

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1987

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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The proceeding of the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP
DECLERCQ Tijl	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
RAMAEKERS Jef	SP
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Étienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
du MONCEAU	
de BERGENDAL Yves	PSC
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Émile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHENARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR
Mrs. TRAUTMANN Catherine	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
MANZOLINI Giovanni	PSDI
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Ricardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM. SPEED Keith	Conservative
STOKES John	Conservative
WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
EWING Harry	Labour
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SIXTH SITTING

Monday, 30th November 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1113).
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1126).
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1110).
8. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1117).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 6 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Observers

The President welcomed parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1113)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Garrett.

The President replied to the speakers.

The President proposed to the Assembly that the presentation of the report on the military use of computers, originally proposed for the afternoon of 3rd December, be brought forward to the morning of 2nd December and that the presentation of the report on European armaments co-operation, originally proposed for the morning of 2nd December, be deferred until the afternoon of 3rd December.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session as amended was adopted.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1126)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pannella and Burger.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Two candidates had been proposed for the posts of Vice-President, namely Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Sarti.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the two Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Sarti were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Valleix, Sarti, Soell, Péciaux.

10. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Cahen answered questions put by MM. Close, Burger, Valleix, Pannella, Stegagnini and Soell.

11. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1110 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The President informed the Assembly that the amendment tabled by Mr. Pannella was out of order.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision.

The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 1)¹.

12. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1117)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Aarts, Wilkinson and Antretter.

The debate was adjourned.

13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure

(Motion for a decision, Doc. 1124)

The President announced that a motion for a decision to amend the Rules of Procedure had been tabled by Mr. Pannella and others.

In accordance with Rule 51 (1), the motion was referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges without debate.

14. INF treaty

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1127)

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on the INF treaty had been tabled by Mr. Stoffelen and others.

The motion was included in the register and referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

15. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the changes in the membership of committees as follows:

¹. See page 17.

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Ramaekers (in place of Mr. Bogaerts)	
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Cariglia Fiandrotti Fioret Pecchioli Sinesio	MM. Pannella Andreis Fassino Cannata Filetti
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. de Beer de Kwaadsteniet	MM. Tummers Maris De Hoop Scheffer
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Cox Hardy Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed Stokes	Mr. Thompson Lord Newall Sir Russell Johnston Ms. Ruddock Mr. Wilkinson

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Foschi Martino Natali Pieralli Sarti	MM. Spitella Andreis Capanna Rubbi Manzolini
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts van der Sanden Stoffelen	MM. van der Werff Eisma Mrs. Herfkens
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Hill Lord Mackie Mr. Shelton	Lord Kirkhill Lady Jill Knight Mr. Stewart MM. Ewing Speed

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Italy:</i>	Mr. Caccia Mrs. Francese MM. Intini Malfatti	MM. Kessler Rodotà Fiandrotti Stegagnini
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van der Werff Worrell	MM. Aarts Tummers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Garrett Hill Parry Wilkinson	Mr. Lambie Lord Rodney Mr. Atkinson Sir Dudley Smith

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Belgium:</i>		Mr. Ramaekers (in place of Mr. Bogaerts)
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Greco Rauti Sinesio Triglia	MM. Intini Rubner Parisi Giagu Demartini
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. de Jong Worrell	Mr. de Kwaadsteniet Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Dame Peggy Fenner MM. Morris Rathbone Redmond	Mr. Stokes Lord Mackie MM. Bowden Litherland

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>France:</i>	Mr. Lacour	Mr. Montastruc
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Caccia Filetti Pasquino Taramelli	MM. Stegagnini Fassino Capanna Natali
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Maris Stoffelen	MM. de Jong van der Sanden
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Jessel Lord Kirkhill Mr. Thompson	Lord Kinnoull Mr. Gale MM. Redmond Parry

6. COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Fiandrotti Salvi	MM. Pasquino Spitella
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. De Hoop Scheffer Tummers	MM. de Beer Eisma
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Faulds Lady Jill Knight	MM. Coleman Shelton

**16. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 1st December 1987, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Steiner</i> (Scheer) <i>Lemmrich</i> (Schmitz)	Netherlands
MM. <i>De Decker</i> (Adriaensens) Declercq <i>Close</i> (Dejardin) Ramaekers Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i>	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (von Schmude) MM. <i>Soell</i> <i>Zierer</i> (Unland)	MM. <i>Aarts</i> <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff) Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Bassinot</i> <i>Bohl</i> (Croze) Fourré <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) <i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun) Jung <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) Valleix	MM. <i>Caccia</i> <i>Filetti</i> <i>Fioret</i> <i>Gabbuggiani</i> <i>Pannella</i> (Intini) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Kessler) <i>Malfatti</i> <i>Martino</i> <i>Manzolini</i> (Natali) <i>Parisi</i> <i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli) <i>Pieralli</i> Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rodotà) MM. <i>Greco</i> (Rubbi) <i>Salvi</i> <i>Sarti</i> <i>Triglia</i> (Sinesio) <i>Taramelli</i>	MM. <i>Ewing</i> (Coleman) Cox Dame <i>Peggy Fenner</i> Sir <i>Geoffrey Finsberg</i> MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) <i>Hardy</i> <i>Hill</i> <i>Jessel</i> Sir <i>Russell Johnston</i> Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. <i>Lord</i> (Lady Jill Knight) <i>Morris</i> Lord <i>Kirkhill</i> (Parry) Sir <i>Dudley Smith</i> MM. <i>Speed</i> <i>Gale</i> (Stokes) <i>Wilkinson</i>
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Ahrens</i> <i>Antretter</i> <i>Böhm</i> <i>Hitschler</i> <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Irmer</i> <i>Kittelmann</i> <i>Schmidt</i> (Mrs. Luuk) <i>Müller</i> <i>Niegel</i> <i>Reddemann</i>	MM. <i>Burger</i> <i>Linster</i>	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. <i>de Chambrun</i> <i>Collette</i> <i>Galley</i> <i>Koehl</i> Mrs. <i>Lalumière</i> MM. <i>Oehler</i> <i>Portier</i> <i>Seitlinger</i>	Federal Republic of Germany
MM. <i>Pécriaux</i> <i>Steverlynck</i>		MM. <i>Büchner</i> <i>Mechtersheimer</i>
France		United Kingdom
MM. <i>Baumel</i> <i>Caro</i>		Mr. <i>Shelton</i>

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

DECISION 1***on the revision of Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rules 7, 8, 12 and 48 as follows:

1. *Rule 7*

Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 3:

“ An alternate must be of the same nationality as the titular member he may be asked to replace. ”

Replace paragraph 4 by the following text:

“ Any titular member of a committee who is prevented from attending a meeting shall arrange to be replaced by a representative or substitute appointed for the purpose. If the latter is unable to attend, the chairman of the committee must be informed of the name of the other member of his national delegation who is authorised to take his place. ”

2. *Rule 8*

Replace paragraph 1 by the following text:

“ The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or, if the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, from the date of the ratification of their credentials by the WEU Assembly in accordance with Rule 6, paragraph 2. ”

3. *Rule 12*

Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 1:

“ A Vice-President may not replace the President during a debate in which he has taken part nor speak in a debate over which he has already presided. ”

4. *Rule 48*

Replace paragraph 2 by the following text:

“ The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next sitting of the Assembly for ratification. ”

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1117 and amendment*).
2. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1123*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of the proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Resumed debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1117 and amendment)*

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Irmer, Valleix, Gale, Pannella (point of order) and Burger.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Pannella.

The debate was adjourned.

The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11.10 a.m.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

4. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1123)*

The first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den Broek answered questions put by MM. Valleix, Close, Hardy, Wilkinson, Pontillon, Pannella, Burger, Martino, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Pieralli, Stegagnini, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Aarts, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Miranda Calha (*Observer from Portugal*), Garrett and Declercq.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Niegel Reddemann Scheer <i>Zierer (Schmitz)</i> Mrs. <i>Pack (von Schmude)</i> MM. Soell <i>Bühler (Unland)</i>	Netherlands MM. Aarts <i>Maris (de Jong)</i> de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>de Beer (van der Werff)</i> Worrell
France	Italy MM. Caccia Filetti Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Fiandrotti (Intini)</i> <i>Stegagnini (Kessler)</i> Martino Parisi <i>Cannata (Pecchioli)</i> Pieralli <i>Pannella (Rodotà)</i> <i>Greco (Rubbi)</i> Salvi Sarti Taramelli	United Kingdom MM. Coleman Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy <i>Stewart (Hill)</i> Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Mackie (Earl of Kinnoull)</i> MM. <i>Rathbone (Lady Jill Knight)</i> Morris Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed <i>Gale (Stokes)</i> Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg MM. Burger <i>Konen (Goerens)</i> Linster	
MM. Fourré <i>Bohl (Jung)</i> Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Pontillon (Matraja)</i> <i>Chénard (Oehler)</i> Valleix		
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Büchner Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> Irmer Kittelman <i>Schmidt (Mrs. Luuk)</i> Müller		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Gremetz Jeambrun Koehl Portier Seitlinger	Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Mechtersheimer
France		Italy MM. Malfatti Natali Sinesio
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Galley		United Kingdom MM. Parry Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation* Doc. 1117 and amendment).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1121 and addendum).
3. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1108 and addendum).
5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1116 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of the proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Resumed debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee and vote on
the draft recommendation, Doc. 1117 and amendment)*

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Caro and Martino.

The debate was closed.

Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Burger and others:

1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper:

“Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and”

Speakers: MM. Burger; (point of order): Pieralli, Close, Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speakers (point of order): MM. Pieralli, Caro, Pieralli and Reddemann.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 449)¹.

1. See page 23.

The sitting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.35 p.m.

**4. Address by Mr. Raimond,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France**

Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Raimond answered questions put by MM. Soell, Rubbi, de Beer and Caro.

5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly

(Motion to amend the Charter, Doc. 1128)

The President announced that a motion to amend the Charter of the Assembly had been tabled by Mr. Pannella and others.

The motion was referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

**6. Draft budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1988**

*(Presentation of the report
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration and vote on the draft budget,
Doc. 1121 and addendum)*

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988.

The draft budget was agreed to unanimously.

**7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 –
the auditor's report and motion to approve
the final accounts**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion
to approve the final accounts,
Doc. 1108 and addendum)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Burger.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts for the financial year 1986.

The motion was agreed to unanimously.

**8. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second
annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1116 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Müller and Soell.

The debate was adjourned.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 2nd December 1987, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Mrs. Luuk)	Luxembourg
MM. <i>Close</i> (Dejardin)	MM. Müller	MM. Burger
Pécriaux	Reddemann	<i>Konen</i> (Goerens)
Ramaekers	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (von Schmude)	Linster
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Soell	
Mr. Steverlynck	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)	
		Netherlands
France	Italy	MM. Aarts
MM. <i>Montastruc</i> (Baumel)	MM. Caccia	<i>Maris</i> (de Jong)
Caro	Filetti	de Kwaadsteniet
Fourré	Fioret	Stoffelen
<i>Lacour</i> (Jeambrun)	Gabbuggiani	Tummers
Jung	Malfatti	<i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
<i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Martino	Worrell
Portier	<i>Manzolini</i> (Natali)	
Valleix	Parisi	United Kingdom
	<i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli)	Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Cox)
Federal Republic of Germany	Pieralli	Dame Peggy Fenner
MM. Ahrens	<i>Greco</i> (Rodotà)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Antretter	Rubbi	Mr. Hill
<i>Wulff</i> (Böhm)	Salvi	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel)
Büchner	Sarti	Earl of Kinnoull
Hitschler	Taramelli	MM. Morris
<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)		<i>Stewart</i> (Shelton)
Irmer		Sir Dudley Smith
Kittelmann		MM. <i>Gale</i> (Stokes)
		Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Mrs. Lalumière	Italy
MM. Adriaensens	MM. Oehler	MM. Intini
Declercq	Seitlinger	Kessler
		Sinesio
	Federal Republic of Germany	
France	MM. Mechttersheimer	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet	Niegel	MM. Coleman
de Chambrun	Scheer	Garrett
Collette	Schmitz	Hardy
Croze		Sir Russell Johnston
Galley		Lady Jill Knight
Gremetz		MM. Parry
Koehl		Speed

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 449***on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that developments in the Atlantic Alliance make it essential to strengthen its European pillar and that at the present juncture WEU is still the only organisation capable of forming this pillar;
- (ii) Considering that the way to achieve this result is through the early implementation of the Rome declaration and welcoming the fact that the adoption of the platform on European security interests marks the starting point in the effective reactivation of WEU;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 responds, in the main, to Assembly Recommendations 420, 429, 432, 438, 441, 442 and 446;
- (iv) Welcoming the development of consultations between member countries in the framework of WEU and expressing its satisfaction that the Council implemented Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty for the first time in summer 1987 in the context of the Gulf crisis;
- (v) Regretting, however, that co-ordination of the action taken by member countries in that region was limited;
- (vi) Noting that the thirty-second annual report of the Council gives only a very inadequate account of the Council's activities in 1986;
- (vii) Regretting the Council's slowness in answering the Assembly, the ever-later dates on which it transmits its reports and the very inadequate information it gives;
- (viii) Noting that the informal procedure increasingly practised by the Council is not likely to alleviate this shortcoming;
- (ix) Stressing that the Assembly's own needs are wholly independent of those of the ministerial organs and that restructuring must not affect the independence of either the Assembly or the Office of the Clerk vis-à-vis the ministerial organs,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Speed up its procedure to allow quicker transmission to the Assembly of the substantial information it needs in order to exercise its responsibility of supervising the Council's activities under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, respect a time-limit, under normal circumstances, of eight weeks for answering questions and adopt a normal schedule of dates so that the Assembly might receive its half-yearly reports in time for preparing useful replies;
2. Ensure the immediate implementation of the intentions expressed in paragraph III (a) 4 of the platform which it adopted on 27th October 1987;
3. While respecting the time-limit of 31st December 1987, take the measures to restructure the organs of WEU allowing these new requirements to be met and, in pursuance of this, invite the Assembly to comment on the draft organogram being prepared by the Secretary-General before its submission to the Council for approval;
4. Pursue the full implementation of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular its paragraph 3;
5. Examine carefully the development of bilateral co-operation between its members on security matters with a view to extending this co-operation to all member countries without thereby diluting the results of bilateral co-operation;
6. In consultation with the Presidential Committee, ensure satisfactory co-ordination of the presence of ministers at Assembly sessions, and in particular the participation of the presidency in all debates on the Council's reports;

7. Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and continue to give and improve information to the Assembly and the public on meetings of the WEU Council at the level of the enlarged Council;
8. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of meetings and the results of the work of the special working group and its sub-groups;
9. Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of the Clerk;
10. Ensure that the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities.

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments*).
2. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1118*).
3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Baumel, Wilkinson and Cox.

Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Close, Reddemann, Gabbuggiani and Malfatti.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

4. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Mellor answered questions put by Lord Kinnoull, MM. Gale, Close, Wilkinson, Lord Mackie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. van der Sanden.

5. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1118)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 450)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 69)².

***6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3.15 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.

1. See page 28.

2. See page 29.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (von Schmude)	Netherlands
MM. Declercq	MM. Soell	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)
<i>Close</i> (Dejardin)	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)	<i>Maris</i> (de Jong)
Péciaux		de Kwaadsteniet
Ramaekers		Stoffelen
Steverlynck	Italy	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
	MM. Caccia	(Tummers)
France	MM. Filetti	MM. <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
MM. Baumel	Fioret	Worrell
Fourré	Gabbuggiani	
<i>Bohl</i> (Jung)	<i>Fiandrotti</i> (Intini)	United Kingdom
<i>Hunault</i> (Koehl)	<i>Stegagnini</i> (Kessler)	Mr. Cox
Valleix	Malfatti	Dame Peggy Fenner
	Martino	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Manzolini</i> (Natali)	Mr. Hill
MM. Ahrens	Parisi	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel)
<i>Duve</i> (Antretter)	<i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli)	Lord <i>Mackie</i>
Büchner	Pieralli	(Sir Russell Johnston)
Hitschler	<i>Greco</i> (Rodotà)	Earl of Kinnoull
<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Rubbi	MM. <i>Rathbone</i>
Kittelmann	Salvi	(Lady Jill Knight)
Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Mrs. Luuk)	Sarti	Morris
MM. Müller	Taramelli	<i>Lambie</i> (Parry)
Reddemann	Luxembourg	Shelton
Scheer	MM. Burger	Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Zierer</i> (Schmitz)	Linster	MM. Speed
		<i>Gale</i> (Stokes)
		Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Galley	MM. Mechttersheimer
Mr. Adriaensens	Gremetz	Niegel
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Jeambrun	
	Mrs. Lalumière	Italy
France	MM. Matraja	Mr. Sinesio
MM. Bassinet	Oehler	
Caro	Portier	United Kingdom
de Chambrun	Seitlinger	MM. Coleman
Collette	Federal Republic of Germany	Garrett
Croze	MM. Böhm	Hardy
	Irmer	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 450***on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the converging views observed at European level on more active participation in the East-West dialogue and any disarmament initiatives;
- (ii) Considering the results of work conducted in the IEPG recalling the interest of a European defence market;
- (iii) Considering that an essential prerequisite for a modern and competitive European defence industry is Europe's mastery of the whole range of microelectronics;
- (iv) Considering the conclusions drawn in the report "Towards a stronger Europe", indicating Europe's relatively weak position as compared with its main competitors in certain areas of defence electronics and specifically microelectronics;
- (v) Considering the close relationship in research and development between military and civilian microelectronics;
- (vi) Noting the striking contrast between the repeated public announcements of the WEU member countries' determination to take the necessary steps in the European Community to strengthen Europe's own technological capability and achieve the creation of a technological community on the one hand and the endless bickering leading to an unsatisfactory agreement on a European framework programme for 1987-91 on the other hand;
- (vii) Considering that the early harmonisation of national operational requirements and the interoperability of the military computer systems are of primordial importance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Stop making solemn statements on the determination of the WEU member countries to create a technological community for as long as their action is turned in the opposite direction, and instead:
 - (a) attach higher priority to IEPG co-operative technology projects than has been the case hitherto;
 - (b) convince member countries of the need to increase the budget for the European framework programme and for Esprit in particular;
 - (c) pay attention to the risks stemming from the protection of American and Japanese markets which calls in question the rules of international trade and threatens Europe's legitimate interests;
 - (d) make a major effort to harmonise national operational requirements for military computer systems;
2. Initiate a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member countries all the Western European countries wishing to take part.

ORDER 69***on the military use of computers -
towards a joint European defence research programme***

The Assembly,

Convinced that the importance of a well-developed data-processing industry cannot be overestimated,

INSTRUCTS the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

To examine in greater detail ways of protecting markets and civil and military interchange in key sectors of technology:

- by comparing the United States, Japan and the WEU member countries;
- by proposing suitable solutions for developing a competitive European industry, particularly in areas of high technology such as microelectronics.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments*).
3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1111 and addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. Hardy, van der Sanden, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Lady Jill Knight, MM. Wilkinson, Fourré, Sir Dudley Smith and Sir Russell Johnston.

4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

*(Votes on the draft recommendations
and draft resolution, Doc. 1116,
addendum and amendments)*

Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 451)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on disarmament.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Stoffelen.

Three amendments (Nos. 5, 6 and 7) were tabled by Mr. Pieralli:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after paragraph (vi).

6. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement” and insert “the agreement”.

7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “should” and insert “must”.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Scheer and Pieralli.

Amendment 5 was withdrawn; amendments 6 and 7 were agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Eisma:

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Urging the United States Senate to advise and consent as a matter of urgency to the ratification of the INF agreement;”

¹. See page 34.

Speaker: Mr. Kittelmann.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Eisma.

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after "ABM treaty" insert "in its traditional interpretation".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others:

8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out "in different armaments and forces".

Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others:

9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Noting in this connection that in Prague on 10th April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons;"

Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others:

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after "in Europe" insert "and the various regions concerned".

Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Kittelmann.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Soell:

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, leave out "with priority to negotiations on the Central European region".

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Scheer.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Eisma:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after "ABM treaty", insert "in its traditional interpretation".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others:

11. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after "military strategy" insert "and doctrine" and leave out the words to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: MM. Reddemann, Stoffelen and Scheer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others:

12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, add two new paragraphs:

"Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to undertake an offensive against other countries;

In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the lowest level;"

Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Scheer.

An amendment to amendment 12 was tabled by MM. Scheer and Stoffelen:

In amendment 12 to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after "countries;", add a new paragraph as follows:

"Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures;"

Speaker: Mr. Scheer.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amended amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation on disarmament.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 452)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution on the INF treaty in the addendum to Document 1116.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 77)².

1. See page 35.

2. See page 36.

5. Recent developments in Soviet external policy

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1111 and addendum)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Péciaux, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Müller, Rubbi and Declercq.

The debate was adjourned.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 3rd December 1987, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (von Schmude)	Netherlands
MM. Declercq	MM. Soell	MM. Aarts
<i>Close</i> (Dejardin)	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)	<i>Maris</i> (de Jong)
Pécriaux		de Kwaadsteniet
Ramaekers		Stoffelen
Steverlynck		Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
	Italy	(Tummers)
	MM. Caccia	MM. <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
France	Filetti	Worrell
MM. Fourré	Fioret	
<i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz)	Gabbuggiani	United Kingdom
<i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Martino	Mr. <i>Redmond</i> (Coleman)
Mrs. <i>Trautmann</i> (Oehler)	Parisi	Dame Peggy Fenner
Mr. Valleix	<i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli)	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
	Pieralli	MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Garrett)
Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Greco</i> (Rodotà)	Hardy
Mr. Ahrens	Rubbi	Hill
Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Antretter)	Salvi	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Jessel)
MM. Büchner	Sarti	Sir Russell Johnston
Hitschler	<i>Fassino</i> (Sinesio)	Earl of Kinnoull
<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Taramelli	Lady Jill Knight
Kittelmann		MM. <i>Stewart</i> (Morris)
Mrs. Luuk	Luxembourg	Parry
MM. Müller	MM. Burger	Shelton
Reddemann	Linster	Sir Dudley Smith
Scheer		MM. Speed
		<i>Lord</i> (Stokes)
		Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Galley	MM. Niegel
Mr. Adriaensens	Jeambrun	Schmitz
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Jung	
	Koehl	Italy
	Mrs. Lalumière	MM. Intini
	MM. Portier	Kessler
	Seitlinger	Malfatti
France		Natali
MM. Bassinet	Federal Republic of Germany	
Baumel	MM. Böhm	United Kingdom
Caro	Irmer	Mr. Cox
de Chambrun	Mechtersheimer	
Collette		
Croze		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 451***replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the Council's continued close consultation on European security and disarmament questions and its determination not to allow Europe to be sidelined in the present strategic debate;
- (ii) Welcoming the commitment in the platform on European security interests adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 to build a European union;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the active rôle of the presidency of the Council in initiating consultation, including the first consultation on a threat to peace arising outside Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming also the establishment of the Council's high-level special working group to improve co-operation between Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Defence in all member countries;
- (v) Stressing the need for a decision in 1988 on the co-location and restructuring of all Council organs and WEU institutions;
- (vi) Calling for an early decision thereafter on the accession of the countries which have expressed a wish to join WEU;
- (vii) Recalling the continued importance of the long-standing institutional responsibilities of the Council concerning troop levels and the remaining internal arms control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that European interests are safeguarded in the present strategic debate;
2. Decide to co-locate all Council bodies and WEU institutions and to define the new tasks of the agencies for security questions;
3. Reinstate in its annual reports the information previously given on the number of control measures carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

RECOMMENDATION 452
on disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at all times at the level necessary to ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance;
- (ii) Welcoming the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union based on zero-zero proposals agreed by the alliance as a whole which it believes must be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will report fully on all aspects of the anticipated agreement when the text is published;
- (iii) Welcoming also the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them, and recalling in this connection the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction the improved prospects for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and a bilateral agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons tests;
- (vi) Noting both the similarities and the differences between the security policy declared by NATO most recently in Reykjavik and the military strategy enunciated by the Warsaw Pact in Berlin, and welcoming the positive aspects of the Berlin proposals for consultations between the two alliances to discuss military doctrine and a search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries in different armaments and forces;
- (vii) Noting in this connection that in Prague on 10th April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons;
- (viii) Calling in general for the councils of both alliances to give careful consideration to all arms control proposals of the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability mandated to discuss asymmetrical reductions of conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals so as to establish a stable and non-threatening military balance in Europe and the various regions concerned at the lowest possible levels;
2. Express full support for a verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the strategic warheads of each party to 6 000, and continue to ensure that any such bilateral agreement imposes no restrictions on the forces of European countries, who are not parties to it;
3. Urge on the two parties the importance of fully respecting the existing ABM treaty and notional limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between them;
4. Call on the North Atlantic Council to consider positively the Berlin proposal of the Warsaw Pact for consultations between the two alliances to compare military strategy, and to find ways of removing asymmetries in types of armaments and forces through reductions to the lower level in each case, and in general to give proper consideration to all arms control proposals of the Warsaw Pact countries with a view to identifying those elements which may provide a fruitful basis for mutually-advantageous negotiations;
5. Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to undertake an offensive against other countries;
6. Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures;
7. In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the lowest level.

RESOLUTION 77***on the INF treaty***

The Assembly,

Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Document 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact,

URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously as possible;

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of all its members.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1111 and addendum*).
2. Threat assessment (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1115 and amendment*).
3. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1112*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of the proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1111 and addendum)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Hill, Soell, Atkinson, Bordu, Hardy, Martino, Lord, Burger and Lord Mackie.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pécieraux, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 453)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 70)².

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

4. Threat assessment

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Speed, Soell, Klejdzinski, Lambie, Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Hitschler.

The President informed the Assembly that Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others, was withdrawn.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy and Dame Peggy Fenner.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen and Kittelmann, Chairman.

The Assembly agreed to refer the report back to committee.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION 453***on recent developments in Soviet external policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that, if confirmed and pursued, the policy of reform and openness undertaken by the Soviet Union opens the way for a far-reaching change in relations between Eastern and Western Europe, important disarmament measures and a consolidation of international peace;
- (ii) Noting that the prospects for “reality and guarantees for a secure world” expressed by Mr. Gorbachev on 17th September 1987 very largely respond to Western Europe’s aspirations, but considering that Soviet practice should correspond more to these words;
- (iii) Considering that the CSCE is the framework in which the conditions for new relations between the two parts of Europe can be worked out, provided adequate progress is accomplished in each of the three baskets;
- (iv) Welcoming the progress achieved in the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons but noting that Western Europe’s security also requires agreements on the verified limitation of strategic weapons, on a balance of conventional weapons and on banning the use of chemical weapons with the progressive destruction of existing stocks;
- (v) Noting that the principal threats to international peace now originate in regions outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (vi) Stressing that a concern of the WEU Council should be to concert the action of member countries to restore peace by the application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 and to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (vii) Welcoming the fact that the Assembly has been able to start a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on the conditions of European security and hoping that it will be possible to continue these exchanges of views,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly the evolution of relations between Eastern and Western Europe;
2. Urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to implement any Soviet-American agreements on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons, while assuring Europe that there will be a determined and vigorous effort to achieve an early, satisfactory outcome to negotiations on other categories of weapons;
3. Through close consultations, seek to uphold joint positions in all meetings held in the framework of the CSCE in order to obtain substantial, balanced results in negotiations held in the context of each of the three baskets, including:
 - (a) the early conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of conventional weapons restoring the balance of forces in Europe and including a satisfactory system of verification;
 - (b) the liberalisation of exchanges of ideas and the free movement of persons between Eastern and Western Europe;
 - (c) the definition of the obligations of each country taking part in the conference, particularly in regard to human rights and the environment;
 - (d) the development of economic, scientific and cultural relations between the two parts of Europe;
 - (e) respect for the sovereignty and independence of all states.

ORDER 70***on recent developments in Soviet external policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that the goal of the reactivation of Western European Union is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Considering that the close association of Western Europe and the United States in the Atlantic Alliance is the essential basis of Europe's security;
- (iii) Considering that any Soviet-American agreement on the limitation of armaments must give Western Europe the guarantees necessary for its security;
- (iv) Noting with interest the initiative taken by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to invite a delegation from the Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly to visit Moscow in April 1987 for an exchange of views on the requirements of European security,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. In order to avoid the reactivation of WEU adding to "transatlantic misunderstandings", to promote a regular dialogue between the Assembly and the United States Congress covering inter alia the consequences for Europe's security of any American-Soviet agreements on the limitation of armaments, on the aims to be pursued in the CSCE and on threats to international peace which may arise outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. To invite members of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to pursue the exchange of views started in April 1987 on the limitation of armaments with a view to achieving a balance of conventional forces acceptable to both parties and on the three baskets of the CSCE in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1987

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1112*).
2. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1119 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1112)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Burger, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Rathbone, Filetti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Burger, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 78)¹.

4. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1119 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Klejdzinski.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Two amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled by MM. Bassinet and Fourré:

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; ”

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study

1. See page 44.

sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence research institute as soon as possible.”

Speaker. Mr. Bassinet.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 454)¹.

5. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the French Delegation: Mrs. Trautmann as an alternate member to fill a vacant seat.

6. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 4.20 p.m.

1. See page 45.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
Mr. Pécriaux	Mr. Filetti	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers)
France	Luxembourg	United Kingdom
Mr. Bassinet	Mr. Burger	Mr. <i>Redmond</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Hardy <i>Rathbone</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Shelton Sir Dudley Smith
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Soell Unland	Luxembourg
MM. Adriaensens Declercq Dejardin Ramaekers Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck		Mr. Linster
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Fourré Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Matraja Oehler Portier Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Caccia Fioret Gabbuggiani Intini Kessler Malfatti Martino Natali Parisi Pecchioli Pieralli Rodotà Rubbi Salvi Sarti Sinesio Taramelli	MM. Aarts de Jong de Kwaadsteniet van der Werff Worrell
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Büchner Irmer Mechtersheimer		MM. Cox Garrett Hill Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Lady Jill Knight MM. Morris Parry Speed Stokes Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 78***on public information activities on security and defence matters
in WEU member countries***

The Assembly,

- (i) Anxious to make public and parliamentary opinion more aware of the European dimension of security and the specific aims of WEU in this context;
- (ii) Stressing that it is of the utmost importance for more members of the Assembly to intervene in their national parliaments on the basis of texts adopted in order to draw the attention of government authorities and public opinion to the work of the WEU Assembly;
- (iii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Netherlands Government in communicating to the Second Chamber of the States-General its position on the future prospects of WEU under Netherlands presidency;
- (iv) Regretting nevertheless that the remarkable efforts made by certain member governments to keep the public – and in particular the younger generation – in their countries informed of security and defence problems only exceptionally give adequate information on the rôle of WEU,

INVITES NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. To ensure that debates on defence and security in parliaments, in the political groups and with governments and the public are organised so as to bring the greatest possible attention to the work of the WEU Assembly;
2. To urge governments to improve the co-ordination, with the appropriate WEU bodies, of their national activities in keeping the public informed, and in particular the younger generation.

RECOMMENDATION 454***on European armaments co-operation –
reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that ever since the Rome declaration in October 1984 the Council as a whole and its members individually have stated that WEU should provide political impetus to the development of European co-operation in armaments matters;
- (ii) Dissatisfied that during the three years that have elapsed since October 1984 the Council has failed to provide proof of this much-vaunted political impetus, notwithstanding the primordial rôle of the WEU countries in the IEPG, their geographical and military position and the size of their defence industry;
- (iii) Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters;
- (iv) Recalling the final communiqué of the IEPG ministers' meeting held in Seville on 22nd June 1987, in which the ministers endorsed the long-term objectives of the European defence industry study (EDIS) report and expressed their determination to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
- (v) Considering that neither the division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG, dating from 1978, nor the agreement regarding co-operation between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU, dating from 1986, are being observed;
- (vi) Considering that the IEPG ministers have declined to establish an international secretariat for the IEPG,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Take the lead in implementing the action plan for an open European market for defence equipment as recommended by the EDIS report by committing its members to reach agreement on common operational requirements for each major piece of defence equipment they will need from now on;
2. Conclude its three-year reflections and deliberations on the reorganisation, future rôle and tasks of the SAC and Agency III and instruct the new ministerial organs to conduct studies connected with the IEPG ministers' decision to develop an action plan for a step-by-step approach towards an open European market for defence equipment;
3. Increase its efforts to guarantee that appropriate international bodies and national administrations provide all the information needed by the body which takes over to conduct its studies;
4. Ensure that the division of work between the SAC and the IEPG dating from 1978, if considered obsolete, is replaced by an up-to-date agreement and that the 1986 co-operation agreement between the presidency of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU is observed;
5. Arrange for the presidency of the IEPG to address the Assembly once a year to inform it about developments in European armaments co-operation;
6. Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence research institute as soon as possible.

II
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SIXTH SITTING

Monday, 30th November 1987

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Observers.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1113).
Speakers: The President; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Garrett, the President.
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1126).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mr. Pannella, Mr. Burger, Mr. Valleix (*Vice-President of the Assembly*).
9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
10. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. Cahen to questions put by: Mr. Close, Mr. Burger, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Pannella, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Soell.
11. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision*, Doc. 1110 and amendment).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), the President.
12. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1117).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Aarts, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Antretter.
13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure (*Motion for a decision*, Doc. 1124).
14. INF treaty (*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1127).
15. Changes in the membership of committees.
16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 3rd June 1987 at the end of the fifth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Pro-

cedure, the minutes of proceedings of the fifth sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session whose names have been published in Notice No. 6.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ministers, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the

¹ See page 16.

The President (continued)

session starting today is of particular importance because it should be the last during the period of reorganisation of WEU that began three years ago with the Rome declaration and, in principle, ends, if not with the adoption of the platform on European security interests in The Hague on 27th October, at least at the end of this year. It will therefore allow us to review events and give thought to the future, which should be calmer than in the recent past, at least where the structures of WEU are concerned.

However, this consideration of events and future prospects is not just an internal WEU matter. At the time of the Rome declaration, two series of events had led our seven governments to undertake the reactivation of WEU that our Assembly had been urging for a long time. The moral crisis stemming from the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, marked by widespread street demonstrations in our towns, had shown the need to reaffirm the will of the Western European nations to ensure their own security. Furthermore, President Reagan's strategic defence initiative made our countries face choices that were at one and the same time technical, strategic and political. The first task the Council set itself after Rome, therefore, was to examine the consequences of the SDI for Europe.

A new dimension was given to the reactivation of WEU when, in the last two years, the consequences of the new Soviet policy, in particular in regard to disarmament, made themselves felt. Our session is being held just before the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev which is to lead to the signing of a treaty on the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and also either to the opening or to the revival of other negotiations concerning not only the entire nuclear panoply of the two great powers but also chemical weapons and conventional forces. In other words, disarmament, and probably also other aspects of détente, are becoming major factors in Europe's security and consequently they must henceforth play a major part in the debates of the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence questions.

These events, to which should be added the rising perils in the Middle East, have continuously spurred the reactivation of WEU. They provide the background against which our session is starting and several of them will be in the centre of our debates.

We shall also consider events inside WEU in recent months: completion of the restructuring of the ministerial organs, the application for the first time, thirty-three years after the Paris Agreements were signed, of paragraph 3 of Article VIII

of the modified Brussels Treaty under which WEU member countries must consult each other as a matter of urgency in the event of a threat to international peace and the adoption by the ministers on 27th October of a platform on European security interests.

Some may have considered the text adopted rather disappointing: its very title was a step backwards compared with the idea advanced by Mr. Chirac in the Assembly just a year ago of a charter formally expressing the requirements of European security and specifically binding its signatories.

Yet, in the new circumstances I have just mentioned, it was not unimportant for the seven countries to reaffirm together the principles on which they base their security and, after relieving WEU of the burden of obligations inherited from a past age, to show in which directions it must now move to make Europe at last exist in defence matters. Faced with the questions raised by the SDI, the new Soviet policy, progress in disarmament negotiations and threats to peace outside Europe, this platform, clearly the result of a compromise between government positions which were known not always to converge, constitutes, in spite of some lack of precision, a major European answer and a programme for WEU.

Our gratitude is due to the Netherlands presidency – and I have no hesitation in expressing that gratitude – for its firmness in directing the work of the Council in the last six months. On its initiative, three meetings of the enlarged Council have been held on the situation in the Gulf in the last three months and European consultations on this matter have been developed. It is also very largely thanks to its efforts that the platform was adopted on 27th October, in spite of serious difficulties.

If it is borne in mind that under our Rules of Procedure committees have to adopt their reports three weeks before the beginning of sessions and that the meeting in The Hague was held on 27th October, it is not surprising that no report has been wholly devoted to considering this platform. It is, on the contrary, remarkable that several of them examine it in detail and it will clearly be prominent in the debate on the activities of the WEU Council for which the reports of the three committees will provide a sound basis, together with addresses by several ministers, including the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. van den Broek.

Queries about how far the affirmation of Europe's security requirements might weaken the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance were answered on 4th November when President Reagan voiced the United States' response by

The President (continued)

emphasising in a speech beamed to a very wide audience that his country welcomed the modernisation of the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France and the affirmation, through the adoption of this platform, of a Western European identity in defence matters within the Atlantic Alliance. According to the President of the United States, this identity should establish relations of equality between the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance.

This step by President Reagan was most important because, without it, the effort to reactivate WEU, started three years ago, might well have failed should our governments have feared that it might loosen the links between the two sides of the Atlantic and call in question the United States' conventional and nuclear participation in Europe's security. We now know that the United States considers Western Europe's assumption of its security responsibilities to be useful to the alliance. I personally am absolutely determined to develop the Assembly's relations with our transatlantic partners as a contribution to averting any future misunderstanding about the implications of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance.

These are the various considerations which have allowed some to assert that WEU has now been reactivated. This is rather premature, however. It is admittedly possible to note a considerable growth in intergovernmental activities in the framework of WEU and this meets the requirements of Article VIII of the treaty. Furthermore, the platform shows a remarkable rapprochement of views which until recently seemed irreconcilable concerning the rôle of nuclear deterrence and member countries' solidarity in ensuring mutual assistance at each other's frontiers. This expression of joint positions gives full weight to Article V. However, those of us who met the Chairman-in-Office of the Council at the close of the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 27th October had to note that the results achieved by the ministers in the restructuring of WEU are far from equalling progress in political consultations and responding to the principles set out in the platform.

We can well understand why the presidency of the Council wished to give priority to working out these principles and following up these consultations. Differences of views between member countries about the conditions for restructuring were such that some degree of failure in this area had been foreseeable for months. However, the considerable progress made in the truly political sector will not have firm foundations or be a real gain for Europe until it is translated into new activity throughout WEU, and this requires deci-

sions which are at first sight far less important than those already taken but without which those taken first might be short-lived.

First, there is the reorganisation of WEU. From what the Assembly has managed to learn of the meeting in The Hague, member countries do not seem to have yet followed through the measures necessary for adopting structures to requirements. It is very good to have decided to reduce the number of agencies to one. But the Council has not yet said what it expects of this agency. In order to take the necessary steps to apply the principles set out in the platform adopted in The Hague, however, it is essential for it to be able to rely on a strong Secretariat-General, assisted by the necessary technical body.

Actually, the Council's work seems to have been dominated by the problems of restructuring, fixing the establishment of the WEU ministerial organs and collocating them. Conversely, it is not yet clear what rôle the Council is assigning to the Secretariat-General in view of the decisive importance assumed by the presidency. The platform adopted in The Hague offers broad prospects for the rôle of WEU but, although information about institutional questions provides many details about secondary aspects, there is nothing about the main question, i.e. the rôle attributed to the Secretariat-General and the single agency.

The second point is the enlargement of WEU. The Assembly has always challenged the grounds for the decision taken by the Council to wait for restructuring to be completed before tackling this matter. The prospect of enlargement now seems to have been delayed because the Council has not yet adopted a position on the candidatures submitted or suggested by countries which are certainly not prepared to stand on our door step indefinitely. We hope that the principles adopted, albeit belatedly, in The Hague on the conditions for admitting new members will allow enlargement to be guided in accordance with Europe's true interests. In the particular case of Spain, it seems to me, to my regret, that WEU has given up playing the useful rôle that it was able to play in other circumstances as a bridge between the Atlantic Alliance and a European country whose relations with NATO were in difficulties.

Finally, there are the relations between the Council and the Assembly. I will not dwell on their financial aspect because of the Council's promise that, as soon as the restructuring of the ministerial organs has been resolved, a decision will be taken on the funds necessary for completing the structure of the Office of the Clerk as decided by the Presidential Committee at the end of last year. However, I wish to recall unequivocally that, before the end of the year, we

The President (continued)

need, without fail, the means of work first requested a year ago. This is an urgent matter for six months' experience as President has shown me that we can no longer hope to pursue the Assembly's activities normally if the essential decisions are not taken in the very near future.

Conversely, I wish to stress that the question of relations between the Council and the Assembly arises at the level of the dialogue established by Article IX of the treaty because, in spite of clear good will on the part of the Council, we have not yet found how to have fully satisfactory exchanges between a Council, reactivated in the political field, and an Assembly which must apply the correct procedure of a parliamentary assembly.

It should be recalled that the modified Brussels Treaty, without laying down supranational principles, was a singularly audacious innovation in that it made the action of the WEU Council subject to parliamentary supervision. Together, the Council and the Assembly must therefore seek means of improving their dialogue to allow the Assembly to be informed more quickly and more completely, thus allowing it to play to the full the rôle assigned to it by the treaty. This means improving official and public procedures. The Council should no longer delay the transmission of statutory texts – annual report and replies to recommendations and written questions. Furthermore, the Council will probably agree that these tardily-communicated texts lack substance and it is necessary to remedy the situation.

The dialogue between the presidency and the Presidential Committee no doubt allows some information to be given at confidential meetings and has the great advantage of allowing remarkable frankness. It certainly shows the major effort governments make to satisfy the Assembly when they take over the presidency. But the whole Assembly should be able to pursue this dialogue with the Council. It is the whole Assembly that votes on the annual report and makes recommendations to the Council.

The solution of these problems is of the utmost importance for the Assembly and also, certainly, for the Council. The standard of the dialogue between the two sides of WEU must remain a continuing concern for both of them. It is mainly for the Council, however, to decide how best to keep the Assembly properly informed. It is at this price that the parliamentary dimension of the treaty will be respected and this is an essential aspect of it. In this way, the deliberations of representatives of governments connect up with those of representatives of parliaments and the Council's actions will be able to gain the support of public opinion.

We well realise that the briefness of the annual report and certain replies to Assembly recommendations or written questions put by representatives is due not to a lack of esteem for the Assembly on the part of the presidency or governments, but to the persistence of certain differences. By moving towards a harmonisation of our countries' views, the Council will therefore be better able to meet the Assembly's requirements. The establishment of a fruitful dialogue between the governmental and parliamentary sides is linked to the success of the organisation. The dialogue can also contribute to this success. Our criticisms are always made in a constructive spirit. The Assembly wishes to help the Council to carry out its important tasks.

Let there be no mistake: the platform adopted in The Hague can be a starting point for the true reactivation of WEU, its enlargement and affirmation as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the application of a single act which aims to set up the European union of tomorrow. It will remain a mere declaration of intent with no true content if its signatories do not swiftly reach agreement on how effectively to follow it up. Concerted action by our countries in the Gulf will be short-lived if, institutionally, it does not lead to the introduction of procedure for permanent consultations backed up by an effective administrative structure. A crisis management unit might thus be established allowing the Council to handle threats to peace that might arise in various regions of the world.

I felt it was important to recall these principles which, thirty-three years ago, were the basis for the modification of the Brussels Treaty by the Paris Agreements, now that ministerial activity in WEU has achieved a new dimension. The rebirth of WEU certainly implies this intergovernmental activity which we all unhesitatingly welcome. But it also requires full respect for the treaty which the Council still rightly considers to be the basis for any enlargement of WEU. This respect also means maintaining the Assembly's independence and granting it the wherewithal to carry out its tasks.

While 1987 has been vital from the point of view of intergovernmental activity in WEU, 1988 must – if we want a reactivated WEU to take its place in a European union as outlined in the single European act – witness the completion of what has been undertaken. Restructuring the ministerial organs, enlargement and granting the Assembly the material and political means it needs to take part in the reactivation of WEU form an ample programme whose early achievement is essential.

In the session now starting, we must recall all the implications of these fundamental principles.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now welcome to our debates the parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

I also welcome those members of the Permanent Council present at this part-session.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1113)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session, Document 1113.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Some members will have heard me raise this point a year ago, but it needs to be raised again. You have just made a significant address in which you mentioned the substantial business before the Assembly and the significant position in which we are placed at this point in European history.

We have to deal this week with ten reports over which at least some committees have laboured long and hard. They all have to be debated in the next three days. I remind you, Mr. President, that some time ago the Assembly decided firmly and clearly that no more than two ministerial contributions would be allowed during the week that the Assembly meets.

I suppose that we have made some advance, because a year ago we had six ministerial visits and this year we have four such visits. However, we shall still not be able to devote enough time to some of the important reports before us. Some members will not be called to speak and others will have to curtail their speeches because of the proliferation of ministerial visits.

I know that it is hoped that ministers will give the Assembly the resources that it needs, but that does not mean that we must sacrifice the independence of our debates, especially if ministers address us at considerable length and leave before difficult questions can be presented to them.

I insist that the Assembly should either stick to its decision that there should be no more than two ministerial speeches in a week or revoke that decision. We should not allow ourselves to be ridden over roughshod by any minister who wishes to have a trip to Paris. I do not suggest that that is why ministers come and I would not dream of suggesting that that view be conveyed to them, but I am sick and tired of trying to ask

questions and not being called, perhaps because some of those questions might cause discomfort to ministers.

If we are properly to discuss the ten committee reports, we shall not have sufficient time for ministers to give a proper account of themselves. I hope that the matter will be considered seriously. I had not expected to have to make the same point again in almost exactly the terms I used last year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Hardy, no one objects to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council having the floor nor the Netherlands Minister of Defence. As for the French speaker it is traditional for a member of the French Government to address the Assembly during the winter part-session. The British Defence Minister, Mr. David Mellor, has also asked to speak.

Let me read you the relevant part of our Charter: “Ministers who are members of the Council and other ministers of member states may be present at all sittings of the Assembly. They may be heard by the Assembly at their own or the Assembly’s request.”

As for the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, he will be very brief and only have the time to answer four questions at most. In other words the ministers themselves are doing their best not to take up too much of our time.

Does that reply satisfy you?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. We face the same problem that we faced a year ago when the Assembly decided that there should be only two ministerial visits in any week. I know that the rule says that ministers may be invited, but it does not say that they must be invited. The fact that we may invite ministers does not mean that any minister who is interested in coming here must be invited.

I asked last year that the word “may” be examined properly and not become the “must”. It is not satisfactory for us to have interruption after interruption of debates that are very important at this stage of Europe’s history.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take note of your comments, Mr. Hardy. I will give the floor to the members of the Council and representatives of member states but I will raise the issue at the next meeting of the Presidential Committee.

I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. You have an important rôle. We have decided to reactivate WEU, and reactivation means participation and debate. I agree with Mr. Hardy. Can you give us

Mr. Garrett (continued)

an assurance that last year's situation will not be repeated? If we do not tackle the problem, we shall face the same difficulty next year. It is no good trotting out the rule book. You have the power to decide who should and who should not address the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – To satisfy members of the Assembly who hold this view the Charter would have to be changed. It would therefore be expedient to ask the Presidential Committee to look into the question.

Mr. Fourré and Mr. Bassinet have told me that they would like to invert the order in which their reports are to be presented.

Thus Mr. Fourré's report on the military use of computers – towards a joint European defence programme – will be considered on Wednesday morning, 2nd December, and Mr. Bassinet's report on European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council – will be taken on Thursday afternoon, 3rd December.

Is there any opposition to this amended draft order of business?...

The draft order of business, as amended, is adopted.

8. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1126)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Document 1126.

I call Mr. Valleix, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this report will of course repeat some of the points made by our President in his very interesting opening address.

What is the rôle of the Presidential Committee if not to be the standing committee of this Assembly? Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, provides that, like the Council, our Assembly must be able to act of itself on a day-to-day basis between sessions or part-sessions. This it does through the Presidential Committee. Indeed, meetings of the Presidential Committee have recently increased in frequency, reflecting the intensification of WEU activity, particularly that of the Council.

What scope does our Presidential Committee have for action? Basically, it has to keep itself

informed of the activities of the Council and, therefore, to monitor those activities step by step whilst at the same time offering such encouragement or making such criticisms as the Presidential Committee feels are warranted. In short, ladies and gentlemen, the purpose of the committee is to act between the sessions in your stead and, today, to report to you on what it has done in the months since the last part-session.

I would comment that traditionally the rôle of the committee has been more a matter of dealing with questions of the moment but, looking at what has happened in the last few months, it seems to me that the Presidential Committee has been increasingly occupied in putting across the Assembly's policy recommendations and decisions. That, after all, is why we are here.

So what types of activity does the committee have, ladies and gentlemen? In fact, there are two: firstly it deals with the administrative tasks that are the responsibility of the Assembly and the committee and secondly it has to discharge political responsibilities including in particular the dialogue with the Council of Ministers. The distinction is somewhat theoretical however because, as you well know, the resources at the command of our Assembly also determine, in part at least, its political influence. Resources are the basis of that influence.

As to the administrative activities, we have to know where we are going. The Presidential Committee has always in mind the mission that seems to have been entrusted to it by the Assembly, namely to represent the final purpose of the Assembly, its political independence in matters of European defence and its effectiveness. It also consists in maintaining budgetary independence so that its objectives may be better served and the Assembly be effectively master of its own actions.

On that budgetary score, moreover, the President of our Assembly identifies two separate aspects; firstly the appropriations for the permanent staff of the Assembly secretariat and secondly the appropriations for the actual operation of the Assembly.

With regard to the former it should be noted that for the staff, as the President has just pointed out, an establishment table has been set out in a note on the structure of the Office of the Clerk which was agreed at the end of last year. So, according to the rules, the staff appropriations are decided each year although, of course, they are renewable in practice from year to year on the same basis. That is why it is perfectly reasonable that there should be no question of any transfers between these appropriations and the operating appropriations which relate to the Assembly itself.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

With regard to that group of appropriations, the Council has only accepted the promotions bound up with job classification, in the framework of the establishment table to which I just referred, on a personal basis. But I have to tell you that the Council has refused to agree to the four new posts intended to supplement that establishment in the 1988 draft budget.

And that is where we stand. The Council has argued, as has already been indicated, that it was difficult and even impossible for it to make up its mind before being able to consider an Assembly establishment. The question needed to be seen as part of the revision of the structures of WEU as a whole.

Clearly, and here I am speaking on behalf of the Presidential Committee, this way of looking at things does not satisfy us because the secretariat seems to us to be an essential tool for the Assembly and that deciding upon the organisation of the Assembly secretariat is a matter for the Assembly – and the Presidential Committee on its behalf between sessions. This is inherent in its functions and responsibilities but it is also the way in which it equips itself with the appropriate resources.

So this, ladies and gentlemen, is a problem for which I hope we shall quickly find a solution, Secretary-General. It would certainly be neither right nor fortunate for our relations and our work that are basically so necessary and important to be soured by disputes or controversy that would be prejudicial to the whole of our organisation.

That, therefore, ladies and gentlemen, is the point we have to deal with.

The second group of appropriations I referred to a moment ago finances the Assembly's activities. These are the appropriations that determine our real capacity for direct political action, in particular in relation to the rest of the world. The right of the Assembly to transfer appropriations from one budget head to another has been recognised by the Council and we can only be pleased at that because it represents the real expression of our Assembly's budgetary independence in its administrative management. That is very important.

This year, the Presidential Committee tabled two supplementary budgets with the agreement of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. At this point I would like to stress the importance of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's draft amendment establishing a legal basis for the action taken by the Presidential Committee on behalf of the Assembly. It is certainly best to regularise a *de facto* situation. The Rules of Procedure will then provide a legal foundation for

this technical measure. We shall be regularising the situation but the measure will naturally leave all the rights of the Assembly intact because supplementary budgets will have to be ratified by the Assembly itself.

One last point, Mr. President, to which you made a discreet reference is the total figure for the Assembly's budget. Clearly the principle of zero growth that the Council has so often repeated cannot satisfy us. It is not compatible with the reactivation of WEU, with the increase of its activities or even merely with the course of events. As we well know, inflation forecasts are often overtaken by the real cost of goods and services. Actually, a zero budget or zero growth, at constant prices, means a cut in the budget, with serious consequences for our Assembly. The problem is still there. Together with the Council we need to find a dynamic solution. We cannot leave things as they are.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is good that we should discuss the budget but even more important to the lofty vocation of this Assembly that we should discuss policy. At last, the intensity of the Presidential Committee's activities matches the intensification of those of WEU in general and its Council in particular and our Assembly. In fact, and this is now standard practice, the new President of the Assembly, as soon as he took up his post, had meetings with both the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, who is the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs and will be addressing the Assembly, and with Mr. van Eekelen, the Minister of Defence. Both ministers then received us in order to take stock of the situation with the Presidential Committee prior to the ministerial meeting.

Before the last meeting in October, the Presidential Committee was naturally very blunt in expressing the views of our Assembly and in particular our impatient and even uncertain hopes, as at 13th October, about the drafting of a European charter.

Two other fundamental problems are the restructuring of WEU and the organisation of the agencies. On enlargement I, too, would like to say how pleased we are to have observers with us from our sister countries in the Atlantic Alliance. We greet them in friendship and cordiality and I would take this opportunity, ladies and gentlemen, to stress our interest in the current possibilities for enlargement. The Presidential Committee has reminded the Council of the importance attached by our Assembly to Portugal's formal application for membership. A favourable decision on that application should be given as quickly as possible.

Spain's case should also be considered without delay. Here, ladies and gentlemen, we are voicing

Mr. Valleix (continued)

the virtually unanimous wishes of our Assembly.

Another vital issue dealt with at that early October meeting prior to the ministerial meeting is the problem of the Gulf. The methods of work that were instituted, the stances taken by the Council, the exchanges of information with our Assembly and the Presidential Committee are all cause for satisfaction. I would just express one wish and that is that this problem, unfortunately still with us and very much so, should continue to be the subject of equally intensive exchanges. Is not our purpose, vis-à-vis the Council, to contribute our thorough knowledge of things and sometimes additional information but also to combine our efforts and bring weight to bear in a solution that is so difficult to find?

Lastly, the Presidential Committee also discussed various developments in political relations with the Soviet world at the meeting in The Hague and I shall sum up our concerns in just one phrase: in answer to the new Soviet international approach there must be a western and a European approach. It is therefore vital that we should define our action in that direction. We shall, in any case, be having a full debate on this issue during this part-session.

The Presidential Committee recorded its satisfaction with progress in co-operation with the Council even though certain inadequacies and gaps were noted.

I would add that we thought it right, on behalf of the Assembly, to point out that the Council's decision-making, particularly with regard to the big international issues, sometimes lacked rapidity and that the wording of its decisions sometimes lacked force. All this happened on 27th October and that was followed by the ministerial meeting after which, before leaving The Hague, the committee held an extremely interesting working meeting, lasting slightly longer than planned, with the Chairman-in-Office. That, as the President has just said, enabled us to gain our first knowledge of the platform that was being drafted with difficulty no doubt, but also with a great deal of talent and, in the end, clarity and at the same time to define the main principles of Europe's defence wishes. I shall not go back over the political analysis already outlined by the President on this point, but a vital step forward has been taken. Following the speech made in this very chamber by the French Prime Minister on 2nd December 1986, referring to a possible charter, we now have a platform instead. The content is more important than the label and our action, finally, will be enlightened by the policies, decisions, restatements and facts contained in this platform. It constitutes a real

doctrine for WEU in 1987 up to the horizon of the year 2000.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have a great deal to do in the way of analysis and then taking implementation as far as we possibly can.

With regard to WEU's ongoing action – another problem raised at that Presidential Committee meeting – I would make the point that problems of structures and headquarter location should not continue forever to be obstacles to our work and discussions. We urgently need to strengthen the effectiveness of our action in both these ways. If we do not do this quickly I fear that we shall get lost in interminable discussions. We need to apply our minds and take coherent and wise decisions. We also need to waste no time. Let us therefore hope that at the next meeting of the Presidential Committee which is to take place in the middle of this month – as we asked you, Secretary-General, on 27th October – further progress will be made.

In this report on the work of the Presidential Committee since the last part-session, a conclusion of a more general nature is called for. The year 1987 could have been difficult, a year of retreat. With this discussion going on at the highest world level that, normally, should culminate on Monday or Tuesday next in the signing of the first instruments by the two super-powers, Europe could easily have given up the fight. It was a job to tighten up the bolts, but, finally, WEU more or less collected itself together and the Assembly and the Council got together too. In that context, the rôle of the Presidential Committee was obviously that of liaison agent but it also had to be the spokesman for the Assembly and the defender of its policy recommendations, some of which I have recalled.

What might have been a fatal risk for Europe has, on the contrary, been transformed into an opportunity which we have managed to seize, relatively speaking, or at least which we have not let completely go to the detriment of a free Europe. In all this I see reasons for hope but the fact remains that the major tensions we saw this year could return in the near or not so near future and that there can be no question of giving up or being satisfied with the situation as it is.

I would therefore like, Secretary-General, to pay tribute to the efforts you are making personally and with your team to try to strengthen the cohesion of the WEU organisation and I am grateful for your increasing readiness to pay heed to this Assembly and its resolute policy recommendations. It does not want to go its own way: it wants to perform its supervisory rôle vis-à-vis the Council and at the same time be a source of political initiative alongside the Council.

As for us, ladies and gentlemen, I simply hope that, as the President said a few moments ago,

Mr. Valleix (continued)

we make the most of the coming months to develop, benefit from and confirm Europe's rôle with regard to defence.

I thank you, on behalf of the Presidential Committee, for your confidence in us and I hope that, together, we shall be the architects of that proud and honourable Europe that is determined to live in peace and to be respected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for your speech. It does not beat about the bush. Your views are shared, I think, by most of us. The question is whether we are up to a task which is, without doubt, increasingly important but also increasingly difficult ideologically and technically.

The excellent report we have just heard poses a very simple problem: to what extent will each of us be able to propose measures to the Assembly that will equip us to face up to our obligations more effectively?

The Rapporteur has brought out very clearly the Council's evasion of its responsibilities towards us in a matter that is fundamental for an assembly that claims to be, and should be, a parliamentary body, namely budgetary independence. Given that our Charter and Rules of Procedure are not satisfactory we can hardly be surprised at this lack of budgetary independence and the lack of political and parliamentary independence that it implies. In reality, we are helping the Council to overstep its functions and not to respect the rules of dialogue. It is a council that counsels nothing because it counsels everything and we, the Assembly, are not the discussion partner and the driving force that we should be. This explains why I propose, under Article XII of the Charter, that Article VIII concerning budgetary questions be amended. The situation is simple. At the moment we adopt a draft budget which the Council can then accept or not, and our own powers regarding the breakdown of the budget are non-existent. I therefore suggest that we make provision in our Charter for a parliamentary procedure ensuring that there will be a discussion and the formulation of our common will in the budget and in the budget procedure. The Charter requires that such an amendment be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives. I therefore ask the members present to kindly sign my Amendment 1 worded as follows:

1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 4 of the draft decision proper:

“ Replace paragraph 1 by the following text:

The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in consultation with the Presidential Committee.

This draft budget shall be submitted to the Council which may make comments in the form of amendments thereto.

Thus amended, the draft budget shall be re-examined by the Assembly in accordance with the following procedure:

- if the Council has not amended the draft budget, it shall be agreed to by the Assembly by simple majority;
- if the Council has amended the draft budget, the Assembly may ratify it by simple majority or itself amend the draft budget as amended by the Council. Any amendment to the Council's amendments to the draft budget must be approved by an absolute majority.

The budget thus adopted shall be proclaimed adopted by the President, who shall communicate it to the Council.”

This matter could be dealt with under urgent procedure. I therefore ask the members intending to sign this draft amendment to say so quickly so that urgent procedure may be adopted.

As you said in your statement, Mr. President, and in the spirit of the report that has just been presented, we must, if we are to promote the dialogue with the Council, assist it and ourselves with instruments – the Charter and the Rules of Procedure – that tally with our own experience. We could have saved ourselves the trouble because our parliaments have had very long experience but we decided otherwise. That is why I hope this amendment is adopted.

You made a brief but very accurate reference, Mr. President, to East-West relations. Let us beware of finding ourselves back in the 1937-38 situation. Let us beware of deluding ourselves. There can definitely be no question of not concerning ourselves with what is going on in the world and, on that point, I agree with the Rapporteur. We should remember Colonel de Gaulle coming back from Poland and, on his arrival in France, telling those who were designing the Maginot Line that it would not be enough because only new weapons – tanks at that time – would be able to hold it, failing which it would become an utterly dangerous form of defence. We should also remember the Quai d'Orsay Secretary-General who resigned when he got back to Paris after accompanying Mr. Daladier to Munich and signing an unwise agreement, because he thought that this so-called peace pact was an act of cowardice in face of the danger of war.

Mr. Pannella (continued)

The Secretary-General from the Quai d'Orsay was Alexis Saint-Léger, a poet who took the name Saint-John Perse and who foresaw the tragedy in store. Today, the claim that military weapons are vital and definitive can only come from the defence industry: we know that the modern weapons for the security and defence of our country are food, technology and propaganda. Yet these are totally excluded from our field of reference and we ourselves do not talk about these aspects of our defence and security. I, Mr. President, would like to see a pressing demand from our Assembly for security and defence to be really equipped with every modern weapon. Let us not stop at the design of the Maginot Line, the tanks of 1939 and today's defence weapons, let us take this further step.

You can argue any way you like but if, today, we say we have to arrive at a WEU that works we are deluding ourselves with a false utopia. Either, during the next few hours, we succeed both politically and technically in having a WEU as a launch pad matching up to today's requirements, or else – with this false and pitiful minimalist utopia – we shall once again lose years and decades and possibly unique opportunities to reconcile freedom with security and peace and the defence of our country with our ideas.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If I have rightly understood, you want to convert your draft amendment to Document 1110 into a draft amendment of the Charter.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Not altogether, Mr. President. I have used the two possibilities. The first, which needed only one signature, is the text you have in your hands. I have tabled that one but there is, of course, a second arising out of that amendment. This I hope to table after I have collected ten signatures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is not the first time that I have to praise a report by my French colleague, Mr. Valleix, both for its content and its presentation. But that is no reason for me to congratulate him again today. I note that several issues in the report will be dealt with later by the rapporteurs for the committees concerned.

The report spells out the rôle of the Presidential Committee which is to inform itself or rather be informed of the Council's activities, and to offer encouragement or even, if necessary, criticism. If WEU were a lady, I would say in

medical terms that the Luxembourg President has tried the Niehans method, which consists in injecting embryonic cells, whereas the Netherlands President is giving her a face lift. Both operations have certainly improved and will continue to improve relations between the parliamentary Assembly with the extremely effective help of Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General.

With regard to independent management of the budget, I note with satisfaction that the Rapporteur and the President of our Assembly are fully agreed that the appropriations for the permanent staff of the secretariat should be separated from the resources available to the Assembly to fulfil its task. Further details will certainly be given in the report on the budget by my fellow countryman, Mr. Linster.

With regard to Mr. Valleix's report, I would like to thank Mr. Whyte, who is about to leave us, for the devotion and courage he has shown during his years in our organisation. I also wish good luck to Mr. Burgelin, his worthy successor, who has already proved his ability combined with great willingness to be of help.

With regard to the political side of the report, I am pleased to note that at last Portugal and Spain have observers with us, a right that other EEC member states already enjoy.

With regard to the political subjects, most of which will be dealt with these next few days, I would pick up a phrase from Mr. Valleix's report: "WEU has to be more efficient". I would say has to "become" more efficient. This must be the goal of all the WEU organs including our own, the parliamentary Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to thank everyone who has spoken. Our debate will indeed continue on the various technical points that have been raised. In these remarks the Presidential Committee sees encouragement to do even better in defending the interests, policies and objectives of the Assembly while seeking the best possible spirit of co-operation and positive construction with the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I believe the Assembly will agree that we should ratify the actions of the Presidential Committee.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In order to bring the Bureau of the Assembly up to strength as soon as possible, I would like, with your approval, to proceed with the election of two Vice-Presidents.

Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure states that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure specifies that no representative may stand as a candidate for the offices of President or Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and that representatives who are members of governments shall not be members of the Bureau.

Two candidates have been proposed in the prescribed manner.

In alphabetical order they are Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Sarti.

If the Assembly agrees unanimously I propose we elect the two Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

I therefore declare Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Sarti elected Vice-Presidents.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pécriaux.

10. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, who told me a moment ago that he was ready to answer any questions at the end of his speech.

Mr. Cahen, would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – This is now the fifth time, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, that you have invited me here to address you during your biennial plenary sessions.

I do not have to tell you just how great an honour and a privilege this is for me and today than ever before.

The session which you have just opened Mr. President is, I believe, bound to be of special significance for me as it is now taking place in

a dual context, both aspects of which are equally important.

Firstly, there is a rapidly-evolving international situation. Secondly, our organisation has recently made a decisive step forward with the adoption on 27th October 1987 of the platform on European security interests which demonstrates the extent to which its reactivation has – as our ministers recognised at their Luxembourg meeting last April – become a reality.

You, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, must be aware even more than I of the importance that these circumstances lend your meeting, as your remarkable speech, Mr. President, that of a real European statesman, has shown.

As politicians and elected representatives of your countries, sensitive to public opinion, you must also be aware of the expectations which your forthcoming discussions have aroused among our peoples. They cannot help but wonder about the future of our Europe in the face of the changes taking place in the USSR which are affecting East-West relations and, beyond that, developments on the world stage. And is their attention not drawn therefore quite naturally to this hemicycle in which representatives of our Council of Ministers and yourselves are about to begin this vital democratic dialogue within Europe about the future conditions of its security.

All these key problems are examined in the remarkable reports which are before you today.

From recent developments in Soviet foreign policy – dealt with by Mr. Pécriaux – to the arms control and disarmament negotiations – analysed by Mr. Scheer – via the assessment of the threat – investigated by Mr. Stokes – many of the points affecting the very foundation of European security have been dealt with, as well as the question I have just mentioned, i.e. informing public opinion of these issues, covered in Mr. Burger's paper.

It will be for you to discuss these issues and, in so doing, to identify the broad lines of the options which – in the indispensable framework of Atlantic solidarity to which all our governments remain committed – you consider Europe should adopt.

On the eve of the summit between the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. Gorbachev, and the United States President, Mr. Reagan, which is to take place in Washington in precisely one week's time, there is certainly no shortage of material to be discussed.

How does this summit fit in with the overall development of Soviet policy?

Mr. Cahen (continued)

What impact will it have on East-West relations?

What will be its influence on the transatlantic relationship? In this connection, Mr. President, I note the importance you attach to developing our links with our transatlantic allies so that there shall be no misunderstanding. I think you are right and I thank you for the thought.

The platform on European security interests adopted by the Ministerial Council on 27th October last expresses the wish that the summit should lead to a United States-Soviet agreement on the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range of 500 to 5 000 km. If that proves to be so, and we may now hope that it will be so, what should be the essential priorities – in accordance with the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in Reykjavik – for both Europe and our common security within a global and coherent approach to arms control?

The tensions and confrontations in the world today could well have serious consequences for our security, construed in its broadest sense. Our organisation is empowered to address these issues by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty as modified by the Paris Agreements, a fact of which we have been opportunely reminded by Mr. van der Sanden, and by virtue of the Rome declaration. This is why there has been close political consultation among our countries on the situation in and around the Gulf since last August. Will the results of the summit also be reflected in this area? And if so, in what way?

You have before you, therefore, very many pressing matters. They are fundamental because the responses which will be given go to the very heart of the problem of our countries' security. The importance of what is at stake is clear.

But, to answer these questions, we now have what Mr. Valleix has called a body of doctrine, which can be used as terms of reference.

That body of doctrine is contained in the platform of European security interests. As Mr. Valleix said, you will remember that this was the hope expressed a year ago in this forum by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Jacques Chirac. Today, now that the hope has become reality, it is only fair to applaud his inspiring initiative. For this is an important matter, of itself and also in relation to the work of your Assembly; I will come back to this question in a moment.

The Chairmen-in-Office of the Ministerial Council, the Netherlands Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Mr. van den Broek and Mr. van Eekelen, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Raimond, and the Minister of State of the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. Mellor, will all be speaking to you about this document.

I shall therefore confine my remarks to two aspects of its approval by our ministers which I believe to be essential.

First, as Mr. Valleix stressed, the reactivation of Western European Union leaves intact the substance of the treaties and, in particular, the obligations which these diplomatic acts place on each of the member states vis-à-vis the others within the framework of the WEU alliance which binds them together. The Rome declaration, however, adds a new and significant dimension to the organisation's terms of reference by making it the European centre for joint reflection and concerted action on security questions. The purpose is to establish among the Seven an on-going dialogue aimed at achieving convergent or even common positions on the concrete problems of Europe's security and thus affirm a European identity in this field.

It can be said that this dialogue has now been in existence for almost two years, that it is occurring at various levels of authority and responsibility and that it has steadily gathered momentum and gained in both substance and significance. It is concerned with the many key questions of security raised by current events.

Three months ago, a new and decisive step forward was taken when, with the Gulf problem, that dialogue addressed for the first time a crisis developing outside Europe's immediate security area but affecting its strategic and economic interests in their widest sense.

Above all, however, transcending current events, it has arrived, with the adoption of the platform, at an initial definition of a European identity in security. Mr. Valleix made special mention of this in the excellent report he presented on behalf of the Presidential Committee.

You will agree that this double event is significant not just for WEU but also for the entire process of European construction in which our reactivated organisation – alongside the Communities and political co-operation, of course – represents a significant component.

Public opinion has clearly seen this and so have the media which reported the event widely and here let me quote from a BBC radio programme which impressed me greatly:

“The trouble with historical turning points is that they don't always advertise themselves as such, and those that do, not infrequently turn out to be imposters. All the same, the meeting of foreign and defence ministers that took place earlier this week in The Hague [the programme went out on 31st October] may well

Mr. Cahen (continued)

turn out to be one such turning point and an important step in the drawing together of the states of Western Europe... Some of the language used in The Hague suggested that something of real importance was happening. 'The construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence' said the platform, which was described by one of the ministers as a 'European identity card'. That sort of talk... could not have been heard a couple of years ago."

It will come as no surprise to you that the report gave me considerable pleasure too, especially as I had followed the daily progress of the work, taking some nine months to produce the document, and also because I was very conscious of the difficulties of the project and the political will shown by member states to overcome them. As the weeks went by I saw gradually emerging from the national positions a growing area of common ground and common language, as a result of which we can now speak – still within the context of Atlantic solidarity – of truly European security.

Secondly, and this is extremely important for you and your work, the platform on European security interests represents a kind of programme declaration adopted by the Council of Ministers on the subject.

This programme declaration is now before this Assembly.

Thus, the ideal conditions are present for the democratic debate which both you and national governments have been calling for since the start of WEU reactivation.

As a militant campaigner for the European cause for forty years and as a career diplomat for over thirty of those years often involved in the misadventures of the European construction process, I am only too well aware that no success can ever be regarded as finally won. As that great European, Jean Monnet, said in this connection in his *Mémoires*, extracts from which I have already quoted on previous occasions, "the path ahead must be opened up a day at a time".

There is still a long way to go to the end of that path. We clearly have much more to do and there will be obstacles along the way. I believe sincerely, however, that a crucial stage has now been passed and that the reactivated WEU has this time got into top gear. If that is so, it is because the intergovernmental organs – notably the newly-created ones which had to prove their worth – have functioned properly.

With their activities guided by ministerial directives and co-ordinated by the Permanent

Council, they have – in the three areas of topical questions, crises outside Europe's immediate security area and the definition of European security interests – pursued the tasks of reflection and consultation assigned to them in such a way as to develop the desired convergent positions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political directors from the foreign ministries and their defence ministry counterparts have already met eight times in 1987 whereas the original and, incidentally, informal agreement was that, in principle, they should meet four times a year.

The politico-military directors from these same ministries and their close associates from the same departments have met as many as two or three times a month – sometimes for two-day sessions and working on late into the evening.

For their part, the work of the expert groups – particularly those concerned with the problem of security in the Mediterranean and the allocation and management of defence resources – has proceeded at a sustained pace. But, as I said just now, much still remains to be done, as you have yourselves pointed out in your speeches.

At the institutional level, for example, the reorganisation of the administrative organs of WEU has still to be consolidated. Your President made the point a moment ago.

At their meetings on 26th and 27th October, our ministers agreed that this reorganisation would involve the merging of the three agencies on security questions into a single entity and that this should come under the direct authority of the Secretary-General. They also agreed that all the administrative organs of WEU should be brought together at one and the same location.

It is with these goals in view that the governments are now working on the changes to these organs. The aim is to remodel them in such a way that, as recommended by Mr. van der Sanden, "the Secretariat-General is in a position to assist the Council in all its activities".

I should not like to end this address without mentioning – in addition to those reports submitted to your Assembly to which I have already referred – the reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, written by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré.

I feel that it is particularly valuable that, through this committee's reports, the Assembly is helping to steer European energies towards co-operative projects designed to enable our continent to maintain, at the highest possible level, its contribution to the mastery of technological progress and the development of basic research. This is especially necessary in the space sector which illustrates how closely Europe's security depends, in the final analysis, on its scientific

Mr. Cahen (continued)

and technological independence. The exceptional richness of our past and our regained prosperity place an obligation on our countries to respond together to the challenges of the future.

It is gratifying that the parliamentary Assembly is making its voice clearly heard in this connection, thus stimulating the genesis of a common political will at governmental level. Because it is, of course, a question of political will and our governments, as they have shown, now have that political will.

Since reactivation, successive presidencies of Western European Union – today the Netherlands presidency to whom I am pleased to pay tribute – have inspired the organisation to achieve the results which we can now see and which have also been greeted with satisfaction in the other forums concerned with the building of Europe.

Let me quote in this context the words of a great European whose work at the head of the European Commission deserves the highest praise and respect. I am talking about Jacques Delors.

Addressing the Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense in Brussels last September at the opening of the current academic year and referring specifically to “Defence, a dimension of Europe”, President Delors said: “In institutional terms, my hope is focused on the reactivation of WEU and its ability to act in the near future as the necessary interface between the European Community, political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance. This hope is based on the fact that, since its reactivation, achieved, it must be stressed, in difficult rather than in favourable circumstances (i.e. the unilateral declaration of the SDI programme and the problem of how to respond to it, the Reykjavik meeting and the quickening pace of the Geneva negotiations), WEU has enabled some fundamental thinking to take place about European defence through the frequent and regular meetings of the foreign and defence ministers of seven member states.”

Mr. Delors then added that, although the platform was not yet agreed, “this thinking should lead to a definition of European interests in the field of defence in the near future. It could be a very important step if, with use, this definition were to become a kind of ‘compulsory reference’ on the basis of which common European positions within the Atlantic Alliance could be established for the implementation of the provisions of the single European act.”

Speaking on 4th November, Mr. Reagan, the President of our great ally the United States, also

welcomed the adoption of the platform as an event of major importance.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a king of my country, Leopold II, said: “You wear an idea out if all you do is to go on talking about it and never put it into practice.” This is a danger which lies in wait for every human venture, however noble it may be. The grand idea of European construction is no more immune from this than any other.

It is now some three years since the reactivation of our organisation effectively began. You have expressed some impatience about its progress, performing in this way the vital catalytic rôle which is that of a parliament. I believe that today we can now together take heart from the achievement of that reactivation and from its results, which will enable the idea of European security – and beyond that the building of our Europe – not to become worn but instead to flourish.

I said that we should take heart together because, as our President and Mr. Valleix said, we share the same objective. We all want security with a European dimension. We want that security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and in the framework of the construction of Europe. So we need to work towards it together.

Clearly that joint action – our joint action – has to be based on the reciprocal exchange of information and of our political wills as well.

In that connection, the parliament you form has an essential part to play. I was gratified to hear the speakers reiterate their wish to play that part. You have my assurance that the Council also wishes to do so with you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address.

A moment ago you said you were ready to answer any questions from members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have a two-part question to put to the Secretary-General.

In paragraph 46 of his report, Mr. van der Sanden said that, at its meeting on 21st September 1987, the General Affairs Committee was divided in its views on the degree of co-operation in the operations of five of our member countries in the Gulf.

I am one of those who did not think they have been a complete success, far from it. The operations were mounted quite separately and, to my

Mr. Close (continued)

mind, far more under the pressure of external circumstances than as the expression of a deliberate strategy for coherent action in that part of the globe where we have vital interests.

I would like to know to what extent there was any military co-ordination of the naval forces sent to the Gulf by member countries. Was the question discussed in the enlarged Council?

On this point I would recall that the Atlantic Alliance has its ACE mobile force which has missions both on our northern flank, in the Narvik area, and on our southern flank, in Greece and Turkey. It too is made up of various national detachments – from Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and so on. It is clear that, even in peace time, the missions given to these forces would be impossible without operational plans worked out in advance, a measure of integrated military command and consultation between the various national detachments. All that, it seems to me, is sadly lacking in the case of the forces sent to the Gulf. I can see that this may be the first large-scale operation of its kind but I nevertheless draw your attention to the fact that if the intention is to have a force permanently on call for similar operations, which seems to me desirable, it would perhaps be a good idea to have contingency plans prepared in advance as well.

Moving to my second point, the media have given a lot of space to an operation by a Franco-German brigade called, revealingly, “cheeky sparrow”. Sparrow was probably a better name for the operation than “daring eagle” would have been! That being said, the event seems to me to have been grossly inflated. In fact, it was a combined operation by two national forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. This has been going on for twenty years since General Haig made it general practice when he was supreme commander. I would also point out that no operations other than integrated multinational manoeuvres can take place in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is gratifying evidence of a renewed interest in the co-operation that has long prevailed between France and Germany.

That brings me to the question I really wanted to ask. We have also learned that the Netherlands is interested in being associated with the Franco-German brigade. I would point out, in passing, that a brigade consists of 3 000 to 5 000 men and this is not likely to have the Soviets trembling in their shoes. Spain has apparently shown a similar interest. I wonder how the Netherlands, situated as it is right to the north of central Europe, could take part in operations in Bavaria or the Alps? While the Spanish, who would probably have a long way to come, would

no doubt arrive in time for the end of the manoeuvres. So much for that.

What I wanted to say was that we have to keep our commonsense and see things in their right, i.e. in this case, symbolic, proportions. We should not imagine that WEU is going to be able to make any extraordinary capital out of this operation.

Another important point relates to the fundamental problem of command. If I remember correctly, the manoeuvres took place without Lord Carrington, the Secretary-General of the alliance, and the Supreme Commander being invited. In my mind, that was a mistake, but no matter. The legitimate question is: if a joint formation were to be instituted, who would be giving the orders if it went into operation? A Franco-German command suspended between the Atlantic Alliance and something that does not yet exist? I put the problem to you and would be glad, Secretary-General, to have your feelings on these two points.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would ask other speakers not to make speeches but to put their questions briefly.

I call the Secretary-General to reply to Mr. Close.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – You have yourself made the point that it was the first operation of its kind. It was certainly the first time that the WEU countries tackled an out-of-area problem. Their approach, if I may say so, has been wholly pragmatic in a field that is within their competence but altogether new.

They began, since after all we are a forum for political thinking and consultation – that was why we were reactivated – with political consultation. On the initiative of the Netherlands President, the political directors and their opposite numbers in the defence ministries met at The Hague on 20th August. At that time, two countries long present in the Gulf had already decided to send out the necessary ships. Following that first meeting, three other countries, at various intervals, decided to send their flotillas too. It should be noted that these were operations at national level but based on WEU consultation which continued into September and October. It is interesting to note that two countries that could not take part directly in the operation – the Federal Republic of Germany because its constitution does not allow it and Luxembourg because it does not have the necessary military and naval capability – decided nevertheless to give their backing to the operation. The Federal Republic of Germany agreed to replace the units leaving for the Gulf not only in the Atlantic but also in the Mediterranean, which was to some extent an innovation and important for Europe.

Mr. Cahen (continued)

For its part, Luxembourg – though not asked to do anything – took the initiative of sharing in the cost of certain operations. It is right, therefore, to speak of concerted political action or political solidarity and, on top of that, technical co-ordination, because the operations are co-ordinated at technical level both on the spot, that is to say between the commanders of the flotillas in the Gulf, and in the capitals concerned: a correspondent has been appointed in the various admiralties and can be summoned by the Netherlands presidency.

You will tell me that this is not what happens in NATO where we have forces permanently on call and contingency plans. We have been reactivated not as an operational organisation but as a political organisation for study and consultation. As I told a Belgian journalist asking me questions about the WEU fleet, I am only a secretary-general not an admiral. It may come, I would not mind, but we have not got that far yet.

To my mind it is because of our progress in political consultation that we were able to mount these operations which are national but have a frame of political solidarity and are co-ordinated at technical level. That is already quite something.

As to Franco-German “cheeky sparrow” manoeuvres and the possibility that certain countries, including the Netherlands – which is news to me and you seemed surprised too, Your Excellency – and possibly Spain, might be joining the brigade or the manoeuvres or the Franco-German defence council, all this has to be seen in a certain context, that of our alliance and our WEU solidarity as expressed in the platform and, for example, in the formal undertaking entered into by all member countries to defend their partners at their borders. Being no more than a second lieutenant on the reserve and in retirement, I shall not make any judgment on the impact or importance of the “cheeky sparrow” manoeuvre. However, in the context of the platform and the undertaking, together with the commitment under Article V of the treaty to defend all our partners by every possible means, whether military or otherwise, the “cheeky sparrow” manoeuvre, the Franco-German brigade and even the defence council may be said to acquire a wholly different dimension and undoubted political importance. I would add that all these problems are discussed within WEU and that extremely useful exchanges of information take place. Europe’s identity and security are being built in WEU around which initiatives are developed like those which are features of the relations between Germany and France but which could equally well be aspects of relations between Germany

and the United Kingdom or between Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean.

Now with regard to the possibility of other countries joining the brigade, the manoeuvres or the Council, that is for the moment no more than an idea. You have asked me whether the Spanish Government is prepared to take part in joint manoeuvres. I do not know, but it is certainly a question that the platform raises for our Spanish friends. Since the platform says that we are all ready to defend our partners at their borders, is Spain ready, as France has declared it is, to do so and to structure its forces to make this possible?

I have heard, off the record, that the answer is not necessarily no. With regard to the Netherlands there is no problem. They have signed the platform. I would even say that it came into being because of the efforts of the Netherlands and Luxembourg presidencies, the members of the Atlantic Alliance and the integrated command. For them there is nothing new in taking part in bilateral, trilateral or other manoeuvres.

Does that answer your questions, Mr. Senator?

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Partly, at least.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General. I would ask members who wish to ask questions to be brief in their introductory statements and the Secretary-General, as far as possible, to give very brief answers.

I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, with regard to the security and defence of Western Europe, why was the term “platform” preferred to the word “charter” proposed by Mr. Chirac? Was it because it was Mr. Chirac who proposed it or does “platform” imply as formal a commitment as “charter”?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you very much Mr. Burger. Actually we had several alternatives. The act could have been called a “charter” and we also thought of “declaration”, “communiqué” and finally “platform”, which was chosen because it has more meanings in French than in English.

Our ultimate concern was that the substance should have more importance than the form and on that score I think I can tell you very briefly – in deference to the President’s wishes – that the word “platform” in no way detracts from the

Mr. Cahen (continued)

substance or character of the commitments entered into in these documents and that these commitments are extremely important. The confirmation of Article V of the treaty, the commitment to defend any member country at its borders, the commitment to improve conventional forces and the support for the deterrence principle with the right conventional/nuclear mix are notions charged with substance and fully binding whatever term is used.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I would just add one word. I feel awkward at taking the floor again because you referred at some length to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions whose Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson, is leaving us. I know my question is something he is concerned about as well.

You referred to the reports of Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré which are indeed highly interesting. They will be debated during this session, but as for certain recent answers to some reports you have not told us everything we wanted to know. I am thinking, for example, of Europe's space future. Fortunately, the decisions reached in The Hague are relatively encouraging.

Secretary-General, do you think that the Council has the will and the means to give effect to the work of that committee? May we, in other words, hope that the dialogue on this subject will be more fruitful in the future than it has been in the recent past?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – It is a fact that when the ministers met at The Hague, they made some very encouraging statements in this field. That is why I made the point because I know that some replies have not been full enough for you. The Council is resolved to pursue and intensify its efforts in this field and those efforts could have repercussions either in our own organisation or in others like ESA. After all they too are involved in the construction of Europe and, if they can play a mainspring rôle in other fields in which they can work more usefully than we can because they have the necessary technical and scientific staff, they will do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, the argument I have heard is that we are an organisation for consultation and political co-operation but is saying that the same

thing as saying that we are prepared to be an organisation of consultation and study in response to action already taken? To my mind we can only be such an organisation if we actually defend our frontiers and an institutional WEU territory. I tell you frankly the Franco-German brigade leaves us unmoved – one way or the other. It is very nice, it is a good thing, it is a sparrow, a swallow – but it does not make a summer. The only people who can really be moved are those with totems or taboos. The time I am moved is when the Secretary-General of our organisation tells us: "It is very good, there is Iran, the Gulf and the things that have happened." Member countries, one by one have taken their decision. Five are there but the others are not. We consult and reflect about what others have done. As far as we can, we pick up the pieces after the bull's visit to the china shop.

My question is this: do you not think when all is said and done that an organisation or union like ours might sometimes have – I will not say the courage – but the need to answer a clear no to something that may seem positive in itself but which is the expression of a chaotic, an anarchical or, say, national and fragmentary way of responding to the events of our century and our age. On the contrary, in the context, it is negative.

I do not, I am sorry to say, share your satisfaction. Quite the contrary. Either we succeed in getting the others to pull together behind a WEU initiative or perhaps, in forty years' time, we shall again be patting ourselves on the back for the progress we have made and hoping that Europe and European defence will come to maturity in the forty years still to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cahen.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Pannella. You said "I do not share your satisfaction", but as always in the European field the satisfaction is double-edged. I feel satisfied today when I look back and see where we have come from. That applies both to the European Community and to political co-operation.

I am not satisfied when I look forward because there is still a long way to go and there, of course, we have to look for further progress. We have come from nothing. We shook ourselves awake two and a half or three years ago. Then we began to learn, as you say very rightly, to react to what was going on in the outside world and to try to consult and agree our attitude towards it. This was the reaction phase. In the Gulf, we went a little further. It is true that it would no doubt have been more satisfactory if it had been a WEU operation. But, after all, when our ministers decided to reactivate WEU they did not go

Mr. Cahen (continued)

that far. As a first stage, they confined themselves to political consultation and reflection. In the end, on the basis of that political consultation, we went further than they had intended and they accepted it.

Then comes the third and last stage, because, in order not simply to react but to take action, there has to be a doctrine: we cannot act or plan without one. Now, thank heaven or rather thanks to the work of the experts and the ministers, we have our doctrine, the platform. Not only can we respond, using the terms of reference drawn up and defined prior to the crisis, we can even use those terms of reference to plan and programme our reactions to given situations in advance. So that is not so bad. I fully agree we should go further. I quoted Jean Monnet a moment ago and I am going to quote him again. You will remember him saying, at the end of his *Mémoires*: "Those who have decided in advance that things will go the way they expected them to go condemn themselves to inertia." No one can foretell the way Europe of the future will look because no one can foresee what further changes will come from change and he added: "The path ahead has to be opened up day by day. What is important is to have an exact vision of one's goal and not to be diverted from it." Perhaps we have made a first step in that direction with the platform.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, I should like to comment on your remarks concerning partial concerted action on the Persian Gulf. I recall that when the multinational force was set up for Sinai, with United States participation, it became an international body even though it was based on bilateral treaties between the countries taking part. The multinational force has in fact continued to operate over a number of years and I think to the general satisfaction. This would appear to teach the somewhat bitter lesson that without United States involvement it is difficult for the member countries of WEU to agree on any major co-ordinated action, as they failed to do for the Persian Gulf.

May I make a further comment. You said, Secretary-General, that with your agreement it has been decided that the WEU agencies should be reorganised into a single agency to provide technical support for the Council. I wonder what the purpose of this is to be. Is the aim industrial co-operation, the co-ordination of scientific and technological research or, particularly at this very difficult time when there are more and more "Irangates", is it to be collaboration in

working out common legislation for the production and the export of armaments?

I should be grateful for an answer on these points, and may I remind you that we discussed them when we met last spring in London.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cahen.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you very much Mr. Stegagnini.

On the first point, there have been many experiments in bilateral military co-operation, particularly in the case of peace-keeping operations. Some of these are under the United Nations umbrella as still in Cyprus at the moment and in the Middle East and others under bi- or multinational agreements like those you have just mentioned and the multinational force in Lebanon.

These are experiments from which we can certainly draw, at least for reference. But they are somewhat different from what has happened with regard to the Gulf where we began with our own field of competence: political consultation and co-operation. This led on to the national operations – we are not yet at the point of having WEU operations and I do not know whether we ever will be – in a deliberate context of solidarity and with technical co-ordination of the implementing action. That is what we have done so far and it is that which gives us satisfaction at this stage in terms of the political climate and the practical course of operations, if I am to judge from what I have been able to glean at the political and technical meetings, i.e. at the level of the admiralties, that I am able to attend.

Up to now we have had three agencies: the first is a think tank on arms control and disarmament problems, the second deals with security problems and the third with those of arms co-operation. The idea is to merge these three units into one, the members of which would be high-level experts and whose field of competence would be, in broad terms, firstly security, that is to say both defence and the control of armaments and disarmament, and secondly security and defence capabilities. This of course relates to interarmament co-operation and problems like resource allocation and management.

In this very broad framework, the single agency would respond to member countries' requests for specific studies. For that purpose it would have to have a very flexible structure. The experts would have their specialisations of course, but they would be able to work with experts with other specialisations in a workshop to meet member countries' requests. It would be a kind of Chatham House – the Royal Institute

Mr. Cahen (continued)

of International Relations in London – at the service of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, my question, like those of previous speakers, is prompted by my anxiety that Western European Union and its institutions are lagging further and further behind the real tide of East-West developments and are being relegated to ratifying the factual achievements of others.

As Secretary-General, you informed the Assembly at the end of March 1987 that the security agencies were being commissioned to carry out two studies, the first on the verification proposals associated with the current arms control negotiations and the second on Soviet arms control and disarmament tactics in relation to the countries of Western Europe.

What has been the outcome of this work so far, and how can the Assembly's committees take advantage of the results achieved? This is a vital question, when we consider that in a week's time, on 7th December, the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces is to be concluded, an agreement of more than 120 pages, with one hundred pages of highly detailed verification provisions, only very few of which are known. This leads me to the conclusion that the Assembly, the Council, the Secretary-General and the agencies are obviously unable in practice to do anything but react to the negotiations of others without themselves undertaking any co-ordinated and concerted action.

How do you consider that Western European Union's institutions could be improved for the benefit of the debates and negotiations of the Assembly and its committees as well?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cahen.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. Soell, the agencies have indeed done the work they were asked to do, particularly with regard to Soviet tactics in this matter. They produced their report which the Council has discussed and is still discussing. In particular, some delegations are still waiting for instructions from their governments on the subject.

You have asked us – and this I think is the heart of the problem – what we can do together – parliament, Council of Ministers, Permanent Council and all the intergovernmental bodies – to react to events.

The problem is political and needs first to be examined on the basis of the body of doctrine

with which we have now equipped ourselves at political level, since reactivation and then the adoption of this platform were decided by the representatives from capitals, then the Permanent Council and lastly the ministers.

By fleshing out this doctrine – and we are resolved to continue our action in that direction – we should be able to decide our long-term positions and in that way to be ready in advance of events by defining how Europe sees things in this or that sphere.

We shall, of course, be presenting you with a report on the basis of which the Assembly will be able to define its attitude. I hope that you will have this discussion with the ministers visiting you and that you will tell them: "This is what we want your platform to go into more deeply, these are the hypotheses we would like you to study and on which you ought to take policy decisions." In this way we shall be able to do more than just react.

In this connection, the rôle of the agencies is very important. If we want to act on the basis of our political doctrine – which is the business of national governments and your parliament – and not just react to certain potential events we have to be able to ask our think tank: what are the facts, what are the possibilities and what are the possible scenarios.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Secretary-General. I also thank the speakers.

11. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1110 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure and vote on the draft decision, Document 1110 and amendment.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I could take ten or fifteen minutes to explain the recommendations in detail, but I do not think that we want to do that. We are already a little behind time.

I assure the Assembly that none of the recommendations is controversial. They all tidy up matters that have been brought to our attention. I shall be delighted to answer questions after our

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

discussion, if there are any, but I should say that all the recommendations are carefully explained in my memorandum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pannella to speak in the debate.

He does not appear to be here.

The debate is therefore closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg indicated that he had nothing to add)

We shall now consider the draft decision in Document 1110.

Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Pannella.

The amendment has been distributed.

However, under Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare the amendment to be out of order.

It is contrary to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (c) of Article VIII of the Charter of the Assembly regarding budgetary questions.

However, the idea could be studied by the Presidential Committee.

We shall now, therefore, vote on the draft decision in Document 1110.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft decision is adopted unanimously¹.

12. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1117)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply

to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1117.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der SANDEN. *(Netherlands)* (Translation). – Mr. President, seldom before in the comparatively short history of WEU have there been in so short a time so many events of fundamental importance to peace and security in Europe and the world.

When I was instructed by the General Affairs Committee to draw up a report on the thirty-second annual report of the Council of Ministers, it seemed a very simple task. There was not a great deal to report on and since hardly anything had happened my report would have to be fairly negative. But that was not exceptional in itself, because when I acted as the Assembly's Rapporteur on the thirtieth annual report a few years ago, immediately after the decisions to reactivate WEU had been taken in Rome in October 1984, I also had to say that relations between the Council and Assembly left a great deal to be desired. Then too I had to point out that the amount of information the Assembly was receiving was completely inadequate.

The Assembly was, of course, pleased when the Council reacted in its answer to Recommendation 420 as follows:

“The Council wishes to assure the Assembly of the importance that the member states as a whole attach to its reply to the Council's annual report in view of the fact that the questions dealt with in these documents directly affect the organisation's activity and its subsequent development. The Council, moreover, has on several occasions acknowledged the important contribution that the Assembly's deliberations have made to the revival of WEU.”

But, Mr. President, that was on 18th September 1985. In the intervening two years the Assembly has adopted three reports, one by Mr. Bianco and two by the current Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Ahrens. These reports are crammed with questions – many of which have remained unanswered.

So when your Rapporteur began work on his report on the thirty-second annual report, nothing had in fact changed and there was a danger of the monotonous tale being repeated. But fortunately things had been speeding up in the organisation's inner chambers, and it seemed that favourable decisions on reactivation could not and would not be put off any longer. Apart from strong initiatives by the presidency, external factors were also needed to bring this about. I refer in this context to the rapidly escalating tension in the Gulf, of which you, Mr.

1. See page 17.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

President, the Secretary-General and Mr. Valleix have spoken today. I refer also to the surprising developments in the relationship between the two superpowers as regards intermediate-range missiles and the announcement of the establishment of a Franco-German brigade.

As regards the reactivation of WEU itself, there have been some important initiatives, which eventually led, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 27th October, to the establishment of a platform which I have even seen called in some press commentaries "a new constitution for WEU". The result of all this was that my terms of reference as your Rapporteur were extended to make the Council's political activities the main subject of the report. I shall not therefore be saying anything today about the thirty-second annual report which, as far as I am concerned, can be stored away in the library as it stands.

Mr. President, I also want to make it absolutely clear today that a reactivated WEU must be no more and no less than the European pillar within the NATO alliance. I am therefore very happy about the assurance recently given by the current Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Hans van den Broek. He said that the Americans are in no doubt at all about free Europe's solidarity with NATO and that they are observing, with approval the developments that may help to strengthen this European pillar. This is as it should be, because security and peace are inseparable in the present world situation and at this very moment an agreement between the two superpowers is so close – closer in fact than ever before – that there must be no rifts in the NATO alliance.

This is all the more true now that President Reagan has for the first time spoken about WEU at length, in a statement on 4th November to a very broad public, in which he gave his wholehearted support to the platform adopted in The Hague. He said then that his country welcomed the statement by the Seven reaffirming the importance of maintaining both nuclear and conventional deterrents and establishing a positive Western European identity in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. He added that a more equal relationship should not diminish our bonds but strengthen them. It should not limit our potential but expand it. Although in 1985 the United States had serious reservations about the public expression of a European view on disarmament, it was now delighted with WEU's reactivation.

None of this alters the fact that the Europeans also have a responsibility of their own and that, in particular, a reduction in nuclear weapons

must focus our attention more closely on conventional arms. But the political as well as the purely military aspects are extremely important. Let me remind you once again that WEU's reactivation, which has now been given such clear form and substance in the platform, must not be seen as a temporary substitute for European political co-operation, which has not worked in the past. Now that we have made a beginning by bringing the seven WEU countries much closer together in the area of security policy, WEU should also continue to be the instrument for further development towards an integrated Europe. After all, the platform itself says in paragraph 3 of the preamble:

"We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification."

In this connection, Mr. President, I should just like to say a few words about more specific developments in relations between France and the Federal Republic of Germany in the military sphere. I will admit that I was taken aback to start with. Why? Because at first sight something strange was happening here: French troops, which are not part of NATO, were going to co-operate with German units, which are integrated. On the other hand, a Franco-German brigade does once again underline very clearly the Franco-German friendship which is so vital to the process of European unification.

However, I still have some quite specific worries, as I will explain. WEU is an organisation to which the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, also belong, and in the case of a subject as sensitive as military co-operation it is never a good thing when large countries look like going their own way to some extent. I will do no more today than refer to this anxiety which the small countries undoubtedly feel, and await further developments. Many questions remain unanswered, and the nuclear aspects are not the least important of them. But perhaps things will be clearer when the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty is celebrated at the end of January 1988.

Mr. President, the platform repeatedly emphasises the need for a united Europe: "It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole."

This brings me to the problem of enlargement. First of all, I would remind you of the Council's position. It has told the Assembly that enlargement cannot be envisaged until the decision-making on reactivation has been completed. The Assembly has said on several occasions that Portugal's application cannot be left much longer. The Assembly has not issued state-

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

ments on other countries in the same way. I refer you to the report by Mr. Ahrens. If I understand the platform rightly, the Council is in fact saying that the ball is back in the court of the countries that are interested in acceding to WEU. Why? Because the conditions that have been laid down for the current member states must also be accepted by new members. I am therefore assuming at the moment that, as all the European NATO countries have been directly informed of the platform, the Council will await reactions from the capitals concerned. I would stress in this connection that as matters stand at present not only the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU treaty, but also the platform must be seen as governing the accession of new members.

I consider it highly logical in this context that the statement by the Chairman of the Council should explicitly indicate that there must be no conflicts between future member states.

There is another very important point in the platform that I should like to single out today. The first paragraph of section III(a) reads:

“We recall the fundamental obligation of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty to provide all the military and other aid and assistance in our power in the event of armed attack on any one of us.”

And in paragraph 4 we read:

“Ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements.”

Others have already referred to these famous words this afternoon. I repeat: “To defend any member country at its borders”, and this obligation should be taken literally and should also be incumbent on new members. The same burden-sharing applies, as the platform also explicitly states, to all aspects of co-operation in WEU.

Mr. President, the developments in the Gulf have – for the first time – prompted the application of Article VIII of the treaty. I am – like others I have heard today – very happy about this, and I hope that co-operation, which is far from complete at the moment, will continue to expand, because what we are in fact talking about here is the freedom of the seas in the Gulf. The purpose cannot and must not be solely the protection of our own national interests: the interests of the international community as a whole are equally at stake.

In paragraph 44 of my report I have said that the Assembly has only twice been informed of the Council's meetings. This meant that we

would not have received any written information on the meeting of 14th October, the so-called “third Gulf consultations”. I am pleased to be able to say now that the President of the Council informed the Assembly of this meeting by letter of 20th October.

I will conclude with a few comments on the Council's decisions on the agencies. The three agencies are being merged into one. I assume that a start has now been made on the implementation of this decision. I also assume that the decision taken on 27th October will be implemented immediately and not left until a much later date. This one agency will then be the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General and will – as far as I know – comprise three secretariats: policy, research and logistics, which will include the support secretariats, such as interpreters. The Council has yet to take a decision on the location of this agency, together with the other ministerial organs.

Mr. President, I will depart from my text for a moment, because I have noted this morning that some people believe collocation would extend to the Assembly and the Office of the Clerk. As far as I know, that is not the case. We are talking only about the collocation of the ministerial organs.

The reactivation of the organisation, which means significant reductions hand-in-hand with greater effectiveness, will release financial resources that can be used to pay for things this Assembly would like to see done. I hope and expect that decisions will very soon be taken on this. After all, Mr. President, you have already written to the Council on this issue.

Last week, Secretary of State Shultz of the United States and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union finalised an historic agreement between the two superpowers, which is to be signed in Washington on 8th December. This treaty will have far-reaching implications, both for East-West relations and for European security policy. Now that the deployment of cruise missiles can be stopped, the reduction of nuclear weapons on the territory of the WEU countries and elsewhere will have implications for the strategy pursued by the NATO countries as a whole and for the WEU countries in particular. I have already referred to burden-sharing, which will also apply to any new countries joining WEU, but first and foremost, of course, it implies an obligation for the WEU countries, as the platform again explicitly states. Burden-sharing applies to both nuclear and conventional arms. The platform states: “European forces play an essential rôle: the overall credibility of the western strategy of deterrence and defence cannot be maintained without a major European contribution not least because the conventional imbalance affects the security of

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

Western Europe in a very direct way." The platform goes on to say: "The Europeans have a major responsibility both in the field of conventional and nuclear defence."

Mr. President, I have almost finished. It is a long time since we were last able to speak with so much optimism in this Assembly about real progress being made in the reactivation of WEU – and in a matter of only a few months. I feel this underlines the political will of the member states of WEU not only with words but also with deeds. I wish the Council luck in this respect, but I also congratulate the Assembly, because the Assembly has never stopped spurring the ministers on to greater unity and to action that would give real substance to the October 1984 Rome declaration. This means that the Assembly too can be grateful today for the results that have been achieved. They are a beginning, but they exist. This also means that this parliamentary body of ours must continue to keep a critical eye on the Council, as befits a good parliament.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Aarts.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report drawn up by Mr. van der Sanden marks perhaps the most important phase in WEU's history. It is a very comprehensive report and I compliment the Rapporteur most sincerely on the outcome.

The report is frequently critical of the Council and I share this criticism. If our Assembly wants to fulfil its function properly, we must receive fuller and faster information on the Council's decisions and political activities. It cannot be sufficiently emphasised that WEU is a democratic organisation which means it is essential for the actions and omissions of the responsible political leaders to be monitored. As the Council of Ministers is more than the sum of the individual government members, it must be accountable to the peoples of the seven member states represented in this Assembly. The need for this will increase in proportion to the reactivation of WEU.

The Secretary-General has referred this afternoon to the democratic dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, and rightly so. But if the Council sets so much store by this, it must do everything in its power to enable the Assembly to be properly equipped for this dialogue.

Mr. President, closely related to this is the way in which the Assembly and the staff and equipment which support it are able to function. That is a second criticism. The decisions on restructuring, the elimination and amalgamation of organs and collocation have been deferred too long. Implementation of the decisions taken should now be speeded up. The passage in the platform that begins "We highly value..." is difficult to reconcile with inadequate involvement in the workings of the Assembly and its organs.

Answers have yet to be given to many questions concerning the winding up of the three agencies, the future of the single agency and the establishment table. Too many uncertainties on this point are indicated in the reports. It is not just a question of efficiency and the sound management of the available resources, important as they are: WEU's future task as we see it must also be discussed. Another very important point is the quality of the staff, which has to enable the Secretary-General to make a creative approach to the challenges that WEU will face in the near future. The decisions on the agencies and the establishment plan cannot, of course, be seen in isolation from the question of collocation. The link is obvious, but this very fact must spur the Council on to take decisions that solve both problems. There should also be absolute clarity on the position of the Standing Armaments Committee.

Developments in the international sphere are a major challenge for WEU. The INF agreement, the continuing disarmament negotiations, the threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf and so on are of immediate concern to the countries of Europe. All these developments should be thoroughly analysed in WEU and considered in terms of their relevance to European security. A suitable and, if possible, anticipatory policy should be developed.

Although the threat in the Gulf area has not been treated in the way many of us had hoped where WEU is concerned, the Netherlands presidency did take steps under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty. Given WEU's history, this action gives the presidency hope for the future. As has already been said, this may be one swallow that does make a summer.

There are developments within WEU as well. Some member states are planning to co-operate more closely at bilateral level. The importance of this must not be underestimated, but the cohesion of the organisation must also be maintained. This entails complete openness towards the other member states. The extension of bilateral co-operation must not be ruled out, but the link with the Atlantic Alliance must not be endangered in any way.

Mr. Aarts (continued)

The enlargement of WEU has been discussed repeatedly in this Assembly, and the Rapporteur is rightly highly critical of the Council's policy in this respect. Portugal in particular has not been treated fairly. We are not underestimating the difficulties, both in principle and in practice, which the enlargement of the organisation involves, but definition of a clear policy has taken far too long. If we are not mistaken, the establishment of the platform has provided one: after all, paragraph 3 issues a clear invitation to other states. We welcome this, because a closed shop is historically unacceptable and does not do justice to other European members of NATO. What is more, the matter of European security is hardly conceivable without the southern flank. The platform also sets out the criteria that would govern the accession of new member states. It is important in this context that WEU should remain united in its perception of the conduct of the defence of Europe. This requires balanced burden- and risk-sharing.

The member states will, where possible or desirable, make their contribution in both the conventional and the nuclear sphere. This "acquit politique" must be endorsed by acceding countries.

The agreement on the security platform must be welcomed. I fully agree with what the President said in his opening speech this afternoon about its being a good point of departure. The platform is the beginning of a new phase of thinking on European responsibility with respect to the security of our continent, if only because the formulation of premises and the reaffirmation of our joint mission lay the foundations for future policy. It is to be hoped that this platform will evolve into a more direct association between the member states, expressing both the determination to stand firm on European security and the will to contribute to an arms level that will not jeopardise security and stability throughout Europe.

All this must be done without selling Atlantic solidarity short, because whatever is said about strengthening European security, the explicit premise must be that this security is possible only in co-operation with the United States. There is no clash between European and United States interests when it comes to standing firm on the defence of democratic values and standards. American security was coupled with Europe's after the second world war, and must remain so. Hence the major importance of a homogeneous, efficient and alert NATO organisation geared to deterrence. As the platform rightly says: "The security of the alliance is indivisible." We call for a policy of European identity and security, taking shape in a reactivated WEU, a European pillar of a North

Atlantic bridge whose other pillar stands on the far side of the ocean. For this – as the Secretary-General rightly said – political will is needed. Our task is to generate this will and stimulate it in our governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – First, I pay tribute to the Rapporteur for his excellent work and for the frankness with which he has presented certain key issues for the future of our organisation to this Assembly. I also pay tribute to the work of the Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of our Dutch friends. They have shown considerable leadership and considerable force of character in moving our organisation forward at a particularly crucial time of intensified negotiations over INF, and of course at the time of increasing tension in the Persian Gulf.

The statement of principle of European security policy – I abhor and abominate the word "platform" – will prove an historic document. I congratulate them on that also. However, we now have to address ourselves to a crucial issue which I hope will not – it certainly need not – divide us. I speak on the question of the collocation of the various organisations of our institutions.

Mr. van der Sanden, the Rapporteur, has been politic and probably wise in saying that perhaps we ought to regard the collocation of the Council and the agencies as sufficient. We should not necessarily press for collocation of the Assembly, the Council and the agencies. Nevertheless, I support that latter course. I will put before the Assembly the criteria that I hope will be adopted on the question of collocation. If they are looked at dispassionately, we can come to a joint conclusion which I think will do credit to our organisation and will at long last bring together the Assembly, the Council and the agencies in one place.

I begin by insisting that the location should enhance the standing of our organisation and not diminish it, and be wholly compatible with the principles and aims of revivification set out in The Hague declaration. It should be a location that will catch the imagination of the European parliaments and public alike, that is architecturally and physically impressive and worthy of the vital rôle of our organisation and help to put our joint work in WEU more in the public eye. Secondly, it should be a location that is acceptable to all the member countries' governments. Thirdly, it should be a location acceptable to the Council of Ministers and parliamentarians of the Assembly alike. In that respect the Council's choice of a single seat for WEU should be ratified by a majority of two-thirds of the parliamentary Assembly. The interests and views of

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

the members of the Assembly must not be subordinate in this matter.

Fourth, we must have a location that is the most cost-effective from the administrative point of view, leading to the minimum displacement of existing WEU personnel, and from the point of view of ease of access by air from all the member countries and the rest of Western Europe, as well as from the United States and Canada and the wider world.

Fifth, we must have a location where the local language is one of the two WEU working languages – English or French – and where both are widely understood and spoken.

Sixth, we must have a location that will not be misunderstood by our American and Canadian friends or by any other members of the NATO alliance.

Seventh, we must have a location that accords with the primordial rôle of nuclear deterrence in the defence of Western Europe.

Eighth, we must have a location where an appropriate building, including a hemicycle or assembly chamber, plus contiguous office space, already exists and is available close to the centre of government of the host nation. No new building should be required or initiated as a consequence of collocation.

Ninth, we must have a location that ensures that as far as possible a fair distribution of European and other international institutions is maintained.

Tenth, we must have a location that will demonstrate WEU's distinct identity and purpose, leading no one to the view that WEU is a mere adjunct of any existing international institution.

I believe that if we keep those ten principles in view they could form the guidelines to an agreed choice for a single site for our organisation in all its three manifestations, which we have long sought and which has been long overdue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we delegates are often criticised by the Council and our governments for taking an insufficiently appreciative or excessively negative view of the Council's activities. However, anyone reading our reports and recommendations – and this is, of course, particularly true of Mr. van der Sanden's excellent report – will observe that the Assembly's attitude is by no means negative in principle; on the contrary, it is constantly trying

to engage in an objective dialogue with the Council. The fact is that the Council makes it rather difficult for us to identify anything positive in the very sparse information communicated to us in its annual reports.

On the other hand, and the point has already been made by the Assembly, it is quite clear that the present annual reports do reflect positive developments compared with those we received a few years ago. For example, they now appear every six months and their overall content has become more political in character. This can be taken as a hopeful sign that WEU's political significance is gradually growing and manifesting itself in this visible form.

But these positive aspects are weakened – one might almost say invalidated – by the Council's continuing apparent inability to furnish the Assembly with these half-yearly reports soon enough for them to be considered while the events covered are still more or less topical.

We are only now able to discuss the Council's thirty-second annual report, relating to 1986, which might be described as yesterday's news. I recognise the difficulty of obtaining the necessary unanimity within the Council, but as these reports are concerned with events and not with analyses for the future, that cannot be a convincing reason for such undue delays.

But I want to do justice to the positive side. I join Mr. van der Sanden in welcoming the establishment on 27th October this year of the platform on European security interests, and the fact that the Gulf crisis has caused the Council to confer on this issue in separate consultations at The Hague, outside the routine sessions of the Permanent Council. It is gratifying that the Council is now finally availing itself of the opportunities offered by the modified Brussels Treaty – a step, I may add, which the Assembly has been urging for years.

The Secretary-General has also informed us that the meetings of the political directors and other expert groups have been intensified, and that too is welcome, although we hope we shall also be kept better informed about the content and results of these consultations.

I now wish to mention three topics which are in my view highly significant and deserving of particular attention by the Council and our governments.

First, the platform on European security interests. Much could be said on this subject, but I will confine myself to one aspect of the document which, though not perhaps of central interest, is in my opinion very important. I am pleased that the document in question is not concerned exclusively with security and defence policy but also expresses aims and proposals for

Mr. Antretter (continued)

East-West dialogue and collaboration. At a time when the CSCE follow-up process in Vienna seems to have ground to a complete halt, I regard this as very important. It is quite true, however, that the Council will soon have to ask itself what concrete steps it should take to implement its good intentions and contribute effectively to the improvement of East-West relations.

A further problem is the reaction of various European states to the latest development in bilateral Franco-German security and defence co-operation. I refer in particular to the establishment of a Franco-German brigade and the still somewhat vague proposals for the institution of a Franco-German security council.

I welcome all efforts to strengthen co-operation with France, in security as elsewhere, though I think the governments concerned should avoid the irritations that inevitably arise when they themselves are not yet sure exactly what they want. I gather from various public statements by members of the German Government that the intention is not to establish exclusive bodies, and I am therefore all the more in favour of these projects being discussed and examined as quickly as possible in the framework of WEU.

My final point is the old and enduring subject of the Council's publicity work. This is, I believe, the third or fourth time I have raised this point without anything much having changed in the meanwhile. What I have in mind at present is not the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, but the information given to the public and the press. Despite the weighty announcements made by the Council some years ago on this subject, the situation seems to be as stagnant as ever, which is all the more regrettable since the Council itself has noted a general increase in public interest in the work of WEU. Yet its publicity policy, if such a term applies at all, is characterised more by reaction than action.

Even the relatively modest job of publicity officer in the Secretariat-General is still vacant, though the post has long figured in the establishment table. If we consider, for example, the magnitude of the publicity efforts made by NATO, both in Brussels and in the member states, and the resources NATO mobilises for the purpose, we must ask how WEU can hope to sell itself to the public as NATO's European pillar, unless it become considerably more active in this respect. You may well be growing sick and tired of the constant need to raise this matter, trivial as it is in financial terms.

If the reserve shown so far – and I wish to emphasise that this does not apply to the Secretary-General – should turn out to be an

expression of political intent, I consider this a very dangerous policy. Consequently, I again urge the Council to pay greater attention to these questions, and to include them in its structural deliberations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the debate be adjourned until tomorrow.

13. Revision of the Rules of Procedure

(Motion for a decision, Doc. 1124)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I inform the Assembly that I have received a motion to amend the Rules of Procedure in the name of Mr. Pannella and others.

In accordance with Rule 51(1), the motion is referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

14. INF treaty

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1127)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I inform the Assembly that I have received a motion for a resolution on the INF treaty in the name of Mr. Stoffelen and others.

This motion is in order.

I propose that the text be included in the register and referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

15. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to changes in the membership of committees.

Changes in the membership of the committees are requested by the United Kingdom, French, Belgian, Italian and Dutch Delegations.

The changes have been published in Notice No. 6 which has been distributed. However, the United Kingdom Delegation has proposed a number of changes to the list published in the notice.

The changes are as follows: in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Cox as a titular member in place of Mr. Edwards; Mr. Hardy as a titular member in place of Mr. Miller; Mr. Thompson as an alternate member in place of Mr. Brown and Ms. Ruddock as an alternate member; in the membership of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Coleman as a titular member in place of Mr. Hardy; Lord Kirkhill as an alternate member in place of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Ewing as an

The President (continued)

alternate member in place of Mr. Millan; in the membership of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. Parry as a titular member in place of Mr. McGuire and Mr. Lambie as an alternate member; in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Redmond as a titular member in place of Mr. Freeson and Mr. Litherland as an alternate member in place of Mr. Woodall; in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Thompson as a titular member in place of Mr. Coleman; Lord Kirkhill as a titular member in place of Mr. Woodall; Mr. Parry as an alternate member in place of Mr. Cox and Mr. Redmond as an alternate member in place of Mr. Edwards; and in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Faulds as a titular member in place of Mr. Miller.

All these changes are subject to ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

These changes are agreed to.

16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 1st December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1117 and amendment).
2. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1123).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1117 and amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Irmer, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Gale, Mr. Pannella (point of order), Mr. Burger, Mr. Pannella.
4. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1123).
Replies by Mr. van den Broek to questions put by: Mr. Valleix, Mr. Close, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Pannella, Mr. Burger, Mr. Martino, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Stegagnini, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Aarts, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Miranda Calha (*Observer from Portugal*), Mr. Garrett, Mr. Declercq.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1117 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the

thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1117 and amendment.

I call Mr. Irmer.

Mr. IRMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, speaking on behalf of the Liberal Group, I wish to thank the Rapporteur warmly for his work and especially for going beyond his brief. Had he confined himself to replying to the thirty-second annual report, what he could have told us would have been of interest primarily to historians, if not actually to archeologists. This again shows how regrettable it is that the Council is still unable to present its reports soon enough for the Assembly to consider them while they are still topical. I wish explicitly to deplore this behaviour, and I appeal to the Council to make its annual reports available earlier in future so that the Rapporteur can really get to grips with the text.

Very wisely and sensibly our Rapporteur has extended his remarks to the events of this year, and we note with pleasure that the idea of reactivating WEU has now taken concrete shape. We welcome this.

We are particularly pleased that proposals have also been made with regard to restructuring and organisational improvement. There is only one note of warning to be sounded – the implementation of these proposals must not founder on indecision as to where WEU headquarters should be located. The interminable discussions about the location of the European Parliament have shown us how in the course of decades the issue can become a bottomless well. I appeal to

1. See page 19.

Mr. Irmer (continued)

you all: even if agreement on this issue cannot be reached for reasons of prestige or because of all kinds of reservations and doubts, the restructuring process should nevertheless take place, regardless of where the institution has its seat.

Mr. Wilkinson yesterday made an eloquent case – for London, I presume – and I can understand that, because it would involve him in less travel. But whether it be London, Paris or Brussels – or even Luxembourg, which certainly merits consideration – the most important thing is to carry out the organisational improvements essential to the functional efficiency of this institution.

Ladies and gentlemen, I especially wish to direct your attention to a point of significance in yesterday's debates. I refer here to the irritation undoubtedly caused to some member states by the agreement for closer Franco-German collaboration on defence. Speaking not only on behalf of my group but as a German parliamentarian, I urge that these attempts to bring about closer collaboration between France and Germany should also be considered against the special historical background, as an effort to overcome the old problems which, as you all know, have existed in the past between these two countries in particular. This is why we ascribe a primarily symbolic importance to this closer Franco-German collaboration. In fact, the symbolic implications will far outstrip those of a practical order.

To those who have fears in this connection I would mention that the alternating command of a joint brigade would present problems of constitutional law in our country, and very careful investigations will have to be made as to whether such an arrangement is at all possible under the constitution. As you know, we in the Federal Republic of Germany are extremely conscious of our constitution. We did not send any ships to the Gulf because our constitution forbids it. You may be sure of one thing: we shall adhere as scrupulously to the provisions of our constitution in this matter as in all others.

What is more, bilateral agreements are always useful when they help to engender and encourage multilateral progress. It is quite possible that this Franco-German collaboration may provide a core or power pack for the collaboration and reinforcement of WEU. We always say, and rightly, that WEU as such does no harm to NATO. On the contrary, we should promote collaboration in WEU in order to strengthen NATO as our collective defence alliance. It is our wish to develop WEU as the European pillar within NATO, and it is therefore my belief that Franco-German collaboration, so far from being harmful, can only be beneficial.

It should also be pointed out in this context that our goal is not bilateral collaboration on defence. We much prefer a European solution, and that is why the platform of 27th October 1987 is so important and significant. It places our joint defence and security policy within the framework of overall European unification. We express here our desire for European union, and this European union is quite inconceivable without the inclusion of questions of security and defence. The fact that this has been recognised and so clearly expressed is the true political breakthrough for Western European Union and is indispensable to its reactivation.

That of course also means that we must make a genuine approach to the idea of enlargement. European union should comprise not merely WEU's seven member countries but something much broader. In the long run we shall not be able to exclude from our collaboration other EEC member states or other members of NATO in Europe. We must search for ways of organising the inclusion in this military, security-related collaboration of those others who are still on the sidelines, on behalf of our joint political goal: the creation of European union.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will just add a final word. For me the reactivation of Western European Union is apparent in the qualitative change that this Assembly has undergone during the past year. When I first came here at the beginning of the year, the Assembly struck me as a gathering of somewhat resigned individuals with their future already behind them and with no drive left. Today the atmosphere is quite different and the spirit of enterprise predominates.

Ladies and gentlemen, let us maintain this spirit and we, as a parliamentary body which also has a monitoring rôle, shall then be able to contribute to a joint European security policy and to the creation of European union. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, in resuming our work this morning I do not know if there are grounds for optimism, although we obviously share Mr. Irmer's view of the buoyant outlook for WEU.

For my part I will be a little more pragmatic. I thank Mr. van der Sanden for the excellence of his report and for his very full analysis as well as for all the pertinent observations and useful suggestions embodied not only in the draft recommendation but also in the explanatory memorandum.

I shall deal with a number of very specific points.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

The question of collaboration is a difficult subject which has been deferred by the Council pending reorganisation of the entire institution and structures. We are now at what should be the end of discussions and approaching the time of decision. I recall, Mr. President, that at the meeting on 27th October we asked to be involved in the work of the Secretariat-General. I hope that this wish can be implemented and that the next meeting of the Presidential Committee will enable us to participate in defining the new structures aimed in part at simplification but also at increased efficiency.

I wish to direct particular attention to the character of this reorganisation. As the Rapporteur pointed out yesterday, the problem does not really affect our Assembly but concerns the reorganisation of the agencies in conjunction with possible geographical relocation. It is important that matters should be clear and any confusion of the issues avoided. I thank the Rapporteur for the clarification he has provided which I accept as identifying the real core of the problem.

My second point concerns the actual choice of a location. You may object that we have not yet reached that point and that it is not up to us to decide directly. While this is true, we intend to participate in the deliberations which will ultimately lead to the decision. After all there are always two ways of approaching a problem, one of which may be better than the other. It could be claimed that as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance WEU should be in the closest possible physical proximity to the alliance, and that consideration would certainly influence the choices to be taken. It may also be said, as I myself would say, that while WEU must be the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance its primary task should be to reinforce European solidarity and the spirit of European unity within the alliance. In other words, it is more important for us to strengthen our European will and our unity within the alliance than to say that we are close to it. While there is no doubt of our determination to act within the alliance, we unfortunately vacillate and hesitate when it comes to taking coherent united action involving our seven WEU countries as well as our European friends in the alliance who are not members of WEU, and why should they not participate? It is always a pleasure to welcome them as observers in this forum with the hope on both sides that they will shortly become full partners. It is therefore more important that we should be located so that we can affirm the cohesion of a possibly enlarged Europe on defence matters than that we should move physically closer to the alliance.

This leads me to the conclusion that other locations are preferable to the NATO headquarters which some are considering. Everyone is entitled to his opinion but it is well that we should discuss the subject, and when the time is opportune the Presidential Committee can further the dialogue with the Council on the matter.

Another point in Mr. van der Sanden's report which has not so far been considered in detail is the publicising of our activities. Paragraph 25 of Mr. van der Sanden's report refers to "the setting up of a unit within the Political Division of the Secretariat-General to be responsible for relations with the press and for providing information". This has always been our policy. I would like to know more about this idea, and I assure the Rapporteur that this could be a most positive step. I say "could be" in the knowledge that there is often a wide gap between good intentions and their implementation. WEU suffers from under-exposure.

We are now in a period of rapid change thanks to WEU's own initiatives which are giving it a new sparkle – and as Mr. Irmer has just mentioned we can say without self-flattery that 1987 has not been a bad year, quite the contrary – and thanks also to circumstances in the world outside. Here I am thinking, of course, of the great debate now under way which should lead to an agreement in Washington on 7th-8th December as the outcome of the meeting of Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. My next remark relates to paragraph 49 of the report on a text unanimously adopted on 3rd June this year, namely Mr. Ahrens's report stressing the need to reformulate WEU's major actions and ambitions in order to define jointly security requirements for the next ten years and the rôle to be attributed to WEU to this end.

At this level I associate myself fully with Mr. Irmer's comments. There now exists, I believe, a buoyancy which is happily due to our own initiatives for the reactivation of WEU. In three years the situation has finally matured, and that fact is specially reflected by the platform adopted on 27th October and signed by the seven member countries.

The importance of WEU's initiative is commensurate with international events themselves because the international dialogues which have taken place during the past year at superpower level have been concerned with disarmament, and we, of course, are in the direct line of fire. Our problem is that we must look more to defence than to disarmament.

Given that some disarmament is taking place apparently over our heads, should we be happy or worried? Whatever the answer, the situation in which we find ourselves is profoundly

Mr. Valleix (continued)

changed. Luckily, the timing of this great and historic international event – and I use the words not with scepticism but at least with a question mark – is taking place in a year when WEU is flexing its muscles, defining its objectives more clearly and laying down the ground rules for its actions. Will this historic event usher in a new era of peace in the world and more specifically in Europe, or will it deprive us of the means which have contributed to European security over the last forty years?

Peace based on terror is not ideal – that much is certain – but if terror is reduced, is peace thereby enhanced? This is a question to which I am as yet unable to respond either with an enthusiastic affirmative or with apprehension. There is some doubt. In the light of Mr. van der Sanden's illuminating report which I have merely touched on, I should therefore like us to take comfort from the fact – to which your own contribution, Mr. President, has been as vital as was to be expected – that the reactivation of WEU has become a reality and we have achieved some results. But the world also pursues its changing course and obliges us to follow. It is a welcome fact that the two processes are simultaneous.

Beyond reactivation, it seems to me that what we should now be aiming at for the year 2000 is the updating of the European defence concept. We are well aware that technology, resources and the defence concept are continuing to develop, and reactivation should therefore necessarily be followed by updating our approach to the problem. The world's equilibrium is shifting and we must move with it, hence my reference to Mr. Ahrens's suggestion.

In these circumstances, Mr. President, I would like Mr. van der Sanden's report to be the inspiration for our updating process accompanied, of course, by a strengthened will for unity and determination to maintain the peace. It is our duty to protect the peace, and more than ever in the interplay of momentous international events we must be clear-thinking in our analysis and must have the political will to ensure that advances in the interests of peace are not, for us, acts of abandonment or resignation. Finally, we must also update our approach to the foreseeable new conditions of defence from 1987 or 1988 onwards as compared with those which have existed hitherto and in which we have been living for many years.

Mr. President, let me say again that I also see grounds for hope in the events of recent months, and I trust that our Assembly will continue in its determination to thrust ahead. Reactivation was a move in the right direction but account must be taken of recent events. Updating of the

defence concept with a wider group of European partners and with a modern approach to the new defence requirements must now be our objective. The task is exhilarating and exciting, but it is not easy. I believe that we have the determination necessary to our purpose.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gale.

Mr. GALE (*United Kingdom*). – It is a privilege to follow Mr. Valleix. I should like to pick up immediately one of his comments. Mr. Valleix drew attention to paragraph 25 of Mr. van der Sanden's report urging the Assembly to pay some attention to promotion and publicity. I suggest to the Assembly and to you, Mr. President, that if you were to go into many of the schools and colleges in Europe and ask the pupils, and even those teaching history and politics, to name the member countries of Western European Union, they might be hard pressed to do so. If you were to take that a stage further and ask them to describe, even briefly, the contents of WEU's platform, most of them would probably find that impossible. I do not wish to pre-empt the next debate or to be out of order, but I note that in the first part of the thirty-third annual report Mr. van den Broek will state that:

“Both media and public have shown a growing interest in WEU in the first part of this year, particularly during ministerial meetings and Assembly sessions.”

That may be so, but if the Council of Ministers believes that to be so, they need to reappraise their judgment. The combined operation of WEU countries in the Gulf is of considerable significance, but how much publicity does it actually receive?

If the Assembly and the Council of Ministers were to spend a little more time concentrating upon matters of security and a little less time involving themselves in detailed and prolonged discussions about collocation, the deliberations of WEU might receive a rather more favourable press internationally, and perhaps a little more attention from those young people to whom a number of these reports have referred and whose interest we wish to attract.

Paragraph 33(c) of Mr. van der Sanden's report refers to international terrorism and he correctly says: “The thirty-second annual report is laconic.” That is an overstatement. The thirty-third annual report, he will be pleased to know, has nothing at all about terrorism, not even the six lines on the subject in the thirty-second annual report. The Assembly should address itself to international terrorism and it should be offering to Europe and the world a clear statement of where we stand.

Mr. Gale (continued)

Regrettably, some countries recently have failed to hold the line when it comes to settling ransoms for hostages held by terrorists. That is the thinnest end of a very dangerous wedge. If we pay once, we shall pay twice, three times, and then for ever. The thirty-second annual report suggests that WEU member countries should participate in other international bodies dealing with terrorism. That appears to imply that this Assembly and the Council of Ministers have not real cause to concern themselves with what is, after all, one of the most serious threats to our security. It is this international body, WEU, that should take a clear line and make a bold statement that we will not in any circumstances, at any price, settle with terrorists anywhere in the world. I should like to think that as terrorism is not mentioned in the first part of the thirty-third annual report, perhaps when we come to see the second part of the thirty-third annual report the Council of Ministers may have addressed itself to that matter.

Co-operation is more important than collo-cation and the fight against terrorism is second only to multilateral disarmament in the cause of European security. If this Assembly and the Council genuinely wish to seek wider and better publicity, their reputation will depend not upon talk but upon achievement.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to know whether the Chairman-in-Office of the Council is present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Chairman-in-Office of the Council will be arriving shortly, Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Do you not consider, Mr. President, that the absence of the executive or someone of the same status as the Chairman-in-Office of the Council from a parliamentary sitting shows a lack of courtesy which is hardly in line with parliamentary tradition?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As you know, the order of the day indicates that the Chairman-in-Office will arrive before 11 a.m. and will address the Assembly at that time. I have no comments to add to that.

I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish to congratulate my Netherlands colleague, Mr. van der Sanden, on the excellent work he has done despite the problems of timing imposed by the rapid march of European events at several levels.

As far as relations with the Council are concerned, shortcomings certainly exist although

some glimmer of hope appeared under the Luxembourg chairmanship, as my colleague, who was present at the Paris session, has just noted. There was also Mr. Poos's contact with the Assembly in Luxembourg at the end of the Council meeting.

I see other glimmers of hope under the Netherlands chairmanship referred to yesterday by Mr. Valleix and by Mr. van der Sanden in his report. I am an optimist by nature as regards the future, the reactivation of WEU at all levels, the restructuring operation, the fusion of the agencies and the reorganisation of the ministerial organs, and I hope that a day will come when the Council's reports and replies to our questions will arrive in time to satisfy our parliamentary Assembly, which is responsible though demanding.

In paragraphs 25 and 26 of the explanatory memorandum, Mr. van der Sanden looks at the very important problem, for both public opinion and our Assembly, of the public relations information emanating from the Council of Ministers and the responsible representatives. A questionnaire in the report which I shall have the honour to present on Thursday afternoon shows that interest in WEU and requests for information about its activities have increased appreciably in recent months.

While the Secretariat-General is now concerning itself with providing answers and other information, it must be noted that the Council of Ministers has not kept its promise, in response to the Assembly's request, to set up within the political division of the Secretariat-General a special unit responsible for relations with the press and for providing information. I therefore wish to table an appropriate amendment to be added to paragraph 7 of the recommendation. My suggested amendment is in French and there is therefore no need for me to read it.

The first part is concerned with general information, and the second with special information. I hope that the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden, will agree with this suggestion, the wording of which he may care to alter or accept as it stands.

If, according to some opinion polls, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party is more popular in the West than the President of our NATO ally, the United States of America, it is because our media have either surrendered or simply have not functioned at all – which is very regrettable. This failure must be made good very quickly and with all possible means to the advantage of Western European Union and the Atlantic Alliance which will remain vital to Western Europe despite the probable agreement between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan.

With regard to the Council's political activities little has been said, rightly or wrongly, about ter-

Mr. Burger (continued)

rorism, as this is chiefly a problem which concerns the Council of Europe. Speaking in Paris, it would be remiss of me not to express my satisfaction at France's substantial measure of success in its policy of "terrorising the terrorists", which is beginning to produce results. The eradication of the hard core has opened the way to negotiation and exchange. I hope that the obligation to obtain a French entry visa which applies to our colleagues in various delegations will shortly be abolished in the wake of France's success in dealing with terrorism. Solidarity has obviously played a part here and will also be an effective weapon outside the NATO area.

Following the threat to Europe's economic stability due to the Iran-Iraq war and insecurity in the Gulf, Europe has reacted after a number of meetings at Council level within the framework of WEU and has taken a concerted, if not actually unified, action under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Turning now to WEU's rôle in European security, the platform adopted by the Council on 27th October 1987 represents a combined and coherent European identity which is vital after Reykjavik and the forthcoming agreement of 7th December. With all due emphasis on the desire for peace and liberty, Europe's security still rests on the right combination of the conventional and nuclear forces of NATO, of which Western European Union is the European pillar, and on the independent forces of France and the United Kingdom with their phased nuclear deterrent capacity.

European unification under the terms of the single European act requires the security and defence platform. As to the entry of the European Community countries which have long been knocking on WEU's door, and I am thinking here particularly of Portugal and Spain and then of Denmark and Norway, we can no longer stand in the way of their admission.

As to the Franco-German brigade, we shall have to see whether Chancellor Kohl's fears stemming from his country's geomilitary position find a response in France after the presidential elections of May 1988.

The United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, has another opinion on the matter and believes that this brigade could impede Western European Union's rôle in European security. I will just say "Wait and see".

On the subject of collocation, I share the view of my British colleague, Mr. Wilkinson.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – It is true, Mr. President, that the problem I raised a short time ago is minor, but for any important debate, and in fact on any occasion, I would like to see the Council presidency represented here in accordance with the practice in our national parliaments and the European Parliament. I thought this should be recalled, or even demanded.

The excellent report before us identifies many other causes of dissatisfaction, which we should not stress in a list of complaints but regarding which we should nonetheless demand compliance with the treaty and statements made.

The Council often acts outside the rules and standards by which our union is governed.

When the Rapporteur, without fear of denial, can draw attention to the lack of a proper discussion on the budget and of the Council's failure to assume its responsibilities and to act in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the treaty, our Assembly cannot do other than respond in clear terms.

In this connection my thanks go to the twenty-five members who have supported my motion to amend the Charter with regard to the budget, which aims at creating a budgetary procedure offering guarantees for ourselves and our union, and I hope, Mr. President, that we shall not have to wait a year for the adoption of this amendment on which there is a consensus.

As this consensus exists, Mr. President, could not the Presidential Committee meet very briefly so that this budgetary procedure can be approved before the end of the session? I am well aware that such a meeting is not planned before 6th or 7th December but it is important that we and the Council should have acceptable budget rules. For this purpose it is sufficient if the Presidential Committee is formally convened and a very short oral report is submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. I repeat, Mr. President, that we have here not a majority but a consensus and it would be very regrettable if you as a good paterfamilias did not allow our Assembly to adopt this budgetary procedure.

When we turn to the late but important decisions on the Gulf and note that these were immediately communicated to the press whereas the Assembly had to wait eleven days it is clear that to continue complaining is pointless. We must say frankly that if such a cavalier attitude towards the treaty and the elementary rules of precedence were to be repeated we should have to lodge an official and formal protest. We will help the Council to stay the Council of WEU, not to act as the informal council of just some organisation or other.

Mr. Pannella (continued)

With regard to the reactivation Mr. Irmer mentioned, I believe we should exercise a little caution. For some years, since the Rome declaration in fact, the only effect of the drive for restructuring and reactivation has actually been to inhibit the growth of WEU. What has become of the applications by Portugal and all the others who want to join the organisation? On the pretext that we are reorganising to give effect to reactivation we are in fact practising a policy which restricts WEU's development and the quality of our activities.

As the Rapporteur has said to excellent effect, it is intolerable that we should have no report on the work of the two agencies. Not only is there delay in passing on to us information which we have the right and duty to know immediately, but there is even a failure to supply us with reports. If this is due to oversight, it is even worse than if it were deliberate. We are in fact denied the information we need to know in order to conduct our deliberations and arrive at informed decisions.

At WEU we are running the same risk which afflicts the European Economic Community. The greater the satisfaction we take in concerted action, the greater becomes the threat of crisis to our organisation's institutional and structural procedures and attributes.

Of course, we welcome concerted international action; we welcome sparrows and swallows; we welcome good will and increased contacts and more dialogue, but we must take care that the dialogues and advances serving the cause of European integration follow the rules which we ourselves have set up under our treaties. Otherwise, by a process of reaction, we are afraid at times and tend more to act individually. At other times there is a need for dedicated constructive work performed in a calm atmosphere. We fail to act in concert and we fail to activate WEU or even the European Community because fear does not impel us to act.

We must therefore demand the full application of the terms of our treaties. The Rome declaration did not nullify the Brussels declaration or our institutional powers as regards arms control and close oversight of the defence and security problems of our times.

That is only one aspect. We had other functions which we have relinquished, apparently in accordance with the Council's wishes. We should state clearly that the Rome declaration has not curtailed our powers or duties as an institution, quite the contrary. We as an institution also have something to say about arms control.

Instead of viewing with satisfaction the consultations and small-scale meetings which take

place at times of crisis between the member states, we should in fact use our procedures and the powers of WEU to respond to dramatic events as they occur. Otherwise, Mr. President, whenever a crisis arises we shall find psychological justification for dispensing with WEU's procedures, institutions and capacity to act.

Naturally, I welcome the Franco-German projects and what has been achieved, which strike me as preferable to the growing prospects of a rapprochement between the two Germanies for which the cultural and psychological ground seems to be being prepared within Europe. I am of course very pleased when two of our member states act together to form a brigade, a company or a division at a time when it is not yet clear how relations between the two Germanies will have developed by 1990.

I must state frankly that I do not fully share the optimism which our Secretary-General has expressed with such erudition and brilliance with regard to the achievement of the last forty years and the prospects for the next forty. It is my belief that Europe is not playing a full or even an adequate rôle. Europe's rôle is in fact incredibly and dramatically inadequate! WEU's long delayed meeting on the Gulf crisis underlines the absence of Europe from the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the politics of the Gulf and its failure to influence armaments, the management of agro-food weapons and the technological and propaganda resources which are increasingly superseding military weapons in the confrontation between the political blocs and in the various operational theatres which concern us throughout the world.

In all these instances we should avoid optimism and pessimism alike. Very practically, very modestly and as "chartered accountants" we should merely try to record the progress of our institutions and what we have achieved, and I fear that in this regard we do not have grounds for satisfaction.

Those, Mr. President, are the observations which Radical Party members, as newcomers to this Assembly, wished to make. As I told the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments this morning, it is my wish that our ideas on defence and security should not be tied to the past. As I was saying a moment ago, we must not overlook the fact that the problems of the third and fourth worlds and the international balance of trade are closely linked to the manipulation of agro-food weapons, which are increasingly being used by multinational enterprises and major food producers without supervision and without any evident desire on our part to address the problem.

I repeat my thanks to the twenty-five members who have been kind enough to support the

Mr. Pannella (continued)

motion to reform the budgetary procedures which we are about to table.

The PRESIDENT. – I propose to adjourn the sitting until 11 a.m. when the Chairman-in-Office will address us.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.55 a.m. and resumed at 11.10 a.m.)

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

4. First part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1123)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the first part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council, Document 1123.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to welcome here today Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and Chairman-in-Office of the Council. Mr. van den Broek has organised two particularly fruitful meetings with the Presidential Committee during which we were able to discuss in depth the problems before the Council. As I emphasised in my address, the Assembly wants the Council to succeed in its undertakings and because it wants to contribute to that success, I congratulate Mr. van den Broek on having, for the first time, implemented the provisions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty concerning threats to peace in whatever area they may arise.

The consultations on the Gulf situation on the harmonisation of the action taken by our countries are a practical sign of the reactivation of WEU which our Assembly has called for. It is also under the Netherlands chairmanship that our countries have agreed for the first time on principles governing the security policy of member states. We are well aware that this success would not have been possible without the typically Dutch determination with which Mr. van den Broek worked for the announcement of The Hague platform. It has already been stressed that a great deal of effort is still needed to give WEU the efficient structure necessary for the realisation of the ambitions we have for it, but, here as elsewhere, we can count

on the Netherlands to persevere until success is achieved.

I now invite you to come to the rostrum, Mr. van den Broek, and I should be grateful if you would then reply to the questions from members of the Assembly.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. President, may I begin by thanking you for your warm words of welcome and add that I consider it a privilege to address this Assembly, which plays such an important rôle in the work of Western European Union. Democratic nations cannot pursue effective security and defence policies without the support of the people and their elected representatives. I therefore highly value your involvement in our endeavour to develop a clearer European identity in security and defence as a vital component of a more united Europe under construction.

Mr. President, you will expect me to report where we stand in the process of revitalisation of our organisation and, naturally, I shall be pleased to do so. But allow me first to touch briefly upon a significant event that in these days is so much in the forefront of the international public debate on security issues and that, moreover, so clearly has implications for the European dimensions of security. What I am speaking about, of course, is the INF agreement that will be signed just eight days from now at the Washington summit.

We do not exaggerate when we call the agreement an unprecedented achievement. The threshold that seemed elusive for so long is about to be crossed. For the first time in arms negotiations, we shall see real reductions. Whole categories of modern missiles will be eliminated. Also for the first time, the principle of asymmetrical reductions will be put into practice: if you have more weapons, you will have to reduce more. No fewer than 1 500 deployed nuclear warheads will be dismantled by the Soviet Union and three hundred and fifty will be dismantled by the United States in Europe. For the first time, a verification system of an intrusive nature will become operative and will include extensive on-site inspections. The significance of those verification procedures and provisions and the asymmetrical reductions cannot be overestimated, not least because of the exemplary rôle that they can play in other arms control negotiations.

Perhaps all those features are obvious. The essential question to be posed in judging the forthcoming agreement is whether it enhances peace and security and adds to stability. After all, arms reductions are not an aim in themselves but should contribute to those purposes. My

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reply is an unequivocal yes. The agreement does contribute to those purposes.

Apart from the fact that the INF zero option proposal originated in Europe, it should be remembered that the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Western Europe was primarily a response to the SS-20 threat directed particularly at our countries. The Soviet threat is being reduced and that allows for and justifies a response in kind. That is consistent policy constantly pursued and seconded by the alliance.

We should not shrink from the success of our own steadfastness or talk ourselves into seeing signs of an impending United States disengagement. The bonds between America and Europe rest on the firm foundation of shared values and common interests. In military terms, the linkage is given tangible expression by the presence of a variety of American nuclear systems on European soil, as well as the presence of large United States conventional forces here. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, put it aptly from this very rostrum when he said:

“ the commitment of our American allies is first and foremost a political reality which does not depend solely on any particular category of arms. ”

I hope that after the agreement is signed the United States Senate will proceed promptly with ratification, bearing in mind the significance of the agreement for Europe. I suggest that the WEU Assembly will want to draw to the attention of the Senate its support for a speedy entry into force of the agreement.

In your address yesterday, Mr. President – I also read the report of the speech by the Secretary-General – you placed the revitalisation of WEU against the background of the rapidly evolving international situation. Developments in the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe, with their bearing on East-West relations, the summit in Reykjavik, the progress in arms control, the SDI initiative, other newly-developed technologies, the perennial issue of burden-sharing in the alliance and the impact of out-of-area regional conflicts on vital European interests are challenges, risks and opportunities which present themselves at Europe's doorstep and call for a more united European response.

I sincerely feel that the recent adoption of the platform on European security interests is timely and provides us with a sort of European identity card. For the first time, it formulates a more coherent European vision of the various aspects of our security and defence.

We clearly place our endeavours in the double perspective of European unification and the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. In doing so, we have reverted to the origins of our organisation. As we know, the Brussels Treaty was only one of the early steps on the long road towards European unity but gave an impetus to common defence and security efforts. By revitalising WEU we want to contribute further to that European integration. For a number of reasons, of which we are all aware, co-operation on security has not kept pace with the progress made in other areas of European construction. The time was ripe to correct that defect.

A more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Atlantic Alliance and that, in turn, will enhance the European rôle and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. Former Secretary of State Kissinger complains in his memoirs that in the drafting of what became the Ottawa declaration the Europeans were reluctant to use the word “ partnership ”. I can tell you that in the drafting of The Hague platform, we all agreed from the start that “ partnership ” was the very word to describe the close ties that bind us inextricably to the United States and connect Europe and North America.

The fact that that message has been understood on both sides of the Atlantic may be witnessed by the appreciation expressed recently by the American President of the adoption of the WEU platform. One of our overriding aims has always been, and will remain, to prevent any type of conflict. We may have differing opinions about how that can be secured, but few will dispute that in present circumstances – and as far as we can foresee – there is no realistic alternative to a strategy of deterrence based on an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Therefore, we committed ourselves in the platform to risk-sharing and burden-sharing in conventional and nuclear areas.

We are also pledged to defend any member country on its borders. That clearly manifests our determination to do so by the stated appropriate arrangement. It is right that this very essence of solidarity points us the way in the months ahead, and we shall reflect on how to give further substance to those commitments. Bilateral co-operation within WEU in security matters between France and Germany is here a case in point and, again, in enhancing our own security it is something to be valued.

Reverting to arms control; you will infer from my earlier remarks on INF that I see more cause for rejoicing than for worry. That having been said, we in WEU have to think about the best INF security agenda, an agenda that, as I have said, will have to take specific European security interests fully into account. Moscow's new

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thinking seems to open up further prospects in arms control and the INF agreement will have the valuable aim of maintaining our steadfastness and, indeed, our part in bringing this about.

As stated in the platform, we would bring out the basis of a coherent and comprehensive arms control concept bearing in mind the requirements of our security. An obvious item in the INF agenda is to realise 50% cuts in strategic arsenals. At the same time we are aware that substantial reductions in nuclear weapons will have the effect of increasing the significance of the current conventional imbalance, and removing that imbalance is clearly a priority.

Europeans have a special interest and I would add a special responsibility in this respect. Major steps in the pace of nuclear arms control would also include the need for a global ban on chemical weapons, and that is of specific European interest. Arms control, however important, is only one of the elements of the dialogue between East and West needed to shape East-West relations more constructively. We have, therefore, to express how much value we attach to it in improving the situation via the CSCE process.

Another case in point – it was mentioned by various rapporteurs yesterday – is the development in regional conflicts and their impact on European security. We have discussed the Middle East and the Gulf. It is with a certain satisfaction that we may note that our consultation within WEU on these out-of-area issues has substantially increased. We have succeeded in signalling to the outside world that where European interests outside our area are at stake we are willing and capable of assuming our own responsibility to protect our vital interests, such as those at stake in the Gulf, where we speak about the importance of preserving the freedom of navigation. WEU certainly has provided us there with valuable instruments to concert our respective national endeavours. It is also of the utmost importance to the United States, the belligerents in the Gulf and, not least, other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council.

I will not refer here to another important issue on our agenda for the coming months – armaments co-operation – because my colleague and co-Chairman, Mr. van Eekelen, will speak about that in his address to you tomorrow. However, I think that I have made it clear that in the coming months there are several subjects on the WEU agenda. We are in close consultation with our colleagues in the various capitals to sort out our priorities and I think I have given you an impression of the lines along which those discussions will proceed. We count on your support

and co-operation to give further inducement to our work.

I cannot leave the rostrum without making a few remarks about the enlargement of WEU and the reorganisation of the ministerial organs. The Assembly will be aware that in the so-called platform which has been considered by the seven members of WEU reorganisation is not regarded as a closed shop. That would run counter to WEU's European vocation. We must, therefore, be open to European nations willing to accept their obligations and to accept the commitments contained in the platform and prepared to give concrete expression to those commitments.

Clearly that will require a dialogue between us and the countries concerned.

I believe that in the not too distant future dialogue will begin with a number of countries that have clearly shown interest in joining WEU, countries that have reacted to the platform. The subject will be discussed at a future ministerial meeting that will communicate with ministers and our NATO allies.

In your address yesterday, Mr. President, I read that you have the feeling that ministers had made greater progress in coming to grips with the specific issues than with reorganisational issues. I hope you do not think me conceited when I say that I am not too sad that it is not the other way around or that we were lacking in fulfilling our responsibility on the political side. I do not mean that I do not take your remarks about reorganisation seriously, and I hope that you and the Assembly are aware that we have done our utmost at the latest ministerial meeting to make progress and that at our October meeting agreed that at some stage the three agencies should become a single entity and that we decided to place the single entity under the leadership of the Secretary-General. We have in the meantime received a draft document to see how the new entity should be composed. We agree that we should arrive at a concentration of ministerial organs in one capital – the same city. I am appreciative of the need for having just one capital, though it is not easy, and I am no less appreciative of the difficulty that faces the Assembly over here.

There are four candidates, which is not bad for an organisation that consists of seven countries, though making the choice is difficult. I can only say that we feel fully committed to the whole process of reorganisation and concentration in the one city. I hope that by the next time we meet it will be possible to communicate to you the eventual choice.

Mr. President, you also touched upon the need to improve the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, and distinguished delegates have also made such remarks. I can only say that I

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agree with most of what has been said in that respect, and we will therefore do what lies within our competence to improve our communications.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – For several years now we have heard time and again that everything possible will be done in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please let the speaker finish what he has to say, Mr. Pannella. You can ask questions afterwards.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I will conclude my remarks, and then, of course, I shall be very pleased to answer further questions.

As we progress along the road to European unification, its different aspects become increasingly interconnected and mutually supportive. WEU has an essential rôle in that process. Looking back at 1984, when we started reactivation, it is clear that a lot has been achieved. WEU is now the political forum for harmonising our views and for promoting our practical co-operation. We have set the principles that guide our further work, and we count on the Assembly to stimulate us further in that work.

Mr. President, it has been said before that if we did not have WEU, we should now have to invent it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you for your address, Mr. van den Broek, and for your readiness to answer questions.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Let me say again, Mr. van den Broek, what a pleasure it is for us to receive you here together with some of the fortunate colleagues who worked with you on 27th October last after The Hague platform was finalised. This platform yesterday received a unanimous welcome from our Assembly. As you mentioned, it reflects the hope expressed by the French Prime Minister in this forum a year ago almost to the day.

You referred twice to this Assembly's ability to provide a stimulus for the Council and urged us to use our inspiration. You have, of course, already referred to what is to happen at the Washington meeting next week, and this brings me to two questions.

First, as things stand, what prospects, in quite general terms, does the platform offer to the seven member states for fresh action as regards the defence and unification of Europe?

Second, to bring ourselves right up to date, if we consider the agreement which may be reached in Washington next week, what effects do you think this will have for European defence? I refer here not only to the continuing process of disarmament, but specifically to the rôle of the WEU Assembly.

How, in your view, should WEU react to this agreement and what initiatives should it take?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I understand that Mr. Valleix is interested to hear more in detail how we view the agenda for the coming months. I tried to indicate in my introductory remarks that in setting up this agenda in the various capitals we tabled a number of issues which mostly relate to what we would call the post-INF agenda, which is concerned with reorganisation, collocation and so on. That will automatically continue.

In the short term it is necessary to reflect on the political issues that deserve the highest priority in our consultations within WEU. I cannot sufficiently repeat that the post-INF agenda will be of the utmost importance. I indicated that for us an INF agreement followed by continuing negotiations on strategic arsenals – the proposed 50% cut – is of the utmost importance; but even closer to our own interests are the negotiations on the present tremendous imbalance in conventional weapons, an imbalance that becomes more acute and damaging where we are reducing nuclear arsenals.

I also referred to chemical weapons. My feeling is that the negotiations in the multilateral framework in Geneva are threatened with stagnation. We have seen progress there in the past year, but my impression of the past months is of stagnation. Europe also has a clear interest there. In other words, we should sound out with capitals whether the WEU governments can harmonise their positions somewhat on these extremely important issues. After all, they are discussed in the NATO alliance. Especially on these issues, where clearly European security interests are at stake, it would be extremely useful and a valuable contribution to cohesion in the alliance if WEU capitals could harmonise their positions and contribute in that way to the discussion in NATO.

Apart from that, we shall continue to discuss out-of-area issues. The Gulf situation has not much improved. Our interests in preserving the freedom of navigation are and will continue for the time being to remain there. We are reaching a point at which we shall have to discuss with each other who will stay there and who will come back. It is of the utmost importance that the

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

European countries participating in the naval exercise in the Gulf carefully concert their positions in this respect. Although I am fully aware that all the individual nations participating there are doing so under a national and individual title, formally the signal of our presence there is of a European, not a national, kind. We should preserve this carefully as an asset. It can only contribute to a lessening of tension in the area if Europe is prepared to assume certain responsibilities, apart from the fact that the vulnerability of each individual and national contribution is lessened by this token.

Mr. Vallex asked what would be the consequences for Europe of withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles. I do not believe that I am best placed at the moment to elaborate on that issue. That typically belongs to the discussion about a comprehensive arms control concept. I speak now in a personal capacity. I am fully aware that, apart from all the advantages that I have enumerated in my introductory remarks, in some capitals there may also be question marks about, for instance, the continuing or not continuing validity of the strategy of flexible response when eliminating complete categories of arms and what-have-you. There may be certain tendencies towards trying to compensate for the elimination of INF. I personally would not support that, but this whole discussion can and should take place between Western European capitals as such. It is of tremendous interest to us all.

In airing our impressions about this agreement – Europe has wanted it in the past and we have suggested concrete proposals, a solution being the zero option – we should try to avoid endangering the desired coupling between the European and United States forces and arsenals. I do not always believe in self-fulfilling prophecies. I would warn against underlining this point time and again. No statements have been made by the American administration anyhow that indicate a lessening of their commitment to Europe. For me that is the best of all reassurances. I am convinced that the United States administration is convinced that a free and independent Europe is also of vital interest to the United States and that the first line of defence of the United States lies in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – My question concerns the INF treaty. In *Le Monde* of 1st December the philosopher Jean-Marie Benoît, who is Deputy Director of the Collège de France and President of the European Centre for International Relations and Strategy, wrote a devastating article entitled “What is the point of

this agreement on Euromissiles?” In Tuesday’s *International Herald Tribune* the American strategist Edward N. Luttwak expressed more or less the same view. My own position is quite clearly defined – I believe that the European agreement is symptomatic of resignation or impotence.

That point having been made, I now put my specific question: one of the great benefits claimed for the INF treaty is that we shall exchange 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles – in my opinion the only valid deterrent as they were capable of reaching Soviet territory and some of them have not yet been deployed – against three times 430 SS-20 nuclear warheads. If we now turn to missiles with ranges of 0-500 km – and according to my old friend General Altenburg’s statement at a conference seven days ago we have eighty-eight Lance missiles compared with 1 438 Soviet Scud and Frog missiles – would it not be very tempting to use the same argument to say, “What a wonderful deal we shall get by exchanging our eighty-eight missiles against 1 438 on the other side!”.

What guarantees do we have that we shall not proceed from the single zero to the double zero and even the treble zero, thereby abandoning the very basis of NATO’s strategy, of the flexible response, without any alternative in view?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. Close has touched on a crucial subject that will be one of the important discussion points in what we call our post-INF agenda – the short-range missiles, those ranging from zero to 500 km range.

I hope that Mr. Close is reassured by the vision that governments have proffered in the platform for future commitments and the components of the deterrents. They have clearly underlined that we do not see in the foreseeable future any credible strategy other than that of the strategic deterrent based upon an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

Secondly, I would readily agree with Mr. Close if he meant that we should be aware that denuclearisation of Europe is simply not on. I could not agree more and that also has been so clearly expressed by what I said on the lines of the platform in this respect. In Reykjavik on 12th June the NATO Council decided that post-INF conventional stability talks would deserve high priority and that in conjunction with those talks the short-range systems could be addressed.

My feeling – I speak quite openly – is that the majority of member states in NATO clearly

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

believe that addressing the short range without having arrived at a substantial correction of conventional imbalances would not be wise. After reading the statements of the Federal Chancellor in the Federal Republic recently, I have the feeling that, also in the Federal Republic, it is certainly an important problem to address the imbalances on short range.

But we feel that the emphasis on conventional imbalances should in no way be disputed. I see a clear rôle for a discussion among WEU members and feel that we shall arrive at acceptable solutions in the sense that there will be no elimination of shorter-range weapons, or rather that there will not even be a decrease of shorter-range weapons in which the numbers are very much in disfavour of the West, as the distinguished delegate indicated. That will not be the case until there is a realistic perspective for correcting the tremendous imbalances in conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the support that Mr. van den Broek has expressed for the INF agreement. Despite hesitations within the alliance and at national level about further reductions in capacity, will the Council consistently and wholeheartedly support the case for asymmetric reductions, if not the entire removal of strategic weapons? Does Mr. van den Broek see any serious difficulty about establishing verification arrangements that would justify such removals or reductions? Does he see any difficulty in arranging verification of the comprehensive arms control policy to which he referred?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – The alliance has spoken out clearly in various communiqués in support of the INF agreement. The alliance, including WEU members, has jointly supported the idea of halving the strategic arsenals. Unrest was created in European capitals at the time of the Reykjavik summit when it was suggested that we should aim at the elimination of all intercontinental ballistic missiles. That theory is no longer under discussion. There is no difference between the allies about their support for halving the strategic arsenals.

I mentioned the agreement on verification arrangements within the INF proposal. It is extremely important. As I said, an intrusive system has been agreed, with on-site inspections. The agreement is set out in a book that is about

six inches thick. George Shultz discouraged us from taking it to bed because it is not interesting literature, but it is detailed and contains much fine print and may be useful in solving the difficult problem of verification in other areas.

It goes without saying that verification of a strategic arms agreement will be even more complicated than verification on INF. We are talking about even more mobile systems that are more difficult to detect. INF is a zero-zero agreement. START will be 50:50, which is more difficult to control. We do not know whether things are moving round. If arms can be produced under an agreement and, therefore, may be stocked and tested, verification becomes increasingly difficult.

However, we should not be discouraged. It is also tough to arrange verification on chemical weapons, but we should continue working on it. Perhaps 100% verification will not be possible and we may have to face the difficult choice of accepting 90% verification with an agreement or getting no agreement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Why did the Ministerial Council respond so negatively to Recommendation 448 on a European space policy until 2000? The broad outlines of the recommendations drafted by our Rapporteur, Mr. Valleix, were endorsed by the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency at The Hague only a few days ago. Does not Europe need a military space policy, so that we may have an autonomous capability in space in military satellites for telecommunications, signals intelligence, navigation, reconnaissance and, thereby, confidence-building? Should not WEU be the instrument for concerting such a policy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I certainly do not discount that possibility. You should attribute our reluctance primarily to financial preoccupations and not to our not seeing a great usefulness in such a programme. Most of our countries are involved in the ESA projects on satellites, missiles and so on. The latest ministerial meeting of that organisation shows that many requirements have been recognised, but there is a great financial problem. Do not see it as a political no; see it, for the time being, as a reluctance because of the lack of finance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, in your introductory remarks you mentioned arms co-operation, and you expressed the hope that this Assembly would stimulate some initiative by ministers, I am happy to provide an opportunity for this.

Agency III has submitted two reports on armaments to the Council. One is entitled armaments co-operation between WEU member countries – co-operative projects since 1984 and the second technology transfer. As usual, the Assembly is deprived of its information sources and research results. These documents would clearly be valuable to the Assembly's future work. Mr. Chairman, could not these reports be passed to us, even if only in declassified form?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – An interesting development has become public only this morning. General Secretary Gorbachev has admitted for the first time that there is a research programme on SDI in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet Union did not wish to deploy such a strategic defence system in space, but it is comforting that we have confirmation of what we have always claimed, which is that a research programme on the western side was prudent, as similar programmes were being carried out in the Soviet Union.

I believe that solutions between Washington and Moscow may be possible. There is a growing rapprochement between them about accepting a commitment of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty for a certain period. That would at least ensure that the deployment of such systems in space did not materialise in the next decade.

I also feel that the difficult question of what would be allowed under the ABM treaty in testing, development and research could be resolved if the political will existed in Moscow and Washington. That would provide the prospect of lifting the blockade on a START agreement.

The report drawn up in WEU is still under discussion. I feel that it is not treated with the utmost urgency because our minds are focused on a number of issues that I mentioned earlier. It would be premature to publish or submit reports to the Assembly. I suggest that my colleague, Mr. van Eekelen, address you tomorrow on armaments co-operation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, notwithstanding its kind words the Council has always acted over the years as

though we were a service corps necessarily bringing up the rear, and I shall therefore ask questions from that standpoint.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Service corps?

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Yes, when dealing with state administrative problems, General de Gaulle used to say, "The service corps will bring up the rear". The fact is that the Council displays towards us a degree of Gaullist condescension which is not always justified by its historic achievements.

What measures suggest that we shall, in future, receive not merely fine words but the Council's replies to our written questions within eight weeks?

The Council should send us its six-monthly reports in good time! I do not believe there has been any ill will here, just a lack of the necessary resources. Good will is essential, but there are other needs as well.

Our General Affairs Committee has described the thirty-second annual report as very inadequate, and I would ask you, Mr. van den Broek, what measures you have taken to correct this totally unacceptable situation and to conform to the rules which theoretically govern relations between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers? These rules have not in fact been observed by the Council for years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I understand Mr. Pannella's frustration and irritation. As for what would be essential to meet the criticisms, we can at least agree about the introduction of the so-called dedicated communications network among the capitals to alleviate the current burden of communications. If I am asked what has been done I can only say that we have asked the capitals and will communicate their replies, responses and reactions as quickly and as soon as possible. I ask for your understanding. We also remain as dependent on the other partners in WEU as they are on us. I do not say that we are always the fastest movers and that they are the slowest. That is not the sense of my remarks. But we have to find ways and means of shortening the process and we need to agree upon the contents of replies to questions.

I fully agree that a period of eight weeks would be appropriate so that the significance of questions did not subside and that we should not take longer to reply. It is not that we wish to be longer with our replies, I assure you.

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

I can only say again that we shall do our utmost to improve this type of communication. We shall have another go at it during the ministerial meeting in order to get the agreement of the seven on this dedicated communications network. There are still one or two member states with difficulties here but we shall proceed along the same lines.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Are there really grounds for optimism when we see the disappointing progress made on conventional weapons at the Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe?

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – My optimism is based on the fact that we are now for the first time reaching concrete results in arms control. I do not underestimate the difficulties that we are encountering in resolving communications on conventional stability. The distinguished delegate is right to say that the mandate discussions on negotiations in Vienna are difficult. On the other hand, I have no less confidence that a mandate will be drawn up in a couple of months' time and that we shall be able to advise on the present follow-up Vienna meeting on the mandate on conventional stability. Having the mandate, however, does not mean that rapid results on communications are to be expected, because we know that it is a complicated matter. However, let us not shy away from our difficulties. It is a priority that should be addressed and we shall continue to address it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, there are earlier bilateral agreements and bilateral agreements which are currently being worked out. We know that the first kind are still impeding the speedy adoption of joint political decisions on defence and security, as has happened with the events in the Gulf; we know that the second do not always appear to some of us to be directly concerned with joint responsibility for European defence and security, as with what has happened between France and Germany. How do you think the first and second problems can be overcome? Do you think that the first are more difficult obstacles or that all the second group offer better prospects? Thank you, Minister.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of*

the Council). – As with many things in life, it is a matter of time. The question is how can we accede to a close kind of co-operation without acting upon our own responsibility as, for instance, in the Gulf in the matter of preserving freedom of navigation. How can we accede to closer European consultation in this respect without more recognition of our own responsibilities, so to speak?

I say that it is a matter of time when I see what has been attained already in the past three or four months and how many sessions there have been of the political directors of WEU in dealing with this problem. We have agreed the naval staffs in the capitals should be communicating with each other on this problem. We have agreed with the five participating nations over there that the naval commanders in the area be in regular contact. Thus I say that you can certainly recognise progress in this area of co-operation.

But we cannot withhold from anybody the argument that on a purely international law basis everybody is acting upon a national title since he is expected to preserve his own national interests. In spite of that legal argument, my feeling is that the cohesion of operation with a more European mark on it, if I may say so, is clearly increasing, and the French and German co-operation should be highly valued.

Everything that leads to the reaffirmation of close French-German co-operation is to the benefit of Europe. The same applies to specific defence and military co-operation. This limit should not infringe upon existing military structures, such as those that exist between members of the alliance that belong to the integrated military circuit. That would be the limit for us. One can go parallel with the other, but should not start infringing upon it. We do not believe that undermining NATO military co-operation would benefit our common security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – You have just spoken about the Gulf and you have told us that the admiralties in the five capitals are in regular contact, and that the naval forces in the Gulf are in regular contact. May I ask a simple question? Let us suppose that a mine-sweeper of country B is sunk by Iranian action tomorrow. I do not ask what would be done, but whether the naval commanders there have sealed orders already agreed by their governments so that they take concerted action along with any other forces in that area, or have such orders not yet been decided?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – The distinguished delegate refers to certain rules of the engagement in the Gulf area, the prime responsibility for which belongs to the ministers for defence. I do not deny that there would be clear political implications in such a situation. Perhaps the question of the distinguished delegate could be dealt with more specifically by Mr. van Eekelen tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am very grateful to you, Minister, for the support you have given to the INF agreement and more generally to the prospects for arms reduction. My question concerns the outlook for negotiations on conventional weapons.

It says in today's Herald Tribune that, according to an American television journalist working for NBC news, Mr. Gorbachev has said that Moscow is ready to enter into immediate talks with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the Soviet proposals for conventional forces in Europe. According to this journalist he said, "We are ready and we have made our proposals. Now we are waiting for a more active response from NATO". These remarks have a very important bearing on future work designed to achieve effective security in Europe based on the minimum level of armaments and I would ask your opinion, Minister, about Mr. Gorbachev's remarks. Could you tell us something about preparations in NATO for negotiations of this kind?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – All the positions taken in Vienna will be co-ordinated within the alliance. Secondly, we have not yet reached the phase of negotiation. We are trying to establish agreement on the mandate of the negotiations, which means that we should agree in the first place about what reduction area we are going to negotiate. Again, there are certain nuances in the various positions. Apart from reduction areas, it must be decided which type of armaments, troops and so on will be involved in those negotiations and which types will be left out. That is the discussion that is going on in Vienna at present.

Before that mandate has been put into place, I do not believe that it is wise to express an opinion on or react to the substance of the Soviet proposals as such. Various capitals – also those belonging to WEU – have already presented certain working papers internally as a contribution to the discussion on substance. Therefore, we are not only waiting until the negotiations

that are going on are concluded before reflecting on the western position, but we are very carefully preparing them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, you described WEU as a forum for political consultation and practical co-operation on defence questions. At the moment co-operation between the WEU countries on land, air and naval training is largely confined to bilateral agreements; for example, between Italy and the United Kingdom for air forces; with Germany for ground forces and staff colleges; with France for naval forces, particularly as regards exercises in the Mediterranean. Why does WEU not seek to promote specific agreements both within and outside the organisation – with Canada for example – in view of the ever-increasing difficulty of providing firing ranges and suitable training areas? I believe that this would be practical proof of genuine collaboration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Plainly, we cannot exclude the possibility of other accords on co-operation between more WEU members being concluded. Nothing is excluded in this respect. I believe that any type of action in this area will be tested against its effects on the cohesion of the NATO alliance as a whole, and existing structures should not be infringed. The examples referred to by Mr. Stegagnini need not necessarily have that disturbing function. Military co-operation between WEU members is being conducted mostly under bilateral agreements. For instance, France has made it known that it would like to extend to other countries certain forms of co-operation that it entertains at present with the German Federal Republic. Whether that would always be in the form of separate bilateral agreements I am not quite certain, but we could think in the longer term of agreements of a more multi-lateral character within WEU. Again, there is no dogmatism in that respect as long as it serves the purpose that we want to serve.

We all know that WEU is not a military organisation. First and foremost it is a political organisation, but it can provide for impulses towards more armaments co-operation or the common training of forces, as we have seen with the Federal Republic of Germany and with France. I think that flexibility, not dogmatism, should rule our proceedings, keeping in mind that in this respect we are serving the enhancement of defence capabilities and of stability in general.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges.

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – In your address, Minister, you did not mention chemical weapons and spoke only of nuclear and conventional weapons. The platform also fails to mention chemical weapons. We do not know what stocks of such weapons are held in the East. Should this not also be of concern to the Council in view of the disarmament talks?

We also know that in 1986 the Council compiled a list of biological weapons. Why has the agency done nothing to verify the production of these biological weapons? We should be as concerned about this question as about nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I readily admit that the latter question does not immediately ring a bell with me, but perhaps I may let it ring if I am given some time. I should like to respond to that question in writing. That would be no problem. I can do that within eight weeks.

I mentioned chemical weapons earlier. It is in the platform, insofar as the platform on the arms control chapter refers also to the decisions taken on 12th June by NATO in Reykjavik. We are speaking about the post-INF agenda. The various sectors of arms control were enumerated, including chemical weapons. As I indicated, there is a certain stagnation about verification with chemical weapons. What we felt two years ago was that sufficient verification of chemical weapons no longer served our requirements. That is the opinion of a number of important partners in these multilateral chemical weapons negotiations. What I tried to indicate earlier applies notably to chemical weapons. One comes to a point where one has to choose between accepting 90% verification certainty with an entire ban on chemical weapons as such or striving for 100%, which one will not reach and which will eventually impede the coming into being of a complete ban on chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Aarts.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the question I want to ask about Franco-German co-operation has to a great extent been covered by Mr. Martino's question. But I have a further, specific question to add. Did those who proposed this Franco-German co-operation at brigade level formally bring the proposal to the notice of the Council of Ministers, and was the Council formally asked for its

opinion on this plan? Is it also intended that the further elaboration of this plan and the practical details, specifically in connection with the military and defensive implications, should be discussed in the Council and, by analogy, the NATO Council too?

Mr. President, I have read what the platform has to say about the enlargement of WEU, which the Minister also mentioned this morning. Can I take it that Portugal may become a member of this organisation in the immediate future if a further application for accession is submitted and if Portugal is willing to satisfy the criteria set out in the platform and the Brussels Treaty?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I am tempted to reply in Dutch, but I shall stick to English, because politicians should try to be consistent!

It is indeed the case that the co-operation between France and Germany, including this mixed brigade, has been discussed by political directors and ministers. At least we have been informed about this by our French and German colleagues. We have welcomed this type of development, but again under the provision that I mentioned earlier – that we wish to count on the fact that these types of co-operation, including French and German forces, should in no way infringe upon the existing NATO military structures as such. Again, as the exchanges of views within WEU, albeit on a purely official level, progress, we certainly hope to remain informed about further developments in this respect.

Mr. Aarts asked whether Portugal could become a member. As I said earlier, we have distributed the platform also to Portugal and I expect that in the foreseeable future – I have indications in that direction – Portugal will ask the presidency to have certain orientative talks on the platform as such. If the conditions are met, it is a decision for the seven WEU members to extend invitations according to the treaty.

Personally, I feel that if Portugal meets all these standards, so far as the Netherlands is concerned – I am speaking in that capacity – we should favour this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now ask members to put their questions in turn for you to answer them together.

I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister rightly referred to the importance of human rights within the CSCE process. While it is too early to evaluate glasnost and perestroika and whether they represent any kind of genuine

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

change, one cannot have any illusion about the difficulty of loosening a dictatorial system or ignoring the relevance to our defence perceptions of progress in that area. Glasnost would have to be assessed according to some timescale. In response to an earlier question the Minister said that it was a matter of time. Could he give us some idea of his timescale and priorities in this essential field within the CSCE process?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Miranda Calha.

Mr. MIRANDA CALHA (*Observer from Portugal*). – I think that the question that I was going to put has been answered. It was about Portugal's entry into WEU. I think that the Minister has answered that, and I am grateful to him.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister mentioned the co-operation of the European naval forces in the Gulf. A reputable British newspaper mentions that there is a possibility of the Netherlands and Belgian mine-sweeping forces' ships being withdrawn, in the case of the Belgians because of low morale among the sailors and, in the case of the Netherlands, because of the cost. Will he confirm or deny that report?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Declercq.

Mr. DECLERCQ (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I want to ask a question about the choice of location for WEU's institutions. The platform clearly stresses that WEU is the European pillar of NATO. Will this be taken into account in the choice of location, particularly as regards the facilities for consulting experts, and the assurance of the American presence as the guarantee of the West's defence? In other words, is it being explicitly borne in mind that WEU must not be seen as conflicting with NATO, but as a form of co-operation within NATO?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – The first question shows the importance attached by the Assembly to improvements in political relations between East and West going hand-in-hand with arms control. I believe that if we do not succeed in making progress in that respect, which includes human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we will soon find limits to arms control agreements. Confidence, which is the best instrument for arms control, can be brought about only by improving human rights.

I should hate to see a cut-off date. We feel that the final document in Vienna should be balanced and should contain substance. We should prefer to continue the conference for some time to achieve that goal.

Progress is being made and will continue to be made on the first basket of the Helsinki final act on security and confidence-building measures and on the conventional stability talks mandate. Those are also clear priorities for the Soviet Union, but it attaches less priority to the third basket, which includes the human dimension, and to the seventh principle of the first basket, relating to human rights.

If the western countries, in a unified rôle, do not ensure that the balance is set out in the final document of the follow-up conference in Vienna we shall probably never have another chance to restore the balance. That is why I am against a cut-off date, which would force us to achieve a result which might be unattractive to us, certainly in the longer term.

As regards the article in the English newspaper, I assure Mr. Garrett that no reasons of finance are at the moment influencing the continuation or discontinuation of our presence in the Gulf. We have an important responsibility there. In the longer term, if the threat from mines decreases, one may consider whether a rotation system among the participating countries of WEU could be instituted, but, as Dutchmen, we advocate this European operation under the Dutch presidency of WEU and we do not intend to withdraw unilaterally. There are close contacts with our partners.

The final questioner said that the members of WEU should not gang up against other alliance partners, particularly the United States. The platform speaks clearly on that issue.

I was asked when we would decide on the site for collocation. I hope – and our endeavours are geared towards this end – that we shall have a solution by the time of the ministerial meeting in April. Delaying a decision will slow down other elements of the reorganisation to make one entity of the agencies under a directorate that is responsible to the Secretary-General. We are motivated to continue our endeavours. We count the blessings of the past months during which progress has been made, but I agree with those who say that we must not get stuck halfway. That will not produce the result that we all seek.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. van den Broek, the applause you have just heard expresses the Assembly's appreciation of your full replies to its questions.

**5. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1117 and amendment).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1121 and addendum).
3. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1108 and addendum).
5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1116 and amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 1st December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1117 and amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro, Mr. Martino, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. Burger; (point of order): Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Close, Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; Mr. Ahrens; (point of order): Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Caro, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Reddemann.
4. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
Replies by Mr. Raimond to questions put by: Mr. Soell, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Caro.
5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly (*Motion to amend the Charter*, Doc. 1128).
6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget*, Doc. 1121 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1108 and addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Burger.
8. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1116 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Scheer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Soell.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1117 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1117 and amendment.

I call Mr. Caro to speak in the resumed debate.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is a pleasure for me to be with you again in a debate which, in fact has little to do with the annual report of the Council for 1986 and is more concerned with the present state of WEU reactivation. You know how much I strove, during my three years as President, to ensure that the Assembly took part in the decisions that

1. See page 22.

Mr. Caro (continued)

the Council had to take to bring about that reactivation. This meant first of all that the Assembly had to be informed of the Council's intentions but also that it had to be able to make its views known to the Council before it took any step committing the organisation for the future. That is why I instituted new procedures for dialogue with the three Chairmen-in-Office of the Council with whom I had to deal, namely Mr. Genscher, Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Poos, all of whom are still heads of the ministries for foreign affairs in their countries. All three co-operated with a determination to succeed to which I would like to pay tribute.

Mr. van der Sanden, our Rapporteur, has rightly recalled that the development of these informal exchanges should not lead to their taking the place of the normal procedures for relations between the executive and legislative bodies. However, the official procedures are so slow and rigid in WEU that the only way to have a dialogue, which may have been imperfect but nevertheless allowed the Assembly, the main-spring of WEU reactivation, not to be left on the touchline when it was being put into effect, was to break out of their constraining formality. So I think that whilst it may be necessary to reinstate the official exchanges between the two WEU organs as the Rapporteur requests, we should not for all that give up holding exchanges of views on a completely off the record basis. For the official exchanges, it is up to the Council to take the initiative and for the others the Assembly needs to organise its participation in the unofficial dialogue in such a way as to be able to feel that it is effectively represented.

The purpose of the action I embarked upon – with, I would stress, the consent of the whole of the Assembly – was in the first place to develop WEU's political activity by obliging the Council to respond in a concrete manner to Europe's problems as they arose so that WEU might assert itself as the voice of Europe for questions within its competence. What it did during the summer with regard to the Gulf affair largely meets that requirement even though joint action outside the NATO area always seems very difficult to mount, so great are the differences that still remain in our seven countries' perceptions of their foreign responsibilities. I am convinced that the approach they took in the Gulf question, whilst very timid, will need to be developed and above all structured in such a way as to leave no doubt that it is Europe that has embarked upon a joint action in this matter to maintain the freedom of the seas.

However, it is only when Europe is in a position to speak with a single voice on specifically European problems that WEU will really be able to perform its rôle. In that connection, The

Hague platform is a definite advance because it sets out the main lines of a European strategy that is part of NATO strategy while allowing for the individual requirements of the various member countries. It is credible because it has received the support of our American allies but it is still far from sufficient, for one thing because there is no obligation to take concrete action and for another because the manner in which it situates WEU reactivation in the setting of a wider movement, the platform for which is the single European act, is very vague. The reference to the single act in The Hague text is obviously not enough to convince the public that what is done in the framework of WEU forms part of the general advance that should lead to real European union.

The question through which the Council could have made this European vision clearer was, of course, the enlargement of WEU. It was faced with a choice: either to link accession to WEU with membership of the European Community or, on the contrary, to impose its own criteria. Sadly, as we can see, not only has it chosen the second of these alternatives but, in addition, it has imposed special conditions on Spain, a member of the Community, which at least one of the WEU member countries – France – does not fulfil.

It is easy to understand that the Council did not want to hold out its arms to Spain too obviously at a time when that country's relations with the United States were in crisis over the renegotiation of the agreement on the maintenance of American nuclear bases on Spanish territory. But was that a reason to use accession to WEU to bring pressure to bear on Spain in that issue? Hoping to do so showed very poor judgment about the possible Spanish reaction and there is every reason to fear that this short-sighted policy will have the effect of keeping Spain out of WEU for several more years without, for all that, making understanding with the United States any easier.

The policy proposed by the Assembly was to invite those of the European Community member states whose rapid accession to WEU seemed desirable to take part in drawing up what was then called the charter and has become the platform on European security interests. The platform would then have become the basis for rapprochement of the members of the Community in the field of security. The line the Council has taken could turn it into an obstacle to WEU enlargement.

Yet that enlargement is necessary if we want WEU to be not only the European pillar of the alliance, which it can only be in an imperfect manner so long as only some of the European members of the alliance are in WEU, but also the

Mr. Caro (continued)

organisation through which the European Community tackles its security problems.

Of course it is no use bewailing lost opportunities, but we need to learn lessons from this for the future, the main one in my view being that what reactivated WEU needs more than ever is that the stimulus its Assembly has given it in the past should continue during the next few years.

That is why the Assembly should put all its weight behind the suggestions that Mr. Goerens, our President, made yesterday and the recommendation that Mr. van der Sanden, our Rapporteur, has presented today. There will be no real reactivation of WEU unless all the WEU organs, Council and Assembly, play their full part in it.

The Council has equipped itself with the means of fresh political activity and that is cause for satisfaction. It has enabled the Secretariat-General, taking advantage of the reduction in the rôle and staff of the agencies, to mobilise the remaining agency in its service and to increase its own working capacity. That could be an excellent thing. But it is the Assembly that could be the loser in this operation if it is not given the financial resources, staff and information it needs to perform effectively the rôle that it ought to have in a reactivated WEU. In my three years in office I was able to see how close it was running to the limits of its capacity in this situation. Very soon, those limits could well be exceeded.

Governments might be tempted to consider that the new slant taken by the Council's activities makes an active Assembly unnecessary. The idea has surfaced in press reports prompting one to wonder to what extent and by whom they are inspired. Whereas the papers up to now – and not without due cause – have always contrasted an active Assembly with a somnolent Council we now read disappointed or even insulting assessments in our regard ranging from those reducing us to the rôle of "sounding board" for the Council, which no parliamentary assembly worthy of the name can accept, to the description in the British periodical *Defence* which recently labelled us a dead duck. In that periodical the Council is described as active, just as our Secretary-General describes it, and the Assembly as half-dead. I hope this is a case of the press going too fast and using caricatures instead of basing itself on the realities that the Council and the Assembly, together, have been building for so many years.

Let us make no mistake, there will be no lasting reactivation of WEU if this dialogue between an organ of intergovernmental consul-

tation and a parliamentary assembly, which the modified Brussels Treaty introduced into a military alliance for the first time in the history of the world, is not maintained. Today, the joint consultation on the situation in the Gulf may give some results. The diplomats were able to reach agreement on the principles of a European security policy. These, however, are achievements with no tomorrow that any kind of change of policy by one or other of our governments could put at risk if reactivated WEU is not based on European public opinion, on the parliaments of the member countries and on a public dialogue between the executive and parliamentary organs of the institution. If the Assembly were really to become the dead duck it is already accused of being WEU as a whole would be lamed and European defence would be in jeopardy.

Is it not the incontrovertible political importance of our Assembly, now recognised by all, which incommodes those who in reality, behind the smoke-screens of their official statements, would like to stifle any action aimed at promoting organised European defence? And would not those responsible for this perverse "dead duck" policy be the very ones who say their dog has rabies because they want it killed?

So, before events place us in an intolerable situation, let us say clearly this very day that the time has come for governments to pay some heed to the very modest demands made by our President, Mr. Goerens, and Mr. van der Sanden concerning budgeting issues and the political dialogue. Let us show, through our firmness, that we are determined not to be reduced to silence or to become the dead duck of Europe which is of course, ladies and gentlemen, far from being our intention.

Let me add at this time when the development of Europe depends upon the motivation of public opinion in all our countries, given the prospects opened up by the single European act and the 1992 target date – whereas the single European act has been in force since 1st July this year laying down the principles for political consultation on defence, security and disarmament questions – that ultimately nothing can be done outside the existing treaties and that these include the modified Brussels Treaty.

So our Assembly of Western European Union, which must be retained with the European Parliament, needs to conduct its business with the prospect of European political unity in mind in order to enable Europe to take its place at last in the dialogue of the continents where, yet again, we are going to see agreement being reached above – if not over – our heads this very month in Washington between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Caro (continued)

For Europe to come alive it has to take its rightful place in the world. To occupy that place it also has to exist in the field of defence and, for that, it has to make itself heard in the Atlantic Alliance. That is the political equation facing our governments. It is the determination to solve that equation that our Assembly must unceasingly assert.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. Caro.

I call the last representative down to speak, Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am doubly grateful to you, Mr. President because, having arrived late for reasons beyond my control, I had already decided not to intervene as I was to speak at the next sitting. I am grateful because I now have an opportunity to offer my special thanks to Mr. van der Sanden for his work in a swiftly developing sequence of world-shaking events. I am sure that it is only because you have such a clear view of the purpose of WEU that you have been able to produce a report which develops in logical terms a subject which dates far back into the past.

We must not even now forget the concept of security and defence on which the Brussels Treaty was originally based. This has changed with the passage of time. Today our ideas on security and defence are very different from what they were. Today we are looking mainly at the world well into the future when there will be no further defence based on deterrence, on the political philosophy of Copernican SDI to meet the steady growth in the number of nuclear weapons opposed only by patient but determined hope. I say patient and determined hope because there were times last August when we would have wished our WEU to intervene more decisively through its Council of Ministers. We were fully acquainted with the modified Brussels Treaty; we were thinking of paragraph 3 of Article VIII and we were expecting one of the contracting parties to act with the urgency which the facts showed to be all important, to bring together the ministers and the other contracting parties to decide on a policy for what happened immediately afterwards.

I must confess that I thought then, Mr. President, of your status, your powers and even your duty; I thought of Rule 3 of our Rules of Procedure which if I am not mistaken provides that in exceptional circumstances the President may convene the Assembly in situations which appear to be extremely dangerous or important or such as to involve the wider interests of the seven countries convened to the Assembly to decide what political action should be taken. In

fact, neither I myself made any special approaches – a letter to Mr. Goerens remained in my drawer – nor did anyone else because we had a sense of responsibility and understood the political realities and hence the impossibility of doing anything in circumstances which are outside the scope of the action we can take and limit what we can do; we are very well aware of the many diplomatic ties which bind many of our countries bilaterally with countries beyond our frontiers; and we know that in diplomacy no great leaps forward are possible. Nature itself takes no leaps forward but diplomacy takes many fewer.

There were – and I put the question today to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council – previous bilateral agreements which are difficult to set aside except by gradual action which is among our responsibilities. But there are still bilateral agreements limited to our seven countries and these are developing and, it seems to some of us, are creating obstacles to unity of action and political agreement within WEU.

I personally do not think this to be the case. The process even when it goes ahead bilaterally within the concert of Europe seems to be a number of solo performances which must however be written into the score for that concert that has to be of a joint nature. That is why I am not afraid of initiatives which seem to be of a local and limited nature within the broad sweep of political events. I think we shall be able to restore the fullest unity of action in relation to these world events. Never before had we been faced with such major issues as the reduction of armaments; never before had we been faced with the possibility of asymmetrical reductions. Never before had the superpowers accepted verification.

So, in this context, it will be more and more difficult and not easier to move forward. We must rediscover our political way, our European way so that we can look forward with peace of mind to future action. Let it not be said that on the other side of the Atlantic it may be difficult to understand our attitude. I would say that if we are to be a pillar we must be a united pillar and must not give the impression that we are moving apart.

We are under moral pressure. Let us look forward to the year 2000 and let us rediscover the way we must take. We shall not stray from it. I am convinced of this because we are all of us responsible to our countries and above all to our Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, firstly, of course, I want to thank the members who have spoken for their contribution. I am very touched by the kind words used in the Assembly to describe this report and the recommendation. I feel this is the time and place to stress that a report of this kind can only be drawn up by a parliamentarian who also has responsibilities in his own country if he has the assistance of a secretariat in this Assembly which has capable people at its disposal. And I commend the Assembly in this case too. Quite specifically I should also like to thank Mr. Burgelin for his assistance.

Mr. President, almost all the many speakers have touched on numerous subjects which are covered by the report and which largely concern the events of the period since 1st July, which I spoke of yesterday afternoon in my introductory statement. I shall not go into all the various aspects again because I note that there is a wide measure of agreement over what has emerged from the Assembly in the last few days about WEU's future, following the decisions now taken by the Council of Ministers, and also, I would stress, about the position this Assembly will have to adopt in the near future, when it comes to dealing with the repercussions of the problems we face now that these decisions have been taken. I was particularly pleased by the comments made by Mr. Aarts, among others, when he made the point that this Assembly is a democratic representative body. He said – and I want to emphasise this – that the need for monitoring will increase as reactivation begins to take effect.

I am then in the happy or, as far as the General Affairs Committee is concerned, unhappy position of also being the Rapporteur at a future part-session on developments in the Council of Ministers since the decision on the platform was taken. So my message to the Assembly is: we shall be coming back to this point. Once again, I feel – this applies to all of us who sit here as members of our national parliaments – that, with the incentives now perhaps somewhat reduced, the need for democratic control over the Council's actions with respect to the reactivation of WEU will be as great as ever.

Some interesting remarks have also been made about the platform itself. They came from Mr. Antretter, Mr. Aarts, my friend Mr. Caro and some others. The Minister, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, also talked about it this morning. It was quite clear that the line which has now been taken is one which has found favour with the Council of Ministers. The Assembly and the Minister too have this morning set a very clear course in accordance with the democratic influence emanating from the Assembly.

The third point on which I want to comment very briefly – it was raised by Mr. Antretter, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Burger and Mr. Gale – concerns public relations activities aimed at the media, on the one hand, and communications from the Council of Ministers to the Assembly on the other. I need not repeat what I said about this yesterday. We are not happy about it. I am now speaking only about the situation up to the Council's thirty-second annual report. I can say that since 1st June the information passed on to the Assembly and also to the media has been greatly improved, when I think of the press conferences the presidency has given in recent months, when I think of the communication – I talked about this yesterday – on the meetings of the political directors, which used to be surrounded with so much secrecy.

I remember – and the Assembly will perhaps remember too – that when I last acted as rapporteur for the Assembly, I put a number of questions on a meeting of the political directors held, I believe, on 25th February 1985 in Bonn, and received a virtual denial that any such meeting had taken place. That is how secret things were in those days! I believe the situation really has changed to some extent and that as an Assembly we should be glad of it. But I would say to Mr. Burger that his amendment will not cause us any problems, because it concerns the provision of information to the public. Let me repeat something I said yesterday. If we want the reactivated WEU to be the forum in which political decisions on our security in Western Europe are given substance and form, it is essential that our constituents be sufficiently familiar with WEU. Our constituents are in fact the 250 million inhabitants of Western Europe.

Mr. President, Mr. Gale and Mr. Burger commented on the lack of information from the Council of Ministers on the fight against terrorism. I sympathise. My report also contains a single comment on this. But I believe it was Mr. Burger who recalled this morning that the twenty-one countries of the Council of Europe bear considerable responsibility for the fight against terrorism at international level and that the Legal Committee has therefore set up a special sub-committee to keep a watching brief on the fight against terrorism at the level of the Council of Ministers. This does not, of course, alter the fact that we too will have to accept that within WEU the same ministers, if we are talking about the foreign ministers co-operating with the ministers of justice of the Council of Europe countries and the seven WEU countries, should be making a joint effort to curb and suppress terrorism. I would just like to add today that, when we are back in our national parliaments, we should also take a look at the financial resources that these parliaments are prepared to make available, to Interpol, for example. I believe it is

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

less than we are demanding for the fight against international terrorism.

Mr. President, this is where the difficulties start. I am thinking specifically of Mr. Wilkinson, who has probably had to leave for the United Kingdom for some important votes this evening. Or am I mistaken? He is still here. He has drawn up a ten-point programme regarding collocation, in which he has included not only the ministerial organs but also the Assembly. Mr. President, I call on you as President of this Assembly to state very clearly that – as far as I know – not a word has so far been said in any of this Assembly's committees about collocation, about the location of both the ministerial organs and the Assembly's organs in one place. This has not been under discussion. So if Mr. Wilkinson wants to come forward with practical proposals, like his ten-point programme, it seems obvious to me that they should first be discussed by the Assembly through the appropriate committee. As I see it, the Presidential Committee is the most appropriate body for this purpose.

Mr. President, all the speakers yesterday and today have talked about the merging of the agencies, collocation and restructuring. Even Mr. Valleix paid particular attention to these aspects. In my view and according to the information I have at the moment, the situation is that the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 27th and 28th October should be implemented in the short term. Yesterday I referred to 1st April in passing. This morning I listened closely to the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, when he spoke of a date close to the next ministerial conference to be held in April.

Mr. President, Mr. Antretter and Mr. Burger also talked about the Franco-German brigade. I listened to their comments with great interest. They correspond fairly closely to the comments I made on this subject yesterday, which are also reflected in my report.

Mr. President, the penultimate point is the question of the Gulf. Mr. Pannella and Mr. Martino spoke about this. What Mr. Martino said this morning naturally has my wholehearted support. In July, August and September we waited with some anxiety for Western European Union to do something. I stress the word "union" in this context, just as Mr. Martino did. This is not some chance grouping of seven governments that meet from time to time. No, it is a collective. A common policy is pursued on Western European security and on the protection of the international freedom of navigation. It is not just a question – as I said yesterday – of protecting national interests: international interests are at stake here. I feel that what the Minister

said about this this morning again demonstrates how right the Assembly is in its thinking, which I am happy to say is now being largely adopted by the Council of Ministers.

Mr. President, just a few words on the enlargement of WEU. Mr. Burger believes it must be enlarged. It was also referred to by Mr. Pannella, Mr. Aarts and Mr. Irmer, who linked enlargement specifically to the question of restructuring in the context of the accession of new countries.

Today the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers said for the first time that Portugal can now expect an answer shortly. This is the first time that the enlargement of WEU has been referred to in such positive terms. He also said that the Council awaits reactions from some other countries. We do not need to be too mysterious about this. Spain was referred to by a number of members yesterday and today. It seems to me that we should not bring any pressure to bear in the current political situation, when Spain is also engaged in talks with the United States about the bases in that country. But we should wait for the reply to the Council of Ministers from the Spaniards themselves after the platform has been forwarded to them. We should then await the outcome of the talks that will follow. I am pleased to see that a number of countries which are not members of WEU but do belong to NATO are also attending this part-session of the Assembly.

You may rest assured that the Assembly – and more specifically, Mr. President, the General Affairs Committee – endorses the European pillar and feels it should be reinforced. We are very much in favour of enlargement, provided that it does not exacerbate existing conflicts between certain members of WEU. There comes a time in this respect when we must call a halt. We shall be interested to see what progress the Council of Ministers succeeds in making.

Mr. President, Mr. Irmer said something with which I agree wholeheartedly. He said that, when bilateral talks are held in Europe, it often means that not much progress can be made at multilateral level. If some progress is then made at bilateral level, it has a favourable effect on the multilateral talks. If a European solution is to be found to many security problems, he said, it will only be because we really want this European union.

Mr. President, I endorse what Mr. Irmer said, and I would add the following. The Assembly must stand by the rôle in which its members, as representatives of the people, are naturally cast in their interaction with the ministers. This rôle must continue to be a critical one.

Mr. President, the Assembly has instructed us to prepare a symposium, which will probably be

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

held in the autumn of 1988. We go along with the Council of Ministers in the context of the substantial report on its activities as far as the thirty-third annual report is concerned. I am optimistic about this, Mr. Chairman of the Permanent Council. Perhaps it will succeed this time. I would also say that the activities which the Assembly is developing in various areas will oblige it, today and in the near future, to go on working at the reactivation of Western European Union as the real European pillar within the NATO alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You wish to speak again, Mr. Caro?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – To comply with the rules I should have asked the Rapporteur's permission to interrupt, but I would like to ask him a question.

I wholly approve the general options advanced by our colleague and friend, Mr. van der Sanden, but I am deeply disappointed in the way he has dealt with the case of Spain and WEU enlargement. The fact that this country may have problems to settle with the United States of America with regard to the maintenance of American bases on Spanish territory is one thing, but the authority for our activity is an international treaty calling for enlargement in the light of present political options. If Spain is to be asked to solve the problem of American bases on Spanish territory why is the government of France not asked to alter its policy and allow American bases on its territory?

Each country has its national defence policy which is its own business but it can still perform an international rôle in the framework of a treaty. For us, the modified Brussels Treaty should be the platform – the word is apt – for bringing us together in the same way as the efforts made at the economic level and in particular in the European Community.

I would very much like Mr. van der Sanden to confirm that this is his way of looking at things and that there is no pre-condition in his mind but that, on the contrary, the Assembly is right to consider that the Iberian peninsula is entitled in every way to share in the organisation of joint defence as the European pillar of the alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding between Mr. Caro and myself. I made myself fairly clear on these matters yesterday when presenting my report. I will repeat what I said yesterday and then follow up the remarks I

have just made that led to the interruption by Mr. Caro.

What I said yesterday was this: at the moment two factors are important where the enlargement of Western European Union is concerned. The first is the Brussels Treaty, and the second is the platform. At the moment the ball is in the court of the countries which would now like to accede. These countries must now make their views known on the thinking of the Council of Ministers as set out in the platform, which is in addition to what is already stated in the modified Brussels Treaty. What does this mean? I have talked about burden-sharing and about the options referred to in the platform. That was yesterday's declaration of intent. But as I hear that Mr. Caro was held up by fog in Strasbourg I can fully understand his interruption.

Today I simply said that, given the provisions of the platform and the Brussels Treaty, the Assembly should proceed with some caution for the moment, because it has already stated its requirements and it is now up to any applicant countries to make their views known, especially in relation to the platform.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is the custom of this Assembly that the Chairman of the committee should also comment on the report and the debate. I will be brief.

I am very grateful to the Rapporteur and to the Secretary of the committee. The time available for this report was once again limited; nevertheless I am very pleased to say that it is not a botched-up job.

As has rightly been said in the debate, the report is on the whole more positive and optimistic than in past years. This is because we are noticing for the first time in the Assembly that our governments are serious about what can be called, depending on place and temperament, the reactivation, revitalisation or reanimation of WEU. Whether this change in our governments' policy stems from their own appreciation of the possibilities offered by WEU, or whether it is due to the rude awakening experienced by the Europeans after Reykjavik, should not concern us. The fact remains that WEU is making progress.

Neither the report nor the statement made by the Chairman of the Council today answer all the questions. It has rightly been complained that the ministers' reports continue to reach us extremely late. Mr. van den Broek gave us some explanation for this practice this morning.

I am also sorry that we are unable to speak today of a positive decision by the ministers on

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

the enlargement of Western European Union to include Portugal – Portugal, because it is the only country which has submitted a formal application to join our organisation.

The ministers were quite unable to bring themselves to make a decision in the Council. They raised fresh reservations, which I am convinced are surmountable: Portugal will be able to satisfy the requirements. Even if – as the Rapporteur rightly said, and the Minister also mentioned this morning – a reaction is now awaited from Portugal and any other countries concerned, we should not stop pressing for the earliest possible decision in this matter. We as an Assembly must not shelve Portugal's application.

I would also point out that the Assembly has already anticipated Portugal's accession very pragmatically in some respects. We find Portuguese parliamentarians not only in the Assembly's plenary sessions but also in the committees, enjoying every right except the right to vote. I very much hope they are also taking full advantage of the opportunities to discuss aspects of joint security with us.

The platform has not been discussed in every detail in committee. Some may find it does not go far enough; others may object that it goes too far. What is pleasing, however, is that this platform not only sets out current policy, but also contains new elements that point to the future: elements of the dialogue, as was said here today.

I am concerned about the Ministers' very hesitant attitude to the urgent demand for the restructuring of our organisation. I am particularly concerned that one member country is said to be making this restructuring conditional on a decision on location. It would be appropriate for the French Minister, who will be addressing the Assembly in a moment, to be asked about his country's position on this question.

Mr. Wilkinson listed the criteria for the selection of WEU's location yesterday in a ten-point programme, a veritable decalogue. I disagree with him in one respect and completely endorse Mr. van der Sanden's view. The question of this Assembly's location is not under discussion at the moment, and no one will dare to take a decision on this without consulting us.

Mr. Wilkinson's ten demands are undoubtedly justified, by and large, but they really leave only two options open. I told him yesterday that he should have added an eleventh criterion: the location must be a city with at least a million inhabitants, then London would really have been the only one left, and Luxembourg would have been excluded as an option. It is not for us to

decide this question, but it would be regrettable if all the restructuring were to be postponed until agreement was reached on the difficult question of location.

It has rightly been said that improved and closer bilateral co-operation must not be allowed to disturb, let alone endanger, the alliance. That is correct. I am, as you know, a member of the opposition in my country, and it is therefore certainly not for me to justify what the German and French Governments have agreed. Formal problems, and also perhaps practical ones, connected with the formation of a Franco-German brigade have been discussed here. Mr. Close pointed out that things would be far more difficult if, say, a Dutch unit were to be added.

I believe we should see things rather more pragmatically and not so formally. What is the aim? The Germans are undoubtedly trying to make it easier for the French through closer co-operation to honour their commitments under the WEU treaty, that is, to improve the defence of southern Germany. That, ladies and gentlemen, is ultimately in the interests not only of the Germans or the French but of us all. I therefore feel these ideas should be greeted with less distrust and believe with Mr. van den Broek that it is an undoubted advantage if the French and Germans co-operate even more closely in the military sphere than before.

Ladies and gentlemen, it has rightly been said that our organisation's public relations activities are more than inadequate. Comparisons have been made with NATO and the European Community. It will certainly not be possible, nor perhaps would it be desirable, for us to spend as much as the Community on public relations. We should not necessarily seek to match the volume of paper distributed by the Commission and also by the European Parliament.

I nevertheless feel that our work, if we take it seriously, includes the task of informing our fellow citizens of defence needs and of our activities in WEU. We owe this information to our citizens. Therefore, Mr. President, we should never tire of demanding an improvement in the Assembly's public relations work, and this also applies to the staffing requirements.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you will have gathered, the report was discussed at length in committee. It was approved unanimously. I would be happy if the Assembly endorsed this view.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the draft recommendation on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council contained in Document 1117 and amendment.

The President (continued)

Mr. Burger and others have tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. Add the following new text at the beginning of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper:

“ Ensure that the permanent structure of the ministerial organs allows the establishment of a unit responsible solely for implementing an active policy for informing the public and the press and ”

I call Mr. Burger to speak to his amendment.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, several speakers ending with Mr. Ahrens have referred to the importance of informing the public. Personally I am against the kind of temporary solution we have at the moment. We must once and for all set up a proper unit concerned exclusively with implementing an active information policy and co-ordinating the national activities of the different member governments. I hope that Mr. van der Sanden agrees with me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may we please vote on separate parts?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Will you please explain what you mean?

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am in favour of the draft recommendation but I wish to abstain on paragraphs (iii) and (v) of the preamble and on paragraph 5 of the operative text. I am in favour of the rest of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have already been through this process in full in committee. If we go back over the draft recommendation item by item we are going to waste valuable time. After the detailed examination we gave it in committee it seems pointless to me to go through it again at a public sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pieralli, your request will be recorded in the official report.

I shall first of all put the amendment to the vote and then the whole of the recommendation.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully understand the point that Mr. Close has just made but when a member asks for a vote on separate parts that request at least deserves to be considered by the Assembly. Even if that takes some of our time, it is a parliamentary right, it has always been recognised. I do not see why the Assembly should simply waive it.

I can readily understand that the majority of the Assembly is against our colleague's request but I would prefer that we uphold a principle to which we are all attached.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Surely, first of all, we have to dispose of the amendment. Secondly, I think that Mr. Caro does not understand what was asked for. What our colleague wanted to do was to vote for particular items in the report. His right to do that is perfectly correct, had he tabled amendments before the debate started. There is now no choice. You have to put this, Mr. President, according to the rules in its entirety.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are right, Sir Geoffrey.

I shall first put Mr. Burger's amendment to the vote and after that I shall put the request for a vote on separate parts to the Assembly.

What is the committee's opinion on Mr. Burger's amendment?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has not discussed this amendment, but I feel sure it coincides with the committee's views. The Assembly should approve this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Burger to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – My request for a separate vote relates to paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of the preamble and paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that we vote first on paragraph (iii).

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I wholly agree with what Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has just said. Probably I misunderstood. If the request is

Mr. Caro (continued)

for a separate vote that means voting paragraph by paragraph. In that case everyone votes the way he wants and then we vote on the whole thing. But we are not entitled to pick this or that paragraph and vote separately the way we want on that. We have to vote on each paragraph or else the whole report.

I suggest to Mr. Pieralli that he should ask for a vote paragraph by paragraph because otherwise his request is not in order and our procedure would fall into anarchy. That being so, I suggest that we treat the statement by our colleague as a statement of vote because he has just told us his opinion. That will appear in the official report as you, Mr. President, have said and we can now vote on the recommendation as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I accept the proposal that has just been made. I have nothing against voting paragraph by paragraph.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly will presumably be in agreement with the procedure that has just been proposed by Mr. Caro and our honourable friend.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our Rules of Procedure are quite precise: amendments must be submitted in writing in time for the members of the Assembly to examine them prior to their discussion. An amendment must also be deemed to exist when it is moved that a separate vote be taken on a given point rather than on the text as a whole, as is the usual practice.

I would therefore very much appreciate it if we kept to the present practice, abided by our Rules of Procedure and voted as we have always done, if only so that anyone else who wants a change made takes the trouble to table a written amendment, giving the members the opportunity to consider it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, since both interpretations are possible I opt for the one which Mr. Reddemann has just given and I shall put to the vote the whole of the draft recommendation as amended, since Mr. Burger's amendment has been agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1117, as amended.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

I now put the amended draft recommendation to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, at 4.30 p.m.

I propose that we suspend the sitting for a few moments pending Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond's arrival.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 4.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.35 p.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

4. Address by Mr. Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is with the greatest pleasure that we welcome Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

It is an old-established tradition for a representative of the French Government to address the Assembly during the second part of the annual session of Western European Union. Last year we were addressed by Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France, who proposed that there should be a European security charter. That idea inspired the work of the Council that culminated, at the meeting at The Hague on 27th October, in the statement of principles by which our countries' security policy should be guided. This is the first time that our governments have agreed to define the foundations of a paramount aspect of foreign policy in this way. Aware of France's keen interest in Western European Union and the decisive rôle that it has played in the revitalisation process that began in October 1984 with the Rome declaration, we shall be listening to your address with the utmost attention.

Please come to the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. RAIMOND (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is an honour and a pleasure for me to be granted this

1. See page 23.

Mr. Raimond (continued)

opportunity to address your Assembly. All the more so in that we are very happy to note that the renaissance of WEU is now acknowledged by one and all.

We have just turned a very important page with the adoption, at the last ministerial session held in The Hague, of a platform on European security interests which stems from a proposal voiced in this very forum a year ago by Mr. Jacques Chirac. Co-operation in the field of security has become a central element for the construction of Europe.

A year ago we set ourselves a goal: to draft this charter on Europe's security interests. In a rapidly-changing international context, one of the high points of which was the summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev which had just taken place in Reykjavik on 11th and 12th October 1986, the Prime Minister told his partners that Europe must be heard. This need, equally apparent to all member states, led to the publication last 27th October of a ministerial statement. I wish to emphasise here, with your kind permission, what I deem to be its most important aspects.

First, this document presents the problems facing European security in a dynamic perspective, taking into account the entire East-West context.

Second, The Hague document is interesting insofar as it not only reiterates a number of principles but also defines a programme. It identifies a number of crucial issues and determines concrete policy guidelines for the future.

Third, the Seven clearly state that the task they are thus undertaking will eventually imply a wider European perspective, while respecting the main defence options of each country, in particular as regards the Atlantic Alliance.

France, as you know, attaches great importance to the opening of the doors of our organisation to Spain and to Portugal, and is thus very anxious that the Seven's present policy not be viewed as potentially exclusive.

As regards principles, we are pleased to note that member states have been able to underscore: the fact that nuclear forces are irreplaceable for ensuring credible deterrence within our lifetime; the determination of one and all to shoulder their share of responsibility for guaranteeing mutual security, both as regards nuclear armaments and conventional forces; the will of all seven member states to contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic relations; the importance of the United States' commitment to the defence of our continent, as illustrated by the

actual presence of nuclear and conventional forces on European soil.

Need one emphasise, finally, how indispensable it is today in disarmament, to recall, as does The Hague document, that it is essential to take into account Europe's specificity as regards both its vulnerability and its special interests.

As regards the future, the Seven have pledged to strengthen their co-operation in accordance with the commitments undertaken in the Brussels Treaty and to improve consultation when crises occur outside Europe.

For member states, The Hague declaration represents a first body of doctrine concerning their security. This is a considerable advance for Europe; it is a success for Europeans.

The Hague document establishes cohesion between what is being done on a multilateral basis in the field of defence, and what is being achieved in the framework of various bilateral co-operation schemes. In particular, what France has undertaken with the Federal Republic of Germany is the necessary prerequisite and very beginning of a process which has complete affinity with our European policy and our defence options, and conversely, it is totally removed from the will to exclude that some seem to fear.

In this context, France wishes to stress the significance it sees in the development of its co-operation with the United Kingdom – which, as another nuclear power, shares a number of common and basic concerns with France – as well as with its other European allies, and in particular those countries that border the Mediterranean.

Finally, we welcome the fact that the declaration adopted in The Hague has given us all the opportunity to clear up a number of misunderstandings that had emerged recently in the United States on the meaning of the task undertaken by our seven countries. Evidence of this can be seen in the very positive responses elicited by our 27th October text, in particular that from President Reagan himself, who welcomed what he called "an impressive statement".

The emergence of such a transatlantic consensus on present trends for European co-operation in the field of security is, to my mind, very promising as regards a more cohesive and stronger Atlantic Alliance.

But this achievement is a beginning, and not an end in itself. The Seven are now going to embark upon the weighty task of implementing the guidelines defined in The Hague, including the institutional change. The paucity of means of an organisation some see as obsolescent, with its eyes mainly on the past, have sometimes made this task quite difficult.

Mr. Raimond (continued)

Today, the structures set up around the Permanent Council allow for close consultation both on a ministerial level and among administrations. They associate foreign ministries and defence ministries in an extremely innovative fashion, which has no equivalent except in the field of Franco-German co-operation.

A pace has been set. The work thus achieved has yielded quite substantial results, as illustrated by the drafting of the charter on security interests, and consultations on problems in the Gulf and in the Mediterranean as the President of the Republic confirmed, in this latter connection, at the recent Franco-Italian summit in Naples.

I wish to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the staff of the secretariat and the various agencies who, in difficult circumstances, have made all this possible and, first and foremost, the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, who was good enough to take on this difficult task and has performed it with unfailing talent and good will.

I think it is important to recall all that has been accomplished in this respect, be it only in reply to your legitimate questions about the value of the reforms we have so far undertaken and on member states' resolve to pursue this policy.

Nevertheless, our task is not done. We still have one very important step to take. And by this I mean finalising the reforms we have undertaken by deciding on how and where we shall restructure the institutions presently headquartered in London and in Paris. The question may seem to be of secondary importance. In actual fact, it is not, as the debate in this very Assembly has shown.

We have all been convinced for a considerable time that bringing these institutions together is essential if we really want our organisation to live up to the ambitious aims we wish to achieve through it. That is why we welcome the fact that the recent ministerial session in The Hague officially agreed upon the collocation principle. Now we have to implement it.

Member states have not yet reached agreement on the future location of the organisation. Further consultations are under way with a view to reaching a decision in what we hope will be the very near future. A number of proposals have been made, and France for its part has suggested that the relevant institutions all be housed in Paris, in this very building.

To our mind, this would present three main advantages. The first and quite obvious advantage would be to bring the ministerial bodies together and close to the Assembly. This

would make for enhanced working relations and co-operation, in accordance with wishes often expressed by those bodies.

Second, the Paris option would, according to our preliminary estimates, have the advantage of being lowest in cost, a fact which under present circumstances is something we have to take into account. The organisation is the owner of most of the premises that it would be occupying. In any case, at a time when the Council is finding it difficult to cover the day-to-day costs of the institutions as they are now, including the Assembly, there can be no question of opting for a high-cost proposal.

Finally, according to our survey, the move could be carried out very rapidly. This, to our mind, is essential if we do not want practical problems to bring our organisation to a standstill for too long, at a time when we expect so much of it.

Nevertheless, France has nothing against other options being considered, but we think it is important to avoid any confusion, either with the Atlantic Alliance or with institutions for European political co-operation. The co-operation aimed at in WEU has to be given the chance to confirm its own potential and that is why we have negated the idea of locating WEU institutions in the same European capital as institutions belonging to the Atlantic Alliance or in the sphere of European political co-operation.

We personally feel that intensified co-operation among member states is crucial at a time when East-West dialogue has quite obviously entered a new phase. In a few days, the intermediate nuclear forces agreement is to be signed at the Washington summit.

Disarmament obviously does not cover the entire range of East-West relations: human rights, the human dimension and political dialogue, in the broadest sense, are also essential components of these relations.

The INF agreement only concerns one aspect of disarmament, but it will be an important stage in this process for a number of reasons.

After a long period of deadlock, Soviet leadership has finally agreed to negotiate on the basis preferred by our allies.

Furthermore, the INF agreement is the first disarmament agreement requiring the United States and the Soviet Union to commit themselves to an actual reduction of their nuclear stockpiles. Of course, these are only limited reductions, especially when compared to the sum total of the superpowers' nuclear weapons, which will be reduced by a mere 4%. But this agreement should normally restore priority to bilateral stra-

Mr. Raimond (continued)

tegic negotiations – a priority they should never have ceased to have.

Lastly, and I consider this to be a most important point, the provisions in the area of verification and inspection are unprecedented in their scope and nature.

But, more generally, what should we think of this agreement in the light of the principles WEU solemnly reiterated in The Hague? First of all, these issues continue to be much debated in the United States, in Europe, in this very Assembly, and I doubt the controversy will come to an end overnight.

Let me begin by recalling that France, which was not party to the twofold decision of 1979, has throughout been guided by two considerations: European security interests, and solidarity with its allies. Secondly, I would point out that the USSR will still, INF agreement notwithstanding, have a vast superiority over Europe in the field of nuclear, conventional, and chemical weaponry. It would perhaps have been preferable to take things in a different order because, however this may be, the USSR's strategic nuclear forces threaten Europe as much as they do the United States. And that is why we feel agreement on INFs cannot be assessed without taking the broader context into account. For this reason, we would very much like this agreement to be accompanied, or at the very least followed in the very near future, by progress in negotiations on Soviet and American strategic armaments, in accordance with the goal of a 50% reduction in all stockpiles agreed in Reykjavik last autumn.

Furthermore, it is a known fact that there will be no genuine stability in Europe as long as the considerable conventional imbalance favouring the USSR and its allies has not been corrected. But we do not want to take the line of reasoning arguing that agreement on INFs need necessarily increase conventional imbalances.

Indeed, strengthening conventional defence can only have one object: to ensure the credibility of the alliance's global capability to deter. Conventional forces are not a substitute for nuclear forces. What nuclear forces aim at deterring is not conventional forces but war.

To conclude, let me voice here a deeply felt belief: it is up to the countries in the alliance to make sure that the INF agreement which is about to be signed is, at the end of the day, in the best interest of Europe's security.

Either the alliance allows itself to be led, as the Soviet Union seems to want, down a path whose outcome might well be the denuclearisation of Europe and the weakening of security links

between the United States and Europe, or the alliance continues to state clearly its perception of deterrence, namely that its security is based on a twofold linkage between nuclear weapons and conventional forces and between the United States and Europe.

These are the reasons why we must, as Europeans and allies, assert our own priorities in disarmament and arms control. This is the object of the work now being done in the Atlantic Alliance. But WEU must also go on with its work in the directions signposted by The Hague declaration, and thus contribute to the global effort.

Public opinion in our various countries will be a major, not to say crucial, element in the debate that will now start on this issue not only in Europe but also in the United States when the time comes to ratify the INF treaty.

This is where your Assembly can play a vital rôle in our democratic countries. Political leaders are not there just to interpret but also to enlighten and guide public opinion, in particular in the field of defence and I believe that, today, that is indeed the issue.

As regards security, Europe's real interests need to be explained and defended by well-informed officials: that is one of the main missions in store for your Assembly; knowing its past record, I for my part am convinced it will succeed to the greater benefit of our common security and the building of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly, allow me to thank you, Minister, for your address. You said you were prepared to answer questions from representatives of the groups.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I shall speak in French; it will be simpler.

Why does France now see so close a connection between the restructuring decision taken by the Council of Ministers at The Hague in October, i.e. a single agency and one director, and the decision to be taken about WEU's single headquarters?

Given the political difficulties of security at the headquarters site, is there not a danger that the reactivation of WEU, which is also desired by our government, will be paralysed by this close connection?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RAIMOND (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Soell, at the meeting in The Hague last October, the discussion about the WEU institutions took place at

Mr. Raimond (continued)

dinner and one first point was clear to all: since October 1986 WEU reactivation had become a fact and the wishes of a certain number had been fulfilled, probably under the pressure of events, but in an extremely concrete, effective and rapid manner. After all, it had taken no longer – almost less – than one year to arrive at the charter on European security or the platform that we have today.

During dinner we all agreed that it was necessary for practical reasons and working convenience for the institutions to be brought together and therefore to be restructured with that object in mind. As I say everyone was agreed on this necessity.

This left the problem of location since the institutions would be brought together.

On this point, the French position is very clear. For obvious reasons, if the WEU institutions were concentrated in Brussels the distinction between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU would, in practice, very quickly blur and in the end the specific character of WEU, bringing together as it does seven European countries represented both by their ministers, for foreign affairs and by their defence ministers, could well disappear.

This, to me, seems a very sound argument and needs to be taken into account. That is what I have just said on this point in my statement. That leaves Paris. This possibility, which is what we propose, offers a number of advantages that I have spelled out.

London was also considered as a possible site during that dinner. London and Paris are not quite the same. It seemed to us that, for many reasons, Paris was to be preferred but I would like to “anticipate” – as it were – what lies behind your question.

With regard to the reactivation, or rather the concentration, of WEU, it is not at all the intention of the French, or of any other participants for that matter, to turn it into something that would weaken the Atlantic Alliance or be directed against the alliance. The problem about Paris is simply a matter of quarrels that belong in the past. They are behind us.

On the contrary, it seems to us that everything we are doing in WEU at the moment, particularly with its strengthening of institutions, can only serve to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. It would not be a good thing to find ourselves back in the situation where we were, you will remember, after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of 1986. Whatever the value and potential of that agreement it would be bad for Europe to respond, as it did then, individually or I might

say, without naming names, by conflicting statements within a particular country.

So it is essential for Europeans, increasingly aware of the need to include the security aspect in the construction of Europe, to be able to consult together and define their positions as they have done and to express those positions to their allies and within the Atlantic Alliance. Here I only see a possible strengthening, not a weakness or a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Raimond.

I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, you expressed the hope that after any agreement on medium- and short-range nuclear weapons it might be possible to arrive fairly quickly at an agreement to reduce strategic weapons by possibly as much 50%. I am sure that we are all agreed on this. I would even say that we go further and I would like to ask you whether, in the event of an agreement – now mooted as a possibility – between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic weapons by half, the country which you represent and which is one of the five world nuclear powers would, in line with the recent declaration by the People's Republic of China, be prepared to join in negotiations involving all the nuclear powers and to reduce your nuclear forces at that stage of the negotiations or even go so far as to give them up altogether.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RAIMOND (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Rubbi, I did not say that we were on the brink of an agreement for a 50% reduction in strategic arsenals. It is a possibility that was considered at the Reykjavik summit between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1986 but, for the Soviets, it was dependent upon calling a halt to the strategic defence initiative. There were other conditions at the time but only this one still remains.

After the considerable progress made in the discussions this year – in particular at Washington before we met the officials of the Atlantic Alliance, the Japanese Minister, the Australian Minister and President Reagan at the United Nations in New York last September – the Americans and the Soviets let it be understood that their next objective, after signing the INF agreements, would relate to strategic weapons. According to the signals we are getting, mostly from the Americans, some very specific discussion is going on about strategic arsenals. I

Mr. Raimond (continued)

shall not go into the details but progress has certainly been made.

However, so far, there is nothing to justify the conclusion – although things may change – that the Soviets have given up any link at all with the strategic defence initiative. So nothing authorises me to say that there is going to be a breakthrough. We shall know whether real progress has been made in that direction after the Washington summit that is to take place next week.

This point is important because, as you know, there are about 12 000 nuclear warheads in the United States and 12 000 in the Soviet Union and, even with a 50% reduction, we would be back at the quantitative balance of ten years ago, i.e. 6 000 on one side and 6 000 on the other.

We have always said that, in our view, the priority should be the reduction of strategic arsenals because agreements on intermediate-range weapons have so far only related to very much smaller figures, in no way comparable to those that I have just given.

What is more, we all know that there is an ulterior objective the Soviets are driving towards. They are quite open about it and they are perfectly entitled to see things their way. Since 15th January 1986 and February 1987, their aims have included, beyond the present dismantling of intermediate-range missiles, the elimination of all American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

That is why we insisted on the priority for strategic arsenals. Up to now, the American position has been the same and we cannot but welcome the fact.

I shall not go into the other problems which need to be discussed, i.e. the imbalances in conventional and chemical weapons.

That brings me to the French nuclear forces. Up to now they have not been involved. In their discussions with the Soviets the Americans have always maintained that the British and French nuclear forces were not to be part of any deal on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and in 1985 the Soviets accepted that. This is a fact and, for the moment, the position remains unchanged.

It has to be said that the French capability currently totals about three hundred nuclear warheads compared with 12 000 Soviet nuclear warheads on the same continent.

The precise answer to your question was given by the President of the Republic in 1983 speaking at the General Assembly of the United Nations. The conditions he listed were a sweeping reduction in the strategic arsenals of

the two superpowers, a reduction in the conventional imbalances and no breakthrough in strategic defence systems that would aggravate the imbalances. The French reply is still the same.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my question concerns the new Franco-German joint brigade. The Minister referred to it in passing when he was talking about the new Franco-German co-operation. I feel there are three options. The first is that it goes no further than this one joint brigade, which would mean that the co-operation would then be more of symbolic significance and we could welcome it, against the background of relations between the two countries in the last hundred years.

The second option is that it is the beginning of a new form of multinational co-operation in which other NATO or WEU countries might also participate. In spite of the practical and, above all, organisational problems, a development of this kind must surely be welcomed.

But if the third option applies and this marks the beginning of a new and extended form of bilateral co-operation between the two countries, all kinds of questions arise. In particular, we would have to see if such a development would be in keeping with the existing treaties. My question to the Minister is which of the three options he believes will apply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RAIMOND (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. de Beer, to me the question of the Franco-German brigade seems fairly simple. The original idea came from Germany – I shall say why in a moment – and France agreed to it.

Work has begun and is continuing, in particular between the defence ministers. It has been agreed that this Franco-German unit would not be a symbolic unit, that its first commander would be French and that it would total 3 500 men. It has already been decided to station the unit in Germany near Stuttgart. The brigade will not be under NATO command because it is possible to combine French troops with German troops not under integrated NATO command.

The problem is being solved pragmatically, positively by stages, avoiding the major hurdles. After all, it fits into the framework of the Franco-German treaty of 1963, whose twenty-fifth anniversary we shall shortly be celebrating, which makes provision for Franco-German co-operation including military co-operation. That co-operation, incidentally, already exists at the level of the armed forces. A few years from now,

Mr. Raimond (continued)

all German officers will have spent some time with the French army. We have joint manoeuvres.

That is my reply to your first question.

My answer to your third is that I do not see what there is to criticise. For everybody of my generation, those who were nearing their majority after the war, the construction of Europe is based on the rapprochement between France and Germany. Forty years after the war, the possibility of a conflict between France and Germany has become unthinkable. This is an irreversible phenomenon whose importance should not be underestimated. Thus, everything that is done to bring France and Germany closer together also works towards the consolidation of Europe.

Everybody knows, in any case, the extreme complexity of the construction of European defence because of the large number of parameters that have to be solved. In other words, the Franco-German rapprochement is aimed in the same direction as WEU rapprochement and WEU reactivation.

Your second question, if I understand it correctly, relates to the extension of that rapprochement to other countries. There is no exclusivity but, even so, let us begin for the moment by dealing with this problem which is complex enough of itself and which we are therefore dealing with step by step.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, my question concerns enlargement. First of all, may I remind you and the Assembly that we are on the eve of a near-historic occasion because the first European Council of heads of state and government to be held since the ratification of the single European act is about to take place in Copenhagen. This conference will therefore have special importance as regards both the implementation of the single act and the political outlook for Europe.

Second, I would refer to what was said by the French Prime Minister in this chamber on 2nd December 1986 with regard, among other things, to the fundamental principles that should govern political action with regard to European security.

Lastly, I would like to say in perhaps a very simple manner but in any case without the slightest ambiguity that, for the Assembly, the basic doctrine of all its activities is to consider that everything we are in a position to do to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance strengthens that alliance.

You, too, advanced a similar argument, Minister. However, if we are to judge by the effects no doubt induced by The Hague declaration, whereby the seven countries shoulder the responsibility for their share of our joint defence in conventional and nuclear fields, this may have prompted certain questions in Spain in view of that country's nuclear position. But if, as our governments and in particular the French Government do, I reason on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty, the principles that it defines, the duties and obligations it entails, the declaration made by the ministers at The Hague and, of course, at least the spirit of the single European act, how is it that the governments of the Seven have not, as the treaty allows, extended an invitation to the two countries of the Iberian peninsula that we need to complete our arrangements for the organisation of the European pillar in the alliance? If their excuse is that Spain still has unfinished business with the United States in matters concerning the missile bases, that is a bilateral matter which has nothing to do with the implementation of the spirit of the single act or the organisation of the modified Brussels Treaty, the authority for our work which allows each of our countries – as France is well aware – to pursue its own defence policy.

I thought, Minister, that after The Hague declaration the door was wide enough open for these new members and that the governments of the Seven would take the initiative. I hope that this is still the position of the French Government and if that is the case can you tell us what is likely to happen in this connection?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. RAIMOND (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – If it had been left to France, the invitation to Spain and Portugal would have gone out straight away. There is no problem for us although the adoption of the WEU platform did raise a few questions, particularly in the Spanish press.

These problems are now dispelled in the minds of the Spanish and Portuguese leaders, since first there was a meeting between Mr. Chirac, the French Prime Minister, and Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, the Spanish Prime Minister, and then we were able to tackle the problems at routine meetings in Portugal. When I saw the stir in the Spanish press, I myself wrote to my opposite number, Mr. Fernandez Ordoñez, to explain that it was a doctrinal platform which did not, for the moment, imply any decisions or measures about which either of the two countries could have misgivings.

Indeed I agree with you, Mr. Caro, that if the seven countries agreed to enlarge WEU to include Spain and Portugal – given that both the

Mr. Raimond (continued)

countries have intimated, the one in writing and the other verbally, that they want to join us – it would be a wholly useful step. It would strengthen European security not only at Mediterranean level but also through these countries' ideas on the security problems of Europe in general, which are very balanced. I simply think that what bothers these two countries is that they want to be sure that their membership would be welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for replying to these four questions.

5. Amendment of the Charter of the Assembly

(Motion to amend the Charter, Doc. 1128)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I inform the Assembly that a motion to amend the Charter of the Assembly has been tabled by Mr. Pannella and others in accordance with Article XII (a) of the Charter.

This document has been distributed as Document 1128.

The motion will be referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges for consideration.

6. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1121 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1121 and addendum.

I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on the resumption of our thirty-third ordinary session yesterday, Mr. Goerens, our President, Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur for the Presidential Committee, and Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and a number of members in the debate on the relevant reports, already drew the political inferences from the

budgetary situation facing the Assembly after the Council meeting in The Hague.

If I am not to indulge in boring repetition, all I have to add at political level to what has been said and to the conclusions that have been drawn is that if our Assembly wishes not just to survive but to assert with increasing firmness its eminently political rôle, the President and the Assembly must return to this subject again and again.

They must not give way to disillusionment, in other words, we must not fall into the trap of letting time wear away our resolve.

In any case, the construction I place on the papers I have and the information I was able to obtain on the fringe of the official meeting so to speak prompts me to believe that, since the meeting of the Council and the Assembly in Luxembourg, the climate with regard to the Assembly in both the Budget Committee and the Council has improved at the level of the budgetary discussions as well as in other respects. The separation of the pensions budget from the operating budget was a clear step forward releasing relatively large additional resources to the Assembly although there is a difference of view between the Council and ourselves on how the texts are to be interpreted and the concrete conclusions to be drawn from them.

Admittedly, and this still happens too frequently, the financial experts seem not to have the same instructions as the various foreign affairs representatives.

This is a point on which I would appeal to you members of parliament. When you seek support in your countries with regard to our budgetary problems do not look to our foreign ministries only, but also and above all tackle your country's financial and budgetary policy-makers.

The thing to remember, however, is that the general atmosphere, and The Hague has also helped, is much more favourable. Let me explain.

Making my excuse the fact that the budget and the political conclusions to be drawn from this situation after The Hague decisions – and there are not one hundred and one ways of drawing those conclusions – were discussed yesterday, I would like to use the little time allowed me this afternoon to show you where we stand with the figures to prove it. After all, the job of the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is surely to talk figures. I agree it is not very exciting, particularly after the speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of one of our organisation's great member countries, but, in this Assembly – as I have said before – discussing figures also means discussing politics – via the budget, so to speak.

Mr. Linster (continued)

The committee's estimates as communicated by the President to the Budget Committee and the Council were for an operating budget in which expenditure and receipts were put at over nineteen million francs and a separate budget for pensions for some two million francs. Now, after Luxembourg, that the principle of a pensions budget is no longer a matter of dispute and since the Council has made no comment on the amounts that it implies for 1988, I need say nothing further about it. Some comments are however called for with regard to the operating budget.

As you know, since the Luxembourg decisions, the operating budget consists of what we consider to be two distinct parts inasmuch as the Assembly is only able to take more or less independent decisions with regard to Heads II, III, IV and V, its influence over Head I, permanent staff, being strictly non-existent. This was brought home to us once again – at our cost – this year. The point was sufficiently stressed by our President, Mr. Goerens, and Mr. Valleix and Mr. van der Sanden yesterday.

The figure proposed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for Head I was 11 313 000 francs, an increase of 1 355 400 francs over the figure for 1987.

This relatively large difference stems from the fact that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had based its estimates on the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk that the Assembly has requested so many times, that the Presidential Committee approved on 4th November 1986 and that Mr. van der Sanden has once again demanded on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in paragraph 9 of his recommendation: "...Accord the Assembly without delay the funds and staff necessary for restructuring the Office of the Clerk."

Appendix I of my report sets out the details of that restructuring, which is discussed explicitly enough in my written report for me not to go through the details again. So let me just make the point now that, apart from the normal incidence of the triennial adjustment and certain regradings, the increase essentially involved the creation of four new posts.

Unfortunately, on the advice of the Budget Committee, the Council did not agree to the creation of these four posts and struck out the additional appropriations included for that purpose. The total concerned is slightly over one million francs which should be compared with the Assembly's overall budget of nearly twenty million francs. This figure should also be set against the fact that, in the ministerial organs, the organisation will be making savings of some

five million francs from the dozen or so jobs not being filled.

That, therefore, is the financial background to the refusal to let us restructure the Office of the Clerk.

I leave you to draw your own conclusions.

However, on this subject of the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk, it is possible to report some slight improvement compared to decisions in earlier years because this time the committee and therefore the Council too has not purely and simply rejected the principle or the need for the creation of these four posts.

They have simply ruled that the appropriations for these four posts should again be deleted for the time being – but without prejudice to "eventual decisions that may be taken when the Council is able to conclude its wider study of the future staffing needs of WEU".

That is not an outright refusal, nor is it a postponement sine die – or should I say until London is no more – only until the time decisions are taken on the reassessment of the structures of the organisation as a whole and therefore including decisions about the agencies and the possible collocation of the organs or some of the organs of the organisation as decided by the Council at The Hague on 27th October.

After the meeting of the Council in The Hague, it emerged that the relevant decisions might be taken in the near future.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of France has just stressed the vital need for swift decisions on these practical questions, including collocation, so that there are no obstacles to decision-making on the real problems. Some rumours – to which Mr. van der Sanden alluded – even give April 1988 as the date. Personally I am rather sceptical because of the fact that France – as Mr. Ahrens emphasised this afternoon and the debate after the address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France showed – seems to want to link the problem of the reassessment of WEU structures with a prior decision on the collocation site or, as Mr. Raimond has called it, "the concentration of institutions".

However this may be, it is no longer all that unrealistic to imagine that the decision about the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk might possibly be taken during 1988. Were that to happen the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration would clearly table an ad hoc supplementary budget. I should say, in passing, that it will have to produce a supplementary budget in any case to make up for certain fresh pension liabilities.

With regard to the other heads of the operating budget, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and

Mr. Linster (continued)

Administration has taken a very strict line. Details of its proposals are set out in sections 3 and 4 of my written report. Since, what is more, the various appendices are very explicit on this subject I shall confine myself to the comment that, for Heads II to V inclusive, the committee had made provision for appropriations totalling 7 886 500 francs.

The Council has changed our proposals: first, it has increased the appropriation under Head II for temporary staff by 50 000 francs, this increase being made necessary by the refusal to allow the four new posts we had proposed; second, it has reduced the appropriations under Head V, Other expenditure, by 42 000 francs.

It is true that because of the Assembly's budgetary independence with regard to Heads II to V inclusive these can only be proposals on the part of the Council.

It is also true that at its meeting yesterday morning, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration recommended that the Assembly should agree with the Council on this proposal whilst underlining the principle that, because of its budgetary autonomy, the Assembly could switch appropriations between the various items and heads if that were to prove necessary during 1988.

Those are the comments that I felt I had to make as Rapporteur for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration enlarging on my written report.

But, whilst I recommend that you adopt the Assembly's budget for financial year 1988 as set out in Document 1121 and addendum, I would like to make one further remark of a general nature concerning the operating budget and more specifically the appropriations under Heads II to V, i.e. the operating appropriations not related to permanent staff.

As long as the crippling inheritance of the shortfalls of the past has not been overcome, in other words as long as these generally operational appropriations are not adjusted to real requirements, the old and unpleasant growth rate quarrel will keep raising its head even apart from the zero growth issue, an illogical term because there can be no such thing as zero growth. Zero and growth are mutually exclusive. The term is a contradiction and only used to hide the fact that there is no growth at all.

Until serious heed is paid to our real needs, until the budget is, once and for all, aligned on those needs, no growth rate will be realistic whether it is based on the budget of the other WEU organs, the European Economic Com-

munity institutions, the organs of the Council of Europe, or the headquarters country of the Assembly.

We first have to have a budget that corresponds to the political objectives of the Assembly of the members of parliament and the representatives of the member countries of the organisation. Only then will we be able to discuss the way in which the growth rate for our budget should be calculated each year.

That, Mr. President, is our real quarrel with the Council. The Office of the Clerk has to be restructured in order to provide some minimal answer to our staff needs. We have to make up for the gaps and shortfalls of the past so as to be able to face up to our real financial and staff needs.

It is only then, in other words when we have built up to a rate of work that corresponds to the real needs of our political function, that we shall be able to hold worthwhile discussions on the growth rate the Assembly needs in order to maintain what we regard as the essential pace for the political reactivation about which so much has been heard since Rome and which has been discovered anew first in Luxembourg and then The Hague. If all the ministers really want the Assembly to be a political organ of the organisation, let them give us the wherewithal, not in high-sounding phrases but in deeds, in other words good, hard cash.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Your report seems to have unanimous support, Mr. Linster, because no one has asked to speak. We can therefore proceed to the vote on the draft budget.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless at least ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 is agreed to unanimously.

7. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1108 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1108 and addendum.

I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – You have Document 1108 in front of you, ladies and gentlemen. You also have a motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1986. This was approved unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

In the motion, the committee proposes that “the Assembly, having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1986, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility”.

Mr. van der Velde, the auditor and Premier Président de la Cour des Comptes of Belgium, also reached the same conclusion and I therefore propose that the Assembly adopt the committee's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Linster for his excellent work and these two reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does Mr. Linster wish to speak?

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Under Rule 33 the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless at least ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is agreed to unanimously.

8. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1116 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116 and amendments.

I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was approved in November. It concerns the Council's report on the second half of 1986, which reached the Assembly on 24th April 1987. The committee's report also considers the Council's report on the period from January to June 1987, which the Assembly received on 16th November, rather too late for it to be discussed in depth in committee. This period covers new developments specifically associated with the events in the Gulf region. In connection with disarmament there have, of course, been events in the last year that have come as a surprise to many people. This is particularly true of the debate in this Assembly.

I would remind you in this context that the Assembly has not submitted a report on disarmament or has been unable to reach a consensus on disarmament questions for three years. We have come through a period in which there have been serious disagreements among the Western European countries and within the North Atlantic Alliance on the main focus of disarmament policy. The arguments over this ultimately resulted in an accumulation of differences of opinion in the Assembly which could not be resolved satisfactorily.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

We all recall the debates during the Assembly's part-session last December and the debates on Mr. Amadei's report in the spring. In the end, Mr. Amadei was unable to vote for his own report, because of the differences of opinion reflected in numerous amendments.

I believe that, given what has occurred in the Assembly and the events of recent months, but above all in view of what awaits us in the future, we must again achieve a basic consensus on the main issues here in the Assembly in the coming period. In view of the disagreements, however, a consensus on all points is unlikely. I will name the main points of controversy in a moment. But apart from these, there are a number of very important basic issues on which, at least to judge from recent months, we are agreed. It is important to reach a consensus on this basis, at least, and it will be vital in the immediate future for agreement to be reached in the West on the next steps to be taken.

Compared with the total lack of movement in disarmament policy over the last few decades, some of the recent developments have been revolutionary. Disarmament or arms control agreements concluded in the past have concerned two different aspects. The SALT I and SALT II agreements sought to fix common upper limits, some of which were not even realistic at the time when the agreements were concluded. Furthermore, these agreements concern only what are known as strategic systems, that is, nuclear weapons aimed directly at American or Soviet territory.

There are other agreements which I would like to call non-armament agreements, those in which a given course of action is renounced for given areas and given categories of weapons. The two most important agreements of this type are the non-proliferation treaty, which was signed in 1968, entered into force in 1970 and has since been signed by over 120 countries, and the ABM treaty, which renounced the development and deployment of defensive missile systems in space, together with the relevant components. Both this treaty and the non-proliferation treaty are still in force today. One might add that the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 between the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union is also a non-armament treaty, inasmuch as it prohibits nuclear testing above ground, in the atmosphere and under water. In 1975 France followed suit in practice, although it has not signed this treaty. China, the fifth nuclear power, has done the same.

There was then no agreement on the weapons systems and problems in Europe of immediate interest to us. Where European nuclear weapons were concerned, all we had were negotiations connected with the INF negotiations. Since 1973

there have been the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, which have yet to produce any results. The reason for this is not simply that the Warsaw Pact has been unwilling to make concessions. The real causes lie deeper. The reductions sought in the MBFR negotiations – nine hundred thousand soldiers on each side within the MBFR area – have been accepted in principle for over twelve years. But progress has never been made in the debate on the question of rates of reduction in East and West, that is, on the proportion of the total reduction which each country might accept. This question has never been discussed in depth even in the West. So far the West has not worked out a position as to how it perceives the implementation of an MBFR agreement in the western countries.

When even such obvious questions have not yet been settled, the conclusion of an agreement cannot, of course, be expected. The basic requirement for the conclusion of an agreement is, after all, that the concept should not only be correct in itself, but should also be supported by a consensus in the West. Then we can negotiate with the other side, which has undoubtedly had specific problems of its own preventing any major progress towards an MBFR agreement.

To summarise, we can say, in view of past experience with disarmament and arms control, that the European problem was not given adequate consideration and that awareness of the problem and ideas on how to reach disarmament agreements were not particularly well developed.

Although there have been numerous proposals for further action – including some from the Assembly of Western European Union – they have had no constructive influence on events. It can be assumed that the political will has not been sufficiently strong, that not enough political emphasis has been placed on disarmament, that other problems have attracted greater interest and that the Western European countries have probably failed by and large to develop the kind of informed opinion that might have enabled a joint position to be adopted.

A great deal has now changed in this respect, both in East-West relations and in the West. The INF agreement is about to be signed. The foreign ministers have agreed the terms and the American President and the Soviet General Secretary intend to sign the agreement on 7th December. Today – a few days before the event – we can assume that the signatures will be put to this agreement, eliminating a whole category of weapons, land-based medium-range missiles, on both sides, regardless of the number of missiles present on the two sides. This is undoubtedly a turning point in post-war history: it is the first real disarmament agreement, the

Mr. Scheer (continued)

first agreement to take account of the European problem.

There have also been a number of very important declarations of intent by both the Warsaw Pact – the joint declarations of Budapest and East Berlin, for example – and NATO. Both sides are preparing themselves and have expressed the desire for broadly based conventional disarmament in Europe and also for a continuation of the process of nuclear disarmament.

It is important for us in this situation – as I said at the start – to begin to emphasise the points on which there is agreement in principle between East and West, and within the West, so that we can discuss the various stages of implementation in the future. The big chance we have now is that it is no longer a question of whether there will be disarmament – there is no disputing that any more – but of how the various steps should be taken.

The basis on which we in the West are now working is that during the negotiations in Vienna on a joint mandate for a European disarmament conference, we have already agreed in principle with the Warsaw Pact countries that it should cover the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. We are agreed that it is not simply a question of the same reduction quotas for individual weapons systems, which would in any case be very difficult, because comparing conventional weapons with each other is harder than comparing nuclear weapons.

Consequently, it will be necessary in these matters of conventional disarmament to examine the doctrines which cause particular distrust of the other side. In other words, it is no longer primarily a question of the simple principle of numerically equal reductions, because this would be to ignore fundamental problems. There are, of course, imbalances in certain categories of weapons, the geographical areas taken as a basis differ, and the military strategies and doctrines differ too.

All this complex of questions must be dealt with if a result is to be achieved, if there is to be no repetition of what has happened in Vienna: fourteen years of negotiations, to no avail.

It is not as if we could afford this delay, since the need for disarmament is indicated by a number of basic facts. It is not just the danger inherent in military potential which is always there and would undoubtedly still be there if there were fewer weapons. What we are seeing throughout the world and quite specifically on the Soviet side, indeed in all the Warsaw Pact countries, is that these countries can no longer afford to sustain their efforts in the armaments

field, amounting in some cases to well over 10% of gross national product, because if they do they will be quite unable to meet the economic needs of their people. They are already having enormous difficulties in this respect, and if the current priorities remain unchanged, these problems will be insoluble. Reason therefore dictates that the forces of reform in the Warsaw Pact countries shift their priorities from military to civil activities.

But we in the West also have fundamental problems of this kind, though they are not as serious as in Eastern Europe. The United States has considerable budgetary problems, which have grown in the last five years. The United States and the Soviet Union alone account for 55% of expenditure on arms in the world. In the last six years there has been a 70% increase in military spending. This has taken place in the middle of a persistent world economic structural crisis, which shows no sign at all of coming to an end, a structural crisis both in the relationship between North and South and within the West itself, not to speak of the economic structural crises in Eastern Europe.

The United States' growing budgetary difficulties are bound to result in even louder and more urgent appeals to Western Europe to increase our military spending, because the Americans find it difficult to see why their military spending should be higher than ours in Western Europe, when they have more serious budgetary problems than we do.

But we also know that the welfare state, which has become a permanent fixture in Western Europe, would allow an increase in military spending only at the expense of major internal difficulties, particularly in the social sphere. This means that we too must contemplate a change in structures. We must always remember that we in Europe are living in the continent at whose centre the East-West conflict takes place – the continent where the dividing line between East and West lies – and that this is the continent with the greatest arms burden.

So there are many reasons prompting us to change gear in favour of an accelerated process of disarmament. The positive aspect of these developments is that the questions of principle we are discussing today are also being discussed by the Warsaw Pact countries, in the same form in some cases, so there is a good chance of achieving a new basis. The key words here are, to recapitulate very briefly: do not think solely in terms of individual categories of weapons, but consider imbalances on all sides, and above all change the doctrines to allow for more confidence-building, particularly where they concern the capacity for aggressive acts. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that we must establish this consensus.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

In addition, there will be – I should not like this to go unmentioned – a number of grave problems in the future which we cannot yet consider on the basis of consensus. In the report we – and this applies to me too, as Rapporteur – have not emphasised these points of potential conflict, because our primary objective was to re-establish a basis for consensus. But I should now like to indicate in a few sentences the trends and the various options that arise, which must be left to a future debate between governments and here in the Assembly.

We agree that the next opportunity would probably be for a reduction by perhaps 50% in what are known as strategic weapons. In all likelihood this too will be discussed on 7th December.

Leaving aside the points on which we are agreed, it is still unclear how progress can be made in Europe in future as regards the problem of reducing nuclear weapons, and how this can be reconciled with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It is also unclear over what range, geographically speaking, we are discussing conventional disarmament. There are various positions on this. As regards the preparation of the mandate for Vienna, is it conceivable that the negotiations will be confined to conventional weapons? This would certainly not be to the liking of countries in the centre of Europe – the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. We have in the centre of Europe an enormous number of nuclear weapons, which entail the constant danger of total destruction. This means we shall have to insist on shorter-range nuclear weapons occupying a central place in future negotiations.

There are those who say conventional and nuclear disarmament should be linked. Whether this would be wise should be discussed in greater depth. There are those who say there should be parallel negotiations on conventional and nuclear disarmament, with perhaps an attempt at linking the two when an agreement is concluded, or perhaps with two separate agreements. There are certainly proposals to the effect that priority should now be given to negotiations on the possibility of reducing the stockpiles of short-range nuclear missiles.

At all events, as soon as it is a matter of further reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe, the present doctrine of deterrence will have to be reviewed in the West to determine how, if most governments want to abide by this principle for some time to come, deterrence might still be guaranteed after the deterrent weapons on both sides have been withdrawn from Central Europe. The question of minimal deterrence will therefore have to be discussed in the future.

None of the points I have just mentioned is made in the report, for the reasons I have given. But it will certainly be incumbent on us – and this is why I have touched on it now – to think very carefully in the future about the various roads to disarmament. The more we can do this on the basis of a consensus on the points that are now in the report, the more constructive and creative this debate will be. I believe that would be in all our interests.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Scheer.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish, of course, to comment primarily on the aspect of Mr. Scheer's report on which we have placed particular emphasis: the question of disarmament. But before I do so, I will comment briefly on something which is also in the report but which Mr. Scheer did not single out and which is perhaps less important. But I feel it should be mentioned because the French Minister also referred to it this afternoon. It is the question of the accession of other countries to Western European Union.

I will mention Portugal once again in this context because I feel that all the criteria which have been established apply in Portugal's case. I do not see why – it has become very clear that this is the Council's attitude, since the French Minister made the same connection – the decision on Portugal can be taken only in connection with the decision on Spain. I think this attitude is wrong. I would not go so far as to say that it degrades Portugal, but it is an inappropriate attitude towards this country, which is being treated as no more than an appendage to Spain. The fact that the two countries occupy the Iberian peninsula does not mean that one of them should be penalised. I felt it essential to make this preliminary comment.

As regards the question of disarmament, I will begin by saying that there is no doubt that the scene has changed tremendously, not least because of the meeting in Reykjavik and what followed. This tremendous change has led to some aberrations in the debate on disarmament. The double zero option for INF weapons and the implications of these INF reductions are all issues which, in my opinion, were not clearly discussed and resolved early enough in the West, in NATO and in WEU.

There has been a great deal of confusion. I will simply remind you that different statements were made on the timing and on the scale involved. I would remind you of the debate that took place in the Federal Republic on the Pershing IA missiles, for example. None of this

Mr. Müller (continued)

would have been needed if consensus had been reached earlier in the western camp.

If we are going to talk about disarmament, we must take up something that Mr. Scheer has also taken up in his report, the question of the credibility of what is introduced into the debate in this context by the Warsaw Pact. As the report quotes from the Warsaw Pact document adopted at the Berlin meeting on 29th May 1987, I should like to refer to a passage which is not quoted in the report but is also quite interesting. It begins by saying – the Warsaw Pact document is reproduced as Appendix III – that the military doctrine of the Warsaw treaty is subjugated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional, and that there must never be a military solution outside the socialist system.

This is in principle a perpetuation of the Brezhnev doctrine, because it explicitly provides for restraint in the taking of military action only outside the Warsaw Pact, not on Warsaw Pact territory itself. So no complaints can be levelled if there should be a second march on Prague or somewhere else.

Another question that arises in this context is how the relationship with Afghanistan is discussed within the Warsaw Pact, because it might well be that Afghanistan is not simply – as Mr. Scheer believes – a negative example of the credibility of this doctrine not being assured until Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. The interpretation in the Warsaw Pact countries might be that Afghanistan, with a socialist government in Kabul, presents a completely different situation, to which this Warsaw Pact provision – the peaceful use of political means – need not in any way apply, and that this in no way conflicts with what is stated there.

Nevertheless, it must be said that the disarmament debate is under way again, that we are now hearing the Warsaw Pact make a statement that was made in a different form in 1969 by the then American President, Mr. Nixon, when the United States military doctrine was changed from strategic superiority to an adequate arms level and balance. This is now being reintroduced into the debate by the Warsaw Pact, and it is above all emphasised by Mr. Gorbachev in his book on perestroika and in his many statements, including a television interview recently given to an American television station.

Of course, the announcement that the Soviet Union, or the Warsaw Pact, intends to replace the present offensive doctrine by one based on maintaining a sufficient level for defence must be examined very carefully. There will undoubtedly have to be a great deal of verification in the next few months.

There is no denying that the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine in the past has been offensive. All the experts on this issue agree that both the deployment of the Soviet Union's armed forces – in Central Europe for example – and the instructions they are given are attuned to an offensive strategy – some even say a Blitzkrieg strategy. No statements, including those of the Soviet Defence Minister, Mr. Yasov, in an interview with Pravda on 27th July 1987, are enough to make Soviet intentions really clear.

In this context I should like to quote a deputy director of the American disarmament agency, Mr. Lynn Hansen, who recently said something that is worth thinking about where we in the West are concerned, because in a parliamentary democracy our military debates start from completely different premises from those of the eastern bloc. After a visit to Moscow he observed that Soviet diplomats or people responsible for such questions in the Central Committee – perhaps even military people – may certainly say things in conversation that are similar to what is said in the West, but that completely different views are encountered in direct contact with officers who are active in the army and not in the Central Committee or diplomatic apparatus.

This is always a problem, of course, in a country where there is no democratic control and it is what distinguishes the two systems in terms of political structure. I believe these are issues on which we shall be focusing as the debate continues.

What is interesting is that the vague, unclear announcements from official quarters on this defensive strategy always require explanations, which are then forthcoming, not from the military apparatus but from the Central Committee's propaganda apparatus, either from some deputy editor or from an editor-in-chief, or an assistant in the foreign ministry or a Tass correspondent, who then try to fall in with something that corresponds to our western speech modes, but does not correspond to the semi-official statements made on the other side.

In his comments on the disarmament negotiations that are needed, Mr. Scheer referred to asymmetry, which was required particularly when it came to the conventional sphere. The proof of the pudding will, of course, be in the eating. What can be said in support of his line of argument is that asymmetrical disarmament is already occurring in the INF negotiations, although – as he himself rightly admitted – the nuclear sector cannot be directly compared with the conventional sector.

The difficulties we have experienced in the MBFR negotiations for almost two decades demonstrate where the real problem for the disarmament negotiations will lie. Clarification will

Mr. Müller (continued)

therefore be needed as early as possible, particularly in this question of asymmetrical negotiations in the conventional sphere. Without this, I believe the whole process of disarmament would very soon come to a standstill again and be confined to what may now have been achieved in the direct INF negotiations.

To conclude, it is for these reasons that permanent, rapid and above all independent consultation within WEU, and among the European members of the North Atlantic pact, is so tremendously important as a means of facilitating the prompt co-ordination by Washington and Europe of decisions on the measures needed if an appropriate, timely and consolidated answer is to be given to anything that the Warsaw Pact may introduce into the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, first of all I should like to express my praise for the report. I particularly welcome the way in which it reappraises the various disarmament negotiations and the progress achieved in them. It does not gloss things over or indulge in effusive optimism: it is a cautiously optimistic appraisal.

It also points out – and I now come to my first comment on the contents – that the INF treaty will be followed by a wide range of extremely detailed provisions. They will concern a very rigid verification system, the details of which are still virtually unknown to us. But it is important that the organs of Western European Union should find out at an early stage what these provisions are.

We are faced with the fact that the provisions of this agreement are to be verified over a period of thirteen years, that each side will be able to make up to twenty challenge inspections in the first three years and that this rigid monitoring system is also needed because we do not yet know enough about what actually exists in this sphere or in the spheres of chemical and many other weapons. This is proved by the fact that all our assumptions on the numbers of Soviet warheads and reloadable systems have had to be substantially increased as a result of the figures which have come to light in recent weeks. It is now being said that over three thousand warheads will have to be dismantled in this sector by the Soviet Union alone.

Secondly, the report refers once again to the reductions in connection with the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. I feel the French objection

that the area of reductions has always been far too limited has now proved to be justified, in this respect at least. It will be crucial for everyone with substantial troop concentrations in the now projected enlarged area between the Atlantic and the Urals to be involved. This is, of course, an appeal to France to play an active part in the discussions and negotiations.

It will no longer simply be a question – on this I fully agree with the Rapporteur – of fixing quantitative thresholds and eliminating quantitative asymmetries but also of taking the geographical problems into account, and the doctrines as well.

Mr. Müller has just spoken of the Warsaw Pact countries' offensive doctrine. Seen against the background of the Soviet Union's past experience – and we Germans played no small part in that – it is more of an offensive defensive doctrine. In other words, the Soviet Union is saying – as it again confirmed at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Military Committee in Berlin on 29th May 1987 – that, in the event of a conflict, it and its allies would at once try to carry it into the territory of the other side.

We know, however, that some governments in Eastern Europe are interested in seeing a change in the doctrines towards an unmistakably non-provocative defence policy. This too we must discuss in depth, and here again we must use our bilateral contacts – in talks with the political authorities and governments in Eastern Europe, not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and other countries.

But it is not just a question of quantitative asymmetries, or of changing military doctrines: it is also a question of the quality of weapons and the debate on zones where the presence of weapons particularly suitable for attack varies, interpreting the word weapons not only in its original sense of tanks, aircraft and artillery, but also in the sense of all the logistical equipment – for bridge-building, etc. – needed to cross large rivers and take offensive action.

Lastly, it is a question of making headway with the favourable experience we have now gained in the area of confidence-building measures. We should take a close look at the report of the inspectors who have recently observed manoeuvres, particularly under the Stockholm agreement of September 1986. These reports clearly show that very specific reappraisals are possible and that the process of confidence-building has continued but they also show that we need to put forward a number of additional demands and that it will probably be necessary in the longer term to establish something like a crisis control centre covering the whole of the

Mr. Soell (continued)

East and West in Europe, given the still very different assessments in East and West of the rôle of nuclear weapons and their impact within the overall strategy.

To conclude, I should like to reiterate the concern that I formulated yesterday as a question during the debate on the Secretary-General's report. If Western European Union and its organs are to take part in this constructive dialogue between East and West, they must organise themselves very much better and obtain information at an early stage. We must participate actively in this dialogue if we Western Europeans, who form an essential part of the North Atlantic Alliance, are not to fall further behind in this competition of ideas. After all, western political forces and even peace studies have in recent years given the European public a great many ideas and concepts, a great deal that is now being favourably received in current discussions in the Soviet Union – although not yet in very great detail in many cases – and it would be a great pity if recognition of their western authorship were to be lost.

I therefore call on everyone who is able to join in this constructive dialogue both at national level and within Western European Union to increase their efforts in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1116, addendum and amendments).
2. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1118).
3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Cox, Mr. Close, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Gabbuggiani, Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Scheer (*Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Replies by Mr. Mellor to questions put by: Lord Kinnoull, Mr. Gale, Mr. Close, Mr. Wilkinson, Lord Mackie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. van der Sanden.

5. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1118*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions

and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116, addendum and amendments.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, disarmament efforts should always be supported, especially at a time when the threats to the world are growing. One must therefore be prejudiced in favour of any effort to limit arms. Why is it then that the forthcoming agreement on the double zero option, which is virtually certain to be signed a few days hence, raises so many reservations and worries? It is because in the final analysis this agreement is not good for disarmament, Europe, the Atlantic Alliance or the interests of peace.

It is not good because any disarmament effort must be balanced, verifiable and significant, and the fact is that the agreement based on the double zero option, which has cost some effort, is not balanced thanks to the clever strategy of Mr. Gorbachev which has placed the Americans exactly where he wanted them, that is to say under an obligation to accept reductions on very favourable terms.

It is also true that the agreement is putting the cart before the horse in the sense that it starts by getting rid of the few European missiles which have maintained a difficult balance between East and West over the last forty years.

It is not good because it leaves the central strategic arsenals untouched and has the wrong starting point, as it eliminates all told a mere 5%

1. See page 27.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

of the world's nuclear arms stockpile and therefore presents an illusion lacking in reality.

Nor is it good for the Atlantic Alliance as, whether we like it or not, it contains the seed of a possible split between the Europeans and the Americans. This is something we shall experience in future years in spite of today's official statements, whose emptiness is clear to anyone with a slight knowledge of history.

Lastly the agreement is not good for Europe, which has only played a minor rôle in the matter. The Europeans have not really been involved in this Soviet-American policy. They were greatly surprised to learn the substance of the Reykjavik summit and they reacted separately in a manner which demonstrated debility and resignation rather than a determination to master the situation. Even today the body of European opinion comforts itself by simulating acceptance of an agreement which removes a large part of Europe's protection. Indeed, a whole strategy based on nuclear deterrence as a counterpart to conventional superiority is to end in a few days without our having any real back-up strategy.

What is to become of the flexible response which was the centre-piece of the Atlantic Alliance? When the United States felt that its own territory was under the threat of Soviet missiles, it invented this doctrine to delay its nuclear engagement as long as possible by attempting to limit the war to a European conflict with conventional weapons.

What becomes of this graduated response if two of the ladder's essential rungs are withdrawn? The truth of the matter is that we are in an entirely new situation and Europeans must react if they do not wish to become the mere onlookers and pawns of history.

In this crisis, the possibilities for a European defence emerge more clearly, and, as optimism must always be maintained, I think this is the right moment for Europeans to awaken a little from their forty years' apathy during which their need for security has been lulled by the relaxing assurance of American protection. Europeans must realise that the defence of Europe is primarily the responsibility of Europeans helped by the Americans and not of the Americans with varying degrees of European support. This means a complete reversal of the political and strategic situation. Will WEU be able to seize the chance which is on offer?

No doubt there are some very reassuring signs, including especially the adoption and signing of The Hague security platform which unquestionably expresses new determination with regard to the defence of Europe. Will this platform turn out to be only an empty gesture

made by a number of WEU countries in reply to the French proposal and without any determination to follow it through, or does it mark the start of a necessary reorganisation of WEU's foundations, structure, aims and political will? If the latter is the case, bravo. The Reagan/Gorbachev agreement will have had at least one favourable result.

But that also means that the establishment of the genuine European pillar which does not at present exist requires more than after-dinner speeches and addresses in this forum which I have been listening to for fifteen years to no avail. The European pillar is not a reality because the Americans did not want it and the Europeans did not attempt it. A new determination is needed if we really want to create a European pillar, and the natural framework for such a pillar can only be WEU which is the sole institutional organisation for the defence of Europe.

Following the platform adopted at The Hague, this therefore means that our authorities must seek ways of laying real foundations for the European pillar. How are they to do this? First, by bringing about a genuine European union expressed in a shared attitude to the problems of European defence and the political issues of the West. Second, and work has already been done in this direction, there must be a development of military, strategic and political co-operation.

The mechanisms of WEU must become more efficient and heavy and unwieldy bureaucracy must stop impeding the progress of a number of operations. There must be real political will, without which we shall be left with speeches, motions approved in a context of general indifference and a complete lack of genuine achievement.

At the risk of upsetting certain conformist views here or elsewhere, I would say that the Franco-German military co-operation furnishes a significant example. It demonstrates that when governments, political leaders, a political community and the advocates of a policy wish to move forward together, they really can do so. Our history with Germany goes back a long way, heaven knows, but recent years have witnessed the establishment of a positive and realistic joint defence organisation which is beginning to bear fruit.

This Franco-German military co-operation must not exclude other defence efforts. There can be no question of creating a Paris-Bonn axis. That would be a serious mistake and is not the wish of either the Germans or ourselves. However, the co-operation does provide a model of what could be achieved at WEU level by a series of advances in highly specific areas.

Mr. Baumel (continued)

We still have a long way to go in this connection: firstly with regard to co-ordination of our strategic policies, secondly in the harmonisation of our programme, and thirdly in the standardisation of our equipment. It is absurd that our European countries use so many different equipment types, as if our forces had to fight side by side it would be impossible for one to help the other with munitions or supplies. It is not enough to organise a few meetings, we have to go much further, and we can do so.

Of course we will have to overcome our nationalistic attitudes, the lobbies of the military equipment manufacturers and the very legitimate wish of every country to keep its own models and standards. It is at the earlier stage of preliminary research that some of the solutions are to be found. I do not wish to be too long-winded, but I think finally that we should also try to adopt a resolute policy with regard to our American partner.

It must constantly be repeated that there is no alternative to NATO. Anyone who, consciously or otherwise, proposes an alternative is playing Moscow's game. It is within the Atlantic Alliance that progress must be pursued and it is in agreement with NATO that the European pillar should be developed, not in rivalry with the Atlantic Alliance but as the necessary counterpart to its American element. Clearly, Europe cannot defend itself without American protection and it is equally clear that Europe cannot defend itself with conventional weapons.

WEU's platform of The Hague contributes three fundamental elements, and I am glad that our governments have given it their backing. First, it confirms that the defence of Europe needs American support. Second, it maintains the need for both nuclear and conventional deterrence. I know that some of our German neighbours display extreme nervousness on nuclear matters and there are reasons for their attitude. We must try to understand the line of German thinking and not overreact to it. But we must explain to everyone that Europe will not be able to defend itself without a minimum nuclear deterrent. Third, the platform recognises the relevance and importance of the British and French forces within the framework of the alliance's common defence.

These three positive elements are grounds for hope that we shall be able to advance further if we wish to do so, if we have a plan and a clear programme and if the declaration made at The Hague is followed by some concrete achievements.

The essential point at present is to adapt WEU's structures to the terms of this decla-

ration. For this to be done, the platform must be followed by the formulation of a clear plan enabling Europe's defence to be reinforced in the only conceivable way – that is through WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

He does not appear to be here.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Yesterday the Dutch Foreign Minister said that if WEU did not exist at this time we should have to invent it. A good reason for the continued existence of WEU is that we should all continue to benefit from the exposition of strategy by our friend Mr. Baumel, who put his finger on many important aspects of Europe's security policy. He rightly emphasised that Europe should awake out of its long apathy on defence matters. Inasmuch as The Hague declaration has now been issued, I think we can be confident that the seven member countries of WEU hold certain principles firmly.

In the first post-war phase of European security policy the principle was one of massive retaliation to any aggression, but that first phase, underpinned by our American allies, was accompanied by a realisation that threats to western interests were not limited to Europe alone. Therefore, although the NATO alliance was the first of the western collective security arrangements, there was also a Central Treaty Organisation in the Middle East and a South-East Asia Treaty Organisation in South-East Asia. Those last two alliances unravelled and the Europeans began a process of withdrawal from empire, initiated by the British in 1947, followed by the French from Indo-China in 1954, taken further by the British, who allowed Aden to fall into Marxist hands in 1967, and by the revolution in Portugal and the Marxist coup d'état in Angola and Mozambique in 1974. The second phase of European security policy began with the Harmel report in 1967 and the enunciation of the doctrine of flexible response.

What I shall use as my text in my brief remarks is the first of the recommendations from our Rapporteur in his reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council. He said that the Council should continue its discussions on all aspects of European security and disarmament and ensure that European interests were safeguarded in the present strategic debate. Since European withdrawal from empire, the Europeans have been far too reluctant not only to pay due attention to events in the wider world, but to pay enough for their collective security in this continent.

On the first point – taking a fair share of the western burden for common security interests in

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

the wider world – there have been hopeful signs. The British reacted effectively to Argentinian aggression in the Falklands in 1982 and the French, to their credit, have reacted extremely effectively to Libyan aggression in Chad in more recent days. We now have a five-nation naval force in the Arabian Gulf helping to maintain the freedom of the seas and the right of navigation in international waters and supporting our American friends in this important task.

At the same time, the doctrine of flexible response is in danger of unravelling in our own continent. In no period have I been more anxious than now because the political and psychological offensive of the Soviet Union is at present perhaps more dangerous to western security interests than the overt threat to Western Europe that existed during the cold war.

In my judgment, compensation really is the name of the game: compensation in the widest sense; compensation for Soviet superiority in chemical and biological weapons; compensation for the voluntary withdrawal of the keystone, the arch, of flexible response, namely, the intermediate-range cruise missiles and Pershing IIs deployed here at our wish on our behalf by our American friends; and compensation not just in the nuclear sphere, for which we shall need enhanced air forces and the modernisation of the French and British deterrents, but in the conventional sphere as well.

I think that over the years the Europeans have proved themselves exceedingly unwilling to provide an adequate conventional defence. Indeed, our French friends have always maintained that such defence is inherently incredible. I think that we, too, have felt the same.

Now we are going to need to improve our conventional forces. Above all, I would say that, at a time of acute budgetary crisis for our American friends, we must come to terms with the reality of the decline of American economic and military power. It is no good for Europe to continue to enjoy a semi-client status. As Mr. Baumel said, we have to provide more for our own defence and we have to help the Americans around the world.

We must also realise that there is no change in Soviet grand strategy. General Najibullah is still kept in power in Afghanistan by 110 000 Soviet troops. A puppet government is still kept in power in Cambodia by Vietnamese surrogate forces. An abominable régime in Ethiopia, which uses starvation as a weapon of war against its own people, is kept in power with Soviet and East German advisers and Cuban troops. In Angola the Marxist forces have been sustained by the Soviets in the biggest offensive they have

ever launched against UNITA forces, and in Central America the Nicaraguan Government still have full political and material support from the Soviets.

At no time in our organisation's history has its rôle been more important – to enhance our defence in Europe and, at the same time, to realise that Europe in concert ought to play a more effective rôle in the wider world. Even our Canadian friends are making us reassess our commitments and priorities by their decision to withdraw the Canadian ship-transportable brigade from the northern flank and two air squadrons that used to go with it.

To conclude, I welcome the report because it focuses our attention on many key issues. I support the declaration of principles enunciated at The Hague, but unless those principles are translated into effective action, we shall have done ourselves damage because we shall have raised our hopes only to have seen them wither on the vine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – It was interesting to hear my British colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, speaking, but I take a somewhat different attitude from his. I do not dispute that this is an important debate and I hope that, as one sees attitudes changing between East and West, that is something on which this Assembly and its representatives will work together so that there will be meaningful stage-by-stage reductions of all classes of armaments.

The size and growth of our nuclear weapons has undoubtedly fortified people throughout the world and the more we talk, the more we understand the differing views of East and West, the better will be the chance of progress.

I warmly support the recommendations of the Assembly, because the report outlines, both at a world level and at a European level, what we need to achieve. All of us would agree that those whom we represent will fully support any efforts by the world's nations to seek meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that Mr. Gorbachev has shown clearly that he has major objectives within the Soviet Union and, because of that, there will undoubtedly be a change of attitude in the defence policy of the Soviet Union. In turn, that will undoubtedly affect the foreign policy of that country, and we should welcome that.

However, I hope that the Assembly and the nations from which we come will also note that, although progress is being made between the world's major powers, we must also take increasing action about the arms trade throughout the world. Enormous amounts of

Mr. Cox (continued)

money are spent on armaments and military equipment – about \$2 million every minute of every day.

Many arms are bought by developing and third world countries that face enormous problems. Mr. Wilkinson cited the régime in Ethiopia. I do not support that régime and I know that vast amounts of that country's limited resources are spent on arms. Similar things are happening throughout the third world.

The Assembly has discussed the Iran-Iraq war on previous occasions. Thousands of soldiers on both sides, many of whom were little more than boys, have been brutally killed. The war has continued because dealers have been selling arms to both sides. We should deplore that trade and our nations should make it clear that they oppose it. I oppose the sale of arms wherever it occurs – and I know that it happens in the East and in the West. Many arms go to poorer nations. We have seen television pictures of the conflicts in third world countries and we know that dictatorships in many parts of the world are kept in power by arms purchases. Naturally, world disarmament is our principal interest, but we must not close our eyes to the arms trade.

All the signs are that there will be a meaningful agreement in Washington on INF missiles. There is no limit to what could be achieved after that. Europe will be forced to examine its security needs. The initial discussions between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev caused problems for many European countries and a successful conclusion to the talks in Washington will add to those problems. It may be unpalatable to some of our leaders, but they must face facts.

I hope that reductions in the number of nuclear weapons will not be followed by the development of chemical weapons, which cause great fear throughout the world. I have read reports that the United States will seek a greater deployment of such weapons in Europe. The Assembly should discuss that matter and we should oppose any such move.

We talk about the reactivation of WEU, but I have not seen much sign of that reactivation since our special conference in Rome some years ago. However, if we commit ourselves to working towards general disarmament – and no organisation is better suited to that rôle – the people of Europe will respond.

I welcome this very good report and particularly the recommendation that there should be closer liaison between East and West. We should encourage that. If we act on these recommendations, we shall be proud of our achievements in the future. Whatever our political views, we all wish to see meaningful reductions in all types of

armaments. Our report and the discussions between Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan can be the first steps along that road.

(Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish first of all to thank Mr. Scheer for his objective, thoroughly researched and well-thought-out report on a matter of burning current interest.

During this session the Assembly has registered echoes of the reservations and even the anxiety aroused in some quarters by the INF treaty on two essential points: firstly, what might be called creeping denuclearisation, and secondly the considerable imbalance in conventional forces and chemical weapons. We should of course welcome the catalytic effect of the INF treaty on the political revitalisation of Western European Union, and the situation has evoked some excellent statements of position and declarations – all of outstanding quality. However, I believe these would be pointless if they were not accompanied by concrete measures, as Mr. Wilkinson has rightly indicated.

It appears to me that we are currently faced by a twin-track decision very similar to that of December 1979, which was exclusively concerned with the deployment of Euromissiles. The new twin decision concerns the need to strengthen and even restructure our conventional forces and negotiations to maintain those forces at the minimum level by asymmetrical reductions with the Soviet Union. The articles I have read today in the Herald Tribune seem to demonstrate that Mr. Gorbachev would be inclined to follow this line for reasons of his own which we can well understand. When I suggest that these two actions should go hand-in-hand, I do so because the first of them – reinforcement – is subject to three constraints. The first is demographic since, as you know, it has resulted in an appreciable drop in yearly numbers called up for service in the various NATO countries. The second is financial and I have spoken at length on this point in previous interventions. I would remind you that according to the most reliable estimates the European fighter aircraft will cost DM 110 million, which is a very high figure and could cause the Bundestag to revise its budget allocations. The third constraint is that of public opinion which, in the wake of many peace demonstrations on the Chernobyl incident, clearly views with repugnance the whole nuclear spectrum, in both its military and peaceful aspects.

In conclusion I will suggest some practical measures which might alleviate the problem

Mr. Close (continued)

both for our Assembly and for the Council of Ministers.

Mr. David Abshire, the United States Ambassador to NATO and, I believe, one of President Reagan's leading advisors, has visited the various capitals to underline the shortcomings in our operational position, especially in Central Europe. These include inadequate forces and the distortion between peacetime and wartime deployment, in other words the absence of "sustainability" or staying capacity which, in the event of a surprise attack, might create an unprecedented catastrophe. This is reflected in The Hague platform which we were recently discussing.

Parallel with Mr. Scheer's proposals, consideration must also be given to the dynamic aspects of arms control and not only to static reductions. I wish to put to you a dual proposition according to which the major opposing forces should both be withdrawn by about 250 to 300 km to the Rhine/Danube line on one side and the Oder/Neisse line on the other. It might be objected that this would amount to demilitarisation, but that is in fact not the case as forces are currently deployed over the whole breadth of the Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, these troops would not be withdrawn, but would simply be redeployed to eliminate the danger of a surprise attack.

My second proposal – and I have already discussed it with the Soviets without getting a satisfactory reply – is for a confidence-building measure whereby munitions would not be carried on combat vehicles in peacetime. You must bear in mind, ladies and gentlemen, that it takes twelve hours to arm fully a tank battalion and that twelve hours are equivalent to 150 km of movement over land. This would also be a measure against a surprise attack, which we rightly fear.

Briefly, that is what I had to say. If we do not adopt a concrete approach to certain problems I am very much afraid that all we are doing here will be considered a futile and superficial exercise far removed from the expectations of the public.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I first wish to thank the Rapporteur and the committee for the report, which presents the reality of Western European Union in cool and precise terms and refers with slightly less coolness and precision to the hopes nursed by many in Europe with regard to current

developments. I would like to make a few observations on both topics.

My first remark is of a purely technical nature. I thank the committee for the recommendation that in future the Secretary-General should be directly represented at the foreign ministry of the country exercising the presidency-in-office of the Council of Ministers at any time. I believe that it will be possible in this way to overcome many of the difficulties otherwise associated with a change in chairmanship. It will make it easier to forestall the creation of bureaucratic structures.

In this connection I would like to thank Mr. Baumel, who has just drawn attention to the danger of bureaucratisation. May I also take the opportunity of repeating an idea which I previously advanced in this forum some years ago, namely that officials should not be appointed to the present central agency on a permanent basis. It should be possible for the various governments to delegate top officials to the agency for a fixed period. This would make contact with the real situations in member states closer than is sometimes possible in the ivory towers of London or Paris.

My second observation, Mr. President, concerns the question of the location of the headquarters of Western European Union. This subject has already been broached yesterday in another context, and I raise the point again, as the committee argues strongly for Brussels in the report, which emphasises that this is the opinion not only of the Rapporteur but also of the committee. Personally, I have nothing against the capital of the kingdom of Belgium, but I do have worries when I read the arguments advanced for shifting the headquarters to Brussels. In the final analysis these arguments imply that Western European Union should be allowed to become a subdivision of NATO.

I do not have the smallest objection to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On the contrary, I share the Rapporteur's view that whoever wishes to be a member of Western European Union must also be a member of NATO. However, in recent years revitalisation has conferred additional political tasks on Western European Union, and these tasks should be further extended. It follows that it would be wrong for us to move into the shadow of NATO. If we were to agree to the Rapporteur's proposal, the members of the WEU Permanent Council would be identical with our representatives on the Permanent Council of NATO, and I would not welcome that.

Mr. Scheer claimed that there was a certain identity of interests, and I do not deny that that is partially true. But this identity is insufficient. It is my belief that Western European Union can only be a truly autonomous institution if the Per-

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

manent Council concerns itself full-time with Western European Union, without being tied either to the NATO Council or, as is the case at present, to the Court of St. James via the ambassadors accredited there from the various member states.

Our proposal, which I believe should be tabled in the coming months, should rather be to set up our own permanent council. I do not mean to imply that we should set up a new ambassador's conference or assign permanent ambassadors to WEU headquarters. It might be much more beneficial if the ministry officials permanently concerned with Western European Union were to form themselves into what might be termed a permanent council. With present-day facilities for travel this would present no problem, and the arrangement would have the primary advantage that, as experts, these officials would no longer have to consult others about their pronouncements in the Permanent Council. We would have the experts immediately available on the spot.

The third point which I consider important is the question of new members, and the report contains a proposal on this subject. I would like to emphasise strongly that if Western European Union accepts new members – and we should not resist this – they should have the same rights and obligations as the other members. We must not try to offer future members, prior to their accession, special arrangements based on what this or that country has obtained over the last thirty years. It would be a bad thing if we were to finish up with a Western European Union containing some countries with less and others with more rights. In my opinion, the rights and obligations must be the same for everybody. I regard this as an essential criterion for the acceptance of new members.

Mr. President, perhaps I might add a few remarks concerning the hopes expressed in the report. Ultimately it is a matter of what the chances for disarmament really are. Mr. Baumel mentioned that we may well be putting the cart before the horse by not beginning with disarmament in the conventional area, where it is most urgent. However, I am grateful for the forthcoming success represented by the signing of the INF treaty next week.

I would just like to remind you of the intensity and length of our debates on this subject and of the controversies that arose over whether any dialogue at all could be conducted with the Soviet Union after the rearmament of NATO, with the majority of this Assembly claiming that disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union would only stand a chance of success when such rearmament was not merely presented as a possibility but also, if necessary, implemented. The

fact that a particular political view has proved correct in the present instance does not necessarily mean that this will always apply, but when we are debating the question of SDI, for instance, I must point out that we have seen similar confrontations.

We have heard some sharp criticism of American policy, and what the report has to say about SDI also strikes at least a somewhat restrained note of criticism. Now we suddenly learn – from yesterday's statement by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev – that the Soviet Union is also working on a form of SDI, that is to say on something it had portrayed as the acme of evil and the greatest threat to peace. When we hear the General Secretary qualify his words by saying that the Soviet aim is merely to conduct research and not to build such a system, I ask you not to take that too seriously, as Soviet policy statements of this kind have, as we are well aware, all too often served only to cloak plans already nearing realisation.

I therefore ask the Assembly to subject the Soviet SDI to the same careful appraisal that many of us have directed towards the United States.

A final observation: I regard it as a matter of urgency that we should now pay special attention to conventional arms and disarmament. The more the nuclear shield is withdrawn, the more important does the question of the Warsaw Pact's conventional strike capability become. If it is truly our aim to safeguard peace by depriving both sides of the ability to attack, then I consider it necessary to study the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons with special care. This must be done, not in global terms, as we are too prone to do, but in relation to the individual areas of Europe, so that the issue does not figure largely in a sector where there is no real danger anyway while a sudden concentration of conventional weapons arises in another sector, giving rise to the fear that our present disarmament policy is not safeguarding but actually endangering peace.

As this is not our wish, and as it is our intention that the incapacity to strike should be ensured on both sides, not only by treaty but also in reality, I earnestly appeal to the Assembly to make its vital contribution to this important subject in the immediate future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. GABBUGGIANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the most recent developments in the world situation and in particular the summit meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union make it essential for Europe to assume, with determination, an effective, inde-

Mr. Gabbugiani (continued)

pendent and specifically European rôle in international politics. Europe cannot, we believe, be merely a passive or reluctant witness to a positive international process that needs to develop to the full and meet wider interests than just those of the two superpowers.

Today, all this has become a more realistic prospect than has long been the case given the clearly changed ideas and new attitudes displayed by the present Soviet leadership at the international level. Europe needs to be in a position to take full advantage of this new phase in the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, between East and West and to assert its own initiative in international politics so that progress can also be made towards a solution of the regional conflicts and a major change in North-South relations and so that decisive advances can be made by negotiation towards solving the disarmament problems on which European security is more particularly dependent.

In this way we shall make sure of a bigger cast of actors on the world stage and avoid a return to bipolarisation. Now that the nuclear imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries has been overcome, with the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of medium-range missiles, there should be no coldness or fears on Europe's part towards the double zero option treaty. Instead, Europe should look forward in confidence towards the possibility and need for further steps on the road to disarmament, but must of course combine this receptiveness with a careful and realistic view of Europe's security requirements.

The Italian Communist Party has shown this awareness of the correlation to be established between Europe's commitment to the peace of the world and its efforts to guarantee the security of the continent in many of its official documents, a recent contribution being the resolution on a European security strategy tabled by Mr. Galluzzi and approved by the European Parliament at its sitting on 14th October.

There can therefore be no possible misunderstanding on the subject of European security in terms of the need for an effective European pro-disarmament rôle in international politics, for co-operation between the various countries and for peace. These judgments are shared by a broad front of democratic forces and the European left.

We consider that further agreements on the reduction of nuclear armaments, including tactical atomic weapons, are essential for Europe so that the security of our continent depends less and less on the nuclear deterrent. We also feel that a new balance in conventional weapons,

where superiority lies with the Warsaw Pact, is also necessary in Europe. Obviously, that new balance needs to be sought and agreed at the lowest level, not the opposite. Similarly the development of Europe's political unity should be matched by a joint vision of defence and security to further the construction of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We heard some interesting views on the construction process this morning.

We are, therefore, Mr. President, against the formation of a third – European – military bloc and the idea of creating a European nuclear deterrent by strengthening and Europeanising the French and British deterrents, because in our opinion this would pull in the opposite direction to the process of disarmament and the reduction and control of nuclear weapons now begun with the double zero option.

In many political, cultural and religious circles throughout the world, voices are heard criticising the vast waste of resources on the arms race to the detriment of a solution for the economic problems from which many countries are suffering and, more generally, the senselessness from the human and social standpoints, of military expenditure. It is now possible to reduce that spending without jeopardising security. The road to be taken, in preference to all others therefore, is that of negotiation with the object of developing the disarmament process and bringing secure peace to all the peoples on this planet.

To conclude, Mr. President, I would like to express our thanks to the committee for the interesting report on disarmament that we are debating and to the honourable member who has presented it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, this WEU session is being held on the eve of the signature of the agreement on intermediate nuclear weapons in Washington. To my mind, this agreement is extremely positive. The fact that for the first time agreement has been reached not to reduce, but to eliminate completely an entire weapons system, the fact that this agreement has been reached in spite of a considerable asymmetry between the forces concerned – as the Rapporteur Mr. Scheer has pointed out, the Soviet Union will have to destroy 1 600 warheads compared with the 348 that the Americans will have to destroy, plus 100 or so SS-23s and SS-12s versus 72 Pershing IAs – and the fact that for the first time the Soviets are accepting inspection and verification on their own territory, all this could well open the way for other significant advances in reducing nuclear –

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

I refer to strategic weapons – chemical and conventional weapons which are the most vital.

Nor do I share the opinion of those who, though rightly considering the Soviet threat to have increased militarily and in terms of potential political pressure when the SS-20s were deployed, now consider that same threat to have increased again, this time precisely because, as well as the SS-20s, the Pershing and cruise missiles that it was decided to install to restore equilibrium with the Soviet Euromissiles are to be destroyed.

Nor, of course, do I share the opinion of those who see this agreement as a functional move in the direction of a denuclearised Europe. The Hague platform, which I think has been judged positively by all the major groups present in this chamber, states specifically in this connection – I would like to read out that paragraph to you:

“ In the present circumstances and as far as we can foresee, there is no alternative to the western strategy for the prevention of war, which has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. ”

I would like to revert to the subject of tomorrow's Washington agreement to say that I fully share the Rapporteur's view, namely that it has come about through the belated acceptance of the western proposals by the Soviets and that – in spite of its truth – the fact may well be obscured, as regards its impact on public opinion today, by the glare of glasnost. For that reason I think it useful to go back over the important milestones in this affair.

Faced with the installation of the SS-20s, we reacted firmly and for many years effectively resisted all the pressures from inside and outside our countries against the twofold NATO decision of 1979. It was we in the West who proposed negotiations – to be more exact, it was a European initiative, it was we who caused the Soviets to reconsider their refusal to negotiate – in the first few months after the December 1979 decision and the reaction of Mr. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership – and their insistence on making negotiations subject to unacceptable conditions, it was we who resisted the extreme pressure from the Soviets when their delegation left the negotiating table in Geneva, and it was to the West that the credit must go for having proposed the so-called zero option from the outset of the negotiations. The fact that the negotiations

have today reached a successful outcome is also due to the fact that we won acceptance for our view that there was no justification for the Soviet claim to involve the British and French nuclear forces or to link the negotiations with others on strategic nuclear weapons and strategic defence initiative problems.

The success that we have had with our negotiating positions and with the specific proposal we made for negotiations to eliminate this type of weapons is therefore clearly demonstrated by the facts.

It is equally clear, conversely, that this success could cause incalculable damage were the treaty on intermediate nuclear weapons not to be ratified – damage at the level of public opinion, damage to the credibility of the West in its negotiations and damage to the cohesion between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. It is therefore right and proper that our Assembly should cast its vote urging speedy ratification of this agreement by the American Senate.

We are, in spite of this highly positive agreement, left with a number of unresolved problems that I have no wish to pass over. The imbalance in conventional weapons, the need to update the Atlantic strategy of the flexible response and the global European perception of arms limitation issues are, together with others, problems to which we undoubtedly still have to find solutions and about which we have cause for legitimate concern. The strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance is a similarly unresolved problem. I would just like to stress that these problems existed before the deployment of the SS-20s and will still be on the table after they have gone. In other words, they are not going to be solved in any way by the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces.

I hope that, now, there will be greater awareness of these problems. Hence our position in favour of the WEU reactivation that began in Rome and has now been consolidated in The Hague platform. It is the development and application of that platform that may enable us to find positive answers to our unresolved problems. The platform does not give any guidelines in its very proper reference to the common objective of an integrated Europe and the construction of European union in accordance with the single act. The platform signposts the road towards a European defence identity that will implement more effectively the commitments entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. This is why, whilst not wanting to pass judgment and with no preconceived ideas, I consider that recent bilateral initiatives, however interesting and worthy of consideration they may be and concerning, as they do, non-NATO-integrated military forces, as Mr. Raimond, the French Minister for Foreign

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

Affairs, said yesterday, cannot, by definition, perform a central rôle in applying the principles to which I have referred, which include the promotion of a European military identity and therefore the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Effective WEU reactivation can in fact be put to the test of truth only in terms of these two imperative requirements in the more general framework of the global construction of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will not discuss the speeches by members who agreed with the arguments advanced in the report, only the speeches in which additional suggestions were made or where I feel the approach should be re-examined.

First, the speech made yesterday by Mr. Müller from the Federal Republic of Germany. He said – as did many other speakers – that there are asymmetries. Reference is also made to this in the report. But I must add that – when I think, for example, of Mr. Stokes's report, which we also have to discuss here – the asymmetries are not only to the West's disadvantage but in many areas to the East's disadvantage.

This is particularly true if we take an overall view. There is, for example, no denying that there are asymmetries in the West's favour in the Pacific sector. It is probably equally undeniable that as regards the air forces there tends to be an asymmetry in the West's favour because of the special technological standards of western weapons systems. This asymmetry is qualitative, not quantitative: the numbers on the two sides are approximately the same.

These are all problems to be considered in the negotiations. A glance at the MBFR negotiations, which I talked about yesterday, reveals that the Warsaw Pact's fears primarily concern the West's air forces and that our fears in the West primarily concern the East's land forces. During the negotiations, reductions in land and air forces will probably have to be discussed together. This is probably the only way to reach a successful conclusion.

This means that we have to establish asymmetries. A uniform numerical reduction in the various categories of weapons is usually the least suitable concept. Account must be taken of the quality of everything concerned, and asymmetrical solutions must therefore be found.

Mr. Soell spoke of considerable progress in verification. I should like to emphasise this once again. The fact that the Soviet Union is now willing to accept on-site inspections under, say, an agreement on chemical weapons or in connection with the monitoring system provided for in the agreement on intermediate-range missiles is a political sensation, considered against the background of the last thirty years. For reasons of principle the Soviet Union wanted to make inspections on its territory conditional on its approval. This is no longer the case. The commitment to allow inspections has become to some extent axiomatic in all international negotiations.

This means that, once this old principle has been cast aside and inspections are accepted, the same will apply to any future agreement. In other words, one of the most serious obstacles to disarmament agreements in the past has been removed. We can but underline the importance of this.

I do not agree with what Mr. Baumel said about the agreement on intermediate-range missiles. He was very critical of it on two grounds. He argued, firstly, that it would give rise to an imbalance to the West's disadvantage and secondly that the West would then be unprotected. I should like to explain very briefly why I do not consider this position sound.

The fact is that the East, that is the Soviet Union, will have to dismantle far more warheads under the INF agreement than the West. In other words, in terms of the number of weapons systems to be dismantled it is an asymmetrical agreement, under which the West has advantages. That is the first point. But what is of prime importance is that, if this situation is compared with the situation in 1979 and earlier, the only conclusion to be drawn is that, if Mr. Baumel's argument is correct, NATO was always unprotected before 1979, in fact since its inception. Can that be a serious claim? I doubt it: not only that – I challenge it.

Looking again at the situation in 1979, there were at that time some seven hundred Soviet intermediate-range missiles, whereas the West had none at all. A zero option would now result in the West's again achieving the pre-1979 situation, that is, there would be no land-based intermediate-range missiles, whereas the Soviet Union would have seven hundred fewer than in 1979. How can it then be argued that the INF agreement will leave the West unprotected in future? If that were so, NATO would in principle have failed to fulfil its security mandate at any time before 1979. But that would not be true.

Therefore I do not believe that we are in a time of crisis. In fact this is a time when crises are being resolved. That is a fundamental difference,

Mr. Scheer (continued)

and in this context I should like to take up what Mr. Wilkinson said. Mr. Wilkinson – like Mr. Baumel – spoke of the need for the Western European countries to take action either to compensate for disarmament agreements or to compensate for American weapons and troops that had been withdrawn.

I do not think is the right road. Although it is necessary – there is a consensus on this, and the report also refers to it – for us to have a European pillar which guarantees the greatest possible degree of Western European sovereignty over security policy, the question is: how do we achieve this? Do we achieve it by making additional efforts of our own in the armaments field under the general heading of compensation, or by some other means? If we were to construct the European pillar in such a way that we were merely providing a European replacement for the American troops and weapons now stationed in Europe, we would, in my opinion, be choosing the wrong course, and it could not be sustained either politically or economically. The result would be that the two principal military factors in the world, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, would be joined by a third strong factor, Western Europe. But is it our task to be, as it were, a third engine of high-tech armament? Given all our problems, given the problems faced equally by all the countries of the world in all kinds of political issues, the North-South relationship, the resolution of the economic crisis and the challenge of the ecological problems, is that our task?

I therefore feel it is not a question of compensation but of helping to ensure that the Soviet Union's and Warsaw Pact's contingents are pared down, but the same must apply to the NATO countries, including the United States, safeguarded and supported by agreements, so that we have disarmament without the need for a substitute, a reduction in arms without the need for a substitute. This does not mean that certain improvements might not be necessary here or there. They will always be needed. But the fundamental question is this: restructuring of the Western European security policy without disarmament, or restructuring in line with the disarmament process? I consider the latter to be the only responsible approach, and numerous arguments can be advanced in support of this view.

Over and above what I said yesterday, I should like to make a distinction between subjective and objective arguments. Subjective arguments are ethical arguments, the reduction of the danger of war and of distrust caused by stockpiles of weapons. Then there are objective arguments.

Mr. Close mentioned a number of objective arguments, which I should like to emphasise, even though he may not endorse all the subjective arguments I referred to, or the justification for them. There are the demographic arguments, for example. It will not be possible for the troops to be maintained at their present level because there will not be enough young people from the early 1990s onwards, and this is not only true of the Federal Republic. He also mentioned financial limits. That is absolutely correct. There is also public opinion to consider: in a democracy public opinion must not be regarded as ballast but as an essential element of democracy.

I should also like to mention the question of the future of our own economy. If we compensate for arms reduction completely or largely on our own, it will mean developing new weapons, it will mean doing what the Americans are doing, gearing more and more technological skills to the great technological challenges which the arms race entails today. This means the increasing involvement of civil technologies in the security sector, because civil and military technologies are growing ever closer together. This is apparent from the overall trend in electronics. It also means having to declare more and more industries as relevant to security, and so exclude them from foreign trade.

The reason why North America is now at such a grave economic disadvantage in competition with the Federal Republic of Germany and Europe as a whole, and above all with Japan, is that the Americans have isolated themselves from the international market in high-tech products by classifying these technologies as relevant to security. Even now there are conferences of American physicists which may not be attended by foreigners, not even Western Europeans, on security grounds. The idea behind this is that all advances should be made independently. Japan, on the other hand, is gearing its industrial efforts and the development of productivity to civil products. If Europe were to emulate the United States, it would be at the expense of its economic development. It would result in East-West trade being increasingly restricted rather than expanded and in our largely closing the doors on Europe's largest potential markets. This cannot be in the interests of our overall development. We cannot confine our economic relations to the improvement of relations between Japan, North America and Western Europe. We must not ignore all the markets in which there is demand for new products. Wrong priorities must not lead to our forgoing these markets.

The object is certainly not to establish a European pillar as a counterweight to America. The object is to form a European pillar in line

Mr. Scheer (continued)

with the disarmament process, in close conjunction with and supported by the United States and taking into account the East-West relationship and its restructuring.

Mr. Close referred to a really central issue. It does not appear to be very important but I consider it highly significant. I am referring to the proposal that precautions should be taken during disarmament negotiations to rule out the possibility in military terms and in terms of weapons technology of a surprise conventional attack. Redeployment measures and above all a reduction in ammunition stockpiles should make such an attack impossible in future. The military effect of these measures should eliminate the capability of a surprise attack.

I consider measures such as those mentioned by Mr. Close to be highly significant. Thinking on security policy should always be based on the worst-case scenario. What is the worst that could happen? Let us imagine a surprise conventional attack. Let us imagine a protracted conventional conflict. It should, of course, be remembered that the Soviet Union could never risk a conflict of this kind, because the West is economically far stronger and economic strength plays an essential rôle in protracted military conflicts.

Accordingly, in security policy, the central issue concerns the options available for countering a conventional surprise attack. All the disarmament measures we take can and should be geared to this. This also indicates where the emphasis should be placed in disarmament in the conventional sector. Reductions must go hand in hand with confidence-building factors.

To conclude, I do not believe that Western Europe has been suffering from apathy where defence questions are concerned, as has been said here. What apathy there was related to the will to review disarmament in context. This was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the prospects for disarmament were not particularly good in the past. It is not a choice between disarmament and security, as some speakers intimated. Nor is there any truth in the far too apprehensive claim that disarmament is a threat to security. We should concentrate on getting used to the idea that, if it is constructive and consistent, disarmament may even improve security. In the final analysis, then, disarmament and security are the issue. That is the message of the report.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Scheer.

4. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Mr. Mellor, I should like to welcome you to our deliberations and to say how much we appreciate your visit, particularly at a time when I understand parliamentary business is very demanding.

I must also express to you, both in the name of the Assembly, and on my own behalf, my gratitude for the very kind and generous welcome which I received on my recent visit to London.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I thank you, Mr. President, for that warm reception and for what you have just said. It was a great pleasure for me to host your visit to London as a way of showing the significance that we attach to the work of the Assembly, a significance that I hope further to enhance by coming here this morning.

I also come here fresh from the Gulf where I had the opportunity of seeing the effectiveness of WEU discussions in the work of the various naval forces from WEU countries in the Gulf.

I have had the opportunity of studying the décor here while waiting to speak. I am not sure whether that very charming tapestry on the wall behind you, Mr. President, illustrates one of the more exciting parts of your visit to London or WEU activities in the Gulf. Perhaps I shall be told in due course.

The security of Europe is once again top of the international agenda. It is appropriate, therefore, that we should be meeting at this exciting time. Next week, in Washington, a historic treaty will be signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. It will lead within a few years to the elimination from Europe and elsewhere throughout the world of American and Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. That will mark a major new departure in relations between the superpowers.

At the same time, ministers of this organisation have issued our platform on European security interests, which sets out in unambiguous terms the principles on which we believe our security should be based for the foreseeable future. It contains clear commitments to continued nuclear deterrence, to the maintenance in Europe of United States nuclear and conventional forces, and to the particular responsibilities and commitments of WEU

Mr. Mellor (continued)

member countries themselves in both the nuclear and conventional fields. I hope in this speech to consider both the significance of the INF agreement and to look a little beyond it to the issues of European security which are touched on in the platform.

I begin with INF. There are six major achievements for the West in the agreement. First, it has proved that to negotiate from strength and to maintain alliance solidarity is the way to achieve arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Unilateral gestures could never have brought the Russians to talk. Had we made those unilateral gestures, we would today face a greatly increased threat from Soviet missiles with no counter-vailing forces on our side.

Secondly, in terms of numbers, it is important to appreciate the asymmetry of the agreement because it will result in the elimination of some two thousand Soviet warheads against some three hundred and fifty United States warheads. We know that the principle of asymmetry will have to be carried forward into succeeding arms control negotiations.

Thirdly, and perhaps even more importantly on the military side, the SS-20 and SS-22 threats to our cities and to the airfields where our intermediate nuclear forces are based will have been removed. This has taken ten years to achieve – a pretty pointless and expensive journey for the Soviet Union – but we have at least achieved this important objective. We have reversed the tide from those darker days of the mid-1970s when the Soviets thought that by bringing in a new generation of nuclear missiles they could achieve a supremacy in Western Europe, which none of us would have been prepared to counter.

Fourthly, for the first time in the nuclear age, nuclear weapons will have been reduced, admittedly only by some 3%, but that has a significance all of its own. Let us hope now that we shall see not only further reductions in strategic nuclear weaponry but also progress in reductions in the non-nuclear fields – chemical and conventional weapons – which we ignore at our peril.

Fifthly, under the terms of the INF treaty a stringent, effective and mandatory verification package will be put into place that will allow both sides to establish and maintain confidence in the continuing effective operation of the treaty. That verification régime is crucial. It is more far-reaching than any previous régime. We shall have to build on it to produce even more searching verification régimes if future talks on more complicated matters, where a zero option will not be available, are to flourish.

Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, if the INF agreement is faithfully implemented, mutual confidence will be significantly increased. We sometimes think of the arms race as a problem on its own, but the arms race is merely a symptom of a more fundamental problem – the lack of confidence and trust between East and West.

I believe that the agreement is a success, and it was gratifying to all of us that yesterday in Brussels it received unanimous support from NATO's Defence Planning Committee. I hope that the United States Senate will recognise the unanimity in Europe in favour of the treaty and will ratify it speedily.

Those who have doubts about the agreement have them on one, two or all three counts: first, that whatever the nature of the Soviet threat, the systems that NATO will lose are essential for deterrence; secondly, that the agreement will lead in time to the complete denuclearisation of our continent; thirdly, that the agreement will somehow decouple the United States from the defence of Europe. All those doubts are properly aired, but I believe that they are all ill-founded.

Deterrence worked perfectly well in Europe prior to the introduction of the SS-20s, the Pershings and the cruise missiles and I believe that it will continue to work perfectly well when those missiles are gone. To deter an aggressor no magic number of nuclear weapons has ever been necessary. What deters is NATO's overall nuclear and conventional capability and the political cohesion that underlies it.

We are in the business of deterrence, not of nuclear war fighting. Our political commitment to nuclear deterrence must be reflected in systems that are militarily effective. But we do not need to have every conceivable target covered. There is no contradiction between the requirements for deterrence, which we have set out clearly in the platform adopted by ministers at The Hague, and an INF treaty.

We should perhaps recall that NATO will in any case still have some four thousand nuclear weapons in Europe even after the elimination of the INF missiles. Certainly we shall continue to need an adequate nuclear element in our force posture for the foreseeable future. History has shown that there has never been such a thing as conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons deter because of their awesome and certain destructive power. They have kept the peace in Europe for over forty years and we must never make Europe safe for conventional war again. So no impression should be created by the INF agreement that the first step on the road to a denuclearised Europe has been taken. It has not. The agreement makes sense in its own right in

Mr. Mellor (continued)

security terms. That is why we all support it. We will not seek to circumvent it, but the alliance will maintain the minimum numbers of nuclear weapons necessary to safeguard deterrence. That will mean continuing, as we always have done, to adjust our force structure and keep it up to date.

I do not see any possibility whatsoever of the INF agreement eroding the security bond holding together the two sides of the Atlantic. As Lord Carrington has pointed out, what couples us is not some variant of arcane nuclear philosophy. It is the flesh and blood of 320 000 United States troops based in Europe who share the same risks as their European counterparts. It is the United States' overall interests, not some particular weapons system, and the shared values of freedom and democracy, which the United States would never lightly abandon, that bind us together.

Fears have been voiced in some quarters in Germany that the remaining Soviet short-range missiles east of the Elbe would fall mainly on German soil in the event of war and that zones of unequal security would consequently be created within the alliance. I recognise, as we all do, these German anxieties about "singularisation", but I ask our German friends to examine seriously how far such fears are justified. Five allied countries, including, of course, Britain, have forces stationed in Germany. Indeed, one-third of our army is committed to the forward defence of West Germany in the event of trouble.

Of course, those forces are subject to the same risks as German citizens and all our countries could, anyhow, still be attacked by Soviet nuclear systems, which are not limited to short-range missiles. Soviet strategic systems are tested down to a very low range, and that is not to mention their nuclear-capable aircraft and submarines. So an attack on one of us will remain, in practice as well as in the obligations enshrined in the North Atlantic and Brussels Treaties, an attack on us all, and it will be resisted by us all.

An INF agreement was not intended to resolve all of Europe's security problems and it will not do so, but it points the way forward to further arms control arrangements which will enhance and not reduce our security.

I want to look ahead to our next priorities, which NATO has already established with unanimous agreement. They are a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, a worldwide chemical ban and, in particular, the elimination of the enormous conventional imbalance in Europe, which affects all of us. The key issue in conventional forces is the sheer quantitative

superiority of the Warsaw Pact – 3 to 1 in tanks, more than 3 to 1 in artillery and almost 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft. Some people say that that is merely bean-counting and that we should look at the qualitative advantages of the West's weaponry, which would result in the imbalance not being so great. Quite a lot of those assessments are based on somewhat tendentious arguments and I recall the words of Lenin who said that quantity had a quality of its own.

The report on the threat assessment, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Stokes, argues in the direction of scaling down the size of the discrepancy. Unfortunately, it has been seized on by the media in recent days to suggest that western claims of Warsaw Pact superiority are exaggerated. We need to be clear about our bases of comparison in this exercise. For example, the Warsaw Pact has more tanks of its newer models on the central front than the West has there altogether, and thousands of older, but far from obsolete, T-54s and T-55s are being refitted and modernised.

We have to ask ourselves why the Soviet Union and its allies retain such enormous forces. If their purpose is purely defensive, why do they need so many? Of course, those in the Warsaw Pact claim – they would, wouldn't they? – that their intentions are defensive. But their operational concepts, training methods and force dispositions are largely based on surprise attack, pre-emption and rapid armoured mobility. Viewed from the West, these are offensive postures, and the West has legitimate fears not just about numbers, but about attitudes.

That brings us to transparency, which is of great importance. If there is to be trust between East and West about each other's intentions, surely we should both be ready to reveal our force figures and dispositions. NATO already does so. The Warsaw Pact can purchase for a small sum all the relevant NATO publications. It would be a major step towards increased trust if the Warsaw Pact would take similar measures. At present, we have to go on our own estimates, which show, for example, a Soviet defence burden of 13% to 15% of gross domestic product, compared with just over 5% in the United Kingdom and most of our other countries.

In 1986, when all the newspapers were full of talk of glasnost and the new attitudes that, up to a point, we all accept, the Soviets were quietly and steadily building up their forces, adding tanks at the rate of eight a day, fighter aircraft at two a day, pieces of field artillery at six a day and warships at one a month. That is perestroika in the wrong direction.

Some people say that we overestimate the numbers. We all got a bit of a shock when the

Mr. Mellor (continued)

Soviet Union disclosed the number of INF missiles it had. We thought that it had to get rid of about 1 500 such missiles as part of the deal. It turns out that it will have to give up nearly 2 000 and when we come to realise it, those estimates were actually underestimates, and we need to bear that in mind. If our estimates are wrong in these assessments, let the Soviets demonstrate that to us. Let them set out, as Mr. Gorbachev hinted they might be ready to do, what they have and where they have it. That will help to build confidence.

I would refer to the talks in Stockholm and to the agreement. Observations and inspections pursuant to the Stockholm agreement have gone well this year. It is essential that we build on that success in our future work on confidence-building and arms control. By "building-on" I mean taking real steps, not declaratory measures. Now the Soviet Union proposes, as it has, that we compare military doctrines. I do not see the point in indulging in discussion of vague generalities. If what the Soviets really mean is discussion of numbers, structures and dispositions of the armed forces themselves, we are all for that. We are all for making progress with concrete treatment of what is in reality a nuts and bolts issue.

What of the European rôle in non-nuclear arms reduction and what about chemical arms control? That is something about which we in the United Kingdom have taken a recent initiative to bring about the eventual elimination of chemical weapons. There is a great deal to be agreed here and even in the civil chemical industry there must be a truly effective means of verification. There must be some element of openness from the Soviet side about chemical weapons. The Soviets have them, though they denied it last year. However, the visit to the Soviet chemical weapons installation at Shikhany showed us nothing more recent than 1952. We would have difficulty in finding out how much had been done since then.

Overall, however, one of the points that the WEU platform makes clear is that arms control is only one aspect of our security policy. The other, of course, is the need while we negotiate – and those negotiations will take a long time, with the setting out of an agenda – to maintain strong defences. Sometimes Americans ask why the Europeans do not look after their own defences. The contribution we make to the allied forces stationed in Europe is over 90% of the manpower. That comes from Europe. We provide over 85% of the tanks, 95% of the artillery and 50% of combat aircraft. At sea we provide over 70% of the fighting ships. Our commitment is clear to the forward defence of Germany in deploying 67 000 officers and men of the army

and air force stationed all the time in the Federal Republic, as well as providing sizeable naval forces to NATO.

As Europeans we must also pull our weight. On the nuclear side we have made clear in the platform that we have a major responsibility in this field. The co-operative arrangements that some of us maintain with the United States are necessary for the security of our continent. They represent our determination to carry our share of the defence burden.

I make it clear that we in the United Kingdom are determined to preserve the credibility of our independent nuclear forces, which make a significant contribution to overall deterrence and security. As well we must ensure that the European voice continues to be heard and that European security requirements are met. The platform sets out as clearly as possible the parameters for this work which sit firmly in the framework of alliance solidarity. As the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, said in Brussels in March:

"A Europe which gets its own ideas straight is a far more rewarding partner for the United States; and is far more likely to have its views taken seriously than a Europe which speaks in a multitude of voices."

But the platform itself says that all this does not mean that we are suddenly in a position to go it alone. It is right for the platform to stress that:

"the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence."

It is wrong to conclude from this that a common European defence policy is near at hand or that WEU can provide some means of integrating European forces into a joint command structure separate from NATO.

WEU is not an operational forum and Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty makes that clear. It is difficult to imagine a faster way to get the Americans unilaterally to pack up and go home than to start multilateral military planning that excludes them. Force planning decisions must continue to be taken in NATO.

What is the rôle of WEU? I set it out with some diffidence. If it is not operational, what is it? A number of people have put this question to me indicating enthusiasm in this Assembly for reactivation, and your parallel fear that it is not quite apparent in which direction we are supposed to be heading. The problem is well put by Mr. van der Sanden in his reply to the Council's thirty-second annual report, which you have debated this week. He argues that we have yet to find a satisfactory solution to the dilemma posed by reactivation. In setting up new institutions and procedures in this Assembly we have "trans-

Mr. Mellor (continued)

formed the character " of our exchanges but with no specific agreement about what new character we are trying to create.

This has led to uneasiness on the part of many and, as we feel our way across uncharted territory, we seem, increasingly, at risk of getting lost.

Let me try to describe the target as we see it from London. The WEU Council's chief value is as a discussion forum for Europeans to define their security interests, bringing clear views into alliance deliberations. The primary focus of our attention has to be the central front. WEU's tightly-knit membership gives it unique possibilities in this area. I say that with all due allowance for the rôle in discussing Mediterranean security that our French and Italian colleagues justifiably emphasise.

We have among us all the Europeans, and they are gathered here, who contribute forces to the defence of the central front, and also all of the European INF-basing countries. The commonalities of our interests should allow us to use WEU as an effective consultation mechanism to help strengthen our defences in the region. The clarification and concertation in bringing together our views can facilitate, and will facilitate, the alliance decision-making process where we can transform our reflections into practical steps within the NATO alliance structure.

This does not necessarily require a large WEU bureaucracy nor the drafting of large numbers of reports or papers. However, it requires a willingness to talk through problems frankly and honestly together as they arise. That is what makes this Assembly so vital.

Bringing the forum close to the centre of alliance and European decision-making would help that and that is the reason why we in the United Kingdom see collocation of WEU's ministerial organs to Brussels as the key development in securing its future rôle. This would be a radical and far-reaching step in the interests of us all and in this context I welcome the part of Mr. Scheer's report that draws the same conclusions.

I was particularly taken with his references to the early history of WEU, which shows that not only the agencies but even the Assembly in the 1950s was located in Paris, deliberately to be close to NATO headquarters. That is why we are here now. The world has moved on, in that context not always in the happiest of directions. The validity of that principle in our own time has not been lost on the Assembly. Let us hope that all WEU governments do not lose sight of it either.

Ironically, the best practical results of WEU consultations so far have not been in the central front but in the Gulf, where I was last week. Our success in sending mine-sweepers there under WEU auspices provides an excellent example of how we can make use of our forum to pursue our own interests and support our allies. I was most impressed to see just off Bahrain the mine-sweepers of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium working together to clear up the mines laid by the Iranians. So far four have been recovered: four threats to international shipping have been removed, all of them under the protection of a United Kingdom warship. That is how our co-operation should work.

I am glad that it was within the forum of WEU, which proved itself invaluable in thrashing out the policies behind the operational decision that was then taken. All that should provide us with a pointer to the way ahead. The basis of such action is fully justified by Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty, as Mr. Scheer and Mr. van der Sanden noted in their reports. With this WEU umbrella permanently in place, we should be prepared to consult frankly and honestly under its protection. We need not always think in terms of action by all WEU members. A consultation among the seven could help to support the activity of a smaller number of us, if that is what our governments chose to do, in some part of the world.

Lastly, Mr. President, I come back to the Assembly, and your rôle in reactivation. This is the only European public forum specifically designed for security discussions. That is why your function is important and could have a key rôle in developing public understanding of the major security and defence issues as they affect the man in the street. This involves dialogue with governments and it means providing critiques of our policies to keep us up to the mark and it will inevitably involve interpreting and explaining to public opinion the significance and meaning of some of the exchanges that occur in the arcane world of European and international security discussions.

I recall the comment made by the current Chairman of the Council to my friend and colleague, the leader of the British Assembly Delegation, when asked why the WEU platform was in such incomprehensible English. It is, he said, for the Assembly to disentangle such complexities and help the ordinary public to understand them. That is the task, and I wish you all well in taking it on. There is no way that that task will become less relevant as WEU goes forward.

I look forward to the chance of a stimulating discussion with members now. We have seen a chrysalis. The old WEU is a chrysalis which has lain dormant for many years out of which emerges, we hope, an attractive and useful but-

Mr. Mellor (continued)

terfly. Certainly, I see the organs of WEU as complementing each other. Urgently, too, we must ensure that WEU does not become an alternative focus for European security discussions to the detriment of the existing organs, but complementing the work of the overall alliance, particularly in the discussions involving our friends from France, particularly in our ability to grapple with the central thrust of the nuclear policy on which our security is based.

Thank you very much, Mr. President, for welcoming me here this morning and for tolerating this contribution, with only the bare minimum of people finding greater solace in the newspapers than they found in my speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address to our Assembly and also for your readiness to answer questions.

I call Lord Kinnoull.

Lord KINNOULL (*United Kingdom*). – First, I should like to add my warm welcome to the Minister on his first visit to the WEU Assembly. I wish to congratulate him not only on his comparatively new responsibilities and the clear mastery of the subject that he has already achieved but on the positive message of hope that he has brought to the Assembly today against the background of this historic agreement which is to be signed next week in Washington.

The Minister is the first minister of whom I know to have touched upon the Gulf. The Assembly would enjoy hearing more from him about his impressions in the Gulf, more on the morale of the naval forces operating there and more on the value that he sees for future co-operation should the need arise. I am sure that we would welcome his impressions and any further comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am grateful to Lord Kinnoull for his kind words.

I think that the Gulf war is an issue that will remain with us for some time to come, and it is important, for all kinds of reasons, that we should focus on it.

My impression is that this war will not come to an early end. I am afraid that the United Nations process has been running out of steam, for two reasons. First, there is the reluctance of the Iranians principally to come to terms with Resolution 598. Thus far they have successfully been able to prolong discussions with the Secre-

tary-General showing enough positive qualities to cause some – though not to take in all of us – to be reluctant to move on to further measures, whilst making it clear that they are completely out of sympathy with Resolution 598.

Secondly, we hoped that, spearheaded by the five permanent members working together – which was a novel and welcome experience in recent months – we could have a follow-up resolution ready by now in the event of the parties backsliding, but, largely due to Soviet reluctance to engage in this, no follow-up resolution with an arms embargo has been agreed.

In my discussions in the Gulf last week I could see no early prospect of an end to the war. However, there is a prospect of the war spilling over to other parts of the Gulf and bringing into it countries not currently involved. This will be gravely damaging to all our interests. All of us have large trading relationships with Gulf countries. We depend to a greater or lesser extent on them for our oil, as well as a ready, willing and friendly market for our manufactured goods. Some of us – particularly the United Kingdom – have long ties of history and friendship. That means that we cannot abandon our friends in their hour of need, and we would not do so.

But the Iranians cynically feel themselves free to attack any one of the 500 merchant ships that at any time are in the Gulf. We cannot let it be seen and caricatured as a significant issue for the United States to get involved in the protection of interests that matter as much to us and, indeed, should matter not only to us but to the rest of the world community – third world as well as first world nations, nations that do not have navies as well as nations that do.

We are asking our forces in the Gulf to perform a difficult task. The British Armilla patrol, which consists of three front-line warships, has accompanied three hundred and twenty ships through the Gulf this year. Some seventeen million tonnes of shipping has been accompanied in the last three months, almost all of it on constant procession through the Strait of Hormuz at action stations, which, as those who have been sailors know, is the most debilitating way to proceed, as no one is allowed a moment's relaxation. We have the example of the Stark to guide us when we consider whether relaxation can be justified. We are asking our naval forces to do a difficult but crucial job. It is a job where still there is a great deal to be done by the rest of the world community, particularly having regard to the number of ships that can still be attacked because they do not have protection.

On mine-sweeping, which is the key WEU interest, I warmly welcome the decision to send the European mine-sweeping force. It is a humanitarian gesture, because there can be no

Mr. Mellor (continued)

more disgusting and vile act than to lay mines in the path of innocent shipping. I believe that our WEU force – although perhaps the closest integration has been between the United Kingdom, the Belgians and the Dutch, but we keep in close touch with the Italians and the French – is playing a vital rôle. All involved have added lustre to their forces by the work that they have done.

At the moment there seems to be a lull in the laying of mines, but we have plenty of reason to think that the Iranians have large stocks, including perhaps more modern types than the rather ancient first world war mines that have been laid so far. I believe that the maintenance of our mine-sweeping forces will be crucial as a deterrent, as well as to pick up the mines that we still believe are out there.

Some people talk of the Gulf as if it were a little lake that could be cleared of mines in about a week. The answer is that it is a large area and there is a great deal of that area still to be covered where there are suspicions.

I am sorry if that was rather a long answer, but I think that the Gulf war is something that we have perhaps ignored for too long. We cannot ignore it now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gale.

Mr. GALE (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister of State has offered the Assembly the wide-ranging and thorough assessment that those of us who know him have come to expect as a matter of course. Therefore, it seems almost churlish to suggest that there was an omission from what he said, but there was. It is a subject that I think is of great interest to what he described as the man in the street.

The Minister of State will be aware that the thirty-second annual report of the Council of Ministers to the Assembly contains a mere six lines of reference to the subject of terrorism and that the first part of the thirty-third annual report contains no reference to terrorism. That fact was the subject of some criticism in the chamber yesterday.

Will the Minister reaffirm that the defeat of terrorism is of the greatest interest to the Council of Ministers? Will he confirm that it is not only a proper but a vital matter for consideration in this Assembly as well as by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament? Will he seek to ensure that a restatement of the Council's position on terrorism is placed back on the agenda? Perhaps most importantly, will the Minister condemn all those who, through negotiation and deals with terrorist organisations, give credi-

bility to their cause and encourage their activities, their murderous attacks and their taking of hostages?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Yes. We find ourselves once again confronted with terrorism on a grand scale, with the emerging evidence that one, and perhaps two, large airliners have been blown out of the air by terrorist action in the last week alone. None of us can afford to drop our guard. All the countries of the civilised world must stand together against terrorism in our deeds as well as in our rhetoric. For instance, when we in the United Kingdom found clear evidence of high-level involvement of members of the Syrian Government in a cynical plot to blow up an El Al airliner packed with innocent people, we took action against the individual responsible and the country. We were glad of the support of our European partners.

If we do not all hang together – as the English saying goes – on an issue like this, surely then we shall hang separately. We cannot effectively combat terrorism when by terrorism one means not just individual bands of outlaws but also states which as a key part of their foreign policy sponsor and support terrorism and gain benefit for themselves through their links with terrorism. It is clear that some countries are committed to state-directed terrorism and every time that we give them credibility by becoming engaged in discussions with them on those issues we lead them to believe that they can profit from those activities.

That is why I believe that unity is strength. If we are to purge terrorism from the face of the world, we must not only be tough with the individual terrorists, but with those who offer the terrorists support and a haven. Until we do that, the terrorists will exploit the incoherence in our national response, so we should take every opportunity to restate, in deed as well as in word, our total abhorrence of terrorism. I hope that that opportunity will be taken once again at the summit in Copenhagen and at any appropriate WEU forum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Minister, you have already partially answered my question which is specific and concerns the regrouping of the bodies making up our organisation. When he spoke yesterday, the French Foreign Minister expressed clear reservations to say the least on the collocation of the organs of WEU and NATO in the same place, that is in Brussels. If my memory is correct, as I

Mr. Close (continued)

believe it is, this Assembly never became Americanised when NATO was only a kilometre distant at the Porte Dauphine. The French Foreign Minister's argument therefore seems misconceived and without substance. One could, in fact, turn it round and claim, as I believe you have done, that it would be beneficial for us to be close to NATO. Since, moreover, Brussels is the headquarters of the Commission of the European Communities, our presence in that capital would add defence to the political dimension. I would like to know your views on the subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I associate myself completely with what has just been said. The fact that I answer briefly does not mean that I have no great thoughts on the matter. I agree with everything that Mr. Close has said.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In welcoming my friend and colleague, Mr. Mellor, can I ask him why he made no reference to the considerable budgetary problems of the United States and their implications for European and alliance defence? Is he aware that the United States expends some 50% of its budgetary outlay on defence for the defence of Europe within NATO and has an expenditure on defence of 6% of GNP, whereas Western Europe as a whole spends only 3.7% of GNP? Surely 374 million West Europeans with an aggregate economy of \$3.5 trillion need not depend quite as heavily as they do on 241 million Americans with a GNP of only \$1.9 trillion. As the Americans are expending in dollar terms ever more on their 325 000 troops stationed in Europe, as a result of the ever-growing decline of the dollar, should not we in this organisation devote much more attention to taking some of the burden off their shoulders?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – There is a great deal in that. We have recognised it in the United Kingdom by increasing defence expenditure by 20% in real terms during the lifetime of the present government. The proportion of our GDP spent on defence – at 5% – is pretty much equivalent to that in the United States.

The extent to which we in Europe bear the burden of our own defence is sometimes under-

estimated. I hope that I made clear the extent to which we contribute to our own defence, but plainly we have to be aware of America's budgetary problems. We hope that the principal targets for budget cutting will be easier to decide as a result of agreements that we hope lie within our reach. The last place to start would be the front-line defence of Central Europe.

If the Americans ask why we do not do more, we must reply that one of the central functions of WEU is to discuss the European pillar, but we cannot let the Americans get away with suggesting that only altruism keeps them here. Let us be clear that the Americans are in Europe to defend their own interests. America without Europe is inconceivable. America needs Europe for its commercial activities and for the rôle that it sees for itself. Even viewed from Kansas and Iowa, America cannot exist as a world power without a strong Western European axis.

There is sometimes unhelpful rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. We are in bed together because being in bed together is the only way that we can be. The sooner people realise that fact, the better.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I may be under a misapprehension, Minister, but I thought that at the end of your speech you relegated the Assembly to a public relations rôle. I had hoped that the Council of Ministers would listen to us as well as telling us what to put about. Perhaps you would like to correct my impression if it is a wrong one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am sorry that you got that impression. – I shall check the text, but I mentioned a range of other matters as well. I said that the function of WEU must be closely tied to the need to develop public understanding. That is certainly right. However, I also said that your function involved a dialogue with governments and providing critiques of our policies so that we could keep up to the mark. More power to your elbow in that regard.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Some points can be clarified by the dialogue.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister has just said: "More power to your elbow." The revitalisation of WEU will involve the concentration of agencies, which may release more funds for the use of the Assembly. I should like to ask the Minister a specific question. Will he be prepared to try a little bit of British parlia-

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

mentary practice and allow the detailed discussion of the budget to take place between politicians – our Presidential Committee – and ministers, rather than being conducted second-hand through civil servants and ambassadors? Frankly, we do not believe that the nuances that we are trying to get over ever get to ministers. Will the Minister give some thought to that possibility? I think that it would be a welcome step.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – During my time in office, I have tried to develop close links with parliamentarians in my country, led by you, Geoffrey, because I think that we must be a seamless web. After all, the object of organisations such as WEU is to draw us together and not to provide further opportunities for dissent and fragmentation. I will certainly give serious consideration to what you have said. If the Assembly feels strongly about the matter, it ought to be addressed by the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

The final question will be asked by Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*). – You spoke about nuclear forces and referred to the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. I should like clarification of the word “independent”. You said that the United Kingdom independent force was attached to the allied force. How independent or integrated are the United Kingdom nuclear forces?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – They are independent in the sense that they are United Kingdom forces which exist, in the last analysis, to defend United Kingdom interests. Of course, it is inconceivable that any United Kingdom interest would not be the interest of the broader confederation of states with which we are in alliance. I must leave my friends from France to speak for themselves, but that is our view.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly for your address and your replies to the many questions. The Assembly is most grateful to you. I take the opportunity of wishing every success to the British presidency which will start on 1st July 1988.

5. Military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1118)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the military use of computers – towards a joint European defence research programme and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1118.

I call Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for having drawn delegates' attention to this report. The hour is late and the time for its presentation may be ill chosen. I am somewhat used to the fact that the discussion of techniques and technology in a parliamentary forum never evokes much surprise, though whether this is due to indifference or unqualified agreement I do not know. What I am sure about on the other hand is that there is a serious lack of understanding of this subject which is characterised by a difficult juxtaposition of technology and politics.

However, a fundamental question has to be asked – should we remain blind to the situation which I have attempted to outline in the report before you? The report contains some quotations from the EDIS report compiled by a European defence industry study team on behalf of the IEPG defence ministers which shows clearly that the European defence industry is competitive in almost every equipment sector with exceptions including electronics, which is an area vital to a wide range of future developments in defence hardware.

For many years, figures, comparisons and tables published in specialised journals have been drawing attention to Western Europe's backwardness compared with its main competitors, the United States and Japan.

Perhaps I may mention a few items nevertheless. France regards itself as being in the forefront of development in the military research field, but in very high-speed integrated circuits it is currently working on one micrometre chips whereas the Americans are simultaneously using a 0.5 micrometre chip for their own programme. This means that we are at least two years behind. At the present time approximately two hundred supercomputers have been set up throughout the world and the figure is likely to reach a thousand by the early 1990s. These very powerful supercomputers used in the military field are the

Mr. Fourré (continued)

future's most important tool. Japan had no share of the world market in 1981 but by 1986 it had acquired 40%. Europe has produced none to date.

On software, Europe used to be well placed. Ada machine language, which is recognised as originating from France, was even adopted as the national standard by the American Defence Ministry, but today the situation has changed entirely and the United States has 50% of the world market and two-thirds of the European market. Nor is Europe's position any better with regard to semiconductors, which are properly referred to as the crude oil of the twenty-first century. According to an American defence committee report the United States' share in this world market dropped from 67% in 1975 to 50% in 1986 whereas Japan's share increased from 25% to 39%. This progress was, of course, achieved at the expense of European and American companies. Western Europe's share dropped from 12.3% in 1978 to 8.5% in 1982.

The table given in paragraph 94 of my report is also significant and marks the patterns of development of the major world semiconductor manufacturers based on sales volume. In 1975 the top European company was in fifth place; by 1980 it had climbed to number three, but by 1986 it had fallen back to seventh place. My remarks are also borne out by two other tables in the document. Of the twenty-five leading world computer manufacturers in 1985, the leading European company occupies the eleventh place on the world computer market.

This situation has already been considered by the Assembly. In 1985 we examined a report and then adopted Recommendation 419, which unfortunately produced only fine words but very few commitments.

The Hague platform has nothing to say on this subject, which I personally regret. However, the realisation of the situation is perhaps real. The speech made by the Secretary-General of WEU the day before yesterday points in this direction, even if efforts are still very modest.

I will quote two examples to illustrate my scepticism. First, after a delay of nearly a year, the European Council reluctantly adopted last September a framework research programme for an amount well below our expectations. Second, the technological programmes instituted in the IEPG framework receive far lower budgets than national resource programmes.

In recent years Europe has, however, taken several timid steps towards co-operation. For example, to meet the technological challenge of the world market, the European Community has drawn up a framework research programme

which is highly competitive in a number of important areas. Everybody knows about the Esprit and Race programmes, which are strictly non-military, and outside the Community the Eureka programme is attracting attention. This is very different in character and encompasses primarily industrial projects as it is the firms themselves which are evaluating the market openings to be targeted.

Lastly, since 1985, several sectors have been involved in co-operative, technological projects dependent on IEPG, and as you know these are government funded. Bilateral and multilateral co-operation agreements also exist, but these operate only between individual countries or companies and cannot necessarily be regarded as forming part of a truly European policy. Despite this movement towards co-operation, it must also be noted that there is still a tendency to give priority to national programmes.

It is a fact that all, or nearly all, Western European countries are pursuing one or more data technology research programmes. Although they are all aware that the size of their national markets cannot support the enormous costs of research, development and marketing, which are essential to achieve a solid position on the international data-processing market, they nevertheless devote the largest part of their resources to such programmes, and all of course hope that their industry will achieve a position as an efficient and sought-after European partner.

The position which has developed over the last few years therefore represents a mosaic of national markets side by side with a homogeneous American market to which European manufacturers have difficulty in gaining access, while the European market is barely accessible to the Europeans themselves, such is the force of the relevant standards and of certain protectionist practices.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what answers can we produce to these problems known to us all? We have an Esprit programme which subsidises particular programmes but nonetheless remains dominated by political whims and narrowly nationalist objectives. We also have a Eureka programme which is admittedly much less confined but lacks a predetermined programme since it is closely dependent on decisions taken by industry.

I personally think that we should pursue the course of multilateral co-operation with simultaneous research conducted under bilateral or multilateral co-operative arrangements within the Community or outside, but sustained by a political will.

In this forum in which all the WEU countries desirous of participating in such an initiative are associated, we have the potential to promote a

Mr. Fourré (continued)

truly joint European research programme on defence issues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to put on record on behalf of the committee our appreciation for the most excellent work that Mr. Fourré has done, which is of great significance for European security. He has worked long and hard and, of course, capacity in computers is of fundamental importance to the operational effectiveness of our joint armed forces and is an essential element of the European defence industry. May I add on behalf of my committee our wholehearted approval of his work and the appreciation with which we hope the Assembly will unanimously endorse it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1118.

In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft recommendation contained in Document 1118 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft order in Document 1118.

In accordance with Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft order in Document 1118 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously².

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution, Document 1116, addendum and amendments).
3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1111 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.50 p.m.)

1. See page 28.

2. See page 29.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 2nd December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
 2. Adoption of the minutes.
 3. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, Mr. van der Sanden, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Fourré, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Russell Johnston.
 4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Notes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments*).
- Speakers:* The President, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman*); Mr. Stoffelen (point of order); Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Scheer.
5. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1111 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pécriaux (*Rapporteur*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Muller, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Declercq.
 6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for an address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

I bid you a cordial welcome, Minister. This Assembly is already very familiar to you. You were indeed a member for many years and the reports which you prepared are very well remembered.

I wish to express my thanks for the major part you have played in the reactivation of Western European Union to which you attach such importance. The Presidential Committee has witnessed the energy of the Netherlands presidency during the first six months of its mandate and I again express my gratitude on behalf of the whole Assembly. I now invite you to take the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELLEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – It is an honour for me to be in the Assembly again, where I see many old friends. I have always attached great importance to the work of the Assembly. The quality of its work and its reports is excellent and I am happy to be here this afternoon.

No one can doubt that the defence and security policy of the European nations is in a state of flux. The number of bilateral and multi-lateral consultations has increased considerably in recent years. Western European Union was reactivated and published its platform on European security interests. The discussions on the security implications of the double zero INF outcome made us once more aware of the complexities of western defence policy.

¹ See page 33.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

The Western European countries, together with their North American partners, are engaged in a serious debate on security requirements and disarmament opportunities in present-day circumstances. There is nothing wrong with that. On the contrary, the alliance would be ill-served if recent developments were left without reflection and discussion.

First, our present security and defence policy is strongly influenced by the breakthrough in the INF negotiations and possible progress in other fields of arms control.

During the ministerial sessions of the Eurogroup, which I chaired last month, it became clear that the European allies were 100% behind the INF agreement and that our faith in the NATO strategy of flexible response was undiminished. My colleagues have authorised me to go to Washington to make clear to United States senators that the Eurogroup ministers favour a speedy ratification of the INF treaty. I have already informed my new American colleague, Mr. Carlucci, who appreciated our position. The conclusion of an INF agreement reinforces the need to elaborate a comprehensive concept of arms control, as was emphasised during the meetings of the Eurogroup on Monday and the DPC on Tuesday and this morning. Such a concept should integrate on the one hand the need to negotiate a stable balance of nuclear and conventional forces at the lowest possible level and, on the other hand, the continued viability of our military strategy.

Secondly, the present situation is characterised by the far-reaching impact of advanced technology. At the strategic level this leads us to an assessment of strategic defence and its implications for East-West relations, the nuclear deterrent and the cohesion of the alliance. At the same time, the application of new technologies has important implications for the procurement of armaments for our conventional posture.

We are obliged to make our contribution in answering these questions to have due recognition of the European security dimension but without undermining Atlantic solidarity and cohesion. This is all the more important against the background of the relative decline of national security consensus since the late seventies in several European NATO countries. The discussion on European security co-operation is also a search for more public support that leaves behind the rifts of the years past.

The military realities offer no easy way out for NATO or for the European allies. The conventional disparities have not diminished. Nuclear reductions, however important as a result of arms control, render more important still the

conventional force comparisons in Central Europe. But conventional defence improvements have to be realised in conditions of severe budgetary constraints; real growth of defence expenditure will be limited.

Western European Union in recent years has played an increasing rôle in the discussion of our future security policy and it should continue to do so. In this respect the platform is an important mark. On the one hand, it contains a number of base-line convictions. The platform sets out the indivisibility of the alliance and it stresses the fact that security of Western European countries can be ensured only in close association with our North American allies. Furthermore, the platform underlines that, to be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces. Given Soviet conventional superiority, only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with unacceptable risks.

Against that background the platform welcomes an agreement on the elimination of land-based INF missiles. I do not agree with the recent Financial Times report on the post-INF situation which concluded that "Europe pines for the good old days". Because of the contradictory reactions to the INF agreement the European allies were even compared with a battery of fevered frogs.

For my part, I fully agree with Lord Carrington's recent statement that we are mature enough to accept a good disarmament success if we have one. A positive element of the INF agreement is the asymmetry of reduction, which reflects the existing imbalance of forces between East and West. The principle of asymmetric reductions, which has evidently been accepted by the Soviet Union, should be applied to other facets of arms control as well, particularly to the conventional negotiations. Moreover, an INF agreement does not affect the improvement and modernisation of nuclear systems in Europe, which was initiated in 1983 by the Montebello decision.

In dealing with the conventional imbalance, we shall be faced with a particularly difficult problem. We should aim at reducing the Warsaw Pact capability for massive and surprise attack which rests upon its superior numbers in tanks and artillery. Enhancement of our security would require deep reductions and asymmetrical reductions. I think that we should start informing our public of these stark realities.

Apart from the base-line convictions that I mentioned, the WEU platform presents a number of challenges. In European defence policy we should always realise that Western

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

European Union is essentially a political body. There is no integrated military structure of WEU. Therefore, WEU is not in a position to decide upon or to implement strictly military measures. We can and must, however, concert our views on defence in order to facilitate and enhance military co-operation within the integrated structure of NATO, or to stimulate bilateral co-operation.

The discussion of Europe's contribution to western defence forces our nations to come to terms with military realities. WEU member states perform their military tasks in one geo-strategic theatre. Their political approaches and economic interests are converging. Therefore, they bear a special responsibility for bilateral and regional defence co-operation in Europe. In this respect the growing French-German military co-operation as it recently has been evolving is most promising. It is important that France and the Federal Republic have underlined the European perspective of their co-operative endeavours. Participation by other countries is, I understand, not excluded. At this moment Western European Union is not the body to take over this kind of initiative. We should not try to create something like a WEU brigade – a Weurobrigade. WEU should, above all, be a forum for exchange of information and for stimulating bilateral or multilateral arrangements for European defence co-operation.

It is therefore important that the European partners are kept informed about the French-German brigade and the common defence council. The same goes for out-of-area issues such as the maritime presence in the Gulf area – and here we can take a further step. There is no WEU naval force under integrated command in the Gulf. But the contribution of Western European Union in enhancing political and military co-ordination of the various national activities is positive. We should continue and further develop that co-ordination. It can serve as a model for future operations.

Apart from political and military operational advantages, European defence co-operation is worth while for economic and efficiency reasons. The concept of European defence forces us to put our own house in order. We should, for instance, look for opportunities of common performance of similar military tasks and joint training and exercises. There have been some promising experiences in this respect. The Netherlands, for instance, has a long tradition of maritime co-operation with the British. We are also studying opportunities for closer Benelux co-operation. I have already referred to the German-French co-operation.

We should not be too reluctant to consider new approaches to defence co-operation. The

alternative is waste by duplication, lost opportunities of economies of scale, ever-rising costs and, in the end, what is called structural disarmament.

Before regional defence co-operation can be successful, some mutual suspicions must be overcome. Sometimes the wish for co-operation is a barely disguised effort to get rid of certain defence burdens. On the other hand, we can no longer confine ourselves to national solutions. Of course, this holds true for smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium, in particular. One of the promising trends is that the bigger nations, too, are increasingly coming to the conclusion that, for political, economic and military reasons, closer defence co-operation is the only way. From the outset, however, it has to be clear that our goal is "more output for the same input" and not a free ride at the expense of our neighbours and allies.

In this way the debate on European defence can sharpen our attention for efficiency and effective resource allocation. In the spring of 1988 the Netherlands will host an expert seminar on aspects of resource management problems. In the first place, financial budgetary aspects of defence planning will be discussed at this seminar. Secondly, attention will be devoted to the growing problem of manpower planning of our armed forces. Thirdly, the development of defence technology will be discussed. I appreciate the vivid interest that the Assembly has in the military application of advanced technology. I refer to the report on the use of computers by your Rapporteur, Mr. Fourné. The report deals with matters of substance – which technologies do we need? – and with the organisation of technology development – how do we finance and produce new technologies? In this respect, the report makes some interesting suggestions, such as the establishment of a joint European defence research programme. It is to be hoped that such proposals will be discussed not only in this Assembly but in the national parliaments.

Apart from the management of military resources, we should pay attention to the macro-economic dimension of European security policy. Western Europe should maintain and enhance a European defence industrial base, as is eloquently recommended by the European defence industry study (EDIS) of the IEPG. Europe should remain able to produce technologically complex defence systems. Much remains to be done in this respect. The process of economic integration has had a beneficial impact on the pooling of investments and research and development capabilities. Nevertheless, the defence equipment market is still far too much divided along national lines. We should create an open European defence equipment market in which competitive consortia can operate in commercial conditions. National governments

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

should no longer protect their cherished defence industries. The long-term benefits of one big, homogeneous home market are self-evident. The report on a joint European research programme, presented by Mr. Fourré, is a welcome contribution that is in tune with the recommendations of the EDIS report.

Here I should like to touch upon the institutional problem of Western European security policy. We should use all available European forums. In the longer run, however, the European Community cannot do without a security dimension. Industrial, monetary and internal market policies, defence and foreign affairs cannot be treated as separate segments of the European union: they are closely interrelated.

The single European act gives some formal opportunity for maintaining the economic and technological conditions for the security of the member states. Prudently and without jeopardising the institutional balance of the EEC, we should explore the possibilities of removing existing impediments. For the time being, however, Western European Union and of course the Independent European Programme Group will continue to play important rôles.

An interesting insight into the relationship of WEU and IEPG can be found in Mr. Bassinet's report on European armaments co-operation, which the Assembly will discuss tomorrow. This politically provocative report offers an adequate description of the difficulties that we face in European armaments co-operation. However, the situation is not as bleak as is sometimes suggested. We must realise, first and foremost, that the different forums of European armaments co-operation are to be used in a complementary and not in a duplicating or even conflicting way. With respect to the operationalisation of the European defence industry study, that means that the action plan, based on the recommendations of the study, should be drawn up by the organs of IEPG, in accordance with the decisions made by the IEPG ministers at their Seville meeting last June. On the other hand, we should not exclude the possibility of WEU conducting specific supportive studies for IEPG, if IEPG makes a request to that end. Problems that arise or delays that occur should, as a general and self-evident rule, be solved by the organisation responsible for the implementation of ministerial decisions.

WEU must define its own rôle in European armaments co-operation. It should concentrate on the more general aspects, such as the broader context of economic and technological co-operation among the governments of the Seven. Another subject for discussion could be the study

of co-operative opportunities in the use of space for security purposes. Furthermore, we could explore the harmonisation of operational concepts as a prerequisite for and a stimulus to successful armaments co-operation.

In many respects governments give preference to IEPG as the primary forum of European armaments co-operation. In a way, IEPG has been doing the work that the founding fathers of WEU envisaged to be the task of the Standing Armaments Committee. Therefore, we should review the position of the Standing Armaments Committee, which has not met since late 1985.

In addition, the working methods and procedures of WEU have drastically changed since the revitalisation of 1984. Many activities are being conducted under the aegis of the special working group, in which officials of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence convene. Regularly in the context of the special working group meetings are held to discuss aspects of defence policy. The armaments co-operation activities of WEU should become an integrated part of this structure.

It is also crucial to develop further relations between WEU and IEPG. The Assembly could discuss the ways and means to enhance the public debate on all aspects of European armaments co-operation, including those within the competence of IEPG. There is no institutional link between the Assembly and IEPG, and in present circumstances we should not aim at establishing any formal relationship. Nevertheless, the Assembly could, for instance, invite the acting Chairman of IEPG to address the Assembly in order to exchange views, as is proposed in the draft recommendation of Mr. Bassinet's report. As far as the presidency is concerned, we shall support such an invitation by the Assembly.

Western European Union has made considerable headway in defining European security and defence interests. Base-line convictions have been laid down in the WEU platform. Future challenges have been defined. Together we are responsible for each country's continued contribution to western defence. Together we must demonstrate our determination to defend any member country at its borders. Together we must investigate ways and means to realise a more effective use of existing military resources. Launching a platform is one thing but to use the same metaphor, we can be satisfied only if WEU is put into orbit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You kindly agreed to answer questions, Minister.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. van Eekelen for his thoughtful and serious con-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

tribution. He mentioned the Franco-German brigade proposal and touched on various areas in which there has been co-operation. He also mentioned the Gulf and he will know that there has been some publicity about a lack of integration of various naval forces in the area. That public perception may not be accurate – we cannot say – but will the Minister accept that if the public are fully to appreciate the work of WEU there will have to be further co-operative developments and a greater awareness of the level of co-operation that has existed in some areas for many years?

The Dutch Marines and the Royal Marines have co-operated in Norway for many years, but future developments cannot rest on calls for an open defence market or publicity about the development of the Franco-German brigade. The Council of Ministers will have to make firmer arrangements for inter-force co-operation at all levels. Otherwise, many of the calls that are being and have been made will be seen to be false and frustrating calls.

What steps does the Minister expect the Council to take over the next two years to ensure that there are developments within the alliance in addition to the Franco-German initiative?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – Mr. Hardy has raised an important point and I agree with the gist of his remarks. I, too, think that we should do our utmost to improve co-operation through concrete projects. However, over the past year, especially, much has been done. I mentioned the Franco-German co-operation, which goes much further than was envisaged until recently.

The offer of the French Government to the Netherlands Government to allow training of our mechanised brigades on French territory is another welcome example of bilateral co-operation.

Mr. Hardy mentioned the Gulf. Perhaps we have not gone as far as some members wished or as far as I would wish, but what has been done in the Gulf is unprecedented. Belgian and Netherlands ships are working under joint command outside the NATO area, with close tactical co-ordination and protection from the United Kingdom's Armilla patrol. I hope that that co-ordination will gradually extend to Italian and French forces in the area.

It is a step-by-step process that we should encourage and cherish. It takes time, but it is a bit like watching grass grow: if you watch it, nothing seems to happen, but if you turn your

back the lawn needs cutting by the end of the week. The examples of co-operation that I have outlined are of great importance to public opinion and we should continue to help them along, provided – here I speak as a practical Dutchman – that they are militarily useful. We should not engage in actions that are only of symbolic value, valuable though symbols are from time to time. Over the longer term, military significance must be the primary consideration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank the Minister for his interesting statement. I have two questions directly connected with what he has said.

I noted with great interest the Minister's remark that we should review the position of the SAC, the Standing Armaments Committee. In my report and also in my reply to the Assembly yesterday I was assuming that the SAC would occupy approximately the same position as the three agencies that have now been merged into one. This was the Council's decision. The SAC has – as the Minister himself said – not met since 25th September 1985, though a few fairly small working groups have been active to some extent. But I was surprised – and I should like further clarification – to hear that, in the prospects outlined by the Minister, the SAC is obviously not going to be abolished, as I had assumed in my report to the Assembly.

My second question concerns an equally interesting remark by the Minister. He said here in the Assembly that it should be considered how far the Treaty of Rome, the EEC treaty, needs to be revised to take account of the position with respect to European security. This is precisely what I was afraid of earlier on. In 1984 we heard of the decisions taken in Rome to revitalise WEU. At the time I was the Rapporteur on the thirtieth annual report. The Minister will remember the time. I have now been the Rapporteur on the thirty-second annual report. On both occasions I said we did not want to be used as a temporary instrument to make up for the absence of European political co-operation, EPC. To be honest, I must say that the Minister has now worried me slightly with the remarks he has made today, when he said literally: “for the time being, Western European Union... will...” etc. I am very worried about this. I should like a further explanation from the Minister.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall try to answer Mr. van der Sanden in his own language.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

His first question concerned the Standing Armaments Committee. I want to make it very clear that I was talking about this as Chairman of the WEU Council, because, where the substance of the matter is concerned, I agree with Mr. van der Sanden. The Netherlands believes that the SAC can now be abolished and its tasks and activities transferred to the special working group. But this decision has yet to be taken in the Permanent Council of Ministers. That is why I said the matter still had to be reviewed.

As regards the EEC treaty and WEU's position in it, I would point out that the Luxembourg single European act emphasises that countries wanting to go further in the area of security co-operation can use WEU for the purpose. Now it is a matter of opinion whether this is regarded as a permanent situation or as a gradual merging of the two. I myself have some hope – although I will admit that this is at best a very long-term prospect – that European political co-operation and WEU can eventually merge where security aspects are concerned. On the other hand, I admit that the immediate prospects of this are not good. What I said was in no way meant to imply that WEU's activities, which have just been so satisfactorily revitalised and will continue to be so, should be regarded as very temporary. I hope we can agree that this state of affairs will undoubtedly be maintained for a good few years and that we can later discuss in greater depth the ultimate objective which will then be discernible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask a question which I asked your colleague who, rightly, referred it back and said that I should put it to you. If a minesweeper from nation N were to be sunk by Iranian action, do the armed ships there carry any sealed orders that would authorise them to take immediate action? I do not ask what the action would be. I do not wish to know. I should merely like to be assured that the governments concerned, through WEU, have considered this and know what they would do and would not have to spend forty-eight hours looking for a solution before coming to a decision.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – This question requires a somewhat lengthy answer: I cannot just say yes or no, because in the participation of the five WEU countries in the Gulf activities there is a difference in the intensity of contacts and co-operation.

The Italian vessels in the area have a different mission from the others. The Italian task is quite directly the escorting and protection of Italian vessels, escorting them if necessary all the way to their destinations in the Gulf. The other naval ships have different missions. They are aimed more at providing either a protection in a general area, or, as in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, are restricted to clearing certain areas of mines.

Your question, Sir Geoffrey, applies particularly to these joint operations by mine-sweepers in the direct vicinity of frigates or other kinds of naval vessels. As the Belgian and Netherlands task group, we have made a very good arrangement with the United Kingdom and the Royal Navy, and that is still in being in those areas where there is a threat, be it by air or surface, to our mine counter-measure vessels, so that we are protected by the Royal Navy. We have to be clear that in such circumstances, when we operate in a particular area as a joint decision, the Royal Navy will treat our Belgian and Netherlands mine-sweepers on the same basis as they treat their own Royal Navy mine-sweepers, so there is no difference in protecting them if something occurs. I hope that I have responded sufficiently in that context. With either Italy and France no such arrangements have been made.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, I read in today's *Le Monde* that Frank Carlucci, the American Defence Secretary, said he hoped that negotiations between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe could start in 1988. "We hope" said Carlucci, "that the United States proposal will be approved by the allies by the end of this year so that we will be able to present a joint position at the beginning of next year." My question to you, Minister, is should the European countries in the Atlantic Alliance simply endorse the American proposal for the reduction of conventional weapons or should they not, rather, work out a common platform for those negotiations – for discussion of course – in order to hammer out a common position with the United States? In the latter case, do you not think that time is very short and that the governments of the European countries of the Atlantic pact therefore need to take the initiative immediately?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – The answer to that question is yes. I shall explain why. The foreign ministers of NATO, when they met in Reykjavik earlier this year, agreed that we needed to establish what

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

they called a conceptional framework linking arms control and defence needs. It is important that we Europeans make an input into that conceptional framework because, after all, it is on our territory that, we hope, that conventional balance will be restored.

On the other hand, it is clearly in the interests of the alliance to do that within an alliance framework. For us Europeans that is probably the most important item on the agenda in our consideration of East-West relationships to bring about a good position on conventional arms control.

First, we have to agree a mandate for the conventional stability talks now taking place in Vienna. However, time is running out. We have to reach agreement within the next few months.

The second problem is the substance of our position. I have already indicated that I see as our most important task the drafting of proposals to induce the Warsaw Pact to make the same kind of asymmetrical conventional reductions that we have negotiated in the INF agreement – perhaps even more asymmetrical.

I have seen a study that says that if our security is to be enhanced we not only need deep cuts and not symbolic measures but cuts in the tens of thousands discussed in the MBFR context. That study says that anything less than one in five is insufficient and does not increase our security.

If that is so, we first have to agree it among ourselves, and then we have to try to negotiate something like that, which will not be easy if it is asymmetrical in those terms.

I agree that this is probably the most important item for next year, and I hope that the WEU Assembly will also be able to make known its views on that point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Some colleagues had very high hopes that WEU would take a much more effective rôle after the Rome meetings intended to reactivate this body some four or five years ago. One really cannot say that those hopes have been realised. I would say that they have been dashed. We have some money, but not enough to make the contacts that we could make, and we worry endlessly about small budgetary matters as well as big. We have no power – I am not sure that we want power – but we should like to feel that we had some influence.

One is bound to wonder what is the real effect of our reports, no matter how carefully we write or debate them. In view of the very last words of the Minister's speech, the very last phrase that he used, how does he think WEU genuinely can be reactivated in such a way as to play the part in the defence of Europe that we would all wish?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – I understand Lady Jill Knight's preoccupation, but I think that the picture that she paints is not as bad as all that. Personally – but then I speak as a Minister of Defence – I think that WEU has taken a tremendous step in enlarging the ministerial deliberations from ministers for foreign affairs to include ministers of defence. To give an example, these meetings twice a year are some of the few opportunities that I have, in a multilateral context, to discuss security questions with our French colleague. In that way we have given ourselves a tremendous advantage. This is the only place where such discussion can take place. I see my colleagues in NATO at least four times a year, but of course the French Minister of Defence is not present. So I find the revitalisation of WEU of great significance on that score.

Secondly, during the past six months of the Netherlands' presidency – of course the Luxembourg presidency had already done excellent preparatory work – we had two examples. First, we had the platform. Six months ago even the most enthusiastic members of this Assembly would not have expected the platform to have been ready in such a short time after the first ideas were voiced in this Assembly a year ago. You should not underestimate the importance of this Assembly in that process either. In addition, the practical military co-operation in the Gulf is not ideal. I have already said, in response to Mr. Hardy, that we could have managed even closer co-operation than we have achieved, but I am confident that, step by step, we shall manage to improve it. We also need the help of this Assembly, so that in your countries you will say that considerations about emphasising the national rôle should be less significant in determining activities in the Gulf.

We all share the opinion that we should be neutral in the conflict. We are directing our activities against no one. Our only purpose is to ensure safe passage through important international shipping routes. That is all we are doing, and we are showing that is also a European interest. After all, our existence to a large extent rests on safe imports of oil from that area. I think that European responsibility there is important.

Finally, as I tried to make clear in my speech, it is in the political underpinning of these activ-

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

ities where I see a particularly useful rôle for WEU and the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In this frank and thoughtful speech, which I greatly welcomed, the Defence Minister of the Netherlands mentioned arms control and armaments collaboration.

On arms control, is he apprehensive about the force of 55 Soviet SSC-4 cruise missiles with a range of 3 000 miles? Does he feel that these ought to have been included in the INF agreement? If that force were to grow, what action would he suggest to the other members of the Council of Ministers?

Secondly, on armaments collaboration, should Europe go further in naval co-operation? In particular, does the Minister believe that we have moved far and fast enough towards bringing the eight-nation NATO frigate for the 1990s – the NFR 90 – to project definition?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – I share Mr. Wilkinson's anxiety about the development of these cruise missiles with a fairly long range. We shall have to watch that development closely. I do not think that technically it can be brought under the INF agreement, because that specifically refers to the various categories of ballistic missiles involved and the cruise missiles on the European side. One thing that we have to watch for with such an agreement is that it is not circumvented by other weapons systems taking over the rôle of the ballistic missiles, as these cruise missiles could. We have to keep a watch on that.

Naval co-operation is very important. Unfortunately, it is a subject that has shown a number of failures during the passage of history. However, I think we now have a chance. This naval frigate for the 1990s seems to meet the needs of at least eight countries, and that is on an unprecedented scale. We in the Netherlands are favourably inclined to join in that development. Unfortunately, there have been some delays as a result of the fact that one country, and then two countries, felt that a final decision on the design still had to await further clarification of the air defence system on the frigate. We in the Netherlands hope that it will be possible to conclude a memorandum of understanding, leaving that feature for further consideration.

The answer is yes, this is a very promising co-operative subject. It will be of great advantage to the European ship-building industries, too, if

we manage to standardise our requirements, and it will be of great benefit to the ministries of defence if, as a result of economies of scale, the price of the ship is less than it would otherwise be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – May I first thank you, Minister, for your words concerning the report which I presented to the Assembly this morning. I owe you double thanks because this is the second occasion on which I have presented a report on a highly technical subject relating to the whole future of micro-electronics and its influence on military forces. I have the impression that there is a general indifference on the subject in this Assembly as elsewhere.

Without wanting to labour the point and without wishing to malign the seven members at the sitting when I presented my report, which received their unqualified approval, I asked myself this morning whether this was a case of indifference or of unqualified agreement. This morning's vote gave me the answer – it would seem that it received unqualified support, though also with a measure of indifference on a subject which seems to me vital to the construction of the Europe we want, especially in the military field.

You referred to a number of points in my report, Minister, but I would be grateful if you would give us your opinion on my proposal which has now been unanimously adopted by the Assembly and which calls for the launching of a joint European defence research programme associating round the WEU member countries all the Western European countries wishing to take part.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – I entirely agree with Mr. Fourré on the importance of this subject. Technical details are often difficult for politicians and you have had a hard though perfectly accomplished task and have rightly stressed the political importance of these technical issues.

I am sometimes extremely surprised to note the wide diversity of communications techniques in our armies, for example. I am equally surprised to find that the air force, the army and the navy often use entirely different systems of information technology. Sometimes equipment differs even within the same service. It follows that if different hardware systems are used joint operating practices cannot be within reach.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

In principle, I am also in entire agreement with your recommendation – all the more so as the Independent European Programme Group, in the report by the wise men which I mentioned in my introductory remarks, has also stressed the need for a common research programme which has the full support of the Netherlands. Unfortunately, no agreement was reached at the group's Seville meeting in June, but I am certain that this recommendation will be on the orders of the day of the next meeting as it represents an obvious need.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – May I say how pleasant it is to see an old friend and a former valued member of the Assembly occupying such an important place. I am sure that we are all delighted about that.

The Minister rightly referred to the imbalance of the forces between East and West. There is now a certain amount of superficial euphoria in the media and elsewhere about the movement towards the control and abolition of nuclear weapons, which we welcome. In view of that, does he agree that it is now more important than ever for us to show the commitment and political will, as members of Western European countries, to redouble our efforts to arm properly where conventional forces are concerned? He mentioned how this has been eroded because free countries have many commitments other than defence, which has always been regarded as an insurance policy. Given the move towards the reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, does he not feel that it was never more important to reaffirm the need for a proper, up-to-date conventional force that can obtain parity with the East?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – Yes, I agree with Sir Dudley, whom I thank for his kind remarks. I also agree with him that the need to address the conventional imbalance is greater than ever.

There are various ways of dealing with this problem. On the one hand, there is arms control. I have already gone into that. That would be the most desirable way because it would potentially enhance our sense of security in the best feasible fashion. However, things have changed since we were looking at MBFR fourteen years ago, unfortunately without success. We are now talking about security between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals. To me, that means that we can no longer use the exclusive criterion of manpower. It is now necessary to go further and to discuss

weapons systems and, especially, tanks and artillery, which play an important rôle in the invasion capability of the Warsaw Pact – the capability for large attack and surprise attack at the same time. That is why I said that we must focus on that and, if we are to manage that, these reductions really must be asymmetrical.

On the other side of the coin – Sir Dudley referred particularly to this – are our efforts in the meantime to strengthen and improve our conventional forces in Western Europe. We must be sober enough to admit that large quantitative increases are probably not everything. Five European countries are now meeting the NATO challenge of 3% real growth. A few have somewhat smaller growth, including my own country, and some countries have a zero-line budget. In those circumstances my emphasis is twofold. In the first place, we must try to round off programmes that are already in execution so that they will make the best possible contribution. With ships, aircraft and tanks, we should see that they are equipped with the necessary weapon systems or sensors. We should try to round off a particular force contribution to the common defence.

Secondly, if there is additional money, we should concentrate on what NATO calls the conventional defence improvements. NATO, with all its shortcomings, has had at least one important achievement in the past three years to define in a better way than ever before priorities for defence spending. In the past, NATO priorities were often a shopping list of all three major NATO commanders together and now they have pinpointed what they regard as the highest priorities. For example, in the case of my country, that is clearly air defence, anti-tank weapons and bringing up to level ammunition stocks. That gives me a tremendous support in a national programme and in defending a national budget based also on real growth. You put it into a multilateral framework and make it clear to your public that that is the best way to spend limited resources.

My clear preference is to continue setting improved priorities for conventional defence and to include armaments planning in a multilateral context so that the smaller countries know what will be done in the alliance, what possibilities are emerging, what decisions should be taken and when equipment will become available. We need that framework to make our plan more useful.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I associate myself with the congratulations offered to the Minister on his very constructive remarks. Has he given any thought to the fact

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

that if balanced conventional force reductions are successful, as we all hope, they will take place against a background of generally high unemployment in Western Europe and will presumably contribute to making it even higher? What longer view does the "practical Dutchman" take of that fact and of the pressures that it will produce on the disarmament process?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – I am worried about unemployment, especially as we have a high rate in the Netherlands. It is going down, but not as fast as we had hoped.

I assume that Sir Russell was referring to longer-term developments. Demographic trends in Europe do not favour defence. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany is already having great difficulty in meeting its defence personnel targets and I believe that many countries will have to face a similar problem. When the children of the children born after the war grow old, the next generation will be smaller and defence will have to compete with other areas for qualified people. As defence will require even more highly-qualified people in the future, it will not be an easy battle.

The pill will have a later impact in my country than it has had in West Germany. We are secure until the mid-1990s but then we shall have difficulty meeting our personnel targets.

I hope – I admit that it is only a hope – that unemployment in Europe is a fairly short-term problem and that in the 1990s we may again be looking for people to fill jobs. It may be said that new technological developments will require fewer workers, but I hope that the problem posed by Sir Russell will not be so serious in the long term. Anyway, if our security is enhanced by arms control measures, they should take precedence over economic considerations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you, Minister, for this interesting and fruitful exchange of views.

I ask for your understanding of our obligation to carry on with our work. I know that with your dedication to democratic parliamentary principles you will not object if we proceed, bearing in mind the size of the task confronting us.

I repeat my thanks and hope that the Netherlands presidency which will come to an end at the conclusion of the first half of 1988 will prove entirely successful.

4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution, Doc. 1116, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now resume consideration of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116, addendum and amendments.

As the Rapporteur spoke this morning, I now call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I should just like to make a few comments on the debate we have had and on the report that I hope we shall be approving in a moment. I will begin by reiterating the sincere thanks extended to the Rapporteur by the committee for the work he has done.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe the style of the political debate we have had today – and the Assembly noticed this yesterday as well – has been gratifying. We have debated objectively and fairly and, without emotively enflaming existing disagreements, we have had an objective exchange of views on them. This is remarkable, and the goal referred to by the Rapporteur when he began the presentation of his report, namely a consensus, has thus been largely achieved.

We should all take up this offer of a consensus in the very near future, and I believe we shall again find we have a great deal in common when we discuss the report by Mr. Stokes tomorrow. The common ground in the Assembly of Western European Union is one of the reasons why we are taken seriously in the Council, and those members of the public who are interested certainly judge us by the extent to which the emphasis is placed on this common ground, without glossing over other questions.

I should now like to make a few comments on questions that have been put. Mr. Reddemann questioned whether we, the committee as a whole, approved of the Rapporteur's intention to recommend Brussels as the seat of WEU. I would like to explain that this was the Rapporteur's opinion. The Assembly has taken it out of the draft recommendation with an appropriate amendment. We are still considering together where the seat should properly be, without ruling out Brussels.

We have also discussed the question of new members. After agreeing on several occasions that Spain and Portugal should join Western European Union, we also concluded in our discussions that the two countries should be treated

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

separately if that is what they want. Portugal should not be left standing at the door simply because we are not yet sure if Spain wants to become a member at the moment. They are separate countries, each has the right to be treated separately, and they naturally set store by that.

This is the eve of an important day, the day on which the INF treaty is signed. I think Mr. Reddemann was right to stress – this accounted for a major part of our debate, after all – that the vast majority believe the INF negotiations would never have succeeded if there had been no NATO twin-track decision and therefore no temporary arms build-up. This should cause us all to stop and think.

The second thing I should like to emphasise is that, while we have had a heated debate here on SDI, almost leading to a split, even the Soviet Union is now taking a calm, relaxed view of SDI, in stark contrast to its original nervousness.

These are two facts that should cause us to stop and think about our forthcoming political activities. I say this without taking sides in any way.

As Mr. Baumel's and Mr. Wilkinson's speeches have shown, we constantly question what is now going to happen about conventional armaments and what will become of the conventional imbalance once the INF treaty has been signed.

Ladies and gentlemen, now that the INF negotiations have been concluded, what we must do – and here again I feel we should emphasise the common ground rather than constantly focusing on our differences – is to consider how Soviet conventional superiority, the real existing danger, can now be reduced. After all, we now have no means left, no lever to force the Soviet Union to agree to conventional disarmament. We can now only wait for the Soviet Union to prove how seriously it takes Europe's security.

The Rapporteur put forward some ideas on structural changes, for instance whether we should make structural changes without disarmament or, as he thought, structural changes should be accompanied by disarmament. He also had some – somewhat philosophical – reflections on the effect which the Soviet Union's conventional superiority would have on the economic imbalance between East and West, if the Soviet Union took advantage of its conventional superiority.

I agree that this should be considered, but I would issue one warning. The ministers' statements in particular have shown that there is agreement in Western European Union, and the platform, which cannot be praised highly

enough, demonstrates the recognition that the emphasis must now be placed on conventional balance, however one likes to put it. In view of the massive superiority of the Warsaw Pact, even thinking about the concept of "conventional balance" is very daring in the European situation, but it is important not to forget it.

In defence policy one thing is important for us parliamentarians: we in particular have a duty constantly to remind the Council of Western European Union of the fine and outstanding declarations it adopts and the deeds that follow. It is an important matter of credibility not only that agreement be reached at meetings on all the things that need to be done, but that there should be mutual checks a year later to see what has actually been done in the past twelve months on the basis of the decisions jointly taken. This would certainly cause even some members of the Council of Ministers to blush, unless of course they are now far too professional to be capable of it.

We have a favourable basis on which to work, one that is relatively encouraging. We have had over forty years of peace in Europe, not least due to the partnership between Europe and America. This indicates that any thoughts of, say, strengthening WEU without the Americans are suicidal rather than realistic. We must constantly stress – and this is extremely important, in order to give the Americans this certainty – that we want to strengthen the European pillar through WEU, without in any way casting doubt on Europe's urgent need for co-operation with America and for the American presence. This must always be kept in harmony, so as to avoid any puzzling confusion about the alleged possibility of a European military power emerging to face the potential adversary, the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

The starting position is also relatively encouraging for us, because European integration has made progress, European political co-operation has provided the basis for a common European foreign policy and some successes are discernible in the definition of the security policy identity of the European NATO members. If it is then repeatedly emphasised that it is only natural for a Europe that is growing in strength to assert its own interests, without there being any conflict between European unification and the Atlantic Alliance, what we are saying, rightly I feel, is that the two complement each other, that the two are mutually indispensable.

Ladies and gentlemen, the report before you is a fair one. This is apparent, for example, from the fact that it was adopted unanimously in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, with, I think, just two abstentions. I would be pleased if this report, which must be seen as a complement to Mr. Stokes's report,

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

were to be regarded as an area of common ground for the future and if we always appreciated that it remains our task to give the Council constructive encouragement to achieve – as I said just now – goals which it has set itself.

If we approve this report today, we shall have together helped to ensure that Western European Union and above all its Assembly are doing their duty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Kittelmann.

We now have to vote on the draft recommendations and the draft resolution in Document 1116 and addendum. I shall therefore invite the Assembly to vote, in order, on the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, the draft recommendation on disarmament and the relevant amendments and finally the draft resolution on the INF treaty.

We shall first proceed to vote on the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council in Document 1116.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put to the vote the draft recommendation replying to the thirty-second annual report of the Council.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now take the draft recommendation on disarmament in Document 1116.

I have been advised of twelve amendments and one amendment to an amendment. These will be considered in the following order: Amendments 5, 6 and 7 by Mr. Pieralli; Amendments 1 and 2 by Mr. Eisma; Amendments 8, 9 and 10 by Mr. Reddemann; Amendment 4 by Mr. Soell; Amendment 3 by Mr. Eisma; Amendments 11 and 12 by Mr. Reddemann; and the amendment to Amendment 12 by Mr. Scheer.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In fact, Mr. President, the order would be for the amend-

ments to be treated separately, Amendment 12 and then the amendment to the amendment. I have them in a different order. I think that you would be advised to reorganise several amendments and then have Amendment 12.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, the procedure is very clear and my proposals are fully in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. We shall first vote on the first eleven amendments and will then discuss Amendment 12 and Mr. Scheer's amendment to Amendment 12. The vote will be taken in the reverse order – first on the amendment to Amendment 12 and then on the amendment.

Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Pieralli reads as follows:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, place paragraph (i) after paragraph (vi).

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if you will allow I shall speak in support of my three amendments to save time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have in fact two more Amendments, 6 and 7, also tabled by Mr. Pieralli. They read as follows:

6. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out "progress on a properly verifiable INF agreement" and insert "the agreement".

7. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out "should" and insert "must".

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – My purpose is to lay maximum emphasis on the treaty on the destruction of intermediate missiles which will be signed in five days' time in Washington. The treaty is beneficial to the Atlantic Alliance as it means eliminating a category of weapons in which the Soviets have marked superiority.

There is a double advantage. As Lord Carington remarked at the meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Oslo, the Soviets were preparing to replace the SS-20s by more modern and effective missiles.

I would add that public opinion in our countries is now far more confident in this agreement and in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit generally, and I therefore suggest that from the start the recommendation should underline the importance of the agreement. The paragraph relating to the INF treaty should in fact be updated as it concerns not merely an agreement but an already established treaty.

1. See page 34.

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

I emphasise that my proposals are framed in the same spirit in which the Assembly requests that the United States Congress ratify the treaty as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 5?

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We could accept the substance of what the author of the amendment is seeking to achieve. But it must be remembered – Mr. Pieralli probably could not have known this – that the committee has submitted an additional opinion, which is to be put to the vote. This opinion is headed “Motion for a resolution”. The text was originally submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, then taken over by the committee as a whole. The idea is that it should be adopted separately. It deals exclusively with the INF agreement. As that covers everything, I do not think any more is needed. I would therefore keep the original text, but in conjunction with the text I have just mentioned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You propose therefore that Amendment 5 be rejected?

What is the committee’s opinion on Amendments 6 and 7 which have already been supported by their author?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In view of events, Amendment 6 should of course be adopted. I also recommend the adoption of Amendment 7.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In the circumstances I withdraw Amendment 5 and maintain Amendments 6 and 7.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 5 is withdrawn.

I therefore put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

I now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

I should now take Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Eisma which reads as follows:

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Urging the United States Senate to advise and consent as a matter of urgency to the ratification of the INF agreement;”

However, the committee has adopted a draft resolution on the INF treaty which is contained in the addendum to Document 1116. In the circumstances I ask the committee whether the amendment is not now pointless.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if the additional amendment, which was unanimously approved by the committee, is adopted here as well, Amendment 1 would be superfluous. It would not then need to be considered further.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As the amendment is not moved, we shall not consider it.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Eisma reads as follows:

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after “ABM treaty” insert “in its traditional interpretation”.

Does anyone wish to speak in support of this amendment?...

As the amendment is not moved, it will not be examined.

Amendment 8 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others reads as follows:

8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, leave out “in different armaments and forces”.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, paragraph (vi) concerns the search for ways of removing imbalances and asymmetries. The committee’s draft contains a restriction. It refers to different armaments and forces. This might lead to the assumption that the proposal is for the search to be confined to certain armaments and forces. I therefore request that the words “different armaments and forces” be deleted to make it clear that we want these studies to relate to all armaments and forces.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We should keep to the original text. It is quite clear that the text concerns all weapons. There is a quite specific reason for the reference to “different armaments and forces”: we realise, of course, that not all the various aspects can be dealt with at the same time or even, in some cases, at the same level of negotiation. This has basically emerged from the negotiations in Vienna on a mandate. The discussions will not, of course, concern worldwide disarmament nor, probably, as I said this morning, all categories of weapons at once. The criteria vary. This is to some extent a description of the basis for a differentiated negotiating process, without of course committing it in any way. That is the point at issue here. This is not a question of principle. The thinking behind the wording is as I have just explained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

Amendment 9 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others reads as follows:

9. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation on disarmament, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting in this connection that in Prague on 10th April 1987 General Secretary Gorbachev confirmed the existence of such imbalances and asymmetries for historical and other reasons;”

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, different views have been expressed in the Assembly on the question of whether there are asymmetries within the defence forces of the two camps. Where the Warsaw Pact is concerned, we now have the very clear statement made by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10th April 1987. Although I certainly do not want to call Mr. Gorbachev as a witness for everything conceivable, if he admits to an asymmetry in the Soviet Union's favour, I feel we should point this out in the report, so as to save ourselves possible arguments in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The quotation referred to is correct. One problem is that the following

passage – I do not have the text with me, so I cannot quote it verbatim – says something like “where such imbalances exist”. I would therefore ask you to consider this: we should not assume from the outset – as Mr. Stokes's report also points out – that there are imbalances in every area to the West's disadvantage. This could in effect cause a breakdown in the negotiations at the very time when they are to begin again.

Now, this sentence does not make it clear on which side the imbalances exist in each case. The situation does in fact vary from one category of weapons to another. The situation differs as between land forces and naval forces and as between Central Europe and other regions. I am therefore opposed to Mr. Reddemann's appraisal. But as this appraisal is not as conclusively stated in the text, and if it is considered in rather more neutral terms, it might be acceptable. I am only opposed to misunderstandings arising.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 9 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 9 is agreed to.

Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others reads as follows:

10. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “in Europe” insert “and the various regions concerned”.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is an interpretation which is surely acceptable even to those who have so far disagreed with what I have proposed. The amendment concerns the question of balance, which may differ substantially from one region of Europe to another. I therefore propose that instead of speaking generally of balance in Europe, we should refer to Europe's various regions. I hope the Rapporteur will be able to agree with me in this case.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur and I agree that this amendment should be approved. I would just point out that as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has not discussed these amendments, neither the Rapporteur nor I can do more than give our personal opinions. This also explains the variation in the way we have voted. In this case, as I have

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

said, we are agreed, and support the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 10 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 10 is agreed to.

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Soell reads as follows:

4. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, leave out “with priority to negotiations on the Central European region”.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move the amendment in place of Mr. Soell.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have nothing to say except that the words “with priority to negotiations on the Central European region” are to be deleted from the end of paragraph 1.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would normally be sceptical, but as we have now adopted Amendment 10, which refers to “various regions”, and have thus made it clear that there are problem regions of a particular type, the amendment can be approved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Eisma reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “ABM treaty”, insert “in its traditional interpretation”.

As Mr. Eisma is not here to move the amendment it will not be considered.

Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others reads as follows:

11. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, after “military strategy” insert “and doctrine” and leave out the words to the end of the paragraph.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Even if I am now at odds with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I have the impression that this recommendation goes on rather too long and yet fails to refer to an important aspect, military doctrine. Although the Rapporteur explicitly emphasised this aspect in his presentation yesterday afternoon – and I therefore hope to have his support – I believe we could delete everything after the clear reference to military doctrine, because it merely repeats what is said elsewhere. Or to put it another way, the wording of the text is slightly unclear, with the result that I at least do not quite understand what the committee wanted to say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – If it is just the insertion of the word “doctrine”, I would have to ask about its meaning. If it means military and technical doctrine, I could understand it, but if it means ideology, I would strongly oppose it.

The amendment causes another problem – leaving out the rest of the paragraph. The rest of the paragraph is extremely useful. I cannot understand how the committee could accept an amendment to delete essential words.

I cannot understand the amendment. It must be completely illogical. Therefore, I oppose it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?...

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I feel – and I can now say this on behalf of the whole committee – that the wording should be left as it is, especially as we have now deleted a distinction elsewhere, despite my opposition. We have the same problem here. Here at least the wording is so clear that everyone knows what it is about. It should therefore be left as it is. Otherwise, the text will become rather too simplistic. It would then simply be a general manifesto with which it would not be so easy to work. I therefore ask you to leave things as they are.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 11 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is negatived.

Ladies and gentlemen, following paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, I have Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and

The President (continued)

others, to which Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen have tabled an amendment.

In accordance with Rule 29, paragraph 7, of the Rules of Procedure we shall first discuss Amendment 12 and then the relevant amendment thereto. The vote will be in the reverse order.

Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Reddemann and others reads as follows:

12. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper on disarmament, add two new paragraphs:

“Call on the Warsaw Pact to renounce its offensive military and technical doctrine and give its armed forces a structure clearly designed for defensive purposes and which does not allow it to undertake an offensive against other countries;

In the framework of disarmament, ensure that in each case both sides make reductions to the lowest level.”

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this concerns a structural problem posed by the Soviet military doctrine, a structural problem connected with the overall defensive strength of the Soviet Union and eastern bloc. I just want to make that clear. I do not think I need explain this proposal further.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – If I may, I would rather speak in favour of the amendment to the amendment then against Amendment 12. In fact, they belong together. I would be in favour of the adoption of Amendment 12 if the amendment to the amendment, which I will explain straight away, is added, because it is needed to round things off.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I first ask your opinion on Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Reddemann. I have already said that Amendment 12 would be discussed first, followed by the amendment thereto. The Rules of Procedure provide for voting in the reverse order.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The amendment to the amendment has, as it were, been triggered off by Amendment 12. The fact of the matter is that, if Amendment 12 and the amendment to the

amendment were adopted, the recommendation would on the whole be more rounded out.

What we have here in principle are two problems which make this virtually the crux of the recommendation. On the one hand, the aim is to overcome the offensive strategy pursued by the Warsaw Pact, as opposed to NATO's defensive strategy. So, the Warsaw Pact will owe us something during the negotiations.

The second problem concerns technical resources that can be used for offensive purposes, in other words, weapons systems which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have. This is not true of the whole arsenal, but there are aspects of the arsenal of weapons – NATO's as well as the Warsaw Pact's – which give rise to this fear of offensive capability, even though our strategy is defensive.

The amendment to the amendment therefore begins by proposing that the Warsaw Pact – as Mr. Reddemann suggests – should be called upon to review, to change its offensive strategy. It then calls on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to work towards the renunciation through negotiation of offensive technical capacities, because simply changing the strategy does not, of course, help at all if arms potentials point in another direction.

The amendment to the amendment also stresses – I have almost finished – the objective, which is the creation of mutual non-provocative confidence-building defence structures. I feel it would also be in the interests of the author of the amendment if it was rounded out in this way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I advise you that under the Rules of Procedure if the amendment to Amendment 12 is agreed to and Amendment 12 is negated, the two texts fall.

Mr. Scheer and Mr. Stoffelen have tabled an amendment to Amendment 12 proposed by Mr. Reddemann and others. It reads as follows:

In amendment 12 to the draft recommendation on disarmament, after “countries;”, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Call on NATO and the Warsaw Pact to renounce offensive technical capacities in favour of the creation of mutual non-provocative, confidence-building defence structures;”

I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I move the amendment to Amendment 12.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment to Amendment 12?...

The President (continued)

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, I now put to the vote the amendment to Amendment 12.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment to the amendment is agreed to.

I now put to the vote Amendment 12 as amended. I inform the Assembly that if this amendment is not agreed to the amendment to it becomes irrelevant.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 12, as amended, is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation on disarmament.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I put to the vote the amended draft recommendation on disarmament.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution on the INF treaty in the addendum to Document 1116.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I put to the vote the draft resolution on the INF treaty in the addendum to Document 1116.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is adopted².

1. See page 35.

2. See page 36.

5. Recent developments in Soviet external policy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1111 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on recent developments in Soviet external policy, Document 1111 and addendum.

I call Mr. Pécriaux, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, to present his report.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report I present on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is entitled “Recent developments in Soviet external policy” and has been unanimously adopted by our committee.

The purpose of the report is to consider to what extent the changes which have taken place in the last two years in the style of Soviet diplomacy also relate to its aims and methods and to study how WEU and the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in general can and must react to the new Soviet external policy. The reactivation of WEU has caused Soviet authorities to give some thought to the present and future of this organisation.

It fell to the General Affairs Committee to suggest to the Assembly the political conclusions to be drawn from the exchanges in Moscow of April 1987 between the Presidential Committee delegation and a delegation of the Supreme Soviet.

However, this report does not look at disarmament, which has been dealt with by another Assembly committee. It is accompanied by a draft order which instructs the Presidential Committee to pursue the dialogue started in April 1987.

Disarmament is currently a matter for the United States and the USSR, and, whether we like it or not, Europe has no direct part in the negotiations. On the other hand, it is directly involved in other aspects of détente, so that the WEU Assembly can properly make recommendations in this area. This required an analysis of the current Soviet situation aimed at identifying the factors behind the new direction taken and the forces in opposition as well as the relationship between the line publicised in ideological terms and the policy actually conducted in the three contexts of internal Soviet reform, European questions and issues outside the boundary of Europe.

During the seventy years since the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet ideology has undergone considerable development, definition and change but it has not always been possible to know how

Mr. Pécriaux (continued)

the trend should be interpreted. These ambiguities have not been removed by Mr. Gorbachev. On assuming power he appears as the representative of the new generation nearest to power at the opportune moment.

In an important passage of his speech to the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Mr. Gorbachev outlined an entirely new concept of the relations between capitalist and communist countries: "The prevailing dialectics of present-day development consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of the world community."

This does not mean that the USSR is giving up its key positions, its domination of the people's democracies, its activities on the world chess board, its propaganda efforts, its security objectives or its determination to play the rôle of a world power.

It is no longer a question of using peaceful coexistence to prepare for war but of using it to organise peace. As soon as the West seeks to develop its relations with the USSR and its allies, these relations become, at least in the expressed view of the chief Soviet leader, a factor for peace and not of confrontation.

Naturally the West cannot base its own security policy merely on the words of the Soviet leaders but must judge the realities behind these words. In recent years Soviet diplomacy has been most actively concerned with European affairs, especially with regard to disarmament. One of its objectives is to eliminate any risk of conflict in the region so as to ensure calm for its period of economic and political change. It wishes to redirect its investments and to develop its external trade with both Eastern and Western Europe. However, even if they are perfectly sincere, Soviet disarmament proposals are also a propaganda instrument designed to weaken the cohesion of the West.

It is notable that Soviet policy with regard to CMEA – the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – has been reactivated.

Similarly, it will be recalled that the Helsinki and Stockholm conferences brought about progress on matters of security and co-operation and that the USSR made it clearly understood that it wanted to develop East-West co-operation in the areas of science, technology, transport, energy and agriculture as well as displaying interest in the Eureka programme. More and more the Soviet authorities are seeking to promote mixed enterprises to encourage the participation of western capital in their economic

development and no doubt also to promote their exports to the West.

However, there are two obstacles to the development of such co-operation – economic espionage and the extent of activities with military associations in the Soviet economy.

This rapid glance at internal reforms, European questions and economic relations brings us to the issue of Soviet policy outside Europe. One paragraph of the report deals with the Middle East, and another with the Far East.

Perhaps I may say in conclusion that Mr. Gorbachev's administration is giving Western Europe an exceptional opportunity to consolidate peace and make progress. But Europe must not buy these results either at the cost of any sacrifice of liberty or at the expense of its security.

The rôle of WEU, the single European organisation with competence in defence matters, is to make known the requirements of European security at a time when the two superpowers appear ready to reach an understanding on the limitation of nuclear weapons.

Disarmament must not be limited to intermediate-range nuclear weapons but must extend to strategic, conventional and chemical armaments. It must lead to an equilibrium and allow of genuine verification.

Détente cannot be limited to disarmament but must aim at bringing the two halves of Europe together on the basis of the principles defined in Helsinki.

The search for peaceful solutions to the crises in parts of the world outside the NATO area is essential to the maintenance of peace within Europe itself. This is not a matter limited to the two superpowers but must necessarily involve the active and autonomous intervention of Europe.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a draft order accompanying the report instructs the Presidential Committee to pursue the exchange of views started in Moscow in April 1987. For us, this is a way of projecting the voice of Europe rather than that of the individual nations in the East-West dialogue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pécriaux.

The debate is open.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I start by complimenting Mr. Pécriaux on a wide-ranging and interesting report. It covers an enormous amount of ground and I believe that he has done the Assembly a great service. He

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

ranges from technology to human rights and no one could quarrel with his assumptions. That was indicated by the fact that the draft recommendation was unanimous. That is not always so in this organisation.

However, we must be aware of three criteria. First, there is no evidence that the basic elements of Russian foreign policy have changed since the days of Peter the Great. Communist commissars do not differ in that respect from Tsarist ministers. This is not in any way condemning what is happening at the moment. It is merely being realistic. All Soviet moves on glasnost must be seen in that light.

Secondly, how much freeing of the log-jam has taken place so far – the release of dozens from the gulags, leaving how many tens of thousands rotting away and the granting of a few score of visas to refuseniks, leaving how many thousands of all religions still persecuted for their desire to believe in God? Are the citizens of the Baltic states allowed to resume their independent status, which was so brutally and illegally stolen from them in 1940? Are the people of Poland allowed their free trade unions or, indeed, free elections? How much importance is really attached to human rights in a meaningful way?

Nothing that I have said is intended to denigrate what Mr. Gorbachev has said and done so far, although I do not think that anyone would quarrel with me if I were to say that he has said rather more than he has been allowed to perform so far. I say "allowed" because Mr. Gorbachev is engaged in a game of chess and he does not know the moves that other elements within the Soviet Union will let him make in the end. Of course, we must seize every opportunity of helping him to achieve progress in those fields which will benefit all mankind, East and West alike, but not if it will be an unbalanced benefit for the East.

Thirdly, why are moves being made? Why has there been an apparent change in Soviet policy since the age of the old men? Clearly, Mr. Gorbachev was able to persuade his colleagues in the Politburo that the Soviet economy could not sustain military expenditure at its present high level and deliver to its citizens even some of the benefits that had been promised by communism over the past seventy years.

Mr. Gorbachev has staked a great deal on achieving various disarmament measures. His very future may depend on a form of payment by results. He will have to show those in the Soviet hierarchy who are suspicious of him that he is able to achieve results that could not be achieved by those who believe that the old policies are more likely to benefit the Soviet Union. As Mr.

Pécriaux's report says, it must be in the West's interests to co-operate as far as we can, commensurate with our safety and with our overwhelming belief in the right of men to have their freedom, irrespective of the form of government under which they live.

I have painted a gloomy picture. The efficient eastern propaganda machine has been able to make a great impression in the West because too often we respond rather than say what we believe. If we walked into the streets of Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin or any of our capital cities and asked the average citizen why the INF treaty was being signed, would he know? Would he know that a decade ago the West said that it would not deploy cruise and Pershing if the Russians did not put in SS-20s?

We know that the only reason why we went on burdening ourselves with extra weapons was that the Russians were not prepared to cease stationing SS-20s and the like in positions that were dangerous to the West. The Soviets win the propaganda battle all along, even though the West has a better story to tell. I do not wish to be too provocative, so I shall say instead that our story is as good as theirs, but we do not tell it.

The only aspect of the contribution by the Dutch Defence Minister this morning that disturbed me slightly was that he did not seem to be too keen to have a propaganda machine talking about the achievements of WEU unless there were lasting military achievements, such as the signing of the INF treaty. I believe that if WEU is to do its job, it must point out time and again that it is working to get a form of security in Central Europe that will satisfy East and West and is not neglecting the fundamental issue of human rights. How many of our citizens know that?

The Assembly has been starved of funds and that may be one reason why we are not putting out these stories. However, the Secretary-General's department and the Minister's department have not been starved of funds, yet still we hear so little.

Will any colleague put up his hand if he has received from WEU over the past two years any piece of paper setting out its achievements? I do not believe that anyone has had such a piece of paper. I certainly have not, yet every month I receive a four-page sheet from the Soviet Embassy telling me what it is doing. If anyone from the Secretary-General's office is present, he might try to enlist our help in our common battle to persuade the public that we are doing a valuable job.

I do not believe in making long speeches and I have only one more thing to say. Mr. Pécriaux's report and speech were masterpieces of balance and common sense. We have to continue on the

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

same path, with flexibility and safeguards. Those safeguards can be reduced or eliminated only when we have cast-iron replacements in place. Words are not enough; we need deeds. Sometimes, too much thought paralyses action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think I can readily support what the previous speaker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, has just said, and endorse Mr. Péciaux's excellent report, because it really is a good review of recent developments.

While supporting the previous speaker, I would like to focus on something of which we should always be aware when we are considering Russian foreign policy. I am deliberately not saying "Soviet foreign policy" but "Russian foreign policy". We should realise that we must consider not only the ideology contained in the word "Soviet" but also the long-term strategy, the long-term objectives of Russian foreign policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, since the days of the brothers Orlov's squadron, which sailed out into the Mediterranean during the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia's desire to command the straits, the warm Mediterranean seas, has been a basic ingredient of its foreign policy. If we observe Russia's foreign policy through the 19th century until the October revolution and what followed, we shall detect a certain degree of continuity, only briefly interrupted ideologically by Lenin's pronouncements on the right of the peoples to self-determination, and other pronouncements which constituted exceptions and were very soon followed by a return to the standard line of Russian foreign policy.

It is really surprising that hardly any other country in Europe has so consistently pursued the same foreign policy for decades and centuries. Remember, for example, that the secret protocol appended to the Hitler-Stalin pact set out in precise terms the guidelines for the interests of Russian foreign policy in the Mediterranean in particular, the Middle East, the Gulf and even the east coast of Africa. Remember that at the conference of foreign ministers held in Paris after the war the Russian foreign minister demanded that the Soviet Union be given the mandates over the former Italian colonies. Its aim was to have a base at Massawa in Eritrea, a base obtained there long ago by the Soviet Union as a result of its long-term policy.

Or think of the Soviet Union's ultimatum to Turkey even before the war was over, demanding military establishments and bases on the Darda-

nelles. This has clearly been Russian policy for decades and centuries.

Many aspects of current Soviet policy in the third world – I have mentioned Eritrea, for example – show that the Soviet Union is still pursuing these long-term Russian foreign policy objectives.

In recent months, however, we have been experiencing something completely new to the West. We are seeing a Tsar, a General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, attempting to pursue Russian foreign policy with media ideas and western media techniques. And, ladies and gentlemen, this foreign policy of his is extremely successful! If you look at the opinion polls in my country, the Federal Republic, and other European countries, you will see that most people – the man in the street, as they say – are convinced that it will be primarily due to Mr. Gorbachev, not some western statesman, if disarmament negotiations and peace talks now get under way. The opinion polls in the Federal Republic reveal that Gorbachev is believed to have a greater desire for peace than, say, the American President.

This is indicative of the many years of experience of the western media world gathered by Mr. Dobrynin, the new man responsible for foreign policy in the Central Committee, the Soviet Union's party apparatus, who was ambassador to the United States for twenty years. Mr. Dobrynin – I once had the opportunity to talk to him for two hours in Washington many years ago – is a shrewd man who knows exactly how policy can be made in the United States with the help of television, for example.

It is surprising that the book Gorbachev has written on perestroika has become a bestseller in the United States. He did not, of course, publish it through the central publishing house of the Communist Party in Moscow but through a capitalist publisher in the United States, to ensure that it would be marketed properly.

Mr. Gorbachev is capable, for example, of admitting in a television interview transmitted yesterday something that has always been denied by the Soviet Union: that the Soviet Union, just like the United States, is conducting research into SDI or space weapons. He does this with a smile, on television, in such a friendly way that instead of seeing it as a threat one gets the feeling that it is "business as usual", just as when the prime minister or president of a western country makes the same kind of statement before the television cameras as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did in this case.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am surprised that the public in the United States, for instance, should blow hot and cold like this. For many years the

Mr. Müller (continued)

Soviet Union or Soviet politicians were seen by the public as what I would call absolute Beelzebubs. Today they command a completely different position. This rapid change from one position to the other is something that worries me, because I feel it is necessary in such situations to keep a clear head, which means neither disparaging nor admiring anyone unduly.

Nor are we careful enough in our use of the language, the terms. Let me give you an example. When the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, Mr. Yeltsin, was dismissed, the headlines in my country read: "Yeltsin voted out of office". Ladies and gentlemen, no one was voted out of office in Moscow, he was dismissed. But terms like this are not used any more. The terms that are taken for granted in our democratic systems are used instead. Here he would have to be voted out of office or resign. These terms are used for the processes of a different system, which helps to obscure the facts, so that the reality is no longer seen.

There have been one or two interesting statements from Mr. Gorbachev which have in fact made it clear that not a great deal has changed. There was, for example, an interview with the editor of the French communist newspaper *Humanité*, in which Gorbachev was asked about the state of pluralism of opinion in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's answer was – rightly – frank: We do not have pluralism of opinion, we have socialist pluralism of opinion. But of course that is quite different from what we understand by pluralism of opinion.

When asked if there were any political prisoners in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev answered: No, there is not a single political prisoner in the Soviet Union. All this under the heading of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, two terms once used even in Lenin's day. They are by no means new inventions.

Let me give you one final example. You know that a major problem in the relationship between the Poles and Russians – I repeat: Poles and Russians – is the tragedy of Katyn, the fate of the Polish officers captured during the war and liquidated by the Soviet NKVD, because the Soviet Union marched into Poland from the East at the beginning of the second war. *Perestroika* should mean telling the truth about this. But what is happening? A Russo-Polish commission has now been set up to look into the matter.

The first interim report, which appeared in the organ of the Communist Party of the Federal Republic, *Unsere Zeit*, on 30th October 1987, states that the commission had agreed there was fresh and much stronger evidence that these Polish officers had been killed by "gangs of

fascist German murderers". I am a historian, ladies and gentlemen, and I am now taking a completely non-political view of this event, simply as part of history. But how can there be a new beginning, how can there be greater honesty – in the relationship between Poles and Russians, say – without a willingness to accept certain historical facts of this relationship which were disagreeable.

If you read Gorbachev's speech on the seventieth anniversary of the October revolution – I have done so: it is a very long and wide-ranging speech – it must be acknowledged that attempts are being made to achieve a new position, but that Gorbachev is being extremely cautious about making genuine admissions. When reference is made to the thousands of victims of bureaucracy under Stalin, it should in reality be to the millions of victims of a whole system installed by Stalin.

So Gorbachev is very cautious in his statements. Perhaps he has to be because his own apparatus, the apparatus from which he comes is still unable and unwilling to grasp all the disagreeable events that have occurred in the history of that great European country now known as the Soviet Union.

I therefore feel – and here I agree with the previous speaker and the Rapporteur – that we must be frank, that we must be prepared to talk, but that in these discussions we must never forget where we stand. We are representatives of democratic countries, who stand up for freedom and human rights. We must always introduce these demands for freedom and human rights into the discussions, even though we are all convinced that everything possible must be done to preserve peace and reduce the stockpiles of weapons. But this must not be allowed to make us forget the great objectives that distinguish us as democracies: freedom, human rights and human dignity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report that Mr. Pécriaux has put before our Assembly today describes in a full and convincing manner the most important aspects of significant developments in Soviet foreign policy over the last few years.

Naturally, divergent opinions could well be expressed about some of his judgments and views but the fact remains that this is a highly praiseworthy and comprehensive study and deserves the approval of our vote.

There is no doubt that Soviet foreign policy has undergone changes and developments in its principles and orientation during the course of

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

the last two years that could well have appeared unthinkable only a short time ago. Our Rapporteur, too, wonders whether the change is genuine. The answer cannot be simply a matter of trust, it has to be put to the test of fact, and one extraordinary fact is that in Washington in a few days' time, the United States and the Soviet Union will be signing an agreement for the dismantling of medium- and short-range nuclear weapons and will lay the foundations, or at least we hope they will, for reaching even more important agreements in the near future on strategic nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.

There is no doubt that such agreements, together with the possibility of negotiated settlements to regional conflicts and tensions, would make the climate of international relations calmer and the foundations of coexistence and peace more secure for the peoples of the whole world.

But is there not a risk that, following this agreement between the two great powers, the part of the world in which we live may find its security threatened? We should be grateful to the Rapporteur for identifying a close connection between the new direction of Soviet foreign policy and Western Europe's security because it is on that point that conflicting judgments and views remain. To my way of thinking, the point is that in some countries and certain governing parties in Western Europe old and out-dated concepts are dying hard in political and military thinking. The kind of response they see to the exciting challenge of disarmament and a new equilibrium and basis for international relations postulates a third, European, military bloc, based on the French and British nuclear capabilities and built up around improbable new alliances between a number of European countries.

Western Europe will not ensure its security in that way; instead it should be playing an active part in the disarmament processes now under way which need to be extended to theatre nuclear weapons and conventional armaments, with their balanced and controlled reduction to lower and lower levels in view. What we need on this side of the continent is a similar development in concepts and policy on how the problems of security and defence have to be formulated today, in terms of gradual disarmament, political guarantees and growing East-West and North-South co-operation.

There is one other and final aspect of the report that I feel deserves consideration, however brief. Will not these profound changes taking place in the USSR result in a stronger Soviet Union? Is it therefore in the interests of the West to lend its support to the new directions taken by the Gorbachev leadership on the inter-

national and domestic fronts? Mr. Pécriaux was very right to ask us these questions because they are at the root of the opposition and concern to which the new Soviet trend has given rise in the West. Is not this, perhaps, the reason why attempts are being made in the United States to raise the voices of groups who could like to oppose not only ratification of the agreement on missiles but also confirmation of the commitments of the ABM treaty and the political settlement of disputes from central America to the Middle East and from Afghanistan to South Africa? But what real interest could Western Europe have in obstructing this radical change of direction in the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic policy? If the reform is likely to help bring results abroad in the way of disarmament, easing of tensions and new relations of trust and co-operation and if, at home, it is a move in the direction of democratisation, political reform, the recognition of fundamental human rights and economic, social and civil development, is not all this, apart from serving the primary interests of the people of the Soviet Union, also in our own interest? Is it not in the interests of a Europe that has, for forty years, suffered too much from the effects of division and antagonism and now needs to set its feet again on the path of trust, co-operation and unity?

If, with this change in policy, the Soviet Union comes out the stronger I believe that we shall have nothing to fear because of the results it will bring in those directions. On the contrary our reasons for continuing in our efforts to ensure that the great values of peace, democracy and social and civil progress prevail will be all the more compelling.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Declercq.

Mr. DECLERCQ (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking Mr. Pécriaux and congratulating him on this excellent report. It is extremely up to date, and it contains some very interesting information.

I agree with the previous speakers who pointed out that the West and especially the younger generation see Gorbachev at the moment as a kind of angel of peace with a message that is very appealing to young people. As a result the public is currently gaining a rather distorted impression of the Soviet Union.

I find it highly appropriate that the report should consider these problems and that Mr. Pécriaux's conclusions should be very cautious. None of us can say for sure at the moment if glasnost and perestroika are empty words, words without substance, or if they will lead to real change in Russia and throughout what I will call "the Soviet Empire". But it is obvious that a negative attitude towards the openness that

Mr. Declercq (continued)

Russia is trying to initiate will get us nowhere with the public and especially with young people in the West. We must therefore look for ways to test the "good will" that the Soviet Union is showing us. We must forward formulas that supply the proof of the pudding, perhaps by once again resorting to the three baskets of Helsinki in each case. Above all, we must refer to those aspects which are surely characteristic of a democratic society and which we are entitled to require Soviet Russia to satisfy. I have in mind freedom of movement, trade relations, normally structured practical respect for human rights. What I am saying, therefore, is that, by building on the cautious conclusions drawn by Mr. Pécriaux and taking a number of initiatives, we must try to establish how sound and genuine the glasnost offensive is.

Another problem is this: I am glad that Mr. Pécriaux also discusses the Middle East problem in his report. I should like to champion the idea of Western European Union's supporting a peace conference on the Palestinian question in which Russia would take part. I know there is a tendency towards aloofness in some countries, but I am convinced that nothing will ever be achieved unless Russia takes part in a conference of this kind.

My second argument is that Russia must be involved – indirectly perhaps – in the organisation of peace in the Middle East. This will also mean that we can appeal to Soviet Russia with regard to one of the gravest dangers threatening the western world today, the movement towards integration and the spread of fundamentalism in the Islamic world. Only if we can also involve Soviet Russia in discussions on this problem shall we be able to seek worthwhile solutions. But the price to be paid – and I do not

think it is too high – is that we allow Soviet Russia to attend an international peace conference on Palestine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1111 and addendum).
2. Threat assessment (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1115 and amendment).
3. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1112).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1111 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hill, Mr. Soell, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Bordu, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Martino, Mr. Lord, Mr. Burger, Lord Mackie, Mr. Péciaux (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
4. Threat assessment (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stokes (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Speed, Mr. Soell, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Lambie, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Hitschler, the President, Mr. Hardy, Dame Peggy Fenner, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman*).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Recent developments in Soviet external policy

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Doc. 1111 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on recent develop-

ments in Soviet external policy and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 1111 and addendum.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for calling me so promptly. Mr. Péciaux, who has made such an admirable report on developments in Soviet external policy, has presented a balanced report. Some of yesterday's speeches took away my main debating platform. Certainly the problem of why the moves being made by Mr. Gorbachev at this time are being made is a matter for deep thought among the left and right of the political parties in Europe. The left, of course, see this as another bursting of a clear sun over a very gloomy Europe. They are reading so much into the present moves by the USSR that their expectations must be proving a serious handicap to Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Gorbachev has already had his problems inside Russia. The conflict between himself and the gentleman responsible for Moscow has been given prominent publicity, but most of those who have already spoken have emphasised the once bitten, twice shy political approach. Mr. Khrushchev entered a great period of détente, rapprochement and peace between the USSR and the rest of the western world. It was not until he took off his shoe at the United Nations that we began to realise that it was still the same Khrushchev beneath the surface.

1. See page 38.

Mr. Hill (continued)

We have seen the same approach from Mr. Gorbachev in his handling of the Moscow affair. He acted almost in a Stalinist manner by repressing his colleague, removing him from office and, oddly, appointing him to a less important post within three weeks. We do not know how the master chess player of politics will cope with the signing of the INF agreement.

Mr. Gorbachev had a spectacular success on American television. The NBC interviewed him in Moscow and, although the only new matter to come out was the information that Moscow was still pursuing its own star wars research, the overwhelming impression was that President Reagan, who has become almost a recluse in television terms, will have a hard battle to match Mr. Gorbachev when he plays to the American television cameras. The public relations in-fighting has already begun and even the most hardened observers agree that Mr. Gorbachev is winning hands down.

The report before us mentions Mr. Gorbachev's public relations successes, but also covers the CSCE process in which thirty-five nations are involved. Much good has come out of the Vienna meetings and the nations of WEU are determined to get a workable European security operation. The British Foreign Office Minister, Mr. Mellor, told us earlier this week about the harmonisation of our forces in the Gulf. The WEU nations are acting collectively for the first time. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union is not backing Resolution 598 from the United Nations Security Council. The Russians could be an enormous force for good in the Iran-Iraq conflict.

We are unable to make many moves towards dialogue with the Supreme Soviet because we do not want to become embroiled in a public relations campaign. Our friends in the United States do not want us to move closer to the Soviet Union, even if only through dialogue with the Supreme Soviet, whose members are not elected representatives.

The Rapporteur's difficulty has been to balance his reports with the fact that the situation is moving extremely quickly. The CSCE is the yardstick against which we should measure the behaviour of all the countries of Europe. It is a blueprint for Europe. It was not achieved by the European Community and it is free of barriers.

We have consistently pressed the human rights issue that is set out in the Helsinki final act. Mr. Gorbachev will be considering that seriously. It is one area where he could show that the key to success of détente or glasnost is a Soviet willingness to register advances in human rights.

Discussions will revolve around the INF treaty and the subsequent security of Europe. We have heard that the number of nuclear missiles involved is only 3% of verifiable stocks, and the British Prime Minister has spelt out her fears about conventional weapons and stocks of chemical weapons. We have a long way to go. Mr. Gorbachev is being urged on with enormous good will, but he is a creature of a system that could remove him as easily and effectively as he removed his Moscow colleague.

Let us wish Mr. Gorbachev as much success as he can obtain in moving towards peace and security in Europe. However, we must also wonder how long he can remain in power. We all know that logic does not always prevail in politics.

The report makes it clear that we must advance slowly, though with all the good will in the world. We have not had much success in our dealings with the Soviet Union and while its military capability remains so massive we must weigh our words carefully. As the British Foreign Secretary has said, we must have realism, vigilance and an open mind in our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The report goes a long way towards my thinking. It was agreed unanimously in committee and I regard it as a balanced report which can do only good.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to thank the Rapporteur for presenting a very balanced report, with a wide range that is all the more praiseworthy because in many respects we still know too little of the details and analytically ascertainable elements of the process of reform in the Soviet Union.

The delegation from the Presidential Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union certainly had a number of interesting discussions and also gained some on-the-spot impressions during its visit to Moscow. But we largely rely on information obtained through the media and the same undoubtedly applies to the Rapporteur. This is a major problem and one that has already been referred to by various speakers in our debates. Western European Union and its organs must greatly improve their analytical instruments if they are to be able to study longer-lasting processes in the Soviet Union and their influence on international politics.

On the basis of information available through the media the Rapporteur has analysed developments in the Soviet Union to some extent. His work here ought really to have been done, as part

Mr. Soell (continued)

of their preliminary work, by Western European Union's organs, especially the agencies, who should, of course, have made use of the scientific apparatus, the experts on the Soviet Union and those who are experienced in the analysis of communist systems of the Soviet type.

The important thing here, as far as I can see, is that for the first time in recent years an attempt has been made to present the Soviet Union's foreign policy in a broader historical and international context, and also the inherent dynamism of the Soviet system and the obstacles the Soviet Union will encounter when it comes to pursuing a more rational and co-operative foreign policy.

We now know that processes have taken place in the Soviet Union in past decades, including developments in the area of disarmament, which have remained largely concealed from the West. Many analyses of the threat from the Soviet Union fail in effect to consider that Stalin's mass armies of the 1940s and early 1950s were greatly reduced by Mr. Khrushchev between 1955 and 1962. According to western estimates based on research in the last few years, he reduced these armies by between 1.2 and 2 million men. Western countries did not know about this, partly because the Soviet leaders did not want them to know. There were certain economic conditions that forced the Soviet Union to reduce mass armament. This is an example of something being concealed for decades because the West obviously lacks a sufficient analytical apparatus, although some of the information we now have was available in the Soviet press.

The second point I want to discuss is also raised in the report. It has rightly been pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev refers to the new economic policy (NEP) of the early 1920s, and so to Lenin, to justify his current reform policy. At that time this policy did not get beyond its initial stages and was replaced by Stalin's policy of five-year plans and industrialisation in the mid- and late 1920s. This being the case, certain forecasts can, of course, be made, seeing that the time set aside for the Soviet reforms is again very short. A comparison with, say, the changes in the system in China in the nine years since the propagation of the four modernisations by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 shows that the Chinese economic and social reforms are based on quite a different timescale. Lack of time may be one of the most serious threats to Soviet reforms and although it will certainly not have any direct implications for East-West relations, there are bound to be indirect implications.

I feel it was right that the report should also refer to the difference in the perception of the threat in Western Europe and the United States.

We know that this perception is not only subject to very frequent change but also to a shift of phase: when the threat is seen as relatively limited, or more limited, in Western Europe, it often expands in the eyes of opinion-leaders in the United States. And vice versa: when the threat is rated lower in the United States, it very often grows larger in Western European eyes. We have just had this debate at the conference of NATO foreign ministers, where a study by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff was discussed, which rated the threat from the Soviet Union's conventional forces lower than previous studies by the Pentagon.

Another important point is that the report refers to the difference between Western Europe's and the Soviet Union's concept of human rights. It is not just that the emphasis is placed on the human rights of the individual in the West and on collective social human rights in the East but that, as the Soviet Union and other communist systems see it, there are no human rights outside the state, no human rights that the individual enjoys as a matter of course. That, to my mind, is a fundamental difference, more fundamental than the distinction between collective and individual human rights.

Furthermore, it is undoubtedly right – and I will conclude with this – that the tenor of the report should not be too euphoric about the Soviet Union's attempts at internal reform, or draw rash conclusions from it for western policy. But it is also important that we seize the opportunities presented by this reform policy, because when I compare the present situation with the 1960s, when the West made its first attempts at détente, I must say that things look rather more favourable at the moment.

I recall that in the mid-1960s Charles de Gaulle, the then head of state of our host country, France, considerably advanced this debate in the West with his triad "détente, entente, co-opération" at a time when internal events in the Soviet Union were causing enormous difficulties. At that time – the Khrushchev era had just been brought to an end, with it, the attempt to take a first real step towards destalinisation – the party apparatus hit back and reversed the attempts at reform made under Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless, the goal of "détente, entente, co-opération" was being propagated at that time.

We know that many events in foreign policy – including the estrangement between China and Moscow – actually enabled a policy to be pursued that led to the first measures of détente. But we also know how fragile that was, when there was a fresh arms build-up in the latter half of the 1970s.

We cannot expect the Soviet leaders to give up communism in order to achieve a more peaceful

Mr. Soell (continued)

situation and closer co-operation between East and West, so we have to live with this system. We must weigh up the prospects for East-West relations under the new Soviet leadership with the same care that has been taken in the report.

I should like to thank the Rapporteur once again and express my appreciation for the attitude he has adopted in drawing up this report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Pécriaux on an excellent and well-balanced report, although, as I shall point out, there are some omissions that should be taken into account in considering the recommendations. There is no doubt that the most significant word for the future of Western European Union since we ourselves discovered the word “ reactivation ” is “ glasnost ”. That was not a word in our vocabulary at the time of the Rome declaration. Now it is used more frequently than any other in our circles. As our Rapporteur reminded us in paragraph 2 of his report, our reactivation combined with glasnost has led to the establishment of an unprecedented dialogue with Moscow. We look forward to the political conclusions of the General Affairs Committee when it reports to this Assembly in due course.

It is essential that those conclusions are realistic and that they are firmer and clearer than those before us today. Of course Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives should encourage in us a renewed sense of optimism. They are in such contrast to the moribund Brezhnev-Chernenko years which Mr. Andropov's brief spell could do little to change except to pave the way for Mr. Gorbachev himself.

These initiatives imply – although they have yet to deliver, as many speakers have reminded us – the end to the oppression of the Soviet people and genuine attempts to increase their standard of living, which we must welcome. If these changes come about, we must hope that they will lead to further reforms to satisfy both the consumer demands and the political demands of the Soviet people. Our optimism, however, must be tempered with realism and, indeed, by scepticism as we remind ourselves that we have all been here before, as several speakers have already said.

As James Hill has pointed out, at the twentieth party congress in 1956 Mr. Khrushchev also denounced Stalin and all his terror and announced reforms not too dissimilar to glasnost and perestroika at that time. Yet within months the Red Army was in the streets of Hungary crushing that country's attempt to break free. If

the people of Romania rose up tomorrow, as they have every reason to do, would the Kremlin regard it as an internal matter? I doubt it. We should also recall that neither Mr. Khrushchev nor his reforms survived, because they threatened too many vested interests and petty empires in the party and in the bureaucracy.

As the Rapporteur warns, Mr. Gorbachev may yet suffer a similar fate, because we know that his stagnating economy cannot be reversed without changes so radical politically that they may not be tolerated. We may yet see such a reaction to them and to him that could restore both terror within and a return to the cold war without. We should remind ourselves also that there is no evidence that Mr. Gorbachev's democratisation means what we would like it to mean, that is, our system of parliamentary democracy, which we know to be the system that best provides protection for human rights.

He has made it plain, and of course, he has no choice other than so to do, that the dominating rôle of the communist party is not in question, although it may be removed from the day-to-day running of his new enterprises, which would be a wise move to avoid blame for failure that might follow. Nor is the KGB, that hallmark of the one-party state and of the Stalin terror, to be dismantled.

We should accept, also, that any new leader of the Soviet Union desperately needs to face up to the chronic failure of the socialist system to deliver and to embark upon economic reforms if he is to satisfy his people. We should appreciate, as you reminded us, Mr. President, that all those dissidents who have been released number no more than a few hundred compared with the thousands of prisoners of conscience who remain, and that they have been highly selected and that they are highly symbolic because we in the West have made them household names through our campaigns on their behalf. They became public embarrassments to the Kremlin.

Nor are there any proposals to change Soviet policy so that Christians and Jews who want to emigrate to countries where they can bring up their families in a religious manner will no longer feel the need to leave the land of their birth. As this report concentrates on the effects of glasnost on Soviet external policy in particular, we should note, as it does, that the Red Army continues to occupy Afghanistan and that the Soviet Union is doing little to encourage Vietnam to evacuate Cambodia. We should note too, as the report does not, that Soviet officers are taking an even more influential rôle in the conduct of the war in Angola and that Soviet advisers remain in Ethiopia: so, tragically, does the famine as a consequence. To the Kremlin, Marxism comes before aid. It is essential that such realities are borne in mind in any recommendations dealing

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

with Soviet foreign policy under Mr. Gorbachev.

I agree that we must seek a balanced result in our negotiations in the CSCE in Vienna, however long it takes. There must be no concessions to the Soviets on trade or aid or credits or technology, nor any development in scientific and cultural relations, without similar concessions from them on the real implementation of the humanitarian and human rights provisions of Helsinki. Our interests must be linked with theirs not only by promises but by actual performance. The recommendations before us could be more emphatic about that.

Finally, the report does not address the Soviet proposal to hold a conference on human rights within the Helsinki process in Moscow next year. It is important that this parliamentary Assembly expresses a view. Personally, I do not believe that we should agree to hold such a conference in any place where human rights are so denied. Instead we must signal to the Kremlin that the rhetoric of glasnost must first be turned into deeds and that those deeds must include the release of all prisoners of conscience, the end to all jamming of all external broadcasts, the end to all controls preventing the freedom of movement and the freedom to emigrate, the unrestricted sale of western newspapers and journals, and legal protection for all the human rights and Helsinki monitoring groups that have recently been established.

When all these have come about, then can we really sit up and accept that Mr. Gorbachev has gone further than any of his predecessors, and that he is indeed someone with whom we can, with vigilance, do business.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bordu.

Mr. BORDU (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report presented by Mr. Péciaux and the General Affairs Committee calls for a number of comments, to be seen, of course, in the context of the prevailing sentiment of this session.

I know that the chief concern of the WEU member states and of many parliamentarians in this Assembly is to make the most strenuous efforts to extricate themselves from what they refer to as "Gorbachev logic". This stands in curious contradiction to the judgment formed by most people in our countries including the United States, where this logic is not only greatly appreciated as a positive development but was in fact that of the western world ten or so years ago. Equally curious is the hypothesis prevailing in some quarters according to which the Soviet Union is the aggressor in all circumstances.

These prophets of good or ill fortune perceive two possibilities: either the Soviet Union will not succeed in building up a competitive economic policy and will consequently have to develop military power to compensate for the set-back at the cost of a reduced social policy, or the Soviet Union will become a modern and competitive industrial society which will then have the capacity to build up a formidable army.

It is the old story of wavering between optimism and pessimism and above all reflects the attitude of those who draw their revolvers as soon as there is any mention of peace. It is in fact a great problem demonstrating that for some people – and there are many of them – one of the problems is still dominated by the imperialist strategy of forcing the Soviet Union into heavy expenditure on armaments so that it may suffer at the economic and social level.

The closer we get to 8th December, when the historic document is to be signed by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, the more the hawks are put out at seeing themselves deprived of their bellicose ideology. Having become accustomed to an attitude of febrile anti-Sovietism, they will have no alternative but to reconstruct a strategy in which the dove triumphs over nuclear evil.

Even though the arms trade today yields scandalous profits, the burden of armaments and armies weighs heavily on every country including especially the United States of America whose policy is to pass on some of the load to its partners. This is exemplified by the costly French military programme law.

Today, the situation of the third world, with its debts, insolvency and frightful poverty affects the developed countries; and in the same way our so-called civilised countries which are claimed to champion human rights are involved in the development of the fourth world. In fact, social policies and equality of countries require democratic development encompassing both the need for a new world economic order and the recognition of man as a central element in human activities and their fruition. This calls for a revolution in our ingrained ways of thought, a change of attitudes and an accommodation to the new facts of history.

Against this background, an examination of the reasons inducing the Soviet Union to change, without embroidering on the real facts and without underestimating the difficulties, also demands that we consider the reasons why the western countries should also make changes in confronting the destiny of all mankind.

We know that tangible realities of the kind which make change inevitable spring from examination of the objective necessities demanding adaptation in an environment which we are all destined to share. Every individual is therefore

Mr. Bordu (continued)

bound by his initial situation, and it seems to me that the first phase consists of political will, verifiable actions and applied measures followed by the first observable changes.

For the Soviet Union, the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement is clearly a concrete fact whose consequences produce pleasure or antagonistic growls but leave nobody unmoved. What is more, in the Soviet Union the availability of information, openness, the right to leave the country, freedom of expression, etc. are problem areas where quite considerable progress is being made if serious observers of every colour of opinion are to be believed.

Is it not conceivable that the continuation of this progress may produce in our own countries consequences favourable to an improved social and economic policy, which will of course have to be imposed on the owners of capital?

Clearly, all the reports presented at this session, be they concerned with policy, science or research, accept the logic of a militarisation of the economy; this logic is to be condemned but is caught up in attitudes of mind which make their authors into sorcerer's apprentices.

It is time to get our acts together instead of indulging in what is often an auction between conservative and social democratic forces. At a time when peoples are yearning for peace and welfare we are far removed from the thinking of those two great statesmen, General de Gaulle and Herr Willy Brandt.

Our age signals a new international order of genuine humanism based on solidarity rather than on aid and on the necessarily reciprocal nature of our interests with due consideration for the most deprived.

In my opinion, despite some positive aspects, Mr. Péciaux's report is very pessimistic, too pessimistic and therefore bars the way to a fuller dialogue with the socialist countries in every area of security for which the CSCE provides the proper forum. The fact is that the results achieved at CSCE provide evidence of a real commitment by the socialist countries towards more democracy, as is borne out by paragraphs 39 and 44 of Mr. Péciaux's report.

The world is confronted by a challenge whose elements are democracy, freedom and peace. Can we not take up and win this challenge together regardless of the social system chosen by nations, which we shall not remould in this Assembly?

Why should we not have greater Europe based on co-operation? This is so obvious that international politics are currently dominated by what is happening in the socialist countries, and particu-

larly in the Soviet Union. The event must be measured at this international level.

Co-operation and the identification of new paths along which the world can advance despite current fears and the lethal danger generated by existing nuclear arsenals undoubtedly constitute what must be the dominant philosophy, to the special advantage of surviving third world countries.

I repeat that Mr. Péciaux's report, though it presents an interesting analysis, is nonetheless in my view too pessimistic to win our vote.

What is more there is a wide gap between the estimable position of such a report and the reality of the over-armament policy pursued by the WEU states. Regardless of the report the general sentiment remains – the more we talk of disarmament between the Soviets and the Americans, the more we pursue a policy of over-armament in the West.

Allow me to quote a sentence used by Mr. Gorbachev in his interview on American television. He said in substance: "If the Soviet Union and the United States undertake to calculate the attempts made on both sides since the war to gain a march on the other, we shall see that it leads to nothing but the simple ruination of our countries."

Mr. President, it is my wish that language of this kind should become common throughout the world in the immediate future.

Because it is very properly a major question here, I also hope that a conference on human rights may be held in Moscow and that it may produce new initiatives to advance their cause in that country.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I may have misheard Mr. Atkinson's introductory remarks but I gather that he actually suggested that you become president of the Young Conservatives. Since we entered the House of Commons together rather a long time ago, that seemed to be stretching the boundaries of possibility, but I share the congratulations that Mr. Atkinson offered you on your assumption of the chair today.

I am glad to be able to speak, interspersed as I am among a long list of British conservative members, all of whom have surprised me in this debate by expressing overflowing good will to the Soviet Union. So remarkable is their generosity, that Mr. Atkinson would rather like Mr. Rupert Murdoch to have ample access to Soviet news stands. I cannot expect that the Soviet Union would be as stupid as western powers which allow the morality of their nations to be corrupted by a very unsatisfactory press.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

We should not make too many extravagant demands. I accept that, as Mr. Hill said, the Assembly today is overflowing with good will for the Soviet Union. Indeed, we are so eager to exhibit our good will that we have showered advice upon it in every possible direction. We seem to be convinced that Mr. Gorbachev is capable of working miracles. We expect Mr. Gorbachev within a short time to put right everything that we feel is wrong within the Soviet Union, yet at the same time as we demonstrate our good will we also demonstrate our cynicism, our scepticism, and our commitment to the aggressive capacity that we have long been demonstrating.

Mr. President, in your speech yesterday you referred to Peter the Great. It is right that if we are properly to evaluate our relationship as the splendid first recommendation suggests, if we are properly to carry out that task, clearly we need to understand Russian history, and clearly, it is right that we should look at the outstanding personalities in that history such as Peter the Great. However, we need to look at much more recent history than that if we are properly to understand the Soviet Union. We must look at its recent history, at the way in which its armies were destroyed in the first world war. It is often said that the allied forces were lions led by donkeys. If the generals on this side of Europe were donkeys, how appalling was the leadership of Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the first world war?

Is it not understandable that after that horror, incompetence, deceit and oppression Marxism should eventually emerge? Should we not also understand that in the 1920s the western powers tried to strangle this new revolutionary state at birth? Is it not understandable that the western powers in the 1930s preferred fascism to the communist state?

Is it not a fact that the western powers still fail to understand that in the second world war more Russians died than men from any other country and that more areas of Russia were devastated and destroyed than in any other country? Is it not reasonable for us to expect that the Soviet Union would never put itself in the position of being at risk of experiencing the same death and the same destruction as it experienced in the second world war?

We have to understand the historic forces. Sometimes in this Assembly I think we fail to make such an appreciation. I am not suggesting that we should accept every Stalinist gesture, every imperialist posture that the Soviet Union demonstrates. We have responsibilities to our own nations as well. We have a responsibility to maintain our own security. I am not suggesting that we should shrink from that. However, there

are those in this Assembly who believe that disarmament is advantageous to Russia. They believe that Russia could benefit from reducing its enormous capacity to invest in military weapons. But do they not understand that we, too, would benefit from such a reduction?

We should be prepared to make genuine gestures to the Soviet Union. The good will that we demonstrate should be much more than skin deep or transient. That is why I commend Mr. Péciaux's report. We should have a dialogue. We should demonstrate a willingness to disarm in a balanced way.

I certainly worry that if we have a dialogue with the Supreme Soviet the conduct of some members of this Assembly would be unsatisfactory. Some members of this Assembly would, for example, almost be prepared to lead an expeditionary force to free Lithuania or Latvia. Some members of this Assembly would spend their time denouncing the Russians, quite properly, for their invasion of Afghanistan. But they would not look to those things where our house is not in order.

Therefore, I suggest that, before we have a proper dialogue with the Soviets, we should understand that we shall have to show restraint, that our good will has to be genuine and that our appreciation of Mr. Gorbachev's efforts will have to be sincere.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*). – Thank you, Mr. President. With your permission I would first of all like to congratulate Mr. Péciaux for his report which includes a very broad analysis even though there have been complaints that it does not have the wealth of data that only the detailed research of experts in Soviet studies could provide. All in all, I do not think that this was Mr. Péciaux's job; on the contrary, I would say that his report is of a very high level and extremely informative as far as this Assembly is concerned.

His is a broad analysis that has, whatever else it may or may not have done, expressed the full meaning of the ideological problem underlying Soviet Russia's domestic and foreign policy stances.

Today we all feel that many of these stances are changing. A few days ago, replying to a journalist who asked him to knock down the Berlin wall, Mr. Gorbachev replied in blunt, bald and point-blank terms that this was an internal matter for the German Democratic Republic.

The statement of that position, Mr. President, comes at a time when the constellation of the East European countries, unquestionably shaken by Mr. Gorbachev's reform in the Soviet Union, is deep in the throes of adjustment and at a time

Mr. Martino (continued)

when, *inter alia*, the effects of the lack of advanced technology are becoming even more acute and the shortcomings of the general economic situation in those countries even more evident. We should not forget, Mr. President, the statements made by the number two in Soviet energy, Mr. Semionov, when he was being questioned here in Paris about Chernobyl and when he said that the number of nuclear power stations in the Soviet Union would need to be increased by a factor of five over the next few years. Then there is the agricultural situation which is extremely bad in the East European countries.

This is an adjustment syndrome, therefore, that the East European countries are suffering, rather like an illness, and which we hope will have salutary effects in terms of their development towards a form of real democracy.

Mr. President, I would only be repeating what so many other speakers have said and what Mr. Péciaux has written in his report if I indulged in further hopes about the evolution of the Soviet situation in the direction of democracy. I also want to keep within the time allowed for speeches in the Assembly and I shall therefore conclude with a point on the Soviet Union's recent foreign policy declaration about the problem of SDI – the space defence system or rather initiative. Mr. Gorbachev's admission about this system, although tied to problems of theoretical technology – but I wonder what technology can remain purely theoretical – smooths over some of the earlier difficulties in the conduct of relations between East and West.

It is my conviction that, beyond this admission, an opportunity can be glimpsed for progress in the intensified quest for tranquillity and peace, and this must be our wish for a better future. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – May I join in congratulating you, Sir Geoffrey, on your election as a Vice-President and on chairing the debate this morning. It is an honour for me as a new member of parliament to become a member of WEU and to speak, albeit briefly, in the debate this morning.

I congratulate Mr. Péciaux on an excellent report that deals thoroughly with a series of complex issues. The matters discussed in this session – disarmament, Soviet foreign policy and, later today, threat – have a common thread which in many ways is one and the same problem. Disarmament stems from a great longing on the part of the West to reduce the tension from which we have all suffered for many years and also to see a major reduction in

the great volume of arms that have been accumulated. It is real longing which, I hope, is now slowly beginning to permeate the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Soviets, too, are now beginning to think that there are advantages in proceeding this way.

However, after forty years of peace it is essential that any moves that we make do not make the world a more dangerous place in which to live. For the sake of our future generations, we must tackle these problems but, at the same time, they would never forgive us if, after forty years of peace, we damaged and endangered their future.

It is essential to have an asymmetrical reduction in both nuclear and conventional arms. I shall not repeat the arguments of not just this session but recent years for the need to keep a nuclear deterrent behind us. If both sides reduce their nuclear forces, yet the Soviets are still left with superior power in conventional arms, there may be more temptations down that avenue for them to consider taking warlike steps than if nuclear arms are available. With conventional arms there is much less chance of radiation contamination. There may be temptations down that road that might make the world more dangerous.

We must not do anything to endanger our links with the United States of America.

It would be disastrous for the West if, during negotiations or changes made in future months and years, the United States thought that it was less necessary to the defence of Europe. WEU has a crucial rôle in ensuring that the United States appreciates that it is important to us and that it must stay linked with the defence of Europe for ever.

In talking about dismantling nuclear forces, I think of the analogy of an explosive device that has been carefully constructed and has been in place for many years. If we wish to dismantle such a device, we must do so with the utmost care, step by step and checking carefully everything we do. Otherwise, the device will blow up in our face.

Peter Hardy spoke about the comments of some conservatives. He exaggerated a little, but I forgive him, particularly as he kindly gave me a lift here this morning. He talked about the good will and advice flowing towards President Gorbachev and accused us of cynicism and scepticism. I hope that I speak for my conservative colleagues when I say that there is no cynicism, but there is scepticism. We are right to be sceptical. Indeed, if we are not to endanger the world, our people must depend on our being reasonably sceptical.

Mr. Lord (continued)

Mr. Hardy also mentioned Soviet history. I am sure that he knows more than I about that subject, but I am prepared to accept that, like many other countries, the Soviet Union is scarred by its history and that that fact colours its general approach. However, the Soviet Union has had sixty years or more to accept its past, to learn and to change. It is important that it should appreciate our history and where we stand. The signs coming out of Russia may demonstrate that it accepts that the time has come to move forward. Until now there has been a stubborn refusal to accept that view. Let us hope that times are changing.

David Atkinson said that "reactivation" was the most important word to have come out of our recent discussions. The most important word for me is "trust". I know that our interpreters have a difficult job, but I hope that they will not mind too much if I stretch them a little with four words of Latin. My old school motto, *fide sed cui vide*, means, "Trust, but see in whom". There could not be a better motto for WEU in present circumstances.

Trust does not just happen. It is not hope or guesswork; it must be earned through honesty and openness and be built over a long period. There are signs that the Soviets are at last prepared to move. If we can make progress in a painstaking way, with checks and balances throughout, it will be an enormous achievement. However, we must remember that our experience of dealings with the Soviet Union is that our expectations have not been realised.

Members have mentioned the internal problems of the Soviet Union and its approach to its satellite nations. I do not now want to dwell on those matters. If we can trust each other in the way that I have described, the Soviets may come to see the benefits for their economy of fewer arms and less spending on arms. Such expenditure reductions could benefit the economies of other nations as well. If we can build up trust carefully and painstakingly, it will be a marvellous achievement.

I congratulate Mr. Péciaux on his report. His final paragraphs sums up the issue. It says:

"The West must therefore continue to seek balanced concessions in every field and not lower its guard until agreements have been concluded on the limitation of armaments subject to the necessary verification guarantees."

My only quibble is that I should like to strengthen that sentence by changing "not lower its guard" to "never lower its guard".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lord. Your use of Latin tempts me to say that the

motto that I should prefer to use is that of my home town. *Non sibi sed toti* means, "Not for self, but for all". That could be the WEU motto. I know no Greek, so I shall leave it at that.

I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Péciaux's report, characteristic of his serious approach and perfectionism, is based on very detailed research and leaves us all to form our own opinion of present Soviet foreign policy.

The political scene is at present so mobile that the Rapporteur has not been able to keep up. I speak here of events in Poland and Romania. The Rapporteur insists that internal economic and social problems are at the root of the new foreign policy. Taking a global view as the Rapporteur has done, it is clear that the youthful Mr. Gorbachev has taken many speedy steps of a character likely to surprise the Warsaw Pact countries as much as the NATO countries, and indeed the entire world.

The first question in my mind concerns the new policy of restructuring and openness and the reaction it has produced in the USSR. Opposition in Mr. Gorbachev's entourage has resulted in the dismissal of the false comrade Mr. Yeltsin. Here I quote Mr. Gorbachev: "Unreined personal ambitions camouflaged under pseudo-revolutionary phraseology do a great disservice to the common cause and the party's authority. Rapid movement is needed on the two elements of the restructuring process – democratisation and economic reform." Particular attention has been turned to senior managers, of whom it has been said that "They must be firmly discarded if they do not accommodate themselves to *perestroika*".

There is no doubt that the new internal policy has also been imposed on the Warsaw Pact allies, some of whose obstructive reactions have no doubt surprised Mr. Gorbachev and his Warsaw Pact chiefs. The lack of commitment of the Polish electors probably springs from the complete apathy of the Polish people.

When it is appreciated that the reforms covered by the referendum will nonetheless be applied at a "slower" pace, it must be asked whether Mr. Gorbachev will not attempt to convert this defeat into a success by a "media operation" presenting the referendum as an approach to democratisation taking the lead from human rights.

What happened on 14th November in Romania points to a political cleavage in that country. As world public opinion is focused on the Warsaw Pact and its behaviour in respect of the convention on human rights, the Romanian leaders had to opt between the habitual massive

Mr. Burger (continued)

repression and a sincere effort to respond to legitimate complaints. In the event twenty or so individuals were imprisoned and the local party chiefs were sacked, including the heads of the works where the demonstration started.

For Mr. Gorbachev, therefore, the economic and social difficulties which existed already have been aggravated by the problems arising from reorganisation and openness.

I would note, in passing, that, since Tito's time, Yugoslavia has been benefiting from a number of advantages compared with the other members of the Warsaw Pact.

At difficult times, this country has always collaborated with the West at the economic and social levels, preferably with France, looking for its support to plead its cause to the member states of the European Economic Community. This is proof that the West does not refuse to enter into an honest dialogue with Eastern Europe on political, economic and other issues.

Returning to Soviet external policy it is therefore understandable that Mr. Gorbachev is looking for successes abroad to calm minds within the Warsaw Pact.

In this context the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party cannot accept any reduction in power of the USSR or the Warsaw Pact, and, if I may make brief reference to Western European security, it can therefore be inferred that the agreements to be reached in Washington will certainly not be to the disadvantage of the Warsaw Pact. The fact is that the removal of nuclear weapons with a range of 500 to 5 500 km is reassuring to the East as these weapons were a direct threat to their territory. Simultaneously, the West has lost the political weapons of deterrence while itself being heavily dominated by the East in conventional arms. The American Congress would be well advised to demand that an annex be appended to the double zero agreement calling for the establishment of equilibrium in conventional forces at the earliest possible moment.

With regard to human rights, I would say that only peace enjoyed in full liberty can lead to the East-West détente which the great majority of us desire.

In the third basket, side by side with freedom, is the issue of education, culture and a respect for the independence of every state.

If peace and détente are to be the goal, nursery school children must not be indoctrinated with hatred for the capitalists of the West to the exclusion of any other form of culture.

If peace and détente are the goals, the athletes of the East must not be prohibited from cultivating private contacts with western athletes at European or Olympic level.

If peace and détente are the goals, there should not be a constant extension of the time-limit for the repatriation of some of the 115 000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

If peace and détente are the goals, opportunities are not seized to test the possibility of detaching Europe from the Atlantic Alliance.

In his report Mr. Pécriaux talks about the house of Europe, but looking at Mr. Gorbachev's book I see that that refers only to Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

I might go on with references to the Berlin wall, racism and the religious problem.

With regard to security, I think the most positive feature of the agreement signed in Washington is the text relating to mutual arms controls and verification.

In conclusion, I will say that I have confidence in the single European act and in the political, economic, ecological and cultural aspects of Europe. I have confidence in WEU's security and defence platform while respecting the Atlantic Alliance and the nuclear independence of France and the United Kingdom.

I do not look upon Mr. Gorbachev as a man in the dock. In my personal view he must be given the benefit of the doubt, and it is my hope that one day we shall attain the détente and the peace I was talking about a moment ago.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – With you, Mr. President, impartially in the chair, you will not mind if I voice some mild criticisms of my conservative colleagues for a lack of pragmatic realism.

We should look at the Soviet Union, which is the subject of this excellent report, and the recent developments in Soviet external policy. They, of course, hinge on Soviet international policy. I do not think of the Soviet Union as a vast revolutionary body. It is a great big centralised conservative bureaucracy; that is conservative with a small "c". It is a perfect example of an immovable object resisting an irresistible force. When we look at what Mr. Gorbachev is trying to do – and we can see examples that have been quoted by other speakers – it is enormously difficult to change this very conservative, highly centralised bureaucracy.

We can also see that though the economic and political imperatives are forcing this change, the Soviets are not going to degenerate into a backward military power. They have got to raise

Lord Mackie (continued)

their standard of living and also raise their GNP. They cannot afford to spend the enormous amount of money on arms that they have been spending.

As Mr. Hardy said, that is to our advantage. I believe that general thinking in the Soviet Union has changed enormously with the impact of communications with the West and, certainly, Chernobyl has changed thinking and caused great fear among people in the Soviet Union, and brought home to them quite clearly, as to many in the West, the appalling results of any possible use of nuclear weapons. In particular, we should have a pragmatic realism while keeping up our guard. While realising that the Soviet Union can step backward, we must try to assist Mr. Gorbachev, who is trying to change this bureaucracy which under Stalin was as evil a system as one might ever meet.

I do not think that we should look at what is happening with the Soviet Union's armed forces. Of course they keep on producing more tanks and more warships. We should look at the industrial and military complex. It is difficult to stop that industrial and military complex in Russia and it will take Mr. Gorbachev a long time to achieve it.

We should understand – as WEU is trying to do – what the simple result of that momentum could be. It may be the result of an attempt to deceive the West in these matters. That is implicit in the report, which is a great credit to the Rapporteur and his committee.

I am sure that we should back it unanimously. The West is losing the propaganda war, and the more we quibble and the more we go back into the past, the more likely we are to lose that propaganda war. A great opportunity is here, as the report says, and all possible advantage should be taken of it.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will endeavour to reply to the various speakers and wish to say how gratified I am at the active and constructive response of the members of this Assembly.

The subject under discussion is of topical concern and it is important that the Assembly should deliberate on it at an interesting juncture in the evolution of WEU's relationships and positions.

I have the impression that two major positions have been expressed in this debate. The first, encompassing those who are "for" the report, is

in a clear majority as all the members except one endorsed the report. The other position represents the member who is "against" the report, and I use the singular advisedly as only one member has taken that line.

The dominant note of the favourable responses is, it seems to me, an urge for realism. In the first speech made yesterday, by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, I noted the questions relating to the status of the Baltic states and the Polish people and also the thought expressed by the President of today's sitting when, speaking as a member, he likened the situation to a game of chess. Mr. President, I am not today in a position to answer your questions!

I share your view that we need to be extremely cautious. If we want answers on the problems of Poland, the Baltic and human rights, we must put the questions directly to those concerned, that is to say to our interlocutors in a dialogue which we must take every opportunity of cultivating.

The second subject which struck me yesterday is publicity and, more particularly, publicity via the media. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg referred to this. After presenting the somewhat professorial and therefore extremely interesting historical analysis, Mr. Müller told us he was very worried about the position, the rôle and the use of the media. He made the point that the media could convey a message which might at some point be presented or interpreted far too generously. He is right in this, and we must pay close attention to the problems of language and communication via the media.

Mr. Rubbi asked whether present developments were genuine and whether there was not some risk that current agreements might be delayed. He also referred to the problems of disarmament. It seems to me that we are not called upon to defend ourselves against an ideology. We have to consider such forces as actually exist, and no ideological change can force us to accept an imbalance which endangers our security. Developments in the Soviet Union appear to suggest the possibility of détente, but there can be no genuine détente without disarmament to ensure our security. As Mr. Scheer dealt with disarmament in his own report I refrained from doing so. This was not the concern of the General Affairs Committee.

To Mr. Declercq I would reply that it is not enough to verify the authenticity of glasnost. I am convinced of its substance. What we need to know first and foremost is whether power in the USSR is at present sufficiently firmly established to ensure that glasnost or openness will finally prevail. Today, 3rd December 1987, I am obviously unable to answer that question. Mr. Declercq also drew attention to the part of our

Mr. Pécriaux (continued)

report dealing with the Middle East and urged that a peace conference be organised by WEU. In my position as Rapporteur, I cannot reply, but the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee may have an opinion to offer, and I thank him in anticipation.

Mr. Hill is right, restructuring does not signify democracy, but it must be acknowledged that this media aspect of Mr. Gorbachev's policy is helping to open a debate and to promote change for the better in the Soviet Union. It is true, however, that there is still a very long way to go in all areas of disarmament and we are still only at the beginning. All the same is there any reason to react negatively provided we safeguard at all times the necessary means to ensure our own security?

I much appreciated Mr. Soell's remarks on the difficulty of making analyses when not all the necessary information is available. This is indeed a difficult process and we are highly dependent on the gathering of information which needs to be accurate. When we visited Moscow – and Mr. Soell was a member of the delegation that visited the Soviet capital – we realised that there were some questions to be asked to which no replies would be received, even on the spot. This has to be acknowledged as a fact which must be accepted, as another barrier to be overcome. If we need information we must do our best to procure it.

A number of speakers have said how important it is that we should address the problems of human rights and the CSCE. While this is true, Mr. Soell has rightly pointed out that our own perception of human rights may not be identical to the current Soviet view. I noted the phrase: "For them, human rights are directly linked to the state." I well understand what Mr. Soell means. There is indeed a direct relationship between society and the state, between the state and the individual. Here we must, I think, address conceptual issues. The concept in question is a profound one, which is political, of course, but in my opinion also and mainly philosophical, and perhaps ethical and even moral. What do we mean by human rights? How should human rights be interpreted from our respective standpoints?

As Mr. Atkinson reminded us, Mr. Khrushchev's reforms also encountered difficulties. Liberalisation of the people's democracies is clearly essential and must be encouraged, but it is naturally a goal which must be pursued with great caution. To a large extent the failures in Poland, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic brought about Mr. Khrushchev's downfall. What is the position now? This is a question we must put to our-

selves, and I am grateful to Mr. Atkinson for having raised this matter.

I am also grateful to Mr. Hardy and Mr. Burger for their support.

To Mr. Hardy I would reply that it is not for us to go back on history and revive the old oppositions. In our opinion détente and disarmament are a sufficient justification for the analysis of current realities. Today's situation does not have to be judged against the backdrop of the past, and it is clearly advisable to turn to good account every positive element to further the causes of détente, understanding and co-operation.

Mr. Burger made some very kind remarks, for which I thank him. He took a global view, embracing young people, the Olympic games, openness, co-operation and the house of Europe. I entirely share his thoughts. However, there is no more to say if we fail to pursue a genuine dialogue, and it is at this point that the key question arises.

Mr. Burger mentioned the present situations in Bucharest and Warsaw. The events which occurred in Warsaw three days ago, if my memory serves me right, are also of historic significance at political level, although it seems probable that General Jaruzelski will not take much notice of the result of the referendum.

The Romanian situation has been referred to by a number of speakers. I will not say here that I necessarily cherish any admiration for Mr. Ceausescu's actions to date or that these are in line with any criteria of mine. Any such statement would be excessive and misrepresent my view.

Lord Mackie referred to the vast bureaucracy existing in the Soviet Union, which I would describe simply as a "colossus". He called for a spirit of pragmatic realism. He wishes to help those who wish to promote the democratic cause. This is indeed important and realistic.

I also greatly appreciated Mr. Lord's intervention, which very humorously expressed sympathy with Mr. Hardy early on. From what he said I noted a Latin tag which seems to me to summarise the report. The tag says in translation: "Trust, yes, but be careful in whom". Indeed, the whole problem revolves round trust and in whom it should be placed. Our Latin tradition stands us in good stead and suggests a fruitful line of thought for 1987.

I have mentioned first those members who reacted favourably to the report, and I tender them my thanks. I have mentioned all except Mr. Martino, whom I also thank for his collaboration. The negative side – and there are always pros and cons – was presented by Mr. Bordu.

Mr. Pécriaux (continued)

I cannot conceal a measure of surprise, not at Mr. Bordu's words which were proper to the democratic process; but I do not detect profound pessimism in the report. That we are able in 1987 to present in WEU's parliamentary organ with the unanimous, I repeat unanimous, approval of the General Affairs Committee, a report suggesting that we should approach the other side, pursue dialogue and endeavour to reach a position of mutual accommodation surely reflects an optimistic rather than a pessimistic attitude.

If I wished to be caustic, I would simply reply to Mr. Bordu that I am not in Lourdes or Zagorsk but here in Paris in WEU. So please give due consideration to the joint efforts of all the members of the General Affairs Committee, who accepted the present changes as a genuine new departure. This is something I would ask you to bear in mind.

I will end my remarks as Rapporteur by tendering my sincere thanks to all my associates and friends who assisted me with this truly interesting exercise. My thanks go first to our former President, Mr. Caro, for the dynamism he displayed during our Moscow visit, which proved highly important and was appreciated by the members of the Presidential Committee.

My very warm thanks also go to Mr. Ahrens, who, as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, showed a true sense of dialogue which enabled him to balance the differences of view in our committee. This is a point to which I particularly wish to draw your attention, Mr. Bordu. Mr. Ahrens certainly has no easy task.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, allow me to be the first continental European to congratulate you on your election as Vice-President. I see in you a committed European and a man who knows the Charter and Rules of Procedure well. We shall therefore be able to meet with a clear conscience under your chairmanship.

I am very grateful to our Rapporteur, Mr. Pécriaux, and also to the committee's secretary, Mr. Burgelin.

Mr. President, you described this report yesterday as a masterpiece of commonsense and balanced thinking. I do not think there is any better way of describing it. It is a very wise report, a report without euphoria and a report that has not succumbed to the temptation to speculate.

The committee discussed this report at three meetings – further proof of our awareness of its

importance. May I also thank those who spoke in the debate on the report yesterday and today and without exception voiced their approval of it.

During the discussion it was repeatedly said that Soviet foreign policy dates not from 1917 but from the time of Peter the Great and is thus an extension of the policy of Tsarist Russia. I believe this to be true. The former Federal German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt pointed it out a few months ago in a remarkable essay.

What General Secretary Gorbachev has evidently set out to achieve therefore seems to me all the greater, all the harder and all the riskier, signifying the abandonment not only of a 70-year-old Soviet policy but also of a 250-year-old Russian policy.

When we consider the Soviet Union's enormous involvement in the Middle East, for example, its policy here too has its roots in the pre-Lenin era. It too dates back to Tsarist times.

I feel we should also take this opportunity – and I am grateful to Lord Mackie for his reminder – to consider what effects this policy, which we call foreign policy, is bound to have within the Soviet Union. It will mean nothing less than that millions of Soviet officials and their families will have to accept very serious implications for their social position, occupation and social standing. This is truly an undertaking that it would be difficult to compare with any other at the present time.

Many speakers have demanded that in talks with the Soviet Union the West should insist on the protection of human rights. It is not surprising that we place such emphasis on this, not only because of Helsinki and not only because all of us here are also members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, an institution that, more than any other, has made the protection of human rights its goal: we also feel bound to insist again and again on the protection of human rights, because each of us has been democratically elected and is therefore under an obligation to protect and defend them.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, intimated the day before yesterday that the extent to which a satisfactory settlement was found for the human rights issues would also determine the scope of the disarmament policy. I agree with him: any country – I repeat, any country – which disregards and violates the human rights of its citizens, which tortures people physically and mentally, is bound to be distrusted by its neighbours. Disarmament cannot, however, be based on distrust, and since it depends on trust there is an indispensable link between human rights and disarmament.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

Mr. President, it will not surprise anyone to hear that the passage in the report which advocates a continuation of contacts with the Supreme Soviet was the subject of a particularly lengthy and even heated discussion in committee. I should like to make one thing clear: we are not interested in inviting spokesmen of the Supreme Soviet to the Assembly to speak from the rostrum. We do not want to develop a PR campaign, and we are not out to draw attention to ourselves or others. What we do want in our committees with members of the Supreme Soviet is a down-to-earth discussion on ways of aligning our interests. That is all.

But – and this, Mr. President, goes beyond the actual text of the report – we should not forget one thing: the Warsaw Pact comprises several countries. There is no doubt at all that the key to the solution of our problems and to the gradual healing of the division of our continent is to be found only in the Kremlin, not in Budapest or Sofia, let alone Warsaw or East Berlin. Nonetheless, we should take account of the self-esteem and self-confidence of the other countries, which might be especially sensitive in this particular situation. We should not therefore close our doors to contacts with the parliaments of our other eastern neighbours.

It has repeatedly been said during the debate that the public are not sufficiently aware of our work. It really is regrettable that the public take so little notice of what we do. Comparisons have been made with the effective public relations activities of the Soviet Union. In particular I would like to see an interest being taken in our present debates, not just in Europe but also by our counterparts in the American Congress, who have important decisions to take shortly. The impression they should gain, not only from the debate on this report, but generally, from the debates we have had since Monday, is that we Europeans consider things objectively and realistically, including the risks inherent in a policy which is, however, giving us cause for hope for the first time in many years.

Mr. President, as Chairman of the committee I ask the Assembly to approve Mr. Péciaux's report.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1111.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing).

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1111, addendum.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. The vote will therefore be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft order is adopted unanimously².

4. Threat assessment

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on threat assessment, Document 1115 and amendment.

I call Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – This report, which we are now going to discuss, was submitted in preliminary form in December of last year but was not discussed. It has been debated at length in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and I must apologise once again for the delay and inconvenience caused by my absences due to my wife's illness.

It is an honour for me to present this report as I am still fairly new to the Assembly of Western European Union. It is also profoundly satisfying to me, as someone who served throughout the last war in the British army, to witness the strength, cohesion and growing confidence of WEU. The report that we are about to discuss was agreed to by the committee *nem. con.*, with four abstentions.

I should like to pay tribute to all those in many countries whom I interviewed, as set out at the beginning of the report, and to thank them all for the help and co-operation that they gave me.

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

Mr. Stokes (continued)

I must say at the outset that certain newspapers seem to have got the report all wrong. There is no conflict whatever in the report with NATO and with our conclusions. I believe that they are absolutely right.

Although I cannot vouch in every instance for the mass of figures that are quoted in the report, I do not believe that they are seriously at variance with the NATO figures – and, of course, figures can be differently interpreted.

All of us in this Assembly realise only too well that, as we study reports which have been prepared over many months, great events may be taking place in the outside world which are bound to have some effect on our reports. We have had the rise of Mr. Gorbachev and the appearance of a new policy of so-called openness in the Soviet Union. I have been fortunate to have had the opportunity of meeting Mr. Gorbachev in London on two occasions. There is one thing of which I am quite certain: he is an expert in public relations. Therefore, from that point of view, he is somewhat to be feared.

We have also had the limited disarmament talks between the USSR and the United States about intermediate nuclear weapons, which are now likely to form the basis of a treaty in the near future.

Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev's position may not be as strong as some people thought, and we therefore continue to live with uncertainty as regards the leadership in the Soviet Union.

I believe that we need to look more carefully than ever at our conventional arms in the West as the nuclear element is being reduced. The Soviets, as the British Prime Minister recently said, can afford to be generous in cutting conventional forces, whereas NATO forces are stretched. We shall, of course, now enter a wholly new era of force comparisons, with the physical inspection of nuclear weapons sites by both the West and the Soviet Union.

I should like now to outline the scope and purpose of the report. It will be noticed that while I believe the report is moderate and balanced in tone, and stresses the need for making fair and sensible comparisons of force levels, it does not deny that the Soviet threat is still there, that the Soviets still occupy Afghanistan and the Baltic states, that Cuban troops are still in several parts of Africa, that the Berlin wall has not yet been pulled down and that, in spite of all the care and attempts at accuracy in our force comparisons, we cannot deny that the Soviet forces are superior to those of the West in a number of cases, that they are poised for attack and not defence, as are the NATO forces, and that, apart from their superiority in aircraft,

tanks and guns, the huge growth of the Soviet navy in recent years and the threat that that poses to reinforcing the Atlantic convoys remains, as well as the Soviets' ability to develop a powerful thrust into the heart of Europe from their strong and large forces concentrated there. In addition, I heard only yesterday that the Soviet Union has stockpiles of weapons which are three times the amount that the West has for stockpiles, which is only thirty days.

Yet NATO has certain advantages. We believe in freedom, we have better trained and better motivated forces and more cohesion compared with the Warsaw Pact forces, and we also have greater technological knowledge. There is no point in exaggerating the Soviet threat too much, and they on their side have serious weaknesses.

We have outlined those facts in the report and I believe that its conclusions are fair and reasonable. Certainly much more remains to be done in co-ordinating the various NATO and national efforts to obtain more accurate force comparisons. I realise, of course, that this is not an easy matter, and force comparison is a very difficult subject.

My task was a huge one and the report is in parts highly technical. I realise, too, that it can be criticised for not including every aspect of the threat which the Soviets pose against the West. I have not, for instance, dealt with the large and important subject of subversion and spying by the Soviets and the constant threat that this always presents to the West. In the propaganda war, which goes on continuously, the Soviets will now, I am sure, intensify their efforts to decouple the European and United States forces if they possibly can.

One strong impression that I received from interviewing many senior officers and defence specialists in different countries was that undoubtedly Mr. Gorbachev and, I believe, some of the present Soviet rulers are trying as hard as they can for some disarmament to allow the Soviets to have a better deal for their people in providing more consumer goods. They cannot do this when so much of their gross national product goes towards the armed forces and their mass of expensive armaments. This is a most important and hopeful factor in the relationship of the Soviets with the West.

We in the West must keep up our guard, as Lord Carrington constantly and rightly reminds us, but there are some grounds for hope that the old Stalinist approach to arms and armed forces in the Soviet Union may at least be somewhat modified. Nevertheless, in the end it is deeds and not words that we want from the Soviet leadership. I very much hope that the Council will take heed of this report and do much more to

Mr. Stokes (continued)

encourage the co-ordination of all sources of information about Soviet strength.

I should like to end by quoting from the statement on the platform on European security which was adopted at The Hague on 27th October 1987:

“ We have not yet witnessed any lessening of the military build-up which the Soviet Union has sustained over so many years. The geostrategic situation of Western Europe makes it particularly vulnerable to the superior conventional, chemical and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact. This is the fundamental problem for European security. The Warsaw Pact’s superior conventional forces and its capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are of special concern in this context. ”

With those remarks, I commend the report to the Assembly.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome and congratulate my distinguished colleague, John Stokes, on an excellent and well-balanced report. If I have a few remarks of criticism, it is perhaps to endorse and strengthen the report and what he has said because he admitted that the report could not completely cover all the subjects, as he and other committee members would have seen. Certainly, the threat in one or two aspects is understated rather than overstated. In these heady days of INF agreements, talk of glasnost and perestroika and even the referendum in Poland just a few days ago, it is nevertheless important that we do not allow these significant and encouraging developments to blind us to the threats still posed to the West by Warsaw Pact forces. As Mr. Mellor reminded us yesterday, the armaments of the Warsaw Pact, particularly in conventional armaments – ships, aircraft and tanks – are still being added to at a frightening rate. We in our democracies cannot hope to match that rate, not least because we see other priorities in social spending that rightly pre-empt our budgets.

Paragraph 5.19 correctly states that the Soviet navy is divided into four fleets, two of which are confined by Danish and Turkish straits. Denmark and Turkey are active partners in NATO. The report also reminds us that for a considerable part of the year the ice-free passage from Murmansk to the North Atlantic is restricted. However, if there were a conflict it

would be on Soviet terms and I cannot envisage there being a conflict while the Soviet fleets were bottled up in their home bases. I believe that we would see one of the many exercises in which the Soviet fleets take part every year. There was a significant exercise this year when virtually all the Soviets’ Baltic and North Sea fleets were in the Atlantic. We have to rely on intelligence to decide whether these are merely exercises or whether ships are being put into place for possible hostile acts. We should be unwise to rely on bottling up the Soviet fleet.

I know that Mr. Stokes appreciates that, as Mr. Mellor said yesterday, the older Soviet tanks are being substantially uprated with new guns, new armour and, perhaps equally important, new firing control systems. We should be unwise to write off those tanks. The newer models are on the central front facing NATO armies.

More important qualitatively is that over the past ten years, across the board, but particularly in terms of armour and submarines, the Soviets have been catching up quickly on the marked technical lead that the West used to enjoy. That closing of the gap has been due in no small part to espionage and betrayal by some keen service personnel in western navies and elsewhere, who have passed on important secrets to the Soviet Union, and to the transfer of high technology from western countries, including Japan, to the Soviet Union, whose new submarines are now quieter, faster and more difficult to detect. I should have been happier if the report had dwelt on the fact that our lead has diminished.

Notwithstanding the economic problems faced by the Soviet Union, it has a lot going for it in the quality of its stealth technology for aircraft and the new armour for its tanks. We would not have considered that possible only a few years ago.

The Rapporteur mentioned the disparity between NATO’s thirty days of war stocks and the Warsaw Pact’s ninety days’ stocks of ammunition and key elements of fighting. In fact, the situation is even worse, because few NATO countries meet their thirty-day commitments in all respects. Once our defence budgets come under review – a euphemism for cuts – it is comparatively easy to cut war stocks, whether of ammunition, petrol, oil or lubricants. People cross their fingers and hope for the best. My guess is that many NATO and WEU countries do not have full thirty-day war stocks. In any case, the experiences of the United Kingdom forces in the Falklands war show that a thirty-day stock is inadequate. The Warsaw Pact has another qualitative advantage in that area, which is a substantial part of its threat.

I generally welcome the report, but I have a reservation about paragraph 8.4, which says that

Mr. Speed (continued)

we should not exaggerate the Warsaw Pact capability for political purposes. One cannot disagree with that statement, but it is important to realise that there is a disparity in conventional weapons and we need to know much more accurately where the Warsaw Pact's conventional weapons are located. Glasnost has not been forthcoming in that respect.

There are other areas where the Warsaw Pact has an advantage over NATO. First, the Warsaw Pact does not have a three thousand five hundred mile reinforcement and resupply line across the Atlantic. More importantly, that line for NATO depends on hundreds of merchant ships, even in a time of tension before the start of hostilities, let alone after the war has begun. We should need a constant stream of merchant ships in the first months of hostilities, but there has been a decline in the merchant fleets of all NATO countries, while the merchant fleets of the Warsaw Pact, particularly the Soviet fleet – which, to all intents and purposes, is under the control of the Soviet navy – have been increasing and adopting a blue water, or worldwide, rôle, with international bases in all the oceans of the world.

Secondly, as John Stokes reminded us and as is pointed out in The Hague platform, NATO is a defensive alliance. If attacked, we cannot sacrifice space for time to concentrate our forces against a main attack on the central front. The space that our forces would sacrifice would be the Federal Republic of Germany, which is one of our key partners. That would not be acceptable to NATO, to WEU or to me. The Warsaw Pact does not have such constraints, with the large plains of East Germany and Poland within which to operate. We have to consider the geography within which they operate, which favours them and their organisation, their military doctrine, the fact that Soviet forces place emphasis on mobility, surprise, deception and offence while NATO is always the defensive force.

For all those reasons, which I think are important components of the threat, I do not believe that the report goes over the top. I welcome it and hope that the Assembly will adopt it, but we must realise that, even today, the threat is substantial.

The report, the proposed amendment and, I hope, my thoughts have reminded the Assembly that, as a conservative in the nineteenth century said – I hope that I will carry socialists with me – the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. We shall neglect that fact at our peril.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Stokes's report, in which a tremendous amount of work has been invested, for which I should like to thank the Rapporteur and the members of the committee secretariat involved, demonstrates what enormous difficulties we face, both in obtaining sufficient data on all the various aspects of armament, and in establishing joint criteria for the proper evaluation of these data. The report makes this clear at various points and most clearly where chemical weapons are concerned. Estimates of the quantities of chemical weapons the Soviet Union holds differ substantially.

But the report also makes it clear that we have not yet progressed very far in the assessment of the qualitative features of armament. I am pleased to see some data on this in the report, but it is very conservative in its evaluation. More should really have been made in the assessment, for example, of the fact that the Soviet Union has drawn level with the United States in only six of the twenty most important basic technology areas, is superior in none and lags well behind in fourteen. I will take anti-tank technology as an example. We have figures on this area. The Soviet Union has introduced a considerable number of new types of tank. They naturally have certain qualities in common with western tanks, be they from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United States or the United Kingdom. There is, for instance, their ability to fight at night and their ability to fire while in motion. I feel more importance should be attached to all this in future assessments.

The tremendous asymmetry in land forces and tanks remains, of course. It is very important for the formulation of our ideas on conventional disarmament and re-equipment to be based on a consensus and for them to be introduced into the East-West negotiations on conventional disarmament. I feel there will be major opportunities for obtaining and processing fresh data in connection with the INF agreement – varied though the assessments of it have been during the debate in the last few days – and in connection with the provisions of this agreement concerning verification. The fact that there will be, for example, numerous on-the-spot inspections and challenge inspections may help to improve the situation greatly as regards the collection of data. A few years ago the Soviet leadership was still describing on-the-spot inspections – and I quote former Foreign Minister Gromyko – as espionage. That was the view taken in 1984. It must be clearly stated that opportunities are now available which will also prove useful to us in the future.

The same is true of the evaluation of observations of manoeuvres and challenge inspections made possible by the Stockholm agreement of

Mr. Soell (continued)

September 1986. The reports we now have, some of which have also been discussed in the national parliaments, or at least in their disarmament and arms control committees, give us more certainty about our past assessments and confirm various conclusions that had already been drawn, but they also indicate the need for further careful checks.

To conclude, I should like to raise another point. Paragraph 2.4 rightly says that the Soviet Union is a world power only on the basis of its military capability. It could be added that it is also a world power because of its huge land mass and its potential, even though this potential has yet to be fully developed economically. Greater emphasis should be placed in this context on the stimuli provided by the current reform process, which we have already discussed. If it is true that military capability is the determining factor in the Soviet Union's rôle as a world power, it is equally true that the enormous part played by military capability in the Soviet economy may also be to blame for what is referred to in the report as "sclerosis".

It is not just a question of military costs as a proportion of gross national product: 13% to 15% according to estimates available to us. We know that over half of all Soviet engineers, over half of all skilled Soviet workers and over half of all Soviet research scientists are employed on arms technology and arms production, which also absorbs, of course, the most valuable raw materials. What we have here is a classic case of armaments sclerosis. This situation has been noted by western observers for years but is obviously seen in a different light by the Soviet leadership.

Some western analyses point to the danger of a build-up in Soviet armaments and of the threat growing again if the reforms in the Soviet Union show a measure of success. That is one possibility.

But I consider it more likely that, given the conditions of modern information and communications that will also prevail in the Soviet Union in the medium and longer term, both the material and immaterial values of civil production will gain more ground in Soviet society and in the upper political strata, which are, of course, similarly involved in the scientific and economic process. This is in fact quite a soundly-based hope, not just an abstract idea.

We must still insist – and I endorse the case made for this in the report – that Western European Union and the Western Europeans as a whole need more of a large variety of resources – including electronic installations – so that they can obtain their own data and achieve effective results in exchanges with others who have large

volumes of raw data. Collecting raw data is one side of the coin. Consensus on the establishment of criteria and qualitative standards of assessment is the other. There must be a political debate and political decisions on this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Stokes has presented a comprehensive report, an extensive and detailed study that contains many facts. I should like to thank him for this good and informative report.

As far as today's debate on the report is concerned, Mr. Stokes, I agree with you that certain things must be borne in mind. For any assessment of the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the view of the Atlantic Alliance, there must be, firstly, a political appraisal of Soviet foreign policy and, secondly, the Soviet Union's conduct vis-à-vis the West must be considered. Thirdly, the Soviet Union's presumed military intentions must undoubtedly be studied. Finally, military potentials must also be included in the assessment. That is the first point of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

As for the second point – you dealt with it once again in your statement, Mr. Stokes – I have a few difficulties where the wording and intention are concerned, especially as, even after critical consideration, I cannot agree with you that friendly relations with the Soviet Union should be made conditional on giving equal status to the occupation of Afghanistan and the occupation of the Baltic states, as you called them, or the Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The occupation of Afghanistan must be condemned. But as worded here, in conjunction with the occupation of the Baltic states, the statement clearly contravenes the spirit of the CSCE documents. If we were to develop this line of thinking we would also have to consider whether large areas of Poland have not, as it were, been displaced, and not all Europeans, including the Germans, would like to see the clock simply turned back, because that would in no way help détente and peace, particularly at the present time.

Mr. Stokes, you said just now that you had served in the last war. I was a small boy living in the Ruhr district during the war, when American and British bombers were destroying our cities. As a child sitting in the air-raid shelter I heard my town falling in ruins around me. That experience taught me what war means. I respect your impressions, but I just wanted to explain how things look from a different angle. As worded, I would call this a reversion to the policy of the cold war.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

On the positive side, Mr. Stokes, you have made a comparison of performance in the various technologies, although I feel sure it was impossible to do this with the necessary precision. What I am criticising in your report, therefore, is not the meticulously assembled data, but simply the conclusions you have drawn in this particular respect. We should not, for example, be afraid of more extensive disarmament. We should take seriously the statement made by the Warsaw Pact countries in East Berlin on 28th-29th May 1987, proposing steps towards nuclear and conventional disarmament. I believe we should follow up these proposals with deeds. The Geneva negotiations and their very positive outcome have surely made it abundantly clear to all of us that genuine and mutually verifiable disarmament is possible.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am also convinced that both superpowers, the Soviet Union as well as the United States, want more extensive disarmament. This desire for disarmament is also extremely important because of the continuing disparities between the two blocs. The critics of disarmament are undoubtedly right when they claim that the superiority of the Warsaw Pact in the conventional sphere and where short-range missiles are concerned still poses a threat to us Western Europeans. That is a fact and I am not attempting to dismiss it.

But what does this mean to the West? It means that we must develop an overall policy for peace and security, a programme on the model of the INF treaty, that is to say asymmetrical reduction to zero or to a common maximum level. I believe that programmes for disarmament (a) in the conventional sphere (b) in the sphere of chemical weapons and (c) in the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons and battlefield weapons are now more urgently needed than ever.

However, these programmes must be incorporated in a common security policy that leads on to other things, including – and here again I would mention you as a rapporteur who has compiled extensive inventories – independent information systems. An independent observation satellite would improve our security and help to stabilise our defence measures. When we discuss Mr. Bassinet's report, we should raise this point in particular, in order to indicate what co-operation in armaments means.

For us social democrats this political standpoint means that our security policy must be aimed at reducing the tendency for each military alliance to regard the other as the enemy and a threat, and at achieving defensive military doctrines in both alliances. That is crucial. The two military doctrines are what matter. For the Warsaw Pact this means – to spell it out clearly –

abandoning the strategy of the expansionist offensive.

For Western European security policy it means developing, in agreement with the United States and Canada, a system of structural non-aggression, with a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. Structural non-aggression means more than mere parity. What it requires is that both blocs visibly forgo offensive options. Common security and the capacity for genuine disarmament must dictate our policy.

This joint programme must be guided primarily by two principles: (a) the principle of credibility and (b) the principle of acceptance by the public and the armed forces.

On the one hand, Mr. Stokes, you consciously avoid the word "balance". On the other hand, you again undertake a comparison of forces without actually using the term "force comparison". Just now you again referred to NATO's thirty-day supply of ammunition, and pointed out that the other side has a ninety-day stockpile. I should like to ask you at this juncture: what do these thirty days, these ninety days actually tell us? They are, after all, quantities used as reference points, which cannot be compared as they stand because we have no idea what either side will be using on the first day. A thirty-day supply of ammunition does not mean, of course, that the same amount of ammunition will be used by both sides on the same day. It may well be that ten thousand missiles or bombs are launched or dropped on the first day and only five thousand or two thousand on the last day, and so on and so forth. Comparisons of this kind tell the expert in these matters nothing on their own. They are usually quoted simply to convince others who do not know much about it.

The North Atlantic Assembly's Military Committee, for example, works on the basis of 144 land-based short-range missiles in the West and 775 in the Warsaw Pact. We have different figures in another sphere too, as you have pointed out, Mr. Stokes: in Europe some two hundred short-range missiles with a range of less than 500 km are deployed in the West and about 1 240 on the Warsaw Pact side. Whatever the actual number of short-range missiles may be, these systems represent a special threat to our country. That is not disputed. So German soil is bound to become a battlefield, because the vast majority of short-range missiles are deployed on German soil or aimed at it. So we Germans, in both East and West, are exposed to a very high risk.

At this point the question of acceptability naturally arises. Is this risk acceptable to the Germans? As I see it, acceptance by the German public is dwindling. To put it in plain terms, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons can no

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

longer be made credible from the German point of view.

The Federal Republic of Germany must not become Western Europe's nuclear fire wall. Anyone who takes the saying "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans" seriously must want to eliminate this potential threat. This was pointed out by Theo Sommer in *Die Zeit*, a German weekly with a very large circulation.

This is also a reference – and I say this here in Western European Union – to the French Pluton missiles, which are aimed at German territory and so threaten the population of France's own defence partner. It should also be made clear here that this weighs heavily on us.

As we see it, therefore, a third zero option is needed in the sphere of short-range missiles, especially as this would result in a greater reduction of the Warsaw Pact's potential. We must not miss this opportunity: we must take advantage of the movement towards disarmament initiated between the superpowers and extend the negotiations to include shorter-range nuclear weapons. On no account must the success achieved in the INF negotiations be nullified by an increase in short-range nuclear weapons.

We believe our next task must be a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons. These short-range missiles are, of course, inseparably linked with conventional forces today. Nevertheless, the West should make every effort to put together an agreement concerning these two sectors. We must realise that negotiations on conventional disarmament are bound to take longer than negotiations on nuclear disarmament because of the greater difficulty of comparing arsenals. We also know that in the case of negotiations on conventional disarmament time is not on our side.

It is therefore important for negotiations on nuclear battlefield weapons and conventional systems, particularly tanks and artillery, to begin as soon as possible. The Soviet Union can then prove whether it is really prepared for a comprehensive disarmament and peace policy in this area. We shall then see whether a policy of common security is possible under Mr. Gorbachev.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will appreciate from what I have said that I can hardly be expected to approve Mr. Stokes's report. It is therefore logical that I should recommend you not to give your approval to this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – Unlike some of my colleagues from the United Kingdom who have already spoken, I cannot commend this report, and I hope that the Assembly will vote against it.

I come from a part of the United Kingdom where conservatives are very thin on the ground. I cannot understand the philosophy behind this report, which, as has already been stated, is the philosophy of the cold war. I hope that we shall not go back to the philosophy of the cold war. British conservatives have never got over the idea of losing the British empire. I hope that we are not seeing an attempt in this Assembly to build another British empire in Western Europe when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan are negotiating to reduce weapons in Europe. The philosophy of this report is to replace those weapons with European weapons.

On Monday, I was privileged to hear the Secretary-General speaking with great pride about the WEU fleet in the Gulf. At one time, I thought that he seemed to be the European admiral. We have enough admirals and generals travelling around the world and telling us about the build-up of munitions and weapons without international civil servants doing the same. I believe, as I have heard during previous debates in the last couple of days, that we have to listen not just to generals and politicians but to the man in the street. Where I come from, the man in the street believes that the Americans and the Russians are taking the first step towards peace. I hope that this Assembly will not take the first step back from peace by supporting this report today.

As a new member of this Assembly, I have been astonished to hear people assuming that we are Europe. WEU is not Europe. WEU is a small number of countries in Western Europe. I have just as much in common with people in East Germany as I have with those in West Germany. Europe stretches over the whole of the European continent and not just over a small group of capitalist countries in Western Europe.

I hope that this report will be consigned to the waste paper basket, where it belongs, and that the Assembly will speak out in support of what the Americans and the Russians are doing, and that we shall not try to fill the vacuum in Europe by building up war weapons in Western Europe to replace those being taken away by the Americans and the Russians. I hope therefore that we shall reject the whole concept of this report which is the concept of cold war, something that I thought we had left many years ago.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In considering the threat assessment that this report

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

graphically underlines in many respects, I believe, contrary to what was said by Mr. Lambie, that we face a classic dilemma in the East and the West. The free world believes that, as there are to be nuclear armaments reductions, that is the beginning of the end of the story, that from now on we shall be able to spend far less on defence and more on many other pressing social priorities – health, housing, infrastructure and so on – in which the free nations of the world are interested. But in a situation of maintaining nuclear weapons of the kind that strong conventional forces need, that will be increasingly difficult on two scores: first, to raise the amount of money required to meet the targets which have been set by NATO for its member countries and, secondly, to convince the electorates of those countries that the money for the insurance policy which we have had since the end of the second world war, and which we have never had to redeem, needs to go on being paid. No one likes to pay insurance, but, by golly, people who do not do so are very foolish.

The other side of the classic dilemma concerns the Soviets themselves. The Soviet Union, as an underdeveloped, backward country in so many social respects, is already well stretched because of its massive spending on armaments over the past thirty to forty years. The people who rule in a dictatorship decide what should be spent and where. In consequence, there is no question of consulting anybody else about the massive amounts that are required for armaments; it just happens – to the detriment of many other aspects of normal life.

I believe that Mr. Gorbachev, who is the most significant leader of the Soviet Union since Stalin, although of an entirely different character, has recognised this. Although still basically very much a Soviet communist, he sees the reality and the need to try to restrict defence spending, if only because he will not otherwise be able to bring his country up to the sophistication of the free western powers.

Allied to that are other problems that we in the West have to recognise. There are the natural fears, which are enhanced by the Soviet leadership, of what happened in the second world war. Millions of Russians were killed and overrun during that time. That has added to the situation in which Russia finds itself as a result. When people are frightened, they take every possible precaution to avoid recurrence.

The other feature – a dual one – that has been mentioned in several debates during this session is that Mr. Gorbachev, however sincere and able, must be vulnerable because, as in all totalitarian states, he could be usurped in a coup by other elements within that country. We hope that will

not happen, but it is a factor that we must constantly bear in mind. There is an additional consideration that I wish to put to the Assembly. In our calculations of the cost of defence, from the point of view of both East and West, and in any analysis of the threat assessment, we must not forget that until now the communist creed has always been expansionist. The idea behind Soviet communism has always been to enlarge its influence and capacity. I do not believe that leopards necessarily change their spots. I do not believe that that can be discounted. It must always be borne in mind for the future.

We have had many criticisms in recent sessions about having too many speakers from ministerial sources, but we should do well to ponder the excellent speeches of our Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. van den Broek, Mr. van Eekelen, who spoke yesterday, and Mr. David Mellor, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, from the United Kingdom. In their various contributions they underlined the difficulties and the situation that we now face.

Mr. Mellor reminded us of the current conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. That must always be in the minds of politicians when they discuss defence topics. Mr. van Eekelen, in response to a question from me, in effect, said, also agreeing with what Mr. Mellor had said, that it was not just a question of superiority in terms of human beings. We face another problem across the great divide – the quality and the performance of the arms available and how essential it is for the West to make sure that it has parity in the capability of those weapons. Again, as has been stressed in other debates, in our defensive capacity we have no intention whatever of starting a war.

I congratulate my friend and colleague, Mr. John Stokes, on an admirable report on which he has put in a great deal of work. I know that he has taken it extremely seriously. It has had a chequered career during its time in committee and in this Assembly, and it has been bedevilled by Mr. Stokes's distressing domestic circumstances. However, he has made a number of sacrifices to fulfil his commitment as rapporteur.

Mr. Stokes brought to bear a realistic and worthwhile approach in his speech this morning, and he is to be commended. I agree with all that he said. On the other hand, I do not agree with all of the actual report. I agree with my colleague, Mr. Speed, that there is understatement in a number of figures. However, it is difficult. No man is so wonderful that he can get all the resources and find out the exact nature of the figures. As a consequence, one has to rely on other sources. I know that that is what Mr. Stokes has done. Some of the figures can be and have been queried and challenged.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

I think that the report is a useful contribution. I hope that Mr. Lambie is wrong. I hope that it will not be cast on one side. A lot of work has been put into it, and it represents a significant contribution to the thinking and progress of WEU.

I believe that we need to be more, not less, vigilant as the nuclear capabilities of both the West and the East are reduced. Like everybody else, I welcome those reductions, but, by their very nature, they contain the danger of a destabilisation of NATO. It would be ironic if the third world war – if ever there were a third world war – were conventional. If a third world war were to break out on conventional lines, we should undoubtedly lose it. We have mentioned before, and it is a fact, that in today's circumstances, if a third world war were to break out on conventional lines, it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war. The temptation is too great for the losing side not to resort to a nuclear capability. When nuclear weapons are finally eliminated, we must have the right balance of conventional forces, that will deter any possibility of hostilities breaking out again in the future. If we do that, we shall have made considerable strides towards the kind of Europe, both East and West, that we all wish to see.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. HITSCHLER.

Mr. HITSCHLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the recommendation submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on threat assessment is based on a report which contains, on the one hand, a political appraisal of the Soviet Union's actual foreign policy and its possible intentions and, on the other, an accurate comparison of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's military potential.

The part of the report that deals with the comparison of nuclear and conventional weapons can be described as an excellent analysis, composed extremely realistically, with an obvious determination to produce an objective appraisal that is commendable for its detail and frankness. We owe the Rapporteur a special debt of thanks for the effort he has put into this report, which was needed in this particular form.

The force comparison addresses all the problems that hamper such an undertaking – problems connected with sources, the uncertainty of estimates, the difficulties presented by the use of different methods of intelligence gathering, difficulties in the assessment of the qualitative differences in the levels of training of troops and of the qualitative disparities between weapons.

Unfortunately, the remarkable observations made here are not noticeably reflected in the recommendations submitted to us. Paragraphs (iv) and (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation do not reflect the information contained in the report on the qualitative differences in such armaments as tanks and anti-tank weapons. Nor do they record the latest developments inherent in the disarmament policy successes announced in the INF negotiations.

The first paragraph rightly states that any threat assessment requires not only a comparison of military capabilities but also a political assessment of behaviour and intentions. While the force comparison in the report has its highly dynamic aspects, in that it takes account of the time factor and qualitative differences, no such impression is created by the part of the report containing the political assessment. An analysis of the threat posed by a potential adversary must cover far more factors than find expression in the part concerning the political assessment of objectives. It is not enough simply to consider a few such indicators as population structure, economic strength and defence spending and to infer the quantitative defence product from these. A threat analysis must be more comprehensive. It must proceed from the potential adversary's overall situation, cover his situation at home and take account of its political implications and the difficulty of meeting them and deal with his external responsibilities on every frontier.

The adversary's military strategy and the particular problems that would be encountered in its pursuit should also be considered. Account must be taken of any logistical problems raised by the economy and the degree to which industry and the support troops are organised. The problems arising from political, economic and military co-operation with allies within the Warsaw Pact deserve greater attention than this report pays them, and the current process of change in the principles of political leadership should also be recorded. This section of the report does not do justice to these issues, is not comprehensive enough and is not reflected in the recommendation.

A threat analysis should not be based on the principle of hope. It must consider the facts, as they stand, but it must not ignore the dynamic processes, more recent developments in the Soviet Union and the successes achieved in the disarmament negotiations.

The recommendation we are asked to adopt here transmits political signals. A closer connection should therefore become clear between actual Soviet policy and the trust or distrust that this policy causes in the western world. The USSR's failure to respect human rights in Afghanistan and elsewhere – I would not refer to

Mr Hitschler (continued)

the Baltic states in the same breath – naturally influences the threat assessment. Progress in the application of human rights favours the climate in which further steps towards disarmament can be taken. This must find clearer expression in the recommendation.

The recommendation should also be supplemented by the information revealed in the excellent force comparison: firstly, the information that NATO's defence potential is at present so constituted that the mix of conventional and nuclear forces is sufficient to give credible support to the strategy of the flexible response, and that further defence efforts will be needed if this strategic flexible response capability is no longer guaranteed; secondly, the information that a comparison of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's capabilities cannot mean a simple comparison of quantities but must be related to the underlying strategic objective and the ability to achieve it. Only then is there any point in all the counting, measuring and estimating, and only then does the military aspect of security policy find its political place; thirdly, the information that NATO's defence capability is currently sufficient to enable further progress to be made towards disarmament, and that willingness to do this will be favourably influenced by any indication on the part of the Soviet Union that it is willing to guarantee fundamental human rights in its sphere of influence to a greater extent than has been discernible in the past. Steps towards disarmament must, of course, result in a better balance of forces, especially in the conventional sphere and in chemical weapons.

The assessment I have tried to outline cannot be adequately reflected in amendments. I therefore regret to say that I cannot approve the report and the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I inform the Assembly that Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Reddemann is withdrawn.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief. I should very much have liked to support this report. Unfortunately, one cannot place regard for one's colleague against the logic of one's assessment of the report. Although it may have been appropriate for socialist committee members to abstain when the decision was taken in committee, it is too harsh a report to deserve to be supported today, in the light of the INF agreement and of the impending dialogue with Moscow.

There are probably several words in the report that make it unacceptable. In view of its timing, it is unfortunate in its references to the Baltic

states. Given the need to assure the Soviet Union that we are not aggressive in our approach, it is an unnecessary resurrection at this stage. Dialogue may help us to point to a different course in that part of Europe, but at this stage it is inappropriate.

It is not wise for us to use the word "unremitting" about military growth. For example, in 1960, the Soviet Union had 210 nuclear warheads and the West had 1 850. In 1981, the West had 10 276 and the Soviet Union had 7 731. According to the latest figures in the report, the West has 11 454 and the Soviet Union 9 987. There has not only been unremitting growth in the Soviet Union, but also almost equally unremitting growth among the western states. At this stage, that sort of adjective would not be entirely appropriate.

Given the timing and context of the report, we should not have accepted the last six words of recommendation 2 (c) "by matching words with further deeds". That strikes a rather aggressive note.

The other reason for my opposition to the report is that there is still insufficient recognition in the West that the overwhelming superiority in men and equipment required to sustain successful aggression must be enormously greater than that required to maintain a proper defence on prepared grounds. The Soviet Union does not have such an overwhelming superiority to guarantee its success, particularly if initial aggression had to be sustained by reinforcement and supply. On the present disposition of forces, the Soviets could not be confident that their aggression would succeed. Given that, and our commitment to security, and despite glasnost, perestroika and whatever words one wants to use, it is not good enough to strike harsh notes and aggressive positions when we are about to have successful dialogue.

For that reason, I hope that the report will be defeated or blocked today. We should take that position in the interests of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the last speaker on the list, Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I am honoured to be called to speak about the report produced by John Stokes, even though we are at the tail end of the debate. This is the first time that I have attended a full session of WEU and I am privileged to have been nominated to join the Assembly at this time in its history, when its rôle has become so important and when, despite what was said by Mr. Hardy, we all have common objectives. I congratulate John Stokes on his immensely detailed and valuable report. It is an assessment of the threat, but the first recommendation accepts that the threat is

Dame Peggy Fenner (continued)

not simply the capability, but involves the Soviet Union's external policy and behaviour.

We have heard from two foreign ministers this week and both commented on the West's surprise when it discovered how much it had underestimated the Soviet threat. There are various ways of determining numbers but the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers referred this week to the first admission by Mr. Gorbachev of the existence of research on a Soviet SDI system. That was not mentioned during the months of preliminary negotiations on an INF agreement. The West said that the Soviets were researching such a system, but there was not a sound from the Soviet Union.

Mr. Mellor reported this week on the difference between the West's assessment of the number of Soviet missiles and the actual number disclosed in the INF negotiations. The confidence to which Mr. Mellor referred cannot be established or sustained without honesty and good will on both sides. British ministers have referred to the litmus tests of that honesty – the general behaviour of the Soviet Union throughout the world, its performance on arms control, its action in Afghanistan and its action on human rights.

We accept that the Soviets' general behaviour shows good intentions and moves in the right direction are being made on arms control, though there have been only promises and good intentions about a limited withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, on human rights, which form part of the political threat, there has not been as much progress as we would wish.

I became aware recently of the absurdity of the continued denial of free access across the borders of the Soviet Union. I was in Moscow to support a British agricultural exhibition and my visa was withdrawn because as a humble parliamentarian I wished to go into Moscow to talk with local people about human rights.

Mr. Lambie mentioned his fear of a cold war of words. I know that we must be careful. He said that he has much in common with men and women in Eastern Europe. Have not we all? However, it would be much better if they had more in common with us, such as free access across the borders of Europe. Then we should be talking about good will, confidence and good intentions.

Britain's Foreign Secretary has said that we should meet glasnost and the astonishing dialogue taking place between Russia and the West with realism, vigilance and an open mind. My colleague Michael Lord referred to the longing in the West for a successful conclusion to the arms reduction negotiations. I assure Peter Hardy,

who cast doubts on WEU's open mind, that mothers and grandmothers throughout the world long for men to live in peace. They want to live in a peaceful world where families can be raised and fed.

Minds in WEU must be open to longed-for changes and I believe that they are open. Nothing in the report changes my view. The realism is pragmatic and eternal vigilance is essential to the defence of our democracy.

I congratulate John Stokes on the immense research that made his considerable report possible. I support its conclusions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Under Rule 31(1)(d), I beg to move that the report be referred back to the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 31, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, the debate may be suspended if the Assembly agrees.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I back Sir Geoffrey's proposal. It will not surprise anyone to hear that if the report were pressed my group would call for a roll-call vote. Looking round the chamber, I realise that such a vote would not be a true reflection of the political balance in the Assembly.

In addition, it would be a good idea if the committee tried to reach the same sort of agreement on Mr. Stokes's report as has been reached on Mr. Scheer's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You support Sir Geoffrey's request for reference back to the committee. You were therefore the speaker in favour.

Does anyone wish to speak against?...

What is the committee's opinion?...

I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, both the Rapporteur and I, the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, support this proposal, and I should like to make a few comments on this.

First of all, we should bear in mind that this report was approved in committee unanimously – with only four abstentions – and as no amendments have been tabled, the Assembly could well have assumed that the report would be adopted today. We must consider this, because I feel that the Rapporteur has a right to see the hard and

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

difficult work he has done acknowledged here. I regard this reference to consideration in the political groups as well as by individual members as a positive indication for the future.

I also asked to speak because I want to emphasise that reference back to committee also has its positive side. Developments in the next few months will undoubtedly make it useful for us to discuss the report once again in committee – with specific reference to these forthcoming developments. I would just ask those who have voiced criticisms to attend, because I feel it is fairer for the criticisms to be discussed in committee.

Mr. President, I also asked for the floor because I should like to depart from the agenda and say a word of thanks. This is the last report that Stuart Whyte has helped to prepare in his capacity as secretary. He is retiring – far too early, to judge by his youthful looks. Perhaps referral of the report for further discussion is not the nicest way to say goodbye, but Stuart Whyte's spirit will live on in further debate on this report, and I believe we all have good reason to thank him sincerely for the excellent assistance he has given us in recent years.

Please do not take it amiss if I also thank our Rapporteur once again. Despite serious personal difficulties he has devoted a great deal of time and attention to this report, and he is with us today. I thank him too most sincerely for his work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Kittelmann. I personally wish to associate myself with the words of thanks you have just expressed to Mr. Stuart Whyte. The Assembly's applause bears clear witness to its appreciation of

all the work he has done for Western European Union. You have my sincerest thanks.

I now ask for the Assembly's view on the request for reference back to committee.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for reference back to committee is agreed to.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1112).
2. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1119 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 3rd December 1987

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1112*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Burger (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Filetti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Burger (*Rapporteur*).
4. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1119 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Bassinet (*Rapporteur*).
5. Change in the membership of a committee.
6. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1112)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on public information activities on security and defence matters

in WEU member countries and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1112.

I call Mr. Burger, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, drawing the attention of parliament and the general public to the activities of WEU and to the state of western security and defence is one of the chief tasks of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

As part of a special exercise started in the French Senate in April 1985 our committee organises information meetings in all the parliaments of WEU members to call their attention to the Assembly's work. We have been able to draw a number of conclusions from our most recent information meeting which was held this year in Luxembourg with members of the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, or more precisely members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Luxembourg representatives to NATO.

Our first finding was that the specific aims of WEU and its reactivation are still generally speaking largely unknown to the public. Our second was that greater efforts must be made to educate the younger generation about security and defence problems.

Since the answers supplied by member governments to questions from parliamentarians as to how they keep the public informed were frequently rather vague, our committee decided to go into the problem in more detail. I was finally instructed to prepare a report on public infor-

1. See page 43.

Mr. Burger (continued)

mation activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries.

To provide a basis for a comparative study, a questionnaire, a specimen of which is appended to the draft report, was sent to the foreign and defence ministries of the seven WEU member countries. You will find the results of the survey in Chapter IV. With regard to the preparation of this questionnaire and the classification of replies, my warm thanks go to Mr. Burchard, the secretary of our committee, who did a large amount of work with great enthusiasm.

Just a few days ago, after this chapter had been written, I received late replies from two ministers, which confirm the report's conclusion that most governments are making noteworthy efforts to attract the attention of the younger generation and of the population as a whole.

However, with a few exceptions the measures taken nationally are still far from giving sufficient importance to WEU's rôle and activities. Furthermore there appears to be no co-ordination between member countries or between them and the organs of WEU.

The other two main chapters of the report deal with the activities of parliaments and of the WEU Council.

The Presidential Committee instructed our committee to study the section of the Council's annual report concerning information to the press and public. This study forms the subject of Chapter III.

Turning to relations with the press, we can welcome the initiative taken by the Netherlands chairmanship-in-office of the Council, which for the first time distributed guidelines to the press on the meetings of a group of senior officials from the governments of WEU member countries on the situation in the Gulf held in The Hague on 20th August and 15th September 1987. Let us hope that this will become standard practice in spite of the fact that no information was released to the public on the outcome of these consultations.

Finally, the information provided in the second part of the thirty-second annual report is not such as to arouse any hope that an active and constant supply of information to the public will become one of the chief concerns of the ministerial organs of our organisation. It is specially regrettable that in spite of increased public interest in all WEU's activities, the specific public relations post created in the Secretariat-General in London has still not been filled. The present arrangement assigning these duties to a member of the political section can only be temporary. The Council must have an efficient unit

exclusively concerned with implementing an active information policy and the co-ordination of action by member governments at national level.

The current regulations governing our committee's powers and terms of reference do not allow us to present draft recommendations to the Council. The regulations on this point should perhaps be revised.

Of course, every representative may table a draft recommendation provided it is signed by ten representatives at least, that is by ten members of our committee, but we preferred to submit an amendment which was tabled when Mr. van der Sanden's report on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council – was considered. This amendment was adopted by the Assembly, and I would like to take this opportunity of repeating my thanks to Mr. van der Sanden.

As far as our parliamentary activities are concerned, the summary in Chapter II gives the impression that interventions based on recommendations adopted by our Assembly have fallen off somewhat due either to recesses of parliament or to the elections which have taken place in Italy and the United Kingdom.

We should particularly welcome the initiative shown by the members of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States-General as a result of which the Netherlands Government submitted to parliament a detailed *mémoire* on the Netherlands chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council touching on all our organisation's present problems which have been under discussion morning and evening during our days here.

There must be pressure for more Assembly members to intervene in their national parliaments on the basis of the adopted texts. This should be done within political groups and in the context of public debates and will enable us to attract government and public attention more effectively to the work we are doing in Paris in plenary session and in committee.

The draft resolution attributes special importance to this parliamentary activity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Burger.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – It is normal in the United Kingdom Parliament, when making a maiden speech, to make some felicitous remarks about one's predecessors. There are so many of my predecessors here that I cannot enumerate them by name, but I should like to embrace them all by saying that they have

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

done well by WEU in their work here and in their representation of the United Kingdom. They have set a high standard in so many ways that I aim to emulate.

It is also normal in the United Kingdom Parliament to make a short mention of one's own constituency. Although it seems far removed from this Assembly, my constituency is pertinent in two specifics.

My constituency is called Lewes and it is built around the town of Lewes. After the battle of Lewes, the British Parliament was first formed. It is therefore appropriate to draw a parallel between the formation of the British Parliament and that of one of its children, WEU. It is a great pleasure to me, and I hope that it will be a great pleasure to my constituents, that their member of parliament is taking part in this Assembly.

Within my constituency is the town of Newhaven, which historically has been the English end of the shortest route between the parliament of the United Kingdom and the WEU Assembly here. It will shortly be superseded in terms of speed, if not in terms of distance, by the end of the financial requirements and the start of work on the Channel tunnel this very week. I believe that there has been no reference to the Channel tunnel during the Assembly's debate so far, yet I also believe that it is something that we must bear in mind in our debates and discussions, because it bears on the tourist benefits and the commercial benefits between the United Kingdom – that island of Europe – and the rest of Europe. It also bears upon the strategic defence aspects of our considerations. I hope that one of the committees of this Assembly will make a point of including thought and discussion about the Channel tunnel wherever and whenever its existence seems important to their considerations.

WEU and the wider world are now beginning the difficult reassessment of defence needs for the future, after the historic Washington superpower summit discussions next week. The fact that neither superpower is a member of WEU in no way diminishes the rôle that WEU can play to an ever greater degree in the future, and we must give our determination to contribute and support our ministers' efforts.

Europe will remain strategically important as it has been historically. It is here where East meets West and where the superpowers still have their most dramatic interface. That is accepted by the United States and by the Soviets. Indeed, I believe that it underlies the INF agreement – an agreement that leads to absolute reductions in nuclear weaponry and which I for one, and, I believe, all delegates here, hope will be extended

to embrace reductions in chemical and in so-called conventional weapons.

With the acceptance of asymmetry and extensive and intrusive verification procedures, the future augurs well but we must be on our guard to ensure that that defensive capacity is not eroded, and we must be particularly wary here in Western European Union.

Yesterday, my colleague, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Mellor, reminded us that 80% to 90% of fighting forces in Europe were European and that 70% of the navies around Europe were European. While a continued United States presence is imperative for us, as for them, European actions and thinking are and always will be crucial.

You may think, Mr. President, that I have wavered from the point of the debate, but it is of no importance to the outside world whether we project ourselves correctly if what we are doing is not important to the outside world. I hope that by re-accenting some of the debates we have had so far this week I have drawn attention to the importance that I attach and that we all attach to WEU's contributions. They are of growing importance. As you, Mr. President, pointed out, I believe that this is the only body explicitly responsible for debating security matters, historically the most important national responsibility of sovereign governments, and now the most important international responsibility of international groupings of nations, such as WEU. Therefore, WEU must be the instrument for building greater European unity within the Atlantic Alliance.

I suppose that begs the question: how is WEU doing and how is its influence being felt? While we share a commitment to the exchange of views – what one might term the search for truth in these matters and debate about what is the truth, which has been apparent in this session of the Assembly of WEU – that may of itself deceive us into believing that we are doing our job well. Our job must be measured by the influence of what we do, and I believe that that is the true yardstick of our effectiveness.

As a naïve and new member of this distinguished body, I hope that fellow delegates will excuse my raising the possibility that we are doing less than well. That is the real message of Mr. Burger's excellent report. The report contains much fundamentally important data on what is being done by national governments and on identifying gaps in what national governments are doing about publicising WEU, its rôle and activities. Too often in our national governments' explanations of security policy the rôle of WEU may be overlooked or subsumed, as the report frequently makes clear, most particularly in paragraph 108. We must keep a careful watch

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

on this, and the report suggests various avenues of action. The recommendations in the report deserve careful study.

I should like to make two comments on the conclusions of the report. First, the report sees value in greater co-ordination among member countries to improve understanding of WEU. I should be wary of such advocacy not because it is not a good thing, but because co-ordination and an aim for concerted action can too often lead to delays and inaction. I would rather encourage each individual national initiative and count on strength in diversity.

Secondly, I give my wholehearted support to the establishment of a professional and effective public affairs unit in the office of the Secretary-General. Indeed, if shortage of funds is the inhibiting factor, I believe that the Council and the Secretary-General should seek reductions in other activity plans and in spending, so that what remains to be done will have wider influence and proper and fuller effect. It is no good deceiving ourselves into thinking that what we do has full effect unless it is known in the wider world. The establishment of however good a unit will not have sufficient success or proper effect if it is not operated under a detailed and active information policy – proactive, not just reactive – and under an established strategy for what the WEU Council, the Secretary-General and the Assembly should and must do to complement and encourage ever better national efforts. Policy and strategy are as important as mechanisms. They may even be more so. Therefore, I am a little sorry – this is my only fundamental criticism of the report – that there is no mention of the need for a strategy or a policy in the draft resolution. However, I certainly hope that the Secretary-General and the Council will note these comments.

WEU must make its voice heard within Europe and across wider horizons. In today's world such publicity is the lifeblood of any democratic assembly. Without proper projection of what we discuss and advocate, ministers and governments are less likely to achieve what they and we want them to achieve to ensure continued reductions in tension and in weaponry of all kinds that contribute to such tension in Europe and worldwide. If the report is acted upon, we shall certainly take a step towards that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Filetti.

Mr. FILETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am a newcomer to Western European Union and have the honour to be one of the members of the Italian Delegation. As is the usual way with new boys I have, on this first occasion, been following the pro-

ceedings of the ordinary session of this Assembly assiduously and closely in order to learn exactly how our institution works and what its real functions are. I am happy to express my full satisfaction and sincere praise for the detailed and excellent reports that both ministers and members have given us on the various subjects on the agenda during these four days of intense activity and for the valuable statements delivered during the debates on those reports.

However, speaking on Mr. Burger's interesting analysis of public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries and wishing to keep within the boundaries of the subject we are considering, I am sorry to have to introduce a note of disappointment and at the same time concern on what seems to me to be no light matter.

The fact that I have noted is, to my great surprise, the practically complete silence, without any justification, of the press, the news agencies and the radio and television services – with the exception of this morning when we had the brief appearance of a television operator and his crew – about all that has been said in this chamber since Monday with considerable intensity and deep-felt emotion.

To my mind, it is essential and imperative that the most important activities and events of WEU, in which those concerning security and defence problems must surely be included, should be recorded and appropriately broadcast by member countries' communications media so that the public is directly and quickly informed and not left in shameful ignorance or informed too late, or else – which is worse – is allowed to form wrong interpretations and judgments.

It is true that our seven countries have the responsibility of introducing initiatives and measures in their respective parliaments in implementation of WEU resolutions and recommendations but, of itself and in fact, the absence of adequate and live news of the work of our union in the press and on radio and television in the individual countries has the effect – I am sorry to note – of disparaging or at best reducing the importance of the problems that are studied and discussed, and in effect detracts from the credibility, validity and effectiveness of the resolutions and recommendations that are adopted, thus discrediting and destabilising the organisation of which, as representatives of the respective parliaments, we are members.

These negative effects – not merely feared but only too real – need to be firmly avoided, especially when they relate to such highly important subjects and events. These certainly include topics relating to security and defence, given that, among the provisions spelled out in the modified Brussels Treaty with their highly

Mr. Filetti (continued)

important implications and effects, Article V lays down a binding obligation on the member states to afford all the military and other aid and assistance in their power to any ally who should be the object of an armed attack and Article VIII, paragraph 3, gives the contracting parties an instrument for protecting, in concert, their political, military and economic interests in any part of the world where a situation arises that may constitute a threat to peace.

What is more, information about WEU's work on security and defence and other major subjects is undoubtedly of vital importance to the basic interests of European citizens and therefore news of what we are doing must not be kept from them or communicated to them too late.

I put forward these brief comments in discharge of the duty that I intend to perform as a European parliamentarian and citizen who has always believed – and will continue firmly to believe – in a better and brighter future for united Europe.

It is in that spirit that I put these thoughts before this eminent Assembly and particularly you, Mr. President, in the hope and – dare I say – the certainty that speedy and useful steps, measures and remedies will be introduced to correct the serious failing that I and, I think, all the members of the Assembly rightly and responsibly have no alternative but to deplore.

In the confident expectation that the necessary initiatives and decisions will be taken I warmly thank all the members and you, Mr. President, for your kind attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I commence by congratulating our two colleagues who have just made their first speeches in the Assembly. It is nice that people are interested in our work and that in their first speeches they offer a modest contribution in terms of philosophy, which is correct in a first speech. The Assembly does not like a speech from a new member that tells us how wrong we are and tries to change the rules and generally cause a disturbance. The two speeches that we have heard this afternoon have been helpful and restrained.

We have a publication in the United Kingdom called *Punch*. It is a humorous magazine and I found a short proposal in Mr. Burger's excellent document that might qualify for entry in *Punch*. It was the proposal by the European Parliament that its members should form the Assembly of Western European Union. The European Parliament likes to involve itself in a vast number of issues that many of us feel have no bearing on

Europe. However, they must know – if they do not, they should – that they are not in the business of defence. I hope, therefore, that this proposal will not be taken any further, unless *Punch* wishes to take it up.

I want to make a couple of comments on the failure of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs to do much about publicity. As an Assembly, we operate as best we can in our own parliaments, but we do not have the facilities to call press conferences and to brief journalists behind doors and tell them things that they should know before they find out things that they should not know. However, the Council and the Secretariat-General have that opportunity. I do not think that they have taken it, but it may well be our fault that we have not sat down and talked it through with them, asking how together we can get more and better publicity for WEU. I certainly propose to go and talk in London to the Secretary-General and to see how it may be possible – at least in the United Kingdom, where the headquarters of the Secretary-General are at present – to make an impact on United Kingdom public opinion.

It will not be easy because WEU does not have much sex appeal. If one was able to find a senior member of staff running around with seven of the secretaries in a nude bathing orgy, you may be certain that that would be a headline in the national press of WEU activities. It would not do much good for WEU, but at least we would be told that these were employees of WEU. How do we find a better way of getting WEU into the press? That is what we all need to do in our own countries by talking with those responsible for the other organs of WEU.

It is surprising to be told in paragraph 32 of the document about the unit for relations with the press and information, which was set up in 1986 in the political division. However, as Mr. Burger's report says, we do not know what happened to the specially created unit outside the political division. Perhaps rather more disturbing was the interesting report mentioned in paragraph 33 which was prepared by the Federal German Government on the activities of WEU. That document made it clear that the post of counsellor for press and public relations had not yet been filled, that the work was being carried out by the Secretary-General himself and that an official from another section had been made responsible for relations with the press. Later that year, three days before Christmas, the Bundestag had said that "the Secretary-General had given an assurance" – an assurance is an important thing – "that he would ensure that this post was filled as soon as possible and in the prescribed form".

Those of us who have held ministerial office know that there is a form of ministerial termi-

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

nology that is rather like a maze – “I will do something soon”, “I will do something at an early date”, “sometime this year”, “before the end of the summer” – but, when you give an assurance, that is something quite firm. The post was still vacant in October – nearly ten months later. Why is the post vacant? I hope that after the debate you, Mr. President, will receive a letter from the Secretary-General telling you why the post is still vacant or when it was filled. If you do not get that letter, perhaps you will write and ask that question. I hope that we shall have an answer before the Presidential Committee meeting in two weeks’ time. I know that the Secretary-General’s office has a telephone rather than a carrier pigeon and it is important that we get an answer.

We are told in paragraph 35 that the Secretary-General’s office answers many requests from the public for information about the activities of WEU and that the number of requests has increased considerably. Mr. Burger’s committee rightly says that that is an interesting piece of information, which raises a number of questions. Who is asking for the information? How are they informed? I know some of the staff in London and they are capable, very helpful people. I should like to see what information they are sending out.

The entrance foyer at the Council of Europe contains a display of literature about the Council in at least five languages. There is short, basic information for members and for the hordes of members of the public who listen to the debates.

I wonder what effort is made to interest the public in coming here. Are parties of school-children from higher forms invited to come in for an hour to listen to our debates? I suggest that they should come not on the first or the last afternoon, but on the second full day when they would find a fairly full chamber. If we do not interest the young, we shall not interest older generations.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Burger and his committee. Not only should we accept the report, but we should bring it up to date every six months so that we can continue to find out what is happening. The report mentions that various publications are circulated by the British Ministry of Defence, but that “in none of these publications is there any information on WEU”. It also mentioned that the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, made a good speech at the Royal Institute of International Relations in Brussels, but that in the distributed copies all parts of the speech calling for a stronger rôle for WEU were omitted.

I have spoken to Sir Geoffrey and to our Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. George Younger. I said that I did not believe that they wanted that sort of thing to happen and it is certainly not what we expect. I have reason to believe that both will ensure that in appropriate speeches in the future reference will be made to WEU. That is why I ask that we should have an updated report every six months until we are satisfied that we are getting the responses to which we are entitled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall certainly forward the official report of our debates to the Secretary-General and will ask him for an early, favourable response to your request.

I call Mr. Katsaros, Observer from Greece.

Mr. KATSAROS (*Observer from Greece*). – I offer my sincere congratulations to the Rapporteur on his excellent work and also congratulate the other speakers on the high quality of their contributions. I should like to examine the report in the context of the enlargement of WEU. As I have mentioned in previous speeches in the Assembly, the accomplishment of political and economic co-operation cannot, after the modified Brussels Treaty and the single European act, be separated from defence co-operation.

The division of political, economic and defence problems is only an artifice for government and departmental purposes. Those different aspects of the same subject should be faced together if we want to remain in the spirit of the single European act.

The Hague platform of October 1987 declares:

“We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification.”

I should add that the European Parliament at its session in October adopted a resolution on the political and security aspects of European strategy. Taking all these facts into consideration, it should be easily understood that WEU and the EEC should be considered as two institutions aiming for the same final purpose.

As regards public information activities, we think it appropriate to draw your attention to the link between EEC and WEU countries with a

Mr. Katsaros (continued)

view to finding ways of ensuring the cohesion of all members of the Community and improving public relations activities to keep the public in WEU and EEC countries informed about the purposes and activities of WEU.

I thought it useful to bring these matters to your attention and to point out that co-operation in all areas among all the countries involved and successful public relations will improve the European idea and reactivate WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – We are privileged to see a number of new parliamentarians in our midst and I congratulate them for having taken part in the debate.

The first British speaker talked about his constituency where, I understand, there is no lack of publicity for our organisation. He referred to the Channel tunnel which is a topic that is sure to be of concern to us in the future. He mentioned defence, WEU's important rôle and the delays in our activities reflected especially in the creation of a public relations post in the Secretariat-General.

Briefly, policies have to be sold; on their own they are not enough. The speaker also mentioned strategy, and a careful reading of the report will reveal that three main subjects are addressed. First, there are parliamentary activities, that is discussions between parliamentarians and interventions in national parliaments based on WEU texts. Secondly, there is the Council with which we have a contentious relationship on a number of issues of which one of the most important is public relations.

The final point is that national governments should do more for our Assembly. When reading the press and other publications one sees a great deal about defence and security but very little about WEU.

The second speaker said he was worried because the press, the radio, the television and the media generally tended to disregard us! Today, by chance, *Le Figaro* has quite a large article about our Assembly, but that is a rare event. Drawing a parallel with the European Parliament, the journalist points out that defence is not within its terms of reference, and it is a matter of satisfaction that that point should be made. The speaker expressed concern about the destabilisation of our organisation if we are not more successful in using public relations to secure greater recognition by the public and by many members of parliament. I have been a member of the Luxembourg Parliament for

twenty years and of this Assembly for only three, but I have noticed that most of my colleagues were ignorant on the subject of Western European Union.

The third speaker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, did not confine his remarks to the report but also congratulated our new colleagues. He made a number of suggestions and in particular drew our attention to the need for reports on information activities which would appear twice a year, or at least every six months. He spoke about his country and also the defence problem. In his view, many speeches are made on the subject, but too little is said about Western European Union. He also suggested that we should imitate the Council of Europe where each parliamentarian is entitled to invite his compatriots to attend sittings as a means of spreading knowledge of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly.

I wish to renew my thanks for the work done by our secretary in collecting and processing the replies we received. I should mention that a large number of questionnaires were received from young people who wished to know about the origin and rôle of WEU.

Our colleague again raised the vital problem of the establishment of a public relations service. He also referred to the problem of Germany and asked whether Father Christmas was likely to see to it that the necessary post is filled. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg finally mentioned Mr. Ahrens's suggestion that two members of WEU including a substitute should be specially instructed to deal with this problem.

Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges has suggested that a member sitting in WEU should no longer sit in his or her national parliament.

Finally, as is pointed out in today's *Le Figaro*, defence is a subject within the remit of the Assembly of Western European Union and is not the concern of the European Parliament.

The observer from Greece spoke of the Common Market, defence and the European Parliament. He considered that the single European act should be implemented in full. If I understood him correctly, he thought that, as Greece belongs to the Community, it should also be part of WEU.

My thanks again to all the speakers. We did not have many representatives here but we did have quality.

I will end with a small anecdote. In my country, quite close to my home, I read the following graffiti on a cemetery wall: "Get out of NATO and WEU!" I must admit to great surprise not at the message conveyed but at the fact that its author knew of the existence not only of

NATO but of WEU as well. Every time I pass by the wall I never fail to give it a glance.

I hope that our Council of Ministers will find the resources mentioned by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. There are certainly expenditures which could be saved on certain posts in the interests of giving us a genuine public relations service. I consider that to be very important. Politicians, political parties and members of government do substantial work in this place but they are somewhat overlooked during elections because of their inability to sell their product.

I hope that the Council of Ministers will ultimately give us the assistance we need to avoid our having one day to engage the unemployed to put up graffiti on walls to make our organisation better known. As Sir Geoffrey said, we must make it a point of honour not to let the reminder come from the Council. It is up to us to remind the Council of this matter every six months until from sheer fatigue it finally does what we request.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Burger.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution on public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries contained in Document 1112.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten representatives requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is adopted¹.

4. European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1119 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific,

Technological and Aerospace Questions on European armaments co-operation – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1119 and amendments.

I call Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report which I am presenting on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is concerned with European armaments co-operation.

The reply to the Council is rather a ritual exercise forming part of the effort to conduct a dialogue between the Council and our Assembly. It might therefore be asked why there should be another report on European armaments co-operation when this is in fact a familiar, accepted and rarely disputed issue.

In our committee's view, there were a number of reasons. In the first place, although such co-operation is rarely disputed in so many words and is often the subject of approval and encouragement, what has been achieved in real practical terms is still very disappointing. Again, the WEU Council speaks constantly of the important rôle that our organisation can play in the process of armaments co-operation and in lending the process political drive, but in practice, when we look at the concrete results, we see that the actual substance is very slight. Finally, our committee considers that the Assembly should give expression to its continuing keen interest in this issue. We will therefore urge the Council to persevere in its endeavours to achieve the ultimate goal.

The report makes no direct allusion to the problems posed by armaments co-operation as the European defence industry study group has already produced a very detailed, expert analysis. This report, which was prepared at the request of the IEPG, seemed very useful, and, as it was written in December 1986, we decided not to go over the points made but instead to make ample reference to the report.

We also thought it pointless to rehearse once more the reasons why Europe should rationalise its defence efforts by closer co-operation in arms procurement and design. We considered simply that reference could usefully be made to a recent study by the American Academy of Sciences which put the wastage due to duplication of the same work in our various European countries at an annual \$35 billion. This figure, considered in conjunction with our current difficult economic situation, seems to us sufficiently eloquent in itself not to require development.

1. See page 44.

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

Our committee has paid not critical but close attention to the succession of statements which have emerged from each meeting of the Council of Ministers since the Rome meeting of 1984. This is reflected in the written report so I shall not analyse these statements now. However, if we compare and bring together the statements made in Rome in 1984, Bonn in 1985, Venice in 1987 and others which I could mention, we see that fine words have been formulated on each occasion but that year after year real, practical progress has been insignificant, not to say zero. Our committee is unanimous in regretting this and I believe that our Assembly takes the same view.

The written report also records the comments of various political leaders: Mr. Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of France, speaking on this platform, Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom, Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, and Mr. Fischbach, the Luxembourg Defence Minister. Here again the statements express the same view, but the fact remains that, as with the Council, there is talk of the political thrust to be imparted and of WEU as the forum in which this could be done, but nothing concrete actually happens!

Our countries all belong to the IEPG but if the political drive, the reactivation and the activities of both are observed over a long period we have the impression of the liquid levels in a U-jar; when the IEPG has been a little more active intentions declared in WEU have been a little less so, and vice versa. We hope this time is now at an end.

At the June 1987 session, Mr. Fischbach said that it was now up to WEU to give political thrust to armaments co-operation within the IEPG, and this thought is corroborated by the position of the Independent European Programme Group. I do not wish to use this platform to pass too final a judgment on the position of the IEPG. This is not the right place, nor is it our purpose or function, although this question must be in all our minds.

My colleagues on the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions have asked me to convey, without dilution, the words I used in committee, together with our dissatisfaction when we observe that these declarations and fine phrases are not followed by concrete progress.

Our committee has put forward two suggestions to improve concerted action by the Council, the WEU Assembly and the IEPG. The first is that the IEPG chairman should once a year address our Assembly or one of the competent committees, that is the Committee on Sci-

entific, Technological and Aerospace Questions or the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to present a report on the progress of armaments co-operation in the IEPG.

The fact that the chairman may be a minister of a country which is not a member of WEU does not seem to us an adequate reason for rejecting this suggestion. On the contrary it seems to be an additional reason for its acceptance. If this proposal were unanimously accepted, it could be taken up and given urgent support by the Council of Ministers. The IEPG might then prove highly receptive to an invitation which could only improve relations on both sides.

The second proposal is much more complex and ambitious, but one day – and the sooner the better – the WEU member countries will truly have to take the initiative in implementing a plan of action for the establishment of a European market for defence equipment of the kind indicated in the EDIS report to which I referred at the start.

WEU is in fact the organisation best placed to give political impetus to this suggestion. The WEU countries all belong to the IEPG, which has more members and seems more likely to be able to act efficiently, though it is also true that mere will to act is not enough by itself. Resources are also required.

Our report also refers to the very prolonged gestation period of the agencies and to the definition of their rôle. Between the declarations of Rome and The Hague nearly four years were needed to define the future rôle of the Standing Armaments Committee before it was discovered that this committee no longer met and that some of its tasks had now been assigned to Agency III. If we have been correctly informed, as the information was conveyed to us only by word of mouth when writing the report, it seems that substantial progress has now been made in this area.

The concept of a single agency was put forward at the meeting in The Hague. We dare express the hope that it will not take four years to set this up and that its functions, objectives and ultimate goals will be properly defined. We also hope that the research and working tools which the Council possesses in these agencies or in this single agency will really be operating in the near future.

Those are the comments I wished to make on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, none of whose members opposed this report, there being just one abstention.

I may have adopted a somewhat more critical tone than is customary on this platform but I had

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

to state loud and clear the feelings of all the committee members, which I am sure will be shared by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Bassinet.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Klejdzinski, the only member who wishes to speak.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Bassinet has presented us with a draft recommendation on European armaments co-operation which is simultaneously intended as a reply to the Council's thirty-second annual report. I consider that Mr. Bassinet's report deserves our thanks. It is no simple matter to present a comprehensive report on this subject. The discontent felt on this subject is expressed by the author in his wording of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation: the Assembly... dissatisfied that the Council, notwithstanding the primordial rôle of the WEU countries in the IEPG since 1984 – I repeat, since 1984 – has failed to date to provide proof of a decisive political impetus towards co-operation in the armaments field. I can only endorse the author's remarks. This statement is made by the author on the basis that (a) the geographical, (b) the military situation in Europe, and (c) the capacities of the European armaments industries should really be an ideal subject for joint planning, development and production. The economic advantages which would flow from such co-operation are an additional bonus.

The difficulties in the path of co-operation are indirectly demonstrated by the fact that the final communiqué following the ministerial meeting of the Independent European Programme Group in Seville expressed a minimum consensus concerning no more than an action programme for the phased creation of a European market for defence systems.

Mr. Bassinet has sensibly refrained from enumerating the problems of co-operation and refers us to a study of December 1986 on the European defence industry, which is no doubt intended to help.

At the same time one is impressed by the figure of \$35 billion a year mentioned in paragraph 7 of the report and repeated today, which represents additional European expenditure arising from the duplication of research, development and manufacture. I assume that the real sum is actually higher, if we consider the total price of a weapons system, including the expense of the necessary ancillary equipment and the associated autonomous logistical systems.

I would like to quote examples which illustrate our current dilemma. They represent the real situation in Europe, regardless of expressions of good intentions and the numerous decisions taken on the subject at various levels. All members of WEU are conscious that anti-tank weapons are of central importance to defence strategy in Central Europe. A helicopter capable of opposing tanks at any hour of the day or night and under all weather conditions is an urgent necessity, and the need for a helicopter to this specification is undisputed.

But what is the position in reality? So far only France and the Federal Republic of Germany have managed to commit themselves to joint development planning. Only in the weapons sector, and I refer here to the Trigat anti-tank missile, are joint deliberations also being conducted with the United Kingdom. Although this involves just one anti-tank missile, additional development costs are generated by the need for adaptation to suit the different weapons platforms, including the integrated firing systems.

There is not even any broad European co-operation in night vision technology, although the experts know that Europe has ground to make up in this exclusively high-tech area.

Another sad chapter is the collaboration on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties. The non-participation of our French friends, with their highly capable aircraft industry, is symptomatic of the dilemma of armaments co-operation. The European aircraft industry has proved its ability to build high-performance aircraft with the Tornado, but what lessons have been learnt from the exercise? It is my personal hope that there will be a growing comprehension, which will ultimately cause more European countries to take part in the European fighter aircraft programme.

Our shortcomings in radar technology, particularly as regards look up, look down, shoot down capacity, are already familiar.

We Europeans are pursuing two costly lines of development towards the desirable modern radar systems. These are (a) the Ferranti-led consortium aiming at an entirely new development and (b) the consortium of AEG and Hughes United States, which is developing a special version of the Hughes APG-65 radar system. I could mention other examples which would further illustrate the fragmented state of our co-operation on armaments.

Quite apart from the development and production costs incurred, and in terms merely of the follow-on costs arising from logistical arrangements and different cross-servicing facilities, the pursuit of two opposing lines of fighter aircraft development is in itself a cost factor

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

which cannot even be accurately quantified, but certainly warrants the description of an expensive luxury.

Mr. Stokes's report, which we considered this morning, makes it clear that, of twenty selected technologies, we enjoy equality with the Soviet Union only in six. Mr. Stokes rightly points out that the selected technologies could substantially alter military potential in the next ten to twenty years. Where are the joint efforts by WEU countries (a) to attain the standards of the United States and (b) to extend and safeguard our western lead in conjunction with the United States?

Eureka is a small step in the right direction, but Eureka alone is insufficient.

My remarks apply equally to European co-operation in the military use of computers in defence technology. Mr. Fourré has presented a report on this. If only we were able to undertake jointly the work on planning, production, compatibility and financing of all the information systems for the various armed forces, we would end up by saving millions – or I would say billions – but here again everybody is ploughing his own furrow.

Apart from the real situation referred to, the burden of all my remarks is to emphasise how important it is that the members of the Council should agree on the common operational requirements in relation to all major weapons systems, as well as on joint planning and development projects which can and should leave room for specific interpretations consistent with national requirements.

I will conclude by repeating my thanks to Mr. Bassinet for his report, which, I recognise, deals with a difficult area. Notwithstanding a few critical remarks on my part, his report warrants our approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Klejdzinski for his kind words about the report and for substantiating by his comments the points which I myself tried to bring out. He emphasised the clear advantages arising not merely from joint manufacture but also from joint weapons development. What he said perfectly illustrates these advantages.

Mr. Klejdzinski referred to one point in my written report which I did not mention in my presentation: the results of the Seville meeting which we considered to be insufficient and which

are so described in the document. He made particular mention of the brilliant achievement of the European aircraft industry, the Tornado, and the possible worries as to its future. He also referred to Mr. Fourré's report on a similar subject – co-operation in data-processing technology.

I share his conclusion; the Council must press for armaments co-operation, not simply talk about it.

Although I did not do so in the written report, I cannot overstate the significance of the successful Nunn amendment adopted when the national defence authorisation act was under discussion in the United States Congress. In a way this success is a challenge to each of the member countries of our Assembly because, whatever the generous intentions behind this effort at collaboration with the alliance countries, we see the filling of a vacuum which we ourselves have left, and we are well aware that vacuums have a brief existence!

That is what I wished to say, Mr. President. I repeat my thanks to the speaker for his comments, and I hope that the Assembly has found some interest in our report.

To save time, Mr. President, may I at once speak to the two amendments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have indeed been notified of two amendments tabled by Mr. Bassinet and Mr. Fourré.

Amendment 1 reads:

1. After paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the organisation in 1988 of a first European defence study session to advance knowledge of the European dimensions of security matters; ”

Amendment 2 reads:

2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Instruct the Secretariat-General to ensure periodical meetings of European defence study sessions and to co-ordinate national initiatives in this connection with a view to setting up a European defence research institute as soon as possible. ”

I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – These amendments are designed to make good an oversight of mine for which I apologise. I have already mentioned to the Assembly the advantages of setting up a European defence research institute. I did not refer to this in the

Mr. Bassinet (continued)

report, and it was consequently not included in the draft recommendation.

We can take satisfaction in the organisation of the first European defence study session which will, we hope, add to the European dimension of security questions. I also hope that it will further concentrate all our minds on the need for increased armaments co-operation. It is these considerations which prompted these two amendments. I therefore request that the Assembly include them in the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1?...

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2?...

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1119, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

5. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have to inform the Assembly that I have been notified by the French Delegation of the candidature of Mrs. Trautmann as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

In accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure, this change must be ratified by the Assembly.

Is there any opposition?...

This change is agreed to.

6. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the session.

Before announcing the close of the session I wish to thank Assembly members for their attendance and the quality of their speeches, the Council members who have attended, the Secretariat-General, the ministers who have addressed us, the press representatives who have followed and reported on our work and all the permanent and temporary staff including especially our friends the interpreters who, as usual, have performed with great skill a task bristling with difficulties.

We shall meet again in 1988 and I now declare closed the thirty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 4.20 p.m.)

¹ See page 45.

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