

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1986

IV

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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IV

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Official Report of Debates

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PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
	BOGAERTS August	SP
	DECLERCQ Tijl	CVP
	DEJARDIN Claude	PS
	PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr.	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM.	BEYSEN Edward	PVV
	CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
	CLOSE Robert	PRL
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	NOERENS René	PVV
	N...	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
	de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
	COLLETTE Henri	RPR
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs.	LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM.	MERMAZ Louis	Socialist
	OEHLER Jean	Socialist
	PORTIER Henri	RPR
	SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM.	ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
	ANDRE René	RPR
	BICHET Jacques	UDF
	BOHL André	UCDP
	BORDU Gérard	Communist
	CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
	CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM.	DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
	FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
	LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
	MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
	MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
	PRAT Henri	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
	SOUVET Louis	RPR

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTTER Robert	SPD
	BERGER Markus	CDU/CSU
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	NEUMANN Volker	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SOELL Hartmut	SPD
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

MM.	ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
Mrs.	FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM.	FISCHER Ulrich	Die Grünen
	GANSEL Norbert	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
	KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM.	PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
	SCHIEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BÜRGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA	
	Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

MM.	de BEER Leopold	Liberal
	EISMA Doeke	D66
	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr.	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl	of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Thomas COX	Labour
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Michael MCGUIRE	Labour
Lord	MACKIE	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Peter REES	Conservative
Lord	RODNEY	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Resumption of the session.2. Examination of credentials.3. Address by the President of the Assembly.4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1068).5. Action by the Presidential Committee (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee</i>, Doc. 1083).6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.8. Threat assessment (<i>Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>, Doc. 1076).9. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO.10. Threat assessment (<i>Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation</i>, Doc. 1076). |
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 9 had been ratified by that Assembly with the exception of Mr. Collette, Mrs. Lalumière and Mr. Portier as representatives and MM. Alloncle, Chénard and Lacour as substitutes in the French Delegation, and of Mr. Stegagnini as a substitute in the Italian Delegation.

In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Observers

The President welcomed as observers Mr. Arne Melchior and Mr. Lasse Budtz from Denmark, Mr. Panayotis Katsaros from Greece, Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five and Mr. Finn Knutsen from Norway, Mr. Antonio García-Pagán and Mr. Juan Manuel Fabra from Spain and Mr. Kâmrân Inan from Turkey.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1068)

On the proposal of the President, the Assembly deferred consideration of Mr. Stokes's report on threat assessment. In consequence, the President proposed that the Assembly should, if time permitted at the end of the sitting, consider

the report of Mr. Kittelmann on European security and the Mediterranean.

The President pointed out to the Assembly that several ministers had asked to speak during the session. The timetable of the session had therefore been modified.

Not wishing to limit the duration of the parliamentary debate and with the Assembly being unable, for budgetary reasons, to hold night sittings, the President proposed that sittings begin at 9.30 a.m. and continue until 7.30 p.m. Votes would be held before 6 p.m.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, De Decker, Freeson, Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Reddemann.

The President replied to the points of order.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was amended and adopted.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1083)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Burger.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

9. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Möllemann answered questions put by MM. Soell, Berger, Close, Jung, Tummers, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Fourré, Büchner, Cifarelli and Antretter.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

10. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO

Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, addressed the Assembly.

Lord Carrington answered questions put by Mr. De Decker, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Wilkinson and Valleix.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Hardy and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The President invited members of the Assembly who had been unable to put their questions to Lord Carrington to submit them to his office. He would ensure their communication to the Secretary-General of NATO.

11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Delegations of France and Italy:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

France:

- Mr. Jung as a titular member in place of Mr. Bourges;
- Mr. Alloncle as a titular member in place of Mr. Wirth;
- Mrs. Lalumière as a titular member in place of Mr. Bérégovoy;
- Mr. Koehl as an alternate member in place of Mr. Jung;
- Mr. Fourré as an alternate member in place of Mr. Delebarre.

General Affairs Committee

France:

- Mr. Chénard as an alternate member in place of Mr. Delebarre;
- Mr. Portier as an alternate member in place of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

France:

- Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in place of Mr. Koehl;
- Mr. Gremetz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt;
- Mr. Bassinet as an alternate member in place of Mr. Fourré.

Italy:

- Mr. Stegagnini as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bonalumi.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations**France:*

- Mr. de Chambrun as a titular member in place of Mr. Mercier;
- Mr. Chénard as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Chambrun;
- Mr. Collette as an alternate member in place of Mr. Gremetz.

13. European security and the Mediterranean

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1073)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Cifarelli, Mezzapesa, Müller, Giust, Rubbi, Berger and Inan (Observer from Turkey).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

**14. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd December, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.10 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium

MM. Adriaensens
Bogaerts
Declercq
Dejardin
Péciaux
Close (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)
Stevelyneck

MM. Müller
Büchner (Neumann)
Reddemann
Rumpf
Schulte
Lenzer (Schwarz)
Soell
Spies von Bülesheim
Mrs. *Pack* (Unland)
Mr. Zierer

Netherlands

MM. Aarts
van den Bergh
Eisma (de Kwaadsteniet)
Stoffelen
Tummers
de Beer (van der Werff)

France

MM. Bassinet
Fourré (Berrier)
de Chambrun
Collette
Hunault (Croze)
Bordu (Gremetz)
Lacour (Jeambrun)
Jung
Mrs. Lalumière
MM. *Prat* (Oehler)
Portier
Valleix

Italy

MM. Amadei
Antoni
Bianco
Cifarelli
Ferrari Aggradi
Stegagnini (Fiandrotti)
Palumbo (Frasca)
Giust
Mezzapesa
Martino (Milani)
Pollidoro (Pecchioli)
Rauti
Rubbi
Sarti
Sinesio
Masciadri (Vecchiotti)

United Kingdom

Sir Frederic Bennett
Mr. Coleman
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Garrett
Terlezki (Sir Anthony Grant)
Hardy
Sir Paul Hawkins
MM. Hill
Freeson (Lord Hughes)
Jessel
Lord *Newall*
(Earl of Kinnoull)
Mr. *Murphy*
(Lady Jill Knight)
Dr. Miller
Sir John Osborn
Sir John Page
Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Wilkinson

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Ahrens
Antretter
Berger
Enders
Haase
Fischer (Mrs. Kelly)
Kittelmann

Luxembourg

MM. Burger
Goerens
Linster (Hengel)

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France

MM. Baumel
Galley
Koehl
Mermaz
Seitlinger

Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Böhm

Italy

MM. Cavaliere
Gianotti

Netherlands

Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

United Kingdom

Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Doc. 1069 and addendum*).
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Doc. 1071 and addendum*).
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Doc. 1072 and addendum*).
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1074*).
5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.45 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

*Revised draft budget
of the administrative expenditure of the
Assembly for the financial year 1986*

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration,
Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum
and 1072 and addendum)*

The reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pollidoro and Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Rees, Spies von Bülesheim, Linster and Sir John Page.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The joint debate was adjourned.

4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1074)*

The first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Poos answered questions put by MM. Bianco, Valleix, Bohl, Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Wilkinson and Ferrari Aggradi.

5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Masciadri, Rauti, Mezzapesa and Poos (*Minister for Foreign*

Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council).

The debate was adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Gerstl</i> (Neumann) Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz) Soell Spies von Bülesheim Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Unland) Mr. Zierer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Beysen</i> (Declercq) Dejardin Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck		MM. Aarts <i>Eisma</i> (de Kwaadsteniet) Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra)
	Italy	
France	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco <i>Stegagnini</i> (Cavaliere) <i>Fiandrotti</i> (Cifarelli) Ferrari Aggradi <i>Palumbo</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) <i>Rodotà</i> (Gianotti) Giust Mezzapesa <i>Martino</i> (Milani) <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet <i>Fourré</i> (Berrier) Jeambrun Jung <i>Hunault</i> (Koehl) Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Chénard</i> (Mermaz) Oehler <i>Bohl</i> (Seitlinger) Valleix		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (Garrett) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. <i>Cox</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Lady Jill Knight) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Rees</i> (Sir John Osborn) Sir John Page Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Berger Enders <i>Scheer</i> (Haase) Kittelmann Müller	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Baumel de Chambrun Collette Croze Galley Gremetz Portier	Mr. Böhm Mrs. Kelly MM. Reddemann Rumpf	MM. van den Bergh Tummers van der Werff
	Italy	United Kingdom
	Mr. Vecchiotti	MM. Jessel Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078 and amendment*).
2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum*).
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the revised report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1075 and amendments*).
5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; European security and the Mediterranean (*Votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1075 and amendments, 1078 and amendments and 1073*).
6. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Votes on the draft budgets, Docs. 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum*).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1069 and addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078 and amendment)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Ahrens, Antretter and Giust.

The debate was adjourned.

4. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France

Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France, addressed the Assembly.

The President invited members of the Assembly who had been unable to put their questions to Mr. Chirac to submit them to his office. He would ensure their communication to the Prime Minister.

Mr. Chirac answered questions put by MM. Müller, Stoffelen, Bianco, Valleix, Goerens, Ahrens, Wilkinson, Close, Soell, Sarti and Sir Anthony Grant.

The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 4.55 p.m.

5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1078 and amendment)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Linster, Bassinet, Fourré, Eisma, van der Sanden, Burger, Sir Paul Hawkins (point of order), MM. Burger and Cifarelli.

The debate was closed.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Hardy, Amadei and Cox.

The President replied to the points of order.

Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Bianco:

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the Reykjavik meeting;”

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 438)¹.

6. European security and the Mediterranean

*(Vote on the revised draft recommendation,
Doc. 1073)*

Speaker: Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*).

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the revised draft recommendation.

The revised draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 439)².

7. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

*(Revised report of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1075 and amendments)*

Mr. Sinesio proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

Speakers: MM. Freeson and Amadei (*Rapporteur*).

The Assembly agreed to refer the report back to committee.

8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

*Revised draft budget
of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986*

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

*(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration,
Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum
and 1072 and addendum)*

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Sinesio, Masciadri, Bassinet, Burger and Goebbels (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

The joint debate was closed.

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Cifarelli.

9. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Rodotà as a titular member in place of Mr. Lapenta.

10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd December, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.

1. See page 22.

2. See page 24.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Fischer</i> (Mrs. Kelly) Kittelmann Müller <i>Gerstl</i> (Neumann) Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz) Soell <i>Lemmrich</i> (Spies von Büllesheim) Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Unland) Mr. Zierer	Netherlands MM. Aarts <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) <i>Eysink</i> (de Kwaadsteniet) Stoffelen Tummers <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Beysen</i> (Declercq) Dejardin <i>De Bondt</i> (Péciaux) Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck		
France	Italy	
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Fourré</i> (Berrier) de Chambrun Collette <i>Bohl</i> (Croze) <i>André</i> (Galley) <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Jung <i>Bichet</i> (Koehl) Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Prat</i> (Oehler) Portier Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Amadei Antoni <i>Stegagnini</i> (Cavaliere) Cifarelli <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Ferrari Aggradi) <i>Palumbo</i> (Frasca) <i>Rodotà</i> (Gianotti) Giust Mezzapesa <i>Martino</i> (Milani) <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rubbi Sarti Sinesio <i>Masciadri</i> (Vecchietti)	United Kingdom MM. <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) <i>Freeson</i> (Coleman) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Cox (Garrett) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Berger Enders	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Italy	United Kingdom
Mr. Mermaz	MM. Bianco Fiandrotti Rauti	Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Mr. Ross
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Böhm Haase Reddemann Rumpf		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 438

*on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that cannot be separated from the recommendation;
- (ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reached the Assembly in time to allow a true dialogue with the Council;
- (iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on its activities twice a year;
- (iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European position towards the United States strategic defence initiative;
- (v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters;
- (vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting;
- (vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also exchanges between the Council and the Assembly;
- (ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU and public awareness;
- (x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communicate to the Assembly, insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it;
- (xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the rôle it assigns to the Standing Armaments Committee or the activities of that body;
- (xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its international secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985;
- (xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies " must also take account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has not followed up this recognition;
- (xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' partners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up the Rome declaration;
- (xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present and future of Western Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over the place the modified Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU;
- (xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively preventing the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the Reykjavik meeting;

3. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and indicate what steps it intends to take to this end;
4. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previously been given in informal communications to some of its organs;
5. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its meetings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained;
6. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors;
7. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I;
8. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the participation of all member countries;
9. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned to the agencies;
10. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates effectively;
11. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics;
12. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the European armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977;
13. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armaments industries carried out by the SAC;
14. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-operation between existing European institutes for security studies";
15. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities;
16. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU;
17. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of its work.

RECOMMENDATION 439***on European security and the Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East region and the Mediterranean area has not changed;
- (ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has not increased since the committee's last report;
- (iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population;
- (iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and positions of allied countries;
- (v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian involvement in world terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region;
- (vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO;
- (vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appropriate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended:

1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in the Mediterranean area:
 - (i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating maritime surveillance under COMMARAIRMED;
 - (ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies;
 - (iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the principle of the freedom of the seas;
 - (iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent.
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by providing military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed forces;
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members;
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-eastern flank;
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to completing the NATO command structure in the area;

6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region;
7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus;
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General;
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction;
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda).
2. European helicopters for the 1990s (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1077 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
5. European helicopters for the 1990s (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1077 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Statement by the President of the Assembly

Before introducing the first item on the orders of the day, the President made a statement.

Because of the important matters on the agenda of the session, the work still to be done, the Assembly's difficulty so far in dealing with the various problems before it in view of the quite exceptional political situation of Western European Union vis-à-vis decisive world events described in particular in the important addresses and comments by Lord Carrington, Mr. Poos and Mr. Chirac, to mention only three addresses, he announced his decision to convene the Assembly, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, in extraordinary session to complete its programme of work and thus strengthen WEU's contribution to the management of fast-developing topical events.

He would ask the Presidential Committee, which was to meet on Thursday morning, to take the necessary decisions on the date, duration and agenda for implementing this plan.

On behalf of the Presidential Committee, he would inform members of the Assembly of these decisions as soon as possible so that each of them, and of course the Assembly committees, might make the necessary arrangements. This would be done with due regard to the commitments of members of the Council and activities in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda)

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, moved a draft order on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987.

He asked the Assembly to agree to his proposals on the problem of pensions, on the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk and on the adoption of a supplementary budget within three months.

On the last point, he asked the President of the Assembly and the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to that end.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985.

The motion was agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Hardy.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986.

The revised draft budget was agreed to.

The President proposed that the Assembly agree to the draft order, at addendum II to Document 1072, on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987, taking particular account of the comments made by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The draft order and, in consequence, the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 were agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 65)¹.

5. European helicopters for the 1990s

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1077 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir John Osborn and Mr. Stegagnini.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg

Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, addressed the Assembly.

7. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom

Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgarne answered questions put by MM. Wilkinson, Ahrens, Sir Paul Hawkins, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Valleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir John Osborn.

8. European helicopters for the 1990s

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1077 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: Mr. Valleix and Sir Paul Hawkins.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Sir John Osborn.

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Bearing in mind the rôle of the EEC in co-ordinating manufacturing capacity, including that of the aircraft industry and, in particular, the helicopter industry;”

Speakers: Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson and Sir John Osborn.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir John Osborn.

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Aware that the rôle of the helicopter in modern warfare is influenced by the use of anti-helicopter missiles such as the ‘Stinger’ and by the use of ‘anti-helicopter’ helicopters;”

Speakers: Sir John Osborn and Mr. Wilkinson.

Sir John Osborn proposed the withdrawal of his amendment.

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Dr. Miller (point of order).

Mr. Hardy moved Amendment 1, previously in the name of Sir John Osborn.

Speakers: Lady Jill Knight, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. Wilkinson.

1. See page 30.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 440) ¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller.

***9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3.25 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.

1. See page 31.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Stoffelen
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Bianco	Tummers
Bogaerts	<i>Stegagnini</i> (Cavaliere)	<i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der
Declercq	Cifarelli	Werf-Terpstra)
Dejardin	<i>Palumbo</i> (Fiandrotti)	<i>de Beer</i> (van der
<i>De Bondt</i> (Pécriaux)	<i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca)	Werff)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Giust	
Mr. Steverlynck	Mezzapesa	
	<i>Martino</i> (Milani)	United Kingdom
	<i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli)	Sir Frederic Bennett
	Rauti	Mr. <i>Freeson</i> (Coleman)
	Sarti	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
France		Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Garrett)
MM. Bassinet	Luxembourg	Sir Anthony Grant
Baumel	MM. Burger	Mr. Hardy
<i>Chénard</i> (Mermaz)	<i>Konen</i> (Goerens)	Sir Paul Hawkins
<i>Prat</i> (Oehler)	Hengel	Mr. Hill
Valleix		Lord Hughes
Federal Republic of Germany		MM. Corrie (Jessel)
MM. Ahrens	Netherlands	<i>Ward</i> (Earl of
Antretter	MM. van der Sanden (Aarts)	Kinnoull)
Böhm	<i>Worrell</i> (van den	Lady Jill Knight
Enders	Bergh)	Dr. Miller
Kittlemann	<i>Eisma</i> (de	Sir John Osborn
Müller	Kwaadsteniet)	Sir John Page
Zierer		Sir Dudley Smith
		Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
MM. Berrier	MM. Berger	MM. Amadei
de Chambrun	Haase	Antoni
Collette	Mrs. Kelly	Ferrari Aggradi
Croze	MM. Neumann	Gianotti
Galley	Reddemann	Rubbi
Gremetz	Rumpf	Sinesio
Jeambrun	Schulte	Vecchiatti
Jung	Schwarz	
Koehl	Soell	
Mrs. Lalumière	Spies von Büllersheim	United Kingdom
MM. Portier	Unland	Mr. Ross
Seitlinger		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 65***on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987***

The Assembly,

Noting that the Council, in communicating its prior opinion, has explained that it was continuing to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and that it will study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible,

1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of the present session its draft budget, as amended by the Council, on condition that within a maximum of three months a supplementary budget for 1987 be established taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the documents already submitted to the Council;
2. Consequently INSTRUCTS the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to this end.

RECOMMENDATION 440
on European helicopters for the 1990s

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential of the helicopter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the United States and the Soviet Union;
- (ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of helicopters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter preponderance of the Warsaw Pact forces;
- (iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters by NATO;
- (iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States;
- (v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States helicopter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the United States;
- (vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states of WEU based on transnational co-operation;
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter;
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry;
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint procurement within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types;
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in terms of orders;
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to international and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic importance.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1081*).
3. Parliamentary and public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1080*).
4. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (*Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1079*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy

Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. Sarti, Cifarelli, Close, Stegagnini, Pollidoro, Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Budtz (*Observer from Denmark*), Hill, Kittelmann, Palumbo, Ahrens and Bianco.

The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.

Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1081)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Tummers and Morris.

The debate was closed.

Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur, and Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

Speaker: Mr. Tummers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 66)¹.

5. Parliamentary and public relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1080)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Murphy, Hill and Enders.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

¹. See page 35.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 75)¹.

**6. Developments in the Soviet Union
and East-West relations**

*(Presentation of the report of
the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1079)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Close, Rapporteur.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th December, at 10.15 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.

1. See page 36.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Tummers <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck	MM. Bianco <i>Stegagnini</i> (Cavaliere) Cifarelli <i>Palumbo</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Mezzapesa <i>Martino</i> (Milani) <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti Sarti	United Kingdom Mr. <i>Morris</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn) Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Sir John Page) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
France	Luxembourg	
MM. Bassinet Collette Valleix	Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (Burger)	
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Ahrens Böhm Enders Kittelmann Schulte	MM. van der Sanden (Aarts) <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Mrs. Kelly MM. Müller Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schwarz Soell Spies von Büllenheim Unland Zierer	Italy MM. Amadei Antoni Ferrari Aggradi Gianotti Giust Rubbi Sinesio Vecchietti
MM. Baumel Berrier de Chambrun Croze Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Mermaz Oehler Portier Seitlinger		Luxembourg MM. Goerens Hengel
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom MM. Coleman Garrett Hardy Ross
MM. Antretter Berger Haase		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 66***on the outline of a new booklet on
Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the outline of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

1. To ensure that a booklet based on the text submitted is published as soon as possible in the five languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is regularly brought up to date.

RESOLUTION 75***on parliamentary and public relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the frequent mention of the reactivation of WEU in debates in some member parliaments;
- (ii) Convinced, however, that still more parliamentarians should take an active part in such debates in all member parliaments;
- (iii) Welcoming the United Kingdom Government's initiative in presenting a written report to parliament on the activities of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs,

INVITES national delegations

1. To seize every opportunity to discuss the rôle of Western European Union in parliamentary and public debates on security and defence matters;
2. To urge the other governments of member countries to follow the example of those of Germany and the United Kingdom and produce regular written reports to parliament on the activities of WEU;
3. To approach their national parliaments and governments to ensure they acknowledge the due central and priority rôle of the Assembly, which is the most direct expression of the political and democratic will of member countries;
4. To continue impressing upon the governments of member countries the need to allocate to the Assembly the financial and technical means essential for the effective pursuit of its public relations activities.

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1986

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations
(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and
vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1079).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

Speaker: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

3. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations

(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1079)

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Martino, Péciaux and Tummers.

Mr. Péciaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Burger, Palumbo, Bogaerts, De Decker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Hill.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Close, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Mr. Martino, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 33(2) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Stoffelen asked for a vote by roll-call.

More than five members having concurred, the Assembly proceeded to a vote by roll-call.

The draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 24 votes to 14 with 1 abstention; 9 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 441) ¹.

4. Statement by the President

The President informed the Assembly that the Presidential Committee had decided that the extraordinary session would take place in Luxembourg on 28th and 29th April 1987 with the following agenda:

1. Reactivation of WEU
2. Disarmament
3. Budgetary and administrative questions.

Speakers: MM. Cox, Dejardin, Dr. Miller, Mr. De Decker, the President, Mr. Goebbels (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

5. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

¹ See page 40.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Spies von Büllesheim Zierer	MM. Stoffelen Tummers <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Close</i> (Declercq) Dejardin Péciaux	Italy	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck	MM. <i>Palumbo</i> (Fiandrotti) Mezzapesa <i>Martino</i> (Milani) <i>Pollidoro</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti Sarti	United Kingdom
France		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Cox</i> (Coleman) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Parry</i> (Garrett) <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) <i>Edwards</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Collette <i>Alloncle</i> (Galley) <i>Chénard</i> (Mermaz) <i>Prat</i> (Oehler) Valleix	Luxembourg	MM. Hill <i>Woodall</i> (Lord Hughes) Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn)
	Mr. Burger Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i> (Goerens)	Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Ward</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Böhm Enders	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Kwaadsteniet	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Müller Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Soell Unland	MM. Rubbi Sinesio Vecchietti
MM. Berrier de Chambrun Croze Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière		Luxembourg
MM. Portier Seitlinger	Italy	Mr. Hengel
	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Frasca Gianotti Giust	Netherlands
Federal Republic of Germany		MM. van den Bergh van der Werff
MM. Ahrens Antretter Berger Haase Mrs. Kelly		United Kingdom
		Mr. Jessel Sir John Page Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (Doc. 1079) ¹:

Ayes	24
Noes	14
Abstentions	1

Ayes:

MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	MM. Mezzapesa
Baumel	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i>	<i>Martino</i> (Milani)
Sir Frederic Bennett	(Goerens)	Sir Dudley Smith
MM. Bogaerts	Mr. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir Anthony	MM. Spies von Büllersheim
Böhm	Grant)	Steверlynck
Burger	Sir Paul Hawkins	Valleix
Collette	Mr. Hill	<i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der
<i>Close</i> (Declercq)	Earl of Kinnoull	Werf-Terpstra)
<i>Palumbo</i> (Fiandrotti)	Lady Jill Knight	Zierer

Noes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Woodall</i> (Lord Hughes)
Bassinet	<i>Chénard</i> (Mermaz)
<i>Cox</i> (Coleman)	Dr. Miller
Dejardin	MM. <i>Prat</i> (Oehler)
Enders	Péciaux
<i>Parry</i> (Garrett)	Stoffelen
<i>Edwards</i> (Hardy)	Tummers

Abstentions:

Mr. de Kwaadsteniet

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 441***on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military deployment not justified by the requirements of its security;
- (ii) Considering that, in spite of the Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the name of détente have led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situation in the peoples' democracies;
- (iii) Noting that the size of the amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the fundamental reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the Soviet Union requires a reduction in its military effort;
- (iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction;
- (v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that country's external relations;
- (vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure;
- (vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of confidence-building measures;
- (ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective concessions in international negotiations;
- (x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal of true negotiations which would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level;
- (xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces – which should be brought to the lowest possible level – in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe;
- (xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise their views on questions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners;
- (xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive rôle to play in this matter and gratified that it has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals;
- (xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide relations of all kinds between the West and the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European positions on armaments and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative;
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments are started;
3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the third world the struggle it calls "anti-imperialist";

4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military effort;
5. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeopardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, including SS-21s, SS-23s and SS-24s;
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1986

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
 2. Attendance register.
 3. Adoption of the minutes.
 4. Examination of credentials.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hardy (point of order).
 5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
 6. Observers.
 7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1068).
Speakers: The President; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Freeson, Dr. Miller, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Reddemann.
 8. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1083).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Goerens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Burger.
 9. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mr. Möllemann to questions put by: Mr. Soell, Mr. Berger, Mr. Close, Mr. Jung, Mr. Tummers, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Hardy (point of order).
 10. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO.
Replies by Lord Carrington to questions put by: Mr. De Decker, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Valleix.
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett.
 11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
 12. Changes in the membership of committees.
 13. European security and the Mediterranean (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1073).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Müller, Mr. Giust, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Berger, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
 14. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
- Appendix:
Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 5th June 1986 at the end of the eighth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

1. See page 15.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the eighth sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session whose names have been published in Notice No. 9.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested

The President (continued)

by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, with the exception of those of Mr. Collette, Mrs. Lalumière and Mr. Portier as representatives and Mr. Alloncle, Mr. Chénard and Mr. Lacour as substitutes in the French Delegation, and that of Mr. Stegagnini as a substitute in the Italian Delegation. Those members were nominated after the adjournment of the session of the Assembly.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify those credentials under Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

These nominations are in the form prescribed by the rules and no objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any objection?...

The credentials are ratified subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This is a serious point of order. It is not party political and I believe that I am speaking for many members of the Assembly regardless of political persuasion. I am sure that they will endorse the comments that I feel to be essential.

I had originally thought of raising the issue under item 4 but since the point of order concerns much more extensive considerations than merely this session, it is appropriate that I raise the matter now. You will be aware that, over a substantial period, many members of the Assembly have become increasingly restive about the proliferation of visiting speakers. In my recollection it was clearly urged that there be no more than two visiting speakers in any session of the Assembly.

When I arrived in Paris today and looked at the order paper I saw forecast five or six speakers. We do not travel in winter across Europe merely to be a mobile audience. We are supposed to be a parliamentary assembly. There are grave matters that we have to consider. We do not come here – I do not want to be offensive about our visitors – to listen to rather trite presentations from ministers who may wish to be on the ministerial bandwagon. We are here to consider serious reports. We shall not have time to do so because of this appalling proliferation of visitors. I do not wish to be rude about the vis-

itors but we are prevented from fulfilling the prime task of this Assembly, which is to consider our reports and so on.

You will understand, Mr. President, that the point I make could be made by someone on the right of European politics and I know that conservatives as well as socialists, liberals and christian democrats share this view. I have no means of telling whether it is the majority view of the Assembly but I suspect that it is. It is certainly the majority view of those of us who have been involved in the Assembly for a long time.

I ask you, Mr. President, to rule on my point of order and to confirm that a maximum of two speakers was the decision reached by the Assembly. I ask you, further, to make whatever alterations are necessary to give this Assembly time to do justice to the subjects that we should be considering this week.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think you will find that your comments are to some extent answered by what I shall have to say in a few moments. The chair is faced here with a problem of a political character which is not entirely prejudicial to the work of our Assembly, as the presence of members of government is part of a policy which we shall be examining carefully during the present session.

I wish to take issue only with your use of the word "visitors". They are, in fact, members of the governments of member countries who, according to the Charter, have a right to address the Assembly whenever they wish. I do not want to start a debate, and I assure you that your point has been noted. We have already put the problems you mention to the Presidential Committee, and appropriate action will be taken.

With your permission, we shall now proceed with our business.

I shall shortly be calling those who wish to raise points of order when we come to discuss the order of business.

First, as President of the Assembly, I wish to welcome the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers. I thank him for coming here and for having made the necessary arrangements enabling the Council presidency to take a full part in all our work. This initiative is particularly welcome to the Assembly, as it fulfils a wish which has been expressed on a number of occasions.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, all observers who have drawn a parallel between the

The President (continued)

work of the various European parliamentary assemblies have stressed the extraordinary cohesion always found in the WEU Assembly from the moment there was question of matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and the organisation which brings us together here.

This cohesion is all the more credible since we are perfectly familiar with the clash of various opinions and political sensibilities inherent in all parliamentary assemblies. The session now starting is not expected to be any more irenic than others from this point of view. As always, each and every one of us will fight for the ideas to which he is attached.

Strengthened by your confidence, allow me to tell you that the very widespread support the Assembly has always given me on matters relating to WEU will, as in the past, continue to be a source of inestimable encouragement and assistance, particularly for everything concerning relations between the Assembly and the Council. The Assembly's firmness and the unanimity always shown by the Presidential Committee were essential for defending a cause which, although not yet finally won, has nevertheless had some success about which I will say a few words.

The Assembly's cohesion has produced and is still producing tangible results for the future of Europe as long as it is expressed with sufficient strength to find a response among public opinion and consequently to be taken into consideration by the governments which are members of the Council.

This is true for the most important and more minor matters alike. In the thirty-two years of its existence the WEU Assembly has worked out, if not a doctrine, which cannot be the task of a parliamentary assembly, at least what may be called a message.

This message is a simple one but clear enough to anyone looking back on all the texts it has adopted, often unanimously. It may be summed up as an affirmation of the *de facto* solidarity that unites the whole of Western Europe, whether it likes it or not, from the moment the security of one of our countries is threatened. The modified Brussels Treaty merely translated into a positive act a reality greater than us and which obliged our countries to face it together.

A second observation stems from this one, i.e. that no true European union can acquire the stability necessary for any political achievement if it fails to assume the consequences of this solidarity, in other words if, at political level, it does not face up to all the requirements implied by European security.

Our colleagues in the European Parliament understand this full well and often claim the right to debate matters relating to security. So far, they have not been successful because our governments recognise only the WEU Assembly as having defence responsibilities.

If some obscurity surrounded the way Europe considered security matters should be handled, the signing of the single European act by the twelve member governments of the European Community and the ratification of this text by our national parliaments makes the situation clearer since this act, while leaving aside the question of European security, recognises that the implementation of WEU's responsibilities is part of an overall process from which a European union should progressively emerge.

Thus, the Rome declaration, which remains the charter for the reactivation of WEU, is no longer an isolated act but, in accordance with what we have always asked for, fits into a process covering every area of European activity. That is what I wished to say when referring, in the memorandum of the Presidential Committee issued last September, to the idea of a European political area.

This can but fortify us in our approach to the Council calling for full application of the principles to which it subscribed in October 1984 and which we recalled in this memorandum. Those of us who took part in the joint meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Council on 14th November at the close of the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg were able to note that, on this point at least, the Assembly's message had been received.

Admittedly, the so-called informal nature of the Luxembourg meeting did not in principle allow any decisions to be taken. However, it does seem to have started off a process which should, if pursued, give substance to that European defence policy which we have for so long deplored as being faltering.

Confirmation of this assertion is to be found in the particularly large number of ministers and others who have asked to speak or who accepted invitations to do so. What several of them represent is certainly not without significance. Their remarks should confirm and explain this new course being followed by the Council. The coming of the French Prime Minister is an event of particular importance and no one can doubt that his address will be listened to most attentively.

It is obviously not to the weight of our deliberations alone that we owe what is undeniably a success for our Assembly but, above all, to events and circumstances which have showed public opinion, sometimes not very aware of the facts of international life, and reticent govern-

The President (continued)

ments that the point of view we uphold meets the challenge now facing Europe.

The reports we are to debate, particularly those by Mr. Close and Mr. Amadei, show there is little doubt that the facts revealed to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance by the Reykjavik summit meeting, in spite of its failure, will be the hub of our debates. Similarly, it is clear that this event has exercised and will continue to exercise a decisive rôle in the direction followed by our governments.

In any event, the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg has already shown that this summit meeting has definitely changed the way Europeans view the future of their security. Reykjavik probably did more for what the Assembly has been asking the Council for thirty-one years than all our recommendations if it has finally convinced our governments that they should use WEU to hold effective political consultations on security and defence matters and to translate these consultations into political action, particularly in NATO. The Assembly has often said that WEU should be the start of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Circumstances seem at last to have inscribed this in the Council's intentions.

The reactivation of WEU is not an administrative option or an institutional restructuring, even if it involves operational changes. It is above all the decision, set out in the Rome declaration but hardly carried into practice before the Luxembourg meeting, to give political content to European defence.

It is evident that the new direction followed by the Council will have considerable and varied repercussions on relations between the governmental and parliamentary organs of WEU.

First, since the question of reactivating WEU was raised, the rigid framework in which the Council worked and set its relations with the Assembly has weakened considerably and some aspects seem doomed to disappear, or almost, in the fairly near future. It is enough here to recall the place occupied by the protocols organising the control of armaments in WEU's activities for thirty years to illustrate how cumbersome and rigid the framework was.

If reactivation becomes a fact, as what we know of the Luxembourg meeting allows us to hope, it would henceforth be political initiatives ill-fitting the old structures that would govern most of what was done in WEU. Quite new forms of relations between the governmental organs of the organisation and the Assembly would then have to be worked out and implemented. We started this task two years ago in agreement with successive Chairmen-in-Office of

the Council, Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and now Mr. Poos, who will be addressing us tomorrow, and experience so far has given some satisfaction, as Mr. Goerens emphasises in the report on the activities of the Presidential Committee which he is to submit to you for your approval.

However, these relations fall well short of our rightful expectations. Much remains to be done, particularly to ensure that the Assembly is kept adequately and as strictly informed as possible about the content and form of the multiple but not very well organised activities which the Council seems to have chosen so that we may debate them properly. The increase in the number of informal meetings and messages can in no way be taken as material for what must be a public, clear dialogue between a parliamentary assembly and an executive body.

The European security committee associating the political directors from ministries for foreign affairs and representatives of ministries of defence, decided upon at the Luxembourg meeting, would provide the Council with a permanent instrument for its political activities. We have received an assurance from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council that this committee would be set up in the framework of WEU which obviously implies that the Council must report to the Assembly on its work. This is a point on which we shall have to be demanding and vigilant since there is little doubt that this executive body, which will elude statutory commitments, will soon be tempted to veil in nebulous, informal and vague terms all the difficulties it encounters in trying to express joint seven-power opinions.

We consider this a vital matter and experience shows there is ample scope for concern. Recently, the repeated refusal of the Council, in spite of its earlier promises, to report on the activities of the Independent European Programme Group has made us wonder what kind of exchanges it is prepared to have with the Assembly. In his report on the political activities of the Council, Mr. Bianco makes a pertinent analysis of many shortcomings in this dialogue and shows clearly that they stem from the weaknesses, not to say the shirking of duty, of a Council which, in the absence of adequate impetus from the governments, seems to be spending more time paring Assembly budgets than taking political action.

It will be for us to ensure that the ministers keep to their decisions. For this purpose, we shall have to insist that they lead to specific commitments and permanent structures. European security cannot be ensured by speeches or by short-lived actions, more or less in response to the emotions which may be aroused by the hazards of international life.

The President (continued)

The disarray caused by the NATO twofold decision of 1979, the announcement of the SDI in 1983, renewed outbreaks of international terrorism and the Reykjavik meeting in 1986 showed, if proof were needed, that Europe could not face up to such events if it did not prepare itself well beforehand by continuous reflection on the evolution of the international situation, its interests and the aims it intends to pursue.

The Assembly for its part must be able to make a better contribution to this reflection than in the past because the new direction of the Council's work is more propitious for holding political discussions.

For this purpose, the Assembly should pay closer attention to the agenda of Council meetings than it has done so far. Admittedly, its agenda was known to us – if at all – only just before Council meetings. But in Luxembourg the ministers announced a number of questions they intended to place in the centre of their discussions in the next few years. It is for us to draw the necessary indications in order to guide our own work in a direction which will allow a fruitful, in-depth dialogue to be established with the Council.

However, the Council must make no mistake. There is no question of our being – as one of its members recently suggested – the Council's megaphone. If the Assembly can help, as it has done so far, to make European public opinion understand the importance of security problems, if it has helped to outline a spirit of European defence, it is because it has never backed away from a public debate and has been able to bring its debates to a conclusion by adopting, with absolute freedom, recommendations on topical international matters at a time when the Council was showing very little interest in them. It is not the Council's new interest that must make it avoid detailed debates, votes or total freedom of expression. The Assembly will be able to play the rôle proposed by the Council of making Europeans aware of the dimensions of their security problem only if it continues to be a difficult counterpart for the Council itself.

If we set aside matters relating to security in the Mediterranean, many aspects of which the Assembly studied well before the Council itself followed suit, it seems evident that relations between Europe and the United States, particularly in regard to everything relating to disarmament and the limitation of armaments, should dominate our debates in the next few months.

These are in fact matters which must now be considered by Europe which would probably have preferred not to have had to tackle them.

For many years, our contribution to our own defence has been merely a small addition, in the systems guaranteed by NATO, to the deployment of nuclear and conventional forces of all kinds by the United States throughout the world. It was thus quite normal that we relied, to varying degrees, on the United States for determining alliance policy, particularly in regard to strategy and, necessarily, disarmament too. We were not well enough armed to be able to find a place for ourselves.

More or less well-founded impressions from the Reykjavik meeting must not make Europe abandon the prospect of reducing armaments and in this connection embark upon a conflict with the United States which would be both pointless and dangerous for us. Europe can no more achieve cohesion against the United States than it can ensure its security without the United States. Defence Europe is first of all a Europe of co-operation and agreement with the Americans. Defence against nuclear missiles, alliance strategy, security outside the NATO area, disarmament and the fight against terrorism are all areas in which Europe cannot envisage its own defence without close, continuing contact with its American ally.

But there too the transatlantic dialogue must remain frank and balanced. We should welcome the fact that our Secretary-General has just visited the United States to explain the contribution a reactivated WEU could make to the alliance. The presence of Lord Carrington at our session and his words later this afternoon will remind us that it is in NATO that these matters are handled between allies.

I do not wish to conclude my remarks about what we have learned of the latest Council decisions without referring to another Assembly proposal which, for the first time, seems to have been followed up positively in Luxembourg, i.e. the Council has undertaken to arrange European training courses in the defence institutes of member countries. This is a first step towards implementing what had been the principal intention of the Seven when they decided to reactivate WEU: to promote the emergence of a European spirit of defence to ward off the threat of a serious moral crisis such as the one following NATO's twofold decision in December 1979. A European defence policy that neglected this essential aspect of joint security would most probably be built only on sand.

Finally, the governments will have to draw the full consequences of their proclaimed intentions regarding reactivation. The Assembly does not have the means which are essential for adapting itself to the new situation and the Council's budgetary policy for several years has been a serious threat to the Assembly's independence and possibilities of working effectively.

The President (continued)

Thus, nine persons representing the executives of member countries or intergovernmental organisations are to address us during this session, some because we invited them and others because they invoked the right of the governments of all WEU member countries to address the Assembly. This is in itself an important, heartening event.

This encouraging demonstration by the governments should have resulted in a much longer session to avoid the truly parliamentary debates being reduced because of governmental addresses. However, our budget, which is a very tight one, prevents us from adding a single day or even a single sitting to what was planned. Such a situation is unacceptable because it is a challenge to parliamentary freedom and to our right and duty to express ourselves on the matters on the agenda of our session.

We are of course not complaining about the number of ministers who are coming. What we are complaining about is that the governments do not give us the wherewithal to pursue our session normally when they claim to show their interest in it.

The whole Assembly will be gratified to learn that, at its last meeting, the Council refused to follow the proposals submitted by the budget experts. It has made noteworthy concessions for our 1986 budget and has said that it is prepared to re-examine the Assembly's requests for 1987. This news arrived too late for us to be able to take advantage of it for organising this session, but we note the political gesture thus made.

Tomorrow morning, we shall have to decide on the proposals Sir Dudley Smith will submit to us on the measures we shall have to take to pursue useful negotiations with the Council on this subject.

The constraints of the order of business of this session prevent me from prolonging my remarks in spite of my wish to speak to you about other matters, particularly armaments co-operation. Recent events have again shown how inadequate this still is and how much it still needs the political impetus which was to be the Council's task but which is still awaited.

I wish to conclude, however, by noting that European defence, which not so long ago still seemed a highly academic question, has in the last few weeks become a major preoccupation for Europeans. This should make our session of very special importance in the history of WEU and perhaps also of Europe.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling you, Mr. Hardy, I have two matters to mention to the Assembly. If you agree, I will call you during the debate following what I have to say about the Assembly's orders of the day.

I have to inform you first of the presence of the following parliamentary observers: from Denmark, Mr. Arne Melchior and Mr. Lasse Budtz; from Spain, Mr. Antonio García-Pagán and Mr. Juan Manuel Fabra; from Greece, Mr. Panayotis Katsaros; from Norway, Mrs. Kaci Kullmann Five and Mr. Finn Knutsen, and from Turkey, Mr. Kâmrân İnan.

I am happy to welcome both them and the members of the Permanent Council present at this part-session.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – We are not.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1068)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now call for the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 1068.

I have to inform the Assembly that I have been advised by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of a request to postpone for the time being consideration of the preliminary report on threat assessment, Document 1076, presented by Mr. Stokes, because the Rapporteur is at present ill in bed.

As this involves internal reorganisation of the order of business for this session, I ask the Assembly to agree that consideration of this question be postponed.

I also ask that the Assembly agree to the inclusion at the end of today's orders of the day, provided there is enough time, of Mr. Kittelmann's revised report on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1073, which was to have been considered at the end of the session on Thursday, 4th December.

The Assembly will also note that a number of late changes have been made to the order of business. The fact is that several ministers have claimed the right to speak at this session under Article VI of the Assembly's Charter. These initiatives are indicative of the interest taken by governments in our work, and can therefore only be a source of satisfaction to us.

The President (continued)

I was, however, determined that these interventions should not adversely affect the parliamentary debate proper. I mean by this that the time allocated to them should leave me in a position to allow a reasonable time to everyone wishing to take part in the debate. I had therefore decided that we should have an evening sitting on Wednesday, 3rd December.

In the event, this decision could not be implemented because the budgetary constraints we have had to apply to our sessions in recent years leave no room for contingencies of this kind. Our staff, both permanent and temporary, are working to the limits of their capacity, and there are no spare staff to call on in an emergency.

Consequently, I had to give up the idea of suggesting what would have been a desirable change to the order of business. The only way we can ensure that we have enough time for the parliamentary debate is to begin our sittings at 9.30 in the morning and to continue until 7.30 p.m. To minimise the problems posed by this arrangement, I shall see that the votes are taken before 6 p.m.

That the participation of a large number of ministers should have this effect demonstrates, I believe, both to ourselves and to the Council the state of paralysis to which we have been reduced by the budgetary policy pursued for some years past with regard to the Assembly.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is what I wanted to say on the subject of an important item of important orders of the day of an important session. I put the matter to you for your consideration.

I now call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am most grateful, Mr. President, and I am sure that everyone shares your regret about the change in the agenda necessitated by Mr. Stokes's illness. But, whilst I am grateful for your courtesy and obvious consideration in response to my point of order, I must say, with respect, that it was no answer. I say that because, Mr. President, the rules which you quoted say that you "may" allow. The point I am making is that you have allowed, when you need not have allowed, half a dozen ministers to be present during this Assembly to take a great deal of the time. They are bound to take a great deal of the time if they are to be afforded the respect that is their due, but by affording the ministers the respect that is their due, you are preventing the Assembly from pursuing its responsibilities. That is the first part of my point of order.

The second part relates to the heartfelt plea that you have already offered, in that the

Assembly is being deprived of adequate resources and it would have been far more potent to say to the ministers: "You cannot come because we cannot afford you." Perhaps that would have driven the point home even more forcefully than your wise and pertinent comments earlier.

Thirdly, since you have allowed the ministers to come, I must ask you two questions. Is it possible to suggest that some of them do not turn up? If that is not possible, is it also possible for me to suggest – I would not wish to be accused of discourtesy but reality requires me to say this and I ask for your comments – and would it be absolutely unreasonable if some of us said to the third, fourth, fifth, or sixth minister to come this week that since it is not reasonable for our debate to be so circumscribed, we have no alternative but to express our protest with our feet by walking out of the Assembly so that ministers are deprived of the mobile audience that they seem to think we are?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been notified of several points of order. You are aware of the liberal attitude of the chair, and I will gladly give the floor to all those wishing to raise such points. I shall be equally glad to reply, but I would ask you not to abuse the facility allowed under the Rules of Procedure in order that our discussions may not be unduly delayed.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully share the views expressed by Mr. Hardy.

The Liberal Group is very gratified to note the growing interest being taken by governments in our Assembly. We cannot, however, hide the perplexity we feel when we observe that the interest they take in their presence here varies in inverse ratio to their willingness to increase the Assembly's budget.

Be that as it may, Mr. President, I wish to state that we approve the changes made to our orders of the day and that we welcome the presence of a large number of ministers. This does, indeed, bear witness to our Assembly's new-found vitality, although we do feel that this attitude should find further expression in budgetary measures and that, in view of the large share of its time devoted by our Assembly to the attending ministers, they should perhaps contemplate increasing our budget so that we could have three sessions a year instead of two.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Although I would certainly support the remarks about the budget, I do not think that this is the occasion to indulge

Mr. Freeson (continued)

in a debate upon that. We shall have an opportunity later to do so. I shall confine my remarks to the order of business.

As I understand it, the order of business is presented to us so that we may agree about it or disagree. It is on the order paper in that form. I object to the order of business and I am prepared to vote against it. I know that that cannot affect today's proceedings. However, if we must have six ministers in four or fewer days, they should all be confined to the latter part of our proceedings, so far as that is possible.

It is now ten minutes to four o'clock. Look at the order of business that we have ahead of us today. There are a number of addresses, including your own, Mr. President, and one from the Secretary-General. We have ministers who are to address us and we are supposed to be dealing with a number of reports, although there is some doubt about one item because of the illness, which we regret, of Mr. Stokes. Nevertheless, it is suggested that another report should be placed on the agenda in the stead of that from Mr. Stokes.

I must protest. It was not necessary for us to have ordered our business in this way. I and others would be less annoyed, less angered – and it is anger that some of us feel about the way that this has been handled – if we were confident that when ministers come to this Assembly they did so for reasons other than simply that of making speeches on matters about which they want us to hear. We should be better pleased if they came before us or our committees to debate security matters at a time when, above all other periods over the past forty years, we need genuinely to be debating such matters. I do not think that we can be confident that that will happen. Six ministers have been asked to come here. They want to address us, not necessarily to debate matters with us. That is what we should be doing in the wake of the Iceland semi-summit. I wish to vote against the order of business and protest most strongly about the way in which this Assembly is being used, perhaps I should say abused, by political leaders.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It is obvious that the point of order raised by Mr. Hardy is not spurious. One ought not to imagine that the view expressed by him was in any way isolated. I support Mr. Hardy, speaking as someone who feels that he is not here primarily to listen to speeches. I have no objection to listening to speeches, but it is not what I am here for. Nor is it what most of us are here for. We are here to debate the issues about which reports have been tabled. If we believe that these reports

are important, and I think they are, it cannot be said that they can be adequately discussed when we have so many ministers scheduled to speak.

I earnestly ask you, Mr. President, when the agenda is being drawn up, not to say: "The most important thing is to have a number of ministers here and then we shall try to fit in as many reports as we can. The important thing is to listen to ministers." That is not how it should be done. The important thing is that the reports should be discussed. If we have time for one or at the most two ministers, that should be thought about afterwards. It should not be a subject that receives priority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The important thing is that, whether we like it or not – and we can argue about it at another date – six ministers are to address us. I hope that when we put questions to them the first that we shall put to each minister will be: "Why are your government not prepared to meet, along with the other governments, the genuine requests of this Assembly for proper funding?" If we can restrain our own ego trips and put these questions to each minister, we shall at least have done some good.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, even though Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has anticipated my proposal, I should like to say briefly that, as a result of a decision of the Bureau, the ministers are now here, and I feel it would be churlish of us not to agree to their staying. But we would probably be failing as parliamentarians if we did not make it absolutely clear to each of these government representatives that the treatment meted out to the Assembly by the Council of Ministers is quite unacceptable to us as parliamentarians. I should therefore like our message to the representative of the Federal German Government in today's debate to be extended to the other five ministers we have invited and then, if necessary, if they fail to draw the logical conclusions, to refrain from talking to any of the ministers at the next part-session.

In Rome, the ministers proposed to us, wrongly I believe, that this Assembly should be solely responsible for public relations matters. But even if we agreed to this, it would be a far cry from our adopting a passive approach to public relations by listening to ministerial speeches which are generally publicised.

Mr. President, my specific proposal is this: let us leave the order of business as it is, but at the same time make it clear to the Council of Min-

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

isters that this is the last time they are going to come here like this and that on any future occasion we shall ask what response the government representatives expect from the Assembly and, at the same time, make it clear what response we hope to have from the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The views which we have just heard expressed provide irrefutable proof of the existence in this forum of a consensus which has nothing to do with political opinions but is an opinion proper to the Assembly itself as expressed by all of us. This is an extremely important point which has a bearing simultaneously on the performance, organisation and credibility of our work.

I accept entire responsibility for the situation we find ourselves in, as it was I who agreed to the attendance of various ministers who wished to address our Assembly, except of course for the Chairman-in-Office of the Council by virtue of his office and whose presence throughout the session is a source of both honour and pleasure to us. As you are aware, if he is unable to take part in our work, his place will be taken by the Luxembourg Minister of Public Security or, in his absence, by the Luxembourg Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. We invited Lord Carrington, the Secretary-General of NATO, to address us, and the other invitations followed on, quite officially, though of course leaving your President no time to consult either the Bureau or the Presidential Committee. I therefore took the decision on my own responsibility and I appeal to you to judge me in your wisdom.

Furthermore, I could hardly say that we refused to be addressed by the representative of a member government, since, under the terms of the Charter, such representatives are fully entitled to attend and address the Assembly by invitation. That is one of the traditions of our Assembly, although we did for a very long time complain that we were never honoured by government ministers in office but only by their representatives. I must add that this is a political issue of a technical character within the rules. It is no mere chance that so many eminent people have expressed the wish to address the Assembly, and we should see that we take advantage of the situation.

I have made the necessary arrangements to extend the duration of the sittings for the first three days of the session: by one and a half hours in the evening and by half an hour in the morning, making together one hour for Tuesday and Wednesday morning and three hours for the two afternoons, or a total of four hours, plus one and a half hours this evening. This means that we shall have, in aggregate, a possible five and a

half extra hours or more than half a day's public sitting. As I just pointed out another solution would have been preferable, but nobody can do the impossible.

Addressing myself to Mr. Hardy in particular, I must say that I totally reject any attitude which might be interpreted as discourtesy. There is no question of this, but only of safeguarding parliamentary rights and asking governments to align their political positions as regards the attention which they give to the parliamentary debates conducted by our Assembly.

We shall have to submit to the Council proposals concerning participation by representatives of the governments of the member countries. It will then be up to the Council to tell the Assembly what action it can take to ensure that such participation in the debates of our Assembly does not affect them adversely.

Two problems arise, and these concern the organisation and the budget. Let us hope that our discussions, the level-headedness of our approach and our sense of responsibility in relation to a matter which has now been engaging our attention for an hour may have favourable repercussions for the Assembly's future. Thank you for raising the matter in thoroughly responsible terms.

In view of the commitment I have entered into, I can now only ask you to approve the order of business, as I have proposed it, with the alterations to the times of the sittings.

My statement will appear tomorrow in the report of the debates for all to see.

May I urge you, ladies and gentlemen, that we trust each other and try to extricate ourselves as best we can from the present situation.

We will now vote on the draft order of business of this session.

Are there any objections to this amended order of business?...

The draft order of business, as amended, is adopted.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1083)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee and ratification of the committee's action, Document 1083.

I call Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report on action by the Presidential Committee which I have the honour to present concerns firstly the Assembly's relations with the Council and secondly the administrative action of the Assembly of Western European Union.

Constituted as it is to represent the various elements of the Assembly as well as to reflect its political trends, the Presidential Committee is competent to approve basic lines of conduct aimed at ensuring the Assembly's cohesion. It should be pointed out that the political dialogue which the committee is able to ensure between the Council and the Assembly has of recent months acquired special importance as a consequence of the thaw in arms control negotiations and the meeting between the leaders of the two superpowers. As it also has budgetary and administrative responsibilities, the Presidential Committee has endeavoured to bring home to the Council the arguments for the financial measures needed to enable the Assembly to fulfil its functions. It follows that the Presidential Committee's task is to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action between sessions.

The section dealing with the Assembly's relations with the Council does not call for detailed comment from me, as our schedule already includes many interventions and reports on the same subject. I shall therefore limit my remarks to the essentials.

My first comment concerns the nature of the relations between the governmental and parliamentary elements of the organisation. The Luxembourg ministers for foreign affairs and defence, who have received in turn the President of the Assembly, the enlarged Bureau, i.e. the Committee for Relations with the Council, and the Presidential Committee, have shown great readiness to co-operate. The members of our Assembly who attended these various meetings made a point of stressing the importance we attach to ensuring that the voice of Europe is heard in the East-West negotiations in the aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting.

In the same constructive spirit, our President, Mr. Caro, drew the Council's attention before the ministerial meeting in November to the Assembly's position on the topics to be discussed. According to information received, the memorandum prepared for this purpose by the President of the Assembly met with a favourable reaction at the ministerial meeting held on 3rd and 4th November.

Without wishing to analyse in detail what the Council intends to do to implement its Rome commitment to reactivate WEU, I must express my satisfaction that the Seven have defined principles and formulated projects which should

enable it to discuss security problems and establish, in parallel with the political co-operation of the Twelve, co-operation between the Seven on security matters.

The decision of principle recently taken by the Council in Luxembourg to entrust to a political committee for European security the task of making Europe's voice heard in security matters is a favourable response to the proposal by the President of the Assembly for the creation of a European political area for the co-ordination of political co-operation.

The Chairman of the Council and the President of the Assembly are also in agreement on the need for WEU to establish a dialogue with the United States in order to demonstrate to the Americans that the work done by WEU serves the global interests of the alliance. And now we come to a worrying point.

Should we, as the Council wishes, complete the reactivation of Western European Union before deciding on the application for membership from some countries of the Atlantic Alliance? The Presidential Committee does not take this view and hopes that the solution to this problem will not be deferred indefinitely.

The second subject is administrative action. The wish to reactivate Western European Union while at the same time depriving the Assembly of the financial resources essential for that purpose amounts to cutting off the water supply from an irrigation system. The Presidential Committee took the view that the conclusions arrived at in London by the meeting of experts of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee were unacceptable. The President of the Assembly therefore wrote to the Chairman of the Council suggesting that the negative points in the recommendations made by the Budget and Organisation Committee should not be taken up.

The Presidential Committee hopes that, with the support of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the modest budget which it has prepared will receive final approval by the Council. The fact is that, if we take account of the increasing burden of pensions due on the retirement of staff recruited when the Office of the Clerk was established, the reductions asked for amount not to zero growth but in real terms represent a cut in the Assembly's resources.

I would like to conclude my remarks on budgetary questions on an optimistic note. Mr. President, the fresh spirit which now prevails in relations between the governmental and parliamentary elements of our organisation as a consequence of the Rome meeting leads me to the conclusion that there is everything to hope for.

Mr. Goerens (continued)

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as the orders of the day are particularly demanding I shall limit myself to these few reflections and will not now go into details of the new methods of voting, which interested delegates will find appended to my written report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Goerens. I also take this opportunity, through you, of thanking the Presidential Committee for its extremely important work between sessions.

In the debate I now call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Goerens on his excellent report, not forgetting the support of the Presidential Committee as representative of the Assembly and, in particular, the personal commitment of our President, Mr. Caro, to the reactivation, or rather the revival, of WEU. There is still a long way to go. I think that, during its chairmanship, Luxembourg will do its best to induce its six partners to attach greater importance to the problem of WEU.

As far as the vital point, the budget, is concerned, our minister for foreign affairs has vetoed any increase in Luxembourg's contribution to WEU. I will say only that we must stress the fact that the Chairman of the Council has been represented here from the beginning and will continue to be so by an appointed Council member throughout the session. The improved dialogue between the Council and the parliamentary Assembly gives rise to the hope that we shall at last hear Europe speaking with one voice on East-West relations. The mooted creation of a political committee for European security made up of the political directors at the ministries for foreign affairs and, possibly, defence should result in a united Europe as far as its security strategy is concerned. One consequence would be an improved dialogue between Europe and America in the global interest of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Council must understand that, under the terms of the Brussels Treaty, it is the only body empowered to define Europe's security interests. Our Assembly is certainly ready to collaborate in serving the interests of our security.

Opinions differ with regard to the enlargement of the organisation. Tomorrow afternoon it will be interesting to hear the President's arguments on this matter.

To conclude, I would like to thank once again everyone who has collaborated in the preparation of this report. I take the view that this forum should welcome all ministers who wish to

show their support for WEU on condition, as has been said, that such support is reflected in their national budgets.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Burger. I have no other speakers on the list.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?...

The debate is closed.

I think that the Assembly is ready to ratify the action of the committee.

Are there any objections?...

The action by the Presidential Committee is ratified.

I congratulate Mr. Goerens on his report.

A minor alteration has just been made to the orders of the day and, with the consent of the Secretary-General of WEU, it is now my pleasure to give the floor to Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. I thank him in advance for his answers to any questions which will be put.

**9. Address by Mr. Möllemann,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when I was last here a year ago, many of you were unhappy that so few ministers addressed you. Now many of you are unhappy that so many ministers come here. I congratulate you upon this qualitative improvement in your unhappiness. But to be quite serious about the requests members have made here, I should like to say the following: the statement I intended to make to you is just being distributed, and I do not therefore need to read it out. If you like, you can read it for yourselves.¹

So that we can do precisely what the Assembly wants, namely discuss questions, I will restrict myself to four comments, which are covered in rather more detail in the statement that has been distributed.

First, in East-West relations after Reykjavik, we should not miss the opportunity of finding out whether the objectives proclaimed by General Secretary Gorbachev, and which he refers to as new thinking, will actually provide an opportunity for a more co-operative relationship between East and West in all areas. We must take

¹ See appendix, page 79.

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

the utmost care to ascertain this. We should not have to reproach ourselves afterwards for missing an opportunity.

Second, this means that we should make a cautious but positive appraisal of the results achieved and initial approaches made in Reykjavik as an opportunity for more ambitious and more practical results in the future – in other words, results set out in agreements. Where the Federal Government is concerned – and I am glad that this appears to apply to most of us, or at least to the governments that met in Luxembourg – this is particularly true of our concern to implement the zero option in respect of intermediate-range missiles, which came within reach in Reykjavik. We would see that as a distinctly positive development, as an improvement, not a deterioration, in the security situation.

Third, I believe Reykjavik has underlined the importance of the declaration made by the then Soviet foreign minister and his American counterpart on 8th January 1985 on the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. They said that a co-operative solution must be found for offensive systems, strategic offensive systems and for any defensive systems, including space systems, with the aim of avoiding an arms race in space and ending the arms race on earth. This means, of course, that space systems, like all other levels – conventional, tactical-nuclear, strategic, intermediate-range – must be the subject of negotiations and that the nature and scale of the planning of space systems depend directly on any results achieved in the negotiations on strategic offensive systems. In other words, the fewer defensive systems we have in space, the fewer we need – ideally speaking, none at all.

My fourth and last comment – you will find all this, as I said, in greater detail in the speech distributed – concerns chemical weapons. Ladies and gentlemen, we are aware, of course, that the conventional imbalance and the situation as regards chemical weapons will become more important if agreements are reached on intermediate-range systems and offensive nuclear systems. But I should not like to leave anyone in any doubt that, as the negotiations on chemical weapons now stand, we have a good chance of completely eliminating this scourge of humanity. The British draft should enable all the negotiating partners to reach agreement. We would very much welcome that.

Those were the main points I wanted to make, without taxing your patience, and at the same time finding a compromise between the request of the British member who is now recovering

over a cup of coffee and what I originally intended.

I now await your questions on security policy or other aspects.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your kindness and courtesy. The Assembly is sitting quite normally and, as I have already said, you have every right to be here. Your address was most interesting, and, as agreed, I shall now call members of the Assembly who wish to ask questions.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, you have implied that progress in one area of arms control should not be achieved at the expense of progress in other, unrelated areas.

I want to ask you what you think of attempts to hamper negotiations, possibly successful negotiations, on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles, with the argument that at the same time short-range weapons should be eliminated and the conventional balance in Central Europe redressed. What do you think of this?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Soell, in this I abide strictly by the 1979 twofold decision, which explicitly provides for the elimination of any imbalance in intermediate-range weapons, ideally through negotiation, but if this is unsuccessful – as was in fact the case – by means of a western build-up with Pershings and cruise missiles.

This decision refers to the need to introduce upper limits not only on long-range systems but also on the shorter-range systems. But it does not refer to the conventional disparity. That is what I mean when I say that progress which can be made in one sphere must not be inappropriately linked to results previously achieved in other spheres. We would lose the confidence of the public – in my country at least – if we tried to back out of the twofold decision in this way. The public are relying on us to take the wording of this decision seriously. The Federal Government will not abandon it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, following on from what you have just said, I should like to make absolutely sure that I understand. We agree, I believe, that if the importance of nuclear weapons wanes, if we adopt the zero option for

Mr. Berger (continued)

intermediate-range weapons as a category and very substantial reductions are made in strategic systems, the conventional force imbalance will, of course, gain in importance; also that we must gear our policy to redressing the balance in conventional forces to safeguard Western Europe and the alliance.

But I should like to raise another question. Does the Federal Government also think – particularly in the light of what happened at Reykjavik – that we in Western European Union must do everything we can to establish a joint disarmament policy, so that it too can be jointly defended and carried through within the alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I can answer the second question, Mr. President, with a simple “yes”. We Europeans must, of course, agree not only on defence policy but also on arms control and disarmament policy. Only then will our proposals be able to bring due influence to bear on opinion-forming in the alliance and thus on the other side as well. That is surely the point of discussions of the kind we are now having.

As for the first question, in the present situation the function of nuclear weapons must be assessed not only against the main purpose of preventing war through deterrence, but also, as regards their necessity, against the current disparity in conventional forces. But I feel we would be going too far in our reasoning if, in the hope that 50% of strategic systems might be dismantled within five years – and it is no more than a hope – and with the thought that there might then be a further drastic reduction ten years later, we were to act as if we already had a world without nuclear weapons within reach, as if the conventional potential was all we had left. No, I think it is right to seize the opportunity to start reducing the nuclear stockpiles now and at the same time to negotiate on the other aspects, as planned.

At the moment, we are at a rather difficult stage in the formulation of objectives: within what framework, with what geographical limits and what co-operation or in what relationship with the neutral and non-allied countries should the negotiations on a reduction of conventional armaments in Europe be conducted? I do not think it is going too far to say that there can surely be no conflict between a further ten years of MBFR and, at the same time, a new conference, which would possibly receive a mandate from the CSCE, on disarmament in Europe. The

two alliances would both attend – France would have to attend if it was to have any point – and a mechanism for intervention or consultation with the neutral and non-allied countries would somehow come into being.

These matters have not yet been settled. But as in the past, parallel efforts will also have to be made in this area.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Following what the minister has just told us, I have three points to make concerning the zero option.

First, the zero option on offer following the twofold decision was in no way the same as the present one, as the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles had not then been deployed.

Second, it was decided at Reykjavik that one hundred SS-20s would continue to be based in Soviet Asia against one hundred equivalent weapons based on American territory. Can you, Minister, put any trust in an operation of this kind, when the mobility of these one hundred SS-20s means that in a few days they can be brought back to the Urals, without even having to leave the Asian part of the USSR, so as to cover virtually the whole of Europe with their 4 000 kilometre range? The same is not true of the cruise missiles based in the United States, which would have to be brought back to Europe to achieve comparable effectiveness.

Third, Minister, do you not think that the credibility of all the parliamentarians who, in their national parliaments, have argued for deployment based on co-ordination between the United States and Europe and the restoration of deterrence at European level thanks to our ability to reach Soviet territory with cruise and Pershing II missiles, has not been shaken in the same way as when President Carter stopped production of the neutron bomb?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – First, it is true to say that the modernisation programmes have not stood still anywhere since the twofold decision taken by the alliance in 1979. Structures have changed in several areas, but on both sides.

Second, although I do not want to go into this in any depth, I would ask you not to forget that it is extremely important for us – as regards the specific area of intermediate-range systems this was perhaps a particularly gratifying aspect of Reykjavik – that the French and British systems were not included, but are still present. That

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

must be borne in mind when the outcome of Reykjavik is assessed.

Third, I pointed out just now – perhaps I did not make myself sufficiently clear – that it was very much the intention of the twofold decision – and of the agreement reached in Reykjavik too – not only to reduce the long-range systems to one hundred on each side – in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and in the United States – but also to try to agree on upper limits for the shorter-range systems. This means that the side which does not currently reach this upper limit has the “right to match” if the other side does not reduce the number of its systems. That was also a part of the Reykjavik agreement.

Against this background, I believe the credibility crisis I have referred to would be more likely to occur if what Mr. Soell mentioned was to happen, if we were now suddenly to link this area to areas that were not mentioned in the twofold decision, although the same disparity in conventional armaments existed even at that time.

Let us not beat about the bush. Among ourselves we may say that the statement by General Rogers, who forged this very link with conventional armaments, naturally does not make things any easier. Well, that is a military view. But here policy must remain the primary concern if we want to avoid a difficult argument.

The question of geographical disparity, which you have also raised, is, of course, a general problem at all arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Soviet Union is linked to its partners by terra firma, while the United States is separated from us by many thousands of kilometres. It seems to me, however, that where the one hundred systems are concerned, this is not a very pressing problem. The one hundred Pershings and cruise missiles would in themselves give a mix of weapons. They could be brought back to Europe fairly quickly if it was felt they were needed here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I was deeply impressed by your address, Minister, and am perhaps even more by the text which was distributed, as this contains a number of contradictions.

Everyone here is anxious to work for peace in Europe, yourself included, but while on the one hand you call for co-operation with the United States and declare that co-operation with France in defence matters is essential, you speak on the other hand of the solution called in German the

“Null-Lösung” or zero option, which could lead to the adoption of a kind of neutrality.

Given that we are all responsible politicians, I would like to put to you a very simple question to clarify the situation. Do you not think that the experience of the last forty years demonstrates that all of us here should support, within the context of European co-operation, the strongest possible European defence? And is this not the only way we can avoid being beggars, in relation to either side, while retaining our ability to defend ourselves?

Futhermore, I am surprised by your attitude towards space defence. The most advanced technological developments are everywhere directed towards defence in space, and I hope we can be clear on this point here.

We take the view that co-operation between French and British nuclear armaments, together with a movement in the direction of European defence, is the only way to guarantee peace. Do you agree with this analysis, or do you believe it is possible to conceive of other methods of ensuring the peace of Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Jung, the zero option is not a German position and it is certainly not a neutral position, but the position of the alliance, and the one I represent here.

On the question of space systems I have again described the position formulated by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz in Geneva on 8th January 1985, according to which the attempt must be made to find a co-operative solution for strategic offensive systems and for the defensive systems developed as protection against them, including defensive systems that could be deployed in space.

A definition was then given of what this means: “co-operative” should always mean that the nature and scale of defensive systems – naturally, I would say – depend on the nature and scale of existing and continuing offensive systems. Thought through to its logical conclusion, this means that if the strategic offensive systems can be reduced by means of arms control agreements, no one can say at the end of the day: Ah yes, but we still need a defensive system.

I believe if we accept that at arms control negotiations and in defensive policy concepts we must always put ourselves in the other side's shoes, the exclusion of space-based defence systems – by either side – is bound to cause the other side to be suspicious and to pose questions that are difficult to answer.

Mr. Möllemann (continued)

We therefore advocate for the current phase of research – and both sides are, of course, conducting research – that we do what came within reach in Reykjavik, that is to say seek to reach agreements which eventually make it possible for a co-operative solution of this kind to be found for the defensive systems as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I should like to say something in connection with the last sentence of the minister's statement. He said that the British member was drinking coffee and that he could not therefore give him an answer. I do not think that it comes within this minister's terms of reference to check when a parliamentarian has coffee, quite apart from the fact that we knew what Mr. Hardy knows.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – You are right. That was, of course, an inappropriate irony, but it was prompted by the fact that I myself had just gone for a cup of coffee and was told there that because of the Secretary-General's generosity and courtesy I should come back sooner. So I did not get my cup of coffee and was envious of the British member, who did. I did not mean to offend anybody.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Möllemann clearly has thoughts that it was worth his while coming to this meeting to address us and we are grateful to him. At least he has shown us the courtesy of realising that there was a timetable problem and has circulated his speech. He has made four important points. In the interest of brevity I shall ask him a question that will require a one-word answer, "ja" or "nein". Do his government propose to support the request of this Assembly for sensible budget arrangements?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I hope I am not making the same mistake as I did over the coffee, but as you know very well there are questions that cannot be answered with either "yes" or "no". Let us take the question: Did you stop beating your wife yesterday? You would not be able to answer that with "yes" or "no". The same goes for this question.

Secondly, I am quite prepared to introduce this Assembly's request into the the deliberations of our cabinet, but I would not be honest if I told you today that the cabinet's deliberations would produce this or that result.

I should therefore like to say, thirdly, that we – I too am a member of parliament, of course – should try to use our most powerful right, the right to establish a budget: through you, in your national parliaments. You should enable your governments to obtain approval from parliament for additional funds for this purpose, and to make larger contributions. Not only shall I not oppose this but, if parliament gives us more money, I shall willingly make the funds available.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – The question I wanted to ask has just been raised by my fellow representative, but I would like to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the minister to revert to the suggestion which he put to us. While it is admittedly of interest, it has in recent years already been considered several times in our parliaments.

I will therefore limit myself to one further thought, which should lend added stimulus to the request to all member states to provide our Assembly with the means needed to enable it to exist, assume its full rôle and discharge its functions.

There is at least one issue which is currently posing a budgetary problem for our Assembly; it is the fact that, for accounting purposes, pensions are included in the Assembly's operational budget – a very poor arrangement in our view.

This additional comment should perhaps be added to everything that has already been said on the subject in support of firm, specific and practical action by our various countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I told Mr. Reddemann quite spontaneously just now that it would probably be advisable for us to sit down with the parliamentary groups after 25th January 1987, when elections to the Bundestag will be taking place, to consider especially with the members on the Budget Committee and those who are here, what can be done to overcome the obvious material difficulties prevailing here, which you have just described very impressively. I am ready to support moves to this end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Büchner.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, as you have recommended that we should not beat about the bush but have referred to a disparity both in the case of medium-range weapons in the past and of conventional weapons now, I should like quickly to ask you another question before you go off for coffee: if, contrary to what you obviously expect, the negotiations on the elimination of medium-range weapons should actually produce a result, if, that is, they should be dismantled in East and West, would the Federal Government consider the conventional imbalance so serious that it would think about rearmament initiatives? Can we look forward to fresh rearmament?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In our national parliament we discuss the armed forces and armaments plans, which are submitted to the appropriate committee and regularly updated. These plans, with which knowledgeable members are familiar, are implemented in accordance with the decisions taken by parliament. They already refer to the need to improve our conventional fighting strength and to redress the current imbalance.

Similar efforts are being made at WEU level. For some considerable time now you have been discussing here what can be done through increased co-operation among the Europeans in arms production and planning and in standardisation to redress the conventional imbalance and that needs to be done.

In the text distributed to you, you will find the idea which I will now reiterate in one sentence: we would naturally prefer to eliminate the imbalance in the conventional sphere by achieving practical results in disarmament negotiations, but we say just as clearly: the effect of each and every step taken under arms control agreements must be geared to our security interest and, if such agreements are not reached, we shall do what is necessary to guarantee our security. But this will not require any new rearmament decisions, simply the implementation of the military and armament plans approved by parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to put a question to the German minister because the failure to reach agreement in Reykjavik has undoubtedly aroused serious concern, particularly in view of the Federal

Republic's position in the centre of Europe and of the conventional threat to Europe as well.

We must remember that the Euromissiles were adopted because of the vital need to correct the enormous imbalance in Europe as regards the Warsaw Pact's conventional armaments. My question is as follows.

No agreement to reduce armaments was reached in Reykjavik. Does the minister think that in present circumstances the Atlantic guarantees and commitments are being overtaken by the strange spread of individual illusions concerning European armaments or does he believe that European security should be ensured by modernising the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and making it more effective?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I have said before, the twofold decision was not taken because of the current conventional imbalance – that is not correct – although we always take account of the overall security situation at all arms control negotiations and in each defence plan.

I will also say once again that, in view of the existing disparities, we must co-operate as closely as possible, and it is undoubtedly common knowledge here too that we must strengthen the European pillar within the alliance, as I tried to explain just now.

As I believe this is a crucial point, I should like to repeat that I do not agree with the view that Reykjavik was a failure, and why I do not agree. All of you, ladies and gentlemen, have been concerned with defence and arms control policy issues for many years. You have observed the long process of negotiations on MBFR, SALT, START, INF and chemical weapons. Did anyone really believe that in the space of a day and a half two men would be able to slice through at a stroke all the knots that have been tied in ten years? Against this background I feel that what was almost achieved and is now the subject of further negotiations in Geneva and Vienna was a great deal, not a failure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, in view of what you have just said – and I agree with you there – I should like to comment on something you say in the written statement you have distributed. You say that the Federal Government is interested in observance of the SALT agreement. What, then, do you think of the

Mr. Antretter (continued)

recent breach of the agreement by the United States, when it put the 131st B-52 bomber into service with cruise missiles?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I believe that in the current situation – and that includes this decision by the American Government – it is all the more essential for us to reach agreements on reductions to replace the existing agreement, which has not, of course, been ratified, and that this time, instead of stipulating ceilings up to which weapons may be accumulated, the agreements should, as proposed in Reykjavik, set upper limits that will necessitate scaling down armament levels. I feel that is more important than for me to continue to discuss an individual decision.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That concludes the questions from members. Thank you, Minister, for your co-operation and for your parliamentary approach and the courtesy and skill with which you have dealt with the Assembly's problems. Once more, thank you, and a safe journey home.

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I am extremely sorry to have to raise this matter, but I understood that I would be called to ask a question. I was grateful for the minister's contrite comment about his reference to my colleague and myself being absent, but it is only reasonable that I should be allowed to ask my question, if only to explain that my colleagues and I did not wish to act ungraciously, but the proliferation of ministers, the change in business and the delay in our proceedings required some discussion.

The question that I wanted to ask the minister – and it should be asked – is a follow-up to the important question asked by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. As a highly skilled and capable former minister, Sir Geoffrey will have recognised the highly skilful ministerial reply that he received. I do not suppose that Sir Geoffrey expected the minister to offer a simple "ja" or "nein" in his response, but clearly we were entitled to ask the minister whether the Federal Republic would be prepared not merely to engage in discussions about an adequate supply of resources for the Assembly but positively to support moves to provide those extra resources. That aspect was not given an adequate response.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am very sorry. I had not noted that you wanted to put a

question to the minister of state. Please forgive me.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Clerk advised me that I would be called to ask my question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I tender the apologies of the chair. Your question will be conveyed to the minister of state in writing, and I hope we shall have a quick reply. I ask the Clerk of the Assembly to take the necessary action.

10. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now give the floor to Lord Carrington and thank him for accepting the Assembly's invitation. You have just taken part, Secretary-General, in a parliamentary debate, and you will have noted that an assembly is a living institution which gets to the heart of the subject at what is an extremely important juncture in the history of WEU. I thank you for coming, and also thank your organisation for the manner in which it performs its functions.

Lord CARRINGTON (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – Let me first thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for the honour that you have done me in inviting me here. I must start with an apology, because you asked me to be here from 4.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. and I made another appointment which I have to attend after 5.30 p.m., so we shall not have long for questions. However, I shall get through as much as I can as quickly as I can.

I sometimes think that those of us who regularly attend occasions such as this are rather like dedicated fishermen who are to be seen sitting under green umbrellas beside rivers, canals and lakes in all weathers. Like you, they have to sit through long periods in which nothing much happens in the hope of an occasional moment of excitement. Like you, they seem sometimes to enjoy it. I shall do my best to produce if not enjoyment, at least food for thought.

I suppose that if a public opinion poll were held within the seven countries that make up Western European Union, asking what the man in the street knew about the great organisations formed in Europe over the past forty years, linking one country with another, most people would immediately think of the European Economic Community. It has always been the case, at least in times of peace, that men and women are concerned above all with how well off they are compared with their neighbours and how their present standard of living compares with that of a few years ago. Mountains of butter and lakes of wine are the ingredients that make head-

Lord Carrington (continued)

lines for the tabloids and headaches for the treasurers.

I dare to guess that NATO would probably be the second most widely familiar body, if only because at fairly regular intervals vocal minorities protest or complain about something that NATO has done, is supposed to have done, or has not done. However unfair it may seem, I am pretty sure that WEU would be much less recognised and less well known to the public. No doubt that is a pity, although it is not necessarily a catastrophe because for those who concern themselves with politics, particularly the politics of defence, WEU is well known and much respected. Over the past couple of years, under the active and vigorous stewardship of Alfred Cahen, a major effort has been made to establish, through its reactivation, something that has come to be called a European defence identity.

After all, we are Europeans, and it is the defence of Europe with which, naturally, we are primarily concerned. If that is what a European defence identity means, I am very much in favour of it. It would be a source of weakness not only to Western Europe but to the alliance as a whole if our defence effort came to be regarded by the general public not as an essential element in our own security but as a tribute to some long-established totem. An effort that can be seen as national defence has an immediacy that simply making a contribution to NATO does not have. We Europeans, having pinned so many of our hopes for the future on a Community that has no responsibility for defence, need to be particularly attentive to the danger that the requirements of defence may be relegated to a secondary importance in the minds of the twelve members of that Community.

I hope, having said that, that my credentials as an advocate of the usefulness of WEU have been established. In my view, the primary importance of this organisation is in the commitment that underlies it. That commitment, embodied in the Brussels Treaty, provides that the parties should "afford the party attacked all the military and other aid... in their power".

It is a more binding commitment than that of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because of that, it joins the seven countries together very closely. Therefore, I believe that you can make a great contribution to defence collaboration within Europe and across the Atlantic.

Some people spend much time calling for new institutional structures to improve our efforts. It would be hard to deny that we are not ideally served by those we have at present. Of the European members of NATO, the French are not members of the Eurogroup. The process of

political co-operation within the Community, for reasons that are well known and fully understandable, although not necessarily admirable, does not address defence issues, and WEU leaves out seven of the fourteen European members of NATO, including the two that happen to share frontiers with the Soviet Union.

There is no way in which we shall reform or recast those institutions to remedy their deficiencies. It is much more constructive to try to make them work more effectively together towards what is, after all, our common objective – to strengthen the contribution of the European allies to the transatlantic relationship that is the cornerstone of our security. So let me – I hope that you will not think me presumptuous – suggest that there are at least two areas in which European partners in the alliance, particularly you in WEU, could do a great deal to promote a more effective European defence identity – first, armament co-operation and, secondly, a greater conventional defence effort.

I have to admit that I have developed, deliberately but perhaps not attractively, the habit of giving my audiences a regular and constant stream of advice about the need for more and better arms co-operation. There is no way that I can know how much impact my pleas have, but I believe in the value of the constant dripping of water on stone, even on the granite of some of my industrial and political colleagues who nod politely in agreement and do nothing.

We delude ourselves if we believe that we can continue in Europe to produce military equipment in the same old way that we have done in the past, each country going its own way, trying to do too much on its own, with inadequate resources and paying too much attention to its own national interests at the expense of alliance priorities and interests. We are getting better but there is still far too much of the project-by-project, deal-by-deal, shorter production lines style of armaments production. In my judgment, we simply cannot afford it. In virtually all areas of our civil economy we in the West have a pretty good story to tell when comparisons are made with eastern bloc nations; but in the area of defence production, it is, for fairly obvious reasons, the Warsaw Pact that is doing better than we in the West, and it is we in the West who have to get our act together.

Describing the problems is easy. Everyone here will be familiar with the rubbish of different allied tanks that cannot fire the same shells, and of different communications equipment that requires expensive black boxes before soldiers can even speak to each other. We have heard the old joke about the only common thing in NATO's jeeps or personnel carriers being the air in the tyres. Tough decisions have to be taken before things are to improve. They will require

Lord Carrington (continued)

high-level political action. There is no shortage of good intentions. Some of the recent initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic are bearing some fruit, but we have not yet begun to grapple with the fundamental issues. In Europe we can no longer afford to dissipate resources through duplication of efforts. We have to pool our efforts.

For example – I hope that this is not too revolutionary – why not set up European research and development establishments, multi-nationally paid for and multinationally manned, in the key equipment sectors? What about the establishment of a defence industrial policy worthy of the name, supported by common acquisition and procurements regulations and practices? We cannot any longer afford to miss opportunities for co-operation because individual nations pursue national, commercial, parochial and technological interests.

As for burden-sharing and conventional defence improvements, you will know as well as I do of the need for the European alliance to do more and to be seen to do more, but the result of the mid-term elections in the United States and the assumption by Senator Nunn of the chairmanship of the Senate Armed Services Committee will bring this subject to the fore once more.

Senator Nunn is a staunch supporter of NATO, but equally firm in his belief that greater European effort is required. This is not a subject that will go away. Arms co-operation and greater European efforts in defence are to my mind two issues, among others, in which you can be of great benefit to your members and to the alliance.

I do not suppose that I can come here as Secretary-General without saying something about the current state of East-West relations in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit. Reykjavik, like most other noteworthy events in East-West relations, has been analysed almost to death and I do not wish to add to the “what might otherwise have been” commentaries.

Few, if any of us, expected anything very substantial to emerge. It was, after all, billed as a summit to discuss a summit, not as a potential breakthrough to a major new arms control agreement, but things turned out rather differently. There was a negotiation and serious proposals were made, proposals which went much further than anything hitherto envisaged.

The first reaction of many people on learning of the breakdown of the talks was deep disappointment, but closer examination later showed how far the two sides had progressed and the areas of agreement between them. Discussions

on matters which even a few months ago would have been regarded as hopelessly visionary were reported. It seemed that the log-jam which had blocked progress for so long might be about to break up.

After the lapse of a few weeks, the consequences of Reykjavik can be seen in a rather calmer atmosphere. We have all had time to reflect on those two momentous days. Reactions have differed. Some Americans have been surprised that Europeans who have, it seems to them, been hesitant in their support for American nuclear weapons in Europe, should now feel that the proposal to withdraw them puts them at risk. Some Europeans on the other hand have been surprised that the Americans went, as they see it, so far and so fast, and implicitly criticise the lack of consultation. This last point is, in my judgment, unfair. The day before the Reykjavik meeting, Ambassadors Nitze and Ridgway came to brief the NATO Council. It was clear that there was no expectation of a negotiation of the kind that in the event took place. It must be equally evident that in the light of the proposals put forward at the beginning of the talks at Reykjavik it would have been impossible for the Americans not to have entered into serious discussion. As soon as the meeting ended Secretary Shultz came to Brussels to debrief and consult. There really can be no complaint of the Americans trying to keep their European allies in the dark.

Most of us were astonished at what did emerge in the form of agreed elements in a possible future negotiating package or, for the more cautious spirits, at least the shape of such package. The realisation grew that the leaders of the two superpowers had come fairly close to, or had at least discussed seriously, the abolition of ballistic missiles and INF nuclear weapons. And West European politicians and diplomats began to debate the consequences of such an eventuality.

One more thing: even if outline agreements had been signed, there would have been many months of patient negotiation. Verification – the key to confidence-building – had been barely touched on in the talks and problems of satisfactory verification in a closed society such as the Soviet Union are fraught with difficulty. We had a long way to go before the conditions under which the Americans had made their proposals could be fulfilled.

Some of the proposals made in Reykjavik may indeed come about. I hope so. If the Soviets abandon the linkage with the SDI there is no reason why a satisfactory INF agreement cannot be reached. Nor if compliance difficulties are solved should it be beyond the wit of man to agree on a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but that is in the future.

Lord Carrington (continued)

Irrespective of whether we succeeded in those two directions, three major things have happened as a result of Reykjavik. First, President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev have now had for the second time experience of direct across-the-table negotiations with each other. They will have learned lessons about how to do business with each other, and that must be to the good. Second, public perception has been changed by the glimpse that radical nuclear disarmament was a real possibility. That will have a major impact on the shaping of the debate from now on. Consider, for example, the way in which those who advocate nuclear disarmament have been able to claim the near agreements in Reykjavik as evidence that they had been right all along. The very fact that such radical proposals have been made will mean that allied strategy will in future be viewed in a totally different light.

One of the most important consequences of Reykjavik has been to remind the alliance of the relationship between the nuclear and conventional components of our defences. In particular, it has drawn attention to what is perhaps NATO's most vulnerable point – the imbalance in conventional forces between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact. And if the aftermath of Reykjavik leads to progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, the need to make parallel progress in eliminating conventional disparities becomes even greater.

When I was addressing the Atlantic Institute a week or so ago, I made the point that the conventional disarmament process was likely to be much more complex and more difficult than nuclear disarmament. The MBFR talks, which one could say were comparatively straightforward, have made little progress in thirteen years. That is not to suggest that we should not put every effort into solving the problem and do a lot more work than we have done in the past. The alliance cannot complain of conventional imbalance and do nothing to reduce it.

It may be that Mr. Gorbachev is really interested in freeing resources for a revitalisation of the Soviet economy. Conventional forces, with their need for manpower and equipment which account for the great bulk of military expenditures on both sides, provide an excellent opportunity. For our part, we are already preparing through the work being done in the high-level task force under the chairmanship of Ambassador Guidi. I do not know what that body will produce. It is reporting to the NATO Ministerial Council on 11th December and working hard on the substance of a problem which has become increasingly important and urgent.

For the present, the alliance must continue to require a range of nuclear systems as well as conventional arms to provide deterrence. There is little alternative as we note the continuing improvements and additions to the already overwhelming Soviet conventional strength. In such circumstances, our strategy of forward defence and flexible response is the only one available to us.

At the same time, allied governments must live up to their undertakings to improve their conventional forces. Conventional forces cost a lot of money. At a time when governments have more than enough demands on their resources, spending on the armed services does not, alas, always have the high priority which those of us who are most concerned with defence would like to see. Nor, paradoxically, are those who are most anxious about nuclear weapons prepared to draw the logical conclusion that more must be spent on conventional arms. Nuclear defence is defence on the cheap, particularly if the nuclear weapons are American nuclear weapons; but we must recognise that we are not going to get all the money we need. We have therefore taken the practical course of trying to concentrate our efforts on areas that matter most – areas where there are critical deficiencies and where a special effort will provide the greatest returns for collective defence. I hope that what we are doing on the conventional defence improvements (CDI) will encourage ministries of defence to make greater efforts at long-term planning and the exploitation of new technologies. None of this will produce dramatic change. But it is helping to shape our collective efforts.

So I would be deceiving you if I ever said I thought that conventional or nuclear deterrence can be had on the cheap. The cost of armaments grows steadily: that is why NATO ministers accepted the target of 3% annual growth in real terms. Whatever we do by way of armaments co-operation and efficiency improvement, the capabilities we shall need in the nineties will still be expensive. Of the WEU member countries only two have declared plans for growth of around 3%. The remainder, some after notable efforts which have improved the equipment, readiness and sustainability of their forces, no longer intend to do so. I must warn you that, just as we are now benefiting from the efforts of the past, if we go on as we are we shall be leaving a dangerous legacy of neglect to our successors and to the people of Western Europe.

Of course, it is expensive. Of course, it places burdens on the taxpayer. But the cost of failing is not just financial; it affects the very foundations of our society and the world in which for forty years we have lived in peace and unparalleled prosperity. It is up to us parliamentarians, legislators, leaders of public opinion to make our fellow countrymen and women understand.

Lord Carrington (continued)

One final word about arms control: the conclusion of the Stockholm conference marked the first multilateral security agreement since 1975. It was not all we wanted but it was a considerable improvement on the measures set out in the Helsinki final act of 1975, particularly in lowering thresholds for the notification and observation of military activities, and in providing – although to some degree inadequately – for on-site inspection. And the inclusion of the whole European part of the Soviet Union establishes another important principle. On the whole that was a step forward. If properly implemented, the Stockholm results will lead to more openness and pave the way for further steps.

We have also seen some progress on chemical weapons. I hope that that will take place as a result of Mr. Shevardnadze's encouraging speech in Vienna.

Of course, progress in the conventional field has been much less impressive and indeed, alas, has taken a step backwards in terms of verification at the MBFR talks. But despite that, if we look back on 1986 and enter 1987, we can certainly say we have had an eventful twelve months. It is a very long time since there has been so much movement in relations between the two blocs. For example, Reykjavik is bound to throw up new ideas which must be dealt with – for example, the Soviet willingness to discuss the previously undiscussable – and, most important of all perhaps in this last twelve months, the alliance remains strong and united, not as strong as we would like, but strong enough to deter an aggressor, and united despite the many attempts to drive wedges between us. It is our strength and cohesion which bring the Soviet leaders to the point of serious negotiation. They are realistic. They have no need to take account of parliamentary or public opinion; and they will consider concessions only when they see that they cannot win their prize by simply waiting for it to drop into their lap.

It is the duty of the alliance – and of WEU – to remain firm, united and resolute but at the same time ready to seize opportunities not only for arms control agreements and reductions but also for the relaxation of political tension between East and West and the creation of a more stable relationship in a world with far too many arms and far too little trust. We in the West are ready. We must hope the Soviet bloc will respond to our efforts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address, and especially for those parts of it which have a direct bearing on the issues to be debated by the Assembly. What you have said reflects perfectly the reality which we have to confront. Thank you again for your contribution to our debate.

I shall now call five members who wish to put questions.

I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your remarkable address and for having underlined the important part which WEU could play with regard to European co-operation on armaments and their standardisation. However, you could perhaps explain to us why it is that the ministerial organs of WEU, including especially the technical agencies of WEU, which meet every requirement in the matter of confidentiality, appear to be sometimes unable to obtain either from the NATO secretariat-general or from NATO and SHAPE headquarters the information they need to discharge the functions entrusted to them by the Council of Ministers of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Lord CARRINGTON (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – I do not think so. I do not know of anything which the Secretary-General of WEU has asked me for which has been refused him. I do not know that anything that has ever been asked for has been refused. It will be recognised, of course, that we have the difficulty in the alliance of working on the basis of consensus and therefore if one of the sixteen countries objected to a piece of information being passed to WEU it would be impossible to pass it. The Secretary-General of NATO, probably unlike the Secretary-General of WEU, does not have the power to override sovereign governments. Sometimes it would be marvellous if he had.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Since, at Reykjavik, if it had not been for the blockage of the SDI question, we could have found ourselves with a provisional agreement about long-distance missiles and INF, and since such an agreement would not have covered tactical nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or verification, is it not the case that, for the foreseeable future, we shall have to go on relying, with gratitude, upon the American nuclear umbrella? What do you think about a future Europe in which some countries accept that umbrella and others refuse it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Lord CARRINGTON (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – There was never any suggestion, even in the very unlikely event of an outright agreement having been signed at Reykjavik, that there would be anything other than a nuclear deterrent to rely on, because the Americans were

Lord Carrington (continued)

talking only about ballistic missiles, which meant that cruise missiles and manned bombers and so on were not included. The suggestion that you can get rid of nuclear weapons in the world in ten years does not seem very practical. Think of the verification problems there would be. I believe that we shall have to rely upon the nuclear deterrent for a long time indeed. Those who feel that they can dispense with the nuclear umbrella have to face the fact that if there is to be a sufficient deterrent we do not need to match the Warsaw Pact man for man, tank for tank, gun for gun because we are a defensive alliance but great expense would be involved. This also assumes that the Soviet Union does not have nuclear weapons either.

Conventional defence improvements are very expensive. The more sophisticated the weapons become, the more expensive they are. Let me give an illustration. During the second world war rich people in England could, if they contributed £5 000, buy a Spitfire. You would be very lucky today to get a Tornado for £14 million. That has outpaced the level of inflation and depreciation of the pound.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We were heartened when you said at the outset of your remarks that the defence of Europe is what we are primarily concerned about. Looking at INF and prospects for arms control in that area do you not feel, since we have, after much political travail, secured the deployment of modernised INF within five European countries of NATO, that to move to a zero-zero option now would be extremely dangerous unless we were to secure good collateral from our Soviet counterparts? That would involve agreement that it would be acceptable on our part to employ anti-tactical ballistic missile systems and, on their part, that they reduce the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s that they have deployed, particularly in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, since we began deploying our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles from the end of 1979.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Lord CARRINGTON (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – I do not think that the European countries have much justification for feeling surprised about the zero-zero option. After all, the twin-track decision in December 1979 visualised precisely that. I was a party to it and I remember. What we visualised was no deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles if the Soviet Union withdrew all of their SS-20s. We were, in effect, visualising a zero-zero option then.

Circumstances have now changed. One of the altered circumstances is that, as a result of the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles, the Soviet Union deployed in Eastern Europe a number of shorter-range nuclear missiles, saying that you could not equate cruise and Pershings with SS-20s. Consequently, we have more of these weapons facing us than ever before. We should insist upon the withdrawal of those weapons as well as the SS-20s that were brought up as a result of the twin-track decision – the deployment of cruise and Pershing.

I also think that it is essential that there be a commitment to a proper SRINF agreement and not just a freezing – although that is no doubt essential – of negotiations. I also think that there has to be a proper commitment to conventional arms reduction talks on a much wider basis than MBFR. Although one does not want to link all of these, because I can see as well as anyone else the problems of doing so, it is essential that we take account of what one agreement in one sector does to the balance in another sector.

ATBM is a little in the future. We are studying the threat but it has not really got to the stage in the alliance where we are sufficiently sure that ATBM is the way to deal with it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I greatly appreciate the force and realism of what you have had to say, and I wish only to draw your attention to Spain's position in the defence of our continent.

We share your undoubted satisfaction at the favourable outcome of the referendum which has confirmed Spain's allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and consequently its firm adherence to the western camp. We extend a cordial greeting to the Spanish observers whom we are pleased to see in our midst.

Could you, Secretary-General, enlighten us on two points?

First, following the favourable referendum, what is the precise nature of the links which have been established or reinforced between our Spanish allies and the various organs of the alliance?

Second, we note that Spain's application to become a member of our organisation has still not been submitted formally. Do you have any more precise information, and can you tell us how NATO would view Spain's entry into WEU? It is, of course, a matter between Spain and ourselves, but you may well have an opinion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General of NATO.

Lord CARRINGTON (*Secretary-General of NATO*). – I am sufficiently old a parliamentarian to answer that second question by saying: “That is a matter for you, not for me”. I am not going to get into trouble.

The Spanish people voted to come into NATO on the basis that they would become full members but would not integrate their military forces. There are at present discussions going on between officials on the international staff and the Spanish Government about what precisely that means. The impression I get is that it is a firm commitment on the part of the Spanish Government that they will not integrate their forces, because that is the basis on which they came in. However, I think there are discussions going on to see what kind of military contribution – and I mean “contribution” in its widest sense – it would be appropriate and possible for Spain to make.

I must apologise. I must ask you to excuse me. I have another engagement and I have to tell you, Mr. President, that it is with the French Minister of Defence. Therefore I do not think that I ought to be late.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your replies to the questions put by members.

I must inform the Assembly that I have noted in writing for the attention of the Secretary-General, who is obliged to leave because of other commitments, the questions put by Mr. Hardy, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Palumbo, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Inan and Mr. Haase.

You know that the chair gives the floor to everyone wishing to speak. Among all the other matters to be placed on record, the chair has therefore also noted the problem of the time to be allowed to speakers bearing in mind the time available to the Assembly. The fact is that we cannot work to hard and fast timetables. Such an arrangement has never worked in any parliament, and is not likely to do so here.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Once again, this is a most serious point. Lord Carrington’s address was a fascinating and important part of a significant debate. You read out a list of members who had questions to ask him. I understand that it is necessary for Lord Carrington to leave, but his contribution was such that I believe it reasonable to ask you to convey to him a request that he should consider the questions that we were not able to ask. I certainly want him to consider my question and I believe that members who had serious questions to ask should be

enabled to present them officially through the Assembly within a reasonable time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your intervention, Mr. Hardy, which is entirely acceptable to the chair. I fully agree with what you have just said, and I would ask members who were unable to put their questions to Lord Carrington to let me have them in writing, if they so desire. I will pass them on at once to Lord Carrington for answers.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I endorse what Mr. Hardy has said, but it should be made clear to Lord Carrington that the criticisms made earlier about too many ministers attending our debates did not apply to him. It is sad that he has become a victim of those earlier complaints. He was booked to speak for one hour and to answer all our questions and I hope that he understands that the critical remarks made by Mr. Hardy earlier today – to which I listened with sympathy – did not extend to him. We should love to see Lord Carrington here on another occasion.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, absolutely correct.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That was clearly understood, Sir Frederic. The procedure will be applied by the chair to ensure that members wishing to put a question get an answer.

We shall now proceed to the next order of the day.

11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before giving you the floor, Secretary-General, I would like to thank you for your courtesy, which will have come as no surprise to those who know you, in allowing Mr. Möllemann, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO, to speak before you.

I now invite you to the rostrum.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, I know very well that you have extremely full orders of the day and I shall therefore do my utmost, since your time is precious, to be as brief as possible.

However, I would like to start by expressing to you my deep gratitude for the invitation to address you today for the third time. In my

Mr. Cahen (continued)

judgment, the importance of this lies in the fact that you are the representatives of the peoples of the states which make up our organisation and in the fact, of which your President has reminded us, that you are the only parliamentary body competent to discuss European security problems in the Atlantic context, to which this security is indissolubly linked.

The gratitude I feel today is all the greater as I believe that this session, opening on 1st December, is one of special importance and is being held at a particularly significant time. I say this for three reasons.

The first is the quality of the reports to be presented at this session. These are extremely important, and have been carefully considered by your Council. I know that the members of governments who are to speak here – in particular Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and Mr. Fischbach – will answer some of the concerns reflected in your reports.

The second reason why this session of your Assembly is specially significant lies in the strength and brilliance of the ministerial representation. I am of course well aware, as Mr. Hardy recently reminded us, that the extent of this representation makes some inroads into the time you have to devote to your strictly parliamentary work, and I appreciate that you may find that troublesome. All the same, as your President has pointed out, the quantity and quality of the ministerial representation here do constitute a political event.

An event because ministers or secretaries of state with responsibilities for the armed forces or national defence will be present at virtually all your sittings.

Again, the presence here tomorrow of the Prime Minister of the French Republic is also a political event.

Similarly, the honour of being addressed by Mr. Möllemann, as was amply proved by the number of questions put to him.

Further events will be the contributions by Mr. Spadolini and the United Kingdom Minister of State for Defence.

Finally, the presence on this rostrum of Lord Carrington was a very major event. As you have all stressed, his presence here bears witness to the fact that WEU is indeed being reactivated, without going outside the alliance. This is evidence that the process is taking place at the very heart of that Atlantic solidarity without which there can be no credible defence of NATO or therefore of Western Europe.

The third reason why the timing of this session is particularly significant is that it is taking place immediately after the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg. Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach will address you tomorrow on the subject of the conclusions reached at that meeting.

I have no intention of anticipating what they will have to say to you. Moreover, they briefed your President and members of the Presidential Committee on the ministerial meeting when it ended in Luxembourg. I can however tell you, here and now, that the results of the ministerial meeting did respond in a most positive way to some of your concerns about the vigour, not to say the reality, of the reactivation of Western European Union – concerns which emerge in some of the reports before the present session of the Assembly.

But I really do wonder, and I put the question to you, whether these reports would have been framed in the same terms and would have expressed the same concerns had they been written after rather than before the Luxembourg meeting. I tell you now that I think not. I appeal here to the evidence supplied by your President, who has just emphasised the exhilaration of Luxembourg, and by Mr. Goerens who, having written his report after the meeting in the Grand Duchy, has expressed his appreciation of its outcome. The fact is that the recent evolution in East-West relations has suddenly highlighted the imperative need for our states – more than ever now – to act in concert about joint security problems. As you know better than anybody, this essential reflection can only take place in WEU.

The Reykjavik talks and their aftermath have clearly shown that WEU is well and truly reactivated and perfectly equipped to take on the responsibilities assigned to it. Mr. Genscher at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg was uttering no empty words when he said: "If WEU did not exist, it would now need to be invented."

Naturally, there is still a great deal to do – that much is clear from a reading of your reports – and I ask you to believe that no one is more aware of this than your Council and its Secretary-General who have determinedly moved things forward since your last session. Allow me to give you one or two examples.

The Council has sought to improve further the procedure for replying to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions which give useful indications to the Council as to its future tasks.

Again with the aim of conveying information to the Assembly more speedily and more completely, it was agreed that the annual report would henceforth be circulated half-yearly. The

Mr. Cahen (continued)

speeding-up of the transmission of texts represents marked progress and clearly shows the Council's real determination to give due importance to the public democratic dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.

Since I last had the honour of addressing you in June, the Council's special working group on SDI has continued to meet regularly. Not only has it exchanged information between member countries on questions related to participation in SDI research but it has also begun to analyse, on a long-term basis, the politico-strategic implications of possible developments in ballistic missile defence.

In its recent progress report to ministers in Luxembourg, the group, whilst considering that it was impractical to draw conclusions at this early stage of BMD research, nevertheless recognised – very significantly – that common perceptions of European security interests linked to possible developments in this area were emerging within the member countries of WEU.

Indeed, as Chairman of the special working group, I am gratified to note that Mr. Bianco in his report, when referring to the information given by the Council on SDI in its thirty-first annual report, states that the consensus reached among the Seven on SDI "went quite a long way".

As to the future, the Council's special working group will, of course, continue to examine the problems arising from SDI. But following the decision taken at the Luxembourg ministerial meeting, this will not be its only task – the group's mandate will now be extended to include the whole range of problems concerning European security.

In the same vein, the ministers decided in Luxembourg that there should be more active participation by the political directors and the representatives of the defence ministries and I am sure that in their addresses Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach will be giving you more details about this new and important aspect of reactivation.

The desire expressed in one of your recommendations that there should be uniform participation by all the member states in joint reflection on security has become a reality as from 13th and 14th November. Indeed, Western European Union emerged from the ministerial discussions as the forum where all its members should determine the security of Europe together. Moreover, this situation is now in the public domain as Ministers Andreotti and Genscher have made clear in speaking to the press.

There is not the slightest ambiguity in this matter, and rumours circulating in early

November about a possible directorate are totally without foundation.

The same recommendation asks the Council to "explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities". A new member of the political division of the secretariat-general has been charged with this essential task of informing public opinion through the media. I was pleased to introduce him in London to your Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. You are also aware – and I thank you for your recognition of this fact – how concerned I am personally about keeping the press and public opinion well informed.

The agencies, for their part, have now received their new mandates from the Council. They have already provided many extremely useful contributions to the Council's work. These studies are an essential tool for the Council whose activities have to cover all aspects of European security.

It is in this context that I was charged in Luxembourg with the task of submitting to the presidency at the beginning of 1987 proposals to obtain the maximum benefit from the agencies.

This attempt to achieve increased effectiveness has led the Council to strive to ensure that the agencies have greater access to the sources of confidential information which are essential for the proper execution of their mandates. In this connection, you have heard the question put by Mr. De Decker to Lord Carrington and Lord Carrington's reply.

I would also add for good measure a point which has already been alluded to. At the instigation of France, European seminars on security and defence matters are to be organised under the auspices of Western European Union. This project was approved by the ministers in Luxembourg. It will be a simple formula, based on the methods of the French Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale and will aim to arouse public awareness of defence and security problems in Europe. I am grateful to France for suggesting that the first session of a seminar initiating this educative effort should be opened in Paris.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you may rest assured that all these steps forward will not prevent your Council from remaining very much aware of the progress still to be achieved, to which quite rightly you call its attention. But this progress should be seen in the perspective of what Western European Union is in process of becoming in accordance with the wishes of those who instigated its reactivation – the governments of our member states and yourselves. What should it become? An instrument of European political co-operation on security,

Mr. Cahen (continued)

through which the public can be better informed in this sphere, particularly in the context of the Assembly-Council dialogue.

The debate on the conditions for European security is certain to develop and it will be your rôle, ladies and gentlemen, to expand and explain this to the public. Your rôle will by no means be that of a mere megaphone, Mr. President, but rather that of a catalyst stimulating democratic debate between the Assembly and the Council in public view.

I am of course aware of the budget problem. This has been mentioned several times this afternoon, and will no doubt be raised again tomorrow. I am just as conscious of this problem as you are since the Secretariat-General is faced with the same difficulty, but I do know that Mr. Poos will not evade discussion of the matter, and that he will handle it in the same positive way in which he has assumed the Luxembourg presidency of our organisation.

The French writer, philosopher and political scientist, Hippolyte Taine, said that a nation died through the sapping of its courage and a drying-up of its ideas. This is true of every major national or international project and, of course, of a project such as the reactivation of our organisation.

However, I very sincerely believe that our courage has not been sapped and that we are not lacking in ideas. Your Assembly has indeed much to do with this through its positive criticism and its vigorous encouragement to the governments of the Seven to go forward. These governments have, for their part, shown lately in Luxembourg what contribution they bring in this respect.

To conclude, let me stress that I am not so presumptuous – and indeed that would go beyond my rôle – as to wave an announcement of victory before you. But I am delighted to have been able to give you this very encouraging report on progress made with reactivating Western European Union. This is vital in itself, as well as being essential to the cause of European construction to which we are all devoted. By nurturing WEU we have in a sense promoted the growth of that recalcitrant but tenacious tree which calls to mind the one celebrated by the Belgian poet Emile Verhaeren when he wrote: A tree which suffered all the rigours of winter and the languors of summer “without for a single instant weakening in its determination that, with each new spring, its life should be enhanced and more radiant still”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your outstanding contribution to the Assembly's debates and for

showing yourself to be such a friend of this Assembly, for a friend you have always been since the auspicious day of your appointment, which has served the interests of us all. I thank you also for the active part which you are playing in the reactivation of WEU.

Perhaps I may summarise the impression of us all at the start of this session by saying that the reactivation of WEU would serve no purpose in itself if it were not based on a renewed will towards political union within Europe. This is what is actually taking place and I am duly grateful to you.

12. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The French and the Italian Delegations have proposed the following changes in the membership of committees:

The French Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Jung as a titular member in place of Mr. Bourges; Mr. Alloncle as a titular member in place of Mr. Wirth; Mrs. Lalumière as a titular member in place of Mr. Bérégovoy; Mr. Koehl as an alternate member in place of Mr. Jung and Mr. Fourré as an alternate member in place of Mr. Delebarre; in the membership of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Chénard as an alternate member in place of Mr. Delebarre and Mr. Portier as an alternate member in place of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt; in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in place of Mr. Koehl; Mr. Gremetz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and Mr. Bassinet as an alternate member in place of Mr. Fourré; in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. de Chambrun as a titular member in place of Mr. Mercier; Mr. Chénard as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Chambrun and Mr. Collette as an alternate member in place of Mr. Gremetz.

The Italian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Stegagnini as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bonalumi.

Is there any opposition?...

These changes are agreed to.

13. *European security and the Mediterranean*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1073)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1073.

Before calling Mr. Kittelmann I should point out that, in accordance with the alteration just made to the orders of the day, I shall give the floor to members wishing to speak after the statement by the Rapporteur, but that the vote will not take place this evening. It will probably be taken tomorrow together with the scheduled votes on the budgetary reports and on those of Mr. Bianco and Mr. Amadei.

I call Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I had the honour to introduce this report on 4th June of this year. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is today presenting a revised version. At the request of a single delegate the Assembly agreed that the report should also consider the important rôle played by various western industrialised countries as suppliers of arms to the Near East. This report has been drawn up in compliance with this request, Tables A and B having been added in Appendix VI.

At my request the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has also promised to draw up a separate and more detailed report on this problem.

Three amendments were submitted to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. One of them, the one in which Syria as well as Libya is mentioned as a participant in international terrorism, has been approved. I hope, therefore, that you will not take it amiss if I refer you in general to my comments in June, principally because the description and assessment of the situation remain unchanged since that time.

We considered three problems in depth: the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean, the NATO countries in the Mediterranean and the non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean.

The fact that in a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar in early July Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and United States naval forces from the Mediterranean – presumably envisaged as a new version of the

Geneva Near East conference – cannot in any way change the basic evaluation of the Soviet Union's policy on the Near and Middle East. In fact, it essentially confirms our view that the Soviet Union is making still more determined efforts to acquire influence in the Mediterranean. The geographical aspects alone of the proposed withdrawal are enough to cast doubt on it.

With your permission, therefore, I will now briefly recall the two most important areas covered by this report. The USSR resolutely exploits for its own ends any trouble spots emerging in the international arena and particularly in the third world. This also applies to the Near East conflict and the associated energy problems confronting the western industrialised countries and equally to the offensive policy of Islam, which is spreading far beyond the actual Iran-Iraq trouble centre to all the countries of the Near East and North Africa, where the USSR is endeavouring to expand its spheres of influence and to weaken the West's position wherever this appears possible without any risk to itself. We must realise that, given the Soviet Union's perception of the world, this is a legitimate means to an end. For our part, we must never lose sight of that fact. We simply have to remember at all times that the West is far more dependent than the USSR on third world countries for raw materials and energy.

Consequently, the strategic importance of NATO's southern flank has not decreased in recent years. In any assessment of the security situation it is more than ever essential to consider not only Central Europe but also the southern region of the allied command in Europe.

The West's primary aim throughout the AFSOUTH sector is still the prevention of war by deterrence. In view of the latent challenges on its southern flank it would seem appropriate to pay due attention to this region. A particular problem is posed by the fact that crises and conflicts outside the NATO area are increasingly affecting the AFSOUTH sector. In the southern region the West not only finds itself confronted with the Warsaw Pact: some member countries in the southern region not only have a common frontier with Warsaw Pact countries but also adjoin an area of regional conflict such as Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan and the Near East.

In these circumstances Turkey's strategic importance has grown. Regardless of events outside the NATO area, it is still our main task to respond adequately to the communist threat.

The Warsaw Pact forces are superior to those of the AFSOUTH sector. The fighting strength of the western units is not yet quite enough.

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

It is becoming increasingly important to strengthen cohesion by extending co-operation to other spheres and by achieving closer political and military integration into the alliance. Above all, the Central European countries must be constantly reminded that vital interests of the West are at stake in this region. The southern region is of great importance to the whole of the alliance. To ensure peace or maintain a credible deterrent capacity, it is clearly essential that the NATO forces in the southern region should also be modernised and maintained at an adequate level.

The security of the countries on the southern flank and control over the Mediterranean continue to be NATO's principal tasks in this area. We have endeavoured to set this out in detail in the report. In this connection we welcome the fact that the United States Sixth Fleet is improving the position of the alliance in the Mediterranean.

We welcome the participation of French forces in manoeuvres in the Mediterranean. Special mention should also be made of the considerable Greek and Turkish defence efforts and the various Italian programmes, including the establishment of a rapid strike force. We also welcome Spain's accession to the alliance, which has similarly improved the West's position in this region.

The political, military and above all economic action that needs to be taken now and in the future is set out in the draft recommendation.

To conclude, I should like to take up two points. We have noted with interest that the Council discussed security in the Mediterranean at its meeting in Venice. In the report we are to deal with during this sitting it has devoted a short section to this subject which bears no relation to the importance of the region. Then, at its meeting in Luxembourg, the Council did not have enough time to consider this problem. We can only call on the Council to see this subject as an on-going task and to take appropriate account of it in its negotiations.

The second point is this; we increasingly have the feeling that too much is said and too much time elapses between the realisation that the economic situation in the southern region needs to be improved and action to this end. In our report we appeal for the stabilisation of the situation in the southern region chiefly through the provision of economic aid – to a greater extent than in the past.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should first like to congratulate Mr. Kittelmann on his essential, important and very full report about which a great deal needs to be said. May I begin by recalling that my party and I myself have always resisted and are still resisting the temptation to shift the axis of Italian foreign policy and of Italian defence towards the Mediterranean or at least exclusively to the Mediterranean. We have always maintained that it is Italy's first duty and interest to stay within the Atlantic family looking towards Western Europe and regard this as the essential prerequisite for the better implementation of a responsible and constructive peace policy in the Mediterranean; Italy must not give way to temptations of the kind which in the past have written some very sad pages in our country's political history.

But precisely because we are calling for the constructive involvement of the original elements of the Atlantic Alliance and because of our position and duties in relation to the problems arising, we should like to add a few reservations to our approval of certain major points in the report.

Our first reservation concerns the words used concerning the serious crisis in the Middle East, the crisis of what used to be Palestine and concerning the great quarrel between Israel and the Arab states regarding the grave problem of the fate of the Palestinian people. I cannot accept a wording which puts the Israelis and the Palestinians on the same footing as though there were faults on both sides. On the one hand there is a state recognised by the United Nations and, on the other, surrounding states which have not been prepared to make peace with it; in the middle there are people deserving of respect for whom the agreement will certainly not be repudiated by Italian republicans who have always recognised the rights of nations. But in order to solve this problem the greed and manoeuvrings of other states must be set aside.

Another major point is the attention which Mr. Kittelmann said he wished to give in another report to the subject of reactions to Libya's sponsoring of terrorist activities. We republicans can approve what the report says about Turkey. In our view the presence of Turkey both on the southern flank of NATO and in the Council of Europe is very important. Since Turkey restored conditions for full participation in the Council of Europe we have kept the question under constant review and consider that every effort to promote agreements and co-operation with that country and especially to improve relations between Turkey and Greece, which are a real

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

thorn in the flesh and an open wound affecting NATO's potential in this extremely delicate sector, should be supported with commitment in every possible way.

Regarding the situation in Cyprus we have made many efforts in the Council of Europe and we must continue because there has to be some serious counterpart to the Turkish Republic; what we want is an expression of European sympathy and support with full recognition of Turkey's co-operation in the Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, Turkish co-operation is needed to reduce tension and to achieve a solution, federal or otherwise, for Cyprus.

Of particular and fundamental importance for all the problems involved is the maintenance of freedom of navigation and of a military and political presence throughout the Mediterranean, particularly as regards Egypt, which is unquestionably a key element for peace as it may be endangered by Islamic fundamentalism or a serious economic crisis. Consequently, while stating that Egypt must be given every encouragement and support, I would recall that the Camp David agreements were a step towards peace. It is my opinion, therefore, that we are right to stress this point because we are not then simply reading a critical lecture about the present but are looking at all the problems we are discussing here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – The steadily deteriorating situation in the Mediterranean is a matter of serious concern to all Europeans. This point was made by, among others, the Italian foreign and defence ministers during the recent meeting in Luxembourg:

"Instability in the Mediterranean has shown no sign of improvement. All the unknowns remain regarding Libyan policy. At this very moment Colonel Kadhafi is waging war in Chad. Serious threats of terrorist activity have spread to other countries. The Mediterranean region is split up into thirty states where régimes and policies change rapidly and thereby affect international conduct."

This statement made in Luxembourg seems virtually to summarise the report we are considering. I must say to the Rapporteur that this report gives a very pertinent analysis of the Mediterranean situation and in particular shows a highly intelligent political understanding of the facts combined with a measure of reasonable realism which have enabled him to put ten recommendations to us. The last of these reads:

"To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region."

May I observe that this document comes from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and not from a committee on economic, social and political questions.

Let us be clear that there is no intention of denying the importance of the military aspects of the problem. Quite the opposite. The recommendation before us stresses among other things that every effort must be made to secure the operational freedom of forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area – naturally with due regard for international law; the need is also stressed for the continued presence of United States forces in the area and of adequate aid for modernisation of the equipment of the armed forces of a number of countries which are still lagging behind technologically.

The vital point is political, however. This is the need to identify and combat the possible causes of war within the various countries. There is no point in vilifying the opposing political and military blocs which we must accept as an unavoidable fact. But both those blocs may be induced to intervene, in particular by conflicts and crises within the various countries and especially in relations between the various Mediterranean countries; this applies in particular to the non-aligned countries and also to countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean; they may be led to intervene by a very unstable political situation, by frequent and sudden changes of political régime and by open or latent local conflicts. Mr. President, I am horrified and bitterly concerned by the diplomatic conflict between Greece and Turkey, two countries with an ancient civilisation and noble traditions, which are unable to resolve their disputes in the Aegean and so, without wishing to do so, weaken the defensive rôle which NATO should have in the area.

These are the internal causes which may persuade and induce one great power to intervene, to the great danger of political and military equilibrium and consequently to the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean and throughout the world.

The Rapporteur is therefore perfectly correct in stating that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked with good relations between the countries and that:

"The success of such an undertaking will depend much more on diplomatic and economic relations than on traditional military power."

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

In these circumstances, vital factors are firstly the cohesion of NATO and secondly co-ordination of the policies of the members of the European Community whose actions can help to preserve peace and stability more than purely military measures.

In this way we shall fulfil the hope recently expressed here that we shall have a Mediterranean and a world with fewer arms and greater security. Otherwise, we run the risk of having a Mediterranean with less arms and also less security but that is not what we want.

For these reasons, Mr. President, we shall give our convinced support to the report and the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking Mr. Kittelmann most sincerely for drawing up such an extensive report on the problems in the Mediterranean area and above all for explaining the military side in such detail. I do not think there can be any doubt that the Mediterranean is today one of the areas of considerable tension in the world, where war, warlike acts, death and injury are daily occurrences, and this, as we all know, in various parts of the Mediterranean region.

In this assessment of the situation we must always bear in mind a sentence in the draft recommendation, the first sentence proposed by the Rapporteur, which says that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East region and the Mediterranean area has not changed. All I can say about that is: how true.

Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that what we are concerned with here might be called Russian and not just Soviet policy, for it was always the classical Russian policy in this region to advance towards the "warm seas", as they were known. Since the squadron of the brothers Orlov cruised in the Mediterranean in the eighteenth century, Russian policy has been obsessed with this area. It may also be of interest that it is mentioned in the secret supplementary agreements to the accords between Hitler and Stalin. In these agreements Hitler granted the Soviet Union a sphere of influence oriented towards the Arab region, that is to say today's major trouble spot, the Persian Gulf. However, these 1939 agreements did not refer to the Balkans or Turkey. The secret talks which the then new Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, who died a few days ago, held with Ribbentrop and Hitler in Berlin in 1940, did not

in the end lead to an agreement on the division of spheres of influence between the two great dictators of the 1940s, Hitler and Stalin, because Hitler was not prepared to meet Molotov's demands that Turkey and the Straits should form part of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

That this was the Soviet Union's objective, ladies and gentlemen, became clear after the end of the war, in 1945. Turkey entered the war in 1945 and so became, as it were, one of the victorious powers on 8th May 1945, and yet, on the termination of the non-aggression and friendship treaty that had been negotiated with Kemal Atatürk, the Soviet Union demanded military bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, making these demands – with others – the focal point of the conference of foreign ministers held in Paris in 1946.

Russia – the Soviet Union – has pursued a consistent policy elsewhere as well, for instance with regard to the former Italian colonies, Libya and Eritrea, which the Soviet Union would very much have liked to bring under its administrative sovereignty at the time. It was always keen to obtain bases in Libya and Eritrea in this way. Then, in 1947, the picture in the Mediterranean changed radically, as the Truman doctrine brought the Sixth Fleet into the Mediterranean to avert a threat to the freedom of countries in the region. As you know, the civil war was raging in Greece, exacting great sacrifices. But for the presence of the United States Sixth Fleet, peace could probably not have been maintained in the Mediterranean, the break between Tito and Stalin though of course made things easier.

Ladies and gentlemen, in this situation and in view of the Soviet Union's interest in this region, it is quite clear that the West, NATO, WEU, must do everything possible to ensure that the balance of forces in this area is maintained so that any unilateral threat can be counteracted.

Turkey's rôle has already been mentioned. I should like to underline this without adding anything to what the previous speaker said. But I do believe that Turkey plays a particularly important rôle as a cornerstone of NATO in the Mediterranean region. It is, however, regrettable that the tensions between Greece and Turkey do not exactly help to strengthen this cornerstone.

Libya was also mentioned. Libya is a serious problem in the Mediterranean, not only, as we know, because of its links with terrorism but also because Libya is a country which pursues an aggressive policy and has occupied part of Chad. In the last few weeks in particular it has become clear that it can no longer rely on supporters, if I may call them that, in Chad itself, since Goukouni Oueddei, the leader of the Gunt

Mr. Müller (continued)

movement, which rose against Chad's President Habre – and this revolt is still going on – has been wounded in Libya, where he is under house arrest, and some of his bodyguards have been shot dead. This shows how Mr. Kadhafi treats his friends. And the occupation of Northern Chad by Libyan troops, with the logistical help of military personnel from the Warsaw Pact countries, has become an open act of aggression, since the Gunt forces have recently begun to seek reconciliation with President Habre again. This example alone – other danger spots have already been mentioned: Iraq-Iran, the conflict in Lebanon, the relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and mention should also be made of Cyprus in this context – shows that there are tensions throughout the Mediterranean area. We for our part in NATO and WEU must therefore be a stabilising factor and do everything we can to guarantee lasting stability and to maintain peace through our active presence in this area and by supporting our friends there.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Giust.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think that previous speakers have said everything there is to be said about the present exceptional situation in the Mediterranean and I consider that the essential merit of Mr. Kittelmann's report on this point is first that it focuses on a problem which is taking a dramatic turn and secondly that it draws our attention and that of all the various organisations to the need to recognise the new undesirable situation existing in the Mediterranean.

This being so, Mr. Kittelmann's report on European security and the Mediterranean is of great importance not only as an Assembly document but also as a text requiring the attention of everyone with military, political and economic responsibilities in the Mediterranean and within our western political structure. It is merely necessary to enumerate the sources of concern and tension mentioned in the report to realise how many matters of concern there are in the region – Iran-Iraq problem. A really serious development has been the recent delivery by the United States of weapons to a country at war which is not a western country and I trust that the Americans will be able to clarify their position; any failure to do so would be of the greatest concern for the whole political structure maintained by the western countries and the members of NATO. It is sufficient to recall the various problems listed from Lebanon to Israel and Palestine as Mr. Cifarelli mentioned, from the major question of the third countries, from the Balkans, from Yugoslavia, from the emerging African countries, from the new war referred to as international terrorism, with the most worry-

ing and dramatic elements in the pursuit of that war located in the Mediterranean, in Syria and in Libya.

On this point, Mr. President, I hope that the recent Italian proposal for more intelligent, more determined or at least less equivocal Middle Eastern involvement in a united effort to combat international terrorism will be accepted, carried through and better understood.

In conclusion, Mr. President, this brief personal summary which is more fully developed in Mr. Kittelmann's report reveals matters of internal concern for the members of NATO and the countries of the western world. I am referring to the disturbing position of Greece and to relations between Greece and Turkey over the issue of Cyprus which make the general picture of the Mediterranean even worse.

These are our reasons, Mr. President, regarding which I will not insult your intelligence by wasting time on further comment, for voting wholeheartedly in favour of Mr. Kittelmann's intelligent and very full report with its political and cultural insight stressing the economic aspects and the need for united action to prevent further possible upheavals in the Mediterranean. But the main and ultimate merit of this report for us, for our Assembly and for everyone in general is that it has aroused historically essential attention in WEU and I would imagine in other organisations responsible for general military and economic policy and has emphasised a particularly delicate and worrying element in an area of extreme delicacy involving all our countries, our whole system and European security.

If calmer, more credible and more certain future prospects are not restored over the Mediterranean as a whole within the next few years, peace will undoubtedly be threatened not only in that area and in Europe as was demonstrated by the recent crisis in the Gulf of Sirte, but unfortunately over much wider areas which could even involve the whole of our planet.

For these reasons I wish to thank Mr. Kittelmann for his report to which we will give the full support it undoubtedly deserves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, European security and the position in the Mediterranean are unquestionably closely linked and the many sources of instability and unresolved problems in the Mediterranean all affect Europe and the preservation of European security, which we all need.

What is to be done then? What is to be done to remove these causes and eliminate the unresolved problems of which there are many? On this point Mr. Cifarelli will perhaps allow me to

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

say that, on the one hand, there is Israel with all its need for guarantees for its security and its existence, which we also wish to be assured, but on the other hand, there are not a number of peoples but one particular people, the Palestinians, who alone in the world have no land or state. This is a legitimate right to which they are absolutely entitled and they cannot be treated as a nomadic people because otherwise we also would be responsible for a tragedy like that which unfortunately struck the Jews in the past and during the second world war. Action must therefore be taken to deal with all the causes, but how?

I must say with the greatest sincerity that Mr. Kittelmann's report is completely wide of the mark in dealing with the political geography of the situation we are considering. I was particularly struck by one sentence in the report which defines the Mediterranean as exclusively western territory. What does this mean, Mr. Kittelmann? I must ask the question because I should like an explanation on this point. On the one hand there is a threat of Soviet hegemony which, it is said, has to be resisted at all costs and on the other, there is United States and NATO dominance which it is sought to impose.

Mr. Kittelmann, I am opposed to both; I am opposed to the risk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact dominance and I am also opposed to the possibility of American or NATO dominance in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is geographically, politically, historically and culturally the area where European, African, Asian, Arab, Israel, neutral and non-aligned states and peoples live together and have to live together; some of these are neutral and non-aligned countries towards whom we must behave correctly because when we speak of Cyprus, as quite rightly we have, we must not forget that a NATO country and a member of the Atlantic Alliance like Turkey is occupying 40% of its territory and has set up a so-called republic on that territory; nor must we make mock of the guarantees of Maltese neutrality because they are given not only by Libya but also by a treaty with Italy supported by more than 180 billion from Mr. Craxi and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Andreotti.

We must see things as they are! The Mediterranean is these countries with which we must work to resolve the problems as the Community foreign ministers tried in 1980 and has several times been attempted in Europe's dialogue with the Arabs. But why has this line been abandoned? It has been abandoned because these vital special interests of Europeans, Africans, Arabs and Asians have been sacrificed to the global interests of the United States of America. We believe that the two superpowers should have a rôle in the Mediterranean but not a stra-

tegic rôle or a sphere of influence but a rôle through which they can help to solve the problems by their authority.

That is why we are in favour of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations and with the backing of the two great powers, as happened in Geneva some time ago. Otherwise we may have a repeat of what happened with Sigonella first and later with Libya. What did the American bombing achieve? Did it perhaps put an end to terrorism? The terrorism which we all wish to fight with determination. None of us thinks that this problem can be resolved by military action, particularly as we have all learnt that these countries – not only Iran but also Syria and Iraq – are dealing in arms under the counter with contemptible swindlers. No; if we go on in this way tensions will re-emerge in the area and it is not by chance that three NATO governments which have signed the Atlantic treaty, namely Spain, Greece and Italy, condemned the American action and that the Italian Government stated formally through its Prime Minister that it will not allow the United States to use Italian bases for other such actions. All of this increases tension. First and foremost the security of the Mediterranean is a problem for the European countries and we are therefore the people to call for a resumption of independent action by European governments and institutions. WEU should also make its contribution in this direction; as Mr. Kittelmann's report does not take that line, I am sorry to say we shall have to vote against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have asked to speak on this report because it might otherwise have looked as if our Italian colleagues were virtually the only people really interested in the problems of the Mediterranean area. I think the German Rapporteur, Mr. Kittelmann, is to be congratulated on once again pointing out that the North Atlantic Alliance, and Western European Union as part of this alliance, are, in the final analysis, maritime organisations. The security of the member countries is probably under less of a threat on the central front, although it is there that the opposing ranks are at their densest, which many people see as a threat. The maritime problems on the periphery are, however, more likely to jeopardise our security.

If I were a Soviet planner trying to test the cohesion of the NATO alliance, I would not look to Central Europe, where the whole alliance would immediately and unquestionably be under attack, but to the northern flank, Spitsbergen, the Norwegian Sea, or the Mediterranean.

Mr. Berger (continued)

Consequently, the Soviet Union is acting consistently in every respect in trying to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean. It has scored successes, but it has also suffered setbacks, both of which we should note in order to draw conclusions for the future.

The Soviet Union has been successful to the extent that it now has a far larger fleet in the Mediterranean than twenty years ago, as the report makes very clear. We must not underestimate this.

The Soviet Union has suffered setbacks in that despite its efforts it has not managed, for example, to gain a really firm foothold on the Mediterranean coast facing Europe, to establish bases from which its fleet could operate far more effectively. As I have said, it has been successful in some respects and unsuccessful in others, but there is no guarantee that it might not succeed in all respects one day. I believe that as members of Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance we must be very wary of this.

What is more, the Mediterranean is also a very important area in the context of what we are now saying, after Reykjavik. If we want to maintain NATO as a whole as a maritime alliance, we must ensure a continued American commitment in Europe and European waters, an area in which the Americans have, in fact, to make a great effort in the interests of our security. If we stopped for a moment to imagine what would happen to Europe if the only fleet in the Mediterranean was the Soviet Union's, we would see what we have to accomplish here together for the future.

I should therefore like to endorse two recommendations made by the Rapporteur, designed to prevent the West from losing positions in the Mediterranean and, if I may, to add a third.

The first is that conflicts between NATO partners, which weaken our position, should, if possible, be resolved so as to strengthen the alliance as a whole. I am referring to Greece and Turkey. This problem must be solved because the present situation detracts from the security of the whole alliance. These two NATO partners must sit down together and try to solve their problems.

Second, as the previous speaker made clear, the problems in this region cannot be solved nor the situation stabilised unless we also make a joint effort to overcome its social shortcomings and economic weaknesses. Only this kind of stabilisation will lead to political stability as well.

The third recommendation I would add is that NATO and the Mediterranean countries that belong to NATO should co-operate as closely as

possible in the region. This includes France and Spain, Spain's continued membership of NATO being particularly important for the West. I feel this recommendation is necessary and should also be supported by this Assembly.

All this makes it easy for us, of course, to approve this excellent report, for which my thanks once again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent report, which makes several references to Turkey, the Cyprus question and the problems between Greece and Turkey already referred to by several of the previous speakers.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, it is pointless to approach the present situation by invoking the historical past. The Turks have twice agreed to sign the document produced by the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, and our President has stated in writing his willingness to sign this document forthwith. The refusal, invariably categorical if not actually obstinate, has come from Greece.

Nobody wishes more than us to help the Turkish community by a fair political solution safeguarding the interest of both communities while maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The problem is to persuade the other party to negotiate and accept the good offices of the United Nations. Therein lies the Cyprus problem.

As far as the Greek-Turkish conflict is concerned, Mr. President, a number of problems have been created by our neighbours. The Aegean, which should, in theory, be an area of co-operation and peace between two nations who have known and been in contact with each other for nine centuries, should in the view of our Greek friends be a closed sea with 78% of its territorial waters in Greek hands. They lay claim to 95% of the continental shelf and to 80% of the airspace – claims which would suffocate the Anatolian peninsula over its sea and air routes. That is unacceptable.

In January 1985, Greece decided to direct all its forces not against the Warsaw Pact but against Turkey, to create an anti-Turkish militia 600 000 strong and to set up an anti-Turkish ministry of the Aegean. In the three years he has been in power, the Prime Minister of my country has called on his Greek counterpart at least ten times to arrange a meeting in Athens, Ankara or elsewhere in Europe, so that they might talk and enter into a dialogue. Our two countries are part of the western world, of the democratic system and of the defence of the West, but still we always meet with a categorical refusal.

Mr. Inan (continued)

Having myself been the recipient of several appeals, I now in turn appeal to you and your organisation to exert pressure on Athens, on Greece, to ask them to enter into a dialogue and discussions with Turkey. On behalf of the Turkish Government, I can give an undertaking that, if you are able to elicit from Prime Minister Papandreou a willingness to talk to Turkey anywhere, we for our part will be ready to go there. We are in favour of peace and co-operation. It is we who defend 37% of the frontiers which we share with the Warsaw Pact.

We have forces about 800 000 strong and an economy which leaves much to be desired, but it is a fact that the Mediterranean is the weakest link in western defence. For too long the West has concentrated its attention on Central Europe. Our Greek friends are playing a negative rôle in the Atlantic Alliance. What is left? Italy, Turkey and the Sixth Fleet not yet committed to the Atlantic. NATO is a de facto American fleet, which from time to time merely puts on the hat of the Atlantic Alliance. That is the real truth of what is happening in the Mediterranean. We also look for cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. We have no wish for family discords, weaknesses or divisions within the alliance, but our Greek friends remain to be convinced. They are nice neighbours, and we care for them greatly, but they are not always easy to get on with. An effort should really be made to establish a dialogue with them.

Mr. President, as you are from a Mediterranean country – and contributions have already been made to this debate by the representatives of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany in the absence of any other country interested in the Mediterranean – I now take the liberty of asking you to intervene with the Greek Government to ask it to put an end to its destructive rôle within the EEC and the Atlantic Alliance and become truly Western European by accepting the need for dialogue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking all the speakers, some friendly, some critical, for the fairness with which they have considered the report.

To be brief, I have nothing to add to many of the comments made because they fully accord with what appears in my report and the conclusions approved by a very large majority of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. But I should like to comment on two or

three remarks, beginning with a personal admission in response to what Mr. Cifarelli said: the equation of Israel and the Palestinians is not a qualitative equation, it represents an appeal to two groups, and is not intended to mean any more than it says. As a very committed friend of the state of Israel I should like to make that absolutely clear.

Many of the statements that have been made here have shown how important the parliamentary Assembly of WEU considers the southern flank to be.

For me personally, as a Central European, it was a pleasure and an experience to act as Rapporteur under the critical eyes of members who are far more directly affected by the problems in their area than we are in Central Europe. I have taken all the more trouble to ensure that you can see from the report how important it is for Central and Northern Europe to pay more attention to these problems as well.

Mr. Rubbi, I listened very carefully to what you had to say. I think I would have done something wrong if you had been able to approve this report without reservation. Nonetheless, the NATO countries in the Mediterranean area – including your own country – are entitled to be treated in the same way as the other NATO countries. NATO has committed itself to equal treatment.

Perhaps even a communist delegate can see his way to agree with the sentiment that not only is economic aid needed in this area but that it must actually be provided. That at least will meet with even your unqualified approval.

I should like to thank you, Mr. Inan, for what you said, as a guest speaker from Turkey. You referred once again to relative strengths. Please do not take it amiss if I do not discuss the dispute between Greece and Turkey, which you described. We have discussed it in great detail in the report, which shows that this imbalance in particular is a challenge to us.

As regards Turkey, which faces major economic difficulties and is of fundamental strategic importance to NATO in the southern region, I would say that we cannot leave this country alone with its problems. WEU should encourage those who bear the responsibility to give Turkey more support.

I should like to thank you, Mr. President, once again and also the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for their support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Kittelmann.

The vote on the draft recommendation will be held late tomorrow afternoon.

**14. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 2nd December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1069 and addendum).
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1071 and addendum).
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year

1987 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1072 and addendum).

4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1074).
5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1078).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.10 p.m.)

APPENDIX

*Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful for the opportunity of speaking to this Assembly once again. My address will reflect the great commitment with which the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Foreign Minister and the Federal Defence Minister are seeking a definition of Europe's security policy interests together with their Western European partners.

The Federal Government knows full well that the efforts of the executives can succeed only if they have the support of the parliaments and the public in Europe. The aim must be to give the policy of European integration the security policy dimension without which any policy for Europe committed to the goal of European union will lack credibility.

The debates of this Assembly and the growing participation of governments in them are a sign that we have made some progress towards the reactivation of WEU since the decisions taken in Rome. Franco-German friendship has played a crucial rôle in this, as in all aspects of the policy for Europe. The speech Prime Minister Chirac will be making tomorrow will, I am sure, underline this once again. The Federal Government is confident that the need to harmonise the security policies of the Western European countries is being increasingly acknowledged.

What is at stake? The Federal Government has always justified its commitment to the reactivation of WEU by referring to the need to consolidate the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. As you all know, the image of the two pillars supporting the Atlantic Alliance was first used by President Kennedy during a speech in Philadelphia in 1962. This image is part of the tradition of American post-war policy, which has remained fundamentally unchanged until the present day. The United States has always supported and encouraged the unification of Europe because it knows that this unification is the best way of combining and strengthening Europe's forces. In his memorable speech in May 1985 before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, President Reagan reaffirmed the United States' continuing loyalty to the cause of European unification when he said:

"I am here to tell you America remains, as she was forty years ago, dedicated to the unity of Europe. We continue to see a strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even

stronger partner. ...That policy saw the new world and the old as twin pillars of a larger democratic community."

Integration is the best way for Western Europe to hold its own in a world that continues to be dominated by the antithesis between East and West. It is the only way for Europe to be sure of its place in tomorrow's world. Europe must accept its responsibility for its own future and for peace in the world.

Europe's security cannot be guaranteed without the Atlantic Alliance. The proven partnership in this alliance must retain its vitality. To this end, it must become still more evident in the future that the alliance partners formulate their policy on the basis of the mutuality of their fundamental security interests.

The process of consultation, in which the day-to-day business of partnership in the alliance finds expression, must be balanced and become even more visible. The American and European public must be able to see that North Americans and Europeans in the alliance together determine the West's position on the operational aspects of security policy.

The Atlantic partnership must be visible so that the Europeans' efforts are appreciated in America and Europe continues to be aware of North America's basic interest in its security. The reactivation of WEU will give the policy of European integration the security policy dimension it requires. Harmonisation of the WEU member states' positions on security policy is also the way to strengthen Europe's contribution to the Atlantic partnership. It strengthens Europe's capacity for genuine partnership and thus the alliance itself.

This was made very clear by the deliberations of the foreign and defence ministers in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November of this year. As the report of the Chairman-in-Office rightly emphasises, the meeting in Luxembourg gave rise to a searching and fruitful exchange of views on the current state of East-West relations. But above all a very broad consensus was reached on important basic aspects of security policy and strategy and of disarmament and arms control policy. This consensus will inspire the discussions of the alliance partners at the forthcoming meetings of the NATO defence and foreign ministers.

The main principles to emerge from the ministers' deliberations in Luxembourg were as follows:

- the essential aim of western security policy must be to prevent any kind of war, whether nuclear or conventional;
- the strategy of deterrence will continue to be important for Europe's security in the future; this strategy guarantees the essential link between Europe's and the United States' security;
- in view of the balance of forces between East and West, the credibility of this strategy can be assured only by a continuum of deterrence which embraces the conventional and nuclear forces of all the alliance partners;
- the efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament at a lower and more balanced level of forces form an integral part of western security policy. Arms control agreements must increase security, and they must be verifiable;
- progress in one area of arms control must not be achieved at the expense of progress in other, unrelated areas. The member states of WEU are of one mind in rejecting the link created by the Soviet Union between the INF negotiations and SDI;
- with the prospect of progress in nuclear disarmament, the achievement of stability in the conventional sphere becomes even more important and urgent. The complete elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world also becomes more urgent;
- the dismantling of longer-range weapons in Europe will make it even more necessary to engage in follow-up negotiations on the elimination of the imbalance in shorter-range weapons, the target being the same upper limits for both sides at a lower level.

Ladies and gentlemen, in Luxembourg the WEU partners defined the task to be performed after Reykjavik. The Federal Chancellor described this task to the German Bundestag on 6th November 1986: the Europeans could be in no doubt that such drastic reductions in nuclear weapons over a comparatively short period as those discussed in Reykjavik would result in a major change in the strategic balance between East and West.

Reykjavik has created a basis for the Geneva negotiations on which progress can be achieved in all three areas of negotiation. In the meantime, both sides have come forward with fresh proposals on intermediate-range weapons, strategic weapons and the space problem, based

on the convergence achieved in Reykjavik. What matters now is that the promise held out by Reykjavik should be translated into practical agreements at the Geneva negotiating table.

The talks in Reykjavik indicated a fresh approach in the efforts of the two superpowers to make their relations in one – in the central – area of security policy more constructive. As we see it, this is the crucial aspect of the Reykjavik meeting. The Federal Government is convinced that there can be no return to the time before Reykjavik. The implications of the new approaches must be carefully thought through. We must be grateful that Reykjavik triggered off this process and we Europeans must together make the necessary effort to ensure that it develops in the right direction. From the Federal Government's viewpoint the following statements can already be made:

We have an overriding interest in an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The Federal Government welcomes the zero option proposed for longer-range missiles in Europe, with a simultaneous reduction to one hundred warheads outside Europe. Both Europe and the alliance have an interest in avoiding the emergence of a new grey area. Shorter-range weapons cannot therefore be ignored during the arms control negotiations. It follows from the need for stability in the area of security policy that shorter-range systems should be subject to restrictions under an INF agreement and that missiles with a range of 150 to 1 000 km should be included in follow-up negotiations. What we want to see is an INF agreement containing a specific commitment to the early resumption of negotiations aimed at also reducing these weapons to the same upper limits on both sides at a lower level. If an agreement of this nature is to be reached in the near future, it is important that the Soviet Union should abandon the irrelevant package it has created with SDI. A policy of all or nothing will prevent any progress. It would be a major step forward for the whole of mankind if the planned agreement required the Soviet Union to scrap 1 335 of its current 1 435 warheads.

As was also pointed out in Luxembourg, we consider it important to concentrate on the immediate and the feasible, that is to say the agreement on a drastic reduction in intermediate-range missiles and the halving of the strategic potential of both sides.

It is particularly important in this context that in Geneva the Soviet Union has confirmed the willingness it showed in Reykjavik to halve the number of its heavy intercontinental missiles – SS-18s. You all know what a serious problem the treatment of these heavy intercontinental missiles has long been in negotiations between the two superpowers.

Against the background of these negotiations in Geneva I should like to point out that the Federal Government considers it very important for both sides to abide by the upper limits imposed by SALT II, because they form a framework for the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Like our partners in the alliance, we see drastic reductions in the offensive nuclear potential of both superpowers as the most important goal. Agreements on a substantial reduction in nuclear potential, like the 50% cut in strategic weapons mooted by both sides in Reykjavik, will make the question of continued observance of the upper SALT limits redundant.

In Luxembourg the ministers also discussed in great depth the interactions which exist in the overall complex of deterrence and which will become more apparent when reductions in individual categories of nuclear weapons are considered. The deterrence that prevents war is based on the "triad", whose elements are not readily interchangeable. On the other hand, since the post-war years, the nub of the European security problem has been the permanent conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, with the particularly destabilising effect of the invasion capability of its front line forces. For us Europeans the essential point is that any kind of war - whether waged with conventional or nuclear weapons - must be prevented in the future. Even a war waged with conventional weapons in Europe today would be many times more horrific than the second world war.

For us the dividing line does not run between nuclear and conventional war but between war and peace. That is why we attach so much importance to the Luxembourg consensus, in which the linking of conventional and nuclear forces of all the alliance partners is regarded as essential for the future. At the same time, however, we attach paramount importance to the efforts to reduce existing instabilities in conventional forces: according to the decisions taken by the foreign ministers in Halifax, the aim is to increase stability and security throughout Europe by achieving greater openness and striking a verifiable and stable balance in conventional forces at a lower level.

With its Budapest declaration, the Warsaw Pact has in principle reacted favourably to NATO's signal from Halifax. Favourable results were achieved at the CSCE in Stockholm, providing a sound basis for further progress in the control of conventional armaments. The group of high-ranking experts set up by the foreign ministers in Halifax will be submitting its reports at the forthcoming meeting of the NATO foreign ministers. The alliance will thus be given a basis for drawing up proposals for further steps in conventional arms control. On several occasions the Federal Government has stated its belief that all

the alliance partners must participate in such negotiations.

Progress towards the control of nuclear arms, however, lends still greater importance to the negotiations on a complete, worldwide ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference. The Federal Government is convinced that success in these negotiations is within reach. What is needed now is an early agreement on the central issue of verification.

The Soviet Union should now translate its announcements into practical proposals. We are prepared to work together on solutions that take account both of the need for stringent verification of the agreement and of the legitimate interest of the participating countries in protection.

Since the Reykjavik talks there has also been an improvement in the prospects for progress towards the gradual solution of the nuclear test ban problem. What must not, of course, be overlooked in this context is that a test ban cannot be a substitute for a substantial reduction in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. The progressive introduction of a comprehensive nuclear test ban that could be reliably verified would, however, help to increase strategic stability. The reliable verification of a test ban is still the essential precondition for any agreement. Although such verification poses considerable scientific and technical problems, solutions to these apparently now exist. A major contribution here could be made by a worldwide seismological monitoring system, the gradual expansion of which the Federal Government proposed at the Geneva disarmament conference in 1985.

The prospect of substantial progress towards a peaceful and safe world with fewer weapons comes at a time when the thirty-five participating nations have gathered in Vienna for the CSCE follow-up meeting. Vienna has provided further evidence that the CSCE offers a framework and a timetable for a process of dynamic development geared to lasting peace in Europe.

In Vienna we face the task of conducting a frank and objective debate on the state of the implementation of the Helsinki final act and the concluding document of Madrid, and of discussing and, if possible, approving further proposals.

The process that has taken place since Helsinki confirms that the security problems cannot be solved in isolation. They are closely related to the promotion of political, humanitarian, economic and cultural co-operation and confidence-building. The CSCE process is part of the vital purpose of eventually overcoming the division of Europe and with it the division of Germany.

This process should enable us to phase out the polarisation of Europe by power politics.

WEU's contribution here is essential. Its reactivation, while strengthening the Atlantic partnership, also demonstrates that attempts to separate the Europeans from the United States and to drive wedges between the European countries have no prospect of success.

The policy of combining the forces of Western Europe, which is what we have wanted for decades, must be vigorously continued. This will improve the conditions necessary not only for the form of Soviet policy to adapt to present-day circumstances, but also for its substance to be so structured that a balance of interests in the outstanding security policy issues can actually be achieved between East and West.

The deliberations in Luxembourg on the Reykjavik talks showed that the WEU countries are linked to the United States in the fundamental solidarity of their security interests. This

will also greatly improve the conditions for progress in our efforts to create a stable state of peace in Europe.

Mr. President, we have made considerable progress since the Rome decisions two years ago. If WEU had not existed, we would have had to invent it in the present situation. We must not underestimate the work still to be done, but the direction is clear: from our joint analysis we know what steps are necessary to ensure the security of Western Europe and the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance. Particular importance attaches to WEU in the light of the efforts to improve stability in the conventional sector throughout Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Federal Government wishes to thank the parliamentary Assembly for its active – and occasionally critical – monitoring of the governments' efforts. It is true: our peoples want more rapid progress. I am convinced that the lively exchanges between the Council and Assembly will carry us forward in our common task.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1986

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Rees, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Linster, Sir John Page.
4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1074).
Replies by Mr. Poos to questions put by: Mr. Bianco, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Bohl, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.
5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1078).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bianco (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Poos (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.45 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1069 and addendum.

Here I have to tell you that, with the agreement of the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, we shall be simplifying our discussions this morning by having the Chairman of the committee speak to all three financial reports followed by a joint

1. See page 18.

The President (continued)

debate. A separate vote, of course, will be taken on each this afternoon as is specified in the order of business.

That being so, we shall also take, now, the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986, Document 1071 and addendum, and the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 and the opinion of the Council, Document 1072 and addendum.

I take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Poos, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and sincerely thank him for being here.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with your suggestion, Mr. President, that I should move formally the budget for 1986 and the draft budget for 1987 for consideration by the Assembly, and that we should have a general discussion to give us the opportunity to express our opinion, which has already been mentioned during yesterday's debate and undoubtedly will be mentioned again this morning.

The situation has changed slightly for the better, but the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, which I have just left, is still deeply anxious about the overall situation and wishes to place certain facts on record. Secretarial difficulties have been caused by our having a meeting so early this morning, at 8.30 a.m., finishing only a minute or two before this session. It has not been possible to put the text on paper. Therefore, I propose to move that addition towards the end of my speech, and I hope that it will be available by then.

I should like to make some general comments on how many members of the Assembly see our budget, including the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, of which I have the honour to be Chairman. It is no secret that there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction and anxiety among members about the zero growth policy of the Council of Ministers representing our member governments. It has been felt for a long time that if we as an organisation are to play our part in the reactivation of Western European Union, we must have the wherewithal to achieve that. It has not escaped the notice of many members that, apparently, the other agencies of

WEU seem to have benefited more than ourselves in those difficulties.

I have raised the matter with my government and ministers present, and I have been told that their policy is zero growth for all foreign institutions of which my country is a member. That may be so. I should like to place on record, on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, our deep appreciation of the Italian Government's attitude and the fact that the Italian ministers have been most supportive of us in our efforts to get a better deal for the Assembly.

Although I welcome the noises that have been made by various ministers, I was a little worried yesterday by what the Chairman of the Council of Ministers said. Ministers believe that the Assembly has a valid rôle to play but the Chairman said that it was up to members to lobby their governments to extract a better response from them. I have done that with the leader of the British Delegation, but we did not get very far because back bench members of parliament do not have the power to raise money. Governments are omnipotent in that regard and it is a matter for ministerial decision. It should not be up to members of the Assembly to lobby their administrations. The Assembly should be regarded as an important body that operates in the interests of defence in Europe. The Assembly should be regarded as an amalgam of the seven countries, and if there is lobbying to be done, it should be done by the Presidential Committee, the President and senior members of the Assembly.

I do not want to harp on the present situation because I see a ray of light after what appeared to be a very unhappy meeting of officials on the budget. The Council of Ministers has made a half gesture towards us. Any gesture is to be welcomed. I hope that that will lead to our claims being fully recognised and understood and that the Council of Ministers will encourage our efforts in the year ahead.

Members will know that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration of WEU decided at its meeting on 23rd October to recommend to the Council that the reduction in the draft budget be 893 800 francs. At its meeting on 26th November, the Council decided to reinsert under three separate sub-heads of the draft budget some 79 875 francs. The reduction has therefore been brought down to 813 925 francs. The most important implication of the Council's decision for our budget is that no new posts have been agreed. The Council reserves the right to return to that proposal when it considers the study of the structure of the Office of the Clerk. There is a reduction in the estimates for the recruitment of interpreters and temporary staff and for the requirements of the Office of the

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Clerk. No offset machines or typewriters are to be purchased, and the teletext machine, which the Assembly so urgently needs, has been refused.

I find it a great indignity that you, Mr. President, and the Presidential Committee should not be given leeway as experienced, grown people to decide whether a typewriter, a new chair or a telex machine should be installed, all within the framework of the money allowed. The inability to do that is, I believe, very undignified in a democratically elected assembly. As one of my colleagues said somewhat sarcastically yesterday, I wonder whether the Council of Ministers would grant us the corn to feed carrier pigeons to take messages back and forth to London as we are not to have a telex machine.

There are reductions under the many sub-heads of Head V of the budget, including mission expenses of the Office of the Clerk and fees for experts. Taking account of the Council's decision, the 1986 budget grew by 1.72% and the 1987 budget shows an increase of 2.22%. Pensions, however, grew by 1.84% and 4.68% respectively.

The Secretary-General wrote an important letter to the Clerk, Mr. Moulias, as late as last Thursday night. I believe that it has been circulated. I do not wish to weary the Assembly by reading it out, but I hope that members will study it. The Secretary-General explained that the Council has not yet taken a decision to apply the zero rate criterion to the operational budget without pensions. It is clear that to continue in that vein will be highly detrimental to the work of the Assembly.

We are a small institution and we are saddled with continuous growth of the pensions commitment. Figures have been circulated and given to the Council of Ministers. In 1984, the pensions commitment represented 4.59% of our budget whereas at the moment it represents 5.69% of the budget. By 1993, it will represent 16.36% of the budget. On 1st January 1988, two senior members of staff retire, causing considerable inflation in the pension element of the Assembly's budget. One does not need to be a mathematical genius to realise that a growing percentage of the Assembly's budget will go on pensions. If our paymasters always operate the zero growth criterion, our successors, if the Assembly continues, will find that the whole WEU budget is spent on the pensions of past servants. That is a ridiculous idea.

I am advised that if something is done about pensions here, that will oblige our member countries to do the same for other organisations such

as NATO, the United Nations and the OECD. I do not entirely accept that argument because many of those organisations are more powerful than us and often have strong contributory pension schemes. I urge the Council of Ministers to consider this problem seriously. Although members of the Assembly realise that, at a time of economic stringency, there is not a great deal of spare cash to lavish on WEU, fairness must come into consideration when one is dealing with small organisations, such as this, that have a heavy commitment to pensions.

We shall be inhibited until member governments realise and agree that pensions should be taken out of our budget and that they should no longer be a continuous issue. We have to pay them. We wish long life to our retired members – I am glad to say that so far they are hale and hearty and living well.

But we may well have a commitment to many of them for many years to come and a burden that the Assembly cannot possibly carry for very much longer.

In those circumstances, therefore, we are extremely anxious to be able to negotiate with the Council of Ministers that, while we need a better deal than we have had to date – and we have had this debate continuing for several years – we should like to be able to impress upon them the need to do something about the payment of pensions.

In those circumstances we intend to be even more active in pressing our case as an organisation through you, Sir, as President, and through the Presidential Committee, and as an Assembly as a whole. When I say that at a very full meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration this morning, with probably one of the largest attendances we have had for a very long time, one resolution was carried almost unanimously – there was merely one abstention – on the subject of negotiation with the Council, it will be realised just how strong is the feeling.

As an Assembly we should begin now effectively to negotiate over the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk, to make ourselves more efficient, to show the Council of Ministers that we can effect economies, that we are making the best use of the funds put towards us, and persuade them in the restructuring now going on in other areas of Western European Union that we, too, should benefit and that we can become a more effective organ, playing our part in the defence of Western Europe and in making our essential contribution to world peace.

I have not yet had the text put before me, but I believe that I can convey its essence. While we are still very unhappy about the budget situation, we do not want to rock the boat and we do not

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

want to have open hostility with the Council of Ministers, which I believe would be counter-productive. Therefore we would, and I would so recommend to the Assembly, accept the changes made in the budget of 1986 and the amendments to our proposals for 1987, but still go on negotiating about the future. I should like to move, therefore, that we accept the budget for 1986 and the draft budget with its amendments for 1987, and also that in accepting those budgets we should welcome the suggestion from the Council of Ministers and from the Secretary-General that we as an organisation will have the structure of the Office of the Clerk looked at, and that we say in the same resolution that we urge the Council of Ministers further to examine the pensions position and to give us the latest thinking on these issues within three months, so that there is a time-limit and year does not just merge into year.

If within three months we as a budgetary committee and you, Sir, as the President of the Presidential Committee could have an answer from the Council of Ministers we should be able to carry on with our suggestions for reform and further contact with the Council of Ministers, having a meaningful dialogue leading to a more satisfactory situation.

I recommend to the Assembly that we adopt the two budgets and the motion that I have just outlined. I am sure that there will be members who will wish to contribute – we heard them yesterday – on this subject.

I thank you, Mr. President, for your sterling efforts in always fighting in the Assembly's corner. I am also grateful for the very hard work put in by our officials in endeavouring to get us a much better deal, a deal to which we believe we are entitled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I join my colleagues, Sir Dudley, in congratulating and thanking you – and through you, of course, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration – for your considerable efforts in defending the legitimate rights of the Assembly.

The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as long ago as the Rome meeting in 1984 we agreed on the need to reactivate WEU, being genuinely convinced of Europe's rôle not only in East-West relations but also in making a positive contribution to reducing tension and increasing confidence through practical action aimed at European security.

This reactivation and independence have, however, been impeded in a thousand ways, including the obstruction of any action by the blocking of the budget. But the WEU budget, based on the changes made, does not conflict with the need for strict and economic management as the President himself showed a short time ago. In addition, we have also repeated the need to rationalise expenditure as fully as possible in order to avoid all waste.

We are all aware of the history of relations between the Council, the committee and the Assembly regarding the budget; but the practical reasons for requesting increases in the budget are those which everyone has recognised as being objectively sound, covering as they do reorganisation of the secretariat, the modernisation and adaptation of equipment, the proper adjustment of funds for staff and particularly for pensions; this is required because discrimination is not possible. I repeat that it is impossible to avoid such adjustments which the Assembly recognised as essential until last year without changing the actual wishes of the Assembly. Furthermore, the increase originally requested would not have added substantially to expenditure or to member countries' contributions; this is a very insignificant matter. That is why I think we should reflect on this point and that a number of members made a sound proposal in committee when they requested meetings between the committee and the governments to discuss this question and ask delegations for an undertaking to discuss with their governments the reactivation of WEU and therefore the provision of an adequate budget.

If there is no change of direction, political activity will progressively decline, because current expenditure on maintaining the existing structure will take priority, until the rôle of the Assembly and then of WEU loses all meaning through lack of funds. While the solution for 1986 did not meet the Assembly's requests of which I have spoken it did ultimately allow the position to be held by recognition of the additional expenditure allowed. As regards the 1987 budget there is still a ray of hope because it was decided at a subsequent meeting between the Council and the committee that requirements and expenditure should be reviewed.

Like other members we were thinking of voting against the budget but this ray of hope suggests that attitudes may change in the future. We shall watch how the situation develops regarding the new assessment and will decide accordingly.

I would, however, like to draw members' attention to the dispute between the Council and the Assembly in recent years. If no account is taken of the wishes of the majority of representatives, the outcome will be to damage the rôle of

Mr. Pollidoro (continued)

the Assembly which is the only democratic body made up of WEU elected representatives. As we are in favour of reactivation – as we have already said – no unilateral action must be taken and fruitful collaboration must be established, recognising the Assembly as the democratic institution of an organisation concerned with security.

For these reasons, and with these reservations, we shall therefore approve the budgets on condition that a new situation is created including the elements of which I have spoken.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I feel that I should make a brief statement as I have worked very closely with Sir Dudley Smith who acted as Rapporteur and who in my opinion is entitled to special thanks as you yourself quite rightly said. This is also my great pleasure. I fully agree with his proposals as regards both substance and method: an open procedure expressing mutual confidence but also a practical determination to discuss a solution for unresolved problems. We must move in the right direction taking account of the comments made by the Council of Ministers and working to resolve the problems as best may be while at the same time recognising the absolute need to bring persuasion to bear both on the Council as a whole and on individual ministers to whom we must respectfully but clearly explain our requests and the reasons for them.

I am confident that we shall be able to move forward as we have done in the past; I am confident that the budget will be recognised as the essential instrument for carrying out our activities to the full and making our contribution.

I should like to stress two fundamental points. The first is our independence or in other words our responsibility. We can receive recommendations from the Council of Ministers or any individual minister for stringency or understanding in accordance with certain criteria which are applied in their countries and should be applied over their whole area of commitment. But certain principles must be stated in the strongest terms; the first of these is autonomy. I know that the President is committed to this; I know that we must all respect this commitment to great stringency, possibly involving some reductions in non-essentials; but it is for us to make the choices and to decide how the best contribution can most usefully be made. It is unthinkable that when the choices have been made they should be changed for economic and financial reasons. The total sum is cut; we shall try to show the reasons why we think this should not happen. But within

the sum allocated to us it is our right and duty to make our own choices so that the funds can be used for the purposes we propose.

The second principle which I consider vital is as follows. The Council of Ministers can adopt very stringent measures. For example, it has applied the highly contestable criterion of zero growth. We decided to accept this but zero growth basically means a reduction because in real terms it means calculating planned inflation which is usually lower than real inflation. It means therefore taking no account of certain increases in equipment which we purchase and are above this average price. However, when this principle is adopted it must be applied logically. In real terms the budget means the sound running of our Assembly. If, over the years, expenditure on pensions increases it cannot be claimed that this contributes to the running of the Assembly. The Assembly's expenditure should be considered net of this extraneous expenditure; hence pensions cannot be included in the calculation of zero growth but must be counted separately. The criterion can be fixed by the Council of Ministers but its application must not be left to the discretion of no matter who, even someone with the greatest authority, ignoring the fact that our members include parliamentarians who have held major government posts and therefore have experience; but the criterion must be applied clearly and consistently.

In the contacts we shall have over the next few months on these two points we must be very firm and clear because they are the expression of our sacred rights and duty to the Assembly.

As I said to begin with, I wish to thank the Rapporteur and agree with his proposal that we should be very polite and use the correct procedures when we discuss this important subject; and I offer my best hopes for his activities over the next few months.

(*Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rees.

Mr. REES (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to revert briefly to the general plight that Sir Dudley highlighted so ably in his opening speech. It is a point of fundamental and critical importance. The point is simply that if the pensions that we pay as a matter of contract and honour to our former officials are index-linked and if the number of pensioners increases over the years, as is likely, it must follow that the proportion of our budget available for general administrative expenses will inexorably diminish.

I do not underestimate the need for a continuing and rigorous economy in the affairs of

Mr. Rees (continued)

any administrative organisation. I do not underestimate the need for a rigorous and continuing search for efficiency in the affairs of any organisation. I do not underestimate the fact that it is our ministerial colleagues primarily and not ourselves who have to fund our activities and justify to our domestic parliaments the moneys that they find for us.

However, a drastic and progressive reduction over time in our general administrative budget must reduce our effectiveness. I believe, therefore, that the time has come – and this was the tenor of Sir Dudley's contribution and may be the point underlying an amendment that I hope the chair will accept, to be moved by Mr. Freeson – for there to be a general review of our functions.

It would be helpful if our officials, when making assumptions about future rates of inflation – they can only be assumptions – prepared a paper for us and our ministerial colleagues on the economies that will have to be made if zero growth is to underlie the whole budgetary exercise. That paper could show where the economies would fall and, particularly, what posts would have to be abolished. We and our ministerial colleagues could then consider the consequences of the abolition of those posts and what reduction in our functions might be necessary.

We might even be brought to the point where we and our ministerial colleagues would logically have to contemplate the extinction of the rôle of the Assembly. I am sure that none of us would contemplate that lightly and that we should resist it rigorously, but even a reduction in our functions would sit ill with the powerful speech made to us yesterday by Lord Carrington and with the overwhelming and warm attentions that are being paid to our debates by a number of ministerial colleagues, including no less a person than the Prime Minister of France.

The time has come for a fundamental review of the rôle of WEU and this Assembly. It will be a salutary exercise and will help us – not that I think we need assistance – to face the consequences of the insistence of our ministerial colleagues on zero growth. More particularly, it may help them in their debates to contemplate clearly and unflinchingly the consequences of what they press on us.

Our debate is critical for the future and the functions of the Assembly. Not for the first time in this Assembly, as in many other democratic organisations, a budgetary committee is performing a critical constitutional rôle.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, discussing budgetary matters is always difficult and explosive. The same is true of our national budgets. But in this Assembly the discussion of budgetary questions is particularly explosive because it is confined to the Assembly's budget, just one part of the WEU budget. It is also limited by the fact that we do not have any budgetary rights of our own. It is very unusual for parliamentarians to have their budget fixed by ministers and bureaucracies.

During the preliminary talks on our budget we are constantly pressed by our governments to save money. The governments have every right to expect this. On the other hand, the amounts involved are often very small and the activities of other parts of WEU, in other words of the same organisation, are very expensive – I am referring to the agencies – although there is nothing more for them to do. We know this, but we have no means of exerting any influence.

It is therefore particularly annoying that the Assembly's budget, small as it is, should be restricted, whereas money drains away elsewhere without any justification and we parliamentarians are unable to stop the flow.

We may complain about having no budgetary rights, not even the right to exercise control over WEU's other budgets, but that just happens to be what the treaty provides. For the moment at least, there is nothing we can do to change this, but we should never stop pointing it out. Particular attention should be paid to budgetary rights if the WEU treaty ever has to be revised and ratified again by the parliaments owing to the enlargement of WEU or on other grounds. This is by no means out of the question and, in the medium term at least, even probable.

I do not think we can go so far as to call for this parliamentary Assembly to be given budgetary rights relating to the whole of WEU. But this Assembly should at least have the right to inspect all WEU's various budgets to ensure that the same principles are applied in each case.

At this part-session the differences between WEU and the Council of Ministers have emerged quite distinctly. I would remind you only of the discussion yesterday about the numerous ministerial statements. Someone asked how much time we would really have left for our own debates. But the differences are, of course, also evident from this budget debate.

Complaints are constantly made about the lack of co-operation between the Council and the Assembly. We all know there are several reasons for this. One is that these two bodies unfortunately occupy separate premises. The question is whether anything can be done to change this.

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

Then there are organisational and staff reasons arising from insufficient dovetailing. Finally, there is the actual work, which tends to proceed in parallel. With difficulties like this, we should not be waiting for a new treaty but trying to make a new start.

That is why I wanted to reintroduce the proposal that has already been discussed by the christian-democrat and conservative group. Would it not be possible and appropriate to set up a working group – a small working group at not too high a level – consisting of members of the Assembly and Council, to discuss questions of common concern? The budgets of other areas of WEU should not be a closed book to us. They must not be kept secret from us. There must at least be joint discussion on them. I believe that, if a working group of this kind were set up and started work, it could also help to reduce distrust and annoyance on both sides. I feel the budget is a particularly good area for a small working group to make a start on improving mutual understanding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too, like President Caro a moment ago and other speakers, wish to congratulate Sir Dudley Smith for his written reports and his statement. These reports, whose clarity and conciseness, prudence and sureness in their assessment of the political factors form the basis of all the budgetary proposals, are admirable.

Above all, although there are often sharp and important political differences between Sir Dudley Smith and myself, I would like to voice publicly my admiration for the tenacity and fighting spirit with which, despite being turned down every time by the experts of the Budget Committee in London, he goes on trying to persuade the ministerial organs of WEU at long last to give the Assembly the financial and staff resources it needs to maintain its position.

I must emphasise the rôle that an assembly of elected parliamentarians should play, ipso facto, in a combination of democratic institutions and also – and above all – the rôle that the ministers, in their public statements at least, have always assigned to it since Rome, namely to be the political mainspring, inspiration and conscience of WEU.

Are we to suppose that it is because the parliamentary Assembly has, however, finally become WEU's bad conscience over the Council's political semi-inertia, that the experts of the Budget Committee want to clip our wings and curtail the resources we need to do our job properly?

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I do not propose to waste the Assembly's time in explaining the arithmetic of our budgetary problems and showing, once again, where the yoke hurts most. The Rapporteur and other speakers have already done so and if I had wanted to do the same I could simply have repeated my last year's statement with different figures.

The reason I wanted to speak at this juncture is to underline a point which merits stressing because the good marks that can be awarded need repeating at least as much as the criticisms, particularly since certain criticisms like that just made by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim may have been fair in the past but are no longer quite so fair today.

In his excellent written report, Mr. Goerens, whose verbal report was unfortunately somewhat fogged by the smoke left by the unfair accusations about the statements of several ministers, explained that, on analysing them, the Presidential Committee had declared the positions taken by the experts to be unacceptable – I am talking about the experts' position on the budgetary questions, of course – and that negotiating with the Council on that basis was out of the question. Following their decision, the President of the Assembly wrote to the Council urging it not to endorse the negative aspects of the Budget Committee's recommendations.

So far, Mr. President, there is nothing very new. How many times have the Presidential Committee and the President of the Assembly protested against the experts' unacceptable positions? – and one cannot help wondering, incidentally, why the experts, and then the ministers, always support the most minimal positions even when proposed by a minority.

But what is new and, unless I am mistaken, unheard of in the annals of WEU is the fact that, whereas for the previous financial year the Council did not even deign to respond to the budget proposals in time for the Assembly to clear the budget by the deadline allowed, for the first time – and this is new, I repeat, and positively unheard of – the Council has ignored the minimalist recommendations of the Budget Committee and substantially improved them along the lines of the views expressed many times here by the Assembly and its President.

There is no doubt that this is not just a compromise, on which we have to congratulate Mr. Poos who negotiated it, but a positive sign and a real encouragement; in my eyes and those of most of the other members of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, it is a very clear political message. It is the first time that the Council has rewarded us not with words but with additional funds. As I say, we think we are right to interpret this gesture not only as a

Mr. Linster (continued)

token of good will but as a positive political signal.

This is all the truer because our Luxembourg Chairman-in-Office has also made it known that he intends to look not only at the thorny problem of the place of the steeply rising financial item of pensions in our budget, but also at that of the urgently necessary restructuring of the Office of the Clerk.

This having been said, Mr. President, there is a further word I would like to add. If we demand a measure of budgetary autonomy for the Assembly, autonomy in matters of detail without the lectures on petty economies from civil servants, however highly placed, that are quite out of place when addressed to an assembly of elected representatives, we have to recognise that the rights we claim have their counterpart in the form of duties. We have to make choices for our priorities and savings where we judge them to be possible and useful. That is the price we have to pay for demanding and securing direct dialogue with political decision-makers.

With my eye on possible future developments and realising that the Council perhaps has other fish to fry than the Assembly budget, I shall vote in favour of the various budgetary proposals we have discussed today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – We should all be worried about the bad-tempered atmosphere that seems to have entered into our dealings over budgetary matters with the Council of Ministers and wonder why.

In the absence of the President himself from the chair, I can say that we have a charming, persuasive and approachable President, an able, dynamic and positive Secretary-General, a wise, experienced and, if I may say so, handsome Chairman of the Budgetary Affairs Committee, an encouraging mandate from our governments, which is shown by the number of ministers who are here during this session, which we should welcome, and a united Assembly. How shall we get over the ill temper that seems to be souring our relationship?

I should like to offer my solution, based on the fact that many years ago, about the time when Noah was launching the ark, I was Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration here. My thesis is this. It seems that the fruit on the trees of Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and myself have ripened at the same moment. We in the Assembly do not discuss enough the work of WEU as a whole, including the other organs and agencies about which we know far

too little. I believe that the Assembly accounts for only about one-quarter of the budget of WEU as a whole. We know extremely little about how the other three-quarters is spent. I have always felt that the dance of the seven veils is more interesting than full frontal presentation, but the activities of the other organs and agencies are about as open to public view as the harem of a reactionary Middle East monarch.

I do not know whose fault it is, but we suffer from some withdrawal symptoms and frustration because we cannot control or even influence the activities of WEU as a whole. That makes us more introspective than we should be. We wonder whether the pension rights of people who are employed in the agencies are better than those of those who work for the Assembly. I believe, on the basis of the little that I have gleaned, that the terms of reference of the agencies have been changed and that they are doing a useful job, but I long to know more.

If the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the President were able to make their presentations to governments and to cover the work of WEU as a whole, not just the work of the Assembly, we might not appear to be concentrating selfishly on our own interests and our representations might be more sympathetically received.

I know that many members of the Assembly suspect that other organs and agencies are treated more generously than the Assembly and that the biblical text which runs "To him who hath shall be given and from him who hath not shall be taken away, even that which he thought that he hath" might apply. I recommend that the Council of Ministers looks to the text of the Good Samaritan, picks up the Assembly from the ditch and takes us along, if not necessarily to the George V, at least to a decent three-star hotel where we can make a full recovery.

(*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I still have a few members down to speak including Mr. Sinesio and Sir Paul Hawkins but, in order to be able to have the Chairman-in-Office of the Council speak to us, I would ask the Assembly to kindly agree to adjourn the debate for the moment. We shall return to it later.

4. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(*Presentation by Mr. Poos,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1074*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg,

The President (continued)

Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1074.

Before you begin, Mr. Chairman, allow me to express to you the satisfaction of the Assembly and above all of its President and to thank you for everything you have done with your colleagues in the Luxembourg Government to conduct this presidency in a manner that claims everyone's admiration and which has enabled us, thanks to your help and that of your colleagues Mr. Fischbach and Mr. Goebbels, whom I also have pleasure in welcoming, to give this Luxembourg presidency and Luxembourg itself practical support in the reactivation we wish to bring about. I invite you to take the rostrum and I hope that, afterwards, you will be kind enough to answer questions from the Assembly.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to say straight away that I am honoured at being able to address your Assembly today as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Western European Union. This is a great honour bearing in mind the well-known fighting spirit of the members of this Assembly, to say nothing of the tenacity of its President.

Never having had the privilege of sitting on your benches but knowing well your legitimate expectations, my only ambition since Luxembourg's accession to the chairmanship of our organisation has been to ensure that the commitments entered into are met. Although our task today is particularly delicate and difficult, we shall endeavour to prove worthy of the confidence placed in us. Needless to say the number of staff we are in a position to muster for the Luxembourg chairmanship and this large international organisation are extremely limited.

It is against this background and in a particularly fast-changing context that Luxembourg finds itself responsible for imparting new vigour to the process of renewal decided upon some two years ago.

Eager to provide a swift response to the expectations so often expressed by all of you gathered here, the Council Chairman first lent an attentive ear to some of the heads of this organisation before consulting member countries. In the second half of this year, for example, he had a meeting in Luxembourg with Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General, Mr. Caro, the President, and the enlarged Bureau of your Assembly.

Immediately after these meetings and in the light of the impressions exchanged, further impetus was given in London, at the level of the Permanent Council, by the presence of political

directors and senior officials from the defence ministries in turn. What we asked for in fact was that everyone should give immediate thought to the future of WEU. There is no need to tell you how surprised we were that no one failed to respond including your President himself and the governments of the member states.

On the contrary, in the light of all these contributions, the Chairman was able to produce a consolidated memorandum which is now the basis for the practical implementation of the reactivation process.

This methodical and systematic approach, without any publicity, enabled the recent informal ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg to take a few first important decisions:

First, the WEU member countries agreed to hold two ministerial sessions in the year, one informal and one formal.

Second, the political directors and, on their initiative, the senior defence officials should meet in principle at least four times a year.

Third, the terms of reference of the working group so far responsible for the SDI issue on its own are now extended to all the politico-military questions that I shall refer to a little later.

Fourth, France and Italy offered to produce a memorandum as quickly as possible on security in the Mediterranean region. The aim is to have this debated early next year in a special group set up for the purpose.

Fifth, aware of the need for co-ordination between the work of the foreign affairs and defence ministries, the ministers responsible for defence, at a separate meeting on the occasion of the last informal meeting, displayed their keen interest in maintaining active co-operation from now on within WEU.

Sixth, the question of a high-speed communications system on the pattern of the Coreu system now being used by the Twelve is being studied by the Netherlands.

Seventh, Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, who spoke to you from this rostrum yesterday, has been asked to produce a study for spring next year on the future of the organisation's administrative structures that are split at the moment between two locations.

In the light of all this, the Luxembourg chairmanship would like to see the organisation take further concrete decisions at its session next spring, its aim being that ministers should express their definitive views on all matters affecting the operation of WEU and its infrastructure.

There is no escaping the fact that, through the interaction of the various levels of responsibility

Mr. Poos (continued)

centred around the Permanent Council consisting of our permanent representatives, WEU is in the process of changing its appearance completely.

However, as I have already said, I do not want to disappoint you by saying nothing about two questions which I also know to be central to your concerns: the enlargement of the organisation and the budget. Whilst it is true that these two items were not on the agenda of the informal ministerial meeting that has just ended, the fact remains that they were broached by the Chairman and all the ministers present who did not at any time seek to avoid discussing them or even to minimise their importance.

As regards the enlargement of the organisation to include new members, which the Council Chairman would have liked to proceed in step with reactivation, it is clear that the majority of member states feel it would be better at the moment to delay any decision on this subject while the reactivation process is still under way. I am able to tell you, however, that no one said he was against the accession of any particular would-be member. On the contrary the points made concerning eligibility for membership and the effects of an enlarged Assembly were argued very calmly throughout. In the end, the wish to see reactivation concluded first won the day.

I therefore ask your Assembly to accept the Council's position of principle in this matter but I also assure you that the Chairman's office, for its part, will not remain inactive. From now on it will act with extreme discretion, with the aim of preparing the ground so that, when the time comes, a decision on enlargement can be taken in full knowledge of every factor to be taken into account.

As to the budget, all of my colleagues accepted that a reactivated WEU needed to have adequate material resources particularly at a time when the budget of the organisation was burdened by certain compulsory expenditure. Here I refer to the rising cost of the pensions of retired members of staff.

As previously, the Council Chairman has tried to be imaginative and has proposed that, once the reactivation process is concluded, the annual growth rate in WEU's administrative expenditure should be no different from that which our budgetary experts allow each year for all the estimates of the Community institutions. In proposing this, the object is twofold: to assimilate WEU with all the Community institutions in accordance with the express provisions of the single European act and to relieve our Permanent Council of the fruitless budgetary discussions we know too well.

Those are the broad lines of what has been done at the level of the structures or, I should say, the infrastructure. It is better than nothing as everyone will admit but it certainly is not enough.

The fact is, as stated in the Chairman's memorandum, there is "a very close and even organic link between the future activities of the organisation and in particular their objectives and the means to be employed in the way of organs and mechanisms". That being so it was urgent and vital that the future tasks of the organisation be better defined. This is an essential aspect of reactivation and the degree of satisfaction felt by member states on that score will largely condition the success of the process begun in Rome in 1984.

Following the consultations that took place between member states it became clear that where European security is involved no subject, in principle, should be taboo. The only obvious limitation is where the responsibilities of other bodies like European political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance are involved.

This is also the approach that governed the choice and title of the subject that the Seven wished to discuss and highlight at their last informal meeting in Luxembourg. By making "after Reykjavik" the only major item on the agenda, the representatives of the seven member governments were given a chance to go beyond the individual reactions that this important event had prompted and, as far as possible, to make a joint assessment of the success or failure of that meeting between the two highest policy-makers on earth.

The Luxembourg meeting was unquestionably marked by the desire for an in-depth discussion of security questions. The specific contribution of ministers of defence, now more closely associated with the organisation and, therefore, more involved in the debate, needs stressing in this connection. The ministerial discussions on this question showed how vitally necessary it is to have a forum in Europe for joint discussion of the security of our continent.

At the same time all the members of WEU insisted that they did not intend in any way to "rock the boat". On the contrary, they all recognise that the Atlantic Alliance had been and still is the guarantee of more than forty years of peace in Europe and that the need for solidarity with NATO is self-evident. It is precisely to the Atlantic Alliance and its strategy that Europe owes these forty years of peace. So the meeting made it possible to underline the fact that Atlantic solidarity continues to be a vital need, a reflection of the indivisible nature of the security of the member states of the alliance on the two sides of the ocean. It is also the reason why main-

Mr. Poos (continued)

taining that peace in Europe has to be the primary objective of any security policy in the future.

The security of European states is to be seen in terms of the planned and effective balanced reduction of arms to the lowest possible level. In following this principle European policy-makers in WEU have no doubt that they are interpreting the deepest wishes of their peoples. Disarmament targets, on which the discussion was focused, have to include reductions of forces and arms of all kinds and first and foremost in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two great powers.

Lord Carrington who spoke to you yesterday stressed that the great breakthrough after Reykjavik is that the public now perceives radical nuclear disarmament to be possible. The second objective has to be stability in the field of conventional armaments but with no imbalance and thirdly, the Seven urge the acceptance of ceilings, agreed by both sides, for very short-range missiles in the event that the zero target for intermediate-range missiles were to become effective. The idea in my mind is that there should be a declaration affirming the possibility of solving the problem of short-range missiles at the same time as that of intermediate-range missiles and I have the feeling that the countries of the East should be invited to do away with this type of armaments as soon as an agreement has ratified the zero objective.

Lastly, the Council is in favour of the elimination of all chemical weapons throughout the world.

A concern voiced several times during this extremely vigorous debate is that any future negotiations on the control and reduction of armaments must increase European security, not reduce it. With that in mind it is vital that if negotiations on one type of weapon are likely to affect an essential factor of European security in a given sector then the emergence, at the same time, of other factors likely to imperil strategic stability without which there can be no security in Europe, has to be avoided.

Indeed, the Seven consider that the need to maintain a capacity to deter not only all aggression but all forms of military intimidation remains essential in present circumstances in Europe.

Agreements on armaments control and progress with disarmament are only conceivable if there is provision for credible verification.

Lastly, the ministers meeting in Luxembourg unanimously rejected the Soviet proposal of a package covering all the measures envisaged for

the various types of weapons but tying their implementation to the United States giving up the SDI system.

As you can see, the rôle of the institution is now outlined very clearly in all its component parts: to be a forum for consultation and joint action on the conditions of European security which are likely to undergo decisive changes during the next few months. This consultation should enable the voice of Europe to be more clearly heard in future negotiations on the control of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons.

Regardless of whether one takes a pessimistic or optimistic view of the content of the Reykjavik talks and the contradictory interpretations to which they have given rise, it is clear that Europe cannot remain outside discussions in which the future of its safety at the end of this century is at stake.

That is why WEU would now have to be invented if it did not already exist. It was in these terms, as Mr. Cahen recalled yesterday, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany spoke – and was not contradicted. I say WEU will go on existing tomorrow, offering its seven member states a unique instrument for the kind of consultation that is not, to our regret, allowed at the level of European co-operation.

It is now up to the European nations not to allow any doubts to remain about the energy they are capable of mobilising and to persuade their allies of their resolve with regard to their joint defence.

In this connection, I have to point out, however, that implicit in our approach is a duty of mutual frankness vis-à-vis our partners in the alliance. It would be wrong for WEU to be a forum for the open criticism of any ally with whom governments co-operate within the alliance. The reason for our organisation's existence is, precisely, to strengthen that alliance by enabling Europeans to increase and improve their efforts through greater co-operation which, after our meeting in Luxembourg, may be defined as European political co-operation in security.

As for the future, let me say finally that the prospects opened up by the Reykjavik summit have set us thinking about the future of deterrence as we know it and the flexible response strategy. This by no means implies that they are now being challenged but the purpose would be to make realistic preparations for gradual nuclear disarmament in readiness for the time when negotiations make this possible. For us, the ultimate goal for any agreement must be fewer weapons and more security for our continent as a whole.

Mr. Poos (continued)

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this brief statement has enabled me to outline in broad terms what we have been doing over the last few months and to give you some indication of the approach taken by the seven member governments of our organisation.

It is now up to you to judge, criticise and propose. That is the rôle of any assembly and I have not a moment's doubt that every constructive contribution from the Assembly will further stimulate not only the presidency but also all the governments of the seven member states.

It is therefore essential that we should be able to pursue this constructive dialogue we have begun with you today in the weeks and months to come. In his opening address Mr. Caro made the point that this presidency will spare no effort in fulfilling its difficult task.

In our turn, we do not think that the Assembly and Council are in competition in this matter. On the contrary, it is together and – to use, for once, a military expression – by closing ranks that we shall succeed.

The confidence that I hope you will express on the occasion of this session will be particularly valuable to us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman-in-Office, I would like to thank you for your major contribution to the presentation of the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council.

As we said, the rôle of the Luxembourg presidency is particularly important at the moment and the attitude of the Council, whose spokesman you are today, is proof that the reactivation of Western European Union has embarked on a road where concrete proposals will be confirming – as we all hope – the declarations made in Rome in 1984.

May I remind you, Mr. Minister, that you agreed, after the question time we are now to have, that we should take Mr. Bianco's report on the thirty-first report of the Council. In that way it will be possible to include the Assembly's preparatory work and your own contribution in the same debate. I would also remind you that you are, of course, entitled to intervene whenever you so desire during the debate.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the minister a question concerning the Council's views on the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; that is, I should like to know whether or not the governments of the seven WEU countries consider that

the proven involvement of some countries in terrorist activities in Western Europe calls for application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if I have rightly understood, the question put to me is this: could the involvement of a particular country in an act of international terrorism lead us into war? I do not think we have reached that point. If we find that a country, any country, is implicated in an act of terrorism – and that was the case in recent weeks – it is up to the European states to consult together with the object of taking sanctions against it.

The intensity and level of those sanctions must depend on the offence committed. You know about the sanctions taken against Libya and Syria during the last six months. These were discussed at length and decided upon unanimously by the member states of the European Communities which, for this purpose, also consulted with the other members of the alliance and in particular with the United States.

To sum up, our response to a terrorist act in which the involvement of a particular state can be clearly demonstrated has to be scaled to the particular case and differentiated in accordance with the proven facts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, we were greatly interested by your very precise statement and its general tone of resolution and determination. You concluded your remarks with the idea of closing ranks – which may be a military term but is also used in sport – in particular between the Council and this parliamentary Assembly. As to closing ranks, in terms not of competition but of emulation about which you spoke at length, the vital attitude is that we should be constantly tightening the unity of our western world and also strengthening our will so that this unity is a real one.

That is the objective of the ambitious 1984 reactivation project signed and sealed in Rome but, in this context, is the Reykjavik meeting a giant step forward or does it present a danger of division or, in any case difficulty?

You said the Council made the position clear at the Luxembourg meeting. Our Assembly itself will be including a study of the various items concerning East-West relations in its future work. In spite of the clear-cut position in your statement, can you again confirm to us that, at the level of the Council, Reykjavik may be

Mr. Valleix (continued)

regarded as both a failure and a positive element and, above all, that our seven partners are resolved at government level to speak with the same voice in pursuing their disarmament action? It is vital to this Assembly that we should be able to rely on you as a partner without the slightest ambiguity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is particularly easy for me to answer this question because most of the reply is already contained in my statement.

I confirm once again that it is indeed the intention of the Seven to pool their thinking and to consult together about what comes after Reykjavik. Together, we have to analyse all the military and political implications arising out of this essential phase in negotiations between the representatives of the biggest and most powerful states in the world.

We are faced with a real challenge and we have to face it together as Europeans. That is why, in Luxembourg, we gave the instructions we did to our political directors and it is also why we enlarged the terms of reference of the special committee responsible for studying the SDI. The SDI is of itself a new factor dictating radical changes in our strategic and political thinking. I hope, in the near future, to be able to present you with the conclusions we reach at all these levels and not least the political level. The question will be on the agenda for the next ministerial session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bohl.

Mr. BOHL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I am from the Moselle and therefore close to Luxembourg which I know to be gifted with common sense and logic. Now, we have budgetary problems and relations are difficult between the Assembly and the Council. What do you think you can do to put an end to all these difficulties which, in my opinion, are so small that they could easily be solved with a little logic and common sense?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I am very much aware of the importance of these budgetary difficulties but I am happy to tell you that the Assembly and the Council are now more or less agreed on the 1986 budget.

Major disagreement, however, remains with regard to the 1987 budget. The Council has proposed a growth rate of 2.79% but if we deduct the cost of pensions the rate comes down to a pitiful 0.49%. If allowance is then made for expected inflation in France we have what is, in fact, negative growth. In my position as Chairman I must say that this increase is not enough and that was also, incidentally, the feeling of my six colleagues when we had our informal discussion in Luxembourg.

Your plea has therefore been heard and the Council will have to think again. I make no secret of the fact that I plan to propose that a growth rate be set in advance for the WEU budget equivalent to that which we have agreed to apply to the other European institutions.

Everybody knows that the budget of the other European institutions is gone through with a fine-tooth comb by the national financial experts. Once a growth rate has been set, it should be possible to adapt it to the international organisations to which the states belong. I hope that this proposal will be agreed by all my colleagues on the Council of Ministers. There is nothing more I can tell you today. Your message, Mr. Bohl, has been received. I shall pass it on to all my colleagues and we will take a fresh look at the 1987 budget.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I am a highly interested observer but, with regard to enlargement, I wonder what I am supposed to tell my government and my parliament. Nobody is particularly opposed to any country and the Seven are going through a process of reactivation. What does this mean?

Two years ago in Rome, the Seven created some interest and aroused hopes with regard to enlargement and the organisation of European defence. The impression now is that they went too far in their enthusiasm and that they are trying to pull back. Is there a firm intention on the part of the Seven in this respect?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I do not think there has been any pulling back at all by the Council of Ministers on the enlargement issue.

The ministers of the Seven have discussed this several times, firstly in Bonn and most recently in Venice. Unfortunately, as Chairman-in-Office, I have to say that opinions differ, not on the principle, but on the date of application of the Luxembourg decision. It is a question of com-

Mr. Poos (continued)

pleting reactivation before going ahead with the important task of enlargement.

That means delaying the decision. The decision on reactivation means there has to be a deadline for it: 31st December 1987. In all logic, the governments who have insisted on completing the first stage – reactivation – must surely agree to discuss enlargement about the middle of next year. They will have to take a positive decision. I have heard no objections in principle from any country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Following Mr. Inan's intervention, may I press the Chairman-in-Office about enlargement? I believe that to the outside observer it appears that the Council is making a profession of pusillanimity in this matter. Is it not the case that in forging an effective European identity on security it is imperative to mobilise our parliamentary and public opinions, and is not this organisation the one, by treaty, and, de facto, the one best able to do it?

When the Soviet Union is sending highly experienced envoys to the West – Mr. Agentov and Mr. Karpov – to try to suggest to our governments that the United States should abandon SDI if progress is to be made on arms control, is not this just the time when we need to enlarge our organisation? How much longer can we realistically keep democratic applicants such as Portugal, my country's oldest ally, in the wings? How much sense will it continue to make for friendly parliaments such as those of Turkey, Norway and Spain, to send observers to play a part in our deliberations?

May I remind the Chairman-in-Office that the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, suggested that it was imperative that our governments continue to spend adequately for defence? If we do not spend adequately for this organisation and if we do not think that its mutual defence commitments are worth extending to other friendly democratic countries, surely we are giving a bad example to the public, whose opinions about security need to be reinforced rather than assuaged by what appear to be bad excuses.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson is preaching to the converted. I think, like he does, that there are arguments for this and that the text of the treaty itself reads in favour of enlargement but, in this

question like any other, the chairman can only convey what the member countries unanimously decide. Enlargement is a decision that has to be taken unanimously and you well know that some governments believe you have to build a house before you extend it. So today I cannot say any more about this important subject but you may be sure that I am ready to go on with my efforts to persuade all member countries so that we may take the necessary decisions as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to repeat the appreciation which I expressed previously to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in Luxembourg particularly as regards the recognition since Reykjavik of the need to extend the rôle of our organisation. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this historic fact at least as a tendency towards a fundamental change and not to recognise that this substantially adds to our rôle. It is not a matter of any will to reactivate but an objective recognition of the need to implement an essential rôle.

I should like to ask a number of questions and then summarise them as a single question. It is true that we should support any agreement for disarmament; this is a matter of moral as well as political principle. When there is any sign that an agreement on disarmament may be possible, we can only be in favour.

We must be responsible protagonists – and I stress the word responsible – and not people who take part but hold back; responsible on the one hand for our contacts with the public and on the other for a responsible and attentive study of the problems which may also require a special commitment from the European countries. If we look at our relative contribution in this matter at the moment we cannot fail to recognise that we are doing much less than the great powers. We want progressive disarmament and a reduction of expenditure. We must assess all this in a most responsible manner. Nuclear disarmament must be gradual whereas our aim for conventional forces must be a balance leading ultimately to a reduction. So if these are the correct policies and the basic points of reference and if we recognise that the road will be a long one, my final question must be as follows. And I agree, Mr. President, that the reply must be collective and consistent and that we must make an effort above all in this Assembly to further a collective and consistent reply, involving – I would emphasise – a truly responsible commitment because it is only by way of responsible commitments and not by standing aside or turning our backs that we shall achieve the great objectives of peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – My thanks to Mr. Ferrari Aggradi for his statement in which he asked an important question and at the same time gave part of the answer himself. In the main I support what he said: it is not our function to accept just any disarmament agreement. On the contrary, at all stages of the discussion, we have to try to work towards balanced agreements that will increase European security. We also have to strive to keep effective negotiations going on all types of weapon whether nuclear, conventional or chemical. Like Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, I believe our response has to be a joint one and this requires collective consultation. That is the reason why we meet in WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have no one else down to speak and that leaves me therefore to thank you, Minister, for your very valuable participation in our debates.

5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1078.

The debate on the budgets will be resumed after this report has been discussed.

I call Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the report we are presenting later than usual, at the end of the year, was not written without difficulty; we can say that some points were continuously revised to take account of new facts as they emerged from time to time. Now it comes before us at a particularly important moment in the political life of the western countries and in particular of the seven WEU countries.

The report in fact comes between the Reykjavik meeting and the Luxembourg meeting. It was approved on 10th November. It was discussed in Copenhagen immediately after the important Reykjavik meeting and was approved in Paris just before the Luxembourg

meeting. These are two dates which I believe are of great political significance because of the decisions we have to take. As the Secretary-General said yesterday and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has reiterated today, I think that the constructive dialogue established between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers has been useful and in some ways productive.

We are all parliamentarians with a positive and constructive determination as convinced Europeans to emphasise the need to make more of international political events and to work out a view common to European countries. In putting a question a short time ago Mr. Ferrari Aggradi made a point which I fully endorse. The international relations established between the two great powers to some extent demand a European view. It is not by accident that Luxembourg revived the hopes of a reactivation of WEU, which had been in some measure dimmed in Venice. I do not think this came about by accident but rather because the Reykjavik talks clearly revealed that Europe could not stand aside and must express its own views on its own problems, particularly on the subject of defence.

I believe that in this Assembly we must stress the need to cease being an institution which as it were follows events as happened previously, after the signature of the treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. After the signature of those treaties Europe raised the question of the imbalances in the European theatre and to some extent – and this is the important point – we became involved in the actual international negotiations aimed at détente and establishing the conditions for world peace.

This, Mr. President and Mr. Chairman, is a state of affairs which we must not repeat. We should anticipate events and speak with a single voice. We should not confine ourselves to general statements but should be involved in actual policies in order to maintain the whole principle of European security as you quite rightly said in your speech.

I should therefore like to extend an invitation to you which will become an amendment that I hope the Assembly will approve with the same unanimity as my report. As you have to speak for the seven WEU countries at the forthcoming NATO meeting on 11th December I wonder whether you might not express a unanimous collegiate view of the WEU countries. I believe that this would be important because the doubts which still exist in some countries would be removed; in my view it is not a mere recital of the facts but active vigorous political action inspired by the Assembly which can produce a European policy which is becoming ever more

Mr. Bianco (continued)

necessary as demonstrated by the Luxembourg meeting.

To use your own metaphor, Mr. President, I agree that WEU's first objective must be to finish building its own house. I am convinced that, before there can be any European policy within the Atlantic Alliance, the seven WEU countries must arrive at a single view and make practical efforts to achieve an even greater measure of agreement between themselves. There can be no doubt about this. I also believe however – and this is the Assembly's general view – that the time is now ripe for any applications aimed at enlarging WEU. I refer in particular to Portugal which made its application a long time ago and is awaiting a reply. We cannot keep waiting indefinitely countries which belong to our alliance and to the EEC and I believe, therefore, that a reply is now due and should be given promptly.

Mr. President, in the dialogue established between the Council and the Assembly which, as I have said, has already produced positive results and replies, we wish to confirm our determination to be constructive. We have to acknowledge that some replies have already been given. For example, a particularly important decision was taken in Luxembourg to set up a committee of political directors representing the foreign and defence ministers; this is a significant step in the implementation of the Rome declaration. We believe that the formation of such a high-level group can lead to ever greater involvement in the problems of our international organisation.

We may also note the reply to the Assembly's Written Question 271. There are still some vague features but the reply is more specific regarding the rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee mentioned in paragraph (xi) of the preamble.

Even if I am speaking in the name of the Assembly I believe as an Italian that we must be particularly attentive to this point. It is also important that the whole of the WEU Assembly should be involved in the formation of a working group on the Mediterranean which – and this is the point and intention of my question – will be specifically concerned and involved in the rôle of WEU in the modern form of warfare known as terrorism which is waged not by isolated groups and fractions but by groups which are manipulated by political powers because the involvement of certain countries is being more and more clearly revealed by court cases and by the political information coming from the secret services of a number of countries. For example, we must not forget the public statements of the German courts concerning the Berlin outrage and the involvement of a specific country.

As we listened to you we saw signs of progress on the problem of our Assembly's budget. In general your remarks seem highly encouraging. As you will have seen from the debate in the Assembly the problem of the budget is a permanent obstacle to the work of the Assembly. We consider, however, that it is a matter not solely for the Assembly but also for the Secretariat-General. The reorganisation and reactivation of WEU with the provision of adequate funds and equipment involves both the Assembly and I repeat the Secretariat-General. We support the requests for more resources. We acknowledge that our structure which is politically important and meets a basic need in East-West relations has been as it were a light hidden under a bushel but today political relationships demand greater attention. We have therefore appreciated your open-minded approach but this must be given practical expression in the two ways we have indicated.

Reading the Luxembourg communiqués I was pleased to note that the Council of Ministers acknowledged the potential rôle of the WEU Assembly. We are the link between European public opinion and public opinion in our countries. As parliamentarians we have an important rôle both in our own countries and in this Assembly and I do not believe that defence problems can be dealt with solely by technical solutions. It is important to create what I might call a cultural and political dimension which is a European defence dimension; hence the important rôle of the Assembly which has already been recognised in theory.

We are determined, ladies and gentlemen, to continue working for disarmament and for a positive relationship leading to full agreement between East and West. We believe that a balance should be established at progressively lower levels but this word "balance" which was repeated yesterday by Lord Carrington and in authoritative terms today by the Chairman-in-Office must be the focal point of East-West relations and the cardinal principle of security; balance not only between the great powers but in the European theatre both for conventional weapons and for the missiles deployed there. There is one overall security not confined to relations between the great powers but taking due account of our position and our rôle.

In this context it is extremely important to keep a close watch on the negotiations in both Geneva and Vienna taking a careful look, as Lord Carrington urged yesterday, at the problems of modernisation, equilibrium and information.

From this standpoint, we feel that the replies given on such problems as relations between the Independent European Programme Group and the information which should be given to the

Mr. Bianco (continued)

Assembly are completely inadequate. We also feel it most important that the rôle of the agencies should be defined in precise terms. There are general indications. There is certainly still some time left. The commitment was that their rôle should be defined by 1987 but we could have offered some guidance or ideas if the Council had given us fuller and more specific information about the agencies' rôle.

We know that on 14th November the Secretariat-General informed the Council of Ministers of the mandate planned by the Council for Agency III but the Assembly has no details on the subject. Everything seems to us to be still at the general level. Even though Lord Carrington said with great good humour yesterday that he had answered all requests for information, we do not find access to the sources of information to be easy or that the agencies can obtain full and adequate information.

There is another problem which we have raised several times in meetings of the General Affairs Committee and is also reflected in the document I am submitting. I am referring to the creation of an independent information centre or some form of co-ordination of information centres on an independent European basis. We cannot operate with second-hand information. I believe that the countries of Europe have the power, capacity, technical knowledge and intelligence to establish at least this important element providing independent sources of information. What institution is better equipped than WEU to do this?

These are the problems covered by the report which, as I said before, was unanimously approved by the committee and I hope will be approved in the same way by the Assembly.

In conclusion I would like to repeat to the secretariat and to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council our wish for active and not passive collaboration, our wish to introduce dynamic elements because I believe that the rôle of the Assembly has been basically important over the last few years. We carried on so that we could reactivate our organisation. The Assembly has succeeded in maintaining unchanged the principles on which it was founded in 1954 after the unfortunate failure of the EDC. I believe that this small flame which has been kept alight can develop into something important and significant at European level within the Atlantic Alliance which is still the fundamental basis of our security. In this framework we wish to be an active and not a passive element as our history and our traditions demand, being as they are the traditions of European history.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we voted for this report in committee after a debate and a number of additions which we believe to be improvements; these were accepted by the Rapporteur and are now included in the draft recommendation submitted for approval. From this report as amended and more restrained than the original text through the removal of some of the original remarks concerning relations between the Assembly and the Council, we wish to take a number of political questions which we consider to be some of the most important.

The first is that the text repeats the commitment to implement the Rome declaration in full. This means, therefore, working towards the reactivation of our institution which we, moreover, consider to be possible particularly because of the political opportunity for major options and choices concerning security and defence policy. In this context we have to inform the Assembly that we yesterday informed the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, and our President, Mr. Caro, of the resolution recently adopted by the leadership of the Italian Communist Party. The interest shown by the people we met whom we should like to thank here publicly, and in particular Mr. Caro's willingness to consider this resolution as material for study and reflection and therefore to submit it to the appropriate committee, will give our colleagues a clearer insight into our views, which we consider to be well-founded and likely to be widely approved because they give priority to the political line of meetings and negotiation in preference to a military approach, as the means of achieving balanced agreed disarmament and a Europe without nuclear weapons.

It is therefore natural for us and wholly in line with our attitude to security questions and hence to questions relating to the powers of our institution, to give priority to the work of the Assembly. As the Rapporteur said earlier, the democratic and political contribution which the Assembly has always made to WEU is that of seeking a European political rôle within the western alliance, enabling Europe to make its voice heard in the negotiations on security and disarmament so that there is no turning back from Reykjavik and so that the possibilities which emerged there can be translated into binding commitments for the two superpowers and for the world as a whole.

We believe that WEU has a special place in this field and that no other European institutions have the same competence. We agree that the Luxembourg meetings have given fresh hope and offer new possibilities which we welcome, partic-

Mr. Antoni (continued)

ularly as regards relations between the Council and the Assembly. We support therefore the proposals to strengthen and increase the efficiency of our institutions and of the agencies in particular. The provisional solution recently achieved at our insistence – I mean the insistence of the Assembly – on matters relating to finance and the budget, which we have already agreed, does not remove the need to repeat yet again that our Assembly and its requirements are inadequately recognised. We think therefore that in our reply to the Council's thirty-first annual report this basic requirement must be reiterated since we are convinced that, in order to develop our institution's potential, our Assembly must be recognised as a representative democratic expression of the political will essential for our peoples to make valid choices.

Lastly, I should like to thank our German, British and French colleagues for accepting the request that the working group on security set up by their governments should be brought under the aegis of WEU. In our view a real possibility for reactivating our institution and reaffirming the status of WEU lies in the need for our independent capacity to affirm moral and political principles for disarmament, negotiations and the untiring search for peace.

We have to say in all sincerity that we still disagree on some points with the Rapporteur whom we would like to thank for his efforts. These differences, however, do not prevent us from confirming that we shall vote in favour, as we said in committee, particularly in view of the Rapporteur's willingness to accept other contributions as happened in committee and because we are convinced that it is through a unified stance by the Assembly in its relations with the Council that the desired strengthening of WEU can be achieved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bianco's report, which I support and will give my vote, echoes and interprets doubts concerning the activities of the Council and its real commitment to the genuine reactivation of WEU. Yesterday, in his impassioned and detailed speech the Chairman-in-Office of the Council tried to prove the opposite and to demonstrate that the Council is seeking to revitalise WEU and the Assembly.

Serious doubts remain, however, concerning any real determination to work consistently for the reactivation of WEU, seeing that the words are leaves and the facts before us are the fruit. What is more these doubts which we have always had are shared not only by some of us but also by the press which says, whenever WEU's

problems are discussed, that its reactivation is planned but has still not taken place. And there is no need to prove that reactivation is necessary; yesterday morning the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and many other speakers on the budget declared that this is the moment for reactivation. It is very much the time for immediate action because there are clear signs of public concern that European governments are not involved in the disarmament problem; and there is also concern regarding the possibility, if not the danger, of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States ignoring Europe's long-term interests.

I do not believe that we should miss so good an opportunity which may never be repeated. Of course, this cannot be achieved solely through partial agreements from which nations are excluded; nor can any genuine reactivation of WEU be achieved by meetings like those in Luxembourg between government officials even of the highest rank as is the case for the representatives of the foreign and defence ministries. Of these relations we know nothing; it is as if we should be given no information of any kind. And this is a most annoying problem which has been with us for much too long.

We should recall, however, that the modified Brussels Treaty requires the governments to report to the Assembly on the manner in which the treaty is implemented even if this takes place outside WEU. It is very important to note that the Council normally fails to provide the required information and, to quote examples, it does not provide the Assembly either with the necessary funds or with the information it is required to supply; it refuses for example to report on the work of the IEPG, gives no information on the Anglo-Franco-German security secretariat, no information on the activities of the political directors for and on behalf of WEU, no information on the work prepared by the agencies. The agencies were one of the outstanding points in the Rome declaration. Much was heard of them in previous reports. Something was said of their rôles but there were, in fact, no adequate details of what the agencies were to do. Today we know nothing about the work of the agencies as though everything were secret and as though information on the agencies' work could not be submitted to us for consideration with the result that the Assembly has to work without the tools it needs to produce satisfactory ideas and opinions and has to go every time to the press for unofficial information almost like a secret society.

This is inconceivable. So far as it is not secret, the work of the agency should be made known.

Finally, I must say that the unified information arrangements of which the Secretariat-

Mr. Masciadri (continued)

General spoke in June have not yet been set up. There can be no point in increasing the activities of governments if the Council does not inform the Assembly and the press of the results.

Among the questions of greatest importance for European security, the Council refers in its thirty-first report to the strategic defence initiative and I imagine that we shall later get further information. I note with concern, however, that nothing is said about disarmament, or European arms co-operation which is still a fundamental problem requiring energetic action because we cannot all go it alone, without even informing our partners and working for some uniformity. Nor is there a word about the fight against terrorism.

In approving Mr. Bianco's report, the committee wished to record a unanimous, vigorous protest against this attitude on the part of the Council. The reactivation of WEU cannot be achieved simply by meetings of government officials but requires close and honest alignment of the Council's programmes with those of the Assembly which must be kept informed. This is the only way to genuine reactivation; all others are likely to fail.

I shall therefore be voting for the report prepared by Mr. Bianco, whom I wish to thank most sincerely for his excellent work. All of us in committee expressed our appreciation of his efforts by voting unanimously in favour without even a single abstention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. Sarti does not wish to speak.

I therefore call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should also like to start by congratulating Mr. Bianco on his excellent work, because it was not easy to understand the significance of the present phase of foreign policy, which is of extreme delicacy, particularly for us Europeans. I shall vote for the report even though, more than on other occasions and particularly at this very delicate stage of Western European foreign policy as a whole, I have reasons certainly for doubts if not for censure or criticism.

On the basis of Mr. Bianco's report, a large part of our debate is directed particularly to what I might call the awakening which has followed the summit meeting in Iceland. Europe continues to occupy a terribly and dramatically subordinate position, involving the danger that an agreement may be reached between the two superpowers which would disregard Europe and what have been correctly defined as its basic,

essential and continuing interests. As we all know at the very recent two-day meeting held a few days ago in Luxembourg between the foreign and defence ministers, and not only government officials, even the British minister and other speakers agreed – as France argued even more forcefully – that any zero option between the United States and Russia for the elimination of medium-range missiles – Russian SS-20s and American Pershings – makes no sense or rather is dangerous for Europe because the Soviet Union has not stopped adding to its arsenal of short-range missiles; what is more, Russia continues to have crushing superiority in terms of conventional armaments, without mentioning its frightening stock of chemical weapons about which strangely enough nothing is ever said in Europe.

As has never been the case previously, therefore, there is a clear and precise tendency in Europe to "associate" all types of nuclear weapons in the debate on the subject and to "link" nuclear and conventional weapons. It is only in that context that Europe would be safeguarded with its security guaranteed and would get away from the subordinate position which I just mentioned; this is, however, the present position in which Europe may at any time be left dangerously behind, to become once again the object and in no way the controller of a foreign policy which affects it directly.

This leads quite logically, rather than politically, to the efforts, the hopes and the encouragement aimed at WEU's ultimately becoming the European pillar of security and armaments; the encouragement to do something serious, practical and effective in that direction, seeing that there has been talk of this for years already and there was no need for the summit in Iceland to demonstrate that Europe is regularly ignored and could well be dangerously left out when the two superpowers meet again in what I am obliged to describe as the "spirit of Yalta".

I have to tell Mr. Bianco, in his capacity also as leader of the Italian Delegation, that it is not enough to say that Europe must change its tune and stop following events; it is not enough to say that it must anticipate events. Something more precise needs to be said in clearer terms.

On this basis and endorsing the often bitter criticism in Mr. Bianco's report, I shall vote in favour so that it may serve to give a thrashing – it does not seem too much to say – to the Council of Ministers of WEU, with its positive and well-directed denunciation of so many unfulfilled commitments and too many disappointed hopes.

As regards its capacity for a unified, independent assessment of the foreign policy which concerns it more directly, and as regards its inde-

Mr. Rauti (continued)

pendent capacity to manage its own security and military problems, this Western Europe of ours has lost many years and has been marking time for many years. We have little time left to make the leap forward that we want, that the times demand and the public is calling for if we do not wish to give formal notice of Europe's official withdrawal from foreign policy and security problems and at the same time destroy any further hope that Europe can remain part of world history.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note that Mr. Cifarelli is not here.

I therefore call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I understand that my friend Mr. Sarti is embarrassed and is tempted not to speak because on this subject we are unfortunately obliged to repeat ourselves and to say the same things. However, may a teacher of Latin be allowed to recall the old saying "*repetita juvant*" before any act of desperation or in other words the resignation of Europe as Mr. Rauti said.

The central problem dealt with by the most valuable report drawn up by Mr. Bianco and submitted to us on behalf of the General Affairs Committee involves a detailed analysis of all the political, organisational and procedural aspects of the reactivation of WEU. As I said, a story which is unfortunately always old but still new. A subject which we are obliged to take up in a boringly monotonous fashion at every session of our Assembly. A subject which, when discussed in general terms in Rome in October 1984, produced the solemn Rome declaration concerning which we clearly deceived ourselves into believing that all the disputes had been ended and all the doubts and mental reserves regarding the clear and definite political will had been set aside; namely, the view that WEU was the essential instrument through which Europe would be able to speak with a single voice and to participate on equal terms in working out a common policy for disarmament and the limitation of weapons. Unfortunately, however, this was not so; unfortunately, it still is not so. And the Rapporteur is obliged to recognise that, because of the many failings and uncertainties, the public time and again doubts the real and sincere intention of the governments of the seven member countries to act consistently on the Rome declaration.

There is a danger that WEU may be put into mothballs or may even have been so already; the pessimists would say that right from the start it has been kept going by the kiss of life.

Mr. Bianco's report analyses the causes of this precarious situation and the failures arising in particular from an unco-ordinated, irregular and irrational relationship between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers which has created what I would call the absurd and contradictory mental atmosphere which we saw yesterday. On other occasions we have complained that the governments pay little attention to the Assembly's work; yesterday annoyance was expressed – by some – that too many ministers were attending. I would say that it was better to have too many than too few.

When there is no perfect partnership between parliament and government and between the legislative and executive powers, parliament cannot work properly and without a working parliament the whole system is likely to fail and be destroyed. This is true for the democratic life of each state and is even more true for democratically representative international bodies like ours.

The report lists the causes of the situation and suggests remedies. We agree entirely with the diagnosis and with the prescribed cure. May I be permitted to stress one point; the political and diplomatic events of the last few years, from the various disarmament conferences in Geneva and Stockholm to the Reykjavik summit, which has inevitably dominated all our speeches over the last few days, confirm one basic observation. Europe must have its own independent European forum for discussing security. We must not be afraid of efforts by others to remove mutual distrust and to achieve disarmament and security in order to create the conditions for a lasting peace. We must however ensure that others do not move in that direction over our heads, not out of unworthy jealousy nor out of a simple need to participate as protagonists but because we are convinced that no policy for a lasting peace can be constructed without Europe and even less if an attempt is made to construct it against Europe.

I do not think that we should fear the so-called zero option because this was above all a European idea and we cannot do other than welcome the fact that it has now been taken up by others. We must, however, work for parallel negotiations on disarmament, Euromissiles, short-range missiles, conventional weapons and chemical weapons so that everyone will have a guarantee that there is no cheating, that there is no exploitation and that the will for peace is unconditional, firm and sincere.

One last thought before I conclude. As Mr. Bianco also said clearly in his report there must be no special agreements, either bilateral or trilateral, between certain states. As our foreign minister said, there must be no club for the specially privileged. Special privileges should be

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

given only to the cause of peace and the cause of Europe. We view with suspicion some tendencies to set up restricted and exclusive working groups on European security problems. We are not convinced by the arguments advanced on the subject because there can always be so many different arguments. In the time of de Gaulle it used to be said that the economic dominance of Germany must be balanced by the military dominance of France, combined with an association with Great Britain as a sort of second insurance in relation to the United States. Today it is said: let us bring together – always in a working group – the most exposed country and the two European nuclear powers. We say no. Separate discussions must be abandoned and everything must be brought back into WEU, that is the new WEU reactivated by new credibility and effectiveness.

For defence purposes Europe cannot become a means of perpetuating privilege for anyone because any such privileges are discriminatory and block the emergence of genuine European awareness. Precisely for that reason the EDC plan of 1954 was based on the elimination of all discrimination, including discrimination concerning types of armaments. It is only in this way that, as our Rapporteur and all of us hope, a "defence spirit" can be reawakened in the peoples of Europe to support the European commitment of diplomats and politicians.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to reply to the various speakers.

Mr. POOS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I can of course only give you a partial reply because your debate has not finished. Mr. Robert Goebbels, Secretary of State, will stay with you throughout and, if you wish, could speak at the end of the debate on Mr. Bianco's report.

I was very pleased to have heard the views exchanged and to observe their high level. In view of the late hour I shall be brief.

I note a complete identity of view between your Assembly and the Council with regard to the constructive dialogue between the two organs of your organisation. I can assure you that the ministers who speak to you do not do so as visitors but in their capacity as essential partners in the dialogue you seek. In the positions you have taken we have found backing and support for the action we pursue, namely the reactivation of WEU. I can already tell you that I am optimistic about the rôle that your Assembly expects to play in that reactivation. When Luxembourg took over the chairmanship of the Council a few months ago we expressed our wish to meet your

Assembly not just in its plenary sessions but also in the person of its President, its enlarged Bureau and its Presidential Committee and to do so at least once a month. I offer you that as evidence of our intention to treat the WEU Assembly at least as favourably as the European Parliament.

One of the speakers deplored the lack of information in the summary reports on IEPG, security in the Mediterranean, the agencies and SDI. The slimness of the texts that I have had the honour to submit to you on behalf of the Council is not due to any ill will on the part of the Council or to the "top secret" nature of the documents concerned but simply to the fact that the work of the Council on these various subjects is not yet completed and that the mandate given to the Secretariat-General has not yet come to an end. So it is just a matter of waiting and I hope that the Chairman-in-Office will be able to present you with more detailed reports on these various subjects at later sessions.

I was particularly struck by Mr. Bianco's comment to the effect that he hoped our organisation would be active rather than passive and that it would act before events rather than react after them. The objective is one I readily accept but it is difficult to put into effect because the members of WEU do not include the two leading actors on the world stage, if I may so describe them, and because these two main partners in the East-West dialogue, the United States and the Soviet Union, set the pace and sometimes create surprises as at Reykjavik. It was described as an historical turning point but no one, in the United States or anywhere else, had I think anticipated the scale of the contacts and the pre-agreement achieved before everything flew apart at the last minute because of the prior condition that the Soviets wanted to impose regarding the SDI. However, the potency of the idea floated at this summit, namely the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons, will continue to busy minds in Europe and those of the governments responsible for European security. We are already well embarked on this thinking process.

That brings me to my last reply concerning the next NATO meeting. We have been asked to present a joint WEU position at this meeting in Brussels which I, personally, consider to be highly important placed as it is at a turning point in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.

In this debate, the Chairman of the WEU Council will try to present the consensus achieved in Luxembourg on certain points, which I have just had the honour to tell you about. The Chairman has been given no authority to present a joint and co-ordinated viewpoint at the Brussels meeting. There is no text that could be presented as a document

Mr. Poos (continued)

agreed by the Seven, but nevertheless, the Chairman will speak on behalf of the Seven, taking his cue from the conclusions of the Luxembourg meeting. In this way we shall try to show to our partners in the alliance that WEU exists, that it has arrived at certain common restrictions with regard to the Reykjavik meeting and that it will be trying in future to add to the degree of consensus already achieved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman-in-Office of the Council, thank you very much. You have my congratulations and best wishes for every success in your activities.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1078 and amendment).
2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Resumed joint debate on the reports

of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Documents 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum).

4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the revised report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1075 and amendments).
5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; European security and the Mediterranean (Votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1075 and amendments, 1078 and amendment and 1073).
6. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Votes on the draft budgets, Documents 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1069 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?..

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1986

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Giust.
4. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France.
Replies by Mr. Chirac to questions put by: Mr. Müller, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Goerens, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Close, Mr. Soell, Mr. Sarti, Sir Anthony Grant.
5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1078 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Eisma, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Burger, Sir Paul Hawkins (point of order), Mr. Burger, Mr. Cifarelli; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Amadei, Mr. Cox, the President; Mr. Bianco (*Rapporteur*).
6. European security and the Mediterranean (*Vote on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1073*).
Speaker: Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*).
7. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Revised report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1075 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Amadei (*Rapporteur*).
8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Burger, Mr. Goebbels (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cifarelli (point of order).
9. Change in the membership of a committee.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 21.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1078 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1078 and amendment.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Müller.

As Mr. Müller has not yet arrived, I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. Bianco for his excellent report, for his co-operation in the committee and for his flexible attitude during

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

the discussion of the report. Although he did not abandon any part of the subject or of his views, his attitude made it far easier for the report to be approved unanimously.

What I particularly like about the report is its frankness in revealing that the relationship between the two political organs of our organisation, the Council and the Assembly, is still not free from inactivity, disruptions and contradictions.

There is undoubtedly a natural tension between these two bodies, a tension such as exists between parliamentarians and governments in any democracy in the world. But if the relationship between governments and parliamentarians in other countries were marred by the same distrust, the same disregard and, in many instances, the same ignorance, as relations between the Council and the Assembly of WEU, I do not think the government of any democracy would last all that long.

We might be tempted, Mr. President, to see the many visits by ministers to our Assembly as the expression of a special and increasing interest on the part of the governments in our work and especially in improved co-operation. But the manner of those visits to the Assembly which I have observed for almost seventeen years leaves me in some doubt over that interpretation. The ministers are nearly always in a hurry, they scarcely ever have the time to make a serious attempt to tackle our questions. We cannot, of course, expect a question raised spontaneously to be followed by an answer that is correct down to the very last detail. But we can expect a minister who comes here to allow himself enough time for a discussion with us, otherwise there is no point in his coming. I must, Secretary of State, exclude the visit of your minister from this criticism. He is one of the few exceptions I have witnessed in the last seventeen years.

On the other hand, when we get back home, we shall be able to see from our newspapers what this or that minister has said in his statement to the Assembly. And we must ask ourselves: is the Assembly not simply being used as a kind of acclamatory body, something like a sounding board for statements by ministers who want it publicised in the media that they have once again stood up for the harmonisation of armaments, for joint defence efforts?

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report clearly indicates the many areas in which relations between the Council and the Assembly are still unsettled. When we read this list, we are forced to the conclusion that Rome was perhaps not meant quite so seriously after all, that the Rome declaration was no more than a flash in

the pan, or that the fault was perhaps ours, the parliamentarians', in that we took the ministers' words too seriously.

I will take up only a few of the points raised by Mr. Bianco. France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic set up a working group which is supposed to consider security in Europe, a task statutorily entrusted to WEU. Another organisation is set up, as if we did not already have a surfeit of organisations in Europe, paralysing and hampering each other. God knows, we are not short of organisations: what we are short of is solidarity. Why is this task not left in the hands of WEU, or at least dovetailed with our work?

Another point is that, in the Assembly's view, it is also Western European Union's responsibility to consider the problem of international terrorism, as we have said in a recommendation. This view appears to be shared by the terrorists, judging by the security measures in and around this building, but our ministers, our governments are saying nothing about it. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council pointed out today that the ministers had considered aspects of terrorism and reached agreements in the European Community. All well and good, but I wonder if the European Community is really the appropriate organisation for discussion of the fight against terrorism, as long as WEU exists?

And then there is Portugal's application to join WEU, which was submitted years ago. The Assembly's appropriate committee – and the same goes for other committees – has discussed this with our parliamentary counterparts and the government in Portugal. Now the Council says: we want to wait until WEU has been reorganised before taking a decision on enlargement. But how much longer is the reorganisation of WEU going to take? Is our organisation not beginning to offend against good manners, against international, or at least European, courtesy?

Or take the budgetary situation. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council told us today that the funds made available for the Assembly will decline. The genteel term for this is "minus growth". The worst of it is that the Assembly's budget has to cover pensions for our staff. Ladies and gentlemen, if we know how old the staff are, how many more years' service they have and what grades they have, we can work out when there will be nothing left of our budget. That, then, is the situation in which the Assembly has to work. And the advice we were given yesterday by the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, that the members of WEU and of the budget committees should get together, will be pointless until the governments, which draw up the draft budgets, increase the appropriations for the WEU Assembly. We are aware, after all, that at least those members who support the gov-

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

ernment in power – and this is true of all parliaments – are not initially inclined to deviate from the government's proposals. So, here again, we ask for bread and are given a stone – and this at a time, Mr. President, when the Reykjavik conference has surely made it sufficiently clear how necessary our work is, how much a joint response to defence policy issues is needed from Europe. In talks with many of our American counterparts we have constantly found that they too are awaiting this European response and do not want a German, a French and a British one. What they want is Europe's response. If Europe cannot come up with a joint response, the world will pass us by.

I believe that the efforts of both superpowers at the moment are very seriously aimed at a continuation of the discussions and that the two leaders of the superpowers are also making serious efforts to achieve success. But in these circumstances – it might have been different if the superpowers had not been willing to talk – a contribution is expected from Western Europe, and WEU is really the only organisation authorised to give this reply. What therefore now needs to be done, in my opinion, is to increase and improve co-operation in our organisation, and Mr. Bianco's report provides a good basis for this, which I hope the Council is also prepared to use.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Rapporteur said today during his oral presentation that our policy, the policy of Western European Union, must be active. I agree with him and would add that this is the opposite of the view expressed yesterday by the NATO Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, which was that we should wait, like the fisherman who will eventually hook something. I believe Europe needs to be active, not passive. Europe, and peace, need movement if by the year 2000 Europe is to be more than a dummy standing between the eastern and western blocs, more than a colossus on feet of clay.

Anyone who had faith in the almost visionary declarations of the Council of Ministers in Rome two years ago must regard Mr. Bianco's report – his creditable report – as an inventory of unfulfilled promises, unavailable information and inactivity. The aim of this inaction is quite obviously not to further but to prevent the revitalisation of WEU.

How vital, it might be asked in connection with the introduction to Mr. Bianco's report, is an organisation, when only in December 1986 is

the parliamentary Assembly able to give its views on the activities of the Council prior to 31st December 1985? How can one talk of vitality, when the Rapporteur has to point out that the Council has hidden away somewhere in the thirty-first annual report the principles on which it agreed over the SDI issue, instead of calling a press conference or at least issuing a communiqué on their approval?

Did the Council not decide to set up a press service in the Secretariat-General? What has been done to implement this decision? The delay surely cannot be entirely due, as the Secretary-General claimed, to the difficulty of finding somebody suitable! It surely cannot be true that the Council takes no notice of comments in the international press. Otherwise it would certainly have noticed that for months not one observer outside WEU itself has given the reactivation of our organisation the slightest chance, insofar as the media devote any space at all to WEU. It is surely not enough to produce at regular intervals dry, administrative-type reports in which interesting information is sometimes so hidden away that it can hardly be found.

So my question is: when is the newly-created working group for public relations activities to start work? My information, I am sorry to say, is that no staff have yet been appointed.

I can only give this warning: if the Council believes the problems connected with our security are such that they are not suitable for public debate, it is all the more important for it to increase its efforts to develop public awareness of the problems and needs we now face. If things go on as they are, no prophetic powers are needed to predict that it will soon be quite impossible to explain the situation to the public. The importance of enlisting public support has long been recognised elsewhere.

But, ladies and gentlemen, there is another very important point here which has not been sufficiently emphasised today: in Rome and afterwards it was said time and again that WEU was the appropriate instrument for an effective security, defence and peace policy just because it was an organisation with a parliamentary assembly. How seriously should this be taken, in view of the principle of zero growth which increasingly prevents the Assembly from participating in the reactivation of WEU? This Assembly can be effective only if it has budgetary powers and the European Court of Auditors examines the implementation of the budget. It surely cannot be true that we are supposed to work effectively for an independent pillar within the alliance when we have to argue with officials over typewriters!

There is something else affecting the Council's political activities and, here again, there is cause for concern: will the Council give some priority

Mr. Antretter (continued)

to the questions of disarmament and arms control, given the situation since Reykjavik, or will it push them into the background in favour of other subjects? It is, after all, striking that no mention at all is made of these issues in the list of contents of part one of the thirty-second report on the Council's activities.

What activities is the WEU Council in fact undertaking with respect to disarmament, at a time when interest is focused on this problem? I am sure that public attention should be drawn to WEU's opinion on the proposals put forward by Gorbachev on 15th January 1986 and by the Warsaw Pact in June 1986. In this respect the report on the Council's activities in the first half of 1986 is just as unsatisfactory as the report on the period up to 31st December 1985, because it says nothing about a possible joint European position.

Can the parliamentary Assembly take it that the Council will be commenting on Reykjavik and SALT II soon? Is it prepared to oppose those who consistently quench every glimmer of hope on the disarmament horizon so that nothing shall hamper the arms build-up? Mr. President, I am afraid the Council does not have a great deal of time left. Mr. Bianco is right when he says that ministerial speeches already scarcely cover up the Council's deficiencies, and that it will soon be impossible to conceal them at all. The Council is in the process of losing all its credit, and the Assembly cannot hope, Mr. President, to maintain its past credit unless the Council manages to ensure that real substance is given to the reactivation of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Giust.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too approve Mr. Bianco's report, its content, the points he made in addition to the written report and above all its subject: the political activities of the Council.

Tomorrow afternoon we shall be taking another important report, that of Mr. Terlezki on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, and the draft resolution accompanying it. Paragraph 3 of that draft resolution contains a sentence I consider to be very important, fundamental even, to the debate we are now holding on Mr. Bianco's report.

Paragraph 3 of Mr. Terlezki's recommendation reads: "To approach their national parliaments and governments to ensure that they acknowledge the due central and priority rôle of the Assembly, which is the most direct expression of the political and democratic will of member countries ;".

I find the same idea in Mr. Bianco's report. When we refer to the political rôle of the Council we also have to question ourselves about the ambiguous position we are in as WEU, i.e. as the European military community in defence of the peoples of Europe. There is certainly an ambiguity in the construction of Europe, as present in the EEC in the form of the European Parliament, claiming as it does with ever-increasing insistence the right to real democratic representation of the will of the nations; and the same applies to the Council of Europe where the representatives of the twenty-one member countries are striving to build up the concept of the right of the Assembly of the Council of Europe to express the will of the peoples of the twenty-one countries.

In this report by Mr. Bianco dealing with the political activities of the Council, we too should take the opportunity to reiterate a claim that is now growing old but is still very important today. If we want to build a credible European defence community for the tasks of peace in which we believe, we have to get away from our present ambiguous and abnormal situation and reassert the Assembly's democratic right to be the central point of reference for WEU.

It is from that standpoint that I support Mr. Bianco's report and the reassertion of that right which I find in it. I have no illusions. We are a long way from having a European government and parliament that would be the real materialisation of such a hope. We are far from having a credible plan that would override European nationalities and – why not? – national defence strategies. But we have to pursue this objective if we want to give credibility to the idea of the Rome declaration, if we want to give credibility to the idea of defence and of real representation for Europe in military and defence terms and if we want to give real credibility to the concept of peace that we are pursuing over and above our nationalities and through the will of our peoples.

There has been talk of improving relations, but that is not just up to us. It is the WEU Council that has to improve its relations with the Assembly. It must be understood that both the Council of Ministers and the WEU Council have to give up some of their prerogatives, they have to recognise that the Assembly is an effective, credible and democratic representative body which has to be entrusted with the decision-making task at least on the most important political issues and military policy of our Europe.

If that, Mr. President, is the conviction of this Assembly of ours – and, on the evidence of Mr. Bianco's report I believe it is – we have before us a more realistic and more credible outlook for the Assembly and for the whole WEU system.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As agreed, ladies and gentlemen, I am suspending the debate on the report in reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council presented by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee because the time has come for the address by the Prime Minister of the French Republic as indicated in our order of business.

4. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister of the French Republic.

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, allow me first to welcome you on behalf of the Assembly and to tell you how much we appreciate the honour you do our Assembly by coming here and speaking to us. For many reasons, we are clearly at an important juncture in the history of Europe.

Your appearance at the Assembly of Western European Union in Paris, which reflects the French Government's attitude towards us, will, I am quite sure, further intensify our awareness of that pressing need of the times we are living in, namely the need to organise the defence of Europe in the close Atlantic solidarity that binds us all together.

Thank you, therefore, Prime Minister, for coming. Would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour and above all a great pleasure for me to follow, twenty-four years later, in the footsteps of Georges Pompidou, Prime Minister under General de Gaulle, in taking the floor before your Assembly.

In the name of the French Government, I am delighted to greet the representatives of our seven nations, with all the diversity of belief and outlook which enriches every democratic assembly.

I particularly want to thank the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, for the efforts his country has made over the last few months to make our work truly effective.

The development of a European awareness in the field of defence undoubtedly concerns us all. It involves the commitment of all our governments, and we are all aware of the rôle France has played in restoring WEU to its rightful place.

It also depends on the consent of the citizens you represent, and I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the rôle your Assembly has played both

in carrying the torch of the institution from the very beginning and in making a crucial contribution to its revitalisation.

With your permission, I also extend special congratulations to your President, Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, for the competence and authority he has displayed in exercising his mandate, which coincides with a decisive period in the history of Western European Union. His commitment reflects the historic vocation of Alsace, the beautiful land which elected him and which, after symbolising the divisions of our continent, is now the symbol of its advance towards unity.

Born in 1954 of the need to associate the Federal Republic of Germany with the collective security of Western Europe and to lay the foundations for a new solidarity, WEU was inspired by a vision of the future: the affirmation of the European identity in matters of security which, for obvious reasons, could not be fully expressed in the economic and military conditions of the post-war years, when the United States bore almost the whole brunt of the burden in the face of the already menacing power of the East.

Recent years have shown that this organisation, richer thus far in potential than in concrete achievements, was meeting an ever more pressing need.

The disturbances which preceded the deployment in Europe of new American missiles, the rather confused debates surrounding the American strategic defence initiative, and, just recently, the latest developments in the American-Soviet dialogue at Reykjavik all add up to a threefold lesson.

First, Europe needs an institution of its own, capable of informing public opinion and of explaining exactly what is at stake, so that the people of Europe can give knowledgeable support to the decisions required in order to guarantee our security. Such an institution already exists: WEU, the only European organisation to have been granted competence in defence matters by treaty. Its original structure, incorporating governments, members of parliament and experts from the international agencies, saves it from one of the prevailing weaknesses of Western Europe, where expert analyses are all too often out of phase with debates based on opinion. Yet to face up to the challenges of security, governments clearly need to be able to base themselves on an awareness of the realities involved. This goal will be all the better achieved insofar as WEU provides an unquestionable reference point in its own field. The purpose of your work is to demonstrate that defence matters can and must stand above differences of opinion.

The second lesson is that although we are well on the way to European unity in economic

Mr. Chirac (continued)

matters, we are still at the teething stage as far as security is concerned, where Western Europe all too often appears to be at the mercy of forces beyond its control. This state of affairs is intolerable to anyone who believes in striving to consolidate European unity.

Finally, the hopes and perhaps even more importantly the anxieties aroused in our countries by the Reykjavik summit have made us more clearly aware of the demands of our own security. Our belief in our common destiny should give a new boost to co-operation at every level: in bilateral relations, between the members of WEU and within the Atlantic Alliance.

In the field of security Europe is faced with challenges unprecedented in range and intensity. WEU has a major rôle to play in helping to come to terms with these challenges.

Take technology first of all. The Soviet Union and the United States devote considerable financial effort, in keeping with their resources, to research and development with regard to new weapons systems. In these circumstances the countries of Europe cannot afford to take the risk of reducing or dispersing their efforts.

France, for its part, is determined to make the necessary financial effort to maintain a modern defence apparatus. But France is also aware that rapidly changing technologies, the increasing complexity of modern weapons and the rising cost of developing and manufacturing them, call for a pooling of efforts with our allies. It is therefore important to seize every available opportunity for co-operation, from the research stage right through to arms manufacture.

The intergovernmental Eureka project and the Community scientific and technological research programme open up a promising path in the civilian sector.

Co-operation between our countries' industries in military fields in which, together or separately, they have developed a certain know-how, is another essential step. A joint appreciation of our real military needs in the face of what is in many respects a common threat is also essential if major projects are not to be hampered by over-exclusive demands with regard to weapons design and production schedules. But however much co-operation there is between our experts, our general staffs or our industrialists, European co-operation on arms issues cannot flourish without the commitment of governments. In this area, alongside a broader institution such as the IEPG, whose main task this is, WEU also has a specific and important part to play.

It should be remembered first of all that WEU countries are always to be found at the source of

any major joint European arms project. Moreover, the particular features of your organisation, whether in the rôle of the parliamentary Assembly, or in the close association of the foreign affairs and defence ministers with the work of the Council, give it a special political potential in such matters.

We must return to the exemplary spirit of the 1960s, when numerous joint projects were carried out. To achieve such a goal will require some imaginative thinking about new forms of co-operation, making the most of each nation's know-how and not necessarily leading to co-production deals wherever a swap-buying policy would enable our countries to modernise their armies at a lower cost.

The French Government is fully aware that the highly exceptional financial effort to which it has committed itself under the new military equipment programme act – which I wanted to implement as soon as the government was formed, and the purpose of which is to achieve a substantial effort, in relation to past experience, on behalf of equipment for our armies – needs to be backed by the successful conclusion of negotiations on major arms projects which can be carried out jointly: tanks, helicopters, third-generation missiles and anti-aircraft defence are among the fields in which, over and above industrial considerations, a common political will must emerge.

The other great challenge concerns the strategic global balance. The scope of the proposals put forward by both sides at the Reykjavik summit in October seemed to shake the very basis on which our conception of United States-Soviet relations was founded. Now that the surprise has worn off, we Europeans must find answers to the fundamental questions which have just been put to us.

The first concerns the possible withdrawal of medium-range American missiles based in Europe. Their deployment, justified initially by the Soviet monopoly of this type of weapon, also symbolised the strengthening of the strategic link between the two sides of the Atlantic. Although we can only rejoice at the Soviet Union's declared intention to dismantle most of its SS-20s, we must nevertheless prevent the possible repatriation of American missiles from weakening the ties between Europe and the United States. We do realise, of course, that the commitment of our American allies is first and foremost a political reality which does not depend solely on any particular category of arms, but undoubtedly corresponds to the deep-seated interests of both America and Europe.

It is important, however, that any agreement which the United States and the Soviet Union might reach should include all the necessary

Mr. Chirac (continued)

guarantees with regard to verification and shorter-range missiles capable of reaching most areas of Western Europe, particularly from territories belonging to the Soviet Union's allies. Failing this, such an agreement might in itself give rise to fresh imbalances. France was pleased to hear the reassurances which the British Prime Minister recently received from the President of the United States on this important point, as on several others.

The zero option cannot be considered as an end in itself but must be part of an all-embracing approach, taking into account the various factors which determine Western European security. Let us beware of allowing the prospect of spectacular, but nevertheless partial, agreements to lead us to the hasty conclusion that the threat has suddenly been dissipated.

We cannot repeat often enough that the peril hanging over us in the form of the formidable nuclear, conventional and chemical arsenal of the East must always be perceived in its entirety. In view of the inherently superior strength of the Soviet Union in conventional and chemical weapons on the European continent, our security will long continue to rely on the presence in Western Europe of a sufficient number of American nuclear weapons.

What, then, are we to think of the proposals to reduce and even eliminate strategic weapons? If the two superpowers agreed initially to substantial reductions in their current strategic arsenals, which are obviously overstocked, France would welcome such a decision as an unprecedented success, since no previous agreement has ever led to a decrease – quite the contrary – in the number of nuclear weapons.

This simple fact suggests that we would be wise not to rush our fences. An agreement on the vast scale just envisaged by the United States and the Soviet Union as a first phase would have to be tested before we could reasonably look ahead to subsequent phases. The importance the United States itself has always, and rightly, attached to observing and verifying disarmament agreements, is an argument in favour of a gradual approach, in which the priorities are clearly defined.

Meanwhile, nobody in the alliance doubts that deterrence, in Europe and in the world at large, will continue to rely on nuclear weapons and on the existence of complementary systems. We believe that missile-launching submarines are of absolutely primary importance in this respect, as their invulnerability guarantees the defender's response capability, however sudden the strike.

As we can see, the area we have to consider is vast. In view of the importance of the stakes, it

would be a pity to limit or curb our thinking for fear of encroaching on the debates of the Atlantic Alliance or bilateral talks between allies.

WEU has the advantage of bringing together nations which, while retaining their individual identity, have decided not to neglect a single factor involved in the building of Europe.

The Atlantic Alliance, on the other hand, is a defence alliance. Whatever common values it encompasses, its member states are not committed to the same unification effort as those in our organisation. It is this long-term prospect, together with the habit, formed over thirty years, of acting in concert at every level, which lends such particular significance to our solidarity in this specifically European context. This kind of concerted action can only help to reinforce the overall solidarity between allies. A strong united Europe that respects the separate identity of its members is a guarantee of the vitality of the alliance and the basis for a healthy, balanced relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic.

I am convinced, and I must stress this, that the threat to the Atlantic Alliance is not the risk of division but the feeling, whether justified or not, that decisions vital to European security might be taken without Europe's having any real say in the matter. Recent developments in the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union confirm this conviction, which I know is shared by all the European leaders I have met of late.

WEU must play a greater part in subjects so crucial to our future rôle. The organisation can already boast some undeniable achievements. The ministerial statements, the reports and recommendations by the Assembly and the work of the experts make up an impressive record and provide a basis for our further work. But it seems to me that the time has come for us to agree to give this activity the political inspiration it still lacks. It is WEU's mission to celebrate without further ado the solemn bond which unites our seven nations in matters of security.

Why not give it its formal blessing in the eyes of the world by drawing up what I would like to call the Western European charter of security principles?

We are indeed unanimous on the following essential principles:

- Nuclear deterrence is still the only effective way of preventing war in Europe. There is no alternative in the foreseeable future. Any developments which may occur as a result of technical progress must aim to reinforce deterrence not to question it.

- The threat which hangs over Western Europe must be considered as a whole: the full

Mr. Chirac (continued)

range of nuclear arms and the imbalance of both conventional and chemical weapons. Deterrent capabilities and disarmament efforts must be defined in relation to this overall threat.

– Maintaining the defence effort of the European states on a level in keeping with the threat is an imperative necessity. It is also the necessary basis for the political strengthening of Europe. In this respect the contribution of the independent French and British nuclear forces is an essential factor.

– Deterrence in Europe requires a strategic linkage between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is represented by the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces on our continent.

– The aim of disarmament must be to increase security at lower levels of armament, by means of realistic and verifiable agreements.

This list is simply indicative. I am certain that the more carefully we look into these ideas, the more we shall be struck by the extraordinary unity of European viewpoints on these issues.

At the same time we shall be able to continue our bilateral exchanges, which naturally include our American allies, and in which France actively participates.

The charter I have just referred to would give a new dimension to our co-operation. Public opinion in our various countries would be in a better position to understand the reasons underlying national or joint decisions taken on defence matters. It would also be of use to the Atlantic Alliance, where our convictions are all too often expressed in a fragmented manner and where an assurance of this nature might serve as a useful example. Our American allies, in their negotiations with the Soviet Union, would know they could count on a solid consensus of European opinion on the major principles of our common security. And finally, it would make the USSR more aware of the reality of a Western Europe which is increasingly asserting its unity and resolution, which also apply to defence issues.

By celebrating in this way the deep-rooted agreement which unites them on such vital issues, the seven members of WEU would be adopting an approach in which other countries could join if they so wished: I am thinking in particular of our neighbours on the Iberian peninsula, Spain and Portugal.

WEU – and to my mind this is its true *raison d'être* – is destined to become, sooner or later, one of the keystones in the building of Europe. Its expansion would thus be perfectly in keeping with the 1984 decision to revitalise it.

France is aware of the legal and political problems which will need to be overcome in order to achieve this goal. The consolidation of what has been achieved through reactivation does not call for precipitate action, but our political stance must be perfectly clear, and we must do everything in our power to make the reality of Western European Union live up to its name.

As I have already assured you, France is determined to contribute to the emergence of a common European awareness on defence matters, which would also draw more substance from the responsibilities of some of our members outside Europe, and from our other obligations within the Atlantic Alliance.

The charter of basic security principles which France calls for today would represent an important step, not only in the history of WEU, but also, and perhaps primarily, in the achievement of the grand vision of Europe. Such an initiative would demonstrate still more clearly our determination to base our security far more firmly than at present on an active solidarity in keeping with our efforts and with what is and should be Europe's rightful place in the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Prime Minister, for your important statement which has already aroused considerable interest among the members of our Assembly, some of whom have put their names down to ask questions. I know you will do your best to reply within the time you are able to allow us.

If you agree, Prime Minister, perhaps you could answer questions you do not have time for in writing. They can be passed on to you through me.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, thank you for your statement. I should like to ask you a question in two parts. Do you believe that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty still guarantees the deployment of French nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on a member country of Western European Union?

Second, what do you think of the comments of the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany on the question of the zero option and the SALT II limits?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – In reply to your first question regarding Article V of the treaty, I would simply say that France, as a member of the alliance, naturally assumes all its responsibilities as laid

Mr. Chirac (continued)

down in the treaty without reservation of any kind.

With regard to committing the nuclear deterrent, it has always been agreed, and this applies both to the United States and to the United Kingdom and France, that there could be no legal system making the use of nuclear weapons automatic for the simple reason that, to be effective, there had to be a measure of uncertainty about the employment of the nuclear deterrent.

That being so, no state could have an automatic commitment in this field. The fact remains that a clear statement of the duties which France recognises to be its under its commitment in the alliance and the strengthening of the solidarity it desires – as I said a moment ago – in the field of European security naturally implies that France considers its security to be exposed not at its own frontiers but at those of its neighbours.

As to the judgment made by Mr. Genscher, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have no comments to make on the viewpoint he has voiced.

With regard to the zero option, I perfectly understand that this goal should be pursued if it genuinely corresponds to reality. I will not conceal from you the fact that I am perhaps more reserved – it is a question of shade of opinion – in my view of the validity of the zero option. I have to ask you to let me have a second look at it before taking a positive stance on this procedure.

In other words I want security to be assessed as a complete entity including – as I just said – nuclear weapons and conventional and chemical forces and, in the nuclear field, the various categories involved. So to what would the zero option, as discussed in the various forums, apply? I am a little worried about this although, of course, I am perfectly ready to consider all the possible consequences.

I have no comment to make either with regard to the overshoot of the technical ceilings defined by SALT II which it would appear our American allies are contemplating except to say that these technical ceilings, which have no value in themselves because they have not been ratified, have already I think been exceeded in some sectors by the Soviets themselves.

That being so, I repeat that I am in favour of a procedure for reducing both American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons which naturally means beginning by agreeing not to raise the ceilings that have already been accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, the new French defence planning act makes provision for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Does France intend to respect its undertakings under Articles III and IV of Protocol No. III of 23rd October 1954?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Naturally, France would like to see the end of chemical weapons provided, of course, that this were verifiable and controlled and that the weapons were really destroyed. But France could not in any circumstances accept the idea of giving up a particular type of weapon if it might be exposed to the threat of the same type of weapon in the hands of others. Given the situation as it is today, France considers that it has to have a chemical deterrent that would cause a potential enemy to reflect on the risk it would be taking by using chemical weapons. That explains the decisions I took in the new defence planning act but that, of course, in no way diminishes the earnest wish of my government for the complete and total disappearance and destruction of all chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, your presence in our Assembly is undoubtedly a highly important event and bears witness to the regard in which our international organisation is held by your government. One statement in your address is of particular significance to us: "But it seems to me that the time has come for us to agree to give this activity the political inspiration it still lacks."

Towards the end of your address you gave this important statement more concrete form by proposing that there should be a "Western European charter of security principles".

Explaining your ideas for the implementation of this proposal you used the words: "at the same time we shall be able to continue our bilateral exchanges which naturally include our American allies".

My question is this: Do you think that, before striking an understanding and agreement with our American allies, we ought to work out a joint position among the Seven of WEU so as to arrive at a united position before we negotiate with our American ally?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – I am not so naïve as to think that things have to be spelled out that clearly. All of us, rightly and naturally – we are independent

Mr. Chirac (continued)

powers – have relations with our American allies as we have relations with each other from which we draw a number of consequences, obligations and advantages.

I simply say that it would be legitimate and probably profitable to the alliance in terms both of its strength and its cohesion, for Europe to reinforce its ties of solidarity thus enabling it to speak more coherently first in the dialogue with our American allies within the alliance and second vis-à-vis the rest of the world. It was never, of course, in my mind that that solidarity should have to come before any discussion with the Americans; that would be both naive and impracticable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, you have been asked several questions on armaments. Now perhaps we could return to your proposal for a Western European charter of security principles; I should imagine that is what will stand out from your statement this afternoon because it is a major project.

If I may, I would like to go back over some possibly more technical points. Among Europe's security requirements, you mentioned technology which is a major factor, of course, and in that connection you mentioned the armament industries several times. May I therefore ask you this question: Does the French Government consider it desirable for the armament industries to be associated with the WEU bodies responsible for studying and defining the problems of facilities for arms co-operation? Does the French Government think that an initiative through the WEU agencies or facilities provided by them might be an answer to this problem?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Valleix, I for my part think it is highly important that genuine co-operation should be established between the big arms industries in our countries. As a way of creating the synergy I referred to a moment ago, France would therefore be in favour of the arms industries being associated in some way with the work of your organisation. As to the form of that association it is clearly up to you to decide and make proposals to governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Goerens.

Mr. GOERENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, my question is this: from what level of verifiable disarmament by the two super-

powers could France consider reducing its own nuclear arsenal?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Unfortunately, Mr. Goerens, the question seems to me premature, or at all events not one for today.

France has always said that when a number of conditions were met, when the arsenals of the great powers had come down, say to a very substantially lower level than at present and not too far away from the level of the independent French and British forces, and provided also that the same kind of progress were made in the field of conventional and chemical weapons – or briefly, when it could then be sure of not losing in its capacity to deter what it was losing in armaments – then France would be ready to reduce its own arsenal but certainly not before.

Unfortunately, I have to say that in the present situation there are no prospects for any reduction, as far as France is concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, I am a German parliamentarian but to make it easier for you to reply I am putting my question in French.

Prime Minister, could you indicate the conditions and cases in which French forces would or would not intervene alongside their allies in the Atlantic Alliance were an armed conflict to break out in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Ahrens, France has entered into the undertakings set out in the treaty. Automatically – I am repeating what is in fact a constant of French policy – France would wholly respect its obligations and would be wholly, unreservedly and actively at the side of its allies.

The only question that could arise is the one raised a moment ago, namely, the use of the nuclear deterrent. I said what I thought I had to say on that point but I repeat that France is fully aware that, increasingly, Europe's security is indivisible, that its own security is not confined to its own frontiers but that it also depends on the security of its neighbours and that France is also defending itself at the frontiers of those neighbours. This is, of course, the reason why France seeks to strengthen its ties of solidarity in furtherance of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – You said in your speech, Mr. Prime Minister, that the allies should seize every possible opportunity to co-operate and, when defining areas of co-operation, you said that anti-aircraft defence was an area in which common political will among the allies should be demonstrated. May I put it to you that a unique opportunity exists to enhance the interoperability and standardisation of command and control of the air defence of our alliance by the procurement by l'armée de l'air of the E3A AWACS aeroplane, which is already in service with NATO in West Germany and with the United States Air Force worldwide, and which might be ordered by the British Royal Air Force? The air threat to our countries is greatly increasing, especially from cruise missiles and air-breathing manned penetrating bombers. This is a technical matter but, in the view of many experts, it provides a unique opportunity that would greatly enhance the strength of our alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson, I am not an expert capable of debating this point in detail but our air defence certainly has to be strengthened. There is no doubt at all about that. It is also certain that we have to take a joint decision and try to reinforce our solidarity in this field too. It is also true, lastly, that a comparative study is in progress as between the Nimrod system and the use of American AWACS. The British are studying these two possibilities just as we are. I recently had occasion to point out to the British Prime Minister that I hoped that our collaboration and cohesion in the study of this question could be stepped up so that we could take the necessary steps as soon as possible, particularly since, in the 1987 draft budget about to be approved by parliament, my government plans a considerable increase in defence expenditure – 11% over 1986 – which includes the appropriations for launching the action needed to strengthen this form of defence against attack from the air.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, how do you think that Western Europe can plan for its security once the United States has deployed its SDI system and the Soviet Union, as is likely, has set up a similar defensive system?

What should Europe do today in order to prepare for that eventuality given its chronic weakness in conventional forces and the bud-

getary restraint that seems to be general all over Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – My first comment is on the last part of your question. I earnestly hope that Europe will realise that to live better we first have to survive and that budgetary restraint in the defence field would be a vital mistake in the present situation and show a lack of sense of responsibility with serious consequences for the future.

In any case, I can tell you that this is not the intention of the French Government. We have just tabled a defence planning act which, as I said, calls for an 11% increase in defence appropriations followed, each of the following four years, by one of 6%. This will enable us to meet all requirements for the modernisation of our forces.

I would wish the same to be true of all European countries because nothing would be more serious than a further weakening of Europe's capacity to defend itself.

Returning to the start of your question, my firm belief is that government means being ready for what is coming. Also, being quite a fan of political science fiction I am quite ready to believe that the day will come when SDI might have real effectiveness because, following the pattern that has obtained since the world began, whenever someone made a better sword someone else made a better shield.

But things are not simple, the prospect of a real defence against missiles is still a long way off. Whilst it is true that the Soviets have been researching this field for over fifteen years and have probably made some progress therefore and that the American administration has launched a vast research and development programme, the fact remains that, for the next twenty-five years, there is not the slightest chance of the balance necessary for peace being based on anything else but the nuclear deterrent.

Over that period what must Europe do? That was your question.

First it has to be alive to its own duties – and not expect everything to come from others – it has to unite more and strengthen solidarity and, with its American allies, credibly assert its capacity, will and determination to defend itself against every type of attack; in other words it must have the means of deterring any kind of assault.

Second, Europe has to be a leading actor in a real disarmament policy.

Mr. Chirac (continued)

Third, it has to be careful not to be led along a road where disarmament could make Europe a hostage, in other words, options where disarmament would apply only to nuclear missiles leaving intact the considerable imbalances in the conventional and chemical fields.

Last, it is essential that every care be taken not to allow any kind of break to develop between Europe and the United States, not that I think our American allies have this in mind. I know that there have been moments in their history when they were tempted by isolationism but that never lasted very long because it was obviously absurd. We saw that very clearly during the two world wars: isolationism cannot and therefore does not work.

But that does not mean that we have to rely wholly on our allies for our defence. It would not be in the interests of our countries – and it is not, incidentally, something we have in mind – or of our dignity.

In this period when there is hope that the shield will be strengthened, we have to reinforce the practical and political means we have of developing solidarity and European union in every field and to take an active part in a balanced, overall reduction of the risk, i.e. a disarmament policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, following on from your comments about the growing complexity of modern armaments, I should like to ask you if your government, having criticised the Vienna negotiations on reductions in conventional forces for covering too small a geographical area, is now prepared to play an active rôle, in view of the offers of negotiation made by the Warsaw Pact, in a much larger area, which is now to extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, especially as this geographical area complies with demands France was making in the 1960s, particularly under General de Gaulle.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – I appreciate the reference to General de Gaulle.

The problem today is that of the framework in which the negotiations for the reduction in conventional arms should take place. As we all know, there are two opposing ideas. The first is that there should be an alliance versus alliance forum, and the second that the best forum is still the CSCE.

I am firmly in favour of the second.

The point is that the alliance versus pact discussions have, in my view, got us nowhere; they have not proved that they can work. I am not trying to analyse why but just noting. On the contrary, with the thirty-five countries of the CSCE I observe that some significant progress has been made and in a relatively short period of time. What is more, this forum has the merit of involving all the nations concerned in security because, after all, the war or peace issue concerns every European nation. So I think this forum is probably the most effective and psychologically the most legitimate.

What is the situation today?

First there is the position of our American friends and allies who are firmly opposed to continuing these negotiations in the thirty-five-country forum. I think they are wrong but that is how it is. France is equally firmly against joining in an alliance versus alliance discussion. What is more, there is no procedure for the purpose.

Next, we see that European governments are generally more in favour of the thirty-five-country discussions within which, moreover, it could well be that some subjects not necessarily of interest to all countries could be dealt with in smaller groups. This is one solution and France is ready to discuss with its European and American allies the possibility of working out such a formula for discussion which might enable differing requirements to be reconciled, under the umbrella – as they say – of the thirty-five, particularly those which are, and this has to be recognised, to some extent secret or confidential.

But I repeat that I am not at all in favour of alliance versus alliance negotiations in which France would not, whatever happens, take part.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Prime Minister, my question is a nice point of terminology. In your opinion is it still right to assert that our union is the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance? If so, would you like to say what your government's opinion is on the possibility of enlarging the union to European countries that are already part of the Atlantic Alliance?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Sarti, I have never been very fond of these architectural metaphors. You referred to a pillar, but everybody knows that there are many pillars “in my father's house”.

Mr. Chirac (continued)

That said, we are unquestionably an essential and important part of the Atlantic Alliance. The rest is a matter of how one assesses or phrases it.

However, I have already said that I am in favour of enlargement. True, one can argue about the enlargement of the European idea itself or about the right time for it. One can debate whether it would not be better to strengthen Europe in-depth before enlarging it, which would unquestionably be to the detriment of that greater depth. These are two different paths. You have to be a realist in politics.

The situation we have is that of an enlarged Europe, so I can hardly see how we could discuss our security problems for very long in the absence of Spain, for example. We have the same difficulties, the country is our neighbour, part of the European Community. What I say about Spain also applies to Portugal.

I am therefore in favour of enlarging Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Prime Minister, I know that your time is precious. With your agreement, a representative will ask the last question, but before giving him the floor I would like to read out the names of representatives who wanted to ask questions but have not been able to: Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Berger, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Hardy and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges. I am really very sorry for them but, as was said a moment ago, we will transmit their questions to the Prime Minister.

I therefore call the last speaker, Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – Having regard to the ministerial decision at Venice to ensure the widest possible co-ordination against terrorism, does the Prime Minister consider that concerted and strong retaliation by all Western European countries is necessary when the involvement of the governments of some countries in terrorist acts in Western Europe is proved? You will realise that I have in mind, among others, the wicked conduct of Syria. If we are not to get unity in Western Europe against this modern evil, how shall we ever defeat it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Prime Minister.

Mr. CHIRAC (*Prime Minister of France*) (Translation). – It is certainly true that the defence of our European values requires that we all share the same resolve. That presupposes a specifically European appraisal of the facts and a European consensus of concerns regarding what

Europe should do in certain parts of the world.

I think the European Economic Community had no difficulty in reaching a common position on this subject at the last meeting at which these problems were discussed by the ministers for foreign affairs and I can tell you that, so far as I know, it will have no difficulty in confirming that agreement and that reasonable and meaningful solidarity very clearly when the next European summit is held in London on Friday and Saturday next.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Prime Minister for giving us so much of your time. As you see we would have liked to have gone on talking with you for much longer. I would like to thank you again for the honour you have done us and I hope the work of the Assembly and the Council will ultimately make WEU reactivation a reality in the eyes of the public.

Thank you once again, Prime Minister.

I now propose to suspend the sitting for a few moments.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 4.55 p.m.)

5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

*(Resumed debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee and vote
on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1078
and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1078 and amendment.

I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after the numerous statements prompted this morning and afternoon by Mr. Bianco's report and particularly after the very detailed address we had from the Chairman of the Council and the questions and answers that followed there is little left for me to add about this document which is excellent in itself. This is particularly true after this morning's Presidential Committee paper and yesterday's address by the President of the Assembly and his memorandum

Mr. Linster (continued)

which have to be seen in close relation to the reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council.

The point is that this reply reviews the period covered by the thirty-first annual report, namely the first half of 1986. With the very tangible progress that has been achieved in recent months and which everyone with President Caro leading has welcomed, it is interesting to note in the present context how relevant most of the recommendations proposed by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee still are. I say "most" intentionally because it seems to me, particularly after the informal meeting in Luxembourg to which Mr. Amadei and the other speakers including yourself, Mr. President, have made frequent and positive reference, that some of the recommendations in Document 1078 although perhaps not completely overtaken by events have lost some of their point, or in other words, have less explosive political resonance than they had immediately after the somewhat disappointing meeting in Venice. To borrow an expression used by Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in today's debate, most of the recommendations preach to ministers who are already converted since the Luxembourg meeting following on the heels of Venice. I refer in particular to the recommendations on budgetary problems but also the recommendation in paragraph 15 on enlargement and, of course, the very first recommendation confirming the Council's intention to implement in full the decisions contained in the Rome declaration. In the meantime we have received not only verbal assurances but also written proposals from the Council which clearly contain the same message.

A series of more technical recommendations relate in particular to the form, nature and quality of the information given by the Council to the Assembly. On this point much more progress is still needed. The same applies to the rôle of the agencies and the information on their activities which our Assembly ought to be able to receive in a different manner.

With the Rapporteurs of the General Affairs Committee, therefore, I appeal to the Council to show the same positive good will in those two fields in the future as that which it has begun to display under the Luxembourg chairmanship as regards budgetary problems and, above all, the more political issues.

Mr. President, whilst paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation proper emphasises that the explanatory memorandum cannot be dissociated from the recommendation, I would like to make it clear that I shall be voting for the recommendation as such, bearing in

mind the comments I have just made, but distancing myself from some of the views expressed in Mr. Bianco's explanatory memorandum and in particular the need to make use of military resources to deal with the threat of international terrorism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – In view of the time and having already expressed my views at our last session on the problems related to the reactivation of Western European Union I shall confine myself to stressing the few positive points that have come up since then, although they must not allow us to forget everything that remains to be done.

In particular I would like to speak on a point raised by Mr. Bianco on several occasions in his report and which Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, has raised in this Assembly, namely, the possibility of setting up a European institute with responsibility for research or studies on defence problems according to the needs of the moment. Underlying these semantic questions there is a problem of definition to start with. The proposal to promote the creation of a European institute for defence research proved impossible to implement. What is important is to set up a research institute and to use what already exists.

The point is that there are already many research institutes that are international in both field and structure. A new one would create a danger of competition and would be seen in that light by those that already exist. In addition, the financing and joint financing problems that would arise would cause harm to these existing organisations and institutes. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a state-type organisation having authority over a research institute of the university type which is generally only able to function in complete and total freedom.

In reply to the question I put to him in Luxembourg, the Secretary-General told us that he was going to ask the directors of research institutes to meet and consider possible forms of co-operation. This initiative is certainly to be welcomed but I do not think it will get us very far.

What our Assembly has several times called for is co-ordination of the work of the existing research institutes whose rôle is to advise people with influence in civilian and political life on what is required for an effective defence policy. May I remind you that our country, France, has particularly wide and successful experience in this field. The Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, whose fiftieth anniversary France is celebrating at the moment, was set up to propagate the spirit of defence. One of its

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

characteristics is that it brings together in intensive courses members of the armed forces, government officials, heads of associations and, more recently, parliamentarians and industrialists and others working in the private sector. It has developed new teaching methods and the former students association is helping considerably to disseminate the spirit of defence in our society.

Recent history has shown that this is useful and I have to say that French society is one of the most consistent in its attitude on the subject. There are, of course, similar institutes in other countries even though their working methods and teaching techniques are not the same which is perfectly understandable.

There can be no question at the moment of setting up a European institute for defence research but what is possible and realistic is to use existing institutes and organise European courses in the national establishments. Information about several projects of this kind has been published in recent years, in particular in the magazine *Défense Nationale*.

Yesterday, Mr. Cahen told us that, on 13th November last, France proposed in Luxembourg that trainees from our seven countries should be invited to a course at the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in 1988. This suggestion deserves the encouragement of our Assembly and should be followed by others.

If there is to be continuity and balance, some organisation will need to co-ordinate these exchanges. Why not instruct a WEU agency to take this on? The Assembly's recommendations to that end have remained a dead letter up to now. This is only to be regretted and explains why I have brought the matter up again, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, allow me to return to the point being discussed in this Assembly a few moments ago on the problem of strengthening Europe's position in the alliance.

The fact is that today there are many who agree in saying that an era of the alliance is coming to an end. Political and technical change in the developed world require that we rethink the forms of our solidarity in the Atlantic framework.

Twenty years ago, President Kennedy was already proposing that the Atlantic Alliance should be restructured on the basis of two pillars – one European and the other American.

"It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against the fragmentation of our alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda."

The two defence concepts that, for thirty years, have been the intellectual framework of the alliance's defence policy – "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" – were fashioned in the United States and this is natural, after all, because one pivots on that country's strategic forces and the other on its tactical nuclear resources. It was at this time that the era of the superpowers began as one of the results of scientific and technological advances. Lacking unity, Europe was unable to qualify in this race of the giants. They say you must not change horses in midstream and so we have to work with what we have and use it to meet our most pressing needs. In that connection, it is relevant that WEU, while not perfect, will have to be the "legal pillar" supporting the enlarged defence edifice. But the problem is not one of structures but of whether or not we have the will to use those that exist for the right purposes.

This is where we are faced with the realisation that there has to be a communicating passage between the two alliance systems.

The two treaties – the Washington Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty – have the same central theme, the "assistance procedure". But far from overlapping on the same question, the two, on the contrary, are complementary, creating an interpenetration between the two alliances for a specific geo-strategic area: Europe.

The biggest differences between the two texts lie in the mechanism by which government commitments are guaranteed. To begin with, the extent of the response is wider in Article V of the WEU treaty because assistance under its terms embraces everything – military and other means. But, as Walter Schutze has pointed out, as long as this group is not in a position to have a military structure capable of translating that assistance commitment into effective reality, the power of WEU is an illusion. That is why the reactivation of the Council as a true intergovernmental executive is really essential to give any value to the application of this article.

Second, there is the problem of the automatic nature of the response. In the WEU framework the statement that assistance is automatic – which is the case – means that once the aggression is confirmed the other states have no power of judgment about the necessity for response.

Nevertheless, the paramount problem remains that of the confirmation and qualification of the aggression. If it is the state attacked that is

Mr. Fourré (continued)

responsible for determining whether there is aggression or not and if that binds the other states then assistance is effectively automatic. But if, on the contrary, it is claimed that this finding does not bind the country's partners or that qualifying the aggression as such is a decision for all the WEU members, then in that case the mechanism is not really automatic and the link that binds the WEU Seven together is not much stronger than that uniting the NATO Sixteen. The wording of Article V of the Brussels Treaty is not sufficient of itself to settle this issue.

The assistance procedure is just as different in the military resources available for the purpose as in its application.

The characteristic feature of NATO is its system of military integration among the states belonging to the alliance, and the real interdependence among them that it institutes. Under the Brussels Treaty, each state retains the potential of its own defence resources. WEU therefore offers a framework within which individual independence, solidarity and equality are all respected which is why I feel that this kind of defence system, first, is a better solution for Europe in search of its own identity in order to safeguard its own security whilst preserving a large measure of sovereignty over its defence resources and, second, also preserves an adequate framework for the building of a European pillar in the Atlantic defence system.

It was in that light that General de Gaulle seemed to see things when he said in 1954:

"The agreements signed in London and Paris are of themselves far preferable. For whilst they offer a basis for the joint defence of the free nations of Europe, including Great Britain and Germany, they allow France, in principle, an army, a presence and an action outside that Europe."

The reactivation of WEU would provide the European partners with a vehicle for expression within the Atlantic treaty and would improve the balance of the Atlantic system in the eyes of the European public. Countries like Spain, for example, might want to secure their defence through an alliance but without, for all that, joining an integrated system. WEU could offer that possibility and in that way these countries, like France, could create separate relationships on either side of the Atlantic.

In the relationships to be established and the agreements to be entered into between the two sides of the Atlantic, the word must be co-operation, not dependence.

In the name of effective western defence, WEU cannot accept that this defence be wholly subject

to NATO which alone ensures United States participation in the defence of Europe and gives Western Europe the benefit of the deterrent value of American strategic nuclear weapons.

It is therefore essential to develop an effective instrument for concerted action but, as President Mitterrand has pointed out, it would be absurd "to put another alliance in the place of the Atlantic Alliance, that would be meaningless".

There are several reasons why WEU may qualify as a forum where the European partners can discuss problems concerning the security of their countries whilst retaining privileged relations with NATO. By harmonising their positions, the European countries can bring an end to any dissymmetry within the alliance by preparing a European alternative should the American commitment fail to be fulfilled. Clearly just saying that the reactivation of WEU will contribute to the cohesion of the alliance is not enough for this to be so. It has to be seen in this way by all the members of the alliance.

In the end, the eagerness to see a reactivated WEU has given it an "Arlésienne" look – European style. Having never, unfortunately, managed to get beyond the stage of wishful thinking, the statements of intent soon wearied the well-informed. Through so greatly wanting its renaissance, many hopes have faded and the enthusiastic have become increasingly rare.

It is no surprise that twenty years after WEU was set up there should be plenty of voices to say it should be brought to an end.

WEU should be a place where the countries of Western Europe can discuss European arms policies with the object one day of arriving at the principle of European security because there is no European defence apart from the alliance.

Industrial interests are too diverse and conflicting. On the other hand it is desirable that common priorities and converging options be expressed among Europeans through WEU, since there can be no sound joint policy without close co-operation on armaments.

But this co-operation on armaments would be an asset for the security of Europe and if that is so, then the notion of "defence-mindedness" is no less important.

But any talk of problems of "strategy" and all that they imply economically and geographically leads at once to the realisation that there is, at the moment, no appropriate forum for doing so.

Except by thinking up an "acceptable, slow and gradual solution so that no one should feel there is any threat to his existence or security ... in other words by giving WEU the second wind it needs to overcome the obstacles facing us

Mr. Fourré (continued)

today and by preparing for ... the self-assertion of a Europe that is master of its own security”.

The approach here is that by calling for co-operation in armaments a strategic plan will be fashioned out of the defence needs of each of the states concerned.

We would then have taken a great step forward together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when we read Mr. Bianco's report, we are struck by developments in two spheres: on the one hand, relations between the two super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the other, relations between the United States and the European allies. The development in relations between the United States and the European allies is of crucial importance to European security, as Prime Minister Chirac's statement this afternoon has also made clear.

The Reykjavik meeting also lent particular emphasis to this point. Matters essential to European security were discussed there without Europe being involved or consulted beforehand. If decisions had resulted from the American proposals in Reykjavik, there would have been a de-linking of European and American security. That is exactly why Europe must pay more attention than before to its own security situation and its strategic relationship with the United States. Our premise is that this should take place within the framework of the alliance. To this end, the European countries must co-operate more closely in military matters, which will require a greater effort in terms of both manpower and equipment, with all its budgetary implications, where conventional armaments are concerned. Only then can the influence of the European partners in the alliance become more substantial, based as it will be on military strength.

We agree with Helmut Schmidt when he says that the Europeanisation of defence will be based primarily on military co-operation between France and the Federal Republic. But it must not stop at that. Effective contributions from the other European countries will also be very important. Western European Union is, in our view, the most suitable body for devising a common security concept for Europe, simply because French involvement is guaranteed. Prime Minister Chirac has referred this afternoon to France's desire to develop a European security policy together with the other European countries in Western European Union. We very much welcome this explicit statement.

The reactivation of Western European Union is therefore badly needed, but it must not be accompanied by fragmentation into smaller forums of countries. We therefore support the recommendation in Mr. Bianco's report that the working group on security in Europe should be integrated into Western European Union. This working group on security was set up by France, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom and joined by Italy later, at the Bonn meeting. So this working group must be given a status within Western European Union so that the other member states may also be involved. I hope the Chairman of the Council is working to this end.

We are very satisfied with the meeting in Luxembourg of the foreign and defence ministers of the member countries of Western European Union. This meeting is a sign that a European security policy is needed, following Reykjavik. Above all, we agree with the outcome of this meeting, with the decision that the defence ministers should henceforth be more closely involved in the Council's activities. We also support the idea of a new political committee consisting of the political directors of the foreign and defence ministries.

All these new activities undertaken by Western European Union can contribute to the establishment of a common European defence policy. Only then will there be a better balance in NATO between the United States and the European allies. I need hardly say that we support Mr. Bianco's excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I will begin by complimenting Mr. Bianco once again on his excellent report and recalling that, when making our preparations in the General Affairs Committee, we had a good and very harmonious discussion on the main lines of this report. I am sure Mr. Bianco will well remember the harmony in which these committee discussions took place, leading eventually to this excellent report.

Since the report was drawn up there have of course been a number of developments which could not be taken into account. But I wonder if this meeting of the Assembly is the right place and time to go so far as to hang out the national or international flag. I am still inclined to be wary until we see in black and white in the documents whom we shall be getting from the Council of Ministers. It is in fact quite clear today that the unease which was and still is apparent in the Assembly following the Rome declaration on reactivation has certainly not diminished. On the contrary. I will very briefly discuss the causes, because I have heard during today's debate that not enough has been said

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

about why we so welcomed the ministers' proposal that WEU should be reactivated.

The point at issue was European political co-operation, which could not assume proper form and substance in the European Community of the Ten and later the Twelve, so that in the extremely important area of security it was necessary to look for another forum – not the kind of forum the ministers deemed Western European Union to be. Very well, but as long as the situation in the European Community is that European political co-operation cannot assume proper form and substance for reasons known to the rapporteurs and the Assembly, WEU will have to be used for this purpose. I should like to emphasise that we cannot simply allow the brakes to be put on this development again in two years' time, which is obviously what we are afraid of at the moment.

The French Prime Minister did not want to use the term "European pillar", and I shall not do so either. But we do urgently need to make it clear within the North Atlantic Treaty, a treaty which we regard as indivisible, that Europe intends to act as a loyal partner in the alliance. It must therefore be possible for a certain element of community to appear in Europe's security policy.

The whole idea behind reactivation, greeted with so much enthusiasm at the time, seems to have come to a dead end in some ways. When I ask myself why this is, there can be only one answer: as I said in committee, the real problem is that the Council of Ministers does not have enough political will. I do not want to link this directly to the budgetary situation facing the organisation, distressing though it may be. But what I will say today is that political will may not be translated into money, although I find that budgetary problems are often used to camouflage a lack of political will.

Mr. President, reference has been made today to Luxembourg and to Reykjavik. As a direct result of the fact that the superpowers almost reached agreement in Reykjavik, I feel that the need for a Europe that can speak with one voice has only been increased, if it is really to influence the factors that are of such crucial importance to the preservation of peace in the world.

I just want to make one remark about the question of enlargement. I want to draw a distinction here. I believe it is clear, given the developments there and the veiled assurances from the Council of Ministers respecting Portugal, that priority must be given to Portugal. I would also refer in this context to the statements made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers this morning in this Assembly and conclude that Por-

tugal is now entitled to a very clear and early answer.

As for other countries that might accede to Western European Union, I must point out that you would have to look a long way to find unanimity in the Council of Ministers. In fact, there is no unanimity. A few months ago we visited Copenhagen. I must say that there was no sign of any enthusiasm from Denmark on the part of either the ministers or parliament about acceding to Western European Union during our visit. I think the Rapporteur will agree with me.

My position is this. In the light of what still has to be done to reactivate Western European Union, we would be wise to keep up the pressure on the ministers and to place rather less emphasis on enlargement until the time comes when reactivation has been completed or is at least well under way.

Mr. President, let us hope the ministers will see rather more reason for reactivation and show rather more political will for it than they have in the last two years. In view of the major problems which Europe and the world have on their plates today, problems such as arms control, SDI and disarmament, we shall then be able to achieve results more quickly. I believe that is the line we must follow; though again, Portugal excepted.

Mr. President, I have almost finished. Mr. Bianco's report raises many questions. The committee has consciously endorsed the Rapporteur's questions. That is also why the very first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation refers to the report itself. I sincerely hope that the Council of Ministers will actually answer these questions, so that the enthusiasm for the reactivation of Western European Union that was aroused in Rome in October 1984 will also be kept alive and reaffirmed in the Assembly in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Secretary of State, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Bianco's reports are never short on authority and warmth, both in direct proportion to the discretion of our Italian colleague.

I shall speak on three points: WEU and security, WEU and the non-member countries and WEU and the media.

With regard to security, terrorism has become a kind of dangerous armed politics. Alone or in co-operation with other European organisations, WEU can and must help in the fight against "God's madmen", "Action Directe", the "Red Brigades" and other terrorist groups that are so difficult to hunt down.

Mr. Burger (continued)

Every terrorist attack causes grief, revulsion and sometimes bereavement and it is difficult to find the ideal answer which can, in all cases, only be the result of European co-operation at all levels. To make concessions to terrorists is to underestimate the real nature of the danger but a great deal of experience is necessary to cope with widely differing situations and to be able to make the choice between rational negotiation and armed intervention. Everywhere, the hostages problem has been a human tragedy for the countries affected, primarily the United States, Israel, Germany, Italy and France.

For the moment, France is the country most affected and needs the co-operation of all its allies – our only strength is in unity.

With regard to relations between WEU and the non-member countries it has to be recognised that some countries in Europe which are not members of WEU have played or are playing a part in European security. Sweden is one example.

Sweden is a neutral country but is subject to repeated incursions by Soviet submarines spying on its coastal defences and communications systems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Burger, may Sir Paul Hawkins interrupt you?

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – By all means!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins with the permission of the speaker.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I draw attention to a television programme that is taking place in our midst. I do not believe that that is correct behaviour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please carry on, Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Sweden's defence budget, neglected for years, has now gone up substantially to cover anti-submarine measures. We were told that, in 1984, six Polish youths claiming to be students went round Sweden knocking on doors to sell pictures by contemporary Polish artists, but not anybody's door, only those where Swedish air force pilots lived.

We were also told that hundreds of military uniforms have been stolen in Sweden over the last few years which suggests that they are now in the USSR and will be used for fifth column units.

On this evidence one has to question whether, after all, the Russians really want peace or whether they are playing poker with the Americans and their allies.

Though President Reagan may be in rough water at the moment I still approve his negotiating tactics: the only valid policy with Moscow is to be firm.

So, WEU has to make an effort to speak with a single voice though this is not always easy. We have to have a uniform viewpoint and the rest of the world has to be able to count first on European solidarity and secondly on that of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Lastly, as regards relations between WEU and the media, I am certain that the reactivation of the union – and here I support what Mr. Bassinet has just said – will not be possible without effective help from the media – the press, radio and television. Our organisation must be recognised by the public.

Some sections of the press, incidentally, seem to attach more importance to Mr. Gorbachev's words than to what Mr. Reagan says. The impression is sometimes that the Russians want peace and the Americans want war. In fact, peace needs many things as well as arms, foremost amongst them being respect for freedom and human rights throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this means that I have the honour of being the last speaker in this debate. I put my name down to speak and I wish to do so for two basic reasons.

This first is that Mr. Bianco, the Rapporteur, has done a really remarkable job. In a way, he has done what an examining magistrate would do in a criminal investigation, separating the lies from the truth, identifying the limits to certain responses and the hollow features of the promises too freely made and analysing the reality of the Rome declaration. As is so often said, words are forgotten but actions live on.

Currently, we are in a situation of reduced resources, a marking-time situation that I feel to be unacceptable. There are many things to be done and reforms to be made, because the situation is becoming more difficult every day. Mr. Bianco made this point very well.

That is why, instead of speaking to this report and reading a speech written in Rome beforehand – my colleagues who do so nevertheless have my respect – I prefer to speak unrehearsed because I feel that what I have to say is part of a real dialogue and part of the exchange of ideas that should take place in this chamber.

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

I am therefore very happy to be the last to speak because in that way I can take account of what the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, said, not contradicting what I have just said about words being forgotten and actions living on but for another fundamental reason.

Historically, the founding of our organisation was the reaction to the let-down after the abortive attempt to create a European defence community. It was in Paris that this failed and that is where the club of the Seven reacted, using an existing treaty as a basis for European integration.

With Europeans and governments in disarray in this very difficult situation we thought that something had to be done so that Germany and Italy were not left out of this urgent, complex, necessary and inevitable defence task. Western European Union was the starting point towards that goal. In the bad times, our ancestors called on the Lord and sought to know his ways. I think that, at a particular moment, the ways of the Lord linked a very serious situation, as revealed at Reykjavik, to a highly uncertain and perhaps dangerous situation in the East-West dialogue and sent the new use of the Western European Union treaty off course.

When we met in Rome and adopted the so-called Rome declaration we were on positive ground and agreed that we had to use an existing organisation for Europe's defence and security. Now we are going to use the organisation to deal with a situation like that of the emperor with no clothes. We could have gone for the zero option that we invented ourselves as Europeans in a situation that was leading us to the edge of the abyss in terms of defence and security.

We all want disarmament. We all want peace. On that subject there is nothing further to be said. But what matters to us is that if peace depends on defence and defence on security then we have to consider what to do about the situation as it now is.

For us Europeans, therefore, a major commitment on defence resources is an urgent need. Mr. Chirac's address today states the French position. The truth is that the next step forward has always depended on France's attitude. We all know that Europe cannot be built without France and, without question, the stop-go signals have always depended on France. Direct elections to the European Parliament were a French decision. Considerable efforts had been made before but direct universal suffrage was not effective until President Giscard d'Estaing decided to call upon Europeans to adopt it.

We read the text of the Prime Minister of the French Republic's address with as critical an eye

as possible but its salient message is that Europe needs an institution ensuring permanent contact with public opinion on these problems. Without defence-mindedness in Europe there can be no serious attempt to build that defence.

Mr. Chirac also pointed out that European integration has been achieved in the economic area but not in defence nor, therefore, in security. The reason for the concern of those who feel absolutely that there has to be a united states of Europe is the fact that, for years, defence and security problems were more or less taboo and left exclusively to the Atlantic Alliance. The lofty minds sensitive to the cause of peace would never discuss them but peace is achieved by performing our duty to defence. If there is no defence there are no states. If that duty is not performed we are nothing but traitors to the countries we represent and the nations we have to govern.

Mr. Chirac referred to the hopes and misgivings that followed the Reykjavik meeting. At this time of hope and anxiety we have, it seems to me, Mr. President, had an answer to your call. You have sent out several reminders of this need in the name of our Assembly and we have had a response. It has been in words, admittedly, but there has also been a gesture and attendance at very high level the impact of which on public opinion will be positive. We should register this and strengthen our resolve.

Protests are important and I agree with the case made by Mr. Bianco for this Assembly vis-à-vis the Council. We must draw the relevant conclusions from that analysis. We are on the way to revival and today we should use this historical opportunity presented to the Assembly of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Mr. Cifarelli, you were the last member down to speak in this debate. In you I salute the perfect European militant, present as you have been in every debate on Europe since the war and I thank you again for your contribution to our discussions.

The debate is closed.

Before asking the Rapporteur to reply to the speakers I would like to tell you how I propose we should proceed for the rest of the day.

You know how the various reports stand. I would have no objection to the Assembly voting on Mr. Bianco's report to which there is only one amendment immediately after his reply.

Following that vote we would, as scheduled, consider the report on the Mediterranean presented by Mr. Kittelmann to which there are no amendments but on which I have decided to give the floor to one of our colleagues present here

The President (continued)

who could not, for material reasons, be called to speak yesterday afternoon.

Next I shall call the four speakers whose names are down for the resumed debate on the three budgetary reports presented by Sir Dudley Smith, who will, of course, reply to the speakers.

If we keep to our time schedule we shall also be able to vote on the proposal of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs.

Only after these three items of business have been despatched shall I call Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to start one of the major political debates of this session. He will be followed, of course, by the members down to speak up to 7.30 p.m. at the latest, and the debate will be continued tomorrow morning.

I would like to tell the Assembly that, because of the decision that has been taken, there will be no voting after 6.30 p.m., as the Rules of Procedure lay down, but those down to speak will continue to have the floor.

As far as I am concerned, as President, I shall consult as required so that I can propose to you an order of business for tomorrow morning having regard to our heavy workload, the number of speakers down to debate Mr. Amadei's report and the number of amendments. We have the noteworthy privilege of a minister's attendance at our discussions in the person of Secretary of State Mr. Goebbels, representing the Chairman of the Council. We have two other ministers as well to address us tomorrow and we shall organise our proceedings as best we can in view of that fact.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. As you know, I have some sympathy with you because of the appalling complexity of the situation that now faces the Assembly. It is worse than I expected when I referred yesterday to the proliferation of visiting speakers. We are becoming like vaudeville or the circus as a result of that appalling confusion.

I am deeply worried about tomorrow's programme. We gather at 9.30 a.m., a minister is coming at 10 a.m., another is coming at 11 a.m. and half an hour after we resume at 3 p.m. another minister is coming. Regardless of the view that we take of Mr. Amadei's report, the debate is fundamental – it is the most important debate of the week, perhaps of the year. For that report to be interrupted as frequently as it will be is scarcely fair. It is scarcely fair that Mr. Amadei will present his report this evening when many

members may have taken the broad hint that you gave, Mr. President, that there will not be any votes after 6.30 p.m.

I find the whole thing confusing. The WEU Assembly will be reduced to sheer farce and vaudeville if we carry on like that. Our experience now will lead the Presidential Committee and the Assembly to look carefully at how we conduct our business.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, let us not get our rôles mixed. The President is there to listen to the views of you all but also to perform his duty and make proposals to you about the work of the Assembly. At the moment we are merely applying the decisions taken and there has been strictly no change. I therefore mean to go on with the proceedings in the way the Assembly has itself decided. I shall later inform you of my proposals for tomorrow.

So far, you can see, in spite of my difficulties in organising this session, I have done my best not to restrict the right to speak or the speaking time of any parliamentarian wishing to take the floor, apart from constraints imposed on time-tables by the ministers who wish to address us.

That being so, I shall, as President, make sure the rights of parliament are respected. I do not, for the moment, intend to open a debate on the order of business. We will see what we can do once the time for voting has passed. Please do not complicate my task with points of order. You have my assurance that the problem will be discussed tomorrow morning when the sitting is opened.

Mr. Amadei, I am happy to call you because you are a rapporteur.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Cox, I have called Mr. Amadei.

(*The President continued in English*)

I will call you, Mr. Cox, but I ask you to avoid starting a new debate with points of order. My task is complicated by the situation. Please help me.

I call Mr. Amadei.

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully realise that the way in which our work is proceeding is none of your fault or responsibility. I am not making a point of order but merely pointing out that I should have spoken today at 3 p.m. and that the vote on my report was scheduled for this evening.

My concern and misgivings, Mr. President, stem from the fact that the whole of the Assembly, majority or minority and those who

Mr. Amadei (continued)

will be voting for as well as those voting against, consider the report on disarmament to be important, certainly one of the most important on the order of business for today.

In addition, Mr. President, because of commitments that cannot be postponed in the Italian Parliament – there is a vote of confidence tomorrow – I shall not be able to be here and therefore I do not see how we can conclude this debate which is, I repeat, considered important by everyone.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. May I assure you that many members of the Assembly appreciate the impossibility of your task on many occasions? We genuinely try to help you. You have a difficult job, but I believe that as parliamentarians we have a right to bring to your attention the fact that in a limited session of barely four days – really three days – already this week we have had four outside speakers, and four are due to speak tomorrow.

I know that you are not in a position to make the decision, Mr. President, but you can recommend that not so many speakers should come to the Assembly. This is a parliamentary assembly, not a showcase for European politicians to come here and speak. Such a recommendation would help.

In the Council of Europe in Strasbourg there is a fair indication of when the list of speakers is to close. A similar procedure here would be helpful.

As Mr. Amadei himself has shown, he is in an appalling position tomorrow, when he has firm commitments in his own parliament. Whatever our views may be on his report, it will be a major debate. Unfortunately, we shall not be able to do justice to it. I am making a genuine effort to help you, Mr. President, as I am sure all members of the Assembly try to help you in view of the difficulty of your task. Are you prepared to back what I think would be the overwhelming desire on the part of the Assembly not to have so many outside speakers and to try to keep to a timetable? In that way we could avoid some of the problems that we shall face tomorrow. How can we have a major debate on an important subject when the Rapporteur is not here?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have a very simple reply to my colleagues who have spoken on this point which goes back to a matter we discussed at the opening of the session. I then undertook, and the Assembly agreed, to review the whole problem of the session having regard

to the large amount of time that would be taken up by ministerial speeches. On both sides there are views for and against in line with the intentions both of the Council and of the Assembly. It is the Presidential Committee's task to review everything and take the necessary steps in agreement with the Council.

My second point is this. The reason I made my proposal a minute ago, and I apologise to Mr. Amadei, is that, in the light of the information I have in my files on the nature of the amendments and the number of speakers, it seemed to me quite obvious that we could not get through to voting on Mr. Amadei's report this afternoon. I have over twenty-five names down to speak – over twenty-five! I thought, therefore, that it would best serve the interests of the Assembly to finish, if we could, with the three reports that we have to vote upon and which do not, on the face of it, present any political problems. I shall ask Mr. Amadei to speak at the end of the debate so that he can at least present his report today in accordance with the order of business.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I ask to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – No more points of order, please.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I intend to save the Assembly time by making my address very, very brief.

First, I wish to thank the seventeen speakers in the debate, each of whom has made an effective and valuable contribution from personal experience, strengthening so to speak the points made in the report itself.

I would also like to stress how much was common to what they had to say. They were all inspired by the desire to reactivate our organisation for which, Mr. President, over and above the complex procedural questions, I feel that today has been a day of vital importance.

The statements that have been made, the views expressed by all our colleagues of the problems involved, the requests that have been put and, more generally, the more fruitful dialogue now established between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly all add up to a point of vital importance that has to be entered, in my view, on the assets side of the activities of our Assembly.

Lastly, I would draw your attention to the fact that, at long last, the press – an instrument tuned with particular sensitivity to the actions of the international organisations – is beginning to pay considerable attention to our organisation, an indicator of its importance and weight.

Mr. Bianco (continued)

These are points that we have to count as well worthwhile.

I shall not deal with the questions put by speakers individually. They expressed their agreement and I thank them for doing so. At this point I simply want to stress that the decisive political event of this debate will be what I hope to be the unanimous vote in favour of the report.

To conclude I would like to ask the representatives in the Assembly to pass on the conclusions of our debate in their parliaments and I would add that my request, in a special amendment that I hope will be approved, that there should be a single voice when the seven countries of our organisation meet their American partner is an important and vital matter needing the support of your votes here and the pressures that every parliamentarian can bring to bear in his own country.

I conclude by thanking the Assembly for its support and you, Mr. President, the Secretariat-General and the Chairman of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation on the activities of the Council as set out in its thirty-first report.

I have Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco, which reads as follows:

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the Reykjavik meeting;”

Mr. Bianco, do you wish to move your amendment?...

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1078, as amended.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case, The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation, as amended, is adopted unanimously¹.

6. European security and the Mediterranean

(Vote on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1073)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the revised draft recommendation on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1073.

Before that, however, I call Mr. Katsaros, as I undertook to because he was unable to speak before.

Mr. KATSAROS (*Observer from Greece*). – Thank you for allowing me to make a short speech, Mr. President.

I also congratulate Mr. Kittelmann on his hard work on this report. However, it says that in January 1986 the Greek Deputy Minister of Defence was reported as saying that Greece was to deploy a new defence system along its borders, particularly in the Aegean Sea, involving 600 000 men, as a purely preventive measure. That number is completely unrealistic as Greece could never keep such a great number of soldiers. Greece has recently reduced the duration of military service and we now have an even smaller army than is reported. Indeed, during her long history Greece has never had such a tremendously large army.

I must respond to Mr. Inan by saying that it is Turkey, not Greece, that does not help to solve the Cyprus matter. If Turkey intended to solve the problem, she should have withdrawn her forces from the island immediately, in line with decisions made by the United Nations. It is deplorable that Turkey keeps Greek and Greek Cypriot soldiers prisoner and refuses to give the slightest information about them.

Mr. Inan spoke of Greek claims on the Aegean shelf. Greece does not claim anything more than she has established from international contracts. Greece demands nothing but she is going to give nothing. That is a clear and honest position. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for making your statement so brief in the interests of the Assembly.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 1073.

Are there five members who request a vote by roll-call?...

¹ See page 22.

The President (continued)

That is not the case. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We have thus concluded our consideration of Mr. Kittelmann's report. Our thanks and congratulations to both him and the committee.

7. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

(Revised report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1075 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the revised report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1075 and amendments.

I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – A moment ago I wanted to relieve some of the tension that had built up in the Assembly and I would like to say immediately that the presence of various ministers and of Prime Minister Chirac, in particular, is important because the political image of the Assembly is not determined solely by speeches and points of order but also by the people that attend the Assembly, which is not a club but a very popular forum that you, Mr. President, represent with great authority. We welcome everyone, therefore, who wants to speak to us.

I wanted to make a proposal regarding Mr. Amadei's report that would release him from his duties in our Assembly and send him back to Italy and restore him to the Italian Chamber of Deputies for his commitments which cannot be put off. With twenty-five members down to speak and twenty amendments already tabled, Mr. President, we really have to look into so important and meaningful a document, prepared as it has been with great enthusiasm and meriting the recognition of this Assembly in the form of careful scrutiny at so critical a moment of international affairs. I believe this report to mark the first step, the first stirrings after the conference in Iceland. I therefore formally propose to the President and the Assembly that it be referred back to the committee so that the amendments can be considered there and better

preparations made for another session in the light of the results that Mr. Amadei has already obtained and which we value.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Sinesio, is this a formal proposal under the Rules of Procedure for reference back to the committee?...

Mr. Sinesio tells me it is and therefore, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, this request for reference back takes priority over the debate in progress. This being so I must rule the proposal to be in order and, under Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure, only the proposer of the motion, one speaker against and the rapporteur or the chairman of the committee concerned are entitled to speak.

Is there anyone who wishes to speak against Mr. Sinesio's proposal?...

I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – We are in considerable difficulty over this report – that I accept. There will be quite a number of delegates listed to speak tomorrow who, unless matters change rapidly tomorrow – and that rests very much with you, Mr. President, and the Bureau – will have some difficulty in participating in this debate when it takes off fully during the course of the next day or two, because we have other duties. So I do not speak as one who has the certainty of participating in that debate, although I have my name down to speak. But I wish to object to any referral back to the committee today in this session. I will try to avoid any comment on the nature of the report for I do not consider that that would be right but in my view this is the most substantial report on our agenda – with all due respect to other reports and to the ministers who have been before us – reinforced by what has been going on internationally as a background to this report since it was drafted.

For us now to refer it back to the committee so that it does not come before us again until the middle of next year – and that is what it amounts to – would be a negation of our responsibilities. We have spent a lot of time – and this is my last comment in objecting to this move – yesterday and today and no doubt we will be spending more time before we close on Thursday, as we have done at session after session, claiming what a wonderful organisation this Assembly is if only the Council of Ministers would give us the resources. Our behaviour over major political matters as far as our responsibilities as a parliamentary assembly are concerned has been a disgrace to ourselves, for which we should be ashamed, on more than one occasion when we have dodged major political debates for one reason or another.

1. See page 24.

Mr. Freeson (continued)

Now to send back to the committee the most important item that we have before us in this session, the most important against the background of what has been going on, would be another example of the failure of this Assembly to conduct itself properly, of which we have seen too many examples during the three years that I have been a delegate here.

There have been many examples of our refusing to conduct ourselves as a proper debating assembly, reviewing certain defence matters. I strongly object, no matter what our difficulties may be, to sending this issue back to the committee. I hope that you, Mr. President, bearing in mind the general situation, will find some way of ensuring that we have a continuous debate, beginning now and continuing without interruption tomorrow. I hope you will ensure that other matters that might interrupt our proceedings are put back until later in the session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall make my comments after hearing the chairman or rapporteur of the committee concerned in accordance with paragraph 3 of Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Rapporteur I can only regret the fact that this request has been made. But I do not think that after it has already been referred back to the committee once a debate on so important a subject can be postponed any further and put off for another session.

There is another point I would like to make to you, Mr. President, and to the Clerk. It is not possible to discuss Mr. Sinesio's proposal at this time. In my opinion the request is not admissible because Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure lays down that a motion on a point of procedure can only be moved once in the course of a debate and I think that we are not yet into the debate whereas it is only during the debate that a proposal of this kind can be accepted. At this moment, in my view, it is not admissible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Rapporteur, I have consulted the Clerk because the interpretation of Rule 31 was after all connected with this debate. I was advised of previous interpretations of Rule 31 by the President.

It also seemed to me perfectly legitimate that the Rules of Procedure should allow the Assembly to give a quick answer to Mr. Sinesio's question since otherwise I would have had to interpret Mr. Sinesio's proposal as another point of order which would have initiated yet another

debate. Applying Rule 31 enabled me to avoid that and thus save the Assembly's time.

I am therefore going to have to ask the Assembly to vote on Mr. Sinesio's proposal.

In reply to Mr. Sinesio and Mr. Freeson, I would point out that my intention was to propose to you an order of business for tomorrow that would have enabled Mr. Amadei to have as coherent a debate as possible on his report in the light of the difficulties with which we are faced. I was not able to do so because of this request from Mr. Sinesio.

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure the Assembly now has to vote on Mr. Sinesio's proposal for reference back to the committee.

The bell calling the Assembly to vote having been rung and the stipulated five minutes having elapsed, the Assembly can now vote in accordance with the rules.

I now put Mr. Sinesio's motion to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The proposal to refer the report back to the committee is agreed to.

8. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 and the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987, Documents 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addendum.

I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when I presented the committee's report

Mr. Sinesio (continued)

on the budget of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1985 (revised) and 1986 at the last session, I had an opportunity to point out a number of inconsistencies in the present procedures for drafting and approving budgets which, ultimately, could only harm the development of WEU's activity and the clarity and effectiveness of the relations between its organs. As you yourself pointed out in this Assembly yesterday, the vague and evasive replies given by the Council to the recommendations voted by the Assembly in that connection and the rough water that the draft budget for 1987 sailed into in its procedural passage prompt me to go back over a number of essential points that call for careful thought.

The financial policy of the Council hinges on the application of the principle of zero growth. What that principle is exactly and its purpose are not clearly explained but we can however observe its effects. First of all it means that all government contributions are kept constant in real terms. To that end the Budget Committee, which is the Council's financial advisory body, uses the foreseeable trend in consumer prices as a reference growth rate. But experience has amply taught us that this has always been lower than the real rate of inflation, that there are categories of expenditure in the budget whose growth has no connection with the increase in consumer prices but is very much higher, that extraordinary expenditures in a financial year have to be offset by reducing ordinary operational spending and that the cost of meeting new pensions also has to be offset by reducing ordinary operational spending.

It is therefore clear that because of its arbitrary statistical evaluation and the fact that it triggers off automatic internal compensatory mechanisms for all new and major items of expenditure, the zero growth criterion implies a gradual reduction in real terms of resources available for normal operating activities.

Over these last few years, the situation has become particularly untenable for the Assembly. I only have to quote the pensions problem. Up to 1983 the pensions account showed income, represented by the contributions of staff in service, to be in surplus over outgoings for the pensions paid. As of 1984, in other words when the first A grade officials reached the age of retirement and left, the situation was completely reversed. The statistics are eloquent: taking 1983 as index 100 the figure for 1984 was 446 and those for 1986, 1987 and 1988 will be 663, 1 071 and 1 750 respectively. In other words, in the space of the last five years, the pensions account will have increased by a factor of over 17 even allowing for contributions by serving staff.

It is simply absurd to think that the Assembly budget can continue to absorb this very large increase in pensions without serious harm to its activities. What is more, the examples I have quoted, which cannot be challenged, force us to conclude that the application of this zero growth yardstick belies its definition because, in reality, it imposes not zero growth but negative growth.

It seems to me that the time has come to ask the Council to throw out this strange criterion which, as we have seen, has no valid technical justification and, in addition, is all wrong politically. Indeed, if we take the view that the term zero growth conveys the idea of a static state, which means there can be no new initiative, how do we justify its continuance at a time when, following the Rome declaration and above all after Reykjavik, WEU is called upon to play a dynamic rôle in asserting Europe's real identity and making Europe master of its own destiny?

There is another point that also has to be made, I feel. The application of the zero growth criterion has created an unacceptable spirit of competition and unease in the WEU organs for it is clear that in the distribution of the envelope of available resources, competition gives an advantage to those organs which, like the Secretariat-General, have more frequent, direct contact with the Council and with its financial advisory committee. Further proof of this is the repeated refusal to buy a telex for the Assembly whilst the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies are authorised to have a system for the teletransmission of documents. With this discriminatory treatment there has to be a change in the procedure for approving the Assembly's budgets. It is also unacceptable for budget proposals decided jointly by the Presidential Committee and the Budget Committee to be discussed by a committee of government experts, who can have no direct or detailed knowledge of the Assembly's problems, before being submitted to the Assembly itself and the Council for approval. Instead, the financial independence and autonomy of the Assembly would require that once the total has been set for the annual operating budget, the Assembly should have the responsibility for its allocation, obviously subject to respect for the rules of proper administration and subsequent audit.

Mr. President, I realise I have said nothing new compared with last year because certain colleagues, and in particular Mr. de Vries and Mr. van Tets have, when presenting their reports, already dealt with these basic problems in this Assembly in the past. However, the debate on the draft budget for 1987 has given me a chance to sum them all up. That leaves me to remind you that the Assembly, in its awareness of these problems, has already recommended appropriate solutions to the Council.

Mr. Sinesio (continued)

The time is now ripe for a general review of the whole problem. As other speakers have pointed out during this debate, we need to avoid fruitless discussions on organisation or internal procedures in WEU at a time when, instead, it should be demonstrating its potential for dynamic and effective action.

So the first thing is to do away with so-called zero growth. To me it is like a trap that will eventually have this Assembly gasping for air and unable to breathe, politically that is, or speak to Europe with that dignity and political significance that we Europeans always need if we wish to preserve the freedom and democracy we have won.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be brief because I have only time to deal with one point and shall drop the others I wanted to make. I have to say that I have read with great care and approve wholeheartedly the report by Sir Dudley Smith which, incidentally, is on the same lines as Mr. Goerens's report. I am more than ever convinced that the Assembly cannot perform efficiently if budget cuts continue to be made with only one apparent logic, that of reducing the burden on the member states' budgets – which seems strange enough to me given the figures that I shall set out later compared with the total budget. What is at stake? I shall not discuss the merits of the small items, e.g. whether it is useful, whether it was useful, or whether it will be useful to buy a typewriter. I shall certainly not discuss the advantages of having the telex system that ought to be installed and I shall not discuss the need for or possibility of certain journeys by the committees or whether they are useful or not useful and where I rely naturally on the Chairman but above all on the committee which, in its wisdom, will be able to know what is essential or necessary and what is not useful.

There is one figure above all that really impressed me and it is on this figure that the whole argument should hang, I feel, because it implies certain highly important judgments of relative value on which we ought to reflect. I am talking about the grand total for the draft budget for the Assembly organs which, including pensions, comes to 18 410 000 francs. For each of the four biggest nations – France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy – this means total outgoings of 3 682 000 francs for 1987.

Now, the government representatives have proposed a straight cut in this modest sum, to be used mainly for the political operations of our

own administration, of 893 000 francs which, again for each of the four countries, means a saving of 162 785 francs, a sum that is clearly of no value or account because no one will try to tell me that the budget problems of the four countries I have referred to can be cured by saving 162 000 francs.

I also have to observe – with pleasure or bitterness, I do not know which – that this is the lowest-cost parliamentary assembly in the world and I am not talking about the industrialised countries that we all are but the countries of the third and the fourth world. I do not think there is one parliamentary assembly attended by so many parliamentarians of seven different nations that costs such an insignificant, almost derisory, amount. Of course this goes back to all the economies that have been made, firstly those in the staff – a staff that deserves all our praise. I shall make one simple comparison because I think it is essential that we should raise the problem. In WEU there are twenty-seven officials and my comparison is with the operations, number of officials and employees in general working at the Council of Europe of which we are members. There they are eight hundred, not twenty-seven. This kind of imbalance is eloquent testimony to the merits of those who work in WEU. I do not say that the eight hundred employees at the Council of Europe are too many but only that the twenty-seven officials working in WEU are too few. So I take this opportunity to stress the great merits of these officials and also to say to all of you that they are too few and that although they may work miracles they are not able to give our work the full assistance required.

I have finished with my list of figures which I feel to be the most telling part of what I have to say – though I think they impoverish our debate – and I wonder whether it is right for parliamentarians from seven nations to be arguing about 162 000 francs when, instead, we ought to be thinking about quite different questions like world politics and events in Europe.

In my view, if we want to give greater meaning to WEU's activity then we have to have a budget that is less tight than the present strait-jacket, which could well hold back the development we need particularly in this post-Reykjavik period.

For these reasons I shall vote for the report but with certain reservations – also made by various colleagues – on which we need to insist because I do not feel that a situation of this kind can be tolerated any longer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – After the statements by so many of our colleagues I need not repeat how important it is for the

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

Assembly to have a reasonable budget. I can only approve what has been said, namely that the proposals before us are more than unsatisfactory.

In spite of the late hour and the few representatives present I would nevertheless like to raise an important question. I do not understand the proposal made this morning by the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee. To begin with, the 1987 budget was based on the work of experts that we all held to be unacceptable. We threw it out together with the zero growth rate it proposed. The Council of Ministers took the same attitude because, after some pressure and exchanges of view, it decided – in the words of Mr. Cahen's letter of 27th November – "notwithstanding the recommended reductions, to allow the following amounts...". The decision, as the Council pointed out, was equivalent to an increase of under 0.5% not including pensions.

This morning Mr. Poos said that he had taken our request on board but that there was a sizeable obstacle apart from the pensions problem. Speaking as Chairman of the Council of Ministers he said he was ready to discuss things again because we all agreed that the proposals made were not wholly satisfactory. That is why I do not understand the Rapporteur's proposal that the Assembly should approve the budget. We believe that a 2.5% rate of increase at the very least is necessary. Perhaps there is some room for manoeuvre and debate between this figure and the 0.5% decided by the Council of Ministers.

In line with what you said yourself, Mr. President, in your introductory address, would it not be wiser for our Assembly not to vote for the budget but to instruct the Presidential Committee, i.e. the body with authority to speak in our name outside the sessions, to take up the matter again with the Council of Ministers?

Naturally, this would delay the approval of the budget and maybe mean that we would have to exist on the provisional twelfth for a month or two. But I do not see why we should accept this budget which, though we all agree it has been improved from the initial zero growth proposal by what the Council of Ministers has proposed today, still seems to us to be too small.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please allow me to interrupt you, Mr. Bassinet.

I would like the minister to know that I will be asking him to reply to Mr. Bassinet and I thank him for this in advance.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Naturally, it has to be expected that these discussions will not be over by 31st December and the Assembly could, once again, have to carry on for

a month or two on the provisional twelfth. Even so, this procedure would be better for the functioning of our Assembly. I am sorry to be speaking with so few representatives in the house and at so late an hour but if we have to have resounding declarations on the reactivation of WEU, then it is just as necessary for the Assembly to have the resources it needs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I would like to support what Mr. Bassinet has said. I can tell the members present that they can trust the Luxembourg chairmanship to find a reasonable solution – as, moreover, Mr. Poos has already proposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling the Rapporteur, may I ask you, Secretary of State, if you have any comments to make on these last statements?

Mr. GOEBBELS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is not my intention to get involved in the debate on your report, but I can confirm what Mr. Poos, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said here this morning. He pointed out that he had tried to steer the discussion at a recent informal meeting of the ministers for foreign affairs and defence in Luxembourg in the direction that your Assembly would have wished. He tried to suggest an objective, permanent yardstick for your Assembly's future budgets. He proposed that we should use the annual growth rate in the administrative expenditure of all the Community institutions so that there should be no discrimination as compared with the growth rate agreed each year by our budgetary experts in the seven member states for all the estimates for the Community institutions.

He then added that the objective was twofold: "to assimilate WEU with all the Community institutions in accordance with the express provisions of the single European act and to relieve our Permanent Council of the fruitless budgetary discussions we know too well".

I cannot of course enter into any firm and definite undertaking in the name of the Council. The Chairman has promised he would take up this question again at the next meeting of the Council in Luxembourg scheduled for April. But, though the Chairman takes the chair, he does not take the decisions. The effort needed to give our Assembly the means to reactivate has to be made by the member states. I do not know what the result of our negotiations will be but, in any case, I can assure you that the Luxembourg presidency will do everything possible to arrive at this, or some other, objective, durable criterion, so that

Mr. Goebbels (continued)

we may save ourselves these somewhat fruitless discussions in future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to close the debate.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am put in some difficulty by Mr. Goebbels's speech and by the suggestion made by the previous two speakers. This is one of the examples of the futility of the way in which this place is run. We started our debate, which was broken into by a statement. I was told that I had to go outside, so I missed what the Chairman-in-Office of the Council said, although it has been repeated by his colleague. I should have liked an opportunity to discuss the position with officials of the Secretary-General. The last statement that I had before the speech this morning was the letter sent to Mr. Moulias from the Secretary-General last night, which clearly stated the position. Although I do not agree with some of it, it explains what agreement had been reached by the member governments of the Council of Ministers. I assumed that we had to operate along those lines, but now we hear that there is some possibility of an improvement if we get to April. We have heard from the ministers' bench a reiteration of what the Secretary-General said. This is a most peculiar way in which to go on.

The implication is that if we accept Mr. Bassinet's motion, we might well get more money, but we might not. I hazard a guess that we shall not and that we shall sacrifice the good will that we are getting in the better arrangement with the Council of Ministers. We were proposing to bring forward a motion suggesting that the Presidential Committee needed to get the lines fully parallel by the end of three months. I still think that that is the best way forward, but I am in the hands of the Assembly. Only half a dozen members are present, so it would be quite improper to consider taking a vote tonight. I am trying to do the best by the Assembly and to do more than merely sum up the debate.

I see that we have at least two officials here. Perhaps they could pay attention for a moment. Can they advise me which way they and ministers would like us to proceed? To use a colloquial phrase, is the budget still up for grabs? Is it possible that in three months' time they will be able to come forward with a proposal? If so, I would fully support Mr. Bassinet and continue on a monthly basis for the time being. Is this just a pious hope? Must we continue our thorough negotiations as we proposed before the Chairman-in-Office made his speech?

Would the officials from the Secretary-General's office let me know the answer

tomorrow morning, as I assume that we are to take a vote then? On the basis of such advice, we can reach a decision about whether to go Mr. Bassinet's way.

It is pointless summing up. I am grateful for the support that I have received. We need a much more representative Assembly before we can take a decision on this important matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to propose that the vote be postponed until tomorrow morning. At this moment only four representatives are present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There is no vote.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In that case, Mr. President, allow me to make a point regarding the voting on the accounts and the draft budget because these are two different things. The accounts tell us what has happened in the Assembly and the draft budget is a forecast. If we could approve them, then the whole question would be settled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Cifarelli, your vast parliamentary experience says that both we and you are right because there are three votes to be taken one after the other. But we decided there would be no voting after 6.30 p.m. and so whatever the nature of the documents we have to vote on we cannot do so until tomorrow as the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs has just reminded us. The order of business has the votes on the three drafts as the first item tomorrow morning. Before we vote I shall call the Chairman of the committee again and he will be able, as he has asked, to explain the significance of the committee's proposal to the Assembly. In that way we should be able to confine the discussion tomorrow morning to the presentation of this proposal by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs.

Then we shall go on to Mr. Wilkinson's report on helicopters and afterwards hear the addresses by the two ministers, Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgarne.

9. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before closing the sitting I have to tell you that the Italian Delegation has notified me of the candidature of Mr. Rodotà to replace Mr. Lapenta as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Votes on the draft texts, Documents 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda).
2. European helicopters for the 1990s (Presentation of the report of the Committee on

Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1077 and amendments).

3. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
4. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
5. European helicopters for the 1990s (Debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1077 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1986

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Statement by the President of the Assembly.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts; Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (*Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda).
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy (explanation of vote).
5. European helicopters for the 1990s (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1077 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Stegagnini.
6. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
7. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgarne to questions put by: Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Ahrens, Sir Paul Hawkins, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Valleix, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir John Osborn.
8. European helicopters for the 1990s (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1077 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir John Osborn, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Dr. Miller (point of order), Mr. Hardy, Lady Jill Knight, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller (explanation of vote).
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Statement by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, before we proceed to the orders of the day I have an announcement to make.

¹. See page 29.

In view of the important questions so far covered by the orders of the day of this session and bearing in mind the work still before us and the difficulty experienced by the Assembly hitherto in dealing satisfactorily with the various issues before it, and having regard also to the somewhat exceptional political situation created for Western European Union by the current crucial events which, to mention only three interventions, were described in the important addresses and comments of Lord Carrington, Mr. Poos and Mr. Chirac yesterday, I wish to inform you of my decision, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, to hold a special session of the Assembly to enable it to complete its work programme and enhance the contribution made by WEU in coping with the rapid pace of current events.

I will ask the Presidential Committee, which is to meet on Thursday morning, to take the necessary decisions with regard to the date, the duration and the orders of the day for the purpose I have just broadly outlined.

On behalf of the Presidential Committee I shall, ladies and gentlemen, let you have this information as quickly as possible, so that each of you, as well as the Assembly committees, can make the necessary arrangements. Account will,

The President (continued)

of course, be taken of the commitments of our members and of the Council as well as of our commitments in the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987

(Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for votes on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 and the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987, Documents 1069 and addendum, 1071 and addendum and 1072 and addenda.

Before taking the three consecutive votes, I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – As you know, Mr. President, and as you reminded the Assembly, I wound up the debate on the budget last night. It is only fair to the Assembly to mention this. In view of the comments of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and, indeed, the further comments of his deputy last night, I promised that before finally taking the decision to move this motion this morning I would have consultations with officials of the Secretariat-General of Western European Union. Having done that, and having had informal consultation with you, Mr. President, afterwards, I am persuaded that it would be sensible to proceed as we had originally intended and not to put the budget in abeyance, as was suggested by two of our colleagues, Mr. Bassinet and Dr. Burger, in last night's debate.

The debate having been concluded, I should like to move three items. The first is the approval of the budget of 1986, which is before the Assembly, and which is now past history, but it is important that we ratify it.

Secondly, I move that we approve the draft budget for 1987, which also has been before the Assembly and has been the subject of our debates.

I should like also to move another motion, which probably evokes the spirit of what I said in my opening address on the budget, and shows what the Budgetary Committee felt strongly. It has been in evidence during the debate in speeches by members from all quarters of the Assembly. The motion has been printed and I understand that it is available if members do not have a copy. It is as follows:

“ The Assembly,

Noting that the Council, in communicating its prior opinion, has explained that it was continuing to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and that it will study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible;

1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of the present session its draft budget, as amended by the Council, on condition that within a maximum of three months a supplementary budget for 1987 be established taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the documents already submitted to the Council;

2. Consequently INSTRUCTS the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to this end. ”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now ask the Assembly to vote on the three reports which have been debated and commented on by the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

The first vote is on the motion to approve the Assembly's final accounts for the financial year 1985, Document 1069 and addendum.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

I now put to the vote the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is agreed to.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You will recall that, yesterday evening, before you made the welcome decision that was announced this morning,

Mr. Hardy (continued)

several of us were very angry that debate was stifled. In view of that and the unsatisfactory character of the Assembly this week, we suggested that we would vote against the budget. May I take this opportunity to express my appreciation of the decision that was made this morning and to say that we ought never again to have an Assembly that is as unsatisfactory and incoherent as this week's has been? I felt it appropriate to abstain on the last vote, but I trust that we shall never again have the experience of the past few days.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless a roll-call vote is asked for by ten representatives or substitutes in the chamber.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put to the vote the revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987.

To the draft order in your possession I add the full text of the statement and proposals just made orally by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, as the two texts are linked.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless a roll-call vote is asked for by ten representatives or substitutes in the chamber.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put to the vote the draft order in Addendum II to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

Consequently the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 is agreed to.

5. European helicopters for the 1990s

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1077 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with the orders of the day we shall now proceed at once to the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European helicopters for the 1990s, Document 1077 and amendments.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour to introduce this report on European helicopters for the 1990s on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The report was passed *nem con* by the committee with one abstention. At first sight, the subject matter may appear narrow and the material specialist and technical, but one of the great merits of this Assembly is that its debates are illumined by the technical insight of specialists. Arms collaboration was identified by the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, in his address as one of the two primary tasks of the Assembly, and no less a person than the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Chirac, identified helicopters as one of the areas of collaboration that are of singular importance.

I am impatient of those who belittle an informed exchange of views about the technical arguments that underlie the principles and strategy of European defence. As my committee has consistently provided well researched, detailed and specialist information to support the European space programme so we believed it to be our duty to address another key area of industrial and technical competence for our continent's defence – helicopter policy which, for too long, has been the Cinderella of European security planning.

There are certain broad themes that underlie the report. First, our armies and air forces have undervalued the importance of helicopter mil-

1. See page 30.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

itary operations. I say armies and air forces because in a minority of NATO countries, including the United Kingdom, there is a division of responsibility for the operation of helicopters between the army and the air force, based largely on the size and weight of the aircraft.

Such a divisive responsibility is probably an additional complicating factor in evolving policies for the procurement and operation of helicopters but not, I would emphasise, fatal. Unity of command and control of rotary wing aircraft as well as their efficient logistic support are probably more important than who actually operates them. Nevertheless, in broadest terms, European armies and air forces have had relatively much smaller helicopter inventories than those of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. That applies to transport helicopters, anti-armour helicopters and anti-helicopter helicopters alike.

The deficiency is paradoxical since a defensive alliance such as ours must rely on mobility and fire power to concentrate force strategy at the decisive point to counter the potential advantage of surprise of the Warsaw Pact and its undoubted preponderance of armoured formations and helicopter-borne assault units. Of course, European armed forces have no experience comparable with that of the United States armed forces in Vietnam or the Soviets in Afghanistan to bring home to them the full benefits of the helicopter in the modern land-air battle.

The European decolonisation conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East have of course involved extensive use of helicopters but much more in support of relatively small-scale operations, such as the deployment of special forces and anti-guerrilla units than in mass formations like the United States air cavalry. The French army with the Gazelle HOT missile combination, the German army with the BO 105 HOT missile combination, and the British army with the Lynx TOW anti-tank missile combination have all up to now relied on anti-tank adaptations of essentially utility aircraft. To their credit, the Italians with the Agusta 129 Mark I have seen the way forward and put into service a truly European dedicated anti-tank helicopter.

In anti-submarine warfare the Europeans have, by contrast, fully exploited the potential of the helicopter. This is true of aircraft such as the Super Frelon in service with the French navy, the British with the Westland, and the Italian Agusta version of the Sea King, a Sikorsky machine built under licence, and a Franco-British Lynx. For the future the Anglo-Italian three-engine EH-101 is under development by EH Helicopters, an Agusta-Westland joint

company, and the first prototype should fly next spring. For anti-submarine operations the EH-101 has considerable potential. It also has potential as a transport aircraft in both civil and military versions.

For future anti-tank operations the picture is more confused than it should be. The British and Italian general staffs have agreed to harmonise operational requirements for a new anti-tank helicopter, a dedicated machine for the 1990s, and at a later stage in this process the Dutch and Spanish general staff joined in. In October of this year the national armaments directors of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom agreed to go ahead with a two-year feasibility and predefinition study of the Agusta 129 Mark II light attack helicopter for their requirements based on the use of the Trigat, which is a three-nation – France, the United Kingdom and West Germany – “fire and forget” anti-tank weapon. The combined requirement should be for over three hundred and fifty aircraft, although basic decisions on such key features as the choice of engine – I hope very much the Franco-British RCM-322 will be chosen – need to be made and numbers of crews also have to be decided. A joint company established in Rome with a 38% Agusta holding, 38% Westland, 19% Fokker and 5% Casa has been set up. The Franco-German experience over the PAH-2 and HAC-3G and HAP programmes merits considerable study.

Moves towards co-operation between the French and German general staffs and between the two industrial partners, MBB and Aérospatiale, have gone on for literally years, almost ten years, culminating in a memorandum of understanding signed by the two defence ministers in May 1984. However, the collaboration has been fraught with problems and indicates clearly that political will is not enough for the success of a collaborative programme. There has to be commonality of operational requirements and doctrine. In this case the divergences between the French and the German general staffs were considerable. The German general staff believe that their aircraft would operate with the benefit of air superiority but would have to have all-weather characteristics and be heavily armoured. The French did not regard air superiority as a necessary precondition and regarded the air environment as likely to be adverse and hostile, and therefore they developed two aeroplanes, one an anti-helicopter helicopter, as well as the anti-tank helicopter.

These complications have not been fully resolved although the governments maintained their determination to pursue a joint programme. Indeed, the French National Assembly sponsored a report specifically into this particular abortive programme, and one hopes that these difficulties will ultimately be resolved.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

There is considerable uncertainty about transport helicopters, too. In September 1985 a memorandum of understanding was signed between France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for the development of the new nine-tonne helicopter, essentially to fulfil two requirements – a tactical transport helicopter and shipborne programme for the new NATO frigate, the NFH. Up to seven hundred machines could be required and the into-service date could be as early as 1993 or 1994. However, here again, although a predefinition capability study was submitted to the defence ministries last month, difficult decisions lie ahead. The French have the possibility of developing further the Super Puma and the British could perhaps most sensibly procure a combination of Black Hawk aircraft to replace their ageing Wessex fleet and a transport version of the EH-101 to replace the Puma. The navalised version of the Black Hawk, the Sea Hawk, could provide an option especially if powered like its land counterpart by the RCM-322 for European operations. This could be an option for the German and Italian navies. The new British frigate, the type 23, has been designed to carry the EH-101.

To summarise the picture I would refer members to the recommendations. In so doing I remind them that the problems of the European helicopter industry are a microcosm of the European arms procurement picture as a whole.

Before concluding I must allude to the extraordinary Westland affair, which convulsed British political life just under a year ago. I do not see the acquisition by Sikorsky as an American Trojan horse within the citadel of the European helicopter industry. It was much more an immediate practical step to cure a short-term industrial problem of over-capacity and lack of work pending the full entry into production of the EH-101 and ultimately the Agusta 129 programmes.

The episode was marred by excessive political controversy and hyperbole and anyway the new European programmes such as the Agusta 129 Mark II and the NH-90 were a decade away, so it was inevitable that Westland turned to its licensor, Sikorsky, to fill its factories with short-term work.

For the future there is a difficulty in that Europe will have to compete with the great resources of the United States in a fragmented sense, and the importance of a concerted European helicopter strategy is brought home to us more and more. We have great problems of over-capacity – up to 40%. We have a strong engine industry, with the RTM-322 being jointly

developed by Turbomeca and Rolls-Royce. That has considerable potential. However, I am always aware of the fact that in Europe we have four principal manufacturers, Aérospatiale, MBB, Westland and Agusta, and that the United States, that vast market, also has four – Hughes, Bell, Sikorsky and Boeing Vertol. To these main four European manufacturers we are adding two new ones, Casa of Spain and Fokker.

It is a picture that urgently cries out for rationalisation and consultation on re-equipment timescales. This Assembly can play its full part in informing public opinion on the issues involved. It has a prominent and useful part to play in this essential element of European arms procurement policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you and your committee for your report, Mr. Wilkinson.

In the debate I now call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – May I be the first to congratulate John Wilkinson as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and our Rapporteur, on what has been a challenging and thought-provoking report on the subject of European helicopters for the 1990s. The value of this report is that it gives the Assembly a document dealing with helicopters in Europe and it has stimulated discussion in our own committee.

When this report was discussed in committee, John Wilkinson knows that I may have been critical. However, I hope that he realises that my observations were meant to be constructive. When I did my own research I had expected that there would be a plethora of reports on this subject from national parliaments, let alone the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament.

After all, industrial production, including that of the aircraft industry – in this instance helicopters – is an interest of the EEC Commission. I welcome the fact that we have a minister dealing with defence procurement to speak to us and I shall pursue this matter at question time if I catch your eye, Mr. President.

If I have a criticism of this report it concerns a lack of perspective in balancing the military use of helicopters with their civil rôle. No helicopter manufacturer – for that matter, no aircraft manufacturer – should be too dependent on the military use of his product. That is a personal view, but I believe that it has wide support among manufacturers.

It was last December that our Chairman proposed that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions should look into this subject. Both he and I knew – John

Sir John Osborn (continued)

Wilkinson touched on this – that Westland were in difficulties. One reason was its over-dependence on defence contracts. In our debates in committee I found that members from countries other than my own were misinformed about the Westland issue due to a series of press reports that had concentrated on sensation rather than reality.

I should like to make a few observations for the information of the Assembly on the Westland and British helicopter scene. Our Rapporteur had two very informative defence select committee reports from my country to help him with his own report – the third report entitled “The defence implications of the future of Westland plc” and the fourth report entitled “Westland plc: the government’s decision-making”. In paragraph 25 of the latter it is said of the time when Sir John Cuckney became Chairman of Westland, in June 1985:

“At this stage, then, despite the serious financial problems which the company faced and despite its known importance as a defence contractor, the collective judgment of the government was that a public sector rescue was not justified and that a market solution should be sought.”

In the third report, at paragraph 88, it is said:

“Sir John Cuckney characterised the European helicopter industry, ‘state-owned or with major state participation, as overmanned, unprofitable and with surplus capacity’.”

That, I think, justifies this report. The important thing was to support the position chosen by Westland plc.

When I was a technical director of a Sheffield steel company I was a supplier to the aircraft industry. When I attended the Farnborough air show this year I could claim to have had thirty-five years’ fairly regular attendance as a supplier to the industry. All new companies in new industries grow like Topsy – haphazardly. Westland was no exception. It was a subsidiary of John Brown, Glasgow, and Clyde shipbuilders and Sheffield steel and engineering manufacturers. John Brown’s home was in my constituency. I have known many directors and staff of that company and they all favoured a closer relationship with Sikorsky and, with a Western European hat, and after hearing Lord Carrington’s challenging address, I sense that a North Atlantic Assembly approach would still permit Westland to co-operate in a European context.

There is a need for much more comprehensive information about the civil use of helicopters. They range in mountainous areas from the con-

struction of power lines to the building of mountain homes. They also have an important rôle in the extraction of oil from the marine environment.

Another issue of interest in political assemblies is that of safety. Safety, particularly with the larger helicopters, and research into the automatic monitoring of mechanical components, especially gears, are considerations that ought to be promoted on a national scale. The recent Chinook disaster in the Orkney and Shetland Islands highlighted the vulnerability of helicopters. Maintenance of the rotors, rotor blades and regular replacement of certain mechanical parts has always been a vital function in the use of helicopters.

The third report of the British defence select committee refers to international helicopter production. In table 2 of that report there is a reference to 20 000 military helicopters in service in the western world. Of those 72% have been built in the United States.

I have tabled two amendments. I shall comment on the rôle of the helicopter and anti-helicopter missiles in moving the second amendment but I must comment now on the new paragraph after paragraph (i) following the challenging and stimulating address from Lord Carrington. He referred to NATO, Western European Union and the European Community being aware that:

“The process of political co-operation within the Community, for reasons that are well known and fully understandable, although not necessarily admirable, does not address defence issues.”

He went on:

“It is much more constructive to try to make them work more effectively together towards what is, after all, our common objective.”

I also welcome the example given by Lord Carrington when he asked:

“I hope that this is not too revolutionary – why not set up European research and development establishments, multinationally paid for and multinationally manned?”

The Chairman of the committee knows that I think that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions should take up that challenge, which also involves aerospace matters. I admired the speech of Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General of WEU, and I hope that he, too, will consider the implications of Lord Carrington’s challenge. Coming back to my theme, I hope that you, Mr. President, will send copies of our report and the speeches of Lord Carrington and Mr. Cahen, together with a copy of the report of our debate, to the Presidents of

Sir John Osborn (continued)

the European Parliament and of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The future of the helicopter industry and perhaps of vertical take-off aircraft and other new developments is one aspect of the challenge, but the Assembly must also face wider issues. Therefore, I hope that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions will continue to review the helicopter industry, with the advice of the North Atlantic Assembly and the experts in NATO and with the advice of the European Community. The helicopter industry has civil as well as military interests. I hope that the industry will be looked at as a whole, and not only by the Assembly. Therefore, I hope that you, Mr. President, will take the hint and ensure that the other two assemblies are aware of our deliberations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am pleased to announce the arrival of Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, and bid him welcome.

I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have looked closely at the report presented by Mr. Wilkinson whom I wish to congratulate on his work on the subject of European helicopters for the 1990s. I can endorse the general line of his analysis and his final recommendations but I think that stronger accent should have been placed on European collaboration in this field. Today, with their leading firms, the WEU countries have the men, technology and production capacity needed to co-operate in the construction of helicopters which should be as "European" as possible. This would have the additional advantage of ensuring effective operational and logistic standardisation.

In Italy, under the terms of a special law on research and development into certain military equipment including the EH-101 mentioned earlier, it has proved possible for the first time to set up consortia of technologically advanced companies making optimum use of each one's experience and research and with the advantage of sharing the very high costs of research and eliminating merciless competition between companies on components of weapons systems.

I wonder whether it might not be possible, through WEU which should in a sense seek to promote an international agreement between the member countries, to take similar action to promote aircraft in general and helicopters in particular, thus eliminating the useless competition which has hitherto taken place through bilateral agreements between industries in the sector.

The possibility of balanced research, development and production by the industries in the WEU countries would have a beneficial effect on international markets where competition by individual countries – as demonstrated by the fight for control of Westland – has no positive economic effects and no major political or military effects for the defence of Europe.

Of course, it is not intended that greater collaboration in the European production of helicopters should replace or run counter to the commitments which the individual WEU countries have with the United States through the IEPG. At worst such collaboration could be on a greater scale and more effective whatever the result of joint research and production in the sector.

I believe that all this could be achieved through the Conference of National Armaments Directors who, with specific directives from their defence ministries, hold meetings every six months on this very subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, in accordance with the orders of the day we shall now adjourn the debate on the report presented by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The addresses by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg, and Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, will be followed, with their agreement, by a single question and answer session. According to the questions asked, the two ministers will reply individually or one after the other. This is a method we have employed in the past, and I thank the ministers for consenting to facilitate our work in this way.

6. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Once again, Mr. Fischbach, I bid you welcome to our Assembly, which is, I am sure, well known to you. As in the case of your colleague, Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I thank you for discharging the Chairman's duties jointly with him. May I say how grateful we are for your participation in our debates.

The WEU Assembly has always wished ministers of defence to attend sessions and your presence here not only meets this wish but also confirms the special rôle of WEU. Speeches and events both prove that the Assembly and the Council now share an identity of view in this regard, and it is proper that this should be emphasised. In this connection you have played a notable rôle, as you recently demonstrated by

The President (continued)

preparing and ensuring the success of the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg. I am grateful therefore for what you have done and have pleasure in inviting you to the rostrum.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour and a great pleasure for me to be addressing you less than three weeks after the WEU Council meeting in Luxembourg. As you know, that meeting was dominated by two main themes: the aftermath of Reykjavik and the reactivation of WEU.

After Reykjavik, Europeans scrutinised, analysed and interpreted the discussions which had taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union and which had seemed to come close to an agreement. As regards the reactivation of WEU, it was the Europeans who were responsible for initiating and following up the idea and it is now up to them to determine how it should be brought to fruition.

Reykjavik was an event of global significance: for a few days and hours the international community held its breath. Was the world about to witness a spectacular change of direction away from the well-trodden paths of traditional arms control?

The reactivation of WEU on the other hand is a slow and almost imperceptible process attracting little attention from the international community and remote from the public at large. Reykjavik has generated many questions and doubts, especially in European circles. The reactivation of WEU can provide Europeans with means of answering some of these questions, and, by the same token, of fulfilling a more effective rôle in the overall process of arms control and disarmament.

The fact is that Reykjavik has given rise to many anxieties, some of them vague and general, some of them more specific. Europeans, and not Europeans only, were taken off guard; they were not prepared for what seems almost to have been decided, although it is true that some spectacular disarmament proposals had been advanced earlier, such as Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion of 15th January 1986 that the world should be freed from nuclear weapons up to the year 2000. But, to say the least, these proposals came out of the blue and had to be treated with caution.

Reykjavik, on the other hand, was something of a quite different order. Here we had not a dramatic exchange of proposals channelled through television and the press, but genuine negotiations, even if they had not been prepared in the manner customary in the past and despite the fact that everything moved with rather breakneck speed.

On this occasion Europeans began to ask questions about the future of their security system, which had safeguarded their peace for four decades. What was to become of nuclear deterrence? Would the importance of this form of deterrence be diminished by the reduction of nuclear forces? After all, the Reykjavik discussions had envisaged the elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles as well as the zero option for Europe in the field of intermediate nuclear weapons.

How was a reduction of the nuclear element likely to affect the security of Europeans as guaranteed hitherto by the nuclear deterrent of their American allies? What was to become of the doctrine of flexible response, according to which the Europeans should be able to repel an attack at any level of military force involving conventional, tactical nuclear or strategic nuclear weapons?

The credibility of the European defence system lies in the ability to threaten to match any level of violence chosen by an aggressor with a higher level of response, i.e. in the projected mastery of escalation. Equally, the determination to conclude hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence is also part of this doctrine.

If one element in this mechanism were to be weakened or eliminated, would not the whole system suffer in consequence? Would it not aggravate the imbalances at other levels? Would the result not be to intensify the anxieties created by the American loss of strategic superiority at the end of the sixties?

By its twofold decision of 1979, NATO sought to counteract the imbalance in intermediate-range missiles created by the massive Soviet deployment of SS-20 type missiles. This decision would, it was hoped, stabilise the extended nuclear deterrent, i.e. the one which is intended to protect the peoples of Europe.

This stabilisation at the level of intermediate nuclear systems was seen as a means of continuing to neutralise, to a certain degree at least, the lower levels comprising the so-called "battlefield" nuclear weapons and conventional forces. Would the abandonment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles not be liable to add in some way to the importance of those levels?

At the conventional level, the Warsaw Pact has long held numerical superiority in terms of tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft. The effects of this quantitative superiority might well be aggravated by the very marked improvements in quality achieved by the pact.

In the case of short-range nuclear missiles, the Soviets have in recent years deployed some 300 SS-21s with a range of 120 kilometres and 240 SS-23s with a range of 500 kilometres, to replace,

Mr. Fischbach (continued)

or more often to back up, missiles of an older type. The Europeans, or more specifically NATO, have only a very limited number of Pershing Is and a limited number of Lance missiles to set against these systems. The European fear is that, even after the reduction or elimination of intermediate-range systems, the Soviets, thanks to their shorter-range systems, could continue to pose an undiminished threat to the military objectives in Western Europe. By this I mean the most sensitive targets such as airports, lines of communication and conventional military establishments.

Europe wonders whether the Soviets might not be tempted to exploit their partial and sectorial advantages for political purposes at least.

In order to forestall such risks and to keep intact the strategy of deterrence by flexible response, any reduction at the strategic and intermediate levels should be accompanied by negotiations on conventional and short-range nuclear forces aimed at achieving a balance of forces at the lowest possible level, but also and above all a balance at a level subject to credible verification.

Those are some of the vital questions Europeans are asking in the aftermath of Reykjavik, and they are far from finding any definite answers. In any event, Europeans should get together to discuss and analyse the situation with a view to co-ordinating and harmonising their positions.

This brings me to the second subject I wanted to take up with you today: the reactivation of WEU and the future rôle of defence ministers within the framework of a reactivated Western European Union.

As was stated in Rome in October 1984, discussions and consultations on problems relating to the military security of Europe are an essential and fundamental argument for the existence of WEU. It was also understood that such discussions and consultations cannot be satisfactorily conducted without the active participation of the defence ministers. Such participation should help to improve the internal balance of the organisation and should, of course, be conducted in a spirit of mutual collaboration with the ministers for foreign affairs.

While it is true that the defence ministers do participate in the work of the Council following the Rome declaration of 1984, it is also true that this participation has not always been entirely satisfactory to those responsible for defence matters. It is therefore important that they should use the process of reactivation – now in a crucial phase – to integrate themselves fully into

the structures and machinery of Western European Union.

A number of steps have been taken in this direction, some of them by the Luxembourg Chairman-in-Office. Letters have been exchanged between him and the various defence ministers. Bilateral contacts have taken place on the occasion of NATO meetings, as in the case of the recent meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group at Gleneagles. I had a lengthy discussion about our future rôle with Mr. Giraud when I met him here in Paris. A meeting of defence experts took place on the morning of 24th October in London, attended by the permanent representatives of WEU, who were joined in the afternoon by the political directors. During the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg the seven defence ministers had a working breakfast together to discuss their future rôle.

The ministers are agreed that, to reinforce that rôle, more topics of more specifically military interest should be included on the agendas for Council meetings. Experts from the ministries should meet more often, either alone or with the political directors or the heads of politico-military departments. Defence ministers, too, should be more involved at all levels of the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council.

When they met in Luxembourg on 14th November, the defence ministers agreed to examine certain aspects of the problems raised by Reykjavik. Their experts are to meet twice before the next Council meeting to analyse these problems.

The other topics which the ministers want WEU to consider are the question of security in the Mediterranean basin and, beyond that, our various questions concerning threats outside the NATO theatre which affect European security.

The second topic is that of European co-operation in arms production, relations with the IEPG, the allocation of resources to defence and the exchange of information on long-term defence programmes and defence strategies.

These are the subjects of permanent interest to which WEU should in future address itself.

I know and am grateful that the Assembly has always sought a closer association with defence ministers, and I hope that it finds satisfaction in the present developments in this area. The greater involvement of defence ministers in the work of WEU can only have positive repercussions for the whole organisation and help to advance the reactivation which is so close to our hearts.

That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to you. I thank you for allowing me to address you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am most grateful to you, Minister.

7. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are most appreciative, Minister, of your presence here. Your position in Her Majesty's Government lends great weight to your contribution in connection with the report by Mr. Wilkinson's committee.

I now invite you to the rostrum.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I understand that, earlier in your proceedings this week, concern was expressed that ministers who spoke at this Assembly should be neither long-winded nor superficial. I shall try to be neither.

I am the first minister from the British Ministry of Defence to address this Assembly in recent years. I do so at a time when the issues of the defence of Europe, and of the rôle of WEU in it, are under particular scrutiny.

If the Reykjavik meeting did nothing else, it caused us in Europe to think hard about the defence of our continent and about the responsibilities of Europeans for ensuring this defence. Some of the old certainties seem to be being called into question. Doubts are expressed in our press and by sections of our public and political opinion about the nature of the threat facing us, about the rôle of nuclear weapons, about military doctrines and about the relative responsibilities of Europe and the United States. If I am to be brief, I cannot address all of these issues, so I propose therefore to deal with just two – what is the nature of the threat facing us and how should the task of dealing with it be shared between Europeans and Americans?

At one level, the nature of the threat is easy to identify. It is the Soviet Union and its military allies in the Warsaw Pact, but what is it about the Soviet Union that we find so threatening? It is, I would suggest, the combination of its ideology and its military capability.

Russia has always been a difficult country for the West to understand. It is a society in which secrecy presides over everything, and it is a society with a view of the world that has always emphasised that security can be achieved only from a position of national strength. Russian rulers have traditionally been obsessed by their vulnerability to invasion and encirclement, and they meet this danger both by building up large forces and by expanding constantly their own borders. A nineteenth-century czarist minister is reputed to have confessed that, to Russian eyes, the only secure frontier was one with Russians on both sides of it.

To this has been added in the course of this century an ideological conviction that the balance of forces in the world must inevitably move in Russia's favour. The success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 established in power a party whose view was of a world divided into two implacably opposed systems, each struggling to shift the global balance of power in its own favour. It established a party that held it as a scientific truth that communism would triumph in the end and which saw its duty as giving history a helping hand wherever possible.

It is this ideological element which marks the crucial difference between communist societies and our own. The Russians are cautious people. We can expect that, in reviewing the security situation in Europe, they will take a prudent view of whether military adventurism would pay, but we cannot expect them to refrain from it because it is wrong or because they have no business interfering in the affairs of other countries. Their moral values are not ours, and the frontiers of Europe would not be what they are today if the Soviet Union interpreted self-determination or territorial integrity in the way that we do.

I am glad therefore that this Assembly is addressing itself to the nature of the Soviet threat and that tomorrow you will debate a report on it. If we are to carry public support for defence efforts in Western Europe, we must be able to explain to our people why it is that defence is necessary. We do not need to over-dramatise, but we do need to explain how Soviet society is different from ours.

We also need to remind our publics of the military facts. It has become fashionable in some quarters to question whether there is in reality a serious military imbalance between East and West Europe; or to argue that somehow things would be easier if on the western side we adopted "defensive" or "non-provocative" philosophies.

But let us consider reality. At the level of strategic nuclear weapons there exists rough parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet concentration on large intercontinental ballistic missiles gives them a potentially significant advantage in missile warheads and throw weight, against that the United States enjoys superiority in submarine-launched systems.

At the theatre level in Europe, however, the Warsaw Pact has a dramatic advantage. They have a four to one superiority in long-range intermediate nuclear warheads, a nine to one advantage in shorter-range INF missiles and an eight to one advantage in short-range missiles. These figures are daunting enough, but they do not include several hundred medium bombers, or the thousands of dual-capable tactical aircraft

Lord Trefgarne (continued)

and artillery which are deployed in numbers which greatly exceed those on the NATO side.

As far as the conventional balance is concerned, it makes sense to look first at the *ready* forces available on the central front. Here the position is clear: fifty-seven Warsaw Pact divisions against thirty-three NATO divisions. Critics have argued that our divisions are not comparable with those of the Warsaw Pact. That is true, for our armies are organised differently. As a result, our divisions are larger because they include a higher ratio of support troops, while their divisions are leaner but have more tanks and more artillery. NATO is, of course, a defensive alliance and we do not therefore need to match a potential aggressor on a one-to-one basis. But bear in mind that Warsaw Pact reinforcements, which could be quickly mobilised and deployed to the central front, are closer than most of the alliance's reserves, which would have to be moved across the Atlantic from North America, and, in the event of a conventional attack on Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact would of course be able to pick the time and place, and deploy its forces accordingly while we would have to disperse our forces to meet all eventualities.

Equipment is another vital factor. For the foreseeable future, mechanised forces will be the key to any European battlefield. From their investment in tanks and artillery both sides appear to agree on that. On the central front we are outnumbered by well over two to one in tanks and by almost three to one in artillery. The broader picture, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is even more disturbing for the overall Warsaw Pact superiority then rises to three to one in tanks and well over three to one in artillery. This amounts to 50 000 of their tanks against 17 000 of ours, and 33 000 of their guns against 10 000 of ours. We would attempt to redress this imbalance by making use of our tactical air power. But even here we are outnumbered by two to one in fixed-wing combat aircraft. Quality of equipment is of course an important factor, and the West retains a technological lead over the Soviet Union in many key areas. We should not forget the old dictum that quality is only more important than quantity if you have enough of it!

At sea the picture is rather different. NATO has about the same number of submarines, and more aircraft-carriers and more surface escorts, but the threat is also different. The Soviet navy would not attempt to occupy and control areas of the high seas but to disrupt our vital transatlantic reinforcement routes. Numerical superiority is not necessary to achieve that. Soviet submarines and surface forces would inevitably enjoy the initiative and although I do not doubt that we

would eventually gain the upper hand, it is crucial that we do so at the outset of hostilities to ensure that reinforcements arrive in time to influence the land battle in Europe.

What counts, particularly when our primary aim is to deter rather than fight a war, is what is immediately to hand or readily available through credible reinforcement plans, and on the basis of current dispositions there remain serious disparities which we will not, for the foreseeable future, be able to rectify using conventional forces alone. For the past forty years our security has depended on nuclear weapons. It still does. In looking for an alternative, we must make sure that we look for a better way, not just a different one.

This does not mean that we should not seek agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control. As the British Prime Minister and the United States President agreed recently, we must give priority to an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces, with restraints on shorter-range systems, to a 50% cut over five years in United States and Soviet strategic offensive weapons and to a ban on chemical weapons. But reductions in nuclear systems will increase rather than reduce the importance of eliminating conventional imbalances and we must not therefore delude ourselves either that total nuclear disarmament can be achieved overnight. The vision of a non-nuclear world should not be allowed to obscure what we need for effective deterrence now, or the modest but real steps that we can take to secure reductions in weapon levels and improve East/West relations. But to replace the current situation of strategic stability with an unstable international environment in a world made safe for conventional war is not an attractive prospect.

The security of Europe will continue to require effective nuclear deterrence based on a mix of systems, which was confirmed at Camp David. It is for this reason that the British Government intends to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent. We believe that it provides an essential element in the alliance's deterrent strategy, and because deterrence must be credible, we are modernising our strategic forces with the acquisition of the Trident II system. We welcome, therefore, President Reagan's reaffirmation at Camp David of the United States' intention to proceed with its strategic modernisation programme and the confirmation that he gave of his full support for our plans.

Europe's security will also require a mix of responsibilities. Two treaties embody them: those of the North Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union. The alliance provides the fundamental guarantee of our security and the contribution and involvement of the United States is crucial to that guarantee.

Lord Trefgarne (continued)

That commitment is based on a unique transatlantic bargain – the pragmatic self-interest of all sides underpinned by a common heritage, shared experience and a joint commitment to the principles of freedom and democracy. It is a unique bargain and one which we should not take for granted. Not only is the American strategic nuclear guarantee irreplaceable, but to attempt to do without America's conventional contribution would place an intolerable burden on the rest of the alliance. Not even the most sanguine critic of the present conventional balance could fail to accept that the withdrawal of six ready divisions, 5 000 tanks, more than 800 guns and surface-to-surface missiles, more than 700 fixed-wing combat aircraft and 350 armed helicopters would tip the scales heavily against us.

The recent tendency in some quarters to question and criticise the United States presence in, and commitment to, Europe is, therefore, alarming. It throws into question the very foundations of partnership on which the alliance has been based for so long. It seems to reflect an implicit assumption that the Soviet Union no longer poses any threat, military or otherwise, to the West. I hope that I have made it clear that I regard that assumption as absolutely mistaken. Europe and America face a common challenge and we should not be seduced into feeling that somehow the Western Europeans can deal with this threat on their own: we cannot. In the face of the common challenge, we need to continue to work together as sovereign and equal partners, in an Atlantic Alliance which each of us has freely chosen to join.

But within the alliance we Europeans have our own particular responsibilities. We must ensure that our pillar remains strong and that we carry a fair share of the common burden. Already the European allies collectively provide the major part of the ready forces in Europe – most guns, most tanks, most aircraft, most men – and of the naval forces in the Atlantic and European waters. Even after full mobilisation and reinforcement, European forces would predominate – and by a wide margin. But Reykjavik has pointed up the importance of improving the European effort. It is a major goal of the United Kingdom's security policy to achieve this. We aim to do so through our national contribution, our bilateral contacts with our European allies, and through active participation in the bodies devoted to European security co-operation.

Our record is not unimpressive. We have been in the forefront of the improved European contribution to our collective defence effort, with a 20% increase in real terms in our defence budget since 1979. In addition to their nuclear rôles and their commitment to the defence of the United

Kingdom, our forces make major contributions to alliance capabilities on the central front and in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel. We also maintain reinforcement forces for the flanks. And outside Europe we retain the ability and the will to undertake our residual security responsibilities scattered throughout the world, and to protect British – and western – commercial, political and economic interests. The combined British and Omani exercise currently taking place in Oman demonstrates our national capability for rapid strategic deployment out of area.

In all areas of our defence effort we welcome as much co-operation with European allies as possible. A crucial area is that of defence equipment, where the work of the Independent European Programme Group is vital to the task of ensuring that we get maximum value for money from our limited resources and preserve Europe's defence industrial capability. We must pursue vigorously the process of harmonising operational requirements, avoid wasteful duplication of effort in research and development and establish collaborative projects to meet the harmonised requirements wherever it is sensible and cost-effective to do so. The relaunch of the IEPG by defence ministers in The Hague in November 1984 has so far proved to be a remarkable success – more successful, indeed, than many of us dared to hope. In the first eight years of its life the IEPG did much useful work, but produced no harmonised operational staff targets. In the past two years it has produced ten. Progress is also being made on the establishment of collaborative European defence research projects.

We must sustain the momentum of achievement in the IEPG. But in doing so we must not forget that the purpose of our work is not the launching of political initiatives, valuable though they may be, but to get effective and affordable hardware into the hands of our armed services.

The IEPG is the central European forum on equipment matters. But the European body which carries the overall responsibility for the security of our continent is WEU. Its treaty embodies the most far-reaching defence commitment ever undertaken in Europe by a British Government.

WEU is not an operational body. But its contribution lies in the fact that WEU has its own particular and unique strengths. It is, for example, the only European body in which both defence ministers and foreign ministers are able regularly to meet together to discuss the wide range of defence and security issues which are of common interest. The members of WEU include all the European countries which maintain forces in Germany, the two European nuclear powers

Lord Trefgarne (continued)

and the five INF basing countries. It is a homogenous group of countries which take seriously the obligations which the WEU treaty imposes. As the Prime Minister of France so aptly pointed out yesterday, it also has the advantage of bringing together countries which have taken a common decision to build Europe together in all its aspects. It is, thus, a natural forum for member countries to meet at all levels, from experts to ministers, to exchange views, pool ideas, improve their understanding of each other's security concerns, and move towards common perceptions on a range of common problems. WEU should be a ginger group – a catalyst for decisions – even if some of those decisions have by their nature to be taken elsewhere.

There is still a fair way to go in the process of WEU reactivation, but we are moving in the right direction and Britain is confident that the rôle identified for WEU in recent years will be valuable.

I am, as I have said, the first British Defence Minister to address this Assembly since reactivation, but officials from my department have been working in close partnership with their foreign ministry colleagues on all aspects of WEU's activity and my ministerial colleagues have, I know, played a very full part in discussions at ministerial level. As WEU now seeks to build on and consolidate its rôle as an important ginger group on security issues, the full involvement of defence ministers and officials in all member countries will become more important. I may have been the first, but I certainly do not think that I will be the last, British Defence Minister to come here to speak to you. I thank you for the opportunity to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your interesting and important address. We are most appreciative to Her Majesty's Government for having sent to the WEU Assembly a government member with responsibility for military and defence matters.

A number of speakers have asked to put questions to the two ministers.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to ask Mr. Fischbach and Lord Trefgarne a question that I put earlier to Lord Carrington. It concerns the zero-zero option for INF arms control in Europe.

May I suggest to the ministers, particularly to Mr. Fischbach, who so eloquently expressed some of the problems associated with this

option, that to pursue it would risk removing a vital part of the ladder of escalation in the strategy of flexible response upon which Europe relies for its security? Lord Trefgarne was right to underscore in categorically clear terms the total theatre imbalance existing in Europe – four to one in INF and nine to one in short-range systems. Was not the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, correct yesterday when expressing his personal anxieties about the zero-zero option, and was he not further correct to say that to pursue that option risked decoupling Europe from the United States in that if we dismantle our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles there will not be any medium-range American or NATO systems in place in Europe, so that Europe will have to move, if it seeks to escalate, directly to the strategic option? To do that would be a difficult decision for our United States allies. Would not that further emphasise the importance of the French and British strategic nuclear deterrents which would, in that eventuality, provide a trigger for the American nuclear guarantee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fischbach.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The question is crucial to the present debate on the strategy of deterrence or the flexible response. Clearly, if Europeans accept the zero option, one element in the flexible response strategy will disappear, i.e. the medium-range missiles or INF. But that does not, in itself, put an end to deterrence or the flexible response, since it is perfectly feasible to imagine a flexible response at the level of conventional weapons and short-range nuclear weapons without involving any higher level which would be looked upon as escalation.

If and when the zero option is accepted and there is a massive reduction in strategic weapons and INF, these reductions will obviously have to be accompanied by parallel negotiations on conventional weapons and, more specifically, on short-range nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – Naturally, I have some sympathy with Mr. Wilkinson's view. I remind him that in 1979 we took the twin-track decision, which included the concept of seeking to eliminate these weapons. I wonder whether the military result of achieving the zero-zero option is perhaps quite as stark as Mr. Wilkinson suggests. We shall retain the air-launched systems, which are not part of those discussions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have listened to two ministers. May I put a brief question to each?

I will begin with Mr. Fischbach. Minister, you reported on the meetings of the defence ministers. What interests me is the subjects you discussed. Can you be more explicit than you were in your statement? What form do the defence ministers of WEU feel contact with the Assembly should take? Is there to be a dialogue between the defence ministers and the Assembly as well?

I want to put my second question to the British minister. I must first say that I live with my family in my constituency 100 kilometres from the border. This may explain my question. Minister, do you share my view that the equipment, distribution and training of the land forces in Central Europe do not comply with their forward defence mission? To be more precise, do we not have a surplus of armoured units, which can, of course, only operate deep in enemy territory, and do we not have a serious shortage of troops really capable of ensuring effective forward defence, directly on the frontier with the Warsaw Pact?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The reply to the first question is that defence ministers are basically concerned with military and defence problems, although this does not mean that they only have a technical rôle. Speaking for my defence colleagues, I can say that, on the contrary, we are determined to fulfil our eminently political rôle even if it is complementary to that of the ministers for foreign affairs.

Turning to the topics we should like to see dealt with, I referred to some of these in my address. They include subjects dictated by current political events as well as issues of permanent concern. Of the latter I will mention only security and problems outside the NATO area which are liable to affect European security.

The problems dictated by current events obviously relate to the aftermath of Reykjavik, i.e. to the political and military implications of the various approaches and solutions contemplated there. At the same time, the ministers also laid stress on one topic in particular – that of problems outside the NATO area. Their main concern is to evaluate possible threats to the member states of WEU in the form of subversive warfare originating from the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East or North Africa. They are also concerned to assess the resources needed to counter these threats.

In reply to the second question, I would repeat that contacts with the Assembly are our major concern. We wish and are determined to maintain the best possible relations with your President, the Presidential Committee and the Assembly itself. In dealings with our colleagues, we insist that we should be given the opportunity on every occasion to explain to the parliamentarians what we are doing and why.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I shall answer the second part of the question, which was addressed to me. Every military plan is, of course, a compromise, making the best use of the facilities and the weapon systems that are available, but you may be assured that it is no part of alliance policy to abandon parts of Germany if the attack takes place. I do not think that I can give any higher assurance than that. We shall be there, fighting for you to the last man.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – Lord Trefgarne's speech was one of the most interesting and fascinating that the Assembly has heard because he addressed himself not only to defence but to the psychological make-up of Russia as opposed to Europe. I have never heard that said here before. It is an immensely important thought, which must be in our minds.

I also welcome Lord Trefgarne as someone who has been concerned with many constituency problems of mine, and he has always been most helpful and sympathetic. I want him to be helpful and sympathetic over this matter, which is not connected with armaments at all. We were greatly encouraged by the Rome meeting, when we were told that we were to be reborn. So far the birth has not yet taken place in the Assembly. Does the Minister realise that his government are saying that there must be zero growth in our Assembly's expenditure and that zero growth must cover all expenditure, including pensions? Does he realise that in a few years' time pensions will eat up 15% or 16% of our total expenditure? I hope that he will take this thought home with him – I know that he is not a Treasury minister – and that Mr. Younger will put our case in the cabinet.

I hope that Lord Trefgarne will address himself to this. Perhaps he can say that in future the Assembly might know something about the expenditure of the other parts of WEU – the office in London and the group of experts. We do not know anything. We do not know what they do, and we should, so that we are involved in the

Sir Paul Hawkins (continued)

whole activity of WEU, which Lord Trefgarne praised, and I was glad to hear that.

Finally, I wanted Lord Trefgarne to know, because the media is sure to say this, that we do not want that expenditure just so that we can come to Paris and have a good time. We all want to be able to help in the defence of the way of life of Europe, and in the peace process. Will Lord Trefgarne please take this message home to our government? I should be grateful if he could answer any of my questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I am familiar with the problems that Sir Paul Hawkins mentions. I had the privilege to attend the reception given by the French Foreign Ministry last night, and every delegate whom I met mentioned it to me. I am not sure that I have much in the way of comfort to offer. It is certainly not a matter for the Ministry of Defence. I understand that it is a matter for the British Foreign Office and the British Treasury, but I undertake to convey delegates' strongly-felt views back to London.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – This morning we have two ministers for the price of one. Although we are not forced to put questions to both, we are tempted to do so, and I intend to give in to that temptation.

My question, although slightly different, follows that asked by Sir Paul Hawkins. Yesterday Mr. Chirac and this morning Mr. Fischbach and then Lord Trefgarne assured us in different ways that they had great regard for the work of WEU and recognised the need for the reactivation of our body. I should like to explain one thing. WEU is struggling to do two wholly different jobs. One is to give a platform to ministers from all the member countries, which takes a great deal of time out of our sessions here in Paris. None the less, that is very important. The other job is to look in depth at different problems, all connected with defence, to work on reports that will be helpful, to produce recommendations that we feel should be adopted and generally to act as a semi-parliamentary body.

Lord Trefgarne said how fundamental it was to explain why defence was necessary, showing how important this body was. In that regard, I should like to see his speech writ large in every newspaper in Europe, particularly his comparisons. He also called us a ginger group and a catalyst. We have to decide what our ministers want

us to do, because we cannot fulfil both functions on our budget. I have to tell both ministers that we are a little tired of hearing a lot of kind words in speeches and not getting a lot of support in member parliaments for the job that we do. Therefore, I ask both ministers to take back to their respective governments the understanding that we in WEU will grind to a halt and be unable to carry out our present twin functions unless we hear more than soft words of support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – My colleague, Mr. Poos, already spoke about this yesterday, but I should like to repeat and emphasise his remarks. At the last meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg, all the foreign and defence ministers joined in expressing their willingness to seek a solution to the budget problems. A solution satisfactory to your Assembly will not merely be sought, it will be found.

Regarding the first statement by the honourable member, I can only express my approval, as the matter concerns WEU, which is the only European institution empowered to discuss the problems of European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – I do not have much to add to what Mr. Fischbach said, but I can underline the importance that United Kingdom ministers attach to WEU, as I said just now. I also undertook to Sir Paul Hawkins to report your anxieties to London.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I have noted Mr. Fischbach's statement which centres basically on the fundamental issue of security. Mr. Poos, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, yesterday used the very expressive formula "fewer weapons for more security". In the global debate, in which all mankind and Europeans especially, have a fundamental stake, as to whether the discussions should take place in the CSCE or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, yesterday confirmed very clearly that France favoured the CSCE. Would you confirm the position of your government, Mr. Fischbach? I thank you in advance and trust that we shall find ourselves on common ground rather than at odds.

Lord Trefgarne, let me say how pleased we are to see you here – all the more so as it is a long

Mr. Valleix (continued)

time since the United Kingdom expressed a view in this forum.

I shall not revert to the subject of the budget; as a Frenchman, I am just as aware of the problem as my colleagues and the other delegates to this Assembly. Thank you for being an ambassador – I crave your indulgence for the demotion – and for ensuring that all the governments move in the direction suggested by Mr. Poos.

The last question I wish to put to you relates to an item of information received this morning. Even we parliamentarians get our information via the newspapers and the radio. This morning it was the radio. It referred to a 10% participation by the United Kingdom Government in the Hermes project.

The matter lies at the heart of our respective areas of responsibility. Are you able to confirm this news? And is there any likelihood, as and when matters develop, of this British participation being confirmed and possibly rounded up? I hope I am not giving wrong information. If my information is correct, I would like your confirmation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The questions are directed to both ministers.

I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – With the permission of the Chairman of the Council, I should like to answer the point about the Hermes project. I am sorry to say that my officials have drawn a blank in the few seconds that we have had to think about it. Perhaps I can check the information and let Mr. Valleix know later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The Luxembourg presidency, speaking of course on behalf of the seven member states, maintains its fundamental support for the dialogue as conducted between the member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the various places where negotiations are in progress. I mean the CSCE, the CDE and the MBFR.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I make one quick suggestion and then ask two quick questions?

My suggestion for solving the budget problem is simple. If this parliamentary Assembly were given the determination of the budget that the

other two organs enjoy, we would soon find that the budgets of those other two organs would be so cut that they would be delighted to give us what we deserve.

Will Mr. Fischbach convey to his colleagues that it is not so much that we have visits from six ministers during a session that irritates us, but that it would be appreciated if one minister came along at the beginning, made a speech and then listened for the rest of our proceedings? We are getting sick and tired of ministers answering questions for an hour or so and then dashing away.

The valuable feature, as Lord Trefgarne said, is informal conversation with delegates when ministers are not surrounded by their advisers and minders and can talk politics to their political friends. That is the danger for ministers – they get divided from their political friends by their officials, who hate politics.

Lord Trefgarne said that one of the problems of a future war was that the Soviets would try to cut off supplies to Europe from North America and elsewhere. Is he able to assure us that NATO forces have sufficient ships available for mine-sweeping? In view of the appalling reduction in the size of fishing fleets, there must be doubt about NATO's ability to find sufficient mine-sweepers quickly enough. Does NATO have sufficient vessels to undertake the work that Mr. Ahrens talked of – getting troops over to the continent in time? We want assurances on both counts if Lord Trefgarne can give them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. FISCHBACH (*Minister of Defence of Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fail to understand the question put by the honourable member.

You know better than anyone that the Luxembourg presidency is, and will remain, permanently represented throughout this session.

Secretary of State Goebbels has been here since Monday and has not left the chamber. He has therefore been able to follow your debates very closely. In this respect the presidency is performing no more than its duty. Mr. Poos as Chairman-in-Office of the Council spoke yesterday. He shared this privilege with me. I wish to emphasise that we were invited in due form by the Assembly which we have had the honour to address.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I can only repeat my thanks and congratulations to the Luxembourg presidency for its exemplary attendance throughout this session.

I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg will know, we have recently commissioned a new class of mine-sweeper – the River class – for the Royal Naval Reserve. Eleven are in service and another is coming shortly. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is right to say that quite a significant part of our capability in that area rests on our ability to take up certain ships from civil commercial activity in times of tension or war. He is also right to say that in recent years the number of deep-sea trawlers available for this purpose has declined sharply. We have therefore recently conducted a study to see what other types of ship might be available and I am glad to be able to assure him that we have identified a number of other vessels that will meet the requirement as we now foresee it.

The critical problem in transporting supplies from the United States to the United Kingdom and thence to Europe will not be to find the necessary ships but to ensure that the sea-lanes are kept open. I mentioned that problem at the end of my speech. Keeping the seaways clear is not a function of the transport capability but for other naval and air force capacity that we can make available for the purpose. I am satisfied that there are sufficient commercial transport ships available for that purpose, but the problem of keeping the seaways open is rather greater.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you. I ask my question as a one-time engineer-scientist and industrialist who is a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. Lord Trefgarne knows that I warned him that at public meetings I am always frightened by questions that my friends and colleagues ask. I hope that he will bear that in mind. Mr. Fischbach spoke about the reactivation of WEU and the rôle of ministers of defence in Luxembourg at the ministerial conference.

In a very wide review, which I appreciated, Lord Trefgarne spoke about equipment and the balance between Warsaw Pact countries and European arms in the European theatre. I ask him a question in his rôle as Minister of State for Defence Procurement. He might like to comment on the British scene, the supply of defence equipment in our country, the level of research on defence, the amount spent on it and the impact of privatisation of the Royal Ordnance and of competition.

I warned when I was a member of the European Parliament that I was among those ten years ago who interested themselves in Community defence procurement. The Commission and the Twelve are interested in the manufac-

turing capacity of military equipment standardisation and procurement. I know that ministers of defence determine the expenditure within their own defence budgets but I remind Lord Trefgarne that Lord Carrington, the Secretary-General of NATO, has stressed the need to co-ordinate and co-operate in manufacture, the need for longer production runs and research in Europe.

My question is to Lord Trefgarne but the Chairman of the Council, Mr. Fischbach, might like to comment: how does he see his rôle as a British minister responsible for procurement in WEU, which he has emphasised, or NATO and even the EEC, with fellow European defence ministers in bringing about co-ordination and co-operation? In other words, how can he bring his influence to get better value for money on a European scale?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Trefgarne.

Lord TREFGARNE (*Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom*). – That is a very wide-ranging question but I certainly see it as my principal rôle as the British Minister for Defence Procurement to ensure that the sums of money that the British Parliament can make available for defence procurement purposes are spent to the best effect. The sum of money made available in this current year, for example, some £8.25 billion, is enormous by any standards and it is therefore a clear duty of mine to ensure that I get the best value for that money and the best equipment I can into the hands of the British armed forces. To achieve that I am quite clear that I now need to take a Europe-wide view of the main procurement projects that we undertake. Of course, that is not always possible. Sometimes there are particular projects for which we alone have the expertise. In other cases there will be projects where the expertise lies in other countries. So sometimes we shall be buying systems from other European countries and, indeed, from other countries around the world as well; but, perhaps more, we shall be conducting collaborative projects.

The cornerstone of European collaboration in which Britain participates at present is the European fighter aircraft project but there are other major projects coming along, too, and Mr. Wilkinson referred to some of them in his remarks about the helicopter industry. That is the answer to the question. My duty is to get the best value I can for the money that parliament makes available and I am clear that the major way to achieve that is through European collaboration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The President (continued)

Ladies and gentlemen, that brings to an end the questions to the Council members attending the sitting. I express to them my warm thanks for their co-operation.

8. European helicopters for the 1990s

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1077 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European helicopters for the 1990s and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1077 and amendments.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – My intervention is to express solidarity and, I would add, amity for our Chairman and Rapporteur, seeing that his report was unanimously approved by the committee.

To stress the importance attaching to the manufacture of helicopters and the market for them in Europe in terms of industry and modern military technology would be to repeat what is already familiar, and I shall not therefore go over this ground again.

Ladies and gentlemen, the quality of this report is already manifest in its table of contents, which shows how comprehensively the whole subject has been covered. I shall therefore address myself more to the realities behind our present debate.

My purpose is to draw attention to the relationship between our debate on helicopters and certain other discussions which have taken place over the last forty-eight hours. To begin with, we are talking about co-operation, and co-operation is, indeed, the basic theme of this report, which brings out the expertise we have gained, which is far from negligible, in the specific area of helicopters – a subject less familiar than aeronautics in general. This advance is properly stressed in the report, which shows where the strengths lie. Unfortunately, it also brings out the weak points, and I am grateful to our British Rapporteur for not side-stepping either the strengths or the weaknesses.

I shall dwell at greater length on the weak points, as it is these which have something to teach us. Wherever the report speaks in favour of European co-operation, such co-operation comes up against an obstacle of one kind or another.

We are in favour, in general defence terms, of linking up with our great American partners, and we are not opposed to some scientific or even industrial co-operation, where this is feasible between Europe and the United States. Here I will mention a French example, as my own country is also involved – in the non-pejorative sense of the word. I refer to SNECMA-GE co-operation on aircraft engines. This is a successful development, which we hope will be continued. But it must be said that we feel some apprehension about the Anglo-American partnership represented by Westland-Sikorsky helicopters. We need assurance that in this new development, in this new Anglo-American co-operation, we shall retain a degree of control, hopefully with a major British content, which implies a real European impact and not merely a position of subservience to the dominant American partner.

Having made this point, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to see us apply it to advantage when considering the current possibilities for co-operation. I trust that the Franco-German dialogue will produce practical results. This stage has not yet been reached, and I therefore hope that France itself will take heed of the remarks made by the French Prime Minister yesterday and that our German partners will reciprocate. You will have noted that the Prime Minister made reference to technology in the face of the unprecedented challenges we have to confront in the area of European security.

“Linking of requirements” were the words he used. This is an attractive concept, although a difficult one to implement and it entails the joint evaluation of military requirements in response to a threat which is in many ways identical. Generally speaking we Europeans have to confront an identical global threat, and joint evaluation is essential if major projects are not to be hamstrung by requirements which are too exclusive in their equipment specifications or in the timetables for their implementation. It is my hope that both the Germans and the French will adopt this recommendation with the need for discipline which it implies.

The Prime Minister’s reply to my specific question about WEU’s contribution to possible co-ordination between European industrialists and to obtaining manufacturers’ views on this subject also struck a positive note which is highly relevant to this aspect of our deliberations, and, I hope, to European military co-operation with all its industrial implications.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall now make a proposal which is liable to have budgetary consequences. Having regard to the debates which have taken place during this session, yesterday especially, and bearing in mind also the experience of previous colloquies

Mr. Valleix (continued)

successfully held in the past by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions – and here I am thinking both of the colloquy on aeronautical co-operation held in Toulouse with its follow-up two years later in Paris and of the Munich colloquy on space matters without necessarily contemplating an event of the same magnitude, since helicopters are a more specialised subject – and having regard finally to a suggestion by our French colleague, Mr. Prat, who is an expert on helicopter engines and has proposed that a study be carried out in this field, I take the liberty, Mr. President, of suggesting that a colloquy, or if not a colloquy then at least a meeting, should be organised. I apologise for making this proposal in a somewhat hasty fashion and without previously notifying the Chairman of the committee. I hope he will forgive me. But this would satisfy the aim of associating European industrialists with our parliamentary activities here and with governmental actions at Council level by bringing about meetings between partners in the defence industries – in this case between helicopter manufacturers. Such a meeting could also be arranged with representatives of our governments who specialise in these problems.

Such a measure might also provide us with an opportunity to show greater willingness to co-operate and to do so more effectively by widening our range of human contacts. In developing such contacts we could examine the more specific question of engines, which are a valuable trump card for the European helicopter industry.

Those, Mr. President, are the remarks I wished to make. They naturally imply enthusiastic and, I hope, unanimous support for the report. The adoption of my proposal, without overstraining our organisation's resources but taking account of the statements repeated again this morning, might enable us to carry co-operation further by bringing together the partners in industry who, in the final analysis, are the ones who give substance to the policy which we wish to see further reinforced between our seven countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you Mr. President, for calling me twice in a very short time.

I congratulate John Wilkinson, our Chairman, whose knowledge of aeroplanes, helicopters and other such matters is probably greater than that of anyone else on our committee. I am no expert on helicopters but I can recognise the great need for them. Troops need support of a type that they can feel is of help to them.

I urge – not necessarily on our Rapporteur who understands the point – the need for co-operation among the nations of WEU in buying and using military weapons. That was underlined by Lord Carrington and Lord Trefgarne. Such co-operation requires the will of parliaments, ministers and civil servants as well as industry. Everyone is jealous of industries in his own constituency yet it is vital for our collective defence that we co-operate.

When I first came to WEU about ten or eleven years ago I attended a colloquy at the National Assembly in Paris dealing with co-operation in weapons buying. I remember Herr Dornier speaking at that meeting. We have, alas, lost him in the past year or two. We have moved some distance since that time, but not nearly far enough. For the sake of the safety and defence of Europe, for the defence of the ratepayers and the taxpayers of Europe, we must co-operate so as to use the brains and the industry of our nations to produce the best weapons possible.

The Tornado plane has probably been the greatest success of such co-operative effort. The Tornado is based in my constituency at RAF Marham. I have been there and discussed this plane with the pilots and those who service it. They told me that they had grave doubts about the plane before it was put into service. Now they tell me that it is the best plane they have ever flown, quite the most wonderful plane to service and to look after, and a far greater success than they ever expected.

A side effect of helicopters is that they cause even more disturbance to the average population and country district than the Tornados, which make a heck of a noise. The Tornados fly over very quickly, but the helicopters fly low, over individuals and gardens. The children are frightened to death of them. Since my constituency is rural I have to tell members that the cows in calf sometimes give birth before they should because of the noise from the helicopters. Animals are frightened by helicopters.

I have in my constituency the largest battle training area in the United Kingdom, at Stanford...

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am in the same position in Germany.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I am interested to hear that comment. We are now to have an extension at Stanford, if the Ministry of Defence has its way. I support that proposal. The battle area will be extended by another 3 500 acres, involving three more villages. There have been meetings in the area over the past few weeks, not all of them full of sweetness and light.

Sir Paul Hawkins (continued)

The main questions are when helicopters will get quieter and whether we can prevent them from flying over villages. Pilots need a point of reference, but sometimes they seem to delight in flying over villages and herds of cattle. That may be a complete misunderstanding, but I hope that I shall be given a few words of reassurance about noise and the production of quieter helicopters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I now call the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a fruitful debate and I thank all the participants. I start by expressing my gratitude to the Clerk of the committee, Mr. Floris de Gou, who has been an unfailing source of wise advice and expertise. This is the first report on which he has assisted a rapporteur and our committee has been lucky to have him. I also thank Mrs. Wingate and all those who were responsible for the translation and typing of the report.

I thank Sir John Osborn for his observations. I greatly respect his industrial and European expertise and I assure him that, in the words of the Tom Lehrer song, "When I can I plagiarise and let no one else's work evade my eyes". However, I did not go so far as to lift whole sections from the report of the Select Committee on Defence, excellent as it is. It is a useful guide to the helicopter industry in the United Kingdom and Europe.

My report emphasises the lack of a civil market for helicopters in Europe. That is made clear in paragraphs 20 to 22, which spell out the disadvantage that we suffer compared with the United States. No doubt we and the helicopter business would benefit from European research and development being concerted more effectively, as Lord Carrington suggested, but I do not believe that the European Commission should involve itself in that task. I have never thought that bureaucratic intervention would solve the problem. The answer lies principally in concerting operational requirements and re-equipment timescales. The market must also play its part, because there is over-capacity and the companies involved must make profits in the manufacture of military equipment.

Our colleague, Mr. Stegagnini, said that the report should have laid greater stress on European collaboration. To be candid, I thought that it was almost wholly oriented towards an enhancement of such collaboration. Of course, as members of NATO, we cannot exclude the possibility of buying equipment from the United States or the possibility of transatlantic co-oper-

ation. Paragraphs 69 to 72 address themselves to that issue. A reasonable balance must be struck but the priority must be to ensure that the European industry collaborates effectively.

There was never really a battle for control of Westland. The stake of Sikorsky and Fiat was always a minority stake, even after its recent enlargement, though it could be argued that the participation of United Technologies in Westland gives it an additional influence and strength and a potential credibility to exploit the European market. A former Chairman and Rapporteur of our committee, Mr. Valleix, rightly reminded us of the importance of Franco-German collaboration in the new anti-helicopter and anti-tank helicopter being a success. We all wish that project well.

I am sure that my report has many weaknesses and I am sympathetic – as I hope is shown by my remarks and by the report – to the worries of Mr. Prat and others who rightly bring home to us the great importance to our security and our industrial base of the helicopter engine industry. Turboméca is a company of remarkable capability and expertise, as is the small engine division of Rolls-Royce. The colloquies that the committee and Assembly have sponsored have always been worthwhile and I am sympathetic to the idea of a parliamentary hearing involving industrialists. I am not sure that it should involve only helicopter industries, but perhaps it could examine the importance of the aero-engine industry for Europe's security.

I was glad that Mr. Valleix said that my country was to participate – to the extent of 10% – in Hermes. The committee and I have always said that the United Kingdom should support a manned space programme and the Hermes launcher. Hotol and Hermes are not mutually exclusive, but the CFM-56 is a power plant of exceptional capability and that is one reason why I suggested to the French Prime Minister yesterday that it would be good for European defence and for our aero-engine industry if the French air force and the Royal Air Force bought the Boeing E-3A aircraft equipped with the SNECMA-General Electric CFM-56 engine for airborne early warning.

My colleague, Sir Paul Hawkins, who is a stalwart of our committee and a great advocate of collaboration, reminded us of the dangers of a parochial attitude. We need a broad vision and the Tornado is a product of such vision. It is proving its worth, and the family of Franco-British helicopters – the Gazelle, the Lynx and the Puma – have also been remarkable successes.

We are all looking towards a successor generation of European helicopters. The Agusta 129 Mark II, the NH-90 and the Franco-German

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

anti-helicopter and anti-tank helicopter are the planes of the future, though that is not to say that there could not be a place for the Black Hawk built under licence, particularly if it had a European engine, the RTM-322.

We hope that you, Mr. President, feel that our deliberations have been fruitful. It has been a worthwhile debate and I look forward to moving on to the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank, you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your observations and replies.

I also wish to stress the quality and importance of your work in an area of outstanding interest, particularly to those aware of WEU's rôle. My only regret is that the obligations and commitments of many of our colleagues have prevented more representatives from taking part in the debate.

I am advised of two amendments to the draft recommendation on European helicopters for the 1990s tabled by Sir John Osborn.

Amendment 2 reads as follows:

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Bearing in mind the rôle of the EEC in co-ordinating manufacturing capacity, including that of the aircraft industry and, in particular, the helicopter industry; ”

I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I made my point about the amendment in the debate, in my question to Lord Trefgarne and in a letter to Lord Carrington.

We have a problem of co-ordination, co-operation and research, to which Lord Carrington referred, with helicopters and the aircraft industry. I felt that after paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation there should be a new paragraph, which has been discussed in the debate. Our Rapporteur accepted the point when I raised it in committee, and we discussed it yesterday. He is not keen, and I should like him to know that I am disappointed that we cannot grasp this nettle now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must give the advice of the committee clearly. We have discussed the amendment not once but twice, although I confess that the second consideration in committee was briefer yesterday. The

committee has never felt that the European Community was the right body within which to co-ordinate such manufacturing capacity. It has never had a rôle in co-ordinating manufacture within the aircraft industry in Europe. Such consortia as Airbus Industrie, Panavia, Europe's missile dynamics group and the space consortia have all progressed satisfactorily without the interference of EEC. We feel that IEPG is the right group for consultation on operational requirements and equipment timescales. We believe that our own body has a constructive co-ordinating rôle to play. Much as I sympathise and agree with the motivation behind the amendment, the advice of the committee would be to vote against it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I have decided not to tread on my Rapporteur's toes. I should like to withdraw my amendment. I should like you, Mr. President, to note the case that I have put and the Rapporteur's reply, bearing in mind that I have been a member of the European Parliament and that ministers have arms in many countries – WEU, IEPG, NATO and the part of the Community concerned with manufacturing capacity. I hope that the Secretary-General will note Mr. Wilkinson's response. Perhaps the point should be pressed in another way and on another occasion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The official report of this sitting will reflect faithfully the exchange of views which has just taken place between you and the Chairman of the committee. The whole Assembly as well as the committee will certainly watch future developments as regards the important point you have raised.

Amendment 2 is withdrawn.

Sir John Osborn has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Aware that the rôle of the helicopter in modern warfare is influenced by the use of anti-helicopter missiles such as the ‘Stinger’ and by the use of ‘anti-helicopter’ helicopters, ”

I call Sir John Osborn to support his amendment.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I introduce this amendment on the tactical side. In it I refer to the “Stinger”, but I could have used the word “Blowpipe” or any other equipment.

You regretted, Mr. President, that we had not had contributions on a big enough scale from

Sir John Osborn (continued)

members of other committees. The tactical use of any equipment, let alone strategic use, should be subject to the opinions of other committees, but that is not a point that I want to press.

The third report of the British Select Committee on Defence, to which I referred and on which Mr. Wilkinson commented, summarised the helicopters in service with British forces and future requirements. I am certain that other NATO and WEU countries have defined theirs. Mr. Wilkinson dealt ably with the tactical side. I have great respect for his mastery of the subject. Paragraph 14 of the explanatory memorandum states:

"The helicopter has once again confirmed its position as a very important if not indispensable means of personnel and logistic support. However, the vulnerability of transport helicopters, in particular to ground-air missiles and other anti-aircraft defence in the frontal zone, is significant."

My amendment ensures that that is mentioned in the preamble and the recommendation. I am grateful for information in Jane's Defence Weekly of 15th November, which refers to the use of Stinger by the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. It states:

"sources said rebel forces have destroyed at least nine Soviet and Afghan helicopters and one or two jet aircraft."

Reference is made to the impact on Soviet helicopters and heliborne Spetsnaz special operations forces, which have attempted to stop supplies of those weapons. The most remarkable effect has been not on the Russians but on the rebels in two respects. First, the supply of those anti-helicopter missiles has been a boost to their morale as the outside world seems not to have forgotten them. Secondly, the SA-7 missile was not reliable. It did not take to being carted over mountains and conked out. The Stinger has proved to be more reliable. The trouble is that the Soviets have defensive mechanisms for steering missiles such as the Stinger away. Infrared screening and the use of flares are examples of that.

In another sense, the use of those weapons in Angola and the help being given to Savimbi is important, but what is much more significant than the use of the Stinger in Afghanistan is the use of the Blowpipe. The Soviets have means of defending their helicopters from heat-seeking missiles such as the Stinger. However, the Blowpipe is optically guided. The advantages and disadvantages of the Blowpipe and Stinger are relevant.

This is a tactical subject that should have been debated in the context of the report. I hope that reference will be made to it in the recommendation. I therefore ask Mr. Wilkinson, who is very competent and well versed in the matter, to reconsider what we discussed in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must remind the Assembly that the committee considered this matter twice, and twice came down unanimously against accepting the amendment. It is technically correct that the Stinger is an effective weapon. Sir John Osborn rightly reminded us of the success of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan when they have used the weapon against Soviet helicopters. The amendment refers to just one hand-held anti-helicopter weapon, and to accept it would distort the preamble to the recommendation, which concerns helicopters for the 1990s. Sir John Osborn mentioned paragraph 14, but paragraphs 15 and 16 and, to some extent, 17 also refer to tactical issues. We should not distort the report with such tactical additions. Again I sympathise with the spirit of the amendment and I know that, in detail, my friend and colleague is right, but I ask the committee not to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I had agreed that I would have welcomed Mr. Wilkinson moving on this subject, but he has not. There are four paragraphs on tactics and I had hoped that there could have been reference in the recommendation to the tactical use of helicopters.

Helicopters have been useful in the Falklands, Vietnam and other theatres of war. Modern technology produces equipment that might make the rôle of the helicopter less certain, but then the users of helicopters developed equipment to overcome Blowpipe and Stinger. The helicopter has been important in all defence operations, but it is vulnerable. I had hoped that Mr. Wilkinson would accept that point in the preamble, but if he will not, I hope that you, Mr. President, will note that it is for other committees to consider this matter. I hope that Mr. Wilkinson will continue to review helicopters and that other committees will comment on the report. I also hope that the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament will comment so that WEU can continue its work. I therefore withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 1 is withdrawn.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Can you tell us under what rule you are permitting speeches concerning the withdrawal of an amendment? I have glanced through the rules twice and can see none that permits a member to withdraw an amendment without getting the consent of the Assembly. Some of us wanted to support Sir John Osborn. As there appears not to be a rule in this connection, do you agree, Mr. President, that the Rules Committee should consider the matter so that the point is covered in future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In view of the very interesting exchange which has just taken place on the two amendments, the necessary steps should be taken so that the recommendation by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions can take account of the exchange of views on these two amendments, which have been withdrawn but which have elicited an important reply from the Chairman of the committee.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Is it in order for me to suggest that we have the views of Sir Paul Hawkins, Sir John Page and Sir Anthony Grant so that we have the concerted effort of all the British knights present?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your humour always finds a ready response in the chamber. We shall none the less vote on the unamended draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I had assumed that Mr. Wilkinson's report would be accepted without question, although I expected Sir John Osborn's amendment to be accepted by his conservative colleague. I came in to support Sir John Osborn's amendment. As a fellow South Yorkshire member of parliament, I felt that I had some obligation in that regard. Where do I stand? The amendment is the property of the Assembly, not of Sir John Osborn. I came to support it, but he has apparently been allowed to withdraw it. Dr. Miller has described the difference in standing between Mr. Wilkinson and Sir John Osborn, but I expected them to accommodate each other. They have not, and I want to support Sir John Osborn's amendment. Although I listened carefully to Mr. Wilkinson, who speaks with great authority on these matters, I still believe that what Sir John Osborn said should be considered properly by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are perfectly at liberty to take over the amendment withdrawn by Sir John Osborn. We are, I think, referring to Amendment 1, which was the second to be tabled.

So, Mr. Hardy is now sponsoring Amendment 1, tabled and then withdrawn by Sir John Osborn. I shall follow the prescribed procedure and ask if anyone wishes to speak against the amendment. This reopens the debate, but is entirely in order.

I call Lady Jill Knight on a point of order.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – This is an important departure from the rules which we have all understood. Certainly, in the House of Commons if a question is tabled and the person concerned is not there to present that question or wishes to withdraw it, we have no right to put supplementary questions. My view has always been that the person who has put down an amendment has the right to withdraw it. Surely that cannot be overturned by some objection at the last moment. I beg you, Mr. President, to recognise that to allow another member to pick up an amendment that has been dropped by the person who tabled it is an important departure from the rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, if you wish, we have time for a debate on procedure for the enlightenment of the Assembly. Before calling Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, who wishes to speak on this subject, I should point out that I have consulted the Rules of Procedure with special reference to the rules covering this issue.

I have decided to accept the proposal of Mr. Hardy who is now sponsoring an amendment which had been withdrawn. In this case the final decision lies with the President of the Assembly. The Rules of Procedure are not specific on this point.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I wonder, Mr. President, whether you can kindly tell us how far back we may go to reopen matters that have been decided. It had been decided for good or ill – and I thought for ill – that Sir John should be allowed to withdraw his amendment; and you have quite rightly proceeded, saying that we were going to take a vote. You have now changed that decision and that puts all of us who normally would wish to support the chair in an impossible position. How far back may we now go and perhaps decide that we may want to take up Sir John Osborn's Amendment 2, which came before Amendment 1? It puts us in a difficult position, Mr. President, if, having given a ruling, you are then persuaded to change it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I can only agree with your comments, Sir Geoffrey, but it is up to me to decide whether a proposal by members can be entertained when an amendment is withdrawn. The fact is that an amendment remains the property of the

The President (continued)

Assembly. If any member present wishes to take over an amendment, I consider that to be within the Assembly's rights. There is nothing in the Rules of Procedure to prevent such a course. That, in any event, is my ruling.

I am grateful to you, Sir Geoffrey. I am aware of your close reasoning and of the honesty and objectivity of all you say about the Rules of Procedure. I shall ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine this case with reference to our debate so that there can be no argument.

I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not wish to dispute the fact that a member is always entitled to take over an amendment which has been withdrawn by someone else. In the present case, however, I would ask whether there is not a requirement to comply with the time-limit for tabling amendments before the start of the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the absence of any requirements laid down in the Rules of Procedure, I am unable to answer your questions. The chair confirms the right of a member of the Assembly to take over an amendment which has been previously withdrawn but has not yet been voted on. This is the right and privilege of every Assembly president.

For the completeness of the debate, does anyone, with the exception of the committee, wish to speak against?...

I call Sir Paul Hawkins to oppose Amendment 1.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I am against this amendment because it was considered twice in the committee and to the best of my recollection was unanimously turned down on the second occasion: I was not present on the first. On that reasoning I feel that we should not reopen discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Paul.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Sir Paul Hawkins summarised the position quite accurately. The verbal amendment of Mr. Hardy, which is identical to Amendment 1 of Sir John Osborn, was considered in detail by the committee on two occasions, on the second occasion in rather less detail than on the first. We had a very full debate the first time and on both occasions the committee voted unanimously against it. I think that there is no reason now to incorporate it in the text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

We shall now vote on Amendment 1 tabled and withdrawn by Sir John Osborn and now sponsored by Mr. Hardy and opposed by the committee.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1077.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless at least five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft recommendation to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I call Dr. Miller for an explanation of vote.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – May I give an explanation of vote, Mr. President? I voted in favour because I felt that there was nothing in the report with which I did not completely agree. I apologise to the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee for not taking part in the debate, as I understand he would have liked others to do. I had to prepare two speeches for debates which, unfortunately, did not take place, concerning a committee of which I am a member.

I know John Wilkinson's competence in this and other areas and, on reading his report, I found it to be excellent. His draft recommendation was equally excellent. I felt that what I should do was to ensure that I voted for it. I whole-heartedly and unreservedly apologise for not speaking during the debate, when I would have said something similar to the remarks that I have just made.

¹. See page 31.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Dr. Miller. What you say is well and agreeably put.

I forgot to reply to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on one point.

Following the withdrawal of Amendment 2, which was tabled first, I could not have allowed a representative, as I allowed Mr. Hardy, to take over the tabled amendment since it had already been disposed of. I was able to do this only in the case of the later amendment on which no decision had yet been taken.

The point of this comment is to convey to you the view of the chair concerning an amendment taken over during a sitting.

***9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3.25 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
2. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1081).
3. Parliamentary and public relations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1080).
4. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1079).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.)

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1986

SUMMARY

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attendance register.2. Adoption of the minutes.3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
<i>Replies by Mr. Spadolini to questions put by:</i> Mr. Sarti, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Close, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Pollidoro, Mr. Inan (<i>Observer from Turkey</i>), Mr. Budtz (<i>Observer from Denmark</i>), Mr. Hill, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Bianco.4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1081</i>).
<i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Morris, Mrs. Hennicot- | <ol style="list-style-type: none">Schoepges (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Lady Jill Knight (<i>Chairman of the committee</i>), Mr. Tummers.5. Parliamentary and public relations (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1080</i>).
<i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mr. Terlezki (<i>Rapporteur</i>), Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hill, Mr. Enders, Mr. Terlezki (<i>Rapporteur</i>).6. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (<i>Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1079</i>).
<i>Speakers:</i> The President, Mr. Close (<i>Rapporteur</i>).7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting. |
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The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

I am greatly honoured, Minister, to welcome you in the name of the Assembly to this chamber which you know so well, having taken part in some major debates particularly since the Rome decision to reactivate WEU.

May I salute you as one of the eminent members of the Council of Ministers, and the Italian Minister of Defence. I would recall the determined part you have played in giving WEU its particular character in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Treaty and enabling it to respond to the challenge of a world situation and world events in which Europe and especially WEU have a crucial rôle to play.

With you to spur it on, the influence of WEU can only be more strongly felt and produce more concrete results. It is in that spirit that I am glad to invite you to the rostrum.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly of Western European Union, it is my pleasure, speaking for the Italian Government, to stress the value of this session of WEU.

Great world events, which were to some extent unexpected and disconcerting, have sharpened European thoughts on defence policy. Such reflection naturally finds its place here in your Assembly which as the French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, said yesterday is one of the keystones of European construction and the high point in the life of WEU, with governments and parliamentarians working together for the construction

¹. See page 34.

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

of European defence which must have the consensus support that can only be expressed through the parliaments.

If anyone had any doubts until yesterday there can now be no further doubt that the road to unification and a European identity lies through a common defence policy.

The meeting between the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party at Reykjavik was an unexpected turning-point in the disarmament negotiations and unquestionably produced moments of drama and surprises for everyone and possibly also for the people actually involved.

For the first time since the end of the war there was a feeling that the two superpowers were on the point of making mutual concessions of great significance for peace. Clearly there was a leap forward. This was not merely an exercise aimed principally at impressing public opinion, as had unfortunately been the case on many occasions during the prolonged negotiations in Geneva. World public opinion and European public opinion in particular realised, as the results of the summit gradually became known, that this time both sides – although probably for completely different reasons – really wished at least to reduce the vast nuclear arsenals which have been growing for too long as though by a vast process of spontaneous reproduction.

Although no agreement was reached in Reykjavik, amazing steps forward were taken towards a realistic dialogue and in particular towards agreeing methods for such a dialogue. From one standpoint we can say that nothing will ever be the same again after Reykjavik. The method of such negotiation has been changed crucially and the point of no return has probably been passed.

Paradoxically, although Europe was not present in the Icelandic capital where the fate of the world was being decided, the discussions principally concerned Europe. What was basically at stake was the future form of our defensive structure; the first consequence of this should therefore be to strengthen in us Europeans, over and above any other consideration, our desire for a specific defence union if we wish to continue, as for so long during our history, to be if not the main protagonists at least essential characters on the world political scene.

Above all it is now apparent that Europe can no longer put off the determination of a European security structure taking proper account of all forms of deterrence; that is of the unified security framework within which the various separate negotiations for armaments

control can be carried on and assessed. In other words it is pointless to conduct and assess the negotiations separately when there is only a single security equation.

This is not to be seen as an effort to seek criteria of "commensurability" between nuclear armaments and conventional forces; it is an affirmation that the concept of security is one and indivisible.

The Soviet-American summit in Reykjavik opened wide prospects for an ambitious stage in disarmament. Admittedly, the summit was not conclusive and the events and declarations which have followed the meeting pose questions concerning the intended objectives.

These new prospects which the Italian Government welcomes with great hope and confidence, mean that we Europeans must think about how to ensure that "more disarmament" is matched by "more security", above all for our continent which is at the heart of East-West relations. It is not a matter here of putting obstacles in the way of the procedure outlined at Reykjavik or of going back to certain sector agreements, such as the zero option for theatre nuclear weapons which was the basis of the dual-track decision taken in NATO on the deployment of Euromissiles. What is needed rather is consideration of how this result can be attained in a situation of equilibrium and security.

From this point of view, the zero option for long-range theatre nuclear missiles clearly leaves a continuing heavy imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact in the number of short-range missiles deployed for distances under 1 000 kilometres. As the zero option must not be challenged again, equal emphasis must be laid on the need for a speedy restoration of the balance for short-range missiles. This balance should be restored over the same time span as the implementation of the zero option. We cannot ignore the fact that since the so-called Euromissiles were deployed in Europe the Soviet Union has undertaken a massive increase of its capability in that sector, with a preponderance of nine to one according to NATO estimates. This is not a problem we can ignore – the zero option is a combined military, political and moral choice – as it is linked with humanitarian intentions. That is why we demand that, together with any agreement on the zero option for longer-range Euromissiles, an agreement should be reached at the same time to restore the balance for short-range missiles and tactical systems.

If other Soviet nuclear systems are capable of threatening the targets we wish to protect by eliminating the SS-20, Pershing and cruise missiles, then, if we wish to maintain the idea of removing the threat of theatre weapons, we must consider

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

all theatre weapons and not concentrate on what would be the mere appearance of an agreement.

It is difficult to see at the moment when the necessary agreements can and should be reached and how they should be made as symmetrical as possible. But we should here and now give some thought to how mutual security can be safeguarded if the zero option, which still has our full support, becomes reality.

There are two possible ways: either sufficient short-range missiles can be deployed to reach parity with the Warsaw Pact forces or we can give more detailed consideration in WEU to the creation of a non-nuclear ground-based anti-missile system within the wider concept of defence against attack from the air.

This raises the question of how, without the security provided by the deterrent effect of intermediate-range weapons, Europe can accept the existing imbalance of conventional forces. Is Western Europe prepared to increase its conventional forces by the substantial measure required to bring them up to the level of the eastern bloc forces? Or is the eastern bloc prepared to bring its own conventional forces down to levels at which they no longer pose a threat or exert pressure on Western Europe?

From a backward look at the deterrent, it seems clear therefore that everything takes us back to the origin of the problem, namely the imbalance of conventional forces, the great issue to which this Assembly has also devoted much attention. There can be no question of starting to make changes in the deterrent if no action is taken to correct the imbalance which first created the need for the deterrent itself.

The Italian Government agrees with Lord Carrington's remark that the "most vulnerable point of NATO is the imbalance between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact as regards conventional forces".

Today, after Reykjavik and its extraordinary breakthrough there is new light on the possible terms of a balance which will ensure security. We must, however, take account of the fact that no substantial progress has been achieved during the years of talks on mutual balanced conventional force reductions, although we should not underestimate the most recent results of the Stockholm conference on multilateral security measures, advance notice by both sides and the observation of military activities.

Serious negotiations on conventional forces should be proposed to the Russians and fully publicised in order to persuade Moscow to commit itself to a drastic cut in its forces; this

measure would provide a real basis for stability and security in Europe.

The Budapest appeal for conventional disarmament therefore calls for an adequate reply containing clear negotiating proposals for defreezing the situation.

It is a matter of obtaining the necessary guarantees so that during the implementation of the zero option and the elimination of the imbalance of short-range missiles, the negotiations for a balanced reduction of conventional forces can achieve significant progress leading to greater security.

But while this is proceeding very gradually as it must, the Italian Government fully agrees with the three points made by Lord Carrington who of course spoke in the name of the whole Atlantic Alliance but, above all, interpreted the requirements of the so-called European pillar of the alliance which corresponds to the underlying logic of WEU.

While a greater effort to restore a conventional balance in Europe is awaited, we urge that WEU should commit itself actively in three directions: first, concerted efforts by our defence ministers to improve conventional defences by means of long-term programmes based on the use of advanced technology; second, the creation of European research and development agencies in the key sector of defence production; third, the pursuit of an industrial defence policy based on common European rules and practices for purchases and supplies.

In all these three directions WEU can do a great deal by establishing procedures aimed at co-ordination and agreement on financial, legal and technological matters.

I welcome Mr. Chirac's proposal for major joint armaments projects.

As Europeans we wish to make an active contribution to the disarmament process. This will only be possible if the process we would like to see guarantees our security within the Atlantic Alliance because there can be no European security outside the alliance. We do not wish to lay down binding preconditions for the various stages. We do however wish the process to be balanced. This will guarantee progress towards the successful achievement of this vital objective.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe is now feeling increasingly isolated. "Irangate" with all its complications and all the problems it has created for our American allies is the source of new concern and also new dangers in the Mediterranean, to which a country like the one for which I am speaking is particularly sensitive having recently experienced all the aggression and threats of international terrorism.

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

The anti-terrorist agreement established between Europe and the United States in the Tokyo declaration at the cost of many sacrifices and doubts – which dominated our work in Venice and also Luxembourg – seems to be in danger or at least to require drafting in fresh terms against the background of an America in torment from self-doubt.

Defence against terrorism and defence of the Mediterranean in the wider context of European defence are two closely-linked issues. We must use all our forces including those of countries which are not members of the military alliance. Both for the negotiations on conventional forces and for fresh studies into means of protecting Europe if the zero option is adopted, France's contribution is essential; and we must once again pay tribute to this Assembly which brings together a variety of institutions and views under the common European banner.

As I am the first member of the Italian Government to speak after the Prime Minister of the French Republic, Mr. Chirac, I must say that the proposal for a European security charter, of which the practical specific content will have to be considered, is a worthwhile proposal for Western European Union and one which should receive the full attention of all the European states including countries like Portugal and Spain which Mr. Chirac also mentioned.

We agree that deterrence in Europe requires the closest strategic unity between Western Europe and the United States and we are convinced that the political strengthening of Europe requires a common defence in line with the ideas of the great federalist tradition which we have supported for many years. There are however, independent views on ways of achieving the zero option and these views must be at the heart of this and future debates before the fixing of any common bases accepted by and acceptable to everyone and valid for a European security charter designed to meet the needs of the seven countries.

To conclude, our aim is to restore a partner relationship between Europe and the United States based on a consistent and courageous acceptance of European responsibilities – that is our responsibilities – in matters of conventional defence, which are taking on vital importance for the security which we must all feel to be European; otherwise there will be no security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. As is the custom in this Assembly – and with your agreement – a number of representatives will now put questions to you.

I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Spadolini, you have spoken to us today as Minister of Defence of the Italian Government but I am sure that as the former editor of some of Italy's leading newspapers you will have noted an outstanding feature of this morning's European press. Because of your efforts, those of members of government and above all of our President, Mr. Caro, WEU has today hit the headlines in the main European dailies. This is of vital importance to us. My question is can the Italian Government confirm the statements made during the recent debate in the Italian Parliament on the finance bill that the Government of the Italian Republic is prepared to give speedy practical effect to its sympathetic attitude towards increasing the Assembly's resources as requested and repeatedly affirmed throughout this debate, in Mr. Bianco's report and during the whole course of our work?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I must thank Mr. Sarti for his appreciation of the Italian Government's contribution to the recent reactivation of WEU following the Rome conference to celebrate the organisation's thirtieth anniversary which put an end to the separation of the foreign and defence ministries and associated them in giving guidance to the heads of an organisation, which is the only one empowered to discuss European security and in so doing removed a number of shortcomings which had been revealed by experience.

As the ex-editor of a newspaper I also share his satisfaction at seeing WEU on the front page of the leading European dailies. This is more than a mere article; it is the consequence of a renewed and sharper European awareness which derives also from the singular and complex manner of Europe's reaction to Reykjavik when it found itself in the middle of major discussions from which it seemed somehow to be excluded. There is a clear need for us all to assert our identity as a continent and an identity on the way to a future common defence.

On the third point I can give an absolute guarantee to Mr. Sarti regarding the Italian Government's commitment, as declared by Mr. Andreotti and myself in Luxembourg, to provide funds to supplement the very miserly budgets which the European states allow to WEU. I can do so with even more certainty because the finance bill has already been approved by one house of parliament – the one of which I am not a member – and the bill is now before the senate. I can also guarantee my personal support as a senator.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you will not be surprised that there have been several Italian speakers, not because of any national alignment or nationalist attitudes but chiefly in expression of our gratitude to Mr. Spadolini for his contribution to this debate. This is not the first time he has been with us.

I share his overall assessment, expressing the view of a leading newspaper man, when he said that after Reykjavik nothing will be the same as before and that we are faced with the consequences whether good or bad.

In this context I have two questions to ask.

Does Mr. Spadolini think that serious negotiations on conventional weapons involving Europe, which is about to be organised and regards the strengthening of WEU as of vital importance, should take up this most serious of all problems once the nuclear shields have been withdrawn and could make reasonable further economic, administrative and industrial efforts to achieve conventional rearmament? Because a conventional balance will not fall from heaven.

My second question is as follows. Seeing that wars are now either fought by proxy or with concealed bombs, does Mr. Spadolini, who has so often spoken on the subject of international terrorism, think that WEU could set up special bodies for this kind of war, not to take the place of the police or the courts in the democratic countries where the rule of law applies but to create a special awareness of the terrorist threat as it affects European defence?

May I remind Mr. Spadolini that a great deal has been said at this session concerning security in the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – With my thanks to Mr. Cifarelli for his appreciation of the government's attitude, I shall now try to answer his two questions.

I think that any serious negotiations on conventional weapons, for which I have called formally after Stockholm, must be based on the willingness of the governments favouring them to provide the necessary means for conventional defence on a rising scale inversely proportionate to any reduction of nuclear weapons for which we must work.

To the extent that we have serious hopes – and it was not by accident that I mentioned the Budapest appeal – that once the nuclear negotiations have been started towards the zero option, which will take a number of years, the Soviet Union will back this mutual reduction of the level of deterrence in Eastern Europe, the greater our conviction that good results can quickly be

achieved with the level of each side's conventional forces and the greater must be our readiness to back their effort. We are well aware that conventional weapons cost more but no country should sit back behind the permanent nuclear shield of the United States; this applies particularly, of course, to countries which have no nuclear weapons of their own and I am therefore referring specifically to the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy which have always observed their commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

I think, therefore, that this effort should be made to match the momentum of détente and the advance towards a better relationship than at present between the two sides in continental Europe itself because otherwise it is clear that by giving up even a minimum defence policy, Europe would give up the search for and the defence of its identity – I use the term made famous by Braudel concerning the identity of France.

I must say that this awareness of common European security is shared in my country not only by the government parties but also by the biggest opposition party. It would be well to read carefully, as I have done, the joint document on European security put before parliament, which says much the same things as I have said in this Assembly.

The second point concerns wars by proxy and concealed wars. I took part in a debate at Venice and urged a measure which was not very great but to some extent anticipated WEU's interest in defining the means for a co-ordinated fight against terrorism. The Venice conference took place five or six days before the Tokyo conference with its declaration committing the industrialised countries to a common political fight against terrorism in preference to the military option.

I would say to Mr. Cifarelli that I do not believe that WEU can set up institutions in the true sense but should help to establish the conditions for a joint analysis of terrorism and for this purpose the existing groups are of great importance particularly in the connection, which I tried to establish in my previous report at Luxembourg, between the defence of the Mediterranean and defence against terrorism which in the Mediterranean is a by no means negligible part of the warlike aggression.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Yesterday, Mr. Chirac declared himself unequivocally in favour of enlarging WEU to include Portugal and Spain. Is that your position, too, in view of the fact that it would bring our southern flank into balance with Central Europe? At the

Mr. Close (continued)

moment, the southern flank consists solely of Italy as against six Central European countries.

In your address you said that a possible counter to the presence of SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 short-range missiles was a renewed quantitative balance or the redeployment of an anti-missile system by the Europeans.

Would you agree, Minister, with the conclusion that even if we achieve this new balance, it would not constitute in any way the same deterrent that theatre nuclear forces gave us at European level?

These short-range missiles, equipped with nuclear, chemical or conventional warheads, are capable of covering the whole of Europe whereas the response that we would command would not allow us in any eventuality to reach Soviet territory. In other words, deterrence at this level is non-existent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – In reply to Mr. Close I would say that my government and I myself favour the entry of Spain and Portugal into WEU. The subject was discussed in detail at the most recent meeting of foreign and defence ministers in Luxembourg.

There must be a balance between the southern flank of the alliance, the importance of which has become crystal clear in recent years and what I might call Central Europe. I see this not so much in terms of more or fewer Romance language speakers as compared with those of Anglo-Saxon stock. I would not say this, particularly because I believe that Spain is essential to Western Europe now that the Iberian peninsula has awakened from its centuries-old slumber in "Spanishness" as though it were different from Europe. This I would say is the chief new feature in the discreet enquiries from Spain and the open application from Portugal to join WEU.

Looking at the ideas which have always determined the course of history this is the one of most importance. Spain and Portugal now feel themselves to be part of European defence; thirty of forty years ago this was a completely foreign idea because of a lingering centuries-old philosophy, regardless of the totalitarian régimes in both countries. Hence the importance of this point.

There is, however, another important point which must be mentioned as we have now touched on this delicate issue. I am referring to the fact that the entry of Spain and Portugal comes at a time which has seen the full emergence of common awareness in the seven coun-

tries without reservation or distinction. From this point of view it might be tactically wise for enlargement to take place after reactivation of the organisation has been completed as was suggested in Luxembourg.

We must bear in mind, however, the moral, political and may I say cultural value of Spain and Portugal's adhesion for European defence and for maintaining a balance between the defence of Central and Mediterranean Europe.

The second point is problematic. I did not state a choice. What I said was that, in the context of the dominant importance of conventional defence, there were two possible approaches. Either to deploy a number of short-range missiles in order to have parity during the negotiations – and in any case the suggestion in Reykjavik was that fresh negotiations on such missiles should be started within six months. This is the first approach. The second I suggested might be for WEU to make more detailed studies aimed at a non-nuclear ground-based anti-missile system, within the concept of enlarged defence against attack from the air.

I do not wish to be too definite and categorical on this second point. Looking at the problem of nuclear deterrence it is clear to me that this type of anti-missile defence has no deterrent effect on a potential competitor who has any kind of nuclear system. But we here start from the different point that, within the need for a balance after long-range missiles have been withdrawn, the element of extended air defence, particularly against missiles, must be evaluated for the defence of Europe. Naturally, of course, it has to be remembered that France and the United Kingdom are still independent nuclear powers; if we had forgotten this we were clearly reminded of the fact yesterday by Mr. Chirac here in WEU. I would say, therefore, that this is a legitimate matter of concern but less so in the thought that we shall have to look for a kind of defence based progressively less on deterrence of the enemy and more on the belief that everyone is working for a new world order in which ultimately there will be no further need for deterrence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Spadolini, I shall be asking you the question I have already put in writing to Mr. Chirac from whom I am expecting a written reply.

As you know, the Italian Parliament has for some time been discussing a new law on the arms trade which is a burning issue these days both nationally and internationally. May I ask you if you do not think that, before any final national legislation is adopted on the subject, steps should be taken at international level and particularly in WEU to promote an agreement or

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

at least precise directives on the subject, common to all the European countries which are major producers of modern weapons and that we should not adopt specific national measures or attitudes which may damage the Italian industry or even give rise to unfair competition and disputes with companies in allied countries?

I think this is an important point and that WEU is the best place for its discussion. I should be grateful for a reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence for Italy*) (Translation). – I would in a way like to reverse Mr. Stegagnini's question and ask him and the other Italian representatives to WEU to launch an initiative on the subject both in the Parliament of the Italian Republic and in the other parliaments. This is in fact an initiative which would come much better from parliaments than from governments as I myself tabled a bill on the arms trade in Italy about eighteen months ago, together with I think seven or eight other ministers. This bill has been redrafted in parliament by a small committee and will come up for debate within a few days or weeks.

The point put by Mr. Stegagnini is undoubtedly correct. Without binding international agreements, no country can control the arms trade and particularly clandestine and illegal trade; just as I say to Mr. Stegagnini, as I have been saying almost alone for years – no country can possibly fight terrorism without a world agreement on anti-terrorist law. They are the same thing because, may I also say, the arms trade and terrorism have been closely interlinked over the last fifteen years. Just as rules are needed for Europe and beyond Europe to combat all evasions and breaches in the arms trade, the same applies to the totally out-of-date and inadequate laws for the fight against terrorism even though some progress has been made recently.

I must say, not purely in defence of my country which has many faults which I have sometimes criticised bitterly, that as regards the arms trade we are certainly not masters of anybody and our national defence is open to great damage from other countries as regards armaments and ruthless competition. I think therefore that the line you suggested is not easy or immediately achievable but I see it as an essential target for mankind and for Europe if we are to escape from all the politically destabilising factors which the unlimited and monstrously swollen trade in arms carries with it.

I conclude by recalling that Lord Carrington spoke of joint procedures for sales and purchases, naturally of a legal nature. The real

problem is to limit and end all illicit arms purchases.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pollidoro.

Mr. POLLIDORO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I welcome your statements and your positive attitude on two points in particular.

The first is your assessment of the results of Reykjavik which has opened fresh prospects for the East-West negotiations on disarmament. The second is that you have reiterated in strong terms the correct western position on the zero option.

I am also pleased because the attitude to the outcome of the Luxembourg meeting has seemed to me to be somewhat confused at this session of WEU. We have for example heard suggestions concerning the need for a kind of European SDI which in our opinion would in no way help good relations with the Soviet Union as we must be ready and willing to continue the disarmament negotiations. There also seems to have been some alarm amongst European politicians concerning the possibility that a disarmament agreement might be reached with Eastern Europe. This, I repeat, is what we seem to understand from certain European political forces.

Since the Luxembourg meeting I have read in the *Voce Repubblicana* a statement by you that "in view of the probable imbalance of conventional weapons between East and West the need is to reduce their potential or to increase ours". We can only repeat that we are ready for this. I wish to thank you for having quoted the recent Communist Party report on security policy in Europe and the world which we submitted to Mr. Caro and Lord Carrington to explain the attitude of the Italian Communist Party to international questions and to the alliances, including NATO, of which we are a member.

Regarding your statement that it is necessary to reduce their potential or increase ours, I would ask you if you consider it more useful, if we are aiming at the lowest possible level, to find out exactly what the Soviet attitude is. That is, do you consider it more useful to "see the cards" and ascertain real attitudes as demonstrated by the Stockholm experience, and the new attitudes of the new leaders. Or do you consider it better to arm at once to restore the balance and then to negotiate which would appear to be the view of some political circles? Or again, would it be better to rearm during the negotiations? Rather, might not this trigger off a new race? This is an important question. Do you favour verifying the negotiating cards first? Otherwise the attitude would be to rearm first and then negotiate but this seems to have failed at least as regards the power which has favoured it over the last few

Mr. Pollidoro (continued)

years. I should be very interested to hear your reply on this point.

So far as Italy is concerned we of the Communist Party are in favour of increasing allocations for the reactivation of WEU and have already declared ourselves in favour of this in the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I have no difficulty in replying because I said in my first speech that serious negotiations on conventional weapons should be proposed to the Soviets at once and fully publicised to persuade Moscow to agree to a drastic reduction of its forces. Clearly if the negotiations failed or ran up against insurmountable obstacles, the European countries should in the interval consider ways and means of beginning to strengthen their conventional weapons, a process which would probably take longer than the negotiations. I have every confidence therefore in repeating that my view is that negotiations on conventional weapons should be restarted immediately.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am pleased to note the presence of one other Mediterranean representative in the chamber, since France gives the impression of not wanting to be identified with the Mediterranean. I express my satisfaction and sincere thanks to Mr. Spadolini for presenting a Mediterranean viewpoint today as he did last June.

With considerable wisdom, he has described the disregard there is in the Atlantic Alliance and Europe proper for the Mediterranean region as far as defence is concerned with all the risks that such an attitude entails. This needs repeating and the attention of Europe and the countries of the Atlantic Alliance needs to be drawn to the Mediterranean which has, unfortunately, become an ocean of crisis.

I would like, if I may, to put a direct question. Both Mr. Chirac yesterday and Mr. Spadolini today clearly expressed the viewpoints of their respective governments with regard to enlargement and we are grateful to them for doing so. However, only two countries were mentioned with any frequency.

We would, of course, be happy to see Spain and Portugal in Western European Union but this somewhat insistent preference smacks to us of limitation. It is not very "nice", really, given

our presence in this chamber and the interest we take in the defence of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance in general.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to thank the representative of our Turkish friends for having so strongly supported the Italian Government's position on defence in an area which has hitherto so far been unduly neglected in the Mediterranean which is the focus of crises and I would say of every crisis. I confirm the links between the governments of our two countries.

As regards armaments there is no limit to be set to what is a European concept and to a certain extent a universal concept. I would merely add that the Turkish Republic is not yet a member of the European Community and that these problems have to be approached gradually but without prejudice and exclusions, realising that the construction of Europe including its common defence will take what may probably not be a very short time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Budtz.

Mr. BUDTZ (*Observer from Denmark*). – Thank you for giving another observer the floor, Mr. President.

My question has already been partly asked. I should like to inform the Minister that I am a social democrat from Denmark, and he is probably aware that in all the Western European social democratic parties we are having a serious debate on the future rôle of Europe. We are not in the slightest doubt that there must be a new rôle for Europe. The big problem is where, how and when. Of course, one of the possibilities must be WEU. Understandably, that has been mentioned. I am happy to note that the French Prime Minister yesterday and the Italian Minister of Defence today underlined the need for Europe to play a much bigger and more prominent rôle.

You, Mr. Spadolini, and Mr. Chirac mentioned two countries – Spain and Portugal. Mr. Inan also referred to them. That is probably because those two countries have already applied for membership. That is understandable, and I fully respect it. I am not even sure that Denmark will ever apply for membership, but there are five other NATO countries – Turkey, Greece, Iceland, Norway and Denmark. I might be right in assuming why you did not mention those five countries, but I am not sure that it is clever to try to split Europe in that way.

After Reykjavik, we are all aware that Europe must play a new and much more prominent rôle. There is not the slightest doubt about that, and

Mr. Budtz (continued)

the social democratic parties agree. But if one divides Western Europe once more, what does one achieve? Later we might participate in dividing Europe because there might be some important nuances in how we look at WEU and its work. On the other hand, we must have some co-operation. It could be European political co-operation – I do not know; we must do something about it. We are not paving the way for a united Europe by splitting it. Therefore, will you confirm, Mr. Spadolini, that you mentioned those two countries because they have applied for membership, and there were no other reasons for not mentioning the others that are participating in North Atlantic co-operation?

Thank you for your patience, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – The reply could be very short. I wished to speak only of the countries which have applied to join WEU because it would have been interfering in Denmark's internal affairs to ask that country to do so. From the standpoint of protocol – and there is nothing to stop me commenting on a known political fact – as I said to the Turks and I say to the Danes, Europe must be enlarged as a defence entity so that we are tending to favour aligning the nucleus for common European defence as closely as possible with the countries which also support the Atlantic effort, while accepting that there are countries with different treaties in the Atlantic Alliance.

You, Mr. Budtz, referred to Norway which has its own régime excluding certain bases while other countries accept the installation of supranational bases. These countries have taken different positions in NATO as regards certain commitments. I think, however, that there is still a need to enlarge Europe for defence and to go into the ways in which it can be enlarged in order to produce fruitful results.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – You made great play of a joint defence policy, Mr. Spadolini. As you will know, that is almost impossible, whether it be in NATO or WEU. If one were to examine each country, one would realise when one got to the United Kingdom that there the political parties have wholly opposed policies on defence. It may be that certain people are being brainwashed by Mr. Gorbachev's well-managed public relations exercise in Reykjavik, and we have already heard one or two strange views here today. However, I suspect that in most countries political union will not hold on

any joint defence policy. Currently there are stresses in the alliance. In its talks with the United States, the United Kingdom is already having difficulty in bringing President Reagan back from the brink of complete nuclear disarmament. I think that Mrs. Thatcher succeeded.

The political stability of western defence is in jeopardy. You may take a more optimistic view, Mr. Spadolini, but if you had listened to the debates here this week, you would realise that, whether it is WEU or NATO, all politicians must take a firmer line. The USSR is winning the propaganda war. It is promising paradise forever provided that we lie down and take the punishment. This is what all defence ministers in Europe must say: "Do not believe the harpie in Moscow. Believe your own conscience. Your own defence is in yourself." Then the public will be more assured about European defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – There is in fact no question to answer. I have heard a confession of the difficulties encountered by the European idea in the United Kingdom and I might add in every country. There are indeed problems in every country but over the last few years a common awareness has emerged between the European countries as regards production for example.

I should like to quote one example which directly concerns the United Kingdom. Five or six years ago who would have thought it possible that five-power agreement could be reached on a fighter aircraft for the nineties? Does the fact that five countries signed an agreement for the fighter aircraft in Madrid on 8th July 1984 constitute common defence or not? The fact that France later withdrew because of difficulties with its industry and that your great country the United Kingdom remains confirms the possibility of developing joint production and research methods, common structures and common supply facilities because all of us – British, Italians and apart from the military aspects French and Spanish – are linked in the command structure of the Atlantic Alliance which immediately involves the surrender of some national sovereignty to other organisations and is to some extent supranational.

I have no illusions that European defence is just around the corner. I am aware that the difficulties in your country are encountered in different forms in other countries. I know that the party politicians are free to take whatever view they like on these subjects and no one would wish to limit party dialectics. But I also know that what is written, as Hegel said, in the stars of history, that is in the wide open European spaces, is bound to happen however much men may resist.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, taking up your remark about the irritation – the term you used was rather more restrained – in Europe with regard to the United States, what do you expect the United States' response to be if Europe does not go in for the conventional rearmament that we are all demanding?

Second, how, in your opinion, should the United States' attitude towards Libya today be assessed, now that over six months have passed and a change of heart is clearly visible in Libya and above all in its President, or Colonel as he calls himself? In contrast to the excitement that arose immediately afterwards, would you say that there is now more sympathy for the American response?

Third, what do you believe should now be done for the Mediterranean countries? What, in your opinion, can now be done to strengthen the southern region?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – These are two very different questions. I shall try to explain my position in regard to a problem which has arisen rather than to the question asked. I shall not speak of United States annoyance with Europe regarding conventional weapons because, as things stand, defence as agreed has been based on nuclear weapons as from the moment that the Germans, British, Italians, Belgians and Dutch asked for Euromissiles to strengthen common European and Atlantic defence and to involve the United States, as was not previously the case. This was in particular the position of the German Government in 1979. I would say, however, that in recent months there has been some incentive for a fresh speeding up of conventional defence, against the prospect of the zero option which has not yet been agreed as the whole process broke down at Reykjavik.

Clearly, therefore, the process is one of hope which we Italians share for the success of negotiations for a radical balanced reduction of intermediate-range missiles in particular. This brings up again the question put by other parliamentarians. The European governments must understand that conventional defence costs more than accepting nuclear arsenals in Europe and therefore calls for a financial effort to co-ordinate and rationalise armaments and to integrate the economies of the various European countries. I do not, therefore, see the subject in exactly the same way as the representative of the United States Congress who keeps on asking for Europe to meet its own expenses.

If I have understood correctly, the second problem is terrorism and the attitude to Libya. As an Italian directly involved I must say that I do not think that the Libyan régime was weakened by the American bombing. I find that the military action taken did not reduce Kadhafi's power, assuming that that was the intention. I find it somewhat difficult to imagine how it can be reduced now that America is involved in aid to a régime like that of Iran which certainly does not behave like a humble penitent.

There is the third question of what is to be done in the Mediterranean. A Franco-Italian-Spanish group for naval aircraft co-operation has carried its studies to an advanced stage. Quite clearly the Mediterranean problem is of immediate interest to Italy and to two countries like France and Spain which are half Mediterranean and half Atlantic, because if Colonel Kadhafi wins the day in Chad not only France will be affected but also Spain and Italy, and if Libyan or Arab terrorism is unleashed in Spain it will not affect that country only. We are all involved in this struggle which should be co-ordinated at military level; but I do not feel able to approve military action against terrorism in the light of experience over the last few years from Lebanon to Libya.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Palumbo.

Mr. PALUMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – May I first express to you, Minister, my satisfaction at your statement concerning the enlargement of WEU to include not only Spain and Portugal but all the European members of NATO which we hope may apply. This is an important statement of which I wish to underline the positive political significance.

My question concerns another aspect of Western European security. At Reykjavik, the United States and the Soviet Union came very close to agreement or at least so it seemed. It seems to have been felt here that there were signs of an American attitude favouring United States interests exclusively at the expense of European interests. As the star wars shield cannot protect Europe but only the United States, may this be the first sign of United States isolationism in relation to Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – As a historian I have some doubts as to whether we yet know the full story of Reykjavik. I therefore suggest that it was not only SDI which led to the failure to reach agreement that Sunday afternoon when we were all following events anxiously on our television screens. The disagreement over SDI was probably the last straw on top of the other complex

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

elements including the balance of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, I do not feel that I can at present say that the star wars shield covers anything at all, not even America because it has not yet proved itself. This shield is a challenge to science and research stretching at least ten years ahead and is rather like a book opened before us; and the United States has taken a heavy gamble, which will now probably encounter more resistance and greater obstacles in terms of votes in Congress, with the new situation now existing in America. In my view, however, it has never been envisaged even by the United States as an alternative to nuclear or conventional defence, except in the message delivered in 1983 by President Reagan looking to the supplanting and total removal of nuclear weapons, a subject on which scientists are divided even in America.

I do not feel therefore that I can answer the second point in the sense that I am unable to say whether space research although inevitable in today's world can resolve the problem of force balances.

The third subject stems from the first two, namely whether there is not a tendency towards isolationism. This threat is so real that the leaders of the three countries I mentioned as wanting Euromissiles want them in order to prevent American isolationism. The British and Italian Governments reached an agreement – and on this subject I recall an admirable article by Aron, the great inspiration of the lay tradition – to combat a constant tendency towards isolationism in America in relation to Europe. The risk America runs is as great as that which it creates and involves America just as much as Europe. Clearly if the zero option is achieved things will change. There will still be risks of American isolationism and the risk of the idea of Europe as a third force for which we lack the necessary strength. As Mr. Chirac said and he cannot be suspected, these risks must now be removed by close military and strategic co-operation between the United States and Western Europe because otherwise we would run the risk of American isolationism towards Europe and European isolationism towards America.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, let me begin by thanking you for your statement this afternoon. I believe it has shown once again that Italy, the Italian Parliament and the Italian Government take particular account of the common interests and common needs of Europe, not only in declarations of principle but also in practical policy.

I have three short questions. The first concerns international terrorism. I know that your country is particularly threatened by it and that you are personally concerned with overcoming it. Our Assembly has considered this question on many occasions. In Recommendation 435 we said that the problem of the terrorist threat was a matter for WEU and one which WEU's agencies could be instructed to investigate. My question to you, Minister, is this: what do you think of the Assembly's view on this, and do you see any chance of its being accepted by the defence ministers and ultimately by the Council of foreign ministers?

My second question is directly connected with the problem of international terrorism. You yourself have just said, Minister – and I share this view – that there is a close link between the international arms trade and terrorism. What opportunities do you see for restricting the international arms trade, and would your country join in efforts by other countries to place restrictions on it?

My third and last question I put to you in your capacity as Italian Defence Minister. What do you think of the establishment by France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany of a working group to consider security in Europe? Do you not believe that WEU rather than an additional working group should be responsible for these matters?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Ahrens for his kind words about my country and the efforts that Italy is making in this struggle. My country is certainly very much exposed to international terrorism.

With regard to the first point, I would say that WEU can certainly impart political impetus through the group it has set up but the initiative for devising new ways of combating terrorism is a matter for other organisations. I would not give WEU any operational functions under this heading.

I confirm the Italian Government's total readiness to join in any combined action for controlling the arms trade at international level with commitments that other governments would be prepared to enter into as well. Being particularly exposed by its geographical position to the risks of illegal arms trading, Italy is particularly alive to the need for a discipline that would avoid the two dangers I consider to be particularly serious: first, the clandestine use of national territory and second the ultimate destination of the arms. We have to have guarantees with far greater international backing that ships in fact go where they are supposed to go. No European government, including the Italian

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

Government, is in a position today to have the means of controlling and monitoring the final destination of arms shipments. It is not possible that a country should send properly licensed shipments of arms – even to a friendly country, not involved in any local warlike conflict – and then see those arms find their way to a theatre of war through triangular trading.

For my part, I repeat that the Italian Government is ready to co-operate; in the next few weeks it will be busy on a series of amendments proposed by the government itself to the bill on arms dealing.

With regard to the proposed three-member directorate, I have to say that it has no formal substance for me because its existence has always been denied. I am too close a friend of France, the United Kingdom and Germany to believe that they would stoop to telling lies, which never go undiscovered for very long anyway, so I accept the denial remembering that in 1983 something similar that was being organised was brought to an end when I visited all three European capitals to prevent an organisation of this kind from being set up.

I have always spoken for four- or five-sided arms agreements or else bilateral agreements – as we have with the United Kingdom, Germany and France.

My concern is that if an industrial defence axis between France and Germany gets too strong it could prompt other countries to feel they ought to have bilateral agreements to match. I prefer agreements between four or five countries.

In any case WEU is a homogenous forum where ideas can be exchanged on disarmament and which is therefore ideal for working out a European approach to defence. If there have to be directorates, they would best be controlled by parliaments because we ought not to forget that the "Directoire" led to a First Consul and then an Emperor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, we well know your deep commitment to Europe and your strong convictions of the part this organisation can play in the development of a security policy for Europe; your address has already confirmed this fact. You have already replied in part to a question put by Mr. Ahrens, which was my question, but there is one aspect I would like to stress. Yesterday the Assembly voted unanimously for a recommendation in a report in answer to the thirty-first report of the Council of Ministers. In my opinion two paragraphs in that recommendation are of particular

importance. The first concerns the question that you have raised, namely, the request that security policy should be dealt with in the context of WEU – not through agreement between certain governments only. This amendment was approved unanimously but there is a further step and that is the request to the Council of Ministers to work out a position agreed by the WEU governments, so that in NATO on 11th December it will be possible, for the first time after Reykjavik and after the important meeting in Luxembourg, to express a joint view through the Chairman of the Council and a document drawn up by the seven countries.

This was unanimously approved by the Assembly; we know the difficulties but we ask what the Italian Government intends to do in that direction.

To conclude I would like to make one other point. There is no doubt that enlargement to include other countries could well be important but we feel that the first need, in view of the difficulties associated with security policy, is to consolidate unity among the existing countries and to think of enlargement later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Bianco for supporting this approach which reflects the general line not only of the present government but also of its predecessors because our country has of course always been to the fore in advancing the cause of Europe even in the midst of so many difficulties.

I agree absolutely with the desirability of the amendment which stresses the fact that security policy cannot be dissociated from what is WEU's essential rôle or, therefore, subcontracted to individual governments outside the framework of an agreement – which enables me to repeat what I said before about a possible directorate.

On the second question I believe a common European position is certainly essential in NATO but we must not forget that there are some countries in NATO that are in WEU and others playing an important part that are not in WEU. So the process can only be gradual.

Speaking for the government, I am not at present in a position to say whether on 11th December we will be able to have a joint document which, presented at NATO, could cause many countries to make reservations. I am thinking of Turkey, Denmark and Norway, countries that cover the far north of Europe and the southern flank. I was recently in Norway and on the border with the Soviet Union and I know the efforts that have been made by Norway;

Mr. Spadolini (continued)

because let us not forget that it hosts no NATO or American bases or nuclear bases and yet has been performing a difficult task ever since 1949. I know too the importance that Turkey represents for Europe's southern flank just as I realise the importance of Greece for the south-east of Europe.

For this reason I am not able, as representative of my government, to approve this formally except as an earnest of the day that WEU will be able to talk organisation to organisation with NATO, as WEU will then represent the reality of Europe and its defence which is assured by NATO.

I have always been against – and I have worked hard in recent years to prevent – the feeling of antagonism that surfaced between the NATO dimension and the WEU dimension almost as though there were something opposing the two; little Europe versus big Europe. However I think that the closer association and integration that are essential for the future will take more than a few days. All this requires a process combining the consolidation of WEU with the removal from the Atlantic Alliance of the elements of doubt and crisis that have plagued it over the last few years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister. Allow me on behalf of the Assembly to express our appreciation of your great willingness to answer our questions yet again. Our discussion with you has been free and open and we have had precise answers which will certainly inspire us in our future work.

Thank you too for your mastery of all the strategic and political facts, including those setting the natural geopolitical boundaries of Western European Union through the interesting dialogue we have also had with the observers from non-member countries.

Thank you again, Minister. We hope to see you again soon. Your presence is always of the greatest help.

We shall now go on to the next order of the day.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to ask for an adjournment please.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is perfectly in order, Mr. Bianco. You see that freedom of speech goes even as far as suspending the sitting.

I agree.

The sitting is therefore suspended for a few minutes.

(The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.)

(Mr. Péciaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1081)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the outline of a new booklet on Western European Union and vote on the draft order, Document 1081.

I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges.

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the text I have the honour to present is not a report in the usual sense but it would be wrong to underestimate its importance at this particular time.

With your permission I have a number of preliminary remarks to make. Our committee decided to update the information booklet brought out on 29th October 1982 and presented to the Assembly by my Luxembourg colleague, Mr. Albert Berchem, not because they felt we had come to end of the restructuring of WEU but so that national parliaments and the public could be kept informed about the situation as it now stands. Of course, the updating of this information has to follow closely on events. That, moreover, is the substance of the draft order that we shall be asking the Assembly to vote upon.

I would first like to thank everyone who has helped in writing the text and in particular the members of the Secretariat-General, all the officials and experts in the organs concerned and, of course, the members of the committee.

The outline of the booklet puts the Assembly last in the list of WEU organs. Some colleagues have told me that it should have been first.

To underscore its importance I shall be proposing to the Assembly that it ask our President to add a foreword to the document in order to show that the parliamentary Assembly of WEU member countries is indeed the central pivot of our common security and defence policy.

Today, possibly more than ever, we need to make every possible effort to inform national parliaments and the public about the existence, activities and future of WEU. The information

Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (continued)

given has to be clear, precise, readable and easy to understand.

The outline for the new booklet goes back to the origins of the European Defence Community which became Western European Union in 1954 and thereafter led a quiet – I almost said peaceful – life for thirty years up to the Rome declaration of 1984 which decided on its reactivation.

Awareness of the need of a common policy to reinforce peace and security in Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance led the seven member countries to restructure the existing organs to give more coherent expression to their common resolve.

In this present simplified outline four different levels can be identified: the government level with the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council, next the Secretariat-General, third the agencies and expert committees and, lastly, the parliamentary Assembly.

Needless to say the efficacy of the different organs is not always measured by the number of meetings they hold. It is also true that budgetary resources are sometimes in inverse proportion to those of the Assembly.

The first goal of our Assembly should, therefore, be either to make the existing organs more effective through better co-ordination or else to achieve more stringently-controlled activity. It would be useful to ask the Council for a study on this subject.

The paper we are discussing reports on the changes that have taken place, particularly at the level of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the abolition of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the institution of three new agencies responsible for security questions but with different individual terms of reference.

The Assembly has found it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the new agencies and has said so in a number of recommendations.

Another reorganisation has concerned the Agency for the Control of Armaments some of whose activities were wound up on 1st January 1986. Yesterday, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council told us that other initiatives had been proposed at the informal meeting of the Council in Luxembourg last November, in particular the quarterly meetings of policy directors. The Secretariat-General has therefore been asked to make a study of the administrative structures and office locations. Should important decisions be taken, these would clearly need to be embodied in the text of the booklet.

The reactivation has not altered the structure of the Assembly and so far no solution has been found to its financial problems. Its rôle, however, cannot be denied. It is vitally important that defence questions be discussed in a parliamentary assembly. Ours is the only Assembly in Europe with the mandate to do this. In that light, its mission is clearly significant and highly important.

Would it not be wise, in order to increase its effectiveness, to combine the parliamentary mandate of the WEU Assembly with that of the North Atlantic Assembly? Article IX of the treaty provides that members of the WEU Assembly also represent their countries in the Council of Europe.

As you know, the fields of interest and action of these two assemblies are totally different whereas security and defence are the major concern of both the North Atlantic and the WEU assemblies, so that the parallelism between their terms of reference is quite evident. Would it not be best to have this problem analysed in depth at international level since it would be difficult to ask most national parliaments to find valid solutions for this matter at individual level?

I shall make one last remark. The historical part of the booklet recalls the events that led our countries to join together to ensure their security. The thinking of the time stemmed from a phase in our history where Europe, because it did not have a solid democratic platform, was drawn into the worst trial of its existence. Co-operation in security was the logical outcome of the post-war period.

That co-operation must not in any way prevent the voice of our peoples' elected representatives being heard. Our Assembly therefore has an essential rôle to play and we cannot accept disparaging remarks about it at any level. A common defence policy is impossible without parliamentary control.

Not that our Assembly, of course, is proof against pitfalls to which all parliamentary assemblies are exposed. But any move to displace decision centres beyond parliamentary control should find us alert and vigilant.

Finally, Mr. President, I now ask the Assembly to approve what the committee has done in the writing and updating of the new booklet.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the debate I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the draft order in Document 1081 on the outline for a new booklet on Western European Union is short, but speaks for itself. The number of speakers is small, even though we are discussing relations with seven parliaments and the public in seven countries,

Mr. Tummers (continued)

and as Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges said when presenting the report, that is a very important subject. We are in fact talking about one of the few means we have of maintaining relations with the public and the parliaments.

I have not long been a member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, but as such I should like to compliment Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on shouldering the task of bringing the WEU booklet up to date.

Mr. President, you will recall that I drew up the motion for an order in Document 1003 of 5th December 1984 backed by a large number of members. It concerned the publication of the history of the third decade of WEU. I corresponded with you about this, Mr. President. On 30th May 1985 you sent me this answer: "You may be sure that the draft budget for 1986 will take into account wishes expressed in Document 1003." You did that, but thanks to the economisers you did not succeed. I will not resign myself to this, and Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges must forgive me for using her report as a peg to hang my problem on. It is not, after all, my personal problem. If we now draw up a new guide, we should use it to guide the public and parliaments not only through the institutional labyrinth of WEU but also through its history. Its history has not been completely recorded, at least not for the public. The second decade culminated in plans for the reactivation of WEU. This is not unimportant. NATO and the European Parliament are much better known to the public than WEU. Of WEU's present, past and future significance the public knows nothing at present.

At the Council of Europe a motion was recently tabled for a resolution on education for peace. In my opinion, this is a subject that might also have been considered by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. The proposal came, let it be noted, from the countries that are more or less sitting in the waiting room before becoming members of WEU. How is education to be provided without history?

What I have said so far, Mr. President, is only indirectly connected with Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges's report. I have already apologised for this. I will conclude by asking her and our committee Chairman to consider proposing, when passing on the order, that the booklet should also refer to the literature on the history of WEU, not just a few lines on its origin and the relevant dates, but a real account of this organisation's fortunes over the last thirty years. It might also refer to the two parts that already exist, and I hope that a reference can be made to the third part that has yet to be written.

Finally, the presentation of the booklet will have to be rather more up-to-date. The cover, the external appearance of the booklet must be such that people are eager to pick it up, which unfortunately cannot be said of the previous editions, whose layout has been insufficiently modern and attractive.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – I congratulate Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on this very worthwhile document and the Chairman of the committee on pushing on with this important work.

When I joined WEU in 1983, one of the first things that I did was to read the booklet about WEU to get a better understanding of what it was all about. One of my major disappointments was that I had to read it about three times to understand WEU's work. The new text is a great deal clearer, and I congratulate Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on producing such a lucid booklet.

We talk about reactivation of WEU and yet time passes swiftly. It was just over two years ago that we had the Rome declaration, and since then we have had budgetary constraints. As a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I am as aware of that as anybody. It is not before time to update our communications, and I suggest that the booklet should be just the first step.

The committee should spend some time thinking about what it will do with the booklet when it has been produced. As Mr. Tummers said, it is important that the booklet is up-to-date and is prepared in such a manner as to force itself on the reader rather than withdraw from the reader, by which I mean that its layout and typescript should invite the reader's interest. The committee should also spend some time considering the booklet's distribution.

I do not think that I am overstating the case when I say that I doubt whether many parliamentarians in our countries know what WEU does, and I hope that every parliamentarian in each of our domestic parliaments will receive a copy of the booklet. It is also important that defence interests receive a copy. I do not mean just civil servants, and I would include major defence contractors and the interested media. Although leader writers might know about WEU, I wonder whether some of the up and coming younger writers know about its importance. We ignore at our peril the universities and senior students of economics, politics and defence, and I hope that the committee can secure access to the libraries that serve those interests.

I have already said that the booklet is readable and a major improvement on the old one, but

Mr. Morris (continued)

there should be what is often called a throw-away leaflet. There should be a simplified leaflet – a précis – which, if made available in large numbers, would help the communication process.

We were all deeply moved by Mr. Chirac's speech yesterday. He encapsulated the importance of the work before us when he said that Europe needed an institution of its own capable of enlightening public opinion and demonstrating exactly what was at stake. We do indeed need to enlighten public opinion. I hope that this will be the first of many booklets. As a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I shall continue to fight for greater resources for this very worthwhile work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur for the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I can be pleased that so few speakers have taken part in the debate, given the quality of the statements by Mr. Tummers and Mr. Morris and the worth of their suggestions.

I agree on the need to write the history of Western European Union but we are in a cleft stick, so to speak, because time presses.

The old booklet is out of print and if WEU wants something to distribute, the new version has to be printed quickly. I therefore propose that Mr. Tummers put his suggestion to the Presidential Committee. The information could be circulated, perhaps, at several levels because what he is asking for would be targeted at a more knowledgeable readership. Our booklet on the other hand, is intended for parliaments and a wider public and therefore needs to be simpler and easier to read.

I wholly agree with the idea of peace education. I myself have suggested several times in our committee that WEU should be mentioned in school text books. For that to happen an approach would have to be made to the national governments. At the moment school books refer to UNO and sometimes the Council of Europe but never to WEU. Every country would have to correct the books currently used in schools.

I thank Mr. Morris for what he said. I had the same reaction as he did on first acquaintance with the original booklet. I too read it several times before understanding it. Even now I still find it complicated and the way the different structures interact is difficult to grasp.

A reference was made to distribution in member countries' parliaments. Here there is a gap to fill because even the political parties in the national parliaments are not included in the WEU mailing lists. They ought to be receiving automatically not only the WEU information booklet but also certain major reports.

Lastly, I thank Mr. Morris for his suggestion about distribution to the other media. If we want the public to be correctly informed about our work we need to contact the mass media and the universities. I am sure that Lady Jill Knight, the Chairman of our committee, will do what is necessary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to make one or two quick comments on behalf of my committee. First, members of parliament are inundated with documents to read. None the less, I believe that they will learn quite a lot if they read Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges's document, not least because this was indeed an eye-opener to me. She points out that no limit is placed on the Council's responsibilities and the preamble to the treaty underlines that its aim is: "To ... preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law...; to strengthen, with these aims in view the economic, social and cultural ties...". In other words, nothing is outside the responsibilities of WEU and I will bet that not many members know that. I would say to Mr. Morris it was precisely because of our anxiety that so few people in our parliaments understood what WEU was that we embarked upon a taxing and tiring programme of carrying our committee to all of our members' governments to explain exactly what we do.

Finally may I ask you, Mr. President, to take particular note of the request by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges that Mr. Caro be asked to write a preface to the book? I underline that that suggestion was not just in her report. She made that novel suggestion with the complete approval of the Chairman of the committee, and I hope that attention will be drawn to that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I asked you if the Bureau would make the effort to have a history written of WEU's third decade. You did not answer. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges was kind enough to take on this task, but this question was addressed directly to the Bureau because I have been in contact with it on this subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I did not reply because I did not think the question was addressed to me personally. My presence in this chair is quite temporary and I shall pass on your request and also that of the Chairman of the committee to Mr. Caro.

We shall now vote on the draft order in Document 1081.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I put the draft order in Document 1081 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

I thank the Chairman of the committee and the Rapporteur for their good work.

5. Parliamentary and public relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1080)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliamentary and public relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1080.

I call Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. TERLEZKI (*United Kingdom*). – Before presenting my report I wish to draw attention to paragraph 23. There is an error there in that I have promoted Mr. Eggar to the office of Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs when that position is already occupied by Sir Geoffrey Howe. I hope that I shall not be in trouble when I return to the House of Commons next week. Mr. Eggar is a minister at the Foreign Office and is doing excellent work.

It gives me great pleasure, having been a member of WEU and of this committee for a short time, humbly but proudly to stand before you as Rapporteur. When the committee decided

at the end of the last ordinary session to select from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which in its opinion should be debated in national parliaments two main issues were prominent. The first was the threat of international terrorism, a matter of major importance to all of us. We consequently selected the Assembly's recommendation on security and terrorism and tried to encourage our colleagues to discuss those matters and put questions before their respective parliaments.

As the report on parliamentary and public relations and the collected texts relating to parliamentary action in the implementation of the Assembly recommendations show, governments have had to answer many questions put by members in several parliaments, particularly France, Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. If governments have decided to pursue their fight against international terrorism in larger bodies rather than in the framework of WEU, we can only hope that they will speedily succeed in achieving co-ordinated and successful action. Since the problem remains unsolved and therefore topical, we must all keep a continuing watch in our respective parliaments.

The will of member governments to give further impetus to the work of WEU led our committee to select the recommendation dealing with reactivation of WEU, its tasks, structure and place in Europe, for national debate. It is encouraging that these questions have played a considerable rôle in parliamentary debates in several member countries in the past six months, although the intensity of discussions has varied from country to country. However, all representatives of member governments have stressed that their governments attach great importance to the work of WEU. For the first time, in May 1986, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office presented a written report to parliament on the activities of WEU, and in the latest Queen's speech its work was mentioned, again for the first time. My parliamentary colleagues, Mr. Christopher Murphy, Sir Anthony Grant and others, have provided information about WEU activities at national level.

Returning to our own activities, it was the intention of the committee to accelerate and accomplish its special information action plan in member parliaments during the year and to present a summary. Unfortunately, the critical financial situation of the Assembly did not allow. Financial difficulties continue to prevent the Assembly from fulfilling its duties properly. In particular, it still lacks the minimum technical requirements for fast and co-ordinated follow-up action in member parliaments and for the speedy communication of information. The WEU Assembly remains the only European parliament without a telex or telefax. We can only ask you all to continue pressing upon governments the

1. See page 35.

Mr. Terlezki (continued)

need to provide the Assembly with the means necessary to do its work speedily and efficiently.

It is mainly up to the individual initiative of every Assembly member to mention the work of the Assembly in his home country. Without presuming to have full information about all debates in all parliaments, one still has the impression that only a few – often the same – members are active in the cause of WEU. Heads of delegations and rapporteurs should therefore help to intensify national debate.

The political groups and parties in member countries could do far more to spread information and discussion among the wider public, perhaps with the help of political foundations or of private or public associations. The committee appeals to all to seize every opportunity to discuss the rôle of WEU and particularly the recommendations of this Assembly, both in parliament and among the wider public, thus underlining the central rôle of WEU in defence and security matters.

There has rarely been a more appropriate time for taking such action in the light of recent events. In the post-Reykjavik situation the European voice must be heard, and the discussion here has to be broadened into a wider-ranging debate involving all member parliaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the debate, I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – Having been mentioned in the report because of my work to promote WEU in parliament, I felt honour-bound to give my support to these excellent recommendations. In considering also public relations and WEU, we should, perhaps, be looking for a simple phrase that encapsulates the work of the organisation. I would suggest “eternal vigilance”, for only in that way shall we safeguard the peace in Western Europe and, probably, the rest of the world.

The Assembly is continually dealing with East-West relations and the consequent importance of the defence and security of Western Europe. I believe that we should pay particular attention to ensuring a balance of conventional forces in Europe and securing a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Perhaps symbolic – but, at the same time, the utter reality – of East-West relations is the city of Berlin. As I have had the privilege to visit both sides of that abomination, which is referred to as a wall, but is, in truth, a monstrous cage, the need for “eternal vigilance” has become frighteningly clear to me and I believe that the require-

ment for it to be recognised in parliaments and among the public has become greater; hence the vital rôle of WEU in promoting the defence of Western Europe. In microcosm, one has the existence of western democracy and free enterprise cheek by jowl with communism and state control.

The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, has outlined her philosophy – which I share – that the state should be the servant, not the master. In Berlin, the allies allow almost complete self-determination to West Berlin and it has become, in effect, part of West Germany. The Russians have almost complete domination over East Berlin, with East Germany just a sham for their control. West Berlin has an administration operating as the servant of the people who live there; East Berlin has an administration that is master of the people who cannot avoid living there.

My knowledge of the British Army of the Rhine is such that I believe that “eternal vigilance” could be its motto also, and that is equally true for the British Royal Marines, who train in Norway in the very different but vital techniques of Arctic warfare. The conclusions from my experiences in both potential war theatres are that we live perilously by not currently ensuring a balance of conventional forces and that not having recourse to chemical weapons puts our forces at a horrific disadvantage.

The nations of WEU, together with our NATO allies, are engaged in nothing less than providing the front line for democracy in its struggle against totalitarianism – and this Assembly must not fail them. As a part of that challenge, we must ensure that we maximise the impacts of our parliamentary and public relations and thereby minimise the threat of our opponents seeking to influence opinion in our respective countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I understand that this is Mr. Terlezki's first rapporteurship and I congratulate him on his excellent work. I know how intensely he feels about defence matters and he has information about the defence of Western Europe at his fingertips. His report will be read and respected by all.

One problem with WEU is its image. As Mr. Chirac said yesterday, it is almost unknown. People know about NATO, but not about WEU. Perhaps the name itself is to blame – it sounds like the name of a women's knitting or sewing society. Perhaps we could change the name to Western European Defence Union, though, as Mr. Spadolini told us earlier, there is little joint defence policy and, at a time when the United

Mr. Hill (continued)

States and the Soviet Union are having talks, Europe is virtually precluded.

The public relations exercise must start with the title of our organisation and go on to the calibre of the work produced. I am sorry that some of my colleagues allow the secretariat to write their reports for them and perhaps to write policy rather than listening to members and writing the policy that they set out. Far too often we receive reports that are virtual replicas of reports issued two or three years previously. It is easy to write a report if one merely changes the dates and names. The quality of the work is not necessarily a reflection on members, who are always hard pressed for time. The back-up staff are not available and the staff that we have are also hard pressed.

If the Prime Minister of France thinks that WEU should be enlarged to include Spain and Portugal, those who hold the financial strings must slacken them so that we can obtain more finance for our necessary requirements. For example, is it right that our President does not have a telex? Is it right that our delegations are stuffed into little rooms and have to try to grab for telephones? Is it right that this Assembly, which is the most uncomfortable that I have ever had the misfortune to sit in, should remain as it is? Surely a little good housekeeping must creep in.

I am not one for asking my government to spend a lot of money; sometimes we get a frosty reply. However, could not our secretariat prepare a financial statement and prove that we face a number of problems? Shall we allow the present state of affairs to continue, fooling ourselves that we are WEU, about to be enlarged and having just been reactivated, but having none of the tools to do the job? We must stand firm.

The report puts the problems in a nutshell. It is a poor reflection of progress in Europe when we have to instruct members to ask questions. We should all be asking questions in our parliaments. The secretariat should put a detailed list of questions before us, so that we can get the answers to reinforce our demand for more finance.

It is late, but there is much that we could go over in the document. My colleague, Mr. Terlezki, has pointed out the problems and has made me think again. At the end of each session we should produce a list of questions for members in each delegation. Those questions should be tabled in every parliament and be followed up.

We must not complain that ministers come to our meetings. We want droves of ministers to come here and to be shuffled on to our uncom-

fortable seats and to wait while others speak. By pushing the message through to our ministers we shall at last win the day. We must not give up hope and the report is a pointer to how to succeed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I congratulate Mr. Terlezki on his excellent report. He has made a major contribution to a better understanding of Europe and WEU.

It sometimes comes as a surprise in political work to realise how ignorant people are about European bodies. The Council of Europe gets confused with the European Parliament, and very few people know what WEU is.

The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations makes a basic contribution to overcoming this ignorance, and I should like to compliment Lady Knight, our present Chairman, on developing new initiatives. We have visited the various countries, we have seen things for ourselves and we have also acquired important information. Of course, the response was not always as we would have liked, but we hope that we have nevertheless helped to strengthen and improve WEU's public image.

WEU and the members of this Assembly must, of course, have the necessary technical and economic resources. Things were in a bad way but at least a start has now been made, and we hope the situation will be improved.

But it remains to be seen whether the most recent measure affecting us parliamentarians is the ideal solution. I refer to the fact that we now vote with different-coloured voting cards. As the colour white appears a great deal, and as the voting cards are of a common shape, quite a few parliamentarians may find themselves doing what I did when I pulled out my invitation from the French Foreign Minister to yesterday's reception rather than my white voting card and so may not have voted in strict compliance with the rules. But perhaps this possible error can still be corrected.

Reference has been made here to certain difficulties. My old friend James Hill has spoken about them. Anyone who has sat on these uncomfortable benches for hours at a stretch and had to go up and down this dangerous staircase several times will be in favour of improvements to the physical conditions in this building. Present conditions may also be the reason for so few members being present here in the chamber. Of course, some have had to leave to take part in election campaigns or perform other tasks, but others who are here in the building, prefer other

Mr. Enders (continued)

more comfortable places to the rough benches here in the chamber.

Mr. President, I have now been a member of this Assembly for fifteen years. I should like to combine my statement with a word of farewell to those who remain. In this decade and a half I have had a great deal of enjoyment and many happy experiences, which I recall with pleasure. We have worked together loyally and across party lines.

When I have been asked what purpose is served by the Council of Europe and WEU I have been able to reply that the mere fact that parliamentarians – from seven countries here, from twenty-one in the Council of Europe – discuss problems together contributes to the improvement of understanding between these countries, helps reconciliation and encourages readiness for peace.

But if there are still confrontations, if they have not been eliminated altogether, I would recall the words of a member of my party, that great European, Carlo Schmid, who was also a member of this Assembly: many a problem is better solved over the white table than the green. We have had quite a few opportunities for this during our work, at our sessions.

Looking back over the last fifteen years, I should also like to thank the Presidents who have guided the Assembly and the entire staff, which is not small, as we can see when we look about us here. My thanks also go to the interpreters working in those small booths and to the administrations of the countries represented here, who have given us many stimulating ideas.

But I also wish to thank the parliamentarians who have contributed so much to mutual understanding and friendship.

I will conclude with a promise to pass on the ideas I have received here. Recalling what we have achieved in the past and bearing in mind the common problems we face, I bid you all farewell.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. TERLEZKI (*United Kingdom*). – First and foremost, I wish to thank my Chairman, Lady Knight, who was helpful, encouraging and very charming in pointing out any mistakes that I made. I am also grateful to the Secretary of the committee who worked so closely with all of us, particularly with me.

It is with some sadness that I heard that Mr. Enders is departing after fifteen years. As a new member of the Assembly who hopes to stay here for fifteen years, I am sad to see experienced members departing from this great institution because I wish to learn and ask for guidance and help, irrespective of party politics. It is sad to lose a man of such high calibre. However, I am sure that Mr. Enders hopes to keep himself occupied for a long time and I wish him healthy and happy retirement.

As for my colleagues Mr. Hill and Mr. Murphy, all that I can say is: a friend in need is a friend indeed. I am grateful for their encouragement. As I have colleagues of such high calibre, I sincerely hope that our committee will go from strength to strength and, with luck, hard work and determination I may have the pleasure of presenting the Assembly with a report detailing the expenditure that we so badly need.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Lady Knight, do you wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 1080.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten or more representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the draft resolution in Document 1080 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

I thank Lady Jill Knight and Mr. Terlezki for the quality of their work.

6. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations

*(Presentation of the report
of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1079)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations, Document 1079.

1. See page 36.

The President (continued)

I call Mr. Close, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall not go into the details of the report you have received, and perhaps read, and thus add to the considerable loss of time that the Assembly has already suffered this evening. I shall therefore be brief but the subject is important because ultimately, in East-West relations, it was Reykjavik and what I would call a truncated summit that was at the root of all the discussions and, in particular, the introductory address by our President and the statement by Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, and various other speakers. However, it will help if I sum up again the general economy of the report for the light this throws on what happened at Reykjavik and its consequences for Europe in general and our Assembly in particular.

One preliminary point. To my mind, the Reykjavik meeting was an interview between the two superpowers equipped with the ultimate weapon, which probably had domestic politics at the back of their minds – the proximity of the elections to the Senate and Congress in the Americans' case and Mr. Gorbachev's concern to restore a failing economy on the Soviet side. All this was apparently done over the heads of the Europeans.

The report has three separate parts: the USSR's internal policy and problems, its external policy and Europe's position in a debate in which we have really had no part.

On the first part I shall be very brief. The statistics in the report are eloquent. Sixty per cent of Soviet exports consist of natural gas and oil. Now when you think that oil prices fell from around \$26-27 per barrel in the third quarter of 1985 to \$10-12 in July 1986 and that the dollar was devalued it is easy to understand that, for the first time ever, the USSR's external trade balance is now \$2.5 billion in the red.

What is more, in order to increase its productivity and be competitive in the future, the Soviet economy, which is not up to the level of the economies of the developed European countries, needs the machinery that we possess – as stated in this report only 29% of Soviet machines are of international standard.

I would just mention, in passing, the problems set by agriculture, alcoholism and a certain level of unemployment about which nothing is said in order to indicate that if Mr. Gorbachev wants to have the Soviet Union fit to face the future, i.e. the horizon of the year 2000, he has to make a fundamental choice which was never made from Khrushchev to Chernenko because of the

internal inertia which has always favoured spending on arms and defence to the detriment of the consumer society.

There has definitely been a change since the new General Secretary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took office. Perhaps the change is not merely on the surface but I doubt whether it implies any challenge to the USSR's key objectives or its doctrine. Even so we have to admit that, since Mr. Gorbachev came to power, things are different both in the plan he has devised to put the Soviet Union back on its feet and in his various foreign policy moves; all the details of what he has done under both these headings are set out in the report before you.

But, as far as Soviet external policy is concerned – this is the subject of part II – it is no less definite that the pressure on Western Europe is being kept up. Soviet expansion is also evident at world level using a technique cleverly combining the direct threat with more indirect strategy, by proxy in most cases as in Africa or Central America. The fact that the Soviet Union has now developed what used to be a coastal navy into what is now an ocean-going navy enables it to make its power felt in every part of the globe.

That said, it is clear that what happened at Reykjavik ought both – these are the two key principles – to arouse our interest and to induce us to avoid any rash enterprise. In other words we have to exercise the necessary caution not to become involved in negotiations that would prevent us from ensuring Europe's security which must, after all, be the continuing concern of the Assembly.

That brings me to the third part of the report on which I would like to dwell at slightly greater length. What is Europe's position in the dialogue between the two superpowers and the Reykjavik summit that I have described as truncated?

The discussions I attended in Istanbul proved to me that after a first glimmer of hope, the Reykjavik summit turned out to be utter disillusion for Europeans, who consider that if the negotiations embarked upon there had been successful Europe would have found itself stripped of its main defence capability.

The curious thing is that all the experts, in their various writings, have expressed their misgivings about our future security. Let me try to sum up the article that seems to me to be most characteristic in that respect. In the International Herald Tribune, Christopher Bertram names the three cornerstones of European security among which he ranks the nuclear deterrent first.

So what do we find? I shall not go over again what has already been said and repeated at this rostrum. Doing away with the theatre nuclear

Mr. Close (continued)

forces, i.e. the cruise missiles and Pershings, while leaving a hundred SS-20s in the Asian part of the USSR would put us in an extremely difficult and worrying position. These one hundred SS-20s could easily be moved back to the Urals to cover the whole of Europe and I cannot say I was satisfied with Mr. Spadolini's answer a moment ago because even if we manage to balance the short-range SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s in quantity, Europe's deterrent policy would be ineffective, the fact being that it is only effective if Soviet Union territory is within reach which it is with the cruise missiles and Pershing IIs.

That said, and still referring to the nuclear arm, what will happen if the Labour Party wins the election in the United Kingdom, if their declared policy is to have nothing to do with nuclear weapons at all? To my mind that means the end of any association between the French and British forces who might have to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of the American theatre nuclear forces.

Lastly, I raised a political problem that no one has answered. I refer to the erosion of the credibility of those by whom the deployment of Euro-missiles has been defended in their national parliaments. They argue from two principles, first that of the "recoupling" of Europe and the United States, confirmed in the interviews with Ogarkoff and Ustinov in the New York Times and second the re-establishment of the deterrent at European level.

I now come to conventional armaments. In some dream of the future one could imagine a world without nuclear weapons. Do I have to remind you of James Hossegar's article in The Times of 27th October? Put shortly, he said that unlike Alladin we had no way of getting the nuclear genie back in its lamp. Nuclear fission is here to stay, unfortunately, and we shall have to live with it a long, long time, so we had better get used to it.

Only yesterday, the French Prime Minister said that the nuclear deterrent was still, in spite of everything, a whole vital element in our strategy, in fact the beginning and end of that strategy, with the incalculable risk that a possible aggressor might contemplate, even given the irrationality of a response at the nuclear level. Nevertheless nuclear deterrence has to be supplemented by deterrence based on conventional forces.

In this field, the fact that needs stressing is the constant erosion of conventional forces. The paradox at the moment is that conventional forces are still more or less the same as they were when the "massive reprisals" strategy was

thought up with conventional forces being "testing forces" so to speak.

In my opinion, WEU is the only valid forum where a unanimous European viewpoint can be voiced. It can reflect European countries' concerns about their security. It is high time that the Union looked into the problem I have just raised. I am sure there would not be one dissenting voice to say we should not strengthen the conventional arm. But how? Sophisticated equipment, high-precision guided weapons and other gadgets are no complete solution because they disregard the human factor – the troops. We need a study by the committees of our Assembly and particularly the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to decide how our millions of reservists are to be used. To my mind they should be used to add weight to the deterrent without, thereby, representing any kind of provocation to the USSR.

I have not the time to elaborate on this point. There is a whole school of thought that has looked into it and produced many studies on the subject. It is high time that we took an interest in the matter. For a justifiably anxious public opinion, WEU is thought to be a forum for making fine speeches and producing excellent reports, with conclusions and effective decisions sadly missing.

However, the members of the Council have gone into dialogue with the various defence ministers and expressed their concern.

To conclude, I would stress that conventional forces are going to play an important rôle to which I would urge you to give your attention. Think about the demographic situation for a start. We know the Bundeswehr is going to lose 110 000 men, which is a quarter of the total since it supplies 500 000 men to the defence system in Central Europe.

In addition solidarity between the United States and Europe on either side of the Atlantic could well be shaken. What would happen if Senator Sam Nunn's proposals went through? I am thinking of the possibility that Europe might cease to play an effective part in the burden-sharing. In that case, the Americans might decide to pull out all or part of their troops from Europe.

In that connection, I would draw the Assembly's attention to the importance of the danger outside the WEU area and I was glad to hear the representative of the Council Chairman say this was of vital concern.

The indifference of European public opinion to what is going on in Central America is, to my mind, disturbing. There is a link between events there – or what may happen in Mexico – and security in Europe. I am thinking of the possible

Mr. Close (continued)

withdrawal of American troops in order to use them for sealing off the 2 000-mile long frontier between Mexico and the United States. These troops could also be used as a means of guaranteeing and securing American intervention based on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

I shall not dwell any further on these problems. I think we are at a crossroads. No doubt we are in the same position as Mr. Spaak in days gone by when he said: "We are afraid". Yes, Europe is afraid of finding itself alone again. It has lived under the comforting shade of the American nuclear umbrella, the erosion of which is no longer in doubt for anyone, in any case certainly not after the Kissinger speech in September 1979 – confirmed as it has been by the large-scale pacifist demonstrations, Chernobyl and other events.

We have to remedy the weakness of our conventional forces and we must also take our part in the battle of ideas that is going on before our eyes, in which the Soviets are past masters. They are also highly skilled in the indirect strategy of disinformation and destabilisation. It seems to me that we are not countering this offensive with the co-ordinated, joint action for which WEU, precisely, could be the vehicle.

If WEU and the Council of Ministers do not realise during this session, which seems to me a vital one, that it is time to express the fundamental viewpoints of European security, in a spirit of complete co-operation with our transatlantic allies, I am very much afraid that the words of Alain Minc in his famous book *Le Syndrome finlandais* will ultimately come true: "Europe," he says "shines like a dead star. Eventually we could become the lungs of the

Soviet Union but with the status of a 'quasi-protectorate' ". I hope that our political will can save us from that terrible fate.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur and, through him, the General Affairs Committee for its excellent work. I would also like to compliment him on his very full report. I hope that the Assembly will give it all the attention it deserves.

Ladies and gentlemen, in view of the fact that the order of business allows us to proceed in relatively comfortable conditions, I ask your agreement to defer the debate on Mr. Close's report until tomorrow.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 4th December, at 10.15 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1079).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

The sitting was closed at 6.45 p.m.

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1986

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

3. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (*Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1079*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Martino, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Tummers, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Burger, Mr. Palumbo,

Mr. Bogaerts, Mr. De Decker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Hill, Mr. Close (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Martino (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Stoffelen.

4. Statement by the President.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Cox, Mr. Dejardin, Dr. Miller, Mr. De Decker, the President, Mr. Goebbels (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

5. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – It is not a point of order, Mr. President. Not only is this the fourth time that the translation into English has failed, but it has been abysmal throughout. I have had complaints from people sitting in the gallery that it has been inaudible and pretty fractured. I have written to Mr. Moulias. I would ask for something to be done because I have to say to you, Sir, that if this standard were the standard that I found used in

my business, people would very soon be changed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The necessary action will be taken. Thank you for your intervention.

3. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations

(Debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1079)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1079.

As Mr. Close presented his report at the end of yesterday's sitting, the debate is open.

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a strange destiny seems to link the most significant reports, from the standpoint of defence and security, before the Assembly this session. Born in a climate of sometimes even excessive faith in the capacity of earnest politicians' reasons and desire for peace to achieve positive results for the whole of humanity, the life of these reports in this Assembly has been somewhat tormented by the changes made to the original text as a result of the events that the headlines – and history – have forced on our attention.

1. See page 38.

Mr. Martino (continued)

I remember the meeting of the General Affairs Committee in Copenhagen on 15th October. Mr. Close felt that the working paper presented at that time was incomplete because of events which might require the judgments it contained to be differently phrased and given different emphasis. There was the disaster of the Soviet nuclear submarine and the resounding shock of Reykjavik and also, perhaps, the need to give some thought to Soviet and American strategy in Central America and Africa.

The weighty study by Mr. Close is based and constructed on solid foundations of personal knowledge and on tactical and strategical data describing situations of unquestionable fact. But the philosophy of many people even among ourselves, who hoped for a different outcome after Reykjavik, made it difficult to achieve general agreement about the draft recommendation that the Rapporteur formulated on the basis of his analysis. There are even those, again amongst ourselves, who share the opinion that Pravda does not speak for itself but puts in the mouth of the General Secretary of the Communist Party, namely that "confidence in Reagan and his supporters has collapsed". And this was said to have happened after the Irangate scandal, thus aggravating and giving a new significance to what came after the halt – or rather interruption I hope – in the preparatory talks at Reykjavik. The hint of a divide between the Europeans and America seems to be stealthily gaining ground behind the scenes.

To my mind this mistaken, immature and instinctive attitude surfacing here and there can only be understood as the mirror-image of a similarly instinctive, immature, mistaken and proud isolationism emerging in certain circles in the United States. Europeans cannot in fact do other than remain "Atlantic" knowing that, behind them, as a well-known journalist said a few days ago, there is always the American safety barrier. On 15th November, in Vienna, Shultz himself said: "The bitter experience after the first world war has taught us that the United States cannot isolate itself from Europe. Isolationism led us into a disaster that we are resolved shall not happen again". We want Shultz to know that the same post-war period taught us Europeans just as painfully the ultimate identity of the deepest interests that bind together the countries on either side of the ocean. We want America to know that its European allies, in proper awareness of their responsibilities which need to be translated into rational common policy-making, will adopt clear-cut and agreed positions, both internally and with their partner across the ocean, on disarmament, the zero option, arms limitations, political judgments and the relevant budgetary decisions, and the efforts

and sacrifices that Western Europe must make as an expression of its inalienable rights and duties.

Rights of independence and free comparison, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, but also onerous duties that have to be shouldered by those who, like us, seek with mind and heart a common future where peace is secure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my certainty that the report by our parliamentary colleague, Mr. Close, would prove to be of high literary quality was matched when reading Document 1079 on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations by a real admiration for his style and for his imposing collection of historical and bibliographical references.

In your report, Mr. Close, I recognised the ability to communicate which I had previously found in your expensive essay in political advocacy entitled "The blue book". The quality of the writing is real enough, but the same cannot be said of the argument! You argue in favour of a freedom which is earned but I would add: a freedom which is earned according to your criteria.

My remarks cover three points: a brief look at the text as a whole, a comment on the preamble and a personal opinion about the recommendation.

The report which we are examining today gives an account which, to the unwary, might seem complete, at least from the scientific standpoint. Actually, this is far from being the case. Is your analysis of the Soviet situation not too exhaustive? Are we, as you suggest, entitled to involve ourselves in Soviet sociology and in the internal life of the Soviet peoples? Should we be worried about the accession to power of Mr. Gorbachev and a new group of leaders younger, as you say, than their predecessors? Do you doubt Mr. Gorbachev's desire for reform? Is it genuine? If not, what are your arguments?

Paragraph 135 concerns chemical weapons. What is to be said about them? Does the Soviet Union have a monopoly of chemical weapons? Is there no suggestion that such chemical weapons should be deployed in Europe in the event of a crisis? Your remarks are aimed at the Soviets, but reference might also be made to statements by the NATO Defence Planning Committee contemplating the use in Europe of binary chemical weapons originating from the United States of America. If so, why not say so? No doubt, out of a concern for objectivity!

Mr. Péciaux (continued)

Turning to armaments, I wonder if I have correctly interpreted paragraph 136 of the report. Is there any fundamental need to rearm Europe? Is there any need to assume that there is a weakness in conventional forces in Europe? Is it not possible to open disarmament negotiations without a simultaneous build-up of conventional forces? The problem has been mentioned during this session by Mr. Spadolini in his replies to questions by Assembly members. What is your opinion, Mr. Close?

Turning to paragraph 97 dealing with Africa, I wonder what is behind the, to say the least surprising, comments it contains. Like some great navigator you go round Africa under full sail, without uttering the key word, the truly universal image encapsulated in the word apartheid. Why baulk at segregation? Let us be brave and close our eyes!

As for Central America, I suggest you look at the report prepared by Ernest Glimm for the European Parliament. You will find there the text of the resolution on the situation in Latin America and the rulings of the International Court of Justice in The Hague handed down in 1986. You will find expressed in the report the wish of the European Parliament that democratic freedoms, freedom of expression and fundamental human rights should be respected in Central America.

I now pass on quickly to the essence of the report and the preamble.

Paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of the preamble referring to justification, internal dictatorship and military effort can only be described as pointless and provocative. Let us concern ourselves rather with our own difficulties and hopes and not pass value judgments about what, if you will pardon the expression, is going on in our neighbours' back yard.

Turning to paragraph (x), what do you mean, Mr. Close, by the phrase "true negotiations which would take account of the strategy now in force"? The phrase prompts me to ask: Involving whom? Where? How? At whose instigation? On whose behalf?

With regard to paragraph (xi) of the preamble, I wonder if we can assume that the USSR has a near monopoly of chemical weapons in Europe.

Finally, I come to the recommendation proper.

Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the recommendation, which talk about anti-imperialism, the Soviet Union's military effort and the increase of conventional forces, strike a jarring and brutal note. They seem to epitomise a crude anti-Soviet

attitude which is, if you will pardon the terms, both blinkered and untimely.

In conclusion, it strikes me that the general philosophy of the report in Document 1079 is aimed rather at an arms build-up than at the disarmament so longed for by Europeans.

Mr. Close, I shall listen most attentively to your replies, but will probably vote against the report notwithstanding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS(*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, is this report by Mr. Close a suitable instrument for cultivating good East-West relations? If not, what are its shortcomings? Let me answer these questions directly for myself. The report is not the most suitable means of achieving the goal for which it was drawn up, and this is due to the limited view it takes of the opportunities for forging satisfactory links and to its lack of understanding of the connection between civil and military, social and cultural, political and economic elements, which is absolutely essential to good relations.

Chapter III (ii) concerns civil co-operation. Anyone coming across the reference to Jakob Burckhardt in the first sentence of the explanatory memorandum might get the idea that this report is so cleverly constructed that it is bound to present arguments other than the cold war cliché in a new form. It was precisely the civil package described in Chapter III (ii) that contained additional means of achieving good co-operation and establishing human relations. Détente, security and peace do not depend on the indulgence of the hawks. They are not a matter for government negotiators and diplomats alone. The members of this Assembly are members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whose work is based on human rights. On the basis of human rights these members work in various committees on problems with legal, economic, social and administrative implications.

Peace and security encourage humanity and were the principles initially enshrined in the earliest version of the treaties by which WEU was created. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges recalled this yesterday in her report, and she refers to the preamble of the modified Brussels Treaty, where all this is to be found word for word. Where peace and security need to be strengthened, the instrument used is deficient if it does not include cultural and social aspects. They create scope for present and future everyday life and form part of the common cultural heritage, whose significance transcends national and political frontiers.

Mr. Tummers (continued)

SDI cannot then be discussed unless it is realised that space is just as much part of our cultural heritage as Strasbourg Cathedral. I wonder why the General Affairs Committee, whose task it is, after all, to deal with general affairs, takes such a limited view of the resources for encouraging good relations. If the European defence identity about which Lord Carrington spoke the day before yesterday and the European cultural identity which is discussed so often do not correspond, the parliamentarians of the Council of Europe and thus of WEU should feel concern. It is regrettable that this concern is not reflected in Mr. Close's report. I would even go so far as to say that it underlines the limited nature of his vision and his lack of insight into the mutual dependence between the political, social, cultural and other aspects of human life. To this extent the report is also unhistorical, and unhistorical documents are a poor foundation for the integral policy which WEU cannot do without. The dialogue between the superpowers must be inspired by a WEU which is intent on pursuing an integral policy. Oddly enough, the only assembly empowered to consider peace and security matters no longer has a cultural section, while the North Atlantic Assembly, which does not have this right, does have a cultural committee, and that is what Mr. Close means when he refers in his report to "various NATO bodies". I shall not appeal here for the reconstruction of WEU's stock of available instruments, but I have taken part in the debate to draw the attention of the members of our Assembly to the fact that, because of the limited view it takes of human relations among the European countries, a report like this is more of a hawk's nest than a guide to good East-West relations.

To complete the picture, I would refer lastly to the debate on East-West relations in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, and I would ask you, Mr. President, to have a reference made to these documents in the report. As this report and the recommendation based on it are so limited and inappropriate, my socialist colleagues and I shall consider not voting for it.

(Mr. Péciaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have been surprised by the tone of the last two speeches, because the report was approved by ten votes to one in committee, with socialists voting in favour. There must have been developments in international relations or other areas, because it seems that General Close no longer enjoys the almost unanimous confidence that was demonstrated in committee.

I do not believe that we shall improve relations with the Soviet Union by relying on hopes and expectations rather than on facts. I have noticed that so far no critic of the report has mentioned the fact that the Soviet Union, with whom we are supposed to be getting on better and better, continues to engage in mass genocide in an imperialist form in Afghanistan.

The latest official figures show that five million men, women and children have been driven into exile and are now eking out an existence along the border with Iran and in Pakistan. I have been to some of those refugee camps and, if they are a sign of a thaw in the Soviet Union's imperialist attitude, I wish that more of our colleagues had the opportunity to visit the Afghanistan borders to see what is going on. The New Statesman, which is one of the two most left-wing political journals in Britain, has estimated that 500 000 men, women and children have been killed in Afghanistan since the war began. If we want our rapporteurs to deal in facts, there is one fact.

Some people hope and expect that the situation will change. Mr. Gorbachev, who is much cleverer than Mr. Brezhnev was, recently announced the withdrawal of 8 000 of Russia's 110 000 troops in Afghanistan. Of course, those 8 000 were mainly anti-aircraft troops and as the freedom fighters in Afghanistan have no aeroplanes, the Soviet Union did not consider it essential to keep those forces in that country. They have been replaced by more suitable troops.

Afghanistan is a shocking example and we should all be thinking every day about how we can ensure the removal of the Russian forces. There has recently been in the United Nations the largest ever vote against Soviet policy. A massive majority, including left-wing countries in the third world, condemned the Soviet Union's action in Afghanistan. Perhaps those who speak of a new warmth in East-West relations could be a little less selfish and recognise that events in Afghanistan prove that there has been no such thaw.

Some members have criticised the Rapporteur's comments about Africa, but he has never said one word in favour of apartheid, and nor have I. However, the policies of the West are making already poor people ever poorer in South Africa and in the front-line states to the north. Having made the moral gestures, we should spare a few moments to realise that we have caused great misery and impending starvation to thousands of people, who, whatever the conditions in South Africa – I do not like apartheid any more than anyone else does – had decided to work there because they could not get a decent standard of living in their own countries. Let us have a little realism.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

There are many areas of instability in Africa and elsewhere because of the continuing presence of the peace-loving, political-military mercenaries from Cuba, who are paid for by the Soviet Union. Again, we see no sign of a thaw there. Efforts are being made to destabilise governments in countries where there is no apartheid. These Cuban mercenaries are sent to fight and die in countries in which Cuba has no conceivable national interest. A similar situation applies in South Yemen and there are even Cubans in Afghanistan, learning from their Russian masters how to be peaceful.

I welcome General Close's comments because they are realistic. As a defence Assembly, we must surely face facts and not be led astray by aspirations and hopes that are not supported by the facts. No one can argue with the facts that I have given. When I heard what had happened in Reykjavik, I thanked God for the first time for the SDI. If that had not proved a blocking point for the Russians, two other agreements would have been made. The first would have resulted in a reduction in the number of long-range missiles. No one would have objected to that, because both sides have arsenals that are big enough to destroy the world twice over. However, as one government after another in Western Europe has realised, the second agreement would have led to a withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles. The SS-20s would have been moved behind the Urals, but even if they were moved far to the east they could be back in the front line within a week. The Pershing and cruise missiles would have gone back across the Atlantic and would probably never have been brought back. I cannot envisage our getting another double-track decision in Western Europe in a time of tension.

Let us suppose that no intermediate-range missiles were left in Western or Eastern Europe. Those who support disarmament do not mention one important fact. Since the difficulties arose over Pershing and cruise, the Russians have been installing in Czechoslovakia and East Germany what they call short-range tactical nuclear weapons. If those weapons are short-range, Norfolk, Suffolk, London and most of the east coast of Great Britain, let alone the countries of Europe, are much closer to Prague and East Berlin than I realised. Those weapons, of which we have no equivalent, would have been left in position had the Reykjavik agreement gone ahead and not broken down because of SDI.

Another thing would have happened. In the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, apart from the short-range missiles such as the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23, they have a ratio of seven to one in tactical nuclear missiles, which would not have been affected had Reykjavik succeeded. That is

an appalling ratio. The Soviets also have an overwhelming supremacy in chemical warfare weapons and even they do not trouble to deny that. At the moment the Warsaw Pact has a massive chemical warfare armoury, which is not available to the West, for reasons that we know. It also has great superiority – too great for anyone's happiness – in conventional weapons.

Several paragraphs in the report refer to the balance of weapons. Unfortunately, there is not another debate in which one can talk about both politics and weaponry. In view of Mr. Close's recommendations, let me repeat the official figures. They are not Sir Frederic Bennett's figures and they do not come from a Conservative Party source, but they are the official figures comparing the number of weapons in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO is now in possession of 20 314 main battle tanks, and the Russians have 46 610, more than twice NATO's figure. In long-range and medium-range artillery, NATO has 8 974 large guns and the Warsaw Pact has 24 000, which is three times as many. NATO has 452 fighter aircraft and the Warsaw Pact has 1 075. If anyone thinks that that is a secure balance without a nuclear back-up, I look forward to hearing how we can expect our conventional forces, when we have fewer troops and reserves, to defend Europe successfully for the foreseeable future.

I support the report, as we did in committee. It is now being claimed increasingly that it would be better to do without the nuclear back-up and spend more money on conventional arms. We all know that it is more and more difficult to persuade western democracies to spend even the present figures on conventional warfare. They do not have any nuclear weapons that they could give up, as the British Labour Party claims, to pay for extra conventional weapons. Therefore, the talk about extra conventional forces being made available as an alternative to the nuclear umbrella is nonsense. No member of parliament from any country would dare to go back to his electorate and say: "I am afraid that we are going back to conventional weapons, and that will mean at least double – not a few per cent more – present military expenditure, at the cost of social services, education and so on." We all know that we are fooling ourselves if we think that.

I should like to add a postscript. In Britain, one political party, Her Majesty's official opposition, says that it can provide the extra forces to rectify the imbalance to which I referred, not by spending more money but by giving up our nuclear programme. Let me quote some more facts and figures. Any change from nuclear to conventional spending would take at least ten years to show effect if there was an attempt to sustain the current levels of defence spending. What would happen if we were to give up our

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

sovereign nuclear deterrent so that more could be spent on conventional weapons?

I said that the Russians had 1 075 aircraft and all of us in NATO have 452. If Britain gave up the nuclear deterrent, twelve extra aircraft would be provided in ten years. Also, instead of our sovereign deterrent, there would be three more small frigates to match up to the Soviet fleet in the Atlantic, which would not cause much heart-searching in the Kremlin. To be absolutely fair, let me say that I am told that if we gave up our nuclear deterrent and spent the same amount of money on conventional weapons, over ten years we could provide 300 extra tanks. The figures show that Russia has 46 000 tanks compared with our 20 000, so I do not think that 300 extra tanks over the next ten years would cause policies to change in the Kremlin.

I have sought to deal with facts rather than fiction and with realities rather than hopes. I congratulate Mr. Close on having the courage to do what we should do, which is to concentrate on realities and not daydream.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, our Rapporteur is an expert on the subject we are discussing and his very clear report is certainly a source of satisfaction to the European conscience of at least a section of our Assembly.

It would be a serious mistake to believe that the Soviet threat no longer exists.

To imagine that European security can be successfully guaranteed without weapons is a dream and an illusion. Our security would not be assured were it not for the Atlantic Alliance and the co-operation of the European pillar. The Council of Ministers and the parliamentary Assembly of WEU must endeavour to accelerate to their ideal cruising speed as quickly as possible. At the same time, we should remember that our young people no longer accept the hypocrisy so eloquently exemplified by arms deals be they "lawful" or "illicit" according to the circumstances.

Drugs, arms and terrorism are an unholy trinity threatening to destabilise the West by corrupting young people through addiction and exposing politicians to acts of terrorism. The absence of terrorist acts in the eastern bloc suggests logically the hypothesis that the East is organising, or helping to organise, sales of drugs and the perpetration of acts of terrorism on our continent.

Apart from this feature of East-West relations and leaving aside the economic links between

some eastern bloc countries and the West, including the twinning of eastern and western towns as their most recent manifestation, the heartless killings at the Berlin wall and elsewhere must bring home to us the fact that East and West are separated by ideological barriers.

We must ask ourselves if honest negotiations are possible with totalitarian régimes where individual liberties and human rights are flouted. All negotiations ending in agreement whether in the private, professional or political sphere, have a winner and a loser – a draw is the exception that proves the rule.

Any negotiations which involve risks to the United States or to Western Europe are unacceptable. It is henceforth vital that the United States consult its European allies before sitting down to the negotiating table with the East. I am aware that it is very difficult to find a common denominator between the Europeans in WEU and the Europeans in the NATO alliance whose common concern is the security of Europe.

It is vital at all costs that we avoid placing the Atlantic Alliance in jeopardy or doing anything to impair smooth co-operation and collaboration in Europe.

In this context, WEU demands to be heard on the basis of close collaboration between its Council of Ministers and the parliamentary Assembly. This constitutes the political council for European security proposed by the Luxembourg presidency. This very close and continuing collaboration will enable the ministers of defence and foreign affairs to keep in touch with the views of both WEU and NATO parliamentarians on the subject of political and military security. This is the charter of European security proposed by Mr. Chirac.

I am not a specialist in military matters, but I have listened attentively to the outstanding speakers who have taken this rostrum. The old medical dictum "prevention is better than cure" when applied to European security could, I think, be rephrased as follows: prevention by balanced deterrence is better than subjugation due to naïve and unpardonable weakness.

As a Luxembourger, who has forgiven the lawlessness of 1940-44, I move among Frenchmen, Belgians and Germans virtually without frontiers, and consider myself to have a truly European outlook. If necessary, I am prepared to defend this liberty and assist in safeguarding it for future European generations. Come what may, let us be on our guard. Let us be sceptical of the new Gorbachev style, with its peace doves in space.

In East-West relations, the decisive and crucial question is to establish a balance of deterrence at the lowest possible level. A definition of such a

Mr. Burger (continued)

balance, acceptable to the representatives of both blocs, would provide the best guarantee for a lasting peace.

Any hope of normal human relationships implying the free movement of people from East to West and from West to East will doubtless always remain a dream, given the existence in the East of totalitarian régimes where the expression of opinions and criticism is forbidden.

Athletes from eastern bloc countries are specially privileged in being able to move about the world with only discreet supervision by their régime. In token of my political objectivity and advocacy of fair play, I would say that Soviet football is in my opinion the best in Europe, if not the world. To field against the Soviets a team of ten players without a goalkeeper would be to court disaster, and the same is true in the military context.

Ladies and gentlemen, as Mr. Poos has said, let us close ranks with fresh determination to face up to our future tasks as a "political forum" for the security of Europe without encroaching on the areas of responsibility of other organisations like NATO, with which we hope to collaborate in a better climate in future.

As head of the Luxembourg parliamentary delegation, I take this opportunity of expressing to our President, Mr. Caro, my sincere thanks for the kind words which he has daily addressed to the Luxembourg presidency.

I am sure you will not be disappointed that another small country has been involved from the start in helping to construct the various European organisations. My thanks to you, Mr. President, and to all our fellow delegates.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Burger.

I call Mr. Palumbo.

Mr. PALUMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am down to speak on the report presented by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee but what I have to say also has bearing on points in the report presented by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which we have not been able to discuss, the report presented by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, which has already been discussed and unanimously approved, and the report presented by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which we decided not to discuss but instead approved Mr. Sinesio's motion for reference back to the committee for further consideration.

The basic subject of all these reports is in fact the same and they are the logical consequences of each other, but they unfortunately come to different conclusions and are even contradictory on certain major points.

Mr. Close's report on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations is the necessary premise for the threat assessment in Mr. Stokes's report, while Mr. Amadei's analysis of disarmament problems and Mr. Bianco's reflections on some aspects of the activities of the Council of WEU do no more than summarise the efforts of the parties involved to preserve peace and emphasise the rôle which Europe and in particular our seven-power Europe can and should fulfil in making an active contribution to the attainment of that great objective.

These four reports are so closely connected that I wonder whether it would not have been possible to merge them into a single text, in order to eliminate the inevitable contradictions which are particularly evident in Mr. Amadei's report, whose conclusions I could not have approved without appropriate amendments.

I turn now to the report by Mr. Close whose draft recommendation I can fully support.

The failure of the Reykjavik summit to produce any positive results – and the impression would have been the same if it had been an apparent success – highlighted a truth which no European citizen can now ignore or pretend to ignore; the fate of Europe is at the mercy of the two world superpowers and depends on the outcome of their negotiations. Furthermore, it must be realised that the terms and aims of such negotiations have changed as compared with the regular summits to which we had become accustomed. The basic objective is in fact no longer the balance of strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate-range weapons. SDI has suddenly been added to the regular issues and has profoundly altered the basic facts of the negotiations.

Anyone can see and must admit that this space defence policy is a terrible challenge by America to the Soviet Union which in spite of vast expenditure on space research, inevitably at the expense of other civilian uses, is in danger of being quickly left behind by the United States in a sector which may have some civilian spin-off but is first and foremost of military importance.

Because of the domestic situation also, it is inevitable therefore that the USSR should seek to halt or at least slow down the SDI programme as much as possible while conversely the United States is doing everything to speed it up.

From now on, this is the new basic factor in East-West relations and all disarmament negotia-

Mr. Palumbo (continued)

tions, which makes us realise the terrible trap – more terrible for Europe than for the United States – which the western world was in danger of falling into at Reykjavik; by giving the impression of being willing to yield some ground on the SDI programme, the Soviets continued their bid to persuade their American opposite numbers to agree to the withdrawal of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons from the European theatre.

The negotiations failed to produce results but the fact remains that on that famous day in Reykjavik Europe was in danger of becoming totally exposed militarily and above all psychologically to Soviet power.

Indeed, if all intermediate-range weapons, INF, were withdrawn from the European theatre all the short-range weapons would still be deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; some of these are capable of hitting with ten-metre accuracy all western targets south of the Loire.

And even if the Warsaw Pact agreed to no first use of short-range nuclear weapons there would still be the threat from conventional and chemical weapons and forces in the East European countries which the Western European states would certainly not be able to meet with their conventional forces.

Addressing Sir Frederic Bennett, I am certainly not unaware of the actual and not merely potential aggression by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, I am not unaware of the tragedy of that country with whose partisans the Secretary-General of my party – the Italian Liberal Party – Mr. Altissimo even spent a short time in secret at the end of last summer.

Reykjavik cannot therefore be regarded as a great opportunity for peace offered to the whole world by the Soviet Union and lost through American obstinacy over space defence. At Reykjavik, Western Europe was at terrible risk; if the American and Soviet positions could have been reconciled, in their exclusive mutual interests, the result would have been a completely new world picture with the United States moving towards new isolationism behind the space shield and the USSR moving towards total dominance in Europe.

As Cinderella between the two great powers, Europe would have been at least Finlandised. A sigh of relief therefore for Europeans and in particular for the members of WEU? No more than that? If that were the only conclusion it would certainly be unilateral and limiting.

The truth probably is that while European security would certainly have been at great risk if

the Iceland summit had produced a positive but hasty solution, it is now difficult to imagine that any subsequent negotiations can ignore the positions stated on that occasion.

The Soviet Union will not be able to go back on its willingness to agree to a gradual reduction – down to the zero option – of nuclear weapons in Europe while the United States will not be able to continue promoting solely and exclusively their research into space defence, it being clear that even if such research – which seems to me to be allowed by the ABM treaty up to the building of a prototype – were capable of producing optimum results for the protection of the American continent – and this has still to be proved – it would certainly not apply in the same way to Western Europe.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to accept, each for its own part, that the negotiations cannot be limited to nuclear weapons and the space shield and that they will at the same time have to cover conventional and chemical weapons and forces in particular.

Europe, and more particularly WEU – and I am hoping for a WEU enlarged to include all the European members of NATO with the prospect of our organisation becoming the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – will have to draw the lesson of Reykjavik and take action on its own to safeguard its future against the deplorable eventuality of the United States taking up an isolationist stance as the Iceland summit in some ways appeared to suggest might happen.

It is precisely for this reason that I am convinced that Reykjavik can act as a powerful stimulus for the construction of a new European defence community which I continue to believe is essential for the security of western civilisation, provided we Europeans learn all the possible lessons and fully accept that our own freedom begins to be lost when it is allowed to depend on others.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bogaerts.

Mr. BOGAERTS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Burger talks about Russian football and it is certainly the best in Europe, but I would like to remind him that last June little Belgium beat Russia 4-2 and succeeded in scoring the two decisive goals between the ninetieth and one hundred and twentieth minutes of the game!

I note with satisfaction that Mr. Close has now abandoned the somewhat ideologically biased and simplistic arguments which he used to advance when depicting the Soviet menace. But, since all partings are such sweet sorrow, we can still from time to time note a resurgence, for example in his description of the internal situ-

Mr. Bogaerts (continued)

ation in the USSR, of a naïvely conservative outlook which differs little from the simplistic arguments advanced by some elements of the far left: the USSR is a totalitarian dictatorship, and it is only by virtue of that fact that it has been able to contain the ardent desire of millions of Soviet citizens to escape to the freedom of the West.

We in the West too often lose sight of the deep social consensus which exists between the Soviet nation and the state, i.e. between the Soviet people and its leaders – a consensus born of, amongst other things, their history, past experience and the steady rise in living standards.

To judge from his report, the Rapporteur does not seem to realise that the divergences between the reformers and the conservatives with regard to future policy cannot fail to have parallel repercussions on the conduct of foreign policy. In a profoundly conservative society, such as has always existed in the Soviet Union and in mother Russia before it, reformers are always in the minority.

To implement their policy they will always need to enter into a “historical compromise” with their conservative opponents. At this point, two courses are open to them: either they can exaggerate the threat from outside, a familiar stratagem for anyone wishing to create a consensus in support of his policy, although liable to intensify a centralist attitude; or they can maintain the status quo, i.e. a spirit of distrust and a siege mentality – all attitudes of mind tending to strengthen the conservative position.

If the society which it envisages is to come about, the reformist team now in power needs a degree of détente and expectation in international relations. But the lesson drawn from the breakdown of détente in the seventies – a breakdown as frustrating to the USSR as to the United States and Europe – is that détente based solely on the two superpowers offers no lasting guarantee. It is only one step from this realisation to the advocacy of a more diversified, and more European, foreign policy, and it is a step which the Soviets are in the process of taking.

The only outcome of the Rapporteur’s recommendation will be that this step towards Europe, which the Soviet reformers wish to take, will prove to be a step in the wrong direction inasmuch as it will fail to produce concrete results. It does not take much imagination to see that, as soon as this first step goes wrong, the conservatives in the Kremlin, and in the party and state machine will exploit the fact to reduce the room for political manoeuvre and impair the standing of the reformers and Mr. Gorbachev.

Notwithstanding the almost dialectical tone of the report, let us now look at its recommendations: an agreement on Euromissiles must not be signed without a reduction in the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in conventional forces; we should not distance ourselves from the Americans with regard to the SDI programme; banning nuclear tests does not serve European interests, trade with the East serves only to back up its arms policy. In a word: “the question of European security is not a regional matter, but is linked to the establishment of a world balance”.

Since this world balance – a hypothetical and debatable concept if ever there was one – will in practice never be attained, we are forced to the conclusion that throughout the whole intervening period it will be impossible to reach an agreement leading to an improvement in international relations at European level. By way of example I cite here the proposals which my colleagues in the SPD in the Federal Republic of Germany have worked out jointly with the SED in the German Democratic Republic with the aim of establishing zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons in Europe.

It is the fear of myself and my party that European inertia of this kind, this failure to face up to our responsibilities, may result in a return to the intractability practised by the Soviet conservatives in power in the Kremlin. Is this the unwitting foundation on which the Rapporteur’s recommendations are based? Is this the true nature of the de facto alliance between conservatives in the East and the West?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we were already familiar with the verve, enthusiasm and talent of the author of that well-known book “L’Europe sans défense”. As we today read the report presented by Mr. Close, we can only congratulate ourselves that we have in our midst such an expert on East-West relations and security at European and world level.

This document has the great merit of an approach which is at once realistic, as far as our relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, and courageous, because Mr. Close does not hesitate, in particular, to broach the delicate question of chemical weapons.

He also suggests that we should exercise great caution in our dealings with the USSR, a recommendation which is all the more apposite since General Secretary Gorbachev’s mastery of the skills of communication certainly facilitates an objective approach to the problem of difficult and delicate relations with the USSR.

As you very rightly say, Mr. Close, the Soviet Union faces a choice: either it can increase the

Mr. De Decker (continued)

prosperity of its people or it can pursue its military efforts. In the past the totalitarian Soviet régime has taken a fundamental option, but I share your hope that it will be obliged by circumstances to rethink its position.

We must look very carefully at all the proposals made by the USSR, but we must never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a totalitarian régime which is not called upon to explain the rationale of its policy to public opinion at home.

You are right, Mr. Close, to draw our attention to the Soviet presence in all parts of the world. This is no doubt the critical as well as the latest factor affecting our relations with the USSR in the security field. The way the USSR has built up its military presence throughout the various continents over the last ten years has altered the strategic map of the world. The USSR has already had a presence in Africa for some years, and a number of members have already referred to Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. I would now like to draw your attention to the appearance of the USSR in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

Clearly, world strategy has been completely transformed since 1975, that is, since the "liberation" of Saigon by Russian tanks manned by the North Vietnamese. The fact is that the Soviet Union, by virtue of a considerable military presence at both ends of its continent, has succeeded in splitting the military effort that the West, and the United States, in particular, has had to make to contain this threat.

Sir Frederic Bennett has referred to the balance of forces in Europe as between the Warsaw Pact and ourselves, but we must also bear in mind that the USSR has completely redeployed its naval forces since 1980. At least half of the total naval strength available to Admiral Gorshkov is now deployed in the Pacific. This new threat naturally forces the United States to make a much bigger effort in the Pacific and Asia.

I also wish to draw your attention to the additional threat which the USSR could pose by its pressure, geographical expansion and encroachments on the third, i.e. the southern, front.

Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979. Should it occur to the Soviet Union to continue its excursion beyond Afghanistan and the Pakistan frontier into Baluchistan, it would reach warm waters. For the first time in its history, it would then be able to split the Eurasian continent into two, and could control it from the North Pole to the Indian Ocean. Operating from the Indian Ocean it would also be able to cut all routes of communication and supply, especially those carrying the free world's

raw materials and oil supplies both to the West towards Europe and to Asia, to Japan and the countries of ASEAN.

Ladies and gentlemen, we must recognise therefore that the moment has come, if only in response to the needs of global strategy, to see that Europe plays a much larger and more decisive rôle in the free world's overall defence capability. So, in conclusion, I wish to draw your attention to the paragraph I consider to be the most important in the draft recommendation in Mr. Close's report.

I refer here to paragraph 5, which states the need for a further effort in terms of conventional forces prior to, or in parallel with, the commencement of negotiations on nuclear weapons, and more especially on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. I am thinking here in particular of the SS-20s, which pose a threat not only to us Europeans, but to all the Soviet Union's neighbours including ourselves to the west, India and its neighbours to the south and Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Indochina to the east. This is further substantiation of the fact that Europe's security and that of the Pacific world are completely interdependent.

Returning to paragraph 5, it is essential that the balance of conventional forces be restored at the earliest possible moment. This should be one of the priority tasks of WEU, which must also concern itself with any disarmament negotiations following in the wake of the Reykjavik meeting, in which the West might support, or continue to advocate, the idea of the zero option. It is specially necessary to ensure – and it is vital that our Assembly should stress this point and bring it home to our governments – that this zero option should include the shorter-range nuclear weapons on the Soviet side. I am thinking here of the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s apart from the SS-20s. From our Western European point of view it makes little difference whether we are killed by an SS-20 with a range of 5 000 kilometres, or by an SS-21 or an SS-23 with a range of a mere 800 to 1 500 kilometres.

The great danger stems from the fact that, in Reykjavik, President Reagan, probably urged on by his wish to obtain concrete results on disarmament in order to rally public opinion on the eve of the legislative elections, made some very specific concessions on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, that is on the weapons of concern to us as Europeans, but not on strategic weapons which are specially relevant to the security of the United States.

This is renewed proof that we cannot always expect to safeguard our security by counting exclusively on a third party, even when that third party is a friend and an ally. It demonstrates our need to encourage that ally to pursue his efforts

Mr. De Decker (continued)

on our behalf by setting an example ourselves, and by making a much bigger defence effort in our own interests.

Ladies and gentlemen, I hope that this excellent report will be adopted with a very large majority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to make a few random remarks about Senator Close's excellent report. It read extremely well and held together as an expression of the hope that the change of management in the Kremlin might lead to better times and the warning that we must not be taken in by the window dressing which may yet prove to be the only thing that has changed.

The first speech in the debate took me straight back to the era of Gromyko and Molotov. It could have been made by either of those gentlemen, because it reflected the 1948 view and suggested that there was nothing wrong with what was going on in Soviet Russia. I found that disturbing, particularly as I thought that the speaker represented a country that wished to defend freedom in the West. However, perhaps the fact that he was able to make that speech here, whereas, I would not be able to make a speech in Soviet Russia, demonstrates the importance of WEU and other such forums.

Colleague Close – I am not sure whether he is a senator, a general or a civilian; each hat fits him well – covers a wide range and rightly talks about the dangers of Soviet penetration in Africa. I am worried about the way in which the West has allowed the Russians to get away with the fact that they have made virtually no contribution to the dying and starving people in Africa. The West has made immense humanitarian efforts, but the Russians have done virtually nothing. It might be worth our while examining what is wrong with our basis of producing information for the world.

Let us try to analyse what Mr. Gorbachev is trying to do. In political life in the East and West, a new prime minister or ruler is usually five or ten years younger than his predecessor. In Mr. Gorbachev's case, there has been an enormous jump in age and one wonders why it was permitted. Many of Mr. Brezhnev's colleagues had held office in the Soviet Union for a long time. They could have taken power, but for some reason it was decided that they should not do so. Was that because Mr. Gorbachev was seen as a man who could outwardly portray a change of attitude in the Soviet Union? Was it because he could demonstrate a willingness to sit down and negotiate without saying: "Not everything is up

for negotiation. We shall merely sit down"? He seems to have been told that he may negotiate.

It is interesting to consider where Mr. Gorbachev goes. If he tries to carry out negotiations that go too far, there is no doubt that the military, who still control Soviet Russia, would rapidly haul him back and say: "That is not permissible." On the other hand, if he achieves nothing, the military may say that it was pointless putting him there and that they had better have a change. Mr. Gorbachev is walking a tight-rope. He must make some progress because the military realise that Russia's economy must have some relief and must be able to deliver something to the civilian population. There must be some reduction in military expenditure, but not too much.

Mr. Gorbachev nearly achieved far more than he ever dreamt of at Reykjavik. We shall never know whether that was by accident or design – unless someone who was there leaks the information in the modern way of officials who sell information and break their oaths. But perhaps that will not happen in this case. I warn my colleagues that we must realise that Mr. Gorbachev is walking a tight-rope.

Senator Close was criticised by two or three members who said that he was merely displaying his well-known distrust and dislike of the Soviet Union. I did not think that anyone here trusted the Soviet Union, but some speeches suggest that there are members who trust the Russians beyond belief. I would be encouraged to trust the Russians if they made it permissible once again – not merely under the constitution, but in fact – for people to go into a Russian church and listen to a priest talking as openly as some Polish priests talked before one of them was murdered. I would be encouraged to trust the Russians if they permitted unhindered services in Jewish synagogues or allowed those imprisoned in Soviet labour camps to come out and go abroad if they wished. At that stage, I might believe that the Soviet Union could be trusted in some of the negotiations.

There is some agitation in parts of Europe because of a foolish statement by a British politician. I do not normally talk about British politics in a European assembly, but because the basis of this Assembly has been put at risk by a foolish statement by the leader of the British Labour Party it is necessary for me to read a two paragraph extract from a speech made yesterday in the British Parliament by Lord Stewart of Fulham. He is a former Labour Foreign Secretary, who was held in high regard in Europe and the rest of the world for his calm and sensible attitude. He said: "The one thing which will put the Russians off negotiation is the belief that if they hang on long enough the West will go in for unilateral disarmament on a large scale... If

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

they believe that they are not likely to be very helpful at the negotiating table."

The headline of the article is: "Our arms policy suicidal, says Labour peer". That is Lord Stewart, the former distinguished British Foreign Secretary.

Mr. Kinnock will not win the election, but that is unimportant. What is important is the fact that he is worrying those responsible for the security of the West. I believe that what I have said is the view held by the vast majority of those who may support his party but will not support it at the polls.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – It is not always fortunate for someone to be a tail-ender in a long, involved debate such as this morning's debate. Many interesting facts were given by Sir Frederic Bennett on the composition of the forces opposed to us on the other side of the iron curtain. We have also heard about the difficulties of trusting the USSR. Most of us in the Assembly will remember Khrushchev in the United Nations taking off his shoe to slam his table, to convey his point. The fear of the Russians has been with us for the past forty years.

Mr. Close was right to say in the first of his draft recommendations:

"Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military deployment not justified by the requirements of its security".

The tension has always been there. There was the episode of nuclear weapons being shipped to Cuba. We have heard about the traumatic events in Afghanistan, and still we in the West allow it to continue.

We have heard many facts about the increase in the number of chemical weapons held by the USSR. We know that Reykjavik was nearly a complete failure for the West in as much as we would have been left completely defenceless in Europe if the negotiations had gone forward to a successful conclusion. Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues have real problems building up for them. Let me give one simple fact. Communications between the East and the West are improving. People in Eastern Germany and further East can watch television proving that the standard of living enjoyed in the West is much superior to that in the Soviet Union. That is one way in which pressure will be put on the Politburo to cut down on spending on what the Soviets would term their defensive weapons. Programmes on television will highlight the falsehood of many of the myths that the Pol-

itburo wants to sustain. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to his draft recommendation, Mr. Close says:

"Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many proposals".

There is an old English expression for that, which is probably impossible to translate: these have been sprats to catch mackerels.

I admire the skill and ability of the Soviet leadership to put on a public relations image that is almost impossible to fault. We have a smiling, well intentioned, well turned out and correctly dressed image, accompanied by a most charming wife, probably in a sable fur coat. The whole package is good to Western European eyes, but I am inclined to think, as Senator Close obviously does, that it is something to fear.

One of the main planks of the report is the fact that the USSR obtains help from the West. The EEC even contributes to its war effort by providing it with cheap cereals and butter, but the help goes beyond that. The USSR purchases surpluses throughout the West, and those surpluses keep at bay what could be famine in some years. The money that is saved by bulk purchasing must inevitably be turned into arms.

The report is excellent. It is time that we said what it says. It is time that we were more forceful and discussed defence policy in depth. Too many of us come here to make political points – that is understandable: one cannot be a politician one week and a neutralist the next; but defence policy is all important. That is what WEU is all about, and it is why Spain and Portugal will wish to join us in the not-too-distant future.

This is an excellent report. It is firm, strong and clear and I for one will certainly vote for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Close, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have listened with sustained interest to the various speakers. As was to be expected, they split along the customary divide separating what my fellow delegate, Mr. Tummers, refers to as the hawks from the doves. Personally, I would say that the dividing line is one separating the realists, who know that international politics are governed by self-interest and not by philanthropy, from the idealists, whose convictions are highly honourable but whose dreams, hopes and sometimes credulity led us, as we know all too well, from the Anschluss via the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia

Mr. Close (continued)

and the Danzig corridor to the final catastrophe which claimed fifty million victims.

I will try to reply as briefly as possible as time is passing and flight times are unforgiving...

I shall address myself first of all to the realists, that is to those who have spoken in support of the report, namely Mr. Martino, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Burger, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Hill and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. I shall then address myself to Her Majesty's opposition and the rest...

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – They have read the report too!

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I was aware of the fact; thank you for this sign of confidence.

I thank all members who have been kind enough to approve the report and who consider that it does perhaps contain a positive element. I am also grateful for their observations during the debate, which were most interesting.

When Mr. Martino, notwithstanding a certain bitterness in the wake of the Reykjavik summit, stresses that we should on no account allow our solidarity with the United States as partners in the alliance to be shaken, he is perfectly right. For his part, Sir Frederic Bennett underlined what is happening in Afghanistan – a situation which many tend to forget in favour, say, of Nicaragua, or apartheid in South Africa. He also quoted some irrefutable figures for the relative strength of forces, figures which I was very disappointed not to find in Mr. Stokes's report. My thanks also go to my Luxembourg colleague, Mr. Burger, for his eminently sensible remarks. I also listened very closely to the arguments advanced by Mr. Palumbo, which are in line with the statements made in this forum by our President as well as by Lord Carrington, Mr. Chirac and Mr. Spadolini. When my colleague, Armand De Decker, draws attention to the worldwide dimension of the threat, he brings to the fore an issue which now appears to be one of concern to the Council and which we refer to as "perils outside the NATO area". This is a problem to which, I trust, not only our Assembly but the Council, too, will give all the attention it deserves. Lastly, I thank Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Hill for their observations corroborating certain points made in the report and underlining the internal difficulties which Mr. Gorbachev might encounter if he trampled too radically on the privileges of the hierarchy or upset established situations and vested interests.

I shall reply at somewhat greater length to the arguments put forward by Mr. Péciaux, Mr.

Bogaerts and Mr. Tummers. I was awaiting with benevolent curiosity the sugar-coated criticisms of my esteemed socialist colleague, and I was not disappointed. He called to my mind the words of a British minister: "I have sometimes listened to convincing speeches backed up by irrefutable arguments and the most substantial proofs. They have on occasion changed my mind but never my vote." I do not expect Mr. Péciaux to give his unqualified approval to the report, as he stated with characteristic frankness that he rejects its substance even though appreciating its form. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, I have said repeatedly that they were not used during the second world war, because they were neutralised by the fact that both sides had them.

It is a fact that in this field the Soviet camp has superiority due to its crushing preponderance, American chemical weapons, considered obsolete, having been withdrawn and the decision to brandish binary weapons having only recently been taken by Congress. In other words, we find ourselves in complete imbalance and faced with a danger which I personally consider to be more real than that presented by nuclear weapons. I would remind my honourable colleague that if we do not have chemical weapons while others do, we shall be obliged to wear protective clothing which will reduce our operational efficiency by 50% – a disadvantage which will not of course affect the other side.

In relation to current strategy, Mr. Péciaux also raised the questions "Where, when, how and decided by whom". I am surprised that he occupies a seat in this Assembly, whose purpose, to the best of my belief, is to address itself to problems of defence and strategy, without knowing that the strategy of massive reprisals was replaced by the strategy of flexible response after France withdrew from the integrated military organisation in late 1966, early 1967. I am all the more surprised since, unless I am mistaken, a strategy is always approved unanimously by all NATO members, and I seem to remember that at the time in question his party was in power. If he now wants explanations, he knows who to ask! He criticises me for talking about Africa. Before dealing with Soviet foreign policy, it did seem that a few words of the report should be devoted to this problem. I have never voiced either support for or opposition to apartheid, and so I have not, as he alleges, interfered in other people's business. I must say however that I find his selective indignation very strange, as in my view the greatest political apartheid is that practised by the Soviet Union with its one-party system, witness the fact that the Soviet empire contains seventy million Moslems, none of whom share in the exercise of power.

I now come to what Mr. Bogaerts had to say. His intervention is confirmation of his party's

Mr. Close (continued)

attitude, which is against nuclear weapons, against conventional weapons and against everything else. If his only response to the threat of conflict is "let's surrender at once" I am pleased to allow him the honour and, of course, the responsibility.

Mr. Tummers, on the other hand, considers that my report is very restricted. However, I consider that Mr. Tummers's points are curiously alien to the topic under discussion as he refers to culture. We shall never be intimidated by any threat posed by the Bolshoi ballet or the Red Army band. I might add that, before 1940, I knew who Goethe was and had read Leibnitz and the rest. I also admired German music. However, I quite failed to integrate all this with the concentration camps where I spent three years in that cultural milieu. Similarly, I can appreciate Chekov, Tolstoi and Dostoyevsky, but I shall never add to the inventory of my appreciation the gulags so marvellously described by Solzhenitsyn.

I ask Mr. Tummers to reconsider and to remember what happened in the late thirties, when a policy of abandonment and backsliding – the Munich spirit – symbolised a degree of naïvety which even prevented us noticing the reversal of alliances and the implications of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, mentioned a moment ago.

As I often say, we have to be realists if we are to preserve the European security we have been discussing throughout this session. Reykjavik should have made it clear that, if we lay claim to European sovereignty, we must have the means of defending it.

(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Vice-Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I just want to make a simple point, Mr. President, about two matters at the close of this debate.

In committee, the report was approved by 10 ayes, 1 no and 3 abstentions. The intention in the harsh tone of the report – harsh because it tells the plain truth – was to avoid the ambiguity of diplomatic phraseology. For me this is praise. I welcome it.

The second point to note is the absence of any amendments. Clearly, there was no practical possibility of changing anything in such a well-documented text. I shall therefore vote for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1079.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – After the answer of the Rapporteur it has become even more clear that this report and draft recommendation are extremely controversial. For that reason it should be made absolutely clear how the Assembly wants to vote on this controversial report. I ask for a roll-call in conformity with Rule 33 (2).

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there five members of the Assembly who support Mr. Stoffelen's proposal?...

(More than five members rose)

We shall therefore vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation in Document 1079.

Before doing so, I shall check that we have a quorum. The attendance register shows 48 signatures out of a total of 89 representatives. We therefore have a quorum.

The roll-call will start with the name of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹:

Number of votes cast	39
Ayes	24
Noes	14
Abstentions	1

The draft recommendation is adopted ².

4. Statement by the President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, before bringing the session to a close I should like to say something about the extraordinary session.

In accordance with Article III (b) of the Charter of the Assembly, I have decided to convene an extraordinary session of the Assembly. The Presidential Committee met this morning and agreed the following arrangements for that session.

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

The President (continued)

Thanks to the kindness of the Luxembourg Government, to which I express my thanks through Mr. Goebbels, the session will be held in Luxembourg on 28th and 29th April next, that is on the occasion of the meeting of the Council of Ministers scheduled for 29th and 30th April.

I would remind the Assembly that the Presidential Committee will meet with the Council at a date to be fixed. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee will meet the Council after its meeting ends.

The work of the committees must be completed in good time but each of you will have made the necessary arrangements, as we had decided that the Assembly committees should meet in Luxembourg at the same time as the Council.

The Presidential Committee considers therefore that the agenda should cover three main subjects, which the committees concerned will work out in detail.

First, the reactivation of WEU. In essence, this will primarily be the follow-up to the report presented by Mr. Poos, with special reference to the Political Committee for European Security. The second matter is the proposal by the Prime Minister of the French Republic for a charter of European security. This question will be studied by the General Affairs Committee.

Second, there is the disarmament issue dealt with in the report by our colleague, Mr. Amadei, which has been referred back to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Third, there are the budgetary and administrative questions, which will be the responsibility of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

At the end of the three-month period which we voted for this week it will be necessary to render an account to the Assembly and, of course, to have an opportunity of discussing it with the Council.

The salient points included in this issue are: the position of pensions in the Assembly's budget; the Assembly's operating budget; the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk and, lastly, the growth rate to be applied to the Assembly with a view to examining and, if possible, implementing the proposals made by the Chairman of the Council in his address on Tuesday.

In view of our extremely tight budget, this extraordinary session will be organised with the strictest economy. We cannot yet furnish full details, but we anticipate having a very small

administrative team so as not to prejudice our negotiations with the Council.

I must add that this extraordinary session I have decided to convene – without any political pressure, it must be said – is the logical outcome of what I might term “the positive growth crisis of our Assembly” due both to the interest on the part of governments and to the amount of work we have to do. As it has not been possible to dispose of all this work, this special session is needed to clear the backlog and, as we shall have an opportunity of meeting the Council on that occasion, it is clear that the top priority for the Assembly, and more especially for its President, must be to ensure that these two days are wholly devoted to deliberations relevant to our Assembly.

I think I have made myself clear.

I call Mr. Cox on a point of order.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – May I first pay tribute to you, Mr. President. We would all accept that you have not had an easy week, through no fault of your own.

I listened with interest to the announcement you made about the special session. I am sure that members will welcome the opportunity to discuss the subjects that you have outlined. Numbers one and three are closely linked. If we are to seek to reactivate WEU there has to be much more generous funding from the governments we represent. Perhaps before the April session our delegations will be able to gain some insight into the thinking of governments about reactivation. It cannot be done without money.

The selection of the second subject, disarmament, will please many members. Since you have said that we are to meet for only two days, may I ask that you ensure that it will be a meeting of this Assembly, with members discussing these items? Will you ensure that whatever pressures are put upon you, no matter where they may come from, you will reject any suggestion that other speakers should attend the Assembly, telling us how much they admire us and support what we are doing but, nevertheless, taking up the time that we should be giving to debate?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have noted your message. You said you had decided to hold an extraordinary session in Luxembourg, but I recall having myself signed a request to this effect. Allow me to point out, therefore, that a number of us did, in fact, help you to reach this decision.

I have a number of other comments. In your opening address you stated that the Assembly's

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

budget was such that it did not even run to an evening sitting you had planned. In that case, I wonder how it is possible to organise a two-day session in Luxembourg. The cost to our respective parliaments will certainly be greater.

Our sessions seem to me to be curiously organised. We complain that our governments show no interest or are not pressing ahead with the reactivation of WEU. We also complain that our financial resources are insufficient to run the machine, but, when it comes to considering a report as important as the one we have just adopted, I note that the attendance register was signed by forty-eight out of eighty-nine members, which means that a fifth were absent and that the report was adopted by only 26% of Assembly members.

I am therefore rather worried about the good name of our parliamentary Assembly. I could have raised this matter privately, but I preferred to air it in public as we are not entitled to level criticisms at ministers, even if they are in political and parliamentary phraseology, unless we are ourselves prepared to shoulder our responsibilities and fulfil the mandate entrusted to us by the electorate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – May I also congratulate you, Mr. President, on the way in which you have handled this difficult week and on the fact that you have adhered closely to the democratic process by arranging the meeting in Luxembourg.

My answer to Mr. Dejardin is that the expense involved in arranging the Luxembourg meeting is part of the price that we have to pay for democracy, but I note that our Defence Questions and Armaments and Parliamentary and Public Relations Committees are meeting in Luxembourg at the same time. That suggests that you wish to save money and not to be profligate with the funds of WEU. We can take that message to our governments, because it will strengthen our hand in our efforts to be taken seriously and may encourage our governments to ensure that we are given proper funding for the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I welcome your decision to hold an extraordinary session in April. On behalf of my group, I gave unqualified support to your proposal. The presence here of a large number of ministers was an event in itself – a very welcome one, and proof of the revitalisation of WEU.

I should like to thank the Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the Council for being with us throughout our session. We owe him a particular debt of gratitude.

If a large number of ministers came here, it is because they considered that it served a good purpose to do so, for themselves, their countries, the concept of Europe and the construction of European defence. I am thinking here especially of the highly important address given by Mr. Chirac.

I am glad therefore that this session is to be held so that discussion of Mr. Chirac's proposal can start and our work on the various reports which we have to consider can be continued. I hope also that the ministers meeting in Luxembourg at the same time will be fully conscious of the fact that revitalisation has actually taken place and that constant co-operation between the Assembly and the Council on current defence issues is, as I see it, possibly far more important than consideration of parliamentary reports. I trust they will also understand that they must reconsider their position on the budget for the whole WEU organisation, including the Assembly and the Secretariat-General.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your remarks, Mr. De Decker, I am also grateful to all the other speakers.

Before giving the floor to Mr. Goebbels, there is a point I would like to mention.

Reference has been made to the cost to national parliaments, but unless there is some element of which I am not aware, national parliaments will not be called on to disburse an extra penny or sou, as we had already decided to hold committee meetings in Luxembourg on the two days in question. The travelling and living costs met by national parliaments will therefore be unchanged.

As to the savings we are going to make in order not to overstrain our budget and facilitate our negotiations with the Council, I must tell you now that only a summary of debates will be provided immediately, with a consequent reduction in costs. The reports of debates you are used to having during sessions will be prepared later.

I must point out here that the decision to organise an extraordinary session is a political one. Our arrangements must be guided by political considerations, and I am sure, given the identity of purpose of ourselves and the Council, that we both – Council and Assembly alike – take an identical political view.

Do you consider, ladies and gentlemen, that, with the means at its disposal, WEU is truly in a

The President (continued)

position to cope with a problem as weighty as the one posed for western nations, and for the members of Western European Union in particular, in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit?

We are the only European assembly where it has been possible to discuss these issues and to take the relevant decisions. Nevertheless, we have the smallest budget, the most modest resources and the fewest administrative services. We also meet least often. In spite of all this we still do our job!

By attending our Assembly in such numbers, members of governments have underlined the identity of view shared by the Council and the Assembly. That means that our present crisis is one of growth. The presence of government members in the Assembly is to the good. I recall the criticisms voiced by Assembly members when government representatives stayed away.

Our resources are still inadequate, and this problem requires attention – but in complete political accord with the Council.

I am therefore not curious to know whether one or other of us had in his pocket twenty, thirty or forty signatures in support of such or such an additional procedure. I only know there is one amongst us who, thanks to you and the confidence you place in him, is in a position to speak on behalf of all Assembly members in the interests of the Assembly as a whole.

I thought it my duty to say this to you. With the backing of the Presidential Committee and the Assembly, we have to ensure the revitalisation of WEU at a particularly significant time in the history of our countries.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to bring this debate to a close by asking you to see to it that our Assembly has the working conditions vital to its operation.

I call Mr. Goebbels, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg.

Mr. GOEBBELS (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Council presidency does not wish to comment on your debates, but I must tell you that I have taken note of what you have said, particularly concerning the budget. In my opinion it is clear that the governments of the member states must join in an effort to provide you with a budget to match your legitimate aspirations.

As I have already had occasion to say personally to your energetic President, Mr. Caro, I

believe in the reactivation of WEU. Such revitalisation is a reality. That fact has been brought home to me by your lively Assembly, which, to borrow the image used by Mr. Bianco on Tuesday, is assuming an increasingly high profile.

That is the reason why so many ministers and people in high authority have come to Paris to attend this session. These visits have underlined the new importance of WEU in European politics, although I understand, of course, that a number of parliamentarians have been inclined to look askance at the resulting disruption of your work. However, let me put a question to you: would your Assembly be in better shape if it were not addressed by ministers? Mr. De Decker and your President, Mr. Caro, have already answered that question.

In response to what my friend Mr. Ahrens said last Tuesday, it is not my impression that ministers come here to use your Assembly as a sounding board – quite the contrary. In the view of the Luxembourg presidency at least, your Assembly is a meeting place, a debating forum and, above all Mr. President, a source of inspiration.

That is why the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Poos, my colleague, Mr. Fischbach, and I have taken it in turn to be here throughout this session so that we could listen to what you had to say and pass on your views and messages to the Council of Ministers. I, therefore, welcome your decision to convene an extraordinary session of your Assembly in Luxembourg. I can assure you that the Luxembourg Government will do its utmost to see that the infrastructures necessary for your work are made available to you at lowest possible cost, and will in this way contribute to the success of the meeting and to the necessary dialogue between your Assembly and the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Secretary of State, the applause which you have just heard shows how grateful the Assembly is for your intervention and for your renewed assurance of support. I would also like to express my own gratitude, which I ask you to convey to your colleagues in the Luxembourg Government, Mr. Poos and Mr. Fischbach.

5. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now come to the end of the session.

Before closing the session, I wish to thank Assembly members for their attendance, the

The President (continued)

Council members who have been present, the Secretariat-General, the successive ministers who have addressed us, the press which has followed our deliberations and given them considerable coverage this week and all the staff, permanent and temporary, including especially our friends the interpreters, who have faithfully

transmitted our words in spite of the difficulties of this session.

We will next meet in Luxembourg, and I now declare closed the thirty-second ordinary session of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

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