

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1984

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP	
BOGAERTS August	SP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
DEJARDIN Claude	PS	
MICHEL Joseph	PSC	
NOERENS René	PVV	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS	
BONNEL Raoul	PVV	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
LAGNEAU André	PRL	
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS	
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	
VAN DER ELST Frans	VU	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BEIX Roland	Socialist	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
BOURGES Yvon	RPR	
CARO Jean-Marie President of the Assembly	UDF-CDS	
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist	
MAYOUD Alain	UDF	
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.	
SENES Gilbert	Socialist	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist	
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist	
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP	

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist	
BOHL André	UCDP	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist	
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist	
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist	

MM. GALLEY Robert		RPR
GRUSSENMEYER François		RPR
HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques		Socialist
KOEHL Emile		UDF
MATRAJA Pierre		Socialist
MERCIER Jean		Dem. Left
NATIEZ Jean		Socialist
OEHLER Jean-André		Socialist
PROUVOST Pierre		UDF
ROSSINOT André		RPR
SOUVET Louis		Socialist
VERDON Marc		

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl		SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert		SPD
BOEHM Wilfried		CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin		SPD
GERSTL Friedrich		SPD
HAASE Horst		SPD
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz		CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter		CDU/CSU
MUELLER Gunther		CDU/CSU
NEUMANN Volker		SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard		CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang		FDP
SCHULTE Manfred		SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz		CDU/CSU
SPIES von BUELLESHEIM Adolf		CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Josef		CDU/CSU
VOGT Roland		Die Grunen
ZIERER Benno		CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM. BUECHNER Peter		SPD
ERTL Josef		FDP
GANSEL Norbert		SPD
GLOS Michael		CDU/CSU
HACKEL Wolfgang		CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe		SPD
JAEGER Claus		CDU/CSU
Mrs. KELLY Petra		Die Grünen
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz		SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz		CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian		CDU/CSU
SCHAUBLE Wolfgang		CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann		SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred		SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter		CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut		SPD
STAVENHAGEN Lutz		CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto		CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stanley THORNE	Labour
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 986).
5. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 988*).
6. Consequences of the Gulf war (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 994*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President announced the resumption of the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the second sitting of the extraordinary session on 29th October 1984 were agreed to.

3. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by the Standing Committee of that Assembly with the exception of Mr. Johnston, representative for the United Kingdom.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Johnston.

5. Warsaw Pact and disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1000)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation on the Warsaw Pact and disarmament had been tabled by Mr. Haase and others with a request for urgent procedure in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The request for urgent procedure had been posted up and the text of the motion circulated as Document 1000.

The Assembly would decide on the request for urgent procedure after the adoption of the draft order of business.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 986)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

8. Warsaw Pact and disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1000)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the Warsaw Pact and disarmament.

Speakers: MM. Haase, Blaauw (point of order), Ferrari Aggradi and Michel.

The request for urgent procedure was not agreed to.

9. Tabling of amendments and lists of speakers

On the proposal of the President, the Assembly agreed that amendments to the text should not be tabled after a rapporteur had risen to present his report and that the list of speakers for each debate should be closed at the same time to allow the Assembly to take a subsequent decision, if necessary, on the need to limit speaking time.

10. Deterrence and the will of the people

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 988 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Cifarelli and de Vries.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Gansel, Gianotti, De Decker (point of order), Müller, Hardy and Milani.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Scheer, Murphy, Vogt and Cavaliere; (points of order): MM. De Decker and Gianotti.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Millan and others:

4. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "nuclear weapons are" insert "at the present time".

Speakers: Mr. Millan, Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Lagorce and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 5 and 6) were tabled by Mr. Millan and others:

5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "refusal" insert "until very recently".

6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "have compelled" and insert "led".

Speakers: Mr. Millan, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Lagorce.

The amendments were negatived.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Millan and others:

7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Millan, Sir Anthony Grant and Mr. Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot in the longer term be ensured without" and insert "would be based on sounder foundations if there were".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Hardy and Lagorce.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Gansel:

3. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Continue to search for a solution to the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations taking into account, inter alia, the 'walk in the woods' formula;".

Speakers: MM. Gansel, Spies von Büllenheim and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " of all kinds ".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere and Lagorce.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 411)¹.

Speakers (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Beix, Sir Frederic Bennett and Sir Dudley Smith.

11. Consequences of the Gulf war

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 994 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Beix, Müller, van den Bergh, Cavaliere, Atkinson, Spies von Büllesheim, Rubbi, Gansel and Lord Reay.

The debate was closed.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation: Mr. Woodall as a titular member in place of Mr. Edwards and Mr. Edwards as an alternate member in place of Mr. Woodall; and to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments proposed by the French Delegation: Mr. Jung as an alternate member in place of Mr. Caro.

13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.30 p.m.

1. See page 16.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Rumpf Schulte <i>Jäger (Schwarz)</i> Spies von Büllenheim Unland Vogt Zierer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel Noerens <i>Pécriaux (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)</i>		MM. Aarts van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)</i>
	Italy	
France	MM. Amadei Antoni <i>Martino (Bianco)</i> Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri (Fiandrotti)</i> Frasca Gianotti Giust <i>Mitterdorfer (Mezzapesa)</i> Milani Pecchioli <i>Palumbo (Rauti)</i> Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchiatti	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Beix Berrier <i>Souvet (Bourges)</i> Fourré Jung Lagorce Pignion <i>Natiez (Wilquin)</i>		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Coleman (Cox)</i> Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hardy <i>Atkinson (Sir Paul Hawkins)</i> Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison (Hill)</i> Lord Hughes MM. Jessel Johnston Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Woodall (McGuire)</i> <i>Millan (Dr. Miller)</i> <i>Corrie (Sir John Osborn)</i> <i>Murphy (Sir John Page)</i> Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Stokes (Wilkinson)</i>
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Gansel (Ahrens)</i> Antretter Böhm Enders Gerstl Haase Hornhues <i>Lenzer (Kittelmann)</i> Müller <i>Scheer (Neumann)</i> Reddemann	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges (Burger)</i> Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Valleix Vial-Massat Wirth	Luxembourg
MM. Baumel Jeambrun Mayoud Ruet Sénès		Mr. Hengel
		Netherlands
		Mr. van der Werff

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 411***on deterrence and the will of the people***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 383 and 388 and welcoming the positive replies received from the Council;
- (ii) Considering that fear of the devastating effects of any armed conflict in Europe is still a prominent and justified concern of the peoples of Europe;
- (iii) Recalling that, until more progress has been made in disarmament, the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence;
- (iv) Underlining however that while nuclear weapons are an essential means of deterrence, a major contribution is also made by governments and nations showing their determination to defend their freedom;
- (v) Regretting that the failure of the Geneva conference and the Soviet Union's continued deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons together with its refusal to hold negotiations on these weapons on a reasonable basis have compelled the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance to start deploying missiles of similar range in Western Europe in application of the twofold decision of December 1979;
- (vi) Noting that the need to apply this twofold decision has been recognised by all the democratically-appointed governments of the WEU member countries;
- (vii) Hoping that constructive proposals will soon be made to allow negotiations to be opened on the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds;
- (viii) Noting that the security of Western Europe forms an inseparable whole;
- (ix) Deploring that this de facto solidarity is not expressed in more intensive consultations on external and defence policies;
- (x) Considering that the improvement of relations between the countries of Western and of Eastern Europe in the context of the CSCE can be a significant help to negotiations on disarmament;
- (xi) Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the West's security, this cannot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the standard of living in the developing countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe;
2. Show the cohesion of the alliance and of its European members by making optimum use of the organs of WEU and of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Concert its views inter alia on the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty for the defence policy of each member and for working out a joint position on the limitation of armaments or disarmament;
4. Continue to apply the NATO twofold decision of 1979 while seeking, with the Soviet Union, ways and means for negotiating balanced and controlled disarmament, particularly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons;
5. In the appropriate frameworks, seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union;
6. Do its utmost to promote the success of current negotiations on disarmament, to encourage the opening of further negotiations on the limitation of nuclear missiles of all ranges and on banning the use of space for military purposes and to develop the North-South dialogue.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Consequences of the Gulf war (*Replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 994 and amendments*).
2. Military use of space – Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 993 and amendments*).
3. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 992 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate was proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely, Mr. Burger.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Burger was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

4. Consequences of the Gulf war

(Replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 994 and amendments)

Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by the United Nations and by Middle Eastern countries" and insert "by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere and Michel.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Beix and others:

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

"Deploy every effort to support United Nations Resolution 540 of 31st October 1983 on preventing the spread of the war in the Gulf and the bombing of towns, at the same time condemning recourse to particularly reprehensible weapons;".

Speakers: MM. Beix, Gansel and Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Beix and others:

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

"Foster the maintenance of a balance between Iraq and Iran likely to convince the two opponents that they have nothing to gain from continuing hostilities;".

Speakers: MM. Beix, Cavaliere and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Sir Anthony Grant and Mr. Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

Speakers (points of order): Dr. Miller and Mr. Blaauw.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 412)¹.

5. Military use of space – Part II

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 993 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. De Decker, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Scheer, Tummers, de Vries and Spies von Büllenheim.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Fourré, De Decker and Klejdzinski (point of order).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

In accordance with Rule 32 (1) (d) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Scheer moved that the report be referred back to committee.

Speakers: MM. Jung, Lenzer and Wilkinson.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the reference back to committee.

The motion for reference back was not agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Fourré.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Fourré and Pignion:

1. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Noting the difficulty of resuming negotiations between the two superpowers, due in particular to the link between space problems and the START and INF negotiations, and considering that under the pressure of opinion at home and among its allies the United States must adopt a position towards the Soviet Union in which the reaffirmation of American power is accompanied by a more marked preparedness for dialogue, particularly on space questions;”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Fourré and Pignion:

2. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqué issued by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons;”.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, proposed a sub-amendment to leave out “After paragraph (iv)” and insert “Leave out paragraph (iii)”.

The amendment, thus amended, was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Fourré and Pignion:

3. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “governments” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“to obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an independent European space station;”.

Speakers: MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 4 and 5) were tabled by MM. Fourré and Pignion:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “alliance” to the end of the paragraph.

1. See page 21.

5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the launching of objects into space.”

Speakers: MM. Fourré, Wilkinson, Gansel, Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 413)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Scheer.

6. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 992 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation: Sir John Biggs-Davison as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Ward and Mr. Ward as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Sir Frederic Bennett.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

1. See page 22.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Rumpf Schulte <i>Lenzer (Schwarz)</i> Spies von Bülesheim Unland Zierer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>de Vries (van den Bergh)</i> Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)</i> van der Werff
France	Italy	
MM. Bassinet Beix Berrier Fourré Jung Pignion <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt (Sénès)</i> Valleix	MM. Amadei Antoni <i>Martino (Bianco)</i> Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Giust <i>Mitterdorfer (Mezzapesa)</i> Milani Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi <i>Palumbo (Sarti)</i> Sinesio	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Coleman (Cox)</i> <i>Morris (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg)</i> Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Earl of <i>Kinnoull (Jessel)</i> Mr. Johnston Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Millan (McGuire)</i> Dr. Miller Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison (Sir John Osborn)</i> MM. <i>Stokes (Sir John Page)</i> <i>Ward (Lord Reay)</i> Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
MM. <i>Gansel (Ahrens)</i> Antretter Böhm <i>Scheer (Enders)</i> Gerstl Haase Hornhues Kittelmann Müller <i>Klejdzinski (Neumann)</i> Reddemann	Luxembourg	
	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges (Burger)</i> Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Lagorce Mayoud Ruet Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy
Mr. Dejardin		Mr. Vecchietti
France		
MM. Baumel Bourges Jeambrun	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
	Mr. Vogt	Mr. Hengel

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 412
on the consequences of the Gulf war

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to peace throughout the Middle East;
- (ii) Considering that a decisive victory by one or other of the belligerents would involve serious dangers for the stability of the area;
- (iii) Noting that no individual power outside the area seems in a position to exert decisive influence in favour of peace;
- (iv) Considering however that the supply of arms to the belligerents by some of these powers is liable to prolong the war;
- (v) Noting that both belligerents have already gravely violated the laws of war several times;
- (vi) Fearing that the war may be accompanied or followed by renewed and aggravated international terrorism;
- (vii) Considering that while Europe's supplies are not yet seriously threatened by the war, an intensification of hostilities might disturb the oil market and hence the security of Western Europe, as would the internationalisation of the conflict,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Afford its full support to any initiative by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries to restore peace between Iran and Iraq and instruct its Chairman-in-Office to do all in his power to foster such an initiative;
2. Seek agreement between member countries and all other arms-exporting countries on curtailing arms supplies to the belligerents;
3. Afford its support to all humanitarian organisations concerned with the conditions of prisoners of war, particularly the ICRC;
4. Gather the maximum information on possible violations of the laws of war by the belligerents and object in the strongest terms whenever such violations are proved;
5. Plan the measures to be taken jointly by member countries in the event of an extension of terrorist operations in the Middle East or Western Europe;
6. Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf war;
7. Encourage member countries to keep large stocks of oil and continue the efforts they started in 1973 to diversify their sources of energy.

RECOMMENDATION 413***on the military use of space
Part II***

The Assembly,

- (i) Determined to pursue its consistent interests in the strategic implications for Western Europe of present and future applications of space technology;
- (ii) Eager to exploit the specialist expertise of the revitalised organs of WEU, namely the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, to concert industrial collaboration in the military space field and to evolve a Western European policy on arms control that takes into account current and projected developments in military space technology;
- (iii) Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqué issued by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons;
- (iv) Welcoming the steady progress of the European space effort under the aegis of the European Space Agency and in particular the validation of Spacelab and the Ariane launcher and success in the fields of telecommunications and remote sensing;
- (v) Appreciating the French Government's commitment as expressed by President Mitterrand to a full realisation of Europe's strategic potential in space and its publicly stated concern that the consequent deductions for European security policy should be drawn and acted upon;
- (vi) Confident that WEU can offer the best forum for parliamentary debate and analysis about the United States Government's strategic defence initiative and the prospects for an effective space-based defence against ballistic missiles;
- (vii) Supporting efforts through the European Space Agency and through national governments to obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an independent European space station,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Act as the primary political instrument for intergovernmental concertation of a unified Western European policy towards the military use of space;
2. Commission the restructured and more appropriately staffed Standing Armaments Committee and Agency for the Control of Armaments to provide expert advice on the defence and industrial aspects and implications, for arms control and confidence-building measures between states, of current developments in military space technology;
3. Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government to prevent divergencies of view between the American and Western European partners of the Atlantic Alliance;
4. Support for industrial, technological and strategic reasons an expanded European space programme and promote enhanced dialogue on related policies and objectives both with the European Space Agency and national governments;
5. Give impetus to a joint European response to the NASA space station proposals which builds on existing European capabilities, is complementary to the modules, elements and systems of the space station as a whole and enhances Europe's technical capacity for autonomous developments in this field including manned space missions;
6. Provide a clear lead and direction to parliamentary and public opinion in favour of a major European effort to meet the challenge of the space age in the fullest sense through increased scientific space experimentation, commercial applications and security-enhancing space developments;

7. Ensure that the reorganised office of the Council of Ministers of WEU can draw on adequate specialist space expertise to inform its consideration of the increasingly important implications for Western European security policy of developments in space technology;
8. Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the launching of objects into space.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 992 and amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 998 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

(*Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 992 and amendments*)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. van der Werff, Böhm, Bassinet, Klejdzinski, Worrell and Lord Kinnoull.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Hill, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

4. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Luce answered questions put by: Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM.

Cavaliere, Hill, Blaauw, Wilkinson, Gansel, Morris, de Vries, Mrs. Knight, MM. Scheer, Pignion and Sir Frederic Bennett.

5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

(*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 992 and amendments*)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Fourré and others:

2. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work in the various multilateral forums;”.

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Hill.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. van der Werff:

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. van der Werff and Hill.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 414)¹.

6. Control of armaments and disarmament

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 998 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pecchioli, Haase, Milani and Cavaliere.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Scheer, van den Bergh and Fourré.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) tabled by Mr. Haase and others was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Agree common instructions to" and insert "Promote exchanges of views between".

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Jäger and Blaauw.

The amendment was negated.

Amendments (Nos. 4 and 5) were tabled by Mr. Pignion:

4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and a comprehensive test ban".

5. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty".

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Scheer and Blaauw.

The amendments were negated.

1. See page 28.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

8. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "early" and insert "quick".

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Blaauw.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 2 and 6) were tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and by Mr. Pignion respectively:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end of the paragraph.

6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end of the paragraph and insert "avoiding any measure liable to confirm present imbalances".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Pignion, van den Bergh, Bianco, Pignion and Blaauw.

The amendments were negated.

Amendments (Nos. 9 and 7) were tabled by MM. Haase and Gansel and by Mr. Haase respectively:

9. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following:

"and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations".

7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

"Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has paved the way for the policy of détente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension among the European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact."

Speakers: MM. Haase, Reddemann and Blaauw.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 415)¹.

1. See page 30.

***7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 5th December, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Schulte <i>Lenzer (Schwarz)</i> Spies von Büllenheim <i>Jäger (Unland)</i> Vogt Zierer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>Worrell (van den Bergh)</i> Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen van der Werff
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Fourré Lagorce Pignion Valleix	MM. Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri (Fiandrotti)</i> <i>Palumbo (Frasca)</i> Giust <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Mezzapesa) Milani Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi Vecchietti	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Millan (Cox)</i> <i>Morris (Sir Geoffrey</i> <i>Finsberg)</i> Sir Anthony Grant Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall (Jessel)</i> Mr. Johnston Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett (McGuire)</i> Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison (Sir</i> <i>John Osborn)</i> Mr. <i>Murphy (Sir John Page)</i> Lord Reay Earl of <i>Kinnoull (Sir Dudley</i> <i>Smith)</i> Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Gansel (Ahrens)</i> Antretter Böhm <i>Scheer (Enders)</i> Gerstl Haase Hornhues Kittelmann <i>Klejdzinski (Neumann)</i> Reddemann Rumpf	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i> (Burger) Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Luxembourg
MM. De Decker Dejardin		Mr. Hengel
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Baumel Beix Berrier Bourges Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Sénès	Mr. Müller	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Amadei Cifarelli Gianotti Sarti Sinesio	Mr. Hardy Dr. Miller

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 414***on United States-European co-operation
in advanced technology***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering this report to be a follow-up of earlier reports on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and especially Documents 773 of May 1978 and 889 of October 1981;
- (ii) Considering that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly on 7th April 1982 to Recommendation 376 stated that the WEU member governments were well aware of the need to contain equipment costs and that the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is the central focus for multinational European equipment co-operation and is actively engaged in identifying opportunities of this type;
- (iii) Aware that, in 1985, the United States will order the development of a new advanced tactical fighter aircraft and that five countries in Europe – plus the Netherlands which has applied to join – are co-operating in a new European fighter aircraft project with an estimated development cost of \$4 billion;
- (iv) Considering American willingness to share its nuclear power plant experience with European countries;
- (v) Considering that the space station was one of the subjects on the agenda of the economic summit conference in London in June 1984 but that no endorsement of European collaboration in the United States space station was given;
- (vi) Considering that an international co-operative space station programme is in the interests of both the United States and Europe and would strengthen Atlantic ties considerably during the research and development phase as well as during the operational activities of the station;
- (vii) Conscious of the need to inject new life into American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Inform the Assembly of the achievements of the Independent European Programme Group since 1978 in multinational European equipment co-operation, specifying which opportunities for savings in weapon supplies have been identified and which two-way street programmes with the United States have been concluded or might be concluded in the near future;
- II. Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work in the various multilateral forums;
- III. Invite member governments:
 - 1. To submit a plan to the United States Government for discussion on how to collaborate in new military programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system platforms and underwater weapon systems about to be developed so as to stop the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets;
 - 2. To promote a common policy on the first space station project, taking into account the need for Europe to receive definite guarantees, such as:
 - (a) information access to the entire space station system;
 - (b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufacturing facilities on the space station;
 - (c) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it;

-
- (d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station hardware;
3. To foster a common European programme for exchanging information with the United States on future nuclear energy plants, drawing on individual up-to-date experience in Europe and the United States;
4. To invite the United States and other governments to reconsider their attitude with regard to the draft convention on the law of the sea.

RECOMMENDATION 415

on the control of armaments and disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Endorsing the Council's view expressed in the Rome Declaration that increased co-operation in WEU will also contribute to the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation;
- (ii) Believing that negotiations on arms control and disarmament, such as those conducted in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, are too important for the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance to be made dependent entirely on the state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- (iii) Welcoming, therefore, the inclusion of arms control and disarmament among the specific conditions of security in Europe on which the Council of Ministers will hold comprehensive discussions and seek to harmonise their views;
- (iv) Reiterating its view that it is impracticable, and indeed undesirable, to seek to establish a separate East-West balance in different categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, intermediate- or short-range – and that any such nuclear balance can be assessed only globally;
- (v) Believing, however, that actual negotiations on reducing present levels of nuclear weapons may best be pursued by such categories,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Seek agreement on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance with arms control agreements, in particular a chemical weapons ban, a comprehensive test ban, and MBFR reductions;
2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing the early conclusion of agreements on a chemical weapons ban; a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems; and a comprehensive test ban;
3. Call simultaneously on the United States to ratify the threshold test ban treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty;
4. Examine any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union linked with the quick resumption of INF and START negotiations, not excluding a possible mutual temporary freeze on further deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons, and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations;
5. Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has paved the way for the policy of détente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension among the European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact;
6. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out specific studies to assist it in the foregoing tasks, and those identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union

and the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)

The report of the General Affairs Committee on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance was presented by Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur.

The report of the General Affairs Committee on relations between the Assembly and the Council was presented by Lord Reay, Rapporteur.

The opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by

Mr. Blaauw on behalf of Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Vecchiotti, Palumbo, Cifarelli and Sarti.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Rauti, Milani, Ferrari Aggradi, Lagorce (point of order) and Vogt.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Müller, Gorla, Antretter, de Vries, Spies von Büllenheim, Reddemann, Gansel, Lagorce, Baumel, Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Hughes.

The joint debate was closed.

Speaker: Mr. Nunes (*Observer from Portugal*).

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Gansel and Vogt.

The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller <i>Schmidt</i> (Neumann) Reddemann Schulte <i>Jäger</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllesheim Vogt Zierer	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Netherlands MM. Aarts <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen van der Werff
France	Italy	
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Souvet</i> (Bourges) Lagorce Pignion Valleix Vial-Massat	MM. <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Amadei) Gorla Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Gianotti Giust <i>Palumbo</i> (Mezzapesa) Milani Rauti Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti	United Kingdom Sir Frederic Bennett Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Sir Paul Hawkins Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Freeson</i> (Dr. Miller) Sir John Osborn Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. <i>Gansel</i> (Ahrens) Antretter Böhm Enders Gerstl <i>Scheer</i> (Haase) <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. De Decker Dejardin Noerens	MM. Hornhues Rumpf Unland	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
France	Italy	
MM. Beix Berrier Fourré Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Sénès Wilquin Wirth	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi	United Kingdom Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Hardy Hill Johnston McGuire Wilkinson
	Luxembourg	
	MM. Burger Hengel	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (*Replies to speakers on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 amendment and 999*).
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. *WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance*

(Replies to speakers on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)

Lord Reay, Rapporteur, Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers.

4. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy

Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. Pignion and Bianco.

The sitting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Paul Hawkins.

Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Vecchiotti, Martino, Spies von Büllesheim, Freeson, Vogt and Milani.

5. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Genscher answered questions put by MM. Pignion, Lagorce, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Cifarelli, Sir John Osborn, MM. Cavaliere, Vogt, Goerens, Spies von Büllesheim, Michel, Blaauw, Hill, Bianco and Enders.

6. *WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance*

(Votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation in Document 990.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European security and" insert "the maintenance of".

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere and Michel.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 4 and 14) were tabled by Mr. Pignion and others and by Mr. Martino respectively:

4. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Considering that, whenever useful, the WEU member countries may consult each other on the repercussions for Europe of crisis situations in other regions of the world;".

14. In Amendment 4, leave out "Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert" and insert "After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation insert".

Speakers: Mr. Pignion, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Michel and Pignion.

Amendment 4 was negatived.

Amendment 14 fell.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others:

6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the action those countries pursued" and insert "to consultations about security challenges".

Speakers: Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

A first amendment was tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the first part of the amendment:

Make the present paragraph (v) of the preamble paragraph (iii).

Speakers: MM. Blaauw and Masciadri.

The first part of the amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the second part of the amendment:

After paragraph (iii) of the preamble, add a new paragraph:

"(iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in

particular on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration;".

Speaker: Mr. Michel.

The second part of the amendment was agreed to.

7. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France

Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France, addressed the Assembly.

8. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance

*(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation and draft order,
Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)*

The Assembly resumed consideration of the draft recommendation in Document 990.

A second amendment was tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

At the end of paragraph (vii) of the preamble (now paragraph (viii)) insert: "and the decision to delete as from 1st January 1986 conventional weapons from the list in Annex IV to this protocol".

Speakers: MM. Michel and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

"Convinced of the need to have a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city in order to facilitate the development of the dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat-General and the Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical organs are able to carry out their duties of assisting and informing the Council and the Assembly more efficiently, ".

Speakers: Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay, MM. Masciadri, Cavaliere and Masciadri.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Gansel:

7. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“ Considering that the reactivation of WEU might jeopardise relations with other NATO member states in Europe, ”.

Speakers: Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Reay and Mr. Masciadri.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Martino and others:

12. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“ Welcoming especially the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the Council’s work, ”.

Speakers: Mr. Pignion, Lord Reay, Lord Hughes and Mr. Masciadri.

A sub-amendment was proposed by Mr. Michel, Chairman of the Committee, to leave out “ especially ”.

Speaker: Mr. Pignion.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

A third amendment was tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

In the first line of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ obtain ” and insert “ afford both the Council and the Assembly ” and in line 2 leave out “ it ” and insert “ them ”.

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Pignion and others:

10. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ concerning Europe’s security which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty ” and insert “ in another area of the world which might have an impact on Europe’s security ”.

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Masciadri, Lord Reay and Mr. Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Vecchiotti and others:

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ East-West relations ” and insert “ an active policy for improving relations between East and West ”.

Speakers: MM. Vecchiotti and Masciadri.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Solve the problem of a single seat for all the WEU organs ; ”.

Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere.

The amendment was withdrawn.

Amendments (Nos. 8 and 13) were tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others and by Mr. Martino and others respectively:

8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“ Play an active rôle in disarmament, for example by making an effort – as a first step – in the relevant international organisations to reach limited and controlled disarmament which contributes to the elimination of the perils of war, thus reinforcing the policy of détente; ”.

13. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein; ”.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Masciadri, Martino, Stoffelen and Blaauw.

Amendment 8 was withdrawn.

Amendment 13 was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 9 and 11) were tabled by MM. Stoffelen and Gansel and by MM. Masciadri and Michel respectively:

9. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Properly consult and inform NATO member states, non-member states of WEU, and clearly indicate its intention to take a positive attitude when examining (possible) applications for membership of WEU. ”

11. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit; ”.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Gansel, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Michel.

Amendment 9 was negatived.

Amendment 11 was agreed to.

Speakers (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Lord Hughes.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 416)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order in Document 1002.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Vecchietti and others:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add "including Europe's rôle for the strengthening of peace".

Speakers: Mr. Vecchietti and Lord Reay.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 58)².

9. Political union of Europe

(Motion for an order, Doc. 1003)

In accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, a motion for an order was tabled by Mr. Tummers.

The motion for an order was referred to the Presidential Committee.

10. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the General Affairs Committee proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Cavaliere as an alternate member in place of Mr. Accili.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 6th December, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.

1. See page 38.

2. See page 40.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Vogt Zierer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen
France	MM. <i>Gorla</i> (Antoni) Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Gianotti Giust <i>Palumbo</i> (Mezzapesa) Milani Rauti Sinesio Vecchietti	United Kingdom
MM. Jeambrun Pignion Valleix	Luxembourg	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Freeson</i> (Dr. Miller) Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Goerens	
MM. Ahrens Böhm Enders <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Haase) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hornhues) Müller <i>Gansel</i> (Neumann) Reddemann Spies von Bülesheim <i>Jäger</i> (Unland)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Wilquin Wirth	Luxembourg
MM. De Decker Dejardin Noerens	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Burger Hengel
France	MM. Antretter Gerstl Kittelmann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Berrier Bourges Fourré Jung Lagorce Mayoud Ruet Sénès Vial-Massat	Italy	Mr. van den Bergh Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. van der Werff
	MM. Amadei Fiandrotti Pecchioli Rubbi Sarti	United Kingdom
		MM. Hardy Johnston McGuire

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 416***on WEU, European Union and the Atlantic Alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Recommendations 406 and 407;
- (ii) Endorsing the initiative taken by its President when he handed a memorandum to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 20th September 1984;
- (iii) Considering that a concerted approach by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to matters relating inter alia to the alliance's defence policy and the action those countries pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is essential for Europe's security;
- (iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration;
- (v) Welcoming the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to WEU so as to adapt it to the present requirements of European security and the maintenance of international peace and to develop the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly for these purposes;
- (vi) Considering that giving WEU a new and wider rôle first implies that the Council effectively assume its obligations under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (vii) Noting that the increase in informal procedure may help the Council's work but might diminish the commitments of member countries in intergovernmental consultations and relations between the Council and the Assembly ;
- (viii) Welcoming the deletion of the list of armaments in Annex III to Protocol No. III;
- (ix) Noting that giving the Council a new and wider rôle means that it must obtain different means of information from those afforded so far by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, in particular to allow it to tackle questions of disarmament and the balance of forces;
- (x) Considering that the joint production of armaments by WEU member countries is progressing only slowly;
- (xi) Considering that the Assembly's activities can be based only on a continuing dialogue with the Council;
- (xii) Welcoming the decisions taken or guidelines adopted by the Council and communicated to the Assembly on 27th October 1984 and the fruitful exchanges of views in Rome on 29th October, but recalling the urgency of reorganising the structure of WEU to allow it to meet the new requirements;
- (xiii) Welcoming the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the Council's work,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Abide by its decision to convene the Ministers of Defence and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of member countries at least twice a year, particularly prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council;
2. Give the Permanent Council the means to act in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and to this end:
 - (a) ask member countries to appoint a permanent representation to the Council in the framework of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty;
 - (b) give the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for applying Article VIII;
3. Ensure the existence and operation of the WEU technical bodies in order to obtain the necessary assistance and information to allow it to examine matters relating to the security of Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, events concerning Europe's security which occur outside the area

covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmament and the control of armaments, the prospects of European armaments co-operation and an active policy for improving relations between East and West;

4. Progressively adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee to these new requirements;

5. While developing an informal dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as proposed by the Council, retain formal procedure for exchanges between the two WEU organs;

6. Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein;

7. Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit.

ORDER 58***on relations between the Assembly and the Council***

The Assembly,

Expressing its satisfaction with the intentions proclaimed in the Rome Declaration,

REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT

To take the appropriate steps, in agreement with the Council, to arrange for the Assembly's participation in the discussions and decisions called for by the attribution of a new and more important rôle to Western European Union;

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1984

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1001 and amendment).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 987 and Addendum).
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 991).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1001 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Cavaliere, Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Martino, Ferrari Aggradi, de Vries, Sir John Page, Mr. Schulte; (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Lord Hughes; MM. Schulte and Adriaensens.

The debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Speakers (points of order): Lord Hughes, Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Beix.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft budget.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins:

1. In Part I, Section A, Head I of the budget estimates for 1985, increase the total provision by 348,000 francs to provide for the head of the private office for the President.

Speakers: Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Beix, Sir Dudley Smith, the President, MM. de Vries (point of order), Beix and Sir Paul Hawkins.

The amendment was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 20 votes to 17 with 6 abstentions¹; 15 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Stoffelen.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft budget.

The amended draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 was agreed to.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 987 and Addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

1. Voting figures announced in the Chamber were: ayes 20; noes 17; abstentions 4. After verification of the vote the result is: ayes 20; noes 17; abstentions 6.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

The motion to approve the final accounts of the administrative expenditure for the financial year 1983 was agreed to.

5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments - Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 991)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen and Enders.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Klejdzinski.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

6. Observers

The President welcomed observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

Speaker: Admiral Zervos (Observer from Greece).

7. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation: Mr. Johnston as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Lord McNair; Mr. Johnston as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Lord McNair; Sir Geoffrey Finsberg as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Murphy.

8. Close of the session

The President declared the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann) Müller <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Neumann) Reddemann Schulte <i>Jäger</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllesheim Unland	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Michel Mrs. Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. <i>Tummers</i> (Aarts) <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) <i>van der Sanden</i> (Blaauw) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen van der Werff
France	Italy	
MM. Beix Berrier Jung Lagorce Pignon Valleix <i>Natiez</i> (Wilquin)	MM. <i>Gorla</i> (Antoni) Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) <i>Colajanni</i> (Gianotti) Giust Milani Rauti Sarti Sinesio	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison</i> (Wilkinson)
MM. Ahrens <i>Schmidt</i> (Antretter) Böhm Enders Gerstl <i>Gansel</i> (Haase) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Hornhues)	Luxembourg	
	Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. De Decker Dejardin Noerens	MM. Rumpf Vogt Zierer	MM. Burger Hengel
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Mayoud Ruet Sénès Vial-Massat Wirth	MM. Amadei Bianco Cifarelli Mezzapesa Pecchioli Rubbi Vecchietti	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
		United Kingdom
		Sir Anthony Grant MM. Johnston McGuire Dr. Miller

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amendment to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985¹:

Ayes	20
Noes	17
Abstentions	6

Ayes:

MM. Böhm	Mr. <i>Lemrich</i> (Hornhues)	MM. Reddemann
Ferrari Aggradi	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel)	Sinesio
<i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti)	Mr. <i>Hackel</i> (Kittelmann)	Spies von Bülesheim
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Mrs. Knight	Unland
Mr. Giust	Sir John Osborn	Valleix
Sir Paul Hawkins	Mr. Rauti	Sir <i>John Biggs-Davison</i>
Mr. Hill	Lord Reay	(Wilkinson)

Noes:

MM. <i>Tummers</i> (Aarts)	M. Bogaerts	MM. de Kwaadsteniet
<i>Schmidt</i> (Antretter)	Enders	<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Neumann)
Beix	Gerstl	Schulte
<i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh)	<i>Gansel</i> (Haase)	Stoffelen
<i>van der Sanden</i> (Blaauw)	Hardy	van der Werff
	Lord Hughes	<i>Natiez</i> (Wilquin)

Abstentions:

MM. Adriaensens
Ahrens
Berrier
Cavaliere
Sir John Page
Sir Dudley Smith

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 3rd December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Attendance register.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Warsaw Pact and disarmament (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1000).
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 986).
8. Warsaw Pact and disarmament (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1000).
Speakers: Mr. Haase, Mr. Blaauw (point of order), Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Michel.
9. Tabling of amendments and lists of speakers.
10. Deterrence and the will of the people (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 988 and amendments).
11. Consequences of the Gulf war (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 994 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Beix, Mr. Müller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Gansel, Lord Reay.
12. Changes in the membership of committees.
13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on 21st June 1984, at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure the minutes of proceedings of the second sitting of the extraordinary session on 29th October 1984 have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of new representatives and substitutes nominated since the extraordinary session of 29th October 1984 whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

¹ See page 15.

The President (continued)

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of those of Mr. Johnston, representative of the United Kingdom.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify his credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

This nomination has been made in due and proper form under our Rules of Procedure and no objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials are therefore agreed, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Johnston is accordingly entitled to take his seat in the Assembly of Western European Union.

I welcome our new colleague.

5. Warsaw Pact and disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1000)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have to inform the Assembly that I have received a request for a debate under urgent procedure on a motion for a recommendation entitled the Warsaw Pact and disarmament.

The motion has been distributed as Document 1000.

I propose that the Assembly decide on the question of urgent procedure after adoption of the draft order of business.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the session now starting is of particular importance because, for the first time, the Assembly will have the opportunity of giving its views of the action being taken by governments to give new life to WEU. On 29th October, thanks to the Italian Delegation, which I wish to thank once again for the sumptuous welcome it gave us, we were able to hold an extraordinary session in Rome. We were thus able to become acquainted with the joint declaration by the

seven governments and hear the views of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Vice-Chancellor Genscher, and two Italian Ministers, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Spadolini. The number and importance of the questions put to them and the attention with which they answered made this a session of great interest. But they left the Assembly no time to express an opinion during the single day of the session. In any event, it was not possible for a committee to prepare and adopt in time a report on the declaration by the Ministers, which is how we have to work under our Rules of Procedure. This we shall be doing therefore during the second part of the thirtieth ordinary session.

If we look at all the reports to be debated during this session, it can be seen that, to various degrees and above all from quite different standpoints, they all concern the action which will have to be taken on the decisions of the governments. Whether it is a matter of European space co-operation, technological developments in the United States, disarmament or the Gulf war, our Assembly can no longer approach them in the same way as in the past.

Admittedly, the Assembly has never hesitated to deal with a broad spectrum of questions as it is authorised to do under the all-embracing modified Brussels Treaty, but it could not overlook the fact that the Council was not following suit. On the contrary, most of the recommendations on which you are to vote during this session urge the Council to tackle questions it has hitherto not touched upon. Since the Rome Declaration, the Assembly has good reason to hope that the Council will at last be able to give meaningful answers.

For many years the Council had been a most disappointing partner. It was admittedly agreed that WEU, with its governmental side and its Assembly, retained the full responsibilities entrusted to it under the modified Brussels Treaty. But while the Assembly effectively exercised these responsibilities the Council practically confined itself to supervising the application of the protocols on the control of armaments and, for other matters, to giving us a summary of discussions in other bodies. In other words, its answers ill-concealed the weakness of its political rôle and the Assembly rightly complained about this on many occasions. Through the Council, it was quite clearly aiming at the way in which governments used WEU and not, I would emphasise, the persons composing the Permanent Council.

The main section of the Rome Declaration setting out a programme of activities for the Council should have put an end to this situation and the recommendations on which you are to vote all seek to pinpoint what the Council should do in the areas they cover. The opinion

The President (continued)

which we ourselves and, through us, European public opinion will have on the will to reactivate WEU will depend, in the long run, on the way the Council answers these recommendations, expressing the collective views of the seven governments. The improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly which the Council has always claimed to be seeking did not depend solely on the favourable attitude it showed towards us. It depended mainly on the will to exist in reality which the Assembly now asks the Council to demonstrate. The Rome Declaration is perhaps not sufficient to reassure it completely.

Several aspects of the reactivation of WEU are in fact still rather vague. There may therefore still be some question as to its nature, extent and shape. Here I venture to recall the very natural concern aroused by this uncertainty among the staff of the two WEU technical bodies.

But, noting that little remains of yesterday's WEU now that the major part of the work of the ministerial organs has been cut out of the lists in the annexes to Protocol No. III, it is also normal for the Assembly to wish to have a clearer picture of what tomorrow's WEU will be. The fact that Vice-Chancellor Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council since last June, and Ministers Cheysson, Luce and Spadolini are attending our session should allow us to see more clearly and I wish here and now to thank all the governments for their rôle in the extraordinary session in Rome and in the second part of the ordinary session. We are gratified to note that several Ministers have availed themselves of their right under the Charter to come and address us.

Moreover, the will expressed by the Ministers in their note of 12th June which, thanks to Vice-Chancellor Genscher, led to the Assembly being associated with every stage of their action to give new life to WEU is already a revolution in relations between the Council and the Assembly.

This consultation admittedly raised a few problems for the Assembly since it has no appropriate structure for frequent, informal exchanges of views with the governments. Thanks to the report to be submitted by Lord Reay next Wednesday on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, we shall be able to see how we can adapt ourselves to this new requirement, whereas Mr. Masciadri's report will allow us to give our views on what we now know of the reforms undertaken by the governments in WEU. For these reasons, and because we shall also be listening to three Ministers, Wednesday will be of very special importance, and I wish our debate to be as clear and frank as possible since the future of our dialogue with the Minis-

ters will depend on its outcome, as will perhaps also to a certain extent the depth of the transformation of WEU which they have begun.

There is no doubt that our fate is of interest to Western Europe as a whole. The presence of observers from several European countries, members of the Atlantic Alliance, bears witness to this interest. At the close of this session, they should be able to take back to their countries as clear and full information as possible about what we intend to do. In the meantime, I extend to them a warm welcome and remind them that we shall not be able to consider the task of WEU completed as long as Western Europe as a whole has not been able to show, in a joint organisation, the de facto solidarity which exists between all our countries towards the threat from outside, whatever may be its nature and origin. In Rome, we learned that one of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal, had already asked to join WEU. This, we believe, confirms the importance of the current transformation of the organisation which brings us together here.

As I am anxious to leave as much time as possible for a debate which promises to be of particular significance, I will be brief. My desire not to prejudge the outcome of this debate prevents me from saying more and I invite you to decide immediately upon the order of business of the session.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

(Doc. 986)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 986.

Are there any comments on the draft order of business?...

Is there any opposition?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

8. Warsaw Pact and disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1000)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is consideration of the request for a debate under urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the Warsaw Pact and disarmament, Document 1000.

In accordance with Rule 43, this request is submitted by ten or more representatives or

The President (continued)

substitutes. May I remind you that I can allow only one speaker in favour and one against, together with the Chairman of the committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.

Furthermore, in accordance with Rule 31 (7), speaking time on procedural matters is limited to five minutes.

I call Mr. Haase to move the request.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must first apologise for tabling this motion at such short notice. This was unavoidable because of the difficulty a European parliamentarian faces through having to wait until his fellow parliamentarians arrive before he can collect the necessary ten signatures. There was no opportunity to do this until this morning.

The urgency of this motion is justified by its subject-matter: the expiry of the Warsaw Pact Treaty in June 1985. The appeal made in the motion to the Soviet Union and the other members of the pact to react appropriately, possibly by modifying the Warsaw Pact, constitutes an invitation to the Warsaw Pact countries to respond to the views of the WEU Assembly.

However, WEU will not be meeting again until next spring. In other words, there will be very little time left if the Warsaw Pact countries are to respond to our idea by June 1985, perhaps only fourteen days, which is nowhere near enough. It is thus the time factor that makes this motion urgent and I appeal for your understanding.

I therefore ask you to declare this motion urgent, with certain reservations no doubt, and to admit it without voting on the contents, so that the General Affairs Committee can examine it tomorrow morning and report its findings to the Assembly on Tuesday. There should be enough time for this.

I feel, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it is very proper for the Assembly to express its opinion on a matter of this kind. Its urgency should not be seen as an obstacle or as a reason for dismissing a very interesting motion on the grounds of formality.

I would therefore be very grateful – and I say this on behalf of all the signatories – if you could agree to the application of urgent procedure, without deciding on the substance of the matter for the moment. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Ferrari Aggradi has asked to speak against the request for urgent procedure. May I remind you, for the sake of clarity, that the present debate is

limited to one speaker in favour of urgent procedure and one against, and also the Chairman of the committee, if he wishes to speak. The debate proper will take place only if the Assembly agrees to the request for urgent procedure.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I should like to put a question to Mr. Haase. Why has he chosen this procedure and not followed the procedure of putting down amendments to the report about disarmament, which talks about all kinds of negotiations? Before there is an answer...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have noted your comments, Mr. Blaauw.

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, speaking both personally and for a number of colleagues, I am in full agreement with the substance of the document before us, which I am also prepared to support; but the problem is not one of substance. I am quite certain that the problem is one of methods and of consistency with our Rules of Procedure.

I ask that the normal procedure be followed, because nothing of an exceptional nature is involved; whatever is said here testifies to our continuing action and the will expressed here stems from our behaviour; vice versa, the urgent procedure would be justified by an extraordinary event such as a threat of war or something similar.

In this case, there is a risk of adding an item which could distort an already heavy agenda; in particular, I fear that we may be creating a precedent, and this is most important. If we agree this time, quite logically we shall be asked to agree in other cases.

I recommend following the normal procedure; everything that happens here is very quickly learned outside without the need for any formal communication; our attitude to the Warsaw Pact is well known. Let us not – I repeat – do anything which not only today but in future also, might make our work more difficult.

Before concluding by saying that we shall not vote for this document, I would urge the authors not to press their demand for urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am quite sympathetic to this motion for a recommendation but I think it ought to go through the usual channels, especially as the General Affairs Committee will probably have to deal with East-

Mr. Michel (continued)

West relations in a forthcoming report and the two matters could be dealt with together on that occasion. That seems a more reasonable approach.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – According to the Rules of Procedure the Bureau should also give its view but, as it has not discussed the question, this provision of the rules on requests for urgent procedure cannot be fulfilled.

I therefore put to the vote the request for a debate under urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation tabled by Mr. Haase and others.

A roll-call vote has not been requested.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for urgent procedure is not agreed to.

The authors of the motion are of course at liberty to table it in the appropriate committee in order to have it examined in accordance with their wishes.

9. Tabling of amendments and lists of speakers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In order to facilitate our work, I propose first that the time limit for tabling amendments should be the moment at which the Rapporteur is called to present his report; second, that the list of speakers in each debate should be closed at the same moment, thus enabling the Assembly to decide on any limit on speaking time in full knowledge of the facts.

Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

10. Deterrence and the will of the people

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 988 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on deterrence and the will of the people and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 988 and amendments.

I call Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf

of the General Affairs Committee I presented an initial report to the Assembly on the problems for European security arising from pacifism and neutralism which culminated in the adoption of Recommendation 388 in November 1982.

The present report on deterrence and the will of the people, which simply updates the initial report in the light of various factors, events and occurrences since November 1982, was submitted to you at last June's part-session, but the debate could not be concluded. Those who took part in that debate will remember that it foundered upon discussion of the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, which included the statement that "nuclear weapons are an essential part of deterrence". After a wide-ranging exchange of views, the Assembly finally adopted an amendment by Mr. Freeson deleting that part of the sentence.

Since that deletion went more or less against the whole thrust of the report and called into question decisions taken by a large majority in the General Affairs Committee, the Chairman, Mr. Michel, asked for reference back to the committee so that a new recommendation taking account of this amendment could be drafted. Reference back, contested by a number of colleagues, was finally agreed to by the Assembly at the end of a heated procedural debate.

I shall not therefore, go back over the substance of the report but simply explain the amendments made to the draft recommendation by the General Affairs Committee, which, I would emphasise, studied it at length and with great attention. While the explanatory memorandum, which I have also amended, expresses the Rapporteur's opinion, the operative part – in this case the draft recommendation – must reflect the opinion of the majority of the committee, which the Rapporteur has faithfully to report. This I shall endeavour to do.

In view of the Assembly's adoption of Mr. Freeson's amendment, what was originally the second paragraph now simply asserts that "the security of Western Europe will be ensured only by deterrence" and leaves it at that.

It has however been "downgraded", so to speak, to third position, and its former place taken by the original third paragraph, more general in scope, which has been brought forward since it refers to the fear of the peoples of Europe that they might have to suffer the effects of a conflict.

In the fourth paragraph the committee has adopted your Rapporteur's proposal, stressing that the "will of the people" referred to in the title of the report – that is, the will of our people and our governments to defend their freedom, is on an equal footing with nuclear weapons, in regard to the deterrence that is the subject of the

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

previous paragraph. I believe our Assembly should be able to reach consensus on this point of capital importance, as now redrafted, since while the importance of nuclear weapons cannot be denied, they are no longer the sole means of deterrence but one among others, which include the political will of our peoples. This needed to be said.

An additional eleventh paragraph affirms that deterrence cannot be effectively ensured without a radical transformation, that is to say improvement, in the standard of living of the developing countries. This is an idea dear to all European democrats which is often expressed in another context, the Council of Europe, and which will take practical shape, at least partially, with the forthcoming signing of the Lomé III Convention.

Very few changes have been made in the original wording of the recommendation proper. As before, paragraph 1 stresses the need to keep public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, the attitude of the members of the Atlantic Alliance to these dangers and the type and level of weapons deployed by Europe for its security.

Paragraph 6 has been fairly extensively rewritten. On a proposal from your Rapporteur, the committee has added to the need to pursue the North-South dialogue the obligation to promote, instigate and encourage all negotiations, present or future, on the limitation of nuclear weapons and the banning of the use of space for military purposes.

It is encouraging that a few days ago, after the announcement that Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko would be meeting in Geneva in January, we heard that the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament, which has been bogged down for eleven months, is finally about to get under way, the thirty-five participating countries having managed to agree on an agenda.

That then is the new text, fairly different from its predecessor, which the General Affairs Committee adopted on 9th October by twelve votes in favour, three against and no abstentions, and which your Rapporteur now submits for your approval.

This report seems to me to illustrate the contribution that the WEU Assembly can very usefully make, through its work and debates, to a better understanding by public opinion of the terms in which security problems are now posed.

I venture to hope that the large majority which voted in favour of this new draft recommendation in committee will be duplicated in our

Assembly, subject to the adoption of certain amendments due to be tabled which I may perhaps be able to support.

The new text reflects all our concerns as elected representatives of peoples who, while fearful of the dangers threatening the world, are asking us to be mindful of those dangers and not to neglect European security while at the same time tirelessly pursuing our efforts towards peace through negotiation, particularly through the limitation of nuclear and other weapons, in order to bring about, if possible, the disarmament so ardently desired by every person of good faith inside and outside this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce. May I once again pay tribute to you for the work which you and your colleagues on the General Affairs Committee have put in, following a debate which did nothing to facilitate a task which you have nevertheless managed to cope with to everybody's satisfaction.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is not simply out of courtesy that I wish to begin my brief speech by thanking the Rapporteur not only for his very intelligent, interesting and full report but also for his determined defence of it, first, during our previous discussion and later in committee right up to today.

The Rapporteur said that the discussion was quite difficult and lively; and I think that we must recognise that by his worthy efforts he helped in achieving a balance, as a result of which this report has retained its full significance and has become more acceptable to the very great majority of this Assembly.

I have been instructed by my liberal colleagues to say that we can accept the report; it deals with a subject which is of the highest interest and also extremely controversial because the fact is that measures relating to defence in the world of today are so vast in scope that they give rise to many doubts among the public at large. We are a very long way from the situation of bygone centuries when a war was something which emerged at the last moment and the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets created the right frame of mind on the spot. Today, the world is continuously confronted by the requirements of overall defence, which is both costly and can have unforeseeable consequences if used, and all the day-to-day problems of public concern. Furthermore we all know – without distinction – that when the necessary measures are considered, thought must also be given to the dangers which would arise for the whole community if those measures became reality.

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

That is why I think that, while we are generally favourable to the report, we should emphasise a number of basic points of agreement. In my opinion a first fundamental point is the one we are considering here, namely, that the member states of WEU within the Atlantic Alliance together constitute a nucleus of organised capabilities and of active determination to defend the liberty and independence of each and all of us, in short a guarantee for peace. But this commitment to peace has another aspect; first, independence and survival as states each with its own rights and freedoms. We have never dissociated the concept and maintenance of a defensive Atlantic Alliance from the basic concept of democratic freedoms. And the countries speaking here through us, their representatives, are democratic countries within the Europe for whose unity we are working in various ways, with great ideals behind us and great prospects before us.

The other strong point in the report before us is the commitment to make European opinion aware of the dangers facing the world and of the measures which the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are taking to meet those dangers; hence to inform the public of the position as regards armaments, of the threat to peace resulting from certain measures and certain very grave decisions now being implemented.

Clearly, if this speech had been made a few months ago, when international tension was at its height and there were fears concerning what can now perhaps – I repeat perhaps – be regarded as past dangers, our tone and our preoccupations would have been different. But if, in the half-light before the dawn, something new is stirring in the world with signs that the dialogue and negotiations may be resumed, this should not be regarded as grounds for facile optimism, leading the public to become less attentive and to relax the vigilance, by which peace is ensured; we should rather interpret this as confirmation that peace is the price for the prudent and the vigilant who are willing to accept sacrifices today for the sake of freedom tomorrow!

Looking closely at the recommendation, I wish, on behalf of my colleagues, to refer particularly to future prospects; we are not fighting solely for our own independence and for the freedom and peace of everyone but also to ensure that our presence in the world guarantees a better chance of peace and of development for others as well.

There is another strong point with which we agree; we intend to work for the best possible outcome for the current negotiations on controlled disarmament and for the opening of fresh

negotiations to limit nuclear arms in the world and to ban the military use of space.

A final major point in this well thought out report is the open approach towards countries outside Europe and the western countries in the Atlantic Alliance; if these peoples and countries continue to live in fear and isolation they will be forced, by circumstances very bad for their lives and development, to take hazardous decisions which may seriously endanger world peace.

Summarising the reasons for our considered support, we do not need – as this would be abusing the time available – to analyse our individual reasons for supporting the various points, from the basis of peace to the arguments which have arisen and to the developments they have produced in the various countries. We regard all this as an undeniably valuable contribution to the history of civilisation; ours is a European democratic civilisation; it speaks with many voices and offers many contrasts. It is, however, a civilisation which from time to time can be divided on individual problems but which is nevertheless able to reach joint conclusions on measures to safeguard progress and civilisation; and it is for civilisation, progress, freedom and peace that we must spare no effort.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in this report the Rapporteur has tackled one of the most difficult subjects of all: deterrence and the will of the people. It is almost impossible to translate the title of the report accurately into Dutch.

We all know that it is particularly important for the public to be motivated to contribute to defence. We must therefore be grateful to the Rapporteur for undertaking this difficult study. Events in recent years have made it clear that our peoples' support for defence is less than total.

The public wonders whether the politicians are on the right track as regards security; whether they really are working towards a safer world. People wonder whether security in the world is not increasingly at risk, especially where nuclear weapons are concerned. The Rapporteur too has considered this question in detail. Are these weapons really more effective in ensuring our security than conventional weapons, or is the situation more complex? Or does a combination of nuclear and conventional weapons contribute to security?

Mr. President, the Rapporteur has not, in my opinion, considered the following points in sufficient depth in his report.

What singles out a democratic security policy is that we also try to achieve the best possible

Mr. de Vries (continued)

mutual understanding on the intellectual level. Paragraph 4 of the report refers to the well-known dilemma over British and French nuclear weapons.

In my view, Mr. President, if we in Europe are unable clearly to define the importance of these nuclear powers and to appreciate that they should be included in the debate between East and West, we shall never be able to conduct reasonable negotiations with the eastern bloc on nuclear weapons. If we claim that certain national systems should be excluded, difficulties will always arise. The terminology used is also confusing, in my opinion. It would be sensible to use the same terminology in NATO and WEU. In NATO they speak of strategic-range, intermediate-range and short-range weapons. The type of weapon is less important than its range. Paragraph 4 should not refer to "theatre weapons" as anti-personnel weapons: that is not their distinguishing feature. As the former Federal German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt so aptly said, nuclear weapons are always strategic weapons: what matters is where they explode.

Mr. President, I am very unhappy about the comment on the American bishops in paragraph 25, which suggests that they would be delighted if hostilities took place several thousands of kilometres from American soil. I do not believe this. I believe the American bishops very largely agree with the European bishops, who have warned of the danger of nuclear war. I do not believe that the American bishops are intent on gaining one-sided advantages for their country.

Nor am I happy with the opinion expressed in paragraph 32, which says that one committee member compared certain tendencies in the pacifist movement with the consequences of Hitlerian propaganda. A rapporteur who includes such a suggestion from a committee member is, in my opinion, paying far too much respect to a stupid and careless remark. It would have been better not to mention it in the report.

Mr. President, I have the impression that the Rapporteur has escaped too easily from discussion of the subject of pacifism by calling anyone opposed to nuclear weapons or to a certain type of nuclear weapon a pacifist and accusing him of agitation. In a political debate, in which a choice always has to be made, one side should not immediately be given a label if it does not agree to the choice made by the other side. The Labour Party in the Netherlands certainly did not oppose the deployment of cruise missiles for pacifist reasons. We are not a pacifist party. But we did not think that the deployment of these weapons would contribute to Europe's security. We may be right, we may be wrong.

We thought we were right. I feel that in general greater respect might be shown for the various influences within the pacifist movement. Pacifism is a legitimate philosophy in European politics. Running the pacifists down – certainly in contradistinction to the militarists – seems to me a very unfortunate way of doing things: there are more nuances involved. We cannot play one group off against the other. There are people who have to make choices, chief among them the politicians. The Rapporteur would have done better to be more cautious in this respect.

Mr. President, I have explained our position on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe before, as other members have done on previous occasions in this Assembly. We are therefore very interested in the amendments that have been tabled to the draft recommendation. Whether or not we approve this report will depend on the adoption or rejection of these amendments.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – This report is not only important but remarkable, because it has been introduced by a socialist. I pay tribute to Mr. Lagorce's courage in expressing views not entirely shared by all his political colleagues and certainly not shared by socialists in my country. I hope that the recommendations will be passed and that the report will be read by socialists everywhere in the West and not least in the United Kingdom. The report should be studied and pondered upon.

Mr. Lagorce reminded us, wisely, that in the second world war, when no nuclear weapons were used in Europe, more than forty million people were victims. It might be added that many of those victims were United States citizens. We should remember that when we hear the suggestion that all evil stems from across the Atlantic.

Of course, we must recognise that today conventional weapons are far more terrible and devastating in their power than any that were used in the 1939 to 1945 war. Can those who argue the anti-nuclear case really lay their hands on their hearts and say, with all honesty, that had there not been a nuclear deterrent we should not have been launched into a terrible conventional war with even more casualties and misery than occurred in the last war?

I believe that Mr. Lagorce is absolutely right to point out that the European nations' will to defend themselves is accompanied by no aggressive designs. No one can say that we have

Sir Anthony Grant (continued)

aggressive designs. It is a factor of security and of peace, and any sign of a weakening of that will is a threat to peace itself.

I wish to concentrate on the issue of the will of the people and the will to defend. Again, Mr. Lagorce is absolutely right to point out that the determined campaign to oppose the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles can now be said to have failed after reaching a climax in the autumn of last year. Conversely, other aspects of pacifist unrest have emerged that are no less dangerous for western cohesion. I want to cite again an example very near home. All will be aware of the tremendous demonstrations and disruption to life that have taken place at Greenham Common in Great Britain. Massive attempts have been made by protesters to disrupt the location of cruise missiles.

Another campaign is starting next door to my constituency at a place called Alconbury, where a relatively small minority of people, who have lost the argument and lost the debate, are determined to put the peaceful citizens – who are the majority – to great inconvenience, trouble and lack of amenities in order to endeavour to prevent the deployment of the cruise missiles in that area. If that is allowed to get out of hand – through the excessive attention of the media which gives those people, who are anti-nuclear protestors, an importance far out of proportion to their real significance – that will sap the will of a nation and the will of the West. I hope that, throughout the West, we shall maintain a strong view against unilateral disarmament. The report points out the dangers of that and, I hope, reinforces the will of the people to sustain proper deterrence against the dangers with which the world is beset.

The key words are “will of the people”. It was the will of the people to preserve freedom that saved us during the last war. It was the will of the people that has resisted tyranny throughout the ages. It is the will of the people that has enabled the western alliance to restore the balance through the location of cruise missiles. It is from the resolve of the West to maintain our defence that fruitful negotiations can be pursued and a lasting peace achieved.

I commend the report very strongly to everyone who has the defence of the West and the hope of lasting peace at heart.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I wish to speak to Amendment 3. Can I do so now, or shall I do it later?

The PRESIDENT. – Now.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – Mr. de Vries said a great deal about the report by Mr. Lagorce with which I agree. The report is intellectually and morally provocative and deserves the attribute of being interesting and important. However, how he pictures the pacifist movement in Western Europe plays unwittingly into the hands of the Soviet Union. It is unwise to depict the millions who have demonstrated in the streets as being at the disposal of the Soviet Union, as fellow travellers. In reality, they are people – especially young people – with the hopes, perhaps illusions, of peace and disarmament. Disillusionment, either with the policy of the United States or the policy of the Soviet Union, can change their attitude.

I wish to repeat something that I said during a private conversation with Mr. Lagorce. I understand that many of our older colleagues, from their experience during the 1930s, know the danger of pacifism in the light of the war of Hitler and the Third Reich. Many of those who were pacifists in the 1930s were brave soldiers in the 1940s, and it is to them that we owe democracy and freedom today. Surely, pacifists became militants by the experience of war, of persecution and of occupation. However, there are also soldiers who, from their experience of war, have become pacifists. There are also politicians who, from watching armament after armament conference, have become convinced that our policy of arms control and disarmament cannot end in upper limits but must lead to reductions in existing weapons.

It is on that basis that I want to speak to Amendment 3, which recalls the formula of the “walk in the woods”. That agreement or non-agreement in the summer of 1982 meant a common limit of seventy-five launchers on each side, a ban on deployment of Pershing IIs in Europe, a freeze at ninety of the number of SS-20s designated for the Asian targets, a limit of 150 medium-range, nuclear-capable aircraft and exclusion of British and French systems.

The “walk in the woods” formula today would mean a substantial reduction in SS-20s – virtually the demolishing of them – and the withdrawal of Pershing IIs. However, it would still mean that there would be cruise missiles in all member countries of Western European Union with the exception of France. Future negotiations, which might start in January, might provide an opportunity for reductions, not upper limits.

What I propose is not a resolution of the German Social Democratic Party congress, nor is it the position of the Greek Socialist Party, the British Conservative Party or the German conservatives. All the same, it was possible in the NATO assembly three weeks ago to have an almost unanimous vote on this formula. Some

Mr. Gansel (continued)

of us may think that it is an ideal solution. For others, such as my party, this is only one step to a more substantial reduction of SS-20s and of western middle-range forces. However, it is a matter on which we can agree.

My question to the Assembly is: are we still able to behave like parliamentarians, or are we merely promoting the resolutions of party congresses or the decisions of our governments? If the latter, we can stop meeting. Instead, we can write letters to each other.

If we can still decide as a parliamentary body, we must have the power to reach a compromise. What some British colleagues and I have proposed is a compromise on a report on a crucial, provocative issue. The question is: can we reach a common result? This for me is a test of whether the Assembly of WEU can compare itself with the parliamentary spirit of the North Atlantic Assembly. I look forward to it. I hope that I shall not be disappointed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall be dealing only with the draft recommendation and not with the report, although I agree with the previous speaker concerning the section on pacifist movements; the treatment of this subject in the report is totally unacceptable.

The report represents the opinion of the Rapporteur, but the draft recommendation, if adopted, becomes the opinion of the Assembly; this is a draft recommendation which the Rapporteur had to withdraw during the first part of this session, in June, because a section was negated by the Assembly. A few changes have been made to the draft now before us but in my opinion it is still wholly unsatisfactory; indeed, in view of recent developments in relations between the United States and the USSR it is also out of date.

Paragraph (v) of the preamble regrets the failure of the INF and START negotiations in Geneva but makes no reference to the fact that the two great powers have agreed to a meeting between Gromyko and Shultz in Geneva in January and I think this should be mentioned.

Paragraph (vii) of the same preamble hopes for the opening of negotiations for the limitation of nuclear weapons of all kinds but the two Foreign Ministers will be doing more than hope and intend to discuss all nuclear weapons and devices so that it is imperative that no preconditions should be set preventing the progress of the negotiations at a reasonable rate; on the contrary every effort should be made to further the talks and there is useful mention of a moratorium.

Then I am amazed by paragraph (vi); continuing support for the twofold decision, taken in 1979, is presented as being popular with the WEU countries; but do you think, Mr. Rapporteur, that the Governments of the Netherlands and Belgium have gone outside WEU and that they should be asked to leave, seeing that they have deferred the decision beyond the limits set by NATO? In parliament, the Netherlands Government went on to say that if between the beginning of 1984 and the middle of 1985 the USSR had not deployed more SS-20s, the Netherlands would not deploy cruise missiles. What does the Rapporteur think of this in relation to the text of the recommendation? In my view, paragraph 4 of the recommendation proper can have no meaning unless it is intended to censure the Belgian and Netherlands Governments which, on the contrary have behaved wisely and democratically. In my view what is necessary first and foremost is to state Europe's attitude, from the standpoint of WEU, to the new set of negotiations which we hope will go forward; secondly I ask that the European governments should also participate, in a way to be decided, in negotiations which concern Europe and the equipment installed on its territory.

So far, the draft recommendation speaks of deterrence and government policy, but where is any reference to the will of the people as mentioned in the title? The peoples of Europe want security and peace but the word peace is missing from the draft recommendation. Has it perhaps become a word which cannot be written? I have the impression that this is a matter requiring psychological rather than political analysis.

In order to avoid adopting a recommendation of little use, it would be better if it were withdrawn and discussed again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker, on a point of order.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am not raising a point of order, but, as a member of the Belgian Parliament, I would like to reply to the attack on the position of the Belgian Government and Belgian Parliament by my Italian communist colleague and to correct certain inaccuracies in his speech. I shall speak at the appropriate time during the debate when giving my opinion on the draft recommendation. I am therefore simply putting my name down for the general debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, once again we are considering Mr. Lagorce's report, and I have just heard the

Mr. Müller (continued)

previous speaker recommend yet again that it be referred back, in other words, that we should not consider it today.

I oppose this recommendation. I believe the report should be adopted and I shall now explain why I think this is necessary.

On the subject of deterrence, I do not really want to quote the old dictum with which you are all familiar and which is constantly misused, but I see no alternative: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. In other words: "If you want peace, prepare for war".

Now there can be no doubt that today it is not because he wants peace that anyone is willing to prepare for war. Nor, however, can there be any doubt that we must use our own strength to achieve a deterrent effect, to prevent our adversary from becoming arrogant, feeling secure and starting a war.

If we consider the history of Europe, we note an interesting development in the immediate post-war period, which must make us all stop and think. As you know, the Soviet Union tried to expand its sphere of influence after 1945. It did this in various areas, until a point was reached when the United States made it very clear to the Soviet Union that enough was enough: in his declaration of March 1947, later known as the Truman doctrine, President Truman stated that any attack on Greece or Turkey would be regarded as a challenge to the United States. He even sent an American fleet to the Mediterranean, where it is still based today.

This was, if I may say so, very effective; in a word, it maintained the freedom of Greece and Turkey. The demands made by the Soviet Union at the conferences of foreign ministers immediately after the war and its direct threats – against Turkey, for example, a country which had certainly been no ally of the Third Reich, demands which would have resulted in the establishment of Soviet bases on the Bosphorus and even in the surrender of Turkish territory to the Soviet Union – clearly reveal that the Soviet Union hoped at that time to use its position of strength as the victor or one of the victors in the second world war to expand its sphere of influence. The deterrent effect of the Truman doctrine of March 1947 put an end to this.

Nevertheless, as we all know, we have had a cold war and confrontation in Europe, with repeated Soviet attempts to undermine and destroy from within the readiness of the western countries – which later, in 1949, joined to form NATO – to defend themselves.

I found it enlightening to read the official textbook of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was edited and published by Afanyassev. It says that communist forces in the western countries must seek to destroy from within the readiness of the latter to defend themselves, and so help to defeat the enemy of the working class.

Textbooks are, of course, there to be learnt from, and they should be taken seriously. We have seen how important this is, from the NATO twofold decision and the campaign directed against it in Europe in recent years.

I can now say with some relief that what the so-called peace movement – I emphasise: "so-called" – set in motion last year has long since petered out. The co-ordinating committee which organised the big demonstration in Bonn last November is now beginning to realise that not everything was above-board. The Christian peace groups have now withdrawn and dissociated themselves from the movement. At this year's repeat performance it was not even possible to get enough people on to the streets to complete the human chain that had been planned.

This is also due to the fact that many of those who organised this campaign were simply guilty of exaggeration: they had claimed that, if the German Parliament decided in favour of the NATO twofold decision in November, the third world war would break out a few weeks later. I well remember receiving letters and telephone calls from people who really believed this. But it did not happen, which the members of the peace movement found far more disappointing.

I was very interested to see from the left-wing magazine *Arbeiterkampf*, which is published by a communist splinter group in the Federal Republic of Germany, that Alexander Schubart, one of the people who organised the movement opposed to the new runway in Frankfurt, said of the "struggle for peace": "We made mistakes, our claims were so exaggerated that others no longer believed us, because our warnings of what would happen became excessive". It was even admitted at conferences that the main target group, young people, could no longer be mobilised.

Of course, Ladies and Gentlemen, this does not mean that we politicians can sit back and say: the whole dispute inside our countries is over, we need not worry about it any more. We must in fact see the present situation as evidence that only our resolution in standing by this NATO twofold decision has enabled us now to look forward to a resumption of negotiations between East and West, between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Had we not then stood firm, the negotiations would certainly not now have been resumed.

Mr. Müller (continued)

All those who said negotiations would never be resumed because the Soviet Union had slammed the door have now been proved wrong: the Soviet Union has been forced to respond to the resolute stand taken by the people and the politicians of the western countries.

Those who want to defend themselves and love freedom must be prepared to stand up for themselves and to maintain some deterrent potential as an affirmation that, if attacked, they will defend themselves.

I am very interested by the references in Mr. Lagorce's report to opinion polls in France which show what a high percentage of the French people would be prepared to go underground, defend themselves and fight for their freedom. I have serious doubts about the willingness of various other European countries, including my own, the Federal Republic of Germany, to do the same. I might make an exception of Bavaria, but I am very sceptical about the rest of the Federal Republic.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this shows us, of course – as the reactions of certain members on the other side of the House confirm – that willingness to defend freedom becomes increasingly doubtful when people are no longer prepared to maintain deterrence at all.

Left-wingers in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, want a nuclear-free zone. I do not want to dwell on the defence policy of the social democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany because nobody knows what their defence policy is. Is Mr. von Bülow right, with his reduction of the Federal armed forces to 300,000 men, or should we take Mr. Vogel, the leader of the opposition, as a model, when he calls not only for a nuclear-free zone but also, as he has done recently, for a tank-free zone? The next zone will have no fire-arms, only knives, and the last zone will have no freedom, either, because that – make no mistake – is the consequence of such a policy.

This is where the real conflict and the risk of war in Europe lie: an aggressive element with an ideology geared to world revolution is, of course, always tempted to use force when an adversary indicates that he is no longer prepared to defend himself adequately.

I therefore welcome Mr. Lagorce's report, Ladies and Gentlemen. I particularly welcome the fact that it was drawn up by a man who does not belong to my group. This shows that truth is, of course, no respecter of party lines and that there must be a clear vote in favour of deterrence, because it is on this that the freedom of all the nations of Western Europe depends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate and commend Mr. Lagorce on his report. He has made enormous efforts to ensure that it is widely supported, and I trust that in the deliberations on the report he will be willing and able to accept certain changes that meet what may well be a changing situation.

Things may have moved a little since the Tuesday evening in June when the Assembly sat very late – perhaps it is reasonable to say that we were not at our best – and British conservatives came charging back to the Assembly to defeat the Indians, who were trying to serve the cause of sanity, if Sir Anthony Grant will allow me, without really understanding what had occupied our time during the hours that conservatives were enjoying themselves at a social function.

I am sorry if conservative members disliked that reference. I realise that nowadays they must be free to criticise the Labour Party, and to seek to present it in a less than accurate light, and that they believe that they are serving the cause of patriotism. However, if we dissent from them, that is regarded as being not really very fair.

As Sir Anthony Grant suggested a few moments ago that there is a real difference between the British Labour Delegation and the rest of the Socialist Group, I should like to say that I am surprised that British conservatives have been prepared to support some of the paragraphs in Mr. Lagorce's report that my colleagues and I view with enthusiasm. We, too, recognise the devastating potential of weaponry in both East and West. We recognise that there was a failure in the international disarmament negotiations and believe that there must be a more determined effort to bring about successful negotiations. We hope that they will result in the limitation of nuclear weapons, and many other socialists in Europe share our view. We would be happy to see a reduction in or the disappearance of nuclear weapons from Europe provided that it could be achieved by balanced negotiations.

We are also enthusiastic about the important point made by Mr. Lagorce in paragraph (xi) of his preamble, which states:

“Considering that while effective deterrence is still, as matters now stand, essential for the West's security, this cannot in the longer term be ensured without a radical transformation in the standard of living in the developing countries.”

I wish that my country and everybody else's would implement that proposal. I must confess, even at the risk of being accused of a

Mr. Hardy (continued)

lack of patriotism, that the British record in that area is like the record of several other member states – an absolute disgrace.

I should also like to refer to the six recommendations to the Council. I hope that British as well as the rest of public opinion in Europe will be properly informed of the dangers faced by mankind. We need to have better information than we had a year or two ago, when British conservatives in this Assembly sought to promote the use of nuclear fallout shelters – as long as they were built by private enterprise.

We must also recognise the importance of recommendation 5 of Mr. Lagorce's report, which states that we must "seek to develop exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe". Those exchanges need to be built on the basis of an effort to promote trust. That ingredient might have been sadly missing over the past few years.

We must do our utmost to promote the success of current negotiations on disarmament. In that respect, I hope that Mr. Lagorce and the committee will be sympathetic and will listen attentively to the amendments to be moved by Mr. Milani and others at the conclusion of the general debate.

For my colleagues in the British Labour Party, I should like to say that we are very much in favour of peace. We remain firmly and clearly part of the western alliance, but we insist that that alliance begin to look forward and recognise that the present potential for horror in the world is already excessive. If survival is to be achieved, we need to see a different attitude by our national governments from that currently displayed by the United Kingdom.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when it was quite rightly decided in June to defer the decision on this subject, it was obvious that clarification of the basic terms of the problem was urgently required.

It must be stressed how greatly the concept of deterrence has progressively changed for the worse since the Atlantic Alliance adopted the doctrine of flexible front-line response in 1967. Even then it was clear that the idea that deterrence could be made more credible by the threat of a controlled, deliberate escalation of the conventional and nuclear conflict, was ingenuous and dangerous. No one has ever been able to deny the forecasts of leading experts that any use of force aimed at changing the geopolitical order of Europe would inevitably have provoked and would provoke a world conflict.

The total improbability of effective control of a nuclear conflict started at the lowest level has struck at the credibility of the doctrine of a flexible response. If, indeed, no one can foresee any control of nuclear escalation, it is hard to see where this doctrine really differs from massive reprisals except that it favours a faster armaments race with the diversification of arsenals and renders more uncertain and unclear the boundary between nuclear and conventional war – and weapons systems.

These ideas are shared with different emphasis by many who in recent years have called for a new strategic doctrine for the alliance. Both the debate on no first strike and the more recent proposals that the alliance should adopt the air-land-battle doctrine or the so-called Rogers doctrine, mean total lack of trust in the strategic doctrine which has been the official basis of the alliance's military policy for almost twenty years.

This being so, I feel that it is at least superficial to dismiss contemptuously the pacifist movements of the past few years. Indeed, I not only believe that the possibility of manipulation or actual infiltration applies only to insignificant fringes but I am also convinced, when I look at the roots of this extensive and varied movement, that there is much less simple-mindedness than we are led to believe.

The truth is that the general public in our countries has understood what some experts have been saying for a long time, namely that the existing system of deterrence has little credibility and that the technical advances with weapons systems create the prospect of an even greater risk.

I should like to refer briefly to the very topical problem of ways of raising the so-called nuclear threshold in Europe. In my view, there are no grounds for believing that a straightforward increase in the quantity and quality of conventional weapons could lead to a raising of the threshold and I would add, provocatively, that I do not think we should be interested in raising it by that means. The doctrines of air-land battle or follow-on forces attack which have recently been under discussion in the Atlantic Alliance have been presented as the way to reduce the dependence of our collective security system on nuclear weapons but they cannot in fact remove the nightmare of nuclear war and, therefore, seem to me to be particularly dangerous.

The serious danger which these new proposals involve lies in the illusion that the strategy of in-depth attack with conventional weapons, based on new, emerging technologies can completely eliminate the use of nuclear weapons; this illusion increases rather than reduces the danger of horribly destructive warfare in Europe

Mr. Milani (continued)

and, because of the form of the threat which it represents – indistinguishable in fact from a nuclear first strike – opens the way to the use of nuclear weapons by both sides.

That is why I think that the debate concerning nuclear strategies versus conventional or almost conventional strategies should be set in a different context; starting from the realisation that if no genuine progress is made towards some hope of progressive disarmament, first and foremost by the creation of broad denuclearised zones on the frontiers between the two blocs and by the adoption of a strictly defensive armaments policy, the debate will remain in a blind alley with no prospect of getting out. This is the basic reason why I feel that I cannot approve Mr. Lagorce's report.

I must add with complete frankness that the report and the recommendation carry us backwards in time to the decisions of 1979 and to the days, still with us, of the complete break between East and West.

Again, the intention would appear to be, on the one side, to protect the French deterrent and, on the other, to tread the illusory path of an independent European nuclear deterrent.

Today, the situation is changing and, while we should not deceive ourselves, it is nevertheless true that Europe should break into the dialogue which concerns its own future.

And this is what was done in Brussels, at the North Atlantic Assembly, when it was proposed that the dialogue be resumed on the basis of the ideas put forward during the walk in the woods in Geneva. And this is what is proposed – cautiously – in the recommendation adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the basis of Mr. Blaauw's report. And this is what Lord Carrington called for when, in an interview given to the *La Repubblica* newspaper on 2nd December 1984, he said: "What is really important is the input which the European members of NATO are prepared to give the Americans and, on the other hand, the care and attention with which the Americans agree to discuss their ideas with the allies."

I do not think it sufficient to reject the recommendation as submitted even if it has been marginally amended. The whole content of the report – and the recommendation – must be up-dated and for that reason I and my colleagues think they should be withdrawn and that the Assembly should decide on a report more closely in line with the changing realities.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to take up something said by Mr. Müller, who, like me, comes from the Federal Republic of Germany, because I feel that his statement was not in accordance with the facts and that some of the things he said about my party call for a response.

Mr. Müller, in our country – but unfortunately only within the SPD – a debate is taking place on the rôle of nuclear weapons in the defence doctrines of the western alliance. I will explain in a moment why this debate must take place. It is hardly surprising that a variety of viewpoints should be aired in an open, democratic debate of this nature. The social democratic view is clear from the decisions my party has taken after lengthy argument.

You try to make out that we do not know precisely what security policy we want, but I could retort that it would be interesting to hear the CDU/CSU's views on the question of the Oder/Neisse line, which has been raised even more pressingly by members of your party in the last few months, and which will undoubtedly have implications for the policy of détente and peace in Europe.

Another issue is the question of arms in space. During the debate on Mr. Wilkinson's report we shall see if, like the Federal Government and the social democrats, you are opposed to arms in space or in favour of them.

I should now like to turn to Mr. Lagorce's report. As in June, we find the contents of this report unacceptable. The fact that virtually the same report, with minor modifications, has been submitted simply shows that views and appraisals differ. We must realise this. In a democracy or in debates among parliamentarians from the Western European democracies there is absolutely nothing wrong in failing to agree.

Nonetheless, I will point out what is needed if there is to be a more discriminating debate in future, with more mutual understanding than is now the case. I will try to do this in terms of this report on deterrence and the will of the people.

The term "neutralist" is used to criticise certain protest or peace movements which have opposed the deployment of nuclear weapons and a NATO decision. But, if this is described as neutralist, we have to ask, as I did in June, and I now make a point of repeating it: is the opposition to a NATO decision to deploy a certain category of nuclear weapons more neutralist than, say, France's withdrawal from the military side of NATO? That was surely a far more

Mr. Scheer (continued)

drastic move. I am not saying that it was neutralist. All I am saying is that it was more drastic than what most of the protesters against nuclear missiles in my country have been discussing. France had its reasons for acting as it did, and I should not like to criticise them here. I would merely point out that France said at the time that it could not leave the decision on its future, which is associated with the decision on the use of nuclear weapons, to another power, however friendly. The upshot was that France established its *force de frappe* and withdrew from the military side of NATO.

To reach a more discriminating view, I believe we should apply the same assessment criteria as France claims for itself. Only then can we have a debate. The conclusions we draw cannot be identical with the French because we are not, and do not want to be, a nuclear power. The same is true of the other central European members of WEU, including Italy. We just want the same criteria. Once we have them, we may also have more mutual understanding for conclusions other than the French.

The same goes for the word pacifist. Mr. de Vries has already said a great deal about this. Are all the 121 countries that do not have nuclear weapons and have signed the non-proliferation treaty pacifists because they renounce nuclear weapons? Is McNamara a pacifist because he attaches no military importance to intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe? Are the members of the peace movements pacifists because they are so worried about the increase in worldwide military spending from \$600,000 million to \$1,000,000 million between 1980 and 1985? Are they pacifists because they are worried about the most dramatic arms race in the history of the world, and in time of peace, with all that this entails for the prospects of overcoming the economic and ecological problems we now face? Or are people pacifists who believe that the danger caused to densely populated countries by the deployment of nuclear weapons there must be reduced?

I call only for the same criteria, because the decisions concern our survival and we must adopt a different course from that chosen by the French.

To conclude, a comment on the principles involved. To overcome the conflict between the possession of nuclear weapons and the desire to protect their own countries, the superpowers are increasingly siting these weapons outside their own territory, or at least not in densely populated areas. This has been going on for the last twenty years. Many technological changes have taken place in the nuclear sector, connected

with the transfer of strategic potential to submarines or desert areas, or the development of accurate nuclear systems that can turn a counter-city strategy into a counter-force strategy. All these developments are designed to reduce the risk of territorial self-destruction. Since other alternatives became available, no nuclear power in the world has dreamed of deploying nuclear weapons in a densely populated area of its own country. And if the French Government had had access to modern submarine technology in the 1960s, there would not have been eighteen intermediate-range missiles in the southern Alps.

Obviously, therefore, the central European countries, which are all densely populated, now say: the inconsistency between nuclear defence capability and self-preservation can be overcome only by reducing the number of nuclear weapons in these densely populated countries through a change in doctrine, arms control negotiations and so on. If this question were not discussed in our countries, I say we would be the helots of the superpowers. In view of the developments that have taken place, if Europe is to hold its own, it must apply the same criteria as other countries claim for themselves and then draw its own, specifically European, conclusions. This will be possible only with a doctrine that seeks denuclearisation while maintaining security. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). - I welcome this report on deterrence the more readily in consequence of the Rome Declaration and the first of the goals that it spelt out as being on the basis of the Brussels Treaty and, therefore, at the core of WEU to strengthen peace and security. That is reflected by the draft recommendation's call for making optimum use of the organs of WEU and should, therefore, be fully supported.

It should be a matter of satisfaction, but not of complacency, that, as we mark the thirtieth anniversary of this defence pact, we also celebrate thirty years and more of peace through security. For that to be maintained in an increasingly dangerous world, both peace and security must be strengthened. Clearly, the two are related.

The Rome Declaration realistically draws attention to a number of essential prerequisites for future success. I hope to highlight but one of those, the development of European cooperation in armaments, in which respect WEU can provide a political impetus. That is also reflected in the draft recommendation's additional call to show the cohesion of the alliance and is a further reason for it to be fully supported.

Mr. Murphy (continued)

Having the aerospace industry in my constituency gives me a particular insight into the importance of such co-operation. In recent years such co-operative development has been seen most spectacularly with civil aircraft, with the A-300 and A-320 European Airbus series. We must equally be seen to have co-operative development in military aspects, be it in aircraft or dynamics.

The British Prime Minister said in a message to the Hatfield plant of British Aerospace on its fiftieth anniversary:

“Everyone who has worked at the Hatfield plant from the great pioneering years of de Havilland onwards has made a tremendous contribution to civil aviation and the defence and economic growth of our country.”

That now needs to be expanded in the light of both the Rome Declaration and this draft recommendation on deterrence to a European dimension.

At the same time, the then British Secretary of State for Defence stated:

“The government intends to support its advanced industries strongly, and to concentrate effort upon the areas where the greatest return in deterrence can be produced.”

That, too, needs to be expanded in the light of the Rome Declaration and this draft recommendation on deterrence to a European dimension. I venture to suggest to the Council of Ministers that British Aerospace has provided an outstanding contribution to the defence of the realm and can equally do so in the defence of the western world.

The Rome Declaration underlines the fundamental importance of NATO to us all and to those whom we seek to represent. Again, that is reflected in the draft recommendation and gives us one further reason for it to be fully supported. If NATO is to be increasingly effective, from which we must all gain, it is right to look anew at its European pillar with its foundations laid in the seven member countries of WEU. But, equally correctly, we must also ensure the involvement of our other European partners to safeguard this vital alliance.

This report on deterrence will do much upon its adoption to ensure that the desires expressed in the Rome Declaration can be translated into achievements.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I always find it gratifying to

hear British conservatives in particular being extremely honest in pointing out, for example, that one of the main reasons for their advocacy of Western European armaments co-operation is the benefit their own constituencies or the industry in their constituencies will derive from such co-operation. I feel if we had more of this honesty in politics, we would know more about the basic motives for the arms build-up that is beginning now in Europe.

I should now like to say a few words about the statement made here today by the German representative, Mr. Müller. He has again used what I consider to be a very anachronistic, but instructive phrase: *si vis pacem, para bellum*. Mr. Müller, for me the most remarkable experience of the meeting in Rome was the address given by the Italian President, Mr. Pertini. I hope you were all listening as carefully as you were during the preceding discussions. He said in fact: *si vis pacem, para pacem*. I believe this version increasingly reflects the will of the peoples of Europe. There is a growing desire to abandon frightening and deterrent formulae: if you want peace, prepare for war, or if you want peace, deter attack. There is a growing desire to abandon these excessive arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which the European countries fear. We have discussed this on various occasions in the past. I believe this report too would have done well to look more closely at these deeply-felt fears of the peoples of Western Europe, not with a view to using or abusing them for some political purpose or other, but because deep down we all have these fears, the fear that both the human race and, to put it in religious terms, creation are going to be destroyed.

If the nations want to be freed from this fear, they also want to be freed from the potential for destruction which is one of its main causes. I feel the Rome report does not say nearly enough about the effort which Europe, now armed to the teeth, should be making to disarm.

If the Rapporteur had looked more closely, if all he knew about the peace movement were not mere hearsay, if he had taken the trouble to be well-disposed towards the members of the peace movement and really get to know them, he might have discovered – and Mr. Müller should note this too – that on 12th December 1979 a fundamental departure from the general consensus occurred, which was confirmed in my country on 23rd November 1983, when one of the major political parties refused to agree to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Since then a new consensus has been sought. The Rome Declaration says more than once that, although this Assembly should act as a parliament, developing ideas and putting them to the executive, which may align them with what

Mr. Vogt (continued)

the people really want, it is also predestined to solicit public support for the new concept of a build-up of conventional arms in Europe after the decisions have been taken. I believe we should discuss this again on Wednesday, when we have the general debate, because this cannot be the Assembly's rôle. The Assembly's rôle and the rôle of a rapporteur in a parliamentary assembly of this kind should surely be to raise those questions which really affect and move the public and to formulate concepts accordingly. The concept formulated in this case should not have been what the Rapporteur is recommending, continued deterrence and a shift towards more conventional armaments.

To revert to what Mr. Müller said, I had hoped that he would look more closely, that he would have noted both this breakdown of the consensus and what is really going on in the peace movement. One of the criticisms he made was that the peace movement had, as it were, harped on the idea of the world coming to an end and now that the world has not come to an end, the peace movement is on the wane. If people had set themselves up as prophets and had said this would happen in the 1980s or tomorrow or the day after, you would have been right to say it was a crime to disturb the public in this way. It has been said and it must be said again and again that, because of the terribly dangerous potential that exists, politicians can no longer be relied upon to prevent the destruction of the world. Frank Barneby points out in a German magazine today that in certain crisis or borderline situations the captains of submarines equipped with nuclear weapons could take off on their own, launch these weapons by mistake, because of tension or for some other reason, and so bring about an irreversible situation. That is a realistic description of the risk.

Mr. Müller says – as many do – that there is constant talk of this risk, that the danger of war is growing as more and more weapons are deployed in the East and the West and in third world countries, but that war has not broken out, which proves, in his view, that the danger has been exaggerated. This argument reminds me of someone who says: "People are always saying that a boiler may burst, there may be an explosion. I see that the water temperature has been rising for a long time and has now reached 95 °C, and yet the boiler has not burst." But this is to overlook the major change that will occur when the temperature reaches 100 °C. I believe this problem must be examined more closely, and it is precisely this aspect which the Rapporteur should have tackled with rather more vigour. If he had not reaffirmed the old options, he would have had to accept the need to

revise his views, which I respect, but which have led to such ideas as "deterrence must be retained". At least he would have had to see the whole of his experience in a new light since the first nuclear weapons exploded over areas inhabited by human beings, on 5th August 1945 and 9th August 1945.

I will not go into detail because time is short. The Rapporteur is attached, among other things, to the deterrence option, almost as if it were the will of the people that this deterrence should be maintained. But I can tell him that deterrence is based on a pedagogical misconception, because sooner or later you have to demonstrate that you really mean it. Only deeds can do this, but in the case of nuclear deterrence the deeds are so monstrous that they should really not even be discussed. Hence the repeated attempts to mollify us with references to political weapons. But it is expecting too much of the public to suffer the constant strain of deciding whether deterrence should or should not be retained and of wondering what will happen if something goes wrong with deterrence and if we really are doomed to destruction. That is why a start must be made on nuclear disarmament. And there must be no attempts to allay public fear by initiating a new build-up of conventional arms in Europe. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am truly convinced that the shared concern of all of us is to maintain the security of the western countries and the peace of all the world and, I would add, peace in freedom and democracy. Differences arise when it has to be decided how security and peace are to be guaranteed.

Some would seek to guarantee both these blessings by unilateral disarmament which means surrender; the sequel to unilateral disarmament and surrender would, I add, be loss of liberty and subjection to some totalitarian country. It would mean slavery.

Others, more realistically, seek to safeguard peace by other methods and I believe that in his draft recommendation Mr. Lagorce has hit the target and has indicated the best ways of ensuring peace in the world and, hence, the security of our countries. I can therefore say that I am in general agreement; but Mr. Lagorce will allow me a few comments on the content of the report. I have the impression that, while the draft recommendation is the result of a considered examination of the facts of world politics, the report is rather designed to make everybody happy. But, as we have seen, some are not in fact happy and I should like to make a few points. First of all, I should like to mention one constant oversight, not only on the part of Mr. Lagorce but also on the part of other

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

sections of our Assembly. I refer to the failure to mention Italy as one of the countries which have done and are doing their duty in full and are contributing effectively and decisively to the maintenance of security and peace. I do not want to have to mention Italy's mission in Lebanon and Sinai.

Paragraphs 3 and 38 of the report mention the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany as countries which have fully discharged their duty and their commitments to deploy missiles, but no reference is made to my country, Italy, which is in fact contributing in important measure to confirming the Atlantic Alliance as an effective instrument for security and peace.

This is not my only complaint – quite fairly, in my opinion; I wish to mention a few other points. Taking his cue from Romania's decision not to fall in with the other members of the Warsaw Pact and to refuse the installation of missiles on its territory, as well as other facts, the Rapporteur asks to what extent there is still genuine solidarity between the eastern countries and the Soviet Union. Let us have no illusions Mr. Lagorce – from these and other signs – that there has been any weakening of the alliance between the eastern countries and the Soviet Union, which is still very close and under the absolute dominance of the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union which holds the alliance under its thumb because it has the means of doing so, in contrast with the situation in the Atlantic Alliance where every member country keeps its independence and consequently takes its decisions completely autonomously and with a true sense of responsibility.

I should also like to mention the frequent references to some suspicions with regard to the United States; it is said that, apart from the famous European pillar in which I believe, efforts should be made to create a nuclear deterrent so that Europe can defend itself alone in the event of separation from or disagreement with the United States. This is a bad line to take, because the United States has given no grounds for such an insinuation and there can be no doubts on the score. I personally consider – and I believe that I am interpreting the thoughts of many other members – that if the present solidarity between the United States and the other countries of the Atlantic Alliance were weakened, European security could not be entrusted to the independent nuclear weapons of France and the United Kingdom; European security would then be at great risk.

The tendency to question American goodwill and to foster uncertainty and doubts is confirmed by a very unfortunate passage – paragraph 38 – which seeks to attribute the growth of the

pacifist movements not only to the 1979 decision – but we are all pacifists and not only the movements about which there can be doubts in some cases at least – but also to the bellicose tone adopted by President Reagan and by the Secretary of Defence. Is a firm statement of justified concern regarding the imbalance created between the nuclear forces and weapons of the Warsaw Pact and of the Atlantic Alliance enough to explain the growth of the protest and pacifist movements? Not in my opinion.

Apart from these few criticisms, I can, however, confirm that – subject to the two amendments I have tabled – the draft recommendation is acceptable and that I shall, therefore, vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have no more speakers on my list.

Mr. De Decker has the floor on a point of order.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would have liked to speak only as a member of this European assembly but I am obliged to correct certain statements by Mr. Gianotti about the position of the Belgian Government and the opinion of the Belgian Parliament on the 1979 decision and the deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium and in Europe. He asserted that the adoption of paragraph 4 of the recommendation in Mr. Lagorce's report would be tantamount to expelling the Netherlands and Belgium from WEU, since both countries were refusing, to some extent, to implement the twofold decision of 1979. Mr. Gianotti appears to be very badly informed about the opinion of the Belgian Parliament and the position of my government, which has always confirmed the twofold decision of 1979 and has continued with preparations for deploying the corresponding missiles in Belgium. These preparations are now practically finished, and there are now seven hundred American servicemen ready to man those weapons in Belgium.

I wanted to point this out, because Mr. Lagorce's report is perfectly balanced, measured and pertinent, at least as regards the recommendations he has put to the Assembly. What he is recommending is continued implementation of the 1979 decision coupled with perseverance in negotiations and in the multiplication of relations with the East. And that is indeed the policy that Europe must pursue. Since 1979, when the countries of the Atlantic Alliance decided to modernise their nuclear weapons system and to negotiate with the Soviet Union, what has been the Soviet Union's response to this twofold proposal and proposed negotiations? Continued deployment of the SS-20s and walk-out from the Geneva negotiations. Then, in September of this year, the deployment of a

Mr. De Decker (continued)

large number of SS-22s in the German Democratic Republic.

Given this Soviet attitude, Western Europe, and Western European Union, are obviously bound to adopt a twofold position: firmness, above all, coupled with negotiation.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to make a personal statement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You may have the floor for a personal statement at the end of the sitting. If it is a point of order, you may speak now provided you are very brief.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – May I just say that so far as the international press has reported and so far as is known to me personally the cruise missiles, or the Pershings in the case of Germany, have been installed at the selected places in Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain since the beginning of this year, but none have yet been installed at Florennes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sure you will agree to leave it at that, gentlemen. Thank you for your understanding. You are helping the Chair to conduct proceedings in the most sensible fashion.

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Lagorce, Rapporteur.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this debate has made me realise the difficulty encountered by governments of whatever countries in trying to reach agreement even when they are acting in the best possible faith. I understand better why negotiations take so long and sometimes get bogged down – why, despite mutual concessions, diplomacy and tact, the final texts are unfortunately often rather tame. This debate is a good illustration.

I shall make a number of points in reply to those who have criticised my report. But let me first thank all those who have been kind enough to recognise that my task has not been easy, but on the contrary rather difficult, and to acknowledge that I have made a great effort to try and reach a consensus. While I very much regret not having succeeded, I can assure you that it was not the will that was lacking.

Mr. Cifarelli spoke of vigilance and prudence. Those are words I can endorse. Indeed, the main burden of the report is the need for vigilance on the part of politicians and prudence on the part of governments. I think I have borne this in mind throughout my report.

In reply to Mr. de Vries on paragraph 32 and Mr. Cavaliere on paragraph 34, I would point out those paragraphs do not represent my personal opinion.

The Rapporteur's job is after all to present such opinions as appear important to him and have been expressed during the discussion in committee. That is what I have done in the case of paragraphs 32 and 34. However, those opinions did not figure in the report I submitted to the committee, and it was only after the discussion that I included them. Perhaps I was wrong to do so. I can only repeat that the report reflects not necessarily my own opinion, but views which seemed to me important. Mr. de Vries and Mr. Cavaliere criticised me for this. As I have already said, the Rapporteur is not there to give his own opinion but that of the majority of the committee.

I would thank Mr. Gansel for the relative moderation of his remarks about me, although he did call the report "provocative". It is, however, simply realistic. In reminding you that the Soviet missiles were deployed before the Pershings, I am being realistic. Everyone knows this. I am not making a judgment but simply reporting a fact. There is nothing provocative in that. There has indeed been provocation from one side, but not from the Atlantic Alliance or the Americans, at least not in my opinion.

With due respect to Mr. Gansel, if I were twenty-five years old – which unfortunately I am not – I would obviously not have written a report like this. The fact is though – as I have already had occasion to say – that I was dreadfully marked by the last war. I admit this shows a bit in my report, and I am perhaps more inclined towards vigilance than young people nowadays, but I think I am doing those young people a service. I am a father, with children and grandchildren, and I would obviously not like them to have to go through what my generation went through. But that does not make me trigger-happy or a warmonger. I am just trying to look at the situation in a completely realistic fashion. Maybe I am wrong, but I would refer those who have accused me of not understanding pacifists and neutralists to my original report on pacifism and neutralism where, in chapter after chapter, I voice my consideration, esteem and friendship for pacifists. They put forward serious arguments that need to be studied rather than rejected out of hand. The peace movements are moreover led by people of universally recognised moral authority.

To Mr. Vogt I would repeat that I had no intention, in my report, of mounting an attack on pacifists, nor have I any wish to reject them. Their existence must be recognised and account taken of their arguments, some of which

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

are valid – but that is a matter for governments, and it is precisely governments that must take them into account.

To Mr. Gianotti and Mr. Milani I would quote the words of a French politician: *Tout ce qui est excessif ne compte pas*, that is, overkill does not help their case. They have after all attacked the very substance of the report and would like to have it referred back to committee, which is tantamount to rejection. It is difficult to convince those who have spoken categorically against my report. I can only disagree with them.

Mr. De Decker has dealt completely with what was said about the NATO decisions and the position of the Belgian Government in this connection. I shall not labour the point.

Let me say once again, for those who have criticised me and who misunderstand my personal attitude and my opinions, that I am no unconditional supporter of the United States, in the way that certain people here seem to be unconditional supporters of the Soviet Union. The French press is currently reflecting the attitude of the French Government, which I support, with regard to United States behaviour in Central America. I am by no means an unconditional United States supporter, but nor am I an unconditional supporter of the Soviet Union, because I also know what is going on in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

I would point out to my colleague and friend, Peter Hardy, that I am a socialist and have probably been one for longer than he has. The fact that I have the support of representatives of other groups for this report proves that I have not carried out my job as Rapporteur in a partisan or sectarian fashion, but that, on the contrary, I have tried to draw all the different opinions together. I am happy to have done so and regret that certain socialist colleagues do not agree with the text that I, a socialist, have drawn up.

Let me remind you that it is in France that the Socialist Party is exercising power in the real world. For the French, socialism is no longer a matter of theory but of actual practice.

To Mr. Cavaliere, who complains that Italy has been forgotten, I would point out that his country, which I hold in high esteem, is mentioned in paragraphs 43, 47, 50, 58 and 61, where reference is made to the opinion of the Pope, the highest religious authority of the Catholic Church and Christendom.

I shall not prolong the debate on this report. Amendments have been tabled and some of them I am quite prepared to support.

Let me end by quoting a colleague who is not a member of my own party but whose words I would like to endorse. Mr. Cavaliere spoke of “peace in freedom and democracy”. That is what I have tried to do in this report. I regret that, in the view of some colleagues, I have not been entirely successful in conveying it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask the Assembly to adopt this report and approve the draft recommendation. May I take this opportunity to thank Mr. Lagorce once again for the exceptional amount of work he has put in on two occasions now, and for his abundant goodwill and honesty. I would stress the word honesty because the task was a difficult one and it was no easy job to bring all the members of the committee and of this Assembly to a consensus. The report comes at the right time. It is absolutely necessary to remind ourselves from time to time what decisions have been taken and what commitments link us to the other countries of the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. The fact that talks may be resumed between the United States and Russia should not divert us from reaffirming our principles and commitments. Quite the contrary.

If, for the time being, we decided to settle for a glimmer of sunlight we would be like somebody who sold his umbrella because he suddenly caught sight of a little patch of blue sky. It is all very nice, but it is not enough to allow us to discard our ideas, decisions and determination. Now more than ever Europe needs to affirm its will and know what it wants. It is because we have known what it wants that we have had peace for forty years. In this Europe of ours, we have been enjoying peace for forty years because we know what we want, because we have stuck to our agreements and honoured them and because, by constant reaffirmation, we show our will to continue honouring our commitments.

This is what the Rapporteur has once again underlined in the document which the Assembly will be approving. I ask members once again to say what they want, to confirm the decisions taken by their states and to affirm, once again if necessary, what it is that we want and what is for us the road towards a guaranteed peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation we have to consider seven amendments.

We shall take them in the order in which they affect the text, that is: Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Millan, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Millan, Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Millan, Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Millan, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, Amendment 3 tabled

The President (continued)

by Mr. Gansel and Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere.

Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Millan, Mr. Gansel and Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

4. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "nuclear weapons are" insert "at the present time".

I call Mr. Millan to move the amendment.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief in moving this amendment and the other amendments because we have already had a full debate.

During the discussion on the report by Mr. Lagorce, there was criticism of the undue emphasis on the nuclear deterrent as part of general deterrence. Certain changes have been made in the recommendation, but some of us believe that in paragraph (iv) of the preamble there is still undue emphasis on nuclear deterrence, as it is the only deterrence mentioned.

The amendment would slightly change the emphasis of the paragraph. It would still recognise that, currently, nuclear deterrence is essential – it does not in any way devalue that observation. However, it would also convey the view of some of us that we want a defence posture by NATO that is not unduly dependent on the use of nuclear weapons. That would also convey the meaning – which, I hope, all members of the Assembly would accept – that the sooner we obtain mutually agreed disarmament negotiations that would eliminate the need to depend on nuclear weapons, the better.

The amendment does not essentially change the meaning of the paragraph, which is that currently nuclear weapons are an essential means of deterrence. However, it clarifies that and slightly changes the emphasis. I hope very much that on that basis the Assembly will be willing to accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would ask the Assembly to deal with the amendments as swiftly as possible, since we have already had the debate, the orders of the day provide for a debate on a second report this afternoon, and there is a committee meeting scheduled to begin at 6 p.m.

We are thus about to move on to a delicate stage in the proceedings, and I would urge members moving amendments or speaking against them to be as brief as possible, following the example just set by our colleague Mr. Millan.

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that the words in the amendments will not

be included. The additional word "are" after "weapons" used in the original paragraph means that if the Rapporteur had wished to express that in any other way, he would have used such words as "will always be".

The very insertion of unnecessary words can imply that soon nuclear weapons will not be an essential means of deterrence. We all hope that that will be the case, but it is a pious hope at present and there is no evidence to support the view.

Therefore, the amendment is, first, unnecessary and, secondly, in danger of being misleading. I hope that the Assembly will not agree to it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – The committee rejected this amendment but I shall support it. My line of thought was, in fact, that while at the present time deterrence was essentially provided by nuclear weapons, the hope was that they could be dispensed with as soon as possible, for there are other means of deterrence that I did not mention, such as conventional weapons, chemical and bacteriological weapons, which a speaker referred to a little while ago, and the mastery of space, which will be the subject of another report. Today one such means is nuclear deterrence. Tomorrow there will perhaps be others. I can agree to this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the view of the Chairman of the committee?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As indicated by the Rapporteur, the committee rejected this amendment, although, since it does not seriously affect the text of the report, it did not give rise to a very heated debate; I believe, however, I am reflecting the committee's opinion by asking for the amendment to be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Millan, Mr. Gansel and Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

5. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "refusal" insert "until very recently".

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to speak also to Amendment 6, because the two amendments are really one.

Mr. Millan (continued)

Amendment 6 is consequential upon Amendment 5.

The paragraph deals with the refusal of the Soviet Union to hold negotiations on a reasonable basis about the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. As has already been pointed out in the earlier debate, to some extent the wording of the paragraph is a little out of date, because since the report was drafted there have been welcome signs of a greater willingness to hold genuine negotiations. Indeed, it has been agreed to hold certain discussions.

We have had much more moderate and hopeful statements from Mr. Chernenko and a much more hopeful response from President Reagan. The current atmosphere is rather better than when the report was originally drafted, and it would be useful to acknowledge that by the insertion of the amendments.

The hope goes with the amendments that the more hopeful atmosphere will lead to some genuine results in the discussions scheduled to take place soon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I suggest that the Assembly follow the request by the author of the amendment and agree to take Amendment 5 and Amendment 6 together.

Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Millan, Mr. Gansel and Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "have compelled" and insert "led".

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The two amendments, although linked, are somewhat different. The first is history and is less unacceptable. The second, Amendment 6, distorts the whole position and cannot be accepted.

The history of weaponry allows no doubt that the West was compelled to act as it has. "Led" is far too simplistic and tries to blur the situation.

I find Amendment 6 wholly unacceptable. Amendment 5, because it talks about "very recently", is still unacceptable, but not wholly unacceptable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I accept both amendments.

The first I justified in advance by referring in my presentation to the announcement of the forthcoming meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko, of which I was not aware when I drafted my report, just as I was unaware of the resumption of the Stockholm conference.

Contrary to what our colleague has just said, Amendment 6 simply introduces a slight change in wording by replacing the verb "have compelled" by the verb "led". There is indeed a slight difference in meaning, and I support his amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 5 is negated.

I put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is negated.

Amendment 7, tabled by Mr. Millan, Mr. Gansel and Mr. Hardy, reads as follows:

7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – One of my earlier amendments was resisted on the basis that it did not add anything to the recommendation. First, paragraph (vi) does not add anything to the preamble to the recommendation. Secondly, I am not sure that it is wholly accurate.

I shall not go into the argument about the exact Dutch and Belgian position. However, whatever the view of governments, the decision to implement the deployment of missiles is very unpopular with the public and, after all, the will of the people is one of the matters on which this report is based. Public opinion polls in the United Kingdom have shown a substantial majority against the deployment of cruise missiles in implementation of the twofold decision.

There is an anomaly in talking about governments as distinct from the will of the people. The amendment would add to the recommendation if this paragraph were removed altogether. I hope that the Assembly will accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant to speak against the amendment.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment. The plain fact is that the paragraph follows logically from the previous one which makes reference to the twofold deci-

Sir Anthony Grant (continued)

sion. It speaks the truth. It says that the decision has been made by all democratically-elected governments. Despite what opinion polls might or might not have said, the answer is that elections in Great Britain, a vote in the British Parliament overwhelmingly and votes in other western parliaments taken democratically have led to the proper decision in this respect. This paragraph says nothing more than the truth. I think that it is relevant and that it should remain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I ask the Assembly to reject this amendment because the sixth paragraph of the preamble is essential to the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negated.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "cannot in the longer term be ensured without" and insert "would be based on sounder foundations if there were".

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not think I need say much in support of this amendment. All the developed western countries try to help the developing countries to advance within their economic and social contexts; all are working for a possibly radical transformation of living standards in those countries. To argue, however, that one day effective deterrence, which is essential for security and peace, will be completely impossible without such a transformation seems to me to be absurd; if such full development were achieved for reasons independent of ourselves and through local factors it would mean abandoning our own security. That is why I maintain that it is better to stress that deterrence will be more solidly based if there is a radical transformation in the standard of living. The basic idea would be the same but would not be carried to the extremes which, I repeat, would weaken our function and would destroy credence in our ability to guarantee deterrence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that the Assembly will reject this amendment for a number of reasons. I shall mention only two. First, it would appear to provide a justification for those who wish to see less urgency applied to overseas development. It makes the cause and the priority of such developments less certain, less secure. On grounds of international stability, the text presented by Mr. Lagorce provides a proper urgency and would require a higher degree of priority than Mr. Cavaliere's amendment might suggest. On the ground of international stability and on the ground that Europe needs to demonstrate that it has a conscience, to move away from the firmness within the report would be a serious mistake.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I am not totally opposed to the amendment but I prefer my wording to that of Mr. Cavaliere, who uses the conditional tense instead of the future. This may simply be a question of translation from the Italian, but I do not really see what it adds. I shall therefore, with due respect to Mr. Cavaliere, vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Gansel, reads as follows:

3. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Continue to search for a solution to the intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations taking into account, inter alia, the 'walk in the woods' formula;".

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Pershing II and cruise missiles are now being deployed in implementation of the NATO twofold decision. We have often voted on this decision in the past, in our national parliaments and here. If there is no interest in reaching compromises in this Assembly, all we need do is go on voting on the NATO twofold decision in the future.

I therefore advocate that we look to the future rather than at the past. In the future there will again be negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and it will be important for the Europeans to emphasise the need, in the interests of our security, for the Eurostrategic weapons systems in particular to be included in

Mr. Gansel (continued)

these negotiations and for our governments or our alliance to be involved in them.

A possible solution might be the walk in the woods formula that was under discussion in 1982. This would mean dismantling a number of SS-20s, fewer cruise missiles and no Pershing IIs.

To forestall an objection from Mr. Lagorce, I would point out that support for this formula does not amount to support for Soviet interests. The Soviet Union had its reasons for not taking up this formula in the past. I do not think anyone in this Assembly supports Soviet interests, and I believe what I heard just now was an interpretation error.

What I propose is, I believe, a chance for us to reach a compromise, to find common ground and that is why I have made a proposal that was adopted unanimously – the French Delegation abstaining – by the North Atlantic Assembly three weeks ago in Brussels. My amendment, which refers to the walk in the woods, is phrased rather more generally, to give the French an opportunity to agree as well, after all that has been decided so far.

If this is also rejected, I do not think there is much chance of the draft report and the recommendation being adopted by a large majority. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there are two parts to Mr. Gansel's amendment. The first proposes the removal of the reference to the continued application of the NATO twofold decision while negotiations are sought. Mr. Gansel would have found it very much easier if he had included this reference in his amendment, because we would then have had a far better basis for discussion.

I believe the past has proved – as both the report as a whole and actual developments show – that it is only by continuing to apply the NATO twofold decision while negotiating that we have any prospect of success. If only for this reason, I think the amendment should be rejected.

The second part of the amendment indicates the desire for simultaneous negotiations, which is also expressed in the report. But the only specific reference it makes is to the walk in the woods.

As far as I know, no one has anything against the walk in the woods concept as such. That is undoubtedly one step towards the goal, and it may well be a good thing to continue down this road, but I do not think that it is for this Assembly to make such specific proposals. We should abide by the general wording used in the report.

For the two reasons I have given, I therefore feel the amendment should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the view of the committee?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It is tempting to adopt Mr. Gansel's sentimental, romantic tone, but in an area like this we have to stay with a meaningful text negotiated in depth by the committee. We cannot after all cripple the report by adopting a text that would be totally meaningless.

I therefore ask the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negated.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "of all kinds".

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my second amendment is very simple; I suggest that in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper the words "of all kinds" after "exchanges" be deleted. Some exchanges with the East, including the Soviet Union, are completely out of the question. Nor does it seem to me appropriate to recall the arguments about the supply of certain technologies which have subsequently been turned against the West itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I am opposed to this amendment because it goes too far in restricting the kind of exchanges that can take place between East and West. Paragraph 5 covers absolutely everything, interparliamentary exchanges – after all, such things do exist – exchanges between governments, and exchanges of all kinds. There should not be any restriction on the nature of such exchanges.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We shall now proceed to vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 988.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. At the beginning of our proceedings you said that there was a time limit of five minutes on speeches. Later you said that we were running late and that there was another debate. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is about to meet. I timed at least two of our colleagues: one spoke for eleven minutes and the other for twelve minutes. I do not seek to criticise you, but it would be helpful if you would bang a gavel after four minutes to make our colleagues realise how selfish they are being in taking double the allotted time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I was going to make the same point. Hitherto the Chair has been rather liberal, but now we need to be a little more careful about time.

Before beginning the debate on Mr. Blaauw's report, I would point out that the speakers' list, which will close as soon as the Rapporteur has been called to speak, has nine names on it. We have to finish the debate today. I therefore propose that the limit on speaking time, which I previously indicated would be five minutes, should be strictly observed.

Mr. Beix has the floor on a point of order.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Given that the Chair was rather liberal with respect to some of the speakers on Mr. Lagorce's report, which certainly deserved such tolerance on your part, I cannot understand why, in the case of Mr. Blaauw's report, which is not unimportant and on which few people have put their names down to speak, you should limit my speaking time to five minutes when I asked for ten. That

would be quite unfair, especially as only a few of us have asked for ten minutes. I can assure you that I will keep within that time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are quite right to speak of unequal treatment in this instance, because if we were to give eleven or twelve speakers ten minutes each, as was the case before, we would not finish the debate today.

I am unfortunately obliged to recognise that we cannot afford to be too liberal in this respect.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. In the light of what has happened, I ask you, Mr. President, not simply to limit your comments to what I am to say to five minutes but to indicate that whether speeches last five minutes, three minutes or two minutes, it will not be possible to reach a conclusion to the debate in time for a vote on Mr. Blaauw's report this evening unless you change the timing of other meetings, including the Presidential Committee that you have called for seven o'clock. I have no interest to declare, but Mr. Blaauw's report requires great consideration.

As it is now nearly 6.20 p.m., and you have called a Presidential Committee for seven o'clock, it is out of the question to suggest that we can rush through a debate of such importance and vote tonight. That would not be fair to the Rapporteur, to the Assembly or to you, Mr. President.

Whatever time you decide upon, Mr. President – and I shall abide by it – you should show that you will not allow the debate to be rushed through and concluded. Whether Mr. Beix has five, seven or ten minutes is irrelevant. I ask you to give some guidance on this.

Those who earlier tried to push in yet another debate on top of today's programme will now realise how wrong it would have been if we had accepted their motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was due to meet at six o'clock or at the end of the Assembly meeting. My understanding is that the committee meeting cannot take place while the Assembly is sitting. It is a vital budget meeting and the budget really must be passed tonight and also ratified or disagreed to by the Presidential Committee as it is to come up later in this session.

If we continue with the debate now, we may lose our quorum of members in the Budget

1. See page 16.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Committee, and therefore will not be able to pass the budget. It is quite unreasonable, having informed people that they will be required at a committee meeting at six o'clock, then to tell them that they must wait until eight o'clock or nine o'clock or even later. I support my colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, and ask you to make some indication of an early adjournment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I ask the Assembly to decide how it wishes to conduct its business. We can very well begin the debate now, stop it at 7 p.m., and then take a decision on the procedure to be followed, asking each colleague to make the necessary effort. But it is quite obvious that we shall not be able to finish this evening. I would be sorry if this debate were to deprive the Budget Committee of the participation of members who are, as Sir Dudley Smith has just reminded us, due to attend its meeting. I shall give the floor to the Rapporteur immediately, after which we shall decide on the necessary measures for the rest of the debate.

Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

11. *Consequences of the Gulf war*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 994 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the consequences of the Gulf war, Document 994 and amendments.

I call Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The report which I have the honour to present to you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is not based on direct knowledge of the situation. I was able to visit the Middle East during the autumn, but not on behalf of WEU, and only countries which are neighbours of the belligerents. I was also able to obtain abundant, though sometimes rather divergent, information from Middle East experts in The Hague, Paris and London, and I wish to thank all those who were kind enough to receive me and give me their views on the war which has been waged between Iran and Iraq for the last four years. I naturally have also used written documentation which, although relatively voluminous, has often proved to be incomplete and sometimes has contained errors. In particular, the Iranian authorities do not seem to have been very

keen about receiving western journalists and observers. Although our knowledge of the situation in Iraq and the views of its leaders is not perfect, in the case of Iran it is far more vague and incomplete.

This means that the document I am submitting to you is open to criticism. I have done my utmost to ascertain the truth but it has not always been possible to confirm the information I have received. This is particularly true for supplies of armaments to the belligerents, which are often conducted through the intermediary of states or private firms which cloud them in thick fog. For instance, since drafting the report, I have learned that the Federal Republic of Germany has declared it has sold no arms to the belligerents since the outbreak of the war in accordance with a principle which it is anxious to respect, contrary to what I wrote in paragraph 28 of the explanatory memorandum, probably on the erroneous basis of oral evidence. I take due note of the German authorities' denial. I have also to confess that since then there remain ambiguous rumours about the preparation of deliveries, possibly for after the ending of the war.

There have been differences between sources and interpretations from the very start of the war. Should one think, like the majority of members of the General Affairs Committee, that the present war is merely further evidence of the conflict which has been waged between the peoples of the Mesopotamian plain and the Iranian plateaux for thousands of years? In this case, the Iraqi attack in 1980 would be, above all, retaliation against the 1975 Algiers agreements and the annexation of the islands in the Strait of Hormuz by Iran in the days when Iran was the dominating power in the region. The weakening of Iran due to the Islamic revolution would then have given Iraq, encouraged and ill-informed by the political refugees it had taken in, an opportunity of taking its revenge.

Conversely, should one think like those who see the Iraqi attack as the only possible answer to the subversion created and maintained on its territory by the new Iranian régime in order to propagate its revolution? The question is not only an historical one. It concerns the future, which will depend largely on the possibility of peaceful coexistence between a country dominated by a fundamentalist view of Islam and all the other countries in the region. Our reasoning and the policy which we suggest for Europe are based on the idea that coexistence is possible in certain conditions, the main one being that war must come to an end without either of the belligerents winning a decisive victory. This is the basic line of my report.

In any event, there is no doubt that Europe's first aim must and can only be the restoration of

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

peace. This is not for economic or oil-related reasons. The oil shortage came to an end at a time when the two belligerents had considerably reduced their sales, and when exports by Iran and Iraq are resumed they will arrive on a saturated market and might upset the energy market, which is in no one's interests – not even that of oil importers. It was already enough for rumours to circulate about the holding of secret talks between the belligerents in recent weeks for oil prices to fall considerably and for OPEC to feel itself threatened. If Europe continues to make the necessary arrangements to meet an unexpected event, such as a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, there should be no great reason for it to fear the economic consequences if the war is continued. At the most, it might be recommended not to become too dependent on the credits that certain countries have granted to one of the belligerents for the procurement of armaments, because a glut of oil in the world might make it difficult for them to recoup their money.

We have quite different reasons for wanting peace round the Gulf. First, there is, of course, the inhuman nature of modern warfare – modern conventional warfare – particularly when two countries are so involved that they do not hesitate to violate the rules of war when they consider such violations necessary for their cause. In the present war chemical weapons have already been used, fourteen-year-old children have been sent to the front line, and the International Red Cross has just discovered proof of the ill treatment of prisoners of war subjected to the pressure of propaganda by their gaolers. Our countries must object strongly to the use of such methods. In fact, the only way to stop it is to put an end to the war.

Political reasons, too, urge an early end to the war. So far, the war has been confined to two countries, although Jordan sent a few troops to fight with the Iraqi army. So far, the two great powers have kept out of it. However, there is every reason to fear that a prolongation of the war would lead to an extension of the battlefield, which would not allow them to remain neutral, particularly if the stability of other countries in the region were to be seriously threatened. Hence, everything must now be done to encourage a return to peace before the war spreads to the point where that is impossible.

However, analysis of present trends in Islam shows that, because of the religious factors that are at stake, neither the great powers nor Western Europe is well placed to take decisive action in favour of a compromise peace. Because of its religious and moral values, the Islamic world would not tolerate peace imposed

by the West or even straightforward western mediation. It is the Moslem countries that can and must take such an initiative and Europe can do no better than urge that by every means at its disposal, realising that those means are limited.

My contacts with representatives of the Moslem world have shown that the latter is more than ever prepared for such a step because it, too, has every reason to want the end of a conflict which is dividing it, which might still involve the great powers and which above all threatens internal balance and stability in the area. The committee preferred not to name the body most capable of taking effective action in favour of peace but, to my way of thinking, it could be the League of Arab States, the only one organised in such a way as to be able to conduct effective diplomatic action. All Europe can do is foster, encourage and support such an initiative.

It is in the context of efficient action for peace that consideration should be given to what a European policy on arms deliveries for the belligerents can and should be. In such circumstances it is clear that several of our countries are selling arms to one or other of these two belligerents for reasons which apparently stem far more from economic and financial considerations than from the interests we all have in the restoration of peace. If in the coming months the WEU Council, as indicated in the Rome Declaration and specified in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, conducts a study of threats to international peace outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, I think it would be natural and highly desirable for it to work out joint principles to be respected in the policies of member states towards the Gulf area. This applies in particular to the limits to be expected in supplies of arms to the countries at war so that those arms cannot make either side hope to achieve an early decisive military victory but rather help to convince them of the need for a compromise peace.

It must be said that Iraq seems to have been resigned to such a peace for the past three years while Iran has continued, until recently at least, to lay down conditions that make it unacceptable to Iraq, including the overthrow of the latter country's present régime. It is Iran, too, that has rejected all offers of mediation already made *inter alia* by the Islamic Conference. The committee is not therefore calling for a full and immediate ban on sales of arms but for a restrictive policy which, if it is to be effective, must be endorsed by other arms-selling countries, now increasingly numerous, so as progressively to bring about an effective generalised plan. Everyone realises how difficult this will be to achieve.

I venture to say what a good thing it is that the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

has so far proved useful because, in view of the wholehearted commitment of the two countries concerned, there would be every reason to fear that if one of them had had nuclear weapons it would have been very difficult for it to refrain from using them.

There is another matter which the WEU Council should tackle if it wishes to fulfil the duties assigned to it by the Ministers who are the authors of the Rome Declaration, and that is the military lesson to be learned from the way the Gulf war has proceeded. Highly sophisticated weapons have been used with very disappointing results on the offensive side. The Israeli-Egyptian war in 1973 had already shown that the days were past when superiority in the use of tanks ensured success on the battlefield. But in the present war there are two armies with very modern equipment and neither side has been able to make any significant advance in areas where they were apparently vastly superior. From a strategic point of view, this war is far more reminiscent of the first than the second world war, probably due to a major advance in destructive fire-power over the mobility of forces.

There is reason to think that war in Europe would proceed differently; above all, the density of the population would make it even more lethal. This is reassuring moreover since everyone should realise that he cannot hope to derive decisive advantages from aggression. However, it seems important for our countries to examine the lessons to be learned from the use of modern weaponry in the Gulf war and insofar as this study is already possible it would fit perfectly into the programme of work which the Ministers intend to assign to the Council with the assistance of the WEU technical organs.

Those are the main points in the recommendation adopted unanimously by the General Affairs Committee, which shows that it is not a biased work but that it meets anxieties that are widely shared by members of our Assembly. I hope that I can find such unanimity in plenary session. That would in any event have the great advantage of presenting a concept of Western Europe's interests to the world with greater force and would show it how we intend to defend them and that we have no reason to be ashamed. It would also oblige the Council to give a unanimous answer to those various points, which would already be a nucleus for the consultations which the Assembly would be requesting by adopting this recommendation.

Paragraph 84 of the report states that the Rapporteur will review the report. It is not my intention to write a new report. That was a mistake.

My final remarks are less light than the previous one. They concern human rights in Iran, which in a way are derived from the Iran-Iraq conflict. My report does not go into detail about the internal position in Iran and Iraq, and I shall not do that here, but I wish to mention the fact that in Iran 120,000 political prisoners are in gaol. Since the Khomeini régime began, 40,000 of its political opponents have been executed. The Shah's régime was not a favourable one for us in the Assembly of Western European Union. The Shah had one system - the Savak - that violated human rights; the Khomeini régime has twenty systems, and the people of Iran are suffering daily.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I thank you for an excellent report and, on behalf of the Assembly, congratulate you on the considerable amount of work you have put into this extremely important document and on the speed with which you have presented it to us.

I call Mr. Beix to open the debate.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, all of us here must deplore most strongly the continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq, the considerable loss of life and the material and mortal dangers to which the belligerents themselves are exposed. It is absolutely frightful to see wave after wave of human beings - a concept of war developed in the countries involved - rushing towards such terrible massacre, especially as we are talking about countries with which we have very long-standing diplomatic and friendly relations.

The report and draft recommendation before us make it necessary for me to explain the French attitude to this conflict, and I shall attempt to do so briefly.

We consider that prolongation of the conflict is a very serious threat to the stability of this region and of the Middle East and that European states' links with the belligerents are themselves a destabilising factor unless they are clearly defined and organised.

The restoration of a lasting peace involves the maintenance of existing balances and, above all, respect for internationally recognised frontiers. Mr. Blaauw's excellent report has the merit of stressing these two points.

One of the parties has clearly demonstrated its wish to end the conflict peaceably by welcoming various offers of mediation and accepting the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council.

France, let me recall, made a major contribution to the adoption of United Nations Resolution 540 of 31st October 1983, which called for an end to hostilities and attempted to stop them spreading.

Mr. Beix (continued)

That does not mean we are putting ourselves forward as arbitrators or policemen in a problem that primarily concerns the countries of the Middle East, but we are faithful to ten years' co-operation with Iraq, while feeling no hostility towards Iran or the institutions with which the Iranian people have endowed themselves in the last few years. It is nevertheless impossible to ignore the fact that, for five years now, those Iranian institutions have been trying to root themselves in religion in a manner that gives cause for concern when it goes far beyond the normal framework of a rightfully-established state.

It is therefore to be regretted that the report deliberately says nothing about France's contribution in this respect, while indulging in a rather facile denunciation of arms deliveries by certain powers – meaning only those supplying arms to Iraq. This ignores the fact that Iran has been buying large quantities of arms on the free market and that there exist, *inter alia* in Switzerland, in both Zurich and Geneva, a number of front companies that have carried out massive deliveries to Iran of Soviet RPG-7s and BMG-71 anti-tank missiles manufactured by the American firm Hughes Aircraft.

Supplies from Israel and South Africa have also been widely solicited by the Iranian authorities, particularly supplies of land and sea detection equipment.

Our co-operation with Iraq, undertaken in a long-term political perspective, is aimed at consolidating the stability of the region, in which that country is a vital element. This position has at least the merit of being clear and public. It is based on five principles which, here as elsewhere, underlie the key aspects of French policy: non-aggression and the will to solve disputes by peaceful means, respect for the territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, security of states within internationally recognised frontiers, justice for their peoples and support for their legitimate rights.

In accordance with this approach we think it essential to draw attention to and emphasise the rôle of the United Nations. As the President of the French Republic declared in Stockholm last April, "We must explore every possible means of contributing towards some kind of cease-fire agreement, pending a better solution".

France thus considers that a balance must be maintained between the belligerents in order to avoid a crushing victory of one side over the other. To us, maintenance of the balance seems vital in order to show the parties that they have nothing to hope for from armed conflict but that

they would benefit by accepting the United Nations proposals without delay.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, why are we considering a conflict that is taking place so far from Europe? We are considering it because we believe there is a risk that a conflict of this kind, in which so much blood has been shed for so many years, might well spread in that very dangerous part of the world, which can rightly be called a global storm-centre.

In fact, the conflict dates back to the late nineteenth century, when the sick man of the Bosphorus – which included present-day Iraq – was already giving notice of the difficulties that could arise there. Even in the nineteenth century European countries were paying close attention to the area. I would simply like to remind you in this context that in the famous secret supplementary agreement between the German Reich and the Soviet Union, the Hitler-Stalin pact, this area was declared part of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. That is why an organisation like WEU, which considers defence questions in Europe, has a particular interest in restoring peace.

This is easier said than done, as we all know. We know that the present conflict did not just happen, it was due to Iraq's reaction to an expansionist policy that had been pursued by the Shah and his father and had resulted in the annexation of territory in the Shatt al'Arab area. The overthrow of the Shah's régime was seen as an opportunity to make a number of corrections, leading to the present war, which has already taken a terrible toll and – as the Rapporteur has rightly said – has led to numerous violations of The Hague Land Warfare Convention and of human rights, not only through the use of children at the front, not only through the use of certain weapons and the treatment of prisoners of war but in other ways as well.

It must be our aim – as I have said before – to bring to an end a war, which, as Mr. Beix has just said, can only be achieved through the negotiation of a peace on the basis of the status quo, meaning that neither side should score a decisive victory over the other, because this would only pave the way for fresh conflicts in that area.

I personally believe that this is scarcely possible until Iran is no longer led by that charismatic figure, Khomeini. There is every sign that a solution might then be found. I would merely point out that the Iranian opposition in exile, the Mujaheddin, and the Iraqi Government have agreed in writing to begin peace negotia-

Mr. Müller (continued)

tions as soon as there is a change of government in Iran.

We can only hope, therefore, that this relapse into the Middle Ages, if I may put it that way, these violations of human rights, which we consider far more frequently in the Council of Europe than here, and which are causing us so much concern, particularly as regards Iran, will very soon come to an end. This would be in the interests of those directly affected, it would be in the interests of world peace, and it would also be in the interests of the security of the WEU member countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, my sincere thanks to the Rapporteur for his report. I shall draw on it for the report I am drafting for the Council of Europe. I should also like to thank the secretariat, of course. The most important point is that it was so long before WEU or the Council of Europe began to consider this dreadful problem. This war has too long been described as a military and political tragedy, when for far too long it has also been a human tragedy. Nonetheless, Mr. Blaauw's report and the members who have just spoken convince me that our dominant feeling in the face of this dreadful conflict is one of helplessness. After all, we can bring neither our economic nor our political influence to bear in this area.

In rational and political terms the conflict between Iraq and Iran goes far beyond any of the wars we have had in Europe in past centuries. This makes the situation highly complicated, and it also raises the important question as to whether we can do anything and, if so, what. One of the things that surprises me is that there are so many people in Europe at the moment who, to some extent, support the Iraqi Government's policy in the conflict whereas, if my memory serves me right, it was the Iraqi Government that began the conflict, at a time when it was thought that Iran and Mr. Khomeini's dreadful régime could be defeated.

We are dealing here with a conflict that is largely inspired by religious motives, and it seems as if we cannot bring it under control in any way or exercise more than a minimal influence. The question is: what are we to do? In Western European Union we tend, all too often, to ascribe influence and power to Europe because we feel we should be the ones who are able to help resolve the conflict. I agree with Mr. Beix - and this must be stressed - that, in view of the parties involved, the religious susceptibilities and the situation in the Middle East, if anyone is to exercise a moderat-

ing influence on the belligerents, it will be the Security Council, in other words the Secretary-General of the United Nations. I attach the greatest importance to our considering whether, if our European countries intend to play a rôle, we should not be calling on the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the Security Council, to play an impartial and moderating rôle.

In view of the military situation, our first objective must be to make it clear to Iran and to Iraq, which is more sensitive than Iran, that, as things stand, this war cannot be won. Without pointing the finger at any particular country, I feel that, the political situation being what it is, the continuing deliveries of weapons, if not actually stopped, must be used in a way that makes it clear to the two sides in the conflict that a military solution is impossible. I completely agree with the Rapporteur when he says that it must be explicitly reiterated that the use of the oil weapon by one of the belligerents, against Europe or the rest of the free world, is becoming increasingly pointless.

To conclude, I have one criticism to make. The report pays little attention - and I quite understand why - to the humanitarian aspects of this ghastly tragedy. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers, many of them young, have died. The many refugees bear witness to the gravity of the human drama. If there is any action we can take, it would be to call on our governments to relieve the suffering wherever possible. I should like to hear what the Rapporteur thinks about this. We might be able to play a rôle here, apart from calling on the Secretary-General and the Security Council of the United Nations to intervene.

Only if the European countries exercise self-restraint will it perhaps be possible to help bring this dreadful war to an end, through another forum, namely the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I fear that the idea is gaining ground that, while we wait for Ayatollah Khomeini to die, the war should be kept going by supplying arms to one or other belligerent and to Iraq rather than Iran. This is how Mr. Beix justifies France's policy of selling arms to Iraq. I do not think that other members can go along with this; any prolongation of the war is very dangerous because it may lead to an extension of the conflict in an area of such importance for Europe's security. Every effort must therefore be made to help the two countries to arrive at a peaceful settlement. The policy of selling arms or competition in the sale of arms certainly cannot be regarded as a

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

way of achieving peace and of bringing the two countries to the negotiating table in order to reach a settlement.

The problem of arms sales is extremely important and I should like to take my cue from the report before us and from the necessity, properly mentioned by the Rapporteur, that the WEU countries should reach agreement on the supply of arms, in order to extend discussion to the question of supplies to any developing country. It is my impression that arms deals, aimed at achieving a certain balance of internal forces in each country, in fact carry the developing countries further away from the economic and social progress we are seeking.

It should also be borne in mind that, by prolonging the war we are discussing and by encouraging trouble elsewhere, the arms trade foments international terrorism. The report and the draft recommendation quite rightly mention this aspect. I am sure that none of us can doubt that terrorism is promoted by the continuation of the war and by the fostering of hate and hostility. We have suffered greatly; we must try to avoid any repetition and that is why every one of us, including the United Nations Security Council must do everything to bring the belligerents to the negotiating table to put an end to the conflict and to avoid the disastrous consequences for western security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to continue the debate for a few more minutes in order to hear the last speakers on the list. I shall remain with you, but I would ask the members of the Presidential Committee, who have been invited to a meeting at 7 p.m., to make their way there. The meeting will begin as scheduled. However, our debate was also scheduled and we cannot afford to upset the order of business from the very first day.

The debate continues and I excuse the members of the Presidential Committee who are obliged to leave in order to attend their meeting.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I appreciate what you just said, Mr. President, and I shall be brief.

Mr. Blaauw's report refers to the sense of futility and hopelessness that we have about the continuing Gulf war, but we should not allow ourselves to be lulled into complete inactivity. He has paved the way with several firm recommendations, of which I wholly approve. We should accept that the present position in Iran will not last, although at this stage we

cannot predict when it will be resolved. History and common sense suggest that a time will come when new forces will take over in Iran. The Rapporteur did not hint in his report that such forces may already exist and may be at work in Iran now.

It would be wrong to ignore the existence in Paris, where the Ayatollah plotted his return to Iran, of an organisation of Iranian exiles to which Mr. Müller referred – the National Council of Resistance in Iran, whose aim is to bring down the Khomeini régime in favour of a non-religious, democratic alternative, and to implement a peace plan which it claims has already received widespread international support. It has among its members such opposition groups already operating in Iran as the Mujaheddin and the Kurdish resistance, as well as receiving the support of traders, industrialists, progressive clergymen, military officers, university lecturers, writers and others. It also claims to have support in more than one hundred military bases and refugee camps between Tehran and the front. It claims to have established a peace movement in Iran, with resistance cells throughout the country that were responsible for organising a campaign week against the war and Khomeini only ten weeks ago in September, with the distribution of thousands of leaflets, the destruction of government and military vehicles, and even the killing of agents of the régime.

If there is a resistance movement as active and as widespread as the National Council of Resistance in Iran claims, we must be aware of it in this debate, and any report on the Gulf war should refer to it. If we are witnessing the beginning of the downfall of the Khomeini régime, which would certainly cause the end of the Gulf war, the west should not only recognise those forces, but offer them practical support similar to that which some of us offer to the resistance movement in Afghanistan.

Those matters were not raised in Mr. Blaauw's report. They should not be ignored, and I look forward to his reference to those forces operating in Iran in his summing-up of the debate tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on a point of order, there is some confusion over whether we shall simply be debating the report today or voting on it as well. Perhaps you could tell us again whether a vote will be taken on this report today?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, we shall simply finish the speakers' list. The Rapporteur will be invited to respond tomorrow morning at the beginning

The President (continued)

of the sitting, and the vote will take place immediately afterwards.

Please go on.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you for this clarification. That is what most of us thought.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pity that, owing to the change in the Assembly's agenda, this report by Mr. Blaauw should have to be taken at this late hour, when so few members are present. This is a significant report because it is so informative. It indicates, for example, how an ideology can in itself lead to war, how it can intensify and radicalise a war and how very difficult it is to end a war when an ideology is involved.

The war between Iran and Iraq also teaches us that it is very easy for a war to break out when the balance of power changes in a given area and actual or apparent power vacuums arise. It is, of course, also a sorry example of how wars can become radicalised and how the basic rules of international law are then no longer observed.

The report expresses this in a cautious manner. It does not side with one or other of the belligerents. From one we have received information on the ill-treatment of prisoners of war – confirmed in some cases by the Red Cross – from the other information on the use of chemical weapons – again followed by a general clarification from the Red Cross, confirmation in fact, but not conclusive. These are terrible developments. They show how a war can escalate.

The member countries of WEU have important lessons to learn from these and other factors. Our committee was therefore right to instruct the Rapporteur to draw up this report. He brings it all back to us again very vividly.

Whether this war can affect the European economies is no longer as important a question as it was four years ago, as the report says. Four years ago, when the war began, it was feared that we might have difficulty in obtaining oil. We now know that, even if oil supplies from Iran and Iraq are further reduced or cease completely, this fear is unjustified because Europe is no longer dependent on Iranian and Iraqi oil, thanks to the oil reserves in the North Sea and many other sources and to energy conservation.

However, we must, of course, realise that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would have a long-term effect on our oil supplies. A major political risk would also be involved since the war might spread if the Strait of Hormuz were closed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will conclude by emphasising something that is clearly stated in the report itself. It would seem that neither side can win this war. It can no longer be won by Iran, with its far larger population, because of Iraq's growing military strength. Nor can it be won by Iraq. To judge from the course the war is taking, Iraq realises that the targets it originally set itself in this war can no longer be achieved. It is therefore coming to rely increasingly on a defensive strategy and merely strengthening its defences.

I believe that what we now have is a pointless war – every war is pointless, but this is perhaps a particularly pointless war – a war which has led to much bloodshed in the last four years; a war which cannot in the final analysis be won by either side.

We should do all we can – as the recommendation to the member states of WEU says – to bring the war to an end as soon as possible. Here a part should be played by the recommendation to member countries to exercise still greater restraint than in the past in their arms deliveries to both belligerents. They should waste no time in reaching agreement as to whether a reduction in arms supplies to these areas of tension would not be an additional method of achieving a speedier conclusion to the war. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, credit is due to the Rapporteur, Mr. Blaauw, for his excellent work and report; we shall vote for both the report and the draft recommendation.

There is one point I should like to make; the analysis might have covered two other aspects. The first is the cruel internal repression by the governments of the two belligerent powers of communists, Kurds, intellectuals and opposition forces. Here, such repressive practices should at least be strongly denounced and condemned.

The second point is the effect of the war between Iran and Iraq on the other associated conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East; these three conflicts affect each other mutually so that a solution for even one of them might have positive effects on the other two and also on the overall stability of the whole region. Urgent and appropriate action is required to put an end to this absurd war; but what is to be done? After the repeated failure of all efforts at mediation, I understand Mr. Blaauw's pessimism and his conclusion that no end to the fighting can be foreseen in the near future; but I cannot agree that the only suggestion for Europe should be a resigned demand for caution. I believe on the contrary that Western Europe and

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

the Community can and should act in their own name in that area.

We cannot confine our recognition of the dangers of the war to times when our normal oil supplies are threatened; this is an important problem for Western Europe which, for that reason as well, has interests to protect in the area, differing completely from those of the great powers; and more generally, it is for us a problem of security and of political, trade and cultural relations with the two countries.

There are at least two areas where Western Europe could intervene constructively and here our Assembly could usefully point the way. First, there could be a demand for an embargo on arms supplies to the two combatants because so long as they continue to obtain such abundant supplies – largely from European countries – as has been the case in recent years they will go on fighting and destroying each other's human and material resources on a vast scale. Secondly, I refer to a resumption of efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement for the Middle East conflict, recognising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in order to guarantee the security of all states in the area, including Israel. Within the last few days a number of voices have been heard in the Arab world calling on the European Community to take precisely such action.

European intervention in the two areas I have mentioned would make a major contribution to ending the absurd war between Iran and Iraq and to the progressive restoration of peace in a part of the world where today not only the destiny of so many nations but also the security and peace of the whole world is at stake.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Blaauw's report is really worth reading and tries to be impartial in every way. I nevertheless have many additions and amendments to propose, perhaps because I have been to both Iraq and Iran in recent years and have met almost all the leading politicians in both countries. I find it regrettable that so few western politicians have taken the opportunity to see the situation in this part of the world for themselves. Our attitude might then be somewhat different.

I have five specific comments to make. First, I feel it should have been clearly stated that Iraq started the war. If we stop calling an aggressor an aggressor, we should hardly be surprised at the decline in the binding force of international law. Of course, Iraq had its reasons for launching an attack, but these reasons must not be

legitimated unless the right to wage a preventive war is accepted, and surely no one can seriously want that.

Second, we should also have stated more clearly that, once it crossed the frontier into Iraq after its military successes, Iran was no longer a defender but an attacker. We could have called on Iran to withdraw to the frontier and so improve the climate for cease-fire or peace negotiations. But we must also realise that Iran needs some kind of assurance that the Iraqi régime will not again try to settle old scores.

Third, in this as in other wars there have been violations of international military law. But a special and unprecedented feature of this war is the use of chemical weapons, which are prohibited and outlawed. How are we to enforce this ban in the future if we disregard it – for whatever reason – by saying that both sides have violated international law? This is a very specific violation, and we should have said so more clearly.

Fourth, the recommendation – not only the report – should not have failed to mention that many of the weapons supplied to the belligerents come from member countries of WEU and that the WEU or NATO member states did not co-operate in their manufacture so that they might be used to kill people in the Gulf. They were meant to form part of the deterrent designed to ensure the security of the alliance.

It is a disgrace that Iranians and Iraqis and even Turkish, British and German seamen should be killed in the Gulf with weapons made in France and equipped with German detonators. It is a disgrace that France, with the Soviet Union, is one of the main suppliers of weapons to Iraq. It would be a disgrace if in the present situation the Federal Republic of Germany decided to authorise the building of submarines for Iran.

Fifth, Mr. Atkinson has said there is a resistance movement in Iran and it must be supported if the Khomeini régime is to be overthrown. I can only warn you against this attitude. I knew some of the people who have died in bomb attacks by the Iranian opposition, and I may therefore be in a better position to judge how fluid the line is between resistance and terrorism.

I do not believe that the people who detonated the bomb in Brighton that was supposed to wipe out the British cabinet would be recognised as resistance fighters by Mr. Atkinson. I can only warn you against trying to dispose of the government of another country in this way. If this becomes standard practice, we should not be surprised if terrorism rebounds on our countries, our governments and the people of our countries. There is a great deal of hypocrisy in the

Mr. Gansel (continued)

way we in the West judge what happens in the East. It will cost us dear. It has already cost us much of our credibility in those countries. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not follow the argument of Mr. Gansel, except to say that I agreed with his remarks about the importance of our not conniving in any obfuscation of who is or who has been the aggressor.

My main reason for speaking is that I was a previous rapporteur on the subject, and I did not wish this occasion to pass without saying a few words of congratulation to my successor. He has done a fine job. The draft recommendation is careful, responsible and fair. His report contains a great deal of interesting information and some very intelligent comments. As he said, his success was crowned in committee by the unanimous adoption of the report, which is exceptional for a subject as controversial as this might be.

The juxtaposition of the first two paragraphs in Mr. Blaauw's report, which are denoted by Roman numerals and start with a present participle, points to one of the realities of the Gulf war. The first paragraph notes the threat to peace throughout the Middle East posed by the war between Iran and Iraq and the second notes the serious dangers to the area that could result from a decisive victory by either side. In other words, we are uncertain whether it would be more dangerous for the rest of the world if the war continued or whether it would be more dangerous if it came to an end.

Neither of the two countries at war could be said to be countries that wanted just to be left alone in peace. They are both ambitious and therefore troublesome or, let us say, they have shown themselves to have had ambitious and therefore troublesome régimes. It is hardly a secret to say that there are many people for whom it is relief that they should both be pre-occupied with and therefore exhausting the other.

Moreover, we cannot do much to bring an end to the war and, contrary to what has been said, those countries are not dependent on the supply of arms from Europe. There is also no apparent opening for diplomacy. If and when there is, as the Rapporteur recognises, we are unlikely to be able to do much more than to encourage from the sidelines. Eventually, of course, as Mr. Atkinson said, all wars come to an end, even if they last for a generation. Therefore, it is wise for us to continue to express our desire for the war to end as soon as possible by diplomatic

means rather than by a decisive victory, which would presumably be an Iranian victory, or by the internal collapse of Iran, which would raise the spectre of a Marxist régime and of Soviet land access to the Gulf.

The Rapporteur's remarks were most interesting, especially his emphasis on the desirability of no decisive victory – that being the least desirable outcome to the war. However, we shall not be able to control what happens. I was pleased to hear the Rapporteur refer to the useful mediating rôle that might be played by the Arab League.

We in Europe would not wish the war to spill over into the Gulf, because it is of paramount importance that oil continues to flow from that area. It would be better to have an oil glut – the Rapporteur made some interesting comments on the consequences of that – which might be an effect of the war ending, than for the supply to be cut off, which would provoke a new crisis and probably intervention by the United States, with all the political dangers that that implies. Of course, we deplore the appalling atrocities that have been committed by both sides, and we desire an end to the war for humanitarian reasons.

There is general agreement on all those matters, including the sad reflection that our influence in the conflict is likely to remain restricted. As the Rapporteur suggested, our influence should be concentrated on trying to limit the scope of the war rather than on trying to bring about its end. Diplomacy may have borne some fruit already in that area.

I end as I began by congratulating the Rapporteur on an exceptional report and on his thoughtful introductory speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

12. *Changes in the membership of committees*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would inform the Assembly that the United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Woodall to be a titular member in place of Mr. Edwards; Mr. Edwards to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Woodall.

The French Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Jung to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Caro.

Is there any opposition?...

These nominations are agreed to.

**13. *Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Consequences of the Gulf war (Replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 994 and amendments).
2. Military use of space – Part II (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft

recommendation, Document 993 and amendments).

3. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 992 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.30 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Consequences of the Gulf war (*Replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 994 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Michel, Mr. Beix, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Beix, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Michel, Mr. Hardy, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Blaauw; (points of order): Dr. Miller, Mr. Blaauw.
5. Military use of space – Part II (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 993 and amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Tummers, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, Mr. Fourré, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Klejdzinski (point of order), Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Scheer (point of order), Mr. Jung, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Fourré (explanation of vote), Mr. Fourré, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Scheer (explanation of vote).

6. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 992 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hill (*Rapporteur*).
7. Changes in the membership of committees.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the election of a Vice-

President of the Assembly in accordance with Rule 10(9) of the Rules of Procedure to take the place of Mr. Goerens.

Rule 10 also states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Moreover, representatives who are members of governments shall not be members of the Bureau.

One candidate has been nominated in the prescribed form, Mr. Burger of Luxembourg.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that this election be by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous and therefore declare Mr. Burger elected as Vice-President of the Assembly and congratulate him.

I take this opportunity of thanking and congratulating our colleague, Mr. Goerens, who, since the sad death of our friend Mr. Berchem, has served most effectively as Vice-President, especially by his very active participation in the work of the Bureau and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

1. See page 20.

4. *Consequences of the Gulf war*

(Replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 994 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is replies to speakers on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the consequences of the Gulf war and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 994 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Mr. President, dear colleagues – I am happy that some of us have survived the breakfast this morning.

The general debate yesterday evening on the report on the Gulf was aimed at three separate subjects. First, it was aimed at the export of arms to the belligerents, and Mr. Rubbi went deeply into that subject. I tried to state in my report and during my introductory remarks that it was unrealistic to call for an absolute ban on the export of weapons to the Gulf. It is not easy to enforce such a ban, because in sealing off an area measures must be taken around that area to prevent the influx of weapons from private markets.

Another factor is that Western Europe, the United States, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries are no longer the sole producers of weapons. The shopping lists of Iran and Iraq show purchases of weapons not in the main from Western Europe but from South America. That is a new and wide-ranging source of weapons. As well as army weapons, light battle tanks and guns, South America sells naval ships and aircraft.

To reduce the weapons influx into that area can be done only by political means. Therefore, the draft recommendation aims not only at WEU countries but, through diplomatic channels, attempts to influence all other countries selling weapons to the two belligerents.

The other main point made by many speakers yesterday related to the atrocities of war. They regretted that not sufficient emphasis had been placed upon that subject in the report. One part of the report points out that a modern war with conventional weapons inflicts great damage on human beings. In particular, the report mentions the use of chemical weapons.

I have not aimed at only one of the two belligerent countries but at both as I believe that they both used chemical weapons and that there were such atrocities as the bombing of villages and towns and the indiscriminate shelling of civilian concentrations.

The third point was that support should be given to those forces that aim at the overthrow

of the Khomeini régime. I made it clear that neither the régime in Iraq nor the régime in Iran has much sympathy from my side. Neither country is a pluralistic democracy. For that reason, it is not my highest aim to live there. Both countries have also been violating human rights on a fairly wide scale. Human rights are violated more in Iran, but putting more emphasis on one country than the other adds weight to the fact that human rights are not highly respected in the two countries. In my introductory note I mentioned the 120,000 political prisoners in Iran, but I believe that there are many political prisoners in Iraq as well. The war has claimed one million victims killed, wounded or missing on the Iranian side.

I should like to maintain a balance. I am not aiming at one country in particular. However, we must support the democratic forces and the conglomerates of liberation movements in Iran which are together in the Council for Peace and the Mujaheddin. I agree with Mr. Gansel that we have to be careful. In the past liberation movements that have been supported by the western world have often turned out later to be violating human rights and carrying out atrocities against those who oppose their taking over of the régime.

Those were the main points that I wanted to make. I should now like to deal in more detail with the contributions made by speakers in the debate.

Mr. Beix tried to defend the position of France vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq. I shall not dwell on that subject. The fact is that France is a large exporter of weapons to Iraq. I said that countries should not be too deeply involved – not even with credits – but should keep their hands clean for the future. Resolution 540 has been supported by France, and the Netherlands has been working very hard to push these things through in the United Nations.

I think that I have already sufficiently answered Mr. Müller's point. Mr. van den Bergh mentioned particularly that the Security Council should do more. The question is: can the Security Council do more? There is the weakness in the situation. Open moves by the Security Council are normally rebuffed – at least by one of the two belligerents. If an initiative is put forward by the Secretary-General, we must support it and try to bring an end to this war between two countries – a war that is becoming more and more embedded in those countries' philosophies and acquiring a prominent place in their normal life.

I think that I have answered Mr. Cavaliere's points. I know that Argentina is supplying weapons to Iran. That should be interesting for Mr. Cavaliere. I answered Mr. Atkinson's point about the Mujaheddin. I can say much

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

the same about Mr. Spies von Bülesheim's point about the rôle of the International Red Cross. It has been a problem for a long time. The International Red Cross was not allowed to enter Iran. That problem has now been solved. Indeed, we already have information on the treatment of prisoners of war. There have been acts contrary to the common rules on the treatment of prisoners of war. We have that fact on the table.

Mr. Rubbi referred to a weapons ban. I do not believe in a complete weapons ban. We should aim at restricting the export of weapons. It is not enough to say that one will export only to a country which at a particular time is in imbalance, because one will never be in the right position to judge the balance because of geopolitical situations and differences in demography.

Mr. Gansel made five points. The first was that Iraq started the war. I endeavoured in my report not to deny that Iraq started the war and not to say that, for various reasons, Iraq had the right to start the war, because no one has the right to start a war. I do not think that condemnation alone is sufficient. In fact, Mr. Gansel answered himself by saying that the moment Iran crossed the border into Iraqi territory, Iran became an equal aggressor. There have been violations of the rules of war according to the Geneva Convention. However, I have said enough about that.

Chemical weapons have been used, and there is reference to that point in my other report where mention is made of a ban on chemical weapons. Iraq is mentioned there.

I have answered the point about the export of weapons from WEU countries. I agree with Mr. Gansel that we should think and talk about this problem in order to reach a solution. WEU countries are not the only ones which have been exporting weapons to the belligerents. We should try by diplomatic means to put pressure on other countries that export weapons to the area not to do so for the sake of mankind, and to prevent the spread of the war and bring to an end a war in which there can be no winner.

I take note of Mr. Gansel's remark about the Mujaheddin, about which I have already said enough.

I thank Lord Reay for his kind words. I do not think that he put any specific question to me.

I have now concluded my answers to the points that were raised by speakers yesterday.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly I thank you once again, Mr. Blaauw, for your excellent work.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his objective and historic report. It will not fail to leave its mark on our knowledge of Middle East relations. The document's merit is that it sticks to the facts and does not overstate Europe's rôle in an area where intervention on our part is at once delicate and difficult. At a particularly difficult time it also reminds us of certain principles governing the rules of war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before taking the vote on the draft recommendation we have four amendments to consider. They will be discussed in the order in which they affect the text: Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Beix, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Beix and Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Hardy.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "by the United Nations and by Middle Eastern countries" and insert "by the United Nations, by Middle Eastern countries or by other countries".

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my Amendment 1 is very simple. Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation affirms that only the countries of the Middle East and the United Nations Security Council would be competent and concerned to use their good offices to restore peace between Iran and Iraq. It is my view, however, that the door should be left open for intervention and initiatives by other countries, as the EEC and its member states do have a part to play.

It is my wish that, in adopting my amendment, we should make it clear that initiatives by other countries along these lines are also welcome and capable of making a positive contribution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur and I are not inclined to accept the amendment as we wish to keep the report within its original brief. Mr. Cavaliere's suggestion is a good one, but it takes us outside these limits and goes further than we consider advisable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

Mr. Beix and others have tabled Amendment 3 worded as follows:

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Deploy every effort to support United Nations Resolution 540 of 31st October 1983 on preventing the spread of the war in the Gulf and the bombing of towns, at the same time condemning recourse to particularly reprehensible weapons ;”.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Amendment 3 introduces a new paragraph between the first and second paragraphs of the recommendation proper and refers to United Nations Resolution 540, which the bulk of member states supported, as was pointed out by Mr. Blaauw just now and by myself yesterday evening.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I want to speak against the amendment. In my view Iran is not a model of humanitarian ideals or respect for international law, but certainly the bombing of towns was started by Iraq and by “reprehensible” weapons is meant the use of chemical weapons by Iraq or French Exocet missiles; but we are in a wrong position when we fail to say what we mean. As long as we fail to do that, it is no use agreeing to amendments that put the blame on both sides. That is why I speak against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view ?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – If there were something new in the amendment I should like to support it, but there is nothing new in it. All that is said in the amendment is in the report or in other parts of the recommendation. Support for any move by the United Nations is in, and we are even calling for more. Bombing and other atrocities are already condemned in the draft recommendation. To include the amendment without emphasising this particular aspect – and I follow what Mr. Gansel says and his ideas – is not the way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Mr. Beix and others have tabled Amendment 4, worded as follows:

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Foster the maintenance of a balance between Iraq and Iran likely to convince the two opponents that they have nothing to gain from continuing hostilities ;”.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The object of the amendments is not necessarily to add any new concept to the report presented by Mr. Blaauw but simply to introduce into the recommendation – its preamble or its enacting terms – some elements aimed at greater clarity.

I can see no reference to United Nations Resolution 540 either in the preamble or in the recommendation proper. This strikes me as strange in view of the fact that, as we were reminded just now by Mr. Blaauw, member states supported or actively promoted that resolution. Why should we not mention it now ?

The purpose of Amendment 4 is to introduce after paragraph 2 the idea that a balance between the two belligerents is desirable in order to persuade them that neither has anything to gain by continuing the conflict. Although it figures in the report, this point finds no place in the recommendation. It would be strange for this to disappear as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment ?...

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I think much has already been said both in the report and in the draft recommendation about the balance to be maintained between the two countries concerned. It seems to me that this amendment is, if you will excuse the expression, somewhat hypocritical, since it appears to provide a cloak for arms sales. The proposal to foster the maintenance of a balance between Iran and Iraq in practice leaves the way open for supplies of arms to both countries. Iran is receiving support from some quarters and Iraq from others and this dangerous and debilitating war will roll on until, one fine day, Iran and Iraq wake up to the need to put an end to it.

I am therefore opposed to this amendment, which might, to say the least, be interpreted as providing a kind of permanent mandate to certain countries to supply assistance and weapons to one or other of the combatants in order to maintain an illusory balance of danger, warfare, destruction and terrorism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view ?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – This amendment is open to misinterpretation. As Mr. Cavaliere has just explained, it can be understood in the right or the wrong way. To include it in the recommendation would be unhelpful and I therefore ask the Assembly to vote against it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Mr. Hardy has tabled Amendment 2 worded as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be relatively brief. I never take a long time, and it is no good my British conservative colleagues questioning that statement of fact.

As Mr. Blaauw will recall, an earlier version of the report contained the suggestion that the war provided an opportunity for western governments and others to study the effects of modern weaponry. I believed that that was barbaric, and was happy when Mr. Blaauw and other members of the committee, in the light of calm consideration of cold print, recognised that the original suggestion was not acceptable and that humanity should not be treated like a guinea pig and subjected to testing. The committee accepted that, and I hope that the Rapporteur will accept my point, which is implicit in the amendment, that we should not appear to suggest that the war is merely a test bed, an opportunity for lessons to be learnt. Of course our governments and governments of the eastern bloc will consider this nasty conflict and no doubt will learn from it, but it would be wrong for us to appear to regard slaughter dispassionately. It would be as well if we deleted the reference in paragraph 6.

The amendment is not designed to challenge the security of the West but suggests that the Assembly act with sensitivity and intelligence, so paragraph 6 should disappear. I trust that the Rapporteur will accept that. In committee he appeared to do so in principle and I think that that view was taken unanimously by the committee. Paragraph 6 is not necessary; it is not an intrinsic part of a valuable report. It disfigures it. I trust that the Rapporteur will accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I do not think that any sensible person could possibly interpret the words in paragraph 6 as approving the war in any way and being in any way insensitive to it when he reads the rest of the report. It would be entirely wrong to take that view. No matter where a conflict takes place, it is common sense to learn from it and to see whether one can, in one's own country or in the rest of the world, draw lessons from it that can save life and improve the prospect of peace. Therefore, I suggest that the words should properly remain in the paragraph.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – It is true that we discussed this subject at length in committee. In committee I was shocked at the original text – one could interpret the paragraph as meaning that we were using the conflict in the Gulf as a laboratory for modern weapons. For that reason, we changed the wording. We now recommend that the Council should:

“Have a study made of the lessons which Europe might draw for its own security from the Gulf war”.

That has nothing to do with the suffering inflicted on human beings by the war, but is connected with the security of Europe. That is wholly in line with the Rome Declaration stating that the Council and the Assembly will study areas of crisis for the security of Europe. We should also consider the danger to the security of Europe's energy resources if the conflict spreads.

That is what the paragraph means, and only those who want to misinterpret it will follow Mr. Hardy's line, and I know that he does not really want that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It was not made clear that the Rapporteur had tabled a new amendment which, to some extent, satisfies what Mr. Hardy asked for. Should we not have had a vote on whether we accept not the text as it stands but the amended text? That change was not made clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Dr. Miller, I have been formally notified of only one amendment tabled by Mr. Hardy and have no word of an amendment originating from the committee.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to this point of order.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I was recalling the discussion that we had in committee, when we accepted an amendment, which I thought was supported by Mr. Hardy. That change made paragraph 6 read as it stands now, which is the form accepted by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In any event the matter is clear. The Assembly has voted on a properly tabled amendment after listening to one speaker in favour and one speaker against and after hearing the view of the committee.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 994 as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure a vote is taken by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present request a vote by roll-call.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call ?...

As a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

5. Military use of space – Part II

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 993 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the military use of space – Part II and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 993 and amendments.

Before calling the Rapporteur, I must point out that, because of what happened yesterday, we have fallen slightly behind our timetable for the session. As it is essential to adhere to the order of business for today's sitting, I have to inform you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that, to assist both you and the Chair, I have had a small red light mounted on the platform, which will light up after a member has spoken for five minutes. This will simply mean that the speaker should finish. I am sure that you will all appreciate the wisdom of keeping to the time allocated to speakers.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a privilege to have the opportunity to introduce

this report on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the military use of space. It is the second report on that subject, the first having been overwhelmingly adopted by the Assembly at its June session. The June meeting studied a report that dealt with the European aspect of the military use of space. This report follows the visit of our committee to the United States in July, which conducted research into the subject. We went to NASA plants, industrial factories and defence establishments. We had talks at the Pentagon, the State Department and the National Security Council. This report deals with the implications for European security of American military developments in space.

It is extremely necessary to study this matter. Following the re-election of President Reagan in November, we can be certain that the United States administration will make a determined effort to examine fully the potential for a space-based defence system for the United States. The strategic defence initiative that began under President Reagan's previous administration will be pursued with vigour to its conclusion. We cannot pull the blankets over our heads in Europe and hope that those things will not happen. The SDI will continue and will have the full support of the United States administration.

For a long time we have been looking for a worthwhile rôle for this Assembly. I believe that WEU could have a definite and clear rôle in examining the military applications of space technology and in providing a forum for reflection for our Council of Ministers to agree on a common European approach to such matters. I ask my colleagues to remember that this is nothing new. We have been using space for military purposes for nearly forty years since the first research of Dr. Werner von Braun and his team at Peenemunde.

Space technology has been used primarily for offensive purposes. The ballistic missile technology is the same technology that enabled us to put men on the moon, to launch commercial satellites and to launch remote-sensing satellites for the better utilisation of the earth's resources. I hope that we shall have no doctrinal hangups about the military uses of space technology, as it has been used in that way for more than a generation. Our interests now should be to use that technology to create a more secure world, to enhance the opportunities for arms control, to reduce the risk of pre-emptive attack, to increase the value of our deterrents for the alliance as a whole, and to try to make the world a safer place for all our peoples. I hope that my friends and colleagues will understand that at the outset.

Satellites have been used not only for the peaceful purposes that I have described but for

1. See page 21.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

many significant military missions. I shall outline a few. First, optical reconnaissance, as with so many of those uses, has two implications. Reconnaissance is necessary to conduct successful military operations, but we also need a surveillance capability to prevent the risk of sudden aggression and unexpected pre-emptive attack. We all understand that such reconnaissance capability has begun to affect military operations. For example, there was the recent case of the American, British and Irish authorities, collaborating by virtue of satellite-derived information, to intercept a boatload of arms destined for the terrorists of the IRA. Radar reconnaissance goes hand in hand with ordinary optical surveillance.

Another aspect of intelligence gathering that is as valid for military operations as it is for confidence-building measures is the electronic intelligence, communications and signals intelligence that we obtain from satellite data. Meteorological satellites are used for peaceful purposes, but they are also necessary for military missions.

Thus we increasingly require relay satellites and geostationary satellites such as the United States tracking and data-relay satellite system. We need early-warning satellites to warn us of the possibility of a ballistic missile attack. We have had land-based systems such as the ballistic missile early-warning system, which has been deployed for more than a generation. Those satellites can detect the infrared emissions of missiles in the launch phase. That enhances our security and provides greater warning time.

We have navigational satellites such as the United States transit satellites now in service and the Navstar system. We have telecommunications satellites, without which our armed forces could not operate effectively. We have the Milstar programme of the United States and the British Skynet system. People will readily understand that the operation in the Falkland Islands could not have been conducted without satellite communications. All those are now taken for granted, so we cannot pretend that there is not already full use of military space technology.

We are so dependent on satellites for our deterrence and arms control, for confidence-building and military effectiveness that we cannot imagine that in any future war an adversary will not want to deafen and blind us by denying us the use of our satellite systems. So inexorably and inevitably, because of the importance of satellite systems in the conduct of military operations and for deterrence, a potential adversary will wish to deny us their use.

Since 1968 the Soviet Union has been increasingly engaged in an anti-satellite programme. In the SS-9 rockets it has deployed an anti-satellite system of the first generation – it may be rather rudimentary and only 50% effective, but it is in existence and deployed. It is not surprising that our United States friends and allies should have sought to catch up and are engaged in the development of a system launched from the F-15 Eagle fighter aircraft.

Until now, the Soviets have sought to make the cessation of United States development of an anti-satellite system a condition of the resumption of the arms control negotiations on the control of intermediate-range and strategic nuclear forces. We are pleased that, following the re-election of President Reagan with a massive majority, the Soviet Union has shown itself willing to resume dialogue, and talks are due to begin early next year.

That is not the whole story. For some considerable time, surface-to-air guided weapons have been used in an interceptor rôle against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase. The United States has the Sentinel system based on the mighty Zeus missile for the area defence of cities. Then followed the Safeguard system with the Spartan and Sprint missiles for the point defence of the ballistic missile bases of the United States.

Following the ABM treaty of 1972, such systems were dismantled by the United States and the Soviet Union retained only one system of point defence around Moscow. But there are now signs of the construction of a phased array radar in the centre of the Soviet Union, which means that it is increasing its interest and renewing its efforts to construct an effective anti-ballistic missile capability. Already the SA-5, SA-10 and SA-12 surface-to-air guided weapons have a capability to engage targets up to 100,000 feet. In some instances, they would be capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles.

The President of the United States is conscious, as we all are, that the mutual balance of terror – the proliferation of offensive systems – is not the best way to assure peace. It is an uneasy peace based upon the concept of mutually assured destruction. It is a peace that does not really render our peoples secure in their hearts – although in practice since the 1950s it has provided security for all the peoples of the western alliance. But it is an uneasy peace that is becoming increasingly criticised.

No one would wish the modernisation of the American strategic deterrence, with its cruise missiles, Trident missiles and MXs to be followed by yet another triad of offensive strategic delivery systems. We want some of the money that might be earmarked for those systems to go into a defensive system. That is the objective

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

behind the strategic defence initiative. The purpose of the SDIs announced by the President is to conduct researches that are wholly within the terms of the ABM treaty to see whether our modern technologies are adequate to ensure some form of space-based defence.

Obviously, initially space-based defence will not be total – it will be partly effective. But in the eyes of many thinkers it would reduce the potential credibility of a pre-emptive strike by our adversaries and thereby enhance deterrence. Because the benefit of acquiring superiority in strategic systems will be, to some extent, negated by a space-based defence, it is believed that the acquisition of the capability for such a defence should enhance the possibility of really purposeful arms control talks that would lead to a gradual, steady, but mutually-balanced and verifiable disarmament in strategic and intermediate-range weapons.

The United States is spending \$2 billion on such researches in the current financial year, and up to \$26 billion by the end of the decade. Half way through the next United States administration the next President will have the facts available so that he can reach a decision whether the creation of such a capability makes sensible, cost-effective policy.

My report is not prescriptive. It does not propose any definite measures by the members of WEU. It does not suggest that the European countries should now engage in a military space programme. It does not suggest that we should work with the Americans. What it does say is that, first, we must have a concerted European joint policy. We cannot just wish away the activities of the two superpowers. We must respond to what they are doing in a concerted and effective manner. The way to achieve such a concertation is to use the Council of Ministers of this organisation. The Standing Armaments Committee could be useful. If it were properly staffed – and that should be part of the process of the reform of WEU – with suitably qualified experts, it could provide the advice necessary for the Council of Ministers to make its decision, to inform this Assembly and to concert an industrial strategy if the Europeans ever wish to develop a capability of their own.

We need to engage in a proper dialogue with the Americans so that we are not left out on a limb and so that what they are doing is for our benefit as well. Here, again, we believe that this organisation could be useful.

We also need to realise that the activities of the European Space Agency have a strategic significance, because they are creating capabilities that could have a military application. But, of course, ESA is precluded by statute from

any military rôle. If we are to use the capabilities of ESA, the decisions to do so will have to be taken by a different body. Here, again, WEU comes in.

When looking at the capabilities involved and industrial capacity, we cannot ignore the importance of the NASA proposals for European participation in the space station. The space station will be the building block for a whole new area of activities in space for the transfer of satellites from one orbit to another; for the cost-effective repair of satellites; and for the utilisation of space for commercial and other purposes on a sustained ongoing, as that horrible phrase is, way. I hope that we shall do it and provide a concerted ESA response; and, of course, WEU has always supported the activities of ESA.

Last but not least, we must ensure that our peoples comprehend the importance for their future of what is going on in space. The Europeans have had an effective programme, largely through ESA, but to a certain extent through national programmes, too, for about one-tenth of the cost of the American programme. However, it has been very useful. We have had successes in telecommunications. We are now going into remote sensing, we have the Ariane launcher, and there is the Spacelab. We are looking to a new generation of programmes, but we need to create public support for the financing that will be required. Here, again, I believe that the WEU Assembly has an important part to play.

I trust that the Assembly will find this report useful. I believe that it is informative in many areas about the SDI, the space station, the implications for the development of new technologies in Europe, our relationship with the United States, deterrence and the cohesion of the alliance as a whole. I have great pleasure in commending the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly I wish to thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your excellent presentation and for your usual, extremely meticulous work.

I would remind you that the list of speakers comprising eight names is now closed and that the little red light will come on after five minutes to warn the speaker to conclude as quickly as possible.

In the debate I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Part II of Mr. Wilkinson's comprehensive and excellent report contains a valuable review of the United States involvement in space and of strategic thinking in the United States, whether it be called high frontier, star wars or the strategic defence initiative –

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

SDI. These are just different names for the same ideas – ideas for replacing MAD, the mutual assured destruction strategy by a system of defence against Soviet missiles that has still to be developed or is already being developed.

MAD is thus to be replaced by a strategy known as “assured survival”, which in the event of hostilities is designed to afford the people and territory of the United States better protection and will in the final analysis, the Rapporteur believes, improve the deterrent.

In this context, mention should also be made of the considerable expenditure on research for SDI, provisionally estimated, according to National Security Decision Directive 119 of 6th January 1984, at \$2,000 million in 1985 and \$26,000 million by 1989.

There is no critical appraisal by the Rapporteur; I regard this as a fundamental lack. I have the feeling that this report has been submitted by someone who is fascinated by the technical possibilities but did not see it as his task to consider other aspects.

Another important assumption made in Mr. Wilkinson's report is that a ballistic missile defence system will strengthen the cohesion of NATO, because a United States that is less vulnerable to attack from the USSR will be more willing to defend Europe. That is a very questionable assumption, and I do not think there is much evidence to support it.

One not unimportant assertion is that a considerable increase in research activities in space is likely; it must be remembered, of course, that research into the civil uses of space can also be applied to military purposes. At least, it is a possibility that cannot be excluded. To point out that it is for individual countries to decide how they intend to use their know-how and hardware highlights the responsibility of each country, but one thing is not clear: will the country originating intellectual progress be able to decide how it is used?

If the report is designed to draw the attention of the WEU member countries and, indeed, of the whole of Europe to the implications of the military use of space, I believe it makes a valuable contribution since it both states the reasons for the military use of space and refers to as yet unrecognised dangers for us Europeans in the use of space for this purpose, which would undoubtedly have a destabilising effect on a European security system.

I am well aware that thought is increasingly being given to the political, strategic and economic uses of space. In many respects the opportunities for human progress in the universe are

inexhaustible. Highly accurate weather forecasting, remote sensing of earth resources, detection of impending natural disasters, medical and pharmaceutical experiments and worldwide communications would not have been possible without space research.

We Europeans cannot stand aside in these fields. We must make our contribution to the peaceful use of space with our scientific and technological potential.

The reality of the present situation is not to be denied: according to reliable sources, the United States was keeping an average of ninety-four military and civil communications satellites in orbit in 1983. The Soviet Union's ninety or so satellites are probably used primarily for military purposes. These satellites are important because of the various functions they can perform: early warning of a nuclear missile attack, photo-reconnaissance of military activities, electronic reconnaissance and surveillance, navigational aids, universal communications, reconnaissance control and command systems to improve the operational capability of all military units, the improvement of the accuracy of missile guidance systems.

Experts regard these satellites, which orbit at an altitude between 100 and 36,000 km, as a crucial aspect of nuclear deterrence.

There is something else that must be borne in mind: the possibility of destroying these satellite components with Asat technology will not contribute to stabilisation but will alter every assumption regarding military balance.

Mr. Wilkinson's report also points out that military superiority cannot be achieved. This cannot be overemphasised. It is also borne out by the history of the arms race. The destabilising effect of an arms race in space cannot therefore be ignored.

The Asat capacity, once installed, might endanger all satellite systems...

(Mr. De Decker, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Please conclude, Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – All right, Mr. President, you told me about the red light. Five minutes have already passed, but I should be allowed to complete my speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Klejdzinski, your time is up.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – At yesterday's sitting we spoke at length about

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

deterrence as a bulwark for the maintenance of peace and security. This subject has been taken up again today in the valuable report and draft recommendation presented by Mr. Wilkinson, who has done a really excellent job which will serve us as a reference and guide in the performance of the tasks before us and in the conduct of the defence and scientific research policies of the WEU countries.

In view of the very short time available to me I shall not address myself to the range of questions relating to the use of space, but will limit my remarks to a single facet of the military use of space which is very important not from the offensive but from the defensive standpoint, as is quite rightly pointed out in the report. The WEU countries which cannot develop a policy of their own for the military use of space are, I believe, deeply interested in the experimental work and programmes conducted by the United States which are aimed at reinforcing deterrence thanks to the noteworthy developments and progress made in this area and at sounding a warning to the Soviet Union regarding an offensive arms policy conducted for so many years, thus imperilling the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

This balance can be restored by defensive systems in space and we are therefore very interested. I would, however, like to add a point which has perhaps eluded the Rapporteur and many fellow delegates. The Soviet Union is very well aware of the importance attaching to the development of weapons and defensive systems in space, but I think that it is also aware of the discrepancy between Soviet progress in this field and the headway made by the United States. In its concern at this difference, the Soviet Union, prompted by the practical achievements which increasingly characterise United States policy in this sector, is seeking for meetings aimed at reaching an agreement which would impose an absolute embargo on the use of space for defensive systems.

I believe on the other hand, and the Rapporteur has drawn attention to this point in paragraph 4, that the conclusion to be drawn from this situation is as follows. The United States and ourselves should insist that such meetings provide a forum for discussion embracing the whole range of offensive and defensive systems and not simply limited to defensive systems in space.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in June I believe we decided unanimously, on the basis of a report by Mr. Wilkin-

son, to adopt a joint European position on the question of the civil and peaceful use of space and, at the same time, to express our concern about the active use of space for military purposes.

In June we called for a convention to limit arms in space. We advocated the prevention of the military use of space through the development of offensive space weapon systems. We felt that the Standing Armaments Committee should make a detailed analysis of the implications for European defence of the military use of space as a basis for further discussion of all the associated dangers and problems. We called for a study by the Agency for the Control of Armaments to consider the possibility of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency for Europe. Amendments were tabled, including one by Mr. Hardy, who once again stressed the need for the use of space to be confined to civil and peaceful purposes. Another amendment, tabled by Mr. Tummers and Mr. Garrett, proposed a symposium on the military use of space at which all the problems could again be discussed.

If we consider the conclusion we drew in June and compare it with the recommendations made in Mr. Wilkinson's present report, we unfortunately find that the agreement we reached at that time - that the Europeans should pave the way for the civil and peaceful use of space and indicate the various elements involved - has now been abandoned. I am afraid that, if we adopt this recommendation, we shall in fact simply be joining in the militarisation of space that has already begun and will continue.

This new report discusses the harmonisation of industrial co-operation where the military use of space is concerned. It refers to the prospects for an effective space-based ballistic missile defence system. It calls for a unified Western European policy on the military use of space. Industrial, technological and strategic arguments are advanced for an expanded European space research programme. Mr. Wilkinson also considers the possibility of obviating the risks attached to a first strike by putting arms into space, and of improving deterrence.

I am sorry, but the recommendations we are being asked to adopt conflict with the decision unanimously taken in June. They conflict with the official declarations of the Western European governments, including the government of my own country. I say this although I do not belong to the party now in government in the Federal Republic - I am a member of the opposition. We cannot simply cast aside now something we took so seriously in June.

I therefore urge very strongly that reference points should not now be created for those in the United States who expect us to participate in

Mr. Scheer (continued)

military space technology and, of course, to pay our share of the costs. That would be the wrong road for us to take.

I cannot see a declaration by a Western European government agreeing with these recommendations, because they no longer provide for any restraint on this fateful use of space. It would be the wrong course to take, because it is strategically naive. The extension of military satellite systems would represent a dramatic step towards building mistrust in East-West relations, and that would automatically have a destabilising effect. Priority must therefore be given to measures preventing the militarisation of space, by means of contractual agreements.

The development of a missile defence system in space does not signify an improvement in deterrence. As both sides have thousands of offensive missiles, it would cost us unimaginable sums to introduce defence systems against all those thousands of missiles. There is no such thing as total security; it would cost both sides billions of dollars. And if only 5% of the thousands of offensive missiles on each side get through, mutual destruction is still possible.

Consequently, if we are to act responsibly, the only way is for Europe to help ensure that space continues to be used for peaceful purposes. We use it for passive military purposes by attempting satellite reconnaissance – in our own interests as well – but we refrain from making active military use of space. I urge that we remain on the course we adopted in June.

I therefore ask Mr. Wilkinson to agree to this recommendation being referred back so that it can be discussed again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not need to repeat what has already been said. Two Dutch members are down to speak. Mr. de Vries will be “entering the ring” with Mr. Wilkinson in a moment. I tabled an amendment to Mr. Wilkinson’s report, Part I, and it is the consequences of this that I propose to discuss. Like the previous speaker, I feel this report takes no account of what we said about Part I in the summer. The threat in space is simply increased by this report. In the 1950s, when Gabriël Marcel wrote his book *Rome n’est plus dans Rome*, it was still possible to find “horizontal” escape routes from the threat of war. At the moment the “vertical” threat to which the earth is exposed from space is so strong that it can no longer be escaped. What is more, the militarisation of space is reducing the earth to a nuclear

shelter. We must make very sure that this trend does not develop still further, especially as regards the population. We are at present creating a “vertical deterrent” from space for everyone on this earth and this vertical deterrent is a particularly grave matter.

Last summer, Mr. Wilkinson said he was “extremely happy” to welcome the addition of Amendment 4 as paragraph 10 of the recommendation contained in his report. I would have thought that he would want Part II to continue in the same spirit as this amendment. But this is not the case. I am afraid that, if we accept this report as it stands, we shall be disregarding Amendment 4, or paragraph 10 of the recommendation. Part II cannot simply displace Amendment 4. Amendment 4 is equally applicable to Part II. I therefore think that after this debate the report should be put on ice, that it should not be voted on and that we should wait until what was agreed in Amendment 4 to Part I has been done. The report must be held over until the colloquy has taken place in Munich in September. If I understood correctly, my German colleague who has just spoken said virtually the same thing. I hope that other speakers will be similarly aware of this point. We cannot agree on something in June and then, in the winter, go on as if nothing had happened. The fact that we adopted the amendment to Part I means that we must put this report on ice until after the colloquy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – As has been said, the debate in June was the ground work for the involvement of the Assembly in the discussion on space. This is our first criticism of the report. It is not a continuation of careful research into the pros and cons of space research and engagement, but a proposal to go ahead. If the Rapporteur says that the report is not prescriptive, I believe that he has not read it and the recommendations carefully. It is prescriptive and does not serve the needs of the Assembly by being so.

Europe needs to try to find out what implications there are for space engagement, not only what the benefits are of a strategic space initiative, as the Rapporteur wants us to believe, but what the implications are for European security. That is not touched upon. If the Rapporteur says that the report deals with the implications for European security of American plans for space, I do not believe that he is referring to his own report, because it does not deal with any of the questions that arise for Europeans regarding American engagement in space. Where is the discussion of the implications of new systems? What does it mean for British and French nuclear forces? What are the implic-

Mr. de Vries (continued)

ations for conventional warfare in Europe? What are the implications for arms control in Europe? What are the implications for our discussions on improving stability in Europe? None of those questions has been answered.

The Rapporteur was obviously so enthralled by the technical possibilities that he sees in the American initiatives that he has not mentioned anyone who was critical of that approach. The Assembly must be anxious about that. If reports presented to this body are an account of only one side of an argument, if we must deal with four pages of heritage foundation, and if the Rapporteur says that it would be easy not to take all this seriously, but we had better be aware that these are not solely "military ideologues with too much time on their hands, sponsored by a right-wing think tank", he is completely on the wrong track.

Many documents contain serious arguments about space engagement. We should not shy away from them. We should take seriously what is happening and try to find a European response. But that response must be based on something more than the Rapporteur saying: "Something great is happening in space and let us join them as quickly as we can or we might miss the boat." In security affairs matters are sometimes a little more complicated, and the Assembly would be well advised to take time at our next meeting to consider not only the potential of the techniques involved, but the political and military implications for the continent of Europe. If one thing is clear from the report, it is that the Rapporteur has no notion of the different perceptions of Americans and Europeans in such matters, and that must be of great concern to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking Mr. Wilkinson for his report. Unlike the previous speaker, I do not detect any enthusiasm in this report for the strategic possibilities of the military use of space. On the contrary, I believe it provides a very objective account of the facts, although it is impossible to foresee the potential and the risks of the military use of space, and hence impossible to foresee the effects it will have on conventional and other weapons systems.

I believe it makes us all very uneasy to realise that in recent years military thinking has turned increasingly to space, in addition to the land and the air. I do not think any of us welcome the idea of having a completely new danger area and of a new front opening up there to meet the need

for military balance. Nor, however, do I think that our security will be served in this area by simply putting our heads in the sand and saying we do not want it. It is the same with all the other weapons systems: there is absolutely no point in putting our heads in the sand and ignoring past experience. That will only increase the danger to ourselves. We have weapons, not because we want to use them, but because we want to prevent others from using them against us.

Yesterday one speaker said the deterrent was illogical, since the possession of weapons automatically spelt danger. Ladies and Gentlemen, why do ordinary policemen carry guns in our countries? Not in order to use them, but in order not to have to use them to maintain law and order. Why do we have fire extinguishers? Not because we like fire, but so that we can fight one if it breaks out. It is therefore is no way illogical to have weapons, even when we have no intention of using them. They are needed simply because of this terrible balance.

The report recommends that the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments of WEU should be modernised and should study in particular the prospects and the risks of the development of space weapons. This brings us to a subject that will be taxing this Assembly with some frequency in the future: the question of the revitalisation of WEU. I take this opportunity to say that I have come across the expression "demummification of WEU" several times in the last few days. I feel we WEU parliamentarians should do our best to avoid this expression, because it denotes a criticism of our own work and of WEU's activities in the past. Rather than "demummification" we should speak of "revitalisation", meaning change, the adjustment of WEU to the present situation. I believe this will confront the Assembly of WEU with a number of unpleasant tasks, which we must not, however, seek to avoid. If we want to reorganise WEU and add to its areas of competence we must realise that we still have institutions whose work is over.

The Agency for the Control of Armaments, which was set up almost thirty years ago, now has nothing to do, and we should have the courage to admit this and to reorganise this Agency thoroughly, which will also affect staffing plans. We must have the courage to do this, because all our countries are subject to certain budgetary constraints and we shall not have access to substantial resources for revitalisation. I therefore believe we must go to work with a sharp knife, a keen mind and the courage to take unpleasant decisions, so that the existing organs of WEU may be fit for the new challenges, and capable of playing their new rôles. A special new rôle stems from Mr. Wilkinson's report, for

Mr. Spies von Büllersheim (continued)

which I would like to thank the Rapporteur once again. Thank you.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the problem apparent from the speeches we have just heard is that of knowing whether Mr. Wilkinson's report amounts to a description of the technical possibilities for the military use of space or a redefinition of a new strategic concept based on such military use. I will make my own view clear by first of all underlining the fact that the American anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite defence programmes are partly responsible for the current questioning of concepts in NATO. These programmes can be linked to military plans for a conventional deterrent based on the new weapons technologies. In either case, the ultimate objective is the same - to reduce or even eliminate dependence on nuclear arms - and we find absolute trust being placed in the use of modern technology to achieve this purpose. At this juncture, I should like to restate France's position. These new strategic ideas tend to foster the concept of conventional deterrence and may have the effect of eroding the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Such erosion is aggravated by the development of doctrines according to which NATO's nuclear weapons would be used against enemy forces, and which envisage the idea of a nuclear battle.

These developments must not affect the French contribution to deterrence of a potential aggressor in Europe - a contribution acknowledged by the allies in Ottawa in 1974. Turning more specifically to the militarisation of space, we consider that the research and projects relating to the military use of space raise a number of very serious questions: the risk of encouraging the arms race in weapons which do not use space - non-ballistic nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and highly sophisticated conventional weapons; the creation between the possessors of anti-ballistic or anti-satellite weapons of an outer defence made up of more directly threatened countries; devaluation of the principle of nuclear deterrence.

I may add that the use of an anti-missile shield, implying that defence should take precedence over deterrence, should not deceive us as to the defensive significance of this type of system. In fact, to make sure, strategically, that such a system could be penetrated, the enemy would be forced to saturate it, that is to say he would have to increase the number of missiles

sufficiently to exceed the capacity of the ABMs deployed. What has to be remembered here is that a race in defensive weapons invariably has the effect of accelerating and aggravating the race in offensive weapons.

France is concerned to maintain the credibility of its deterrent, but it would be wrong to see in its negotiating stance on space weapons nothing more than a petty and selfish withdrawal behind its own national deterrent. On the contrary, its attitude is dictated by the desire to forestall in the European context the major risks arising from a new East-West arms race. As the Rapporteur said, the question now is to react against the combined effects of indifference and a failure of the collective will, whereby Europe has allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to play the dominant rôle in space.

It is no longer realistic today to aim at the complete demilitarisation of space. On the other hand, it would be both desirable and possible to reach agreement on the following points: very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including especially the prohibition of all those capable of reaching high-orbit satellites; the banning for a renewable five-year period of the deployment on the ground, in the atmosphere or in space of guided weapons systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles, and the prohibition of any tests associated with these; reinforcement of the existing system of notification of the launching of objects into space established by the convention of 14th June 1975.

As we are aware, following the speech made by François Mitterrand in The Hague in February 1984, France has also taken the initiative in the setting up of a military reconnaissance capability organised and controlled by the European countries in order to provide extra protection in the event of aggression. This initiative is based on the principle that Europe will only be able to sustain an adequate technological level if it first acquires a system of space transport and independent means of reconnaissance in space.

A joint effort therefore seems essential, although the cost is so enormous that there must first be a shared political will. A Franco-German working group has therefore just been formed to look into the joint construction of an observation satellite capable of matching the American satellite. This joint effort should be given our wholehearted political support.

At the same time, we do not want the issue of European involvement in the use of space to aggravate the East-West confrontation. Under pressure from the Europeans, it seems that the United States is having to adopt towards the Soviet Union a stance in which the reaffirmation of American power is accompanied by an increased readiness to engage in dialogue, particularly on space matters. We should therefore

Mr. Fourré (continued)

welcome the announcement on 22nd November of a resumption of talks between the superpowers, the preparatory meeting for which is planned for January 1985. It is reported that the resumed talks will cover "entirely fresh" negotiations and that the Soviet Union is no longer demanding the withdrawal or freezing of INF before engaging in a round of negotiations with the United States on nuclear and space weapons.

In view of the various points which I have just made very briefly because of the short time available I propose a number of amendments which I could not table in committee because of delay in translating Mr. Wilkinson's report. I apologise to our Rapporteur and trust that the Assembly will be prepared to accept my apologies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). - My warmest congratulations to Mr. Wilkinson on his very complete, very succinct report. It does honour to our Assembly to consider a document which is so important to the future of Europe. This debate itself has its part to play in the revitalisation of WEU.

The fact is that space questions are not examined at this level in the Strasbourg assembly which, all too often, is bogged down in more immediate questions like agricultural or tariff problems whose influence on the future of Europe is very slight indeed. Mr. Wilkinson's excellent report presents the current state of affairs extremely well and poses the vital question. If we in Europe do not react at once, the venture into space will give the United States and the Soviet Union an irretrievable technological lead.

If Europe fails to unite in an extensive space programme, we shall be the underdeveloped countries of the northern hemisphere twenty years hence. Are we sufficiently aware that the applications of the weightless conditions inside space stations will lead to nothing less than a technological revolution and to a new era in modern metallurgy, with far-reaching strategic consequences? Are we sufficiently aware that, without an independent space capability, Europe is bound to divulge the results of all the experiments which it conducts on board the American space shuttle?

Ladies and Gentlemen, while the European GNP amounts to 27% of the world figure as against the 25% of the world's GNP accounted for by the United States, the United States devotes 0.5% of its gross national product to space whereas our countries allocate a mere

0.05%, or ten times less. There you have one reason for Europe's political inexistence.

Mr. Wilkinson was right to deal at length with the United States SDI project. On a recent government-sponsored trip I had occasion in the Pentagon to meet General Abrahamson, who is in charge of this programme. I am convinced that the United States will press ahead.

This raises two questions for Europe: will the United States anti-ballistic project operate to the advantage of Europe? If the reply to the first question is affirmative, as indeed it is, the problem for us Europeans is to know whether our researchers and our industries will be involved in the project. It is the very survival of our technology which is at stake here. If we are excluded, Europe will have to develop its own space system.

Mr. President, WEU can play a vital rôle in this situation. As a first step, it would certainly be very useful if our Assembly invited those in charge of the American SDI project to come over here to tell us about it. General Abrahamson would be delighted to accept such an invitation.

I shall conclude, Mr. President, by pointing out that Europe possesses all the skills needed for space projects. The achievements of Ariane and Spacelab demonstrate that we possess the technology and the scientific expertise to take part in the most ambitious space projects. I congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on the very comprehensive character of his recommendations to the Council and I hope that the Council of Ministers of WEU will examine them very closely.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Klejdzinski for a quick point of order.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak.

I just wanted to explain that we social democrats are fundamentally opposed to the use of space for any military purpose. I am, however, aware that a country or group of countries will certainly not be among the world's economic and political leaders next century unless it is able to use space technology.

As a matter of principle I should like to say that I cannot endorse any activities of WEU aimed chiefly at turning it into a centre for concerting military space programmes, even if the defensive nature of all such initiatives is emphasised here.

On behalf of the social democrats I can only say that we should seriously consider referring this report back to the appropriate committee, because I am fully convinced that a report of this complexity is in need of revision, after the wide-

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

ranging debate we have had here. If necessary, we shall make a proposal to this effect at the end of the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a very important debate. The question now is whether this Assembly will rise to the magnitude of the issues involved and make appropriate decisions. We cannot wish away what the superpowers are engaged in in this area. We might wish that they were not doing it, but we know that they are embarked on significant and increasingly important military space programmes. I hope that this Assembly, which is the sole organisation in Europe competent to make the appropriate strategic response, will make it.

First, Mr. Klejdzinski went beyond scepticism to a fairly wide-ranging critique of this report. Obviously, were space-based defence against ballistic missiles possible, it would be costly. The question is, first, whether such a defence is feasible – that is what the strategic defence initiative is about – and, secondly, whether, if it is feasible, it is cost-effective. Then there is the question whether, even if there were no space-based defence, the creation of a new generation of offensive systems would not be even more costly than the creation of a space-based defence. These are the questions that we are addressing. That is why we need the strategic defence initiative to continue.

We should not delude ourselves. Whatever we may vote here, the strategic defence initiative will continue. That is the purpose of the United States administration. The United States administration, and certainly the Russians, will regard us West Europeans as even more impotent – even more insignificant than usual – if we just pull the blanket over our heads and pretend that these things are not happening. Mr. Klejdzinski suggested that these developments were somehow destabilising.

For a number of years the Soviet Union has been engaged in a massive programme of amelioration of its strategic offensive nuclear capability. One has only to look at the modernisation of the SS-19 ICBMs and the Typhoon-class submarine – the biggest nuclear-powered submarine in the world – for the launch of strategic weapons. Although there has been some reduction in the increase in military spending on conventional forces by the Soviet Union, there has not been any reduction in the increase in spending on its offensive nuclear capabilities or on its space programme.

Let us pursue and support this strategic defence initiative, let us find out what the conclusions are, and let us concert our position in Europe. Then, when the United States administration make their decision, I hope that we shall have a unified position and that our relations with our American allies will be so good that we can influence the decision. If we opt out of the process and wish that it were not happening, we shall have little influence when the decision is made.

Mr. Cavaliere referred to a treaty for the banning of the military use of space and to the Soviet Union's efforts in space. I ask the Assembly to remember that in the June report, which was adopted and which we in no sense go back on – indeed, it was the foundation for this report – we recommended just such a treaty. That recommendation stands. It is a recommendation that we uphold and that I support.

Mr. Scheer made an interesting and challenging speech in which he suggested that somehow this report had diverged from the position that we adopted in June. That is not so. The purpose behind this report is to show that research into space-based defence systems could provide an impetus towards dialogue on arms control and, we hope, agreement on mutual balanced and verifiable nuclear disarmament. Up to now the Soviets have believed that by piling offensive system on offensive system they could obtain a strategic superiority that would give them political advantages and benefits.

Any space-based defence, even the most perfect that could be envisaged, will not be 100% effective. We are talking not about 100% defence, but about defence that could make a pre-emptive attack incredible. That is a very important factor. I do not think that is in any way destabilising. Offensive systems have an almost 100% chance of getting through to targets on land. If that possibility were diminished by a significant degree, our security would be enhanced.

Mr. Tummers rightly referred to the amendment that we adopted to have a symposium, sponsored by this Assembly, on all these matters. Our committee is engaged in preparing such a venture. I cannot pre-empt the committee's deliberations – the committee is to meet this evening – but we intend to hold a symposium in Munich at which the possible uses and applications of space relevant to Europe will be discussed.

Le défi spatial pour l'Europe could be the subject of this symposium. It is a timely subject. It will give us an opportunity to go more deeply into all these matters. If we approach that symposium having rejected this report, it will look as though we do not want to address ourselves seriously to the subject. This

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

report will be the basic information document. I hope that we do not reject it.

Mr. de Vries embarked on a passionate opposition to the report. That surprised me, because the report is in no way dogmatic. It is very much the opposite. It is asking questions. Indeed, it is begging questions. It is begging this Assembly to put to itself the question that it does not wish to address to itself.

Mr. de Vries, who has a great interest in this Assembly as well as in the North Atlantic Assembly and in his own parliament in the Netherlands, suggested that the report ignored the implications of the militarisation of space for European security. I think that is very wide of the mark. I do not believe that a space-based defence would in any way diminish the effectiveness of our deterrent. It would enhance our security. As far as conventional forces are concerned, the problem always has been that we have the potential adversary on our doorstep. If we do not have sufficient conventional forces, he can within a few days march into our countries.

So a conventional defence would be as necessary as ever and the doctrine of flexible response would be as valid as ever. Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, in a characteristically generous, objective and realistic speech, made clear that it is no good our just wishing away the developments. The Soviet space programme, for good or ill, is actually largely a military programme. That is the whole basis of what they are engaged upon. Mr. Spies von Bülesheim referred to the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments in paragraph 2 of the recommendation. If we turn down this report, we shall be refusing ourselves an opportunity to create a new and worthwhile rôle for WEU as a whole, for the Standing Armaments Committee on industrial aspects, the Agency for the Control of Armaments for arms control aspects – and that is an aspect of close interest to our electors – and of course for this Assembly as a forum for reflection and of course as a sponsor of symposia such as the one we are to hold in Munich.

Last but by no means least, Mr. De Decker in a contribution of great warmth, cogency and clarity made clear to us that half the United States space effort is military and that they spend ten times as much on space as we do. Can we ignore that challenge?

In Europe we can say that we shall just go on with our traditional technologies. Man may go to the moon, and beyond to the stars, may create the means to analyse the resources of this earth and communicate messages around the globe and beyond and so on, but we shall choose to

ignore it. If that is the choice for Europe, heaven help us, for we shall deserve the underdeveloped status of which Mr. De Decker so forcefully warned us. We have to pose ourselves the basic question: will an ABM defence be helpful to Europe? I believe that it will, because such an anti-ballistic missile defence would not just be valid for European defence and American defence but would be a defence for the free world and a defence against the inadvertent launch of missiles, of war by miscalculation and all these spectres that haunt us. We have to know what the European rôle will be and if we do not analyse these matters and deal with them thoroughly and regularly and in depth, we shall not come up with the right answers.

We have had a very good debate and I welcome it. I would say to Mr. Fourré that I regret that the pressures of time overcame the translators and that they were unable to translate the text into French as soon as he would have wished but I accept the force of one of his amendments to which I will later be sympathetic, at least in part. I believe that the paragraph which is critical of the Soviet Union for not coming to the conference table should be withdrawn since we are now to have arms control talks in January, which is a thoroughly welcome development. I hope that that has been helpful to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have just a few brief comments to make at the end of this very interesting debate. I will begin by thanking the Rapporteur on behalf of the committee for this excellent report. Once again he has given proof of his extraordinary competence in the fields of aviation and space travel.

Differing political views are, of course, an accepted fact. I should therefore like to thank those who have helped to enliven the debate with their critical remarks. However, I will say now on the committee's behalf that I will oppose any request for a postponement of the vote and insist on its being taken today.

On 8th November 1984 the committee approved the draft recommendation by a large majority of nine votes to only one against, with two abstentions, as the report itself states, and I feel the Assembly should do the same.

As regards the colloquy, the Rapporteur has already pointed out that today's decision will not, of course, mark the end of WEU's work or, more particularly, the work of the appropriate committee. We shall be considering these

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

issues again in depth at a colloquy to be held in Munich next September.

Of late it has become almost fashionable to discuss space questions. The calendar for the space debate includes numerous important dates in this year alone, from the American President's offer to the Europeans in his state of the union message of a share in the manned space station, through the proposal by President Mitterrand on 7th February 1984 to consider the idea of a European space community, to a date of technological importance as well: the successful launching of Ariane 3 on 4th August 1984.

In many European countries the continued development of the European Ariane launcher and participation in the American space station are under discussion at the moment. I do not think we can therefore accuse the Rapporteur of overlooking the need for a critical appraisal through sheer enthusiasm. We are simply faced with the alternative of playing an active part in the opinion-forming process or taking no further part in this debate. I do not think we can accept the second of these options.

Nor do I see how there can be opposition to the call for active involvement in the opinion-forming process, reaching agreement between ourselves and a joint European position in WEU's activities. I do not see this as conflicting with the decisions taken by the WEU governments, and I would point out in this context that pessimism leads nowhere. All the prophecies of doom in my country about the implementation of the NATO twofold decision and the "ice age" that would follow have not been fulfilled after all.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let us take a decision today. Instead of trying to hush up the facts we should be noting them and drawing the logical conclusions. The report calls for further deliberation. We must not bury our heads in the sand as things develop. I call on you to take a decision today and thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer, on a point of order.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a number of amendments have been tabled by Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion. I assume that, if these amendments were put to the vote, they would be adopted, but before we take a vote on amendments, I call on the Assembly to consider whether this report should not be referred back to the committee, on the following grounds.

First, if it were referred back, we would not be left empty-handed by any means, because we

adopted one report in June. In other words, it is not as if we would have no basis at all. We are quite prepared to build on the foundations laid in June.

Second, we could then hold the colloquy on which we agreed in June, discuss it in committee and then report to the Assembly again. It would be better if we brought the second report into line with the aims of the first and also with the aims set out in the amendments.

I would therefore prefer the report to be referred back to the committee and to the colloquy for discussion. I ask that this proposal be put to the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The Assembly has before it a proposal for reference back to the committee.

I call Mr. Jung to speak against this proposal.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very surprised at the request for reference back of such an important document. I am convinced that this is an area where WEU must really show its strength, and I agree with Mr. De Decker that we should have the courage of our convictions in a matter of such capital importance to the future of the world and of Europe.

I fail to understand therefore how a young parliamentarian can bring himself to ask that the document be referred back to committee just because he is afraid to take the necessary decision. We, as Europeans, have to stand up for ourselves between the United States and Russia and we should shoulder our responsibilities and accept the report.

I, too, congratulate Mr. Wilkinson who has defined our responsibilities very positively and clearly. I also associate myself with Mr. De Decker's remarks: either we move forward together in a positive fashion and in collaboration with each other or we run the risk of one day becoming an underdeveloped part of the world. We do not want that to happen, and we must therefore display a proper sense of responsibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - In accordance with the provisions of Rule 32, I now call the committee Chairman.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I refer the Assembly to the arguments advanced by the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, and to Mr. Jung's remarks and oppose this proposal on the committee's behalf. I call for a vote here and now!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to add one word to what was said by the Chairman of the committee and by my colleague, Mr. Jung.

It would be most unfortunate if, before we had even considered the important amendments tabled by well-qualified members of the committee, we sought to throw the report back to the committee. We should go through the amendments, see how they affect the text and then come to a decision on whether we want to vote for or against the report or whether we want to throw it back to the committee. To prejudge an important debate on some well-thought-out amendments at this time would be a strange way to proceed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote the proposal for reference back to committee moved by Mr. Scheer.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The motion for reference back is not agreed to.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to give an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Explanations of vote normally come at the end of the sitting, but, as the procedure is a special one, you may speak, Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I abstained from these votes because I would have preferred the Rapporteur's proposal to be accepted and because there are a number of remarks I should like to make. Like the rest of my colleagues, I unfortunately have little time to explain the attitude of our group to this report. It is true that the presentation of these amendments and the result of the vote itself should today have provided a better opportunity for determining the possibility or otherwise of carrying over consideration of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before voting on the draft recommendation, we have to consider the amendments.

Five amendments to this text have been tabled by Mr. Fourré.

Amendment 1 is worded as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Noting the difficulty of resuming negotiations between the two superpowers, due in particular to the link between space problems and the START and INF negotiations, and considering that under the pressure of opinion at home and among its allies the United States must adopt a position towards the Soviet Union in which the reaffirmation of American

power is accompanied by a more marked preparedness for dialogue, particularly on space questions;”.

I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – This amendment proposes the rewording of paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. As we all know, the position is that the Soviet Union like the United States has responded to the need to enter into dialogue on the problem of the military use of space. By this amendment I am therefore suggesting that the area of the present debate should be shifted a little in response to these important indications of a change of posture between the two superpowers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The drafting of the draft recommendation was somewhat overtaken by events, which is not an unusual occurrence in the Assembly. From the outset, I should like to make it clear that in present circumstances it would be wholly inappropriate to use language in the draft recommendation that might make more difficult the process of restoring dialogue and engaging in fruitful arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, I ask the committee to delete in its entirety paragraph (*iii*) in the preamble to the draft recommendation because, as you will note, Mr. President, it is somewhat hostile in its tone to the Soviet Union, which is unfortunate in present circumstances. However, equally, I do not think that we should substitute for paragraph (*iii*) wording that is hostile to the United States, which is perhaps the case with Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion. It is best to have no blame and to be even-handed. We should give every encouragement to the process of dialogue, the possible restoration of détente and certainly the fruitful process of arms control.

Therefore, with the permission of the Assembly, I urge that we delete in its entirety paragraph (*iii*) and substitute Amendment 2.

That amendment was also tabled by Mr. Fourré and by Mr. Pignion. It is excellent in its tone and summarises the present position admirably. Therefore, I would accept Amendment 2 to replace paragraph (*iii*).

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Fourré, are you prepared to withdraw your amendment?

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 1 is therefore withdrawn.

Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion have tabled Amendment 2 as follows:

2. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“ Welcoming the announcement made on 22nd November 1984 in a joint communiqué issued by Tass and the United States Department of State of the probable opening of negotiations on all problems relating to nuclear and space weapons; ”.

The committee has tabled a sub-amendment proposing that “ After paragraph (iv) ” be replaced by “ Leave out paragraph (iii) ”.

We will now vote on this proposal.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The sub-amendment is agreed to.

I now put to the vote Amendment 2 as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion have tabled Amendment 3 as follows:

3. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “ governments ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“ to obtain, in the framework of possible co-operation on the proposed NASA space station, full guarantees regarding the conditions of this co-operation, thus leaving open the possibility of developing an independent European space station, ”.

I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment concerns the efforts which might be made by the European Space Agency and national governments in connection with the NASA space station. As we shall learn from the report to be presented by Mr. Hill shortly, the committee has already expressed the hope that this possible collaboration should be conducted with the necessary concern for reciprocity at every step.

I have tabled Amendment 3 with this in mind so as to leave open the possibility of an independent European space station as suggested by President Mitterrand some time ago.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I have great pleasure in accepting the amendment, which is well drafted and which reinforces the essential message that was contained in the original paragraph (vii). As Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion have emphasised in their amendment, it is important to secure reciprocity and guarantees and, above all, to create the technical capacity for an autonomous European space station. The French Government have always appreciated the importance to Europe's development of an expanding European space programme, and they understand well the implications of space technology to military matters. Because of what the French Government have done in providing the initiative of the Mitterrand declaration and because of the industrial benefits that could ensue from the amendment, I urge the Assembly to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion have tabled Amendment 4 as follows:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ Alliance ” to the end of the paragraph.

I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – This amendment is in line with the spirit of the debate we have just had, that is to say, subject to widely varying interpretations. As I tried to make clear in my very brief speech, the question is whether this debate should provide an opportunity for defining our respective positions or whether we must, today, declare our attitude to a new concept of strategic defence involving the military use of space.

I do not believe that this debate is closed. On the contrary, this draft recommendation allows us to proceed further, if everyone recognises all the different positions and not just that of the United States. A short time ago I referred to France's position. My Amendment 5 is in line with that. So, accepting paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation as it stands would not allow us to take the matter further and would mean committing ourselves at once to a new initiative despite the fact that we are not yet fully equipped to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Fourré, may I take it that you have also spoken in support of Amendment 5?

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion have tabled Amendment 5 as follows:

5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Take into account the proposal made by France at the disarmament conference held in Geneva in June 1984 that negotiations be held on the military use of space leading to commitments which are limited with regard to anti-satellite systems, progressive with regard to a test ban and verifiable with regard to improving the existing system for notifying the launching of objects into space. ”

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 4 and 5?...

What is the committee's view concerning these two amendments?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – With the leave of the Assembly, I shall deal with one amendment at a time. They are separate and distinct and they merit individual consideration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A separate vote will, of course, be taken on Amendments 4 and 5.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In that case, may I say that I accept Amendment 5. I propose a counter-amendment to Amendment 4, which will be more satisfactory and which contains the essence of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation. To meet the arguments of Mr. Fourré and Mr. Pignion, and to improve the present wording, I suggest the following:

“ Maintain the closest liaison with the United States Government about the strategic defence initiative ”,

so that we are fully informed of what is going on. The word “ benefits ” might be misinterpreted. I urge the retention of the words:

“ and suggest a space planning group be established within NATO to that end ”.

The reason for that is that the strategic defence initiative must have implications for the other European members of NATO such as Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain and Greece. The dialogue should take place within NATO so that those countries can be kept fully informed about the strategic defence initiative. I urge the Assembly to adopt my counter amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – The closing time for amendments is at the beginning of the debate, and the reason for a closing time is so that everyone knows the amendments to which we must speak. That

should be especially true of the Rapporteur. It is not right that he should introduce new amendments and compromises in the last minutes of the debate. It shows that either the Rapporteur does not know about the amendments that we have been discussing for the past two or three hours, or that the entire report should be sent back to the committee. It is impossible to deal with a new amendment that has been presented by the Rapporteur at the last moment. I believe that it is against the procedural rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have noted your remarks, Mr. Gansel.

We decided, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, that all amendments should be tabled at the correct time before the sitting, and that has been done. However, the Rapporteur is quite at liberty, during the sitting, to comment in detail on behalf of the committee on amendments which have been properly tabled. Mr. Wilkinson has just tabled a sub-amendment. It may be treated as an amendment but it is, by its nature, a document arising from the debate during the sitting. I therefore rule that the Rapporteur's proposal be considered.

Does Mr. Fourré agree with Mr. Wilkinson's proposal or not?

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – If I have properly understood the translation, Mr. President, Mr. Wilkinson's proposal is an improvement on the initial text approved by the committee. But our Amendment 4 goes further. We want to keep room for future manoeuvre based on a real discussion of the different concepts of strategic defence and the military use of space. As it is now organised, the debate seems to freeze the position. No doubt there is a need to maintain very close links between the United States Government and ourselves, but I would prefer the consequences of initiatives to be examined in a different report, at another time and with a different timetable. I therefore prefer to maintain Amendment 4 as tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It would be for the convenience of the committee if I accepted the amendment, which I do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate on the amendments is closed.

I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The President (continued)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 993 as just amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present request a vote by roll-call.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call?...

Since a vote by roll-call has not been requested, I now put the draft recommendation, as amended, to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Mr. Scheer for an explanation of vote.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am giving this explanation of vote on behalf of all the members who voted against.

Our opinion is reflected in what was adopted by the Assembly in June and in Amendment 5. As Amendment 5 conflicts with the remarks made by Mr. Wilkinson, who fully supports the strategic defence initiative, we could not simply ignore this inconsistency. We were therefore forced to vote against.

6. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 992 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology, Document 992 and amendments.

I call Mr. Hill, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – This report on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology is the last in a series of reports which the committee started from the very beginning of its existence in 1966.

1. See page 22.

Scientific, technological and aerospace questions are necessarily questions that have to be answered in an international framework. What is more logical than to study them in the world's most advanced democracy?

The Presidential Committee realised this from the very outset and the committee is most grateful that it has again been able to visit the United States to be briefed on a series of questions it submitted in advance to the Departments of Defence, State and Energy, as well as to NASA in Washington.

I should like to express my appreciation and that of the committee to the staff of the United States Embassy in Paris, the Departments of Defence, State and Energy and NASA in Washington and the eminent leaders of the aerospace industries whom the committee met during its visit between 9th and 22nd July this year.

To consider this aspect of the visit first, all the aerospace companies that the committee visited were convinced that close links between Europe and the United States had to be maintained if western civilisation was to remain in the vanguard of technological developments. An example I cite here is research on forward-swept wings for tactical aircraft, the so-called X-29A of the Grumman Corporation. This development is also being studied in Europe and it might revolutionise aircraft design in the years to come. Another significant development is the concept of stealth aircraft, which also belongs to the future. Such aircraft cannot, or not easily, be detected by radar.

I should also mention the modular automatic test equipment programme, or MATE, by Sperry – a computerised test equipment programme which can be readily adapted and deployed to meet all the needs of new avionic systems. Another example is Nexrad, the next-generation radar system, which is capable of detecting severe weather conditions. This offers great potential for application in Europe and throughout the world. Another interesting development in the aerospace industry is the policy of not building new aircraft, because of the cost, but of re-equipping and re-engining existing airframes in order to prolong their operational flying time. I also wish to mention the United States-British development of the Harrier II aircraft and the rôles played by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation and British Aerospace. This is an example of United States-European co-operation in high technology products. Although there are still many difficulties to be overcome in this type of co-operation, at least this is a start for future developments.

Of great importance, too, is the exchange of manpower between Europe and the United

Mr. Hill (continued)

States. For instance, TRW has some 20,000 staff in Europe. One great problem is that reserves of qualified staff are not sufficient and TRW therefore has to hire out staff to European firms in order to produce new electronic equipment for weapons systems, for instance, or drilling systems for new sources of energy.

On the government side, the committee had most interesting briefings by representatives of the Department of Defence on research and technological developments. One of the political subjects discussed was technology and security and the steps to be taken in order to control the transfer of products and technology to Warsaw Pact countries. In research and development the Pentagon gives the highest priority to computers and very high-speed integrated circuits which have a capability for massive and fast data-processing. High on the priority list, too, are stealth aircraft, advanced software and microprocessing. The committee will discuss this subject in its next report by Mr. Fourré, and Western Europe will have to launch a collaborative programme, if only to avoid being bypassed in software technology by the United States and Japan.

Finally, I come to one of the most interesting aspects of the visit – space station developments now being undertaken by NASA together with many aerospace companies. The committee came to the conclusion that NASA and ESA already have a long collaborative experience and Europe also has a body that can act on its behalf. The committee is convinced that manned space stations are the kind of programme that can provide a stimulus for technological development leading to a stronger economy and improved quality of life. Europe should therefore carefully consider the United States invitation to participate in the development of such a station.

In the draft recommendation the committee has mentioned the guarantees, mentioned also in the previous debate, which Europe should obtain if the space station project is to become a collaborative effort. The committee mentioned specifically:

“(a) information access to the entire space station system ;”

We do not want to be excluded from any part of the project even though we will be a minor partner ; and the document gives the details. Of the \$8,000 million programme we are expected to fund to the extent of \$1,000 million.

“(b) equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufacturing facilities on the space station ;”

This is absolutely essential if we are to get the fullest co-operation.

“(c) access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it ;”

as is the norm now.

“(d) European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station hardware ;”

It is essential that in the module frame we are responsible in its entirety for one specific area.

I hope that the Assembly will accept the committee's recommendations. I know that the visit was extremely enjoyable. All members of the committee were very hard working, ably led by Mr. Lenzer, our Chairman, and there are many aspects of the document which I have not the time to stress.

We were all fairly disappointed at one stage by the lack of progress in the signing of the Law of the Sea Convention. It was categorically spelt out to us that the United States had no intention of signing it. Nevertheless, I feel we have to include it in the document because it is a European concept that as many signatories as possible are added to the treaty. At the end of the document I have included one paragraph on that.

I have taken up enough time already, in view of your strictures on time, Mr. President. I should like to recommend the document to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Hill. I congratulate you on your work and on the excellent report you have presented to the Assembly, and I am very grateful to you for your brevity, which I greatly appreciate.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: Sir John Biggs-Davison as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Ward ; Mr. Ward as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Sir Frederic Bennett.

Is there any opposition ?...

These nominations are agreed to.

**8. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 992 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

3. Control of armaments and disarmament (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 998 and amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 4th December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 992 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Böhm, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Worrell, Lord Kinnoull, Mr. Hill (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman of the committee*).
4. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Luce to questions put by: Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hill, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Morris, Mr. de Vries, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Pignion, Sir Frederic Bennett.
5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc 992 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Hill, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Hill.
6. Control of armaments and disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 998 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Haase, Mr. Milani, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Scheer, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Jäger, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Pignion, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Haase, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹. See page 27.

3. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 992 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 992 and amendments.

In the debate I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Rapporteur has made an extremely good impression with his report on a subject with which he is very familiar. It also contains some interesting information, which does, however, vary in nature and quality. The compilation of an extensive list of questions, shown in Appendix II, also inspires confidence in the approach to this complex subject matter. This does not make my task any easier, because I do feel that some criticism is called for.

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

The report on the information, comments and impressions gained during the committee's visit to the United States does not comprise a systematic treatment of the list of questions I have just applauded. This results in an irritating lack of clarity and even some contradictions. Furthermore, the report unfortunately makes one thing abundantly clear: if we compare the situation in mid- and late-1984 with, for example, the report of the colloquy organised by the same committee in London in February 1982, it is clear that Western Europe has made next to no progress. Should this European aspect not have been considered in greater depth? Co-operation means, after all, co-operation between Western Europe and the United States, between government and industry. This is only possible where there is a certain level of both technological and financial equality. I feel the report suffers from the lack of a genuine analytical comparison, a confrontation, if you like, of the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance in this respect.

There is another aspect to be considered. Co-operation in the implementation of a global concept is quite different from the serial production of smaller systems. In the latter case it is necessary – certainly for Western Europe – to consider the possibility of achieving a required minimum, the volume of production, what this means as regards numbers of spare parts and so on.

The next criticism I have to make concerns the enthusiasm that has been expressed over the permanently manned space station. This eagerness is an obvious reflection of views and desires expressed by people in American industrial circles and in NASA, to whom the committee talked. Was not a report entitled "Surveillance space stations and the United States' future in space" published in the United States a few weeks ago? That report argues against NASA's planning or reopens the discussion on it. Should Western European Union not establish the pros and cons and at least put these problems to our governments before we, as responsible parliamentarians, invite member governments to participate in and make guaranteed agreements on this space station, as the draft recommendation does?

For several years a kind of financial adventurism or exaggerated optimism was rampant in almost all our countries. There has even been a book on the subject in France. In my own country we indulged in a very ingenious, but extremely costly system of dykes and in the expensive business of assisting and reorganising firms, with very little success. True, that was in the 1960s and 1970s. But it would be a mistake to think that another country, parliament or

government will be ready to sign a blank cheque in the 1980s, even for a space station.

A grave deficiency of this report is the absence of an assessment based on an analysis of the relative facts and figures, which is so essential to every member of the legislature. The most obvious example of this, I find, is the remark on the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. Where did that line of thinking suddenly spring from? Had Icarus climbed so high that he plunged into the ocean depths? The whole convention is extremely complicated. I am fairly familiar with it, and perhaps it covers too much ground. Multinational companies differ in their views on the convention. British Petroleum seems to be clearly opposed. Royal Dutch Shell appears to be in favour: at least its former president Wagner spoke in favour of it earlier this year. Governments, too, at least where democracies which consult their parliaments are concerned, have taken different stands. Moscow has already laid claim to the future results of the exploitation of the seabed, thus trying yet again to benefit from the efforts of our capitalist society without investing a penny itself. What I find wrong is the expression here of an opinion like this, culminating in a recommendation, backed by so few arguments and really based entirely on Mr. Eskine's statement.

As I said before, it is a good report, but it does not deal adequately with all the problems connected with each point. I therefore believe another report is needed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Böhm.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are in the process of strengthening WEU as the European pillar of NATO. Europe's future freedom depends on its remaining a close ally of the United States. The reactivation of WEU will give this alliance added momentum, but Europe's future will also depend on its success in not only maintaining but also improving on its present technological standards. This too will necessitate close co-operation between Western Europe and the United States, for the benefit of both.

Mr. Hill's report makes this abundantly clear. The improvement and intensification of scientific and technological co-operation are shown conclusively to be vital to the alliance. The desire for closer technological co-operation with the United States expressed in the recommendations and the report is also proof, however, that the planned reactivation of WEU will not be a step down some specifically European road but a step towards strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Our efforts in WEU form part of the response to the increasingly

Mr. Böhm (continued)

urgent question as to the importance for Europe in political, economic and above all security policy terms of rapid developments in the area of advanced technology.

The furious rate of advance in microelectronics, telecommunications and space technology, particularly in Japan and the United States – as we were able to see for ourselves during the committee's visit – is exercising a growing influence on the social, economic and military situation in all the industrialised countries.

What part is Europe playing in this technological process? Europe has fallen behind in some areas of advanced technology, such as integrated circuits and basic technology in the whole field of electronics. But on the whole I think Europe bears comparison economically and technologically with other parts of the world. The decline in its share of the world market must not be overdramatised. We must see it as a challenge. Efforts must also be made to counteract the hostility to technology that has emerged, particularly in Germany, and to improve co-operation with the United States. But above all else Europe must take advantage of its unified market of 260 million people and increase transfrontier co-operation.

The evident success of joint efforts such as Airbus and the area of space technology can be taken as a model in this respect. Europe can and will gain in importance, both as a potential partner in technological co-operation projects and as a competitor in international markets. Then – and only then – will Japan and the United States continue to take an interest in Europe as a market for the products of their advanced technology.

It must not be forgotten that the United States' lead in various sectors is due in part to the deliberate injection of public funds, a course which is not open to us in Europe in this form.

Of the United States 1985 defence budget of some \$293,000 million, about \$34,000 million is earmarked for research, development and testing. Public and private-sector spending on research and development will amount to around \$100,000 million. Such orders of magnitude are inconceivable in our continent.

Of all the government-financed research projects in the United States, some 70% are devoted to military research. Many of these also benefit the civil sector and improve its efficiency and competitiveness in the world.

Reference must be made in this context to the need for a balance between European arms procurement in the United States and United States procurement in Europe, the present ratio of 7 : 1

being far from satisfactory from the European point of view. Armaments co-operation must not remain a one-way street: it must become a two-way street. Mr. Hill's report refers to actual projects, the fighter aircraft and the military helicopter, for example. It also insists that, if Europe intends to keep up as a third force in space, it must participate in the space station project. I consider co-operation as partners on properly established terms to be the economically acceptable option here.

Smooth co-operation in the field of advanced technology is in the interests of all concerned. WEU should regard the encouragement of such co-operation as one of its principal tasks. Mr. Hill's report will form a suitable basis for discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur for his excellent work and for his skilful handling of United States-European co-operation in advanced technology. He will perhaps allow me, however, to make a minor criticism concerning the body of the report. I find that he is inclined to equate NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. I am aware that all the non-French members sometimes attach less importance to this distinction than we do, but we must be exact in our terminology and must distinguish between the respective areas covered by NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. Having made this point, which is not fundamental to the report's content, I repeat my congratulations to the Rapporteur.

With regard to the emerging technologies, the report makes clear what has been due to the initiative of the Pentagon and what has been taken up subsequently, more especially on the initiative of the Independent European Programme Group. The writer very properly emphasises – and this is an important point which cannot be made often enough – that if there is no co-operation between the various countries of Europe the result will be a combination of waste, an inability to maintain ourselves at the highest possible technological level and, very soon, an inability even to keep up with scientific progress.

In the report which I had the honour of presenting to the Assembly two years ago I also emphasised this point, and I think it is well to do so again.

While the necessary financial outlay is certainly great, these funds must be employed with discrimination, that is to say in areas where they are likely to produce good returns.

The question we always have to answer in this connection is whether the necessary and vital

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

relations which must continue to exist, and which do and will always exist between the European countries and the United States will do so between the United States and the community of European countries speaking as far as possible with one voice and pooling their resources, their inventive capability, their drive and their creative imagination or, alternatively, between the United States and each of our countries individually. In the latter case the imbalance in the relationship can become excessive, as we well know.

This point cannot be overstated. It is not just the problem of co-operation between the European countries and the United States which has to be faced; we also have to ask whether this co-operation takes place between European countries as a group and the United States.

I welcome the thrust of the report and would now like to direct my attention to certain parts of it.

To take the example of the future fighter aircraft, five European countries including France have joined in the feasibility study. Mr. Charles Hernu, our Minister of Defence, has stated that this project is the only way for us to maintain a presence at a high level in the aircraft industry against competition from the United States and Japan. If this is not done, our military procurement in ten years' time will be from America.

On the subject of European participation in the American space station project, the draft recommendation rightly states the conditions on which such co-operation would be beneficial to Europe. International participation in the programme was, in fact, approved at the last London summit in June 1984. NASA has indicated that European participation in the project will be set at 20% to 25% of the investment, or \$5,000 million. The point must be made that our European countries are wary of repeating the Spacelab experiment, as a result of which they now have to lease from NASA a system whose development they helped to fund. Furthermore, the European Space Agency is not convinced by the assurances which have been given to the effect that the space station project will be purely civil in character, and hesitates to take part in a programme whose rôle might prove to be military.

Another major worry in our countries relates to the cost in terms of substitution. A number of critics believe that the space station project will adversely affect certain scientific programmes by diverting funds away from them. However, in some areas, Europe has acquired enough experience to play a full part in the engi-

neering of certain components of the space station: the Eureka automatic recoverable platform programme, the German/Italian Columbus programme and the ESA long-term preparatory programme for space transport systems started in January 1983.

It follows that Europe could well look for a more equitable agreement on the international project launched by NASA.

The difficulties arising from technology transfers across the Atlantic must also be quickly overcome.

An exclusively European space station project has been mooted in a number of statements. I would remind you that the speech made by the President of France in The Hague on 7th February 1984 was along these lines: "There is a need for Europe to be able to launch a manned space station capable of observation and transmission and therefore of countering any possible threat".

Finally, I regret the fact that the draft recommendation under discussion by WEU draws attention only to the rôle of the IEPG without mentioning anywhere the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee in contributing to the development of European co-operation in the field of arms programmes. I shall therefore table an appropriate amendment, which I hope the Rapporteur will accept.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling the next speaker on the list I would like to welcome Mr. Richard Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. I thank him for coming to this Assembly to address us shortly.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are considering two major subjects today: the militarisation of space this morning and now co-operation between the United States and Europe in advanced technology, sometimes known as ultra-technology, presented in a well-written and very discriminating report.

One might think that these two subjects were quite unrelated, but I feel they are inseparable as regards the scientific statements they make, while their viewpoints must be considered and assessed quite distinctly. This is even truer today, if I may say so, and that is the more serious problem.

The world must be kept intact for future generations. It is only on loan to us. We should remember this when we pass judgment on technology and its future prospects.

Mr. Hill has submitted a report on co-operation between the United States and Europe

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

in advanced technology, which I have read with great interest and attention. It gives us a good insight into the United States' present industrial potential and must, I believe, be seen as a challenge to us Europeans. It also tells us about the areas in which research work is going on, the limits really being a matter for the imagination.

Some people are already claiming that advanced technology is the political power tool of the future, and I would not dare to contradict the people who make this claim.

I should like to pick out two fundamental statements. First, the United States administration and Congress keep the civilian and military aircraft market closed to European imports. Second, I share the Rapporteur's view that the one-way street, meaning that we may only buy technological products, must become a two-way street for the exchange of highly sophisticated technology. I very much welcome the suggestion that, when joint development of weapons is needed, selection should be based on competitive procedures. We Germans have had experience in this field with our Leopard 2 tank.

Third, we Europeans do not want simply to be invited to help finance expensive programmes: we want proper work-sharing, in which we develop our own components with a substantial technology element, not forgetting the spin-off effect of other product lines, especially in the case of aviation and space technology programmes. We are all aware of the Americans' high technical standards or technical know-how in the fields of super-computers, data-processing, optical systems, sensors, microelectronics, robotics, artificial intelligence, telecommunications, miniaturisation, guidance – avionics or inertial navigation – laser technology and laser micro-holography. We Europeans must regard these as a challenge.

We must seek co-operation wherever we have something appropriate to offer, but we expect our American friends to be fair partners.

We have an efficient industry in Europe, and we must reach agreements beyond Europe's frontiers. We must also think – if I may remind you of this – of the many skilled jobs held in this sector of European industry, which must be preserved. The co-operation among a number of European countries in the production of the Tornado weapons system is, in my view, an example of our efficiency and our ability to do good work when we want to.

I must also say I find it extremely regrettable that it has not yet proved possible to persuade the United States to sign the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. It was very late in announcing that its signature depended

on the deep-sea mining régime. Unfortunately, the christian democrats in the Federal Republic have adopted a similar position and so cast doubt on the siting of the International Tribunal in Hamburg. They have thus lost the chance of being represented on the preparatory committee and using it to try and change the deep-sea mining régime. I personally would have liked to see the Europeans agreeing amongst themselves, because this decision is particularly harmful to relations with the third-world countries.

In this context, I would also point out that not only space technology but also deep-sea technology will be a key technology in the future. Through international co-operation with developing countries we Europeans could have provided the necessary support, with our advanced technology, to enable those who are always left behind to participate in the exploitation of marine resources.

We Europeans should seize every opportunity this report offers us. I therefore consider it to be a good and comprehensive report. It has the support of the social democrats in the Federal Republic.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Worrell.

Mr. WORRELL (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by thanking the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, for the clear and extensive information he has provided on all kinds of aspects of military and technological developments in the areas of space and energy.

Many members have already spoken, and I can therefore confine myself to a few brief comments. Mr. Hill implies in his recommendations that he has reservations about European participation in the space station project. The ESA member countries have decided to participate in the development of this project and to bear a not inconsiderable portion – namely \$1,000 million – of the \$8,000 million development costs over the next eight years.

It is important, of course, that the United States should be able to develop a project of this kind in co-operation with Europe following a critical analysis of the present situation. But it must then be perfectly clear that Europe can play a full part in this project. During our visit to the United States, however, it emerged that there are grave doubts about ESA's full participation in this project. It is not clear whether Europe and the American companies would be able to participate in the development of the space station project on a basis of equality. It is not clear whether Europe would be fully involved when the space station becomes fully operational. As Mr. Hill has already said, we do not want to be mere observers but to play a full

Mr. Worrell (continued)

part. Nor is it clear how much responsibility European companies could assume or how much information on the overall project would be available to them.

Mr. President, at the moment there is hardly any guarantee that the conditions under which ESA will participate in this project can actually be satisfied. During our visit to NASA it became clear that whether or not Europe participates in this project depends on co-funding and quick decisions. Critical questions were waved aside. One of our hosts, Mr. Robert Freitag, said quite categorically that Europe must make up its mind soon, or the United States would go it alone, without Europe's co-operation. He even referred to protectionism!

We must therefore take a very critical view of present developments. The Rapporteur rightly made a number of critical remarks and asked for guarantees before ESA actually starts to participate in this project. How can our Council ensure that the basic conditions are actually met? Many of our countries are at present undergoing a socio-economic crisis. Many people are having to accept cuts in their incomes, and unemployment is high. At a time like this the main question is whether we should contribute \$1,000 million to a project to which a great deal of uncertainty still attaches and whose social relevance has yet to be proved. I am therefore very pleased to see the critical remarks Mr. Hill has made in his report.

In the report the Rapporteur calls for an exchange of information between the United States and Europe on the construction of nuclear power stations and the use of nuclear energy. I feel we must be very cautious here. During our visit it became clear that all kinds of technical and also social problems will prevent the implementation of much of the United States overall nuclear energy programme. These problems arose partly as a result of a wide range of energy-conserving measures. The waste problem has also played a major rôle. But it must again be said that the nuclear energy lobby has more influence than those who are working on such alternative energy sources as wind and solar power. The money we spend on the development of nuclear energy is out of all proportion to the amounts spent on alternative energy sources. I feel this point should have been made in the recommendations. Europe, possibly in co-operation with the United States, might pursue a stimulating policy in this area.

Mr. President, the development of yet more weapons systems is still being advocated. Mr. Wilkinson, for example, has recommended that space be used for military purposes, but in my view there should be more talks on disarm-

ament. In my country there has been a campaign against hunger in Africa which raised 60 million guilders. But this sum contrasts sharply with the amount we think we can afford to spend on the modernisation and further development of our weapons systems. We in fact export them to the developing countries, even though we can do nothing to solve the most serious problem in the world, hunger. We unfortunately think far more about the danger that threatens us and about our security. We still do far too little to seize the opportunities we have of helping people who are starving and have nowhere to live. Very little progress, unfortunately, is being made in this respect. I feel we must do far more to solve these problems rather than investing a great deal of money in all kinds of new weapons systems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Kinnoull.

Lord KINNOULL (*United Kingdom*). – First, I should like also to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Hill, the Rapporteur, on the excellence of his report and the lucid manner in which he introduced it this morning. It is a daunting subject, all set out with commendable clarity befitting the Rapporteur's reputation. When one examines the fairly exhaustive and intensive itinerary the committee undertook in the United States, rushing here and there, one is reminded of the almost proverbial American tourist who set out innocently to take in, in one day's bus trip, Windsor Castle, Oxford and the city of Edinburgh. When she returned exhausted she waxed lyrically of Oxford castle and the splendours of Windsor university. Our Rapporteur did not fall into that trap, nor did he, wisely I think, seek first-hand experience of the space laboratory in orbit.

The report is particularly timely for Western European Union and its reactivation and, although this morning the Rapporteur suggested that it was the finish of the committee's work, I hope that the subject will remain on the table under the penetrating glare of the committee, because it needs it. Those of us who have taken an interest in United States collaboration in aerospace almost always find that in principle United States politicians and industry are in favour of European collaboration, anyway on paper. It makes sense politically, economically and technically; and there are, indeed, there are known to be, great problems, problems of buy American policy, problems of foreign sales, industrial protection, design leadership and work sharing.

Indeed, there is even the risk of cancellation of projects. But there are successes, as the report points out. There is the Harrier project and more recently, of course, the Hawk, and in European terms, the Tornado; and we hope to see

Lord Kinnoull (continued)

joint development of the advanced trainer. There is also joint development of the advanced aero-engine by Rolls Royce and Pratt and Whitney in Japan.

The logic of collaboration supported by the demands of market forces can be best illustrated, I suggest, by the civil airline industry over the development of the wide-bodied aircraft. Four years ago, there were three United States companies – McDonnell, Douglas and Boeing, and one European company, Airbus Industrie. Today, there is only one United States company left in the business and if Europe had not got together ten years ago there would be no European company at all and the success in the building of the Airbus would not have been achieved. It needed vision. The vision paid off; and the same applies, of course, to the military project as well.

The report reminds us of the truly vast resources needed in the space laboratory research and development programmes of NASA, and of the \$8 billion to be spent over the next eight years. In paragraph 47 of the report, it is suggested that the European Space Agency would have to spend \$1 billion to acquire 10%. I hope they do not spend \$1 billion to acquire 10% because it should be 12% if it is to be *pari passu*. Nevertheless, this huge investment is vital if Europe is to collaborate in this important field. It needs no vision to see this and every effort should be made to encourage member governments to support it.

The report recommends that in any nuclear energy policy there should be free exchange of information on future nuclear energy plants between Europe and the United States of America. I suspect that European industries may consider that sweeping recommendation as industrially a little naïve. Europe has a lead over and expertise that is greater than that of the United States in nuclear energy. Should we not maximise that expertise, as we would expect the United States industry to do? Where do our interests lie? I suggest that recommendation 3 in the report should be modified.

I commend the report. Both sides of the Atlantic need co-operation for future good. It is up to good political and industrial sense to achieve that. Support from Western European Union through the report can do only good.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Hill, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I compliment Mr. van der Werff on his hesitation about the blank cheque from Europe for participation in the space platform. In future we shall have to cover that matter, but there is definitely a possibility that it will not be a blank cheque but that there will be full co-operation with financial assessments on a rolling programme.

Mr. Böhm said that this technological co-operation fitted in well with the reactivation of WEU. As I said in my report, the United States has new-found confidence, which shows in the statements from the Department of Defence, the Department of State and the Department of Energy. President Reagan implemented the star wars suggestion and the vast budget for the space platform. He has just had a successful re-election, which is reflected in United States confidence throughout the world.

Mr. Bassinet was critical in that he felt that there would be a lack of co-operation. He feared that there would be a one-way rather than a two-way street. I slightly verge on that side. For obvious reasons, the Americans are nervous of the transfer of technology. There have been tremendous leakages of some of what I would think were almost industrial secrets. For example, mainframe computers have been mysteriously crossing into the Warsaw Pact countries. So I can understand that the Americans may be hesitant to give us a full two-way street at the beginning. However, we shall seek co-operation with them and we shall seek not only to reassure them that we are trustworthy but to tell them that they will have to be equally trustworthy with regard to our transferred technology.

Mr. Klejdzinski said that advanced technology was the political world tomorrow. That is true. Politicians know the importance of being in the vanguard of high technology. We know that it is the big challenge of the age. In the United Kingdom it is almost the equivalent of another industrial revolution. As politicians we must meet the challenge head on.

Mr. Klejdzinski regretted the lack of movement on the law of the sea, which is understandable. We are all a little disappointed, but we were told categorically in Washington by a department official that not only were the Americans not attending any further meetings on the law of the sea but they categorically resisted signing. Many countries will take their lead from the United States. Therefore, the law of the sea is still a problem for the future, but I had to include that matter in the document because it was covered in the visit. The report is really a description of a visit, not necessarily a description of political wills.

Mr. Worrell said that there might be a critical attitude on the space platform programme. He

Mr. Hill (continued)

is right. If we move into that area of co-operation, it will cost us a minimum of \$1,000 million and, like all vast high technology programmes, these programmes escalate financially. Mr. Worrell has great doubts. The trouble is, as all politicians know, that one cannot run in front of the automobile for ever with a red flag. One must be in the vanguard of creative thought. Europe has vast research and a wonderful programme with the European Space Agency to build on. There is no question but that Europe will take the decision quickly. The conditions that will have to be complied with will work their way through the normal system within a short time. Certainly within the next five years we shall have the space laboratory/space platform debate at least once every year.

My noble friend the Earl of Kinnoull said that he was a little worried that the United States collaboration would be only on paper. That is up to us. We must show good will. We are now dealing with confident politicians, so confident that they may resist our pleas unless we show more progress than can be written in a letter. Many things were discussed in the paper, including the nuclear energy programme, and we can do much to help. My noble friend is right to say that Europe is in advance of the United States in nuclear terms – long may it remain so.

We have much to offer the Americans, and they have much to offer us. It is a two-way street. Our nations are proud in the same way that the United States is a proud nation. We can collaborate and in future I think that we shall move forward together in an interesting, creative space performance. I believe that our platform and many other projects will be taken for granted in future.

I am sorry that I had to hurry in making my reply, but I realise that we are pressed for time. I have answered every query as far as I can.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to wind up this debate with a few brief comments on the committee's behalf. I too wish to thank all those who have helped to enliven the debate, and the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, for his admirable summary, for the second time, of the conclusions drawn by the committee during a visit to the United States.

This also shows that contacts between the committee, and hence the Assembly of WEU, and the United States have become a tradition.

I myself have been a member of this committee for over ten years, and in this time we have made fairly regular attempts to maintain and strengthen our contacts with the United States because we believe close political co-operation is essential. And what could contribute more to political co-operation than close co-operation in advanced technology?

Various members of the committee have already said how impressed we were by the innovations and modern technology that are spawned by the defence programmes in the United States. To repeat and compare the figures: in 1985 the United States will spend not quite \$300,000 million on defence alone, most of it being earmarked for the improvement of advanced technology in the area of defence. By comparison, a total of about DM 46,000 million will be spent by the public and private sectors in my country, the Federal Republic of Germany, which is certainly not a minor industrialised country and is very active in the field of modern technology. This, I think, illustrates the different orders of magnitude involved.

This report too gives a particularly high priority to German participation in the American manned space station project. I must again refer in this context to the premises set out in the draft recommendation: information access to the entire space station system, equality between European and American companies exploiting the research and manufacturing facilities on the space station, access of European crews in order to operate the space station and not just to visit it, and thus European industrial and operational responsibility for a primary item of space station hardware.

Let me make it quite clear once again: Europe must do more than merely supply components and must, if there is to be any point to the whole project, be given genuine overall responsibility for the system.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe we are about to embark on a period of highly interesting co-operation between Europe and the United States, which is not to say that other countries – Japan, for example – will not be very important to us. But if this is to be, we must first decide precisely what we want. I hope that the report and today's debate will have made a contribution in this respect. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, it was my intention to take the vote on the amendments and the draft recommendation before the Minister's speech. In view of the hour, you would no doubt prefer to make your speech now, Mr. Luce.

4. Address by Mr. Luce, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have great pleasure in welcoming you here, Minister, to address the Assembly.

Please accept my thanks in anticipation for replying to the questions which will be put to you by the members of the Assembly.

You have the floor.

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. President and distinguished members of the Assembly, may I say how very glad I am to be here today. This is the first occasion on which I have been able to attend a meeting of the Assembly, and I was especially interested to listen to the debate on the report by Mr. James Hill on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology. I am here in my capacity as a Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom, but I should stress that my specific responsibilities range from arms control to the Middle East and the Far East.

It is a great honour to be speaking in Europe's only parliamentary assembly specifically mandated by treaty to discuss vital questions of European defence and security. The meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome in October put us on course for a vigorous and vibrant future for Western European Union. It updated our aims and set about refurbishing our organisation, and I am especially glad of the opportunity to address the first normal assembly session since that date.

This is a time to look forward, and to see how WEU might best take its place in the wider context of things. We are giving a new start to WEU. At the same time, we are at the start of the new presidential term in the United States. There are new hopes of a dialogue between the two superpowers as we look forward to talks between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva next month. Where does WEU stand? What part will it play in the future?

Ministers at Rome spelled out their conviction that better utilisation of WEU would strengthen European defence co-operation and improve the common defence of all members of the Atlantic Alliance. I want here to emphasise Britain's commitment to those goals. We played a leading part at Rome in arguing that there was a real rôle for WEU in the 1980s. We also believe that the position of Europe within the alliance should be fully represented and explained, both to our other allies and to the public. The United Kingdom is taking an active rôle in the discussions under way in Permanent Council

on how best to implement the Rome decisions; and we shall certainly be actively involved when appropriate changes are made.

I wish to spend a few minutes outlining what we think WEU should be doing and why. Let me first re-emphasise one point which all in Rome accepted – that our objective is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic arch, not to substitute for it. We want to provide the most effective possible support to the American guarantee, which is fundamental to our security. It is not our intention to create an exclusive inner core of Europeans within the alliance, nor to generate a special club that will become detached from NATO. On the contrary, we have made plain our intention to keep non-WEU allies fully informed of our activities. We shall be frank and open with them so that there is no sense of exclusion and no weakening of the alliance itself. We shall work to anchor the European element within the wider alliance in a stronger and more coherent way.

The questions for Europe today are clearer and more urgent than ever. Are we making the best possible contribution to our own defence? If not, how should that be done? Our aim is to do what we can to improve and sharpen the European defence contribution. That can be done only by developing better ways of co-operating among ourselves. We need the forum of WEU for political debate about how best to further that co-operation. We must use it to stimulate those other groups that deal with the practical implementation of co-operation day by day – for instance, in weapons production and procurement. WEU members may be able to act as a ginger group in those bodies with wider membership. We must not forget our other great responsibility, as democratic European governments, to explain to the people of Europe the nature of and the need for proper European defence and defence co-operation. It is vital for us all to ensure that our plans for the future have the maximum possible public support.

Four points are of particular importance in that process. First, Europe has a respectable record in the alliance. Secondly, we cannot, however, stand still. There are deficiencies that must be put right to maintain the credibility of our forces and our strategy. Thirdly, the alliance is not only a matter of defending the NATO area, out-of-area policies also have a bearing on our security. Fourthly, arms control is an area of particular importance.

We must make it clear to our publics and to our American friends that Europe contributes to the alliance and the whole of western defence at a very high level already, and we have impressive results to show for it. We should not forget that and we must not allow others to forget it.

Mr. Luce (continued)

Some figures, well known to many of us, amply demonstrate the point. Of the alliance's ready forces in Europe, for example, the European allies provide about 90% of the ground forces, about 80% of combat aircraft, about 80% of tanks and some 75% of fighting ships in European waters and the Eastern Atlantic. We maintain three million men on active service compared with two million in the United States. If we include reserves, the respective figures would be six million for Europe and three million for America. Between 1971 and 1983, European defence expenditure increased by 25%. In 1983 the European allies spent the very substantial figure of \$98 billion on defence. In the background, unaccounted for in the figures, are of course all the hidden costs of our host nation support.

Of course more needs to be done in the face of the ever-growing capabilities of Soviet forces. I have in mind, for example, infrastructure within the NATO Alliance. At a time of severe resource constraints we must use all the means at our disposal, including WEU, in a vigorous search for ways in which, by working together, we can enhance the capabilities of those forces in the face of any aggressor.

Europe also contributes in other ways to the strength of the alliance. Security is not a function of military strength alone. There are many other areas where the European allies have made, and make, a sterling contribution – the preservation of stable, democratic systems; the encouragement of economic prosperity at home, and development overseas; the pursuit, on a realistic basis, of a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – an aim to which my government attach particular importance. In that context, I welcome the fact that Mr. Gorbachev has accepted an invitation to visit London this month and that Mr. Gromyko will follow next year.

We also recognise that our security is affected by developments outside the NATO area. By a variety of means, political and economic, as well as military, the European allies have contributed to stability and peace in these regions.

As Minister of State responsible for arms control, I particularly value the steadfast European commitment to seek security at lower levels of armaments, on the basis of balanced and verifiable agreements. The British Government and governments of other countries will be working with redoubled energy in the coming months to see whether real progress can be achieved.

I have outlined the major functions which we see developing for WEU in the future: first, and

most crucially, the strengthening of the alliance by strengthening its European pillar; secondly, developing a European voice on matters of defence and security; thirdly, giving political impetus to the process of improving practical European defence co-operation; fourthly, by generating in-depth intra-European exchanges on matters of the greatest importance to our security, such as arms control and disarmament, East-West relations, and the problems generated by out-of-area questions; lastly, by working to encourage a firm base of public support for our effective and constructive defence policies.

The Assembly and other institutions have a major part to play in fulfilling those functions. Ministers spoke at Rome of promoting – and I quote – “greater co-operation between the Council and the Assembly [as] a key factor in the enhanced utilisation of WEU”.

I would like to endorse on behalf of my government what ministers said at Rome about “the importance they attach to the recommendations and work of the Assembly”. That applies particularly in the vital areas I have mentioned which are designated in the Rome Declaration itself. The Rome documents rightly draw attention to the possibility of the Assembly making use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU both to improve contacts between Council and Assembly and to increase the availability of information.

On the institutional side, the Rome meeting issued a number of instructions to the Permanent Council to manage the adaptation and reorganisation of the various bodies of WEU. Ministers recognised that their commitment and determination to make fuller use of WEU made it necessary to “bring the existing institutions into line with the changed tasks of the organisation”. These matters are, I know, being handled now in detail within the confines of the Permanent Council. I do not wish to prejudice the course of those detailed and sensitive discussions, nor to prejudge their outcome. So let me just emphasise what I believe to be our general desire. The study of appropriate changes should be carried forward urgently, so that the decisions of Rome may be executed as swiftly as possible. In deciding on what rearrangements should be made, we must bear in mind the fundamental need to give expression to the Rome decisions in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible. With those principles in mind, we look forward to the Council's eventual recommendations.

Some may ask why should WEU do all those things? Are there not other active European bodies, within NATO and in political co-operation? Of course there are, and we value them all. The Eurogroup, the Independent European Programme Group, European political

Mr. Luce (continued)

co-operation and NATO itself have essential and well-established rôles to play. They are not in competition with WEU or vice versa. Their functions are in our view complementary, and none would be complete without the others. The task of European defence is too complex to be shouldered by any single body. But I would argue that WEU is well fitted in many ways to take a major rôle in the process. We have undervalued its potential in the past and we must work to get better value from its many unique features in the future.

First, WEU is a European body bound to the Atlantic Alliance. For the United Kingdom, that brings a particularly valuable feature. The terms of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 provide the legal basis for our commitment of substantial land and air forces to the mainland of Europe – forces which are, of course, declared to NATO. We therefore see WEU as firmly integrating us with its other European members, on the one hand, and with our transatlantic alliance, on the other. No other body performs that function.

Secondly, WEU gathers together the seven allies at the heart of Europe – France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and the United Kingdom. We in the United Kingdom have made no secret of our desire to see the process of European political co-operation in the Ten go further in the direction of discussing security-related issues. We attach great importance to political co-operation in general and this aspect in particular. But all of us recognise the existing constraints in this forum. Our attention will be drawn to them when Mr. Masciadri's report is debated by the Assembly tomorrow. So, while we will work to extend political co-operation further, there remain real gaps for WEU to fill and real work for it to do.

Thirdly, WEU has the advantage of being a specifically political European forum. It is debarred by the Brussels Treaty – which explicitly disavowed any intention to duplicate NATO – from an operational military rôle. It is not intended to trespass upon the practical armament co-operation carried out in other bodies. Indeed, it does not have the expert executive capacity to do so. Co-operation in WEU is thus designed to and should remain primarily political. The organisation itself is designed to accommodate debate and discussion of a political nature to give a political boost to our defence effort. It gives us a forum of a unique kind for consulting each other and seeking to harmonise our views on matters of mutual concern. I need hardly spell out the value of this for the proper co-ordination of our national policies on security issues, or for providing a

more political impetus to the technical work under way in other forums.

I said earlier that we needed to pay special attention to the needs of the European public, and that WEU and this Assembly had a special rôle to play in this. I should like briefly to return to this theme before closing. We must reassure our publics both that our defences are adequate to deter and, if necessary, to repel an attack at whatever level is necessary and that the alliance retains its essentially defensive nature. Recent misrepresentations in the press of NATO's long-term planning guideline on "follow-on forces attack" as heralding an offensive change in NATO doctrine underlines the importance of this task.

In fact, nothing has changed in the undertaking, spelt out in the Bonn summit in 1982 and reaffirmed in last December's Brussels declaration, that "none of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack".

But deep interdiction has always been part of the alliance's conventional capability for responding to attack. The tactic of cutting an opponent's line of communication is as old as conventional capability in this area. It neither contemplates the use of nuclear weapons nor involves a substantially faster escalation to their use, as wrongly alleged by some commentators. Indeed, by strengthening the alliance's conventional capability, it could or should have the opposite effect. While making and being seen to make every effort in the pursuit of arms control and a constructive East-West dialogue, we must explain to our publics the rationale underlying our concept of deterrence and the irreplaceable rôle of the alliance.

I notice from the reports to be debated at this Assembly that the theme I have addressed and the points that I believe to be of most significance will not be unfamiliar to you. I have already mentioned one aspect of Mr. Masciadri's report. He takes up in more detail many others that I have mentioned. It is not for me to discuss this or other reports here – that is your task – but I agree wholeheartedly with the essential thrust of that report.

Let us now urgently tackle the task set at Rome of injecting new life into WEU. Let us translate the declarations made there into solid results quickly, so that the enthusiasm for renewal is not lost. In that way, we can be sure of achieving the success of which President Eisenhower spoke in his message to the governments of the seven member states of WEU shortly after the conclusion of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954:

"The success of [the Atlantic Alliance] will be determined in large measure by the degree of practical co-operation realised among the

Mr. Luce (continued)

European nations themselves. The Western European Union and the related arrangements agreed upon in Paris are designed to ensure this co-operation and thereby to provide a durable basis for consolidating the Atlantic relationship as a whole. ”

Mr. President, I should certainly welcome the opportunity to answer any questions. Regrettably, I have to leave here at about 4.15 p.m. to catch my plane back to London.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister for a most interesting address. Following the extraordinary session in Rome, since when each of us has had time to form a clearer idea of the implications of the ministerial Rome Declaration, you are the first member of a government to address our Assembly. It is therefore very proper that the President of the Assembly should recognise the interest and great significance of your remarks.

Several members of the Assembly would like to ask you questions, and I know that you are ready to reply. We can devote about three-quarters of an hour to questions and answers. I will ask members to be very brief and to restrict themselves to their question, avoiding if possible the tendency – normal in a parliamentarian – to make a political statement at the same time.

As President of this Assembly, I would like to say how much I appreciate the efforts made by Her Majesty's Government. While we realise that every government has done its best, my colleagues and I have witnessed the activities conducted by the members of your government. In the presence of the Assembly, I therefore wish to express our appreciation both to them and to yourself.

The first question will be put by Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I was pleased to hear the Minister give such a robust welcome to the Rome Declaration and to the new rôle for WEU. I was interested in the emphasis that he placed on the need for public support for this new rôle, because it coincides with an excellent report by Mr. Lagorce on deterrence and the will of the people, which we passed yesterday, in which he stressed the need for public support for all that we do in the West.

Therefore, I should like to ask the Minister whether he would agree with me that parliament has a particular rôle to play in this respect. It is only through our national parliaments that we can get public interest and support for our activities. Would the Minister agree with me that there is a need for all of us, as parliamentarians, to urge that more time and attention be paid to

this subject and to this new rôle for WEU in our national parliaments? Can he give us any ideas on how we might go about it, particularly in the British Parliament, which seems backward in this respect?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Although I am at present in France, nevertheless I have no doubt that the Leader of the House of Commons and the government managers may well be noting any remarks I make, so I must be careful about making any commitments about what the British Parliament can do in terms of discussion of these issues. I am impressed by the nature of the question that Sir Anthony Grant poses, because I have no shadow of a doubt that, at a time when there is very great concern and interest in the question of, for example, arms control with the forthcoming meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko, it is going to be singularly important that public opinion should continue to be made fully aware of the importance both of our defence policy, and, to complement that, our arms control policy, and why we as a government believe that the only way to get a secure future is by balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

It seems to me it is essential for governments and parliamentarians to carry public opinion with them. This requires constant explanation and that was why I laid particular emphasis on the rôle that my government feel the Assembly here can play to complement and supplement the rôle that national parliaments can play in educating public opinion about defence and arms control policies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I am delighted to see Mr. Luce here today. He has said that the British Government have undervalued WEU in the past and the renaissance or rebirth of WEU is shown by his presence, and we are delighted. I must say, though, that it is a great pity that many of his colleagues are absent and unable to hear his speech, because the British Government have demanded that we return home tonight. That is a great pity and undervalues this organisation.

That having been said and knowing you, Mr. Luce, do not agree with it – whatever they will say when they hear that at home I do not know – I wish to ask whether you will press your colleagues to recognise that if you see a greater rôle for this Assembly, you will back it with the funds necessary to do the work you want us to do.

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I had thought that that might be the first question. I am not surprised that it has come

Mr. Luce (continued)

early. I know that my colleague Sir Paul Hawkins has taken a long and strong interest in the work of the Assembly and the union. May I first answer the question by saying that it seems to me we must first define what we believe to be the right objectives for WEU.

That seems to be the number one task in which the Rome meeting was of particular importance because it was there that the Foreign and Defence Ministers got together and launched a declaration and set out what they thought were the right objectives in overall terms for WEU. It seems to me that what flows from that is that one then needs to examine the function of the union – which is now what the union has been asked to do through the permanent secretariat, the Permanent Council – so that we can see how those objectives can best be fulfilled.

It is sometimes rather dangerous to make an assumption that in order to achieve certain objectives or certain functions it is automatically necessary to increase a budget. What we now need to do as the next stage is to await the outcome of the working party, for example, on the recommended functions of the union and the Assembly and of the arms of the Assembly, the agencies. When we have seen that we can make a judgment. I have to point out to Sir Paul Hawkins, as of course he knows, that our government follow a very strong policy on constraints on public expenditure, which is a factor that we have to take into account.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would like to express the Assembly's appreciation, Minister, of the exchange you have just conducted with Sir Paul Hawkins.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, notwithstanding your reference to the matter when replying to Sir Paul Hawkins, I should like to put a direct question. We are talking about reactivating WEU. The Rome Declaration sets out our former and our present tasks and states that the Assembly should be enabled to perform more useful work. It envisages reorganisation of the two technical organs of WEU, but states that all this is to be accomplished without asking for any changes in staffing or budget.

Do you really believe that it is possible to do everything enumerated in the Rome Declaration without any alteration in staff or budget?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – As Mr. Cavaliere has already suggested, in a way that question flows from that posed by

Sir Paul Hawkins. I myself really feel that it is a mistake to make any prejudgment on these issues. The most important thing now is to clarify how we can adjust the function and organisation of the Assembly and the Council in such a way as to enable WEU to fulfil the objectives set out quite clearly in the Rome Declaration. I do not believe that it flows and follows logically that this must inevitably mean an increase in the budget. What we have to do at this stage, when matters are still being studied by the working party, is to look at these recommendations very carefully, bearing in mind that every government is coming under important budgetary constraints and, that being done, budget decisions can flow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I thank the Minister for his speech. It was very acceptable and we all enjoyed it. Indeed, we are all heartened by the commitment of the Council of Ministers to the strengthening of WEU, albeit, as the Minister has said, without any additional funds. The problem will arise that with the strengthening of WEU other nations will apply to join. This is already partly taking place. Could the Minister of State give some indication of how he views the thoughts of the United Kingdom on the prospect of additional nations, such as Portugal, Spain or Turkey, joining WEU, and whether that would be welcome?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. Hill has posed an important question which I am well aware is one that is becoming increasingly a subject of discussion. As I said in my speech, we are all aware, here particularly, of the wide range of organisations that already exist in Europe which have some capacity or other to deal with security-related issues ranging from NATO and political co-operation through WEU to the IEPG and other organisations. We must take all that into account when we are assessing both the functions and membership of WEU. It seems to me that it is much better to build on existing institutions than to create new institutions, when one considers how many already exist.

Having said that, I would answer Mr. Hill this way, in the same sense as I answered the budget question. I believe that it is much more important for WEU to get its act together first, under existing membership which has been consistent since 1954, than it is at this stage to consider wider membership. I suggest that that is the right priority. We should examine the functions and recommendations of the working party. Then we should decide together as governments how those functions might best be adjusted. Then the following question might

Mr. Luce (continued)

have to be posed: what about the membership? The best principle is that we should start from what we already have and see what we can make of it first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - I was pleased to hear the distinguished Minister's remarks about political discussion, because that means exchange of views and exchanged products of minds, particularly because he likes to have a political discussion on matters of mutual concern. I have two questions, out of many, on matters of mutual concern. The first is on the resumption of tripartite negotiations on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Could I hear the Minister's ideas on the position of the United Kingdom on a possible resumption of the tripartite negotiations?

My second question is linked to the first because it is about the conference on disarmament in Geneva. Is there any possibility of speeding up the process of coming to a conclusion on agreement on a chemical weapons ban in Geneva? That is of the utmost importance for the future of mankind, particularly after the breaking of the existing regulations on chemical weapons. Can we look forward to an initiative from the United Kingdom?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - I noticed with great interest that Mr. Blaauw produced no fewer than two reports for discussion this week, one of which is on the control of armaments and disarmament. I am interested that he asked those two questions.

There has been a great deal of discussion on the comprehensive test-ban treaty in several forums, including Geneva, New York, and the first committee of the Assembly. As Mr. Blaauw knows, the heart of the problem remains verification. That is genuinely a difficult part of the problem. The issue must be seen against a background of what we in the Assembly hope, I am sure - that the preparatory meeting between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz in early January will lead to an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. At least they should have a parameter of discussion on the related issues of outer space, strategic arms and intermediate nuclear weapons.

The comprehensive test ban needs to be viewed against that background. There are possible areas in which one can make some progress until such time as the heart of the problem - verification - is overcome. I am not sure that the tripartite discussions are necessarily the right way to proceed at the moment, but

there are other areas in which progress can be made. I shall mention just one as an example - lowering the threshold for tests, which could be seriously considered in the next few months. In terms of priorities, we must hope that the overall talks between the two superpowers will lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons.

With regard to chemical weapons, the British Government, like others, attach great importance to a comprehensive, verifiable agreement. Again, we have the problem of verification. It is an extremely complex subject. During the first three months of 1983 there was some progress on verification. The British Government made some fresh proposals for challenge inspection. The Soviet Union responded in a modestly helpful manner at the end of February with some ideas for on-site inspection, and by the spring it looked as if some progress was being made. However, I fear that since then no progress has been made.

There is an increasingly dangerous imbalance in the possession of chemical weapons between the East and West. The East now has over 300,000 tonnes of chemical weapons. That is extremely serious, and makes it all the more urgent that we should reach agreement. It is the British Government's priority to attach the highest importance to that matter when the Geneva conference resumes in January.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - I join my colleagues in expressing my warm appreciation of Mr. Richard Luce's remarks. I am sure that we all greatly value the imagination of his speech and his perceptive realisation of the potential of our Assembly. An agnostic converted to the faith is often the best of evangelists.

I should like to ask the Minister whether he believes that the new political impetus that could be derived from a revived WEU would be enhanced if there were a formal liaison between the IEPG and the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU. I would not wish to pre-empt the work of the Council in reviewing the operation of the organs of WEU, but there is no way in which a political constituency in favour of arms collaboration in Europe is being built. Were that liaison to be formed, at least the Assembly would be motivated to enhance that co-operation.

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - My colleague Mr. Wilkinson posed a very important question about the liaison that should exist in future between WEU and other organisations such as the IEPG. Again, it would be wrong of me to prejudge or prejudice in any way the work of the working party, save

Mr. Luce (continued)

only to say that it is a point that we shall take seriously. I shall take it on board and note it carefully. For organisations such as WEU to work utterly in isolation in the long term cannot be productive, so liaison among various bodies doing complementary work should be considered carefully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). - Many members of the Assembly, including my colleague Mr. Cavaliere, are convinced of the need to have a single seat in one city for all Western European Union's organs. Would the British Government welcome Western European Union if it chose London as its single seat?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - If such a decision were taken, the British Government would welcome it warmly. However, we have not quite reached that stage. We must first have answers to the following questions: what are the functions of WEU; how many arms of WEU and the Council should there be; and how should they operate? Against that background, the question of location will be decided. If London were a popular site - I do not know whether it would be - the British Government would welcome such a decision warmly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). - The Minister of State rightly emphasised the importance of the Rome Declaration, as the political debate has not been won outside Europe. Does he recognise the extreme urgency of the revamping and repositioning of WEU? Will the British Government press the working party for a recommendation so that the matter can be settled in 1985 and not be allowed to drag on beyond next year? As a member of the Public Accounts Committee, may I say how much I support what Sir Paul Hawkins said. We shall not have a new rôle of communication on a zero growth budget.

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - Mr. Morris has made an important point about the urgency of obtaining recommendations for the future operation of WEU. That is something that my Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has already stressed is a matter of great importance. We want the recommendations to emerge as quickly as possible and certainly as early as possible in 1985.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - The Minister has expounded on the important contribution the European countries make to the joint defence effort and said that we have a respectable record in this respect. He is, of course, aware that the United States Senate takes a different view. Earlier this year there was a heated debate in the Senate on an amendment tabled by Senator Nunn, who believes the Americans should send a kind of inspection team to Europe to see whether it is achieving 3% growth in real terms. The question is how the Europeans ought to react to this. Should we say to the Americans: "We think we are doing enough", or does the Minister feel that the best thing would be to do rather more for defence, to satisfy Senator Nunn?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - This is an important question because, in the light of the Nunn amendment before the American election, we know that there is American anxiety, especially in Congress, that Europe is not pulling its weight. That was why I went out of my way today - I have done so on several occasions - to stress that Europe plays a prominent rôle in a wide range of areas. That brings me to the other rôle which I said that WEU, with other organisations, could play - the exchange of information between this Assembly and Congress so that the Americans are aware of the true perspective. I gave the figures about the size of forces, about the European contribution to combat aircraft and tanks and about the reserve forces, in which Europe plays a prominent rôle. At the same time, we should not understate the weaknesses of the European rôle within the alliance and, to the extent that we can, we should put that right.

There must be more contact among parliamentarians in Europe and congressmen in the coming weeks and months so that there is a true understanding of the contribution of Europe to the alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). - I very much appreciate what the Minister of State said, especially about the Rome decisions, and his hints on how the Assembly might usefully proceed. I had intended to ask him about the British Government's activities with regard to arms control. If he has something more to say about that, I should be pleased to hear it, but he has already answered Mr. Blaauw's question on that matter. If he has nothing further to say, will he instead say something about the American initiative following the Reagan election? What are his views on the possibility of success for the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States?

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I shall answer those two questions together as they are closely related. The British Government welcome warmly the decision of Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz to meet, by way of a preparatory meeting, in the hope that there will soon be discussions on outer space and nuclear matters between the United States and the Soviet Union. The British Government are strongly committed to working for a reduction in arms expenditure, but those reductions must be on a balanced and verifiable basis. The government will do what they can to work closely with the United States – our important allies – in these discussions, and to contribute towards consultations with America and the NATO Alliance on the important arms control talks.

I would go further and say that we have a much better prospect of obtaining progress in arms control, where we have had no progress for too long, by getting a better atmosphere of understanding between East and West by means of a broad dialogue. That is why we attach so much importance to the visit to London this month of Mr. Gorbachev, and thereafter in 1985 by Mr. Gromyko, and to visits that Sir Geoffrey Howe and other Ministers will make to eastern bloc countries. This is a matter of great importance, because unless we have greater understanding and an East-West dialogue on a much broader basis, we shall have much less of a chance to make progress on arms control discussions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to congratulate the British Government on creating the post of Minister for Disarmament, which does not exist everywhere. Perhaps that is why disarmament policy is left largely to the civil servants – a problem we face quite frequently. The problems are taking a negative course faster than the political countermeasures can be developed. New political initiatives must therefore be taken.

I have two questions on this subject. The first concerns the initiative of the heads of government from four continents. The Spanish Prime Minister, the Greek Prime Minister, the Tanzanian President, the Presidents of Mexico and Argentina and the late Prime Minister of India took the initiative by appealing to the nuclear powers to get together and reconsider a freeze on nuclear arms at their present level. This initiative was welcomed by a large section of the European public, including the former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. My question to the British Government is this: to what

extent might it be prepared to consider and take up the idea of this initiative?

My second question concerns the problem of Eurostrategic arms control negotiations. We know the arguments – they need not be repeated – advanced by the British Government for rejecting the idea that its nuclear stockpiles should be included in the count of western weapons. My question is this: under what conditions would the British Government be prepared to allow its arsenal, which – to use the words of the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Craxi – is not on the moon, to be considered in negotiations on a balance of nuclear power between East and West? Thank you.

Mr. LUCE (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I must apologise to the Assembly, but after this question I must leave if I am to catch my plane.

Reference was made to the appeal of the four or five heads of state that there should be urgent discussions and progress on nuclear arms reductions. What really matters above all else – and I think that Mr. Scheer was implying that – is the political will by all sides to make progress. That has been lacking for some time, especially from the Soviet Union. However, the fact that it took the initiative in proposing the meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko is a welcome sign.

All our experience of arms control suggests that expectations should not be raised too quickly and too high. Arms control is a long, hard road in achieving genuine agreement. It requires political will in 1985. I believe that the United States and the West have the will. Do the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc have that will? If they do, we shall begin to see progress in 1985.

The British Government do not believe that a freeze of nuclear weapons is helpful. On the contrary, it ossifies an imbalance between East and West. We want reductions in nuclear weapons. We hope that the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union will be a start that will lead towards that aim. It is in that area that progress must be made. Those two powers possess the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world, so they must make the start.

We very much hope that the will of President Reagan to make a start will be responded to by the Soviet Union. In that context, we must view our independent strategic deterrence. We believe that it is necessary for our future security, but if – and we have already made this clear – there is progress in the discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union which then leads to reductions in nuclear forces,

Mr. Luce (continued)

it will be sensible and possible for us to review the scale and nature of the contribution of our own independent strategic deterrent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Luce. You have just mentioned that you are very short of time. Mr. Pignion and Sir Frederic Bennett especially wish to ask you a question, but we are in your hands. You have given us liberally of your time, but perhaps you would be prepared to stay a few moments more so that my two colleagues may address a few words to you?

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Minister of State has partially answered the question I wanted to ask about the inclusion of the French and British weapons in the American arms count in seeking a balance of forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I shall respect the Minister's wish to leave at once. He need not answer my question, but simply take note of it.

I am delighted to have been here today with my British colleagues. We have often been attacked in other forums in Europe for dragging our feet over European initiatives. On this occasion, we are in the vanguard. For that reason alone, I am grateful that the Minister has spoken as he has.

When he returns, I hope that he will now understand that for distinguished Ministers to come here and make brilliant speeches and give brilliant answers to questions is not enough for this Assembly. The idea put forward unanimously by the General Affairs Committee that a Minister from one or another country should be present during our debates was endorsed by everyone. However good the Minister has been, we are sorry to lose him now.

Whatever is done about enlarging WEU – and I accept the priorities – do not let us fall into one of two errors. First, we cannot create a European pillar of defence and then have two classes of citizens in Europe – those entitled to join and those not entitled to join. Secondly, do not be selective when the time comes to decide that enlargement is correct for the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Luce, I cannot improve on the words used by my colleague. Thank you again and a safe journey home. (*Applause*)

5. *United States-European co-operation in advanced technology*

(*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 992 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, before voting on the draft recommendation in Document 992 we have two amendments to consider.

They will be discussed in the following order: Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Fourré and Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. van der Werff.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Fourré and others is as follows:

2. After paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Use more actively the Standing Armaments Committee as a technical body of WEU to harmonise the positions of the seven member states in matters concerning the European armaments industry and to co-ordinate their efforts in order to improve the efficiency of co-operative work in the various multilateral forums;”.

I call Mr. Pignion to speak to this amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – There is not much to be said. While this addition does perhaps add to the length of paragraph I it is exactly on the lines of the recommendation and our discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – To shorten the debate, I am prepared to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Mr. van der Werff has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have two serious objections to the inclusion of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation, even if it does reflect impressions the committee gained during its visit to the United States. What are the facts? The convention on the law of the sea has nothing to do with the report and is indeed only remotely connected with transatlantic co-operation. It

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

concerns international legislation of the future, which is a completely different matter. As regards the subject of the report, to my knowledge there certainly is talk of co-operation among the major multinationals in deep-sea mining projects. To my knowledge, there is even talk of consultations among the governments on either side of the Atlantic. The invitation to the governments to reconsider their decisions on the convention on the law of the sea should be dealt with separately in view of the nature and importance of the subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – This document is a description of a two-week visit to the United States. In paragraph 28, Mr. van der Werff will see that Mr. Otho Eskine, Director of the Office of Advanced Technology, raised the subject himself. As it was raised, I thought that it should be included in the report. It states in categorical terms that the United States has decided neither to attend the conference nor to sign the agreement of 9th December 1982.

Those of us who wished to see the law of the sea convention ratified were faced with a brick wall. It was felt that, as this attempts to be a true record of our visit, we should include this paragraph on the law of the sea. We could scarcely ignore it in our recommendations.

This subject will go on for some time. The Chairman of our committee, Mr. Lenzer, has already done an extremely good report on the law of the sea. This is but a paragraph in a long document. It was part of our visit. Therefore, I should like it to remain for reference purposes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negated.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 992 as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present call for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call?...

As there is none, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the amended draft recommendation to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

I congratulate you, Mr. Hill.

6. Control of armaments and disarmament

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 998 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the control of armaments and disarmament and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 998 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur of the committee, Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – In debating the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the control of armaments and disarmament, the Assembly will, I am sure, welcome the joint statement issued in Moscow and Washington on 23rd November concerning the meeting between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in Geneva on 7th and 8th January. The statement is quoted in paragraph 2.10 of the committee's report. But I must sound a note of caution. It would be unwise to be unduly optimistic about an agreement merely to enter into new negotiations, and to meet merely "to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations". It is rather a lamentable commentary on the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations that such an agreement should have been heralded as a breakthrough. Until a year ago, ongoing negotiations on arms control between the two superpowers on agreed subjects with agreed objectives were a permanent feature of the international scene, and had been for more than a decade. So, while remembering that the SALT agreements in the past have taken many years of patient negotiation, we can welcome the announcement as a positive sign of thaw in East-West relations.

The committee reported in the spring on two sets of multilateral negotiations on arms control – the conference on disarmament in Europe, now in session in Stockholm, and the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations which have been in progress in Vienna since October 1973. The committee's present report concentrates on the other important multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and disarma-

¹ See page 28.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

ment – the forty-nation conference on disarmament in Geneva – which is actively negotiating a convention to prohibit the production, possession or use of chemical weapons, but which at the same time is not discussing as seriously as the committee believes it should two other important items on its agenda: arms control in space and a possible comprehensive test ban. The present report deals also with the present situation concerning the bilateral INF and START negotiations which were broken off when the Soviet Union walked out on 23rd November 1983.

I will deal with the main points of the committee's draft recommendation, contained in Document 998. The preamble is, I think, self-explanatory. In the first three paragraphs the Assembly is asked, first, to endorse the Council's view, expressed in the Rome Declaration, that WEU can contribute to the maintenance of military strength and political solidarity, and on that basis can foster dialogue and co-operation between the countries of East and West. The second paragraph recalls the importance of the various multilateral forums of arms control and stresses the important contribution that can be made by the European countries on issues which are not, like the INF talks, essentially a matter of bilateral negotiation between the two superpowers. The Assembly is therefore asked to welcome the fact that arms control and disarmament have been specifically placed by the ministers among the subjects on which they will seek to harmonise their views in WEU.

The fourth paragraph reiterates a view that the Assembly has expressed on many occasions in the past on reports from the Defence Committee – that when we get into the nuclear numbers game, counting missiles, warheads, submarines and aircraft, it is not possible, and indeed not even desirable, to attempt to establish whether "balance" exists or does not exist in every conceivable category of nuclear weapons system. Certainly, as far as intermediate and intercontinental nuclear weapons systems are concerned, they are all strategic from the standpoint of European countries whose capitals and industrial centres are in range of all these weapons, and we can only think in terms of an overall balance. That does not mean, however, as the fifth paragraph of the preamble points out, that actual negotiations should not resume the quest for agreement on reductions by separate categories of weapons. Agreement may well be facilitated by narrowing the range of weapons systems to be considered in any one agreement, as was being done in the INF talks.

I turn now to the operative part of the recommendation. Paragraph 1 draws attention to difficulties that have arisen in the course of 1984

because of differing views among the western allies on the extent of verification measures necessary to provide adequate assurance of compliance in two areas of arms control – a chemical weapons ban and the MBFR. The problem of verification of any comprehensive test ban is of longer standing, as Mr. Luce has already mentioned.

The intention of this paragraph is to recommend that WEU countries at least should be agreed among themselves on the extent of verification measures to be called for in draft agreements tabled in various international forums when negotiations are taking place, so that the western countries should not be placed in a position of seeming to increase their demands from one day to the next, at a time when there appeared to be some progress towards agreement.

The second paragraph lists two topics on which there are real prospects of agreement in the not too distant future – chemical weapons and space weapons – and a third topic – a comprehensive test ban – which in the view of the committee could make a most important contribution both to limiting the nuclear arms race in general, and also to strengthening the non-proliferation régime. In paragraph 4.8 of the explanatory memorandum, the committee points out that the review conference under the non-proliferation treaty is due to be held next year, but that as yet the nuclear weapon powers have no progress to report under Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, which commits them "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...". The recommendation calls for common instructions to be given to the representatives of the WEU countries participating in the conference on disarmament, with a view to reaching early agreement on these issues.

As far as space weapons in particular are concerned, the committee feels strongly that this is a relatively new subject in the field of arms control negotiations, covering weapons systems which have not yet gone beyond the stage of development, and on which therefore it is at present much easier to reach agreement on limitations, than it will be after operational weapons are deployed. Addressing this Assembly on 21st June this year, my compatriot, Mr. Klaas de Vries, said:

"I am struck by similarities between the present situation and that of the mid-1960s, before MIRVs – multiple independent warheads – were introduced on strategic ballistic missiles. It was common ground then that it would not be possible to verify the presence or existence of MIRVs once deployed on missiles but that national means of verification then in existence made it possible to

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

monitor all tests of such weapons systems so that it would have been possible to verify a ban on their development. The same is true at present of anti-satellite weapons.

In the mid-1960s the United States had unquestionable superiority in the then single-warhead strategic ballistic missiles of about 1,700 compared with 500 deployed by the Soviet Union. By the time the United States began to deploy its first MIRVs in 1970, the Soviet Union had reached near parity in single-warhead missiles. With its MIRV programme, the United States rapidly achieved overwhelming superiority by 1976 with some 7,300 strategic missile warheads compared with 2,300 for the Soviet Union, but the following year the Soviet Union began deployment of its own MIRVs and within four years had again reached near parity but this time with some 6,300 warheads compared with the 7,300 of the United States. The net outcome of the MIRV programme was enormous military expenditure, a brief four years of United States superiority, followed by renewed stalemate at four or five times the previous levels.

For me the moral is very simple – the time to seek a ban on space weapons is now, before development gets properly under way. ”

It is not always that I am able to endorse the views of Mr. de Vries, but I do so on this occasion.

I would like to quote, too, from an article in the latest issue of “Foreign Affairs” contributed by Mr. George Kennan, one of the most distinguished American ambassadors to Moscow, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser to President Kennedy, Mr. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence under President Kennedy, and Mr. Gerard Smith, the negotiator of the first SALT treaty.

These American public servants, two of whom were directly responsible for building up the main backbone of the United States nuclear deterrent – the Polaris and Minuteman weapons systems – have this to say about President Reagan’s strategic defence initiative:

“The overwhelming consensus of the nation’s technical community is that in fact there is no prospect whatever that science and technology can, at any time in the next several decades, make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”

Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation draws attention to the unfinished business in the threshold test-ban treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, signed by the United States

and the Soviet Union in 1974 and 1976 respectively, but not yet ratified by the United States. The paragraph calls for the ratification of these agreements and for the resumption of the tripartite comprehensive test ban negotiations broken off in 1979.

It is now a year since the NATO cruise and Pershing II missiles began to be deployed in Europe, and by the end of the year one-fifth of the deployment programme will have been completed. The status of deployment as it is believed to be in November is shown in paragraph 2.7 of the explanatory memorandum. Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation calls therefore for an examination of any constructive proposals from the Soviet Union which may be made in the resumed INF and START negotiations, which need not, in the committee’s view, exclude a possible mutual temporary freeze on further deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons, until the prospects of meaningful agreement with the Soviet Union can be probed – and with INF and short-range nuclear weapons I do not mean only on the one side SS-20s and on the other Pershing and cruise missiles; I mean also on the other side SS-21s, SS-22s, SS-23s and a possible future SS-25. If a balance should be negotiated between SS-20s on the one side and Pershing and strategic cruise missiles on the other, we are put in a hole in Europe with the SS-22s with a range of 900 kilometres stationed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and within range of Paris, Brussels, The Hague and other cities.

Lastly, paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation calls on the Council to agree specific studies which should be assigned to the Agency for the Control of Armaments both to assist the Council in its discussions on matters of arms control and to assist committees of this Assembly in preparing their reports. At Appendix III to the explanatory memorandum the committee has made its own proposals concerning suitable tasks for the Agency which, in accordance with the document on the institutional reform of WEU, adopted by the ministers in Rome, will in the future be required:

“to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions;

undertake the function of studying security and defence problems ;

...the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion.”

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Mr. Blaauw, for the very clear presentation of your report.

In the debate I call Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there are some aspects of Mr. Blaauw's report about which I have some personal reservations. I wish to state, nonetheless, that I share the general sentiments expressed in the document before the Assembly and in Mr. Blaauw's report.

As he himself has pointed out, this document was prepared prior to a number of events with very great and favourable implications. I refer firstly to the initial steps towards a resumption of the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States on the control and reduction of armaments and to the meeting planned for early January between the Foreign Ministers of the two superpowers. This is an event of exceptional importance, particularly when we consider the general climate which has prevailed in international relations over the last two years. We are, indeed, witnessing a first very hopeful sign in the wake of extremely acute and dangerous tensions which have dramatised the whole field of international relations and have brought them to the very threshold of actual breakdown.

A glimmer of hope, which we can only qualify as highly promising, now seems to be beginning, and I share the hope expressed by Mr. Blaauw that this may grow and lead to positive developments and agreements.

I also agree with him, however, that we should not cherish any illusions. It is essential, on the contrary, that all the forces for peace - parliaments and governments throughout the world - work for the success of these initial moves in order to achieve at last the resumption of a new phase of negotiations between East and West, the establishment of a climate of mutual trust in international relations and with it the halting and reversal of the present arms race.

In this context, the draft recommendation under discussion seems to me to be of real value because it calls for positive action to persuade Western European governments to adopt an active and constructive attitude. There can indeed, be no doubt that the peace and security of Western Europe are closely linked to the state of relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Each cycle of tension or détente invariably brings with it costs or benefits, risks or advantages for our own countries. There is no doubt that the incredible waste of resources on armaments throughout the world and, above all, the terrifying prospect of a nuclear conflict weigh heavy on the whole of mankind and, in even more acute form, on

Europe, which is invariably the main sufferer from the consequences arising from relations between the two superpowers.

For all these reasons WEU cannot confine itself to hoping and waiting but must, as stated in the recommendation, take initiatives of its own in favour of a resumption of the dialogue and negotiations on armaments control and disarmament. In this context, I find that special importance attaches to three questions: first, negotiations on strategic arms and Euro-missiles involving the need for appropriate decisions on such issues as a freeze on the deployment of Euromissiles and on the replacement of short-range weapons in the interests of a successful conclusion to the negotiations; second, negotiations to secure the prohibition of anti-missile weapons and special systems which it seems obvious to me, would, if introduced, aggravate the arms race and render all the problems of control exceedingly difficult if not actually insoluble; third, agreement to ban chemical weapons and, especially, all nuclear tests: this last issue is squarely faced in the report and draft recommendation.

The fact that these requirements are given their proper place in the document accompanying Mr. Blaauw's report is a matter for satisfaction. I also agree with the proposal put forward in the document that the Agency for the Control of Armaments should cease to be a kind of pretence and should become an important and independent instrument for ensuring an independent place for Europe in the military balance and enabling it to exercise a positive influence on negotiations.

For all the reasons I have briefly outlined and because we wish to be consistent in our attitude of always supporting any European initiative aimed at promoting balanced disarmament, Italian communist members take a favourable view of Mr. Blaauw's report and will vote for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I remind you that speakers are allowed only five minutes.

I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like first to congratulate Mr. Blaauw on his report. It is well-balanced and reflects what is probably the prevailing view in this Assembly. However, early action is required to reduce levels of armaments in view of the impatience of many people in our countries.

Europe's interest in détente is, of course, quite distinct from that of the United States. The European countries view security primarily from a regional angle, while the United States interest

Mr. Haase (continued)

is global. This difference should not frighten us, but it does mean that European interest must be vigorously defended vis-à-vis the leading power in the West.

In organisational terms, this is reflected in the reactivation of WEU, on which there is a large measure of agreement; in closer co-operation within NATO's Eurogroup, where armaments co-operation is concerned - here again there are no major differences - and in closer co-operation in EPC, among the member countries of the European Community.

As regards the substance of the matter, I believe European interests are reflected in the following major objectives, to which the report also refers. First, there is the ban on chemical weapons. It may be possible to make a prior concession by agreeing that chemical weapons should not be deployed and stored in Europe and where stocks of these weapons already exist they should be quickly removed because it is enough for the United States to have such weapons.

A second point I should like to make is that the member countries of WEU should place particular emphasis on confidence-building measures, so that the conference may be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible and foundations laid for further talks.

I find it particularly important, however, that we should not be sceptical about the fresh negotiations between the two superpowers, which will not begin until January. We must make a positive contribution. I do not think it is right to be sceptical about the future. On the contrary, I believe there are many signs that this conference stands a better chance of success than its predecessors.

But this also means - and I want to make this absolutely clear - that the European governments must try to enter into close consultations with the United States from the outset. We in this Assembly should give our governments a parliamentary mandate to try to achieve such co-operation and enter into such consultations as soon as the negotiations begin.

I have tabled an amendment. I do not consider it absolutely essential to delete paragraph 4 of the recommendation, although it does refer to the INF negotiations, which of course have been slightly superseded by the new talks. But I feel that at the very least something should be added to paragraph 4, as I and two other members have proposed, to the effect that we call for intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during those negotiations. I leave it to the Rapporteur to decide whether

paragraph 4 should be amended, but at least this point should be added.

We must also consider the different positions of the Eastern European countries vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This applies to Romania and Hungary and also to the German Democratic Republic. I will not go into greater detail at this juncture, but I feel we must bear this in mind and draw the necessary conclusions. In other words, our position must be such that the Soviet Union does not have a fresh chance to bind the Eastern European countries more closely to itself than is already the case. Although Part I of Mr. Blaauw's report refers to this aspect indirectly, I feel it should have gone into it in greater depth and above all indicated the direction that should be followed.

I should like to make some contribution in this respect as well, through the amendment I have tabled which concerns the continuation of the Warsaw Pact.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Haase, I am sorry to say that you have exceeded your speaking time. No more than two or three minutes, please.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I have almost finished. Just one more sentence.

I feel this amendment should be adopted, because it calls on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries to reconsider and to tell us whether or not the Warsaw Pact in its present form is still necessary. We have some time to spare, since the Warsaw Pact expires on 5th June 1985. I would be grateful to the Rapporteur if he could approve this amendment.

To summarise, I find this report acceptable, it has my approval, and I call on the Assembly to adopt the two amendments. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Milani to speak for five minutes.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I attach importance to the fact that the Rapporteur has prefaced the draft recommendation with the statement that the problems of disarmament and arms control are now too serious and too urgent for Europe to renounce any rôle for itself and to concentrate all its hopes in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. While it is not for us, at least not in this Assembly, to anticipate the outcome of the talks due to take place next January, we can nevertheless draw attention to the risks which, in my opinion, dim the optimism with which we should contemplate the first signs of a lowering of East-West tension.

The fact is that the most recent developments in military technology have placed ever greater

Mr. Milani (continued)

difficulties in the way of the search for honest agreements advantageous to both parties. I shall restrict myself to three examples, the first of which is the proliferation of cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead – an issue which obviously concerns NATO as much as the Warsaw Pact. The point here is that the deployment of these weapons systems, which are both highly versatile and easily concealed, in an unspecified number of military aircraft, ships and land bases, will make it increasingly difficult to check that any agreements reached are being properly implemented. This will therefore constitute a growing source of distrust in relations between the two blocs.

The second example, which is very important to us, relates to the new anti-missile systems and the so-called star wars strategies which were discussed here this morning, in my view with some arrogance. Here there are two points to be considered: on the one hand there is the prospect, announced by President Reagan following his "historic" speech of March 1983, of the final demise of the mutual deterrence theory, and on the other hand there is the danger inherent in the empirical reasoning behind the approach to the actual problem of technological programmes relating to these weapons systems.

I realise that, leaving mere rhetoric aside, everybody is conscious of the dangers of a policy which seeks security in the complete insecurity of the enemy. It must, however, be recognised that, when the terrifying destructive power of nuclear arsenals is involved, the security of the planet is truly indivisible. We cannot therefore delude ourselves into supposing that we could escape the general holocaust by possessing a shield more effective than the enemy's weapons! Furthermore – and this is the second point I wish to make about these problems – even the more pragmatic notes sounded in the recent NATO parliamentary assembly and also here this morning, far though they may be from the rhetorical flourishes of the American President, nonetheless point to an extremely dangerous situation in which the armaments race is escalated step by step, almost without noticing and with no clear awareness of what is happening and no explicit decision.

To sum up, I am very worried that, despite the well-founded objections to the programmes I have mentioned, support will nevertheless be given to the deceptively reasonable policy of implementing research programmes without thinking out the ultimate consequences. We all know how things develop and the reality, once again, will be that of the *fait accompli* with decisions laden with serious implications being taken almost clandestinely and thereby eluding both democratic control by parliament and the

general public in the alliance countries as well as the forthcoming efforts to get negotiations going between the two blocs, which are very properly mentioned in the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Blaauw.

Finally, I must return to a subject I touched on yesterday. This concerns the so-called emerging technologies and the attempts, by the use of these technologies and the doctrine of the air-land battle and the deep-strike, to free our defence systems from dependence on nuclear weapons. It is my impression, in fact, that it is extremely dangerous to engage in lines of research which can make the boundary between nuclear and conventional weapons increasingly uncertain and blurred. From our experience of all earlier negotiations between the two blocs, we realise the extreme complexity of the problem of equivalence between different weapons systems conceived in the context of different doctrines for their use. We are aware, in particular, how the doctrine on which the policy of the Atlantic Alliance was for a long time based, i.e. that of balancing the superiority of the eastern bloc in conventional arms by an emphasis on nuclear weapons, has made it extremely difficult to move towards disarmament in both conventional and nuclear weapons in the European theatre.

Reduced to their essentials, these are the considerations of a technical nature which, in my opinion, call for a great deal of caution in approaching the next phase of negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Fundamentally, however – and I will not dwell on the matter – there are very sound political reasons why, as our Rapporteur properly points out, it is not wise to rely exclusively on the initiatives of the two superpowers. Here I welcome Mr. Blaauw's report, especially for its objectivity and because it emphasises the fact that, from the European point of view, it is difficult to distinguish, at least in conceptual terms, between strategic and theatre nuclear weapons systems. At the same time, I wish to emphasise that I find it contradictory that Mr. Blaauw was yesterday able to vote for a report and a recommendation which were so much at odds with the convictions expressed in his own report, although this is not the only contradiction in this Assembly. A second example is this morning's vote on Mr. Wilkinson's report and recommendation. Dealing with the same subject, the Atlantic Assembly which met in Brussels in November voted to refer the matter back!

With regard to the proposals in the recommendation, it is worth pointing out, apart from the hope that the negotiations will be successful, the welcome character of a number of these, such as the banning of anti-missile missiles – and I repeat that this is a contradiction, as it is not possible to hope for something and then set

Mr. Milani (continued)

a different objective – and, more especially, the banning of chemical weapons and nuclear tests. It would have been more to the point had the Rapporteur referred explicitly and in some detail to the very recent change in NATO's military strategy. It is astonishing that a body such as the WEU Assembly has not discussed this issue and is not discussing it at the very time when the change is taking place! After all, it amounts basically to the first radical change introduced in the seventeen years since the last strategic choice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, you have used up your time.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – At a time when we are talking about its reactivation, the WEU Assembly should be discussing not only star wars strategies but also these other topics which are laden with so many political, military and economic implications of the greatest possible relevance to Europe – otherwise there is no reason why it should exist! But the pointers in the recommendation and the ideas as to how Europe should have a permanent presence in East-West negotiations are all vague. While taking a favourable view of the report and the recommendation, I shall therefore abstain from voting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I shall be very brief because, when moving my amendment, I shall touch upon one of the fundamental points of the subject and the report.

I should like to begin with an expression of regret that security and peace will always be based on the balance of terror. Negotiations aimed at reducing armaments of any kind may well produce an acceptable solution by restricting weaponry to minimum levels, but such a balance, even at these minimum levels, would still bear out the fact that security and peace are indeed founded on the balance of terror, even – I repeat – at low levels.

I do not wish to suggest by this that negotiations should not be pursued. On the contrary, they should be intensified. Any arms reduction, however small, is beneficial, if only because it would enable countries to invest the money saved in other areas for the economic and social advancement of the people and for aid to the developing countries. I am not, as some members seem to be, over-optimistic about the new initiative to be launched in December with the meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the United States Secretary of State. Experience shows that the path is fraught with great difficulties, that in twelve years the MBFR has

not taken a single step forwards, and that, after lasting for years, negotiations were broken off without achieving any useful result whatsoever. It follows that the European states of the Atlantic Alliance as well as the member states of the WEU Assembly must increase their direct involvement and intensify their efforts at furthering negotiations and contributing helpfully to a favourable outcome. If, however, an agreement on arms control is not reached, any result will be meaningless and will offer no hope of any benefit.

Arms control is especially essential for us, in particular, as we are confronted by countries which, because of their political organisation, are not subject to checks imposed by the opposition, by the press and by public opinion, whereas in western countries the deployment of cruise or Pershing missiles, for example, requires a lengthy period of preparation and discussion for the precise reason that public opinion is involved in these measures and their control. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, SS-22s and SS-23s can be deployed from one day to the next without a word of discussion beforehand.

It is therefore necessary to place particular emphasis on arms control and on verifying the proper observance of any agreements reached, and I would like to end, Mr. President, by expressing the hope that the negotiations which are to begin in January may prove truly fruitful, or at least more fruitful than those which have gone before. However, this hope must be backed up by a constant effort by the various countries concerned and by all of us to ensure that the actions of the allies are properly concerted without those displays of distrust and discord which in the past have been so unhelpful to the cause of security and peace.

(*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I welcome the report and recommend its adoption because it describes rather more authentically than previous opinions the present aims of the Western European countries in the arms control negotiations and because it emphasises the rôle of Western Europe in this complicated negotiating compromise.

As we had a debate on arms in space this morning, I particularly welcome the chapter of the report on this subject because it expresses an awareness of the problems involved that I can fully endorse. It would be rather surprising – if I may be allowed an ironic remark – if everyone who has directly or indirectly spoken in favour of the SDI programme today approved this

Mr. Scheer (continued)

report. I personally am able to do this, because I see no inconsistency between what I said this morning and what the report says. But there is an inconsistency between approval of the SDI and approval of this report. I believe this needs to be stressed.

I should like to pick out the two respects in which this report, in my opinion, goes beyond what has so far been decided. One is the claim that negotiations are undesirable unless they can be conducted at global level, and that it is impracticable, and therefore undesirable, for separate negotiations to be held on the different categories of nuclear weapons. I believe this is a crucial decision, which should not simply be ignored, and will be very important to our future negotiating strategy.

The report also expresses views which the Social Democratic Party of Germany has been putting forward for years on the principles of the negotiations. It has become clear that separation of the INF and START negotiations, far from making things easier, has exacerbated the problems. It has also emerged that separate talks on land-based systems, to the exclusion of sea-based intermediate-range systems, has aggravated rather than eased the situation. Hence the enormous importance of this section of the report, as long as it receives attention in practice. As parliamentarians should rise above the current level of diplomatic efforts, this report comes close to fulfilling this parliamentary requirement.

Secondly, I want to emphasise the sentiment expressed in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation. It recommends that a temporary freeze on further deployments of INF and short-range nuclear weapons should not be excluded. In the opinion of the Social Democratic Party, a rampant build-up of intermediate and short-range weapons on both sides of the demarcation line in Europe will have serious consequences.

If the talks were confined to one category, while the build-up in the other categories continued – I would remind you that the deployment of SS-22s is even more serious for Western Europe than the deployment of SS-20s – the arms control negotiations would always be lagging behind the problems. It is therefore particularly important to emphasise that one condition of negotiations between the two sides is that a freeze on further deployments of intermediate and short-range weapons in East and West should not be excluded. It is also important for this idea to be put to the appropriate governments. It is a point that, in my opinion, should be discussed in greater depth in the future. The question is how the problem of tac-

tical nuclear weapons might be taken into account in the negotiations.

So far, efforts to control armaments have neglected this problem and the initiatives to this end which might be undertaken in the MBFR talks and elsewhere are especially important for us. I say this because I believe we must consider the problem even more carefully in the future, by which I mean no criticism of the report. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is always a pleasure to discuss a report by a member from one's own country, especially when you find that he has abandoned his political beliefs. I am surprised to read in what is in many respects a very pleasant report things that I would not have expected of Mr. Blaauw, a conservative liberal, in the past. I will explain why I am so happy with various aspects of his report. I shall also ask him a few questions.

Mr. President, the most important question is how we Europeans, members of WEU, can help to ensure the success of the Geneva talks when they are resumed, as they very probably will be. From the European point of view this is the most important political challenge we shall face in the months to come. In my opinion, the resumption of the talks is politically very important, especially as the Soviet Union, which has always imposed conditions, now seems prepared to accept the resumption of these talks unconditionally. The question that again arises in this connection is how we members of WEU can help to ensure that these talks are a success.

I agree with the Rapporteur that it is extremely important for Europe not to become dependent either on the United States or on the Soviet Union when it comes to ensuring the success of the talks. The European member states are consulted in NATO, so the question is: how can Europe organise itself in order to exercise more influence over these talks? I therefore fully endorse the Rapporteur's view that the European countries must place greater emphasis on agreeing common European instructions on the course the talks should follow.

I am delighted to see that Mr. Blaauw says we should not try to strike a separate balance in each category of weapons. This is what the Netherlands Labour Party has been saying in the Netherlands Parliament for years. When we called for a debate on the subject in the Second Chamber, Mr. Blaauw's party was firmly opposed, convinced that there could be nothing worse. But to my surprise I now see from the report that Mr. Blaauw is suddenly in favour of integrating the various talks, because it is impos-

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

sible to strike a separate balance in different categories. However, this conflicts with the statement in the recommendation that we must continue to negotiate by categories. This cannot be right, unless he means that if we negotiate by categories for practical reasons, we must bear in mind what is happening elsewhere. I should therefore like to hear his opinion on the following question. Should we welcome the apparent creation, under the leadership of Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko themselves, of a forum in which various negotiations are co-ordinated? This essentially means – and it is here that Mr. Blaauw has abandoned his beliefs – that negotiations would no longer be pursued by categories and that we would seek to establish a global balance.

Mr. President, another important point made in the report is that Soviet deployment of SS-20s was frozen some time ago. I believe this is true. Mr. Blaauw has said so, and I must therefore believe him. This leads me to ask: if we Europeans are trying to ensure the success of the Geneva talks, would it not be worth while, taking the Soviet move as a basis, for us to announce a temporary freeze in the deployment of intermediate-range weapons in Western Europe? Would it not be worth while responding to the Soviet position with a positively significant political gesture? In this context, I have a “Dutch” question to ask. Does Mr. Blaauw feel that in the present circumstances, if the Russians do not change their minds, the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands is unnecessary? In my opinion, this is in total conformity with the views of the Netherlands Government, to which my party does not belong, whereas Mr. Blaauw’s party does.

Mr. President, did I understand Mr. Blaauw to say that the French and British Governments must be invited to allow their nuclear weapons to be included in the global balance – not therefore by category – of weapons in East and West? To conclude, I must say that I completely agree with Mr. Blaauw that the dangerous developments in the field of space weapons must be kept under control.

Mr. President, I had some criticisms, but I am glad that Mr. Blaauw has seen sense at last. I shall take great pleasure in voting for his report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I take the opportunity presented by our consideration of the report and the draft recommendation to make clear our position on the control of armaments and disarmament.

The Rapporteur has stated that the first half of 1984 was not a favourable period for dealing with the INF and START negotiations. We must nevertheless take note of the announcement made jointly by Tass and the American Department of State on 22nd November last of talks aimed at the resumption of East-West negotiations. This is an important announcement as it is suggested that the negotiations will not merely be a resumption of earlier Soviet-American bargaining but will be entirely new. The Soviet Union is therefore no longer demanding as a prior condition the withdrawal of the missiles deployed by NATO following the dual-track decision in 1979.

It is also said that these negotiations will cover the whole range of problems associated with nuclear and space weapons, but we are pleased to note that the Rapporteur has been careful to mention that the inclusion of the British and French nuclear weapons in any negotiations would be premature as long as the arsenals of the two superpowers remain at their present high levels. This question has already been dealt with in a firm declaration by the alliance, which rejected Soviet claims of so-called equal security.

France will agree to participate in negotiations on its nuclear forces on the following conditions: that the superpowers first reduce their nuclear arms to the point of eliminating the present imbalance; that the superpowers first make significant progress towards removing other threats, such as that inherent in the imbalance in conventional and chemical weapons in Europe; and that new threats have not arisen in the meantime.

France has always expressed reservations on arms control on the grounds that it tended to freeze the balance of forces on a two-power basis and did not face squarely the problems of reducing existing arsenals and techno-strategic competition.

Furthermore, France considers that it is misguided to attempt to deal in isolation in nuclear weapons intended exclusively for the European theatre, since long-range strategic weapons can be used in Europe in the same way as tactical armaments.

Regarding the possible “freeze” referred to in paragraph 4 of the recommendation proper, I regret that this idea perpetuates a number of more complex problems like that of the imbalances, which could not be overcome by a mutual temporary freeze on further deployments of INF.

As far as the military use of space is concerned, I have already expressed my views on this subject when we discussed Mr. Wilkinson’s draft recommendation, and I shall not therefore return to the matter.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

In the field of chemical weapons, however, we should make a determined effort to achieve a verifiable agreement prohibiting the production of chemical weapons and setting an exact timetable for the destruction of stocks.

Turning to the Agency for the Control of Armaments, it seems to us that the reactivation of the two technical organs of WEU should not lead to the amalgamation of their respective areas of responsibility. For instance, while we may endorse the proposal on studies relating to disarmament as within the particular province of the Agency, it does not seem expedient to assign to the Agency for the Control of Armaments operational activities such as the sending of observers to allied exercises or to the manoeuvres of Warsaw Pact countries.

In our approach to the issue, the question of controls is subordinate to the need for a political reaffirmation of WEU's rôle. At the same time, the Agency for the Control of Armaments will retain control functions both actual, as for example over the non-production by the Federal Republic of Germany of chemical weapons, and potential, as for example over biological and chemical weapons in the case of the continental countries, together with the publication of lists of prohibited substances.

Subject to these remarks, which have been embodied in the various amendments tabled by my friend Lucien Pignion, which we should like to see adopted, we should be in a position to support the draft recommendation under discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to speakers.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - I should like to thank all my colleagues for their kind words about the report, which was an amalgamation of contributions by many members of the committee. I did not manage to note down all the questions that were asked, so if I do not give all the answers required, I probably missed the question.

Mr. Haase was specific on a couple of subjects, one of which was chemical weapons. He said that the report did not refer explicitly to the planning of such weapons on the European continent, particularly in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. I did not have the impression that such an idea would carry the majority in the committee or even the Assembly. As can be seen from Appendix II of the report, Liberal International was the first international political organisation to adopt a resolution on the subject, and it is asking that chemical weapons be removed from German soil.

What about confidence-building measures? I fully agree with what Mr. Haase suggested. Confidence-building measures are important in all areas. In many other areas where there is conflict between people one wonders whether there is a real conflict of thought or just a conflict of perception. I thank Mr. Haase for his ideas about negotiations, but I am not being gloomy about that. Liberals are optimists. We always see the good things in mankind, but sometimes we think that we should be more realistic. With the history of arms control negotiations in mind, I hope that there will be results, but let us not draw conclusions in advance and act as if good things had been put on the table by the other side.

Mr. Haase and many other speakers dwelt on the threat aimed at Europe by the SS-21, the SS-22 and the SS-23. I should like to refer mainly to the SS-22, which I mentioned in my introduction. I think that Mr. van den Bergh missed that part of my speech, when I said that the SS-22 constituted one of the main parts of paragraph (iv). I am pleased to hear that the socialists in the *Bundesrepublik* understand that problem. It is difficult to make Dutch socialists realise it, but I shall not dwell on national antagonisms.

Mr. Milani dwelt on many subjects and I share his anxiety about space weapons. However, that does not mean that I need to vote in favour of a subject that goes further than this specific subject. As members of parliament, we sometimes have to weigh what is most important and if we think that the balance is positive, we vote in favour, although we do not get everything that we should like. Probably along another path we shall get the extra percentage that we missed in the initial report on space weapons.

I agreed with his approach on chemical weapons, as well as that of Mr. Fourré. We do not need a chemical weapons posture. I had no information about a change in the tactics or strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance on chemical weapons. The only impression that I had was that somebody had mentioned something about military retaliation capacity, but he was brought back to earth. We must fight chemical weapons strongly. Some people say that they are the poor man's nuclear weapon, as the Rover is the poor man's Rolls Royce.

I thank Mr. Cavaliere for this comments. He made a long contribution on the problems of the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23. Those weapons are included in paragraph (iv), although they are not named. That is why I am against deleting paragraph (iv). However, we shall debate the amendments later.

I thank Mr. Scheer for his remarks. I referred to all the points he raised in my introduction.

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

I am pleased that Mr. van den Bergh is glad about my contribution in the report. It is always nice when compatriots agree with each other. However, I do not follow my other socialist colleagues in saying that liberals cannot fall from their belief because they have no beliefs.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – Political beliefs.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – That is not true.

In the report when I refer to a freeze, I am not talking about a unilateral freeze of cruise missiles and Pershings on the western side because the SS-20 programme is complete. I am not asking for it; I am just telling them that if that proposal is put on the table, it should not be immediately negated. What should be on the table is a temporary freeze of INF and short-range nuclear weapons. I should like to tell Mr. van den Bergh that that includes SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s, which are very dangerous. The French should have been more positive in their approach.

What about linking and unlinking? One of Europe's fears has always been that the two superpowers will come to an agreement on weapons that will not reach the other country's soil. The SS-20 cannot reach American soil, but it can reach the countries of Europe and could be used, as I said in my introduction, against Paris, Brussels and The Hague, to mention only a few.

Mr. van den Bergh asked whether, in the present circumstances, I was against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. He picked only one type of weapon from a range of weapons. That was not the right thing to do. The 1979 dual-track decision was reached in solidarity, with a time schedule in it for different countries. It would not be right to break that solidarity simply because one believes that the other side has already completed its programme. I cannot support that philosophy. Therefore, I still believe that when nothing is happening we must face the problem, which means probably that the Netherlands will have to deploy its share of cruise missiles by the end of 1985. As Mr. van den Bergh said, the coalition government of the Netherlands will make the decision, and the Liberal Party will adhere to it.

I do not remember saying anything about French or British nuclear weapons, but it is clear that they must have a background part in international negotiations.

Mr. van den Bergh mentioned the linking of negotiations. In the past, when we had separate

INF and START negotiations, which were on different bases, it was not a good idea to merge those negotiations and have them round the same table. However, they clearly influence each other. If the outcome of the negotiations in January is an umbrella over all those things, I would agree with having discussions underneath it, although there could still be separate negotiations in different areas. I should tell Mr. van den Bergh that that will not be real integration. We shall discuss the matter in another forum.

I thank Mr. Fourné for his remarks, but I am sad that he does not agree with some of the ideas in the draft recommendation. We shall see how the Assembly acts on the amendments, but I believe that France must make some move and not remain in its old position. I agree entirely with what he said about definite planning for the destruction of chemical weapons, but that must be negotiated in Geneva on a reciprocal basis. There must also be a timetable. I endorse his suggestion of bringing together the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, because I believe that there should be some innovative thinking about those two organs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the committee Chairman.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, for reasons totally beyond my control I have not been able to follow the work of my committee. I shall therefore refrain from comment other than on the quality of the work done by Mr. Blaauw, as I am fully aware of the enacting terms and the draft recommendation. As Mr. Blaauw has said, the Assembly will judge for itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before voting on the draft recommendation we have nine amendments to consider.

These will be discussed in the order in which they apply to the document, that is: Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 9 tabled by Mr. Haase and Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Haase.

I have to inform the Assembly that Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Haase, has been withdrawn.

I would point out that we could discuss jointly Amendments 4 and 5 by Mr. Pignion as well as Amendments 2 and 6, one by Mr. Cavaliere and the other by Mr. Pignion, which are about the same subject. If the proposers and the Assembly agree, this procedure will save time.

Are there any objections?...

The President (continued)

I thank the Assembly for agreeing.

Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Pignion, reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Agree common instructions to" and insert "Promote exchanges of views between".

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I have to point out, Mr. President, that this is a personal amendment. The sending of "common instructions" strikes me as being premature and peremptory in present circumstances, and I therefore suggest the more flexible wording: "Promote exchanges".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Jäger.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would not dream of comparing my knowledge of defence matters with that of Mr. Pignion, who has a great deal of experience in this Assembly. My criticism therefore concerns less the general caution he has urged in these matters than the wording he has proposed.

If we are to press for the reactivation of WEU, as we have done since the special session in Rome, and to give it greater strength, I feel a reference to exchanges of views is too weak. WEU member countries must pull themselves together, take joint decisions and give their representatives at international conferences joint instructions. I believe that is the new spirit of WEU and that it should find expression.

That is my only reason for opposing your amendment, Mr. Pignion. I quite agree that caution and a carefully considered approach are called for. We must find a way of expressing the fresh determination to make WEU an effective factor both in security and in disarmament in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I wish to speak against the amendment. There is currently an exchange of views between the representatives of WEU countries at Geneva, but to give it more political impetus there should have been instructions from politically responsible persons – the secretaries of state and the ministers. For that reason we chose the words "Agree common instructions", which bring the matter to a higher and more political level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Pignion, is as follows:

4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and a comprehensive test ban".

Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Pignion, is as follows:

5. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "and with the United Kingdom to resume the tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty".

I call Mr. Pignion to move these amendments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I am mindful of the wording used by Mr. Blaauw and of the remarks he made a short time ago, but in view of the on-going negotiations during which a number of measures have been agreed which have never been adhered to, and considering also that those countries, including my own, which are still carrying out nuclear tests, do so under conditions covered by a tacit agreement reached during earlier discussions, that is to say with tests performed only below ground and limited in force to 150 kilotonnes – which is already quite a lot – I would prefer that this phrase be omitted from the draft recommendation. It would be somewhat hypocritical and, as with any pious wish, it would solve nothing to have a phrase on which we agreed but whose application would, I believe, prove entirely unattainable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I call on the Assembly to reject Amendments 4 and 5 and to leave the recommendation as it is.

All the Western European governments and parliaments, except the French Government, have been calling for a comprehensive test ban for years. It is unacceptable that all the other Western European countries should change their views in deference to the special rôle France plays in this connection. How the French rôle, which is related to the *force de frappe* – this is not new – can be harmonised more closely with the policies of the other WEU countries in this area must be discussed in the future. It is not a question that can continue to be ignored. But it will not be possible for us to fall back behind positions adopted years ago for well-considered

Mr. Scheer (continued)

reasons by every country, including the United Kingdom, on a comprehensive test ban.

I therefore call on the Assembly to leave the text as it is. That too will reflect the new spirit of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take it that your reply refers to both amendments.

What is the committee's view?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – When I heard that there was to be a French amendment to this part of my draft recommendation, I hoped – it became a vain hope – that it would attract France to make a four-country negotiation. If we really want to do something about nuclear weapons, we must begin at the heart, which is where the weapons are tested. All new generations of weapons must be tested.

In the non-proliferation treaty there is both horizontal and vertical non-proliferation. For that reason there has been heavy support in all WEU countries for a comprehensive test ban as a start towards the control of nuclear weapons.

In view of the review conference next year on the non-proliferation treaty, it would be a generous gesture if three of the five admitted nuclear powers began negotiations again about a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Pignion has tabled Amendment 8 as follows:

8. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "early" and insert "quick".

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – This is a drafting amendment only. The term "early" is used to refer to crops and in psychology but is not so apposite here. It is simply a question of the right word.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I do not think this amendment requires much discussion.

Does it affect the substance, Mr. Blaauw?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – In view of the new developments may I say that I accept the amendment. In English "quick" is a better word than "early".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is agreed to.

Mr. Cavaliere has tabled Amendment 2 as follows:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end of the paragraph.

Mr. Pignion has tabled Amendment 6 as follows:

6. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "not excluding" to the end of the paragraph and insert "avoiding any measure liable to confirm present imbalances;".

As these two amendments deal with the same subject I suggest that they be discussed together.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

I call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 2.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to explain the reasoning behind this amendment I should like to remind you that NATO's dual-track decision of December 1979 was prompted by the circumstance that the previous balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been upset by the deployment of SS-20s. With the passage of time, and even during the negotiations, this imbalance was increased, as the Soviet Union virtually trebled its deployment of these missiles and unremittingly pursued its policy. It is hardly necessary to point out that the United States did not ask for a freeze on the deployment of SS-20s while the negotiations were in progress. To say now that a freeze should not be ruled out is tantamount to a disregard of reality and, in my view, would not contribute helpfully to the rapid progress of negotiations or to a solution of the kind we all hope for. Such a freeze would instead mean perpetuating a state of affairs favourable to the Warsaw Pact, or, in other words, preserving the Pact's present superiority. Clearly, in this kind of situation, the Warsaw Pact would see no advantage in pressing on with negotiations in order to arrive at a rapid agreement, meeting all the objectives which we set ourselves.

This is why I have tabled this amendment deleting part of the fourth paragraph which refers to a possible freeze. Let us leave the decision on this issue to the negotiators so that it can be taken, with the agreement of the Europeans, when the course of the negotiations has made clear the various positions and the prospects ahead.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion to move Amendment 6.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I learnt in the past that, if the same amounts were taken away from two unlike quantities, the difference between them stayed the same. When a situation comprising two truly dissimilar quantities is frozen, the imbalance between them becomes permanent. As far as I can see, both in spirit – although I realise that this view is not entirely shared by the committee to judge from the rumblings I have heard – and in the letter – for those who read through the draft recommendation – the “freeze” perpetuates the status quo. If the existing situation is out of balance, the imbalance persists.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the two amendments?...

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am opposed to both amendments because they are closely linked and, in my opinion, the idea behind them is roughly the same.

In my statement I asked for a more far-reaching view of what might happen in the event of a freeze on intermediate-range weapons. I nevertheless believe that, if WEU endorses Mr. Blaauw's views, it will be making a major contribution to the success of the talks that are very likely to be resumed in Geneva. If we go along with Mr. Pignion and Mr. Cavaliere, the recommendation will be deprived of a very important new element, which may act as a stimulant for the Geneva talks. This presupposes, of course, that we can persuade the Soviet Union and the United States to adopt a similar position.

I must unfortunately tell my colleague Mr. Pignion that it is virtually impossible to talk of a lack of balance in the various categories of nuclear weapons for the very simple reason that balance can be assessed only in global terms. I therefore support Mr. Blaauw in his efforts to retain the present version of the recommendation – as I expect he will – because, with it, WEU can help to overcome the present deadlock in the arms talks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Pignion's amendment should be considered as forming part of, and not as superseding, the text of the report, and I therefore ask Mr. Pignion to move the amendment in those terms.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Bianco, I can only consult the Assembly on the basis

of the documents which have been tabled. Your proposal might take the form of an amendment to an amendment but it would be a document for the sitting and I feel myself obliged to ask the views of the author of the amendment and of the committee to clarify matters fully for the Assembly.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I think it would be difficult to alter the wording.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I again draw attention to the fact that this is not a one-sided freeze, that it is a wholly different freeze from that which has been talked about previously.

I am asking for a mutual – which means both sides – and temporary – which means with a time limit – freeze on further deployment of not only INF as they are, SS-20, Pershing and cruise missiles, but also SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s. This is more far-reaching and it is to the benefit of Europe to stop this weapons race on the part of the Soviet Union with the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23. If that formula could result in the start or speeding up of the INF and START negotiations, we should embark on that course.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negated.

I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negated.

Mr. Haase and Mr. Gansel have tabled Amendment 9 as follows:

9. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following:

“and further aim its efforts to achieve intensive consultations between the United States and the European allies during new United States-Soviet negotiations”.

Mr. Haase has also tabled Amendment 7 as follows:

7. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Remind the Warsaw Pact states that WEU during the thirty years of its existence has never prepared or taken any aggressive and hostile measures against the Warsaw Pact but on the contrary has paved the way for the policy of détente and aims at peaceful interaction and reduction of tension among the

The President (continued)

European peoples; and call upon the states of the Warsaw Pact to take into account this position of WEU, which is also in conformity with the position of the United States and Canada as well as of the NATO member states, when taking a decision on the confirmation of their treaty beyond June 1985 and to draw consequences from this position for the continuation or shaping of the Warsaw Pact."

Mr. Haase, may I take it that you are prepared to move your two amendments at the same time?

I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The two amendments are quite explicit and call for no comment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 9 and 7?...

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The subject raised by these amendments should properly have been put to the General Affairs Committee. To adopt them now would be contradicting the decision taken yesterday against urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Contrary to what Mr. Reddemann said, yesterday the Assembly decided that there was no urgent procedure on the subject. Probably, one of the ways of bringing forward the matter should have been the General Affairs Committee or another choice. I appreciate the way in which Mr. Haase approached the subject and support both his amendments, which should be included in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 9 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

I now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

We will now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 998, as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present call for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call?...

As there is none the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

We will now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

Thank you, colleagues, for working so diligently.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 5th December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.20 p.m.)

1. See page 30.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Masciadri (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Lord Reay (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Blaauw (*for the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Vecchiotti, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Milani, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Lagorce (point of order), Mr. Vogt, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Müller, Mr. Gorla, Mr. Antretter, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Hughes, Mr. Nunes (*Observer from Portugal*).

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. *Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. *Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹. See page 32.

3. *WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance*

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, relations between the Assembly and the Council, and the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, Documents 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999.

I call Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my report was drafted during the summer already behind

Mr. Masciadri (continued)

us and was discussed and approved by the General Affairs Committee on 30th October. On the other hand, the Council of Ministers met in Rome on 26th and 27th October and produced the Rome Declaration; I was, therefore, unable to see that declaration until the last moment and I was, of course, unable to make use of its valuable information, deductions and conclusions in my report. I like to think, however, that, despite this difference in time between the drafting of the report and the Rome Declaration, which in fact is also concerned with the reactivation of WEU, there is some basic affinity between the report I am introducing and the Rome Declaration of the Ministers' intentions.

There is certainly a substantial problem when it comes to translating words and intentions into facts by the adoption of measures which will really relaunch WEU, because there is still a wide gap between proposals and words, which are the appearance, and the real facts and the measures to be adopted which I trust will bear abundant fruit. Today's discussion should also be fruitful, although I have to accept the fact that while mine should have been the central report and one of the basic reasons for the Assembly's meeting, time is unfortunately too short, which is a matter for regret to both myself and the Italian Delegation.

Before going into the substance of the measures and provisions I mentioned previously, I must say that an essential condition for a genuine reactivation of WEU is an immediate declaration that the issue of our loyalty to and unbreakable link with NATO is not a matter for discussion. This link existed in the past, is still with us today and must always continue and we must recognise that we are part of NATO without any possible idea of becoming a third force, which we do not intend to take any further, because it would be foolish and against the whole history of the birth and development of WEU and contrary to the need to guarantee peace and security for our countries.

One point which my report mentions concerning loyalty to NATO is the question of the European pillar. If it were weak it would weaken the whole of NATO. We must meet certain commitments which we cannot set aside. We must also maintain our commitments for a reason which might be regarded as tactical but is not so; namely our wish that those in America itself who are calling for American forces to be withdrawn from Europe should not prevail. This tendency must not be encouraged from our side and we must therefore continuously strengthen our European pillar consisting mainly of our alliance.

Subject to these considerations, steps must be taken to implement the reactivation of WEU. These comprise substantially five or six measures. The first is fundamental and relates to the Council of Ministers which, in accordance with the Rome Declaration, is to meet not once a year but twice, one being an informal meeting attended by both Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, whose presence I regard as essential, because of the complex issues to be discussed; this is a pillar of the reactivation of WEU.

But I think at once of a second essential measure, relating to the Permanent Council which meets in London mainly at ambassadorial level. On this point, I express some doubts in my report because I feel that ambassadors at the level of appointments to London already have many other matters on their minds, so that the problem of WEU, although fundamental is in danger of becoming one among many. I am not calling for the same procedure as that followed for years at the Council of Europe, where there are separate ambassadors for the various areas of work; I do say however that a similar but not identical arrangement should be instituted, so as to avoid the risk of having a Permanent Council which, despite having to meet once a month, does not produce the desired results.

A third measure relates to the Secretariat-General which has to be strengthened in order to ensure the continuity of its work, which is not purely administrative, but also and principally political in character, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in fact provides for such continuity. It is far from my thoughts to criticise the past or the present in any way; there must however be a secretary, who in addition to being a leading civil servant, is also a person of some political stature, as his work is essentially political.

A fourth basic measure relates to the technical agencies of WEU, about which so much has been said, especially in the Rome Declaration, but which are not a new issue. I am referring to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. As regards the first of these two, apart from the question of whether the two bodies should be unified and a third element added in the shape of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee - on this point the Rome Declaration does not state clearly enough whether the two should be unified quickly or whether the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee should be kept separate - leaving this point aside, which is to be studied by a special committee to be set up by the Council, the Agency's problem arises from cuts which are neither excessive nor too modest but reflect the realities of the present situation.

Mr. Masciadri (continued)

Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty straightforwardly eliminates the controls originally carried out; in view of circumstances in 1984, some forty years after the end of a world war, it was unjust to retain controls of certain types of armaments – namely missiles and long-range bomber aircraft – for Germany alone. I take this opportunity to welcome the fact that these controls have been eliminated for the Federal Republic of Germany because they have become historically unfair and useless impositions which needed to be eliminated. My report indeed notes the relevant fact that controls of so-called conventional weapons, some of them obsolete, have been eliminated. The list dates back thirty years and in those thirty years not only technologies and policies but everything else have changed, with the result that the list in Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty has been rescinded by the Council of Ministers. I repeat that I have noted this but that I do not welcome the fact for reasons which only lack of time prevents me from analysing.

From the standpoint of timing, this is perhaps not the moment to eliminate the only control which only one organisation in the world can apply, at least when we have to ask others, including the superpowers to accept controls on armaments and disarmament. It may be objected that if controls are unacceptable between NATO countries, they could not be accepted on a world scale by the superpowers and that is why I note that there will be no more controls over conventional weapons even though I think it would have been better simply to update the list; but I note the situation, because it has happened and is already behind us, so that, without welcoming the fact, I repeat that I note a situation which already exists.

I shall not go into the issue of the tasks which might be allocated to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and might include major strategic studies or consideration of problems relating to détente and disarmament; these must be mentioned because they affect peace and security, which are among the fundamental reasons for the existence of the institution I am addressing.

I should like to make two points concerning the Standing Armaments Committee. The first is that serious and reasoned thought must at last be given to the problems of joint production, standardisation and interoperability in Europe, or at least between the seven countries meeting here. On the subject of joint production may I mention the wholly Italian example of the Agusta combat helicopter suitable for use in Europe and by NATO. At least two other European countries decided to begin studies, with the loss of some millions of dollars, for the construc-

tion of another combat helicopter. This is not joint production but competition between Europeans for the same type of production and this does not seem to me to be constructive. Attempts were made to involve at least two or three countries; this should serve as the sign of an intention to start joint production between the seven European countries, possibly with the involvement of other NATO countries. Standardisation and interoperability are absolutely essential, because in the event of an attack it is unthinkable that it should be met by Frenchmen with one type of weapon, Italians with another and Germans with yet another. This would pose very serious problems for which I can see no solution.

There is also the problem of the two-way street, that is the problem not of competition with the Americans but of protection for Europe's industries. If we look at the present situation, however good or bad it may be, about 90% of armaments are produced by the Americans and a modest 10% by Europeans. This is no two-way street but almost exclusively a one-way street. I believe that one of the subjects which the Standing Armaments Committee should look into is that of raising the 10% to a much higher figure so that if technology and economic strength progress, we shall be able to aim at even higher percentages so that the two-way street ceases to be a one-way street.

My report also covers a number of minor problems such as that of official and informal consultations. I welcome the fact that recently there have been informal contacts between the President of the WEU Assembly and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers. This cannot however become a formal arrangement. There should rather be official relationships which cannot be permanently replaced by informal contacts, leading before long to a worsening of the situation; documents and above all meetings, including exchanges of information with the Assembly are valuable, necessary and indispensable.

There is also the problem of relations with other European members of NATO, a subject to which I refer in the final recommendation. Just as an example, Portugal has now applied to join WEU. I do not believe that we can reject such a request out of hand; later other countries may ask to join WEU as well as the EEC and we should be happy if arrangements could be made enabling other countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance to maintain contacts with us for information, discussion and meetings. We should be even happier if some of these countries voluntarily asked to join provided the conditions were right.

The final question is that of relations between the Council and the Assembly. Recently these

Mr. Masciadri (continued)

have improved. I cannot claim to represent continuity here but so far as I know these relations have not, in the past, been very good as in fact I believe they should become. They were somewhat loose, as is shown by the fact that questions had to wait months for a reply from the Council of Ministers. I am sure that I am speaking for everyone here when I say that, if we want to help the revival of WEU, relations between the Council and the Assembly must be improved because consultations between the Assembly and WEU's technical agencies, which the Assembly should also be able to use, can be very beneficial.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Masciadri, for your report and for your careful summary of a number of extremely complex subjects which, as you have said, form a whole.

I should also like to thank you for beginning the debate on a day which is not only politically important but will also be valuable for the future of our organisation.

Before giving the floor to other speakers, I wish to announce that the orders of the day for this sitting have been slightly changed. I prefer to say so now so that everyone knows and the details can be passed on to absent members through the groups.

We shall begin the sitting at 2.30 p.m. and immediately hear an address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of the Italian Republic. This will be followed by approximately three-quarters of an hour of questions.

At 3.30 p.m. Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council will address the Assembly.

At 5.30 p.m. we shall hear an address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Affairs of the French Republic.

The sitting will no doubt finish a little later than yesterday's since it cannot close until votes have been taken on the documents and amendments.

I ask every speaker to exercise self-discipline so that all the members down to speak may do so this morning.

I call Lord Reay, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – It is a pleasure to share the platform with Mr. Masciadri and especially to follow a speech of such fluency and brilliance. I entirely understand how galling it must be for those who wish to speak in this debate to be confined to five minutes – especially for Mr. Masciadri's compatriots, who might be tempted to follow his passionate style of speaking.

I have great pleasure in introducing for the approval of the Assembly a draft order which, after expressing satisfaction with the proposals put forward by the Council of Ministers in its Rome Declaration, requests you, Mr. President, to organise the Assembly's participation in future discussions with the Council, and instructs the Presidential Committee to establish the means by which such dialogue may be pursued. If the Assembly votes for the order, the Presidential Committee will be authorised to establish a liaison group through which formal and informal consultations may be held between the Assembly and the Council.

At present, such consultations are held by the so-called enlarged Bureau, which includes the President and the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, plus two others from two political groups that are not currently represented in the Bureau. That arrangement has two faults which it is generally agreed should now be remedied. First, it is an informal arrangement that has the disadvantage, among others, that the Bureau can meet the Council only informally. Secondly, it does not provide for substitutes, with the result that its numbers are frequently seriously depleted. A formally-constituted liaison group would have to represent all seven nationalities represented here and all four political groups. With that qualification, it should be as small as possible. National delegations could be asked to nominate substitutes, but the group's composition and other aspects will be decided by the Presidential Committee, if the order is passed. I understand that the Presidential Committee is likely to meet this month.

Whether the liaison group meets the Council formally or informally – the Rome Declaration and Mr. Masciadri's report encourage the development of both forms of contact – is a matter that will have to be decided later. There is much to be said in favour of the liaison group meeting the Council or the presidency of the Council before each part-session so that some joint preparation of the Assembly's session can take place. That might add considerably to the session's impact, especially if it was combined with the proposal put forward yesterday by Sir Frederic Bennett that a minister from a member state should always be here during debates.

The report should be considered as a first sketch of the problems raised rather than as the last word from the Assembly on the Rome proposals. As Mr. Masciadri said, the Assembly has not had enough time to react properly to the Rome proposals. The report deals with having separate national delegations to WEU and to the Council of Europe. There is no doubt that, under Article IX of the modified treaty, delegates to WEU must be the same people who compose those countries' delegations to the Council of Europe. Any change to that would

Lord Reay (continued)

require an amendment to the treaty. If, however, one or more of the seven member states wanted to reverse full members and substitutes – or some of them – from one assembly to the other, that should be their own affair. From what I heard when we discussed the matter in the General Affairs Committee, and from what I heard in the corridors, there appear to be many different opinions among members about what they would prefer. I have no doubt that that question will be discussed further in committee.

The Rome proposal for a colloquy with the Assembly might be a good idea and a good way of launching the new WEU – especially if it had the full participation of members of the Assembly and all ministers.

We must study the financial implications, but I do not see why they should be very great. Meetings of the liaison group will largely be replacements of existing meetings of the enlarged Bureau. Moreover, the WEU budget will have to bear only the cost of attendance by the secretariat. The colloquy would, presumably, cost some money – but it would hardly be reasonable for the Council to make a proposal for something that it was not prepared to fund.

We might fairly point out that the reduction in the rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments will produce very large savings within WEU by 1986. The work that is left for the Agency will require only some 10% of its current staff. I see no need for WEU to become – or to be represented as threatening to become – a monstrous bureaucracy consuming the hard-saved funds of member states.

We do not know whether the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee will emerge from the current review as one or two bodies. Very likely, one at least of them will be charged with preparing technical studies for the Council, on the basis of which the Council can set about discharging the five tasks that it set itself in Part I, paragraph 8, of the Rome Declaration. Their relevance to us in that context lies in the last of the proposals made by the Rome Declaration for improving the contact between the Council and the Assembly – namely, the suggestion that the Assembly might make use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU. I want to put in a word of caution. If the Assembly wishes to call for reports, for example, from bodies that are responsible to the Council, I am sure that such requests must pass through the Council. I cannot see how such technical institutions could retain the confidence of governments – above all, as defence is involved – if they were responsible as much to the Assembly as to the Council.

On the development of a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions – and the Rome Declaration expressed a desire to see the development of such dialogue – an obvious candidate is the European Parliament. That, like the Community as a whole, is limited by its restricted rôle under the Treaty of Rome and by the attitude of some member states within political co-operation. However, some of us have had contact with members of the European Parliament, and I understand that that is being renewed today. We welcome among us observers from several European members of the North Atlantic Assembly.

On relations with national parliaments, the Assembly has a committee that deals with that matter, and we shall no doubt hear its views in due course.

During my speech, apart from trying to give an initial response to the proposals on the future relations between the Council and the Assembly contained in the Rome Declaration, I have repeated two of our proposals – that there should be a joint preparation of our sessions by the liaison group and the Council presidency and that a minister from a member state should always be present in our Assembly throughout our debates.

I wish to make a third proposal – that the presidency of the Council reports back to the Assembly at the start of each session on what action has been taken on the Assembly's previous recommendations to the Council. That would force the Council seriously to consider the Assembly's recommendations. By the inevitable law that operates in politics, it would oblige it to try to please us by showing at least some regard for our recommendations.

At present, our recommendations are ignored by the Council, ignored by the public and ignored even by ourselves. They are like paper darts fired off harmlessly across the nursery by bored children, who do not bother to see where they land or whether they hit what they have been aimed at – if, indeed, they have been aimed at anything.

Let us try to make good use of this unique opportunity when, for reasons that have nothing to do with the Assembly, things have begun to stir, when thinking is still fluid and we have an opportunity to influence that thinking. Let us seize this opportunity to introduce greater meaning and importance into the life of this Assembly by seeking to integrate it more realistically into the political life of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should like to thank Lord Reay and his committee for their report on another important aspect of rela-

The President (continued)

tions between the Assembly and the Council. I congratulate them on the work they have done.

I call Mr. Blaauw to present the report drawn up by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I was asked by my friend, Mr. De Decker, who has been called back to Belgium for two important debates in his parliament, to take over his excellent work and present the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the report from the General Affairs Committee.

The committee has studied the draft recommendation and largely has no hesitation in supporting its main lines. We did not need to have lengthy discussions. However, we had a feeling that something was missing from what was decided by the Council of Ministers in Rome, supported by the Assembly. For that reason, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments submitted three amendments, broadly as follows.

First, we should like to embody in the draft recommendation the very important paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration which is specifically aimed at what the ministers intend to do in future in their own discussions – namely defence questions, arms control and disarmament, the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe, which was supported yesterday by the Assembly's adoption of the draft recommendation on the Gulf war, Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations – that has been reiterated many times in this Assembly – and the development of European co-operation in armaments, in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus, not as a competitor of IEPG, but in parallel with and even in support of each other. After all, we talk here as members of parliaments about European co-operation in armaments. IEPG has a governmental relationship, with the only check being the national parliaments. The committee tried to bring more logic into the order of the different parts of the draft recommendation, but I shall not dwell on that aspect because it is before everybody.

The second amendment is in line with Recommendation 406, which was adopted by the Assembly on 20th June this year. It seeks to abolish controls on conventional weapons set out in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III. I hope that the amendment will be adopted, because it represents an important change in the future rôle of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and takes away some ancient discrimination between member countries of WEU.

The third amendment seeks more co-operation between what I may call the bodies upstairs and ourselves – between the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. It is fully in line with what has been in the mind of the Assembly and in the minds of the ministers who in Rome accepted Recommendation 406 in this connection. I shall not reiterate what was said there and is in the document. However, it needs to be in the draft recommendation presented to us.

Yesterday I followed Mr. Fourré in saying that, in reinstating the Committee and the Agency, we should consider merging them. They have a great deal of work in common – studies, but not going out and checking controls on armaments. Although this is not in the draft recommendation, because we could not really step into the shoes of the Council of Ministers in London, we hope that they will think it is a good idea.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – When we come to consider your amendments, Mr. Blaauw, we shall continue the most interesting debate you have just begun.

The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sorry to have to start my necessarily brief remarks by regretting what was not done in Rome and is still not being done here in WEU. In Rome the thirtieth anniversary was celebrated and note was taken of the declaration by the Council of Ministers, but there was no discussion. I thought that when the Assembly met in Paris, the basic central subject would be, in view of its importance, the relaunching of WEU and its significance; instead, there is an agenda full of subjects all on the same level, with the result that, I again repeat, the main subject is sacrificed. Let us not therefore complain when the press and the public at large take no notice of us.

The announcement that the United States and the Soviet Union are to meet to consider resuming negotiations on a fresh basis and without preconditions, should also herald a great opportunity for the reactivation of WEU; if, as I hope, these talks take place they should be as wide-ranging as possible but, as they will presumably be protracted and difficult, I believe that the first proof the superpowers should offer of their desire for peace should be to call a halt to the arms race, by way of a moratorium and a freeze, designed to restore an atmosphere of trust between East and West. Europe should be actively associated with these talks, arguing that the military balance has now changed and that the real situation in Europe and the world is no longer as it was in the distant days of the fifties

Mr. Vecchietti (continued)

when co-operation between WEU and NATO became, in practice, the absorption of WEU into NATO.

If the relaunching of WEU has – as it should have – an essentially political significance, it should of necessity lead to the formulation of a European security policy in which Europe will have an autonomous rôle for peace within NATO. This policy should take up the dual track doctrine of the Harmel report on security and détente and should update it in line with the new tasks. In other words, what is required is a reversal of the present tendency to seek unilateral security through the arms race and the production of the most murderous instruments of mass destruction, including the nuclearisation of space; collective security should be sought by new policies on a fresh basis. If Europe could unite for such a peace and security policy, European union would start to become the reality for which the peoples of the European Community voted last spring; in this way, we should take a historical step for the world, where not only would problems of peace and security take on new dimensions, but a major incentive would be created for resolving the differences which separate North and South.

The Rome Declaration of the WEU Council could be of great value if it became the starting point for a new policy aimed at the progressive abandonment of European security based on American and Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on European territory, and at laying the foundations for continental security based on conventional weapons, not exceeding the strict defensive requirement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Instead, it simply proposes strengthening the conventional armoury, maybe co-ordinated by WEU, which of itself would not change the present situation: nuclear weapons would remain decisive for any security policy and the consequence would be increased nuclear bipolarisation on the United States and the Soviet Union, which would negate any practical attempt to give more weight to Europe as proposed in the Rome Declaration.

Nor should the mistake be made of underestimating the decisive rôle of the two superpowers in achieving peace; quite the reverse. This is not to be confused, however, with the exclusive rôle which the United States and the Soviet Union have taken on over the past decades; above all, this contrasts with the present crises of economic and political bipolarisation. Unfortunately, the draft recommendation does not contain adequate arguments or specific political proposals, which we expected after Rome, to justify the reactivation of WEU; nor is there any proper assessment of the international situation or any major suggestion of the kind to be found

in Mr. Masciadri's report. Consequently, if the draft recommendation is not substantially improved, the Communist Group will abstain in the hope that WEU will be able to do what it has not done today, namely provide itself with a new and valid peace and security policy geared to present-day needs.

Europe is pushed towards these objectives by great changes in the international situation; failure to appreciate their significance means accelerating the decline of our countries in relation to the rest of the world which, starting with the leading Pacific states, is already contesting the historical world rôle which Europe has held for centuries.

Sooner or later, mistakes, whatever their source, have to be paid for; at least, let us WEU parliamentarians be strong enough to avoid them in order to save Europe, its future and its destiny.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Other members of the Assembly share your view, Mr. Vecchietti, on the time we should like to have spent considering the reactivation of WEU. But we must comply with the orders of the day for this sitting, which were adopted by the Presidential Committee last July, to enable the committees to meet.

I would remind you that the Presidential Committee is composed of the President, the Vice-Presidents and the chairmen of all the committees and political groups.

I call Mr. Palumbo.

Mr. PALUMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is our first meeting since we celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty, in Rome a little more than a month ago.

On that occasion, the seven member countries of Western European Union, proposed afresh, in almost enthusiastic terms, the relaunching and revival of the activities and rôle of our organisation, in the knowledge that active co-operation between the member states could open the way to fresh goals on the road to Western Europe's security and to safeguards for the way of life which is the basis of our civilisation.

This conviction goes hand in hand with the realisation that, despite inevitable difficulties and recurrent crises, social and economic co-operation between the members of the European Economic Community has been and still is vital and that over the last thirty years the Community has succeeded in bringing about radical changes in international relations and in our ways of living and thought.

Admittedly, the European Community seems to be in deep trouble at the moment; but I find

Mr. Palumbo (continued)

myself in agreement with those who believe that the best way of resolving the deadlock towards which the Community institutions are moving is not to put the integration machinery on ice but rather to speed it up and to aim directly at the target of European union. And since in my opinion political integration cannot be dissociated from a common concept of security, the terms of the problem naturally and inevitably come together in the context of common defence. If, therefore, Europe is to be relaunched politically, there must be an accompanying military relaunch of Europe's presence in international politics.

I cannot perhaps agree completely with Julien Freund when he recalls that "states came into being during wars and after wars" and affirms that "the real federative principle in politics is the military principle and not the economic and natural principle"; my relative doubts stem not from what I regard as a correct assessment of the military aspect of integration but rather from what I feel to be too great an understatement of the economic and cultural aspects, which seem to me to be equally essential.

I am, in short, convinced that every time a measure of cultural and economic homogeneity is achieved without going on to military and, therefore, political integration, the result is loss of what has been achieved jointly with the danger of travelling again - backwards this time - over a road which can easily end in economic disputes followed by political and ultimately military conflicts.

Having said this, I can go on confidently to quote Freund when he says that "in theory the EDC initiative was politically correct, because it aimed at basing the unification of Europe on the integration of the armed forces; but it was premature because it contradicted the idea of a common effort, simply because the contributions of the different parties were too unequal".

I am pleased to say that today, when circumstances have changed completely, there is a move back to the insight of those days - and in that context it is little more than an accident of history - although it may be of some satisfaction to those who attend this Assembly that the subject is now being discussed in WEU which, as is stated over and over again, is the only Western European organisation with any powers in defence matters.

In saying this, I certainly have no intention of underestimating the rôle played by NATO in the years since the last world war which have been years of peace for Europe, lasting longer than ever before; nor is it possible to ignore the vital function which the North Atlantic organisation

has fulfilled, as it has succeeded in developing strong political ties in the western world, precisely because of the common security it has provided for the member countries. Nevertheless, it is equally undeniable that this experience has been based on historical circumstances quite different from those of today.

Paraphrasing Orwell, it may be said that all the animals were then equal except one which dominated all the rest and was, therefore, in a position to impose major reforms and far-reaching changes. To continue the paraphrase, this animal is now less superior in relation to the others and the result is that the concept of leadership is now tending to give way to that of partnership, with what seems to me the essential aim of ensuring that the military and, therefore, the political weight of the Western European countries shall be as far as possible in line with the economic weight which they, over forty years of peace guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance, have acquired in the world.

Moreover, it is unthinkable - and I, as a citizen of Europe much more than as a citizen of Italy, certainly do not hope for it - that a new common European defence organisation should be modelled on NATO, precisely because there is no country in Europe with the political vigour, the strategic foresight and the financial resources which then marked the preponderant position of the United States in the western world.

No European country is at present capable of making up for any American disengagement, resulting from isolationist tendencies which are always a possibility, although one which has fortunately been removed for the immediate future by the result of the recent presidential election; no European country can on its own meet the most immediate and urgent defence needs and provide a truly credible deterrent at world level.

This raises the question of the degree to which the Western European countries should co-operate for the common defence. There seem to me to be two requirements which cannot be ignored at least in the medium term. First, account must be taken of the limits on the funds which each European country is today in a position to commit, in its present economic and social circumstances, which do not appear to offer the prospect of large sums being made available. Secondly, the new European defence community - as I like to call it - must not be allowed to develop around preferential axes which, of themselves would mean the end and not the start of defence co-operation.

Hence, my conviction regarding the possible options for the European strategic model: first there is the option of a Europe, completely autonomous as regards both nuclear and conventional weaponry - and wholly independent of the

Mr. Palumbo (continued)

two superpowers, thus becoming a superpower itself; secondly there is the option of a Europe "more" independent of the United States but still linked with the Atlantic Alliance: between these two options, I have no hesitation in preferring the second although, as a European, I cannot fail to feel the attraction of the first.

Firstly, I think that this is the only way of blocking from the outset the ambitions of individual European countries which already have some nuclear weapons – although not of sophisticated types – to play some kind of leading rôle which is even worse if associated with other similar temptations.

Secondly, it is hard to imagine that the internal budgets of the individual states are capable of bearing vast and steadily rising defence expenditure, both because the available resources are limited and because such a choice would not arouse much public enthusiasm in each European country, where on the contrary there is already growing opposition, on social and cultural grounds, to any form of expansion of defence budgets.

My conclusion is that European security cannot, at present and for the foreseeable future, do without the Atlantic Alliance; at the same time, there is an urgent need to redefine rôles and reorganise collaboration on a different basis, so that the European countries can be actively involved even in the forthcoming negotiations and cease to be passive spectators of the strategy on which their security depends.

In this context, if WEU were appropriately enlarged to include the NATO countries which are not members and if it were given more tasks and a stronger structure, it could really become the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, as precisely defined by Senator Masciadri in his excellent report which we support, as we also support the strengthening amendments proposed by Mr. De Decker, in the opinion submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and moved by Mr. Blaauw.

In this way, it is imaginable that, with a bigger but not impossible further financial contribution – to which moreover all our member countries are already committed in NATO – the conventional defences of Western Europe could be suitably strengthened to narrow the wide quantitative and technological gap between the conventional forces of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact and to delay the possible, and always damnable recourse to nuclear reprisals, thus raising the threshold of risk of a war which would inevitably threaten the actual survival of our civilisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, today I might be tempted – not out of snobbery – to speak in French, so as to remove the possible impression that this is a debate between Italy and the whole of Western Europe, as the long list of Italian speakers might suggest. I will not do so, however, because I am anxious to make best use of the time allowed to me.

The fundamental merit of the Rapporteur and the basis of our acceptance of his report is that he succeeded, by updating the previous material so fully quoted and all the documents submitted, from which he has drawn the logical conclusions, in anticipating the Rome Declaration, demonstrating logical as well as political continuity between texts produced over the years by the Assembly and the points made by the Ministers in the Rome Declaration.

I do not think it is exaggerating to say that the Rome meeting was of a constituent nature because it formulated virtually a new charter for Western European Union; of course, the treaty is not changed but no change is necessary; however, the Rome Declaration on which our debate is based calls for a number of comments. First, decisions were taken concerning the Council of Ministers, its structure and its procedures; second, as a consequence of those decisions, changes were proposed to the tasks performed by the Assembly and the body to which it is responsible. I consider this to be the essential point of the Rome Declaration because I hope that this will put an end to the toing and froing, so to speak, of our tasks and duties, according to the political situation.

Of course, all international assemblies are affected by the political and parliamentary situation, but it is precisely the continuity of the institution which determines its significance; if I repeat that we should congratulate the Ministers who held the meetings which produced the Rome Declaration it is because they used the existing institutions, thus turning to account British wisdom, which dates back to the celebrated thirteenth century document, Magna Carta, to the point of drawing inspiration from it in the most advanced public law of the English-speaking countries and not of them alone.

May I make another point. Quite apart from any decisions we may arrive at through the proposed amendments, three suggestions have been made by Lord Reay. He knows a great deal of the difficulties involved, which in the European Parliament have also been the subject of various criticisms and have demanded much determined effort to ensure that objectives are pursued. He suggests that at the start of the

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

session a report should be given on the replies to questions and recommendations; that a member of the Council of Ministers should attend always and not occasionally – and here I feel that we should hoist the flag on our building today to mark the exceptional presence of not less than three Ministers at our debates; and that a link be established between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers; these are the points I wish to reiterate with special emphasis on the third, in the sense that the consultation groups must not act in isolation and thus thwart any chance of instituting contact procedures capable of producing worthwhile results.

My third comment arises from the Rapporteur's close and detailed study, which suggests plausible solutions for the basic questions posed. What is to be done with the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee? It is recommended that there should not be too great a call on budget funds and that the impression should be avoided of seeking to set up a major new structure to deal with defence problems; I can agree on this point but I am unable to accept the idea of "do-gooders" who will object to the discussion of these defence problems and will then behave like ostriches! I consider that armaments control should not be dismantled because it meets a general demand and in times of difficulty ensured that relations between the countries on each side of the Rhine were completely honest. This may come about when armaments co-operation has been properly developed in the service of a European defence policy; it will then be essential to have control bodies.

Today, ideas are turning to disarmament as a valid prospect for the whole free world but we must not abandon specialised agencies which have already proved their worth and can call on their great experience of armaments control and disarmament. In conclusion, I think that the Rapporteur's wording of the third point in the draft recommendation is very well-chosen as it calls for an assurance from the Council regarding the existence and operation of the technical bodies of WEU; this is essential if our activity is to match up to the requirements of European security within the Atlantic framework and also of Europe's security in areas outside the Atlantic Alliance.

Lack of time prevents me from going into further aspects of arms control, disarmament and East-West relations, but I believe that the Rapporteur has provided the Assembly with an opportunity to express an opinion fully and clearly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I apologise Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for this string of speeches in Italian, which is quite unintentional; it does however demonstrate our appreciation and our profound belief, in our destiny and our future, in the political and institutional rôle of our union – although I do not think that this applies to the Italian Delegation alone.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Sarti, this prompts me to say something to the Assembly. I gave strict instructions for speakers' names to be entered in the list in the order in which they requested to speak. The Italian Delegation, which is remarkably well organised, submitted names *en bloc*, and I refused to change the list since some members are absolutely opposed to such changes, however well meant. But I am glad you raised the point.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – It is an expression of our general support and our commitment.

Having said this, I should also like to congratulate Mr. Masciadri on his excellent report, which states the essentials without fostering illusions. I am sure that this serious approach is acceptable to everyone as being that best suited to the work of WEU; a political choice is made without illusions. What is offered is almost a consolation prize for the failure to approve the EDC and the consequent dropping of the idea of a European army thirty years ago. Without harbouring illusions, Mr. Masciadri, we have to go on living because the optimism engendered by the Rome meeting is based rather on will than on reason. Mr. Masciadri, who, like myself, is Italian, knows this very well; he says as much in his report and in the final text of the draft recommendation.

The ministerial meeting in Rome received a good press and is already a success. As the case is exceptional, we must concentrate all our attention on it. It is vitally important to reach the public and if our press service is not strong enough, it will be no use having the services of first class staff, as we have in this difficult sector. Of course, it is not solely a matter of finance; to get ourselves noticed, we must act – politically – to acquire the space which we cannot obtain with our confused institutions, policies and budget.

No political action is possible without paying due attention to the institutional problems. Yesterday, a major Italian newspaper, which covers WEU affairs, quoted Ortega y Gasset: any political speech which fails to take account of institutional problems is mere idle talk. And Mr. Masciadri warns us against this danger. For example, much has been heard in the lobbies during our session of the way our services work and quite rightly so. But the way

Mr. Sarti (continued)

the Secretariat-General works – and this has been excellent – should be discussed at the end and not the start of a debate, because it is a consequence and a corollary.

If WEU gets off the ground, because there is a political will to give the institution a more important rôle, it will then be necessary to revitalise the whole of its structures which have, in fact, worked very well in terms of the requirements of the past thirty years. The machinery – or the “intendancy” as General de Gaulle called it – must be given its rôle as a political driving force as happened with NATO under the admirable stewardship of Mr. Luns, as is now happening with the prestigious appointment of Lord Carrington and is happening, or should be happening, at the Council of Europe and more generally in the United Nations; at the same time, if I may express a humble opinion, the mistakes must not be repeated, because, while the rôle of the secretariat should be enhanced to make it into the decisive, permanent element of the institution, we should never forget the rôle of the Presidency of the Assembly, which is also a political element and not merely provisional or ornamental. The worst we could wish on our institution is a bureaucratic epilogue; this seems to me what has happened to the United Nations despite the eminence of its secretaries-general from Mr. Hammarskjöld onwards.

What is required is a happy medium and a political future; Mr. Masciadri's report has the merit of dealing with this problem for the first time. It is now for us, the political groups and national delegations to answer the questions raised. We can and must strengthen our structures and establish a proper relationship between governments, Council and Assembly along the lines successfully followed at the Council of Europe; the appointment of permanent representatives to WEU would certainly create problems for the European chancelleries – I turn to the ambassadors who honour us here with their presence and their close and informed attention; but there are representatives to NATO and UNESCO, so why should there not be permanent representatives to WEU?

Let us note with satisfaction that henceforth the Defence Ministers will be accompanying the Foreign Ministers at meetings of the Council. This is a new departure which, I repeat, I do not regard as revolutionary enough or as grounds for wild expressions of joy, but it is better than nothing. Does this all constitute the “political turning point” of which so much was heard both before and after Rome? At once, I say no, at least in part; it is the first sign of a change and not a true turning point; there is greater American interest, Mr. Masciadri said, in anything done by the European partners in WEU which

shows a greater will for common defence in place of the old, traditional subservience of Europe towards the dominant partner. Ignoring the American opinion, I would suggest that we from now onwards eradicate from our vocabulary the now rhetorical concept – sometimes devoid of meaning because too often repeated and ideas which are too often repeated end up by concealing a reality which is ceasing to exist, and that is certainly not what I hope – that WEU is the European pillar of NATO; certainly WEU is that, but not only that.

In conclusion, I would say that the accession of other members to our alliance – in principle, all European countries already members of NATO, but not those countries alone – will serve to strengthen not only our friendly ties with our American ally but also Europe's involvement and the realisation by our peoples of their common destiny and their duty to take the initiative and make proposals. I am thinking primarily of the Mediterranean flank, and not solely from the military standpoint; what happened with Kadhafi in Malta should serve as a warning to us. Balances in Europe and throughout the world are being destroyed – in apparently marginal sectors. The idea is that the accession of Spain and Portugal would strengthen Europe but this has to be set against the major problem of whether or not the previous Spanish Government's decision to join NATO is confirmed – a referendum is being held; Spain is the natural choice to deal with the Arab world and this is a fundamental factor in our view.

I am sorry that time prevents me from going into detail on all the points so well listed by Mr. Masciadri, setting our sights on the pole star of a politically integrated Europe. I am not in a position to speak for the Italian Delegation but I can say that I am proud to be the fellow-citizen of such a sensitive and cultured European as Mr. Masciadri; for me as a christian democrat he expresses my sentiments exactly.

(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I also agree with Mr. Masciadri's report, comments and analysis. I would also like to congratulate him formally for the “courageous realism” with which he has stressed not so much and not only the largely majority conclusions on which we are agreed but also the points which are still open and unresolved and the problems which are still outstanding. And I also start with the problem which Mr. Masciadri quite rightly calls the “basic question” of the relations between WEU and NATO, which means the relationship

Mr. Rauti (continued)

between Europe and the United States. Mr. Masciadri sums up with the words "No third force policy". I would prefer "No third world policy" with the meaning at present attached to that expression and with all the confusion, equivocation and basic anti-Europeanism that it implies.

Since, on the contrary, the aim is to make Europe into a "third force" both politically and militarily, I do not think that the expression can be criticised but feel rather that it sets what I would regard as a desirable objective. And this can bring us back - in respect of concepts as well as of terminology - to the theory of the two pillars as stated for example by Mr. Genscher who is quoted in the report. But the European pillar must really and seriously be that, must have the strength and validity to be that and must be aware of its rôle and its purpose. But then - and we must draw the logical consequences which must be drawn in politics as in the daily lives of all of us - let us go forward and remove the obstacles still in the way of the effective reactivation of WEU, let us advance along the long road to the effective political and military integration of Europe.

To repeat a heartfelt cry from Lord Reay, we must stop firing paper darts and we must not ourselves be inundated uncritically by the flood of paper which present-day international institutions turn out.

If Europe becomes a force, a third force and a great force as it already is in the commercial, economic, scientific and technological spheres, it will be better for the whole world because what the world lacks at present is precisely Europe's wisdom and balance and the painful and many-sided historical experience which make Europe what it is; what the world lacks is Europe's culture and its special form of civilisation.

To conclude, I also can accept - on behalf of the political party I represent - the four practical measures proposed by Mr. Masciadri in order to move - better perhaps, to start to move - from words to actions. Many other measures might be suggested, particularly, as regards arms, the integration of armaments, programming and above all reduction of the present dramatic 90% to 10% gap between the American pillar and the European pillar, but here we cannot look for the "best", which is a matter for the individual political forces but must seek to move forward gradually towards the greatest possible political and military integration of the decision-making structures and of armaments. Without all this, if we do not advance decisively and with self-respect in that direction there can be no real security and future for Europe which will not emerge from its present inferiority and docility

as Mr. Sarti so correctly described the situation; a situation which is damaging and objectionable to Europe and is damaging and detrimental to the balance of the whole world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that the problem to be considered is the increasingly obvious emergence of an actual divergence of interests and views between the European countries and the United States; this divergence is the real reason for the widespread uneasiness and for the impression of weakness and fragility which the alliance seems to present, despite the vast programmes for nuclear and conventional rearmament. Here, the most delicate issue, apart from divergent economic interests, is the growing difficulty encountered by American efforts to extend the air-land battle doctrine, already adopted by the United States forces, to the whole integrated military structure of the alliance.

Political parties and governments in many European countries and even military leaders in some of our countries have stressed the dangers which this doctrine involves from the strategic standpoint, because it substantially increases the risk of a war actually fought in Europe; from the political standpoint, because of the problems it puts in the way of negotiations and the search for agreement on the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons; from the politico-economic standpoint, because the new stage in the armaments race would renew the subordination of Europe's armaments industry and of our countries' scientific and technological research.

The deep strike and follow on forces attack doctrines recently approved by the NATO Defence Planning Committee do not change the reasons for these objections; the use of emerging technologies does not reduce the risk of marginalisation of Europe's industrial and technological potential or the uncertainty regarding the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, which still justifies the most serious reserves concerning a plan aimed at raising the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

The problem of the relationship between the United States and Europe in the matter of new technologies and development of their respective industrial potentials is not confined to military doctrines; for example, we have already insisted several times on the question of transfers of technology to the Warsaw Pact countries; I think that the vital issue to be considered is that of sharp competition between the United States and Europe in this precise area. The real difficulty which causes so many misunderstandings is not the rather abstract problem of the extent

Mr. Milani (continued)

to which our markets should be open to the East but rather the extent to which Europe can and should act independently in its own economic and trade relations. If, therefore, these are reasons for us to be more attentive when studying relations between a European organisation such as ours and the Atlantic Alliance, we must not forget that there are open questions at European level which must be discussed frankly.

I am referring in particular to the idea of more or less disguised leadership or – as has been said in the past – the idea of two Europes moving at different speeds. In that case, also, we are speaking of questions with deep economic roots which are repeated in defence and security policies. For example, I do not think that there is any point in discussing the extension of the French or the French and British nuclear potential to Europe, in any of the ways so far suggested, both because the basic reasons for opposing the nuclear strategy today apply equally to American and Soviet weapons and to the weapons held by other, medium-sized powers and because I do not believe that the other countries, Italy included, have any interest in freeing themselves from economic and military subordination to the United States to accept a new leadership guaranteed in some way by one or more continental powers. Here we have to be realists and to accept that the strategic defence policies and even the economic policies we have pursued over the last few decades cannot easily be translated to a European level. It is quite obvious that the strategic deterrent provided by the United States cannot be replaced by anything centred on Europe; nor has Europe the strength required to compete with the superpowers, as this would involve very high financial and social sacrifices and probably less security for everyone.

The problem therefore has to be turned round and it must be recognised that a European security policy must be based on completely different premises and, as our Rapporteur quite correctly said at one point, on political and economic as well as military aspects. Then, for all the European countries without exception the first problem on the agenda is that of a joint initiative concerning the East-West dialogue and co-operation with the emerging countries of the South. Here, Europe can and must play a major part in maintaining overall balances in the world and can, without presumption, make its own fundamental contribution to overall security which, as everyone must now recognise, can no longer be based on force or agreement between the two giants. As regards the connected problems on the agenda, may I say that the practical fate of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, agreement with the European Par-

liament and so on are vital matters and to some extent raise the question of which European institution is in a position to enable Europe to find itself again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In thanking you, Mr. President, I have a comment to make; I am embarrassed at taking the floor after all the Italian speakers who have followed each other this morning in the order – according to the President – in which they put down their names to speak, but I consider that I should have been allowed to speak after listening to what others had to say; precisely for that reason I have not prepared a written text. The President might have felt that he had sufficient confidence to apply the principle of alternate speakers. The result would have been a more flexible debate. I would not have intervened at this point this morning if I had not been moved to do so by the importance of the subject under discussion.

I do not need to repeat my plaudits or my total acceptance of Mr. Masciadri's report and to announce that I will vote for the recommendation; but we are not yet at the conclusion because this is only the start of the present phase.

Why is the Rome Declaration so important? Because it sets out objectives, guidelines and procedures; it is a sound basis for our work. Our fundamental task is to translate the principles laid down into action; this is an onerous and difficult task, requiring us to act in concert. In this context, I do not wish to make proposals but rather to formulate a number of basic principles the first of which is the following.

Ours is a political organisation which must remain so in order to develop in future. The organisation makes policies, sets common strategies and decides what our relationships should be both internally and externally; making policy and formulating strategies means Europe speaking with an authoritative voice, enabling it to make its best possible contribution. This point must be clear.

The presence of defence ministers should not affect this fundamental element but should simply lead us to reiterate that a serious approach is required in this specific field. The raising of quality and efficiency requires not so much political discussion as joint production and a degree of unification, harmonisation and standardisation of structures and armaments. As regards preparation, a joint effort is needed to improve quality and efficiency. Resources and types will be discussed at political level but once a decision has been reached appropriate action for the best must be taken at military level.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

One further point. A general integration of our countries is needed, based on defence, but also on a number of key economic, monetary and other requirements. Relations with the other European organisations must be adequate; structures must be harmonised with what has already been achieved and geared to our tasks, not for personal or special reasons, but so that our Assembly can work to best effect. Ties between the Council and the Assembly must be strengthened in order to establish close and continuing organised links with all who can contribute and have any responsibility in the matter.

For reasons of time I shall not go into more detail and I shall simply remind the President – with favourable intent – of his – that is the Presidency's – responsibility to make suitable arrangements to enable the Assembly to participate in the discussions and in the decisions we are required to take if more is really to be made of WEU. I recommend that the Presidential Committee should fix a procedure for permanent links with the Council so that our Assembly can really discharge its duties for the protection of peace, the better integration of Europe and the complete fulfilment of our tasks.

At all levels, in all committees and with the participation of all groups, this is the goal to which we must bend our practical efforts in the next few months, because we have as yet barely started; if at this session, instead of spending so much time on certain useful but not essential matters we had concentrated exclusively on the follow-up to the Rome Declaration, we should have done something of the greatest value; we have not done this today but have started to do so. Let us therefore go forward with determination and a decisive political will.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would not dream of complaining about the Italian festival to which we have been treated this morning. It reveals the interest our Italian friends have in the question under discussion as one of them has said.

However, the difficulties the last speakers on the list will encounter cannot be overlooked. I would remind you that, when the list of speakers is drawn up in the Council of Europe, account is taken not only of the order in which requests to speak are received but also of the nationality of the speakers and efforts are made to alternate the various languages wherever possible. This also makes it easier for the interpreters because they do not then have to translate from the same language for long periods and so have a chance to rest.

Could we not follow the example of the Council of Europe, which seems better to me?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your suggestion, Mr. Lagorce.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. Ladies and Gentlemen, in his book "The Damned of the Earth" Frantz Fanon wrote about Europe as follows:

"For centuries Europe has been holding up progress for other people and subjugating them for its own ends and to its greater glory. For centuries it has been suffocating almost all humanity in the name of an alleged spiritual adventure. Look how the pendulum swings today between nuclear and spiritual disintegration..."

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is not only foreign nations that have been suffocated by the European social and economic order. The European Community itself has bestowed upon its peoples a system of over-industrialised, consumer-oriented, exploitative conditions, in which factories pour out poison, chemical fertilisers exhaust and destroy the soil, and transport and energy production methods pollute the environment.

I shall not draw out the list, but simply say that there is a connection between the exploitative and wasteful aspects of this economic system. It is no coincidence that whenever bottlenecks have occurred in the world supply of raw materials, the Europeans have always remembered that they have to be able to maintain a way of life and an economic system that I have termed wasteful and polluting. Ladies and Gentlemen, I think the time has come to decide whether it is worth paying the price, which is not paid by us alone but imposed by us on other people.

There used to be one thing about the European Community that was rather attractive: it was not a military power and there was no need to fear that if it developed further into a European union it would tread the path to super-power status, the path of deterrence.

Now, however, Ladies and Gentlemen, you are setting your sights on becoming a super-power with military and, I would say, one day also nuclear capability. It is no longer only a question, as you claim, of strengthening the European pillar within NATO, but – and here I quote from Mr. Masciadri's report – of creating the defence structure of a future European union.

Ladies and Gentlemen, although you still claim for the time being that this is conventional defence, and take advantage of the fact that the

Mr. Vogt (continued)

peoples of Europe are deeply disturbed by nuclear strategies and weapons of mass destruction to try and buy them off, as it were, with prospects of Europeanisation and greater reliance on conventional weapons, the peoples of Europe should not overlook the fact that the logic of the nuclear age will lead to the day when this European union will also want to defend itself by every means available, and that will include nuclear weapons.

Two WEU countries already have the means available, and are already nuclear powers. As you know, not only are they not subject to any general controls, but their nuclear potential is not even subject to control by this institution, Western European Union.

Nor can you calm the peoples of Europe by telling them that you want to strengthen the disarmament and arms control aspects of WEU. If you study the Rome report and think about the institutional consequences, you have to face the fact – and I believe it is a very hard fact for an Assembly like this to face – that WEU's arms control powers are going to be weakened still further than before, and that even new staffing provisions will not be sufficient to give the necessary standing from Europe, from Western European Union, to achieve disarmament in Western Europe.

We have repeatedly demanded that the European Community – or European union, if you like – should not tread the path of militarisation or hard technology but should remain a civil power. Now, however, the government representatives – Defence and Foreign Ministers – who met in Rome have set their sights on militarisation. In view of the emergence within the European Community of resistance and opposition to the attempt to turn Western Europe into a military power, they have withdrawn the whole problem from the directly elected European Parliament and transferred it to Western European Union. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, is this an organisation that can exercise a parliamentary control over such an arms build-up – a control worthy of the name? All my observations lead me to doubt that.

Nor is it true – as one speaker, Mr. Vecchiotti, said at the beginning of the debate – that we should be surprised not to be taken seriously as an assembly, to have been kept cooling our heels in Rome for a whole day, during which we were only allowed to ask questions, and to be allowed to voice any opposition we may have to this project now in speeches of no more than five minutes' duration. With regard to institutional matters, the Rome Declaration says that the rôle of the Assembly should be increased. That is what it says, but what comes next? Next comes

the statement that the Assembly – that means us – should, in particular, contribute even more to associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council, which expresses the political will of the individual governments.

Ladies and Gentlemen, that shows quite clearly what the Council of Ministers thinks of this Assembly. The deplorable thing is that together with the arrangements made by the President and the Presidential Committee – we and you, worthy parliamentarians, play along with this. And this, let me tell you, is only the beginning. Every further step towards militarisation will be accompanied by a further loss of democracy.

Mr. President, I have almost finished. In a recent interview, Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission, regretted the fact that conditions in Europe were not like those in the United States and that Western Europe had not yet achieved the same degree of armaments co-operation, pointing out that things were much easier for arms manufacturers in the United States because it was one unified area from coast to coast with a single client, the Pentagon.

Are you prepared to accept responsibility, if things go that way, for building a military superstructure into European development and European union? Are we to end up with a European Pentagon? Is that what you are trying to achieve? Then you must say so.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not think you have any chance of success and we will make sure that you do not. You have no chance of convincing the peoples of Western Europe that this development is under democratic control, nor have you any chance of convincing them that Western European Union is the source of serious initiatives towards disarmament and arms control.

If you want such claims to be credible, you will have to make very decisive changes in the terms of the Rome Declaration, and you will also have to ensure that this Assembly is a truly democratic body, capable of exercising control. Thank you.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, problems relating to security and peace are always linked to events outside the NATO area. We must take account of these events and, among many others, one virtue of the Rapporteur's work is that of calling our attention to them also. To pay attention to problems arising outside the

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

NATO area means having a closer and more effective Atlantic Alliance; and in this context the revival of WEU comes at a very opportune moment and is a very positive and significant fact. But – please excuse me for my doubts and pessimism – I would not wish us to stop at mere declarations and statements of principle and not go through with the practical measures announced.

May I also be permitted to mention the none too reassuring attitude of France, which was the first country to raise the banner of a reactivation of WEU and which seems to me to have cooled off a great deal recently; and I am afraid it may be changing its mind. I say this because of certain attitudes I have observed and also because I was unfavourably impressed by what was said in the debate held in the National Assembly on 8th November last, after the Rome meeting, when, in response to the pessimism expressed by Mr. Couve de Murville regarding the revival of WEU and Mr. Daillet's criticism of the government itself concerning that revival, a very disappointing reply was given by the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, who not only failed to remove the doubts but even stressed the need to strengthen certain relations and collaboration with the Federal Republic of Germany, or alternatively with the United Kingdom, which was almost tantamount to going back on everything which had been solemnly affirmed at the Rome meetings and in the Rome Declaration.

On the other hand, I do not wish the plan to relaunch WEU to cause more damage or to remain no more than a mere paper exercise. One of the reasons for past concern in the Atlantic Alliance has been the question of relations between the European members of NATO and the United States, which have been marked by misunderstandings and criticisms which have led both sides to take up disturbing attitudes. I would not wish the misunderstandings which have arisen with the United States to be added to by any which might be created between the NATO countries and the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, by the plan to strengthen WEU that might further disaffect those countries.

That is why great attention must be paid to relations with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly as the danger has shifted from the central front to other fronts, and in particular to the Mediterranean, and we cannot ignore or fail to mention the great importance of, for example, Turkey's contribution, particularly in view of Greece's somewhat uncertain and equivocal attitude. That is why I am surprised that paragraph 76 of Mr. Masciadri's most praiseworthy report, where reference is made to the programme for achieving European union, emphasises the need to define the geographical

limits and lists a large number of countries but not Turkey, without which it seems to me Europe would not have a great deal of significance.

I am sorry if I sound a bit of a wet blanket but I have spoken this way simply to give us all a stronger motive to ensure that the Rome Declaration is translated into facts adding to the strength of NATO and therefore providing a better guarantee for security and peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the importance of the Rome Declaration and the spirit of Rome have been apparent from the beginning of this debate – a debate in which I, as tenth speaker, am only the second not to speak in Italian. While we all appreciate the beauty of the Italian language there has also been a suggestion that we should change the way in which the order of speakers is arranged.

First of all, however, I have to deal not with an Italian, but with the other person who did not speak in Italian – our colleague, Mr. Vogt. He will understand this, since he was, of course, provoking me. He quoted Frantz Fanon, a Europe hater and ideologist of third world guerrilla struggle. He painted a picture of Europe based on a cultural pessimism like that of the German nationalist night in the twenties, which took its cue from Spengler's "Decline of the West".

My dear Mr. Vogt, I recommend you to take a trip to the National Museum in Dar-es-Salaam and see how much the Tanzanians themselves appreciate Europe's rôle in the development of their country, the struggle against slavery, etc. Or take a trip to Ethiopia or the Sahel region, where the people are starving. Then you will see that only the Europeans can save these people, that it is the European pharmaceutical and chemical industry that has to help these people with its products, and that it is efficient European agriculture, not bearded witch doctors with magic charms, that can save these people from hunger and starvation. I wanted to say this first of all, because I think it needs to be made clear even in this Assembly.

Before I turn now to the matter in hand, I would say to Mr. Vogt: look into the history of WEU and you will see why it came into being. It arose because people in Europe recognised the logic of defence and were prepared to join together in order to counterbalance the threat of an attack by the Soviet Union or the eastern bloc.

WEU was originally an alliance against a rebirth of militarism in Germany. That alliance

Mr. Müller (continued)

was then reoriented to counter the new danger that had arisen. Our wish to reactivate WEU today arises, in my opinion, out of the very same facts, which have not changed in the meantime.

We all know that politics cannot be pursued by war. We all know that, given the terrible weapons that exist in the world today, we have to preserve peace. But we also know that peace cannot be achieved through unilateral disarmament but only through rational negotiations. Here we have a new task for WEU. Besides armaments co-ordination – and I regard this too as one of WEU's tasks as long as disarmament has not taken place – it must bring the weight of the Europeans to bear in those negotiations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are always deploring the fact that Europeans do not speak with a single voice. President Kennedy's famous image of the two pillars of NATO – Europe and the United States – is still just words even now. We know that the European Community has no brief in this area, and that the only real mandate, established by treaty, is that of WEU.

Why should we not make use of this mandate especially as the countries represented in WEU are all pulling in the same direction – which is much more difficult to achieve in the framework of NATO or the European Community – bearing in mind, for example, certain statements by Greek or Danish representatives in NATO and the European Communities. Among the seven countries of WEU it is easier to define and pursue a common policy.

I also think it important – and Mr. Vogt will not like this – that we should direct our attention, in accordance with Article VIII of the WEU treaty, to sources of conflict outside the NATO area, and indeed, as expressly stated, to threats to economic stability. I think we must consult together and also act together here. I myself was Rapporteur for this Assembly on the Chad conflict and I fear that, given the present prospects, we shall probably soon have to discuss that same conflict again. We have to do this, not because we want Europe to play the rôle of a superpower or substitute world policeman, but because, in today's conditions, the security of Europe requires us to take due account of all centres of conflict in the world, since there is no longer such a thing as a geographically limited policy. The people from the German Democratic Republic security service who are building up the security service in Nicaragua, like the Bulgarian pioneers in Angola, are people from Warsaw Pact countries, but they are not active in Europe. They are active in Africa and in Latin, or rather, Central America. This shows, Ladies and Gentlemen, to what extent today's conflicts

are world conflicts, and how difficult it is to limit them geographically. It is – let me repeat – for this very reason that the information and contacts provided for in Article VIII are necessary.

I regret that too little account has been taken of this in the past, that there have not been joint consultation and joint action and that contacts between member states did not take place in the case of either the Chad conflict or the Falklands war.

One final comment, if I may. The Rome Declaration says that the rôle of this Assembly should be strengthened. I consider that urgently necessary. For example, the dialogue between the member states of the Assembly and national parliaments called for in Section II, paragraph 3 of the declaration is urgently needed in order to achieve, *inter alia*, better co-ordination of national policies in Europe.

One word of warning, however, I am not in sympathy with the repeated proposals for reform that would turn this Assembly into a body concerned purely with defence, with one kind of representative here and another kind in the Council of Europe, the representatives here being defence experts. Of course there should be defence experts in this Assembly – please excuse me, Mr. President, I have a cold and cannot continue – I would simply like to make the point that this Assembly needs politicians as well as defence experts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gorla.

Mr. GORLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I hope that I shall not annoy Mr. Müller too much because what I have to say will probably sound incredible to him. In reality, I shall be out of tune. I shall not go into the merits of the individual problems which have been raised; I shall simply underline a difference of concept and ideas regarding the draft recommendation on which we shall be voting; and, I hope Mr. Masciadri will not hold it against me, as regards the ideas in his explanatory memorandum which is exceptional for its well-thought-out arguments.

I think that the party I represent is light years away from the ideas which are presented as taken for granted but which, in my opinion, should be discussed somewhat more seriously than usual. I will give two examples: I do not believe that the defensive nature of the Atlantic Alliance, including the way in which its policy is developing, can be accepted as a fact of nature once and for all, but must be discussed from time to time; I believe that full discussion is necessary of the concept of security which we adopt in our resolutions and which we use to give the political and military replies we have felt we should give here. I believe that on this

Mr. Gorla (continued)

issue I am in company with hundreds of thousands, of millions of people in Europe, who think that there is no prospect of security based essentially on the logic of a balance of forces, on a policy of terror and on a policy and concept of a Europe dependent on the Atlantic Alliance, which could well become the concept of the superpowers.

We believe that security for the peoples of Europe in their relations with the rest of the world must be sought in a totally different direction. I shall be asked "Why?". What sense is there in your coming here to speak so out of tune? I believe I must do so out of intellectual honesty and out of respect for other members. I believe I must do so also even if I know that these problems cannot be dealt with fully in five minutes and can only be enumerated, as I will do without taking too much time.

I have already mentioned the concept of the Atlantic Alliance and of Europe as a superpower. I should now like to bring up the question of arms production and the arms trade. Here we are discussing the better rationalisation and harmonisation of armaments within WEU and more generally at European level. In my view the problem is not that but rather where these better co-ordinated armaments will go, in terms of the real problems of peace and security in the world.

May I give one small example: in Florence there is a firm which makes what are known as SMA weapons systems and today, but not in the past, sells its systems simultaneously to Iran and Iraq. I should like to have an explanation of the concept of security behind these facts. At this stage, I am not really very interested in whether military production is more rationalised, more Europeanised, but I am more and more interested in where the goods produced go; and I think this is scandalous because the problem of the Gulf war is on our agenda and I believe that, while such things go on, any talk of the Gulf war will of necessity be completely abstract and mere begging of the question without any practical effect of any kind.

Naturally, I shall vote against the draft recommendation. I would simply add that what I have said and my vote against should in no way be interpreted as lack of interest in the political problem of Europe and in the problem of steadily increasing European collaboration, of a supranational structure which in terms of independence and autonomous initiative on the world scene will be more effective than anything hitherto; but this will not be achieved by the logic of armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe we owe Mr. Masciadri a debt of gratitude for this excellent, clear report, and also for his passionate commitment to his and our cause.

The report shows that the Rome Declaration is inspired less by conceptual thinking than by the idea that a second pillar of equal strength should be erected in relations between Western Europe and the United States. For that reason the declaration aims primarily at revitalising an existing institutional framework within which the security policy of Western Europe would emerge with a more clearly defined identity.

In so doing it stresses two main aspects, which are briefly as follows. First, there is the intensification of security and defence policy consultation and co-ordination procedures in the Council of Ministers, Permanent Council and WEU Assembly, and between those bodies. Second, a new definition of the functions of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments is envisaged.

These approaches are to be welcomed in principle, but I do not think they shed adequate light on all the problems. For instance, these initiatives must be tested for compatibility with the principle of avoiding anything that might restrict the opportunities for peaceful exchanges between the states of Europe. The main aim of enhanced Western European co-operation in security and defence policy can only be to phase out the exaggeratedly threatening postures and military potentials of East and West, consequently reducing the risk of war. In the military area this involves a fundamental reappraisal of the so-called flexible response, particularly the first use of nuclear weapons, as well as all plans for an offensive strike against the adversary's hinterland. It also involves the change-over to a strictly defensive policy, which the Warsaw Pact must also of course be asked to adopt if "equal security" is to be achieved. This might be one of the results of the future conference on security and disarmament in Europe negotiations. In the political area it involves breaking down the superpower confrontation in Europe, without thereby fundamentally jeopardising the existing systems of alliance. It involves, as a flanking manoeuvre, an initiative by the European Community to broaden and deepen economic and technological co-operation with our neighbours to the East.

There has been a great deal of discussion and speculation since Rome, much of it covert. However, if we are serious about a substantial restructuring of WEU, then, firstly, we shall have to go beyond the structure and, secondly, covert discussion of the contradictions will not be enough. Let me try to examine some of these points.

Mr. Antretter (continued)

Whatever the Soviet Union's joint responsibility for the crisis of détente in the last few years – and God knows it should not be underestimated – the trend towards seeing NATO solely as an agency for military security policy and new armaments programmes has in any case increasingly given rise to the question of a possible reorganisation of Western Europe's security and defence alliance. It would, however, be taking too narrow a view to see discord with the United States only in the area of security policy. The divergence of interests can also be seen in wide areas of economic policy. And we in this chamber are particularly aware that as far as armaments policy is concerned, American administrations take it absolutely for granted that relations between the United States and Europe are a one-way street. We have had occasion to discuss this problem here in the Assembly during debates on more than one report.

I would like to bring up another matter which, for the Federal Republic of Germany, must be seen as the linchpin of any plan to strengthen Western European co-operation in security and defence policy. I refer to the present and possible future rôle of France. The WEU treaty, as we know, imposes an automatic obligation of mutual assistance. This obligation, however, exists only on paper as long as French military forces stand apart from any form of military integration and the French nuclear strike force is explicitly planned only for the defence of the French sanctuary – where possible on the German approaches. The question is therefore – and I have framed it in the words used by my colleague Mr. Gansel in the Bundestag – how far France's interest in the reactivation of WEU coincides with the interests of the other WEU countries, whose forces are part of NATO's integrated military command and share the attendant risks, and whether France will be prepared to give up its separate security and defence policy rôle and instead play a leading Western European rôle in this area.

Finally, let me refer to a scenario put forward by the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, in a speech to the Bundestag. The object of this security initiative, as he called it, would be a planned harmonisation of the French and West German conventional defence potentials for the purpose of forward defence, which would defuse the problem of the size of the American troop presence in Western Europe. In addition, the sanctuary protected by the French strike force would be extended by a unilateral French declaration to include the Federal Republic of Germany, which would push into the background the nuclear-threshold problem associated with the presence of American troops. In exchange, the Federal Republic would under-

take to give priority to economic co-operation on armaments and above all in the field of advanced technology in Western Europe.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are aware that this would to some extent highlight the problem of arms exports, and there too we have certain misgivings, because the Federal Republic in particular has imposed far-reaching arms limitations on itself. This requires attention, but the problem may be soluble.

I see that I have already exceeded my allotted time, Mr. President, so I shall leave it at that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to join earlier speakers in using part of the short time allotted to me to express my special thanks to Mr. Masciadri for his report. It provides an extraordinarily good basis for our discussion about the future of Western European Union.

Mr. President, the reason why we are discussing Western European Union is probably not entirely straightforward. There are probably more reasons at the moment for discussing a revival or reactivation of Western European Union. However, it is plain to me – and I think this was also reflected in the ministerial declaration in Rome – that what is at issue is a conflict between the people of Europe and European governments rather than a conflict between European governments and the American administration. In my opinion it was primarily internal European considerations which stimulated the effort to reactivate Western European Union. This also comes through in the declaration by the ministers, stressing that this Assembly should play a primary rôle in influencing public opinion.

In my view, Mr. President, this is completely back-to-front. This Assembly consists for the most part of elected representatives of the people, and it is not their job to transmit governments' ideas to the people. On the contrary, they are supposed to convey the views of the people to governments. If we stray from this path we shall be making a capital error.

Mr. President, in the short time allotted to me I would just like to say a word about the way in which Western European Union should operate in general. We must ask ourselves how we can make a real contribution to European security in future. In the field of military security and military co-operation I think we already have so many organs that there is no need for the Assembly to concentrate on this field.

In Europe we are capable of destroying each other many times over. Any conflict would have a disastrous outcome, and the main

Mr. de Vries (continued)

concern of European security policy must therefore be to look for political means of preventing conflicts. By political means, Mr. President, I mean that we should make a concerted attempt to develop ideas for reducing the present military and political menace.

Disarmament is currently being discussed in a number of European forums, but if we are honest with each other we must admit that they concern themselves with completely irrelevant issues. The negotiations in Vienna on troop reductions are still bogged down in the method of counting troops, although we all know that these do not constitute the greatest threat. In Stockholm the discussion is about quite minor, tentative measures, which, though not superfluous, make no crucial contribution to European security.

I believe that Western European Union, if it makes efficient use of the institutions at its disposal, must be capable of placing more practical proposals before ministers and before this Assembly, so that measures of greater practical significance can be introduced.

Mr. President, our first job must be to forestall conflict in Europe, which means that we must make sure that stability is maintained. However, we must also agree among ourselves on pressures to prevent a sudden outbreak of hostilities. This means reaching agreements which at least preclude a surprise attack by either side. This in turn means taking measures which also affect the military dispositions of both blocs, making it less likely that a conflict could be started or even decided by a rapid advance.

Practical measures of this kind need to be discussed in European circles and proposed by Europeans in forums concerned with increasing our security. I believe that at present insufficient knowledge has been accumulated about this in Europe. It would therefore be a good idea for the Agency for the Control of Armaments of Western European Union to act primarily as a data bank for all information on arms control relevant to Europe and then as a source of suggestions to all European governments on the points that should be raised.

The function of Western European Union must never be that of a new organisation operationally concerned with defence matters. Our hope should be to meet together in discussion, explain our points of view and supply ministers with material for practical decision-making. In my view this must be done with complete openness – even vis-à-vis other Europeans. We must cause no disquiet or tension in other countries, either in Western or Eastern Europe. The subject matter of our discussions must be a genuinely European security policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we owe Mr. Masciardi particular gratitude for his report – and I include Lord Reay in this – because he has given us a wealth of suggestions for the future work of WEU. There are so many that I shall confine myself to four comments.

The first is of a general nature. Whenever there is talk of reactivating WEU, the same questions arise. What will your future relationship with America be? What does the United States think about this? Are you trying to detach yourselves from the West? Do you want independence? All I can ever do in reply to such questions is to point out – and I am very happy to be able to do so – that the United States looks upon reactivation of WEU with great favour. In view of many statements – and we have heard them again today – it should be pointed out that nothing said by WEU – at least by most of the representatives in this Assembly, could ever be interpreted to mean that the reactivation of WEU might be directed against the United States. That would be out of the question. Nothing said here could be understood in that way. All of us here are well aware that we cannot ensure and maintain effective defence and security for ourselves in the foreseeable future without the United States.

My second comment refers to the procedure chosen for this reactivation. In his report the Rapporteur is rather critical of the fact that an informal procedure has been chosen and that our President has had talks in a personal capacity, and will of course continue to do so, while, given the informality of the procedure, the Assembly as such is not properly involved. It seems to me that the Rapporteur is right. This is not meant as a criticism of the President. His first duty is to get involved and get the Assembly's voice heard wherever he can. But I think that we, from the benches of this Assembly, should again emphasise the Rapporteur's comments and ask the President or the Presidential Committee to take every available opportunity to ensure that committees of this Assembly – perhaps in informal talks, that is, in second or third level discussions – confer with the working groups set up. I think this is feasible and we should try to achieve it. The relevant committees of this Assembly should have direct, albeit informal, contacts with the working groups or representatives of the working groups set up by the Permanent Council. I see, Mr. President, that you are nodding in agreement. This should also be taken as a direct request to you personally.

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

My third comment is as follows. Time and again we hear complaints, and this report is no exception, that joint armaments production is far from having reached the stage we had hoped for and would consider desirable. But I think we in this parliamentary assembly should not hide our light under a bushel and make ourselves out to be worse than we are. There is every reason to claim that the stage reached so far in joint production and interoperability of armaments could never have been reached had there not been this close contact between countries in the committees of this Assembly. I say this also as a member of the Assembly's Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. How often have we discussed joint projects, how often have we come together and said: we as members of our national parliaments will now make informal approaches to our defence ministries to ensure that one or the other joint project goes ahead. Even though there is still a long way to go, we have nevertheless made a considerable contribution to the position we have now reached.

My fourth and last comment refers to other European countries' wish to join WEU. We note with pleasure that, since WEU has been reactivated, friends from the Nordic countries, some of whom we of course know from the Council of Europe, have been here as observers, that we have observers here from Spain and Portugal, and that our Assembly is attracting positive interest. That surely is a positive by-product.

Mr. President, I see that my time is up. I shall be finished in a moment.

We should, from this Assembly, once again specifically emphasise the general political point that, in the interests of European security, we cannot have a situation in which there is a common European security system and a common economic area within the framework of the European Community, while one or two countries in Europe, which we need strategically for our defence, stand outside WEU. There is therefore a political wish to bring all the countries together in the military field as well. We should endeavour – and I shall finish here – to formalise observer status for the necessary interim period to a greater degree than is possible under our Rules of Procedure. Much would be gained in this interim period if observers from countries interested in accession were also able to speak in the Assembly and express the views of their countries. There will still have to be a waiting period, and many problems remain, but that would be one way of gradually leading all the European states to our final goal, which is that in the long term, the membership of the

European Communities and of WEU should coincide. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, now that so many members have addressed themselves to these excellent reports, I shall not expand on the question of whether we want to reform Western European Union, but consider instead how we should go about it. On that point I would like to make a few brief comments to supplement the reports.

As I see it, the central body of Western European Union remains for the time being the Permanent Council of ambassadors in London. The question is whether the structure of that Council is really suited to the tasks of Western European Union. Every other institution of a European nature that we know, and for that matter the NATO institution, has special ambassadors, members who are concerned only with the affairs of the institution in question. Those institutions do not follow the practice which the embassies in London have necessarily fallen into of giving responsibility for matters concerning Western European Union to their most junior officials.

If we are really serious about reforming Western European Union, I think we have to give the Permanent Council a completely new team, in fact set up a proper Permanent Council of our own, rather than a body in which over-worked ambassadors have to do yet another job as a sideline, whereas in our opinion it ought to be of central importance.

My second point, Ladies and Gentlemen, is this. A relatively small organisation like Western European Union will finally have to give up the luxury of having two centres at the same time. If we are to be taken seriously we shall not be able to avoid concentrating the various bodies of Western European Union in one city. I am not suggesting any particular city, but I would simply ask that the parliamentary Assembly be provided with a chamber in which it does not have to work, as we do here, under lighting conditions better suited to a grandiose chapel of rest.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I, as my third point, broach this question: how can we, as the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, not only express our views to the Council of Ministers and Permanent Council in a better way, but also, and above all, prepare our work in a better way? Yesterday we had a lively debate in the General Affairs Committee during which we complained about how little attention – when it comes down to it – we are able to give to the matters with which we are

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

charged here. We talked about our constituency work, our activities in our national parliaments and our work in the Council of Europe. Western European Union came only in fourth place.

Lord Reay has indeed made suggestions as to possible improvements; for example, changing the number of delegation members, substitute delegation members at least, so as to avoid, as far as possible, having to work in the Council of Europe as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure that, by itself, this will not be enough. What we need is a body that is, so to speak, the parliamentary equivalent of the Permanent Council, a body consisting not of parliamentarians but of representatives of parliamentarians who can work for the Assembly in the same way as the Permanent Council works for the Council of Ministers. I say this most advisedly, because I am convinced that we shall not really be able to relieve ourselves of part of the burden of preparing and co-ordinating our work unless we manage to set up such a body. Such a body should not and could not take over the work that falls to us as elected representatives, but it could prepare it in such a way that, in subsequent co-operation with the Council of Ministers, more is actually made of this Western European Union of ours than is presently the case.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I in this connection raise the question of the effectiveness of the work of the various secretariats at the present time. I freely admit that I cannot fully judge this, because I simply do not have the time to assess the full scope of the work. But I note that all international organisations now have a tendency not to recruit their secretary-general from the civil service but, wherever possible, to appoint a politician as head of the organisation. This is not because a civil servant would be unable to do the job – we ourselves can have no criticism on this score – but simply because they know that a former minister as secretary-general can deal with a minister-in-office in quite a different way from a civil servant who has never had the opportunity to become a minister.

Might it not also be advisable to stop considering the various secretariats, above all the most senior posts, as life-time appointments and to see them instead as posts to be occupied for a year or two? The foreign or defence ministries of the member states would then compete with each other to second the best officials to the WEU bodies, enabling us to increase the efficiency of the secretariat without running the risk of people contracting vocational blindness by doing the same job for twenty years.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I see that my time is running out. Let me make one final point. We have meanwhile been receiving – and this testifies to the attractiveness of WEU – the first enquiries as to whether we might enlarge Western European Union and accept more member states. I think we agree that we would warmly welcome all democratic European states into our circle. But I would like to issue a warning against doing this indiscriminately. The Council must first carry out a proper reform of the present unsatisfactory organisation of Western European Union, so that we can give those who want to join us the chance to work effectively together with us in a reformed organisation, as we would all wish to do in the interests of peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I welcome this painstaking report and the recommendation, which has been drafted with a view to achieving the widest possible consensus. Nevertheless, the recommendation does leave some room for additions and improvements. The German social democrats, and along with them a large number of the socialists and social democrats in this Assembly, will vote for most of the amendments tabled – for example, Mr. Cavaliere's first amendment, and Amendments 5 to 13. We can also accept Amendment 10, if Amendment 6 is adopted. We shall vote against Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 14. Among those we shall be supporting are amendments tabled by christian democrats and communists, French socialists and Dutch socialists, liberals and social democrats – in fact the whole European political spectrum. It is important that we in this Assembly should not divide along the lines of domestic political differences in our own countries, but should see ourselves here as Europeans.

We have a great deal left to do in the development and joint representation of European interests. We always talk about Europe having to speak with a single voice. I am not interested here in voices, whether harmonious or not. We are not a church choir or a symphony orchestra. We are politicians, not musicians. In Europe we have common interests to defend, and we should not fall into the trap of speaking in flowery phrases. We should analyse the facts soberly, work out common objectives, and jointly represent European interests.

I believe this is necessary above all in three areas.

First, our most important common interest is to prevent war in Europe and guarantee our security, which is threatened by the military potential of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We know we can guarantee our security

Mr. Gansel (continued)

only together with the United States, but we also know that European and American interests are not identical, both for geopolitical reasons and for reasons of nuclear strategy, and also because the United States, as a world power, has global responsibilities and involvements.

It is important that Europe should not allow itself to get drawn into these involvements, that the sparks of war should not leap from other regions of the world to Europe. It is important for us to restrict our defence to the area of the North Atlantic Treaty, but we must also recognise that threats exist in other parts of the world. That is why I ask you to support Amendment 6, which is based on the minimum provisions of Article VIII of the WEU treaty.

Our second common interest, next to our national interests, is European unification. It is our task to bring our national interests into harmony with European interests. We will be able to speed up the process of European political unification only if we open Western European Union to other European states – not on behalf of the joint production of armaments, as Amendment 11 has it, but for the sake of political unification. This applies to Portugal and Denmark, and perhaps also to Norway and Spain. Western European Union must not be an exclusive club, where European unity may be confined to military matters and a “little Europe”. Security policy is of course one aspect of European unification, but it should not be the dominant aspect. I do not believe that a Europe of generals and arms dealers will be more successful than a Europe of winegrowers and dairy farmers.

Our third interest is in understanding that while France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany are in a special position by virtue of their demographic, economic and military strength, that does not mean they have special rights in Europe. They have special duties. Theirs must be a position not of privilege but of special responsibility for Europe. We must beware of what my colleague Bruce George referred to in the NATO Assembly as the danger of European tri-partheid: the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany on one side and the rest, so to speak, on the other. If we proceed in that fashion we shall never have a united Europe. It is equally important not to take a premature decision on a single seat for Western European Union.

To make London the only seat could marginalise France, while to make Paris the only seat could mean giving France a dominant rôle in WEU. Perhaps there are other options. However, the important thing is that all European member states, all the states in Western Euro-

pean Union, should feel jointly represented by us – and that is why I ask you to reject Mr. Cavaliere's Amendments 2 and 3.

The Rome Declaration consists essentially of formalities. While I respect the work of the diplomats, the main work has to be done by us politicians, if not in this Assembly then in our own parliaments. The main task will not be to reach agreements about whether ministers should also meet informally from time to time, but to achieve greater recognition of our common European interests and to pursue them more effectively in a spirit of compromise. That is the purpose of our specific suggestions on all these amendments. Rome represents an attempt which, without overestimating, we would like to see as an opportunity – and that is the point of our contribution. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the conclusions drawn by our Rapporteur, Mr. Masciadri, are drastic. When he says that, if the will to inject life into WEU is not soon converted into “institutional terms and into effective activities”, it is to be feared that its “reactivation may merely be the shroud for burying WEU”, his diagnosis is harsh and his prognosis pessimistic.

While paying tribute to the excellent quality of Mr. Masciadri's report, I should like to take a rather more optimistic view. I do not intend to be one of those who would agree – tacitly at least – to the signing of WEU's death and burial certificates.

WEU's present shortcomings, which it would be pointless to deny and a pity to exaggerate, are due to defective structures and inadequate means for its purposes. These relative and temporary failings are unconnected with and do not affect the objectives, doctrine, utility or interests of WEU, which was formed as a contribution to European security and world disarmament.

It is the technical organs which need to be reformed and improved. The Council must be furnished with the means to act by augmenting and improving its equipment, institutions and structures and by establishing a more flexible and more regular pattern of relations and dialogue between the Assembly and the Council.

Efforts must also be made to inject new life into WEU and to give it a wider and different rôle by reframing and amending Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

At the same time, there must be permanent and the clearest and most effective consultations possible between the WEU bodies and our part-

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

ners in the Atlantic Alliance. These consultations must remain cordial, but there must also be frankness, objectives must be aligned and resources must be pooled, as the price to be paid if results are to be achieved. They must be realistic and, while the need for communication and talks must be respected, dangerous delays in the joint co-ordinated action that is now more necessary than ever must be avoided. There must be genuine concerted action in both research and arms production in order to ensure that our collective security is really increased and truly adequate. And joint efforts must be stepped up within the geographic confines of the Atlantic Alliance and more specifically of the member countries of WEU, but also as regards our joint objectives in the areas of disarmament and arms control and of East-West relations.

This is what I would call our reserve, our territory. Geographically and in terms of our convictions and duties it is here that our obligations and our limits lie. It is in these areas and with a view to achieving these results that we must take consistent further action to adapt the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee to meet these new requirements, develop the unofficial but fruitful dialogue between the Council and the Assembly and maintain and improve the official procedures for exchanges between the two WEU organs. All this is and will continue to be useful. All this is and will continue to be necessary.

We must renovate WEU, understand each other better so that we can take more appropriate action, become more credible in the eyes of our partners and better equipped to succeed with them, take a wider view and improve our resources, our relations and our activities.

I am convinced that this vast programme is feasible. I fully endorse the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Masciadri and again congratulate him as he deserves. I firmly believe that, provided this is what we really want, we shall be attending not WEU's funeral but its necessary and certain rebirth. This is something which, like you, I welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The basic issue for discussion at this session, and one that concerns WEU's future, is a decision on the action we should take after the Rome Declaration if it is to be more than a simple declaration of intent and if we are determined to play a courageous and resolute rôle in the defence of Europe in close co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance and the United States. For the

moment, there is nothing to indicate clearly what course should be followed. We are, of course, the only European defence organisation, but for thirty years we have been living in the Sleeping Beauty's castle, which it is now being proposed we should dust down. But what powerful vacuum-cleaner are we going to use? Words are not enough: the will is needed.

The disease that is gnawing at Europe is doubt and lack of will. And this situation will not be changed by the statements we shall hear this afternoon from a number of major political leaders. The situation is disturbing because we are schizophrenics. On the one hand, we are afraid of the USSR, but we do not want to do anything that might upset it. On the other, we are afraid of the United States when it is too strong and when it is too weak. This puts us in a position of great inferiority. What is more, who can fail to see that Europe is of progressively less importance in American policy.

The presidential campaign passed without any reference to Europe's problems. The present dialogue is between the eagle and the ostrich, the eagle being the United States, the ostrich Europe. Europe only takes its head out of the sand to look at the sky for fear that some missile may fall on it. The ostrich does not want the eagle to be an eagle, and the eagle is sorry that the ostrich is an ostrich. That is the situation as it is. All this is just words, you will tell me, but it is true.

Let us try to make a practical and very rapid analysis of the problems we face.

For thirty years, rather like Pirandello's characters, we have been in search of truth, each believing he has his own truth. In fact, WEU's weakness stems from the different ways in which we assess and perceive all the problems.

We do not agree on the nature of Soviet power. We do not agree on the Soviet threat or strategy. Our views on the United States differ. We cannot agree, in essence, to put our relations with the United States into very clear terms, and we lose ourselves in different disputes. That we do not agree on WEU's mission is sadly evident everywhere including here.

We do not agree on standardisation and arms production. How will European defence be possible without a military-industrial complex? But we do not have an adequate military-industrial complex. How can there be joint defence when individual countries come and speak to us here, pathetically, of co-ordination and concerted efforts and yet prefer American to European matériel? How can we carry any weight in the world when we are incapable of agreeing clearly on a joint strategy?

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Nor do we agree on various political problems in the world: Lebanon, Chad, the problems in the third world, the problems in the Middle East. Certain members of WEU are supplying arms to Iran, while others are trying to help Iraq. Do you think this is the way we should be showing ourselves to the rest of the world? Do you think this is evidence of cohesion and strength?

In fact, America has resumed its forward march and its dynamic approach, but Europe is not following. We must therefore give very serious thought to the real conditions attached to the reactivation of WEU. Indeed, the impossible must be attempted if WEU is to carry any weight and become a real organisation again. I am not one of those who resort to destructive criticism. What are the conditions? They are simple. Perhaps too simple for this Assembly.

Firstly, the United Kingdom must stop dreaming of the privileged relations it once enjoyed with its American cousins and realise that a continental group of countries does not pose the same threat as the Holy Roman Empire or Napoleon.

Secondly, Germany would do well to bear in mind that it must form an integral part of the West and stop thinking that it can achieve reunification through some neutralist or complacent policy. But this will not come about unless France for its part formally undertakes to consider German security to be as important for Europe, and for France itself, as the security of its own national territory.

No French Government has dared to say this. The present government is not saying so. What are needed are not guarantees, which may be difficult to give, but formal assurances that the fate of German democracy beyond the Rhine is as important to our country as the fate of the provinces this side of the Rhine. Until this assurance has been given, we can talk of Franco-German co-operation and devise a military or any other kind of policy for Germany, but there will be nothing real about it.

In addition - and I will conclude with this, although I could say a great deal more - there must be a radical change in WEU's structures, methods and thinking.

We can, of course, go on meeting and chatting to each other. We can, of course, go on adopting resolutions and reports for years and years. We have been doing so for thirty years, and we can go on in this way for a long time to come. The ambassadors can, of course, meet in a friendly atmosphere. The constant trips to the various capitals and the round of diplomatic cocktail parties can, of course, continue. None of this means anything. Until WEU's struc-

tures have been radically changed, from the top, it will not be enough for the Foreign and Defence Ministers to meet twice a year. WEU must be headed by a political secretariat-general. There must be a joint military body involving contacts between the chiefs-of-staff and - why not? - ultimately Europe's general staff.

Clearly, this reform will not be possible unless there are negotiations with America. Let there be no mistake: the improvement of European defence will not be achieved through agreements among Europeans, since certain European countries act only with United States approval. It will be achieved through a frank discussion with the United States. Progress will not be achieved through concordance between Germany, France, Britain and various other countries - almost always concerned in varying degree about what the American reaction might be. Let us face the problem that exists between the United States and Europe and make the Americans understand that European defence will not weaken but strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. Until the Americans understand this, there will be no point in drawing up plans. That is the problem at present.

I would add that thought must also be given to the emergence of new technologies: space wars, difficult to imagine at the moment, the problems connected with the revision of Soviet strategy. When listening to his general staff one day Churchill said that, while the chiefs-of-staff are making up their minds, it is also a good thing from time to time to think of the enemy's strategy. This is rather what we should be doing, because we cannot close our eyes to what is going on in the rest of the world, particularly the part opposed to us.

It is very difficult to align the activities of an alliance, but I shall conclude by simply quoting Churchill once again: nothing is worse than working with allies, except having no allies at all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I am glad that today we can make a wide-ranging and systematic contribution to the discussion of the reactivation of Western European Union. In Rome that was unfortunately not possible. The impression I got there was that Western European Union was scarcely worth reviving, so far did that sitting fall below parliamentary level.

Here, however, we are not face to face with the ministers but just discussing these matters among ourselves. In Rome the matter of the right name for the revitalisation of Western European Union came up, but for me it was not the name that was at issue but rather the exten-

Mr. Tummers (continued)

to which historical awareness might be brought to bear on the steps we have to take now. I have the impression – and in saying this it is not my intention to denigrate Mr. Masciadri's report – that he pays too little attention to the origins and history of Western European Union, the unique features of this treaty and the foundation on which it rests, when compared, for example, with the North Atlantic Treaty. If we are to talk about a renaissance, let us follow that cultural example and study the wellsprings of Western European Union so as to discover how its activities in their present form are rooted in past achievements by Western European Union on behalf of peace and security.

Some twenty years ago, a report was prepared by Mr. von Merkatz of the General Affairs Committee – you may have had occasion to consult it from time to time – which described the first ten years of Western European Union. That report was followed by a second, which did likewise. I have suggested to the General Affairs Committee that a third report should also be set in train, covering the history of the last ten years, up to and including the important developments of 1984, not simply in order to produce an array of facts, but to study history, as politicians should. I repeat, in my opinion Mr. Masciadri has made far too little use of the history of WEU as his guiding light.

In the time ahead – I shall not define the period, as there is no reason why ten years should elapse before something significant happens – Western European Union might perhaps drop the term "Western" and become a European union, with an increased membership, especially from additional Mediterranean countries. I regard this as very important in ensuring that the scales of the Seven are not tilted in favour of a few militarily and industrially powerful countries playing a kind of sub-American rôle in the union.

A point which you have heard me make before, but which I re-emphasise in these discussions, is that Western European Union must guard against becoming "NATO-ised". There is a difference between the North Atlantic Treaty and Western European Union. It is the difference between the shield – provided by NATO – and the human lives to be protected behind that shield. Western European Union concentrates on society, on what the provisions for life should be, whereas NATO's only real concern is with the doctrine of deterrence and with ensuring that when it wears thin it is restored to the highest possible standard by the introduction of new weapons. The effectiveness of deterrence wears off, and it is therefore necessary to give a fillip to the arms race from time to time. Therein lies the difference between Western European Union

and NATO. We want no truck with treaty violations; we want to keep them inviolate and to honour them. I therefore think there is no need for the proposal, apparently from Mr. Cheysson's group, for admission to membership of the WEU Assembly on a new basis. Recruitment to the WEU Assembly must continue to be, as it is now, from the Council of Europe. This will guarantee that the other fields of interest – I refer to cultural, economic, social and similar disciplines – introduced into the Council of Europe in the fifties will continue in some measure to be reflected in the Assembly and can play a part in ensuring that this does not become a specialised "hard-edged" military club. The principles and spirit of the treaty establishing Western European Union must be honoured.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have listened to almost the entire debate and it seems that so far we have not given enough attention to why it is that the seven member governments have, after years or even decades of prodding by members of the Assembly, decided to give it a new active and expanded rôle. It is not just coincidence, nor is it due to the fact that our arguments have recently become more conclusive in their effect.

In recent years, Soviet propaganda against the West has concentrated largely on trying to convince Europeans, with varying success, that the defence costs that they are being asked to bear and the efforts they are being asked to make are simply to support one of the two superpowers – their ally the United States of America. That has been the constant theme of the propaganda. The Soviets try to tell us that we are not being asked to spend money on our defence, that we are being asked to create forward battlefields and unsinkable aircraft carriers rather than to protect our sovereignty, which the Soviet Union has no intention or wish to disturb.

Those arguments have had some success in Germany, Holland and, regrettably, in my country. They have not had much success in other parts of Europe. As an Englishman, I must admit that they have had less success in France and Italy. One must ask why that is so. For one reason or another, those countries have not allowed themselves to become so susceptible as to believe that they would be used almost as a mercenary force in a battle between the two great superpowers. European governments, irrespective of their political complexion, have realised that. The French Government realised it a long time ago.

We must instil a European identity within the Atlantic framework that shows that we are defending ourselves, not merely acting as the agents of a foreign power.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

It was that conclusion, after the failure of the Genscher-Colombo initiative, that led ministers, late in the day, to realise that they should go back to the beginning of WEU and NATO. There are phrases that have not been used for years, such as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, which has one pillar on one side of the Atlantic and a pillar of equal importance, if not of the same strength, in Europe.

Contrary to much propaganda, I have never found anyone in America who is other than extremely pleased that Europe is, at long last, beginning to realise that it is itself that it is defending. The current American Government is raising no objection to the idea not of a new and expanding rôle for WEU but a realisation of its original rôle of providing a European pillar of defence. If we are to undertake that rôle, we cannot limit it indefinitely to the seven countries that have been members of WEU. I echo the words of Mr. Spies von Büllenheim in saying that if we are to develop the rôle of a European pillar of defence, we must ensure that it is not a club within a club with second-class citizens who are within the Atlantic Alliance but are not members of the European pillar of defence. That would not increase our unity but decrease it, and it would create a divided Europe as well as a divided Atlantic Alliance. That would be the worst of all worlds.

Time forbids my going into details about the papers presented by Lord Reay and Mr. Masciadri. They are the beginning of the efforts that we must now make. I make only one plea on the reforms – it is wrong for ministers to come here only to deliver their speeches and answer questions. This is a political assembly and throughout each of its meetings there should be a political presence. It is a fact that one cannot get any idea of the intensity of feeling simply by reading papers. I have found my government receptive to the idea, and I think that it is something on which you, Mr. President, should insist during the discussions before you.

I close with the question: when does a politician become a statesman? The most crude and obvious reply is that every politician becomes a statesman when he is dead. I like to think that it is possible for a politician to become a statesman while he is still alive. He should not be thinking only of two or three years ahead or only of his own political lifetime. In an assembly such as this and with the rebuilding of WEU he should be thinking of ten or twenty years ahead. It will be too late in ten or twenty years to say: "My God, we should have had a European pillar of defence."

There is not one person in this Assembly – and this is not an anti-American sentiment –

who can put his hand on his heart and say that in twenty years' time we shall still have enormous American forces protecting Europe. A statesman looks ahead. If ministers convert words into deeds and we follow the advice of the Rome Declaration, there is no reason why we should not fulfil two purposes – to make our western defence more effective by giving it a European identity within the Atlantic framework and also provide for the future so that if, one day, the need should arise, Europe – the very cradle of civilisation, culture and human values – will be capable of defending itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I intend to confine my few remarks to Lord Reay's excellent report. That is not because I am not interested in the excellent report by Mr. Masciadri, but because I do not pretend, after more than twenty members have spoken, mostly about that report, to be able to add anything that has not already been very well said by others.

The General Affairs Committee unanimously approved the draft order. That is why I want to speak to Lord Reay's report. That unanimous approval could be surprising, first, because we had very little time to consider it since it was presented in Rome, and, secondly, because in parliamentary terms we are signing almost a blank cheque. The instruction to the Presidential Committee is to establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is able to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU. We also gave you, Mr. President, very wide power to take the appropriate steps in agreement with the Council.

I cast no aspersion on one or other of the Rapporteurs, but I cannot imagine two greater contrasts than the way in which the Italian and British Rapporteurs presented their reports – one with passion and the other with House of Lords restraint. Lord Reay emphasised that his report to the General Affairs Committee was not a final conclusion but was a sketch only of the matters that had to be considered. The General Affairs Committee accepted that report unanimously on the basis that it would have further detailed considerations to decide what the liaison arrangements ought to be. Similarly, it would be in your interest, Mr. President, if the committee gave detailed consideration to the appropriate steps that you might take. In taking those steps your hand would be much strengthened if it were clear that you had the support of the Assembly.

For those reasons, I want to emphasise the importance not only of what is before us today

Lord Hughes (continued)

for acceptance but that which will come before us in the General Affairs Committee in due course. Unless we get those steps right, however anxious we are to make change, we may not be able to implement it satisfactorily.

My final ambition, Mr. President, is to sit down before you put on the red light, and I shall do that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is closed.

I wish to inform the Assembly that I have received the following letter from Mr. José Luis do Amaral Nunes, Chairman of the Portuguese Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly:

“ The Assembly of the Republic has often sent observers to the plenary sessions of the Assembly of Western European Union.

These delegations have helped to bring about an atmosphere of interest in WEU, which has resulted more significantly in the request for membership submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal.

We therefore believe there is the greatest interest in sending a parliamentary delegation consisting of representatives of the Socialist Party, the Social Democrat Party and the Social Democratic Centre to attend the session to be held in Paris from 3rd to 6th December.

I therefore ask you to grant us the right to speak in the debates in order to make our country's position known.”

After receiving this letter, the text of which will be included in the record of the proceedings, I naturally complied with the request made by the Chairman of the Portuguese Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, whom, like all his counterparts in that assembly, I invited to send an observer to join us, as I informed you at the beginning of the session.

Mr. Nunes, I am now delighted to ask you to address the Assembly.

Mr. NUNES (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would first like to thank you for allowing me to speak at this session of the WEU parliamentary Assembly.

This year, when WEU is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary, it is natural for the member states to ponder over the events of these thirty years, which have been so valuable in lessons and experience.

Portugal, whose democratic institutions have been restored, has had to reconsider the essential aims of its policies in order to regain its rightful place among the nations of the world. Our

democratic option was directed from the outset towards Europe, and has found expression in our candidacy to join the EEC.

However, our accession to the EEC is not an isolated act, but rather the partial fulfilment of our policy. Our foreign policy is not confined to entry to the EEC; we are well aware of the importance of Portugal's presence in the world, and of our natural interests in other continents, particularly in Africa and our former colonies which have become new Portuguese-speaking countries; co-operation with them is a cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Portugal has always been acutely aware of the need to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and NATO to which it has always given its total support both politically and militarily. As a signatory of the Washington Treaty, Portugal has always been actively involved in the NATO structures, as one of the essential links in the defence of the free world.

We have always stressed the importance of a continuing exchange of views between the allied nations, taking due account of the ways in which the alliance is affected by the sectorial policies of the member countries, particularly in the economic field.

It is our belief that, in addition to economic integration, the EEC has led to the development of a European entity which has had a vital function in the dialogue with the United States.

In the same way, in WEU the member states have been able to exchange views profitably on defence questions. However, these exchanges have not produced structures for concerting the defence policies of the European countries, not only because the WEU machinery lacked the necessary driving force but also because the number of member states is still small, in terms of European political realities.

The co-ordination of a defence policy for the European countries within WEU, will of necessity involve the expansion of WEU and changes in some articles of the Brussels Treaty. However, the traditions of WEU clearly show its capacity to adapt to new realities.

Thirty years ago, the Paris Declaration provided for the entry of Italy and Germany. It is therefore significant that thirty years later, and also in Paris, a delegation from the Portuguese Parliament, aware of the necessity to co-ordinate European defence policy and to establish institutions through which such co-ordination is possible, should come here to support the application which has already been submitted by the Portuguese Government.

Portugal wants to have an active rôle in the definition and co-ordination of a European defence policy. It is our belief that greater

Mr. Nunes (continued)

convergence of the defence policies of European countries will contribute to strengthening the European ideal and a more fruitful dialogue with our friends on the other side of the Atlantic.

It was surely in this belief that most of the participants in the Rome meeting stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly in mobilising public opinion to support the strengthening of the European pillar of the western alliance. Portugal is an important part of this European pillar, and when there is general agreement on the need to restructure WEU, and to strengthen defence co-operation in Europe, to reduce armaments, to disarm and to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, my country cannot be absent.

Portugal has been playing an important rôle in the European institutions. We are members of the Council of Europe, of the European Free Trade Association. We have applied to join the EEC and expect the negotiations to be completed shortly. In this political context, we have been following your work for the last four years through a parliamentary delegation attending as observers, as we are convinced that Portugal has its place in WEU.

We signed the North Atlantic Treaty as a full member. We have made a significant contribution to NATO and we think that the defence of the European democracies will be consolidated if a co-ordinated defence policy is adopted.

We have a word to say in the definition of that policy and experience to offer for the process of co-ordination. We realise that some provisions of the Brussels Treaty will have to be modified so that we can join but this is not the moment for an in-depth legal analysis.

By our presence, we are simply seeking to draw your attention, Ladies and Gentlemen, to Portugal's application to join, which we are asking you to support.

Like yourselves, we are committed to promoting and encouraging progressive integration in Europe. It is with this purpose that the Portuguese Government has applied to join WEU. And our delegation has come here to support that request in the hope of convincing you that Portugal needs to make its voice clearly heard in WEU also.

We therefore request that a delegation from the Portuguese Parliament should take part as observers in the work of the plenary sessions and some committees, until such time as we become a full member.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are convinced that our needs and our aims would then be better known. We are perhaps a little

late, but Europe is not just a policy, it is our destiny. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly I should like to thank you, Mr. Nunes, for your address and to convey our thanks and greetings through you to all your colleagues in the Portuguese Parliament who have accompanied you.

As you will have gathered from this morning's proceedings – and as will become even clearer this afternoon – WEU attaches considerable importance not only to its reactivation but also to the fact that the fate of the whole of Europe is at stake. Your presence and that of your Portuguese colleagues at this session of WEU bears witness to your interest in our organisation and in the work we do. Thank you for your help, your support and your co-operation.

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (Replies to speakers on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Documents 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999).
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France.

Are there any objections?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe there are now eight representatives left in the chamber. I would ask their names to be recorded so that we are remembered on the day when Western European Union decides to hand out medals. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That will form part of the process of reactivation, Mr. Gansel. We shall get there in the end with patience and humility.

I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have a question. Could you explain how this discussion with the ministers will proceed? Will there be any chance to put questions? Is it to be a dialogue, or what? If questions can be put, can this be done spontaneously from the floor or will there be a list?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As I said at the beginning of the sitting, though evidently not clearly enough, questions may be put to both

Mr. Spadolini and Mr. Genscher. There is no set rule on the listing of the names of speakers who wish to put questions. It will be enough for them to let the presidency know or to raise their hands at the appropriate time. There will be no restrictions, but I would ask you to keep your questions short and not to make statements.

Are there any comments?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 5th December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (*Replies to speakers on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999).
Speakers: The President, Lord Reay (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Masciadri (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*).
4. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
Replies by Mr. Spadolini to questions put by: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Bianco; Sir Paul Hawkins (point of order); Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Vecchietti, Mr. Martino, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Milani.
5. Address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Lagorce, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Cifarelli, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Vogt, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Michel, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Hill, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Enders.
6. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (*Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Michel, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Michel.
7. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France.
8. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance; Relations between the Assembly and the Council; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance (*Resumed vote on the draft recommendation and draft order*, Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Reay, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Reay, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Pignion, Lord Reay, Lord Hughes, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Masciadri, Lord Reay, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Vecchietti, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Martino, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Gansel, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Michel; (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes; Mr. Vecchietti, Lord Reay.
9. Political union of Europe (*Motion for an order*, Doc. 1003).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers.
10. Change in the membership of a committee.
11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 2.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be

published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance *Relations between the Assembly and the Council Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance*

*(Replies to speakers on the reports of the
General Affairs Committee and of the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 990
and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the replies to speakers on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of

1. See page 37.

The President (continued)

the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, relations between the Assembly and the Council, and the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the draft recommendation in the report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, Documents 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999.

Before calling Lord Reay, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, I would like to welcome Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

I of course know, Minister, though perhaps this ought to be more generally appreciated, that you are undoubtedly one of the members of our governments who have done most to reactivate WEU and thus to usher in the period now beginning.

This morning the Assembly began a most important debate on the substance of the reports by your fellow countryman, Mr. Masciadri, and Lord Reay, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, whose Chairman, Mr. Michel, is present on the committee bench.

We have concluded the joint debate, but the Rapporteurs have yet to reply to the speakers. With your agreement, Minister, and provided your schedule permits, I shall call upon the Rapporteurs to reply to the speakers, and then give the floor to the Chairman of the committee, after which I shall have great pleasure in inviting you to address our Assembly. Thank you once again, Minister, for joining us.

I call Lord Reay, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Most speakers this morning concentrated on the report by Mr. Masciadri. That was quite natural because it dealt with the central issue of the revitalisation of WEU. Most speakers gave their views on the uses to which a strengthened, revitalised and more active WEU could be put.

Several speakers, such as Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Vogt and Mr. Müller, made strong political statements. However, my report dealt only with relations between the Assembly and the Council, and few members addressed themselves to that.

However, I shall now comment on some of the original proposals that were made. Mr. Spies von Büllenheim stated his belief that the committees of the Assembly should have contact with a working group within the Council. He specifically addressed you, Mr. President, and I am sure that you and the Presidential Committee will consider his proposal when you

review the ways in which relations between the Assembly and the Council can be further developed.

Mr. Reddemann proposed the strengthening of the secretariat of the Assembly to make it a stronger counterpart to the Permanent Council. I understood him to mean that he wanted the Permanent Council to have responsibilities more narrowly dedicated to WEU than at present. His proposals will have to be considered, but on the face of it they might entail additional expense.

Mr. Cifarelli reminded me of the days that we spent together in the European Parliament. I understood him to support both the proposal for a liaison group between the Assembly and the Council and my proposal that the presidency should report at the beginning of each session of the Assembly on how it had reacted to previous Assembly recommendations. Such a procedure was introduced into the European Parliament when the Commission was obliged to report back at the beginning of each session on what action had been taken on the Parliament's proposals. Sir Frederic Bennett repeated something that I had already suggested – the need for a permanent ministerial presence from one of the member states during our debates.

While I was grateful for what Lord Hughes had to say, I did not know whether he was complimenting me or Mr. Masciadri – or perhaps he was deftly managing to do both. He was quite right to emphasise that my report was meant only as an initial outline of the proposals. Further study is required, which the committees of the Assembly will undertake in due course.

Only one amendment has been tabled to the draft order, and it is in the name of Mr. Vecchiotti and his friends. Whatever one thinks of the substance of the amendment – and I do not object to its sentiments – I ask him to consider whether it is appropriate to introduce a political statement – even if an acceptable statement – into an order that is concerned only with establishing a procedure for a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. I feel that it is out of place to include a specific political statement in an order of this kind, and I ask him to consider whether he wishes to press the matter to a vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This is an extremely important report, especially for the President of the Assembly. We shall have occasion to return to this later. Thank you, Lord Reay, for your very positive contribution to our future work with the Council.

I call Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank all speakers not only for their kind words but also because they have added a great deal to the discussion which I opened this morning on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. I note that there have in fact been more voices in favour of, than against my report; in any case, the basic rule of democracy is that opposing views and opinions must be heard.

I am pleased that the report is considered to be important; this emerged from all speeches and the short time available for the debate certainly has not narrowed its scope and detracted from the importance of the points raised by members.

There remains one problem of substance, which was implied in many speeches, namely a certain doubt or a certain fear many of us have that the good intentions expressed in words in the report and even more authoritatively in the Rome Declaration, will not be translated into facts, measures and actions decisive for the existence of our European organisation. The reactivation of WEU is a political fact, linked with political decisions rather than instruments. Instruments are, however, necessary and indispensable; here several references have been made to the individual cases of the Standing Armaments Committee, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Secretariat-General which needs to be strengthened for truly political functions and not simply technical and administrative tasks. What is needed most of all is continuity of action.

I shall not mention individual speakers by name as that would take too long. What emerged clearly from all the speeches was that another subject considered to be of vital importance is that we should, here and now as we always have, proclaim the validity and importance of the European pillar, even acknowledging that NATO has an importance which can in no way be ignored because it is essential for the peace and security of the world and in particular of our Europe. The European pillar must therefore be strengthened and this strengthening is in our hands. I am quite sure that the Americans would not be pleased if this European pillar were weaker and more acquiescent than in the past and than we hope it will be in the immediate and more remote future.

The whole Assembly should join in the policy launched by WEU, together with the Council and there should be osmosis, an exchange of views and information between the technical bodies which should also be at the service of the Assembly so that it can give a serious and practical course to its own work. There should be osmosis between the executive, represented by the Council and the parliamentary organ represented by this Assembly.

The last point raised concerns encouragement to expand WEU. This morning we were unanimous in welcoming the speech by the Portuguese representative, who in turn paid tribute to us. If other European countries wish to join WEU and if the circumstances are right, this union, which is the heart of Europe, should be enlarged.

I have tried to summarise briefly the various questions discussed here. I will conclude by saying that we have today been discussing a very immediate and important issue. Detailed action, for which we have no time today, will have to follow. It is only by strengthening our political will and the institutions which have been discussed that we shall be able to provide WEU with a better and more worthy existence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Masciadri, I know that you and Lord Reay still have much to do before we vote on the recommendation. I would, however, like to thank you here and now on behalf of the Assembly for the contribution which you and the General Affairs Committee have made. As I said in welcoming Mr. Spadolini, this is an extremely important moment for us. The issues you raise in your report may provoke controversy, but the Assembly must take account of whatever conflicting opinions are put forward. We know that there is a consensus on the need for the European countries to progress beyond the present stage. I wish to emphasise that the work of your committee is fundamental to this task.

I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, this Assembly can in all modesty consider today a great day for WEU. We are at a turning point in history, the implications of which are not yet entirely clear, but which will gradually bring about a new awareness and new habits in every area of WEU politics.

Some people perhaps, in a spirit of pessimism or caution, did not at first believe in this turning point for WEU. This morning, some speakers still appeared hesitant. We can nevertheless be sure that Mr. Masciadri's remarkable report will be a milestone in the history of WEU, a point of reference for the future, and a guide for future action.

I thank Mr. Masciadri and congratulate him on his determination, perseverance and hard work throughout the session in producing a report of such importance.

I should like to refer to a number of central points in this debate. First of all, the Rome meeting affirmed a new principle of reactivation, involving more and more frequent meetings of

Mr. Michel (continued)

the Council of Ministers at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. We were pleased with the question and answer session that followed this first meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome. I imagine that such a procedure has implications for the future. The working method that has now been adopted should henceforth commit us to a different kind of dialogue. This must continue. It is nothing less than a political revolution.

The second point to which I would like to refer is the programme for strengthening WEU's constituent bodies, especially the Secretariat-General and the Permanent Council. I am not in favour of institutional changes. I believe that the more you ask of people who already have a great deal to do, the better the results. Experience of the voluntary spirit and tradition shows that it is better to ask more of people who are already overworked. Let us therefore not change the institutions but instead give the Secretariat-General and Permanent Council the means to do what we are asking of them. The first test will probably come tomorrow morning when we examine the budget. We shall have to say then whether or not we agree with the limited or increased resources to be allocated to WEU for the execution of its duties.

My third point concerns the need to strengthen the rôle of the two technical bodies on which WEU is based, that is, the Standing Armaments Committee, whose strengthening should lead to unified armaments manufacture and respect for the strength of all our industries vis-à-vis those on the other side of the Atlantic, and, secondly, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which should be given new tasks to compensate for those now withdrawn from it. I fear that some of us do not sufficiently appreciate the opportunities before WEU in this respect, and I deeply regret this.

A fourth point is the problem of the enlargement of WEU. This morning we heard a statement from a colleague from Portugal who replied in advance to our wish to talk, in the near future, with new countries which are members of the Atlantic Alliance but not members of WEU, with which we are destined to work in future. This also anticipates our future work. The General Affairs Committee yesterday decided to begin talks with the Spanish and Portuguese leaders, pending such talks with delegates from other countries. We are on the threshold of the enlargement of WEU. That is also one of the tasks before us and a challenge we shall have to take up. Even if we find the answers only to the four points I have just mentioned, we shall have accomplished a remarkable piece of work for the future of WEU.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Lord Reay put a remarkably well expressed two-fold demand to the President of this Assembly and the Presidential Committee. He asked both of them to comply with the new procedure for contacts between the Council and our Assembly. That is another task facing us in the months to come. It is a formidable and delicate task, but one that should reflect all the intentions expressed in recent months, and particularly in today's debate. It should set the seal on the real renewal of WEU that all of us want to see.

If our determination is indeed as we have described it, if our courage is such as we have wished, we shall be able, thanks to our work, to set out enthusiastically on the new road which WEU is taking today.

It is highly desirable that the Assembly should be unanimous when we come to vote on the two reports before us.

Of course, some of us may be hesitant. Some may not have got all they wanted – perhaps the two reports and the debate in the Assembly have not met our expectations. Others may think we are going too far. But it seems to me that the general approach of this twofold report ought to satisfy the whole of the Assembly in the months to come.

That is why I am appealing to all members. When they have had a chance to appreciate the committee's attitude to their amendments, when they have heard its response – and we intend to show a great deal of good will – I shall ask them to accept that a unanimous vote will reinforce the standing of WEU and belief in its future, which we all have at heart, since all those who have spoken have tried to contribute to this work and ensure its future success.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I add my applause to that of my colleagues. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate not only the wisdom and tact which characterise your leadership of a committee whose political task is so important for our Assembly, but also your faith as a convinced European who continues to make such an effective contribution to our work.

I hope that your wish is answered. Who more than the President could want it to come true! We must however leave the matter to the democratic decision of our Assembly. We shall do all we can to ensure that our work has the hoped-for positive effect.

**4. Address by Mr. Spadolini,
Minister of Defence of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

I invite you, Minister, to come to the rostrum.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to thank you for the warm welcome you have extended to me on behalf of everyone here; following the turning point of the extraordinary session in Rome and the President's invitation to continue the dialogue started there at the Assembly's headquarters is a matter of great satisfaction to me and of great political interest. I find it a matter for satisfaction because I am again here as my country's Defence Minister and also, as in Rome, as representative of all the Defence Ministers of the other countries, not simply in response to a formal invitation or fulfilling an appointment which has been too infrequent for too long – for thirty years the Foreign Ministers and the Defence Ministers had never met together as they did in Rome – but in recognition of all the political, economic and social interests to which present-day Europe and European Defence Ministers attach much greater importance and significance than in the past.

The reason for the great political interest is that since the Rome Declaration the presence of a Defence Minister here in the Assembly should signify – quite apart from being here myself – that the union intends to press forward with practical measures to implement the objectives restated and enlarged upon in the Rome Declaration in order to initiate a new constituent phase – if you will allow me to use an expression which recalls the great moments of European and Italian history. In this phase, the increased presence of Defence Ministers does not mean that we are concerned solely with the military dimension of European defence; it means rather that we are moving forward along the road foreseen by the great Europeans for whom political union must, to some extent, have meant agreement on the essential matter of security policy.

Today we can already say therefore that the first meeting of Defence Ministers in Rome has a future; a future of productive co-operation; a future of technological innovation; a future in the possible establishment of controls on arms exports; a future in the theory and techniques of disarmament. I shall deal briefly with each of these four basic points which, in fact, are covered by the reports submitted by Mr. Masciadri and Mr. Lagorce discussed at this session.

I have come from Brussels, where we discussed these points. I thank the President for having brought forward my speech which should have followed that of Mr. Genscher, because political commitments require me to be in Rome late in the afternoon, thus cutting short my brief stay in Paris to which I was looking forward. You know that the whole of Europe is covered by a close network of bilateral and multilateral contacts in this field; this network has

precise technical points of reference, namely the national armaments directors and the valuable central institution, relaunched at The Hague, in the shape of the IEPG. So, as we said in Rome, we wish to avoid duplication but it is also necessary that WEU, the only body which brings parliamentarians and governments together for European defence, should make the greatest possible use of its own institutions and, in this case, of the Standing Armaments Committee. That is why we are repeating the proposal we made in Rome, namely that the Conference of National Armaments Directors should work either in London, to prepare the proposed regular meetings of defence ministers, or here in Paris as an effective instrument of the Standing Armaments Committee, which otherwise is in danger of becoming no more than an administrative secretariat lagging behind decisions taken elsewhere.

In my country we are following very carefully the discussions in progress in the Atlantic Alliance on the strategic implications of the new technologies; Mr. Milani can be assured that we are not entrusting European defence, the search for peace or the desired elimination of the nuclear threshold from men's thoughts, to ideas and applications as yet unproven. We know that if the conflict starts to escalate no one will know when it will stop; here, however, we certainly need to initiate a dual process of which WEU must be an essential part in both cases.

The first process, which has become part of political propaganda in the last few years, is the modernisation of conventional armaments using technological methods for which Europe must not be subordinate to American industry; faced by these technical challenges we must not rely wholly on the United States for our equipment. I am sure that our American friends would not like to see a rundown European defence industry, because it is only a very short step from technical to psychological loss of the ability to provide for one's own defence.

The second process is to promote a defensive attitude and a balance of conventional forces, so that the banning of nuclear weapons can at least become a possible hope. Some will say that this is a wild dream; but I believe that if in the other scale we have the biological destruction of the planet, even the wildest dream must be encouraged. If some people, with the optimistic spirit of the pacifist movements which, when they are not unilateral, deserve all our respect, harbour the illusion of universal disarmament, why not realistically encourage the idea of the middle way, of a balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals by a programme whereby nobody would give up their own military and defensive capacity? In both the political and technical process, there is wide room for thought and for the joint forces – political, scientific and productive – of the WEU

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

countries, all nationalistic whims being ruled out by the vastness of the problem.

Not casting aspersions at the defence industry but recognising that it is essential to the concept of European independence, which we must reaffirm and maintain, I think that Europe should formulate a common policy for licences and bans to bring European foreign policies and controlled exports of armaments into line. In order to achieve this and avoid the greatest discrepancies, WEU can serve a particularly useful purpose with the experience it has acquired over thirty years. Joint decisions and uniform controls steered by the seven countries could provide a very effective stabilising element, co-ordinated over wide areas of the world in the interests of peace; because of its relevance to security this is one of the areas in which the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be given new tasks.

Apart from any such new tasks, I think that the Agency has a strategic rôle to play in the union; we have abolished out-of-date discriminatory controls but we have not and cannot abandon the idea of disarmament control which is still the concern of the Agency. I would say that the actual idea of European defence should be associated with the idea of seeking ways of achieving disarmament. It would be an unforgivable political mistake in relation to western public opinion, to peace movements which are not slaves to mere propaganda or unilateralist ideas and even to the cautious interest of the Warsaw Pact countries, if the machinery of the Agency were dismantled progressively as the old tasks disappear. The Rome Declaration contains a precise mandate to define the new tasks of the Agency which must not involve the recruitment of more staff but must combine greater responsibilities with technical readaptation.

At Stockholm, in Vienna and in the new talks at Geneva, which the world will be watching anxiously, the seven WEU countries, united and armed with suggestions and technical guidance for control of the various disarmament policies, are making their presence known. WEU, and within it the Agency, is the only European institution which can seriously be included – not like the fly on the coach wheel – in the dialogue between the superpowers with ideas for inspection aimed at the controlled reduction of armaments which is the goal of all the governments of the seven WEU countries. The public in Italy, and I believe throughout Europe, is extremely sensitive on this point and would not accept the abandonment of the instrument for peace which WEU represents.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I know that in all parts of WEU these subjects are under close consideration and that appropriate forms of organisation are being sought; my hope is that they will always be inspired by the idea of Europe and its political interests, highlighted in the Rome Declaration; in no case should petty bureaucratic interests prevail as they have absolutely no place in the great idea of revitalising WEU.

We believe, we know, that many of the hopes accompanying this end of the century are linked to the idea of a Europe which, for us, always coincides with the idea of liberty and peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, the Assembly has listened to your address with the closest attention. I am sure it will derive full benefit from it in carrying out its work.

A number of representatives wish to put questions to you.

I call the first of them, Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, repeating a remark already made in Rome, you spoke of the Agency for the Control of Armaments as an “instrument of peace”. Thank you for using that expression.

Is it your intention to urge the Council to give favourable consideration to the list of tasks which Annex III to the report on arms control and disarmament proposes should be entrusted to the Agency for the Control of Armaments? I realise this question may put you in an awkward position, Minister, since we have just been discussing the matter. I hope you will not think I am trying to trap you. I take the liberty of putting the question to you since you have spoken of the Agency for the Control of Armaments in such positive terms.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I thank the speaker who raised the key problem of the Agency which is now that of adding the word “European” to armaments control. We are in favour of giving the Agency wider tasks and this is perhaps the most significant result of the Rome meeting; we believe the Agency may have an essential part to play in defining those tasks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, we know you for a convinced European from your action in the government and we appreciated just now the assurance that the chancelleries of the WEU countries are studying in detail plans for relaunching the organisation. May I add, however, that we have the impression that no real political vocation has yet been

Mr. Bianco (continued)

found for WEU and that the problems are being discussed a very long way from WEU, despite the affirmation that this is the only body where security problems are discussed.

I should like to ask you what you think and in what direction the Italian Government is thinking of acting to implement the commitment of the Rome Declaration.

The problems and disputes which have arisen in recent years between the United States and the Soviet Union are the result of differing assessments of the problems of strategic parity. On this point, on which everyone is agreed, namely the determination that neither side shall achieve supremacy, assessments have differed according to the differing information provided by the two powers. Do you not think that WEU needs a separate service for assessing information from other sources, in order to take effective action enabling member countries to decide their own balanced guidelines? These will also provide a balance when the talks are resumed between the two great powers and will thus avoid what you very opportunely described as a subordinate place for Europe in the colloquy between the great powers.

Mr. SPADOLINI (Minister of Defence of Italy) (Translation). – I should like to thank Mr. Bianco for his remarks, which perhaps highlight the essential question of how the words of the Rome Declaration are to be translated into facts. I belong to the school of thought which looks upon words as bricks, as ideas from which history is built. Parliamentarians in all our countries must remind their governments of the ideas approved and of the commitments entered into because, as I see it, the precise and detailed implementation of the commitments of the Rome Declaration is of itself the revival of WEU, if we hold true, if we are strong enough to hold true to our undertakings to do certain things with absolute determination and within a certain time, as regards certain problems and certain schemes.

During the long run-up to the joint meeting of Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, I observed more suspicion than support for WEU, from the moment that we initiated, together with our colleague Mr. Hernu, whom I am glad to greet in the French capital, the joint action by France and Italy – in many respects concurrent but from different standpoints, particularly as regards Atlantic commitments – for the extraordinary session to be held while Germany had the chair. But, as compared with the starting point twelve months ago, there have unquestionably been significant developments, such as the communiqué issued yesterday by the Eurogroup in Brussels, which refers explicitly and formally to

the efforts of WEU; and in recent months, diplomatic talks have been held at all levels with the valuable participation of our Foreign Ministers; and, as I said, I find that the prejudices of the whole IEPG area towards WEU have become less pronounced and that it is now realised that work can very well be handled by WEU for the programming of armaments and by the IEPG for their standardisation, without different bodies, one more political and the other more technical, having to oppose or neutralise each other.

This means that the necessary progress with public opinion, which is always essential for these battles, has been achieved. The Assembly also deserves great praise for the session held in Rome. The governments will have to take account of the wishes of the parliamentarians; as I emphasised in my speech, WEU is the only real meeting place for governments and parliaments in Europe. We believe it is destined to develop and grow and not to maintain undesirable barriers. Precisely because it is first of all an idea, Europe cannot tolerate limitations and we believe that the strengthening of the Agency for the Control of Armaments will enable Europe to make its voice heard in the much desired and now imminent dialogue between East and West, between the nuclear superpowers.

The second point raised by Mr. Bianco is in the same context. I believe that the Secretariat-General is capable of fulfilling the proposed task of providing an adequate nucleus for assessing and answering the frequently agonised questions concerning strategic parity. Here again, it is a matter of injecting more power and determination into organisations specifically named for reform and strengthening in the Rome Declaration, in order to meet the point mentioned by Mr. Bianco, namely the political and technical necessity of balancing European and American production. The initiation of European joint production schemes, such as the fighter aircraft for the nineties, designed in Madrid, is certainly an answer to the great question of Europe's founding fathers who in their day dreamed of the defence community; how to launch European defence with co-ordinated forms of arms production without which Europe would clearly be unable to maintain its identity in that sector in any case or any direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall now interrupt the sitting for a few moments in order to welcome Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This may be less a point of order and more a matter of courtesy. One of our members has spent a quarter of an hour distributing pamphlets throughout the Assembly and in the public gallery while the Italian Minister was making a major speech. I ask you to advise the Assembly whether, in future, such conduct should be allowed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note what you say, but I am already aware of what has happened. Any member of the Assembly is free to enter the public gallery, but if a member intends to distribute documents, I think he should request authorisation to do so from the President simply as a matter of courtesy, and I regret that no such request was made to me. However, I would like the incident to be considered closed, and I shall speak personally to the member concerned.

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have two questions to ask, one general and the other very specific. I gained the impression, Minister, that in your speech, you with your great sensitivity and capacity for synthesis, reiterated that WEU is primarily a political institution, called on essentially to make policy and to formulate a strategy and policy both within our countries and in relation to other countries. Could you confirm that my interpretation is correct?

Next, my specific question. The substantive problem before us today, which to me is fundamental because it involves our credibility, is that of translating into practical action the ideas and proposals put forward in Rome. In the case of defence, I think that the problem is the following: with the resources available – I am not arguing whether they are large or small – would it be possible to establish the best and most effective defence? If this is possible, I must stress that high quality and efficiency require certain things which can be achieved gradually but must be achieved; exchanges of information must be increased, defence structures must be co-ordinated, standardised and integrated, joint training centres must be set up and joint programmes must be set on foot in order to have forces with the same equipment, arms and machines so that they are the best expression and guarantee of the peace which is the ultimate aim of all we do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am very happy to welcome Mr. Genscher.

I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to join the President in welcoming my friend and colleague, Mr. Genscher.

In reply to Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, the first point he made is correct; I did intend that WEU should have a basically political function because the battle for Europe is fought entirely on the political front. We must look to a political Europe and agreement on defence policy is one instrument for achieving a political objective.

As regards the translation into co-ordinated action of the proposals formulated in the Rome Declaration, I think that the whole range of subjects mentioned by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi must be included, up to and including the wide-ranging joint programmes to which I alluded in my previous reply to Mr. Bianco, involving the forces of the individual countries which acting separately could not meet the requirements of defence. Despite all this, there is too much opposition from national industries and policies; the illusion is still entertained that preferential links between two countries can resolve Europe's problems. We have worked against preferential axes, including such links between Defence Ministers and we consider it important that today there is no longer any possibility of things which were possible two or three years ago, as for example the tendency to exclude Mediterranean Europe, or Italy or Spain from such forms of co-operation. This is why I referred specially to fighter aircraft – not because I am an aeronautics fan. I would say to our "green" colleagues who send me leaflets that this is not the problem and that this is the first move towards European co-operation to come from Madrid, that is from the capital of a country which returned to democracy only a few years ago – and also to Europe because there is no Europe without democracy – and is looking for real links with the other countries for a certain level of defence production which could not be achieved by Italy, France, Germany or the United Kingdom on its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vecchiotti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to ask Mr. Spadolini whether, in the event that negotiations take place between the Soviet Union and the United States and cover problems relating to European security, he considers that, in the spirit of the Rome Declaration, the Western European countries should not only be consulted but should be involved in all decisions directly concerning Europe, so as to give European security a collective basis founded on the controlled, balanced reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My answer is "Yes". I made the point during my speech; the European countries should be consulted and one of WEU's main tasks as an institution is precisely to indicate the most suitable ways and means of ensur-

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

ing that such consultation becomes participation in final decisions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, you are a member of the government which has at all times shown itself to be firmly convinced of the importance of building a Europe with a single currency and united in defence, economic matters and political matters. This is also the aim of the party of which you are general secretary. In Rome a great step forward was taken with the proposal for a continuing dialogue between European organisations so that the measures which need to be taken by every supranational European entity in order to construct the Europe of tomorrow can be fully implemented. The recent decisions on the agricultural problem have, however, confirmed the need for sacrifices from everyone. Should petty nationalism over defence be abandoned? Do you think that it can be overcome in Italy and elsewhere?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I welcome the progress made in Dublin towards the economic integration of Europe, by the acceptance of Spain and Portugal, although I would have preferred the decision to be without reservations and subsequent conditions. The same spirit, involving sacrifices by our country as well, borne with great dignity in order to resolve the problem, should inspire us in the field of defence and I repeat my reply to Mr. Ferrari Aggradi regarding the need to sacrifice part of oneself, sometimes in direct proportion to resources.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, the Council has confirmed its intention that WEU should be reactivated, and has at the same time stated that no additional resources will be made available. I consider this to be right and proper, as all bureaucracies have a tendency to expand in line with anticipated responsibilities. My question is whether the Council intends in the near future to make specific proposals as to where actual savings could be made by the elimination of superfluous posts and wasteful expenditure within WEU, arms control and so on? I ask whether we may expect these suggestions soon, and whether the Italian Government will use its good offices to ensure that we get them; also whether the proposals will be conveyed in such a way that they can be discussed in this Assembly?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My answer to our German colleague is that both are necessary; savings on some items of the budget and other proposals to be put to the Council. In my opinion, the problem can only be resolved by savings in some directions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – In contrast with the emphasis, the almost singular emphasis, that has been given by some people when discussing the reactivation of WEU on increased armaments and developing a kind of West European military industrial complex, the Minister devoted much of his speech to developing the Agency for the Control of Armaments as a means to control arms exports and to study the means of moving towards peace and disarmament, the different kinds of strategies and the logistical problems that might well be involved. Most welcome! Would the Minister agree, and do his fellow ministers in the Council agree, that the level of arms exports from Europe as well as other continents is growing far too rapidly and in some instances is adding to poverty, to starvation, to instability and insecurity in difficult areas, so creating risks for us in Europe?

Secondly, what priority does the Minister give to proposing specific intergovernmental action to restrain arms exports outside Europe? What action is being proposed now by Ministers of the Council?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – This is unquestionably a real and serious problem and I myself gave a hint when I called for a common policy for licences and prohibitions, which does not exist at present, and I added “to bring European foreign policies and controlled exports of armaments into line”; which, if you ask me to translate into simpler terms, means that a very close watch must be kept on trade in arms with countries involved in local conflicts. As Prime Minister, I always tried my best to prevent any Italian arms from going to either Iran or Iraq but I do not know whether all countries have done the same. The first rule, therefore, is not to fuel local conflicts. Sales of arms should be suspended for the whole duration of any such war.

There is of course a second problem affecting the budgets of newly-independent states: the purchases of arms, sometimes by underhand, concealed means, which has led to corruption even in my country. This is a serious problem, because the wishes of both the selling governments and the purchasing governments are involved and national legislation will have to be

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

carefully revised, and harmonised at European level; and it is another of WEU's tasks to ensure that differences between countries are not too wide.

I will conclude on this point by saying that the wishes of even the most powerful governments are sometimes set at nought by international groups which do what they want.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I have four questions, Minister.

My first question is this: are you prepared to acknowledge that there are many citizens in WEU countries who do not wish to see the concept of security defined in exclusively military terms; who are therefore looking for political solutions and who are currently very disappointed that the European Community is turning from a civilian into a military force? In this connection it is of course quite plain that if a leaflet, as you term it, is handed to you drawing attention to this state of affairs, it is meant as a serious request that you reconsider the matter.

My second question is whether you are aware that for historical reasons the Soviet Union is very worried about the abolition of the weapons restrictions on the Federal Republic of Germany? Have you heeded the memorandum of 10th July 1984, which drew attention to the serious concern aroused in the Soviet Union by the Federal Republic's ability, in particular, to manufacture long-range strategic weapons? Sir, I am asking whether the Minister is prepared to take cognisance of this memorandum!

My third question comes in the wake of the ministerial declaration in Rome, and I ask whether you realise that there are very many people in Europe who hold the view that the primary concern of the European Community and Western European Union should be initiatives aimed at disarmament? Do you realise, also, that among the peoples of Europe it is widely regarded as extremely questionable for WEU ministers to have no other concern than to lend new impetus to the arms race?

Fourth, what is your view of the wording of the Rome Declaration to the effect that the Assembly should contribute even more to associating public opinion in the member states with the policy statements of the Council? Do you not share the view that this message is unworthy of a democratic assembly? Ought this not to be the other way round, in the sense that it is the job of the Assembly to bring certain ideas to the Council's attention, so that the Council can then react and may perhaps also let the public know that it is doing so?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). - I shall reply briefly to the questions put to me. I affirmed the political nature of WEU and said that the military dimension is not enough. I need only refer to my reply, therefore, as it was not influenced by the leaflets of our "green" colleagues, which I had not then read. As to the appeal to me, it is right and proper that the parliamentarians of a multi-national assembly should turn to the government representatives and should raise matters of conscience, to which I said I always defer, whenever they are sincerely-held views. As regards the anxiety of the Soviet Union concerning the arming of Germany, I would recall the anxiety felt by the Germans over Soviet arms and also my visit to the home of the then Chancellor, Mr. Schmidt, who showed me Soviet SS missiles deployed 36 kilometres from his private residence in Hamburg. He was a socialist Chancellor, belonging to a great party which, above all, has well-known views on missiles and what he said to me suggests a reply to a dual concern we have committed ourselves to removing, as regards a fresh balance of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level, which must also be verifiable.

The Rome Declaration has a political side and is not confined to the control of armaments; it calls for a European defence effort which, I repeat, is always a political effort.

As to the fourth question asking whether it is for the Assembly to make the most of the Council or vice versa, I would answer that it is for both; the Assembly should make the most of the Council's objectives and the Council should always submit its ideas to the sovereign judgment of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). - My first question follows on from Mr. Vecchiotti's and concerns our attitude to the meetings to be held in Geneva on 7th and 8th January, that is to the start of the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States is going there with the idea of an umbrella covering all problems; and to see what happens. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is going there with the idea that the prime need is to avoid the militarisation of space. These are two general ideas; but I think that the two countries will then find a way to start discussions and possibly to reach agreements, although there must be some definite doubts on that score.

First question: has Europe its own ideas, not for conclusive negotiations but for questions which should be discussed, which it considers vital, and if so what are they? In particular, as Italian Minister of Defence, can you tell us whether the Italian Government and yourself in

Mr. Milani (continued)

particular have any ideas on the subject and can you tell us what they are?

My second question concerns the NATO Defence Planning Committee, or rather the change in NATO strategy after seventeen years – to which little reference has been made here – which I believe the Defence Ministers have approved and adopted as the new strategy of the Atlantic Alliance. May I ask what this new strategy is and in particular what it involves as regards independence or subordination to American industry, as you mentioned earlier? You are the author of the Italian white paper on defence which speaks of twelve weapons systems already approved and available under this strategy; you also spoke of the need to protect the armaments industry in the various European countries. May I ask what this strategic choice involves? I am naturally pessimistic regarding the payments we shall have to make to the United States.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – The speech made this morning by Mr. Weinberger to the restricted planning committee shows that the American umbrella is very wide; for the first time, it is agreed that the Geneva meetings shall cover strategic and tactical weapons and all issues concerning space. This is the new element bringing the two points of view closer together.

For the rest, it is difficult to imagine that two countries, which have quarrelled so violently in recent years, can start with an agreement at a first meeting on procedures. It can be taken, however, that the new atmosphere as compared with recent months and years is a fact of global importance. Europe must therefore work for global solutions whenever conventional security is involved because that is our responsibility.

I cannot discuss the French and British missiles because I have not been authorised to do so by Mr. Mitterrand and I do not want to be called to order, especially in Paris.

As to the Rogers theory of the deep strike, so far as I know it has not, as of today, been approved by any document in the Defence Planning Committee.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I was referring to the deep-strike strategy chosen by the Europeans.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I am not aware that this strategy has been adopted.

There is a problem connected with the Rogers proposal, which has not been carried further, namely that of the emergent technologies. In the case of the most sophisticated and expensive

armaments this would widen the gap between the European and American arms industries.

Generally speaking, agreement is not easy to achieve on the emergent technologies. As I learned only today in Brussels, what the United States is seeking, therefore, is to increase the chances of agreement on existing conventional arms, pending assessment of the post-nuclear situation, as we say. In fact, once agreement is reached on nuclear weapons, many problems will take on such a different shape that the importance of other contributions will be reduced.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you, Minister, on behalf of my colleagues, for your contribution to our work.

There are no more names down for questions, but I know that you said that you would stay for our debate. If you were able to do so we should be very flattered.

We hope you will continue to support the reactivation of WEU. We are very much counting on you, Minister, and I would like to thank you once again for your consideration.

**5. Address by Mr. Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you will have noted that, a short while ago I had the pleasure of welcoming the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, Minister Genscher, and I would like now to thank him once again for joining us.

Mr. Chairman, you are well acquainted with the Assembly, both with its plenary sittings and with its liaison and preparatory work. We are greatly indebted to you and are very much counting on your assistance at this time in order to continue along the road which we have started to take under your chairmanship.

I ask you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at their anniversary meeting in Rome, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union expressed their clear commitment to close co-operation on security policy. I gave you a detailed account

Mr. Genscher (continued)

of the decisions taken in Rome when I addressed the Assembly on 29th October. Those decisions are an expression of courage. They point the way into the future and they are constructive. Close and trusting co-operation within WEU on matters of security and defence makes for progress towards the unification of Europe; it strengthens the Atlantic Alliance; it is a contribution to dialogue between East and West, and it serves the cause of peace.

The WEU Assembly carries much of the responsibility for ensuring successful co-operation among the Seven in the field of security. It has important tasks to perform, which include the following:

First, the Assembly reflects and gives parliamentary expression to the views of the citizens of our countries on security issues.

Second, the Assembly is in permanent communication with the Council of Ministers. It elaborates its own proposals on major aspects of security which are taken into account in decisions of the Council of Ministers. These decisions are in turn the subject of debate in the Assembly. This procedure is an example of practical democracy on the international level.

Third, the Assembly is in regular contact with other parliaments. In this way it helps to present a clear picture of WEU's work in other organisations, especially NATO.

Fourth, the Assembly and the Council of Ministers combine their efforts to ensure a consensus of public opinion on matters of security and defence.

The extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome came up with a number of concrete proposals for improving co-operation with the Assembly. It is pleasing to note that the Assembly will be discussing those proposals during this regular session. Council and Assembly should further intensify their contacts. The two informal meetings with the Bureau of the Assembly on 9th October and 19th November were in my view a good start towards improving the dialogue. Mr. Caro, the President, deserves our thanks for his active participation. I am convinced that such meetings will produce substantial results that will be a guide for the future.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in Rome the Council of Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to submit proposals on a number of important matters before its next session. It was asked to report on how the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee can be restructured so that they can do justice to the future tasks of WEU, how joint

public relations activities of the Seven in the field of security and defence can be improved and co-ordinated, whether and how the advice of military experts can be used for the work of the Council of Ministers, how the Council of Ministers should respond to Portugal's application for membership of WEU.

In this connection I myself proposed the establishment of a research institute for security and defence matters.

With the assistance of the Secretariat-General, the Permanent Council in London immediately set about its task. As Chairman-in-Office of the Council I shall be anxious to see the work completed quickly so that proposals can be put before the Council for decision at the next meeting.

However, the revitalisation of WEU focuses mainly on intensive dialogue on security and defence policy. At their next meeting in Council, which I have suggested should take place in the second half of April 1985, the Foreign and Defence Ministers will have an extensive discussion on topical problems.

I will propose that questions of disarmament and arms control should occupy an important place. One outstanding aspect is a convention providing for a global ban on chemical weapons. In addition, the Seven might discuss problems of the military use of outer space and its significance for Europe. Disarmament and arms control is a subject of special interest at the moment following the decision of the United States and the Soviet Union to resume their bilateral dialogue.

We welcome and support that decision. The fact that two Foreign Ministers are to meet in Geneva on 7th and 8th January 1985 is a confirmation of western peace and security policy. That policy was strongly reaffirmed by the members of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Washington Declaration of 31st May 1984. The United States-Soviet talks will have a positive impact on East-West relations overall. We are strengthened in this view by the fact that the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact, too, in their communiqué issued yesterday, welcomed the agreement to begin these talks and noted that there is now an opportunity to change the situation for the better. The success of the negotiations will depend on both sides recognising each other's security interests and acting accordingly. Inevitably, the difficult and complex problems of security and arms control will be the central theme. On our recent visit to Washington Chancellor Kohl and I found that a good basis exists for close co-ordination between the United States and its European allies. In their joint statement the Chancellor and President Reagan reaffirmed the necessity of continued close and

Mr. Genscher (continued)

intensive discussions within the alliance. In particular they stressed the importance of close consultations on all arms control matters and reiterated their resolve to continue to contribute actively to this process of consultation. With the East-West dialogue about to be revived, it is particularly important for Europe to strengthen its identity, both politically and in terms of security. The Europeans have a special responsibility for themselves and for their continent in this respect. They must be able to live up to that responsibility in all areas of East-West relations. In this context it is very important for the CSCE process to retain its central rôle in the East-West relationship and to be carried forward in all its aspects. The small and medium-sized nations of Europe are called upon by the CSCE final act, the tenth anniversary of which will be celebrated on 1st August 1985, to work, on an equal footing with the superpowers, to make peace safer in divided Europe and to foster co-operation.

The Warsaw Pact countries, too, in their communiqué of 4th December 1984, have underlined the importance of the rôle which all European states have to play in strengthening peace in Europe. This is an important indicator. I am also pleased to note that the Warsaw Pact countries have expressly committed themselves to continue and intensify the CSCE process, to foster détente, and to develop co-operation in Europe on the basis of the final act of Helsinki.

The broad range of subjects which the Foreign Ministers of the superpowers will be discussing on 7th and 8th January offers a good basis for a new start. The aim must be equitable and verifiable agreements that will ensure a stable balance with fewer weapons. This applies both to strategic and to intermediate-range weapons, as well as to the military use of outer space.

In this context we must not forget that it is the imbalance of conventional forces that can spark off a crisis.

By producing agreements on confidence- and security-building measures, the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe is to help prevent the danger of a military confrontation in Europe. The object of the Vienna negotiations is to secure parity of force strengths in Central Europe and thus contribute to military stability at a low level. Moreover, it is extremely important to us that the world should be freed from the scourge of chemical weapons by means of a comprehensive agreement. The negotiations of the Geneva Disarmament Conference with a view to a global prohibition of chemical weapons are in an advanced stage. Although

agreement has been reached in principle in some areas, important issues are still unresolved. Within the framework of WEU, differing views can be clarified among member states and a common position worked out. WEU can in this way help keep the negotiations moving forward.

Arms control in outer space is of immediate concern to us Europeans because we ourselves are becoming more and more involved in the utilisation of space. We should harmonise our interests and views in WEU and as far as possible present a common position in consultations with our principal ally, the United States. Our work in the Geneva Disarmament Conference, which is also considering ways and means of preventing an arms race in outer space, should also be co-ordinated.

Western European Union can in my view play an important rôle in defining specifically European interests in all important matters of disarmament and arms control. It can, for instance, contribute to the opinion-forming process within the alliance and help work out the negotiating position of the United States in its dialogue with the Soviet Union. But in so doing we must clearly recognise that Europe can pursue an arms control policy only together with the United States; it cannot go it alone. The German presidency will be inviting the representatives of member states responsible for disarmament to meet in Bonn for preparatory discussions on the subject of disarmament and arms control, also with a view to the next meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in their Rome statement the Ministers gave prominence to defence questions. Here we shall be relying very much on the knowledge and the assistance of the Defence Ministers. Defence covers a broad range of subjects. One of the tasks will be to make a common analysis of the security situation in Europe. It will have to be undertaken primarily by the governments of member states and the Council, but the Assembly, too, will have to make its considerable expertise available. Only then will we be able to cope with all aspects of the work that lies ahead.

Ladies and Gentlemen, another important subject is Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. In this context the Ministers will be assessing Europe's present contribution to alliance defence. This calls for efforts by all partners. Having just adopted its new plans for the Federal armed forces, the Federal Republic of Germany has shown that it is willing to make additional sacrifices, one of them being the decision to extend the period of compulsory military service. We must counter those who underrate Europe's defence contribution and who insist that it increase its share. If

Mr. Genscher (continued)

we consider the distribution of burdens in the North Atlantic Alliance, the Europeans have nothing to be ashamed of. After all, there are some burdens which cannot be expressed in figures. The scope and quality of the European contribution and its importance for the collective security of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance need to be clearly emphasised. And where deficiencies and gaps exist we should continue our efforts to remove or fill them.

Europe seeks a balanced relationship with North America. To achieve this, Europe's voice will have to carry more weight in the transatlantic dialogue. The community of interests in defining and shaping our security policy is evident from our efforts to preserve equal security for all members of the alliance and to safeguard the integrity of NATO territory. It is one of the major responsibilities of Western European Union to emphasise Europe's rôle in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Transatlantic relations also embrace the economy. Trade, the rejection of controls or protectionism, co-ordination and the joint use of technological advancement and high technology, are important aspects of our co-operation and common interests in the field of security. There is a need for improvement, however, in the European-American two-way street with regard to co-operation on armaments. The present ratio of European to American supplies of arms and equipment is about 7:1 to our disadvantage. We find this disproportion unsatisfactory.

Through better co-ordination of European armaments policies and by balancing the arms contributions of the transatlantic partners, it will be possible to create a genuine two-way street. This will call for an intensive, common effort.

Our aim must be to proceed beyond the discussion of basic policy matters to the solution of practical problems. More joint projects for the production of armaments will have to be launched. Our resources are scarce so we shall have to use them rationally to avoid duplication of work and we shall have to agree on priorities. We shall have to ensure that Europe's industrial productivity and competitiveness are also maintained in the field of arms procurement. Here we see how closely security and economic policy are linked together.

Western European Union will have to give political impulses in this respect. The political importance of co-operation in the field of armaments will have to be emphasised. The current work of NATO's Independent European Programme Group will have to be supported by WEU.

Another important topic at the next meeting of the Council will be how to improve the public information policy of the Europeans on matters of security and defence. The citizens of our countries need to have a better understanding of security matters. Especially in connection with the resumption of the East-West dialogue on disarmament and arms control, WEU can do a lot to present this complicated subject-matter in a way that will make it comprehensible to the public. This is one of the main responsibilities of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, a start has been made on the task of implementing the Rome decisions. The Permanent Council and its organs will pursue this task intensively with a view to achieving concrete results. They will submit constructive proposals to the Council of Ministers for decision.

The seven members of WEU are determined to work closely together on security and defence matters. I appeal to you, Ladies and Gentlemen, I appeal to the Assembly to play an active part in this process. Let us together use the opportunity afforded by the revitalisation of Western European Union to achieve further progress towards the unification of Europe, to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, and to help safeguard peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now invite you to answer questions that a number of my colleagues wish to put to you.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – May I also assure the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of our pleasure in having him with us again.

Although, Mr. Chairman, you referred in your address to the German proposals and to intentions concerning the Rome Declaration as regards arms control and disarmament, would it be indiscreet to ask what measures have been or will be taken to implement the intention to achieve the controlled limitation of armaments and disarmament and, particularly in the context of the Geneva conference, what is happening about the ban on chemical and space weapons?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like first of all to recall what Mr. Spadolini said about the concept of negotiations under one umbrella. This concept, which in practice ensures that all disarmament issues are covered in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, serves the fundamental interests of the European states, as we are

Mr. Genscher (continued)

concerned that every possible aspect of the matter should be included. I should like to remind you that the deployment of Soviet SS-20s, which was at the root of the medium-range missile problem, was made possible partly by the omission of this range of armaments from the START negotiations. It is therefore particularly important that all types of weapons should be included, and the statements we heard during our Washington visit conveyed the assurance, also expressed in my own speech, that by consultation the views of the European partners in the alliance would make an important contribution to determining the American negotiating stance. This process will take place within NATO and should also take place within the collaborative framework of Western European Union.

Given the complexity of the subject I believe we are all well aware that the start of the dialogue, when the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union meet in January, does not mean that the negotiations will begin and shortly afterwards end in certain conclusions, but only that the door will be opened for negotiations which will certainly be prolonged. The meeting of the Council of Ministers planned for April will therefore by no means be too late, but can indeed make an important contribution to the identification of European interests. The question of space weapons will be an important issue here.

As I said at the NATO meeting last year, our concern as regards space is to achieve preventive arms control to ensure early on that space does not become the scene of a new arms race. We shall use our discussions in the WEU Council of Ministers to put forward and define our ideas on this subject. I hope that the report on the April meeting in the Federal Republic of Germany will furnish the Assembly with some initial practical results of this endeavour to identify our interests as they relate to the forthcoming negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, after listening to your speech with great interest I would like to ask you the following two questions.

What concrete measures does the WEU Council intend to take to ensure better application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which stipulates that member states should consult each other on all matters constituting a threat to international peace?

How will it be possible to avoid overlap with the procedure for consultation in the framework of political co-operation among the Ten, given that, in the Stuttgart Declaration of 6th June 1983 on European union, the Ten decided to intensify their co-operation to include “co-ordination of member states’ positions on the political and economic aspects of security”?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – When the Stuttgart Declaration was formulated, security questions were specifically defined. Reference was made to security questions without the military aspects. This already makes it clear that consultation of the states linked together in Western European Union will be broader-based. That means that in the political and economic spheres of security policy there will certainly be some overlap with the consultations taking place in the European Community, but the basis will be broader, in that it will also include military aspects. There will therefore be a partial overlap, but the spectrum is broader by virtue of the definition of these aspects.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister stressed that one task of the Assembly was to make the work of WEU understood in other bodies, particularly NATO. Will he take steps to ensure that our seven countries’ permanent representatives to NATO insist on full replies being prepared by NATO to recommendations of the WEU Assembly that the WEU Council refers to NATO? Unfortunately, a recent example occurred with Recommendation 404 on the state of European security. We attach great importance to this matter and would be grateful for the Minister’s assurance.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Sir, you will understand that I can give you such an assurance only for the Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany: there, it will be done. However, I shall be pleased to take the matter up with my colleagues and ask them to do the same.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In terms of the work of this parliamentary assembly, which should function continuously and effectively, is it possible to accept the suggestion made today that every session should be attended by a Minister for Foreign Affairs and possibly a Minister of Defence, or at least a permanent representative of the WEU Council of Ministers, so that contacts between the govern-

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

ments of the various countries with this Assembly shall not be exceptional and wonderful as on this occasion?

Having been reassured by the statements of the Italian Minister of Defence, to the effect that arms control should be continued and extended to areas outside our own, now that disarmament and controls on a wider scale are being discussed, should not the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee be appropriately strengthened – each with its own functions – in order to prevent, as it has done so well in the past, all worries and doubts, and any uncertainties and controls between the member states of WEU.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Sir, it is, of course, desirable that a Minister should be present at the Assembly's deliberations. Schedules will have to be very carefully coordinated. When you consider that yesterday the Foreign Ministers met in Dublin to discuss, among other things, the sugaring of wine, while the Defence Ministers on the other hand were in Brussels, it is quite obvious why...

(Mr. Gansel interrupted.)

Mr. Gansel, one thing is certain, good wine is necessary to the morale of the troops ... it is obvious why you have a gathering of ministers here today.

With regard to your second question, we shall now engage in discussion and clarification of the issues which you have referred to as "clearing the ground", and in this regard I think our April meeting will be very important.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the fact that ministers are able to travel back to their homes via Paris, which gives us a chance of working more closely together. I have two points. First, an institution such as the Council of Europe has a substantial secretariat and substantial ministerial activity. The EEC has both the Commission and Council of Ministers, which take initiatives upon which the assembly then comments and criticises. Western European Union has been involved largely with arms control and the main rôle of the union has been borne by the parliamentary Assembly. What thought have ministers given to strengthening the executive of Western European Union? It is not necessary to increase staff – staff could be seconded from member countries. Could Western European Union have a more executive rôle, perhaps with ministers or their secretariat preparing position papers for the Assembly to consider?

Secondly, being more practical, President Reagan invited Europe to take part in the space station programme. Yesterday we had a debate on reports by Mr. Hill and Mr. Wilkinson on what is happening in the United States of America. Will Western European Union at ministerial level be able to take an initiative to respond to that invitation? The North Atlantic Alliance and the EEC may be in a position to do this or will it fall on individual European governments? I would value the Minister's views.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In the first place, Sir, you do me a grave injustice. Far from travelling home from Dublin via Paris, I have already attended a meeting of the Federal Government this morning.

Turning now to your first question, one of the tasks imposed by the Rome Declaration concerns the strengthening of the WEU executive. Here I believe that we can find useful suggestions in the report on which decisions can be taken at our April meeting. I am very grateful for your observation that a strengthening of the executive does not necessarily imply a staff increase. We all know other ways of helping to improve matters, and I do not need to go into details here.

As far as participation in the space station is concerned, this is, of course, primarily a decision for individual governments. That said, it is my opinion that a concerted attitude in both NATO and Western European Union would be desirable. I shall in any case endeavour to ensure that there is at least an exchange of views on the subject within Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – If WEU is really to be reactivated, special attention will have to be given to relations with other European countries in the Atlantic Alliance in order to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings. There is a move to open WEU to other countries; Portugal has already asked to join. Right from the start, should accession be confined to the other members of the EEC or countries which have applied to join, or should it include other European countries such as Turkey which are of such importance for the security of the West and of the southern flank of the Mediterranean?

Should applications to join be examined very carefully, pending the outcome of certain developing situations or, in my modest opinion, should they be decided on without raising too many obstacles and therefore quickly, if there are no special problems, as happens with applications

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

to join the EEC? What is the Minister's view on the subject?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I should like to say first of all that I regard it as a compliment to the work of Western European Union and to our joint efforts towards its revitalisation that in our present situation we have to deal with the question of the admission of new members. If you are not attracted by a group, you are unlikely to want to join, but Portugal's formal application betokens its interest and implies recognition of our work and our objectives as well as confidence in the future of Western European Union. I attribute similar significance to Spain's publicly declared interest, although this has not taken the shape of a formal application.

We have always been at one in believing that Western European Union should contribute to strengthening the European pillar, but that it should on no account be allowed to split the alliance. We also share the view that Western European Union contributes substantially to the strengthening of Europe's identity in terms of its political rôle and security policy, and we see this as another reason for not increasing divisions in Europe.

What does all this mean? It means that Western European Union should, in principle, allow the admission of European member states of the western alliance who want to join. However, in scrutinising applications for membership, Western European Union will have to be quite certain that the countries seeking admission are guided by the same ideas and objectives as ourselves and that their entry and the expansion of WEU will not weaken it from within but, on the contrary, each country's entry will mean an enhancement of our joint endeavours. Applications will be examined and accepted or rejected on this basis. It is actually wrong of me to talk about "applications", as there is only one at the moment. I should like to mention at this point that my discussions in Portugal have fully convinced me that the aim behind the Portuguese application is to act in the same spirit as the Seven. This was the reason for the early declaration by the Federal German Government that it was very sympathetic to Portugal's wish.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vogt.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – After your entirely favourable assessment of the Portuguese application, I should like to ask you whether you have not been struck by the fact that, perhaps with the

exception of Luxembourg, the seven countries, together with Portugal and Spain, are among those which have attempted at one time or another to set up an empire from their home ground. Has it not struck you that these Europeans are now banding together with what remains of their vitality to form a kind of new European empire? I would like to ask what you think of the application from this point of view. I am glad the Assembly has such a sense of humour.

You mentioned secondly that it was the job of the Assembly to ensure a consensus of public opinion. I should like to ask what consensus you are talking about, and by what democratic means such a consensus was reached. Let me frame my question more precisely by pointing out that, at the very moment when you were saying that, there was in reality no consensus in Western Europe and that in fact Denmark, Ireland, Greece and other new political forces like the Rainbow Group, the greens and others constituted an opposition – I can easily tell you, *privatissime et gratis* – the opposition in Europe is growing at this very moment – at this very moment, I say, you abandon the real European level within the European Community and seek refuge with your militarisation projects in Western European Union, thereby directly denying this alleged consensus which has to be made plausible to public opinion.

Thirdly, Minister, you talked about an institute...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please be more brief, Mr. Vogt, and confine yourself to putting questions to Mr. Genschler.

I would ask you to be as brief as possible out of consideration for other members.

Mr. VOGT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Certainly, Mr. President. I come to my third question.

(The speaker continued in German)

You mentioned an institute for security and defence matters. Do you not think that we are currently facing problems of disarmament, arms control and new disarmament initiatives which call for far better staffing than the present establishment of the Agency for the Control of Armaments? In administrative terms and from the point of view of personnel policy, what do you propose to do to bring about a real change in staffing levels?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – If you do not mind, I will begin by answering the third question. The form this institute may take is a decision we shall have to take in April, but I must emphatically disagree with you when you

Mr. Genscher (continued)

make a distinction between security policy on the one hand and disarmament and arms control policy on the other. It is in fact the special feature of the western alliance's security policy that arms control and disarmament are integral, not opposing, elements of that policy.

Turning now to your other questions, I note first of all that you regard any attempt to strengthen the European idea with the greatest distrust, whereas we believe that the strengthening of the European identity makes a valuable contribution to safeguarding peace in Europe. When all is said and done, the will of the European democracies to unite is no more than the lesson we all draw from history, that only in concert will the European democracies be able to preserve freedom and peace for their peoples.

I am therefore totally unable to accept arguments in which you develop the idea that our collaboration – whether in the European Community or in Western European Union – is some kind of substitute for earlier colonial ambitions – ambitions from which you have generously excluded Luxembourg.

No, the fact of the matter is that the identity of Europe, in terms of history, politics and security policy, contributes to our ability as Europeans, represented by the European Community and also by the narrower area of collaboration here, to play an important rôle in the cause of freedom, and not only in Europe: the European Community can take important initiatives for the safeguarding of security throughout the world. That is our objective and so, far from being denigrated as militarisation, this peaceful purpose of European unity should be supported with all the energy at our command.

Therefore, Ladies and Gentlemen, we see the trend towards expansion as lending additional strength to our endeavours, and here we are concerned to achieve a consensus between the various member states. We want consensus, which I regard as basic, on the fact that the union of European democracies contributes to peace in Europe and throughout the world.

That still leaves room for debate about the right way of achieving this objective. Such debates are being conducted, and must be conducted, in our national parliaments and here in the WEU Assembly. But, it would be a good thing if none of the parties in this Assembly disputed this basic consensus, that European unification, namely the union of European democracies, is a contribution to the peace of Europe and the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Before putting a question to Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I would like to remind the Assembly that before the second world war Luxembourg was, as Mr. Vogt has just said, not a colonial power but a neutral country. I can tell you, however, that our experience of neutrality was very bad indeed. That is why Luxembourg remains firmly attached to the aims set out in the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties.

Mr. Chairman, you have just told us that, during the recent talks which you and Chancellor Kohl had with the President of the United States, the wish for greater consultation with the Europeans was expressed. That of course raises the question of the effectiveness of such a dialogue, which has of course been raised many times in this Assembly. However, the position of WEU, which intends to strengthen its rôle as the European pillar of NATO, could become much more important in the future. It therefore seems advisable to insist that the European member countries of NATO will not in future be able to allow themselves the luxury of different interpretations of the concept of security.

Do you have the impression, Mr. Chairman, that the United States is seeking a privileged partner on the European side and, if so, could you explain the thinking of the United States in this matter?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – My impression is, Sir, that the United States is interested in entering into discussion with its European allies. They are looking for talks within the NATO framework since, from their standpoint as the North American partners in the alliance, they can, of course, make no distinction between their European allies who belong to Western European Union and those who do not. On the contrary, in order to maintain an even balance within the alliance they must, and rightly so, seek discussion with all their partners.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman-in-Office of the Council, you ended your address by exhorting this Assembly to collaborate in the revitalisation of WEU. My question concerns the way in which this is to be achieved.

The Council has had informal contacts – and perhaps we should add that we are glad they were informal – with our President and our Bureau. But with these informal contacts – beneficial though they may be in that they simplify and accelerate matters – there is, of course, some concern that the real process of

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

revitalisation – and this includes the technical fields – you did after all say just now that we all know ways of saving money and I want to make the point in your own terms – might tend to bypass this Assembly as such, if these informal contacts exist only at top level.

Hence my question: do you see any possibility, or are you prepared to promote the possibility of the experts appointed by the Council meeting together on occasion with the second tier of this Assembly, the relevant committees, for instance, for joint discussions on the questions we face?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is naturally difficult, Sir, for me to associate myself with the line of thought that there is a first and second level in a parliamentary forum.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In terms of their work.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I also believe, of course, that it is a matter for the Assembly to decide to what extent the Bureau is in a position to discuss matters with the presidency of the Council. I say “with the presidency” advisedly, as we should certainly be deceiving ourselves if we supposed that these informal contacts could ever be conducted with the full Council.

That I took part in both these contacts is linked to the fact that I am the Chairman-in-Office. I have already told the President of the Assembly that I can naturally not guarantee always to be there when I am no longer in the chair. My colleagues are in a similar position.

As I have already said, you in the Assembly must decide how far these contacts are to be taken in essential matters – in matters of substance. That cannot be decided by the Council or the Chairman of the Council.

Turning to the central question concerning collaboration between the appointed experts and the Assembly committees, I would regard this collaboration as useful and will support the idea in discussions with my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, in your remarkable address you mentioned the proposals addressed to the Permanent Council by the Council in Rome concerning the study of certain immediate problems

such as Portuguese membership of WEU and the reorganisation of certain key WEU bodies.

You suggested the establishment of a scientific institute devoted to research on security and defence. What might be the content of such an institute? Is there not a danger that it would duplicate the work of other WEU bodies? What would be the budgetary implications, given that we are about to encounter difficulties with our budget?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Such an institute could naturally in no circumstances be a constituent organ of Western European Union but should provide a means for arriving at joint conclusions in matters affecting security policy in the broadest context, including therefore issues of disarmament and arms control. Such findings should benefit from the contributions made by scientists from all the member states of Western European Union. If you will, the institute could also provide a forum in which leading figures could collaborate who are not members of the Assembly or the Council but who are concerned with questions of security policy. I consider that the results of this work, together with the discussions to which they would inevitably give rise, could be a stimulus to the work of both the Council and the Assembly.

As always, the crucial question will naturally be that of funds, but I think that if such an institute is properly conceived, the funds will be forthcoming.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration listed five items on which ministers would seek to harmonise their views. They were defence questions, arms control and disarmament, East-West relations, strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, and European armaments co-operation. Ministers also agreed that they might consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. Since then we have had the IEPG meeting in The Hague, which discussed armaments co-operation. We have read in the newspapers that a recent NATO conference decided to enlarge the ammunition stocks in NATO countries and to improve the infrastructure of airfields. We have also heard about the January summit between distinguished persons from East and West.

Which of the topics mentioned in paragraph 8 have been discussed since then by the Permanent Council? Which items are on the agenda of the next meeting of the Permanent Council on 13th December? In Rome, ministers said that they wished to deepen their dialogue with the

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

Assembly. Would it be possible for the Assembly to be informed, by way of a report, of the activities of the Permanent Council and which topics it has discussed?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - The work of the Permanent Council in the intervening periods is reflected, Sir, in the ministers' meetings. The reports on the ministers' meetings therefore include the work - one might say the preparatory work - carried out by the Permanent Council.

The April meeting will thus be followed by the relevant report, which will naturally deal, among other things, with the matters to which you have referred.

I might perhaps just add that in the interval between Rome and the April meeting we wish to create the conditions for ensuring that co-operation in the areas defined in Rome actually takes place. Zero hour for this enhanced co-operation will, therefore, purely as a matter of form, follow the April meeting. At the moment we find ourselves in a kind of transitional phase, in which the necessary conditions have to be created to enable the objectives defined in Rome to be achieved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). - On examining the candidacy of countries willing to accede to Western European Union, will the Council take into account the need for countries to make a concrete contribution to collective defence, especially through participation in the integrated military structure of NATO?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - The contributions made by individual states to collective defence arise from their membership of the Atlantic Alliance, although we are very well aware that the status of the various member states of our alliance is highly differentiated and multilayered.

Crucial to admission to Western European Union is that those desirous of entry - and I must repeat that there is currently an application from one country only and that is Portugal - should identify themselves with the aims of Western European Union and with our efforts to revitalise WEU. That is the essential criterion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. Genschler, I agree with the line of your address to the Assembly and I would stress that the European governments - German, French, Italian, British and others - have made every effort to encourage a resumption of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union; the policy of those countries has proved to be correct, avoiding any wild and unilateral pacifism which would not in fact have helped towards such a resumption.

You say that Europe wants to make its voice heard in this dialogue and to make its contribution; but where and how does the Council of Ministers of WEU intend to establish contact with the two countries taking part in the dialogue, the United States and the Soviet Union?

Might it be possible to propose the appointment of an observer to the Geneva talks?

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - Our co-operation in the formulation of the western negotiating position and in the conduct of the negotiations on the western side takes place within the western alliance. Our work in Western European Union serves to define the European interests voiced within the western alliance. This means that we shall not, as Western European Union, assume the rôle of a kind of third party, either on the western side or indeed in relation to the Soviet Union. Our sole concern must be to ensure that Western European Union serves to integrate and define European interests, and that the seven members feed into the organs of the alliance what we understand and have worked out as our collective position. For the alliance is the joint body to which we belong, together with the Americans, who are the western representatives in these East-West negotiations. So that is where the input takes place and this is where we define it and work it out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Minister, two previous speakers have already referred to the prospects in space. My questions are on the same subject.

In view of the increasing attention being given to the military use of space, I should like to ask you to expand a little on what you have termed preventive arms control with regard both to the need for such control and also to its practical implementation.

You mentioned, Minister, that the question of collaboration in technological research and high technology should be included in the transatlantic dialogue. The whole field of space research

Mr. Enders (continued)

is just such an area of high technology, and calls for vast resources. We in Europe are not in a position to compete with the Americans, as there are considerable differences of scale between the United States and ourselves. What is your view of this situation? Do you think that the Europeans should associate themselves more closely with American research and projects – say with the space station or even with a moon station? Or do you think that the somewhat limited programme of European research centred on Ariane 5, Hermes and Columbus should be kept independent of the large-scale American space projects? Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The expression preventive arms control means that, in space, we should not look on passively until such time as an arms race begins and then start thinking about how to put the clock back by arms control and disarmament. We should endeavour from the start to keep this area of potential arms build-up within the sphere of arms control policy. That is what is meant by preventive arms control.

I turn now to your question on the European technological potential. We should not close our eyes to any possibility of using technological developments for the good of Europe, without becoming dependent. I cannot agree with your view, Sir, that our potential in Europe is not on a par with that of the Americans. We have to ask ourselves why an approximately equal number of people in the European Community should not be as capable of engaging in technological development work – and I mean here development generally, not just in its application to armaments – as the same number of people in the United States. If you put this question, the answer will not be long in coming: simply because the Europeans have so far been unable to pool their potential for technological development. We have a divided market. We talk about a common market within the European Community, but in reality the market is split, and in this situation nobody is more angelic or virtuous than the next man. Consider, for example, the procurement policy of the national authorities: in country *x*, post office *x* will purchase only *x* products from *x* domestic manufactures, and will shun the possibly more cost-effective and advanced *y* products of country *z*. This means that true market conditions still have to be created.

The same applies to the pooling of financial resources. Mr. Spadolini is right when he says that neither the Germans, nor the French, nor the Italians nor anyone else is in a position to produce the funds required for major projects in

the field of advanced technologies. Of course we conduct our development work side by side and engage in parallel research. All this has got to be co-ordinated if Europe is to regain its leading position in technology. In many areas we have retained it, in others we have not. Europe's lead in the past was always founded on our leading position in technology. The fact that this leading position was not invariably put to the most noble or beneficial uses is irrelevant. In terms of straightforward potential, it was an expression of Europe's state of technological development. Today we are in the process of relinquishing this lead, not just to the Americans but to the Japanese as well.

The SDI programme provides a specific illustration of this process. This is a United States research programme, planned to extend over five years with funding at the rate of \$5,000 million per year. I have already told the Assembly that it is impossible for me to say today whether, at the end of this five-year period in which \$25,000 million, or at the current exchange rate DM 75,000 million will have been expended, the United States will have a new missile defence system in space. Of one thing, however, I am quite certain: at the end of those five years the United States will have achieved a technological advance which is not merely of military significance but will be of the greatest possible importance to the competitiveness of the United States in all civilian fields as well.

We must finally recognise that we shall only be able to keep up with events and remain competitive if we Europeans at long past pool all our potential and resources. Failing this, we shall become a technological dependency with all the detrimental economic, social and security problems consequent upon that status.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have come to the end of the list of questioners. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have already expressed, on behalf of my colleagues, our appreciation of the considerable amount of work you have put in. It is not customary on these occasions for the President of the Assembly to put questions to the Chairman of the Council. I might perhaps have done so in former times, but thanks to the close co-operation that has taken place between us there is happily no need for me to join my colleagues in putting questions to you, since I am delighted with the attention you have paid to the Assembly. You are, Mr. Chairman, half way through your term of office. We are very pleased that the end of your term is not too near, for there is still a great deal to be done, and with you in office we know that we shall be able to carry on.

In your remarkable address to us today, and in your replies – to take only the last as an example –

The President (continued)

you have shown that the European ambition that unites us all has a real threefold foundation of progress, security and peace, in which the three concepts are inextricably interwoven. The last challenge to which you referred is further proof of this. We are, after all, working for the future of the generations to come.

Mr. Chairman, we shall never be able to tell you how much, in this period of reactivation of WEU, the parliamentary Assembly which I have the honour of chairing owes to you. We thank you once again.

**6. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance
Relations between the Assembly and the Council
Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments on the draft recommendation
in the report on WEU, European union
and the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation and draft order,
Docs. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance and the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on this draft recommendation, and the vote on the draft order of the General Affairs Committee on relations between the Assembly and the Council, Documents 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999.

Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation, we have to consider fourteen amendments.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, raises no procedural problems. However, before calling this amendment, I would like to inform you how we shall proceed with the following amendments concerning the fifth paragraph of the preamble: Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Pignion, Amendment 14 tabled by Mr. Martino, Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, the two separate parts of the first amendment tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, consulted for opinion.

Having studied the various amendments tabled, I would propose the following procedure: I shall first put to the vote Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Pignion. If this amendment is adopted, we shall then vote on Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Martino, but, as a result, the first amendment of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, consulted for its opinion, and Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, will be void. On the other hand, if Mr. Pignion's

Amendment 4 is not agreed to, we shall not vote on Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Martino, but shall vote, first on the first part of the first amendment tabled by the committee consulted for opinion, and then on Mr. Stoffelen's Amendment 6.

Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "European security and" insert "the maintenance of".

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – My first amendment is not on a point of substance, but is designed to reword the idea more clearly and in a more acceptable manner.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is quite a feat, both in substance and in form.

What is the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Pignion and others reads as follows:

4. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Considering that, whenever useful, the WEU member countries may consult each other on the repercussions for Europe of crisis situations in other regions of the world ;".

I call Mr. Pignion to move his amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – These are concerns which we have expressed throughout the report. I therefore thought that the fifth paragraph of the preamble could be summarised clearly and simply, seeing that the strengthening of WEU is now on the cards.

WEU has a rôle in the alliance by definition, and there is no need to repeat it on every occasion. To put things succinctly will in no way diminish the importance of the recommendation or preamble. We are working in the framework of the alliance and there is therefore no need to keep saying so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I do not see the point of the amendment unless it is meant to weaken the thrust of the report. The report is clear. In this section it refers to a “concerted approach” and goes on to talk about “those countries pursued outside the area covered... essential for Europe’s security”. The amendment says “whenever useful... may consult”. It sounds very wishy-washy and, it weakens the efforts of the report. I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am very sorry, Mr. President, to have to go against you somewhat in regard to the sensible order which you proposed for consideration of the amendments.

I am tempted to say to the Assembly that the committee will accept its judgment on this amendment, but on condition that Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Martino, is accepted, otherwise there will be a logical contradiction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We entirely agree.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – We can therefore leave the decision to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is exactly what I said: if Mr. Pignion’s amendment is agreed to, we shall then vote on Mr. Martino’s amendment.

Since Mr. Pignion’s amendment affects the substance, I must take it before Mr. Martino’s amendment which affects the form.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – We have been thinking along the same lines. The people sitting next to me can see that I have written against Mr. Martino’s amendment: “In the case of Mr. Martino’s amendment and with respect to my own, leave the decision to the Assembly.” I think that Amendments 4 and 9 can go together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It seems, therefore that the committee is prepared to leave the decision to the Assembly, which will bear in mind Sir Geoffrey’s argument against Mr. Pignion’s amendment.

I shall therefore first put to the vote Mr. Pignion’s amendment, which affects the substance, since Mr. Martino’s simply changes the position of the fifth paragraph of the preamble.

I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Martino, is consequently void.

Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others, reads as follows:

6. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the action those countries pursued” and insert “to consultations about security challenges”.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – There have been many discussions in this Assembly on out-of-area problems. During those discussions I several times expressed the opinion that we do not object to information and cultural consultation about actions of member countries outside the territory of the alliance. That information and consultation can be valuable as far as those actions can affect the security of Europe, but at the same time we are strongly opposed to any involvement, directly or indirectly, of WEU or the alliance in such an action by a member country outside the territory of NATO. The proposed text of paragraph (v) is risky as it could be interpreted as pleading for the concerted action of WEU in case a member country pursues an action outside the territory. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty strictly limits any activity of the Council in those cases to information and consultation.

For those reasons we propose Amendment 6 to avoid any misunderstanding about the possible involvement of WEU in military actions outside the territory. I hope that no one will object to an amendment that strictly follows the text of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I object to this amendment because what Mr. Stoffelen has said is again quite unnecessary, because I do not believe that the committee would have given us a draft recommendation which was outside the modified treaty. That would be foolish because we operate within the treaty. Again, what Mr. Stoffelen is trying to do I believe, quite unintentionally I am sure, is to weaken the whole thrust of WEU, and for that reason I wish to object to his amendment and hope that we shall stick by the original draft put to us by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I suggest the Assembly reject this amendment, of which I do not see the point. It repeats a term

Mr. Michel (continued)

that appears in the explanatory memorandum and thereby makes the text more difficult to understand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

The first part of the first amendment tabled by the committee consulted for its opinion – the text of which appears in a document submitted for the Assembly's opinion and which does not constitute a separate document – renumbers the present paragraph (v) of the preamble paragraph (iii).

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I move the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The committee is in favour of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put to the vote the first part of the first amendment.

The first part of the first amendment is agreed to.

The second part of the first amendment reads as follows:

After paragraph (iii) of the preamble, add a new paragraph:

“(iv) Welcoming therefore the decision of the Ministers to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular on the six points listed in paragraph 8 of the Rome Declaration;”.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The committee is against this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I think there is some confusion in the presentation of amendments. Is what you have just read the wording of the first part of the first amendment or the wording of the second part?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sorry. We are dealing with the preamble. We have

already settled the questions relating to the fifth paragraph. The first amendment tabled by the committee consulted for opinion is in fact composed of two amendments, since its first paragraph concerns the fifth paragraph of the preamble, which was the subject of Mr. Pignion's amendment, and its second concerns a different paragraph.

We are now therefore considering a substantive change in the preamble. That is why I am putting it to a separate vote at this point.

The President's work is not made easier by the presentation of amendments in a rather muddled form.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In that case what you propose is acceptable, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all of you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for helping me to cope with this very important debate.

Before proceeding to vote on the amendment, I welcome the Minister for External Relations of France, who has just arrived.

Thank you for joining us, Minister, I would have liked to welcome you personally outside the chamber but, as you can see, you have arrived right in the middle of a battle of amendments – a peaceful battle I hasten to add – over the draft recommendation on the reactivation of WEU.

I know you have done a great deal of travelling recently, and we appreciate your being with us. However, although we jointly agreed on the time of your address, permit me, before inviting you to the rostrum, to consult the Assembly on the second part of the first amendment tabled by the committee consulted for opinion.

I put the second part of the first amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The second part of the first amendment is agreed to.

As agreed, we shall now interrupt our debate.

7. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now ask you, Minister, to come to the rostrum and address our Assembly.

Mr. CHEYSSON (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I always feel

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

honoured to address you, and this feeling is even stronger today. For this session of the Assembly of Western European Union marks a historic stage in our organisation's history. We are now seeing the outcome of much thought on the use to be made of our institutions following changes in structure and functions that have become necessary in the normal course of thirty years' existence, in compliance with the Brussels and Paris treaties that gave birth to WEU.

In this process your Assembly has played a leading rôle. I have no hesitation in saying that had it not been for the Assembly, WEU might have died of boredom, and I thank you for your determination that this should not happen.

Before the governments, you saw the problems and suggested solutions. Right from the first days of WEU you realised the need for the Assembly to conduct a fundamental debate on the security of our peoples. I have welcomed this on several occasions from this rostrum, because I think it regrettable, even dangerous, that public opinion should not be aware of the essential facts of the situation. Such awareness would avoid many instinctive reactions of suspicion and concern, and would provide many useful ideas for our governments to take into account.

This has led you, in the course of the past thirty years, to make various proposals for the necessary changes in the WEU institutions. I therefore once again express my appreciation of the work you have done.

The memorandum which Charles Hernu and I addressed to our colleagues in January 1984 was conceived both as an echo of your suggestions and a response to your questions.

You know how the member states reacted to the French initiative. Overcoming hesitation on the part of some states, and disagreement on the part of others about the emphasis to be given to this or that approach, the Council of Ministers decided last June that reactivation was desirable and agreed on procedures. A document was published reflecting the French memorandum and the very similar views of the German Government, and anticipating the declaration and decisions published at our extraordinary meeting in Rome at the end of October. These in turn were immediately echoed by your Assembly at its own extraordinary meeting in the same city. The considerable progress thus made in less than a year could doubtless not have been achieved without the numerous reports and ideas provided by your Assembly.

It is now for you, during this part-session, to consider and debate in detail the proposals put forward in Rome, thus providing an example of

the dialogue between your Assembly and the Council which France has, from the outset, been seeking to broaden. I shall therefore be noting the result of your deliberations with great interest. May I also pay tribute to your President, Jean-Marie Caro, and to the Office of the Clerk, who have spared no effort. As you know, the President of France paid a personal tribute by receiving President Caro recently at the Elysée. Your session will provide an occasion for thought and a new point of departure, since it is now a question of implementing the Rome guidelines.

Let me reiterate the main lines of my country's approach to this matter.

I shall not spend much time on the institutional aspects, for which solutions are now being found. The documents published in Rome are clear in this respect. What is involved is, on the one hand, relations between your Assembly and the Council and, on the other, the need, in the present circumstances, to respect the balance between the various institutions – Assembly, Council and technical bodies – and to adapt them in a way that does not threaten their existence.

I will, however, make one further remark on institutions, with reference to what some are already calling enlargement. As you know, one state applied for membership on the eve of the ministerial meeting in Rome. Other countries have asked for information about our work. There are difficult legal problems involved here. The 1954 agreements include some short-term clauses that have since been overtaken by events but nevertheless figure in the treaty. Should any enlargement therefore be preceded by renegotiation of the Paris Agreements? We need to think about this.

But that is not the point at issue now. A procedure for accession would make little sense in the present circumstances, when we need first of all to renew the institutions, demonstrate our will to move forward, and then see where Western European Union stands. The experience of other international organisations clearly shows that it is scarcely possible or reasonable to embark simultaneously on enlargement and internal development. I trust this remark, which is simple common sense, will not be interpreted as hostility towards any particular state. Quite the opposite is true. Under the present conditions of European security, and knowing what our treaty stands for, how could we be other than extremely receptive to gestures of solidarity from countries close to us in the alliance, several of which have the same concept of defence in all its aspects as the seven who signed the Paris Agreements in 1954?

Let me turn now to the substance of our work. The Rome meeting approved guidelines for

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

reflection and studies on disarmament, armaments co-operation and security. The three subjects do not of course have the same resonance or scope, but they need to be seen together.

How would it be possible to understand attitudes to arms control without taking into consideration the guiding principles of security? Can the will to examine jointly the defence problems of the countries of Europe be credible without the determination to co-operate in the production and procurement of armaments? The member states must therefore intensify consultations on these three subjects so as to reach, where desirable, joint positions that will find expression in the bodies competent to deal with them: meetings on disarmament and, above all, the institutions of the Atlantic Alliance.

This is an enormous field but its limits are nevertheless clear. My defence counterpart and I have had more than one occasion to recall the words of the President of France, when he said: "We cannot build our future security by destroying the security we already have." We are conscious of the existing realities, with which nothing must interfere. The Atlantic Alliance will no doubt remain the guarantor of our joint security for a very long time to come, the symbol of the vital solidarity between Europe and the United States and of the essential interlinking of the defence of all parties to the alliance.

I would also like to say quite clearly that the future work of WEU will in no way lead to a change in French security doctrine. Our security is and will remain based on deterrence. We are not trying to equip ourselves to win a war, but we want war to remain impossible, unthinkable, suicidal for whoever might unleash it. And this deterrence, which we cannot at present conceive as other than nuclear, will remain, as far as we are concerned, independent.

On the various themes I have mentioned, fruitful work can be accomplished together with the Assembly and, under arrangements still to be worked out, with the technical bodies. As agreed in Rome, the latter need to be reorganised, especially in view of the eventual disappearance of the tasks of conventional arms control. The restructuring of these bodies will enable them to become useful instruments for both the Council and the Assembly. It will then be possible to carry out studies on such major questions as the arms race in space and the problems raised by new technologies in regard both to disarmament – verification – and to our own defence – conventional defence.

The WEU technical bodies should also be able to help us adopt joint positions that will enable

us, in a wider framework, to co-operate better on armaments. We have to remain in the forefront of technological advance. We have to ensure the best possible use of our research and defence potential within our strictly-limited budget resources.

I cannot finish this brief recapitulation of French positions without referring to a subject that must concern us as a matter of prime importance – the forthcoming resumption of Soviet-American talks, on the principle of which the two parties, as we had long been hoping, have recently reached agreement at long last. This is excellent news. The announcement of next January's meeting ends a period of uncertainty and even of tension that began some years ago with the deployment of the SS-20s, to which deployment of the first American missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany a year ago was a necessary response.

We have been wishing for this resumption, and are now very pleased that it is to happen. It is not, however, any great surprise. France has always considered that firmness on principles, solidarity among allies and readiness for dialogue, would constitute the best incentive to resume negotiations sooner or later. The last two years will, I am sure remain a perfect example of what can be achieved through affirmation of a quiet and unshakeable determination, coupled with a tireless call for dialogue.

The forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union thus marks the beginning of a period of hope. Experience has shown that the negotiations will be complex and delicate. They will have to take account of the security interests of all parties, including the member states of Western European Union.

In this respect two considerations need to be borne in mind in the months to come.

First, our countries must keep abreast of developments in the Soviet-American dialogue on arms control, because we have our own interests and want the countries of Western Europe in the long term to strengthen their common identity and the expression of that identity. Such vigilance should not of course be interpreted as meaning that we have any sort of reservations about the Soviet-American negotiations or that we are worried about the attitude of our friends and allies on the other side of the Atlantic. It simply testifies to our countries' political determination to remain the principal agents of their own destiny. In this way, we shall be able to maintain in our peoples the constant feeling that their defence is under national control. They must never have to fear

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

that their interests might be the subject of wider deals beyond their control.

Furthermore, in the period now beginning, it is important to avoid creating the illusion of a hierarchy in arms control negotiations, with a bilateral level dealing with essentials and a multi-lateral level dealing with side issues. Priority of course lies with Soviet-American strategic arms, both nuclear and space weapons. But that does not mean that other moves for controlled arms reductions have suddenly lost their interest or significance. Of course, I am thinking in particular of the Stockholm conference, which is an integral part of the CSCE process to which the countries of Western Europe continue to attach the great political importance embodied in the final act of Helsinki. Our concern here is, as you know, to encourage a fuller, more intimate and more productive dialogue between the peoples of Europe that history brought together and that the last forty years have separated. I am also thinking of chemical weapons. Our states must continue to seek an agreement in Geneva that will guarantee security under proper monitoring and control.

On all these problems, WEU must reflect, study and debate. And you, members of the Assembly, are there to ensure that those who elected you participate in these reflections, studies and debates. This session indeed marks a turning point, and I thank you, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for having allowed me to speak here on behalf of the French Government.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you, Minister, for what you have said. May I also express my thanks, through you, to the French Government for all it has done to promote the reactivation of WEU. You know, as we do – and the debates before you arrived proved this – that the Rome Declaration of the Foreign and Defence Ministers has aroused considerable interest. The parliamentary Assembly has taken the time, through its committees, and in particular the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to provide adequate material for the debates at the present session. It is our earnest hope that the work which the Assembly and the Council are now undertaking will be outstandingly productive and will arouse public interest and support both in the media and from the man in the street. For without the understanding and support of public opinion, it will always be difficult for us to progress along the road mapped out for us. We know this from past experience. Thanks to your presence and that of your predecessors on the Council, I think that the future now looks brighter. Thank you once again, Minister, for taking part in our deliberations.

**8. WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance
Relations between the Assembly and the Council
Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments on the draft recommendation
in the report on WEU, European union
and the Atlantic Alliance**

(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 990 and amendments, 1002 and amendment and 999)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall now resume consideration of the amendments.

The second amendment tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is as follows:

At the end of paragraph (vii) of the preamble (now paragraph (viii)) insert: “and the decision to delete as from 1st January 1986 conventional weapons from the list in Annex IV to this protocol”.

On the second amendment tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, as the committee consulted for opinion, what is the view of the committee consulted on the substance?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – We are against this amendment, because we see no reason to welcome the mundane fact that conventional weapons have been removed from control by this Agency. We do not see the point of this clause.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Does any member of the committee consulted for opinion wish to speak on behalf of its Chairman or Rapporteur?

I call Mr. PIGNION.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I have not followed the debate but I think that the committee I represent would not fight for this amendment. I am content to follow the opinion of the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put to the vote the second amendment tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The second amendment is negatived.

Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

2. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“Convinced of the need to have a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city in

The President (continued)

order to facilitate the development of the dialogue between the Council, the Secretariat-General and the Assembly and to ensure that the WEU technical organs are able to carry out their duties of assisting and informing the Council and the Assembly more efficiently, ”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – This amendment poses the problem of a single seat for all the WEU organs in the same city. Everyone is aware of the importance of this problem, both because relations between the various bodies need to be improved and because large savings can be made on travel, attendances and time if the problem of the headquarters is resolved. We need to make savings in order to spend in areas where more funds are required. As the Council is opposed to increasing either the establishment or the budget, savings which can be made become an important point. I would add that if all sections of WEU were brought together in the same city, staff could be redistributed to meet requirements which exist in some sections but possibly not in others. I hope, therefore, that my amendment will be accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Normally I find myself agreeing with many of Mr. Cavaliere's amendments, but I do not agree with him on this occasion. It is premature to say that we need a single centre for the institutions of WEU. There would be considerable political problems at present. From the distant and disinterested situation in Rome, I can easily imagine that it looks confusing and unnecessary to have the institutions of WEU divided between Paris and London. However, I assure Mr. Cavaliere that the matter does not look so simple to anyone coming from one or other of those two countries. I consider, first, that it is not yet proved to be necessary and therefore the question is premature, and, secondly, there are political difficulties. I suggest that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I take Mr. Cavaliere's point, which I in fact mentioned in my original report. There is a basis of truth in what he said but the problem may have political and diplomatic complications. It is therefore worth discussing the subject in the General Affairs Committee which has not yet considered it. I therefore suggest that

Mr. Cavaliere withdraw his amendment, the subject of which will be taken into account and fully discussed by the committee, together with all its implications.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am very surprised that the committee has not considered the amendment which I tabled on Monday morning, since it met after that. I would not wish this to be a way of postponing the matter *sine die*. I cannot therefore withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since you have not obtained satisfaction, Mr. Masciadri, what position do you now take?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I asked Mr. Cavaliere politely to withdraw his amendment, to which I am opposed, because my arguments should have been sufficiently convincing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Amendment 7, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen, reads as follows:

7. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“ Considering that the reactivation of WEU might jeopardise relations with other NATO member states in Europe. ”

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The reactivation of Western European Union has been described, for good reasons, as strengthening the European pillar of NATO and, by doing so, strengthening the alliance.

We welcome this reactivation, but realise that this European pillar of NATO is extended to more than the seven members of WEU – to Denmark, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal and the other European member countries of NATO. Therefore, the justified attempts to harmonise the views of the member states of WEU in the specific conditions of security in Europe might jeopardise relations with other NATO member states in Europe which belong to the same European pillar but do not take part in the reactivation of WEU.

Amendment 7 makes it clear that we realise that we must be cautious in our relations with other NATO member states in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – It would be a great error to adopt this amendment. It is extremely pessimistic and would only serve to alarm European non-WEU countries. It is in conflict with the spirit of the recommendation as a whole, which welcomes what is being done to give a new and stronger rôle to WEU. Even if it were true that it might have the effect of harming relations with non-member countries – anything might happen – it would be wrong to mention it.

In any event, there is no indication that this need be the case at all. On the contrary, speaker after speaker has shown that he is in favour of maintaining the best possible relations with other European member countries of NATO which are not members of WEU but will look favourably on any applications for membership with a view perhaps to extending observer status and possibly, in the long term, full membership, although we know there are problems involved in that, as Mr. Cheysson described earlier.

In any case, however, in that atmosphere it would be wrong to include an amendment of this kind which would not serve the purpose of reassuring other countries. On the contrary, it would alarm them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen will understand how sorry I am to have to oppose the amendment. I fail to understand why the reactivation of WEU should mean a split with other, non-member countries in Europe. We are seeking to establish a basic nucleus for the unity of all European countries and I fail to see the risk which he sees. I regret, therefore, that I must oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

Amendment 12, tabled by Mr. Martino, reads as follows:

12. After paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“ Welcoming especially the fact that the Rome Declaration introduced the question of disarmament into the Council's work; ”.

Does anyone wish to move this amendment in Mr. Martino's absence?...

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – After hearing Mr. Spadolini, how could we fail to welcome the introduction of the idea of disarmament? It is perfectly natural and in the spirit of reactivation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – What I dislike most about this amendment is the inclusion of the word “ especially ”. There are three earlier paragraphs in which we welcome recent developments. We welcome the fruitful exchanges which took place between the Council and the Assembly in Rome. We welcome the deletion of the list of armaments in Protocol No. III. We welcome – most importantly of all – the wish expressed by the Council to give new life to Western European Union; in other words, it covers the whole central point of this report. Yet here we say we especially welcome the content of this amendment. In other words, we are giving it an importance above the other developments which we have expressly welcomed. It would be wrong to give this over-emphasis and therefore I am afraid that in the form in which it is drafted the amendment is not acceptable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Does Lord Reay's intervention mean that he would accept the amendment if the word “ especially ” were deleted from it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I was waiting for the committee's reply to see whether or not Lord Reay's comment would be taken up.

I call Mr. Masciadri, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – This appears in the Rome Declaration; I am not saying that it is a vital section because it is impossible to say what is fundamental and what is not, but it is certainly one of the main sections, because it speaks of disarmament. I fail to understand a request to delete a section which was supported both in writing in the Rome Declaration and verbally in the statements of intention by ministers. This certainly does not tend to weaken our overall policy which we and the ministers spoke of at length.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – There is a slight difference of meaning between

Mr. Michel (continued)

the English and French texts. The French text uses the more cautious expression "notamment", while the English text uses the word "especially", which can of course be much stronger. If the two texts could be brought into line as indicated by the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, we could accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Michel, what do you suggest we do about these two adverbs?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – That they be deleted, Mr. President.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – All we have to do is adopt Lord Hughes's sub-amendment and delete the adverbs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are no objections?...

I therefore put Amendment 12, as amended, to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 12, as amended, is agreed to.

On paragraph 3, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, consulted as the committee for opinion, has tabled a third amendment worded as follows:

In the first line of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "obtain" and insert "afford both the Council and the Assembly" and in line 2 leave out "it" and insert "them".

I call Mr. Pignion to move the amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – The purpose of this amendment is to make it quite clear that, as previously requested, the Secretariat-General and any other body capable of doing so, will provide such assistance. Our point is to make sure that those bodies do give their assistance in the work in accordance with the decision taken. The matter is clear. We are asking that the information be supplied and not that the means of supplying it be sought.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – We cannot accept this amendment since it would lead to institutional difficulties. The executive and the legislative must not be confused. Of course, the Assembly is entitled to know everything that is going on and to ask via the executive for explanations to be given or work to be carried out, but the work of the committees and

bodies of WEU must be carried out by order and under the control of the executive, at the request of the legislative. We cannot confuse the two powers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put the third amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The third amendment is negated.

Amendment 10, tabled by Mr. Pignion and others, reads as follows:

10. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "concerning Europe's security which occur outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty" and insert "in another area of the world which might have an impact on Europe's security".

I call Mr. Pignion to move the amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Is not Amendment 10 void as a result of the rejection of Amendment 4?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That may well be so. What is the committee's view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – It seems to me that this amendment has exactly the same content as Amendment 4. One refers to the North Atlantic and the other to other parts of the world. It could perhaps be accepted; all in all this is not a problem of substance because the subject has been dealt with adequately. I am not opposed because the amendment does not radically affect the proposals in the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am against the amendment to some extent, but I have intervened merely to ask a question. I have read the amendment in English several times, and it would appear not to alter the sense of the original recommendation. However, it does not fit into the English translation. I do not know whether anyone else can make sense of it, but it would have to be rewritten if it were intended to revise the original English text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall deem you to have spoken against the amendment, since I cannot give the floor to everybody. I shall, however, call Mr. Pignion, since he has not had the opportunity to move the amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, excuse me for confusing Amendments 4, 9 and 10, but in Amendment 10 things are clearer, and there is no point in stating that

Mr. Pignion (continued)

we should confine ourselves to the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. The world is a big place, and we can obviously be affected by and be sensitive to conflicts and difficulties arising in parts of the world other than the geographical area of the North Atlantic.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The committee thus disagrees with the author of the amendment.

I put Amendment 10 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 10 is negatived.

Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Vecchietti, reads as follows:

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “East-West relations” and insert “an active policy for improving relations between East and West”.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The purpose of Amendment 5 is simply to clarify the expression “East-West relations” in the draft recommendation, which has no meaning as it is not possible to cancel either part. It is necessary to state the direction policy should take. We therefore propose, the wording “an active policy for improving relations between East and West”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee’s view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The committee can accept it because, all things considered, this expresses more clearly the idea contained in the text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, reads as follows:

3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“Solve the problem of a single seat for all the WEU organs;”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – This amendment is no longer relevant because the previous one, to which it related, was not accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 3 is thus withdrawn. Since it concerned the recommendation proper, I could not consider it void as a result of a vote on the preamble.

Amendment 8, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others, reads as follows:

8. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“Play an active rôle in disarmament, for example by making an effort – as a first step – in the relevant international organisations to reach limited and controlled disarmament which contributes to the elimination of the perils of war, thus reinforcing the policy of détente;”.

Amendment 13, tabled by Mr. Martino and others, reads as follows:

13. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“Follow closely the expected resumption of international negotiations on disarmament and prepare the necessary measures to allow Europe to play an active part therein;”.

These two amendments can be taken together.

I call Mr. Stoffelen to move Amendment 8.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – During our discussions in WEU we must realise what it is all about. WEU, NATO and the reactivation of WEU are not aims by themselves, but instruments to maintain peace and security. The best way to do that is through a policy of détente to reduce tension in East-West relations. We must have a foreign policy that reinforces détente.

WEU can and should have those aims. As the British Minister, Mr. Luce, pointed out yesterday – and the Chairman said today – defence policy and disarmament are closely linked. They belong to each other. A disarmament policy is at least as important as a defence policy. That is why we tabled the amendments.

The Council should not restrict itself to words, but should play a really active rôle. As a first step, it should make every possible effort to reach the relevant international organisations to promote limited and controlled disarmament. The Council should reinforce a policy of détente.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee’s view?

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The committee has no general objection, but I must compare Amendment 8 with Amendment 13 which is on the same subject but worded more clearly. I shall not oppose this amendment but I must point out that these two amendments on

Mr. Masciadri (continued)

the same subject differ in wording only; Amendment 13 is preferable because it does not change in any way the purport of Amendment 8.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Martino to move Amendment 13.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Our colleague might have been asked to withdraw his amendment in favour of the other which means the same. The committee rather hints at requesting the withdrawal of Amendment 8 in favour of Amendment 13, which has the same content but is more clearly worded.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). - As the Rapporteur will recall, he and I spoke for at least fifteen minutes on this text. Therefore, I am surprised that during our discussion he should have been in favour of my text but now prefers another. However, that does not matter. What matters is the solution to the problem. If the later text is acceptable to the great majority - the text in Amendment 13 - I shall not press the aims of my political group. What matters is a solution to the problem. Therefore, I am prepared to withdraw Amendment 8.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Amendment 8 is therefore withdrawn.

We very much appreciate your attitude, Mr. Stoffelen.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - On a point of order, Mr. President. This report has also been sent to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Therefore, I should like permission to say something about these amendments, because they are in line with the report on disarmament.

The PRESIDENT. - To which amendment are you speaking, Mr. Blaauw - Amendment 8 or Amendment 13?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - Amendment 8 and Amendment 13 are for me the same. I can speak to them together.

In the report on disarmament we adopted a similar sentence in our recommendation. Therefore, I should like to say that the committee would probably have voted favourably on the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Let me summarise the situation. Mr. Stoffelen has withdrawn Amendment 8, following which the Rapporteur has announced that the committee is in favour of Amendment 13. Furthermore,

Mr. Blaauw, speaking on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, as the committee consulted for opinion, has endorsed the reasons for tabling these two amendments.

That being clear, I put Amendment 13 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 13 is agreed to.

The next two amendments, Amendment 9 and Amendment 11, can be taken together.

Amendment 9, tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Gansel, reads as follows:

9. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Properly consult and inform NATO member states, non-member states of WEU, and clearly indicate its intention to take a positive attitude when examining (possible) applications for membership of WEU. ”

Amendment 11, tabled by Mr. Masciadri and Mr. Michel, reads as follows:

11. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ Develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU as soon as circumstances permit; ”.

I call Mr. Stoffelen to move the amendment.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). - With permission, I should like to leave this to my colleague, Mr. Gansel.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the aim of both Amendment 11 and Amendment 9 is to keep open the possibility of admission to WEU for other European countries which are members of NATO, but I think that the wording of Amendment 9 is better.

I consider that the wording of Amendment 9 is preferable to that of Amendment 11, as Amendment 11 lays too much stress on the joint production of armaments. Amendment 9 makes it clear that WEU is a political, economic and military organisation and not merely an organisation for the joint manufacture of weapons.

In support of this, I would like to refer to something said by the French Minister for External Relations. Mr. Cheysson availed himself

Mr. Gansel (continued)

of the poor visibility and his unobtrusive suit to quit the hall at such speed that we delegates had no chance of asking him questions. When one questions a minister, one may not always expect an answer, but it is still nice to be able to ask the questions. As a parliamentarian, I at least am not accustomed as it were to be a mere observer of the performance of a High Commissioner, but perhaps Mr. Cheysson is already at work on behalf of the European Community.

Be that as it may, Mr. Cheysson stated that the admission of other European countries would present legal problems because of the previous history of the Brussels Treaty. I cannot agree. If, for example, Portugal wishes to join WEU, we shall not expect it, like the United Kingdom, to station troops on German territory in accordance with Protocol No. II, Article VI. Nor shall we expect Portugal to subject its atomic weapons to WEU control in accordance with Protocol No. III, Article III, which France does not do either. Those are, after all, the historical parts of the WEU treaty. Our only wish, on the contrary, is that any European country belonging to NATO should have the opportunity to co-operate within this European institution and should not be debarred from so doing. That is why Amendment 9 has been drafted in this way. There are no arguments of international law, history or politics which militate against this approach. We should vote for the amendment with a big majority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am not quite sure why we have grouped these two amendments together. They are totally different. One is talking of possible enlargement. The other is talking purely about co-operation and joint production. I would have thought that having heard Mr. Cheysson earlier, Amendment 9 should be withdrawn because it is otiose – perhaps “unnecessary” is a better word for the translator – because he very clearly explained why at this stage it would be quite wrong to start a process of enlargement until we have our own house in order. I would hope, therefore, that Amendment 9 would be defeated and then if we can deal separately with Amendment 11, I would have thought that this is one which ought to be looked at first and in some detail by the relevant committee, rather than have it discussed, as it were, in a two-minute speech on something as important as this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view on Amendments 9 and 11?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The Assembly will not be surprised to learn that Mr. Masciadri and I support Amendment 11 against Amendment 9, since we ourselves conceived it after having read Amendment 9.

If I urge the adoption of Amendment 11, it is because the wording is stronger. Amendment 9 encourages talk, while Amendment 11 calls for the development of existing co-operation.

It must be remembered that the projects of the Standing Armaments Committee have been open to NATO countries outside WEU since 1954. There is therefore nothing new here. We would be running the risk of breaking down an open door if we voted for Amendment 9, which is clearly inadequate. I therefore urge the Assembly to agree to Amendment 11. Not to do so, however, would not be too serious since we would then be left with the original text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 9 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

I put Amendment 11 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is agreed to.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I find it difficult when you put an amendment for consideration by the chairman or rapporteur, who then gives a view in the name of the committee, when the amendment has not been considered by the committee, and he himself has tabled the amendment. I should like you to consider whether it is acceptable that those who have tabled an amendment should have the right to say, on behalf of the committee, whether it should be accepted. I should like to ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure specifically to look at the matter and, if necessary, to say that that procedure is not permitted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The clearer we can make our debate the better it will be. I therefore welcome your proposal with interest, but the fact remains that even members sitting on committee benches are able to table amendments personally. A little while ago I called one of the Rapporteurs to speak to an amendment. Your suggestion is very useful. The Committee on Rules of Procedure is currently going through our rules with a fine-tooth comb to see how they might be improved so as to avoid misunderstandings.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I want to take the matter further than Sir Geoffrey Finsberg did, because none of the amendments had been considered by the committee, yet sometimes it was said that the committee wished or did not wish so and so. When such circumstances arise in the Council of Europe, either the chairman or the rapporteur begins his remarks by saying that the committee has not had an opportunity to consider the amendment, so he is giving his own opinion. That would be the proper course of action for this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall all be very careful to be more precise. In this case the amendment was tabled personally. I think members had understood it in that way, although your comment is perfectly justified.

We shall now proceed to vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 990, as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

The Assembly will accordingly vote by sitting and standing.

I put the draft recommendation as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted¹.

We now move on to the vote on the draft order on relations between the Assembly and the Council presented by the General Affairs Committee.

On this draft order I have Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Vecchietti, which reads as follows:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add “including Europe’s rôle for the strengthening of peace”.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The sole intention of this amendment is to reflect the words of the declaration, the first two sections of which are concerned with peace problems.

It is therefore an addition to the Rome Declaration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

1. See page 38.

What is the committee’s view?

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I am speaking as the Rapporteur, not on behalf of the committee. I referred to the amendment in my opening speech and said that I was against it because I considered it to be out of place in an order concerned only with setting up the institutions that we shall need in order to pursue a dialogue with the Council. It is unnecessary and inappropriate to put the peace stamp on it once more. I should have thought that we had had enough references to peace in our debate on the previous document to satisfy almost everyone in the chamber, except perhaps Mr. Vogt. The amendment is not appropriate in this document, and I ask members to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly understands the situation.

I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft order in Document 1002.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or their substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

The Assembly will accordingly vote by sitting and standing.

I put the draft order as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

I thank the General Affairs Committee and all of you, Ladies and Gentlemen.

The texts which we have just adopted are important. At the end of this morning’s debate, Mr. Michel, you hoped for broad consensus. You can be satisfied with the results of today’s work.

Before the usual announcements I would beg the Assembly’s indulgence – and I would like this to be minuted – for the conduct of this afternoon’s sitting. We have proceeded in a manner unusual for a parliament. In the middle of a vote we interrupted our deliberations and I gave the floor to a member of the Council. In the nature of things, our working methods must, as you know, be geared to the commitments of the governments and, above all, the members of the Council, when we have the opportunity to have

1. See page 40.

The President (continued)

them with us. This sitting, however, almost coincided with the end of the ministerial meeting in Dublin. I had therefore no option but to accept with gratitude the times proposed by the members of the governments, and I would ask members to excuse the interruption during the vote on amendments. Nevertheless, if I were in Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's place, I would doubtless take the same view, and we must therefore review our working methods. Reactivation imposes many duties on us. I once again beg your indulgence.

9. Political union of Europe*(Motion for an order, Doc. 1003)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Tummers and others a motion for an order tabled in application of Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1003.

I would be grateful, Mr. Tummers, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you could agree that we should discuss this tomorrow in the Presidential Committee, especially as this motion in practice requires reference back to the appropriate committee, which raises no problems. Do you agree, Mr. Tummers?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

10. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Italian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the General Affairs Committee:

Mr. Cavaliere to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Accili.

Is there any opposition?...

That is agreed.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 6th December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1001 and amendment).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 987 and Addendum).
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 991).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting closed at 6.45 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 6th December 1984

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1001 and amendment*).

Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Spies von Bullesheim, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. de Vries, Sir John Page, Mr. Schulte; (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes; Mr. Schulte, Mr. Adriaensens, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*); (points of order): Lord Hughes, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Beix; Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Beix, Sir Dudley Smith, the President, Mr. de Vries (point of order), Mr. Beix, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Stoffelen (point of order).

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of*

the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 987 and Addendum).

Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 991*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Hackel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Enders, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Hackel (*Rapporteur*).

6. Observers.

Speakers: The President, Admiral Zervos (*Observer from Greece*).

7. Changes in the membership of committees.

8. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1001 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1001 and amendment.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Last year I warned the Assembly that we faced a great number of problems over our budget, not the least of which was the request from the Council of Ministers that we should have zero growth. We all know that the internal budgets of our own member countries are under pressure because of a number of factors, including economic recession throughout the world; and we were faced very much with this edict from the Council of

1. See page 43.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Ministers, representing and talking on behalf of our member governments. So it appeared to be a rather difficult position.

I am afraid that over the past twelve months that warning has been well and truly borne out by the fact that we have had to watch expenditure extremely carefully, and that has also been complicated by the fact that we have regenerated, or attempted to regenerate, Western European Union – something which I am sure we all welcome and which I believe is an admirable initiative. But it carries with it certain responsibilities and certain other claims that may well be necessary and that need to be worked out.

The budget for 1985 is presented in a new form, which was approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to take account of the comments made when budgets for earlier years were discussed. There was some criticism in the past that we had not presented the budget as clearly as possible, and we have attempted to remedy that. The budget is in two parts, the operating budget and the pensions budget. This distinction conforms with Recommendation 409, which was adopted unanimously by the Assembly after the debate on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU. I deal first with the operating budget.

The President of the Assembly considers that the will to give new life to WEU, which was demonstrated in the extraordinary and successful session that we had in Rome recently, must be followed by an improvement in the operating means available to this Assembly. That is something to which we would all subscribe. The very brief period between the Rome session and the ordinary session that we are now completing, however, has not allowed the Assembly bodies concerned to make an accurate assessment of the requisite needs. Therefore, the 1985 operating budget now before the Assembly takes account only of the most pressing requirements, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration having reserved the right to examine the matter at a later date and to communicate its conclusions to the Assembly at the May 1985 session. At the end of my remarks I shall refer to that again.

A comparison between the 1985 and 1984 operating budgets shows the following percentage increases, all amounts being in French francs. Total expenditure for 1985 is 16,037,800; in 1984 it was 14,656,200, a 9.42% increase. The net total, however, for 1985 is 15,579,800 and for 1984 was 14,426,200, a percentage increase of 7.99%.

I hope that members will note that. The comparison shows that the Assembly was unable

to keep to a zero growth rate which, according to official estimates, should be about 4.5% in 1985, but it would be correct to consider that in 1984 compared with 1983 the operating budget represented a growth rate lower than the inflation rate, which would be about 7.5% – that is 3.98% for expenditure and 3.11% for the net total. Consequently, if that difference were deducted from the growth rate of the 1985 budget, that would fall to the equivalent of a zero growth rate.

Head I deals with permanent staff and accounts for 56% of the new total of our operating budget. Estimates are worked out on the basis of salaries on 1st January 1984 plus, in accordance with the criterion also adopted by other WEU bodies, expected adjustments. Therefore, that is 2.5% as from 1st July 1984 and 4.5% for 1985. The salaries of Grade A officials are subjected to a levy of 3% as from 1st January 1984 and 4.5% as from 1st July 1985. Those levies are shown in the receipts section of the budget.

It should be emphasised that estimates under that head are based on the present strength of the Office of the Clerk, which numbers twenty-seven. As I have said before, the structure of the Office of the Clerk will be studied attentively to determine the requirements and tasks that the clerks must fulfil. That is surely absolutely fundamental to our future activities and deliberations.

Estimates under Head II – temporary staff – which account for 16.62% of the net total of the operating budget, are affected by the sharp increase – I emphasise this point – in salaries payable to certain categories of temporary staff specially recruited for Assembly sessions and committee meetings between sessions. We must not underestimate that – this is a very expensive item. In particular, I refer to interpreters who, when the agreement between their association and the co-ordinated organisations was reviewed, received an increase of 6% in addition to the increase in salary scales applicable to permanent staff.

Secondly, I refer to verbatim reporters who, because of the growing scarcity of members of that profession, are becoming increasingly difficult to recruit and who are asking that their salaries become gradually closer to rates paid in the private sector. They have presented us with something of a problem. However, I think that it would be fair to say that representations have been made to me in this respect. Some of the reporters were not too happy with the item that appears in the budget on that score and they have promised to help, in consultation with me, and to allow the matter to be studied carefully to see where we can make some improvements and

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

get the maximum efficiency for the least possible cost.

Estimates under Head III – expenditure on premises and equipment – amount to 8.29% of the net total of the operating budget. They are mainly affected by the purchase of a personal computer for book-keeping purposes, the replacement of an offset machine that is almost completely worn out, and the hire of five word-processors. It is also planned to purchase computer desks for the staff operating the word-processors.

It should be noted that for the first time a three-year programme for the maintenance and modernisation of all equipment is given in Appendix III of the budget. The programme, for which there is a clear need, will be regularly kept up to date and presented in future budgets. I am sure that everybody in the Assembly will agree that the more efficient we become, the greater the chance we have of saving money and of getting the maximum effect from the expenditure that we undertake. There is only one way to real cost saving – efficiency. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has taken that message on board and I hope that it will be underlined and fully subscribed to by the Assembly.

Estimates under Head IV – general administrative costs – are 13.87% of the net total of the operating budget. That shows a reduction in real terms in printing and publication of documents, which will offset the cost of hiring word-processors. That shows the efficiency angle of modernising ourselves. Estimates under Head V – other expenditure – amount to 8.16% of the total of the operating budget, and are more or less the same in real terms as the appropriations in 1984.

Expenditure under the pensions budget represents only a minimum increase – 0.96% – compared with the figure in 1984 due to the fact that the orphan's pension paid in 1984 is no longer taken into account, entitlement having ceased. In general, as mentioned in the explanatory memorandum, this budget still seems positive for the governments if one adds the contributions of serving staff, included under receipts, and government contributions which, conversely, are not included in the budget because of the financing system chosen by them – full cover of the cost of pensions through the budgets of the co-ordinated organisations. That confirms – if confirmation were needed – the attitude of the Assembly, which, in Recommendation 409, voted in favour of separating the operating and pensions budgets to avoid the cost of new pensions to be paid affecting the appli-

cation of zero growth rate to the budget, which, after all, is just common fairness.

Under the present procedure, the draft budget of the Assembly should have been examined by the Council before being submitted to the Assembly for approval. It was not possible to follow that procedure because the Bureau of the Assembly decided to examine part of the budget – the structure of the Office of the Clerk – after the extraordinary session in Rome. The 1985 budget was therefore communicated to the WEU Council at the same time as it was communicated to the Assembly.

In presenting the budget to the Assembly, I ask members to bear with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I have not discussed the possible changes that were mooted in meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration because at the end of the day several were rejected, if only for the interim. However, other speakers may refer to them. I hope that there will be a general discussion about what people feel expenditure should be devoted to and where it should be increased, because it is extraordinarily helpful not only to the President, the Presidential Committee and the Bureau, but to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, which has responsibility for formulating the figures and ultimately for presenting them to the Assembly.

We can make substantial progress in the coming year. This is effectively a holding budget. We may feel able to come forward with a supplementary one in the spring. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has arranged to meet in February. I intend to consult the Secretariat-General in London in an effort to resolve differences and misunderstandings, I hope in a spirit of co-operation, so that we are all thinking on the same wavelength. There will be other meetings with staff and informal meetings among leading members of the Assembly. Our aim is to make the parliamentary Assembly of WEU more effective and efficient so that it can play a leading rôle in the reactivation of WEU, which is now fully under way. If we do not do that, we shall be failing in our task.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you, Sir Dudley, for your report and for the work done by your committee. I wish to express my appreciation of the good sense displayed by you and your committee in the present situation, which, while it is exciting in many respects, does nonetheless pose some technical problems which have stood in the way of your committee's work. You have dealt with these problems very neatly and I hope that members will respond to your appeal.

The President (continued)

I take this opportunity, as President of the Assembly, to voice the hope that the technical difficulties we have encountered will not interfere too much with the work of the Council, as close co-operation between the Council and the Assembly, especially in this area, is absolutely vital. When I say Council, I am thinking primarily of the Permanent Council.

In the debate, I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I had to return to Britain during the week and I was taken aback to discover that this sitting was starting at 9.30 a.m. Therefore, my speech is not as well prepared as some of my previous speeches have been.

I congratulate Sir Dudley Smith and his colleagues on the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on a useful survey of the financial basis of this organisation. I recognise the difficulties, but having spent many years in local government as well as fourteen years in the House of Commons, I am extremely reluctant to approve any supplementary estimates. International, as well as national and local organisations, must learn to plan their affairs and to operate on a regular basis. I shall be reluctant to accept changes during the year, especially if those changes are not politically relevant.

My main purpose in speaking this morning is to say that there is an obvious ambition for WEU to provide greater influence and perhaps become a developing force in the determination of political priorities. WEU has been less significant than may have been desired when it was founded. It is not widely recognised, and it could have exerted more influence during the past twenty years that it has. It has been described as a "sleeping giant"; the inaccuracy in that term is more applicable to its stature than to its somnolence. I understand the desire of members who are deeply interested in the Assembly and in WEU as a whole for its influence to grow and for it to become more widely recognised.

This is a small organisation that already spends £1,250,000, which is substantial for its size. An increase in establishment and expenditure will not achieve greater recognition. The increase in expenditure between this year and last is much larger than the increase in inflation. The member governments may wish a net increase in our budget but such an increase must be democratically decided in advance.

The organisation and the governments who fund it cannot be expected to foot the bill if it has not been decided democratically. That is an essential point. In any democratic organis-

ation, it cannot be right for one or two people – no matter how influential they may be or how strong their countries are – to decide such matters. I and other members will object strongly if a supplementary estimate is produced after the event to cover the cost of such decisions. WEU will not improve its influence or its stature in that way.

During early autumn I heard many rumours about what was happening, and I was delighted that Mr. Moulis was able to provide a full reassurance when I wrote to him on behalf of my labour colleagues. It was a relief to have that assurance, but I am still not satisfied that matters are as they should be.

I trust that when the committee resumes its work it will always have a quorum; I have asked my colleagues to ensure that they attend meetings. I trust that the committee will exercise proper vigilance to ensure that the organisation's accounts and plans are acceptable. I have heard about developments which I do not believe can be entirely approved. We shall not achieve greater stature by throwing around money more liberally. I pay tribute to many staff members, who are dedicated and who understand the importance of their rôle, but they must accept that we shall achieve nothing simply by spending money or by increasing the number of employees.

I hope that the Assembly will be careful during next year not merely to contribute to the development of recognition, but to ensure that that development is based on effective organisation. At present I am not entirely satisfied that it is as effective as it should be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in my country we have a saying to fit those occasions when we make plans and promises and indulge in talk without considering the resources needed for the implementation of our ideas – we say we are "doing things on a shoestring". I get the impression that a large number of proposals and programmes are being prepared for WEU, too, but that it will eventually prove impossible to find the means for turning words into action. It is no secret that, whenever we have examined the budget in this Assembly, the criticism has always been the same; resources are totally inadequate and this prevents us from doing a better and more useful job. So far from thinking that conditions have improved, I believe they have actually got worse, and when there is talk of reactivating WEU with programmes which I would call over-ambitious, thought should be given to the means needed to put them into effect. The intention is to restructure

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

the technical organs, the Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee and, in the Rome Declaration and the various speeches which have been made on the subject, emphasis has been laid on the need for qualified staff in view of the unlikelihood that the new tasks assigned to the Agency and the committee could be handled by the present establishment.

And how is all this to be achieved? By making proposals? By mere talk? Are we to blind ourselves to the fact that an effort, a sacrifice, is required if we are really to carry out the proposed restructuring and if WEU is to acquire the organisation and resources needed to perform its new functions? Mr. Hardy has said that the staff deserves our esteem and praise for the job which it is doing in awareness of the important functions which it has to perform. We agree entirely. But are we truly to suppose that the more specialised and intensive work which will have to be undertaken in future can be handled by the existing organisation? Consider, for example, the secretaries of the major committees. How are the reports prepared? The rapporteurs do an excellent job, but if a secretary should fall ill for a lengthy period, say one or two months – and heaven forbid that such a thing should happen – then reports could be neither prepared nor laid before the Assembly. Should not each of these estimable persons therefore be backed up by someone else able to share the workload and take over when necessary?

I believe that this issue cannot be sidestepped, and that to achieve all this the member states should accept the need to make some small sacrifice. In this context, Mr. Andreotti, the Italian Foreign Minister, said correctly in Rome that the budget was ridiculous – Mr. Hardy has claimed that it is considerable, but it all depends on how one looks at it – since the total budget would not buy half a Leopard tank. Is it not clear then, Ladies and Gentlemen, that we must be more pressing and more demanding in our dealings with those whose responsibility it is to provide us with the resources needed if we are to do our job properly at this time of the renewal and strengthening of our organisation?

I now revert to a speech made yesterday. My amendment concerning the problem of siting the various WEU organs in one city was rejected. I see that the light is on and I must defer, but it does seem to me that we are faced here not only with a shortage of resources but also of the time allowed. As I was saying, my amendment raised an important practical problem. There is a need for closer links between the Assembly, the Council, the secretariat and the technical organs, but it escapes our notice that, with the situation as it exists at present, unnecessary expenses are

incurred which could be avoided if there were not this geographical separation with some organs in one place and others elsewhere. I would like to know the cost of moving staff from London to Paris twice a year for a total of two weeks. This expenditure could be avoided. I would like to ask the governments of the member countries about the travel and accommodation expenses incurred by ambassadors and their staff in coming to Paris to be present at our deliberations. I would further like to ask how much it costs for members of our staff to go to London to submit questions to the responsible authorities. This is expenditure which could be avoided. There is no need to increase national contributions – zero growth – but, yes, there should be a change of organisation and yes, there should be savings which could be used to meet the requirements to which I have referred, without mentioning the fact that the whole of the staff could be reorganised.

I trust therefore that due attention will be given to these points if we do not wish this organisation to undergo – not a revitalisation – but a slow and accelerating demise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere. I would point out that the lighting of the red lamp you referred to is a public reminder to moderate the length, not the quality, of interventions. Its purpose is to enable the President to be as liberal as possible. It is not a guillotine, and my liberal treatment in your case, Mr. Cavaliere, has enabled you to speak for eleven minutes. This is a privilege very often allowed you by the Assembly, but I hope that not many speakers will emulate your example.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am most grateful to you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not intend to speak at length, but I hope you will share out the privileges in this Assembly equitably.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what we are discussing in this debate – and we must remember this at all times – is the budget of this Assembly and not – unfortunately, I would add – the budget of WEU as a whole. Article VIII stipulates that we may prepare our budget and then transmit it to the Council for approval, and Article VIII(c) says that we may also express our views on WEU's budget. I feel we have been very restrained in exercising our right under Article VIII(c) in the past.

The sums we are talking about here are very small, half-posts and one whole post, and we must often wonder, with some derision, what

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

justification there is for so many posts in the Agency for the Control of Armaments – fifteen to twenty, if I am rightly informed. Why are there still fifteen or twenty senior posts in the Agency for the Control of Armaments? Critics say – and I do not necessarily agree with them, I am merely repeating what they say – that all the Agency has left to control are ABC weapons, and one or two people would be enough for that. I do not think it is worthy or appropriate for us parliamentarians to give a great deal of thought to a single post or half a post, while our governments simply ignore these overstaffed institutions, once created to perform traditional tasks.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe we must pay particular attention to these considerations now, because WEU is about to be reactivated and assume new responsibilities. I feel this should prompt both governments and us parliamentarians to look into these matters and ensure that, if WEU's budgetary resources are not to be increased, they are in future disbursed in a manner that we parliamentarians too can approve.

My second comment concerns the question of a personal assistant for our President. In my opinion, the President's desire to have a personal assistant differs markedly from all the other requests for staff connected with this budget. All four of the presidents I have known regularly expressed the need for a personal assistant. I feel that, as the President's workload is now growing, with the efforts to reactivate WEU, we should agree to this request, and I welcome the amendment Sir Paul Hawkins has tabled on this subject.

I would add that I think it right to establish this as a permanent post, but the incumbent should not occupy it permanently. I consider it essential that each incumbent should vacate the post when the president completes his term of office, to be replaced by a person appointed by the newly-elected president. There are various reasons for this. First, it must surely be possible for the President to have someone in whom he has confidence, from his country's foreign office perhaps, seconded to his private office for two years. Second, he must be able to confer with him in his mother tongue. And third, I think it is quite right – we have this elsewhere in politics – that, while he is in office, the President should have at his side a man in whom he has absolute personal trust. That, I feel, justifies the creation of this new permanent post.

A third, very brief comment, Mr. President: having received your letter, your request or the request of the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will be considering the future position of the Clerk

and his deputy, the senior counsellor. This question really must be answered. We unfortunately failed to settle it conclusively in 1980. We must therefore do so now, and I believe this question may also influence the budget. I do not think this need result in the postponement of the adoption of the 1985 budget, but I do feel that the deliberations of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may raise points that should culminate in a supplementary budget for 1985. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I disagree almost entirely with what was said by my British colleague, Mr. Hardy. What he said might have been relevant before we had our debate yesterday, because he referred to matters that we disposed of yesterday. We are now in a new era. Both the Council, which originated the rebirth, and the Assembly, which endorsed it yesterday, implied that we had to look to the future not the past. I fear that Mr. Hardy was looking to the past.

The change in our situation means that there must be fresh expenditure – not necessarily all of it additional expenditure, but much of it reallocated. If we do not will the means we do not deserve to succeed. We were determined yesterday that we would succeed. Nobody would support throwing money around, as Mr. Hardy suggested. He conjured up that as a figment of his own imagination.

I should like to give my colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, notice of a question to which I should like an answer when he responds. It relates to the transport arrangements for the President. I understand that, because our President is doing an enormous amount of work, he is making more use of transport. Therefore, that involves more frequent hiring of a car. Clearly, the President has to do his job properly. I have nothing but praise for that. However, on the basis of the hiring of a car, I should like to know the total figure for twelve months, extrapolating the expenditure so far, compared with the purchase of a new car and the employment of a driver, the purchase of the new car being on the basis of write-off over so many years. That is a simple figure. I warned the Chairman beforehand that I would ask this question.

Next year must involve a new and radical look at many of the things that WEU does, but in particular, I suggest, the duties of the President and the costs involved. If we have a conscientious President who is determined as our representative to be seen to be active in much the same way as the President of the Council of Europe, we must will the means for him to do that. Duties ought to be looked at. We ought to see what is involved in the revised duties and

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

work of the Assembly in what I prefer to call, rather than its revitalised rôle, its Phoenix-like rôle.

We need to examine properly whether the organs of Western European Union need to be in two places or whether one place would give economies in time and cost, which was exactly what my friend, Mr. Cavaliere, suggested yesterday. I was only sorry that he did not accept the advice given to him by some of us that he should withdraw his amendment rather than have it defeated, because had it been withdrawn it could have gone to the committee to be properly examined. We have lost a little time because he did not agree to that. I understand the sign language that he is making and I want to say only that very many of us agree with him that this has to be properly looked at, and the answers that we have had so far from the Council of Ministers are not really acceptable because they tell us absolutely nothing.

We also need to examine the staff requirement for our revised work, including some decisions on whether we require a staff of a different calibre and whether some or all should be on a three-year or five-year contract instead of permanent. I support the view of my friend, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, on the particular question of an assistant for the President. In exactly the same way as British ministers are enabled to have political assistants, or *chefs de cabinet*, they stay in position only as long as the particular minister stays in post and, if they are engaged on that basis, they are there for one, two or three years, or occasionally, as in the case of British ministers, two months. They do not have tenure for life and it is most important, as Mr. Spies von Büllenheim has said, that this particular post does not have tenure for life.

These are all vital issues and we can expect nothing more on this interim budget, but we shall require assurances on these various issues and answers to the questions that I have posed before we can decide on any supplementary budget, and clearly there will have to be a supplementary budget. But it will have to be a supplementary budget that is meaningful, a budget that has answers to the queries and costs attached to those answers. All that means that the Council of Ministers as well as this Assembly will have to wake up and work not at its normal lethargic speed but at a speed at which most of us are used to working in the real world outside, the real world that pays for this Assembly, the taxpayer in every country, the industries and businesses in every country who are taxed to provide the expenditure for bodies such as this and the Council of Europe.

We therefore have to work at the same kind of speed as if we were in the commercial world,

and that means that the Council of Ministers has to do exactly the same. We rely upon you, Mr. President, to impress upon the Council of Ministers the need for urgent answers to questions that we raise. Equally, we must expect you and your staff to work far more quickly than they have been doing to give us the information we need for the kind of budget answers that I have suggested. If we get this done, we can have a useful discussion when Sir Dudley comes with his supplementary budget and it will be, I hope, a budget that will recognise the importance of this organisation in the next decade.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, you know the state of my country's economy and you are certainly aware of my party's general attitude, and my own, in any discussion about Italian budgets – we wish to curtail expenditure as far as possible while improving overall economic management and restructuring many services. Our sole concern is to cut back expenditure, not to submit requests for additional funding.

Mr. President, you will believe me when I say that the economic crisis currently facing WEU will not change my customary attitude or my judgment. Restructuring and a search for greater efficiency – yes; and administrative economies may perhaps be achieved by the decisions taken in Rome with regard to WEU, but I do not believe that will be enough. The other day, in the General Affairs Committee, I said that whatever decisions were taken here concerning the solution of problems arising from the new relations between the Assembly and the Council they would involve practical consideration of the budgetary repercussions which the Council cannot overlook. This statement is to be found in paragraph 18 of the report considered at that meeting, and had the support of all members of the committee. I believe there is certainly general agreement on the need for the greatest economy in the administration in the interests of finding the right solution to the points raised at the Rome meeting, but, whatever the solution which may in due course be adopted, it is certain that additional expenditure cannot be ruled out.

Yesterday, in reply to a direct question, Mr. Spadolini, pointed out that it was not a case of choosing between restructuring aimed at greater economy on the one hand and additional expenditure on the other – both would be needed for a revitalised WEU. In the General Affairs Committee this simple line of reasoning led me to ask the committee Chairman for a commitment, and I would end my brief intervention by inviting the members concerned to

Mr. Martino (continued)

give an equally important undertaking at this meeting; I ask them therefore to declare themselves. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I consider it my duty, and it is one that I am very happy to perform, to begin by expressing to our committee Chairman, Sir Dudley, our support, satisfaction and gratitude for the way in which he has conducted the examination of all the technical and political ramifications of these problems. Our President, Mr. Caro, has referred to a display of sound judgment. That is precisely what it was, and it was displayed at a difficult time!

I wish to raise a fundamental issue, and I do so with a due sense of responsibility and circumspection, asking that it be noted and drawn to the attention not only of the Secretariat-General but also of the Council. I refer here to a question of procedure and conduct which relates to our areas of competence and to our relations with the Council.

My lengthy career in politics is familiar to you – for five years I was under-secretary of state with responsibility for the budget in my country, and I have also been Finance Minister. I have, moreover, had the great honour of chairing meetings of Finance Ministers at Community level at which such personalities as Giscard, Schiller and Butler made their presence felt by the rigour of their views. I would like, therefore, to refer to the practice adopted in my country: the Finance Minister has the last word concerning all the budgets of state departments whatever their nature, but he has no authority to decide those of the lower house or senate. If from time to time this situation placed me in some doubt, I did not express any objections but merely asked for a meeting with the presidents of the two houses so that I could voice my concern in highly confidential surroundings. It was not, therefore, the parliamentary budgets themselves which were at issue in the sense that the parliament enjoys – how shall I put it? – not only our respect but also the trust which is its due.

I do not ask this of the Council, but I believe that I am within my rights in expressing my deeply held belief in the need for more mutual trust in our relationships. I reject the term “understanding” in preference for “trust” and, if the word is not too pedantic, a modicum of respect besides. I have had occasion to see certain letters which have been transmitted, the like of which I should never have taken the liberty of sending either to the parliament or to its president!

I say this because, if certain decisions were left to us, I have no hesitation in stating that I should be the first to shoulder the task with complete responsibility and dedication. I repeat, I am not raising a question of status but a problem of procedure, because we do indeed merit trust and would be able to use it with the greatest discipline and conscientiousness. The fact is that our self-discipline and sense of responsibility would be made greater by the knowledge that it was our voice which carried the day, and if you tomorrow, Mr. President – to make an unrealistic hypothesis – decided to place some needs before others and raised a number of non-essential issues, I should not hesitate to take a different view and would ask you to act with your characteristic sense of duty. I say this only to illustrate what our conduct should be!

I wish to end by repeating that the committee Chairman has indeed acted with wisdom. We have, Sir Dudley, accepted the budget despite the fact that, to put it frankly, many members wished to vote against. In fact, our votes were guided by our trust in you and I myself acted in that spirit. We have thus expressed a commitment which I see confirmed at this meeting, and in adopting the budget we also express our firm political will that the activities of WEU shall not be hindered by minor economic and financial questions. Such a thing would be unthinkable in view of the importance of our work.

I have talked about trust, and advisedly so. Zero growth has been referred to, but we know that pensions are going up, and so the budget is being reduced in real terms. The arguments go on, but that does not prevent a general consensus on occasion. We have heard the various attitudes expressed by ministers and governments, and once more we are reprimanded and told “No”. When necessary, it is we who should be saying “No”, without being on the receiving end of negatives which are incompatible with our political status.

I express my warmest thanks to the Chairman for the proper solution in the form of an interim “holding” budget guaranteeing the performance of our ordinary tasks. When a number of points have been clarified and the Council itself has acknowledged certain duties and functions which we have to perform, you should take the initiative, Mr. President – or we shall take it ourselves – in quantifying these increased commitments; this should be done with the maximum rigour and discipline, not with an eye to the personalities and prestige involved but, I say again, simply to allow this Assembly to work as well as it can.

If there are to be obstacles, let us at least avoid those due to a lack of resources. Such a situation would be totally irrational. Mr. President,

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

I call upon you personally to ensure that our demands are properly pressed home.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). - I have the privilege of speaking on behalf of my christian democrat and liberal colleagues from Holland. There is unanimity in our country about how to deal with the WEU budget.

Yesterday, Minister Genscher said in response to a question that he was not necessarily looking to more people in WEU, and that we all knew that there were different ways to deal with our problems. That is probably a good lesson for us. We must be careful about jumping to conclusions about enlarging the number of personnel employed by the Assembly. I am very much in favour of a well-founded personnel policy, but I am not as passionate about that matter as Mr. Cavaliere. We must keep cool and understand that there are fine job descriptions for all the personnel whom we employ. We know that they will co-operate in the interests of efficiency. We are not just creating posts to solve a problem that should be solved in other ways by not employing more staff.

In the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration I moved an amendment to prevent our creating new posts in the present budget. I agreed with my colleagues that we should as quickly as possible have another meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs to find out what proposals we should make that might even entail an increase in the number of personnel. However, this body wants to be absolutely sure that whatever new appointments we make and whatever new posts we create, those appointments are sustainable and rational, and contribute to the overall efficiency of the body. I do not believe that either the committee or the Assembly itself would wish otherwise. I was glad that the committee accepted my amendment to postpone that decision until further notice, probably in February.

I should like to say a few words about assistance to the President. We have a dynamic President and are grateful to him for his efforts on our behalf. Nevertheless, in creating facilities for him, we must take a long-term view. We shall be dealing not only with a French president living in Paris but with presidents living in Belgium, Rome or London. We must be careful about the arrangements for his personal staff.

There was an original demand for a chauffeur and a car for the President in Paris. It is obvious to me that such a proposal does not make much sense. If the President lived in some other capital, what would the chauffeur

and the car be doing in Paris? When we have a French president who fulfils more duties in this country, we should try to help him out so that he can hire limousines and chauffeurs whenever necessary.

We should not create a structural post, because within two or three years we might be in a difficult position, with the President's chauffeur sitting idly in an office waiting for the President to come to Paris.

We must also apply some criteria to the appointment of the President's assistant, and we should give ourselves a little more time to consider the matter carefully. We must formulate a job description. We must know how the President's assistant will fit in with the other personnel of the Assembly. At present, we employ twenty-seven people, and when we appoint a person with the capabilities that are obviously necessary if one considers the salary to be paid of 348,000 French francs - that would be a large salary in my parliament - we would wish to know that that person will co-operate in the best possible way with the rest of the staff. We shall need a clear description of his job and his relationship with the Clerk of the Assembly and the other staff.

What will the assistant do? Will he sort the President's mail or write his speeches? Are not other members of the staff capable of doing that? The result of our discussions might be a decision to appoint staff for the President, but we must try not to create a second organisation in the Assembly that works apart from, and not in co-ordination with, the present staff.

I said that 348,000 French francs represented a large salary in my parliament, and the same probably applies to many other parliaments. Mr. Spies von Büllesheim made a relevant point about employing someone only for the term of the President. That might have some cost implications, because where could we find first-grade people who were willing to work only for short periods? The committee must give some attention to that matter to ensure that we attract the right people and that we are not stuck with a post that is excessive to our requirements.

I was disappointed this morning to discover that an amendment had been tabled. The committee was wise to say that we should take a little more time to consider carefully every aspect of this matter. We must ensure that we are doing the right thing when we create new positions in the Assembly and that we not only do the right thing but do it in the right way. It would be better for Sir Paul Hawkins to withdraw his amendment. That would better serve the needs of the Assembly.

If we go home and tell our parliaments and colleagues that the revitalisation of WEU has

Mr. de Vries (continued)

resulted in giving the President a special assistant without a job description or an analysis of his co-operation with the rest of the staff, they will look at us as though we are fools. When we have built a new WEU we should make a case that is as strong as possible, and that will convince everyone else. That does not mean employing chauffeurs and assistants without considering what that will imply. The matter will need careful consideration by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). - There has been much discussion of new posts this morning. Sir Dudley Smith set us an intimidating example of efficiency and productivity by speaking as both Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, but perhaps we should all follow that example.

My colleagues and I discussed this morning the entire meal set in front of them by Sir Dudley Smith, and I shall speak shortly about one knife and one fork. My first point relates to Head V, paragraph 4, on staff pensions. A few years ago, when I was a member of the committee, the pension arrangements for our permanent staff were extremely unsatisfactory. We must all be glad that those arrangements are now more sensible and effective.

Referring in his report to Head II, Sir Dudley Smith says:

"It seems appropriate to mention the special problem raised by the recruitment of verbatim reporters, which is becoming more difficult at each session because members of this profession are becoming rare."

That sentence may be relevant to French verbatim reporters, but it is not so relevant to verbatim reporters in English and other languages. I ask Sir Dudley Smith, as Chairman of the committee, not to make too sudden or dramatic a change until there has been a proper assessment of the problem. I do not wish to sound parochial, but I can tell the Assembly that there have been many investigations and experiments at the House of Commons into the use of electronic equipment instead of ordinary verbatim reporters. However, it has been found that, as yet, no machine can produce as perfectly what is done by the human brain and hand.

Finally, may I give us all a little pat on the back. On the BBC World Service this morning, there was a good feature on Western European Union and its revitalised rôle. It is a good sign that a fairly influential world organ is taking a

new interest in us and I commend the efforts of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and our small but effective press and public relations office here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Schulte.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to say a few words about Sir Paul Hawkins's amendment. I am very concerned about it, otherwise I would not have asked to speak. But when I see that you, Mr. President, are to have a private secretary or private assistant at a cost of 348,000 French francs net, as I understand it...

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). - On a point of order, Mr. President. I thought that we would have a debate specifically on the amendment at a later stage. Would it not be better to leave this discussion until then?

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). - On a point of order, Mr. President. My colleague, Sir Geoffrey, is wrong to say that we shall have a debate on the amendment. One person will speak for it and another will speak against it. In British terms, that is not a debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Schulte.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, may I continue with my comments on the budget in general? I do not know if everyone is familiar with the situation. Nor do I know much about national scales, because I have never been particularly interested. But when I see that 348,000 French francs net are to be set aside for this post, I have the impression that things are getting completely out of hand. That is about what the Chancellor receives in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would ask you to take this matter very seriously. Many people have the impression that Europe is becoming a continent of sinecures. There is considerable opposition to this, in my country at least, and among civil servants and parliamentarians as well. I should like to make that perfectly clear.

It may be necessary to increase the number of posts in WEU, and I would in no way deny that after we have discussed this thoroughly we may find that the President needs a personal assistant. But I strongly urge that we give further, very serious thought to the sum that has been mentioned here. I at least regard it as indefensible for this post.

The following problem was raised in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, of which I am no longer a member: should the

Mr. Schulte (continued)

first step be to increase the number of posts, in the hope that this will lead to greater efficiency, or should we wait and see whether we are given the means to become more efficient and then adjust the staff accordingly? I am for caution in this respect as I have said before. I would be glad if we were to choose the second course and wait to see if we actually succeed in making more of WEU. A crucial factor will be the relationship between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers and the latter's willingness to accept us and our views and to discuss them with us. If this actually happens and if the impression is that WEU is becoming more important than in the past, that would be the time to decide on any alterations to the budget. The national parliaments would probably be more sympathetic to this approach. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Adriaensens, the last on the list of speakers.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I very much regret that I was unable to attend the last meeting of the Budget Committee. However, as someone who chaired that committee for three years, I can well understand the problems of my successor, Sir Dudley Smith. As I did not discuss the budget in committee, I would like to make a few brief remarks on it now.

I am against an A3 official for the President's private office. Presidents come and go, but officials remain. Some members have made comparisons with national parliaments. I think the procedure to be adopted here should be like that in the Belgian Parliament, where the minister's staff go when the minister goes.

The current President would not have been too pleased to have had an assistant appointed by his socialist predecessor. That would surely have resulted in constant tension between the President and the head of his private office. However, the proposed solution of "parachuting" an A3 into WEU would also create tension between the President's office and the existing administration.

I am convinced that if the reactivation of the Assembly takes place, the work should be carried out primarily by the Clerk and the permanent staff. I would, however, be entirely agreeable to increasing the staff if there turns out to be more work. We have to solve our problems within our budget. After three years' experience I know that we could not raise the necessary money within the present budget by making savings under certain heads to pay for an increase in staff. The only solution is to persuade governments of the need to provide WEU with greater financial resources.

I am thus personally not opposed to increasing the WEU staff if future activities make it necessary, but I am opposed to appointing a permanent official to the President's private office, because a permanent official remains while presidents come and go.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a vigorous and worthwhile debate during the past hour. I am grateful to those members who were prepared to stay until Thursday to contribute to the debate. This is not the most exciting of subjects – budget debates have minimal attendances.

There is a general recognition throughout the Assembly that this debate is a fundamental and key part of the future and we must pay a great deal of attention to the financing of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU because of the developments during the past few months.

Although the subject is technical and a little dry, the relevance of what we are trying to achieve is extremely important. It shows the interest that parliamentarians of different political persuasions are giving to the subject and the general good will to try to make this body more effective than in the past – one that will contribute to the defence capabilities of Europe and help to preserve peace. That is what it is all about.

Some of the speeches underlined the points that have arisen. I am sorry to begin in a complaining tone, but Mr. Hardy's speech was negative. He was dealt with effectively by my British colleague Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. Like Mr. Hardy, I am against supplementary budgets. He must have been fed up with past labour governments in Britain as they were rather good at introducing supplementary budgets, and I certainly opposed them.

I am sure that Mr. Hardy will be sensible and appreciate that this is not simply a supplementary budget to increase expenditure. As many speakers have recognised, a great deal of reorganisation is necessary if we are to become a relevant and efficient organisation. Mr. Hardy said that we were already spending substantial sums. That may be true, but reorganisation can lead to efficiency and value for money. I hope that he will appreciate and understand that we are trying to make ourselves more efficient.

As one speaker said, to revise and change does not necessarily create additional expenditure. However, I would be the first to agree that bureaucracies tend to magnify themselves.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Mr. Cavaliere, in a typically engaging speech, stressed that we must be equipped properly to carry out our new tasks. I agree. Indeed, one can become so cost conscious that if one is not careful one becomes totally stultified. We might not even have half a Leopard tank if we carried economy too far. There can be false economies in any walk of life. If one cannot see the wood for the trees, if one merely goes forward with the idea of cost-cutting, at the end of the day one can save pennies but still lose pounds. That is apposite to peripheral activities. Mr. Cavaliere mentioned ambassadors. There are all kinds of people in the bureaucracy associated with WEU who are not immediately relevant to the activities of the parliamentary Assembly. I have great sympathy with the view that he expressed.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim referred to the WEU budget as a whole. This carries on very much from what I said about Mr. Cavaliere's remarks. The WEU parliamentary Assembly is a small element of total WEU expenditure. I agree that other agencies in this organisation need radical financial revision. Indeed, I asked for the figures when he made his point, and the Assembly will be interested in them. The Secretary-General's department in London has forty-eight people, the Agency for the Control of Armaments has fifty-two people and the Standing Armaments Committee has twenty-eight people. We have twenty-seven. One must put this in context. There are 128 well-paid officials engaged on other aspects outside the parliamentary Assembly. When we argue whether we can afford to put in extra help to assist the President of the Assembly, we begin to see matters in context.

Financial reformation is needed. I agree there with Mr. Hardy and Mr. Cavaliere. However, there are other aspects besides the parliamentary Assembly that need revision, and I hope that that will come about. Some of the saving that Mr. Spies von Büllenheim mentioned is relevant. He suggested that the President should receive the best possible support. There is an amendment on that matter. We shall listen with interest to the speeches by the proposer and whoever decides to oppose it.

My colleague, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, made a penetrating speech. He rightly said that there must be fresh expenditure in a revitalised Assembly, even if it is not necessarily additional. Many people make the mistake when talking about fresh expenditure of believing that it means more money. It does not necessarily. Sometimes it means making the best possible use of available facilities. Sir Geoffrey said that we must succeed, and so we must if we have the political will to go forward.

Sir Geoffrey asked me a specific question about transport. He was courteous enough to give me notice of this matter, because it is not one to which I could give an answer off the cuff. However, the secretariat got to work and it has produced some revealing figures. A contentious point was introduced in the first efforts on the draft budget - that you, Mr. President, should have the support in your activities of a chauffeur and car. The figures I am about to give are not exact, so I hope that no one will pin me down on them. However, they are reasonably accurate. The cost of running a car and having a chauffeur with all the expenses will be about 130,000 French francs a year. The car would be a one-off expenditure on a diminishing basis, written off over a period of time. The cost would be 180,000 French francs and the fuel would be 2,700 French francs. That is a grand total of 312,700 French francs. The total cost for the hire of a car and driver, plus mileage, would be 301,616 French francs per year. The hiring of a car costs almost twice as much as buying a new car and recruiting a chauffeur to drive it. For the first year the cost of the car is included. Therefore, the hiring of a car is almost twice as much in the circumstances.

I do not wish to take sides. It is wrong for the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to do that. However, this matter was debated fully in committee and it is the Chairman's task to back his committee. I think that the Assembly should take note of those figures. It is one thing to talk about economies and quite another to say that we must not embark upon this vast expenditure without looking at the figures. When we do that, we find that one option costs twice as much as the other. Therefore, Sir Geoffrey was right to raise that point.

It is also important to consider the staff required. We may need a different calibre of staff - possibly on short, renewable contracts. I agree that we must have answers to some of those questions in a supplementary budget, which I hope to present in the spring.

I say to Mr. Martino that I understand Italy's problems. However, it is a question of priorities. Either WEU is worth while and we enhance its work with sensible, reasonable finance or we allow it to wither away and waste money on all the well-paid jobs that I have mentioned, because at the end of the day nothing will be achieved. Unless we provide the support, we shall not be able to make any contribution to the defence and safety of Europe and the countries that we represent.

I am grateful to Mr. Ferrari Aggradi for his kind remarks about me and my activities and the activities of the Budget Committee. We have accepted the commitments for the future,

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

and so I believe has the Assembly. He was right to stress that we must have the political will, but we need stringency to get value for the expenditure that we undertake. Unless we do that, we shall not make effective use of the resources devoted to us by our own governments out of taxpayers' money.

Mr. de Vries said that new posts must be sustainable. I agree. I think that must be the aim of the Budget Committee and ultimately of the Assembly. He also referred to the provision of a car and chauffeur. I hope that he found the figures that I gave revealing. Whether we provide extra assistance to the President of the Assembly now or in the future is a matter for this Assembly to decide. It may be that someone already on the staff could be seconded to provide that extra assistance. However, that person might have to be replaced by someone else to do the work that he or she did.

It is relevant to note that our present President is working harder than any other President I have encountered. He is contributing an extremely high-profile job. I believe that he is doing his job most efficiently and effectively. I do not denigrate those who have served in that office in the past, at least one or two of whom have been personal friends. We have taken on a whole new echelon in the last few months. WEU is now very different in its approach from what it was a year ago, and that must be taken into account.

I am obliged to Sir John Page for drawing attention to pensions. That is always negative expenditure. There is nothing to be gained from it in the activities of any organisation, but such expenditure is necessary because no worthwhile organisation treats its ex-servants scurvily. If they have given a great deal of their working life to the organisation, they must be recompensed properly. Pensions represent an ongoing item of expenditure. I am glad that Sir John feels that we have now made the pensions system more effective. I subscribe to what he said.

With regard to verbatim reporters, I do not know whether he heard my point about this but it is a vexed question and I mentioned it during my speech. We are looking into this point but the difficulty is that under the rules of WEU it is provided that we must have a verbatim report, or as near a verbatim report as possible, in the hands of the Assembly, and indeed in the hands of everybody else, at the earliest opportunity, which means in effect the next morning. I am advised that, for example, where sound recording is concerned, either, as Sir John Page says, it can be very inefficient and nowhere near as efficient as a verbatim reporter, or, if it is, it is

terribly expensive, and with the sophisticated equipment required would probably be more expensive than the payment of the verbatim reporters. There is also a subsidiary French question. He mentioned the question of French stenographers. There is, I understand, the question of trying to reconcile the rates of pay where French stenographers are concerned with those of some of their counterparts. But I give him an assurance that we are looking into this matter.

I know that Sir John is an inveterate listener to the BBC World Service when abroad and I am delighted to hear that the revitalised WEU has been mentioned. This is the accolade and we are obviously now on our way to getting features of that kind.

I have noted what Mr. Schulte said. He always makes a very useful contribution to our debates and again he expressed a need for efficiency and the need to impress upon our member governments the relevance of our activities. How much I agree with him! We have to do that. It is essential, because, whatever the public thinks about us, unless we impress our own governments, they will not keep us in the organisation, they will let the organisation wither away and, heaven forbid, they might at the end begin to withdraw from WEU.

Mr. Adriaensens, who is a former Chairman of the Budget Committee – and I sympathise with him in that – said that the key to this whole business was the Clerk and the senior staff, and that is absolutely correct. The future activities of this organisation will, as he suggested, decree the staff we need. If we become much more enhanced and much more active, we shall certainly need some extra staff and some streamlining of it. If we just go pottering along in the ordinary way, there is no justification whatever for an increase in staff. Indeed, there would be justification for a reduction in our activities. I do not want to see a reduction in our activities. I want to see the kind of example, Mr. President, that you have set to us, both before and since Rome, carried out by all members of this Assembly whatever their political persuasions.

The kind of coverage and the informed articles now being written about WEU give us a wonderful chance of co-operating with the Defence and Foreign Ministers of our various countries in aiming to achieve what we have always tried to achieve – the Europeanisation of the NATO concept in our part of the world without in any way detracting from the overriding need to keep our connections with the United States in the interests of peace or the free world. In those circumstances, I believe this budget to be a very important and relevant document. I am grateful to those who have

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

contributed and I hope very much that the Assembly will give it a resounding vote of support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes for a point of order.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – A point of order, Mr. President. How does Sir Dudley reconcile the figures he has just given for the hire of cars with the budget which he is asking us to approve which under sub-head 22 puts the estimate for official cars hired for 1985 at 60,000 French francs, while in the explanatory memorandum, these words appear:

“Compared with 1984, estimates under this sub-head are higher than the foreseeable rate of inflation due to the fact that the President of the Assembly, elected at the June 1984 session, is constantly at the seat of the Assembly. It will therefore be necessary to hire a chauffeur-driven car more often.”

If the figures which Sir Dudley has just quoted are correct, we are being presented with an entirely inaccurate estimate in the budget.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Lord Hughes, your point of order will engage you in debate with the Rapporteur.

I take the view that points of order should relate to the conduct of debates, not to their substance. However, to please you, I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – It is obviously unwise, whilst we are trying to conduct questions and answers, to raise points of order, but I must try to deal with this. The figures I gave were given in good faith and were supplied to me by the secretariat. I understand that the figures we have in the budget relate to the car that we currently have which requires hiring and the figures I gave were what it would cost the Assembly if we hired a car from outside on a fairly permanent basis when needed, taking an average of the number of times it would be needed. Therefore, if we move to that system, although it would be less expensive than the present system – which again is something that needs to be looked into – it still compares unfavourably with the cost of actually buying our own car and having a chauffeur on the staff.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to raise a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – We, as an Assembly without resources of its own, are here to discuss a draft budget of a kind which most

parliamentary assemblies in the same position are unanimous in defending before their Council of Ministers. This is not the case today. Why not? Certainly, the situation is not due to any failing on the part of the Assembly, but arises from the fact that there are some things in the budget which cannot be regarded as desirable.

In the debate now starting we should bear in mind that the budget increase asked for is 14.3%...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Beix, this is not a point of order.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – But it is, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You could have put your name down to speak.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to move withdrawal of Amendment 1 for the following reason...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You should have had your name put down to oppose the amendment.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The Budget Committee in London tells us the authorised increase is 4.5% and we are asking for 14.3%. Is there any historical precedent for this? No, there is not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Beix, please! Everyone must do his job and mine is to chair the debates in this Assembly. If you wish, I will allow you to speak first against the amendment tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins and you can ask him to withdraw it. That is the correct procedure, Mr. Beix, and not the introduction of a point of order.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I think it is more sensible to call for the amendment to be withdrawn before the debate rather than speak against it before the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take your point, Mr. Beix, but if I let you go on speaking on a matter of substance I shall be faced with a series of requests to speak on points of order and the whole debate will be disorganised. I insist on keeping to the rules of debate in this Assembly.

Sir Paul Hawkins has tabled an Amendment 1 to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985. It reads as follows:

1. In Part I, Section A, Head I of the budget estimates for 1985, increase the total provision by 348,000 francs to provide for the head of the private office for the President.

I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I do not mind who opposes this amendment or asks me to withdraw it but I should like to move it first of all. I sincerely congratulate Sir Dudley Smith on a really difficult task extremely well carried out. He has achieved a greatly improved layout and therefore improved even my understanding – and I am not very good at accounts – of the budget and its components. Further, may I ask that another time we have the budget – and it will be a very important one – presented earlier in the sitting? I wholly accept the need to know the facts about our other organs' expenditure and I hope we shall get that information – although there has been some reluctance previously to send it to us – so that we can make up our minds about our own budget.

I agree with my friends, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, about the length of appointment of an assistant to the President – I am not asking for a permanent assistant to be put on the budget expenses.

I should like to explain why I am moving the amendment. The post was in the original budget, together with two others. I feel sure that Mr. de Vries will not disagree with me when I say that Mr. Haase from the Socialist Group moved that the post be retained, and I seconded that. Mr. de Vries rightly moved an amendment to the amendment and won the day. I cannot say exactly how many voted for each proposition.

My reasons for wanting the post to be put back into the budget are threefold. First, for many years we have been pressing for reforms of WEU and its various organs. In particular, we have criticised the way in which the Assembly has been neglected by the Council of Ministers. Now we have had the Rome Declaration, followed by visits of British, German, Italian and French Ministers telling us that they are sorry that they have neglected us for so long and stating that they will give us fresh work to do. Surely, if we are to be given fresh tasks, at least we should have a modest increase in the means to perform them.

I recognise what has been said – that we should do that when we know what the tasks are – but the President's work over the next six months will be vital to the Assembly if he is to put a great case on our behalf against the other organs that spend so much more money than we do, as we have heard. If our President does not have someone at his side to help him, our cause – our Assembly – will suffer because we will not be able to put over our point of view as efficiently as the President or we would wish.

The Council of Ministers and other organs have far more officials and advisers than we have. We must stand up for the Assembly.

Our President is significantly doing that. He has been praised by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I should like to say that we have a President worthy of this time of change. Anyone who has seen our President in action will know that. He acted as an ambassador with the Pope in Rome and made a magnificent speech – admittedly, I could not understand at the time, but I read it afterwards; unfortunately, I am not a French linguist. I wish I were.

We have an amazing President. He has great stamina. I hope that he will not consider that he must do this all the time – he sat through every one of our sittings in the Chair. I do not know why he did not have to leave the Chair, because I have to sometimes! Let us be worthy of him and ourselves and at least give him some assistance. It would help the Assembly to do its job and stand up for its rights, as we expect it to do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you are finally putting me in the position of the speaker opposing Sir Paul Hawkins's amendment.

From what Sir Paul says I deduce that he is arguing in favour of increased expenditure by the organisation, and that certainly deserves to be noted, given the originality of such talk. But it is my contention that Sir Paul's amendment is pointless, and that is why I am moving that it be withdrawn. The fact is that the draft budget on which we disagree provides for a general 14.3% increase in expenditure. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration will sanction 4.5%, which is itself an increase on the 3.98% authorised between 1983 and 1984.

Is there any historical precedent for a parliamentary assembly without any resources of its own obtaining a threefold increase in expenditure over the figure approved by the Budget Committee and the ministers? There is not. That means that there is little chance of getting the additional 10% asked for over and above the amount which will certainly be granted. And even if these 10% were sanctioned, what should they be used for? This was the point discussed this morning, without reaching any agreement. Opinions are completely divided. If these 10% were authorised, we should have to return to the decisions taken by the Bureau of the Assembly and reopen discussions about priorities, with special attention to the promotion needs of the existing staff of the Assembly before the possibility of new recruitment is contemplated. Now, all the discussion as to whether the President should travel in a 4, 2 or 6-cylinder motor-car is, admittedly, of absorbing interest, but it does not project a very flattering

Mr. Beix (continued)

image of the Assembly, and is liable to prove unproductive. Hence my request for the withdrawal of Sir Paul's amendment calling for the recruitment of a head of private office for the President – a matter which must be subject to political agreement.

One of these days, Mr. President, it will be necessary to sanction the recruitment of a head of the President's office, although some thought should perhaps be given to his scale of remuneration and the associated national insurance payments. There is food for thought here. Before contemplating this new recruitment, we must examine, very constructively and bearing in mind our talks with the budget experts, the priorities we consider appropriate within the framework of an increased overall budget for the Assembly. We should indeed ask for an increase in the budget, but we should not as the saying goes "put the cart before the horse". Give yourself enough time, Mr. President, for negotiations with the Assembly and the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I do not want to say too much more because I mentioned the matter in my winding-up speech. I am placed in some difficulty because I thought that this was a good idea and voted for it. It would be wrong of me, as Chairman of the committee, to vote either way, so it is right for me to abstain. The committee rejected the proposal by a substantial majority after a long discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you warmly for the interest taken by the Assembly in finding ways of lessening the President's workload. I am most grateful. The problem you face is not an easy one and involves financial and structural difficulties. It is, in fact, an issue which should be examined in the general context of the administration of the Assembly which I have the honour to chair.

I must tell you that I am in the hands of the Assembly. I shall continue to perform my duties in accordance with your wishes and as you decide.

Thank you again for your concern and for your interest in the whole budget of the organisation and its Assembly.

I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. As a matter of principle is involved in the debate, it should be proper to have a roll-call vote on the amendment. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-

tration has suggested that it would be wise for the Assembly to investigate the matter further, to put it in the right context and to give the committee time to work out the proposals. I want there to be no misunderstanding. We all appreciate the work that you do, Mr. President, and you are not the subject of the vote – it is the structure of the Assembly. This must be put in the right perspective. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has asked you to give it time to produce the right proposals. If we are confronted with an amendment which means that the Budget Committee can do its work but the Assembly will not listen to it, all members of the Assembly must accept their responsibilities and say "Aye" or "No" to such a proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall interpret your intervention as raising a point of order on the resumption of the debate on the amendment, as I have not yet initiated the procedure for voting on the recommendation, and have not yet asked the Assembly whether it wishes to vote by roll-call. You referred to what the Chairman and Rapporteur, speaking for the committee, said about his committee's attitude. I suppose that is the reason why Mr. Beix is raising his hand. I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The amendment which I asked to be withdrawn simply to allow you time for negotiation – does it stand?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I ask Sir Paul Hawkins, who initiated this debate, to state his position.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I am in a rather difficult position. I believe sincerely that what I have asked for is right and that my amendment would not cause trouble to the Assembly. I have stated my case. If the amendment is defeated, these words will be borne in mind when we next review the budget. I believe, and I must maintain, that our President needs such assistance now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Paul Hawkins wishes his amendment to stand.

We shall therefore now vote on Amendment 1.

I am advised by Mr. de Vries of a request for a vote by roll-call.

Does this request have the support of at least ten representatives?...

It has.

We shall therefore vote by roll-call.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does anyone else wish to vote?...

The President (continued)

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote, after rectification, is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	43
Ayes	20
Noes	17
Abstentions	6

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Stoffelen on a point of order.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Could you give us your guidance? Since when can members be present and vote when they have not signed the list of attendance? On what basis did you rule that they were entitled to vote? I understood the position to be that only members present who had signed the list could vote. How many members who had not signed the list voted?

I heard you ask one member whether he had signed the list. He said that he had not, yet you asked him to vote. I believe that to be contrary to the rules. Please give us your guidance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, I had the quorum checked before the vote so that we could proceed, and there was certainly a quorum present. You heard as well as I did that, when I asked one member if he had signed the register, he replied that he had not done so but went to sign at once.

Out of courtesy I acquiesced. Another fellow delegate was in the same position and had voted, with my consent, in the same circumstances.

One voted for, the other against! This outcome, which is political, has nothing to do with your point of order, which relates to a procedural matter.

The incident is now closed.

We shall now vote on the draft budget in Document 1001, as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber call for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call?...

As there is no request for a roll-call vote, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the whole document to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft budget, as amended, is adopted.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate the committee which, with good sense, has laid before you the budget which you have just approved. Acting on your behalf, I shall be responsible, in very large measure, for implementing it.

Once more I thank all those in this Assembly who have concerned themselves with the work of the Chair.

I wish to state that, in line with the decision you have taken, I shall continue to act as in the past, that is to say in close collaboration with the Bureau, seeing that we are jointly responsible for managing the Assembly, and, of course, with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

I say this to reassure those who might otherwise have left with some doubts at the back of their mind.

Thank you for your attention.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 987 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 – the auditor's report and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 987 and Addendum.

I call the Chairman and Rapporteur, Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I do not need to detain the Assembly for too long because we have already had a major debate that covered all the aspects. We are now going back over history.

The auditors have examined the accounts and found them to be in good order. There has been a little contretemps about underspending, and we were taken to task by the Secretary-General's department. However, it has been fully explained that that was caused by two or three factors, not least that two of our member countries held general elections during the spring session last year, which meant a short session here. Therefore, there was substantial underspending. It is fully accountable and has been

1. See page 44.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

disregarded for the budget that we have just approved for the forthcoming year.

In all the circumstances, I need not detain the Assembly.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1983 in the addendum to Document 987.

Is there any request for a vote by roll-call?...

As a vote by roll-call has not been requested, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is adopted.

5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 991)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – Parliamentary action taken on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on European co-operation in space technology, Document 991.

I call Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur.

Mr. HACKEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my report has nothing like the implications and importance of the interesting vote we have just taken, but it is interesting enough to warrant a discussion.

As we debate the report before you, I feel it should be remembered that we have a quite specific task to perform in this committee.

On the one hand, it is our responsibility to ensure that the attention of the national parliaments is drawn to the activities of the WEU Assembly and that they follow up these activities with the necessary vigour. On the other hand, we can pass on ideas and suggestions for the

work of the WEU Assembly emerging from the debate at national level.

I would emphasise once again that our work does not extend to delivering opinions on the substance of the matter in hand or to submitting our own proposals on specific aspects. In addition to compiling the regular general report on its activities, the committee has recently taken to singling out specific areas of topical importance for analysis to see what progress the debates in the national parliaments are making.

Where space technology is concerned, however, I feel I should refer you to a number of unusual features. Space technology has both civil and military aspects which, as the debate in the national parliaments has shown, cannot always be separated. The report does not therefore attempt to make a clear-cut division. But I believe that we in WEU should direct our attention particularly to the military implications of space technology.

Secondly, the Council of Europe regularly discusses the problem of space technology. Mutual information and work-sharing between WEU and the Council of Europe, and possibly the European Community should also be a matter of concern to the committee.

Thirdly, independently of WEU initiatives, an intensive debate on space technology questions is taking place in the parliaments of many WEU member states.

Turning to the structure of the report, Section A contains the general report on the committee's activities, which I should like to refer to again before I close.

Section B covers the material gathered on the debate in national parliaments. Chapter III refers to the most important recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly and the Council of Europe. Chapter IV covers the consideration of various WEU recommendations in national parliaments, while Chapter V sums up the work done so far. At this juncture, I feel I should emphasise the proposals for improvements in the committee's work, which it considered some years ago. I will revert to this subject at the end of my statement.

Chapter VI contains a selection of other parliamentary debates and opinions, and in Chapter VII conclusions are drawn from the whole report.

As you can see from the extent of the report, investigations by the national parliamentary secretariats and data from the parliamentary computers have enabled us to gather a great deal of material. I should like to take this opportunity to thank the secretaries of the delegations most sincerely for their help.

Mr. Hackel (continued)

Nonetheless, the report cannot claim to be complete. A selection had to be made because, unlike most parliaments in the member states, the Assembly's secretariat does not have a data bank, and we are unable simply to obtain the data we need at any time. I should therefore be very grateful, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you could draw attention to any major contributions not mentioned in this report.

If I may now turn to the contents of the report, it is important to realise from the start that from among the many recommendations concerning space questions the Committee for Relations with Parliaments selected only Recommendation 328, on meteorological satellites, as being suitable for debate in the parliaments. There was consequently a relatively lively response to this in a total of six parliaments. The other recommendations merely gave rise to isolated questions in various parliaments. The substance of these questions varied widely, since the recommendations adopted in recent years have covered many aspects of space technology. Apart from demands for long-term planning by ESA of European space activities, proposals have been put forward regarding the various Spacelab programmes, the Ariane launcher programme and co-operation with third countries, including Japan.

At this stage of my presentation, I should like to deal in somewhat greater detail with the military implications of space technology, especially as these questions are of particular interest to us in WEU. This summer the Assembly adopted a detailed report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the whole range of problems connected with the military use of space, on which, I might point out, Senator Frasca questioned the Italian Government very closely, thus setting us all a good example.

Of the earlier recommendations, Recommendation 328 concerned, among other things, the call for European meteorological satellites to be used for defence purposes, and Recommendation 369 the proposal for the introduction of military observation and communications satellites.

Statements made to date by the Council and governments in reply to a number of questions raised by members of parliament are far from being as clear and harmonised as they should be. It is therefore only logical that the WEU Assembly should take up the whole problem in Recommendation 410 and discuss it here.

The summary of debates in Chapter VI makes it even clearer that there are considerable differences of opinion on military matters in Europe,

but in view of the magnitude of the forthcoming decisions this is hardly surprising.

But there is agreement on some points, Ladies and Gentlemen, and most particularly as regards the prevention of the deployment of offensive space weapon systems, as the WEU Assembly says in Recommendation 410. Apart from this, however, there is a broad area of defensive uses of space, and it is here that opinions still differ very widely.

For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the question of the defensive use of space is currently being debated in the Bundestag. I must add, however, that little importance is evidently attached to the WEU Assembly's Recommendation 410. At least, it has not yet been mentioned. Members of the French and British Parliaments have repeatedly called for some national military observation and data-transmitting satellites. Bilateral co-operation with the United States on space defence was also prominent in debates in the United Kingdom.

These few examples alone, Ladies and Gentlemen, show that interests and views on these questions still differ very considerably in many European countries. Before there can be practical co-operation or even standardisation of systems, there must be a political debate on a joint European position.

As this debate has only just begun, WEU parliamentarians now have a chance to recall the foundations laid by Recommendation 410 and to call greater attention to the reports on which it is based. This should be further prompted by the Franco-German discussions, between the Federal German Chancellor and the French President in Bad Kreuznach on 29th and 30th October, on aspects of a future presence in space and co-operation with the United States. This brings me back to the civil aspects of space technology.

It is clear, Ladies and Gentlemen, that in many parliaments the work of various European parliamentary assemblies has had absolutely no influence on their debates. Sometimes these debates could bring out ideas which might be studied at European level, for example:

In Belgium a question raised was what became of state subsidies to industry for its participation in European space research; in the Federal Republic the possibility of radio and television broadcasts by direct broadcast satellites was mentioned in the Bundestag several times; in France the question of working out international regulations for satellites in orbit was raised; in France and Luxembourg there were discussions in parliament on bilateral co-operation on television satellites, following which Luxembourg opted for an American system.

Mr. Hackel (continued)

In this context, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like briefly to raise the question of work-sharing once again. At the beginning of the report I point out that other European organisations, particularly the Council of Europe, regularly consider aspects of co-operation in space technology. The WEU Assembly has consequently put forward numerous proposals in its recommendations for areas in which the Council of Europe or even the European Community might take action. Would it not make for a reasonable division of work, it must be asked, if the appropriate committee of the WEU Assembly suggested to the Council of Europe that some of these subjects might be suitable for discussion at pan-European level?

In summary, it is obvious from both a quantitative and a qualitative comparison of debates in Chapters IV and VI that the extent to which the work of this Assembly is taken into account in national debates does not yet correspond in any way to the intensity or quality of the work done in either place. European parliamentarians should therefore become more involved in debates in their national parliaments.

This problem brings me back to the general section of the report on the committee's activities, which is to be found at the beginning, under Section A.

It is regrettable that, according to the secretariat's calculations, the number of interventions by WEU representatives in the national parliaments in 1983 should have diminished considerably between 1982 and 1983. On several occasions in the past we have discussed ways of improving and intensifying our activities. It is also a question we have considered at length at the committee's meetings in the last few months. The Chairwoman has made a number of suggestions which, it is to be hoped, will attract considerable attention in the near future, and the former Chairman, Mr. Stoffelen, suggested various ways of improving our work in an earlier report.

One of these suggestions concerned the selection of recommendations for debate in the national parliaments. It was proposed that the selection of recommendations should be discussed in greater depth in committee and agreement should be reached on the tactics to be employed in the parliaments. The feasibility of this should be seriously considered – I think we really should try it. Of course, there is the drawback that until the end of the ordinary sessions of the WEU Assembly we do not know for certain which version of which recommendations and which report will be adopted, but, Ladies and Gentlemen, everyone knows the subjects well in advance. In addition, this

report for the first time proposes that WEU should give priority to recommendations on aspects that are still particularly controversial in the national debates. This might help to speed up the process of clarification and decision-making in the national parliaments of the various countries.

In one specific case, for example, we find that, if the committee had given more careful thought to the matter, Recommendation 410 might have been selected as suitable for discussion. It was not selected at the time, and we have made up for this now by including the second part of the report on the military use of space among the recommendations. Yesterday the committee decided that WEU should recommend national parliaments and parliamentarians to give earnest consideration to these questions.

To conclude, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should just like to refer you to the welcome news mentioned in my written report that the Netherlands Delegation has now followed the example of France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany and is publishing reports on the sessions of the WEU Assembly for the Netherlands Parliament. I am very grateful. This is a good opportunity to repeat the appeal to the remaining three delegations to follow suit. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the debate I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – As representatives here will know, I am more used to speaking in English when I speak on behalf of the Socialist Group or as Chairman of the Socialist Group. This time, I speak as a Dutchman and since the Dutch language is at least as important as other languages, I shall continue now to speak in Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. Chairman, I would like first of all to thank the Rapporteur for his thorough work. This is a very sound report, which brings into sharp focus the results of no fewer than seven recommendations from this Assembly in regard to space technology. It is a very good thing that the committee which I had great pleasure in chairing for three years is trying to establish what effects the debates and decisions of this Assembly actually have and what follow-up takes place in the national parliaments. Although the picture we get is rather negative, we need to continue with this. The Rapporteur has shown in detail that the seven recommendations in question resulted in a grand total of twenty-five questions in our seven parliaments. As we say in the Netherlands: "Count your winnings!" The result is extraordinarily meagre. The key paragraph in the report is the very dismal paragraph 137, in

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

which the Rapporteur tells us that in all the debates in the national parliaments on space technology there has been no visible connection with the debates in this Assembly. If we are honest – and I hope we always try to be – we ought to draw certain conclusions. I shall mention four, including a link between Mr. Masciadri's report, which we discussed yesterday, the budget and Mr. Hackel's report. I think there is indeed a clear connection between them.

Given that the Assembly yesterday adopted the recommendations of the General Affairs Committee concerning the reactivation of WEU by a large majority, we would do well to realise that it will all come to nothing if this Assembly and its committees carry on in the same old way. If, in the interests of European peace and security, we want to turn a hitherto moribund institution like WEU into one that is very much alive, we have to change our own way of working. This week we have tried to do something that, strictly speaking, is simply not feasible. We have tried to discuss eight reports in three days and at the same time to receive three ministers and a junior minister. It simply cannot be done. We have had meetings with ministers where a speaker, addressing a chamber full of attentive members, made his speech and promptly vanished. That has nothing whatsoever to do with proper relations between a government and a parliament.

I come now to the practical conclusions for our working procedures. As a member of the Presidential Committee I have already pointed out that it is for that committee above all to draw a number of conclusions about our working methods. Let me begin with the production of reports. It would be a very good thing if all committees could realise that productivity is not always best expressed in numbers. It would be an extremely good thing if reports always dealt with subjects that fall within the framework of WEU. However important South America, China, Japan and Central America may be, WEU was originally set up – and the Rome Declaration also makes this point – for the sake of peace and security in Europe. It would also be good for committee members to think about how much they themselves actually need reports in their national parliaments. As I have said, the Rapporteur informs us that this Assembly has adopted seven recommendations on space technology in the course of a few years, without any noteworthy use having been made of them in the national parliaments. I suspect that most of us – if more than the usual eight members were present – would have to admit that this does not altogether surprise them. We should bear it in mind when considering the subjects on which reports need to be drawn up.

With regard to the working methods of committees in general, I think it is a very good idea to have more formal and informal discussions between the Assembly and its committees on the one hand and the Council of Ministers on the other. Before taking decisions in specific areas, the Council of Ministers should ask the Assembly's opinion. This should be followed by a discussion between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. This is now happily more and more the case in relations between the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe and its Assembly.

I come now to the second set of conclusions on the debating procedures in this Assembly. The Chairman of our committee has on several occasions rightly stressed the importance of having ministers with us who are prepared to discuss with us the reports and other items on the agenda of the Council of Ministers that are also on our agenda. That would be something quite different from the lectures without slides which we now receive from time to time.

I come to the third set of conclusions, which have to do with follow-up. As I have pointed out in a number of reports for the committee, our work here is of limited significance unless we are prepared to follow it up in our national parliaments. It is therefore most important that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments should plan intensive discussions with representatives of the standing foreign affairs and defence committees of the different member states, so that it is not simply a question of ministers expressing a political will to use the instrument of WEU, but that it actually happens as regards national parliaments and their standing committees.

I think it is in everyone's interest – especially bearing in mind yesterday's and today's reports – that all of us, Council of Ministers, Secretariat-General, Assembly and staff should co-operate to achieve optimum use of the financial and human resources of this Assembly. It would surprise me greatly if the staff of this Assembly proved to be the only staff that was 100% efficient. It is therefore extremely important that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has decided, although not by a very large majority, to look into this matter more closely.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments and the Rapporteur, Mr. Hackel, have done us a great service by holding up a mirror to a specific area. The picture is not very attractive, but there is nothing wrong with the mirror. Let us draw the necessary conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Hackel on his excellent report on action taken by the national parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly on the important subject of European co-operation in space technology.

A great deal of hard work and expertise, under the chairmanship first of Mr. Stoffelen and then of Mrs. Knight, have resulted in a document which deserves considerable respect. An assessment of all the facts reveals that we European parliamentarians have no need to hide our light under a bushel.

Our discussion today concerns the activities and initiatives which have been approved in the form of recommendations on space technology adopted by this Assembly. They include various satellite programmes and their implications for telecommunications, broadcasting, meteorology, the remote sensing of earth resources and the forecasting of natural disasters and environmental pollution.

Our activities also concern co-operation among major European institutions in the peaceful use of space. Representatives from the WEU member countries have taken up these suggestions in their national parliaments, put questions to their governments on the implementation of decisions taken, or sounded out their positions on the various problems. Our debates have thus led to action being taken or to ideas being translated into practice.

The report refers, for example, to a motion for a resolution tabled by a group of SPD members of the Bundestag this summer. It expresses the fear that European space technology, which has hitherto been used solely for peaceful purposes, is increasingly being used for military purposes. It invites European participation in a manned space station on condition that it be used exclusively, and verifiably, for peaceful purposes.

Yesterday I asked Mr. Genscher, the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, after his statement to the Assembly, to explain his ideas on preventive arms control in space. He based his answer on the need for controls but, if I understood him correctly, he felt they could only take the form of arms limitation, not of a total ban, in view of the danger that threatens. Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe we must be ready to prevent rash attempts to turn space into a battlefield for future hostilities.

In relation to the plans and goals of research into the peaceful uses of space, I must refer to the transatlantic dialogue on research in the areas of high and advanced technology. These two form the basis of space research and require the investment of vast sums. But there is a huge gap between the United States and Europe

in terms of the results achieved. In the United States the construction of a space station or even a moon station is already being considered, at an estimated cost for the latter of \$70,000 million to \$90,000 million.

We Europeans cannot compete with such expenditure. Europe has built Spacelab but can scarcely use it itself, on purely financial grounds. There is a danger that scientific results will continue to be sacrificed to large-scale technological projects.

Europe's plans are to develop the Ariane launcher to a fifth stage, which will not only be safer but also have more thrust. France is also considering the construction of a space taxi, Hermes, with which astronauts can return to earth. Nor can the plan to develop a European space station called Columbus by the 1990s now be regarded as utopian.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I mention these prospects in connection with Mr. Hackel's report to make it clear that Europe is not without a future where space is concerned. It should be stressed that the space age is not a thing of the past: it has scarcely begun.

However, if the European countries continue to think in terms of competing space projects, we shall run the risk of falling victim to parochialism. The United States does not owe its lead to the energy generated by a large population. The population of Europe is just as high. Europeans simply need to initiate space projects together and improve co-operation in this area. Success would be bound to follow, especially as Europe is the traditional home of science and research.

Today's debate can therefore help to spread the word that European solidarity is needed in space activities. It is to be hoped that Mr. Hackel's report will encourage us to continue resolutely down our chosen road, particularly in view of the fierce competition from Eastern Europe and Japan.

If in our national parliaments and in the WEU Assembly we support and insist on the peaceful use of space, we shall make progress here and at home towards our goal, which is to make our policy understood.

(*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the importance of space research, space technology and co-operation among the European nations in the field of space technology is evident from the fact that this

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

Assembly has considered excellent reports on this subject three times this week. However, I do not think it appropriate that reports on subjects that deserve a great deal of attention should be debated at a time when parliamentarians show little interest in the proceedings. This criticism has already been voiced by Mr. Stoffelen, and it should also be levelled at the representatives of the various European countries and of their ministries. I should like to have seen the same attendance as in the budget debate just now, when we were discussing whether certain allocations should be maintained. After all, we cannot say, on the one hand, that we are lagging behind in Europe and need to do this and that in industry, when, on the other hand, no more than five or six members are in the chamber to discuss a subject of such importance.

I consider Mr. Hackel's report to be so important because I believe the subject we have been discussing this week and today will largely determine the state of tomorrow's world. One day we shall be forced to ask whether we human beings have really taken good care of this earth we have on loan.

The report gives a good review of the whole range of European activities in the field of space research and space technology and attempts to summarise the space policies of the various European countries. When I say "attempts", I mean that the Rapporteur has made a serious effort to collect all the relevant material, but despite his efforts, even he has been unable, in my opinion, to define the broad lines of a European space policy. Like other rapporteurs before him, in reports on the military use of space and co-operation with the United States, he stresses that space technology has both civil and military aspects which it is not always easy to separate. I agree with him on this. For example, information supplied by a meteorological satellite can, of course, be used for both civil and military purposes: the latter possibility simply cannot be excluded in this specific case.

Many examples of this kind could be given. In what I consider to have been a very discriminating statement, Mr. Enders quoted numerous examples, which I will not repeat in view of the time.

But – and this must also be said – since we are aware of the impossibility of distinguishing between the civil and military uses of space in each and every case, we must not cease to insist on arms control in space. The arms race in space must be checked. There can be no arms control policy without the co-operation of the United States and the USSR. Activities in space must not be allowed to have a destabilis-

ing effect and so possibly increase the risk of war.

I should like to single out one other factor to which the report refers: the European space nations are very active, successfully in some cases, but their differing views on an active space policy are equally apparent. The European aerospace industry can only hold its own in the world if it is willing and able to enunciate and to pool its interests. If it does not succeed in doing this, the race will go on for ever.

Research in the United States into the military use of space will force us Europeans – irrespective of a possible transfer of technology from the United States – to increase our financial efforts if we are to make up just some of the ground we have lost in the peaceful use of space as a result of the spin-off effect of military research in the United States. We in WEU must bring this problem to the attention of our national parliaments.

So it is up to all of us to make sure that our national parliaments become more aware of the importance of aerospace activities. We Europeans must establish a common European space policy which is generally aimed at the civil use of space to the benefit of all mankind. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Hackel, Rapporteur, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. HACKEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not intend to spend too long in replying to everything that members have said, especially as most of the comments indicate that they and I – and the other members of the Assembly, I believe – are in agreement.

Mr. Enders said that he thought space policy had a special part to play. I think we can all agree on that. I am sure that the subject we have been discussing will continue to be debated for a long time to come, and in far greater depth than it has been here, in the committees, in the plenary sessions and in the national parliaments. Mr. Enders's remarks, which I fully endorse, were partly designed to contribute to this process.

Mr. Klejdzinski pointed out that, despite the importance of the subject, very few members are present. Well, we know the same applies on other occasions, so I would prefer not to pass judgment.

Thank you nevertheless, Mr. Klejdzinski, for your kind words about the report. As you said, it does not reveal the existence of any broad lines of agreement on a common European space policy. In fact, one of the aims of the report

Mr. Hackel (continued)

was to re-emphasise this very fact. It is a major failing, and we would do well to introduce changes in the future which would help to bring Europe closer together in this area too.

Mr. Stoffelen, the first to speak in the debate, has had many years of experience in this committee. He made a very critical appraisal of the Assembly's work and put forward numerous proposals. Here again, it must surely be agreed that what he said was essentially right. Mr. President, I would be glad if we could give very careful consideration to his proposals in the Assembly's various organs, including the Bureau.

I would also propose the following: in recent months the Bundestag has been discussing its own view of itself, and I feel the Assembly should spend a morning, or even a whole day, doing the same. Since Rome, and in the last few days in particular, we have been talking about the new rôle WEU should play. But we have not discussed the specific tasks the Assembly might perform within WEU.

I followed the debate on the budget very attentively this morning. As a politician concerned with his own country's budget, I am, to be honest, sometimes rather surprised at the way budgetary policy is made here. Nor do I completely agree with what is being said about the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly or, basically, with the way in which individual committees operate here.

In the Bundestag we have had a debate on our self-image, and despite very considerable scepticism before this debate, it has in fact met with a good response from the public as well. This may perhaps encourage our Assembly here to make up its mind how it intends to organise its work over the next five or ten years, what form its relations with the Council of Ministers, the national parliaments and the committees should take and what procedural methods it should adopt. It will then be able to define its own rôle, which, in my opinion, has suffered very seriously in recent years as a result of neglect by the Council of Ministers. I would be grateful, Mr. President, if this suggestion could be taken up at one of the forthcoming sessions. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should like, Mr. Hackel, to express my warm thanks to your committee and to say how much I appreciate your efforts. The fact is that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is entering a period which will doubtless see considerable changes in the nature of its work. I have noted with interest the suggestions you have just made to the Chair. This is one of the subjects before

the Presidential Committee, which has already debated the matter and will have to do its utmost to find appropriate answers, now that WEU has to be opened up and the Assembly has to respond to the Rome Declaration of the ministers. Your committee will have much to do in this area.

The very close and steadily-growing relations between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council will require the Assembly to establish specific agendas which, by agreement, will be kept in step with the work of the Council. This suggests that our Assembly's future agendas will take on a new style. I know I can count on your committee's support and I thank you personally for your contribution.

The Assembly takes note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – At the end of this sitting I should like to add to what I said in my opening address by extending a personal greeting to the representatives of the countries which sent observers to the present session. I therefore greet, from Denmark, Mrs. Britte Hansen and Mr. Bjørn Elmqvist; from Norway, Mr. Jakob Aano; from Greece, Admiral Kleanthis Zervos; from Turkey, Mr. Barlas Dögu; from Portugal, Mr. José Luis do Amaral Nunes, Mr. Rui Almeida Mendes and Mr. Luis Beiroco; from the United Kingdom, Mr. Bruce George and the Rt. Hon. Dr. John Gilbert, representatives and members of the House of Commons Defence Committee, and also Sir James Scott-Hopkins, member of the European Parliament.

I have great pleasure in acceding to the request of Admiral Zervos, representing Greece, one of the observers who have been following closely the Assembly's deliberations, to say a few words to the Assembly.

I call Admiral Zervos.

Admiral ZERVOS (*Observer from Greece*). – Since this morning's debate on parliamentary relations has now ended, and as it is more or less relevant to the few words I have to say, I take this opportunity on behalf of my colleagues from Turkey, Denmark, Norway and even Spain – for if they were here I am sure they would tell me that I speak on their behalf – and Portugal – though my dear friend Nunes has spoken for himself – of cordially thanking you, Mr. President, and all the members of the Assembly of Western European Union for the effort you are making. I know that from now on the Assembly's job will be recognised more by the Council of Ministers and that the Ministers will be ready to hear its submissions.

Admiral Zervos (continued)

For four days I have listened carefully to all the Assembly's deliberations. I agreed with some of what was said and disagreed with other things. That is democracy. If all of us had the same opinion, without variation, there would be no democracy in our countries. As a descendant of the ancient Greeks, I love to hear different voices in an assembly. Of course, the general line is the same and we do not deviate from the main path that leads us to the achievement and sustainability of the ideals of democracy and freedom.

Although we have remained mute for four days, I know that our names will appear in the Assembly's official minutes of proceedings so that in future those who consult the official record will realise that European countries which, at the moment, do not belong to the Assembly, are interested in its work.

I wish the Assembly success in its tasks for the benefit of not only the seven member countries but the whole of Europe, the alliance and the world.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for honouring me and giving me the opportunity to address so many dear and honourable members of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you, Admiral Zervos, for your kind words and for the honour which you do us in conveying your message to the Assembly.

I also extend greetings to my eminent colleague and friend, Mr. Karl Ahrens, President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose assiduous attendance I should like to match in his own assembly.

I thank the press for its close attention, and I also wish a speedy recovery to an eminent

member of the Office of the Clerk, the press counsellor, Mr. Paul Borciér, whose illness, as you know, has prevented him from attending a session for the first time in a long career as an official of the Assembly.

Finally, my thanks to all staff for their untiring and expert support and especially to the interpreters on whom we can rely in all circumstances.

7. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: Mr. Johnston as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Lord McNair; Mr. Johnston as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Lord McNair; Sir Geoffrey Finsberg as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Murphy.

Is there any opposition ?...

The nominations are agreed to.

8. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The business of the session is now completed. I declare closed the thirtieth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)

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