at some point in the future.

The conclusion to be drawn from developments in Europe in recent years is that the prerequisites of Sweden's security policy have changed. A policy of neutrality can no longer be applied as a relevant description of the policies we wish to pursue – I mean classical, traditional Swedish neutrality, not neutrality in general.

In the cold war epoch, Sweden endeavoured to distance itself from any kind of foreign policy co-operation which might give other countries reason to question the credibility of our policy of neutrality. But now the situation is different. Sweden has as great an interest as any other European country in taking an active part in building up a new security architecture in

Europe, in order to be able to handle, contain or solve the security threats and tension which we are likely to face in the future.

Our application for membership of the EC is an expression of the fact that we share the Community's long-term objectives, as formulated in the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act, and that Sweden will work for the realisation of these objectives together with other member states. As a member of the European Union, Sweden will participate fully in a common security and foreign policy, as established in the Maastricht agreement in the autumn of 1991.

As far as Sweden is concerned, this means a commitment to be responsible for our own defences so that we can remain neutral in the event of war in our neighbourhood. Sweden is only responsible for its own defence.

We are serious about remaining a relatively strong military power. Late last night, the Swedish Parliament approved a new five-year defence plan to decide the main goals and structures of Swedish defence from 1992 to 1997.

In one way, that decision is unique. The Swedish Parliament's decision yesterday was to increase the military budget for the forthcoming five years in real terms. I realise that few countries are doing that now. It must be explained that during the 1980s, unfortunately, we did not increase defence spending as much as we should have in line with other countries, and that means that there are many things to be repaired. That is exactly what is happening now. That defence decision means that we shall complete the new JAS 39 Gripen programme; we shall buy, in the forthcoming year, new battle tanks for the Swedish army; and we shall increase our capacity to fight at night. We shall give an appropriate place to all Swedish soldiers in the main forces, and continue to improve submarine defence. We shall keep the number of submarines that we have today through building new ones to replace the outgoing ones. We are doing that because, in the forthcoming years, we can see no alternative to an independent Swedish defence system.

At the moment, the European structure of co-operation and security is at a formative stage. There are a number of different possibilities for continued development in the 1990s. In a recent report the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Swedish Parliament stated unanimously that Sweden's policy of non-participation in military alliances imposes no restrictions on its participation in European co-operation, and that Sweden's security policy is characterised by active and full participation in the endeavours to fulfil the goals shared by all European nations. I am glad to have the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Swedish Foreign Affairs

Mr. Björck (continued)

Committee here today. They, too, are participating in a WEU session for the first time.

One could say that this policy is not absolutely clear. But it would not be appropriate for Sweden to commit itself to decisions that have not yet been taken within the EC, WEU, NATO and other European bodies, because very few members of those organisations have decided about the future.

The Foreign Affairs Committee states that: "A decision concerning the issue of WEU membership is not possible before Sweden has obtained membership of the European Union. Before that, the issue is without relevance. The policy of non-participation in military alliances still remains."

As for the timetable for Swedish membership of the European Union, last year, during the term of office of the previous social democrat government but with the backing of 90% of the parliament, Sweden handed over a formal application for membership on 1st July. At least so far, the timetable has been that Sweden should become a full member of the EC on 1st January 1995. We do not know whether we can stick to that timetable or whether recent events have changed it. We still hope that we shall be admitted on 1st January 1995. That is not a decision for Sweden but for the member countries of the EC and that will mean that we can also discuss other matters in a more constructive atmosphere.

Without discussing the question of Sweden's participation in WEU, I would like to emphasise the valuable contributions which WEU can make to security policy developments in Europe in this context. WEU is undoubtedly contributing to strengthening the ties between Germany and France, and thus to the cohesion of the process of European integration. WEU can also contribute to meeting the need for forces for peace-keeping for dealing with crises. Finally, WEU represents an opportunity for Europe to apply a purely European perspective to the many new security problems which are occurring on our continent, and which unfortunately no doubt will occur in the future.

Let me emphasise, however, that Sweden still regards American involvement in Europe as a highly important factor, both in political and military terms. In this context, I would like to emphasise the importance of the American commitment to the stability of Northern Europe. We hope that co-operation in WEU, for example, will not develop in a way which will undermine the rôle played by the United States in our part of the world.

I have tried to give you a picture of Sweden's security policy situation and the background to

the decisions which will have to be made in the course of the second half of the 1990s. One might compare Sweden's policy of neutrality in the post-war period to a number of stone tablets which have now been broken. There are no new sacred tablets in stock, and as a result, some of my fellow countrymen feel a certain disorientation when confronted with the security and foreign policy situation in Europe. Furthermore, many of them have failed to grasp the scope of the political changes in Europe which have taken place since 1989.

This is why Sweden needs a penetrating and balanced discussion about its security and foreign policy options, prior to membership of the EC. This process is not simple, and there are no clear answers here. Never forget that Sweden had a policy of neutrality for many years. Sweden has not been in a war since 1815. Swedish neutrality has been, and still is, regarded highly by an overwhelming majority of the Swedish people.

That is something that should be discussed. With Europe changing so rapidly we should try to make the necessary adaptations in our area. I am glad that there is unanimity about this, as evidenced by the foreign policy report. Earlier we had to say no to many of the options offered to us. Now we are not saying no, but we are not saying yes either, to all of the options available in Europe today.

The great change for Sweden is that today we are prepared to discuss various options. We are not tied to old formulas. Therefore, in future, Sweden be an interesting discussion forum. In addition, you will find a Sweden that is prepared to make concrete contributions to European collective security. That is new for us. I beg for your understanding that such a process is not always easy for a small neutral country. We should learn a lesson from what happened the other day in Denmark. Changes of this kind take time and it is extremely important that we take the people along with us and that we do not fight them when we embark on building a new united Europe.

I personally welcome the discussion about this in my country. The time is indeed ripe for Sweden to have a discussion about this, not only within its borders but together with our fellow-Europeans. If we can do this together, I am sure that in future the Assembly will find Sweden active in European policies and taking responsibility for keeping peace, stability and democracy in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Minister for your address.

I am sure you will not mind answering the questions some of our members want to ask you. Seven have their names down.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome my old friend, Anders Björck, and wish to ask him a two-part question. First, can he elaborate a little on what he said about the effects that might be rubbed off on the other nordic countries following the Danish referendum? Secondly, in the light of what he said about the increasing, not decreasing, perils that appear likely in the Kola Peninsula, can he understand that for some of us it is difficult to appreciate why Sweden wants to maintain an independent defence, yet if anything happened to Sweden, it would expect NATO or some other body to come to its rescue? Does it not feel that it could go a little further more quickly in its own interests?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – What happened in Denmark is a warning sign for all of us. We in Sweden hope that it will have no impact on the timetable for our membership of the EC. I would regret it if there was any impact. On the contrary, I think that the effect on Sweden will be to mobilise all those in favour of European co-operation and Swedish membership. Many of us in Sweden think that there should be an overwhelming majority in the referendum that we shall have in 1994. Everybody is aware that it will not be easy and that will definitely mobilise everybody on the yes side. I have no doubt that in 1994 there will be a substantial majority in favour of Swedish membership of the EC and that the Swedes will be able to take part in European Union. I hope that everybody who is dealing with European affairs now will be aware that Europe is not self-propelling. We need to take responsibility for political affairs and not to take support for European ideas for granted.

Sir Geoffrey's second question was about the situation in the northern part of Europe, in particular the massive build-up of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula. We in Sweden are following this closely for obvious reasons. Troops from Central and east Central Europe have been moved not only to the Kola Peninsula, but especially to St. Petersburg military district or, as it is still called, Leningrad military district. That is very close to Sweden.

Sir Geoffrey is justified in asking whether Sweden can reject an attack from a country with 160 million inhabitants. I do not think that the present leadership in Moscow has any intention of attacking Sweden or any other country. Yet, as a defence minister, I must think about the unthinkable. What will happen if the future brings changes? Never forget that in such countries there is always a risk of coups, such as happened last year. We in Sweden are giving the defence of northern Sweden priority in the new defence plan that we agreed last night and an

attack against Sweden should be so tough and hard, and should take such a long time that we should be able to consult with others and, ultimately, ask for help. An attack on Sweden, Finland and Norway cannot be regarded in isolation. If that happens, there is a grave risk of starting another great European war. Then we all would have joint responsibility to stop it by helping those who have been attacked.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I too am very pleased to see you amongst us, Minister, and to point out the fortunate coincidence of Sweden's presence here on the day on which we are to discuss a report which specifically mentions the problems you have touched upon, including that of neutrality.

Since you yourself referred to your country's wish to study ways in which it could take part in the task of ensuring collective security, I would like to ask you this question.

Given the state of non-war in Europe since the end of the second world war thanks to the pacts countries entered into and given the prospects opened up by Maastricht do you not think, on the basis of what now binds us together and will bind us increasingly together in the future, that the notion of neutrality has now been superseded by that of solidarity?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – I shall try to answer the interesting question put by my old friend, Jean-Marie Caro. Let me put it this way. We normally talk not about Swedish neutrality but about foreign policy with a European identity – that is a bit of Sprachregelung, if you will allow me to use that expression. I have been accused of many things by my political enemies – there are not many – but I have never been accused of attacking the classic idea of Swedish neutrality.

For Sweden, neutrality was a good thing when Europe was divided, but what was right in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and even the 1980s may not be right in the 1990s and after the year 2000. I am not criticising those who are in favour of Swedish neutrality, as I am, but I think that we must now redefine our foreign and security policy. That is exactly what we are going to do. The process is already under way. I quoted earlier the views of the Foreign Affairs Committee which clearly indicated that there is strong unanimous backing for a redefinition of Swedish foreign policy. It is important that that is backed by a solid majority in parliament and a majority of the people.

I do not think that if you are trying to become a member of an exclusive club, such as the EC, it

Mr. Björck (continued)

is polite before you have been admitted – Sweden has not been admitted yet – to tell WEU or such organisations exactly what they should do and how they should behave. We should wait and see a little. Let us see what concepts the EC, WEU and other European bodies find and, when we have done that, hopefully we will become full members of the EC. Then it is time, as I said in my speech, to start trying to join in what is possible – I hope that many things will be possible. But we should not say or do that before we have become members. It would be very improper to do so.

When we are joining any kind of European collective security system which emerges – perhaps CSCE – the best thing that we can bring with us is, in my humble opinion, a modern, strong Swedish defence. That would give us the possibility of choosing, and we would also have something substantial that could be for the benefit of other countries, especially taking into account our geographical location in the tense area in the northern part of Europe. That indicates that Swedish defence will remain strong and, until we have found something at European level, completely independent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – It gives us great pleasure, of course, to have the Defence Minister of Sweden amongst us. I thank him for his address.

You present something of a paradox for us this morning because, following on the Danish referendum, you are now telling us of your country's determination to be part of the European Union and at the same time, as minister of one of the neutral countries, you talk to us about defence and your country's own particular efforts.

You have not fully satisfied us as regards your interpretation of the result of the Danish referendum. Do you not think that the Maastricht approach lays too little stress on political, diplomatic and defence aspects in spite of the progress that is said to have been made and too much on Europe of the traders, through economic and monetary union alone, in which financial, banking and monetary concerns take pride of place? How does Sweden see this problem?

You are also Minister of the only country in continental Europe to have increased its defence budget. This was the scoop you announced to us – coldly I was about to say – this morning. Could you give us an idea of how big the increase is?

Apart from the campaigns you told us about, how do you intend to explain this decision and

win the support of public opinion? Your technique could perhaps set an example for others.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – I completely agree with my old colleague, Jean Valleix, that in the discussion in Sweden about Swedish membership of the EC there has been too much talk about the economic aspects. I very much miss the ideological European dimension in our discussions in Sweden, especially as I was President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I miss the cultural and ideological aspects, the striving to build up a common Europe with a European identity as something unique in the world – Europe as a superpower, not just in the economic sense.

As in Denmark, there has been a tendency for all that to disappear from the debate. Together with many other Swedes, I shall do what I can to bring back the European idea for the referendum which we will have in 1994. If there is discussion only about tariffs and such things, I can understand why people fear a Europe run by bureaucrats. We should avoid that.

On the question of the defence budget, the decision last evening to increase the budget in real terms by roughly 3% in five years means that we will have full price compensation and planning stability during the next five years. The idea behind this new defence decision is that we should make the peacetime organisation a little smaller and instead buy new, modern weapons. We have learned the lesson from the war in the Gulf, we hope. As I said, the idea is that there should be a reduction in the peacetime establishment and a modern, sophisticated defence with the best possible weapons.

There is another element. We have decided – it will mean a high cost – to maintain the Swedish defence industry in the 1990s. That means that we are now seeking European partners in that respect. We are a country with 8.6 million inhabitants. We make military and civilian aircraft, submarines, the JAS 39 Gripen, and missiles. We have two independent car industries, and so on. It is not possible to maintain all that without help, although last year the previous social democratic party established the first contact with the Independent European Programme Group – which I think is familiar to all of us here. We have asked to establish relations with it and have just started that process. This is also something new for us and we hope that you will support us.

Jean Valleix asked also about the reaction among the people. Some are against and some are in favour. I think that the majority would accept it – there was a good majority in the parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am extremely pleased to see our old friend Anders Björck as Minister of Defence. I wish to follow his suggestion and make a more or less ideological remark. The essential point for me is that at Maastricht we decided that there would be a united states of Europe. Of course there will be a common security policy with elements of defence. Why? We want to make Europe safer. This institution is not a military one. We are the security identity of the Communities. In our resolutions we asked our Council of Ministers – you could be one of them, Mr. Björck – to contribute to this attempt to make Europe safer, to develop a real security policy and to produce creative ideas about the peaceful settlement of disputes, about ways of preventing conflict and about mediating.

We in this Assembly have adopted recommendations asking our Council of Ministers to be active in promoting respect for Resolution 757 of the Security Council on Yugoslavia. The people there want our help and I would not understand if many people in Sweden did not agree with that way of thinking and were not willing to help.

We have just two options: a country applying for membership is invited to become either a member or an observer. Would it be possible to include in all these discussions a request like: “Please join us in our attempts to make Europe safer?”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – Yes. As I said in my statement, if Sweden joins the European Union we will be prepared to accept the Maastricht agreement, which provides for co-operation in both security and foreign policies. I tried to explain that perhaps the time is not yet right for Sweden, which has not yet been admitted, to point and say, “You should behave like this.” Most of the countries represented here have been members of the EC, NATO, WEU and other bodies for many years.

I fully understand that we cannot join the European Union without being prepared to be a good partner in building a new Europe. There should not be an A team and a B team playing on the European ground. Of course, I am talking about Western Europe; there could be other options for those countries that are newly-born democracies with other sorts of economies.

If I may be a little personal, I must say that it is sad that what is happening in Yugoslavia has been allowed to continue for such a long time. It is the first time since 1945 that there has been a conventional war with conventional forces on

the European mainland. We must never forget what happened in 1945. Europeans should take the responsibility for peace, stability and democracy on the European continent.

Like any Swede – or indeed, like anyone here – I have nothing against the United Nations peace-keeping efforts. They are excellent. Sweden has taken part in many such exercises since the 1950s in the Congo. We have done what we can to support the United Nations. However, I hope that in future the solutions to such conflicts will primarily lie at a regional level. There are obvious grounds for future security and military co-operation in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Germany*) (Translation). – I too am pleased that the Minister has accepted our invitation and addressed the Assembly today. I have taken careful note of his comments, and I was pleased to hear him say that the policy of neutrality in the conventional sense can no longer be upheld because of the change in the political situation and that Sweden wants to join in the shaping of a common foreign and security policy in and for Europe. The Minister also added, however, that Sweden could not become a member of Western European Union until it had joined the European Community. It has submitted an application for accession. I feel there is an inconsistency here, and I would ask the Minister for an explanation.

If Sweden wants to be involved in the formulation of a new common foreign and security policy, it will know that the signal for this was given at Maastricht. It was a clear signal, and the process has already begun. In other words, we are now in the process of establishing this common foreign and security policy. Sweden wants to participate. It could participate, and it could do so directly. It could, for example, be involved as an associate member until it achieves full membership and bring direct influence to bear on the formulation of a common foreign and security policy.

Why does the Minister not envisage the possibility of a transitional solution, especially as there is already economic co-operation between his country and the European Community? That would surely be a transitional solution until a decision is taken on Sweden's membership of the European Community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – The Swedish march into Europe should be step by step, otherwise there is a risk of setbacks in Sweden, perhaps similar to those that occurred in Denmark a couple of days ago. I am sure that many inside and outside Denmark

Mr. Björck (continued)

regret what happened there, but politicians should fully respect the will of the people. We must not attack the people, otherwise we will behave like those former countries behind the iron curtain.

The first matter for Sweden is obviously membership of the EC and it is important that the timetable for that is not delayed. That is my message to the representatives here today, all of whom are influential politicians in their own countries. If there is delay, that could mean delays in other steps that Sweden wishes to take. We are prepared to discuss all sorts of steps, but I would have difficulty explaining to the Swedish people that Sweden is trying to join other organisations before it has a solid platform, which must be full membership of the EC and full participation in the European Union.

Many of us are eager to join many organisations in Europe, but the timetable for joining the EC is 1st January 1995. That is only two-and-a-half years away and we are prepared to be patient, but we must stick to that timetable. After that, there will be a few new Swedish activities. I certainly do not want to risk a backlash in the process, such as appears to be happening now in other areas.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am glad to share the general pleasure at seeing Mr. Björck here today, particularly because I am meeting him here after being with him in the Strasbourg assembly for a long time.

In your speech, Minister, and more especially in your replies to other speakers, you made it clear that your country has a very advanced defence industry, particularly in the aeronautics, space, electronics, submarine and naval sectors and indeed, in all branches concerned with defence and the defence industry. You also said that Sweden has a population of eight million and therefore called on Europeans to come and collaborate with you.

In Europe we have the Independent European Programme Group, IEPG, which until recently was a multinational organisation under NATO but, as was confirmed by the French Minister for Defence yesterday, will pass under the control of WEU by the end of the year. It is therefore not a matter of joining WEU but of applying for accession to the European group which handles industrial and scientific planning, programming and co-operation in sectors where your country can certainly make a contribution at a particularly difficult time of economic restrictions when resources are limited and joint efforts therefore have to be concentrated.

As you have said that you will have to move step by step towards Europe, and therefore replied no to a query by another speaker about the possible association of Sweden with WEU, precisely because it is a European international organisation, might you perhaps be willing to accept the accession of your country to the IEPG which represents only a multilateral agreement and is not an international organisation?

This would be an effective first step towards European co-operation; it might also be a useful initiative for your country and for everyone in such a delicate area. It could certainly be very useful for Europe because you are at the moment the only defence minister getting increased funds from parliament for improving and modernising the defence system. Such collaboration might therefore be to the general advantage of everyone.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – It is extremely important for the Europeans to have their own independent defence material industry. In my country we sometimes encounter problems with the release of technology from America, despite the fact that we have excellent relations with it. Sometimes, we have to depend on the Americans' good will to release modern weapons to us, so we should have alternatives. I have been considering the matter deeply since I took office and I believe that the only solution is to have an independent European industry. Sweden is too small to carry that heavy burden, and even though many of the countries represented here are far bigger than Sweden, they too have problems due to the enormous cost of developing modern weapons. I cannot see why we should not co-operate on this matter.

I have made official visits to the countries of many of my colleagues, including Austria and Spain. Next week, the French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, is to visit me and then, in August, the German Defence Minister. We shall discuss developing co-operative links within Europe on defence material. I hope that the Swedish links with IEPG, which have just been established and have been received favourably, will soon be strengthened with seminars, colloquies and conferences.

I am not here to market Swedish weapons, but a small country such as Sweden has to be extremely efficient, as we have no extra money to spend on military establishments. We now develop high-tech weapons at a reasonable cost – the only option open to us. We in Europe are starting to construct a military alliance, which we could develop immediately, without waiting for the final decisions on a new European military and security structure at the end of the 1990s.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Puig, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Later in this chamber, Minister, I shall be presenting a report on the situation of the CSCE and the Helsinki negotiations. In order to write it I had to see a number of people and make several trips. I take this opportunity to thank you publicly for the kindness you showed me when I came to Stockholm. You outlined the Swedish position for me as you have also done in your address this morning and in your answers to members' questions.

My own question relates to the Helsinki process and CSCE. As you know, there are those who think the July summit was a great success and even a leap forward. Other analysts, however, think it could turn out to be a failure. It is being said that, as far as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are concerned, the guarantees are not sufficient to lead to binding agreements. We are also told that some western countries do not have the real will to bring things to a conclusion.

You are well informed, Minister, of how the Helsinki negotiations now stand and I would like to have your view on the subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – I am afraid I am not that well informed, but I have some experience of CSCE and, as Sweden is to take over the CSCE chairmanship later this year, we are following developments with great interest.

To avoid any misunderstanding, I think that CSCE is a great idea and a step towards the establishment of a joint security structure in Europe, which is good. However, it is not easy to run an organisation with fifty-two members – there could be more – when they have various backgrounds, states of democracy, traditions and types of armed forces.

It is easy for me to be sceptical about the diversity of CSCE. However, if we give it time, I think that CSCE could develop into an efficient peace-keeping organisation in Europe. But we should learn something from history; an organisation without the scope to use efficient sanctions or military intervention – which we all hope that we can avoid – is normally not strong enough to maintain peace. We should consider the era between the first and second world wars, when there were plenty of treaties, colloquies, meetings and conferences which allowed the European people to gain a false sense of security.

The worst thing that could happen is that we give the CSCE, or any other European organ-

isation, a false feeling of security. The CSCE must be equipped with executive power, whether for sanctions or military matters. Otherwise, it will be an organisation without a real future. I do not know how that could be done, but the time is ripe to take up that discussion. So long as we are not working with a consensus and as one, we shall not have the necessary quick and efficient results from the CSCE. Today the CSCE is covering areas which, although far from Paris, are not far from Sweden, and where stability is very limited.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martinez.

Mr. MARTINEZ (*Spain*). – I do not need to tell our friend, Mr. Björck, how happy we are to receive him here. At this stage in the debate, most of what one wanted to ask has already been asked and my questions have already been covered by Mr. Caro and Mr. Stoffelen.

How does Mr. Björck see the possibility of Sweden's presence here being more than episodic? I fully understand his willingness to integrate in the project. I also understand that, because of that, he does not want to mention affiliation to Western European Union before Sweden comes into what I would call the Maastricht "scope". Does he believe that, as soon as special guest status, which he introduced to the Council of Europe, is introduced here, the Swedish Parliament should be part of our work so that we can have a permanent Swedish presence in our work, following what we do and contributing to what we think about security aspects of the European project? Is he ready to support the idea of having Swedish colleagues present among us in a flexible but permanent way?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. BJÖRCK (*Minister of Defence of Sweden*). – May I say to my very good friend Miguel Angel Martinez that special guest status, which we introduced in 1989 in the Council of Europe, immediately became a great success. Member states of the Council of Europe jointly did a good job to give the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe some kind of contact with what was for them a brand new world. Without special guest status, development would not have been as good within the Council of Europe.

As for special guest status and Swedish participation here, this is a parliamentary body, so the question should be answered by the Swedish Parliament. If I am asked for my opinion – Mr. Tarschys nods at me – I think that it should be welcomed and that it is a good way to start, with informal contacts, without discussing official relationships. WEU's contact this week with guests from the Swedish Parliament is how we should start such relationships.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you again, Minister, for your clear replies. We look forward to a future opportunity to resume this fruitful dialogue with you.

7. Arms control: CSCE and WEU

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Defence Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1306)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on arms control: CSCE and WEU and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1306.

I call Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, when some of you heard that the title of my report was to be arms control: CSCE and WEU, you asked me why we were dealing in this forum with the CSCE, a matter which did not concern us. I believe that after the Swedish Minister's address this morning, and the questions which representatives put to him, it is clear that we must discuss CSCE in this forum in the context of the extent to which it should be involved in security in Europe and the various levels of organisation of peace and security in Europe.

In order to be able to produce the report I have presented to you, I had to contact the various organisations in Europe concerned with defence and political co-operation, and also visit some countries personally. I must thank the ministries and departments in those countries which received me and gave me details and documents on views and debates in these organisations. I must thank the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs in Madrid, the Ministry of Defence in London and the Secretary-General and his assistants. I must thank all those in Vienna, the CSCE and the Austrian Government who received us and provided us with their documents and appraisal. I have already thanked Mr. Björck who received us in Stockholm. I must also thank those in Helsinki, at the present CSCE headquarters, and in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whom I visited and who enabled me to provide you with an enormous collection of documents which are not so much analyses but which could be of assistance in our work. As you can see, we have been busy and I must also thank those persons who helped me to draw up this report; they worked very hard so that you could have available to you all the documents which might have a bearing on the subject of my report.

Ladies and gentlemen, I said in committee, and I would like to repeat here, this is a time of great significance for European security. I think

this is evident from the fact that we have clearly embarked upon a process of change as a result of the Maastricht agreements; we see that in Helsinki the new mandate of the CSCE is being discussed, how it will be organised and what will be its functions. We see that within the Atlantic Alliance – and I was in Canada two weeks ago – they are also reflecting on the future structure of NATO, on the reform of the Atlantic Alliance and its future rôle, and they are even discussing the future and geographical scope of the Council of Europe.

We have reached a turning point, a time for change, leading to the construction of this institutional and legal framework based on political agreements to guarantee the security, defence and peace of Europe. Finding ourselves at such a point, we are not in a position to make final decisions, we must see what agreements are reached in Helsinki, how the various institutions are affected, how they will relate to one another in the near future and how we can all co-operate, because the present proliferation of institutions is not sustainable. We shall have to find ways in which they can work together, co-operate and possibly even merge, so that we have institutions which are both viable and efficient.

We have come to the end of a phase in history, and stand poised at the beginning of a new one. I am referring not only to the cold war, but also to the era which started with the Charter of Paris. We have gone beyond the Charter of Paris and now have different problems to solve. This is why it was important for WEU to discuss the future of the CSCE. For the matters now being discussed in Helsinki, and which will occupy the July summit, are of great significance and will naturally affect the future of the CSCE, but will also have repercussions on the whole European security order and, obviously, if we talk about the future security order of Europe and the West – and, I repeat, I mean not only European but also western, in other words the Atlantic link – if we talk about these things in WEU, which is the European defence plan in embryo, we must take account of events in Helsinki and the future rôle of the CSCE.

There is no doubt that the CSCE is an ambitious project, but it is also contradictory, as Mr. Björck has said. In Paris the resolutions adopted were implemented and the bare bones of a structure for the CSCE began to function; there were negotiations in Vienna which led to the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, the reduction of conventional weapons, the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty, which is making progress in the search for and agreement of confidence-building measures, and there is even in preparation a new mandate on conflict prevention and management which gives substance and meaning to the working of the CSCE.

Mr. de Puig (continued)

I used the word contradictory, however, because in the first place, the fifty-one member countries of the CSCE, by their sheer numbers, create genuine problems of efficiency and even rationality; some of these fifty-one countries are only now becoming democratic, cannot yet guarantee the stability we would like, and some, like the former Soviet Union, have still not resolved problems such as who holds and controls the weapons, be they nuclear or conventional. An agreement on the distribution of armaments has still not been reached. When an institution with fifty-one members faces problems of this nature, it is obvious that this reduces its ability to operate efficiently, and there are those who believe that we should perhaps let this institution run down because it has, to a certain extent, achieved its principal aim.

There are those who wanted the CSCE in Paris to be a great organisation to enable the countries of Central Europe and the East to have available an organisation to help them out of the vacuum in which they found themselves when the wall came down, and obviously the CSCE has been of use, it has helped. But now that the time has come to ask what its future rôle may be there is no general agreement and the debate is open.

Therefore I told Mr. Björck that some of us feel that the CSCE was conceived for another purpose and that the July summit may, in fact, be something of a disappointment because Helsinki is expected to produce a widely-agreed mandate on arms reduction and, as I said, on conflict prevention, and the committee of chiefs of staff should, as Mr. Björck also said, have the ability to act quickly whenever necessary. All of this is shrouded in uncertainty. It is not certain that such plans can be approved in Helsinki. It has to be said that there is opposition to revitalising the CSCE. Such political opposition does exist.

There are also the other problems I have mentioned: the fact that the CSCE countries cannot give the desired guarantees, the general situation of stalemate in which we find ourselves, and, let us admit it, there is also institutional opposition. In Canada, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, I called this institutional patriotism. Certain areas are the remit of other institutions and quite clearly for the Atlantic Alliance, which sees its task as defending the Atlantic Alliance, this means halting the progress of the CSCE. That is one opinion. My view, which is reflected in my report, is different. I believe that it is perfectly possible for the CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance to coexist. There could be a reorganised CSCE adapted to present-day needs rather than to the requirements of Paris, which have been overtaken by events, and at the same time, there

could and should be a strong organisation with Atlantic links and which should be able to adapt itself and not simply continue as before. The Atlantic Alliance, that is to say NATO, must also ask itself what its future rôle should be, because it is not easy to see how NATO can continue indefinitely with sixteen members, for instance, when there are countries knocking on NATO's door to be admitted. It is no longer tenable that NATO can continue with some of the structures it had during the cold war, because the old enemy no longer exists.

Change is needed, as is co-operation, and there is also a potential need for joint effort and integration with the CSCE. This is what I consider to be necessary and this is what I have said in my report. I would like to say that the WEU presidency, through Mr. Genscher, has spoken in favour of this view. WEU and its Chairman-in-Office in Berlin reminded us that our institution was in favour of developing the instruments planned for by the CSCE. He wanted to make them more efficient, give the committee of chiefs of staff more influence to enable it to take action at times of crisis, create this instrument of conflict prevention and make progress with disarmament or more stringent arms reduction. As Mr. Genscher said, the new mandate from Helsinki would have to establish new confidence-building measures and should, in particular, establish channels of political dialogue in order to reach the agreements on security which would then be translated into laws and regulations which would establish the European security order. That was Mr. Genscher's opinion; it is also mine, and it is advanced in my report.

The CSCE's future has not yet been decided; let us see what happens in the month and a half of negotiations which remain and at the summit. In my report I plead that the organisation should be institutionalised to the greatest extent possible and that, notwithstanding the acknowledged difficulties, this institution should under no circumstances be allowed to be run down on the ground that it no longer serves the purpose for which it was conceived. Therefore, the underlying problem is one of political will. This political will does exist and I believe that it is in the interest of the Europeans and of WEU that this is so and that the CSCE emerge strengthened from Helsinki.

I am aware that there are problems of competition. One of the criticisms that can be made of the present situation concerning security institutions is the problem of duplication, redundancy and competition between the various institutions; indeed, the Atlantic Alliance created a North Atlantic Co-operation Council which is becoming a kind of mini-CSCE as far as its structure is concerned, but as to resources and effectiveness it is very significant. This creates

Mr. de Puig (continued)

problems. My solution to these problems, after having consulted several others, seeking the opinion of the ministers of defence and the negotiators in Helsinki and discussing this idea with the North Atlantic Assembly itself in Canada, is to integrate the task and make it a joint task – the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the programmes and aims of the CSCE.

I am aware that some of you think that this is going to extremes, that the proposal to request or suggest to our Council of Ministers that our representatives in Helsinki should argue in favour of the famous NACC being included in the work of the CSCE is too bold. Nevertheless, although some of you may consider this to be audacious, I believe it to be a rational and responsible way of solving a totally unacceptable problem of duplication and competition between institutions.

I say this fully accepting the Atlantic link and the idea that the CSCE also represents the Atlantic link, just as NATO does and WEU ought to. This is not a question of comparing the function of European institutions with the United States and Canada or having United States and Canadian institutions seizing the lead in Europe. It is a matter of working together, which is what Mr. Fachel spoke for in Canada, and under no circumstances can he be accused of being anti-American. He said: I am against American hegemony, and against the United States acting as the world's policeman. I believe that it is the United Nations Security Council which should be the world's policeman and that we should all work together.

This is the best solution and this is what I have tried to suggest in the conclusion to my report. In this area in the field of security I believe that WEU has a rôle to play. It should play an active rôle in both the political and operational arena. It is my view that we must take part in debates, with our own proposals, whether it be within NATO where our position, that is to say the position of the Nine, should be made known, or in the negotiations in Vienna, to which we are always invited, or in Helsinki, where we have been invited and where the Secretary-General has presented a WEU report, or even in the CSCE or in any other international forum. This co-operation and contact can be with neutral countries, such as Sweden for example; it is a contact which I feel should be maintained preferably with countries which have applied for entry to the European Community, but also with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which we must not abandon and with which we must also maintain relations.

Furthermore, from a more operational point of view, I believe that WEU ought to make available its capability in the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. There is, for example, the satellite observation centre at Torrejón de Ardoz, which could provide technological assistance to aerial verification and to specialised aircraft. We could also give assistance in implementing the Conventional Forces Treaty as regards verification, inspection, training, exercises and evaluation visits. We could co-operate and assist in developing security- and confidence-building measures and we could also give our opinion on the military forces which should be present in Europe given that under Maastricht WEU is initially entrusted with a European defence policy project. In all these instances we should be present, putting forward our own proposals.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I think we can say that we have made good progress recently in arms control matters – not without problems, but we have progressed. At this crucial moment I believe we could continue to create the institutions and the legal and political framework for the security of the future.

An opportunity such as this may not present itself again in the coming years and what Mr. Björck said is true: we may feel safe but we may not be as safe as we think. Well, let us set about this calmly and with great precision, without battles between institutions, and with each one of us co-operating and finding it possible to compromise, so that we arrive at a unanimous and efficient system. I believe that we can make progress and that the CSCE process, which is the central theme of my report, must, as a result of Helsinki, constitute an impetus for co-operation in security matters, an impetus for negotiations on arms control and that after Helsinki there should be a new mandate to continue negotiating; that would be the time to organise conflict prevention and management thoroughly and effectively, based on a fundamental doctrine: this is a time for politics to take precedence over military considerations. The cold war was the time when military considerations took precedence over politics. Today it is the politicians, political agreements and legal agreements, together with the capacity to verify and implement them, which should motivate us and should have precedence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Moya.

Mr. MOYA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Mr. de Puig has presented a report this morning and in previous sessions in committee which is along rather similar lines to a report he presented previously on arms control, and I think it is of interest to point out two important strands of thinking about recent events in the report.

Mr. Moya (continued)

One strand of analysis or thought concerns the problems involved in arms control; it describes how such control is achieved. It does not restrict itself to what might be called an x-ray or photograph of how the negotiations progress and how they result in arms control in progressive stages, but rather the whole process is described in an abstract outline, which I believe to be appropriate and reasonable, in Chapter VI of his report. It is what might be called an arms control philosophy which is certainly worthy of attention. Indeed, it encapsulates perfectly all the progress which is being made with regard to the doctrine of the allied countries in relation to the conceptual framework of the philosophy of arms control. In my view, it is an interesting contribution, not confined to giving a list of achievements and of progress which might be made in the future.

There is, however, a second aspect, a second thread, the one to which he most frequently referred in his address. I am referring to the network of the security institutions in Europe at the present time. In recent months, since our last WEU Assembly I would say, there has been a series of events which have accentuated the fact that the international security situation is at a crossroads. In the context of our Assembly and WEU, certainly since our last meeting, we have seen how the Maastricht agreements have considerably reinforced the rôle of our institution as the nucleus around which the European defence identity is to be articulated. There have been subsequent initiatives, which we are sure will fall within this framework and within the framework of co-operation with the alliance, such as the Franco-German initiative for an army corps as the basis for this future European army.

I believe that this is an important moment for us to strengthen and give direction to WEU, around which the European defence identity is to be articulated as a result of the Maastricht summit.

There have also, however, been important happenings and new events in the institutions of the CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance, as Mr. de Puig said. The analysis contained in his report, and which he summarised for us in this address concerning the CSCE, well illustrates the fundamental shift which has taken place in the CSCE, from being simply a conference to consolidating, or beginning the consolidation process, as an institution. Obviously, this consolidation is still in process, as indeed he said, and will have to meet important challenges, which we hope it will be able to do, at successive summits of the CSCE. I am referring in particular to the need to obtain a more dependable flow of income for the CSCE, the need to adopt mechanisms for

decision-making and the ability to apply sanctions. These are essential instruments for generating confidence in its own effectiveness. We also need to be aware of the consequences of the volatile environment surrounding the security situation at the moment and especially those arising from the size of the CSCE membership of fifty-one, which makes effective co-ordination of security measures extremely difficult.

There have been other events since our last Assembly, also of interest to the alliance, to which Mr. de Puig referred. Debates have been opened on matters that are still very topical, but no decisions yet reached. I am referring, for instance, to what has already been announced in statements by representatives of the Secretariat-General of the alliance, namely the possibility that the Atlantic Alliance may become a pillar or the armed wing of the CSCE. This is a forward-looking debate – the articulation and development of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council – and I congratulate Mr. de Puig on this initiative and for including it in the framework of the CSCE as a means of avoiding duplication and as a rationalising measure – important tasks in the context of the alliance.

I would like to stress that, for me, the most interesting aspect of Mr. de Puig's address is the overall spirit of the report, which I feel is worthy of mention. There are two stances which can be taken as regards the overall security position. One is to try to resolve the problem of institutional articulation by means of competition between institutions. I think we should avoid this. It would be as unhelpful to put the emphasis on Europeanism at the cost of the Atlantic link as it would be to strengthen that link at the cost of European identity. I therefore believe that what is important is an attitude of co-operation and dialogue between institutions in an attempt to find formulas guaranteeing security without the need for duplication. I am in no doubt that it is such a spirit of co-operation with other institutions that will lead to the strengthening of the CSCE to which Mr. de Puig refers.

(Mrs. Err, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fabra.

Mr. FABRA (*Spain*) (Translation). – Madam President, first, may I congratulate Mr. de Puig on the excellent report he presented to us today. It represents much effort and research, and is further evidence of the praiseworthy and sustained commitment which our colleague brings to Western European Union. His independent, perfectionist turn of mind did not permit him to feel satisfied with the report he presented to us six months ago, so he wanted to add to it and bring it up to date.

Mr. Fabra (continued)

This was a necessary task, because the members of this Assembly have a grandstand view of the vertiginous changes now occurring in the world, in every way. And when the forces producing the change are out of control, it is difficult to think of it as improvement or progress. I say this not simply because we are not controlling them, as with the events in the former Soviet Union – for in that particular case nobody is controlling them, not even they themselves, nor is there anybody who should be doing so, since the Warsaw Pact no longer exists either.

And we should not only be concerned about the A B C weapons – atomic, biological and chemical. For nowadays when we talk about arms control, we should also be thinking about explosives and conventional arms, including light arms. Or do we not consider it a threat that units of the former Soviet army still stationed in the republics of Central Europe are selling all their arms in order to survive, and that these arms might fall into the hands of Serbs or of international terrorists?

Madam President, before closing I should like to ask the Rapporteur to utilise his prodigious industry in taking, now or at some later date, an initiative that will help to put an end to the lack of any control over the arms of the army of the former Soviet Union. And if anybody should think that that is not our task, it would be clear that the time has come to close down our present institutions and establish new ones, since they would have proved lacking in the necessary flexibility to meet the challenge of current events in this changing world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. de Puig.

Mr. de PUIG (*Spain*) (Translation). – I am going to speak in French to prevent the debate being solely hispano-Spanish, the only speakers so far having been members of the Spanish Delegation.

I am delighted that Mr. Moya, my colleague and friend, endorses the report. He is an eminent parliamentarian, head of the delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly and well acquainted with the subject. He was with me in Canada where he made great efforts to explain to our Canadian and American friends the position of WEU and our views about EC processes as I have set them out in my report. Thank you Mr. Moya. I share all your opinions. Lastly I note that maybe it will be possible to simplify the European institutions so as to make them more effective. Like you, I believe that

WEU has its part to play, a very important part that we have to promote.

I am also very pleased to have the support of Mr. Fabra, a member of the opposition in my country. I am cheered to find parties that are usually my political adversaries approving the report. I have to tell Mr. Fabra that during our trips to Helsinki we met representatives of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and I thought I detected in them a firm resolve to settle the problems of arms control. Of course I cannot guarantee that this control will be here soon and that all danger has ceased. Nevertheless I believe that the political will of the authorities in these countries will prevent confrontation and lead to the signing of agreements. I feel that the Helsinki process and the agreements resulting from the July summit offer good grounds for hope that the guarantees required will be forthcoming.

The Defence Committee, like all the WEU committees, should follow these events with close attention and, where relevant, draw up further reports on these basic problems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Vice-Chairman of the committee.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Madam President, I want to begin by saying that I think it a great pity that so few of my colleagues have taken part in the debate. If I had not had to sit in this seat today, I would have liked to take part in the debate on this report.

The Defence Committee has made a very extensive and thorough study of the report. And with good reason. It is not only a good and interesting report: it also concerns a subject that is attracting a great deal of attention, a subject we are bound to have to consider regularly in the future.

I should perhaps mention that, when the vote was taken on this report in committee, fourteen members voted for and four abstained, though not because the contents of the report posed any problems for them. The only reason for their abstention in the vote on this report was that they objected to paragraph 9 of the recommendation, which says that chemical and biological weapons must be eliminated and the number of nuclear weapons must be reduced. As I have said, it was only because of this paragraph that four members of the committee abstained.

Madam President, with your permission I would just like to say a few words unconnected with the report. Not only are we speaking in an almost empty chamber at the moment, so that this could hardly be called a debate: it is also noticeable that only one of the chairs reserved for ministers and the Secretary-General is occupied. The Secretary-General is not only

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

absent but no one is standing in for him today. From *Le Monde* we see that a meeting of the Permanent Council has been convened in London today to consider the sanctions imposed on the former republic of Yugoslavia. In the first place, it is rather unfortunate that the Council of Ministers should be meeting at the same time as the Assembly of Western European Union, but even so we could surely have expected them to have sent representatives here. The Presidential Committee or other appropriate bodies should surely have discussed this with the Council of Ministers, and also with the Secretary-General.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1306.

Under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

8. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of the first part of the session.

Before closing the sitting, I would like to thank and congratulate Assembly members for their attendance and for the quality of their speeches.

I feel I can also speak for the Assembly as a whole in extending my warmest thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the ministers and our Secretary-General who have addressed us from this rostrum and been gracious enough to answer the questions we have fired at them.

I also give my friendly regards to all the representatives of the press who have followed our proceedings and been kind enough to convey news of them to the public in our respective countries.


Lastly I wish to thank all the permanent and temporary staff – and especially the interpreters – who have shown their usual efficiency.

I look forward, ladies and gentlemen, to seeing you all again at the end of the year for the second part-session which will, I am sure, be as fruitful as those preceding it.

I now declare the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union closed.

(The sitting was closed at 11.55 a.m.)

1. See page 48.



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