

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1979

I

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54 32

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
PERIN François	PRLW
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie
VERLEYSEN William	Soc. Chr.

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
DRUON Maurice	RPR
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF

MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMAIRE Marcel	CNIP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
VISSE René	Communist
WARGNIES Claude	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
BARDENS Hans	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
President of the Assembly	
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
WITTMAN Fritz	CDU/CSU
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BOLDRINI Arrigo	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CORALLO Salvatore	Communist
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
GONELLA Guido	Chr. Dem.
MAGGIONI Desiderio	Chr. Dem.
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
ORSINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
ROBERTI Giovanni	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SEGRE Sergio	Communist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

Mrs. AGNELLI Susanna	Ind. Rep.
MM. ANTONI Varese	Communist
ARIOSTO Egidio	PSDI
AVELLONE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BORGHI Luigi	Chr. Dem.
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DEL DUCA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FACCIO Adele	Radical
MM. GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
Mrs. PAPA DE SANTIS Cristina	Communist
MM. PINTO Biagio	Republican
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
ROSSI Raffaele	Communist
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SGHERRI Evaristo	Communist
TREMAGLIA Pierantonio Mirko	MSI
URSO Salvatore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Soc. Chr.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

Mr. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
Mrs. van den HEUVEL-de BLANK Ien	Labour
MM. van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederio BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
John ROPER	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour
Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour
N...	
N...	

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Gordon BAGIER	Labour
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Robin COOK	Labour
Jim CRAIGEN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. Kevin McNAMARA	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
Mr. Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Mr. Keith STAINTON	Conservative
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AGENDA

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session
Paris, 18th-21st June 1979**

I. Report of the Council

Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Africa's rôle in a European security policy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 4. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Parliaments and defence procurement | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. SALT II and its implications for European security | <i>Report tabled by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 4. The balance of force | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 5. Study on collective logistical support | <i>Draft order tabled by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. The industrial bases of European security | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Relations with parliaments

Relations with parliaments

Information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session
Paris, 18th-21st June 1979

MONDAY, 18th JUNE

Morning

Meetings of Political Groups.

11.30 a.m.

1. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session.
7. Ratification of decisions of the Presidential Committee.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Political activities of the Council — Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty — Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments.
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions — Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of
the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions.
4. Twenty-fourth annual report of the Council :
presentation by Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chair-
man-in-Office of the Council.
5. Address by Mr. Aigrain, French Minister of State attached to the Prime Minister, responsible for
research.
6. Debate on the annual report of the Council and replies by Committees.
7. *Votes on the draft recommendations.*

TUESDAY, 19th June

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, of the General Affairs Committee
and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions for the election of their
bureaux.

10 a.m.

1. The industrial bases of European security :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

11.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Scholten, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for the election of their bureaux.

3 p.m.

1. The balance of force :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Study on collective logistical support :

presentation of the draft order tabled by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft order.

WEDNESDAY, 20th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

Africa's rôle in a European security policy :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Müller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Parliaments and defence procurement :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 21st JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

10 a.m.

1. Relations with parliaments :

presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

2. Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

**Symposium on a European armaments policy
Brussels, 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979**

RESOLUTION 62

**adopted by the Presidential Committee
on 18th January 1979¹**

The Presidential Committee,

Noting the interest aroused by the symposium on a European armaments policy held in March 1977 and the colloquies on a European aeronautical policy held in September 1973 and February 1976 ;

Considering that it is the duty of the European assembly empowered to deal with security matters to organise another symposium with the purpose of helping to define measures to allow the armaments industries of the Western European countries to meet the qualitative and quantitative defence requirements of our countries in the best conditions,

DECIDES

1. To organise a second symposium on a European armaments policy in October 1979 ;
2. To contribute, on this occasion, to the commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the agreements modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty.

Organisation

1. Topics

Three topics will be dealt with at the symposium :

- (1) definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe ;
- (2) political, institutional, economic and social conditions of defence procurement ;
- (3) research, development and production of armaments in Western Europe.

Each of these topics will be dealt with under the responsibility of one of the Assembly's three political committees, i.e. the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (topic 1), the General Affairs Committee (topic 2) and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (topic 3).

At the second part of the present session, each committee will have to submit a report to the Assembly on the same topic, drawing political conclusions from the symposium and making recommendations to the Council.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments will of course be responsible for drawing the attention of parliaments of member countries to the conclusions.

2. Documents

The following documents will be distributed to participants for information and to provide a basis for reflection :

- (a) A European armaments policy (report submitted by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments at the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session and Recommendation 325 adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978) ;
- (b) recommendations to be adopted by the Assembly at the first part of the present session and the documents on which they are based :

— Parliaments and defence procurement (report to be submitted by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments) ;

¹ In accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

- Political conditions for European armaments co-operation (report to be submitted by Mr. Van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee) ;
- The industrial bases of European security (report to be submitted by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions).

The last three reports may include appendices giving relevant background information.

3. Working groups

Three working groups will meet during the symposium to deal with each of the three topics. Each group will be chaired by the Chairman of the Committee concerned and include, in addition to the members of that Committee, participants in the symposium appointed for the purpose.

4. Time-table

The symposium will last two full days and one morning and will be open to the public. A working group may, however, decide to deliberate *in camera*.

First day

- 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. Opening sitting during which leading politicians will speak
- 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. Meetings of the three working groups
- 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. Meetings of the three working groups

Second day

General debate in plenary sitting on the texts communicated by the working groups

Third day

- Morning Presentation of the conclusions drawn from the symposium and press conference

5. Date and place

The symposium will be held at the Palais des Congrès, Coudenberg 3, 1000 Brussels, on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979.

6. Chairmanship

The symposium as a whole will be chaired by the President of the Assembly.

7. Participants

Participants, numbering about 400, will, except for duly justified exceptions, be nationals of Western European countries as follows :

(a) Ministers concerned in member countries

(b) Parliamentarians

(i) the following members of the WEU Assembly :

- the Presidential Committee ;
- the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;
- the General Affairs Committee ;
- the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ;
- the Committee for Relations with Parliaments ;

(ii) — Chairmen and certain members of the defence committees and other appropriate committees of parliaments of WEU member countries, other European member countries of NATO or the EEC and countries which have applied for membership of the EEC ;

- the President of the European Parliamentary Assembly and the Chairman of its Political Committee ;
- the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and the members of its Military Committee.

(c) Officials and senior officers

- (i) national armaments directors of member countries and other representatives of ministries of defence ;
- (ii) representatives from military headquarters of member countries ;
- (iii) permanent representatives of member countries to WEU and NATO and their high-ranking representatives to the NATO Military Committee ;
- (iv) representatives of member countries to the IEPG, the SAC, FINABEL and agencies and committees res-

possible for directing joint production projects ;

- (v) ambassadors of WEU member countries in Belgium, where the symposium is to be held.
- (d) *One or two members of the Commission of the European Community*
- (e) *The secretaries-general of the above-mentioned international bodies or their deputies or assistants*
- (f) *Representatives of the armaments industries of member countries and persons responsible for bi- or multilateral armaments projects (international industrial consortia)*
- (g) *Representatives of trade unions in the industries concerned*
- (h) *Persons invited in an individual capacity*

8. Languages

Documents will be issued in French and English. Speeches and statements may be made in the official languages of member states. The Secretariat will provide simultaneous interpretation of speeches into French and English.

9. Financing

The cost of organising the symposium will be borne by the Assembly's normal budget.

10. Preparation

The Presidential Committee will prepare the symposium with the assistance of a consultative group of experts.

Topics of the papers

Working Group I

1. Prospects of the work of Panel I of the IEPG — time-table for replacing equipment
2. Prospects of bi- and multilateral European co-operation
3. Prospects of the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors
4. An industrial view of the definition of armaments requirements and procurement
5. The rôle of permanent consortia in European co-operation

Working Group II

1. Political conditions of defence procurement — relations between the United States and Western Europe
2. Political conditions of defence procurement in Western Europe
3. Juridical conditions of defence procurement
4. Economic and social conditions of defence procurement
5. Financial conditions of defence procurement
6. International constraints

Working Group III

1. The future tank
2. The future combat aircraft
3. Naval shipbuilding problems
4. Electronic communications
5. Missiles
6. Future weapons

*Twenty-Fourth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1978*

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Fourth Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1978.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters :

I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly	18
II. Activities of the Council	20
III. Armaments Control Agency	28
IV. Standing Armaments Committee.....	35
V. Public Administration Committee	37
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions	39

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council and other Ministers who addressed the Assembly during the twenty-fourth ordinary session confirmed the interest of member governments in the work of the Assembly, which is concerned with both European security and European union, and the only European Assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence.

The Council, who are anxious to play their full part in maintaining close collaboration between the two organs of WEU, continued the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora.

A. Twenty-third annual report of the Council to the Assembly

The twenty-third annual report to the Assembly, giving a detailed account of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1977, was transmitted to the Assembly at the earliest possible date. Additional information on armaments control was provided in accordance with the procedure applied each year since the Council's reply to Written Question 123.

B. Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly

The Council took careful note of the reports presented by Assembly Committees during the two parts of the twenty-fourth ordinary session, on a number of questions concerning European security and European union. They also noted with interest the subsequent debates on those reports.

The Council gave careful consideration to the fifteen recommendations¹ adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-third ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session and to the thirteen written questions² put by members of the Assembly.

With the help of national administrations and the working group, they made every effort to answer the Assembly as quickly as possible. However, the drafting of some replies on developing problems was deferred so that the

Assembly could be given information of a useful nature. They noted that similar considerations, mentioned by one of the Rapporteurs, had in some cases delayed the submission of committee reports which had only reached the Council as the sessions opened. Furthermore, as the Assembly is aware, the Council have to observe the principle of unanimity in preparing their replies and must therefore agree on texts which reflect positions shared by all seven member governments.

In their replies to Assembly recommendations and questions, the Council took account of work in progress in other bodies to which the member states of WEU belong. The fullest possible details were given of consultations in which the representatives of the member states had taken part, more especially in the framework of political co-operation between the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council.

C. Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies

Two informal meetings took place in Bonn, on 5th June 1978, after the ministerial session of the Council.

At a working lunch arranged in accordance with the 1968 agreement and presided over by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State at the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, members of the Council had talks with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. In accordance with established practice, the Chairman-in-Office also met the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

In the afternoon, the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments met, also under the chairmanship of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, to discuss three subjects proposed by the Committee: the joint production of armaments, the MBFR negotiations and armaments exports.

At these two meetings, the Assembly representatives were briefed on the progress of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries of WEU, which Ministers had discussed that morning.

On 3rd November, the Council held an informal meeting in Rome with the General Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Radi, Italian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It had been agreed that the exchange of views would cover three subjects proposed by

1. Nos. 307-321.

2. Nos 179-191.

the Committee, namely, the consequences for the defence of Europe of the widening of the European Community, Europe's foreign relations and the rôle of Africa in a European security policy.

As they stated in their reply to Recommendation 319, the Council consider that political contacts with Assembly bodies should remain flexible and open. The introduction of formal procedures which would involve lengthy previous consultations between governments and would deprive the talks of all spontaneity, should therefore be avoided. Furthermore, even at informal meetings, the remarks of both the Chairman-in-Office and of other members of the Council take due account of agreed positions and, so far as possible, of the views of all governments.

The Committees expressed a desire to continue contacts of this kind, but also suggested that the procedure might be improved. The Council share the Committee's wish that the fullest advantage should be taken of such informal exchanges of views which, in their opinion, should help to further mutual understanding and extend the political dialogue between the Assembly and themselves.

D. Meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments

The purpose of meetings of this body, which was set up in 1959 and comprises the members of the Defence Committee, the members of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Council representatives, is to provide the Committee with information on questions concerning armaments co-operation dealt with by the SAC.

The tenth meeting of this sub-committee was held in Paris on 30th October 1978. It was concerned, firstly, with the current work of the SAC and, secondly, with the implementation of the mandate given to the SAC by the Council in 1977. The Assembly Committee reiterated its interest in the current study on the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries of WEU and was given an up-to-date progress report. Information was given on the legal part of this study, which had already been submitted to the Council. As regards the economic part, it was recalled that the SAC had to take account of the work of the independent European programme group when drafting this section.

The Council appreciated the satisfaction expressed by the Committee Chairman and took note of the Committee's wish that the Liaison Sub-Committee should meet regularly.

E. Speeches to the Assembly by Ministers of member governments

The Council are aware of the importance which the Assembly attaches to participation by Ministers in its debates. Several representatives of member governments addressed the Assembly on the principal subjects on the agenda for the twenty-fourth ordinary session.

In June 1978, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, introduced the twenty-third annual report; in the second part of his speech he set out his government's views on East-West relations, the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the situation in Africa, disarmament and terrorism. Mr. Mulley, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, spoke on European security, and Mr. Stirn, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made a statement on his country's disarmament policy.

In November, Mr. Peijnenburg, Netherlands Minister for Scientific Affairs, addressed the Assembly on problems of co-operation on energy and space questions. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State at the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, spoke on the progress of East-West relations and also dealt with her government's policy towards Africa and Asia. Disarmament again formed the subject of a statement by the French representative, Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Mazzola, Italian Secretary of State for Defence, gave the Assembly some details of the work of the IEPG and also covered the subjects discussed at the recent joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee held in Rome. Mr. Tomlinson, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, spoke on assistance to developing countries in relation to broad security considerations.

Ministers also answered a large number of questions put to them by members of the Assembly.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The Council met at ministerial level in Bonn on 5th June 1978, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The permanent representatives met eleven times at the headquarters of the organisation in London and there were thirty-four meetings of the working group.

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The Council's replies to the Assembly and the statements made by Ministers taking part in debates during the twenty-fourth ordinary session clearly confirmed that the member countries of WEU are fully resolved to maintain in force all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and remain determined to fulfil the obligations entered into for a term of fifty years.

The clause in Article V of the treaty providing for automatic mutual assistance is a vital element in the security of the member countries of the union and as the Council said in their reply to Recommendation 309, they are fully aware of the binding character of this provision.

Furthermore, as was recalled in the replies to this recommendation and to Written Question 185, the Council would be convened under the provision of Article VIII if any member so requested, to consult on any situation which might constitute a threat to peace or endanger economic stability.

In their reply to Recommendation 319, the Council stated that in implementation of Article VIII they would continue to ensure that the modified Brussels Treaty is applied and observed both as part of their own activities and in connection with consultations held in other frameworks, particularly within the machinery of political co-operation between the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council. They observed that, by the frequency and pattern of its work, European political co-operation plays an important part in enabling the Nine to reach an agreed view on the most important foreign policy issues and to speak with one voice. In directing their own political activities, the Council must therefore take account of the results so achieved, believing as they do in the need to further European cohesion and to avoid all unnecessary duplication of activity as well as the possible delaying effect of differences between a narrower or a wider framework of European political consultation. However, the Council at permanent representative

level are still checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected. Whilst this duty has not involved active or detailed consideration of issues forming the subject of consultations elsewhere, it nevertheless guarantees fulfilment of the responsibilities and undertakings set out in the modified Brussels Treaty. Moreover, the Council, meeting at ministerial level, consider various problems concerning European unity and security.

During the year under review, the various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times on the agenda for Council meetings.

In Bonn, on 5th June, the Ministers discussed the progress of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee, in implementation of the mandate adopted by the Council in 1977, on the situation of the armaments industry in the member countries of WEU. The permanent representatives kept in touch with the progress of this study throughout the year¹.

Furthermore, as stated in Chapter I, the development of questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols again formed the subject of the continuing dialogue with the Assembly, which is a major feature of the Council's activities.

A. Political questions

1. East-West relations

In Bonn, on 5th June 1978, Ministers discussed East-West relations in depth.

Statements were presented on the development of bilateral relations between the member countries of WEU and the eastern countries since the previous ministerial meeting.

Information was given on the many contacts between governments with particular reference to a number of high level visits including visits, in 1977, by the King and Queen of the Belgians to Poland, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to Yugoslavia and Poland, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to Romania, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to the USSR and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany to Bulgaria, and also by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic

1. See part B. 3 of this Chapter and part A. 1 of Chapter IV.

Republic to Luxembourg and by the First Party Secretary of Hungary to Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany; visits early in 1978 by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to Romania, the Italian Minister for Foreign Trade to Hungary, the Czechoslovak Head of State and the Soviet Head of State to the Federal Republic of Germany, the Polish First Party Secretary and Foreign Minister to Italy, the Foreign Ministers of Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic to Belgium. Among visits planned for the following months special mention was made of those by the Polish, Romanian and Soviet Foreign Ministers and the Party Secretary of the German Democratic Republic to France, the French Minister for Foreign Trade to the USSR and the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic; visits by the Foreign Ministers of the German Democratic Republic and Bulgaria to Italy, the Hungarian Foreign Minister to the Netherlands and the Soviet Foreign Minister to the United Kingdom and the Polish Finance Minister to Luxembourg.

The German delegation reported on the overall development of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

Ministers discussed the development of multilateral East-West relations with particular reference to the meeting held in Belgrade in implementation of the final act of the CSCE and the situation in certain areas outside Europe.

As the Council recalled in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 307, the governments of WEU member countries approached the Belgrade meeting with the hope that it would be possible to achieve a better implementation of all the provisions of the final act of Helsinki and that concrete measures to that effect would be taken. They considered that although this goal had not been realised the meeting had not been without value and was one more stage in the long process of détente.

Ministers reaffirmed the great importance attached by member governments to furthering the process of détente and expressed the hope that the conference in Madrid in 1980 will inject a new momentum into that process. They emphasised that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is of primary significance for the improvement of understanding and co-operation between all the signatory states of the final act of the CSCE.

They further observed that disregard for the indivisibility of détente could not but jeopardise the improvement of East-West relations.

In addition, member governments of WEU took an active part in consultations held through-

out the year within the framework of the political co-operation of the Nine for the purpose of co-ordinating closely the positions of the member countries of the European communities. They also participated actively in the work of the North Atlantic Council which included, in particular, a study of the long-term trends of East-West relations. During the meeting of that Council at ministerial level on 7th and 8th December 1978, their representatives and those of their partners in the Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed the continued commitment of the allies to a policy of détente as the best means of promoting stable and mutually-beneficial relationships between governments and better and more frequent contacts between individuals. In doing so they emphasised once again the indivisibility of détente. Point 5 of the communiqué issued after the meeting commented on the results of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in the following terms:

“Ministers expressed again their firm conviction that full implementation of all sections of the CSCE final act is an essential element for promoting détente. They noted with regret certain negative developments in its implementation during 1978 especially in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in that of information. They stressed the need for improvement in implementation to be shown between now and the Madrid meeting, so that the participating states could take part on the political level. They emphasised that this meeting would provide a valuable opportunity for undertaking a further review of the implementation of the final act and for considering future progress. They agreed on the importance of careful preparation of the Madrid meeting and, to that end, expressed their intention to consult closely both among the allies and with the other CSCE participating states. They noted the positive outcome of the recent Bonn meeting on the preparation of a scientific forum.”

2. Relations between European countries and the People's Republic of China

Having noted Assembly Recommendation 315, the Council wished to make it clear that the governments of the member states remained willing to develop and strengthen both their political and their economic relations with China. They would continue their efforts to deepen their political dialogue with that country since they considered that no one could be unaware of the impact of measures taken by such an important country and since the solution of a number of problems faced by the international community could not be usefully sought and effectively ensured without China being associated in it. Furthermore, these same governments would con-

tinue to give due attention to the strengthening of economic and technical relations, since the existence of a stable and confident China seemed to them likely to be a propitious factor for the maintenance of stability in the world.

The Council are convinced that the policy thus defined, which can and must be followed with a view to improving the chances of worldwide détente, will be a positive contribution to peace and will benefit the security of the whole international community.

With regard to the possibility raised in Written Question 186 that defensive weapons might be supplied to the People's Republic of China, the Council noted that the policy of member countries was or would be decided on the basis of their assessment of the overall progress of their relations with that country and taking into account their own armaments export policies.

3. Relations between European countries and African countries

The governments of the member countries of WEU have played an active part in the discussions which have taken place in European political co-operation with the aim of co-ordinating the African policies of the Nine.

Replying to Assembly Recommendation 318, the Council stated that they fully supported the efforts of the British Government, in co-operation with the United States Government, to achieve a genuine transfer of power in Rhodesia through a settlement involving all the parties and bringing about a ceasefire, and to call on all the parties to attend, and negotiate constructively at, a "round-table" meeting, in order to reach a settlement acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. They also endorsed the view recorded by the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum in July 1978 that the choice of leaders in Zimbabwe was up to the people of Zimbabwe.

The Council, who share the Assembly's view that apartheid must be terminated in South Africa, noted that the institutionalised racism in that country was in total contravention of the western concept of human rights.

They emphasised the determination of the member countries of WEU to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 418 on South Africa and 253 on Rhodesia.

As they pointed out, the Nine have undertaken to encourage their companies operating in South Africa to implement the "code of conduct".

With regard to the problem of Namibia, the Council fully supported the proposal drawn up by the western members of the United Nations Security Council for a peaceful settlement in the

territory leading to earlier independence through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision. They fully support Resolutions 431 and 435 adopted by the Security Council on 27th July and on 29th September 1978 respectively.

Responding to other concerns expressed by the Assembly, the Council stated that, whilst all countries had the right to advance their interests by normal diplomatic, economic and political means, they supported the position of the OAU in believing that African problems were best solved by African states themselves, without external intervention. They would, therefore, deplore the creation of military spheres of influence by foreign powers which would jeopardise the prospects for peace, both in Africa and in the surrounding areas. In this connection, the Council also welcomed the improvement in relations between Zaïre and Angola.

Furthermore, the Council confirmed to the Assembly that their contribution to economic and social development was one of the prime objectives of the co-operation of the WEU member countries with African states. Referring to the negotiations designed to renew the Lomé Convention, they noted that the European Economic Community, in the statement made during the formal opening of the conference on 24th July 1978, made clear its intention to maintain its links with the countries party to the convention and to develop co-operation with those states to the maximum extent possible; the Community also stressed the very great importance it attached to respect for human rights.

4. Situation in the Middle East

In their previous report to the Assembly, the Council expressed the hope that the efforts of the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel at the end of 1977 towards a settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict would lead to developments which would make possible a general, just and lasting peace with the participation of all the parties concerned.

It is in this spirit that the governments of the WEU member countries have taken an active share in consultations within the framework of European political co-operation in 1978.

Developments in the Middle East were mentioned during the joint meeting between the Council and the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly held in Rome on 3rd November 1978.

5. International terrorism

The Council considered Assembly Recommendation 314 with the utmost care. In replying, they noted that within the framework of their political co-operation, the member states of the

European Communities discussed in depth the problems raised by international terrorism. They stressed that the European Convention on the suppression of terrorism had come into force on 4th August 1978. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration on terrorism at its meeting on 23rd November.

Having referred to the declaration on the hijacking of aircraft adopted at the economic summit in Bonn on 16th and 17th July 1978, the Council stated that they would watch developments in this field.

The Council feel that the governments of member states within the framework of both international and European co-operation, have so far made all the joint efforts it was possible for them to make in their fight against terrorism. As they informed the Assembly, these efforts will be continued in the light of future developments of the problem.

B. Defence questions

As in previous years, the Council confirmed on numerous occasions during the year under review their determination to fulfil all the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and to ensure their implementation. The Council have given full and proper attention to their responsibilities in the fields of defence and security, and will continue to do so.

Thus, when presenting the twenty-third annual report to the Assembly in June, Mr. Forlani, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, stressed the resolve of member countries' governments to fulfil their commitments vis-à-vis the treaty and protocols, and recalled that because of the automatic mutual assistance clause in Article V, the treaty is one of the fundamental elements in the member countries' system of security.

The Council have continued to give the fullest possible support to the Armaments Control Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee in the accomplishment of the important missions entrusted to them (see B.3 below and Chapters III and IV).

1. Level of forces of member States

All the procedures prescribed by the modified Brussels Treaty have been carried out, during 1978, by the Council, assisted by the Armaments Control Agency and also by NATO and SHAPE.

(a) Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place

under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1977, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 3rd May. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1978 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1977, at a meeting on 17th January 1978, in Brussels, the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council. At their meeting on 15th February 1978, the latter noted that the level of these forces, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II. At the same meeting, the Council took note of a declaration on French forces by the permanent representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for 1978.

(b) Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command — internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces — are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the Agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, in 1978, to carry out their obligations under

Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe

In accordance with the undertaking given in paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 213, the United Kingdom Government declares that the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe at 31st December 1978 amounted to 59,883 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. At 31st December 1978 there were 3,243 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units could be speedily returned to their duty stations in an emergency affecting NATO.

3. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in member countries¹

During the year, the Council followed the progress of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee in implementation of the mandate given to it in April 1977. In April 1978 they received the report drafted by the SAC on the legal statuses of firms. Noting the interesting features of this legal analysis, the Council examined the working methods proposed for producing the economic chapter.

At their meeting on 5th June in Bonn, the Ministers, reviewing the progress made, stressed the need to ensure harmonisation between the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and the independent European programme group, and to avoid duplication of effort. Aware of the Assembly's interest in the study being carried out, Ministers instructed the Head of the International Secretariat to give a verbal account of the situation to the Assembly Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments during their joint meeting with the Council that afternoon.

The Council follow closely the Standing Armaments Committee's continuing work on the economic analysis of the study.

On the matter of the division of work between the independent European programme group and the Standing Armaments Committee on studies relating to European armaments co-operation, and in conformity with the undertaking at the joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee of the Assembly on 3rd November 1977 in Bonn, the Council approved the text of an information note on 15th February

and this was duly forwarded to the President of the Assembly.

The meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments, held on 30th October in Paris, offered a further opportunity for discussing, with the Assembly Defence Committee, aspects of the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee (see point D in Chapter I).

4. Assembly recommendations and written questions

(a) After receiving Recommendation 320 on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-third annual report — the Council made a careful study of the views expressed in the plenary debate on the report prepared on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. In their reply, they gave the information and details requested by the Assembly and took the opportunity to recall the vital rôle of the Armaments Control Agency.

Welcoming Recommendation 308 on communications and crisis management in the Alliance, the Council made a number of points in their reply. They observed in particular that, in the context of crisis prevention measures designed to improve stability and increase warning time of any real threat, member nations, before extending arms control negotiations to cover all categories of weapons having an immediate impact on European security, would need to assure themselves that their involvement in such negotiations would indeed offer the prospect of redressing the force imbalance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, and of improving stability.

Regarding the problem of strategic mobility raised by the Assembly in Recommendation 312, the Council welcomed in their reply any developments which seemed likely to assist the forces of allied countries.

A full answer was provided by the Council for the wide-ranging Recommendation 313 on security in the Mediterranean. Features of this reply included various forms of defence co-operation between members of the North Atlantic Alliance in the area, the use of the consultative Co-ordinating Committee for reviewing certain aspects of policy on arms exports to some countries outside the Alliance, and the non-aligned status of Yugoslavia.

On the subject of United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology (Recommendation 316), the Council in their reply underlined the value of NATO's long-term defence programme, whose aim is to achieve rationalisation and increased military efficiency through greater standardisation and interoperability. Certain measures in the field of tactical telecommunications are provided for in the pro-

1. See also Chapters I and IV.

gramme, with a view to enhancing the overall facilities of the Alliance — essential to political consultation in times of crisis.

(b) During 1978, the Council dealt with five written questions on defence topics. Nos. 179 and 180 concerned the disarmament proposals put forward by the President of the French Republic at the special United Nations session in May.

Written Question 181 related to the activities in Zaïre of a German firm specialising in missiles.

No. 182 concerned the safeguarding of information received by the Armaments Control Agency in the course of its work, while No. 188 dealt with the signature, by member states, of bilateral agreements with the United States Government (memoranda of understanding) on trade in defence equipment.

C. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions

The Council continued their dialogue with the Assembly on the policy of European countries in the fields of energy, the aircraft industry and space.

They noted with interest the searching reports prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. They gave careful consideration to Assembly Recommendations 310, 311, 316, 317 and 321 on European co-operation, and relations between Europe and the United States, in these various fields.

1. Energy problems

(a) Europe's energy supplies

At their meeting in Copenhagen on 7th and 8th April 1978, the heads of state or of government of the member countries of the European Communities underlined the urgent need to make Europe less dependent on imported energy and acknowledge the need to give high priority to large-scale investments in this sector. At their subsequent meeting in Bremen on 6th and 7th July 1978, they similarly emphasised that efforts to resolve long-term energy problems should be intensified at all levels and that the primary objective was for all countries to reduce their dependence on oil imports. In reply to Recommendation 321, the Council confirmed that all the governments of member countries were prepared to work towards a European energy policy and noted that they were concerned with prospects for 1990 and beyond. They observed that this addition was necessary because investments in the energy sector had, in most cases, long leadtimes, which had to be taken into account.

The Council pointed out that discussions on energy matters and decision-making in that area were being held in several fora, such as the European Communities and the International Energy Agency. Thus, as they pointed out in reply to one of the points on which the Assembly expressed concern, mechanisms have been established within IEA and the European Communities to ensure supplies to the countries concerned in times of crisis.

Furthermore, the Council assured the Assembly that all governments concerned considered the development of conventional and new resources of energy and energy production and energy conservation to be of great importance.

Although the initiative for energy conservation existed mainly at national level, there was a great deal to be achieved through international co-operation and through exchanges of information and experience. In consequence, the Council noted, governments favoured a co-ordinated international approach. Many governments had already implemented a number of measures to promote energy conservation through good house-keeping and the improvement of efficiency in the use of energy in the industrial, transport, building, agriculture and domestic sectors. Several governments had decided to reinforce their efforts on research, development and demonstration of new techniques and new forms of energy.

Finally, the Council pointed out that, in the framework of general investment stimulation, special support would become available for industries which reduced their dependence on oil or on natural gas, by greater efficiency and by switching to other fuels.

(b) Peaceful use of nuclear energy

The Council noted the concern expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 310, regarding problems connected with the spread of nuclear energy.

In their reply, they pointed out that the member governments had acted to promote co-operation between supplier countries for the purpose of safeguarding the peaceful use of exported nuclear energy by appropriate controls. The guidelines adopted in September 1977 by the fifteen countries composing the nuclear suppliers group provide that the International Atomic Energy Agency shall safeguard the peaceful use of all sensitive exports to non-nuclear weapon states; these were communicated to the IAEA in January 1978.

Furthermore, the Council explained their position to the Assembly on civil nuclear assistance to third countries and on the protection

of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, referring, in particular, to the nuclear suppliers' guidelines.

2. European aircraft industry

In their reply to Recommendation 321, the Council noted that all governments were prepared to seek and promote the best employment of their respective industrial skills and production capacities in order to achieve a strong and competitive aircraft industry in Europe.

With regard to the civil aircraft industry, the Council fully recognise the need to strengthen co-operation between European airframe, aero-engine and component manufacturers. Progress has already been achieved with such products as Concorde and the Airbus-300. This last is part of a major programme of integration for long-term co-operation within "Airbus Industrie".

With regard to the military aircraft industry, the Council agree that there should be close and permanent consultation between the European states with a view to finding European solutions for the development of aircraft and helicopters. In replying to Assembly Recommendation 311, they noted that possibilities of co-operation in these fields were being intensively studied, both at governmental level and within the framework of the independent European programme group, including co-operation on a European helicopter. The Council are aware of the importance of adopting programmes for co-operation, in the interests of the competitiveness of the European aircraft and space industry in relation to United States industry.

The aim of strengthening European co-operation in the civil and military sectors of the industry does not exclude transatlantic collaboration. With regard to the establishment of co-operation with American manufacturers for long-range civil aircraft, the Council informed the Assembly that, in their view, this could be envisaged in the long term and that the industry should determine the category of aircraft which should have priority in the negotiations. However, they consider that in order to offer potential American partners a counter-balance, the European countries need, first of all, consolidated co-operation among their own manufacturers.

3. Space questions

In replying to Assembly Recommendation 317, the Council gave the following details on the state of European co-operation.

The overall telecommunications satellite programme and the production of a promotional series of five Ariane launchers have already been

agreed upon by the delegates of the countries represented in the European Space Agency.

The French earth observation satellite project (SPOT) was submitted to each of the member states of the European Space Agency within the time limit and in accordance with the procedures laid down by the ESA convention. Although member states had the opportunity to participate in this new project, it emerged, in the course of debates in the Council of the Agency, that only one of them wished to do so. The French Government therefore decided to carry out SPOT as a national project, and France has stated that she would be prepared, if requested by the states concerned which are members of the European Space Agency, to permit, when the time comes, the use of the SPOT platform for future European missions.

In this context, it should be mentioned that ESA member states are considering a programme for an ESA earth observation satellite to be launched by 1985.

During the 1977-81 period, two programmes (Ariane and Spacelab), of a size never before achieved in Europe, are due to be completed and a number of geostationary satellites (OTS, ECS, Meteosat, Marots) have been or are to be launched. The success of these programmes will, from 1981 onwards, open for Europe the age of operational application satellites, especially in the communications field.

Furthermore, member countries noted the Assembly's interest in the pursuit of European activities in earth observation including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites. In this connection, it should be mentioned that at their last meeting of the year, on 12th and 13th December, the Council of ESA approved on the basis of the Italian Sirio programme, a European Sirio-II satellite programme for study of the transmission of high frequency radio waves through atmospheric disturbance.

The Council's reply to Recommendation 316 covered various aspects of collaboration between European countries and the United States in space matters. The Council mentioned agreements concluded by the European Space Agency with NASA in connection with the Earthnet programme. They also referred to the existing co-operation between ESA and the American Space Agency for the construction of the Spacelab laboratory. They added that ESA also co-operated with NASA in implementing its scientific programme; thus, the European Agency has outlined a programme to use the space available in the Spacelab laboratory for scientific experiments.

They welcome the decision taken on 8th December by the governing Council of Intelsat to procure one Ariane launcher for the future

launching of one of the Intelsat-V series of satellites.

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In their reply to Recommendation 316 mentioned above, the Council gave the Assembly details on international and European co-operation in the field of oceanographic activities and the conservation of fish species. Whilst the third United Nations law of the sea conference was still in progress, they noted the efforts made by the participating countries to adopt a legal régime for oceanographic research which would protect the interests of both coastal and researching states. Moreover, with regard to the problem of the protection of fish species, the Council referred to the work done within the framework of the European Communities and the United Nations environment programme.

D. Secretariat-General

The new Deputy Secretary-General of Western European Union, Ambassador G. J. Schlaich, whose appointment by the Council had been announced to the Assembly, took up his duties on 1st March 1978.

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During the year, the Secretary-General and his principal officers, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations as observers, when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years, the most frequent of these contacts were made with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. Introduction

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1978, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1978, the twenty-third year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

B. General problems**1. General operating methods**

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods ; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

Furthermore, in implementing the methods briefly recalled above, the Agency has, as it is permitted, always sought possible improvements, with the close co-operation and mutual trust of the government authorities concerned and for certain matters of the NATO and SHAPE authorities. Thus, in 1978 it was able to make certain improvements to the questionnaire to member countries, to the despatching arrangements and in the preparation of combined ACA/SHAPE inspections ; in addition, in planning the inspection programme account was taken of measures completed or in hand, to reorganise the armed forces of certain countries.

2. Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to exercise its mandate

The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1978.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member state, to what that state calls "strategic forces".

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place ; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments.

C. Controls from documentary sources

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. Information processed by the Agency

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states

The questionnaire sent to member states for 1978 was broadly the same as those of previous years.

As in all previous years, follow-up action on the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents which, in 1978 as in the past, was based, in particular, on the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's requests for annual information.

The detailed replies submitted to the Agency were an important factor in the selection of establishments for the programme of agreed control measures for 1978.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2(a) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the

United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency studied the defence budgets of the member states as well as the budget section of their replies to its questionnaire. In addition, its experts had consultations with the appropriate departments in the Defence Ministries of member countries.

The conclusions of these budgetary studies confirmed the information obtained directly by the Agency concerning the quantities of equipment subject to control acquired by member countries during 1978.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 24th November 1978, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 8th December 1978 under the chairmanship of the Deputy Director of the Agency ; this meeting was attended by the representatives of the Director of the International Military Staff of the NATO Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There were no comments on the total quantities of armaments declared as held by the member states (Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented by the Agency.

In consequence, the total quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states for forces placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be considered as appropriate levels for the control year 1978 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

(b) *Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe*

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states as being required on 31st December 1978 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1978. The quantities notified to the Agency can thus be considered as appropriate levels of armaments for the current control year within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV.

D. Field control measures

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

(a) As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency :

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed ;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1978 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

When drawing up its programme of control measures, the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured.

For non-production field control measures, the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the information available to it, including that obtained from the 1977 and earlier inspection programmes, its progressive analysis of budgetary and other data and particularly the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's requests for information. At the conclusion of this review, it drew up a programme for a limited number of control measures on a similar scale to those of recent years.

With regard to the control of levels of stocks of armaments declared by member states, sampling techniques were again deemed to be adequate for verifying member countries' declarations with the requisite level of confidence. No factors emerged to vary substantially the scale of the programme or the distribution of control measures between member states, the different

armaments or the various types of establishment involved. A shift of emphasis from munitions and naval matériel to air matériel was however decided upon and, to a lesser extent, from factories and depots to units.

(b) With the general scale of the control measure programme so determined, the Agency proceeded to more detailed studies of certain specific aspects. The armaments of each of the armed services of the member states were examined fully and in depth. Special attention was given to existing logistic systems and plans for their development.

In addition, the programme for control measures at factories was designed to ensure that, whenever possible, non-production, production factory and repair depot inspections were combined in order to cause the least disturbance to the establishment visited.

(c) To avoid duplication of activities, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control measures relating to the forces under NATO authority shall be carried out by the appropriate NATO authorities. The forces subject to the Agency's control measures therefore vary in percentage and type from country to country, and this is an important factor in the Agency's programme considerations. Article VIII also affects depot inspections, but in a different manner. Since the logistic support of forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility in peacetime, difficulties can occur in defining which matériel and munitions in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces under national command. Such problems were again avoided in 1978 by the renewed approval of the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in 1957.

(d) As the Convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1978, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld.

2. Type and extent of field control measures

In 1978, the programme drawn up by the Agency was carried out in accordance with the well-tried procedure of previous years.

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

The total number of control measures was sixty-eight. It should be noted, in this connection, that this pattern of control activities carried out by the Agency is satisfactory: it enables some 80% of existing armaments to be checked in four years for the air force, five years for the navy and six to seven years for army munitions.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command;
- (c) control measures at production plants:
 - (i) quantitative control measures:

In 1978, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing aircraft engines, manufacturing missiles and ammunition, and manufacturing armoured matériel and at one shipyard.
 - (ii) non-production control measures:

These control measures related to chemicals and missiles.

3. Conclusions

(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its tasks of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1978, the Agency was able to report to the Council:

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Current production and purchases

Land forces armaments modernisation schemes and reorganisation programmes are in hand in all member countries.

In the field of armoured equipment, procurement programmes for battle tanks are almost complete in France and Italy. Series production of the Leopard II is in progress in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Production of the derivatives, armoured recovery vehicles and bridge layers, is continuing.

M-48 tanks are being modernised in the Federal Republic of Germany by mounting a 105 mm. gun and Hot missiles are progressively replacing the SS-11 on missile tanks.

Armoured vehicle programmes previously mentioned are continuing as follows: AMX-10 and derivatives in France; M-113 and derivatives in Italy; YPR-765 and derivatives in the Netherlands; M-113, artillery observation type, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

With regard to anti-aircraft equipment, production of the Guépard is continuing and the programme should be completed in about 1980. First units with this equipment have been formed in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands.

The Roland programme, which is a co-production between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, has begun and modernisation of the Hawk is continuing.

With regard to artillery, the acquisition of the Lance system by five WEU member countries is nearing completion.

Series production of the FH-70 155 mm. towed howitzer has begun in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

(b) Control activity in 1978

Control measures were carried out at several depots, at several units under national command, and at a plant manufacturing armaments for land forces.

2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles

(a) Current production

1978 was notable for the start of production of several new missiles covering widely diverging rôles: in the anti-tank rôle, the Hot, which is a heavy long-range missile designed to arm a wide variety of existing and specialised vehicles and helicopters, will provide the armies with an improved anti-tank capability; the Kormoran, which is an air-launched anti-ship missile designed for operation from a fighter bomber, can be launched at very low levels by naval aircraft; the Aspide, which is a dual rôle missile (air-to-air

and surface-to-air), will mainly replace the American Sparrow missile in the SPADA ground/air defence system, and the Albatros ship-board air defence system; the Exocet AM-39, which is an air-launched variant of the basic surface-to-surface Exocet MM-38, being shorter and lighter and having an increased range.

Thus, the following modern guided missiles are currently in production in member states: Milan and Hot (jointly produced by France and the Federal Republic of Germany) and Mamba; Crotale surface-to-air missile; Matra Magic and Matra R-530 air-to-air missiles; Exocet MM-38 (jointly produced by France and the United Kingdom), Otomat (jointly produced by France and Italy) and Sea Killer MK-2 ship-to-ship missiles; Exocet AM-39 and Kormoran air-to-sea missiles; Masurca surface-to-air missile; the Malafon anti-submarine missile; Pluton surface-to-surface tactical missile with a nuclear capability; Aspide surface-to-air and air-to-air missile.

A number of missiles of the previous generation are still being produced: SS-11 surface-to-surface anti-tank missile; AS-12 air-to-surface missile.

Mention should also be made of production of 110 mm. artillery rockets in the Federal Republic of Germany, and of Zuni air-to-surface rockets in Belgium.

(b) Future outlook

Other guided missiles have reached an advanced stage of development or are awaiting series production: Seawolf surface-to-air missile, Marte air-to-sea missile, and Matra Super 530.

(c) Control activity in 1978

Quantitative control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided and other self-propelled missiles or launchers, at several units under national command equipped with these weapons and at plants manufacturing guided missiles. One of these measures was combined with a non-production control measure.

3. Military aircraft

(a) Production and purchases

Three new large-scale programmes which were mentioned in the Council's previous annual report have reached the following stage: the French Mirage 2000 has begun flight tests and series production is expected to start at the end of 1979. Assembly lines for the F-16 have been set up in Belgium and in the Netherlands, as have those for the Tornado in the United King-

dom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and series production of these two aircraft is due to begin in 1979.

Co-production between France and the United Kingdom of the Jaguar A/E continued in 1978, while joint production of the Alpha-Jet by France and the Federal Republic of Germany has begun.

Furthermore, implementation of the F-104S programme in Italy has reached its final phase.

(b) Future outlook

New fighter and close support aircraft are projected. Thus the Federal Republic of Germany is conducting research on a tactical fighter aircraft (TFK) with a major ground support and air superiority rôle and the United Kingdom on a short take-off and landing aircraft (AST-403). Italy is preparing specifications for a combat aircraft (AM-X) specially designed for close support.

(c) Control activity in 1978

Control measures were carried out at several aircraft and aircraft engine depots, several air units under national command and at aircraft engine plants.

4. Warships

(a) Current construction

New construction and modernisation programmes have continued on the mainland of Europe in the countries with naval forces.

New construction mainly comprises frigates, small fighting ships and hydrofoil craft as well as submarines, almost all of which are of conventional type; these will replace obsolescent units which are soon to be paid off.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the construction of a number of missile frigates has begun. Destroyers of the Hamburg class have been modernised.

In Belgium, the construction programme for a number of anti-submarine escort vessels has been completed.

In France, the fifth nuclear-powered missile submarine is nearing completion; the construction of a nuclear attack submarine is continuing. The construction of a number of conventional submarines has been completed.

As for surface craft, construction of A/S corvettes continues. One aircraft carrier has been modernised.

In Italy, the last of a number of missile frigates are being built; construction of another series has begun. Construction of hydrofoil craft is progressing. The modernisation of missile cruisers is continuing.

In the Netherlands, the building programme of a series of missile frigates is progressing satisfactorily. The construction of the first of two submarines to replace two others has begun. Modernisation of the A/S frigates is continuing.

(b) Control activity in 1978

A quantitative control measure was carried out at a naval shipyard.

5. Chemical weapons

(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1978 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1978.

(b) Control activity in 1978

As in previous years, the Agency addressed to the appropriate authorities of the state concerned a "request for annual information to facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons". The reply received to this request was, as in the past, of great assistance to the Agency in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1978.

The supplementary procedure designed to increase the effectiveness of the Agency's action, which has been tried out since 1973, was again applied successfully in 1978.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, the Agency, as in previous

years, asked the following question in its questionnaire: "Has the production of chemical weapons on the mainland territory of ... (member state) passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage?"

In 1978, as in the past, the states concerned replied in the negative.

Any of the member states could, whilst not actually manufacturing chemical weapons on its mainland territory, have obtained such weapons by other means such as importation. For this reason, as it does every year, the Agency requested the member states in the corresponding sections of its annual questionnaire to report any quantities of chemical weapons they might hold, whatever their origin. In the reply to this questionnaire, no member country declared holding any chemical weapons.

6. Biological weapons

All member countries reported their agreement to renew in 1978 the list of biological weapons subject to control. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. Atomic weapons

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts

1. In 1978, as in other years, technical information visits were arranged to enable the Agency's experts to keep their knowledge up to date.

The air experts visited the Centre d'essais aéronautiques at Toulouse and the wind tunnel at Faugat in France, the aerospace research centre at Porz-Wahn and the rocket propulsion institute at Lampoldshausen in the Federal Republic of Germany. The land forces experts visited the artillery school at Draguignan in France and the Royal Army Research and Development Establishment at Fort Halstead in the United Kingdom; the naval experts visited naval exhibitions at Genoa in Italy and Rotterdam in the Netherlands.

In the field of biology and chemistry, technical information visits were arranged to the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

The research centre studying animal viral diseases and a major specialised industrial establishment producing serums and vaccines were visited in the Federal Republic of Germany. The experts were also received at the military centre for ABC weapon counter-measures.

In Italy, they visited the facilities of a plant producing organic and mineral compounds. They also had discussions with officials of the General Directorate of Veterinary Services at the Ministry of Health.

Visits in the Netherlands to a national research institute, an industrial laboratory and a factory provided the experts with an opportunity to add to their knowledge on detection of and protection against chemical agents, on organo-phosphorous products and on biological products.

An Agency expert also visited Establishment No. 2 (NBC) of the Defence Research Centre in Belgium.

Discussions with the experts met in the course of the visits referred to above contributed significantly towards keeping the Agency's experts informed of the latest scientific and technical developments.

2. The Documentation Office continued to collect and collate for the benefit of the experts, both specialised and other published documents on military subjects (research and development, introduction of new weapons, reorganisation of the armed forces, etc.), as well as on financial and economic subjects (budgetary decisions of member governments, general economic trends, the growth of certain specific sectors of the economy and of certain firms working on defence, imports and exports of armaments).

Liaison was maintained with other technical documentation establishments.

G. Miscellaneous contacts

1. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, the Agency must carry out its duties in an atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with the national authorities. To this end, it believes that it is essential to maintain frequent personal contacts with these authorities. During 1978, it continued to take advantage of every opportunity for such meetings.

2. Moreover, as provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty, the Agency has maintained close contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities.

In this connection, mention should be made, in particular, of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C.2 (a) of this chapter and of the implementation of the system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections mentioned in point D.1 (c).

3. During certain meetings held under the auspices of WEU or NATO, the Director of the Agency was able to make contacts with senior officials of various countries.

H. General conclusions

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1978, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV :

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV ; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1978 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls :

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of armaments that the government of this member state has undertaken not to manufacture ;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1978, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

As in the past, the atmosphere of co-operation prevailing in relations between the Agency and the authorities of the member countries and of NATO, as well as those with members of private firms, played an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

The Standing Armaments Committee met three times in normal session, on 23rd January, 23rd June and 16th October 1978. It also met three times as an ad hoc group, for the specific purpose of discussing the study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU undertaken in implementation of the mandate adopted by the Council in April 1977.

1. Study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU¹

On the basis of a draft prepared by the International Secretariat, the Standing Armaments Committee produced a report on legal statuses in the armaments sector of industry in member countries, forming one part of the study called for by its instructions. This document was transmitted to the Council on 24th April 1978, and presented orally to the permanent representatives on 19th May by the Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

For the economic chapter of the study, the Committee adopted a work programme at its first meeting of the year in January. The International Secretariat was invited to collect economic data from the available sources, using the method followed in preparing the legal study and excluding questions coming within the scope of the investigations of the independent European programme group.

The International Secretariat has started to collect the data required for the first part of the economic chapter, which will be devoted to a general economic and financial presentation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. The second part will include an analytical description of the armaments industries as such; in view of the need to avoid all duplication, its preparation is closely bound up with the work of the IEPG.

At the October meeting, the delegate representing France, which is the pilot country for Sub-Group 4 of Panel III of the IEPG, gave the Standing Armaments Committee a progress report on the work of this sub-group. Sitting as an ad hoc group, the Committee studied a provisional report summarising the data so far

¹ See also Chapter I, C and Chapter II, B. 3, second paragraph.

collected by the International Secretariat which was asked to continue its survey with the help of national delegates.

2. Other activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

The Standing Armaments Committee devoted part of its discussions to the work of Working Group No. 8 on operational research and of the group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment.

The members of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Head of the International Secretariat took part in the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on joint production of armaments, held on 30th October¹.

On the invitation of the French aerospace company (SNIAS), delegates to the Standing Armaments Committee accompanied by members of the International Secretariat, visited the Bourges establishment which specialises in the production of missiles.

B. Activities of the working groups**1. Working Group No. 8 (Operational research)**

Working Group No. 8 met twice during 1978, in March and October.

Exchanges of information took place as usual and delegates presented a number of new or updated forms on tri-service operational research studies.

The operational research studies were provided by various delegations for the library.

In addition, the group reviewed the progress of work on the five language glossary of operational research terms which is due to be published early in 1979 in five volumes (one for each language).

As regards the evaluation of military equipment, the March meeting of Working Group No. 8 adopted directives for continuing the activity of the working group of experts on this question.

This meeting of the group was combined with a symposium on "Problems of managing personnel of the three services with given structures and hierarchies". The papers read on

¹ See Chapter I, D.

this subject and the subsequent discussion again showed delegations' interest in these symposia which are held once a year.

The second meeting of the group was combined with a visit, on the invitation of the French authorities, to the French navy's operational research centre at Toulon, on 19th and 20th October. A number of studies were presented to the military and civilian experts taking part; they were preceded by introductions by the Commander of the fleet training centre and the Director of the GROUPE and followed by detailed discussions. At the trials centre for air defence weapon systems and the fleet training centre, participants gave particular attention to the application of data processing for weapon systems and for handling operational data.

2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment

The group of experts, which is responsible to Working Group No. 8, continued preparation of the report on the first phase of its work. This is a comparative study, based on the recovery vehicle, of the German "weighted sums" method and the French "Electre" method. Other methods such as cost effectiveness, "Vera" and the breakdown into main components were also considered.

At its first meeting of the year, the group heard a report by the delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany on the practical application of the "Vera" method; a professor from the University of Paris also gave a talk on "The bases of multicriteria selection methods".

At its second sitting, the group considered the final draft of its report on the evaluation of the recovery vehicle; it is not expected that this highly technical document can be submitted to the Standing Armaments Committee before the spring of 1979.

C. International Secretariat

1. Contacts with the Council and member countries

On 19th May, the Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the International Secretariat, presented his annual verbal report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee to the Council. On the same occasion, he reported on the progress of the study undertaken by the Committee in implementation of its mandate, with particular reference to the legal section already submitted to the Council.

He had official talks at the Ministries of Defence in London, Luxembourg and Rome. He was also invited to visit the Royal Ordnance Factory at Nottingham, the Genoa naval exhibition, the Farnborough international air show and the exhibition of naval equipment at Le Bourget.

2. WEU Assembly

The Head of the International Secretariat reported to the Standing Armaments Committee on the debates on armaments questions which took place in the Assembly. Extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations relating to these questions were brought together in a document circulated to the members of the Committee.

3. Contacts with the independent European programme group

The Head of the International Secretariat had discussions with the Chairman-in-Office of the IEPG in Rome concerning the studies in progress in the Standing Armaments Committee and the IEPG.

4. Contacts with NATO

The International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee was represented by an observer at meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in April and October.

A member of the Secretariat also attended two meetings of the NATO Group on Naval Armaments.

5. Liaison with FINABEL

The regular contacts begun in 1973 between the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the FINABEL Committee continued as usual.

In this connection, a member of the International Secretariat paid a liaison visit to the FINABEL Secretariat in Brussels.

Furthermore, as in all previous years, an observer from the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee was invited to Brussels, at the end of November, for the meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee which brings together the chairmen of all FINABEL working groups.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. Meetings of the Committee

The Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings in Amsterdam from 31st May to 2nd June, and Stuttgart from 18th to 20th October. The Committee thus continues to prefer towns other than the capital of the country for its meetings and so provides opportunities for interesting contacts related to its work, with local authorities or, as in the case of the second meeting in 1978, a Land administration.

A subject to which the Committee devotes a part of its discussion is the administrative organisation of member countries and the political and social factors which influence the administrative structure. During the year under review, for example, the Committee considered plans and developments relating to regionalisation and the amalgamation of communes in a number of the member states as well as the devolution of powers to Scotland and Wales; it also discussed a number of studies which had appeared during the year relating to the development of computerisation and, from a strictly administrative point of view, compared the principles governing the organisation of services within the various ministries in each country.

Another subject on which views and information are regularly exchanged concerns the duties and terms of service of state employees. These are, of course, questions where interests are very similar in the administrations of the seven countries: the position of unions in the civil service, the exercise of the right to strike, the extent of political activities of civil servants, equal conditions for men and women and the problem of remuneration. This last question was considered from two angles: firstly the sometimes considerable salary differences which often exist between officials in different ministries; and secondly the more general angle of the economic difficulties facing the majority of countries, which are beginning to have unfavourable effects in the administration. In this context mention was also made of the numerous measures under study or already being implemented as part of the fight against unemployment which are likely to affect the public service to a considerable degree: the creation of new jobs, shorter working hours, lowering of the retirement age, opportunities for part-time work, etc.

B. Multilateral courses for government officials

As indicated in the previous report, for 1978 at least, the Committee modified the formula

used for these courses in recent years which, by its nature as a training course, was basically designed for young civil servants from the member countries, to give them a better preparation, from a European standpoint, for their future duties. This time a specific subject of common interest was chosen for study by a group of fairly senior officials.

The aim of the course was to enable these civil servants to exchange information and compare their national experience regarding the decision-making process which precedes the carrying out of developments affecting the environment and the background to people's lives (building of roads or railways and major installations such as ports or airports, nuclear power plants, etc.), and regarding the preparation of town planning projects.

The numerous developments of all kinds which the nation as a whole regards as necessary raise the problem of land use; likewise, urban sprawl makes it necessary to regulate land use, and town planning documents are becoming increasingly important; finally, widespread concern to protect nature and the environment frequently makes it more difficult to arbitrate between general economic needs and local conditions.

The Committee therefore thought it useful to provide the opportunity for long-serving civil servants with experience of the preparation or taking of this type of decision to meet and compare their experience of these problems in their respective countries.

The course, which this year was organised by the French Government, was held in Paris from 4th to 8th December. Twenty-one participants attended, all of the seven countries being represented.

The work centred around two main aspects of the process of decision-taking and control:

- consultation of the public by prior enquiries or by any other means;
- whether courts can exercise control over the decision taken and to what extent.

During the first part, each national delegation presented a summary report on the position in their own country.

The following days were devoted to two case studies. The first related to a problem having purely local implications and consisted of a study, based on a dossier provided by the delegation of the host government, on how the town planning project for an average European town

should be prepared and approved. The second concerned the carrying out of a major capital scheme with obvious local consequences but based on national requirements.

C. Study visits

The development of international co-operation in all areas, but more particularly the development of European co-operation has provided an ever-increasing number of national civil servants with the opportunity of work contacts with their opposite numbers in other countries. There are consequently many direct links between national ministries and those abroad and many study and information visits are arranged through this channel. Consequently the situation is no longer at all comparable to what it was when the Public Administration Committee, which played a pioneer rôle in this field, made the first move to set up a network of exchanges of civil servants. Other networks have grown up in the meantime and have continued to diversify. The Committee, nevertheless, continues each year to arrange a number of visits, under the personal responsibility of its members ;

these visits are carefully prepared and the results, recorded on each occasion in a report, are forwarded to the Committee, as well, of course, as to the administration visited.

The subjects studied during these visits are, naturally very varied as can be seen from the following list for 1978 : relations between central and local governments ; organisation of communes (subjects studied in Belgium) ; comprehensive education ; forensic science services (subjects studied in the Federal Republic of Germany) ; legislative controls of gambling (subjects studied in France) ; value added tax, health service negotiations on pay and conditions (subjects studied in Italy) ; organisation of censuses : "co-habitation" and social benefits ; the control of unfair dismissal from employment (subjects studied in the Netherlands) ; recruitment procedures (subject studied in the United Kingdom).

These visits are arranged on a bilateral basis throughout the year by the national delegates of the sending and receiving countries, but at each of its meetings, the Committee spends some time on this subject, to enable each delegate to comment and to gain from the experience of his colleagues.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS**A. Budget**

Summaries of the main budgets for 1978 and 1979 are shown in the Appendices to this report. The proposed budgets for 1979 have remained within the boundaries of inflation compared with those of 1978.

The original intention was that the option period for the pension scheme should end on 30th April 1978. It was, however, extended until 30th June 1978 for all five co-ordinated organisations. This was due to difficulties experienced within the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts regarding the interpretation of Article 36 of the pension scheme rules which deals with the adjustment of benefits resulting from changes in cost of living and standard of living applicable to all pensions.

However, on the closing date of 30th June 1978, discussion was still continuing regarding firstly, the problem of granting survivors' pensions to widowers of female staff members and, secondly, the problem of affiliation to the United Kingdom social security legislation in relation to the new pension scheme. For these two reasons, staff concerned were allowed to remain in the provident fund with the right to reopen their option once the current discussions and negotiations had been concluded. It is hoped that these matters will however be settled shortly and all staff members can then make their final decision whether or not to join the pension scheme in the course of 1979.

This uncertainty means that figures showing the results of the option are not yet final; more staff members might eventually join the pension scheme but the preliminary figures as at 30th June 1978 are given in the Appendix. For the same reason the sums due to member governments as a result of validation cannot yet be finally calculated but the preliminary figures are also given in the Appendix.

The system of partial tax compensation and the application of special rules concerning the division of contributions and tax as between the member governments requires a special pension budget as part of the total WEU budget.

The contributions to the United Kingdom social security scheme, by both staff members and the organisation, have been held in a suspense account in the organisation's budget since April 1975, the date of the new United Kingdom legislation, pending the final outcome of the current negotiations. Meanwhile, at their meeting on 13th December 1978, the Council were informed by the United Kingdom delegate

that his government was now prepared to conclude an agreement with WEU whereby staff members who were members of the co-ordinated organisations pension scheme would be exempt from compliance with the provisions of the social security acts in the United Kingdom. The British authorities are expected shortly to present details regarding the new situation.

B. WEU administrative meetings

The practice was continued as before of bringing together periodically the officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk responsible for administrative matters.

The problems arising from the implementation of the new pension scheme have necessitated an extra meeting of the Budget and Organisation Committee and an extra period for verification of the validation exercise by the Board of Auditors.

As in previous years the co-operation with the WEU Staff Association has continued to be excellent.

C. WEU provident fund

As explained above, the option period for the pension scheme terminated only on 30th June 1978, while at the same time two issues remained outstanding. Since discussions on these aspects of the scheme were still continuing, most staff members made their decisions regarding the options rather late, or even reserved their option right. This situation has made it difficult to foresee future needs as regards an investment policy for the provident fund.

The monies that became — or would become — reimbursable to governments as a result of the validation process, while awaiting the final outcome and as a provisional measure, have been invested by the organisation in a similar way as the provident fund proper. In order to safeguard the financial interests of the member governments, the Council appointed two national representatives as temporary members of the Secretary-General's advisory panel.

The advisory panel considered that the interests of staff and governments were best served by continuing the existing policy of short-term investment in currencies up to the closing date

of the option period. During the period leading up to the settlement of validation accounts and in order to overcome problems of accountancy in the face of varying exchange rates, the total fund was held in French francs — the unit of account.

As soon as the final audit on the validation exercise has been completed, and validation monies paid over to governments, the investment policy for the greatly reduced, and henceforward continually diminishing, provident fund will be considered.

D. Activities within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations

1. Committee of Secretaries-General

The Secretaries/Director-General of the five co-ordinated organisations met twice this year to discuss administrative problems, mainly concerned with :

- the interpretation of Article 36 of the pension scheme rules ; the question of survivors' pensions for widowers of female staff ;
- means of improving the machinery of co-ordination ; problems associated with a possible admission of other organisations as full members to the framework of the co-ordinated organisations ;
- the 1978 general review of salaries ; the review of the salary adjustment procedure ;
- relations with the staff associations.

2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General, Committee of Heads of Administration

These Committees met as a rule every month in conjunction with the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee and also held several special sessions to deal with specific problems.

At the same time there has been a steadily growing degree of co-operation with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations.

3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts

The Co-ordinating Committee met eleven times in 1978 and issued twelve reports, Nos. 147-158, in the course of the year.

These reports dealt with the following subjects :

147th report : The 1977 general review of remuneration of A and L grade staff members, effective from 1st July 1977. Approved by the Council on 15th February 1978 (see also 143rd report).

148th report : A decision not to pay staff the remaining 20 % of an advance to compensate for the increase in cost of living over the second half of 1976. Approved by the Council on 19th July 1978 (see also 141st report).

149th report : The creation of a Joint Pensions Administrative Section for the co-ordinated organisations to ensure uniform application of the pension scheme rules as well as to centralise as far as possible the necessary administrative work. Approved by the Council on 21st April 1978.

150th report : Interpretation of Article 36 of the pension scheme rules and an extension of the option period until 30th June 1978. Approved by the Council on 21st April 1978.

151st report : Intermediate ad hoc salary increase for staff serving in Turkey due to an excessive rise in the cost of living. Approved by the Council on 3rd May 1978.

152nd report : Periodical updating of the daily subsistence allowances for staff travelling on official missions with effect from 1st May 1978. Approved by the Council on 19th May 1978.

153rd report : Advances of salary increases to compensate for the increase in cost of living over the second half of 1977, with a threshold of 2 %. Approved by the Council on 19th July 1978.

154th report : Acknowledgment of the right for female staff to reopen the option for the pension scheme once the current discussions to grant a survivor's pension to widowers have been concluded. Approved by the Council on 19th July 1978.

155th report : Intermediate ad hoc salary increase for staff serving in Turkey. Approved by the Council on 13th October 1978.

156th report : Review and periodical updating of the rules and allowances for staff travelling on duty, with effect from 1st July 1978. Approved by the Council on 13th October 1978.

157th report : The 1978 general review of remuneration of B and C grade staff members, with effect from 1st July 1978. Approved by the Council on 13th December 1978.

158th report : Periodical updating of the children's and dependants' allowances and education allowance applicable to all staff, with effect from 1st July 1978. Approved by the Council on 24th January 1979.

APPENDIX

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1978

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	814,120	6,240,350	13,501,600	19,741,950
Pensions	27,425	394,900	1,884,300	2,279,200
Travel	26,685	81,000	387,450	468,450
Other operating costs	87,740	352,475	491,505	843,980
Purchase of furniture, etc.	3,495	5,500	43,700	49,200
Buildings	—	67,600	121,680	189,280
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	959,465	7,141,825	16,430,235	23,572,060
WEU tax	270,050	2,140,100	4,590,150	6,730,250
Other receipts	9,600	39,500	83,500	123,000
Pension receipts	13,110	146,400	1,014,600	1,161,000
TOTAL INCOME	292,760	2,326,000	5,688,250	8,014,250
NET TOTAL	666,705	4,815,825	10,741,985	15,557,810

National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1978

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	65,559.33	1,529,851.32
France	120	133,341.00	3,111,562.00
Germany	120	133,341.00	3,111,562.00
Italy	120	133,341.00	3,111,562.00
Luxembourg	2	2,222.34	51,859.36
Netherlands	59	65,559.33	1,529,851.32
United Kingdom	120	133,341.00	3,111,562.00
TOTAL	600	666,705.00	15,557,810.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU main budget for 1979

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	889,285	6,905,400	14,263,600	21,169,000
Pensions	66,420	421,200	2,007,400	2,428,600
Travel	34,715	84,500	346,000	430,500
Other operating costs	125,995	443,765	546,430	990,195
Purchase of furniture, etc.	4,040	8,500	24,900	33,400
Buildings	—	132,000	241,700	373,700
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,120,455	7,995,365	17,430,030	25,425,395
WEU tax	304,290	2,389,500	4,893,500	7,283,000
Other receipts	9,650	50,500	95,000	145,500
Pension receipts	19,855	255,500	512,600	768,100
TOTAL INCOME	333,795	2,695,500	5,501,100	8,196,600
NET TOTAL	786,660	5,299,865	11,928,930	17,228,795

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1979

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84
France	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Germany	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Italy	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Luxembourg	2	2,622.20	57,429.32
Netherlands	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84
United Kingdom	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
TOTAL	600	786,660.00	17,228,795.00

* A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Armaments Control Agency.

Pension Scheme

	Numbers opting as from 1st July 1974	Numbers opting for full validation of service	Numbers opting to retain provident fund	Staff recruited since 1st July 1974	Retired staff	Hors grades
	Option No. 1	Option No. 2	Option No. 3			
Secretariat-General ..	2	14	21 ¹	4	5	2
Armaments Control Agency	2	32	7	8	22	1
Standing Armaments Committee	—	16	6	6	9	1
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly	1	19	2	4	2	2
TOTAL	5	81	36	22	38	6

1. Includes seven who will review their options when the outstanding question of reversionary rights and United Kingdom social security are resolved.

Provisional statement of WEU pensions validation receipts¹

Expressed in accounting units (1 AU = 1 F. franc)

	Validation monies due on 1st July 1974	Amounts held at end of option period (P.V. No. 1 a/c)	Proposed 5.5512 % write-down	Balance of P.V. No. 1 a/c (2) — (3)	Validation monies for service after 1st July 1974 (P.V. No. 2 a/c)	Total validation monies (4) + (5)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secretariat-General ..	1,948,726	2,752,915	108,178	2,644,737	1,183,176	3,827,913
Standing Armaments Committee	1,580,638	2,079,607	87,744	1,991,863	1,212,013	3,203,876
Armaments Control Agency	2,947,874	3,802,162	163,642	3,638,520	2,874,353	6,512,873
Assembly	2,363,360	3,363,696	131,195	3,232,501	1,983,945	5,216,446
TOTALS	8,840,598	11,998,380	490,759	11,507,621	7,253,487	18,761,108
Validation monies transferred to the budgets in 1977					+	563,388
Validation monies credited to budget income chapters in 1977					+	694,550
Amounts of outstanding loans, etc., to be repaid (to the budgets) in five years from 1st July 1978					+	1,041,524
Total of WEU validation monies						21,060,570

1. This statement is incomplete because it does not include all interest earned, or to be earned, in 1978 nor all sums credited to the budget in 1978.

**Information on defence questions for members of parliament
and
Relations with Parliaments**

**INFORMATION REPORT ¹
submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments ²
by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur**

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INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Jeambrun (Alternate for Mr. Visse) (Chairman); MM. Schlingemann, De Poi (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arfé, Böhm (Alternate: Müller), Bonnel (Alternate:

Dejardin), Delehedde, Enders, Hengel, Kershaw, Roper, Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In May 1977, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments submitted to the Assembly a study on members of parliament and defence, prepared by Mr. Delorme, Committee Rapporteur¹. This study covered four aspects of the matter: general responsibilities of parliament in defence matters; defence and parliament's legislative rôle; defence and parliament's supervisory rôle; defence and parliament's information rôle.

1.2. *Inter alia*, the Rapporteur emphasised the importance of the powers devolving on parliaments at both legislative and supervisory levels. However, parliaments no longer had certain powers which were necessary if they were to be closely associated with the elaboration of defence policy, and the Committee considered it would be desirable to set up what might be called a national defence council in which members of parliament would sit at the side of technical experts. It was nevertheless fully aware that expert knowledge and sources of information were sadly lacking among members of parliament.

1.3. Admittedly, in theory members of parliament in WEU member countries have very extensive powers in respect of legislation on military commitments in their respective countries both for the number of national service and regular servicemen and procurement of the equipment necessary for the armed forces. But in practice although governments submit proposals to them for the replacement of one aircraft by another, for instance, or a tank produced in one country by a tank produced in another country, in order to be able to compare the proposals and take decisions members of parliament have to ask the author of the proposal, i.e. the government, for the information they need. They may resort to other means such as the press and specialised reviews or research carried out by their secretariats, but this is a lengthy, costly and far from satisfactory process².

1.4. The Committee therefore asked your Rapporteur to study the possibility of obtaining information by faster and less expensive means, drawing upon more independent sources, while retaining government departments as their principal source. (It is obvious that if members

of parliament came to doubt the honesty of this source it would not be possible to continue on such a basis.)

II. Information on defence questions for members of parliament — use of computers

2.1. The Committee therefore thought of the possibilities offered by the use of various computers which stock military and defence data and asked your Rapporteur to contact two centres having computers of this type and which seemed the most suitable for the Committee's requirements:

- the Armaments Documentation Centre in Paris;
- the Strategic Research Institute in Vienna.

A. Armaments Documentation Centre

2.2. On 11th September 1978, your Rapporteur visited the Armaments Documentation Centre (CEDOCAR)¹ in Paris, where he was received by the Director, General Yerle, the Assistant Director, Mr. Guilleminet, Chief Engineer, and Mr. Klopp, Assistant to the Director for International Affairs, who were kind enough to answer all the questions put to them.

2.3. The task of CEDOCAR is to carry out research and meet the requirements of the General Delegation for Armaments, military headquarters and organisations approved by the Minister of the Armed Forces in scientific, technical, industrial, economic and financial data of all kinds relating to armaments. This task is defined and guided by an advisory committee on armaments documentation and a higher council for armaments documentation. Action is co-ordinated in the General Delegation for Armaments with the assistance of central representatives appointed at the level of the major technical directorates and local officials appointed at the level of establishments and departments.

2.4. The centre's main publications are three monthly reviews. The first gives about ten-line summaries of documents drafted in French. The second covers documents of foreign origin and the third bio-medical documents of French and foreign origin. In twenty-two chapters, ranging from aeronautics to space technology and covering social, mathematical and military sciences,

1. See Document 739.

2. Cf. report on parliaments and military procurement, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur.

1. See establishment table at Appendix IV.

accompanied by a subject and sequence index, they provide detailed information on a vast range of texts numbering well over half a million each year. Another publication appears every fortnight and gives references and indexed summaries of selected scientific and technical news on specific subjects such as air safety and aircraft accidents, remote-controlled aircraft and aerial targets, the OPEC countries, new sources of energy, political defence studies, missiles, cost of armaments and communications satellites, to name only a few of the three hundred subjects dealt with in this way. The selective dissemination of information (SDI) makes it possible to keep abreast of and update information in a specific area. The references of documents are provided simultaneously with their selection by CEDOCAR and other sources.

2.5. The centre has a multiple-media information storage system which contains most of the primary documents on paper, microfiche or new media. A reference storage system helps the user to find the required information with the assistance of the thesaurus, index, lists, catalogues, directories, memoranda, etc. A documents reproduction section, a translation section and a library complete its services. Finally, a telephone assistance service (TAS) operates every day to answer general questions and questions on sources of scientific and technical information, primary texts and French and foreign standards; for scientific questions as such, information may be obtained by telephone from the departments dealing with the classification of information by branch.

2.6. CEDOCAR documents bodies responsible to the Ministry of Defence, state establishments such as universities and defence contractors and bodies outside the Ministry and state departments. The Assembly, or even better WEU as a whole, might take out a subscription for the services available, subject to the agreement of the Minister of Defence, Mr. Bourges. Since your Rapporteur's visit, the Assembly has been placing its documents and proceedings, booklets and dossiers at the disposal of the centre. Should agreement be given, a fuller exchange of documentation might be considered.

2.7. As regards the preparation of documents for the Committees on Defence Questions and Armaments, General Affairs, and Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the centre, which is equipped with a computer, could, in the opinion of your Rapporteur, provide an entirely new form of assistance for us; in the preparation of questions to be put to the national governments or to the Council, the telephone assistance service could be of considerable help to members of the Assembly. Obviously your Rapporteur cannot assess the assistance the centre might be able to offer the Standing Armaments

Committee or the Agency for the Control of Armaments, but possibly a contact might prove fruitful here too.

B. Strategic Research Institute, Vienna

2.8. On 7th and 8th March 1979, your Rapporteur visited the Strategic Research Institute of the Austrian military academy, where he was received by the Commandant, General W. Kuntner, the Director, Colonel F. Freistetter, and several members of their staff. Set up on 1st January 1967, this military academy in turn set up the research institute which for the past ten years has been trying to answer all the questions put to it by the government, the armed forces, parliament and parliamentarians and even university professors and journalists.

2.9. The institute's task is to co-ordinate, rationalise and centralise the work of the ten documentation services which exist in the armed forces, improve working methods and extend the range of subjects covered. There were two initial stages in the development of computerised documentation: (a) the preparation of registers and catalogues for users; (b) the installation of a keyboard terminal to be able to question the computer (IRMS: information retrieval and management system), before the current stage: (c) direct questioning with display screen and use of STAIRS/VS, FAIR and TLS (storage and information retrieval) systems. For two years, the institute has also had a camera for microfilms and apparatus for reproducing microfilms and has thus become one of the most modern documentation services in Europe.

2.10. Apart from a series of studies and reports under the sole responsibility of the authors, and which do not therefore represent the official opinion of the institute, two monthly information-documentation reviews are published. Series A gives general information and series B technical information relating to defence. Each review covers and analyses between eighty and a hundred articles per issue¹. The rest of the information is fed directly into the computer after being processed by the staff of the institute in accordance with a thesaurus (index) which currently lists more than 18,000 words or groups of words. Finally, like the French CEDOCAR, the institute publishes a series which automatically gives the references of documents on a specific subject, known as profiles of interest. The series at present covers more than two hundred subjects.

2.11. Since the institute was set up, its staff (which, on 1st January 1979, in addition to ten documentalists and two secretaries, included eighteen officials from other departments work-

1. See lists at Appendices V and VI.

ing at the institute for one or two hours a day and a dozen national servicemen) has worked on more than 150,000 documents and now handles each month between 2,800 and 3,000 texts taken from 800 periodicals from 40 countries and written in 16 languages. In 1978, a total of 9,558 computer searches were made and 4,811 articles reproduced.

2.12. The institute's publications are free of charge and could probably be obtained by the WEU Assembly. For the time being, requests for specific searches may be made only by Austrians. Your Rapporteur considers that the large quantity of documents from Warsaw Pact countries would fully justify an approach being made by the President of the Assembly. The speed with which detailed and very specialised answers may be obtained, the wide range of matters covered and the existence of very full and completely up-to-date documentation are all good reasons for wishing to establish useful and permanent contacts between the institute and the Assembly without delay. Moreover, the Assembly has already begun to make available to the Vienna centre the same documentation as it sends to the Paris centre.

C. Position in the parliaments of certain member countries

2.13. Answering a question put by Mr. Lenzer, the German Government gave the following information on conditions for the use of federal computer services by members of the Bundestag :

"The Federal Government endeavours to transmit information requested or needed by the Bundestag as quickly and as fully as possible. The Federal Government's store of information and the computerised data bank are at the disposal of the Bundestag, parliamentary groups and individual members within the limits of the possibilities prescribed by law. Moreover, the Bundestag and its members receive a vast amount of information in the framework of the presentation of reports, answers to questions put in parliaments and statements by members of the Federal Government at hearings under Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law.

Requests for information from the Bundestag may sometimes be subject to restrictions in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers. This principle also protects the area of internal decision-making by the Federal Government. Moreover, the communication of personal data must take account of the fact that the constitution provides special protection for the human person and dignity. In accordance with the provisions of the law on the protection of federal data, which give a

more detailed definition of this protection, such data may be communicated only in specified conditions. Finally, it must also be ascertained that no important matters affecting the public interest or professional secrecy prevent the information being freely communicated."¹

2.14. In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords began using computer services experimentally in 1974 for storage and retrieval of information as a result of investigations between 1968 and 1973 into the possible application of computer techniques to the work of parliament. After two-and-a-half years of experimental use, a computer system was authorised by the House and became operational in January 1977. The House has now appointed a Computer Sub-Committee of its main Offices Committee to give guidance on present and future developments. The Lords system has been evolved with the closest co-operation from the government's Central Computer Agency (CCA). Indeed, the House itself is not a party to computer contracts ; these are entered into by CCA on behalf of the House.

2.15. The Informal Joint Committee of both Houses on Computers set out a number of principles which have been followed in the development of the House of Lords computer system. The most important of these are :

- (i) that a gradual, step-by-step approach to development should be adopted ;
- (ii) that applications should be easy to learn by someone unskilled in the use of computers ;
- (iii) that terminals should operate satisfactorily in a normal office or committee-room environment ;
- (iv) that the system should not be dependent on any particular manufacturer ; and
- (v) that development should take into account the possibility of public access to some parliamentary data bases.

2.16. The system that has been established in the House of Lords consists of seven terminals in the Lords and two in the Commons. Each terminal comprises a typewriter keyboard and a screen, known as a visual display-unit (VDU). In addition, there are two printers in the Lords and one in the Commons. The software, or programme, is IBM's STAIRS/ATMS (storage and information retrieval system/advanced text management system). STAIRS is the information retrieval side of the package. ATMS is used for data entry and editing. ATMS is also being

¹ See Bundestag Proceedings, Appendix 44, 16th February 1979.

used for the typing and temporary storage of draft committee reports which are then easily amended by secretaries and printed out.

2.17. The system is used by "dialogue" with the computer through terminals. A user types words or phrases of ordinary language together with a certain number of symbolic commands. These appear on the VDU screen, and are then transmitted to the computer itself. On receiving different commands the computer will carry out the variety of functions which its two programmes, STAIRS and ATMS, enable it to do. Stores of information are built up on different subjects in a number of data bases. Each one of these contains documents which are typed into the system using the ATMS programme. They are then held in permanent storage and can be retrieved by using STAIRS. STAIRS enables the user to retrieve documents by searching for any word, number or reference number that occurs in that document. One can therefore retrieve a specific document by searching for an item (for instance a reference number) which is known to occur in that document only. Alternatively, the computer will retrieve the whole range of documents which it contains on a particular subject if a search is carried out on a word — such as a subject heading or general description — that occurs in all of them. The breadth of a search can be varied by altering the complexity of the terms or string of terms that the computer is asked to retrieve.

2.18. Once documents have been found in this way, the list can be manipulated if required — for instance, it can be organised according to the dates of the documents, and in ascending or descending date order. Each document can be displayed on the screen in front of the user. The list or any part of it can also be printed out for permanent record. If the ATMS programme is being used for editing draft committee reports, the keyboard and screen are used in place of a typewriter, and the draft report is only printed out on paper when it is in the form required. This is a useful facility which can save office time, particularly when a committee makes frequent revisions to the drafts of its reports, and the facility is independent of any of the permanent stores of information.

2.19. The system is used by members of the staff of the Parliament Office, the libraries of both Houses and the House of Commons Vote Office. None of these had any computer experience before the system was established. Staff who are going to enter data require only an hour or two of initial training before operating the computer terminals, which they do under supervision at first. All data entered into the computer for permanent storage are checked for accuracy. The general running of the system is discussed at regular progress meetings attended by all the parties involved in the system, including CCA.

Overall guidance on future developments is the responsibility of the Computer Sub-Committee.

2.20. In the House of Lords, at present computer systems are used exclusively by the library staff on behalf of peers. Therefore, staff use these systems when they judge that they have something to offer which is not readily available in any other form. Staff seldom hand a print-out from the data base directly to a peer preparing for a debate, but frequently use it to see what there is and choose, from what has been retrieved, items which they think are relevant to his particular enquiry. However, it is true that on the whole more requests come in for specific information on a particular point relevant to the subject of a debate rather than for blanket information on the whole subject matter. Staff also search on the British Library's data base, which includes the Library of Congress files, when this is relevant.

2.21. The peer himself has, of course, direct access to the com-fiche (computer output in microform) catalogue if he wishes which includes a sequence arranged by Dewey Decimal Classification, but the computer-produced catalogue is more often used by the staff for selecting individual publications relevant to a peer's enquiry or useful to research workers in answering an enquiry from a peer. There is some overlap between the catalogue and the on-line data base. The catalogue is being taken back to 1950, whereas the library data base contains only material entered during the last two years. Sometimes where the enquiry is for a bibliography, staff will have an off-line print made, but it is more usual for them to search, as with their own material, for items which they will either use themselves in answering the enquiry or select from a retrieve list for the peers' use.

III. Activities of the Committee

3.1. This is the twentieth report which the Committee has submitted to the Assembly on its activities. If account is taken of the twenty-one reports submitted by the Working Party for Liaison with National Parliaments (as the Committee was formerly called), it is therefore in fact the forty-first study on relations with parliaments. The Committee's activities have had variable results, as shown in Appendix I and in the paragraphs on the subject in most earlier reports. Indeed, Rapporteurs have rarely been satisfied, particularly when, after the steady and sustained effort from 1963 to 1968, a constant decline was recorded, reaching a low in 1974, albeit an eventful year during which the Assembly adopted a series of interesting reports. In this twentieth report, your Rapporteur is happy to announce that thanks to the untiring work of members of the Committee the

situation has changed considerably : once again, the threshold of a hundred interventions has been crossed in the parliaments of member countries : for 1978, a total of 110 interventions has already been recorded by the Committee secretariat and Collected Texts 29 relating to parliamentary action in implementation of recommendations adopted by the Assembly therefore heralds brighter prospects.

3.2. The other two publications, the orange booklet and the monthly bulletin, have been issued at their usual frequency. It is to be noted that the latter publication marked its fifteenth anniversary at the beginning of June : 180 issues have been prepared by the secretariat with no outside assistance. To strengthen the impact of this working instrument, which is increasingly in demand from documentary services, etc., it would be desirable for the secretariats of the various delegations to help the Committee secretary with his work. Too much information eludes him simply because the elements (documents, etc.) concerning these activities do not reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

3.3. At the close of the last session (20th-23rd November 1978), the Committee held its half-yearly discussion on the texts which had just been adopted. In accordance with Rule 42*bis* of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, it selected the following recommendations which it felt should be discussed in the parliaments of member countries :

- 323 on disarmament ;
- 325 on a European armaments policy ;
- 328 on weather forecasting.

These three recommendations were officially transmitted by Mr. K.-U. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, to the Presidents of the parliaments of member countries who in turn referred them to the appropriate committees. Following the selection of the texts transmitted to the parliaments of WEU member states, the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Mr. Jeambrun, wrote to all Committee members on 29th November 1978 sending model questions to be put on the three recommendations. As was to be expected, Recommendation 328 on weather forecasting was the subject of interventions in four countries, whereas there were interventions on the other two in only two countries (France and Italy). Ministerial answers were given on Recommendation 326 on application satellites in five member countries. These answers are analysed in Chapter IV.

3.4. In his report of 3rd November 1978 (Document 791), your Rapporteur deplored the absence of brief reports on Assembly sessions in certain member countries and suggested that they follow the example of Germany, Italy and France :

“... a report might be included in the *Chambre des Députés*, a Luxembourg review distributed free of charge throughout the Grand Duchy, and in the Weekly Information Bulletin of the House of Lords and its equivalent in the House of Commons which, since July 1978, have been keeping the public informed of the work of the British parliament (for an annual subscription of £24). The Belgian and Netherlands Delegations could certainly find similar solutions.”

Unfortunately, none of the four countries concerned has followed up this suggestion. The Committee joins its Rapporteur in repeating this suggestion in the hope that delegations will take the necessary action.

3.5. Moreover, your Rapporteur feels consideration might be given to posting up the agendas of the Assembly committees and plenary sessions on the notice-boards of the thirteen parliaments of WEU member states and including them in their bulletins, etc. Finally, he also wishes consideration to be given to the possibility of organising joint meetings with a national delegation or political group when a text adopted warrants such action.

IV. Government answers to questions on Recommendations 326 and 328

A. Application satellites

4.1. Most questions dealt with the European Space Agency programme and the delay in implementing it due to the budget not having been adopted in time. Answers by the various ministries referred above all to the difficult economic juncture and the impossibility of competing with American industry. The Belgian Minister, Mr. Vandekerckhove, was prepared to approve the 1978 compulsory budget. He hoped that it would be possible to approve it in 1979 or that member states would agree to include the same sums in the 1979 budget which (in January 1979 !) has yet to be discussed. The Italian Minister said that certain reservations on acceptance of the ESA programme had been lifted in November 1978. Mr. Huckfield, British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Industry, deplored the delay in approving the general budget and would endeavour to find a solution to the problem. He feared that if the situation were to continue the main effect would be a reduction in funds available for implementing the agreed scientific programme of the Agency.

4.2. Answering a question as to whether he was prepared to afford his active support to examining the establishment of a meteorological satellite system together with a network of mobile ground

stations, Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the French Government was playing an active part in the programme. Mr. Hauff, the German Minister, recalled the Federal Republic's contribution to ESA programmes: participation in the Symphonie programme; responsibility for the major part of the Telecom programme; participation in the development of maritime stations and radio distress installations for the Marots programme.

B. Weather forecasting

4.3. Questions on the European meteorological satellite system Eurometsat, stemming from the pre-operational Meteosat programme, led to positions being adopted by several ministers. Mr. Thorn, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, said direct Luxembourg participation in the development of this system appeared difficult in view of the high technical level required. Consideration might be given to installing a user station at Luxembourg-Findel airport but this would be very expensive: the station at the Belgian Royal Meteorological Institute had cost about 25 million Luxembourg francs. Mr. Wellbeloved, British Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Air Force, said the European geostationary satellite Meteosat I was at present operating as a research system and should the system prove to be cost-effective in competition with conventional ground-based systems a continuing operational programme would be contemplated. Meteosat II was currently being discussed by the appropriate European institutions and it was possible that it would function as an operational system. The United Kingdom was keeping in close touch with developments.

4.4. In Italy and the Netherlands, questions on short-, medium- and long-term weather forecasting elicited comments to the effect that "their reliability is being assessed", "reliability indices apply only to techniques for developing forecasting methods" and the search for "a system which might merge conventional forecasting methods with mathematical methods" was proving very difficult.

4.5. Answers are still awaited to several questions on one or other recommendation. In view of the number of questions still unanswered, it is impossible to analyse the situation in regard to Recommendations 322, 323, 324 and 325. It is nevertheless important to note that the answer to a question in France on Recommendation 325 (A European armaments policy) was printed in two well-known French newspapers, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*, and was mentioned in several other newspapers and regional radio programmes. Once again, this proves that a written question may often stretch beyond the limited audience of those who read official reports and reach a large section of the population.

V. The Committee's visit to the Netherlands

5.1. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments paid an information visit to the Netherlands on 3rd and 4th May 1979. During its working meeting, it asked its acting Chairman, Mr. Schlingemann, to write to the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments drawing the Committee's attention to the possibilities of obtaining information on defence and armaments matters through the intermediary of the Armaments Documentation Centre in Paris, the Strategic Research Institute in Vienna and possibly the computerised data banks in the Bundestag and the House of Lords. If members of the Defence Committee were interested in the possibilities afforded by the use of computers in the various national parliaments, it might be useful to mention the fact in Mr. Maggioni's report on parliaments and defence procurement.

5.2. The Committee also considered the possibility of drawing the attention of national parliaments to the symposium on a European armaments policy to be held in Brussels on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979.

5.3. During its stay in the Netherlands, the Committee visited the seat of the States-General of the Southern Holland province. An address by Mr. Porrey, Divisional Director, on the administration of this province was followed by a discussion with members of the Committee.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	37	8	21	4	10	14	111
1979	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	98	247	201	287	23	98	225	1,179
Annual average	4.26	10.74	8.74	12.48	1.00	4.26	9.78	7.32

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1977

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1977	297									—	23
	298	x				1				1	
	299	x				2				4	
	300					1			2	3	
	301					1			2	3	
	302			2		1			2	5	
	303									—	
	304					2			2	4	
305					1			2	3		
306									—		
Nov. 1977	307	x				1				1	34
	308	x				1	1			2	
	309	x				1		1		2	
	310	x				2				2	
	311	x				1				2	
Other action			4	15	4				2	25	
June 1978	312									—	30
	313	x	2	2					2	6	
	314	x	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315					2				2	
	316									—	
	317		2			1				3	
	318	x	2	1		1			2	6	
	319									—	
320									—		
321					1				1		
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	81
	323	x		3		1				4	
	324					1				1	
	325					1				5	
	326	x	2	2	4	3		2	2	11	
	327									—	
328	x		2			4	2	4	14		
Other action			7	25	4	4	2	3	2	45	
1979				1						1	1


APPENDIX III

Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels
9th-10th May 1977	Rome
3rd-4th November 1977	Bonn — Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of Hesse)
31st May-1st June 1978	Paris — Cergy/Pontoise
3rd November 1978	Rome
3rd-4th May 1979	The Hague

APPENDIX IV

Simplified establishment table of CEDOCAR



APPENDIX V

*Information-Dokumentation**List of specialised publications used for Series A*

Academy of Political Science (New York), Adelphi Papers (London), Aerospace International (Washington), l'Aerotecnica Missili e Spazio (Neapel), Afrika heute (Bonn), Air Force Magazine (Washington), Aircraft Engineering (London), Allgemeine Militärrundschau (Paris), Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift (Frauenfeld), Alte Kameraden (Stuttgart), American Journal of International Law (Cambridge, USA), American Science Review (Wisconsin), Archiv der Gegenwart (Bonn-Wien-Zürich), Archiv des Völkerrechtes (Tübingen), Armada International (Zürich), Armamentaria (Leyden, NL), Arme NYTT (Stockholm), Armee-Motor (Zürich), Armee-Rundschau (Berlin), Armées d'aujourd'hui (Paris), Armed Forces International (New York), Armor (Washington), Army Logistician (Fort Lee), The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (London), Army Research and Development (Washington), Army Times (Washington), Artillerierundschau (Neckargmünd), Asian Survey (Berkeley), Astronautik (Hannover), Außenhandel (Moskau), Außenpolitik (Freiburg), Australian Outlook (Canberra), Aviation Week and Space Technology (New York), Aviazione e Marina (Genua), Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung (Köln), Berichte zur Raumforschung und Raumplanung (Wien), Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (Köln), Bulletin (München), Bulletin of the Operations Research (Baltimore), Society of America (Baltimore), Canadian Military Journal (Montreal), China Quarterly (London), Conscience et Liberté (Bern), Contact (Brüssel), Current History (Philadelphia), Defence (London), Defense Management Journal (USA), Défense Nationale (Paris), Deutsche Außenpolitik (Berlin), Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bonn), Deutschland Archiv (Köln), Dialogue (Washington), Die Bundeswehr (Bad Godesberg), Digest des Ostens (Königstein), Dokumente (Offenburg), Dokumentation zur Entwicklung der Schweizerischen Armee (Zürich), Der Donauraum (Wien), Draegerheft (Lübeck), East-West Relations (Den Haag), Economica (London), Elektronische Informationsverarbeitung und Kybernetik (Berlin, DDR), Esercito (Rom), Europa (München), Europa Archiv (Bonn), Europäische Rundschau (Wien), Epoche (München), Flugrevue/Flugwelt (Stuttgart), Flugsicherheit (Köln), Flugwehr und -technik (Frauenfeld), Forces Aériennes Françaises (Paris), Forces Armées Françaises (Paris), Foreign Affairs (New York), Foreign Affairs Bulletin (Bangkok), Fortune (Illinois), Forum (Wien), Frankfurter Hefte (Frankfurt/Main), Fuerzas Armadas de Venezuela (Caracas), Futurum (München), Gesell-

schaft und Politik (Wien), Geschichte, Zeitgeschehen, Politik (Berlin), Gewaltfreie Aktion (Berlin), Government Business Worldwide Reports (Washington), Heer (Bonn), Honvedsegi Szemle (Budapest), IBE-Bulletin (Wien), Illustrierte Neue Welt (Wien), Infantry (Montgomery, Alabama), Informatik (Berlin, DDR), Informations Aéronautiques (Paris), Informationen, Berichte, Modelle (Wien), Instant Research on Peace and Violence (Tampere, SF), Interavia (Genf), International Bulletin (London), International Classification (Frankfurt), International Journal (Toronto), Internationale Politik (Belgrad), International Problems (Tel Aviv), International Security (Cambridge, USA), Internationale Wehrrevue (Genf), Interplay (New York), IPW-Berichte (Berlin), Izvestija (Sofia), Journal für Angewandte Sozialforschung (Wien), Internationale Zivilverteidigung (Genf), Journal of Conflict Resolution (Michigan), Journal of International Affairs (New York), Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (London), Journal Südafrika (Bonn), Kampftruppen (Herford, BRD), Kuba (Havanna), Loyal (Bonn), Luftfahrt International (Nürnberg), Luftwaffe (Kalkar), Marine (Bremen), Marine Corps Gazette (Quantico), Marine Rundschau (Stuttgart), Microwave Journal (Dedham, USA), Military Affairs (Manhattan, Kansas), The Military Balance (London), Military Review (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), Militärgeschichte (Potsdam), Militär-Politik (Hamburg), Militärtechnik (Berlin, DDR), Mirovaja Ekonomika i Mezdunarodne Otnosenija (Moskau), Mitteilungen und Berichte (Salzburg), Mizan (London), Monat (München), Nachrichten für Dokumentation (Frankfurt/Main), Nation, Europa (Coburg), National Defense (Washington), Nato Brief (Bonn), NATO's Fifteen Nations (Amsterdam), Naval Review (Washington), Die Neue Gesellschaft (Bonn), Neue Politische Literatur (Frankfurt/Main), Neue Ordnung (Bonn), Neue Welt im Bild, Neue Zeitschrift für Wehrrecht (Bonn), The New Hungarian Quarterly (Budapest), New Middle East (London), Novaja i Novejshaja Istorija (Moskau), Operations Research (Baltimore), Orbis (Philadelphia), Osteuropa (Stuttgart), Osteuropäische Rundschau (München), Öffentliche Sicherheit (Wien), Österreichische Forschungstiftung für Entwicklungshilfe (Wien), ÖMZ (Wien), Österreichische Osthefte (Wien), Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik (Wien), Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), Paratus (Pretoria), Peace Research Review (Dundas/Ontario), Pioniere (Darmstadt), Plus (Düsseldorf), Polish Perspectives (Warschau),

Political Quarterly (London), Political Science Quarterly (New York), Politische Dokumentation (München), Die Politische Meinung (Bonn), Politische Studien (München), Politische Vierteljahresschrift (Köln), Presse der Sowjetunion (Berlin), Problems of Communism (Washington), Problems Sovietiques (München), Proceedings (New York), Promet (Bad Homburg), Propellants and Explosives (Weinheim), Publizistik (Bonn), Quadrante (Roma), Relazioni Internazionali (Milano), Report (Wien), Reconquista (Madrid), Reservilainen (Helsinki), Review/Gesundheitswesen und Umweltschutz (Wien), Revista de Aeronautica y Astronautica (Madrid), Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerre (Buenos Aires), La Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris), Revue Militaire Suisse (Lausanne), Rivista Militare (Roma), Royal Air Forces Quarterly (London), Royal United Service Institution Journal (London), Rude Pravo (Prag), Rumänien heute (Bukarest), Schweizer Monatshefte (Zürich), Der Schweizer Soldat (Zürich), Science and Public Affairs (Chicago), Sicherheitspolitik heute (Bad Honnef), Soldatenjournal (Wien), Soldat und Technik (Frankfurt/Main), Soldier (Aldershot), Soldiers (Alexandria/Virginia), Soviet Military Review (Moskau), Sovjetzkij Vojn (Moskau), Sozialistische Politik (Berlin), Lo Spettatore Internazionale (Roma), Strategic Review (Washington), Strategic Survey (London), Stra-

tégie (Paris), Studies in Comparative (Los Angeles), Studies on the Soviet Union (München), Survey (London), Survival (London), TAM Magazine des Armées (Paris), Terzo Mondo (Milano), Truppendienst (Wien), Truppenpraxis (Frankfurt/Main), USSR and the Third World (London) Verde Olivo (Havanna), Vereinte Nationen (Bonn), Die Vereinten Nationen und Österreich (Wien), Viata Militara (Bukarest), Voennyi Vestnik (Moskau), Vojno Delo (Beograd), War/Peace Report (New York), Wehrausbildung in Wort und Bild (Bonn), Wehrforschung (Sinzheim-Winden), Europäische Wehrkunde (München), Wehrtechnik (Darmstadt), Wehr & Waffen (Sasbachwalden, BRD), Wehr und Wirtschaft (München), Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (Tübingen), The Western Political Quarterly (Salt Lake City), Wissenschaft und Weltbild (Wien), Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropas (München), World Politics (Princeton), The World Today (Oxford), Zeit Bild (Bern), Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (Wiesbaden), Zeitschrift für Luftrecht und Weltraufgaben (Köln), Zeitschrift für Neutralität (Frankfurt/Main), Zeitschrift für Organisation (Wiesbaden), Zeitschrift für Politik (Berlin), Zitate, Analysen, Kommentare (Zürich), Zivilschutz (Bern), Zivilschutz (Wien), Zivilverteidigung (Bad Honnef).

APPENDIX VI

*Information Dokumentation**List of specialised publications used for Series B*

- | | |
|--|---|
| Airadio News | Fernmelde-Impulse |
| Air et Cosmos | Fernmelde-Praxis |
| Airline Management and Marketing | Fernmeldetechnik |
| Aktuell (Steyr) | Fette, Seifen, Anstreichmittel |
| Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift | Flight - International |
| Angewandte Chemie | Flug Revue |
| Angewandte Informatik | Flugwehr und -Technik |
| Archiv für technisches Messen und industrielle Meßtechnik | Französische Technik |
| Armed Forces Review | Bauwesen, Hoch- und Tiefbau, Städtebau — Aktuelles |
| Armee-Motor | Französische Technik |
| Army Research and Development | Bauwesen, Hoch- und Tiefbau, Städtebau — Erzeugnisse, Gerät und Techniken |
| Atomkernenergie | Französische Technik |
| Austro-Motor | Bauwesen, Hoch- und Tiefbau, Städtebau — Forschung und Entwicklung |
| Automobiltechnische Zeitschrift | Französische Technik |
| Aviation Week and Space Technology | Chemie, Gas, Erdöl — Aktuelles |
| Berichte und Informationen — Österreichisches Forschungsinstitut f. Wissenschaft und Politik | Französische Technik |
| Berichte zur Raumforschung und Raumplanung | Chemie, Gas, Erdöl — Erzeugnisse, Gerät und Techniken |
| Bild der Wissenschaft | Französische Technik |
| Brand aus | Chemie, Gas, Erdöl — Forschung und Entwicklung |
| Brandschutz | Französische Technik |
| Brown Boveri Mitteilungen | Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie — Aktuelles |
| Canadian Defence Products | Französische Technik |
| Canopus | Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie — Erzeugnisse, Gerät u. Techniken |
| Chemie für Labor und Betrieb | Französische Technik |
| Chemiker Zeitung | Elektro- u. Elektronik-Industrie — Forschung u. Entwicklung |
| Chemische Rundschau | Französische Technik — Maschinenbau, Hydraulik, Engineering |
| Computer - aktuell | — Erzeugnisse, Gerät u. Techniken |
| Das Elektron international | Französische Technik — Maschinenbau, Hydraulik, Engineering |
| Der Elektroniker | — Forschung und Entwicklung |
| Der Fernmeldeingenieur | Französische Technik — Versch. Industriezweige, Verbrauchsgüterindustrien |
| Der Schlüssel | — Erzeugnisse, Gerät u. Techniken |
| Der Soldat | Fresenius Zeitschrift für Analytische Chemie |
| Der Stahlbau | Funk-Technik |
| Deutsches Waffenjournal | Funkschau |
| Die Bautechnik | Gemeinwirtschaft |
| DIN-Mitteilungen | GIT — Fachzeitschrift für das Laboratorium |
| DK-Mitteilungen | Hansa |
| Elektrisches Nachrichtenwesen | Heraklit-Rundschau |
| Elektronics | Hughes News |
| Electronics Weekly | IBM-Nachrichten |
| Elektronik | Ideen des exakten Wissens |
| Elektronik Information | Informatik |
| Elektronik und Maschinenbau | |
| Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift — Ausgabe A | |
| Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift — Ausgabe B | |
| Elin Zeitschrift | |
| Erdöl und Kohle | |
| Ericsson Review | |
| Explosivstoffe | |

- Information — Nachrichtenblatt f. Flugsicherungstechnik
 Informationsdienst f. Bildungspolitik u. Forschung
 (Dokumentation)
 Informationsdienst f. Bildungspolitik u. Forschung
 (Reportagen)
 Ingenieur-Digest
 Interavia
 Internationale Wehr-Revue
 Isotope in Industrie und Landwirtschaft
- Kampftruppen
 Kerntechnik
 Konstruktion im Maschinen-, Apparate- u. Gerätebau
 lagern — fördern - transportieren
- Laser
 Lebensmittel und Ernährung
 Logistik, Technik u. Versorgung
- Manager-Magazin
 Maschinenwelt — Elektrotechnik
 Materialprüfung
 Mensch und Arbeit
 Meßtechnik
 Military Review
 Militärtechnik
 Mitteilungen des chemischen Forschungsinstitutes der Wirtschaft Österreichs und des Österreichischen Kunststoffinstitutes
 Monatsberichte — österr. Institut f. Wirtschaftsforschung
 Motortechnische Zeitschrift
- Nachrichten für Dokumentation
 Nachrichtentechnik
 Nachrichtentechnische Zeitschrift
 Neues von Rohde und Schwarz
 Nobel Hefte
 Nuclear Fusion
- Olympos 593 News
 ÖNORM — Mitteilungsblatt des Österreichischen Normungsinstitutes
 Ordnance
 Österreichische Bauzeitung
 Österr. Ingenieur-Zeitschrift
 Österr. Militärische Zeitschrift
- Österr. Osthefte
 Österr. Zeitschrift für Vermessungswesen
 Österr. Nachrichtenblatt für Luftfahrer
- Philips Technische Rundschau
 Philips Telecommunication Review
 Physik in unserer Zeit
 Pioniere
 Point-to-Point Communication
 Proceedings of the IEEE
 Progress-Bulletin d'Avancement
- Rationalisierung
 Raumfahrtforschung
 Raumfahrtnachrichten
 RCA-Review
 Rock Mechanics
- Seewirtschaft
 Siemens Forschungs- u. Entwicklungsberichte
 Siemens Zeitschrift
 Soldat und Technik
 Stahl und Eisen
 Statistische Nachrichten
- Technical Review
 Technik und Betrieb
 Technische Mitteilungen
 AEG-Telefunken
 Technische Mitteilungen für Sappeure, Pontoniere u. Mineure
 Technische Rundschau
 Technische Überwachung
 Technisches Informationsblatt der Wirtschaftsabteilung der Französischen Botschaft in Österreich
 Telonde
 The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal
 Truppendienst
 Truppenpraxis
- UKW-Berichte
 Umschau in Wissenschaft und Technik
 Unterrichtsblätter der Deutschen Bundespost — Ausgabe B
- VDI-Nachrichten
 VDI-Zeitschrift
 Vectors
 Verpackungswirtschaft
- Wehr und Wirtschaft
 Wehrausbildung in Wort und Bild

**Political activities of the Council —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur**

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur

Foreword

I. WEU in 1978

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

1. Replies of the Council
2. Report of the Standing Armaments Committee
3. Joint meetings
4. Participation of Ministers in Assembly sessions
5. Assembly budget

III. Political questions

IV. Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens (Alternate: *Hengel*), Ariosto, *Beith*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, Brugnion, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank

(Alternate: *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), Mende (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg (Alternate: *Schlingemann*), Müller, *Péridier*, Perin, *Portheine*, *Reddemann*, Segre, Urwin (Alternate: *Lewis*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the political activities of the Council — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Welcoming the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council confirmed its intention to continue “the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora”;

Welcoming the content of many replies to recommendations of the Assembly and to written questions put by members, particularly Written Question 191;

Regretting however that the informal procedure employed at joint meetings between Committees and the Council allows too much ambiguity to be left in the replies of the Council;

Welcoming the content of the statements made by representatives of several member governments to the Assembly during the twenty-fourth session, particularly in voicing the wish to make fuller use of WEU for discussing in a European forum all matters relating to Europe’s security and for strengthening European co-operation in armaments questions and in disarmament;

Noting that the Council is still “checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected” and that the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times on its agenda;

Noting that the Council has demonstrated its good will in agreeing to a substantial increase in the budget of the Assembly, leaving it the possibility of assessing its own requirements, and in the active participation of most member governments in the work of the Assembly;

Considering that since, in due time, WEU will be called upon to take its place in any future European union, the smooth operation of this institution is essential for building a Europe which is master of its destiny;

Aware that such an independent and autonomous Europe can but be a political Europe based on a truly co-ordinated foreign and defence policy leading to integration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Pursue efforts to extend the dialogue with the Assembly by keeping it regularly informed of:
 - (a) the results of the work of the IEPG;
 - (b) the completed parts of the study undertaken by the SAC which are not covered by military secrecy;
 - (c) matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda of its meetings;
2. Seek a procedure for joint meetings which allows each participant adequate freedom of speech but which also allows the collegiate views of the Council to be expressed;
3. Demonstrate more clearly in its work that it considers the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly Article XI, to be a positive contribution to the establishment of a European union;
4. In the context of direct elections to the European Parliament, have studies made on ways and means of including WEU in the framework of a European Community whose responsibilities would be extended to foreign and defence policies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Minnocci, Rapporteur)

Foreword

1. Before tackling the essential aspects of his report and just before the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, your Rapporteur wishes — speaking for the moment mainly in a personal capacity — to mention briefly the basic problem of European defence which, if not solved, might mean that WEU and its Assembly would be in danger of losing much of their political significance.

2. He will do so in the words used by a former senior official of NATO, Yves Laulan, in his remarkable essay published last year under the rather strange title of *Visa pour un désastre*, which dealt with this problem of European defence. On page 183, Mr. Laulan wrote :

“It is not a matter of recreating conventional European co-operation between national defence efforts but of developing an integrated system such as the one planned in the draft EDC treaty.”

3. Only thus, continued Mr. Laulan, might the idea of Europe come to fruition, for “the notion of Europe has no meaning unless based on the notion of collective security”, i.e. on a truly integrated foreign and defence policy (and not only on economic union): only at this price can true European independence be asserted.

4. Mr. Laulan therefore concluded that “the building of Europe must be started again from its foundations, where it was at the beginning of the nineteen-fifties.”

5. Your Rapporteur fully shares the views of Mr. Laulan, including his very severe criticism of WEU. He believes there is much food for thought in the important suggestions made in this book, particularly now that the direct elections to the European Parliament seem to be creating conditions which are propitious for reviving political Europe.

6. Your Rapporteur will now turn to the more specific aspects of his report.

I. WEU in 1978

7. Since the United Kingdom joined the European Community and as a result of the development of nine-power political consultations, there has been much speculation about the possible future of Western European Union at a time when many of its activities under the modified Brussels Treaty are being exercised in the framework of other organisations.

8. The impending election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage has also raised the question of how far the WEU Assembly might, in turn, find its prerogatives undermined by the development of the European Parliament's activities. Indeed, the latter's adoption of a report on European armaments procurement co-operation on 8th May 1978 raised the problem of the respective responsibilities of the two assemblies.

9. But in the course of 1978 the WEU Council gave frequent proof, and in many different ways, of its desire to respect the modified Brussels Treaty in full and, for the first time, demonstrated a desire to place the organisation in the framework of the future European union which is still the declared aim of all our countries.

10. In the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, the Assembly is given far more detailed indications on this matter than ever before, as is also the case in the answers to several written questions put by members of the Assembly to the Council and, even more so, in addresses by several Ministers during the Assembly's last session and in their answers to questions put by members of the Assembly.

11. Among these statements, several passages are worth quoting because of the clear-cut limits the governments intend to impose on the responsibilities of each assembly. For instance, on 20th November 1978, Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said:

“The primary task of Western European Union is to consider security problems. It is the only European institution in which it is possible to discuss these questions, from which our countries can obviously not stand aloof.

As you are aware, 1979 promises to mark an important stage on the road to increased co-operation among European countries. It would therefore appear particularly useful to recall a few actual facts. Accordingly, we can only feel astonishment at certain insinuations which crop up here and there, to the effect that WEU might have outlived its usefulness, that other institutions might be in a better position to take its legacy in hand, and even that its members might not really be competent to discuss the problems which are in the first instance their concern, without the reassuring and protective presence of non-member but friendly and allied countries. The position of the French Government in this regard is devoid of all ambiguity. We do not wish to see any

weakening of WEU; for the latter must remain the forum in which we can hold discussions amongst Europeans on security problems and problems of co-operation in the armaments sphere. And, in this connection, I should like to pay tribute to the useful work performed by the Standing Armaments Committee, without prejudice to the responsibilities incumbent on the independent European programme group."

Answering two oral questions, the Minister of State was more explicit:

"... I consider that all matters connected with confidence and security — and hence all matters connected with disarmament — may appropriately be raised here in your Assembly..."

and referred to the proposals made by Mr. Michel Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Assembly in November 1973:

"... the deputy is alluding to a statement made here in this Assembly by Mr. Michel Jobert. It was completely in line with what should, in my view, constitute the activities of WEU. And as I reminded you just now, when speaking at the rostrum of the support which the French Government gave, was continuing to give and would give in the future to WEU, not only is there no conflict, but there is on the contrary perfect harmony between what Mr. Michel Jobert stated then and what I have said this morning..."

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic, endorsed Mr. Bernard-Reymond's statements as follows:

"... On behalf of the Federal Government, I can endorse unreservedly the statement of my French colleague, Minister of State Bernard-Reymond. As has been repeatedly stated in this Assembly, the Federal Government does not wish to see any weakening of WEU as created by the modified Brussels Treaty..."

and said in answer to a question:

"... I do not believe either that there is any cause for anxiety that the discussion on the future competences of the European Parliament is in any way linked with an intended or even conceivable weakening of WEU and its Assembly..."

.....

"... I can confirm unreservedly that all parliamentary parties in the German Bundestag stand firmly and unswervingly by the WEU treaty..."

Finally, Mr. Mazzola, Italian Minister of State for Defence, speaking on behalf of his government and as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said:

"I can only at this point express the Council's appreciation of the Assembly's rôle in regularly monitoring the developing problems of European security and union from the particular standpoint of WEU, and direct the Council's own attention to the problems of major concern to the union. The Council too, I can assure you, has not failed to keep a close watch on application of the Brussels Treaty and annexed protocols, given the continuing importance attached by the member governments to the treaty itself and their manifest will to fulfil the obligations assumed by them."

This statement assumes its full importance when seen in the context of what the same Minister said shortly afterwards:

"For my part I believe that in any case the enlargement of the European Economic Community and the coming elections to the European Parliament may be regarded as important milestones towards realising the full worth of having a democratic, jointly responsible and progressive democratic union of the nations of Western Europe. Indeed it is the aim of all European institutions to assist in developing and completing European union by gradually enabling its peoples to speak with one voice."

12. From all these statements, a true government doctrine towards the application of the modified Brussels Treaty appears to emerge for the first time based on the idea that the modified Brussels Treaty is one of the foundations of the future European union, that it bestows a number of responsibilities on the Council and Assembly of WEU and that these responsibilities must be effectively exercised in order to promote the establishment of the union. In this respect, the Council removes much uncertainty by linking, in Chapter II of its annual report, Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty creating the Council with Article V defining the automatic assistance which the signatories undertake to afford each other. This point has been frequently emphasised by the Assembly but on occasion it has feared that the Council might neglect this aspect by drawing too fine a distinction between the treaty and the organisation devolving from it.

13. The Assembly can therefore welcome the positions adopted by the Council, i.e. by the seven governments meeting in the fundamental institution of WEU, first because they espouse a number of themes and ideas which have been upheld in the Assembly for years and second,

because governments have been brought to voice these views through the questions which members of the Assembly have steadfastly put to government representatives in their national parliaments or in the Assembly.

14. The annual report of the Council recalls a number of points which are not entirely new but which, if compared with previous reports, confirm the course indicated by the Ministers for the present and future of WEU. For instance, reference may be made to the introduction to Chapter I which recalls that the Assembly:

“... is concerned with both European security and European union, and [is] the only European assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence...”

The Council also confirms that its dialogue with the Assembly covers:

“... questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora...”

15. Furthermore, on its own work, the Council announces — and this is the first time it has spoken so clearly — that:

“... at permanent representative level [they] are still checking regularly that the application of the modified Brussels Treaty is in no way neglected...”

It even specifies that:

“... During the year under review, the various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared twenty-seven times on the agenda for Council meetings.”

16. Your Rapporteur is perhaps not altogether convinced by the latter extracts from the annual report of the Council insofar as the European political cohesion which should emerge from such consultations has not always been translated into fact. For instance, reference might be made to the absence of consultations between members of WEU prior to the Guadeloupe summit meeting at the beginning of 1979 — although security and defence matters were scheduled as a major item on the agenda — and uncertainty about the attitude of Western European countries towards strategy, armaments, joint production and the arms trade. The regular checks of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty which the Council claims to be making at the level of permanent representatives do not seem to probe very deeply or, to say the least, do not seem to result in well-thought-out joint positions. What exactly does the Council do in this respect? Could it not be that it merely answers the Assembly's recommendations and written questions put by

members which in fact generally have a bearing on the application of the treaty, failing which moreover the Council would not have to reply? Or does it merely ensure the implementation — admittedly indispensable, but purely routine — of the various prescriptions of the Paris Agreements relating to the level of forces and the control of armaments? Or does the Council at ambassadorial level really tackle of its own accord, as is its duty, matters relating to foreign policy and defence when it considers consultations to be necessary?

17. Whatever doubts there may be, and which may be strengthened by the Council's restrictive interpretation of Article XI of the treaty, the determination it has expressed to check the application of the treaty is worth underlining and meets a wish constantly expressed by the WEU Assembly.

18. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to underline the importance of the Council's answer to Written Question 191 put by Mr. Roper, in which the Council confirmed that the range of activities assigned to it in the field of defence questions and armaments had undergone no restriction since the outset and that it would continue to inform the Assembly of any questions raised by member governments in this context. This too is something the Assembly had frequently called for without, until now, obtaining such clear commitments.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

19. Relations between the Council and the Assembly have certainly eased insofar as the Council has adopted positions close to those advocated by the Assembly, and the Council is correct in underlining a definite improvement in relations between the two WEU bodies.

1. Replies of the Council

20. Members of parliament have been able to note that their written questions or the recommendations adopted by the Assembly have elicited more substantial answers than heretofore, particularly on important and delicate matters such as the control of armaments, the sale of arms to non-European countries and the application of the Brussels Treaty.

21. The Council recognises that answers to certain recommendations or written questions have been transmitted late and sometimes very late. This may well be due to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary unanimity in the Council for the adoption of a text. However, one of the reasons given by the Council is that the replies requested related to “developing problems”, and it consequently deferred its reply because it

wished to give the Assembly "information of a useful nature". Here it should be recorded that to be really useful the information given to the Assembly should refer to matters which have not yet been settled. Effective parliamentary participation in the work of the institution and the application of the modified Brussels Treaty depends on the Council providing the Assembly insofar as possible with information on current problems and not just problems which have already been solved. But the Assembly must also note that the Council invokes the fact that Assembly documents are often distributed late as justification for its own delays:

"... similar considerations, mentioned by one of the Rapporteurs, had in some cases delayed the submission of committee reports which had only reached the Council as the sessions opened."

22. The obvious conclusions must be drawn and the Committees must ensure that reports are adopted in time for them to be transmitted to the Council within the statutory time limit before each session.

23. But one side's mistake is no excuse for the other: the Assembly must ensure that its own rules are applied as well as possible and the Council must diligently demonstrate its desire to co-operate closely with the Assembly and maintain a dialogue which it steadfastly claims to be an important aim.

2. Report of the Standing Armaments Committee

24. The General Affairs Committee has already pointed out that its work might be hindered by the Council's failure to communicate to the Assembly the section of the study by the SAC approved by the Council in 1978. The situation is now even more acute since the Assembly is preparing a symposium to be held in autumn 1979 on the very subject of European armaments co-operation. The Assembly could understand if the Council's attitude were attributable to military secrecy, but if, as the Council has said, its intention is to transmit the report only when it has been adopted in full, the Assembly would have greater reason to complain since there is every indication that the second chapter of the SAC's study will not be completed for quite some time. It is to be believed, however, that the juridical aspects dealt with in the first chapter are public knowledge and consequently there is no valid reason why this chapter should not be communicated to the Assembly, unless certain governments are afraid of the publicity that might reach other member countries about the status of firms.

3. Joint meetings

25. On 3rd November 1978, the Council held what it called an informal meeting with the

General Affairs Committee. The Committee has made no attempt to conceal its disappointment that the Council has never wished to try out the procedure for joint meetings which it itself proposed to the Assembly.

26. Indeed, contrary to the wish of the General Affairs Committee, the Council has deliberately reduced joint meetings to the level of so-called informal meetings. The dialogue is perhaps more flexible and frank in such a framework, but however much "the remarks of both the Chairman-in-Office and of other members of the Council take due account of agreed positions and, so far as possible, of the views of all governments", the position is far from clear and it is difficult for members of parliament attending such meetings to know on whose behalf each member of the Council speaks.

27. Admittedly, as the annual report notes, formal procedure "would involve lengthy previous consultations between governments", but is not the very object of the WEU Council to provoke such consultations between governments rather than avoid them? Instead of claiming that such procedure "would deprive the talks of all spontaneity", it should be noted that the procedure specifically proposed by the Council drew a distinction between a more formal part requiring such lengthy consultations and a less formal part where spontaneity would take over.

28. It should be added that the Council tries by various means to be informed in advance of the questions the Committee is to put and at the so-called informal meeting in Rome it was quite clear that on the Council's side the spontaneity it proclaims was false since the Chairman-in-Office replied in great detail to questions which had not yet been put to him.

29. In short, the General Affairs Committee does not share the Council's enthusiasm for these informal meetings. It can but note that the Council considers them as a means of avoiding lengthy consultations between governments and, finally, it has an impression that they combine the disadvantages of formal procedure since its questions must be communicated in advance and the disadvantages of informal procedure since it cannot be sure whether the replies given convey the joint positions of the seven governments or the respective views of each one. In this matter the Committee bows to the Council's demands, which it considers unfounded, and deplores that the Council persists in refusing to apply a procedure which it worked out and proposed to the Assembly and which the Assembly had accepted.

4. Participation of Ministers in Assembly sessions

30. The improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly was also evident in 1978 in the satisfactory participation of Ministers

from various governments in Assembly sessions. Their relatively numerous attendance and the high standard of many of their speeches should be recorded.

31. It should also be noted that, at a time when it was responsible for the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council, the Italian Government was represented by a Minister of State for Defence. This is not very standard practice since the Chairman-in-Office of the Council is generally a Secretary or Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Mazzola's presence met a wish expressed several times by the Assembly, i.e. that the Council should show that it is not formed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs alone but by the representatives of the governments of member countries in the fields of application of the modified Brussels Treaty. Defence Ministers are thus perfectly entitled to speak on behalf of the Council and the Assembly can but welcome the fact that the Italian Government sought to demonstrate the fact.

32. However, in general, the titular Ministers should attend sessions of the Assembly more often. Although it is often the Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs who attend meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers, it is generally the titular Ministers for Foreign Affairs who represent their governments in the nine-power political consultations and often also in the North Atlantic Council. If therefore the governments are determined to allow the WEU Assembly to supervise all problems relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even in cases where such matters are handled in other frameworks, it would be desirable for the governments to be represented quite often at Assembly sessions by Ministers of cabinet rank. One is obliged to note, however, that several governments have not been represented at sessions by their Ministers for Foreign Affairs for some years. This is so for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

5. Assembly budget

33. Although it is not for the General Affairs Committee to deal with budgetary matters, it must underline the way the Council confirmed its declarations of good will by acceding very largely to the requests for increases in the budget for political groups and the press. The Assembly is particularly pleased that the Council left it the task — which is natural but has not always been the case — of deciding how to divide the new allocations between these two heads.

III. Political questions

34. The Council's account of its work in international policy matters calls for little comment.

In fact, the same questions arise year after year, particularly East-West relations, and here co-ordination of the policies of Western European countries would appear to be fairly satisfactory whether exercised in the North Atlantic Council, nine-power political consultations (particularly for the CSCE) or WEU which appears to be specialising in discussion of bilateral relations.

35. But for relations between the European countries and the People's Republic of China, the annual report reveals a failure on the part of the Council. Referring to the answer to Written Question 186, the Council says that:

“... the policy of member countries was or would be decided on the basis of their assessment of the overall progress of their relations with that country and taking into account their own armaments export policies.”

36. This means that the Council has noted that it was incapable of working out a joint policy on a matter which is very clearly and very directly within its purview. It may be wondered whether, on a matter which is outside the responsibility of the European Community, since armaments are involved, the Council has really taken the initiative of tackling the problem of relations between its members and the People's Republic of China other than by replying to Recommendation 315 and Written Question 186. Apparently, according to the annual report, it has not and it is evident that if the Council tackles such questions only in order to find an answer to recommendations or questions from the Assembly, it will have little hope of working out a joint policy which can develop only from continuing consultations between member countries. Your Rapporteur has to ask the Council to pursue its consultations on the arms exports policies of each of its members with a view to determining European policy on the question. That is its responsibility and no other European institution is empowered to take its stead.

37. Conversely, the description of relations between European and African countries given in the annual report shows that co-operation between Western European countries has been pursued in various frameworks for many years and very considerable results have been achieved. Thus the Council can claim a remarkable unity of views among its members on the question of Rhodesia and the *de jure* recognition of the Zimbabwe people, apartheid and obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 253 and 418. The general application of the code of conduct in respect of South Africa is another proof. Similarly, in the case of Namibia, the fact that the Council was unanimous in affording its full support to Security Council Resolutions 431 and 435 clearly shows that a European policy exists.

38. When the annual report states that the Council supported the position of the OAU "in believing that African problems were best solved by African states themselves, without external intervention", this too is a joint position which it was possible to reach only after lengthy and delicate consultations. Of course, these consultations were not held in the framework of WEU, but the Council is right to proclaim that the results it has achieved come within the scope of the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

39. However, when the Council says that "they would deplore the creation of military spheres of influence by foreign powers... both in Africa and in the surrounding areas" it should be more specific about what it means by "surrounding areas" or indicate more clearly what it thinks of the prospects now taking shape of allied countries stationing forces in the Arabian peninsula.

40. With the problem of international terrorism, the WEU Council is also able to refer to

undeniable results achieved in consultations between Western European countries in frameworks other than WEU, and the Assembly welcomes this news.

IV. Conclusions

41. There is no doubt in your Rapporteur's mind that the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council has made definite progress in three areas: first and definitely foremost, co-ordination between the various European institutions which should allow WEU one day to take its place in the future European union, then the related area of relations between the Council and the Assembly and finally co-ordination of the foreign policies of member countries as elaborated in a very wide variety of frameworks.

42. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that the Assembly approve the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council.

***Political activities of the Council —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5¹

tabled by Mr. Druon

1. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "take its place in any future European union" and insert "play a more important rôle as the possibilities of European union progress".
2. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "leading to integration".
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "to be a positive contribution" to the end of the paragraph and insert "to be a necessary complement to the establishment of a European union".
4. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the context of direct elections to the European Parliament".
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "of including WEU" to the end of the paragraph and insert "whereby WEU might better concert security policies as political co-operation between the member states of the EEC develops".

Signed : Druon

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 5 negatived ; Amendment 4 agreed to).

***Political activities of the Council —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

AMENDMENT 6¹

tabled by Mr. Urwin and others

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

Signed : Urwin, van Waterschoot, Konings, Miller, Scheffler, Cook, Ahrens, Faulds, Northfield, Roper, Hardy, Stoffelen, Schwencke, Büchner

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

REPORT¹

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur***

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submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur

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V. Conclusions

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bohmer (Chairman); Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens (Alternate: *Hengel*), Ariosto, *Beith*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank

(Alternate: *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), Mende (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg (Alternate: *Schlingemann*), Müller (Alternate: *Lenzer*), *Péridier*, Perin, *Portheine*, *Reddemann*, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation

The Assembly,

Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economic, military and political independence of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will eventually reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms ;

Noting that national armies no longer provide a large enough market for any European country to be able to produce armaments at competitive prices ;

Considering that armaments industries occupy an important place in the economies of several Western European countries where they make a major contribution to the maintenance of employment ;

Considering that it is evident that their work makes a worthwhile contribution to the development of scientific and technical research in many fields and to the maintenance of a high level of technology in Europe ;

Considering that the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ;

Deploring the extension of trade in arms, particularly to countries in areas where there is dangerous tension ;

Gratified that the independent European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the important task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states can allow this work to be developed ;

Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for the organisation of defence and armaments in Europe ;

Considering that WEU will therefore be called upon to take its place in any future European union ;

Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 31st May 1976 is guiding its work in this direction,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments co-operation develops along lines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance ;
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may be completed in the reasonably near future ;
4. Study attentively the results of the study with a view to preparing on this basis directives to be addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations concerned ;
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG ;
6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exporters and importers of armaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly in areas where peace is threatened.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. At its session in November 1978, the Assembly debated two reports presented by the General Affairs Committee, one on the consequences of the forthcoming enlargement of the European Communities for the defence of Europe and for WEU and the other on Europe's external relations. However, circumstances prevented a major debate being held on the wider and more essential lines of Europe's external and defence policies.

2. In a particularly topical manner, these two reports in fact expressed two political philosophies which seem at first sight contradictory. One was highly ambitious: Europe was to be allowed to play a significant rôle in the world balance by asserting itself as a leading power capable of making its full weight felt in the search for solutions to problems with which the world will have to come to grips between now and the end of the century.

3. The other implied a view of Europe whose influence in the rest of world would be based not on its ability to wield military power but on the idea that its very weakness would give it an original rôle, i.e. the promotion of peace and justice in international relations and within states.

4. However attached one may be to moral and political values as important as the search for peace and détente, the extension of respect for human rights, the development of less privileged countries and the success of the North-South dialogue, it is not evident that the pursuit of these aims alone would provide a sufficient basis for a European policy and, even less, ensure Europe's security. Refusal to consider security problems between Europeans is obviously not enough to ensure peace on our continent and it would cut back sharply its rôle in the world.

5. It is also questionable whether this view of Europe exercising an essentially moral influence in the world, not based on strength of arms, would arouse the enthusiasm necessary to ensure the lasting success of the cause of European unity, particularly among the younger generation. Opinion polls in the various countries in the context of the current campaign for the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage indicate that public opinion is in favour of developing a Community Europe but also less determined than at other times to

do its utmost to ensure the success of the cause. The fact that Europe has not yet managed to make up its mind about matters as important for its present and its future as its own defence is certainly partly responsible for this relative lack of interest in the European cause among a large part of the population which nevertheless seems favourably inclined towards Europe.

6. In short, the question is whether the preparation of a more elaborate European policy in foreign affairs and defence matters has not become essential to the success of economic and political co-operation destined to lead to the constitution of the European union which all our governments declare to be their aim.

7. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it extremely important to place in a somewhat wider context all matters relating to European armaments co-operation and particularly the symposium to be held in Brussels in October 1979 and to examine whether such co-operation is necessary before studying the general economic, social and political implications of developing such co-operation. This he feels is the rôle of the General Affairs Committee whose report must therefore avoid overlapping with those to be presented by more specialised committees.

II. Western Europe and the armaments problem

8. For several years, the world has witnessed a growth in what is known as the arms race. Its multiple aspects are in no wise limited to Europe and the two superpowers but stretch over a large part of the earth, including the Middle East, Eastern Asia and to some extent Africa. Only Latin America, although not completely out of it, seems to be playing but a modest part.

9. According to *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1967-76* published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in July 1978, military expenditure throughout the world in 1976 is believed to represent 5.8 % of the world GNP, i.e. the equivalent of what the world spends on education and more than double what it spends on health (2.4 %). But whereas the percentage of GNP earmarked for defence in the industrialised countries has dropped sharply in the last ten years, it has risen in the underdeveloped countries which, as a whole, spent as much in 1976 on defence as they did on education and health combined. These are only averages and

some countries show considerably higher figures¹.

10. However, prospects offered by the United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament held in 1978, hopes of peace arising from the Washington treaty between Egypt and Israel and the favourable evolution of SALT II are pointers that in the next few years the limitation of armaments and, in certain cases, disarmament will at last enter the field of reality. It is evident that a general slow down in military expenditure might have sweeping repercussions on the growth rate of developing countries if they managed to allocate more of their GNP to productive investment and if the industrialised countries set aside slightly more of theirs for assisting the third world. These are prospects which cannot be overlooked in a European policy concerning the production and sale of arms since any limitation of the arms race can but foster both the maintenance of peace in Europe and the development of international trade in which Europe plays a major part.

11. Among the several reasons for the arms race, a prominent one is of course the confrontation between the two blocs. So far, the agreements on security and co-operation in Europe, the SALT I agreements and SALT II negotiations, as well as the MBFR talks, have failed to bring about any reduction in the build-up of

1. According to *The Military Balance 1978-79* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the percentages of GNP spent on defence are given as follows:

(1) <i>Atlantic Alliance</i>			
United States :	6 %	Netherlands :	3.6 %
Turkey :	5.7 %	Federal Republic :	3.4 %
United Kingdom :	5 %	Belgium :	3.4 %
Greece :	5 %	Italy :	2.4 %
France :	3.6 %		
(2) <i>Warsaw Pact</i>			
Soviet Union :	from 11 to 13 %		
Other countries :	from 5.9 % (GDR) to 1.7 % (Romania)		
(3) <i>Rest of Europe</i>			
Yugoslavia :	5.2 %	Sweden :	3.4 %
Others :	less than 2 %		
(4) <i>Middle East</i>			
Israel :	29.9 %	Jordan :	15.5 %
Egypt :	22.8 % (in 1974)	Iran :	10.9 %
Syria :	16.4 %	Iraq :	10.2 %
(5) <i>Asia</i>			
North Korea :	10.5 %	Singapore :	6.3 %
China :	8.5 %	Pakistan :	4.6 %
Taiwan :	8.3 %
South Korea :	6.5 %	India :	3.1 %
(6) <i>Africa</i>			
Nigeria :	7.8 %		
Rhodesia :	7.7 %		
South Africa :	5.1 %		
(7) <i>Latin America</i>			
Peru :	3.1 %	Brazil :	1.1 %
Argentina :	2.8 % (1976)	Colombia :	1.1 %
Venezuela :	1.4 %	Mexico :	0.6 %

armaments; at the very most it has been channelled in certain directions. But hostilities outside Europe, the need for security or the ambitions of certain powers have led them to procure large quantities of the latest equipment. The Yom Kippur war in 1973 illustrated the danger such weapons might constitute for international peace and the need for those who felt threatened to increase and modernise their equipment. Another reason is probably the status states or governments may expect to gain by possessing a modern army.

12. However, the rôle played by industrialised countries in this race should not be underestimated: as producers, they often derive considerable revenue from arms exports which help to maintain the balance of payments which had been in jeopardy since the rise in the price of oil and raw materials after the October 1973 war. The sale of arms is now more than ever a major factor in the trade battle between our countries and for economic reasons they more or less close their eyes to the drawbacks and dangers involved in the spread of modern weapons in areas where peace is often uncertain. For some, arms sales may be part of their policy for keeping a check on their customer countries and for others merely a question of winning markets as in the case of any other product.

13. But in the West other reasons encourage an aggressive search for external outlets for the armaments industries, one being that national armies can no longer absorb the full output of armaments producers in their own countries and the other member countries of the Alliance do not always provide an additional market. They therefore look elsewhere for additional markets and any drop in their exports might jeopardise their ability to produce at competitive prices. Their concern to keep their production capacity intact makes them increasingly dependent on their customers.

14. The armies of the West are now faced with the need to take important decisions affecting the future of the armaments industries. They have to take account of the considerable build-up of armaments by the Warsaw Pact forces in recent years. In spite of the redeployment of Soviet forces to the East, facing China, the Warsaw Pact has acquired undisputed superiority over NATO forces in the West (primarily in the central sector) and to an ever increasing extent on the northern and southern flanks, particularly in tanks and aircraft. If only as a deterrent and for their defence policy to be effective, the NATO countries must make a considerable effort to equip themselves with armaments capable of meeting attacks which are backed by tank and air support. In a work published in 1977, *L'Europe sans défense*, a Belgian general was able to contend that, with the armaments then available, NATO forces were incapable by con-

ventional means of preventing a Soviet offensive reaching the Rhine within three days. Presumably there is no question of equalling the number of tanks and aircraft deployed by the eastern countries but of acquiring the means of defence needed to counter them, which implies concentrating research and production on new weapons which will play a major rôle in the armies of tomorrow : precision-guided missiles, enhanced radiation weapons, lasers, etc.

15. This new course would require a considerable increase in sums earmarked for investment in all the western armies. To this end, since 1978, the NATO countries have agreed to increase their defence budgets by 3 % per year in constant value. This is a valid increase but it will not be enough if it not used rationally to have the maximum effect on NATO's defensive strength.

16. Europe therefore has to meet contradictory requirements : on the one hand, it is clear that the world as a whole is expending too great a proportion of its intellectual, economic and financial resources on the production of armaments which, although leading to useful spin-off in many fields, is in itself sterile. A large amount of money, work and grey matter which might be more usefully employed in research, particularly into new sources of energy, food or medicine, is employed in the manufacture of highly-sophisticated instruments which in the best of cases will pile up in silos, hangars and depots until they become obsolescent and are sent to the scrapyard, which, after all, is better than having to use them. But, on the other hand, such waste seems essential to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. No serious attempt can be made to limit it without endangering the credibility of the West's deterrent capability which means being able to meet every threat by the most appropriate means : if it is acknowledged that the first requirement of any rational policy is to ensure the security of the population, no pennypinching in the means of doing so can be considered acceptable.

17. The problem now facing the West is how to cut down waste and ensure maximum security at least cost. This is all the more essential since, at the present difficult juncture in the West, security efforts are often misunderstood and hard to accept in the eyes of the public even though the armaments industries may help to limit the the problems of unemployment now troubling most European countries¹. It must

1. It is extremely difficult to obtain detailed, accurate information on the numbers employed in the armaments industries since many firms producing modern weapons or components for weapons systems also work for the civil sector. This is the case *inter alia* for the aircraft, automobile and electronics industries and even, to a certain extent, naval shipbuilding and explosives. It is with some reservation therefore that the following figures

therefore be shown that such expenditure is neither useless nor excessive, and that it is not a burden on the countries' balance of payments. Thus, any procurement of expensive weapons today is normally offset by purchases made by the selling country in the buying country.

18. At the present juncture, everything indicates that, at least within the Atlantic Alliance, this situation is beneficial mainly to American arms producers who can take advantage of the large market represented by the United States army to offer items on outside markets for which the overheads (including research and the development of prototypes) can be spread over very long production runs, whereas European industries have to cover their overheads in the far smaller numbers ordered by their national armies. Compared with their American competitors they are therefore in a poor position on the markets of their European partners. The situation seems even worse when the compensation aspect is studied. Since smaller numbers of finished products are produced in Europe at higher cost, the number of parts and components purchased in exchange has to be increased accordingly in order to offer equal compensation. The phenomenon of the scale of the economy therefore operates doubly in favour of American producers as compared with their European competitors, which explains their frequent trade successes in Europe itself in recent years. Such successes help to limit still further the outlets available to European producers and extend American outlets and therefore accelerate a process which would quickly relegate European industry to a secondary, sub-contracting rôle to the benefit of its American rivals.

19. Hence, it is not surprising that European countries which are the most capable of supplying the more sophisticated weapons should find themselves forced into options which may sometimes be regretted. The choice they have is :

- (i) to promote sales to non-member countries of NATO, particularly those which, for political reasons, are not prepared to procure American weapons or to which the United States refuses or may refuse to sell certain weapons ; this obstructs the elaboration of a joint policy by NATO member countries on many international questions, including those affecting the Middle East, and might lead to the progressive destruction of the cohesion of the Alliance ;

are quoted for numbers employed in the armaments industries : between 160,000 and 300,000 in France, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom and between 15,000 and 80,000 in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy.

- (ii) to accept co-production agreements with American firms on terms which leave them little say in the latter's decisions ;
- (iii) to resign themselves to producing only a limited number of types of weapons for which they are sure of having a wide-enough market, even if they have to rely on the United States to produce other equipment needed for western defence. This option, like the previous one, can but reduce the capability of European armaments industries and eventually, in view of the steady and fast-moving progress of technology, make Europe incapable of producing many of the weapons it needs for its defence for lack of investment and sooner or later for lack of technological know-how. The last two options would thus mean leaving the United States permanent responsibility for Europe's defence and complete control over it.

20. The Americans seem to have realised these difficulties and for several years have been seeking solutions.

21. One step is for the establishment of a two-way flow of trade in armaments between Europe and the United States. In 1978, it led to the signature of a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and European members of NATO to encourage reciprocal procurement of armaments on the basis of free competition. It is clear that these agreements fall well short of providing a satisfactory solution to the essential problem, i.e. the survival of a European armaments industry, because they do not guarantee that the American armed forces will purchase European equipment but merely seek to allow a free market which in this case favours American manufacturers.

22. Moreover, the two-way street is interpreted differently on either side of the Atlantic : Europe considers that the aim is to achieve a balance of arms procurement and sales between the European and American partners, whereas the United States tends to seek a balance between imports and exports of money spent on the defence of Europe, which includes on the American side of the scales the cost of maintaining American armed forces on the mainland of Europe. In this way, the overall balance would show a deficit for the European partners in the field of armaments proper.

23. However, in the United States itself many now consider that the maintenance of a major armaments industry in Europe contributes to the cohesion of the Alliance as a whole. But although some feel that protecting this branch

of the European market may encourage organised production and markets in Western Europe, others on the contrary consider that Europe will only manage to achieve this if it is forced to do so by the merciless laws of the market.

24. Thus, insofar as the forces of the Atlantic Alliance would have to co-operate closely in the event of war and as such forces must be available to SACEUR in accordance with operational needs, it is essential to achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability in the framework of the Alliance, i.e. it must be materially possible for the holder of a weapon of whatever origin attached to a unit of a country of the Alliance to have access, anywhere in the Alliance's armed forces, to supplies of munitions, spare parts or fuel, or to be able to use its means of communication to contact its partners thanks to unified standards, calibres and specifications. This is an operational necessity apparently recognised by all members of the Alliance but still far from being achieved satisfactorily in national armies.

25. This is not a matter of standardisation which would imply a far greater degree of unification of weapons and equipment in use. Some members of the Alliance, including France, are afraid that this concept, based on practical and operational considerations, may, if applied, mean European armies being fitted out with American equipment since each time decisions had to be taken in this field the weight of the United States plus that of countries procuring American equipment would inevitably be greater than that of European manufacturers. But would the reaction of these countries be less negative towards a European standardisation of armaments, perhaps starting with a limited number of categories of weapons? Such an operation should have the immediate effect of favouring European producers on the European market and in the longer run improve Europe's position in negotiations with the Americans on standardisation extended to cover the whole Alliance. Should it not prove possible to make a serious effort to obtain standardisation among the European members of the Alliance, it may well be wondered whether they have any choice other than to conclude the most advantageous agreements possible for the purchase of American equipment.

26. However this may be and whatever attitude the United States eventually adopts, as matters now stand everything indicates that an effort should be made to organise production among the European members of the Atlantic Alliance. There is now little doubt about this and, in many fields, industrialists are making the effort themselves — in aircraft, naval shipbuilding (mine-sweepers) and missiles for instance. Yet, co-operation between states and military headquarters is still far from adequate, despite a

whole series of attempts made in the last thirty years, most of which have so far produced no decisive result.

27. Although neither the North Atlantic Treaty nor the modified Brussels Treaty defines the elements of a common armaments policy, they have both provided frameworks for trying to work out and organise such a policy.

28. (a) FINABEL was set up in 1953 by the chiefs-of-staff of the French, Italian, Belgian, Netherlands and Luxembourg armies, joined by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956 and the United Kingdom in 1972, with the aim of defining the nature of army equipment requirements, working out specifications jointly, conducting joint tests and holding exchanges of information.

29. (b) The WEU Standing Armaments Committee, set up in 1955 by the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty, was given a first task of promoting agreements on the joint production of armaments by member countries. In addition, in 1976 it was asked to make a study of European armaments industries.

30. (c) When the idea emerged in NATO of forming a European nucleus, which became Eurogroup, the latter set up a sub-group of armaments directors, EURONAD, in which representatives of all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance except France take part.

31. (d) At the end of 1975, the members of Eurogroup formed the independent European programme group, in association with France. This is not an institution any more than Eurogroup and has no secretariat. There is an annual meeting of under-secretaries of state of participating countries, meetings of national armaments directors and of experts. The latter have three tasks :

- (i) to prepare lists of equipment in use in national armed forces, replacement schedules and the equipment that might be used for replacement ;
- (ii) to study co-operation between member countries in a number of specific projects ;
- (iii) to examine procedural and economic problems which have to be solved if co-operation is to be effective, e.g. competition, technology transfer, compensation, trade, industrial co-operation and procedure for developing new weapons systems.

32. (e) Finally, the importance of bi- or multi-lateral programmes carried out by certain member countries should be underlined, particularly in the aircraft and missiles industries. So far, such undertakings have given the best results where production is concerned.

33. With the exception of this last case, it is clear that results achieved are in no way commensurate with the effort made : although FINABEL's aims were modest, this was not so for the SAC, yet its work has come to little, although it may take credit — to a degree difficult to assess — for much of what has been achieved at bi- or multilateral level since the SAC on the one hand has made national authorities come to grips with the problem of European co-operation and on the other it has brought together qualified representatives from the Defence Ministries. Finally, provided there is sufficient good will to facilitate its task much may be expected of the study which it is making of European armaments industries about which today only partial, abridged and inadequate information is available.

34. Eurogroup, for its part, has now lost much of its reason for existence where armaments are concerned since the IEPG has so to speak taken its place, but it is yet too early to review the group's achievements since it was formed so recently. It should be pointed out, however, that some believe it will play a leading rôle in the near future but information available about its effective working fails to confirm this optimism in view of the difficulties it seems to be encountering in tackling economic problems and the small number of specific projects which seem to be taking definite shape.

35. Apart from these efforts at institutional level, it should be added that in this respect the WEU Assembly for its part has constantly played a driving rôle by urging the governments of member countries to promote European co-operation in armaments matters. Numerous reports, symposia organised by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and approaches made by many of its members to their countries' authorities all add up to shape what may be called a true Assembly doctrine, over and above the inevitable differences which emerge from time to time regarding the possible ways and means of such co-operation.

36. On the ultimate goals, it has in fact always been widely agreed that the aim of European armaments co-operation was to maintain and increase Europe's capability in this field so as to strengthen its general economic potential and improve the effects of efforts made by each state for the common defence and to ensure that Europe was more independent of American production so that it might be better able to take upon itself the options which are essential for its defence.

37. The problem of armaments cannot be separated from the more general question of defence policy and the strategies adopted by the

Atlantic Alliance and also from their use as envisaged by national military staffs. An armaments policy is not built on purely technical or industrial bases but is designed to provide the armed forces with the means they need to fulfil their rôle. Yet, it would appear that, apart from limited forces assigned by a few countries for possible distant attack, all the forces of the Western European countries would have to be deployed or in any case exercise their deterrent effect on the same terrain in the event of hostilities. From this point of view, the situation of France, which is outside the NATO integrated command system, is no different from that of the other Western European countries since France has its place in the second line of western forces deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany.

38. There is every reason to think that the requirements of these forces on the same battlefield will be identical and that a weapon which is suitable for one European country will also be suitable for all the others. It would therefore seem logical for all the Western European countries to have the same weapons, and in this case the principle of economy of scale would apply to the full. Indeed, the growing cost of sophisticated weaponry forces each national army to use less of a given item of equipment. For instance, the number of aircraft deployed by most European countries is considerably less than just before the second world war.

39. It has therefore become much more costly to set up production lines and it is also taking much longer to do so. Once lines have been set up, the cost price of each finished item becomes higher as runs become shorter in view of the vast sums needed for what is now known as research and development. The fact that the Western European countries have in the last ten years had to reduce drastically the proportion of their gross national product earmarked for defence makes them wait longer than desirable before replacing obsolete equipment, to the detriment of the efficiency of their forces.

40. It would therefore seem quite logical for these countries to pool their resources, efforts, research and technology for the design, development and production of what might be a uniform item of equipment. It may naturally be considered that the American armed forces deployed in Europe have requirements similar to those of European troops and that there might therefore be co-ordination at Atlantic level. However, American military authorities have to plan the deployment of their forces not at European level but at world level. At one time, many American forces were deployed in Vietnam. The United States is now considering sending troops to the Near or Middle East. They must be prepared for fighting on the shores of the Pacific or of the Atlantic, in polar or tropical regions and in a

very wide range of climate, vegetation, terrain and population.

41. For instance, for the Vietnam war the American army developed a large number of new types of weapon. The American military authorities therefore have to equip their forces with more polyvalent weapons than those needed by the European forces or with a far wider range of weapons. Joint production of armaments by Europeans and Americans is not impossible. Most Western European countries do so on a bilateral basis in a manner corresponding to their respective economic structures, and in 1978 several of them signed agreements with the United States for developing trade in this field. But it cannot be as general or complete as it might be between European countries.

42. The fact is that there is no lack of bodies responsible for co-operation but twenty-five years' work are far from having produced conclusive results.

43. There are various reasons for this slowness or even failure.

(a) Political reasons

44. Possibly some countries, anxious to retain a degree of independence vis-à-vis their allies, are not kindly disposed towards too much standardisation which would make them dependent on foreign suppliers for some of their weapons. However, too much importance should not be accorded to such reasons. Indeed, France, which has steadily proved to be the country with the greatest concern for its independence of decision, is also one of the most zealous in organising joint production of armaments by Europeans in such bodies as the SAC or the IEPG and through bilateral agreements.

(b) Commercial, economic, social and financial reasons

45. In recent years, the European countries with the largest production of the most varied armaments have developed a policy for sales of arms abroad¹. This is the case *inter alia* of

1. Statistics on the arms trade are usually fairly unreliable and do not always tally. According to *Die Welt* of 19th April 1979, in 1976 this trade represented a sum of \$13,300 million. It reported that the principal exporters were :

	\$ million
United States :	5,200
Soviet Union :	3,700
France :	840
Federal Republic of Germany :	636

The principal importers were then Middle East countries :

	\$ million
Iran :	1,400
Israel :	947
Iraq :	765
Libya :	741

France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. They were encouraged in this direction by the increase in the price of oil and a number of raw materials which forced them to increase sales of manufactured products, including armaments, in order to stabilise their balance of payments. This led them to view the armaments they produced no longer merely from the point of view of Europe's defence but also from that of possible markets. Particularly in countries which are not large-scale exporters of armaments, there are growing complaints about sales of armaments which at least part of public opinion considers to be dangerous for international peace, whereas the governments of exporting countries often seem anxious to retain a free hand in this field. This does not facilitate the co-ordination of the production of armaments between European countries, although the difficulty must not be exaggerated since certain jointly-produced armaments, such as the Jaguar training and tactical support aircraft, have found good markets abroad.

46. Conversely, even in Europe there sometimes seems to be the utmost difficulty in finding purchasers for armaments produced in Europe. Preference often goes to armaments produced abroad, particularly in the United States, because of their lower cost or more rewarding industrial compensation, which factors carry considerable weight among purchasing countries. In recent years, this was the case for a number of aircraft deals, particularly in Belgium and the Netherlands.

47. But it must be observed that in the absence of organic co-operation between producers of aeronautical equipment in Western Europe these countries have had to choose between bids not from Europe but from individual European countries and the United States. Decisions were reached in the light of national interests because the bids were national bids. In several of the most important cases, national interests led them to opt for the procurement of American equipment and this will probably always be so as long as their industries are not directly involved in equipment produced by the whole of Europe rather than by a single European country. As long as production conditions remain unchanged, there is every reason to fear that European solidarity will not be enough to allow governments to purchase, perhaps at a higher cost, equipment produced by European industries.

48. This leads to a third aspect of the economic obstacles to the joint production of military equipment by the European countries. Such production would certainly involve a far-reaching restructuring of firms and it is to be feared that this might lead to a drop in the overall level of employment. The crisis prevailing in Europe

since 1973 has made it very sensitive to such consequences. However, it must be borne in mind that in the longer term rationalised production, far from limiting employment possibilities, improves them insofar as it makes European products more competitive on the European and world markets.

(c) Juridical reasons

49. The status of armaments industries differs from one Western European country to another since some parts are nationalised and others are privately-owned. Moreover, whatever their status, states have had to keep tight control to prevent clandestine exports of armaments and to ensure the maintenance of production capacity whatever the economic situation.

50. Progress in European economic integration is now reaching company rights, but those producing armaments have very largely escaped Community intervention, for instance where regulations protecting free competition are concerned. It would therefore seem essential if any progress is to be made towards wider co-operation to attain some degree of uniformity of state control methods and procedure, labour legislation and protective regulations in order to achieve joint production on the basis of inter-firm or inter-state agreements or through the creation of multinational groups for the development of new weapons. One of the aims of the symposium to be held in October might be to determine how such joint production could be organised.

51. Here, mention should be made of the WEU Council's instructions to the Standing Armaments Committee in May 1976 to undertake a far-reaching enquiry for the purpose of studying and analysing the European armaments industries. According to information communicated by the Council, the Standing Armaments Committee has completed the section of its enquiry on the juridical aspects. It is regrettable that the Council did not consider it desirable to transmit to the Assembly more information on the contents of this chapter as it promised in reply to Recommendations 293 and 299. The question is probably not to ask the Council to communicate to the Assembly the full text of a report written for governments since this might incite some of them to be restrictive in supplying the SAC with the information it needs for pursuing its enquiry. However, it would be natural and highly desirable for parliamentarians, who have to give their views in their own countries on the adoption of defence budgets and hence on matters relating to the procurement of armaments, to have as much information as possible about the prospects of European co-operation in this field.

52. In any event, the mandate given to the SAC is clearly defined, since :

- (i) although set in the context of "possible rationalisation on a European scale", it calls for "a descriptive analysis of the situation", thus depriving the SAC of the right to submit any form of recommendation. As such, this is already a considerable and absolutely new task ;
- (ii) the enquiry is limited to a "definition of the armaments sector", the "collection of economic data" and a study of the "legal status of firms and domestic legislation", i.e. it takes no account of other types of obstacle ;
- (iii) the SAC is asked to "take account, in particular, of the tasks undertaken" by the IEPG without specifying how far the SAC's study is to depend on results achieved by the IEPG, particularly in the definition of standards on which to base its definition of the armaments sector.

53. However this may be, it is quite clear that apart from the points raised in the SAC mandate there are other obstacles whose importance should not be overlooked, as implied by the Council in its reply to Recommendation 309 :

"The sole purpose of the study at present being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee is to describe the economic and legal position of armaments industries in member countries. It is not required to include any political assessments or conclusions leading to the regulation of the sale of arms..."

(d) Military reasons

54. It is difficult to assess the rôle military reasons have played, but it would appear to be considerable. This is due to the high degree of independence enjoyed by each country's military authorities. They all have their own traditions, staff, working methods and equipment replacement schedules. Financially they depend on national budgets and must obtain the sums they require from national parliaments or governments. They define their requirements in the light not only of the needs of an overall European defence but also of all these factors and the rôle of these factors in decisions taken must not be underestimated. The only remedy would be to compel military authorities to define their requirements together, to agree on the type and specifications of the equipment they need for the years to come and to set up a body capable of taking decisions in the event of differences and disputes in order to define equipment adapted to the needs of a European army in stages to be determined jointly and in advance.

55. One of the tasks of the independent European programme group is to meet these requirements and its Panel I has the specific task of taking stock of requirements on the basis of NATO defence plans. But the IEPG seems to be progressing only slowly towards the definition of equipment, however valuable its work may be, and there is probably no reason to doubt this even if available information on the matter is very sparse. This is probably due to the fact that armaments experts taking part in its work do not sufficiently commit the military authorities for which many other factors and constraints count very strongly. The logical solution would obviously be to set up a European military headquarters, i.e. a European army. It is hardly possible to consider this at present, so the search if not for a solution at least for an improvement in the present situation should be made through increased consultations between national military authorities.

56. Failing such arrangements, it is to be feared that attempts by government experts to align national definitions in forums such as the SAC, Eurogroup and the IEPG will never achieve anything more than mediocre results.

III. European defence and defence of Europe

57. Now, as thirty years ago, much ambiguity still surrounds the aim pursued by those who speak of Europe. Is it a step towards a wider form of society, western today, world-wide tomorrow, in which the state in its traditional form would be destined to decline? Or, on the contrary, is state power to be strengthened by separating it from over-narrow national societies and adapting it to the needs of this century? Are national entities to be strengthened so as to hold each other up in a confederal system in order to allow them to face the twenty-first century? The first option seems the most rational, the most in conformity with a moral philosophy which refuses to set the state or nation on a pedestal and offers the best prospect for the fulfilment of mankind.

58. But can one act as if the triumph of universal reason was sufficiently certain and anticipate the decline of the state? What would be the worth of a policy which was not based on a strict analysis of the facts and on an assessment of the threats and the means of meeting them? Should the future be planned as if the security of an international system was guaranteed? Consideration of collective security, i.e. each country's defence policy, cannot be dispensed with.

59. In Europe, such a policy no longer has to lean on feelings once thought of so highly. For the people of Europe, war is no longer a means of pursuing a policy; the aim of defence is to ensure the survival of the population by avoiding war. It must therefore be stripped of all the

finery surrounding military things and tackled with the coolness of the chess player.

60. What is to be defended is the possibility for the society in which we live to determine its own present and its own future. Who is threatening it? Those who might be tempted to determine them in its stead either by enclosing it in a system which would progressively stifle its freedom of action or by threatening to use force to make it come to terms. Faced with this twofold threat, all Europeans are in an identical position even if they do not see it in the same way because they have all inherited costly and inefficient institutions from the past: a conscript costs more than a horse guard but is probably no more useful when faced with nuclear missiles.

61. An attempt may be made however to define a few guidelines:

62. (i) The aim of any defence policy in Europe is to deter attack.

63. (ii) The essential element of deterrence is the strategic nuclear weapon.

64. (iii) Europe alone does not have a strong-enough nuclear deterrent. It therefore needs an external deterrent.

65. (iv) The external deterrent is not enough since it is not conceivable that the United States should risk the destruction of its cities for the sake of meeting a limited attack on European territory.

66. (v) It must therefore be completed by a limited deployment of forces designed merely to deter local attacks by demonstrating that Europe can and will stand firm and any escalation would involve the risk of nuclear war. The numbers deployed should not be too great since this would weaken the deterrent by increasing the probability and credibility of limited hostilities. They should be limited enough to show that Europe cannot allow its fate to depend on the outcome of one battle but strong enough to show that it is determined to defend itself.

67. (vi) To play its rôle, this limited deployment must be efficient, i.e. it must have the backing of the most appropriate weapons constantly adapted to the needs of a doctrine which takes account of the possibilities of the latest weaponry. Thus, to offset the enormous superiority of the Warsaw Pact in tanks and aircraft, it is not necessary to have an equivalent number of tanks or aircraft but:

- (a) a defensive doctrine allowing the challenge to be met;
- (b) weapons to back up this doctrine;
- (c) officers and men fully conversant with this doctrine and these weapons.

68. All information currently available on the deployment of NATO forces indicates that for political reasons there is some confusion as to the type of doctrine which would be applied in the event of attack, that all sides are hesitant to use some of the weapons known to be the most effective, that officers are often trained in accordance with out-of-date doctrines and that the troops are far from having mastered the use of modern weapons which which they are moreover not always equipped.

69. However, the cries of alarm raised in certain military circles in recent years have not gone unheeded. It is clear that consideration of the possibilities of rethinking strategy has developed in a particularly remarkable manner. For the first time since the second world war, this has not been a purely American or Soviet phenomenon but has spread to Western Europe where defence research institutes have been increasing in numbers for the past fifteen years and there has been a renaissance, if not of a doctrine, at least of an endeavour to take account of present-day political, military, economic and technical data. A bibliography of reviews and other publications on this research published in recent years would be very long. The symposium organised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly in 1977 illustrated the work of advanced industries in the armaments field. The slight increase in sums earmarked for investment in the defence budgets of most of our countries and the redeployment of some of their forces show a definite will to adapt to new circumstances. Are these efforts enough? For many reasons, it is doubtful.

70. (vii) While the defence of Europe is based on strategic deterrence and tactical deployment, it is evident that at the present juncture strategic weapons are held by a small number of powers and for various reasons this situation will not change for a long time to come. On the contrary, Europe is forced to consider what might be the battlefield in the war of tomorrow so as to exercise the supplementary deterrence needed for the credibility of overall deterrence. This is the field in which the most spectacular progress has been made in recent years both in nuclear and conventional weapons and in the doctrine for their use. Most probably, the development of the strategic arms limitation talks, by blocking strategic armaments, helped to guide research towards what are known as the grey zones.

71. (viii) Europe currently has the means to back up this policy which it has been pursuing successfully for the past thirty years. But it could pursue it more cheaply and effectively if it managed to transform the *de facto* solidarity of European firms into a common defence undertaking. It is prevented from doing so by the heavy burden of national pasts: what with the

fears of smaller countries, which prefer the hegemony of far-away America to that of a powerful neighbour, speculations about the prestige conferred on larger countries by their relative force, nostalgia for past glories and established positions in military headquarters, everything opposes a cool analysis of aims and means.

72. This does not mean that there is no basis for co-operation between Europeans in defence matters because, in 1954, the modified Brussels Treaty instituted WEU. The task of the WEU Council was to promote continuing consultation between governments, necessary if the essential provision of the treaty was to work properly: the automatic assistance clause in Article V. But very soon — in some instances from the outset — WEU relied on other bodies to exercise a number of its responsibilities: NATO for defence matters, the Council of Europe for cultural and social affairs and the EEC, once Britain became a member, for economic affairs. Its rôle has therefore been confined to ensuring that these responsibilities were really exercised by the organisations to which they had been entrusted, account being taken of the fact that WEU does not have the same membership as the European Community nor the same way of working since it has no supranational elements nor the same powers. It does not form part of the European Community except insofar as the treaties of alliance provide an essential basis for any common European policy in any field whatsoever.

73. The weakness of the European pillar of the Alliance is an element of imbalance in the Alliance and of division between Europeans. Attempts to remedy this, such as the Harmel plan, have had only partial results. For the defence of Europe, American and European views do not necessarily concord. The first aim of any American government is the survival of the United States and its inhabitants. This may result in a strategy rather different from what Europeans would like, involving a more ready acceptance of the possibility of a limited war whereas for Europe any war, even limited, would be catastrophic. Again, Europeans know that there is every chance that their territory will become a battlefield in the event of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore they wish NATO to pursue an offensive strategy — which does not mean an aggressive defence policy — to avoid fighting on their territory. Conversely, the United States can accept a strategy which tolerates more flexibility in the use of space to allow more effective use of its armed forces.

74. Naturally, for many years, the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Defence Planning Committee have been used for discussions between allies on these strategic concepts. The

Europeans have obtained considerable advantages there such as the adoption of the forward strategy. But they may still wonder how far the means at the disposal of NATO in face of the massive deployment of forces in Eastern Europe are in a position to guarantee the application of the principles on which the allies have agreed. In point of fact, they can hardly complain because their contribution to the common defence effort, in spite of increases in 1978, is still less than that of their American allies and *a fortiori* than that of the Soviet Union or the Eastern European countries.

75. The search for détente and above all the limitation of nuclear weapons also brings out different points of view among Europeans and Americans.

76. (i) There are differences over the nature of the balance which must be organised and maintained. Whereas the first preoccupation of the United States is the maintenance of an overall balance between the strategic nuclear weapons of the two great powers, Europeans are primarily anxious that NATO should continue to wield the means necessary for local deterrence in Europe. The development of new weapons in recent years and decisions taken by the United States Government to limit their development — for instance, in the case of the neutron bomb — raise problems for the Alliance which yet seem far from solution.

77. (ii) In another respect, the Soviet Union seems keen on having the third round of SALT include western nuclear armaments as a whole, including those of France and the United Kingdom, in the overall calculation of the strategic nuclear potential of the western partners. For the moment, France and the United Kingdom seem reluctant to have their military arrangements included in negotiations between the two great powers, even if they were to be more closely consulted by the United States in the course of such negotiations.

78. (iii) Finally, in the case of détente proper, there have sometimes been sharp differences between American views and those of certain European countries about the nature of the provisions of the Helsinki final act. Europeans have tended to lay greater stress on the provisions which concern non-intervention in the internal affairs of states whereas the United States has laid particular emphasis on those relating to respect of human rights.

79. Admittedly, there is nothing fundamental in these differences and they in no way call in question the principles on which the Alliance is based. Nevertheless, the very different weight carried by the European states on the one hand and the United States on the other within the Atlantic system and throughout the world makes

it very difficult for consultations between allies on problems relating to the general course of the Alliance to operate smoothly.

80. These various considerations indicate that the defence field is the one where the greatest differences still exist between members of the European Community. It was not by chance that the EDC failed but for deep-rooted reasons whose effects are still felt today : France's recent request to its partners to change the responsibilities of Euratom to make Community activities compatible with the development of its own nuclear force is further proof. As long as this situation prevails, it would be dangerous for the future of the European union to link defence policy too closely with the Community institutions. First, certain countries would very probably object from the outset. Subsequently, if a few immediate results were achieved, they might be called in question shortly afterwards and, what is more serious, result in the overall Community achievements being challenged.

81. This does not mean that Europe should neglect joint and detailed examination of its defence, it is merely that one should not rush into linking this examination too closely with the institutions of the European Community. This observation is not unrelated to a study of the prospects of European co-operation in armaments matters.

IV. Organisation of Europe and defence problems

82. The question obviously arises as to what extent a European armaments policy can or should be the business of the European Community. It would be undeniably logical for the European Community, which is responsible for co-ordinating the whole of Europe's economic policy, to take the place of states for armaments production and trade as it has done for the coal and steel industries, nuclear energy and agriculture. This point is strongly emphasised in the report on European armaments procurement co-operation submitted to the European Parliament by Mr. Egon Klepsch, Rapporteur of the Political Committee, on 8th May 1978 (Document 83/78). In adopting this report, the European Parliament called on the Commission "to submit to the Council in the near future a European action programme for the development and production of conventional armaments within the framework of the common industrial policy".

83. However, if suggestions are to be made only if there is a possibility of applying them, the fact must be faced that the armaments industry has a number of special characteristics and, however necessary it may be, here European co-operation runs up against difficulties which

have been described in the previous chapter. It is already evident that the Commission is hardly equipped to respond to the invitation of the European Parliament and there is every reason to think that the Council of the Community would not, at the present juncture, wish to take over such a programme, on the one hand because the Community now includes one country, Ireland, which would not agree to take part in a joint defence policy and on the other because France has so far refused to discuss in the Community framework any matter relating to defence. It already showed its radical opposition to the procedure envisaged by Mr. Klepsch when the latter submitted his report to the IEPG. Answering a written question put by a member of parliament on the subject, Mr. Barre, French Prime Minister, said on 18th December 1978 :

"... The Chairman of the IEPG reported on this visit at the meeting of the group held in Rome on 3rd October at the level of national armaments directors... at the express request of the French Delegation the group did not take note of Mr. Klepsch's report but only of the statement by the Chairman."

Answering a question by another member of parliament on 14th December 1978, Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said :

"... the European Economic Community can neither have nor acquire responsibilities in respect of defence policy. Armaments policies, which naturally form an essential part of defence policy, are also a matter for member states. As far as the government knows, the Commission has not contradicted this interpretation although certain of its members noted that the EEC might, by taking industrial and customs policy measures, assist in the elaboration of a European armaments policy. The government has already had an opportunity of specifying in reply to other questions on the same subject that it is determined to oppose any attempt by the Community institutions to take action in a matter which is outside the field of application of the treaties. It notes that no proposal of this kind has been made."

84. As pointed out by your Rapporteur, European armaments policy is not solely an emanation of industrial policy and although he is convinced that it must take its place in the future European union this does not necessarily imply that the Community must take it over in the immediate future. So far, European governments have organised co-operation in this field outside the Community framework and these efforts must neither be slowed down nor *a fortiori* broken off because of an institutional difference. On the

contrary, an examination must be made to see how they can be increased and made more effective at the present juncture.

85. It is quite evident that the nine-power political consultations bringing together the members of the European Community form the framework in which this common external policy essential for the effective development of joint production of armaments can be worked out. However, in these consultations, the Nine have not yet tackled matters relating directly to the defence of Europe either because some of them do not wish to consider such matters outside NATO or because others do not want to become too closely linked with NATO through the intermediary of these consultations.

86. Conversely, the North Atlantic Council holds many consultations on such matters, but NATO covers only a clearly-defined area whereas crises and tensions are on the increase outside this area. Most European countries have interests in or links with other parts of the world, but they vary considerably from one country to another. On the other hand, the United States now has world-wide interests and responsibilities which means that through its action anywhere in the world it commits allies who pay only a fairly remote rôle in formulating decisions which nevertheless concern them.

87. The reactions of the European public to the Vietnam war are a demonstration of this weakness. But one may wonder whether more recent crises in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East may not further upset at least a part of European public opinion.

88. Such difficulties have apparently already affected the process of consultation in NATO. Atlantic News No. 1101 of 23rd February 1979 analyses the progress of consultations as follows :

"It is on questions outside the NATO region that allied cohesion disperses, and — which is more serious — there is resistance by certain nations to any attempt to formulate even an agreed NATO analysis of such problems, much less an agreed NATO position or policy for action by the West. Any member nation is of course free to raise any subject for discussion that it wants to, but that is as far as the matter can go. Other nations can — and do — state that they will only listen to the discussion, that they will make no contribution to it, and that they will, in effect, veto any effort to formulate any Alliance analysis or solution regarding it. Certain nations do this consistently. Others do it variably, according to what 'extra-NATO' problem is raised.

This in turn has led to discussions in Alliance circles as to whether or not the traditional NATO policy of acting only on consensus (that is, unanimity) of all members is still relevant to the new challenges coming at the West from regions outside the NATO area.

Dr. Henry Kissinger articulated the problem precisely in an interview published in the International Herald Tribune last December. He said, 'We and our allies must have a capacity for regional defence inside and outside the NATO area. If we do not develop this, then in the eighties we are going to pay a very serious price. The first instalments are already visible.'

89. The attempt to hold consultations on a more restricted basis as at the summit meeting in Guadeloupe in January 1979 does not seem to have produced conclusive results. Reports available indicate that there was no prior consultation either in the framework of NATO or among the Nine, which is all the more regrettable in that many European members of the Alliance, not to mention Canada, were not represented. The concept of a directorate of the larger powers replacing a faltering Europe cannot be a solution to the questions raised by co-operation between the United States and its European partners.

90. The greatest uncertainty therefore hovers over the way a European foreign policy can be worked out from the moment it is a question of defence. Consequently, Europeans often find they are unable to assert their views on questions discussed in the framework of NATO because there is no European policy on such matters : concepts which are to become those of the Atlantic Alliance are prepared in Washington and the European policy of the United States Government is then to induce its European partners, one by one, to endorse its views, not because it wishes to stifle a European voice — it has often urged Europeans to organise themselves — but because, in the absence of a clear response from Europe, it can hardly do otherwise.

91. Moreover, on questions relating to common security but not the responsibility of NATO, the absence of consultation sorely paralyzes Europe or, even worse, sets Europeans against each other on matters over which they do not, *a priori*, fundamentally disagree. This was evident in 1977 during the disturbances in Zaïre. Both France and Belgium sent limited forces to carry out missions in Kolwesi. But the two missions were based on different concepts and appeared to compete with each other whereas everything called for joint action by the Western European countries to ensure the repatriation of Europeans and help to restore peace in the area. The consequences of conducting two operations

might have been most serious and Europe should do its utmost to avoid any recurrence.

92. It is precisely for matters which do not concern NATO, because they are not related to the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, or the Nine, because they relate to security, that the WEU Council is, under the modified Brussels Treaty, obliged to meet and consider measures to be taken under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty :

“At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.”

93. In none of the other treaties now associating the Western European countries are there any equivalent undertakings and although it is quite right for the WEU Council to rely on wider organisations to exercise those of its responsibilities which they can exercise, it is still committed to intervene directly when the problems arising are not within the purview of these bodies. The Assembly has asked it to act on many occasions, particularly when it adopted the recommendation in the report presented by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in November 1975 (Document 680). This was also the sense of the address by Mr. Michel Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 21st November 1973. As long as no other European organisation has effective responsibilities in these matters, the proposals he made on that occasion and which were endorsed by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Federal German Minister of State, at the Assembly's last session, retain their full importance. The French Minister said :

“For an undertaking in the interests of security such as I have attempted to outline, with détente allied to defence, Western Europe Union has its part to play and is not without importance.

I do not forget that the treaty setting up WEU created an alliance among seven European countries. If all its members were in agreement, WEU could constitute a valid theatre for the thinking and talks which I have just suggested. These, today, are more necessary than ever, for Europe must now concern itself with a future which may not be very distant. It must, in any case, concern itself with strategic developments themselves, which have called into question so many programmes that we go on pursuing more through wishful thinking than from conviction.

... Why, for example, should the horizon of our thinking, and indeed of the organisation generally, not be widened, both in detail and as a whole, so as to take on a real European dimension ?”

94. Possibly members of the European Parliament may wish to use the new authority deriving from their election by direct universal suffrage to have the Community authorities intrude in armaments, if not defence, matters. There seems little chance of their succeeding, but should they do so, it is to be feared that the governments may take advantage of the fact that the European Community binds them to no formal commitment in this field to evade sooner or later any form of control or co-ordination which they do not consider to be in their immediate interests.

95. Compared to this, under the modified Brussels Treaty the seven signatories accepted specific commitments in defence and armaments policy. Signatories are bound by Article IX, under which the WEU Assembly's responsibility covers the application of the whole treaty, which means, as the Council has often recalled, that it is the only European parliamentary assembly with responsibilities in defence matters. It receives a report from the Council and is therefore entitled to be kept informed of the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee which depends on the WEU Council.

96. But while it is true that the Council's responsibilities may be exercised by other organisations such as the Council of Europe, the European Community for economic matters and NATO for defence questions on which it reports to the Assembly, this should also be true of the IEPG whose prerogatives come within the Council's responsibilities. It is therefore perfectly logical and in conformity with the modified Brussels Treaty for the WEU Council to report to the Assembly on the work of the IEPG.

97. In 1978, the Council assumed quite a clear commitment in this sense when, in answer to Recommendation 319, it affirmed that :

“... the duty which belongs to the Council alone of informing the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty forms a major aspect of their political activities.

The Council therefore intend to meet the Assembly's request for fuller information on consultations between member countries on matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty...”

98. Answering Written Question 191, the Council, in the enigmatic style of which it is so fond, stated that :

“With regard to the joint production of armaments, the Assembly was informed

that the Council had begun a study which resulted in the mandate adopted in April 1977, calling on the Standing Armaments Committee to undertake the study now in progress of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries.

.....

With due regard for the confidential nature of their deliberations, the Council will continue to inform the Assembly in the appropriate manner of any questions raised by the member governments in this context."

99. It may however be wondered whether the seven WEU governments would be prepared for the IEPG to report directly to the Assembly. If not, consideration should be given to what their true objective was when they sought to develop European armaments co-operation in the framework of new organisations which had no ties with international institutions or treaties. The sparse results achieved in these unofficial bodies do not even allow them to quote efficiency as a reason. Is it not just a question of avoiding parliamentary control because the seven governments are unable to agree on the type of information they may communicate to a parliamentary assembly since their consultations on such matters are still in a state of gestation ?

100. However this may be, WEU is still the only European assembly with defence responsibilities and the only truly European institution with the task of keeping watch on the application of a treaty of alliance between European countries, and one day or another it would be desirable for this treaty to be merged with those establishing the European Community so that defence matters may take their place in the future European union. The fact that WEU has not yet carried out fully the task entrusted to it by the signatories of the 1954 agreements does not mean, as is sometimes implied, that it has a contagious disease. It is the governments that, for various reasons, overt or covert, have not wished to make the most of the instrument they gave themselves. There is no reason to think that they would agree to do something outside this framework which they do not wish to do inside it.

101. In any event, Europe must be allowed a future in defence matters by keeping intact the treaty itself and the bodies responsible for applying it. To claim to consider the treaty as negligible compared with the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU Council as pointless compared with nine-power political consultations would *a priori* deprive Europe of the only grip it now has on defence matters and consequently jeopardise the future European union. It is not by neglecting or

destroying what already exists that the future of Europe will be prepared, but, on the contrary, by developing it and making the most of what the treaties as they now exist offer for organised co-operation.

V. Conclusions

102. Behind this at first sight rather limited problem of co-ordinating the armaments production and co-operation of European industries is the far wider problem of what kind of Europe it is possible and desirable to build today, since these matters involve the national responsibilities to which states are the most attached. Today, everything indicates that the store set by some in the building of a federal Europe cannot come to fruition immediately and at best the Europe of tomorrow will still be confederal. Defence and armaments are still the most serious obstacle in the way of European union.

103. But whatever its framework, Europe will have to meet the requirements of its population, particularly in terms of employment, the economy, the standard of living, protecting the environment and energy. But it must be given the means to do this. European co-operation must not be just a question of dividing the burden of a world crisis on the various national economies but a means of overcoming the effects of this crisis by improving the organisation of production and a better division of employment and consumption. It is clear that the armaments industry has its place in such a Europe even if it must remain outside the responsibilities of the European Community for some time to come.

104. Europe will also have to rise to the aspirations of the younger generations who, in the over-narrow confines of the national states which are a legacy of the last century, no longer find room for developing their initiative and hopes. They are showing growing concern about the limited prospects available.

105. It is not in the type of international co-operation in which Europe's industrial rôle would be reduced to one of subcontractor of greater or lesser importance that Europe would be able to provide work for its research workers or technicians for very long. It must retain all its creative possibilities if it is to stop a brain drain that has threatened its future for a long time already. Just as it will have to come to grips with all the problems relating to energy production, it will have, if it wishes to keep control of its future, to assume responsibility for everything relating to its armaments and, more generally, its security, even if this has to be in the framework of an alliance and in close co-operation with the United States.

106. Your Rapporteur did not wish to go further into this subject as he knew it was to be considered in greater depth by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, on a report by Mr. Valleix. He will therefore merely emphasise that, apart from its military and economic aspects, the joint production of armaments brings into play a whole series of political factors which he has sought to describe in this report, the main one being the independence of the Europe of tomorrow, i.e. its ability to retain responsibility — in the framework of the alliance with the United States, admittedly — for matters relating to its own defence and its rôle in the world.

107. Your Rapporteur has attempted to list the obstacles which have stood in the way so far: practically all of them are tantamount not to a refusal, but to an absence of political will which has allowed too great a rôle to be played by the protectionist reflexes of nationalised or private firms and the states themselves or even of administrative departments which are in principle under the political authority of the state but are often skilful in asserting special or limited interests. In the case of armaments, this is often so for military authorities. But insofar as the production of armaments involves many industrial firms it should be noted that in many cases the latter do nothing to help to form the groups, mergers or consortia necessary for joint production. From this point of view, nationalised firms seem no more flexible or co-operative than private firms and may sometimes be suspected, on the contrary, of benefiting from their situation by confusing their own short-term interests with those of the public. This means that a political

will clearly expressed by the state authorities might, in most cases, overcome these obstacles. But such a firm will is only too rarely apparent.

108. Undeniably, progress in the study by the SAC in the framework of WEU will be a criterion of the governments' will. How much assistance, documentation and information will they provide for this study which they themselves commissioned? Information obtained so far points to very little. And then, once the study has been completed, if it is not lost in the sands of time, which is still to be feared, what use will the governments make of it? If they file it in their archives without trying to work out an effective policy for armaments co-operation on the basis of its results, this will mean that the step taken in May 1976 will, at best, have been only a passing impulse with no future, or perhaps too an operation designed to deceive public opinion and let it be thought that there was a desire to succeed which was, in fact, inexistent. On the basis of its conclusions from the study, the Council should draw up directives to be addressed to all responsible authorities, both civil and military, national and international, so that it may be considered that it is applying the modified Brussels Treaty in armaments matters.

109. European armaments co-operation cannot therefore be considered as a purely military matter, nor purely industrial. It is both, but it is above all political, and the future of a Europe which can exist only if it proves itself adult and responsible, even in areas where it would be easier to keep silent, largely depends on the efforts and sacrifices which will effectively be made by all concerned to allow progress to be achieved.

Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Cook and others

1. At the end of the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add :
“whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production limit the investment available for civil production ;”.

Signed : Cook, Urwin, Miller, Konings, Stoffelen, Schwencke, Roper, von Bothmer

1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Political conditions for European armaments co-operation

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Roper and Mr. Valleix

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "directives" and insert "guidance".

Signed: Roper, Valleix

1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman); MM. Abens (Alternate: *Hengel*), Ariosto, *Beith*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds, *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank

(Alternate: *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), Mende (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg (Alternate: *Schlingemann*), *Müller*, *Péridier*, Perin, *Portheine*, *Reddemann*, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation**on various aspects of co-operation between
Europe and the United States**

The Assembly,

Welcoming the desire shown by the United States Government to pursue and develop its co-operation with Europe in every field ;

Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development of a European union as a favourable factor in such co-operation ;

Considering that, in an unfavourable economic situation, recourse to protectionism would be a serious danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has set itself the aim of progressively freeing international trade ;

Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the balance necessary for developing trade ;

Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consultations between European members and the United States on external policy matters ;

Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages to define a joint foreign policy itself ;

Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of strategic arms limitation talks calls for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and participation by Europe in the SALT III negotiations ;

Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a two-way street for trade in armaments but concerned lest such a trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, in the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by all the member countries of WEU in accordance with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ;
2. Study in particular the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment of new weapons ;
3. At regular intervals, make a critical appraisal of the strategic concepts adopted by NATO ;
4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered by bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and several European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Close co-operation with the United States was not Europe's choice, it was an unescapable necessity. The rôle played by the United States in the world is such that the currencies of the whole world are defined in relation to the dollar, raw materials prices are fixed on American markets and United States arms directly or indirectly ensure the security of a large part of the world, whereas Europe, united or not, no longer has the means for an external or defence policy capable of meeting the Soviet challenge, whether in Europe or *a fortiori* in the rest of the world. Alone, it cannot contemplate ensuring its defence in face of the tremendous nuclear and conventional arsenal deployed by the Soviet Union. To ensure and organise close co-operation with the United States is therefore essential for the foreign policy of each of the Western European countries and the concern for greater independence sometimes shown by some of them has never led them to deny the need for such co-operation, although they may have loosened or sought to limit certain aspects.

2. On the American side, co-operation with Western Europe also seems necessary insofar as the United States alone cannot shoulder all the responsibilities stemming from its vocation as a world power. Europe's economic, and above all commercial, power is essential for the maintenance of an international economic order from which the United States is the first to benefit. Relations between Europe and a large number of countries on other continents, particularly in Africa, are an important factor of cohesion in international society and the return of the United States to an isolationist policy reminiscent of the situation immediately after the first world war now seems unthinkable. Hence the United States can no longer view its own security as being independent of that of Western Europe and if it maintains large conventional and nuclear forces in Europe it is not just to fulfil an undertaking entered into almost thirty years ago, it is because it is now essential.

3. However, co-operation between Europe and the United States raises a problem insofar as the Western European countries are steadfastly moving towards particularly close co-operation among themselves with the aim of setting up a European union whose shape and institutions are still uncertain. In every field therefore the question arises as to whether priority should be given to intra-European co-operation, i.e. the building of Europe, or to co-operation between Europe and the United States. To

pursue these two aims simultaneously is certainly necessary but, in practice, it is often very difficult to avoid having to choose between policies leading in one or other of two directions. In this report, consideration will be given to what form of co-operation with the United States would not affect the search for a European union for which the Americans continue to voice their strong support.

4. In fact, it is not the deliberate wish of the United States that transatlantic co-operation should clash with European union. During its visit to the United States from 19th to 23rd March 1979, the Committee saw that the present government is just as intent as its predecessors, if not more so, on asserting its twofold desire to co-operate closely with Europe and to encourage the development of the European union. On this point, the Committee heard no dissonant voice. But co-operation with a Europe anxious to continue the process of unification encounters a number of obstacles based not on opposition on principles but on practice dominated by facts, many of which are beyond the free choice of either side.

5. One obstacle is the way the democratic system works in the United States. American society as a whole is not well informed about matters outside the American continent and, like any society — but perhaps to a greater degree because of the size and mass of American territory — it views world problems only through the screen of national politics. It is therefore inevitable that those governing the United States, and to an even greater extent American parliamentarians, should be extremely sensitive to the reactions of the electorate which sees the world's realities through the prism of its own affairs. President Carter's difficulties in imposing a real energy policy on American society is further proof, if proof were needed, of this difficulty facing the world's greatest power in pursuing a policy which conforms to its world vocation.

6. Moreover, the United States Government itself, although quite sincere in declaring that co-operation with Europe is one of its foremost concerns, also has to meet other requirements which, perforce, at times take priority over everything else.

7. First is the security of the United States and its territory. Admittedly, the Americans are probably almost unanimous in considering that United States security depends on that of Europe but they may not have the same view of two different aspects of American security.

For instance, the idea of a conventional, or even a nuclear war if limited to the use of theatre weapons on the mainland of Europe, is not unthinkable for the American authorities. Your Rapporteur was able to note that on many occasions the Americans whom the Committee met asserted, either deliberately or as a slip of the tongue, that the aim of American policy was to avoid any nuclear war. Many Europeans would refrain from making such statements because they consider that even a conventional war on the territory of Europe would be as fearsome as nuclear war and consequently NATO's policy of deterrence should seek to avoid all forms of war and not just nuclear war.

8. Second, the United States is very interested in reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, particularly on all matters relating to strategic weapons. The very aim of agreement is to eliminate the risk of nuclear war as far as possible, and, secondarily, to develop peaceful coexistence between the two great powers. But such agreement has to be based on negotiations in which Europeans can take no part although the matters discussed are of direct concern to them such as those relating to the level of forces and weapons not only in Europe itself but throughout the world.

9. Third, the range of resources available to the United States has induced it, on a number of economic matters of world importance, to adopt positions determined by somewhat different requirements from those of Europe. For instance, a restriction on international trade would harm Europe far more than the United States in view of the relative importance of its trade. But an increase in raw material prices and particularly in oil prices may make the United States increase its own production even if the cost price of American oil is relatively high, whereas Europe with hardly any resources to develop will have to bear the cost of any price increases.

10. Finally, events anywhere in the world may make the Americans turn their foreign policy in a particular direction without European concerns having any influence on their action or assessment of the situation. For instance, where American policy towards the Middle East is concerned, members of the General Affairs Committee were able to see that there were wide differences in the various assessments of United States action.

11. Moreover, while American policy is in principle in favour of the establishment of a European union it has to take Europe as it is, i.e. as a group of countries in which most political and even economic decisions are still taken at the level of national states. It cannot therefore be blamed for increasing bilateral steps for developing its trade with each individual

European country or some of them. Moreover, the Americans are not the losers since their partners, being weaker and less competitive, are not so well placed for negotiations. But one may wonder how far the development of these partial or bilateral relations with Europe is not contrary to the establishment of a European union.

12. Two recent examples illustrate this alternative. One concerns the arms trade. In 1978 the Americans increased their bilateral agreements with the European member countries of NATO with a view to activating trade in arms. But whatever reservations may have been written into these agreements in favour of European co-operation it is not evident that increased trade really helps Europe's attempts to rationalise production and co-operate more closely in this field.

13. The other example concerns general policy: the summit meeting in Guadeloupe in February 1979. Anxious to consult European partners, President Carter met President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister. These three statesmen represented their own countries and not Europe as such. Nor could there be any claim to do so since, according to the press, intra-European consultations before and after the Guadeloupe meeting were particularly unsatisfactory. Such meetings at which the European Community as such is not represented but at which heads of state or of government of certain countries constitute privileged partners for the United States President obviously make little contribution to agreement between Europeans nor to the development of European unity. It is quite understandable that the United States finds it more convenient to limit such summit talks to a few powers and that these should be the larger European countries, but the United States cannot be unaware that by so doing it gives its partners a privileged position which others find hard to accept.

14. In fact, it is not the United States but the Europeans who, with their slow stumbling progress towards unity, bear main responsibility for the hesitations shown by the United States in seeking Europe's point of view: it is faced by a scattering of states which are often incapable of consulting each other.

15. For all these reasons, Europe is divided over two options which have been facing it for many years: one is the priority to be given to co-operation with the United States as compared with the establishment of a European union. Naturally, all Europeans believe that both aims should be pursued but, depending on circumstances, the aspect and the time, they give priority to one or the other and so far they have never managed to co-ordinate the two aims.

The second point at issue between Europeans is the growing suspicion among some of them about the very building of Europe because, hidden behind bilateral relations between some of their partners and the United States, they believe they can discern a means used by the United States to dominate Europe or by certain Western European countries to rely on American power to strengthen their positions in Europe itself. In short, although the need for co-operation between Europe and the United States is not challenged, the ways and means are.

16. In this report, your Rapporteur does not intend to propose an overall solution. He considers it as pointless to wish to postpone co-operation with the United States until the day European union exists as to jeopardise this union by developing bilateral co-operation which takes no account of Europe's decision to move towards union. Starting from problems effectively arising today, he wishes to study how co-operation between Europe and the United States can be pursued and organised parallel with real and tangible progress towards European union.

II. Economic co-operation

A. Monetary questions

17. Until the first world war, gold was the monetary standard for all countries engaged in international trade and each currency was convertible into gold. After the first world war and the accompanying inflation it became impossible to restore natural, stable parities between national currencies and gold. All were defined in relation to gold at rates which were nominal because they were not convertible. However, the dollar was less affected by inflation than European currencies and it became the most widely-used unit of account in international trade. The European countries consequently assimilated their dollar reserves to gold reserves and this had a very strong inflationary effect since the dollars accumulated by the central banks were generally reinvested in the United States. As a result, money spent by Americans was not withdrawn from circulation in the United States.

18. This trend was accentuated during and after the second world war, and the Bretton Woods agreements set up an international monetary system based on a fictitious parity between the dollar and gold at a level of \$35 per ounce of gold. For better or for worse, this system lasted more than twenty years with resulting inflation which steadily increased the gap between the reality of the money in circulation and the fiction of the exchange rate, to the point that in the wake of several European

countries the United States had to accept a floating rate for the dollar, i.e. no reference to a monetary standard. As for all European currencies, the value of the dollar now depends solely on public confidence in the United States economy and hence in the management of the United States Government. As a result, there have been extremely wide and sudden fluctuations in the exchange rates of the various western currencies between each other. This phenomenon has become more marked since October 1973 due to the spiralling cost of oil and the start of a deep-rooted economic recession.

19. In March 1978, a number of member countries of the European Community set up a European monetary fund designed to keep parities between their currencies at a steady level. It is yet too early to say whether these countries will manage to keep this European monetary system going since this would mean equal self-control in the management of their economies. In the United States, the creation of the European monetary fund was initially thought to be directed against the supremacy of the dollar. But in March 1979 the American authorities concerned were able to assure the General Affairs Committee that this was no longer the case and that on the contrary they considered the attempt to be a positive effort to solve the international monetary crisis. In fact, the relationship between the dollar and the ECU may develop in an atmosphere of rivalry which will mean that everything which is beneficial to one will be to the detriment of the other and vice versa.

20. In the medium term, at least, the results of the United States economy in 1978, with a progression of 3.9 % in constant terms in the GNP and a drop in the unemployment rate from 8 % to 5.7 %, might herald a reversal of this trend if in 1979 the Americans manage to redress the two weak points of their economy, i.e. the rate of inflation (7.5 %) and the trade balance, whose deficit (\$16,000 million) beat all records in 1978. Although the deficit in the trade balance appeared to be dropping at the beginning of 1979, the rate of inflation has on the contrary risen¹. But in the longer term, such rivalry would be particularly disastrous as it would do absolutely nothing to solve the world monetary problem. If by creating the European monetary fund the participating countries are trying to become a true European partner capable of negotiating with the Americans on an equal footing to re-establish an international monetary system, the fund will play a highly

1. These figures were given to the Committee by the United States Department of the Treasury. They are definitely more optimistic than those published in the press at the same time (inflation rate : 11.3 % ; deficit in the trade balance in 1978 : \$28,000 million).

positive rôle. If on the contrary the fund helps to boost speculation it will then be a destabilising factor and may lead the West into a most serious monetary catastrophe.

21. Machinery exists for consultation between central banks and bodies responsible for the financial policy of the western states. The IMF in particular should play such a rôle. But this can be done only if there is a true will on all sides to eliminate monetary anarchy and revert to a world monetary system. But although the European countries which have decided to take part in the new monetary fund seem determined to fight inflation vigorously, it may be wondered whether, despite the recovery plan adopted in October 1978, the United States Administration is aware of the problem. Will it be strong enough to resist pressure to allow the United States to base its economic recovery — which has been taking shape for the past three years — on inflation? If this were to happen the worst fears would be confirmed for the monetary, commercial and economic future of the whole western world, and consultations in the IMF would not change much.

B. Trade

22. In Europe, external trade comes within the terms of reference of the Community so your Rapporteur will not dwell on the matter. However, he wishes to recall a few points directly governing relations between Europe and the United States because, since the Tokyo round negotiations are coming to an end, 1979 may be strongly marked by the debates on the ratification of these agreements in all the signatory countries, including the United States Congress. While there is a tendency in Europe to accuse the United States of pursuing a non-tariff policy aimed at restricting United States imports of products manufactured in Europe, the Americans make similar complaints about the Common Market, particularly for agricultural produce.

23. It may be thought that each side embarked on the Tokyo round negotiations with the intention of removing the other's obstacles but on both sides of the Atlantic the economic recession brought added pressure. Both sides must therefore be equally aware of the need to make the sacrifices necessary to avoid having to resort to protectionism to meet difficulties in national economies.

24. However, the United States' purported good will towards the European Community and the unification of Europe must be demonstrated in the trade field by recognising that unity is the vocation of Community Europe, i.e. that the reciprocal trade advantages which the member countries of the Community offer each other,

particularly preferences stemming from the common agricultural policy and hence the Rome Treaty, are based not on protectionism but on a political will to achieve unity. To be logical with the policy it says it is pursuing, the United States Government should consider Community Europe as an economic whole and not as an organisation of independent states, and it must not claim to be a victim of discrimination when Europeans treat intra-Community trade as a domestic market. Otherwise, serious misunderstandings may subsist in trade negotiations between Europe and the United States.

25. Nevertheless, Europe for its part must see the customs union on which it based its economic unity as a step towards more open markets. It is the weakness of the organisation of Europe, apart from the customs aspect, that has led Europeans to attach too much importance to the customs protection on which European unity has been based and which has made the EEC a divisive factor in the international market.

C. Energy

26. Since October 1973, the United States like the Western European countries has come up against the problem of the shortage of energy resources. In fact, the October 1973 crisis merely highlighted an extremely serious problem caused by the unbridled rise in the consumption of energy, particularly oil, by all the industrialised countries. This phenomenon was even more pronounced in the United States than in Europe.

27. Even if specific political reasons had not sparked off the sudden increase in prices at the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, the shortage would probably have caused a similar increase in prices a few months later. But because the crisis surfaced through events in the Middle East a political solution appeared possible. The world took time to realise that this was not so and that the West could not for ever increase its expenditure on energy in such a wasteful manner. It is now clear that the era of cheap energy has come to an end and consequently it is urgent for industrialised countries to redirect their economies along lines which, to be effective, must be concerted.

28. (i) It is essential for all the western countries to limit their energy consumption, particularly in cases where it does not serve productive purposes. Everywhere the waste of light, heat and mileage helps to burden the balance of payments of industrialised countries and heightens the threat of an energy shortage. In early 1979, the United States Government launched an active propaganda campaign to reduce wastage which is a greater problem in the United States than in Europe, where there is

perhaps less wastage but the problem is a real one and governments have so far done little to encourage the population to reduce consumption. In any event, the American authorities made no secret of the fact that the campaign has had little effect and that they are relying mainly on higher energy prices to restrict consumption. But does this not mean choosing inflation as a temporary measure against waste? Can Europe afford to follow such a course? Even here, where mainly internal measures should be taken by each state, they should be concerted so as to avoid major upheavals in the economies of the states concerned.

29. (ii) Building up reserves is obviously no answer to a serious and prolonged crisis but it should allow immediate difficulties to be met, as resulted from the Iranian crisis at the beginning of 1979, and also ensure the possibility of survival in the event of war or a blockade of oil supplies. The Western European countries have made a major effort in this field by agreeing to build up reserves corresponding to more than two months' consumption. The United States, which has oil resources on its own territory, does not seem to have made a comparable effort. It has undertaken not to allow Israel to be the victim of a blockade or boycott by the oil-producing countries, but this undertaking will have its full deterrent effect on the oil-producing countries only if the United States is able to call on large-enough reserves. In February 1979, however, President Carter, Mr. Brown, Secretary of Defence, and Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy, announced military and naval measures designed to allow the United States to move quickly to ensure that western countries had access to oil from the Gulf area should it be threatened.

30. (iii) It is obviously essential to develop alternative forms of energy among which the only one which seems to offer prospects of fast, large-scale development is nuclear energy. However, the nuclear energy production programmes adopted after the 1973 crisis by most western countries have everywhere been slowed down, held up or stopped by very strong public reaction, particularly in areas where new power stations were to be built. Nowhere have these programmes been fully respected. Nuclear energy production certainly involves risks, as shown by the incident at Harrisburg on 1st April 1979, but present-day technology appears to allow such risks to be mastered provided all necessary steps are taken in time, even if this means taking longer to build power stations. Further, since the development of nuclear energy production is extremely costly, countries which have the means of acquiring a complete nuclear industry have every interest in finding external outlets to help them to amortise the cost of their technology. But in many respects

these industries depend on patents purchased from the United States or on imports of natural or enriched uranium which is difficult to obtain other than from the United States or one of its close allies. It is evident that the policy of exporting nuclear energy-producing industries involves considerable risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world and it is understandable that any country aware of its responsibilities should avoid supplying its customers with means of participating in this proliferation and ensure that all necessary steps are taken to prevent buyer countries from recycling plutonium. For this reason, the Americans have firmly opposed the policy of exporting nuclear power stations pursued by some of their European partners. Because they own the patents and control the uranium market they have managed to delay and sometimes even prevent the conclusion of certain deals. European countries victims of these measures readily suspected their American ally of using the fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons to protect their own industry's markets, thus precluding dangerous competition from their European partners.

31. It is difficult to sort out the true facts from warped interpretations in such accusations. But what emerges is the need for dialogue and agreement between the United States and its European partners on nuclear and energy policies as a whole and on the type of provisions and standards to be included in all contracts relating to equipment for countries which do not have nuclear weapons, since :

- (a) in face of the oil-producing countries, whose coalition has carried considerable weight on the international oil market, it is in the interests of both the United States and Europe, as consumers, to concert their approach in order to avoid too great a shortage or too fast a rise in prices ;
- (b) if Europe and the United States are to achieve such results, they must pursue a twofold policy of limiting energy consumption and accelerating the development of alternative sources of energy ;
- (c) finally, in nuclear matters, all countries producing nuclear power stations must reach agreement on standards to be applied to exports of plants of all kinds so as to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons while enabling the world capacity to produce nuclear energy to expand as quickly and on as broad a basis as the requirements of security allow. Early action should be taken, for several countries are now in a position to produce nuclear weapons.

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32. On the whole, economic co-operation between Europe and the United States is proceeding fairly satisfactorily. Where trade is concerned, mutual complaints are the subject of overall negotiations such as the former Kennedy round and the present Tokyo round. These negotiations have already produced most important results and have above all prevented the present world recession from affecting international trade. In the monetary field, it is to be hoped that the European monetary fund will allow Europe to carry more weight in the IMF consultations and speed up the search for a new world monetary system. Where energy is concerned, in view of the existence of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is still a means of controlling everyone's activities, and agreement should be possible on the limits to be imposed on the sale of production plants to third countries.

33. This does not mean that consultations between Europe and the United States are satisfactory. There are in fact many weaknesses to which both Europe and the United States should pay greater attention. But the existence of the European Community and the work of its Commission mean that in economic matters Europe is a relatively well-organised entity and a partner which is not without weight in the balance with the United States. Whether a satisfactory solution will be found to problems which will inevitably continue to dominate relations between Europe and the United States in the coming years depends on how far Europe can maintain and develop its structure and tackle consultations with the United States collectively.

III. Europe's security

34. While there may be some economic rivalry between Europe and the United States, this is obviously not the case for defence. The United States can hardly separate the problem of Western Europe's security from that of its own security any more than Europe can assume responsibility for its own defence other than in close co-operation with the Americans. The framework for co-operation here is the Atlantic Alliance and the organisation which stemmed from it, NATO. It may be said that in its thirty years of existence NATO has worked fairly satisfactorily since it has managed to avert war in Europe, which was its essential aim. American forces have been permanently stationed in Europe to guarantee that Europe will be protected by the United States nuclear deterrent.

35. However, there have always been differences in the European and American view of how the Alliance should ensure joint security. This is easy to understand if it is recalled that the position of the United States shelters it from

certain dangers and the threat of invasion or war other than nuclear, whereas Europe fully realises that any war, whether nuclear or not, would cause widespread devastation in Europe. On the other hand, its position as a leading power confers world-wide responsibilities on the United States which Europe has not had since the end of the colonial empires.

A. Strategic problems

36. These considerations explain certain divergences, or rather different approaches to the problems of the Alliance's strategy. For a long time, Europe insisted on maintaining the concept of massive retaliation as the basis of the Alliance's strategy because the threat of the whole American nuclear arsenal seemed to be the best means of ensuring what was intended to be a global deterrent. Progressively, the European partners in the Atlantic Alliance came round to the concept which the United States had started to develop once Soviet missiles began to threaten its territory, i.e. graduated response. This doctrine is based on the idea that a war will not necessarily destroy the territory of the super-powers and that if it broke out it would be possible to contain it at a level determined by tacit or explicit agreement between the belligerents. In short, a distinction could be drawn between a world-wide nuclear war, disastrous for all, and a European war during which negotiations between belligerents would be possible.

37. There is a serious danger of such a doctrine making war less improbable and unthinkable than with a doctrine of massive retaliation. However, it must be noted that the credibility of a doctrine of massive retaliation reduced considerably with the growth of Soviet nuclear power. Who indeed could imagine the Americans taking the risk of total destruction of their territory and cities in response to a limited attack in Western Europe? The presence of American divisions and increasingly diversified nuclear weapons on European territory allows the deterrent to be graduated so that for each level of weapons used in an attack there is an appropriate means of response which makes retaliation more credible.

38. To satisfy the Europeans and make them accept this doctrine of graduated response, NATO, after long and difficult negotiations, adopted its forward strategy intended in principle, in the event of hostilities, to carry the fighting immediately into enemy territory, the aim being to make the prospect of limited war more acceptable to Europeans. This is still the official doctrine of the Alliance but in fact it is increasingly necessary to ascertain whether it corresponds to real possibilities, failing which its deterrent value would be naught. Apart from

the event, difficult to entertain, of members of the Atlantic Alliance adopting an offensive policy in Europe, forward strategy implies a defensive policy based on an offensive strategy using appropriate weapons in quantities placing NATO clearly above the Warsaw Pact. But it is well known that this is not the case and a considerable effort would have to be made to change the situation. It would take several years with the forthcoming budgetary increases planned by the United States and a number of European countries for their armaments.

39. Moreover, most recent progress is not in offensive weapons but in defensive weapons thanks, in particular, to precision-guided missiles and the neutron bomb. At the present stage of technology, provided large enough quantities are available, these new weapons are extremely effective against all offensive weapons used by ground forces, and particularly tanks. There is every indication that the greatest armaments efforts in recent years have been directed towards precision-guided missiles on which the most research has been done. Finally, on 10th July 1978, the United States decided to manufacture certain components of the neutron bomb even if, as the Committee was told in Washington, implementing decisions are taken only very slowly in view of the reactions of Congress.

40. Such investment implies the choice of a defensive strategy, whether it has already been made or whether it is subsequently imposed by the type of armaments available to NATO forces. It is probably reasonable since there would be no point in accumulating tanks in a period of technical development when such a weapon seems more or less condemned. But a choice of this kind will have considerable repercussions on the Alliance's strategy. It can thus be seen that the dominating country within the Atlantic Alliance is in fact opting for a strategy which is probably perfectly reasonable but differs from the one in principle adopted by members of the Alliance as a whole.

41. In recent years, a number of European military authorities have expressed very pessimistic views about the ability of NATO forces to resist an unexpected Soviet attack, estimating at between three and ten days the time it would take Soviet tanks to reach the Rhine. Even if the Soviet Union is not now thought to harbour aggressive intentions, it must be noted that the military authorities have rendered a great service to all the members of the Alliance and have helped to induce several European members of the Alliance as well as the United States to make a financial effort — however modest — to increase their military budgets by 3 % per year as from 1978 in constant terms, this increase being earmarked essentially for investment in

conventional weapons. Information now available indicates that this effort has been enough to increase considerably the defences of the Atlantic Alliance in Europe and hence its possibility to deter aggression.

42. The situation is evidently less clear in the case of nuclear matters. The American authorities concerned confirmed to the General Affairs Committee that they were anxious to draw a sharp line between nuclear and conventional weapons and, in order to avoid automatic escalation to nuclear war, they emphasised their hostility to the "mini-nuke" doctrine at one time contemplated by American defence authorities. Europe cannot consider basing its defence on escalation any more than the United States, but a defence policy based on deterrence means according greater importance to the development of cruise missiles which alone can meet the challenge of Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. In face of these nuclear weapons, most of which are aimed towards Western Europe, only the deployment of an adequate number of cruise missiles, which are hard to intercept, can offer an adequate deterrent. In this respect, American determination in the strategic arms limitation talks to retain their right to develop and deploy cruise missiles will inevitably be viewed by Europeans as a test of their true wish to defend Europe since only a demonstration of this wish can act as an effective deterrent. Information obtained on this matter by the General Affairs Committee makes it impossible to conclude with all certainty that the United States Government is determined, in the framework of SALT, to retain its ability to deploy a defence system in Europe based on cruise missiles. Those with whom the Committee spoke in the United States made no secret of the fact that there was no concerted plan between the European members of NATO and the United States in this field.

B. Limitation and control of armaments

43. At the end of 1978, the United States and the Soviet Union succeeded in preparing the texts of three agreements which were to bring SALT II to an end and mark the beginning of SALT III. However, at the beginning of April 1979, the SALT II agreement had not yet been concluded. There is some unease in Europe about these negotiations as a whole, probably not because of the content of the SALT I and SALT II agreements but rather because of a number of questions which are inevitably raised in the minds of Europeans about the aims of United States policy in this domain.

44. During the General Affairs Committee's visit to the United States, American governmental authorities strongly emphasised the fact that the SALT agreements were only additional

elements in a defence policy and that in no case would SALT determine United States defence policy. However, Europeans cannot help wondering about the ultimate aims of these negotiations and their possible implications for the future defence of Europe, particularly as it is now clear that the Soviet Union is going to ask for French and British nuclear weapons to be included in SALT III.

45. SALT II covered only the limitation of strategic weapons, i.e. means of delivery with a range of more than 5,500 km. and thus capable of reaching American territory from the Soviet Union or vice versa. All weapons deployed in Europe, consisting mainly of continental (medium-range) weapons or tactical (short-range) weapons, were thus excluded. In recent years, the Soviet Union has made considerable progress with continental weapons thanks to the production of the SS-20 missile which, launched from Soviet territory, can reach any target whatsoever in Europe and the Backfire bomber which has a similar range.

46. There is therefore a danger of the area covered by SALT, i.e. strategic deterrent weapons, which would be frozen at their present level and in which reductions might subsequently be made, being disconnected from medium- and short-range weapons, i.e. those used mainly in Europe, where there would be no brake on the armaments race. Any such disconnection might, although this is not at present the aim of the Americans, result in the fate of Europe being dissociated from that of the United States, leaving the Soviet Union with overwhelming superiority over the European allies of the United States.

47. It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to establish a closer link between strategy and the diplomacy of armaments control. Apparently the United States has largely achieved this but it seems that its European allies are still a long way behind and the Atlantic Alliance has stayed with strategic concepts which take insufficient account of the current strategic arms limitation talks.

48. In the United States, the Administration is afraid that Congress may blame it for the inadequacy of means of verification and supervision to be included in the agreement. In Europe, there will probably be less criticism and reservations about this aspect than about the possibility of the deterrent effect of American weapons being reduced under the SALT II agreements, not to speak of fears of what might happen in SALT III.

C. Armaments co-operation

49. For several years the American authorities have been particularly concerned about achieving

co-operation between members of the Atlantic Alliance for the joint production of armaments. The two-way street formula was adopted under the Republican administration for associating the two sides of the Atlantic in a common effort. The fundamental concepts of this proposal were quite clear. On the one hand, cost prices were to be cut by extending markets and on the other better use was to be made of the military equipment of NATO forces thanks to interoperability of weapons of various origins. In general, these proposals were welcomed in Europe both because of the military requirements they met and of the Europeans' wish for lower cost prices for the weapons needed by their forces.

50. However, at the same time the European countries made a new effort to increase the joint production or at least the standardisation of their weapons. Their aim was slightly different from that of the Americans since it was not so much a question of trying to base common defence on uniform equipment as of lowering cost prices so as to promote and develop a truly European armaments industry instead of one shaped on a purely national basis as is now the case. Although it may not have been the intention, the American proposals might in effect endanger these joint production plans because of the size of American firms and their much longer production runs. In joint production on an Atlantic scale, there was a risk of European industries being reduced to subcontractor status which, however profitable, might allow the United States to gain such a lead in research and development that Europe could have no hope of regaining its place in international competition.

51. The establishment of the IEPG in Europe and the bilateral negotiations between European members of the Atlantic Alliance and the United States, which led in 1978 to the signature of a series of memoranda of understanding, thus occurred at the same time and it may now be wondered whether the memoranda will not make the work of the IEPG even more difficult insofar as they may give priority to transatlantic co-operation, sometimes more advantageous for the industries concerned, over truly European co-operation.

52. Moreover, the concepts on which this two-way street is based vary from one side of the Atlantic to the other. In the United States, there is a growing tendency to consider that there must be an overall balance between United States expenditure on common defence and expenditure by the European countries in the United States to the same end. But European expenditure consists essentially of purchases of military equipment, whereas much of American expenditure lies in the cost of maintaining forces in Europe. The Europeans, on the contrary, consider that the two-way street should, as far as possible,

bring about a balance between Europe's expenditure on armaments in the United States and American expenditure on armaments in Europe. Under such a concept, there would have to be a major change in United States armaments procurement policy since so far the quantity of weapons purchased by the United States in Europe has been very small.

53. Third, the question arises in the United States of how and to what extent the European industries should be encouraged to group and organise themselves to achieve a size and power enabling them to compete with corresponding American industries. One school of thought accepts some protectionism for the European armaments industries insofar as this allows them to grow into valid partners or competitors for American industry, free competition then becoming the only determining factor in the procurement of all Alliance countries. But another school of thought believes that the European industries alone will never make this organisational effort in the framework of a protectionist policy and the only way to regroup them and rationalise European production is to bring Europe face to face with a market in which everyone has to meet the same conditions. This means all the members of the Atlantic Alliance being free to choose the equipment they find the most suitable and the cheapest, the two-way street thus no longer being an organisation of trade but merely an opening up of the market.

54. Your Rapporteur considers that the aim of transatlantic armaments co-operation should be to open up and liberalise markets so as to allow European armies, as well as the American army, to obtain the best equipment at the lowest price. However, to achieve such a result quickly, it is not certain that the way is to open markets completely straight away. He thinks that an effort to organise production in Europe as envisaged in the framework of the IEPG and the broad lines of which should emerge from the SAC study is needed before such results can be achieved. This means waiting *inter alia* to know more — thanks to the work of the SAC — about the various conditions in which European armaments co-operation might be developed.

55. Your Rapporteur is convinced that the European governments will meet with understanding in the United States if they seriously wish to embark on co-ordination of the European armaments industry. If, on the contrary, the work of the IEPG and the SAC continues to mark time without achieving significant results, the wish to form a European armaments industry would be nothing more than a pretext for protecting national interests, which would fully justify American insistence on free access to everyone's markets.

IV. External policy

56. Every alliance has a problem of co-ordinating the foreign policies of its members since they are all committed to supporting their partners in the event of hostilities with other powers. The Atlantic Alliance attempted to solve this problem by creating the North Atlantic Council. However, since the Atlantic Alliance covers clearly-defined areas consultations are an obligation regarding those areas alone and in fact it has frequently happened that one or other member of the Alliance, whether European or American, has pursued policies in other areas of the world which did not at all tally with the views of its partners. This has sometimes led to serious crises, a most characteristic one being the confrontation between the United States and France and the United Kingdom over the Suez affair in 1956. At present, the main problems relate to three fields: East-West relations as a whole which are admittedly considered regularly in the North Atlantic Council but on which co-ordination of external policies seems far from perfect, the Far East and the Middle East.

A. East-West relations

57. The word *détente* which has been used to describe East-West relations in the last fifteen years is certainly very ambiguous and it is natural that it should be interpreted differently not only by East and West but also by the various member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and even within these countries by the various parties or sections of public opinion.

58. Certain aspects of East-West relations should be studied apart since although they are interrelated they pursue separate aims by different means. One such aspect is of course the limitation of armaments and disarmament. A second one is the consolidation of the status quo in Europe so that each one may be certain, insofar as possible, that the other has no aggressive intentions. A third aspect is that individuals should be allowed to escape the power of reasons of state to develop to the maximum their economic freedom, and their freedom in the arts, science and of expression. In short, human rights must be able to flourish, bearing in mind that they are not merely formal rights guaranteed by the constitutions of most western countries but include requirements of an economic nature without which the first would be meaningless.

59. Since President Truman defined the policy of containment, the United States has based its relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries on maintaining frontiers as they were after the second world war. This desire for stability has been an essential factor in the trend of East-West relations and seems to be a

major objective of the Soviet Union, whereas for the West it is but a price to be paid for the consolidation of peace.

60. Conversely, when President Carter took office, the United States Government started to emphasise other aspects of détente, and showed an active interest in what was happening inside the eastern bloc and even in individual countries including the Soviet Union. The final act of the Helsinki conference is typical of the present situation since it juxtaposes two principles which are not absolutely contradictory but nevertheless frequently come into conflict in practice, i.e. non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the collective responsibility of the signatory states for the respect of human rights and freedom.

61. In this connection there is no opposition between the Western European countries and the United States. All pursue the same aims. There is no doubt however that priorities are not everywhere exactly the same and Europe now attaches increasing value to the maintenance and development of healthy economic and trade relations between Eastern and Western Europe although some are sceptical about outside efforts to induce the Soviet Union and its allies to have greater respect for human rights. On several occasions, the United States Administration, under pressure from Congress, has envisaged economic reprisals against the Soviet Union if it failed to show greater willingness to respect human rights. These threats have not been without avail and it is to be noted, for instance, that the number of Soviet citizens authorised to emigrate, to Israel in particular, has increased considerably in recent years. Similarly, the Soviet Government now seems to think twice before using more forceful means of curbing dissident factions. But even measures of such limited effectiveness are possible only if policies are permanently co-ordinated. Should the United States refuse to deliver certain equipment to the Soviet Union and allow its European partners to gain control of the markets thus freed, the result would be a *de facto* disruption of the Atlantic Alliance in face of the very danger it was formed to fight. One such instance has just arisen with regard to France's sale of a computer for the forthcoming Olympic Games in Moscow which the Soviet Union had ordered from the United States and which the latter finally refused to deliver. A consensus must therefore be found among members of the Atlantic Alliance to avoid some of them taking firm stands which isolate them and to maintain the cohesion of the western alliance outside times such as that of the preparation and holding of the Helsinki conference when consultations in the NATO framework were a worthwhile complement to those held by Europeans in the framework of the Nine.

B. Near and Middle East

62. The Middle East is now more than ever an area of East-West confrontation, but generally indirect confrontation in which local factors play a decisive part. Whereas it might have been thought that developments in Egypt and a number of other Arab countries since 1973 would have allowed the crises clouding the area since the end of the second world war to be progressively settled, several events have allowed or may allow the Soviet Union to intervene more actively than before, sparking off even more serious confrontations than in the past.

63. This evolution started with the revolution in Afghanistan in 1977 and Pakistan's turn towards dictatorship. In 1978 there was even more serious unrest in Iran following which the Shah had to leave the country in January 1979 and make way for a régime which has not yet managed to assert its control over the whole country. It is impossible at the moment to ascertain the exact rôle of the Soviet Union in this series of events but there is every indication that the Iranian revolution was not directly due to the intervention of outside forces.

64. The unrest and insecurity in Iran led to a cut in its oil output and then a total halt in exports, which was very serious for the West as a whole since Iran was the world's second oil exporter after Saudi Arabia. Since the change of régime, oil production has picked up again but the present government does not wish it to return to its 1977 level. Again, it has cancelled a large number of contracts under which Iran was to have been equipped with modern industries and means of transport and thus use its profits from oil to become an industrial power.

65. The United States Government appears to have taken a long time to realise the full seriousness of the crisis and it supported the Shah's régime longer than necessary in spite of the strong internal opposition to the régime. It supplied the most sophisticated weapons, considering Iran as the most reliable outpost of western positions in the midst of an area of instability. Consequently, the Iranian revolution adopted a hostile attitude towards the West and the United States in particular, which was accused of having intervened in Iran's internal affairs to maintain by force a régime which had lost popular support.

66. Europe seems to have been quicker to realise the threats to the Shah's régime and it was in France that Ayatollah Khomeini, who inspired the Iranian revolution, took refuge after being banished by the Iraqi Government. In France he was able to use the press, radio and television to spread extremely violent propaganda against the Shah's régime. It was thus apparent that in

autumn 1978 two member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, France and the United States, were pursuing two diametrically-opposed policies since one was still supporting the old régime whereas the other did nothing to hide its assistance to the advocates of revolution in Iran. The two countries' attitudes may be judged in various ways, but they are characteristic of the lack of harmonisation between the foreign policies of the United States and Europe.

67. Relations between Israel and the Arab countries have not led to open opposition between Europe and the United States but the trend of American policy towards Palestinian problems has given rise to reservations and fears in Europe. It is known that the United States Government brought strong pressure to bear on the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to induce them to take part in the Camp David negotiations which were to lead to the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries in Washington on 26th March 1979. Naturally, no one in Europe disapproves of the search for peace between Israel and neighbouring Arab countries, but many European observers wondered whether President Carter's methods for achieving this result might not jeopardise the chances of a true settlement. Indeed, although the United States Government still considers, as the General Affairs Committee was told many times by the American authorities during its visit, that the Washington treaty is a step towards a more general settlement of all Middle East problems and that a sort of peace movement was thus set in motion in which the whole Arab world would progressively become involved, Europeans have often felt that, quite the reverse, the Washington treaty merely made a general settlement more difficult and made absolutely no contribution to solving the most serious problem, that of the Palestinians. They believed it might endanger the Arab governments the least hostile to a general settlement, increase unrest throughout the Arab world as shown by events in Lebanon and foster anti-western reactions which might *inter alia* produce a fast and inconsiderate rise in oil prices thus perhaps causing a crisis which would be extremely serious for Europe. It should be added that there is nothing to show that the Israeli Government shares the American view that the Washington agreements are but a step towards general peace and the very fact that two days before the treaty was signed it was announced that more Israeli colonies were to be established on the West Bank indicates that Israel is not at all prepared to make more concessions than it has already done.

68. In short, American policy in the Middle East seems dangerous and disputable to many Europeans, and certain governments have shown — so far discreetly — that they were anxious not to be associated with an American policy

in which they had no part, while others have voiced approval of American policy.

69. Thus, in the Middle East and Iranian affairs there has been a blatant absence of consultation and co-ordination between the policies of the United States and of its allies, the outcome of which might be extremely dangerous for the whole western world.

C. Far East

70. It is easy to understand that after the Vietnam affair the United States has taken the greatest care not to become involved in another war in the Far East. It is equally evident that the Soviet Union has tried to take advantage of this situation to extend its influence, particularly as it felt threatened in that area by the growth of Chinese power and the increasingly hostile attitude of China towards it. At the end of 1978, Vietnam, backed by Moscow, invaded Cambodia, overthrew the government in office and set up a régime favourable to it. China was the only country to react to this invasion and at the beginning of 1979 launched an offensive on its Tonkin frontiers.

71. The United States for its part had for ten years or so been drawing closer to China, this being marked by President Nixon's visit to China and then, after the death of Mao Tse-tung, recognition of the People's Republic of China, the severing of relations with the Taiwan Government and the very rapid development of economic relations with the People's Republic of China. The United States was not thereby departing from the policy long pursued by most Western European countries which all had diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and had also considerably increased their economic and trade relations in 1978.

72. The problem now is how far the development of friendly relations between China and the western countries can and should lead to further co-operation in political and defence matters. At present, political differences do not seem very great since no one seems prepared to endorse Chinese ventures in its frontier disputes with the Soviet Union or in its ambitions in South-East Asia. Nevertheless, certain Western European countries have concluded arms contracts with the Chinese Government, while the United States Government, fearing that the Soviet Union might consider such deals as provocation and close western rapprochement with China as an encirclement of its territory, is proving most reserved about such a policy. As long as such arms sales are small, these differences are not too serious. But the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance will have to concert their approach to China and Far East problems so as not to allow situations to develop in the same way as in the Middle East and also

because their policy towards China may have considerable repercussions on Soviet external and defence policy as a whole and hence on the security of all.

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73. Although necessary, the co-ordination of the foreign policies of Europe and the United States encounters considerable difficulties. Some are psychological because, since the end of the Vietnam war, the United States seems determined to keep within the strictest limits its commitments in both Asia and Africa but it alone is able to supply weapons, guarantees or forces which might effectively contribute to preventing developments too unfavourable to the West. The Western European countries certainly do not have the means of taking effective action every time there may be a clash with Soviet power.

74. As a result, serious differences have surfaced in various connections and many Europeans now seem to be afraid that the United States will pursue a policy which no longer guarantees due respect for its commitments to its allies. At one and the same time Europe is therefore concerned about the world balance, maintaining its relations with the Arab world and the security of its oil supplies and how much confidence it may have in American commitments.

V. Conclusions

75. After this review of the difficulties of co-operation between Europe and the United States, it would be illusory and naïve to expect the United States to be something different and not draw the conclusions it thinks it should draw from the recent past, even if many Europeans reach different conclusions.

76. Europe must realise that for geographical reasons and in view of its economic possibilities and history the United States cannot share the same views on all world problems, be it in economics, armaments or external policy. The cohesion of the West, which is essential for the security of all, can be guaranteed only through continuing agreement between the United States and Western Europe. But this means that Western Europe must really exist. In areas

where it has achieved a degree of unity as in international trade and perhaps tomorrow monetary matters, it is proving possible and fruitful, if not always easy, for Europe and the United States to reach agreement based on joint interests and compromises between special interests. The expected success of the Tokyo round is most encouraging in this respect. But in areas where Europe has not really taken shape it is unable to exercise the rôle justified by its commercial strength, economic activity and even its efforts to help to ensure its own security. Its ability to be a true partner of the United States and to assert its legitimate interests therefore depends on how far it manages to organise itself in common institutions and elaborate a European policy. Europe's vital interests are certainly at stake in matters such as the strategic arms limitation talks, the international monetary system and the search for peace and balance in the Middle East. It is clear that the United States Government has decided to take account of this but it is equally clear that Europe is unable to assert its views.

77. The establishment of a European monetary system may give it the means to do so.

78. In foreign policy matters, nine-power political consultations have not so far achieved adequate results, apart from a few cases such as the CSCE.

79. Where defence is concerned, Europe's weakness is not due only to its vulnerability and to its inadequate troop levels and weapons but rather to its institutional inexistence and lack of will. Proof of this in 1978 is to be found in the way European governments evaded adopting a clear stand on the neutron bomb when the United States Government sought their opinions. The main obstacles to co-operation between Europe and the United States lie on the European side and it is mainly for Europe to find a solution. In the fields in which it is already united, Europe can pull its weight as a partner. A divided Europe will at best be mediocre, commanding but little respect or heed, continually complaining about decisions taken without it, whereas the United States seems to realise fully that European unity is necessary to achieve balance in the Alliance which will be as beneficial for the United States as for Europe itself.

Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Urwin and others

1. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph 5 as follows :

“5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems between the United States and the European countries.”

Signed : Urwin, van Waterschoot, Schwencke, Scheffler, Konings, Cook, Stoffelen, Faulds, Northfield, Dejardin, Roper, Hardy, Büchner

1. See 7th Sitting, 21st June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States

AMENDMENT 2¹
tabled by Mr. Périquier

2. Leave out the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
“Considering that there is the utmost interest in maintaining co-operation between Europe and the United States, *inter alia* in order to try to settle any disputes which may arise in certain fields ;”.

Signed : Périquier

1. See 7th Sitting, 21st June 1979 (Amendment withdrawn).

Africa's rôle in a European security policy

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 10 votes to 2 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman) ; Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairman) ; MM. Abens (Alternate : *Hengel*), Ariosto, *Beith*, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds (Alternate : *McNamara*), *Gessner*, Gonella, Hanin, Mrs van den

Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate : *Voogd*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate : *van Waterschoot*), Mende (Alternate : *Vohrer*), *Minnocci*, Mommersteeg (Alternate : *Schlingemann*), *Müller*, *Peridier*, Perin, *Portheine*, *Reddemann*, Segre, Urwin, *Warren*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on Africa's rôle in a European security policy

The Assembly,

Considering that Africa has resources which are essential for the economic activity and security of Europe as well as for the development of African economies and for the improvement of the standard of living of the African peoples ;

Noting that harmonious economic development provides the firmest basis for political stability in Africa ;

Considering that the Lomé Agreements provide the basis for co-operation which is profitable both to Western Europe and to Africa and gratified that most African states have freely taken part in this co-operation ;

Welcoming the measures taken recently by some African states to establish democratic régimes ;

Believing that any outside military intervention inhibits this trend ;

Welcoming the end of the dictatorial régime in Uganda,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the co-ordination of the African policies of its members ;
2. Encourage all attempts by African states to base their political régimes on free, universal and pluralist elections ;
3. Ensure that a free, universal and pluralist vote is respected in the forthcoming elections in Namibia ;
4. Examine, in view of information available on the elections in Rhodesia in April 1979, whether freedom to trade with that country should not be re-established.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Müller, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. In June 1978 your Rapporteur had the opportunity of presenting a report on European security and African problems in which he underlined the importance for Europe of its relations, particularly economic, with the African continent and hence its interest in developing and organising co-operation and promoting the maintenance of peace in Africa without intervening in the internal affairs of that continent. A year later, there seems to be no reason to change this view.

2. At the beginning of 1979, Sir John Rodgers drafted the part of this report dealing with the economic aspects of co-operation between Europe and Africa. Regretting that Sir John is unable to join him in presenting, as planned, the whole of this report, your Rapporteur felt he could integrate the part of the report prepared by Sir John in the document he is presenting today to the General Affairs Committee.

3. If the overall evolution in Africa over the last year is now contemplated, it is rewarding to note that, although it might have been less protracted and in calmer circumstances, it is nevertheless more or less in conformity with the wishes expressed by the General Affairs Committee.

4. It is clear that while the development of the application of the Lomé agreements has been considerable, progress has also been made towards peace based on better respect for human rights, particularly in southern and eastern Africa. Unfortunately, this does not mean that all African problems are in sight of solution. The fact is that new fighting has broken out which may always lead to further intervention from outside, but so far it is the African states themselves that have handled the affairs of their continent. Other matters such as developments in Ethiopia, Chad or Mauritania are a subject of preoccupation. Nevertheless, the overall evolution of the African continent in the last year may be considered with some optimism.

PART ONE

Economic aspects

I. Economic relations between Western Europe and Africa

5. In the last thirty years, relations between Western Europe and the African continent as a whole have been marked by the sweeping move-

ment of decolonisation with the result that nowhere on the continent is there now a territory dependent on a former colonial power. Although gradual, decolonisation was long enough ago and is now sufficiently advanced for it to be possible to try to study its repercussions on relations between Europe and Africa.

6. One question which arose was whether colonisation created a form of artificial economic solidarity based on the principle of imperial preference and, consequently, whether decolonisation might not have changed the course of the economy of the African countries leading to a break in this solidarity which, after all, was not of long standing. Some African countries in fact tried breaking off economic links with Europe as a complement to the political independence they had acquired. A study of the trend of external trade in these countries in recent years shows that the links of solidarity did survive decolonisation and that, far from having diminished, they still play an essential rôle in the economies of the African countries.

7. Table VI in Chapter III of the appendix gives statistics for three of these countries: Guinea, Mali and Tanzania. Although the statistics available for Guinea are inadequate, it can nevertheless be seen that in 1975, although its aim had been to establish profitable economic co-operation with the Soviet Union, less than 3 % of its imports came from socialist countries and only 0.52 % of its total exports went to those countries. Of the countries whose trade statistics are given in Table VI, it will also be seen that Guinea has the lowest trade figures. This probably explains the desire of the Guinean Government, which has not changed since the country achieved independence and is still attached to revolutionary principles, to renew links with its former tutor country, France, which it broke off when it became independent.

8. Similar remarks may be made in respect of Mali and Tanzania. Comparison between the three reference years 1970, 1975 and 1976 shows that only a little over 11 % of Mali's total exports were to socialist countries. Where imports are concerned, although almost 20 % came from socialist countries in 1970, the percentage fell to just over 10 % in 1976. In Tanzania, the trend has been similar: its imports from socialist countries fell from 15.42 % in 1970 to 8.32 % in 1976 and its exports to these countries from 5.28 % to 4.79 %.

9. This means quite clearly that attempts by certain African countries to divert traditional flows of trade and seek new suppliers and customers, particularly in the Soviet Union and

its allies, have largely failed. Moreover, there have been many cases in which Soviet experts or manufactured products from the Soviet Union have had difficulties in meeting the needs of the African countries which have turned to suppliers or experts in the European countries who were better equipped to meet their requirements.

10. However, unlike the situation prevailing before decolonisation, solidarity has not been limited to trade with the former colonial powers but now covers the whole of Western Europe and the EEC in particular.

11. The Yaoundé Agreements defined the shape of the economic relationship between the six-power Community and the associated African countries. Subsequently, changes had to be made to take account of the enlargement of the EEC and the large number of African or other developing countries wishing association status. This was the rôle of the Lomé Convention of 28th February 1975 which so to speak codified this solidarity in a number of principles which your Rapporteur will examine later. It would therefore appear that North-South solidarity has been maintained and has even gained in importance in the last thirty years, at least in relations between Western Europe and Africa.

12. A glance at the map of the world shows that the North American industrial powers are the main customers and the main suppliers of the Latin American raw material producing countries and the main consumers of their agricultural produce. The Soviet Union for its part has developed relations with certain Asian countries and above all has sufficient raw material resources and agricultural produce on its own territory to meet its consumption needs to a very great extent. Its status as a trading power falls far short of its industrial capabilities. It consumes relatively few tropical products and is not a major potential customer for countries exporting such products.

13. Europe, a small but very densely populated continent with highly developed industry, can find only a very small proportion of its requirements domestically, be it for its own consumption or to supply its industry with energy and raw materials. Conversely, Africa, because of its size, relatively small population, rich mineral resources and low level of industrialisation, is in a position to supply Europe with what it lacks, and the development of trade between these two parts of the world is imperative both for the Africans, who can find the equipment and experts they need for the development of their countries and society only in the industrialised countries, and for the Europeans, who have to use their exports to pay for the raw materials and food products they import.

14. The crisis with which the world has had to grapple since 1973 has had major effects on

trade between Europe and Africa, all the repercussions of which cannot yet be assessed. Up-to-date statistics about the activities of many African countries are fragmentary and incomplete. Moreover, disturbances in several of these countries in recent years make it difficult to distinguish between permanent trends and accidents of particularly eventful history.

15. The increase in the price of oil was followed by increases in the cost of many raw materials essential for the economies of the industrialised countries. In the case of agricultural products, the sometimes very sharp increases were often followed by equally marked reductions, as for coffee in 1977-78. However, certain comments may be made after analysing available statistics for the last few years.

16. First, the crisis has not yet had such catastrophic effects as the 1929 crisis because solidarity remained intact which was not so in 1929 outside the imperial systems. The maintenance of open or, at least, non-prohibitive customs systems by the industrialised western countries allowed the flow of trade to be kept open and therefore also allowed industry to remain at a level tolerable for the people of both developed and developing countries. World-wide solidarity was probably a major factor in alleviating a crisis which threatened to be the most serious ever known in the industrialised world. Although the crisis is still far from over, it is now evident that no one any longer has confidence in economic nationalism for countering it.

17. Second, the position of the less-developed countries with regard to the new economic difficulties was not always the same. The income of those able to produce oil or raw materials quickly showed a sharp increase. Although their income may have slowed down somewhat since 1975, they were able to push forward their development plans, create processing industries and move rapidly away from underdevelopment. Conversely, those whose resources failed to gain value through the crisis became considerably poorer since they had to pay much more for raw materials, energy products and the manufactured goods necessary for their equipment, which was consequently delayed. If to this is added the special crisis in Western Africa due to a long period of drought and the spread of desert areas, it must be noted that a number of African countries, far from escaping underdevelopment, appear to have sunk even further in the last five years. Whatever assistance they may obtain from abroad has become essential for their very survival and it is only from Western Europe that they have obtained or hope to obtain most of it.

18. Third, the Soviet Union intended to exploit the economic crisis by increasing direct and, above all, indirect intervention on the African

continent. Admittedly, it did not send troops in large numbers but there is no doubt that it encouraged and helped the Cubans to play the rôle of being invited to send troops for the dissidents and so-called freedom fighters for whom the Soviet Union supplied the arms and pay. But the Soviet Union did not wish to take full responsibility, probably in order not to spark off a reaction from the United States. It also supplied arms to countries or uprisings over a large area of Africa.

19. A question which arises is what is the Soviet Union's aim. The limited extent of its economic efforts and the very meagre assistance it has afforded African states which seem prepared to become its customers imply that the Soviet Union has not given serious consideration to gaining a colonial-type foothold on the African continent. On the contrary, rather than seeking to establish a presence there is every indication that its aim is subversion, fomenting unrest and the extension of insecurity. It would therefore seem that Soviet calculations are directed less at Africa itself than at solidarity between Africa and Western Europe.

20. For the Soviet Union, the aim was to reduce Europe's sources of raw materials in Africa so as to increase their cost to the detriment of the balance of trade of the European countries or to cut them off completely, thus forcing Europe into a major economic crisis in the hope of exploiting the social and political effects. Operations such as those undertaken by the Cubans in Angola and then in the Shaba are typical of this method. Similarly, the Soviet Union has made repeated bids in Tanzania, which is one of the principal outlets for the rich Shaba mining area. Nor is there any doubt that subversive movements in Rhodesia have received active Soviet support as has Algeria to encourage its operations directed towards the Western Sahara and the Mauritanian mineral resources.

21. In short, the indications are that the Soviet Union's aim in Africa is to strangle the European economy rather than transform the African continent. It is a constant of Soviet policy to wage a high-powered campaign of revolutionary propaganda in sparsely industrialised areas, not to solve these countries' problems but to promote revolution which it considers to be the end result of the capitalist system in highly industrialised countries. The recent history of Soviet relations with China can but accentuate its suspicion of revolutionary movements, even if supposedly communist, in developing countries.

II. *Western Europe and Africa's resources*

22. Industrial Europe is and must be a large-scale consumer of raw materials and energy is found in only very small quantities on its territory. It therefore depends on its purchases

abroad for maintaining and developing its industry. First and foremost, this is true for energy and oil, 94 % of its consumption having to be procured abroad.

23. The same is true for almost all metals. Europe has insufficient deposits, many of which are on the point of running out and most of which contain only low-grade ores which are expensive to exploit and give mediocre yields. In the case of iron ore, for instance, European deposits generally contain only 30 to 35 % metal whereas ore imported from Mauritania contains about 65 %. It is therefore for economic reasons that European iron and steel industries have had to move from their traditional operating areas towards the coast where it is possible to bring in higher-grade ores more cheaply, as well as the coal needed for their furnaces. On the whole, the crisis has favoured new industries at the expense of older installations. But, except for negligible quantities, Europe has no production of many metals to be alloyed with iron in the production of special steels needed for the manufacture of machinery, engines, etc. For instance, the EEC countries produce only 2.8 % of the iron extracted in the world, 2.5 % of the bauxite, 4.8 % of the lead and 1.9 % of the zinc whereas its industries supply 17.5 % of the cast iron, 18.7 % of the steel and 14 % of the aluminium and smelt 16.3% of the lead and 20% of the zinc produced in the world. For rarer metals, it is even more badly placed. For instance, Europe produces no copper and the development of its nuclear power stations makes it necessary to purchase large quantities of uranium which it produces in only small quantities.

24. But apart from its economic requirements, Europe also needs these products for its security and defence. All the metals it lacks are essential for modern arms-producing industries. Rising prices and possible threats to Europe's supplies jeopardise this security. Most European governments have therefore built up stocks to hedge against temporary shortages. However, stocks are not sufficient to meet a prolonged shortage. In this respect the United States is not and cannot be a valid partner for Europe since it has itself to import an increasingly large proportion of the raw materials and even the energy products which it consumes. Table V in Chapter III of the appendix shows the percentage consumption of certain products imported by the United States. The proportion has increased steadily in recent years. It can thus be seen that trade with Africa is increasingly essential both for Europe and for the whole free world. Europe for its part has the utmost need to maintain free access to mineral deposits in Africa. Most of these consist of metals, some of which are rare, such as tin, copper, manganese and vanadium, and which it would be impossible for Europe to find elsewhere.

25. It is naturally extremely difficult to give figures for these deposits since most of them are not well known and only a very approximate estimate can be given of their extent. But the tables given in Chapter I of the appendix show that apart from fairly common metals such as iron and aluminium Africa also has large-scale deposits of copper, zinc, lead, tin and manganese and above all it has large uranium deposits.

26. Uranium, essential for the production of nuclear energy, is also in short supply in Europe since so-called "reasonably certain" deposits in the EEC amount to only 37,500 tonnes of exploitable uranium at a price below \$30 per pound compared with world reserves of 1,650,000 tonnes of which 522,000 tonnes in Africa, mainly in South Africa and Niger. In 1977, the EEC countries produced 2,140 tonnes compared with 28,400 tonnes in the world and 5,708 tonnes in Africa. As Europe has only very small deposits of coal and oil, it is facing the need, which will probably become more urgent in future years, to develop its nuclear power stations. But the conditions imposed by many producer countries for exports of uranium lead to increased precautions and delays in deliveries. At the present time, twenty-two contracts between EEC countries and the United States, covering 1,000 pounds of uranium, are being held up, although the United States supplies Europe with 70 % of the uranium it consumes. It is therefore clearly in Europe's interest to help the African countries which have large natural uranium deposits to exploit these resources systematically and develop their marketing arrangements. The only alternative for Europe is to resort to breeder reactors whose technology does not yet appear to have been fully mastered. Similarly, the maintenance and development of nuclear forces by certain Western European countries means they must retain access to uranium.

27. The first table in Chapter III of the appendix shows Africa's growing share in the imports of industrialised countries and subsequent tables clearly show that the western countries are by far Africa's biggest customers in this field. Europe must also be able to count on regular supplies of raw materials because the operation of many of its industries depends on them.

28. Nowadays, industrialised countries tend to constitute increasingly large stockpiles of the raw materials used by their industries both as a protection against soaring prices and to avoid shortages caused by subversion, unrest or fighting in Africa. But efforts in this field are necessarily limited and stocks cannot account for the requirements of European industries for more than a few months. Their rôle is one of a strategic reserve to allow European armaments industries to continue producing should raw material supplies from Africa be interrupted

by a temporary crisis rather than to meet the peacetime requirements of industry over a long period.

29. Regular supplies are also essential for maintaining prices, this being the only way western industrial firms can organise their production. The example of the crisis caused by the sudden increase in crude oil prices at the end of 1973 shows how dependent the European economies are on raw material prices. This crisis was in fact accompanied or followed by a rapid rise in the price of most metals, including uranium, and even of a number of agricultural products such as coffee. To maintain regular supplies and stable prices, Europe must ensure the security of the sources of such products and transportation from the site of the deposits which are often a long way from the coast, as is the case of copper from the Shaba and uranium from Niger, as well as sea communications to European ports. Disturbances in Africa in recent years have had a direct effect on the security of such routes, particularly in the Shaba and Mauritania. Most European states have taken account of this and have provided considerable technical and financial assistance in the organisation of ports and the development of railways in Africa, particularly in Gabon. But the transfer of mineral products from the Shaba to accessible ports is still a delicate problem because it depends very largely on the good will of the countries through which the railways of the region pass, particularly Angola, Zambia, Rhodesia and Mozambique. This is a particularly unstable area and threats to security are far from over: it is to be feared that crises will be even more serious and perhaps more lasting in the future than hitherto.

30. European economic requirements fall in with the true interests of the African peoples themselves, who need to be able to organise the development of their own economies, which implies that they must be guaranteed stable incomes over long periods. They therefore have the utmost need to ensure continuity of exports and stable prices, as well as the possibility of transporting their ores to the industrialised countries.

31. If, in addition to these factors, it is borne in mind that Africa lies on a route which has again assumed great importance, particularly for oil products from the Gulf states and the Middle East which, even today, cover more than 60 % of Western Europe's oil consumption, the strategic importance of the African continent becomes clear. The closing of the Suez Canal in 1956 resulted in much larger oil tankers being built which nowadays can hardly use the reopened Suez Canal and therefore continue to sail round Africa. The security of these routes is at least as important for Europe as the protection of African mineral supplies.

32. Finally, a glance at the map in the appendix showing mineral output shows that it is the southern part of Africa, i.e. the part furthest away from Europe, which is the richest in mineral products and round which ships from the Indian Ocean and the Gulf must pass. The statistics in Table B of Chapter I and Table III of Chapter III demonstrate the major rôle played by southern Africa. But this is the region of Africa where there is the greatest threat and the most instability.

33. Europe therefore has excellent reasons for wishing to put an end to these threats and ensure stability in the area. Such a result can be achieved only by maintaining or re-establishing peace in this area leading to open frontiers, full employment and the development of lines of communication, the possibilities of which will in any event remain limited for a long time because of the natural obstacles which geography places in the way of the economic penetration of Africa. Continued disturbances and threats to the future of certain states provides little encouragement for those who have the means of making the investments necessary for the rational exploitation of African resources for the benefit of the international economy and the development of local industry and consequently of the standard of living of the African peoples. It would be absurd to make the efforts needed for this transformation of economies and societies subject to the possible attainment of certain objectives, however generous they may be. On the contrary, it is this transformation which should allow the African states to move more quickly towards a democratic structure which has never managed to find a solid basis in countries whose economies were still underdeveloped.

III. Economic co-operation between Western Europe and Africa

34. The organisation of the Economic Community in Europe and its subsequent enlargement raised the problem of how to adapt economic links between the Western European countries and Africa as a whole. The imperial system which had prevailed until then had in fact allowed the establishment of close economic links between the colonial powers and their colonies. There were privileged markets based on customs systems which were sometimes prohibitive and in any event protected by very high customs barriers. These markets could survive neither the independence of the former colonies nor the opening of Europe's frontiers.

35. Indeed, the very principle on which the European Economic Community was based implied the speedy removal of customs barriers within six-power Europe. The problem then was to ascertain how far special links between colonial powers and their former possessions could be maintained, and this could be possible only if

they were extended to all members of the European Community. It would have been logical for a parallel organisation of African states to form a true African common market. For various reasons, this has not been possible so far. First, the African states have often proved to be weak, torn by rivalry and internal strife, both ideological and tribal, and by outside battles which the decision to maintain the frontiers of the colonial era failed to prevent. These weak and unstable states could hardly consider regrouping themselves. The stronger and best adapted might have been dragged down by the others.

36. Nor was regrouping helped by the geography of Africa or the absence of an adequate internal communications network. Penetration of the continent by waterway and railway had not produced a continuous rail network and efforts in recent years are still far from successful. It is always lines of penetration that are built and they do not form a real network. The absence of a standard gauge also makes the organisation of trade between African states very difficult.

37. Third, the ideological and economic options of newly-independent states made it difficult for them to agree on a joint economic and trade policy. An instance of this was the failure of the attempt by three East African countries, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, immediately after their accession to independence. While Tanzania nationalised many of its industrial and commercial firms and adopted a firm policy of dirigism, Kenya tried, not without success, to attract western capital and technology by maintaining and developing a liberal form of economy. This led to considerable distortion of the predominating tendency in both countries: whereas Kenya profited from large-scale investment and provided a point of penetration for many western industrial and commercial firms wishing to extend their activities in Africa, Tanzania endeavoured to protect itself against such foreign installations and consequently had to oppose the activities of firms established in Kenya on its own territory. It should be added that the coup d'état carried out by General Idi Amin Dada in Uganda in 1971 caused rivalry and clashes between Uganda and Kenya, so that most joint undertakings, such as East African Airlines, for instance, had to be dissolved and split between the participating states in conditions particularly unfavourable to the maintenance of normal economic relations. On several occasions, frontiers were even closed between the members of this association, which is now completely inactive.

38. The situation is hardly better in West Africa, where connections between the various ports linked by national railways to a hinterland relatively isolated from the rest of Africa have not allowed a true common market to be set up

in these areas. The same political rivalries, the same differences between economic systems and the same internal and external struggles are to be found there as in East Africa. Generally speaking, it may be said that so far there has been no success in grouping states.

39. This has not been without consequence since many African states are at the mercy of internal subversion and external intervention which have increased in recent years. Most noteworthy are the cases of forces entering Zaire from Angola and the struggle between Ethiopia and Somalia for the Ogaden region. But the civil war in Nigeria must not be forgotten, nor that in Chad, accompanied by frontier clashes between that country and Libya, nor the case of the Western Sahara and Mauritania which still involves a risk of pitting Morocco against Algeria, the Burundi massacres and the many threats to several Western or Central African countries.

40. Finally, southern Africa has for many years been the scene and stake of a series of conflicts between colonialists of European origin and certain local populations, encouraged by neighbouring countries. Insecurity has increased considerably in this area, whose future now seems most problematical.

41. So Europe was not faced with a single partner but a series of states or territories which needed to pursue the economic co-operation launched in the colonial era but which were most anxious to retain every aspect of their independence.

42. In 1963, the then six-power European Community managed to reach an agreement with thirteen African states and Madagascar (AASM). In this agreement, signed in Yaoundé on 20th July 1963, a series of free trade areas was set up between the EEC and each signatory African state within which the movement of products of EEC origin was conducted under the same tariff conditions. Each African state remained master of its customs protection against other African states and Madagascar associated with the Community but within the EEC benefited from progressive liberalisation measures similar to those applied among the Six. The Community customs tariff was soon lowered but an import system for AASM products was set up at the same time which included special tariffs for agricultural products which competed with European products, with total exemption for a certain number of African products. In addition, the Yaoundé Agreement provided for the granting of financial assistance for improving agricultural methods in Africa, promoting diversification so as to terminate the system of monoculture of coffee or groundnuts prevailing in several countries of the Gulf of Guinea and supporting the price of agricultural foodstuffs, particularly in the event of a sharp drop in prices.

43. For the first time, a system was freely accepted by independent African states after true negotiations. The Yaoundé Agreement was subsequently renewed for five years. Signed on 19th July 1969, it included most of the provisions of the first agreement but extended them to cover a series of measures to promote the marketing of AASM products in the EEC while leaving the AASM the right to protect their economy against European products, subject to application of the most-favoured-nation clause in respect of the EEC.

44. When the question of the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community arose, that of relations between members of the Commonwealth and the EEC were *ipso facto* also raised, which led the Community to announce that it was prepared to extend to other underdeveloped countries the advantages granted to the AASM. An agreement on trade preferences was concluded with the three countries of the East African Federation in September 1969.

45. But the transition to a nine-power Europe, the extension by the EEC of the generalised preference system to all underdeveloped countries and the rise in the price of raw materials and oil introduced new conditions which led the Community to make a full review of the whole question of its relations with the countries of the third world as a whole and negotiations began in 1973 with forty-three African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP). The ACP managed to work out joint positions which were upheld by a single spokesman, thus allowing them to ask the Community to drop its insistence on reciprocity in respect of trade advantages and grant full freedom of access for their agricultural products on EEC markets and industrial co-operation to allow on-the-spot processing of an ever greater proportion of the resources of the beneficiary countries.

46. Finally, on 1st February 1975, when the Yaoundé Agreement expired, it was replaced by the Lomé Convention associating forty-six African, Caribbean and Pacific states with the Nine. Since then, the number of ACP signatories has risen to fifty-two, most of which are African.

47. This convention includes new elements. The first is trade co-operation based on the principle of non-reciprocity and voluntary imbalance between the obligations of the Community and of the ACP states. In fact, apart from a few agricultural products which compete with European products, products originating in the ACP states are admitted to the Community with full exemption from customs duties, but the ACP states are free to choose their own customs policy, subject to their guaranteeing the EEC most-favoured-nation treatment and making no discrimination between its members.

48. This trade co-operation is also intended to bring stability to the export revenue of the developing countries with a view to guaranteeing as far as possible their economies against fluctuations in prices or in quantities of products offered on the EEC market. This henceforth became the case for a whole series of products: twelve basic commodities of which eleven are agricultural or stockbreeding products, the twelfth being iron ore, and a number of their by-products. The principle on which the stabilisation system is based (STABEX) consists of ensuring that ACP states receive financial compensation in the event of their income from exports to the EEC during a specific year being noticeably lower than the average income of the preceding four years. STABEX has the backing of 375 million units of account to cover a five-year period. There is a special agreement in the case of sugar, of which the EEC undertakes to import 1,400,000 tonnes per year, although a large-scale producer of sugar itself.

49. This price stabilisation is accompanied by a policy of financial and technical co-operation. A global sum of almost 4,400 million units of account is available for this purpose, provided in constant proportions by the nine EEC countries. This Community assistance is for inclusion in the framework of the development programmes of each beneficiary country and is therefore worked out by joint agreement between the EEC and these countries on the basis of proposals made by the states. They themselves are responsible for implementing projects, particularly for the negotiation and conclusion of works agreements for technical assistance contracts.

50. Some of this assistance, amounting to about 10 % of the total, is intended for the creation of a sufficiently-wide market within the ACP states and neighbouring developing countries to allow a reduction to be made in the economic dependence of the underdeveloped countries on their suppliers. The less-favoured nations benefit from privileged treatment to meet their special requirements and a major effort has been made for financing small and medium-size firms in the ACP states.

51. In the industrial field, the Lomé Convention sought a better division of industry within the ACP states, the establishment of new industrial relations between them and the EEC for improving the transfer of technology and its adaptation to the specific requirements of the beneficiary countries, improving the marketing of ACP industrial products and increasing the rôle of the local staff in industrial development. This implies a far-reaching policy of information, contacts between firms, transfers of patents and the development of research for which the Lomé Convention provides a framework. Its true value is still difficult to assess since it depends on so many different elements.

52. The Lomé Convention came into force on 1st April 1976. Since then, seven new states have acceded including the Comoro Islands in 1976 and the Cape Verde Islands and St. Thomas and Prince in 1977 among the African countries. The ACP states represent a surface area of almost 20 million sq.km., i.e. eleven times more than the European Community. Together, they have some 300 million inhabitants, the equivalent of the population of the Community. They represent 65 % of the area of Africa and 70 % of its population. In 1973, they supplied about half the gross internal product of Africa, amounting to \$42,067 million, which demonstrates the importance of these agreements for the continent as a whole.

53. Trade results already achieved are extremely encouraging, but it is yet too soon to make an accurate assessment of the long-term impetus to trade. In 1977, there was a 19 % increase in EEC imports from the ACP states which is particularly remarkable since the share of oil in this expansion of sales by the ACP to the Community was very small. The share of the ACP in imports from the EEC rose for the first time in 1977, amounting to 7.3 %. This overall increase was accompanied by some stagnation or even a drop in their share of imports from the former colonial powers, but this was offset by the increasingly large proportion of imports from the ACP in the trade balances of Italy and Germany.

54. Agricultural and food products form a large and growing proportion of imports by the Nine from the ACP (43 % in 1976); oil from Nigeria and Gabon account for 33 % of these imports. Fertilisers, ores and metals account for about 20 %. In all, about 50 % of all ACP exports go to the Community compared with 15 % to the United States. For some agricultural products, practically all ACP exports go to the Community where freedom of access is guaranteed for more than 99 % of imports from the ACP.

55. However, there are less promising aspects too, such as an uneven distribution of imports from the ACP between Community countries, the development of competition between equivalent or substitute products, erosion of preferences due to the application to all third world countries of the generalised preference system and, finally, the fact that EEC exports to the ACP have increased faster than its imports. The ACP's share of exports from the Nine has increased steadily since 1975, rising to 6.7 % in 1977, but it should be pointed out that although the Community provides an outlet for more than 50 % of exports from the ACP, these countries are incapable of offering a comparable outlet for exports from the EEC.

56. For instance, the European Community tried to introduce an original form of co-

operation intended to establish lasting channels of trade between it and a very large number of African countries and other third world countries. The African countries occupy an important place in this system which admittedly is intended to maintain and develop traditional economic links between Europe and Africa but also to allow the quickest possible transformation of the economies of the African countries by improving and diversifying their agriculture, initiating and developing industries, promoting specialisation and broadening the basis of their trade not only with Europe but also with each other.

57. In short, if applied satisfactorily, the Lomé Convention should bring about the progressive transformation of the whole continent. On the other hand, it should provide Europe with access to African resources which are essential for its security and its prosperity. Application of the Lomé Convention began too recently however for it to be possible today to assess the results.

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58. Thus the structure for close association between the EEC and Africa exists and its operation depends essentially on the good will with which the Lomé Convention is applied. As has been seen, the interests of all concerned reside in far-reaching co-operation with due respect for the full independence of the African states and their freedom to direct their economic development as they think fit, while affording them the means to do so. This may not necessarily be the result because for political rather than economic reasons the African states may not pursue such co-operation actively.

59. It is quite evident that they are encouraged in this direction by the active propaganda of the Soviet Union and Cuba against the neo-colonialism of which they accuse the Western European countries. But so far no other partner has offered the African states outlets comparable to those offered by Europe, such favourable market conditions for their products, particularly in view of the efforts made to stabilise prices, such large-scale financial assistance and such extensive and effective technical assistance.

60. But Europe must also ensure that co-operation is not jeopardised by other trends in the common trade policy of members of the EEC. Further or faster enlargement of the Community towards southern Europe, the speedy development of Mediterranean policy or an unbridled search for partners among the countries of the third world might deprive the Lomé Convention of some of its substance. The value of Africa for Europe is so great that care must be taken in the years to come to ensure the smooth operation of a system of co-operation for which there is no precedent in history and which can do much to strengthen stability and peace in the world.

PART TWO

Political aspects

I. Developments in southern Africa

61. The situation is still dominated by the policy pursued by South Africa which seems to have a twofold aim: on the one hand, in respect of human rights to make a number of concessions to international public opinion in order to end the isolation to which it has been condemned, on the other hand, to confer greater stability on its relations with neighbouring states by allowing régimes more representative of the coloured population to be established in Namibia and Rhodesia although without condoning more radical or rebellious factions.

62. Within the state of South Africa, a few measures, albeit timid, have been taken in favour of the black community, although the execution for political reasons on 6th April 1979 of Solomon Mahlangu, in spite of pleas by authorities of many western countries, leaves considerable doubts about the liberal intentions of the South African Government. Yet the autonomy of the Bantustans seems to have been better respected than heretofore. Most progress seems to have been made in the search for a solution to the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia.

(a) Namibia

63. South Africa accepted not only the principle of the independence of Namibia but also, at least in outline, the plan proposed by five western powers — the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France — for guiding this territory towards independence. Application of this plan started on 26th February 1979 with the start of the progressive deployment of a United Nations force to maintain order and peace in the area until the free elections to be held in September. In fact, a whole series of secondary problems remains and may easily jeopardise what was gained in February since one of the nationalist organisations, the SWAPO, seems determined to obstruct the peaceful conduct of the elections. Again, South Africa is making a number of claims which, if not respected, might induce it to revise its position in the Namibian affair.

(i) South Africa is calling for the liberation of political prisoners held in Zambia. These are former members of the SWAPO who turned against that organisation and then were interned in camps in Zambia. The number of prisoners has been reported to be as high as about 2,000 but many of them have now disappeared for reasons which have not been explained satisfactorily and the Zambian Government claims that now there are no prisoners. Its point of view is shared by

the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, but strongly challenged by the South African Government which claims that several hundreds are still detained in the camps. The South African Government seems to have valid sources of information since it was able to communicate to the United Nations Secretariat-General in August 1978 a list of 79 prisoners and their place of internment and in view of the attitude adopted by the representative of the Secretary-General, the South African Government is believed to have doubts about his impartiality.

(ii) The composition of the United Nations force also raises difficulties since South Africa is prepared to accept the presence of Romanian, Canadian, British and Indian troops but objects to Scandinavians and Nigerians whose governments it believes have opted too clearly for the SWAPO cause.

(iii) More serious is the problem defining the areas over which the authority of the United Nations would be extended. South Africa wants a United Nations presence on the territories of Angola and Zambia where SWAPO guerrillas have their rear bases. The African states are not opposed to this but in that case wish control to be exercised also over the part of South African territory bordering on Zambia.

(iv) Far more serious seems to be the question of applying the cease-fire which should start once the United Nations forces are in place. South Africa and the SWAPO must both undertake to respect it but South Africa insists on peace being effectively re-established before beginning to withdraw its forces which now number 20,000 men and which should be reduced to 1,500 within three months. Consequently, any incident may delay the withdrawal of the South African forces.

(v) Should there be such incidents, it is to be feared that the African parties will refuse to maintain the date fixed before the end of September for the vote since they would not agree to it being held under the control of a large South African force.

64. However this may be, the governments of the five western powers behind the plan for United Nations intervention show some confidence in the evolution of the situation and have expressed their readiness to send observers to keep their governments informed of how the United Nations' work is progressing. These representatives are to be housed in the same building in Windhoek. They consider the installation of the United Nations contingent as irreversible and consequently that it constitutes an adequate guarantee of the favourable development of the Namibian problem. That is not without importance because the SWAPO is far from grouping all the African population of Namibia. It is

particularly strong among the Ovambo tribes which account for about half the population of the country whereas the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance draws its support from among eleven other ethnic groups.

65. The elections last December showed that with a high participation the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance obtained a majority of 80 % throughout the country, 60 % in Ovambo territory and 99 % in Herero territory. More moderate and with a greater likelihood of finding a compromise between the white and black populations and reaching agreement with the government in Pretoria, this party is therefore in a good position to win the elections in September provided they are surrounded by adequate freedom. Naturally if it won the SWAPO would object as it did in December 1978 on the grounds that the support of South Africa swung the balance too much in favour of the DTA. Conversely, assistance of all kinds, including military assistance, afforded to the SWAPO by the Soviet Union, Cuba and above all the German Democratic Republic provides grounds for fears that the elections will not be conducted in all tranquillity. These threats bring heavy responsibility to bear on the shoulders of the five powers concerned.

(b) Rhodesia

66. In Rhodesia too, elections were organised in April 1979 to form a parliament of 100 members of whom 28 should be Europeans and 72 Africans. These elections were organised by the provisional government of Mr. Ian Smith.

67. The question was whether the majority of the population would afford its support to the compromise between the Rhodesian Government and certain representatives of the black majority including Bishop Abel Muzorewa. However, many rebel elements refused to take part in these elections of which they condemned the very principle. The Rhodesian guerrilla movement was reported to have decided to try to prevent them being held. In fact, the Rhodesian Government mobilised virtually the whole white population since all whites in Rhodesia up to 59 years of age were called upon to ensure the maintenance of order during the elections, thus enabling the government to deploy 70,000 black or white soldiers throughout the country to protect the electors. To these should be added the private militia of the main leaders of the African parties agreeing to the elections, i.e. about 5,000 men whose task was to prevent an army estimated at some 10,000 guerrillas from disturbing the process of the elections.

68. Thus, from the outset, the elections were heavily handicapped by the refusal of the leaders of the guerrillas to take part on the grounds that forces were being deployed and also that an

electoral system guaranteeing the whites 28 % of the seats whereas they only constitute 4 % of the population was inherently unequal. In addition, whatever the results of the elections, the transitional measures planned guarantee that the white minority will continue to control the government of the country for at least five years. Finally, the Smith government is criticised for a series of military operations against the rebellion not only on Rhodesian territory but also on the territory of neighbouring countries such as Zambia where the Rhodesian army fought against the Zimbabwe rebellion through to the capital, Lusaka. For its part, the Salisbury government justified these operations by the need to prevent guerrillas jeopardising the freedom of the electors.

69. It may therefore be wondered whether the April 1979 elections will be a true contribution to re-establishing peace and a constitutional order acceptable to the black majority of the country or whether on the contrary the main result will not be to disarm the African rebellion by dividing its forces and enabling the western countries to resume their supplies to Rhodesia. Indeed it seems that the South African Government and the Rhodesian Government have based their tactics on the sincere desire of the great majority of the population to live in peace. There have been estimates of over 14,000 deaths in the civil war, at least half of them among the civilian population, which would signify wide popular support for the approach worked out by the Rhodesian Government whereby the leaders of the rebellion would be kept out of the political game.

70. The parliaments of western countries invited to send observers to supervise the conduct of the elections turned down this offer but a number of parliamentarians went in a personal capacity. Their testimony indicates that the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of relative freedom.

71. Considering the circumstances, participation in the elections was relatively high : 64 %. The victory of the United African National Council of Bishop Muzorewa was clear since it obtained 67 % of the votes cast, i.e. 1.8 million votes, and should secure 51 of the 100 seats in parliament as against 28 for the white minority represented by Mr. Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front and 21 for the other African parties, 12 of which go to Mr. Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union. The new provisional government should include 10 representatives of the United African National Council, 6 from the Rhodesian Front and two from each of the minority African parties, making 14 black representatives and 6 whites.

72. The question now is what will be the attitude of the western countries towards the new Rhodesian Government. Will they recognise the April

1979 elections as valid and end the boycott of Ian Smith's régime ? Naturally the Soviet Union and a number of its African allies, including those who afforded their support to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, will reject the result of the elections outright. So far the western countries have reserved their opinion. However, the United States Ambassador, Andrew Young, has already announced that President Carter would not recognise the new Rhodesia-Zimbabwe Government but certain American observers such as Senator Helms have pronounced that the elections were absolutely free. This senator has tabled a bill to raise the embargo and a significant part of Congress would seem prepared to vote for it.

73. European governments should also examine the results of these elections with the utmost attention and concert their views so as to adopt a joint approach. Any such position should be reached on the basis of a calm assessment well removed from the heat of the elections. It should take due account of the danger of backing a régime which was not sufficiently representative and on the other hand of encouraging movements of rebellion which would be representative only of a minority but whose operations might increase tension in southern Africa and bring about a further hardening of the policy of the Pretoria government. A government in Rhodesia with a black majority but tolerant towards whites would be an invaluable encouragement to the search for a reasonable régime in South Africa.

(c) *Mozambique*

74. For months, attacks, sabotage and various disturbances have been on the increase in this country. Some were attributed to Rhodesian guerrillas but others were claimed by the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), an underground movement against the Frelimo régime. This movement seems to have had steady support from the government of Mr. Ian Smith in Rhodesia in opposition to the Maputo régime and the Rhodesian guerrillas of Robert Mugabe. It is reported to be equipped with modern weapons and to have been joined by a number of Frelimo defectors including officers trained in the USSR. The requisition of foodstuffs by the Mozambique army and the Frelimo is reported to have brought it wide support among the rural population.

75. At the moment the MNR seems incapable of seriously challenging the power of the Mozambique government but its development and activity testify to the urgency of finding a solution to the Rhodesian conflict and the danger of any prolongation of present tension in the eastern part of southern Africa. European governments must take this into account when examining the problem of raising the boycott on Rhodesia.

II. East Africa

(a) *The Uganda revolution*

76. The most serious disturbances have most certainly been in East Africa. Bolstered by the support they had from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and also certain countries of North Africa, the Tanzanian Government in support of a widespread movement of Ugandan refugees launched a major operation against the highly-discredited régime of Marshal Idi Amin Dada in Uganda. In April 1979 the Tanzanian army took strong action to help the opponents of the Uganda régime to invade that country where it seized the capital, Kampala, and forced the troops still faithful to Marshal Amin Dada to take refuge in the forest areas near Kenya. It thus put an end to one of the cruelest dictatorships with the least respect for human rights and set up in Kampala a provisional government drawn from among the insurgents.

77. The reasons which led Tanzania to disregard the principle of the territorial integrity of the African states set up after colonisation are certainly complex. There is no hint of hegemony in the Tanzanian Government's action but the indications are that it wished first to secure guarantees against the threats so often levelled at it by the former dictator of Uganda and, second, to promote the downfall of his régime without calling on forces from outside Africa. It is yet too soon to form an opinion on the new régime in Kampala. It may however be considered that it has every chance of being more democratic and having greater regard for the preservation of the rights and liberties of mankind than the previous régime. It should be noted that this is its clearly-expressed intention whereas, during their withdrawal towards the frontiers of Kenya, troops still faithful to Marshal Amin Dada have multiplied their acts of repression. The Ugandan and Tanzanian forces which took over Kampala have found many traces of massacres carried out under the Ugandan dictator.

78. It remains to be seen whether the new régime will have the energy and drive necessary to restore the economy after such a long period of absolute despotism in Uganda producing such deep-rooted disorder.

79. Many African and European countries have hastened to recognise the new régime in Uganda. In doing so, they have condoned Tanzania's military operation which put an end to the dictatorship in Uganda.

(b) *Ethiopia and its neighbours*

80. Information available on the evolution of the situation in Ethiopia and neighbouring territories is still extremely limited which makes

it very difficult to form a substantiated opinion. It appears that with the assistance of Cuban volunteers and Soviet arms the government which emerged from the 1975 uprising putting an end to the régime of the Negus has managed to control a large part of the territory of Ethiopia and former Eritrea. The régime is despotic and repressive and has already led to the departure of many refugees, mainly Eritrean, who are now crowded in Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan in appalling material and moral conditions. As of now, 35,000 Ethiopian refugees constitute about 12 % of the population of Djibouti where the government is unable to accommodate them. There are reported to be about 300,000 refugees in the Sudan, i.e. more than 10 % of the population of the country, equally ill-equipped to receive them, particularly since it has already had to take in several thousand refugees from Zaïre.

81. These refugees constitute a human problem for the world as a whole and a political problem for the receiving countries which are afraid that a problem similar to the one in Lebanon will develop in the camps whose numbers are swelling. The United Nations High Commissariat for Refugees has so far been unable to find a satisfactory solution to these questions and, to do so, it would require a demonstration of international solidarity. In not wishing refugees to settle permanently on their territory, Djibouti and the Sudan have particular fears for their security and vital interests should an Ethiopian revolutionary power emerge. Such is the case in particular for Djibouti whose Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mounin Dahdon Farah, is reported to have appealed to the governments of Arab countries for assistance in resisting a threat of subversion directed by the Ethiopian Government. According to the authorities of Djibouti, the leaders of Ethiopia have armed a revolutionary group which has already started operations against the armed forces of Djibouti.

(c) *Libya*

82. There is now every indication that East Africa is one of the most unstable areas on the African continent. Events in Ethiopia and neighbouring countries in the last three years seem to threaten the stability of the whole of this area and Libya for its part seems to be playing an increasingly important rôle in destabilising North-East Africa. According to information from various sources, it is reported to have provided Marshal Idi Amin Dada with assistance in defending Uganda against Ugandan rebels and Tanzanian forces. If the N'Djamena government is to be believed, it provided increasing assistance to the rebels in Northern Chad, part of whose territory it is claiming, moreover. It is also said to have supplied arms and perhaps troops to the Ethiopian Government.

83. The aims pursued by Colonel Kadhafi's government have never been very clear but more than ever it is emerging as a subversive element and trouble maker in a large part of the African continent which is all the more formidable in that its revenue from oil has allowed it to equip its army with the latest weaponry purchased from members of the Warsaw Pact and from certain western countries too.

III. Central Africa

84. After its difficulties in 1978, Zaïre now seems to be passing through a calmer period. However, there is still much anxiety about its stability and the means available to the Kinshasa government for effectively controlling the country as a whole and promoting the necessary economic changes. At least the assistance obtained by Mr. Mobutu's government from many African states during the 1978 crisis leaves room for hope that African solidarity will continue to act in its favour and should there be a further threat to the integrity of Zaïre there would no longer be any need for intervention by European powers.

85. But the situation in Chad seems far more complicated. In 1978 the N'Djamena government was replaced by a new régime whose roots were to be found in the rebellion in the northern area. Christian elements in the south of the country are finding it increasingly difficult to accept the authority of the capital but this is not preventing a new rebellion backed by Libya from developing in the north. A conference of five different armed organisations was convened in Kano, Nigeria, in March 1978. An agreement was reached but when the question arose of associating six other militant organisations in April, the Kano conference had to resort to setting up a committee of enquiry into the representativity of these organisations. It is difficult to see how a government lacking the support of the various ethnic groups forming the population of Chad could remain in office for long in N'Djamena without the support of outside powers. If Europe does not wish to take direct action in this area it should encourage the Organisation of African Unity to assume its responsibilities and promote the formation in N'Djamena of a government which secures the backing of all fractions of the population of this country.

IV. West Africa

86. West Africa has been an area of relative stability since the end of the civil war in Nigeria. The development of oil in this country has allowed its economic activity to be restored without delay and the economies of several other West African countries such as the Ivory Coast seem to be developing fairly quickly in a framework of political stability.

87. This is not so for all countries in the area however. The further deterioration in the climate in the Sahel and the extension of desert regions have steadily reduced the areas under cultivation and particularly those suitable for breeding livestock with a consequent increase in poverty and often famine.

88. In Nigeria, the military government which has been directing the country for thirteen years has decided to stand down and allow free elections to be held on 7th May 1979, as was done by the military rulers of Ghana in 1969. The attempt in Ghana failed after twenty-seven months. The Nigerian Government has taken account of this unfortunate experience by first re-establishing democratic procedure at local level and establishing a federal system with nineteen states as a ploy against tribalism. Five parties are to take part in the May 1979 elections in an atmosphere of remarkable freedom after thirteen years of bans on political parties. It remains to be seen whether the elections will produce a stable majority capable of continuing the realistic policy pursued by the military régime, particularly in economic matters. Should this not be so, it is to be feared that democratic practices will be jeopardised for a long time to come, not only in Nigeria but also in neighbouring countries.

89. Important elections are also to be held in Ghana in the coming months with a view to the adoption of a democratic constitution.

90. The only international conflict in West Africa is between Mauritania and Morocco. Once Spain put an end to the colonisation of the Rio de Oro, the area was shared between Morocco and Mauritania. A rebellion, encouraged and armed by Algeria on whose territory it set up its rear bases, developed outside the former territory of Rio de Oro in Morocco and Mauritania where the railway for transporting Mauritanian iron ore was subjected to frequent attacks, which led to a reaction from France with the commitment of its forces stationed in Mauritania.

91. This problem produced high tension between Morocco and Algeria, both of which have quite powerful armies, and there is still a danger of hostilities worsening. There have been two revolutions in Mauritania since July 1978 and each new régime undertook to negotiate with the leaders of the rebellion but on terms which have so far proved unacceptable to the rebels. It is extremely difficult to assess the true extent of the rebellion since statistics about the population in that part of the Sahara are extremely dubious.

92. However this may be, a solution should be found giving due satisfaction to this population. But at the same time it is to be feared that before a solution is found there will be fighting between Morocco and Algeria which might most probably

provide the Soviet Union with a new pretext for intervening on the African continent. Here too, western intervention seems hardly desirable, whatever the interests at stake, since this could but provide an opportunity and pretext for other outside intervention.

Conclusions

93. After this brief glimpse of the situation, your Rapporteur has to conclude that more than ever African problems must be handled by the population of Africa itself. The relative moderation of the Soviet Union and its allies in African affairs in the last year has allowed the Africans to take far more action than heretofore in the settlement of the problems arising on their continent.

94. Certain measures however may be taken to facilitate this process. One is the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa on the basis of the Lomé agreements. It now seems clear that most African countries have realised what advantage they can draw from these agreements and have understood that this is not a new colonialist operation on the part of the Europeans but a basis for co-operation based on new principles.

95. Second, Europe must be far more cautious and moderate in its supplies of arms to African

states. Several times, arms procured by one African country or another have been used in other areas. Libya in particular has been an active agent of a policy of destabilisation in Africa thanks to the arms it has procured in Europe and elsewhere.

96. Finally, the policy of pressure against South Africa and Uganda has produced tangible results which should not be compromised by over-systematic support for the aims of rebel movements. Results are obviously more conclusive in the case of Uganda where the Tanzanian Government was encouraged to help the Ugandan rebels to terminate the régime of terror in their country. In the case of southern Africa, there is nothing conclusive in the nature of the compromises which have allowed elections to be held in Rhodesia and promised elections in Namibia. What is positive is the use of universal suffrage decided on in Namibia and already applied in Rhodesia. Even if the results of these first elections are being challenged and even if they fail to allow a régime to be set up which might re-establish order and peace, they nevertheless demonstrate that the sovereignty of the people has been recognised as the basis for a new state. That is the basis on which it is possible to institute régimes with sufficient backing to produce effective peace and permanent respect for human rights. It is Europe's duty to take account of this now in its attitude towards the boycott of Rhodesia and guarantees of free voting in Namibia.

APPENDIX

Africa — Principal mineral deposits



CHAPTER I

*Mineral products in Africa — known reserves**A. Principal ores*

(Estimate million tons)

Country	Iron	Bauxite	Copper	Zinc	Lead	Tin	Manga- nese	Uranium	Coal	Phos- phates
Morocco	60		600		1,400		680			16,200
Algeria	600		600		600					45
Tunisia	40									270
Egypt	430									1,090
Mauritania	130									
Senegal	400									120
Niger								40,000		
Guinea	600	4,064								
Sierra Leone	100	100								
Liberia	700									
Ghana							320			
Nigeria						276			450	
Central African Empire								7,000		
Gabon	940						90,000	20,000		
Zaire			25,000	900		195	3,100			
Zambia			29,000	700					200	
Rhodesia	440			600					6,600	
Namibia	400			1,000	1,400					

Source : *Industries et travaux d'Outre-Mer*, March 1978.*B. Share of southern Africa in world reserves*

	%
Chromium	96
Industrial diamonds	89
Platinum	71
Gold	50
Cobalt	40
Manganese	37
Vanadium	19
Fluorine	17
Uranium	14
Copper	13
Asbestos	6
Antimony	5

Source : *Défense Nationale*, December 1978.

CHAPTER II

Mineral production in 1976

(in thousand tons)

Country	Iron ore	Bauxite	Copper	Zinc	Lead	Tin	Manga- nese	Uranium	Coal	Phos- phates
Morocco	40		4	15	67		118		700	15,293
Algeria	2,800			14	2					820
Tunisia	485			7	11					3,294
Egypt	1,242						4			550
Mauritania	9,415		9							
Senegal										1,580
Niger								1.460		
Guinea		11,316								
Sierra Leone		660								
Liberia	21,340									
Togo										2,068
Ghana		267					312			
Nigeria						4			300	
Gabon							2,217	0.955		
Congo			2	5						
Zaire			444	68		4	157		90	
Angola										
Uganda			7							
Tanzania									753	10
Zambia			709	38	14					
Rhodesia	600		50						2,600	
Namibia			39	46	42					
Botswana			12				1			224
Others		272			3	2			556	173
TOTAL AFRICA	36,222	12,248	1,276	193	139	11	2,808	2.415	5,223	23,788

Source : *Industries et travaux d'Outre-Mer*, March 1978.

CHAPTER III

Trade**I. Africa's share in industrialised countries' imports**

(\$ million)

	1967	1976	1977
Total exports to developed market economies (a)	147,460	658,351	749,390
From African developing market economies (b)	6,750	34,431	39,596
From South Africa	1,460	3,803	5,383
Africa's share	5.6 %	5.8 %	6.0 %

(a) Excluding South Africa.

(b) Excluding Southern Rhodesia.

Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, special tables in the June issue.

II. Exports from developing Africa*(a) Crude fertilisers and minerals*

	1967		1976		Annual average growth rates 1967-76 (%)
	\$ million	%	\$ million	%	
World	210		805		+ 16.1
Developed market economies (a)	168	80.0	585	72.7	+ 14.9
Developing market economies	14	6.7	91	11.3	+ 23.1
Centrally planned	24	11.4	132	16.4	+ 20.9

(b) Metalliferous ores and metal scrap

World	365		1,117		+ 13.2
Developed market economies (a)	354	97.0	1,000	89.5	+ 13.2
Developing market economies	2	0.5	23	2.1	+ 31.2
Centrally planned	9	2.5	63	5.6	+ 24.1

(c) Mineral fuels and related materials

World	2,070		27,265		+ 33.2
Developed market economies (a)	1,903	91.9	23,768	87.2	+ 32.4
Developing market economies	115	5.6	2,828	10.4	+ 42.7
Centrally planned	6	0.3	334	1.2	+ 56.3

(a) Excluding South Africa.

(d) Non-ferrous metals

	1967		1976		Annual average growth rates 1967-76 (%)
	\$ million	%	\$ million	%	
World	1,020		1,734		+ 6.1
Developed market economies (a)	944	92.5	1,052	60.7	+ 1.2
Developing market economies	16	1.6	419	24.2	+ 43.7
Centrally planned	19	1.9	40	2.3	+ 8.6

(e) Total

World	7,960		41,839		+ 20.2
Developed market economies (a)	6,576	82.6	35,899	85.8	+ 20.8
Developing market economies	720	9.0	4,964	11.9	+ 23.9
Centrally planned	530	6.7	1,961	4.7	+ 15.6

(a) Excluding South Africa.

Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Special tables in July 1975, August 1976, May 1977, June 1978 and July 1973 issues.

III. Exports from South Africa

	1967		1976		1977	
	\$ million	%	\$ million	%	\$ million	%
World	1,900		4,787		6,690	
Developed market economies	1,460	76.8	3,803	79.4	5,383	80.5
Developing market economies	355	18.7	918	19.2	1,220	18.2
Centrally planned economies	4	0.2	20	0.4	21	0.3

Source: United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, special tables in the June issue.

IV. Oil movements from Africa

(in million tons)

	1967	1976	1977
<i>To:</i>			
United States	3.0	98.1	123.6
Canada	1.5	2.5	19.6
Western Europe	130.5	123.2	124.6
Latin America	—	19.1	21.0
Africa	—	0.7	0.2
South-East Asia	—	1.9	0.9
Japan	—	3.5	1.2
Australasia	—	—	—
Other Eastern Hemisphere	0.8	11.1	4.5
Destination not known	3.0	—	—
TOTAL	141.0	260.1	276.0

Source: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, annual issues 1967 to 1977.

V. United States imports

(as % of consumption)

Bauxite	88
Chromium	100
Cobalt	75 (imported from Zaïre)
Tin	100
Manganese	95
Nickel	90
Oil (of which 40 % by the Cape of Good Hope)	60

VI. Share of state-trading countries in the trade of certain African countries

1. Imports from :

(\$ thousand)

Country	1970			1975			1976			1977
	World	Socialist countries	%	World	Socialist countries	%	World	Socialist countries	%	World
Angola	368,514	315	0.07	430,000			200,000			
Ethiopia	173,058	9,533	5.51	293,978	16,223	5.52	406,042			349,000
Guinea	55,023			154,320	4,490	2.91	123,000			
Mali	44,799	8,951	19.98	189,295	28,662	15.14	150,153	15,568	10.37	145,000
Mozambique	324,000	216	0.07	401,130	70	0.02	350,000			
Nigeria	1,058,986	61,408	5.80	6,041,232	175,057	2.90	8,194,632	259,894	3.17	
Tanzania	271,488	41,869	15.42	718,260	92,101	12.82	566,578	47,157	8.32	704,000
Zaïre	532,975	3,776	0.71	727,127	16,682	1.80	827,000			610,000
Zambia	476,992	8,962	1.88	928,716	30,312	3.26	850,000			817,000

2. Exports to :

Angola	423,385	1,699	0.40	900,000			200,000			
Ethiopia	122,302	1,516	1.24	230,778	5,910	2.56	313,258			330,000
Guinea	42,377			130,000	680	0.52	202,000			
Mali	35,456	647	1.82	36,766	8,157	22.19	84,537	9,394	11.11	145,000
Mozambique	156,774	122	0.08	294,620	180	0.06	190,000			
Nigeria	1,058,986	35,377	2.88	7,991,994	132,993	1.66	9,726,421	49,590	0.51	11,772,000
Tanzania	238,326	12,589	5.28	348,679	20,691	5.93	459,981	22,053	4.79	501,000
Zaïre	735,366	17		742,366	4,461	0.60	930,000			981,000
Zambia	1,000,950	54,183	5.41	811,503	20,849	2.57	1,046,000			898,000

Source : United Nations statistical yearbooks.

VII. EEC trade with certain African countries

Country	Imports	Exports
	%	%
Morocco	51.1	59.2
Algeria	59.9	45.4
Tunisia	64.5	53.7
Libya	54.2	49.6
Egypt	37.4	30.1
Sudan	46	42.4
Ivory Coast	63.1	57.9
Ghana	42	38.2
Nigeria	60.2	35.1
Cameroon	66.8	62.3
Gabon	78.5	32.2
Zaire	54.2	73.3
Angola	32.2	12.5
Kenya	40.7	35.9
Tanzania	34.8	39.2
Zambia	43.3	46.3
South Africa	48.1	48

Source : Eurostat, 1978, pages 136-137.

CHAPTER IV

*Co-operation under the Lomé Convention**Percentage of STABEX products in exports*

Country	Products	%
Botswana	Hides and skins	9
Burundi	Coffee, cotton, hides and skins	95
Cameroon	Cocoa, coffee, timber	61
Central African Rep.	Coffee, timber, cotton	62
People's Rep. of Congo	Timber	42
Ivory Coast	Cocoa, coffee, timber	67
Dahomey	Palm products	34
Ethiopia	Coffee, hides and skins	51
Gabon	Timber	32
Gambia	Groundnuts, groundnut oil and oilcake	94
Ghana	Cocoa, timber	80
Upper Volta	Groundnuts and groundnut oil, cotton	30
Kenya	Coffee, tea	33
Liberia	Iron ore	71
Madagascar	Coffee, hemp	33
Malawi	Tea, groundnuts	24
Mali	Cotton, groundnuts	46
Mauritania	Iron ore	73
Niger	Groundnuts, groundnut oil	24
Uganda	Coffee, cotton, tea	86
Ruanda	Coffee, raw hides	65
Senegal	Groundnuts and groundnut oil	35
Sierra Leone	Iron ore, palm nuts	15
Somalia	Bananas, copra	71
Sudan	Cotton, groundnuts	65
Swaziland	Cotton	3
Tanzania	Coffee, cotton, hemp	31
Chad	Cotton	69
Togo	Cocoa beans, coffee	39

Source : International Financial Statistics, November 1974.

Africa's rôle in a European security policy

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy and others

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows :
"Condemning the policy of apartheid as still pursued by the South African Republic as contrary to the principles of democracy and human rights and as a threat to world peace ;".
2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
"and induce the South African Republic to terminate apartheid ;".

Signed : Hardy, Faulds, von Bothmer, Urwin, Cook, Lewis, Miller

1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment 1 negatived ; Amendment 2 agreed to).

Africa's rôle in a European security policy

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by Mr. Faulds and others

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "Examine" and add :

"in view of the nature of the constitution and the circumstances of the elections in April 1979, whether recognition can yet be given to Southern Rhodesia or sanctions yet be lifted."

Signed : Faulds, Urwin, von Bothmer, Roper, Stoffelen, Schwencke, Cook, Enders, Northfield, Miller, Craigen, Konings

1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment negatived).

Africa's rôle in a European security policy

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Mr. Boucheny

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add :
- “and, taking account in particular of the repeated condemnation by the United Nations of the régime in South Africa, strive resolutely to restore freedom for all races and ethnic groups in that country ;”.

Signed : Boucheny

1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment not moved).

Africa's rôle in a European security policy

AMENDMENT 5¹
tabled by Mr. Page

5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, after the first word "in" insert "and after".

Signed: Page

1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

The industrial bases of European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*²
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur

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on the industrial bases of European security

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Warren (Chairman) ; MM. Valleix, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Adriaensens, Bernini, Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate : Porthoine), Hawkins (Alternate : Beith), Konings, Lewis,

Malvy, Mart (Alternate : Hengel), Müller, Péronnet, Pinto, Schwencke, Talon, Treu, Ueberhorst (Alternate : Scheffler), van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the industrial bases of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms of European armaments co-operation ;

Considering the military and economic need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring its security, a condition of its independence ;

Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of armaments at the research, development and production stages ;

Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of several member countries and the ability of some of them to produce many types of equipment without international co-operation ;

Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen years ;

Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organisation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which this report is to be a preparatory document,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment :
 - (a) to be produced on a co-operative basis ;
 - (b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability ;
 - (c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable importance ;
2. Assess the results and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ;
3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infra-red sensors for weapons systems ;
4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concerned, introduce appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary rights ;
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equipment and working out harmonised methods of financing ;
6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in European co-operation.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In his report on British membership of the European Communities and the prospects of scientific and technical co-operation in Europe¹, Mr. Lloyd demonstrated that Europe had made far less progress in advanced technology than the United States. For instance, in the aerospace, nuclear and computer industries, the European effort could not really be compared with that of the United States although the scale of the European market and the extent of Europe's combined resources were comparable. Continued economic progress in Europe would ultimately depend on technological progress and to keep a good lead high technology skills would have to be developed.

2. Although research and development of modern computer and data-processing systems took place in the United Kingdom the industrial development was promoted by IBM and the United States navy at the end of the second world war; the first all-electronic digital computer was completed in 1945. Commercial use started in 1950 and IBM became commercially active in the computer field in 1952. The explosive growth of this industry was sustained by the concurrent development of mini- and microelectronic hardware that began with the invention of the transistor in 1947.

3. Without mentioning the progress of computer programming, the introduction of time-sharing and micro-computers has considerably reduced costs and helped to boost applications and sales.

4. Aware of the potential of computers, the Pentagon and American military authorities have urged industry to strive for even better performances. This was not the case in Europe and it took a long time for European governments and industries to realise the need to acquire such means. By then the IBM position was so strong that neither individually nor jointly in UNIDATA (Philips, Siemens and CII) could national European industries compete effectively.

5. A similar example in the sixties is the conquest of space if one compares American successes with Europe's failure with the Europa I launcher in ELDO.

6. It thus may appear that only the super-powers can afford to allocate a major part of their gross national product to work considered

to be of national interest, and defence work in particular, and that only they are able to promote very expensive new developments as in the cases mentioned. The question therefore is whether the combination of numbers, size, wealth of natural resources and scientific and technological expertise will, in industrial matters, lead to a difference in kind or degree between the super-powers and other nations of the world.

7. The example of France, which has concentrated its resources on nuclear weapons, and of Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands with certain industries, seems to demonstrate that it is not a question of kind but of scale and that if an adequate volume of resources combined with the will to complete a given programme exists, European scientists and industrialists can succeed as well as those of the superpowers.

8. The question therefore arises as to whether Europe is to use the industries which are the basis of its defence. Will Europe always be handicapped by a lack of political will or can European collaboration compensate for American science, technology and resources?

9. In its reply to Recommendation 325 on a European armaments policy¹ the WEU Council of Ministers rightly stated that:

"...the Council consider that efforts to organise European co-operation in the field of armaments production are essential and should be vigorously pursued.

...Indeed, the search for standardisation must not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin, leaving the European industry with only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors which in the long term would be a threat to its existence.

The restructuring of the European armaments industry raises a number of complex problems which are not limited to industrial and customs policy or research policy, but directly involve the security of states."

10. Your Rapporteur is happy to note that the Council is of the opinion that the suggestion to restructure the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community would "imply a wide interpretation of the field of application of the Treaty of Rome" and that "such an interpretation has already been opposed by a number of governments."

¹. Document 573.

¹. Document 786.

11. During discussion of the working paper on 4th April, some members pointed out that the report should also stress the need for an overall policy of détente with the East. In this context your Rapporteur might mention the proposals to set up an arms control group within NATO to advocate steps for curbing theatre nuclear weapons with a view to paving the way for greater European participation in the next round of United States-Soviet Union nuclear arms negotiations. This proposal was made at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 6th April 1979 by the Federal Republic of Germany. Your Rapporteur believes this subject should be developed further in the General Affairs or Defence Committee as the technological aspects are far less important than the political and military aspects.

II. General aspects of industrial problems

12. The technological basis of a modern industrial nation is considered a national asset of great importance. Governments believe that it is both a political and economic necessity to protect and improve this basis, especially if it is rooted in investment in advanced military technology. The European Community, which is the world's second largest industrial grouping, is an economic and not a defence community and therefore has to exclude technology for military purposes from its field of interest. Among our nations, defence-related industries are either nationalised or under close national governmental scrutiny; they are considered national instruments for the execution of certain national policies.

13. In order to overcome the recognised smallness of scale and series, certain weapon projects have become bilateral; Britain, France and Germany have collaborated on several weapon systems projects which have resulted in Anglo-French, Anglo-German and Franco-German projects, but unfortunately there are no major trilateral Anglo-Franco-German defence projects.

14. In the civil field many governments are aware of the need for co-operation, research and development. The late Netherlands Minister for Scientific Affairs, Mr. Peijnenberg, said, addressing the Assembly on 2nd November 1978:

“In various countries it has now been realised that a stimulus needs to be provided by the authorities if an adequate degree of technological innovation is to be achieved, thus bringing about both economic growth and new job opportunities.”

15. He remarked further that the industrialised countries should concentrate on innovation in those areas where traditionally and internationally they had always held a leading posi-

tion and that scientific and technical knowledge should thus have as wide a basis as possible. International co-operation was essential, not only from the viewpoint of exchanging information but certainly also from that of acquiring knowledge, especially in areas where capital-intensive investment was called for.

16. In recent years NATO members have increasingly found that modern weapons technology requires ever broader markets. Thomas A. Callaghan, famous for his report about United States-European military co-operation, described the situation as follows:

“In the years leading up to the first world war nations of 25 million people could largely provide for their own defence. By World War II and its immediate aftermath, only nations of 50 million people had the resources to develop and produce their own military hardware. By the sixties, however, nations of the size of Britain, France, Germany and Italy could no longer bear the burden of weapon system development and production...”

17. Your Rapporteur thinks this is correct, at least over the overall spectrum of armaments systems development but not in special cases.

18. The disparity between the United States and any one European country in terms of military requirements, defence budgets, resources, companies and markets is one of the most difficult problems to solve with regard to European-American co-operation. Bilateral projects such as the American-German tank or the British-American Harrier development project have not come to fruition because of the difficulties involved in this type of co-operation. Disparity in scale makes it impossible to structure several major development programmes on a bilateral basis between the United States and Britain, France or Germany. A single bilateral project might be possible, but not a second or third. Several projects between the United States and any single European nation state would completely distort the financial, economic, technological and industrial balance within that nation state as the development work and cost would be extremely difficult to share; American requirements are often five to six times greater than those of any single European nation state. There are in fact four structural obstacles to bilateral co-operation between the United States and a major European power: first, one individual project is too small a structure for a co-operative effort; second, taken individually the European states are too small for bilateral co-operation on several projects, third, dispersed, European industry is not large enough to produce weapon systems on a continental scale and, finally, the United States has its own national military requirements based on its own ideas and

inventions and therefore the question of national pride is introduced.

19. Moreover, no European nation state is financially able to risk research and development on a continental scale without having prior assurances of continuous continental-scale markets. The national budgets, the companies and the markets are scaled to national rather than to continental efforts.

20. In order to overcome the difficulties in the "two-way street" between Europe and the United States regarding a balanced flow for selling and buying armaments, a weapons family concept has been proposed. This means that on each side of the Atlantic a weapons system is to be developed which is complementary to a weapons system developed on the other side. The United States, for instance, would be the sponsoring government for an advanced medium-range air-to-air missile and one of the major European governments, acting on behalf of a consortium, would be the sponsoring government for an advanced short-range air-to-air missile. Such a plan should be accompanied by general memoranda of understanding to waive various national restrictions on imports, etc., on a reciprocal basis and to prevent dual production in NATO countries.

21. There are various disadvantages in such a programme for weapons families. First, it would mean that a given weapons technology would for an extended period of time be handled by one of the partners in the Atlantic Alliance. This would imply that the industries on the other side of the Atlantic would pay no attention to the technical development of any such weapons system and there would be the additional burden of having to formulate a common policy for sales to third countries.

22. Within Europe and the Alliance, the export policies of the various countries are quite different. It seems doubtful whether a compromise could be found between France and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Federal Republic and the United States on the other, which for different reasons follow different export policies. In the United States there are important Presidential limitations on third country sales. The Federal Republic of Germany wants weapons exports only to NATO countries and in exceptional cases to other countries, as long as the security of such a weapons system is assured. The sale of any modern weapons system abroad may help the Soviet Union to gain knowledge of it or acquire it.

23. In addition, it is highly unlikely that European governments would give their industries a free hand in drawing up agreements between themselves or leave negotiations in the hands of prime contractors. The United States Government seems more inclined to give industry a

free hand, except for "classified" or "sensitive" equipment.

24. In order to overcome the difficulties that would arise if certain technology were researched and developed on only one side of the Atlantic, it might be suggested that 20 % or more of the total sub-system design, development and testing be carried out by subcontractors on the opposite side of the Atlantic to that of the prime contractor. One could go even further by suggesting that there should be comparable levels of transatlantic subcontracting in each of two complementary programmes in a family of weapons systems, as in the case of the medium-range and short-range air-to-air missiles.

25. In some fields of militarily significant technologies such as electronics, commercial applications may occur three to five years in advance of military applications. For example, large-scale integration integrated circuits were first applied in computers and microprocessors and while they have already been used in existing weapons systems, they will play an increasingly important rôle in electronics for weapons systems in the 1980s.

26. The control of such critical technologies does not need to be absolute in order to be effective. The objective should be to delay their acquisition by the Warsaw Pact countries. The allies should keep a measurable lead time in the practice of such technologies, perhaps from five to ten years. It is of the greatest importance that these security aspects should be taken into consideration in an exchange of weapons systems and this again has a direct influence on exports of weapons systems.

27. The following fifteen technologies may be considered as critical :

- computer network technology ;
- large computer system technology ;
- software technology ;
- automated real time control technology ;
- materials, structures, fabrication, processing and manufacturing technology ;
- directed energy technology ;
- LSI-VLSI (large-scale integration and very-large-scale integration describe microcircuits in electronics) design and manufacturing technology ;
- military instrumentation technology ;
- telecommunications technology ;
- guidance and control technology ;
- microwave component technology ;
- military turbine engine technology ;

- fibre optics and advanced optics technology ;
- sensor technology ;
- undersea systems technology.

III. Drawbacks of dispersal

28. The lack of standardisation of munitions used in large quantities and the lack of adequate interoperability between the communications systems of each member of the Alliance and between certain other equipment which may for instance prevent the refuelling of one country's aircraft in another's installations are sources of inefficiency which are unacceptable from a military standpoint. Interoperability and some degree of standardisation are therefore an absolute minimum necessity for the armies of allied countries which may one day have to stand side by side.

29. In economic terms, the lack of standardisation of equipment or components produces a heavy logistic burden for all the countries concerned since one way or another more support facilities are needed because of the diversity of the equipment deployed. It is necessary to double up teams of experts, stocks of spare parts, specialised training means such as simulators, etc. Thus, for the same number of weapons, the use of more than one type increases the expense.

30. A similar handicap is encountered at production level : the cost of research, development and manufacture has to be multiplied by the number of different models produced, and the shorter each production run is, the greater is the cost of amortising the operations in question ; for that reason and to secure acceptable unit prices, the main manufacturers of sophisticated equipment have endeavoured to work on a co-operative basis ¹, mainly bilateral but also tri- and multilateral, and to export their wares. This is the case for the United States and, in Europe, for France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany ².

31. Can this situation be improved ?

32. A satisfactory solution is difficult to find : the problem has been recognised since the beginning of the sixties but has become worse due to several factors such as :

- the Atlantic Alliance is an association of independent democratic states each of which has its own political, economic and

1. The list of the different programmes pursued on a co-operative basis is given in Appendix I.

2. Appendix II.

military problems and consequently interests and motivations which may be different from those of its partners ;

- each country is responsible for the logistics of its own forces ;
- once rebuilt after the second world war, the newly fitted-out European industries started work in increasingly-advanced branches of technology in many new sectors such as nuclear energy, electronics, communications, aerospace, etc. ; this technological surge allowed the medium-sized European powers to produce almost the whole spectrum of weapons they considered necessary ;
- at the same time, American equipment, which at the end of the war was the main equipment of most European forces, became obsolescent. These countries then quite naturally turned to their own industries for replacements ;
- technological gains and industrial proprietary rights are a source of wealth for these countries and their industries, whose greatest value resides in the fact that they can thus maintain a high economic standard in face of the commercial offensive of developing countries with very low-cost manpower. This applies to everyday products. For products, even very complex ones, which have to be produced in very large quantities, account must also be taken of Japan and the United States, which have, or are developing, highly-automated means of production, and countries with socialist economies for which the cost price is not of the same importance as in liberal economies. Maintaining a high level of research and study potential is therefore essential for our industries and this potential must be kept fully occupied even at the risk of duplicating work in a rival firm of the same or another nationality. This factor will be a major obstacle to the standardisation of armaments equipment for a long time, whatever steps may be proposed for pooling technological know-how ;
- the unemployment crisis throughout the West incites industrialists and governments to seek work even with a low profit margin. This is true for such sensitive areas as the iron and steel industry, boiler making, shipbuilding, car and aircraft industries, chemical industries, electronics, precision engineering, etc. ;

- laws, regulations and standards in force in the various European countries are also often major obstacles to the progress of co-operation, particularly as they express different attitudes, ways of thinking and motivations.

IV. *Military requirements and European industry*

33. National strategies determine the military options of national general staffs. Based on the national strategy and the options available, the military authorities define their requirements. It is clear that nuclear weapon countries such as France and the United Kingdom have national strategies different to those of the Federal Republic of Germany or Italy. The strategic considerations of the Benelux countries are different again. As long as there is no common denominator for the national strategies, it will be impossible to have an overall armaments programme at European level which could be translated into a coherent programme of orders to the armaments industries in the WEU countries.

34. This brings out the important point that military staffs do not have the same concept of the threat and how to meet it. Moreover their range of military means is not composed in the same way nor, in the case of equipment of a similar type, is there the same time-table for phasing out obsolescent items. Requirements and replacement schedules are therefore different in member countries. In order to harmonise the technical and industrial effort of the member countries, co-ordination of strategic and tactical guidelines should be established and replacement time-tables progressively harmonised. In order to assess the military situation your Rapporteur asked an expert, Ingénieur Général Brindeau to outline as accurately as possible the situations that must be faced in order to identify methodically the nature and volume of the principal requirements of the armed forces. General Brindeau's opinion is appended to this report¹.

35. Past history has shown that the possibilities of regrouping efforts for Europe's defence can be achieved only on the long term. The member countries' objectives and defence conditions are still varied, in spite of the solidarity which has emerged under the WEU and North Atlantic treaties. Co-operation can develop only from a gradual, pragmatic approach. The same will be true for the co-ordination of efforts to develop the advanced technology sectors essential for modern defence. General Brindeau's paper

underlines the sectors in which such co-ordination should be undertaken or promoted, i.e. aeronautics, telecommunications, computers and space — in the space sector of course a great deal has already been achieved in the European Space Agency. The industrial bases of European defence are however not restricted to these advanced technology sectors nor to the industries which work directly on armaments. They also include the advanced technology industries linked with energy which, in view of their importance for the European production cycle, makes the latter highly vulnerable.

36. In the energy field, as in many others, everybody agrees that fundamentally no effective solution can be found by any one country alone. But on neither side of the Atlantic has it been possible to establish an efficient common energy policy. Recently Common Market energy ministers gave up their attempts to create such a policy. The reason for this failure is that importing countries are afraid to adopt a uniform position.

37. Where aeronautics are concerned the Committee has taken many initiatives to promote co-ordination in the civil and military fields. At the colloquies organised in 1973 and 1976 it urged the member governments to establish a family of aircraft based on the Airbus. By the end of 1978 the eight-year-old Airbus Industrie had captured 37 % of the wide-bodied aircraft market, and was second only to the American Boeing company. Because of the success of its original model, the Airbus A-300B, Airbus Industrie is to sell a shorter version, the A-310, scheduled for completion in 1983. The planes are being built by a consortium of companies from five European nations and their success is partly due to the fact that in an area of increasingly expensive energy they are designed for low energy consumption. The French Transport Minister, Mr. Joël Le Theule, declared in Toulouse in April 1979 that Airbus, which now provides 17,000 jobs in the five nations which build it, will employ 40,000 workers by the late 1980s.

38. In the military field, your Rapporteur put a written question to the Council on the next generation of fighter aircraft :

“Does the Council not consider that the time is ripe to approach the Europeans concerned with a view to reaching agreement on the concepts from which will emerge the next generation of fighter aircraft and a harmonised military policy ?”

and on 21st March 1979 he received the following reply :

“The Council are aware that much work is already going on nationally on the concepts

1. Appendix III.

for the next generation of fighter aircraft. Effective arrangements exist for these concepts to be compared and harmonised. The work on a possible European tactical combat aircraft is being co-ordinated by the independent European programme group, which has set up a special study of the operational factors as the first step towards seeking to establish a co-operative programme. The technical, financial and military problems to be overcome are very great, but there is every indication that those concerned are fully aware of the importance and desirability of finding a European solution to the requirement, if this is at all possible."

39. In the field of computers Europe's future is not so bright. So far European collaboration has come to naught, but the industries should be regrouped in a European framework. If Europe does not take decisive action in this field it will never be able to compete with IBM or the growing Japanese computer industry.

40. The domination of IBM in particular is reinforced by the absence of standardisation, especially of software, at European level. The software aspect has never received sufficient attention in the European computer industry with the result that Europe is now three to five years behind the Americans.

41. There is of course an important rôle to be played by computers in defence as is clear from the accelerated introduction of computers in American military and space programmes. It appears that existing computers might be able to meet military needs at present, but this will not necessarily be so if no special measures are taken in the meantime. Europe cannot remain dependent on imports of computer elements for its own military equipment when they are produced only outside Europe. This would certainly have political consequences which would be unacceptable to many European countries and would also affect the export of weapons systems which in turn would have social consequences for the armaments industries.

42. With regard to military satellites, your Rapporteur wishes to point out that these have been dealt with in earlier reports by the Committee, i.e. Document 766 on application satellites, Document 773 on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology and Document 785 on weather forecasting.

V. Industrial bases of defence

43. Throughout the preceding chapters, it has been evident that research and the development and production of efficient weapons was based on the application of every form of advanced technology by leading industries :

- aerospace industry ;
- electronics, radioelectric and communications industry ;
- opto-electronic industry ;
- nuclear industry ; etc.

44. These advanced technology industries have certain common features :

- (i) their products are highly sophisticated technically ;
- (ii) their output is being continually renewed ;
- (iii) expenditure on research and development is very high ;
- (iv) they employ highly-qualified staff, more than in other industrial sectors ;
- (v) the programme generally constitutes an economic entity ;
- (vi) the state intervenes at every level ;
- (vii) there is a dominating industry : that of the United States ;
- (viii) in general these industries do not hesitate to launch co-operative programmes ;
- (ix) for all these reasons the western governments are trying to develop them to the maximum, leaving them as much independence as possible.

45. Two remarks introduce the organisation of this section :

- whether for engines or for weapons, co-operation at European level in the nuclear field is out of the question. Although some degree of Franco-British co-operation may be possible for means of delivery, this could only be in the fairly distant future ;
- the aircraft and space industry as a whole reaches the highest level in the various aspects of advanced technology. The study of this industry will therefore be the central theme of this section.

46. The aerospace industry has five branches of operation, i.e. airframes, engines, equipment, missiles and space, and three markets, i.e. civil aviation, military aviation and space. Through aircraft, missile and space equipment, it is in direct contact with the electronic, radioelectric and opto-electronic industries. *Technical complexity is a characteristic of the products of these industries.*

47. The aerospace industry produces equipment which owes its survival in air or in space to its

reliability and that of *all* its components. In addition, such equipment must be light and capable of high performances. All components are therefore at the highest level of the technological capability of a country in all the technology used.

48. To produce a modern aircraft, the number of subcontractors under the prime contractor is very high, varying from several hundred to several thousand, and in order to qualify each of these firms must pursue major research and development programmes. The following percentages may be quoted for expenditure on research and development compared with turnover :

— aerospace industries	20 %
— electronic industries	6 %
— machine tool industry	4 %
— communications industry	8.5 %
— chemical industries	4 %

This high technical level explains the qualifications required of the staff employed :

— engineers and executives	13 %
— technicians, draughtsmen	34 %
— skilled workers	38 %
— unskilled workers	15 %

49. High research and development costs must be amortised over a large number of aircraft. For instance, for large-capacity *civil* aircraft, account being taken of the market, some 350 aircraft must be sold to achieve a good financial balance. This result can usually be attained only ten or fifteen years after the programme is launched. *The major programme is therefore an economic entity.*

50. To give an idea, a current major programme represents about \$2,000 million and provides work for 20,000 to 50,000 persons over a period of fifteen to twenty years.

51. The civil work of firms therefore depends on only a few major programmes. The whole European civil aircraft industry depends essentially on Airbus. As a consequence :

- the danger of a programme coming to a sudden end may be reduced by seeking to produce families of aircraft with as many common parts as possible and not taking technological strides which are too great ;
- risks may be spread and reduced through co-operation instead of cut-throat competition ;
- civil work is part of a wider framework of civil and military programmes in which the volume of military orders

often accounts for three-quarters of the firm's work and, even for civil orders, the state is directly or indirectly the most important customer.

State intervention

52. In both the aerospace and the armaments industries, the state intervenes and the Ministry of Defence is the guardian ministry. Its action covers orders for equipment, verification of technology used, production controls, etc.

53. The state acts as a privileged customer by helping to promote research and development programmes which may or may not be followed by production ; it acts as customer through the airlines, whether nationalised or not ; it exercises control over export sales. It plays a leading rôle in space and military work.

54. But it is also a constructor by producing in its arsenals and nationalised firms, investing and making its own means of production available to private industry — duly compensated of course — and testing materials, components and equipment in its laboratories and complete systems in its in-flight testing centres, etc.

55. It intervenes in financing programmes, wholly in the case of military and space programmes and for specific aspects of civil programmes : half the Concorde programme was financed by the French state and half by the British. For Airbus, the states concerned (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) made available to the manufacturers' banks a sum of \$1,000 million and guaranteed a further \$1,000 million if necessary ; reimbursement is planned over a run of 360 aircraft.

56. Finally, the state intervenes through the regulations it introduces to ensure the standard of products (normalisation, technical specifications, etc.), to protect its own industry, to regulate the industrial proprietary rights to be attributed to the partners or to control export (war matériel) or import policy.

A dominant armaments industry

57. The United States is the world's leading producer and exporter of arms.

58. In the civil field, the various European aerospace industries now have an excellent programme, Airbus, a large medium-haul transport aircraft which is being pursued at European level and has good export possibilities. This is a master programme which may result in a truly European aerospace industry of which this programme may form the cornerstone of its unity.

59. The success of the programme shows the effectiveness of the form of co-operation adopted: Airbus Industrie is a firm set up to implement the programme. It is committed to a process of development which makes it the hub of integration in the European civil aircraft industry with sole and almost unchallenged responsibility for running the programme. It is at present 44.6 % responsible to the French Government, 44.6 % to the Federal German Government, 6.6 % to the Netherlands Government and 4.2 % to the Spanish Government. The British Government has just joined in.

60. In fact, Airbus Industrie integrates the major part of the civil work of all the leading European firms: British Aerospace, SNIAS, MBB, VFW-Fokker and CASA (Spain — 6,300 persons).

61. This example shows what results European industry can achieve when it concentrates on the implementation of a major programme. It confirms that a united European industry may be three times smaller than American industry in numbers employed but Europe can improve its relative position.

62. For military equipment, a growing trend for Europe to meet its own requirements should be recorded: eight countries purchased 1,500 F-104 Starfighters, five countries purchased 600 F-4 Phantoms and finally four countries purchased 310 F-16s. The latter instance might never have been necessary had a competitive European aircraft been presented jointly by several European countries. This decline in American supplies to Europe has been offset by European-produced equipment.

63. Several joint projects have been or are in the process of being carried out: Alpha-Jet, Jaguar, MRCA, helicopters, missile weapons systems and Ariane launchers for placing civil or military satellites in orbit, etc.

64. However, a division must be noted between the position of the manufacturing countries which are more or less in favour of procuring equipment in Europe and that of other European countries which opt for American equipment (Norway, Denmark, Greece, Turkey and, to a certain extent, the Netherlands and Belgium). This division allows American strategy to maintain and increase its military and technological leadership in the framework of NATO. This American position is meeting growing reluctance among the principal European countries which wish the NATO market to be opened to the various armaments industries of the countries of the Alliance — on both sides of the Atlantic — whereas the Americans place various obstacles in the way of procurement of European equipment by their forces (in general, the impact of the Buy American Act is 5 % on

civil aircraft, 5 to 15 % on spare parts and 50 % on foreign arms; United States standards, etc.). The policy of standardisation so skilfully advocated by the Americans in the various NATO bodies and in the press is intended to propagate American products and is a cornerstone of their strategy. American reluctance to open its own defence market to the other countries of the Alliance and pressure in favour of its armaments increase the tendency of the principal European countries to develop their armaments industries.

65. Another important element is what, in the European view, is the over-hasty evolution of NATO's strategic planning and European countries are far from enthusiastic about financing the very expensive purchases of new American equipment which this entails. Reluctance about introducing the AWAC system clearly illustrates this trend. Consequently, and in spite of many difficulties, European military aerospace production and, more generally, the co-operative production of sophisticated weapons systems, is being organised and is developing in every field: aircraft, helicopters, missiles, artillery and even tanks and combat vehicles, depriving American industry of much of the European market and ultimately and already competing with American products in the third world.

European shortcomings

66. Although smaller in size than the American branch, the order of magnitude of the European branch of the armaments industry is nevertheless comparable, but:

- because the military requirements of the various European countries are different;
- because their equipment replacement schedules are different;
- because national peculiarities are too marked;
- because co-operation is still sometimes considered a last resort when a purely national programme proves impossible;
- because in any event national egoism is behind all agreements; when countries find agreements are no longer in their interests, they abandon them and move on;
- because a jointly-produced product is often a mediocre compromise, relatively costly and with longer delivery delays than national products;
- because once a programme has been completed the co-operative structure is dismantled and when a new programme

is started a new structure has to be formed and participants again taught to co-operate ;

- because there are always conflicts of national pride in the race to be prime contractor and for the resulting spin-off and the problem of sharing production is often difficult to settle ;
- because there are always countries which wish to export and exports may run up against political conditions imposed by partner countries ;
- because there may then be problems in obtaining parts needed for producing equipment for export ;
- finally, because industrialists are reluctant to allow others to avail themselves of their own industrial proprietary

rights without guaranteed protection and remuneration,

European production is compartmentalised, which precludes longer production runs and the amortisation of research and development costs over a sufficient volume of production.

67. However, although not the best, the policy pursued by the European countries makes them competitive in many areas, except perhaps very recently, because of the present weakness of the American dollar.

68. The fact remains that for major programmes which may involve high research and development expenditure, the capital available at national level alone is not sufficient, being below the critical threshold guaranteeing an effective programme. A joint effort is therefore essential but the legal structure in the various partner countries does little to facilitate such an effort.

APPENDIX I

Different programmes pursued on a co-operative basis

CVRT	BE, UK	
Gepard (AA 35 mm)	BE, FRG	
RITA	BE, FR	
Alpha-Jet	BE, FR, FRG	
Transall	FR, FRG	
F-16	BE, NL, NO, DK, US	
Tyne/Olympus logistic support	BE, NL, UK	
Minehunters	BE, NL, FR	
Olympus gas turbine support	FR, UK	
Seagnat — anti-ship missile decoy system	DK, FRG, NO, UK, US	
Anti-surface ship missile	FR, FRG, NL, NO, UK	
SP-70 — 155 mm self-propelled gun	FRG, IT, UK	
FH-70 — 155 mm towed gun	FRG, IT, UK	
Midge surveillance system	CAN, FRG, UK	
Milan	} Euromissile	FR, FRG
Hot		
Roland		
Tornado, multi-rôle combat aircraft	FRG, IT, UK	
Jaguar, strike/attack aircraft	FR, UK	
Puma, twin engine GP helicopter	FR, UK	
Gazelle, GP light helicopter	FR, UK	
Lynx, anti-submarine and utility helicopter	FR, UK	
Martel, stand-off air-to-surface guided weapon	FR, UK	
JP-233, airfield attack weapon	UK, US	

Abbreviations :

BE — Belgium	IT — Italy
CAN — Canada	NL — Netherlands
DK — Denmark	NO — Norway
FR — France	UK — United Kingdom
FRG — Federal Republic of Germany	US — United States

Source : Document 786, Appendix IV.

APPENDIX II

Estimated armaments exports from 1965 to 1974

Country	Amount (\$ '000 million)	%	Increase between 1970 and 1976 (%)
United States	31.5	50.50	511
Soviet Union	18.8	30.00	
France	2.9	4.65	140
United Kingdom	2.2	3.50	
Federal Republic of Germany	1.2	1.95	
Others	6.0	9.40	
Total	62.6	100.00	

Source : Official report of the WEU symposium, March 1977.

APPENDIX III

Expert opinion on military requirements*(submitted by Ingénieur Général Brindeau)***1. General**

It is proposed to examine briefly the extent to which European industries can or cannot meet the requirements of the military authorities of their own or of other European countries allowing them to fulfil their rôle. This remark brings out a first important point, i.e. that military headquarters do not have the same concept of the threat and above all of how to meet it. Moreover, their range of means is not composed in the same way nor, in the case of equipment of a similar type, is there the same time-table for phasing out obsolescent items. For a given military situation, requirements and replacement schedules are therefore different.

It is necessary to outline the possible situations which must be faced in order to identify methodically the nature and volume of the principal requirements of the armed forces. This is what has been done below as an example and to provide food for thought ; but for a subject which would warrant lengthy development, the question is dealt with very briefly and superficially, account being taken only of cases which allow the fields where a special common effort seems necessary to be circumscribed very quickly.

For geographical reasons, NATO armed forces have little room for manoeuvre and deployment. A direct attack on European territory would therefore have to be contained on the land or sea frontier or frontiers under attack. There is no question of withdrawal in depth to gain time, particularly as the human and economic resources of the European powers are relatively close to the frontiers and very vulnerable because of their relative concentration.

It should be stressed that the European countries together on a relatively small slice of land have little choice but to share the same strategy towards the threat from the East. However, in view of their nuclear capability, the United Kingdom and France, unlike other European countries, have direct means of deterring the Soviet Union. Their position is therefore quite different from that of the other countries.

But Europe as a whole has its back against the sea, set in the midst of a bloc of hostile or at best neutral or neutralised countries, with high import or reinforcement requirements in men and equipment, energy and mineral resources, or even food. Due to the strengthening of the Soviet navy and above all the state of its submarine forces and the fact that they may have the support of

bases established along our supply routes, a state of latent crisis exists which may break into violence at any time, first in countries of political strategic or economic interest for Europe and then in Europe itself. In short, and without going further, two possibilities have to be considered:

- (i) a brief, violent war ;
- (ii) a long war with alternating periods of violence and relative calm.

However, before describing these possible instances, mention should be made of the strategy of deterrence which the nuclear powers hope will continue to prevent war. They are well aware that military action within Europe would result in its almost total destruction.

The two possible instances mentioned above may be described as follows:

In the first case, vast quantities of means are consumed in a short period of time. Until the end of the war, it must in practice be possible to subsist on stocks of equipment and other supplies, and fighting stops:

- because one side is unable to continue the fight for lack of means,
- because negotiations are successful, as a result of nuclear deterrence, for instance,
- or because nuclear escalation comes into play.

However, unless one side is to give itself up to the enemy on relatively unfavourable terms, or be annihilated, the second possibility must intervene before means are exhausted.

In the second case, periods of relative calm allow the two sides time to build up their means from large stocks in bases away from the fighting area or areas, it being possible to replenish such second reserve stocks from industrial means mobilised for the purpose.

The build-up of stocks in the first case raises no particular problem for a medium-sized country or for Europe: it is a question of financial means and time.

To assess Europe's situation in the second event, the table hereafter must be borne in mind. In view of the hazards of sea transport in the event of prolonged war, Europe's situation appears critical in all circumstances. It may therefore be concluded that it would be able to resist only as long as its stocks lasted and that war products obtained by mobilising industry would probably arrive too late.

Imports	United States	Soviet Union	EEC
Energy	10 % (possibly less)	0 %	55 %
Mineral products	25 %	10 %	60 %
Agricultural products	0 %	10 %	20 %

From these considerations it may be noted that the European countries must constitute and maintain stocks of armaments (weapons, munitions, various equipment), foodstuffs and strategic products (oil, rubber, cotton, etc.), at a high enough level to allow the fighting ability of their units to be maintained despite wide-scale destruction and to ensure the life or survival of their inhabitants for as long as deemed necessary to bring the war to an end or at least until the next relatively calm period which would allow essential supplies to be brought in.

To make a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the means necessary, the declared doctrine of each possible enemy, the level and type of their armaments and the means afforded by friendly resources must be taken as a basis.

It is well known that the Warsaw Pact forces have a clear superiority in conventional weapons over the NATO forces.

It is now vain to hope to achieve a balance with available resources because the financial

Estimates

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Total fighting strengths	1,176,000	1,331,000
Battle tanks	11,300	27,900
Mechanised divisions	20	57
Tactical aircraft	3,315	5,700
Major combat ships — surface	914 (NATO Europe) 172 (United States)	4 (Eastern Europe) 243 (USSR)
— attack submarines	133 (NATO Europe) 75 (United States)	12 (Eastern Europe) 243 (USSR)

effort needed to achieve such a balance is not considered politically acceptable. Less conventional solutions must therefore be sought.

The problem is therefore to constitute and maintain initial strategic stocks and armaments at an appropriate level.

It has always been possible for material superiority to be effectively countered by the strategic and tactical skill of far smaller numbers of forces. Since there is no question of attaining the level of forces of the Warsaw Pact, it is essential to explore other courses which may at least allow an attack to be contained.

It should be added that all military actions conform to the following cycle:

- collection of information about the enemy;
- exploitation of this information;
- decision and transmission of instructions;
- positioning;
- attack;
- protection of friendly installations or systems against enemy action before, during and after the main action.

Moreover, these various operations may be conducted on land, sea or in the air or any combination of the three elements. Finally, for the sea, two distinct areas, on and below the surface, must be taken into consideration.

2. Monitoring the battlefield

The main factors of a successful offensive include the effect of surprise and the superiority obtained at a given time in a given area. Advantage was taken of these factors by the Arab forces at the time of the initial attack in the so-called Yom Kippur war in October 1973.

To meet the threat with limited but adequate means, it must first be possible at all times to obtain various kinds of information concerning each potential enemy: unit strengths, equipment, strong and weak points in deployment, intention to attack, defend or withdraw, location of headquarters, location and size of depots, logistic deployment, network and capacity of lines of communication, contact action, radioactivity, air cover, location of assembly areas, fire planning (location of batteries, adjustment fire) etc.

The problem described here, which applies mainly to ground forces, is equally crucial for air and naval forces, not forgetting the variations which are of course peculiar to them.

In the case of ground forces, present-day heavily-mechanised and motorised units, both friendly and enemy, have become extremely

mobile. To exploit or counter such mobility, further increased by the possibility of helicopter transport, calls for extremely fast command reactions to any enemy move. Such reactions are possible only if *almost instant knowledge* is available of the situation on the battlefield and in the adjacent airspace or sea area.

There are many means of obtaining the necessary information, starting with conventional means such as patrols, observers, agents operating in enemy territory, reconnaissance units and reconnaissance aircraft, but each of them can supply only part of the puzzle and often with a time-lag. In foreseeable fighting conditions, these means will be inadequate since they do not allow full cover of the area concerned, or detailed knowledge of points of interest or real-time information.

The command of a major operational sector must therefore have *at its direct disposal powerful means of observing the battlefield*, effective in all circumstances, by day or by night, in a clear or naturally or artificially opacified atmosphere, in an environment which may be subjected to interference (counter-measures, screens, electromagnetic shocks, decoys, etc.). It must also have the auxiliary means essential for dispatching information and processing it to make it assimilable and for transmitting orders, reports, etc.

The kind of information which has to be obtained has already been mentioned and air observation appears to offer the greatest possibilities of obtaining the required results. Other conventional means listed and batteries of dispersable detectors capable of transmitting observations, such as those developed and used by the Americans during the Vietnam war, add to and confirm information gathered by air observation.

In addition to the military characteristics mentioned, it must also be possible to dispense with fixed installations and to operate on open terrain or sections of roads and to remain operational with limited support facilities and in spite of enemy reactions.

Air facilities for monitoring the battlefield may be:

- satellites;
- manned aircraft;
- remote-controlled systems.

Satellites

Observation satellites can supply interesting strategic information and in certain cases important tactical information. For instance, during

the Yom Kippur war, it is believed that the gap between the flanks of the second and third Egyptian armies was discovered by an American satellite. The timely communication of this information to the Israeli military authorities allowed the Egyptian front to be cut in two and the situation was thus reversed. But it is doubtful whether such information could have been obtained by satellite if operations had been conducted in a covered area. Furthermore, satellites are vulnerable and are prone to destruction, damage or jamming.

Manned aircraft

These have proved their worth either as light observation aircraft used in the world wars or as high-performance reconnaissance aircraft (Mirage, Jaguar, etc.) fitted with various kinds of observation equipment (radars, photographic apparatus and optical cameras) or infra-red equipment.

These means provide worthwhile information but it is generally slow to process, partly because of the large number of images recorded which have to be sorted out before use.

Slower aircraft may be used with better results but their slowness makes them extremely vulnerable. This can be remedied by choosing highly-maneuvrable aircraft, duly protected and equipped with detectors and the necessary means of storing information or, even better, effecting the initial processing and transmitting the information in a more or less final form. Such means can provide a good solution to the problem. The helicopter is naturally an excellent vehicle which, when equipped with appropriate means of observation, can make a detailed reconnaissance of the battlefield.

But if the enemy considers the objective worthwhile, strong air defences will have been set up making air reconnaissance too risky to be conducted by manned aircraft.

Remote-controlled aircraft

Remote-controlled or pilotless aircraft — drones, RPV (remote-piloted vehicles) — were successfully used on a large scale by the Americans in Vietnam and by the Israelis at the end of the Yom Kippur war.

A distinction must be drawn between drones, whose flight is programmed and which receive no instructions from the ground, and remote-controlled aircraft which are more or less entirely controlled from the ground.

Both may be equipped with day or night cameras or television cameras or with other detection systems with an all-weather capability thanks to thermal infra-red sighting.

The principal technical problems to be solved for equipping forces with appropriate apparatus of this kind are:

- where photography is concerned, the possibility of producing very high-performance films in Europe without having to rely on America;
- where detectors are concerned, the need to develop sensitive elements in various thermal or other infra-red fields (very high-frequency electromagnetic waves, for instance);
- the need to miniaturise components, inertial guidance systems and memory storage cameras with charge couple devices (CCD);
- the need to have whole systems which are as reliable as possible, in spite of unfavourable environmental conditions; this raises problems, in particular for wholly or partly remote-controlled systems which must be protected against enemy counter-measures.

In addition to air observation, there are, as we have seen, a host of other means:

- observers, patrols, etc., who may be helped by various opto-electronic systems using passive infra-red sensors, for instance;
- many kinds of radar with which units on special duties are equipped (pin-pointing the source of enemy fire, for example);
- laser beam apparatus for guiding projectiles or for range finding, etc.

In all these fields, although present-day technology is very effective, not all requirements can be met and an effort must be made in all areas, both at the research and at the development and manufacturing level, to remain at the desired level.

Data processing

The speedy collection of reliable information on the enemy is not sufficient. The quantity of data obtained on enemy and friendly forces as well as on many other elements such as ground conditions, the weather, available resources, etc., forms a volume which is difficult to handle without the help of a large staff or, even better, by automatic computerised data processing which is almost instantaneous.

Working out a situation which must cover at one and the same time enemy troops, friendly troops and many other factors necessitates recording many messages, reports and data,

keeping the information recorded up to date, extracting and compiling data needed for preparing syntheses, displaying them on a map of the terrain by means of symbols or in the form of numerical situations or any other form allowing them to be put to use.

This data-processing system, necessary for the command and control of operations, may also be used as a data bank allowing the necessary information to be found easily and displayed directly or in synthesis so as to allow the command to take decisions and draft and transmit operational orders and information to upper and lower echelons and to parallel echelons in neighbouring units.

Such a system therefore includes:

- a computer which stores information and instructions received and prints out the information requested when required;
- input units allowing information to be entered and kept up to date;
- display systems allowing the following to be obtained:
 - cards giving the information requested (i.e. by means of symbols representing enemy or friendly tanks) ;
 - messages adapted to the current situation.

Similar systems are also needed for artillery purposes, for operating communications networks and for other activities (NBC in particular). It should be noted that these various systems must be interconnected and exchange selected information between each other. They must therefore be interoperable between each other and also with corresponding systems in allied countries.

From a technical point of view, in addition to the production of economical, high-performance and compact computers, there are complex problems to be solved. For this purpose, use must be made of mini- or microelectronic hardware such as :

- large-scale integration circuits (LSI);
- microprocessors ;
- read only memories (ROM);
- bubble memories;
- charge couple devices (CCD).

A research, development and manufacturing effort must be promoted for all this hardware so that Europe may become technically and industrially independent in these matters. A further attempt should be made to establish European collaboration in the computer field in order to compete with the American and, soon, the Japanese industries.

Communications networks

The second function is the transmission of messages of all kinds needed for the communication of information and circulating orders. Note should be taken of the development of interconnected computer networks and above all of the ever-greater integration of all information and command networks. This has led to extremely complex systems which must be handled by one or several computers.

The radio-electric part of these networks may be protected against enemy jamming and leaks by the use of transmitters and receivers using synchronised frequency changes. Such equipment allowing systems to be interoperable is extremely complex and raises many technical problems.

3. Land forces

Although the foregoing considerations have been developed mainly from the point of view of land forces, they are valid for the three arms (land, sea and air) subject to a few minor variations. There are greater differences in the other stages of hostilities and they will therefore be considered separately for each of the armed forces.

Force mobility

The mobility of units calls for little comment since Europe's technical level and industrial capability allow it to meet all the requirements of its ground forces, except for very large capacity transport helicopters, but there is only a limited requirement and market for them and it is therefore preferable to buy them. To some extent this is also true for long-range capacity transport aircraft.

Fire power

Now to consider the attack proper, i.e. firing capacity, weapons and weapons systems, with reference only to conventional weapons.

A point worthy of note where conventional weapons are concerned — infantry weapons, artillery, tank guns, etc. — for most current types is the usefulness of being able to use standardised munitions, or more precisely, munitions with the same interior ballistics. Standardisation must be advocated initially for various infantry weapons, rifles, machine guns, automatic guns and 105 and 155 mm artillery.

There are various calibres of machine gun: 20 mm, 25 mm, 27 mm, 30 mm, 35 mm, etc. It is evident that such a disparity does not facilitate mutual logistic support and that the difference

in performance between 27 and 30 mm projectiles, for instance, probably does not justify the existence of these two calibres.

A worthwhile goal is for the artillery of the same calibre belonging to different nations to be able to fire the same ammunition and this is also desirable for each class of mortar.

Still in the field of artillery, it is worthwhile, as from 155 mm, to be able to use projectiles which are guided to their targets at the end of their trajectory, as this allows enormous savings in the tonnage of munitions needed to attain a given result. In spite of the higher cost of each projectile, this innovation is of very great military value. Such projectiles require inbuilt guidance systems which home in on a target along a beam (laser or radioelectric for instance) and the military problem is to pinpoint the target.

Another major improvement is the production of artillery capable of firing as many projectiles as possible in a very short space of time and changing its position very quickly to avoid being caught in enemy counter-fire. Such a use calls for a sophisticated target computer integrating all data needed for firing, particularly data showing the position of each gun, to be supplied by accurate navigation systems. The performance of propellant charges must also be very consistent.

The same computers should also allow any quantitative inferiority to be offset by high flexibility of fire manoeuvre allowing several separate targets to be fired at in a short space of time.

Data on the enemy obtained by artillery observation units are fed into the computers. Since such information may be useful to the command by adding details to the picture of the overall situation, the desirability of linking the artillery data-processing networks with those of the command is recalled.

An anti-tank capability is one of the most important aspects of ground hostilities. In terms of fire-power, there are at present four conventional means of attacking a tank:

- direct-firing guns using hollow-charge shells or high initial velocity projectiles (tank guns);
- indirect-firing mortar or gun with special projectiles particularly effective against light armoured vehicles;
- mines placed or scattered by another projectile, helicopter or other means;
- guided missiles with a hollow-charge military warhead.

Mention is made for the record of existing nuclear mines and the neutron bomb which might

be an effective weapon for use against tank formations.

There are advantages and difficulties inherent in the implementation and use of each of these means. Here again, in each category, the European countries produce excellent equipment which has proved its worth. But the ever-increasing demands of users and the endless search for the weapon against armour call for a constant effort in every field:

- improvement in the ability of hollow charges to pierce armour, which is being continuously improved;
- accurate high initial velocity 105 and 120 mm tank guns firing armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabots with tracers (APFSDS-Ts) capable of piercing thick, high-resistance armour at great distances. For these guns, an attempt is also being made to obtain accurate fire when the tank is moving, which calls for the development of high-performance stabilising devices and high-quality suspension for armoured vehicles.

Indirect-firing guns or mortars may be used with anti-tank projectiles. This method of indirect fire is effective against infantry and artillery support units and light armoured vehicles. It involves the use of projectiles (105 or 155 mm shells or 120 mm mortar projectiles) which explode on target at a wide angle of some 70° projecting a high-speed lateral cone of burst from a prefragmentation of one body of the projectile.

Although not 100% destructive, widespread use of mines can provide an effective barrier against vehicles and slow down or halt armoured or mechanised formations for the time necessary to clear paths through the minefields. This may allow friendly forces to mount a counter-attack or bring anti-tank units into action more effectively than would be the case against moving targets.

The following problems are encountered with mines: they are effective only if laid in very large numbers, if the resulting minefields are booby-trapped in order to hamper mine-clearance and finally if a deterrent effect can be created by including a few highly-destructive mines among the large numbers of more economical mines.

In addition to the question of quantity and quality, there is the problem of their use on moving fronts with effective means for laying them mechanically to allow large quantities of anti-tank mines to be buried quickly.

Here again it would be desirable if the most common types of anti-tank mine could be laid by

the various automatic laying devices and conversely if a laying device could handle the various types of the most common mines.

In addition to this equipment and in order to hamper enemy movements within an area of a certain depth leading up to the line of contact, small-size mines have been envisaged, to be carried to the drop-off point by aircraft, rockets or helicopters and scattered over the area to be closed off.

Studies have been made of such equipment, based on rockets, in the United States and several European countries, but each project was based on a different military concept. Rockets and their mines or other military payloads have already been produced but because of the high cost of such projects the countries concerned would appear to be moving towards a joint project.

Finally, there are anti-tank missiles, where Molotov cocktails and their more sophisticated hollow-charge counterparts fired by short-range rockets are mentioned for the record.

The European countries have second-generation wire-guided anti-tank missiles with very acceptable performances. Third-generation fire-and-forget systems, i.e. which can fire a projectile and then move away or fire at another target, are being studied. The most difficult to develop is the self-guiding system, i.e. the element which must lock on to the target and keep the missile on target. An all-weather device must be found which is not affected by jamming, decoys or screens, and studies still need to be made of sensors on the correct wavelengths which have perhaps not yet all been exploited and which would allow the effective scope of weapons to be extended.

Laser guidance, for example, which is very effective in good visibility, can become totally illusory when fine particles are suspended in the air. The possibilities to be explored range from infra-red to thermal infra-red, from laser beams to electro-magnetic waves, from optical sensors to radar, with or without monitoring or being followed to the target by a guidance unit.

A similar type of equipment is used by aircraft against targets on the ground, moving tanks and objectives designated by observation systems, such as the command post, active radar, etc., and the solutions to be found for improving surface-to-air missiles are little different from those needed for third-generation anti-tank missiles.

4. Air forces

It is well known that control of the sky is a decisive factor in conventional warfare. For this, friendly forces must have the ability:

- to carry out ground attacks with tactical support aircraft to back up the ground forces;
- to conduct reconnaissance missions at every altitude but particularly at high and low altitudes because of possible action by enemy air defences;
- to send up interception missions to prevent enemy flights over certain areas;
- to fly ever more deeply into enemy territory, generally to carry out bombing missions;
- to fulfil certain transport tasks;
- to carry out special missions with certain aircraft such as maritime patrol aircraft.

For each mission, which requires aircraft with different performances, there must be a corresponding type or types of aircraft and, in addition to projects pursued jointly by two or more countries (Jaguar, Tornado, Alpha-Jet, etc.), there are many purely national projects.

In civil aviation, Europeans are increasingly inclined to co-operate. Expenditure on development and production of a new aircraft can be amortised only over fairly long production runs of about 300 if the project is to be reasonably profitable as in the case of the Airbus project, for instance; but this number may vary according to the complexity and degree of innovation of the equipment. It is therefore clear that those co-operating must agree among themselves and promote exports in order to increase sales.

Military aircraft are generally far more complex than civil aircraft since they are bursting with electronic and other equipment. Moreover, higher performances are expected, at least in certain fields (e.g. rate of climb, manoeuvrability, maximum speed, maximum altitude, etc., for fighter-interceptors).

In the circumstances and in view of the relatively small number of aircraft which can be procured and sold by European countries, the latter are more and more inclined to pool their efforts and industrial capabilities for developing new projects, as is the case for the successor to Jaguar.

Moreover, co-operation raises many difficulties, as for the exportation of jointly-produced aircraft by one or other country which may be contrary to the political views of another participant. Yet the number of aircraft which have to be produced to amortise development costs is even higher than for civil aircraft. Once this or other similar difficulties have been solved, such as questions of industrial proprietary rights, which are not insurmountable as shown by the success of many co-operative projects, Europe's ability to design and produce airframes, engines

or most other equipment should allow the requirements of European air forces to be met, provided the latter can agree on what their requirements are.

There would appear to be no need here to go into the question of air-to-air, air-to-surface or air-to-sea weapons. The technical problems are of the same type as have been discussed in the context of ground forces.

However, reference must be made to the special problems raised by cruise missiles which mainly fly at low altitude and have an original navigation system which makes use of topographical knowledge of the ground overflown. Similarly, in the case of air-to-sea weapons, weapons systems such as anti-submarine weapons in particular and torpedoes are special because of the environment in which they operate (water) and because of the special type of sensors equipping their self-guidance systems.

One way of gaining control of the sky is through air defence. This is an overall battle waged like a ground battle on the basis of information gathered, which may be translated by the term early warning. This information is obtained from powerful radar installations, generally permanently installed in suitable areas allowing in-depth observation of enemy air space. Radar echoes recorded are identified, monitored and processed in air defence data-processing centres which alert and can scramble means of destruction or interception (air defence surface-to-air missile batteries, Hawk for example, or interceptors).

The vulnerability of fixed radar installations in wartime is obvious and AWACS (airborne warning and control system) was developed by the Americans on the one hand as a solution and also to augment the possible spectrum of observation, to detect low-flying aircraft and to process and transmit the information obtained, each system being a complete airborne observation, command and control post. A similar system, but less complete and complex, has been developed by the British on the basis of Nimrod with a more markedly maritime rôle than AWACS.

All the countries of the Alliance except France take part in the system consisting of a combination of AWACS and Nimrod, which is to enhance the possibilities of the Alliance's air defence and ground environment network, NADGE, in whose operation France participates, having taken part in its development.

Where weapons are concerned and mentioning fighter-interceptor aircraft for the record, Europe produces several air-to-surface missiles intended for use against aircraft flying at low (150-800 ft) or medium (800-19,000 ft) altitudes. The Roland system, jointly-developed and pro-

duced by France and the Federal Republic of Germany, has also been adopted by the United States which produces its own Americanised version. Here, the two-way street has worked, but has not led to standardised equipment, and it is to be hoped that the European system will be interoperable with the American-produced system.

It should also be recalled that Europe has produced the Hawk system under licence and is now producing the improved Hawk system known as HELIP (Hawk European limited improvement programme). The countries participating in this co-production are Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States.

Enemy aircraft are no longer the only threat from the air; defence is also needed against enemy missiles and rockets which are not clearly visible as targets on radar and are therefore difficult to locate and track by this means. Various defensive systems are being studied, particularly for the protection of shipping and the long-distance destruction of nuclear-warhead bearing missiles.

Probably the most effective method is the use of systems designed to interfere with the self-guidance systems of attacking missiles by the use of decoys, jamming, etc.

Analysis of the problems linked with the mastery of air space will be pursued no further. The main point to be borne in mind is the importance of the aircraft and space industry on which the production of most modern weapons systems (missile-based or not) depends, and of course aircraft, helicopters, drones, etc.

5. Naval forces

It is generally agreed that naval operations may be grouped under seven main functions:

- the nuclear threat from nuclear-propelled submarines with a ballistic missile-launching capability (SLBM). These submarines, which form part of the deterrent, are practically invulnerable when at sea. Conversely, they may be detected and attacked when leaving or entering their bases and must consequently be protected by the full range of naval and air means at those times. Such protection is a priority task for navies with missile-launching submarines;
- operations against missile-launching nuclear submarines: detection, tracking, possible destruction. Such operations are conventional intervention combinations

of various types of detection and action by surface forces, naval aviation specialised in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and attack submarines;

- the presence of friendly fleets in remote sea areas prepared to intervene in the event of an incident in their area. In the Indian Ocean, for instance, there are many units of various nationalities because of the strategic importance of the sea lanes used by large tankers;
- operations against these intervention forces;
- protecting maritime lines of communication;
- operations against enemy lines of communication;
- various other operations, amphibious, for instance.

It is not possible to assign fixed priorities to these various groups of action since the order of priority depends on the nature of hostilities and consequently on known or presumed enemy reactions.

At the start of hostilities it is to be expected that emphasis will be placed on protecting ballistic missile-launching submarines, operations against intervention forces and then attacks on and/or defence of lines of communication.

There is no question of studying in detail the requirements corresponding to the various tasks mentioned above, nor is it necessary, for the technico-industrial aspect with which we are concerned here may be analysed on the basis of operations to attack or defend maritime lines of communication, for instance.

It has been seen that there is little hope of the Alliance's forces in Europe being able to contain the enemy longer than allowed by stocks of weapons, munitions, vehicles, aircraft, equipment and goods of all kinds stockpiled as a preventive measure. Such stocks are necessarily limited but an attempt must be made to lengthen the period of containment thus obtained by taking steps to increase them to the maximum and bring in reinforcements, from North America in particular. An air lift would certainly be valid for men and expensive but relatively light-weight equipment, but the bulk would have to come by sea, if possible before the naval war stage began.

The total cargo at present transported across the Atlantic is 1,600 million tons per year, and every day there is an average of some 7,000 ships on the North Atlantic or in its ports.

In a period of austerity, 70 million tons would have to be transported each month. Furthermore, the abovementioned reinforcements may be estimated at a million men the first month plus a million tons of equipment. Moreover, munitions would represent an additional 4.5 million tons, plus fuel representing 2.5 million tons per month. Taking account of air transport possibilities, 1,500 cargoes would therefore have to be guaranteed the first month of the crisis and thereafter 500 cargoes per month for the support of future operations.

The picture is one of a large number of merchant ships ploughing the seas at a speed of at least twenty knots and crossing or trying to cross the Atlantic practically on their own. Convoys would have to be formed however for slower ships and for entering and leaving port, but this would depend on available escort ships. Moreover, the Soviet Union has 320 submarines, some of which would probably be deployed along the most likely routes for allied merchant fleets when fighting in the North Atlantic became imminent. Presumably these submarines would try to sink any ship attempting to make the crossing.

A merchant ship following a zig-zag route at twenty knots is not an easy target, even for fast nuclear-propelled submarines which now constitute one of the greatest dangers for surface shipping (and also for submarines). The nuclear attack submarine is a large, very high performance vessel. It can vary from 3,000 tons with a submerged speed of 25 knots to 5,000 tons with a submerged speed of more than 30 knots.

Such submarines, capable of diving to great depths (500 metres or more) will be increasingly silent and hence more difficult to detect. These hunter-killer submarines are already dangerous armed with torpedoes, and they can also be armed with subsonic missiles capable of being launched from below the surface into an airborne trajectory. These missiles, with a range of over fifty nautical miles, are a serious threat to any surface shipping justifying their use.

Anti-submarine defence is primarily a question of detection by sonar — active towed at an average depth of 500 m or passive for long distance detection and lateral listening sonars for close detection.

Weapons used are grenades and anti-submarine torpedoes which may be launched from various platforms: surface ships, helicopters, aircraft.

Another major danger for ships is that of specialised aircraft which include long-range aircraft operating from more or less distant ground bases or carrier-based aircraft and more particularly short or vertical take-off aircraft but which require a base near the combat area, or

helicopters, which raise the same problems but need only small platforms.

These aircraft may carry weapons, tactical missiles or torpedoes, or serve as markers for the use of precision-guided missiles.

The air defence of surface shipping may be ensured by guided missiles with a range in the tens of kilometres and close-in defence by shorter-range missiles. Finally, immediate defence is provided by specialised artillery systems (cone of dispersion of a multi-barrelled high rate of fire weapon for instance). There are at present few means of defence against diving or low-level missiles. Immediate defence has therefore to be combined with counter-measures designed to divert attacking missiles.

However this may be, at great distances from land, mastery of the sky will still belong to aircraft carriers which, with their escort and ASW vessels, will always be the best means of ensuring freedom of the seas in the areas where they operate.

The last threat comes from surface ships. The most current are of medium tonnage (2,000 to 8,000 tons), of conventional design and construction, with a top speed of 30 to 35 knots and a cruising speed of about 20 knots. (Nuclear propulsion is possible only for warships of more than 6,000 to 8,000 tons, e.g. aircraft carriers, because of the weight, volume and cost of a nuclear generator.)

Mention should be made of the tendency to reduce tonnages and the almost total abandonment of conventional artillery and its replacement by systems of self-guiding missiles launched at great distances from the target, thus allowing fast, smaller ships to launch long-range attacks on far more powerful vessels.

Finally, maritime patrol aircraft with a high observation capability make a further contribution to the close-in means of defending sea lanes. These long-range aircraft have very sophisticated computer-controlled weapons systems including real-time data-processing and display functions.

This brief survey shows that in the naval field the same advanced technology is to be found as in other fields:

- aircraft industry technology;
- electronics and communications, radar and laser systems;
- computers and data-processing;

and for ships:

- nuclear propulsion;
- thick hulls for submarines;

and for detection:

- active and passive sonar techniques;
- magnetic detection techniques for submarines and thermal or mechanical wake detection.

Building hulls calls for only a few comments. Civil shipbuilding is fairly different from naval shipbuilding although there are common problems and some activities are similar, but for civil shipbuilding very large-tonnage hulls are required whereas for the navy they rarely exceed 4,000 to 5,000 tons.

In view of the critical situation of civil shipbuilding, economically valid solutions have been sought although they may not necessarily guarantee the lowest unit cost price. For instance, it is said that the Germans have had to have five frigates built by six different shipyards because they found it socially necessary. Concentration of projects is not therefore always the only solution to be envisaged.

Glossary

Silicon chips : By grouping a growing number of electronic elements on silicon chips, microelectronics augment the capacity of electronic systems. A chip is a rectangle measuring about 20 sq.mm. cut out of a silicon disc treated in

such a way as to obtain the required electronic properties.

LSI (Large-scale integration) : In large-scale integration, several million electronic components are grouped on a single chip to form circuits, some of which are simple electric devices and others units of logic operating in accordance with Boole's rules of algebra.

Microprocessor : A data-processing unit can thus be built on a single chip, thereby obtaining a microprocessor. A microprocessor is generally associated with other specialised chips, particularly memories, in a microcomputer system. However, complete computers have already been built on a single chip.

Storage (Memories) : Certain applications require permanent storage of data which is rarely modified (e.g. as for the programmes of pocket calculators). Read-only memories (ROM) are used for such permanent storage. Other storage is active.

Bubble memories or storage and charge couple devices (CCD) : These are means whereby data circulates as if stored in series in a closed tube. They thus pass across the display system. Bubble memories are obtained by polarising tiny magnetic bubbles in a thin layer of orthoferrite or garnet. Charge couple devices (CCD) are obtained by arranging the surface of a chip so as to transform it into a grid including a large number of condensers. A 15 sq.mm. chip can thus store more than 65,000 data.

APPENDIX IV

European aircraft programmes**Tactical and support aircraft**

Dassault-Bréguet/Dornier Alpha-Jet trainer/close support aircraft — Orders total 486, including 200 for French air force and 175 for West German air force. First deliveries to France were in May 1978 and first deliveries to Germany were in February 1979. Export orders total 74 to five countries.

Dassault-Bréguet Mirage 2000 — About \$142 million will go for research and development and another \$166 million is budgeted for production this year. The third prototype is scheduled to fly in May. Twin-engine version Mirage 4000 was scheduled for a first flight in March 1979. French air force has a current requirement for 200.

Dassault-Bréguet Mirage III and 5 fighters — Production continuing slowly on orders for new and replacement aircraft, with total orders at 1,370 by the end of January.

Dassault-Bréguet Mirage F-1 fighter — Production rate continuing at about 5.5 a month. Orders still stand at 505. Two-thirds are for export.

Dassault-Bréguet Super Etendard naval strike fighter — Being produced at a rate of 2.5 a month, the first eight of an order for 70 by the French navy have been delivered.

CASA C.101 — Certified 30th December 1978, Spanish air force is committed to buy 60 training versions.

SAAB 37 Viggen fighter/ground attack aircraft — Production of JA-37 is scheduled to continue until 1987, with delivery of initial lot of 30 under way to Swedish air force. Firm orders for JA-37 total 90 from Swedish Government, with an option for an additional 59. Contracts for 329 JA-37, AJ-37, SK-37 training, SH-37 and SF-37 reconnaissance versions of the Viggen signed by Swedish Government.

SAAB B-31A light attack advanced training aircraft — Replaced by a version designated SAAB SK-38/A-38 trainer attack aircraft. Development funds for new aircraft are available until 1982. Replacement for Swedish air force SAAB 105.

Macchi MB-339 jet trainer — Delivery of first lot of aircraft ordered by Italian air force has started and will be turned over to air force flight experiment centres before deployment to training schools in mid-1979. Italian air force also has increased its order from original 20 to 100.

British Aerospace Harrier VTOL strike fighter — Four versions currently in production on a common line that will remain open until the end of 1983. Delivery of a follow-on order of 24 single-seat GR Mk.3 aircraft for the British Royal Air Force has begun and delivery of aircraft to the Royal Navy will begin later this year. Navy has ordered 34 single-seat Sea Harrier FRS-1 aircraft and one T Mk.54 two-seat trainer. A follow-on order for five AV-8As has been received from the Spanish navy.

British Aerospace HS-1182 Hawk trainer — Royal Air Force has taken delivery of 96 of an order for 175. First four aircraft of an order for 50 from Finland are in production in Britain, with the first due to fly within a few months. The remaining 46 will be assembled in Finland from components built largely in Britain. A further 20 aircraft have been exported.

Panavia Tornado (MRCA) — First production version of the Tornado is scheduled to fly in July in England, and the second in August in Germany. Nine prototype aircraft and five of six preproduction aircraft are in the flight test programme, with the sixth preproduction aircraft to fly soon. West Germany is to receive 324, Britain 385 and Italy 100.

British Aerospace/Dassault-Bréguet (Sepecat) Jaguar strike fighter — Production of an initial order for 40 aircraft for India is under way, with the first deliveries anticipated in autumn 1979. Assembly of follow-on aircraft will be in India. British Royal Air Force has received its full order of 202 and the French air force has received 156 out of its total order for 200.

British Aerospace BAC-167 Strikemaster attack aircraft — Components for 10 aircraft have been completed, but assembly is being delayed pending signing of a firm contract. To date, 145 aircraft have been delivered to nine air forces.

Airlift

Short Brothers Skyvan — In production at a rate of one per month. Total sales to date are 126.

Short Brothers SD 3-30 — Eleven operators so far have ordered 34 of this twin-turboprop commuter airliner, with another two units on option.

CASA C-212 Aviocar — 166 delivered and 21 on order. The C-212-200 is expected to be

ready for delivery by scheduled certification in mid-1979.

Aeritalia G-222 — Deliveries of 44 aircraft to Italian air force continue. Argentine army aviation has ordered three and Dubai one.

Aérospatiale / Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm/ VFW C-160 Transall — Programme being restarted with a French air force order for 28.

Anti-submarine warfare

British Aerospace Nimrod — Two conversion programmes under way involving all 49 Mk. 1 ASW Nimrods. Of these, 38 are being converted to the Mk. 2 ASW version and the remaining 11 are being converted to the Nimrod AEW airborne early warning aircraft. First conversion expected to fly this summer.

British Aerospace HS-748 Coastguarder — Ocean surveillance version of the HS-748 transport is being demonstrated to potential customers.

Dassault-Bréguet Atlantic ANG — Replaces earlier Mk. 4 version. Construction of first prototype began in January. First production model flight scheduled for mid-1984. French navy has ordered 42.

Dassault-Bréguet Guardian — Adapted from the Falcon 20 for coastal surveillance. United States Coast Guard has ordered 40.

Helicopters

Agusta A-109 — Sales continue to civil customers in United States and elsewhere. Military version in production. Approved for IFR and offshore operation with pop-out floats. Approval of gross weight increases to 5,730 lb. in process.

Agusta A-129 — Programme started to supply three prototypes of this anti-tank helicopter to Italian army.

Agusta-Westland — Collaboration under way for a new ASW helicopter in accordance with Italian navy and Royal Navy requirements

Agusta-Bell series — Production of 205, 206 and 212 families continuing for civil and military operators, including 212 ASW version. Production also launched for AB-206L-1 Long Ranger 2. Collaboration with Bell for new model 412.

Agusta-Boeing CH-47C — Production of Chinook continuing at 1.5-2 units a month.

Agusta-Sikorsky S-61/SH-3D — Production continuing at one unit a month for Italian and

foreign operators in naval and utility version as well as VIP models.

Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm BO-105 — Orders total 400, with 370 delivered by early 1978. PAH-1 missile-armed anti-tank version under development and West German Defence Ministry has ordered 212.

MBB-Kawasaki BK-117 — Civil helicopter being developed jointly by MBB and Kawasaki for production in both countries has 30 orders. First flight planned for mid-1979. Deliveries to begin in early 1981, and peak production rate of about 100 a month is projected, evenly divided between Germany and Japan.

Aérospatiale SW-315B Lama — Total production as of January was 246, including 39 in 1978. Production continuing at a slow rate.

Aérospatiale Super Frelon — Production continuing at about one unit a month for export.

Aérospatiale SA-360 and SA-365 Dauphin 14-place utility helicopter — Production of the single-engine SA-360 continuing with 38 built by January. First deliveries of the twin-engine SA-365 were in 1978, with 37 built by this January.

Aérospatiale/Westland SA-341 and 342 Gazelle business/liaison/scout/attack helicopters — Being produced at about 15 a month for military export customers for advanced scout/armed attack rôle. By January, 805 of both models had been built.

Aérospatiale AS-350 5-6-place light utility helicopter — By January, 54 had been built and 30 had been delivered, including 20 to the United States.

Westland/Aérospatiale WG-13 Lynx — Orders for 287 helicopters have been received from eight nations and the Arab Organisation for Industrialisation (AOI). British Army has ordered 100, British Royal Navy 60, French navy 26, Dutch navy 24, Brazilian navy 9, Danish navy 7, Norwegian air force 6, Qatar 3 and Argentine navy 2. In addition, the AOI has ordered 50, of which the first 20 are being built by Westland and 30 will be assembled at Helwan, Egypt. A stretched version, designated WG-30, is under development.

Westland/Sikorsky SH-3D — In production in five versions. To date, 188 have been delivered out of orders for 234. British Royal Navy has ordered 56 Sea King Mk. 1 and 38 Mk. 2 versions and the Royal Marines have ordered 15 Mk.4 versions. British Royal Air Force has ordered 16 of the Sea King Mk. 3 version. Others ordering the Sea King include Norway 11, German navy 23, Indian navy 15, Pakistani navy 6, Belgian air force 5, Australian navy 10 and Egyptian air

force 6. Troop-carrying version of the helicopter, called the Commando, is being built for Egypt and Qatar with funding provided by Saudi Arabia. Egypt has received 27 out of 28 on order and Qatar has received all 4 of its Commandos.

Westland WG-34 — Design definition studies on an advanced three-engine ASW helicopter are being performed for British Ministry of Defence.

European missile programmes

British Aerospace Sea Skua — Anti-ship missile in development for the British Royal Navy for launch from ship-based Lynx helicopters. Initial deployment planned for 1980.

British Aerospace Sea Wolf — Air defence system in production for the Royal Navy. Improved version, designated M-40, under development.

British Aerospace Rapier — In service with the British army and the Royal Air Force regiment in both optically-guided and radar-guided Blindfire versions. Standard version ordered by the Iranian air force, Australian army, Zambia, Oman and Abu Dhabi.

British Aerospace Swingfire — Long-range, wire-guided anti-tank missile in service with the British army in a vehicle-mounted configuration. Also sold to the Belgian army. Infantry-portable version has been sold to Egypt.

British Aerospace SRAAM — Research and development programme for new short-range air-to-air missile.

British Aerospace/Raytheon XJ-521 Skyflash — Air-to-air equipped with an EMI limited fuse and Marconi guidance. In production for the British Royal Air Force for use on air defence aircraft, purchased by Sweden for use on Viggen fighters and evaluated by the United States.

British Aerospace Sea Dart — In production for the British and Argentine navies. Improved version under development. Land-based version offered.

British Aerospace P3T — Sea-skimming missile under development for the British Royal Navy. Based on technology of the Martel missile, but uses semi-active radar guidance.

British Aerospace/Australian Ikara — Anti-submarine missile produced in Australia and marketed by British Aerospace. In service with the British and Brazilian navies.

British Aerospace Sabre — Air-launched anti-armour and hard target missile being

defined, based on technology of the Rapier surface-to-air missile.

Short Brothers Seacat — Surface-to-air shipborne missile, in production and sold to navies. Advanced version with a sea-skimming capability is under development.

Short Brothers Tigercat — Land-based version of Seacat with Marconi Blindfire radar acquisition system. Sold to six nations.

Short Brothers Blowpipe — Shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile in service with the British and Canadian armies and others. Modified version for launch from armoured vehicles and ships under study.

Aérospatiale AS-15 — All-weather, air-to-surface missile under development to replace older AS-12 missile.

Aérospatiale MM-38 Exocet anti-ship — Deliveries continuing of both surface-to-surface and air-to-surface AM-39 versions. Land-launched, coastal defence version, MM-40A, being tested by French navy. Orders for all versions by about 23 nations stand at about 1,200, the same as a year ago.

Aérospatiale AS-30 air-to-surface — Scheduled for first firing by the end of March. New laser guidance version under development, with production expected to begin around 1980.

Aérospatiale Pluton — Five French army artillery regiments now equipped with this tactical nuclear weapon, an increase of one regiment since last year.

Aérospatiale/MBB (Euromissile) Milan anti-tank — Aiming for full production of 1,600 a month in about a year. British Aerospace Corporation is now licensed to produce the missile, which is already in production in France and West Germany. Export customers now total 16, an increase of three over last year.

Aérospatiale/MBB (Euromissile) Roland low-altitude air defence — Production is approaching the 1980 target of 250 a month. All-weather Roland 2, which has been adopted by the United States, is in production in West Germany for German forces. Optically-guided Roland 1 in production for French forces.

Aérospatiale/MBB (Euromissile) Hot anti-tank — Production nearing target of 800 a month. Production versions have been delivered to French and West German armies and nine other nations, an increase of three export customers since last year.

Aérospatiale SSBS/MSBS nuclear ballistic — Work continuing to replace earlier land-launched versions with SSBS S-3 missile with thermonuclear warhead, improved penetration

aids and improved re-entry fairing. Four French nuclear submarines, each with 16 missile tubes, are now operational with MSBS M-20. A fifth 16-tube, nuclear submarine is being equipped with A-20s while a sixth is due to be equipped with M-4s by 1984.

Thomson-CSF/Matra Crotale surface-to-air — In production for French navy and export customers including South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt. Total orders were 2,060 as of January.

Matra R-530 air-to-air — Export deliveries continuing to those countries operating Mirage III and 5 and F-1 fighters, with 3,300 sold as of January.

Matra Super 530 long-range air-to-air — Production started in January 1978. French air force has ordered 2,000 to equip Mirage F-1 and 2000. There have been no new orders since last year.

Matra 550 Magic air-to-air dogfight — Total orders stand at 5,000, including French air force and navy and 10 export customers.

Matra/Oto Melara Otomat anti-ship — In production for the Italian navy and four export customers, with 400 orders received as of January.

Sistel Marte air-launched anti-ship — Helicopter-launched version of Sistel's Sea Killer Mk. 2 missile is continuing qualification testing by Italian navy, which will be completed by mid-1979.

Sistel Mariner — Surface-launched version of Sistel Marte incorporating helicopter-borne radar and fire control system for operations from very small ships is under development.

Sistel Indigo-MEI surface-to-air — All-weather, air defence system against low-flying, high-performance aircraft and mounted on tracked vehicles for mobility is being funded through development and production by special

Italian army 10-year supplementary budget law. Prototype now being tested.

SAAB B-83 air-to-ground, quick-reaction missile — Now under development to be used primarily on an eight-missile per aircraft configuration for the planned SAAB SK-38/J-38 trainer/strike aircraft.

SAAB RB-05A air-to-surface — Production run completed late last year for AJ-37 Viggen attack aircraft.

Bofors RB-70 man-portable surface-to-air — Now operational with Swedish army. New all-weather version planned. Norway initially has ordered a limited number and other countries are interested.

Selenia Aspide air-to-air/surface-to-air/ship-to-air — In operation with Italian navy in ship-to-air version, and in production for Italian air force and army in other versions.

Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm advanced air-to-ground — Programme formerly called Jumbo is now under review to determine whether it will go into production phase. German Government is looking for partners in full-scale development programme.

MBB Kormoran air-launched, anti-ship — Now in series production for West German navy and air force. Italian Government has shown interest in acquiring missile.

MBB Cobra — Production for West German ground forces of this anti-tank missile is completed. Licensed production programmes continue in Italy, Turkey, Pakistan and Brazil.

MBB Armbrust 300 — Shoulder-launched anti-tank missile in series production in Brussels by joint Belgian-German company.

MBB Mamba — Anti-tank missile replacing earlier Cobra is now in production in West Germany and is being co-produced under licence in Italy, Turkey, Pakistan and Brazil.

European multinational programmes

General data					Dimensions and weights					Power plant		
Name	Manufacturers and countries	Primary mission	Crew	Passengers	Wingspan, ft.	Max. length ft.	Max. height, ft.	Empty weight, lbs.	Gross weight, lbs.	Number, make and model	Max. speed, mph	Remarks
Tornado (MRCA)	Panavia ³	Strike-Recon.	2	—	28.2 ¹ 45.6 ²	58.8	18.7	23,000	40,000+	2 Turbo-Union RB.199-34R tf.	M 2+	Variable geometry. Ordered by Britain, Italy, Germany. Air defence version ordered by Britain only.
		Air Defence	2	—	—	—	18.7	—	—	2 Turbo-Union RB.199-34R tf.	M 2+	
Concorde	Brit. Aerospace, Aérospatiale, France	Supersonic transport	3	108-128	83.8	203.8	37.1	173,800	408,000	4 Olympus 593 Mk. 602 tj.	M 2	In service.
A-300B2	Airbus Industrie ⁴	Short-haul	3	269-345	147.1	175.1	54.2	189,400	313,000	2 GE CF6-50C tf.	M 86	— 200 for hot/high conditions. — 200 with 3,100 n. m. range. — 200 with 3,100 n. m. range. Under development. Under development. Study of extended range version
A-300B4		Medium-haul	3	268-345	147.1	175.1	54.2	194,000	347,100	2 GE CF6-50C tf.	M 86	
A-300C4		Conv. pax/cargo	3	269-345	147.1	175.1	54.2	—	—	2 P & W JT9D-59A tf.	—	
A-310-100		Wide-body	2-3	205-255	144.0	153.1	51.9	165,330	266,750	2 CF6-45B2A or	M 84	
A-310-200		Wide-body	2-3	205-255	144.0	153.1	51.9	167,710	291,010	2 CF6-80A or	M 84	
A-310-X00		Wide-body	2-3	205-255	—	—	—	—	—	2 P & W JT9D-7R4C or 2 R-R RB.211-524B4	—	
Transall	Aérospatiale, France MBB, Germany VFW, Germany	Mil. transport	4	80	131.3	105.2	38.5	61,730	112,435	2 R-R Tyne R.Ty. 22 tp.	277	
ORAO /IAR-93	Soko (Yugoslavia) CIAR (Romania)	Close support	1	0	—	—	—	—	—	2 R-R Viper Mk. 632-41	—	Development
JET B-1	Aérospatiale, France British Aerospace, U K	Transport	2-3	131	34.2	35.9	12.5	83,820	132,500	2 GE/Snecma CFM56 tf.	M 0.84	Proposed joint development projects.
JET B-2	VFW-Fokker, Germany MBB, Germany	Transport	2-3	162	34.2	35.9	12.5	89,180	153,560	2 GE/Snecma CFM56 tf.	M 0.84	
Alpha-Jet	Dassault-Bréguet, France Dornier GmbH, Germany	Trainer/Ground Support	2	0	29.11	40.3	13.9	6,944	13,227	2 Snec/Tur. M49 Larzac 04 tf.	M 0.85	German version has wing hard points.
Jaguar	SEPECAT	Trainer B, E	2	0	28.5	53.9	16	16,850	34,000	2 R-R Turbomeca Adour Mk. 804 tf.	M 1.5	Export version.
		Strike S, A	1	0	28.5	50.9	16	17,250	34,000	2 R-R Turbomeca Adour Mk. 804 tf.	M 1.5	
		Strike	1	0	28.5	55.2	16	15,432	34,000	2 R-R Turbomeca Adour Mk. 804 tf.	M 1.5	

1. Swent. 2. Unswent. 3. Partner 4. Associate

**Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council**

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur**

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on scientific, technological and aerospace questions — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Energy production
- III. European aircraft industry
- IV. Space questions

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Warren (Chairman); MM. *Valleix*, *Lenzer* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens*, *Bernini*, *Cavaliere*, *Cornelissen* (Alternate: *Portheine*), *Hawkins*, (Alternate: *Beith*), *Konings*,

Lewis, *Malvy*, *Mart* (Alternate: *Hengel*), *Müller*, *Péronnet*, *Pinto*, *Schwencke*, *Talon*, *Treu*, *Ueberhorst* (Alternate: *Scheffler*), *van Waterschoot*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on scientific, technological and aerospace questions —
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the dialogue with the Council on the policy of member countries in the fields of energy, the aircraft industry, space and other areas of advanced technology;

Convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmental problems associated with new sources of energy call for solutions which cut across national frontiers;

Regretting that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term European energy policy;

Aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy;

Welcoming the increase in European collaboration for the production of civil aircraft, especially Airbus, and hoping that this success will induce governments to promote more intensive European collaboration for the production of a family of fighter aircraft and of helicopters;

Considering the growing market for European satellites and launchers,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its dialogue with the Assembly but that it enter into more details in its twenty-fifth annual report regarding Western European policies on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, their goals and achievements;
2. Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated programme in :
 - (a) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries;
 - (b) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale oil, liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy;
3. Arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting a merger of the existing management consortia producing Jaguar and Tornado;
4. Urge governments to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for uninterrupted development and production;
5. Promote the series production of Ariane launchers in order to conquer part of the world market for European and non-European satellites and their launchings.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Committee appreciates the Council's interest and the continuing dialogue on the policy of member countries in scientific, technological and aerospace questions, especially in the fields of energy, aircraft production and space.

2. Western Europe's dependence on outside sources of energy is increasing and is therefore becoming more dangerous for European security. It is deplorable that the European governments still take so much time to formulate an energy policy and that there is still such a divergence of views between the European countries with large energy resources and those which lack them. A report published on 24th April 1979 by the United States Office of Technology Assessment predicts that the free world's petroleum production will reach a peak some time after 1985; the supply shortage after that peak will then constitute a serious threat to the western way of life.

3. For the first time an optimistic note can be struck where the European aircraft industry is concerned. The Director General of Airbus Industrie has received permission from the French Government to increase production at the Toulouse assembly plant from the current 2.3 planes per month to 3 per month by 1980, possibly reaching a maximum of 8 to 10 a month later.

4. On the state of European co-operation in space questions, the Council pointed out in its report that during the period 1977-81 the Ariane and spacelab programmes were due for completion, both being programmes of a size never before achieved in Europe. If European industry continues its progress in the development of satellite technology, the success of these programmes from 1981 onwards would open for Europe the age of operational application satellites, especially in the communications field.

5. All the aforementioned subjects will be dealt with in greater detail later in this report, but here your Rapporteur wishes to underline the fact that at the end of April 1979 a new round of anti-satellite limitation talks started in Vienna between the Soviet Union and the United States. An early agreement to ban the testing of attack satellites, while negotiations are in progress, might be acceptable to both sides. It might then be possible to ban any aggressive action directed towards spacecraft of these two countries. The second step might be the banning of specific anti-satellite hardware. Protection of reconnaissance spacecraft is not at

issue but rather the protection of communications, early warning, navigation and other operational satellites. It is not the intention of either side to reach a formal agreement to coincide with the signing of the SALT II agreement, but there is a link between the two as the ability of the United States to verify Soviet compliance with the SALT II agreement and a test ban on attack satellites remains a key political issue in the United States.

6. The fourth subject mentioned by the Council is the work of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The third session was reconvened at Geneva on 19th March 1979. Of the 158 countries participating in the Law of the Sea Conference 119, which are members of the group of developing countries, are opposed to unilateral United States action on the basis of the United Nations resolution declaring the deep ocean resources "the common heritage of mankind". The same group of developing countries would like an international treaty to be ready for signature in Caracas in the spring of 1980. The United States believes deep seabed mining could start before 1985. At the moment six United States firms are involved in four major international consortia now conducting exploratory development of the mining of nodules which contain manganese, copper, nickel and cobalt ores. The sites involved are in the northern Pacific Ocean, beyond the areas of national jurisdiction at depths of more than 4,000 m.

7. At the end of the first sitting of the third session on 27th April 1979, the group of 119 countries made the following suggestions which will be discussed when the conference is reconvened at the United Nations headquarters in New York on 19th July for a further five-week sitting. The main proposal called for a five-year moratorium on seabed mining projects. The United States Government was not in favour of such a moratorium. Furthermore, the group of 119 countries proposed that the mining industry contribute 35-40% of its profits to help finance third-world participation in seabed mining. The United States considered this percentage much too high and 20% was suggested instead.

8. Another proposal was to limit the volume of minerals from deep-sea mining on the international market so as to protect land-based producers of such minerals.

9. Finally, there was a discussion on the voting system of the international executive group that would control the mining of the seabed minerals.

10. A consensus was reached on four key issues : (i) the rights of landlocked states to share in the fishery resources of their coastal neighbours ; (ii) the responsibilities of countries to enforce and obey rules protecting the marine environment from pollution ; (iii) the definition of the outer limits of the continental shelf ; (iv) the extent of the zone boundaries within which marine science research can be undertaken on the continental shelf.

11. Although there was a broad consensus on these four subjects, final decisions will have to be taken at the meeting in New York.

II. Energy problems

12. In her study on nuclear exports and non-proliferation¹, Simone Courteix stated :

“A paradox of our age is that nuclear technology, which holds out such great hopes if it is considered as a means of meeting present and future energy requirements in peace, is also an important factor in the armaments industries. Here it should be recalled that the statutory objectives of the Agency (for atomic energy in Vienna) are to seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and so far as it is able to ensure that assistance provided by it is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The means used to attain the objectives of non-proliferation are mainly the non-proliferation and other treaties, application of IAEA safeguards and the London directives adopted by the principal countries exporting nuclear materials and equipment which were translated into fact *inter alia* by the application of safeguard measures applying to the transfer of sensitive technologies and measures relating to the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, etc.

In spite of this range of means of fighting proliferation, there are growing fears that breaches may or will be opened in the immediate future. The main reason for this forecast lies in the fact that it is expected that energy of nuclear origin — which, since the oil crisis, has become more competitive and more essential — will be widely used in many countries before the end of the century and that there will be

widespread ownership of large quantities of nuclear materials and nuclear fuel cycle installations which might in the future be diverted towards non-peaceful activities if a number of juridical-political and technological barriers are not erected in time.

According to certain studies¹, a number of countries (twelve to fifteen) may at present be considered as on the threshold of accession to strategic nuclear power insofar as they possess reactors and the technical and industrial means of producing nuclear weapons. These countries have been grouped in three categories according to motivation :

- states in positions of insecurity which might be tempted to develop nuclear weapons to ensure their defence (Israel, South Africa, South Korea, Yugoslavia) ;
- states seeking such power for reasons of prestige (Brazil, India, Iran, Spain) ;
- finally, rivals of some of the abovementioned countries wishing to keep up with the others (Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, North Korea, etc.)².”

She concluded :

“However, two considerations must be borne in mind : first, there is always a time lag between a political speech and the requirements of international nuclear trade. The reversal of a situation in a highly political area, account being taken of its economic, social and ecological implications, etc., is always possible, and events in recent months have proved this. Second, since nuclear deterrence continues to be a decisive factor in the conduct of international relations, there is still a strong temptation for certain states to possess their own bomb. So safeguard measures against proliferation may in the end only be provisional. The nuclear powers will not always be able to be the nuclear police of the world while themselves refusing to reduce their stocks of arms. Sooner or later, general disarmament will be the only alternative to nuclear proliferation.”

13. Your Rapporteur agrees with the Council on the urgent need to make Europe less dependent on imported energy and to give high priority to large-scale investments in the energy sector. However, full account should be taken of the abovementioned considerations together with other security considerations which came to the fore with the Harrisburg accident.

1. *Recherches Panthéon — Sorbonne — Université de Paris I — Sciences juridiques, droit des relations internationales.*

1. Those of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and of the Ford Foundation.

2. Cf. International Herald Tribune, 13th May 1977, page 2.

14. Addressing the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in Washington on 23rd April 1979, President Carter remarked that the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 28th March 1979, had not resulted in harm to the public, and that the accident may even have served some positive purposes. The United States would redouble efforts to improve the safety of nuclear power and, even more important, the accident had reminded the world vividly of the dreadful consequences of a nuclear war.

15. In Europe, the German Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Lambsdorff, stated in April 1979 in an interview with the International Herald Tribune that the United States and European countries would stay dependent on foreign energy resources for the near future and that their only chance of reducing their vulnerability was to try to diversify in different sources of primary energy.

16. The German Government's position on nuclear energy had not changed and no important option for primary energy could be neglected. The Federal Republic could not be without nuclear energy, especially from the point of view of competitiveness because it was still the cheapest form of energy. Of course, safety was the number one point and was more important than energy supply, but all the necessary safeguards had been made.

17. The export of nuclear power plants was no great problem but the question of reprocessing and recycling was. The German position had always been that nuclear technology should be exported only to signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Non-signatories such as Brazil would still be subject to the controls specified in the treaty.

18. The United States President and the German Minister for Economic Affairs as well as Mr. Barre, Prime Minister of France, in his statement of 7th May 1979, are convinced that nuclear power is still essential for filling the energy gap. The United States obtains 13 % of its energy from seventy operational nuclear power plants; the target, set last year, is to increase that figure to 20 %.

19. The Common Market countries draw about 10 % of their electricity from nuclear sources and are counting on 30 % by 1985. The United Kingdom, with thirty-three nuclear plants, generates 12 % of its power; West Germany, with sixteen nuclear plants, 11 %; and France, with fifteen nuclear plants, 14 %. The French Prime Minister said on 7th May: "We must expect a rise of about 30 % in the price of oil in 1979; the energy crisis is here; awareness of the problem has not yet gone as deeply as might have been thought." He confirmed that

France "would not let go of nuclear energy". It is expected that nuclear energy will meet more than half France's power requirements by 1985.

20. Even before the Harrisburg accident, nuclear energy programmes were slipping behind, partly because of slow economic growth, partly because of public opposition. The number of nuclear reactors planned in OECD countries has been cut by more than half in the last eight years. This might go further as official statements about risks have been discredited in most countries. The political choices have to be clearly discussed in order to prevent a public backlash against nuclear power.

21. Your Rapporteur wishes to mention that in the framework of the Community it has often been pointed out that the similarity of energy supply problems encountered by industrialised countries requires similar efforts for their solution. Early co-operation in research and development is an important prerequisite for opening markets and also for the development of uniform criteria and standards. Environmental and safety problems associated with new sources of energy, especially pollution of the atmosphere and waters and the safety problems of nuclear facilities and radiation protection problems, require solutions which cut across national frontiers, especially in the densely populated area of Western Europe.

22. However, efforts to establish a common European policy have not had much success, especially in development sectors soon to be put to practical applications. In nuclear fusion, where practical applications will not be immediate, a joint integrated research effort could therefore be undertaken.

23. The Council of Ministers of the European Community, meeting in Brussels on 27th March 1979, was again unable to reach a decision on the medium- or long-term energy policy of the Communities. The only decision taken by the Council was that it would start to study the Commission's proposals on Community goals in the field of energy for the next ten or twelve years. However, no other decisions were taken nor were the guidelines adopted for a present-day Community energy policy. Where then is the political will to work towards a European energy policy? If the governments are so concerned by the prospects for 1990 onwards, why has no action been taken?

24. In 1979 agreement was reached on particular issues such as a programme for uranium prospecting in the nine European countries, physical protection of fuel material, a programme for storing radioactive wastes and a two-year programme on security aspects, but these partial agreements do not constitute an overall programme.

25. In the framework of the OECD, the International Energy Agency has concluded agreements on crisis management, energy conservation and development of additional energy resources. The agency has given a special impetus to broad international co-operation in energy research. Sections of programmes which compete with European programmes are closely co-ordinated with the Commission of the European Communities. The main purpose is collaboration with Japan, the United States and important European industrialised countries which are not members of the EEC.

26. Apart from institutionalised collaboration many neighbouring countries in Western Europe have special projects on bi-, tri- or multilateral bases, i.e. Urenco, Eurodif, Franco-German collaboration on fast breeder reactors, etc. Although all European countries say they are prepared to work towards a common energy policy it is disappointing to acknowledge the little progress made.

27. For Europe's security, growing dependence on oil supplies remains a critical problem. Neither are the strategic oil reserves very great. Europe will certainly not have any influence on the OPEC countries unless it develops a positive energy policy and a new generation of energy technology capable of replacing oil. Failing this, the money paid into the OPEC treasuries will remain a heavy unproductive burden on the European budgets.

28. A major research and development effort should be made to promote supplies of new natural gas and coal derivatives; for example, natural gas could be obtained from non-conventional sources like coal-bed methane and tar sands. Europe will certainly have to base its energy on a new technology such as solar energy, non-conventional gas and perhaps even shale oil or liquified coal.

29. On 25th April 1979, the Council stated in reply to Recommendation 326 on application satellites that, although numerous studies were available on the subject of solar power satellites for supplying the earth with energy, such systems were very expensive. It considered the realisation of even only a small prototype at least premature. Your Rapporteur does not agree with this comment as, for its security, Europe must reduce its dependence on the OPEC countries, and account must also be taken of the enormous sums which are yet to be paid for oil and the near certainty that one day in the not too distant future oil will have to be replaced by an alternative source of energy.

III. European aircraft industry

30. Answering Written Question 189 put by Mr. Valleix, the Council stated on 21st March

1979 that in the civil field there were advantages to be gained by co-operation between European airframe, aeroengine and component manufacturers and it noted that progress had already been achieved with such products as Concorde and the Airbus A-300. Actually the European consortium, Airbus Industrie, has raised its market share from 6 % to 19 % in a single year. Last year it sold 132 units of the A-300 and introduced a smaller version, the A-310, designed to compete directly with Boeing's 767. Airbus Industrie's increased share in the world market meant that Boeing's share of world orders for commercial aircraft fell from 59 % to 57 % in 1978; Lockheed's market share fell from 7 % to 6 % and McDonnell Douglas lost most, sliding from 28 % to 17 %. There are, therefore, certainly advantages to be gained by co-operation between European manufacturers.

31. The American firm Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner and Smith, which is an authority on economic analysis and forecasts in aircraft industries, is of the opinion that between 1979 and 1990 the world market for civil transport aircraft might be some 6,300 transport aircraft, costing about \$24,000 million. Airbus Industrie might get 14.3 % of this market, McDonnell Douglas 20.7 % and Lockheed 9.4 %; by far the largest share, 55.6 %, will remain with Boeing. For Boeing this would mean some 3,900 aircraft, and for Airbus Industrie some 800 aircraft.

32. However, as the Council rightly remarked, collaboration between European manufacturers does not mean the exclusion of the American industry. In fact the latter has much to gain from the success of Airbus Industrie: General Electric has long supplied engines for the Airbus and recently Pratt and Whitney moved in to share the market. United States industry also manufactures the electronic gear of the Airbus.

33. The first firm order for the Airbus A-310 came from Swissair, which belongs to the KSSU group whose aircraft have Pratt and Whitney engines, whereas the Atlas group, to which Air France, Lufthansa and Alitalia belong, will order the A-310 with General Electric engines.

34. Two versions of the new Airbus A-310 are being offered: a short-range version capable of transporting 240 passengers over 3,880 km and a medium-range version capable of transporting the same number of passengers over 5,580 km.

35. After the first firm order from Swissair, major orders for the A-310 transport aircraft came from Lufthansa, KLM and Air France. Lufthansa ordered twenty-five A-310 aircraft and took options for an additional twenty-five; KLM ordered ten and took options for another ten; Air France ordered five and took options

for another ten. These sales raise the number of firm orders for the A-310 to fifty-two; there are fifty-five options.

36. With regard to military aircraft the Council informed the Assembly on 21st March 1979 that much work was already being done nationally on the concepts for the next generation of fighter aircraft. It stated that the technical, financial and military problems to be overcome were very great but that there was every indication that those concerned were fully aware of the importance and desirability of finding a European solution. In your Rapporteur's opinion the most logical conclusion would be to combine the two companies now working on co-operative projects, i.e. Panavia, where the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy are co-operating on the airframe side and Rolls Royce, Fiat and MTU on the engine side, and Sepecat, which is responsible for the Jaguar production where Rolls Royce is working with Turbomeca on the engine side. If the next fighter aircraft is to be a joint European venture, the three major countries should participate at an early stage and the three air staffs should work together.

37. The Mirage 4000 is being developed in France, the TKF-90 in Germany, and the AST-403 in the United Kingdom; the staffs of the respective air forces should therefore study all three prototypes.

38. Governments should not forget that if France and the United Kingdom had acted together the Americans would never have succeeded in selling the F-16. However, because of competition between France and the United Kingdom the Americans found a way of selling the F-16 in spite of the fact that this aircraft did not meet NATO requirements.

39. Overriding everything is the need to establish a strong European base from which part of the world market may be conquered. It is true that the United States spends ten times more on research than any European country and that the American effort is four times greater than that of all the European countries together. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that even with its limited research and development resources Europe was able to produce Concorde, Harrier and the first swing-wing aircraft — the equivalents of which the Americans have not produced.

40. Governments should make an extra effort in the helicopter field. Industrialists have already set up a consortium, which has now been in existence for six years, but if their work is to be successful they need government projects to work on.

41. Euromissile, which directs the industrial and commercial aspects of the armed systems

Milan, Hot and Roland, their derivatives and sea-to-sea missiles, should be the permanent consortium in charge of missiles.

IV. Space questions

42. Many problems facing the European Space Agency stem, on the one hand, from the difficult economic situation in Europe which restricts the funds member states can allocate to space activities and, on the other, from the need to take major decisions concerning new space activities.

43. In its reply to Recommendation 326 on application satellites the Council stated that the agency had funds available in its own general studies budget to finance preparatory work on the desirable aim of formulating a coherent programme setting long-term goals for Europe. However, to the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, ESA's mandatory 1978 budget has not yet been approved, let alone the 1979 budget. Its approval requires the unanimity of the member states but this could not be obtained because of the attitude of the Italian Delegation which is not satisfied with the industrial return or the method of calculating contributions. The mandatory 1978 budget includes the general budget and the scientific programme budget. Practical arrangements have been made to minimise the consequences of this lack of decision for the daily work of the Agency. Nevertheless this situation has created a difficult atmosphere which could hamper ESA's ability to tackle the substantive problems of European space policy and programmes.

44. As far as the Ariane programme is concerned it is planned to have Ariane available and proven at the end of 1980. Although the first flight trial has been delayed to November 1979, the planned date of the last trial has been kept at October 1980; moreover a six months' margin exists between the last development firing, scheduled for October 1980, and the first operational launch, scheduled for April 1981.

45. For the operational phase the ESA member states approved the manufacture of six operational launch vehicles in addition to the four prototypes. The question now is whether a new series of five launchers should be ordered to enable ESA to meet requirements up to 1983. The Council of the Space Agency decided, during its meeting on 3rd and 4th April 1979, to manufacture a sixth launcher to put into orbit an Intelsat V telecommunications satellite.

46. Also under discussion is a modification to the first and third stages of Ariane and the addition of solid boosters which will increase the launcher's lift capability from 1,700 kg to 2,300 kg. ESA would therefore be able to offer

a launcher of higher performance and thus improve its chances of selling Ariane for programmes in both member states and non-member states. ESA does not intend to produce two types of the launcher in parallel but will offer only the new version with the modified first and third stages.

47. The arrangement for Ariane stipulated the price calculated in 1973 (380 million accounting units)¹, recognising that inflation had to be taken into account. Furthermore, the participating states committed themselves to contribute to a margin of 20 % for technical contingencies. France guaranteed to cover any additional expenditures up to a limit of 35 %. It is expected that the cost to completion of the programme will remain far below the total accepted by the participating states.

48. Financial difficulties have also arisen with regard to spacelab. The original cost was estimated at 570 million accounting units, which meant the nominal cost plus a margin of 20 % for technical contingencies. Now the global cost is estimated at some 680 million accounting units or 140 % of the initial cost, which amounts to 3,700 million French francs. The increase in the cost of spacelab has not yet been approved by all member countries although they have been kept informed about the situation of the programme and the technical contingencies. Italy, for instance, which until now has financed 18 % of the programme, has already announced that it wishes to make only a symbolic contribution to the extra 20 % of the cost. This will probably mean that other member countries will be invited to pay more.

49. NASA is committed to order a second spacelab. A definite order should be placed at the end of 1979 with delivery planned in the 1982-83 time frame. Until then ESA is obliged to give NASA all necessary logistic aid so that it can use its options freely. This means however that 1,400 people working on spacelab for ERNO in Bremen will have to be kept on the payroll. NASA may still wish to modify spacelab should this be necessary to make it compatible with the shuttle. The difficulties of integrating the various components of spacelab might have been underestimated by the manufacturer. The engineering model of spacelab, which should have been ready by mid-1979, is now ten months behind schedule and may be ready in mid-1980. The first flight, with two payload specialists, is planned for August 1981 and the second flight for January 1982. The first spacelab should be delivered to NASA in August 1980 in order to leave NASA one year to fit it into the shuttle. In view of the fact that the shuttle programme

is also running behind schedule, the delay with spacelab should not have serious consequences.

50. The shuttle has been delayed because of engine development problems which meant that the space shuttle's main engine programme had to be rescheduled. One incident resulted in some engine damage which had repercussions on the financial situation of the programme. The target date for the first launch is still 9th November 1979, but it will probably not take place until early 1980. The American Congress has approved NASA's request for \$185 million supplementary appropriations to carry the shuttle programme through fiscal year 1979. For fiscal year 1980, NASA might be obliged to request a considerable supplementary appropriation.

51. Where hardware is concerned NASA is convinced that solutions are currently available to nearly all problems that still exist.

52. On both sides of the Atlantic the space organisations have encountered financial difficulties due to overspending of the budgets for development programmes.

53. Of great importance is a well-defined future programme on the use of spacelab and the shuttle. The performance of spacelab should be improved in three respects: it should be given more electrical power, its flight should be longer than originally foreseen — thirty days as a target instead of seven — and the time necessary to fit out spacelab for its second and subsequent flights should be reduced.

54. A study on the use of spacelab from 1983 onwards should therefore be undertaken in order to define the evolution of co-operation between member states and the prospects of future co-operation with the United States.

55. Your Rapporteur submitted a second report on application satellites¹ on 26th October 1978 and will therefore not deal with this subject in detail again. He will merely give some extra information on developments since that time.

56. The Meteosat programme is producing satisfactory results and is integrated in the telecommunications network of the World Meteorological Organisation. It involves global acquisition and distribution of weather data. Images sent from Meteosat can be seen on German television every evening at about 7 p.m. The meteorological services of the ESA member states are presently considering the possibility of ensuring the continuity of the service by the creation of a new entity, EUMETSAT, which would be in charge of providing an operational system of European meteorological satellites.

1. 1 accounting unit = \$1.25.

1. Document 784.

57. Meteosat II will be launched on the third qualification launch of Ariane in 1980.

58. Existing weather satellites are also widely used for defence purposes. Arrangements are kept under continuous review by the NATO Military Committee Meteorological Group independently of the ESA work in this field.

59. Further to his abovementioned report, your Rapporteur put a question to the Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic, Mr. Hauff, on the future of communications satellites and the international market for such satellites. On 29th November 1978 the Minister gave the following answers :

“As indicated in Bundestag document 8/1595 of March 1978, recent studies show that in the eighties the world market will amount to DM 17-30,000 million. An estimate made in December 1977 by the Centre for Aeronautical and Space Research and Tests at the request of the Ministry of Research and Technology gave a figure of DM 24,000 million, of which 40 % for satellites and ground installations (antennae) and 20 % for launchers. Europe's possible share of the world market has been estimated at 30 % or DM 7,000 million. Should Germany obtain a share of not less than 25 % of the European market, this would represent a figure of about DM 2,000 million for the eighties. Large user receiving stations, needed for direct broadcasting, are not included in these estimates.

When assessing the openings afforded by these market prospects, the strong demand for experimental use of Symphonie and the interest shown in direct broadcast satellites must be considered positive. Conversely, the delay in completing satellite systems, for political and financial reasons, particularly in Brazil, Iran and the Arab states, must not be overlooked.

Where conventional broadcast satellites are concerned, European industry is hardly in a position to compete with American industry which practically dominates that market, even if the adoption of the ECS operational satellite system in Europe consolidates European industry. On the other hand, direct broadcast satellites have a great future. According to estimates by the German Centre for Aeronautical and Space Research and Tests mentioned above, in the eighties broadcast satellites will represent almost as high a proportion of the market as other communications satellites. German industry being well placed at the outset because of the extent of its research, priority will be given to broadcast satellites.

The success of this undertaking will depend on industry making strong efforts to align its prices with those of the Americans and pursue an active sales policy.

German research and development have gained an international position where communications satellites are concerned :

- The Franco-German Symphonie communications satellite programme on the experimental transmission of television broadcasts, telephone conversations and data, whose two satellites were launched in 1974 and 1975 and have since played a successful part in world-wide tests, has demonstrated a capability to develop satellites of this type and place them in geostationary orbit.
- The Federal Republic was responsible for the major part of the ESA Telecom programme, both technically and financially. In March 1978, work started on the ECS communications satellites for setting up a European operational satellite system to transmit communications on a large scale and broadcast television programmes. The OTS orbital test satellite was launched successfully in May 1978. A comprehensive test programme is under way.
- The ESA Marots (more recently Marecs) maritime satellite programme is to form part of the planned world-wide Inmarsat system. At the same time, maritime stations and radio distress installations have been developed in Germany.
- Where direct broadcast satellites are concerned, for several years the emphasis has been on modular-type operational models intended for satellite platforms, payloads and receiving installations with the result that German industry is now well placed to develop and produce satellite systems of this type. Thanks to the encouragement of the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, German industry has recently had considerable success on the international market :
 - German industry is developing and producing the attitude control system and solar panels for the seven new-generation Intelsat V satellites constituting the world-wide Intelsat satellite system. It has thus obtained the largest subcontracting contract outside the United States.
 - The German electronics industry has provided wave propagation tubes, *inter alia* for the American SBS (satellite business system), the NASA

TDRSS (data-transmission satellite system) and the Canadian ANIK-B communications system.”

60. In addition to these replies your Rapporteur would mention that at its meeting on 3rd and 4th April 1979 the ESA Council authorised the Director General to sign an agreement with Interim Eutelsat, the organisation which is to be in charge of the exploitation of the telecommunications, concerning the TCS system. (The approval for the signature of a similar agreement concerning Marecs A and B had been given previously.) The ECS programme includes five satellites, four of which will be launched by Ariane from 1981 onwards. The total cost of the programme is estimated at 306.8 million accounting units, of which 220.6 million will be financed by ESA and 80 million by Interim Eutelsat. Interim Eutelsat will also have to finance between twenty-five and thirty earth stations in order to exploit the ECS system.

61. The ESA decision-making bodies also agreed to sustain the programme to manufacture a third maritime communications satellite, Marecs C, until 1st September 1979 when the situation has to be reviewed.

62. It is encouraging to see the perspectives which are open to European industry in the space field and it is hoped that they will be fully explored.

63. It must nevertheless be recalled that space is still a very large venture which generally exceeds the capacity of one nation. It seems therefore essential that the European co-operation which has been the basis for the success of the present ESA programmes be augmented in the future and that the prospect of illusory short-term benefits will not lead European countries to develop national programmes at the expense of co-operative programmes which could at the end of the day only benefit non-European industry.

64. Finally, further to his first report on application satellites, your Rapporteur is pleased to be able to say that Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain have now ratified the ESA Convention and that only France has still to ratify it. Once France has done so ESA will no longer have to operate under the old ESRO Convention but will be able to follow the new ESA Convention.

*Scientific, technological and aerospace questions —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Valleix

1. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :
"Examine the possibilities of all-European co-operation in energy matters ;".
2. After the new paragraph, add a second new paragraph as follows :
"Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements ;".
3. In the original paragraph 3, leave out from "by promoting" to the end of the paragraph.

Signed : Valleix

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment 1 amended and agreed to ; Amendment 2 agreed to ; Amendment 3 withdrawn).

***Scientific, technological and aerospace questions —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council***

AMENDMENT 4¹

tabled by Lord Northfield

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows :

“(c) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create transfrontier dangers ;”.

Signed : Northfield

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment agreed to).

Parliaments and defence procurement

REPORT ¹

**submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur**

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Roper (Chairman); MM. Bonnel (Alternate: *Verleysen*), *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Ahrens*, Baumel, Bechter, *van den Bergh*, Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin (Alternate: *Lambiotte*), Fosson, Grant (Alternate:

Banks), Handlos (Alternate: *Büchner*), Hardy, Konen (Alternate: *Spautz*), de Koster, *Lemrich*, *Maggioni*, *Ménard*, *Pawelczyk*, *Pecchioli*, Péronnet (Alternate: *Sénès*), Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, *Tanghe*, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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* * *

Introductory Note

The Rapporteur gratefully acknowledges the assistance in the preparation of this report and appendices of Miss Franca Gusmaroli, of the *Istituto Affari Internazionali* in Rome, who was appointed by the Clerk as an outside expert at the request of the Rapporteur. The invaluable contribution made by the parliamentary defence committees and Ministries of Defence in the NATO countries is mentioned in paragraph 11 of the explanatory memorandum ; the Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those chairmen and officials who prepared replies to his questionnaires.

Draft Recommendation
on parliaments and defence procurement

The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procurement policy ;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information ;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, or other committees concerned :

1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of external security, not of political or administrative convenience, on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied levels, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment ;
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ;
3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry ;

B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries ;

C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified information with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procurement of new weapons systems.

Draft Resolution
on parliaments and defence procurement

The Assembly,

Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ;

Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of those of Germany and the Netherlands, are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ;

Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control the choice of defence equipment ;

Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information ;

With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the military and economic requirements of the Alliance as a whole,

CALLS UPON THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

To assert their democratic right and fulfil their democratic duty, where appropriate through their defence, budget, or other committees concerned :

1. To be fully informed on all aspects of defence policy, at both the national and allied level, especially on matters affecting the assessment of the military threat and the choice of defence equipment ;
2. To exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations, of the long-term defence programmes, and of all stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ;
3. To compile systematically information on current research and development projects in the national and European defence industry ;
4. To collaborate in the compilation and exchange through the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly of information concerning alternative defence equipment projects available in allied countries using where appropriate the good offices of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly of Western European Union.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Maggioni, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In recent years the increased sophistication of modern weapons has led to a significant rise in expenditure for the procurement of new weapons systems. It has been calculated that disregarding cost increases due to inflation the real cost of major systems is rising at an average rate of about 6 % per year¹. The increase both in development and production costs has led to difficulties for the arms industry which in their turn have been translated into an increase in the final cost of systems available on the market. It is thus easy to understand why the members of the Atlantic Alliance have shown growing interest in reducing development costs and securing the advantages of long production runs. This means looking for ways of sharing development costs and/or arranging joint production with other countries.

2. This is the crux of the problem from the arms industry point of view. From the point of view of each country's military leadership co-production offers the advantage of standardisation and interoperability. It should be borne in mind that militarily speaking the problem is not simply one of costs but also of providing the armed forces with jointly produced weapons systems which can maximise operational and logistic flexibility.

3. At this point there remains the political problem, that is the third and undoubtedly the most important factor involved when a western democracy seeks to equip itself with a new weapons system. For years now the Committee has concerned itself with arms procurement policy, examining the problem from many different viewpoints, both in industrial and in military terms. It is sufficient here to recall the symposium on a European armaments policy organised in March 1977 (and its successor planned for October 1979), and most recently the Committee's report of the same title² submitted during the November 1978 session of the Assembly.

4. In the present case your Rapporteur was asked to examine the extent to which parliaments of the WEU and certain other allied countries investigate and control expenditure on defence procurement, and their ability to influence policy

in the direction of standardisation and joint production.

5. Considering the triangle of military men, industrialists and politicians involved in the arms procurement process the greatest difficulty met by parliamentarians is the fact that it is impossible for them to make a clear and correct evaluation of the expenditure options they are called on to approve. In western democracies these options are the responsibility of various sectors within the administration. On questions of "military policy" these work within a general political framework where by law the only control is that exercised by parliament.

6. In democracies final authority on arms purchase should belong in constitutional terms to parliament, inasmuch as parliament controls and approves the decisions taken by the government. Clearly this parliamentary control cannot be based on criteria which are purely and exclusively technical. It is of course possible for experts, if not parliamentarians themselves, to determine whether a given aircraft, ship or missile is technically valid, to evaluate whether or not it is capable of carrying out the tasks for which it was designed. But how can parliamentarians judge whether it is right to allocate a certain expenditure to carry out these tasks when they are only vaguely aware of the nature of the tasks themselves?

7. If they have to give a reasoned and responsible evaluation of the technical proposals they first have to decide what kind of defence they are seeking; what are to be the limitations of this defence and what are to be its priorities. Secondly, parliamentarians must have the maximum of information available to them, at all times. The only way to satisfy the first requirement is through a correct defence policy debate between the parties in parliament, a debate which can take place at any stage in the procurement process or, as usually occurs, at the point at which parliament is called on to approve the funds allocated by the administration for its policies. This occurs in all the countries examined in this report. Nonetheless, for a series of reasons which vary with the specific features of national political systems this debate is not everywhere of the same importance.

8. What is certain is that where there is little debate and where objectives are imprecisely defined a power vacuum is created which is then exploited and filled from outside. Those who fill the vacuum lack political cover; they have no precise frame of reference to which to refer; they are thus highly vulnerable and find it impossible to make the more courageous decisions they would like to be able to take. In the absence

1. Roger Facer, *Weapons Procurement in Europe — Capabilities and Choices* — Adelphi Papers No. 108, IISS London, 1975.

2. Document 786, 31st October 1978, Rapporteur : Mr. Critchley.

of political decisions naturally enough bureaucratic routine comes to prevail. In this case the military establishment becomes dissatisfied with the absence of clear political directives and unwilling — for reasons of secrecy which cannot always be justified — to discuss military questions in depth. The result is that the military content themselves with the management of the funds bureaucratically assigned to the defence sector, without this management of funds being subjected to full parliamentary control.

9. The second requirement — that parliamentarians should have available to them sufficient information to make a correct evaluation — can be met through improved collaboration between the parliament and the administration, through independent bodies set up by parliament and through the initiative of individual members of parliament. Here too the quantity of information available varies from country to country according to the political relations existing between the government parties and those of the opposition and in line with the specific features of the national cultural and political scene.

10. From these premises the aim of this report is not so much that of criticising and evaluating national practice case by case as that of understanding and explaining how, when, and with what powers, both in theory and in practice, the parliaments of the various countries examined intervene in the process of procuring new weapons and finally that of determining the influence they exert in this way over joint production projects and standardisation.

11. Given the lack of an adequate literature on the subject the Rapporteur decided that it was both useful and necessary to prepare two detailed questionnaires so as to acquire detailed information on the specific situation in each NATO country (except Iceland which has no armed forces). The first of these questionnaires was addressed to the Minister of Defence, and replies for the most part have been prepared by the staff in each Ministry of Defence, directly involved in the arms procurement process. The second went to the chairmen of the defence committees of the various parliaments, institutionally responsible for approving defence expenditure, or at least expressing an opinion on expenditure proposed by the government. Replies in many cases have been prepared by committee staffs.

12. In drawing up the two questionnaires¹ the aim was to reconcile various conflicting requirements. First of all it was necessary, for certain countries where all information was lacking, to ask as much as possible about everything, including elementary points. Thus in the Italian

case, for example, the answers obtained provide precious information not available elsewhere. At the same time however the Rapporteur had to avoid asking other countries for information already available in studies and articles.

13. It was decided to group the questions in an order which as far as possible reflected the stages in which the decision-making process is logically decided. Finally emphasis was given to those stages during which, in practice, parliamentary control is most important.

14. The starting hypothesis was that as in practice the evaluation of the international situation is the responsibility of politicians, it is politicians who in each country should decide the objectives to be achieved, and thus determine military policy. Given this policy the military authorities, on the basis of technological research by the national arms industry and at international level, should determine the military means best adapted to achieve these ends. It is at this point in the process, before an order has been placed, that parliamentary control should be exerted. This report thus aims to determine whether in practice this parliamentary control is exerted *a posteriori* or *a priori*; whether by law parliament is given equivalent information about possible alternative options and finally whether parliaments have the power to exert their control through legislation, and through specific initiatives aimed at exerting control and acquiring information.

15. The questionnaires attempted furthermore to formulate the questions in such a way as not to tie these too closely either to decisions on specific weapons systems, or to specific national situations. At the same time they attempted to avoid the opposite risk, namely that of generalising from points necessarily tied to specific national situations or to the characteristics of specific weapons systems.

16. The questionnaire on the defence equipment procurement process addressed to national defence ministries consists of seven sections:

- A. Elementary information on the bodies responsible for procurement.
- B. Information on the initial stage in the process, that is the formulation of the military need for a new weapons system.
- C. Information on the second stage, namely the formulation of operational equipment requirements for the system.
- D. Information on the development of the system as specified in the earlier stage of the process.
- E. Information on the pre-production phase following the development of a prototype.

1. Attached at appendix.

- F. Information on allocation of funds.
- G. Conclusions concerning how far the theoretical procedure described above corresponds to reality as well as the political problems which arise in practice.

17. These phases should not be considered chronologically, rather they should be seen in a relationship of cause and effect (e.g. the allocation of funds, research and development). Thus each phase originates in the preceding phase while at the same time influencing the latter.

18. In each of the phases covered by sections B, C, D, E and F the information requested concerns the workings of the arms procurement process; the bodies involved in this process; who is responsible for what; whether there is liaison between the different sectors of the administration; what are the links with the arms industry and with those international allied bodies responsible for relations between the administrations and arms industries for the allied countries; what form is taken by relations with parliament, and lastly which are the factors which influence the decisions which have to be taken so as to pass from one stage to the next.

19. The second questionnaire, addressed to the defence committees in the various national parliaments, consists of four sections:

- A. General information on the rôle of parliament in the arms procurement process (which parliamentary bodies are involved in this process? How do they intervene? What are their powers?).
- B, C, D, E. Detailed information on the rôle of parliament during the various stages of the arms procurement process.
- F. Information on parliamentary control over budget expenditure including funds for new weapons systems.
- G. Political attitudes towards Euro-American problems and relationship of these to European collaboration in the arms field.

20. It was believed that it was of fundamental importance to investigate parliament's rôle before going on to examine the principal question posed in this report, namely that of how parliament might exert an influence over joint production projects and thus over standardisation. The aim of the second questionnaire was thus to determine how, when and with what process national parliaments intervene in the process covered by the first questionnaire.

21. Both questionnaires were sent to the fourteen members of the Atlantic Alliance (excluding Iceland which does not possess armed

forces); three southern European countries (Portugal, Greece and Turkey) failed to reply. Thus in practice the report covers the seven WEU member states: France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium (the Belgian Chamber of Deputies has not replied), Luxembourg and the Netherlands and four other NATO members: Canada (the Canadian parliament has not replied), the United States (no reply from the Senate), Denmark and Norway.

II. Analysis of replies received to the questionnaires

A. General — Organisation of Defence Ministries

1. Bodies concerned with decision-making

22. The main bodies involved and the majority of decisions taken in the arms procurement process belong to national defence ministries (or national departments of defence) and vary according to the importance of the system to be purchased or the decisions to be taken. It is unnecessary to give a detailed country-by-country description of the workings of national procurement systems; significant general characteristics only will be described.

23. In general, and leaving aside the Minister or Secretary of Defence, it is possible to identify within national defence ministries procurement bodies both of a technical-military and of a technical-administrative nature. Within these two broad categories the number, names, composition and size of these bodies vary from country to country. Each country has its own procurement system and its own regulations. In general however these bodies fall into one of three main sub-categories: decision-making bodies, consultative bodies and control bodies (the latter are absent in the organisational chart provided by the Luxembourg ministry). In this small European country the arms procurement process is on a very small scale due to the small size of Luxembourg's armed forces — 700 men grouped into one infantry battalion and one independent company.

24. Amongst the decision-making bodies belonging to the technical-military area there are such bodies as the chiefs of staff responsible for evaluating the procurement problem from an operational, technical and financial point of view. Amongst the decision-making bodies belonging to the technical-administrative area there are bodies such as the various secretariats and general directorates responsible for making this evaluation from an economic, technical and industrial viewpoint while at the same time taking all necessary legal and administrative measures involved in the contracting procedure.

2. Interministerial arrangements

25. Whereas certain countries such as France and Italy listed exclusively bodies belonging to their respective defence ministries, other countries referred to other sectors of the national administration thus giving a fuller picture of interministerial co-operation in the procurement process. In Britain, for example, unlike other European countries, a special body known as the Procurement Executive has been set up so that the various authorities responsible for the procurement of military matériel come under the responsibility of a single ministry.

26. Belgium lists those bodies including the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Finance as well as the following interministerial bodies: the Council of Ministers, the Ministerial Committee for Economic and Social Co-ordination, and lastly the Interministerial Committee for the Budget.

27. In Norway, if there is a choice between indigenous production or procurement domestically or abroad, there may be discussions with other ministries such as the Ministry of Industry. A similar procedure may be used when participation in bilateral or multinational production is contemplated. In the Netherlands an *ad hoc* body is set up to deal with the procurement of any exceptionally expensive weapons system. This may include representatives of the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and Finance.

28. Among the bodies responsible for the procurement process Denmark cites the Ministries of Trade (compensatory affairs) and of Finance (budget control); an interministerial consultative body on defence questions (the Defence Matériel Board) which includes representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Trade and Finance, from private industry (on account of its involvement in production) and from the trades unions. Finally, Denmark cites the Parliamentary Finance Committee responsible for the final decision to allocate funds to a new weapons system. (Denmark is the only European country to cite a parliamentary body. The United States does likewise.)

29. Finally it should be noted that the United States lists among the most important bodies involved in this work not only the Military Departments, the Department of Defence, the Budget Office, the Cabinet and the President but also Congress. Congress plays a greater rôle than the national parliament of any other Alliance member in deciding the respective size of the three armed services and in distributing the funds required for the use, maintenance, development and procurement of their military equipment.

3. Relations with parliaments

30. In western democracies not only government bodies but also parliament should play an important rôle in the arms procurement process, if only because it is parliament which debates and approves the funds allocated in the budget to military equipment. From the answers received to the questionnaires it emerges that in the majority of Atlantic Alliance members this rôle is mainly carried out by parliamentary defence committees and to a lesser extent in plenary session or in other standing *ad hoc* committees.

31. In the United States two further committees — the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs — can also affect supply decisions presented by the government.

32. In Germany, the Defence and Budget Committees of the Bundestag participate in this process (the rôle of the Bundesrat is practically nil). During the debate on the defence budget other committees and other political groups of the Bundestag can also intervene, the former to discuss the departmental budget schedules of interest to them; the latter to propose amendments. Even in the single-chamber Danish parliament, defence equipment procurement is principally under the supervision of two committees — the Defence Committee and the Finance Committee.

33. In the Netherlands, parliamentary involvement in the procurement process is restricted to the Second Chamber. In Canada and the United Kingdom on the other hand the debate on the supply of defence equipment is limited to the House of Commons, even if the House of Lords can, and occasionally does, consider defence matters.

34. In the British House of Commons these questions are dealt with by the Expenditure Committee and more specifically by the Sub-Committee on Defence and External Affairs. The Committee of Public Accounts also may occasionally deal retrospectively with an equipment purchase in its capacity as a scrutineer of past expenditure.

35. The French Senate refers not only to the work of the Defence Committee, but also to the possibility that two further informal groups may be involved in weapons procurement, namely a group within the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and a second group in the Budget Committee. The rapporteurs on the budget participate in both of these groups.

36. The Belgian Senate emphasises that as the procurement of expensive defence matériel involves more than just defence, the Economic and Foreign Affairs Committees may also intervene.

37. In the Italian Chamber of Deputies there is not only the Defence Committee but also the recently constituted Committee of Enquiry on Military Supplies and the permanent Sub-Committee on Military Planning.

38. The number of these bodies should not be allowed to give a misleading impression concerning the rôle effectively played by parliaments in the arms procurement process. On the contrary (to anticipate what emerges from the analysis of the answers to the questionnaires), unlike the United States Congress, European parliaments with very few exceptions are not involved in the various phases of the process through which new weapons systems are procured, rather their rôle tends to be restricted for the most part to requests for information; the control exerted in practice is limited to the debate and vote on the budget.

39. In Italy not only does parliament exert control through the annual defence budget debate but also through the recently-passed ten-year laws for the modernisation of the three armed services. In France parliament may intervene on other occasions: during the vote on the military programme law, which gives figures for the funds allocated for the purchase of military materials over a five-year period, and during the annual presentation of the report on progress made towards putting this law into effect. Again these various kinds of action referred to by the parliaments in their replies should not conceal the real practical importance of parliament in arms procurement.

40. In any case, despite the various means of acquiring information which the committees have at their disposal (parliamentary questions, motions, enquiries, investigations, hearings, etc.) the majority complain of a lack of real consultation by the executive, and an inability to exert real control over the various stages of the procurement process, often due to the lack of necessary information. It will be possible to investigate this question in greater detail when we examine the various stages in the procurement process. Here it is sufficient to state that the most satisfied parliamentarians seem to be those from the Netherlands and Germany.

4. Parliamentary access to information

41. In general there are no direct relations between the executive and the parliament; rather these pass via the Minister of Defence who is the only minister responsible to parliament on these questions. In the majority of countries, with some detailed procedural differences, the Minister testifies to the defence committees in the national parliament and replies to written and oral questions. Parliamentarians may also require (or in some cases only request) that he should pro-

vide them with all the information they need, including, at the Minister's discretion, classified material if this should be necessary.

42. In France and Belgium classified information below "secret" level may be requested by individual parliamentarians, but they may not always obtain it. Information is however only given in certain cases and *ad intuitu personae*. Under the terms of a procedure which has never been institutionalised or codified it is the rapporteurs in the committees rather than the committees as a whole who receive this information; at the same time the chairmen of the French Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees have free access to telegrams of the foreign affairs and defence ministries including those dealing with relations between ministers.

43. Italian parliamentarians may obtain information only with the approval of the highest national security authority (the President of the Council of Ministers). Like their Luxembourg colleagues their names do not appear on the list of those entitled to receive classified material nor does it appear that in practice such a concession has ever occurred.

44. In Germany all parliamentarians have access to national classified matters up to "top secret" level, provided that they show a plausible reason for requesting it. For NATO classified matters a written security clearance is required.

45. In Canada the Minister is obliged to testify before both standing and *ad hoc* committees, to reply to questions and to provide such information as required, including the release of classified information.

46. In Norway the right to demand classified information is restricted to members of the Defence Committee whereas in the Netherlands and Denmark, while parliamentarians have no such right, in practice they always receive this information up to "secret" level.

47. In the United Kingdom, even if parliamentary committees may receive information up to "secret" level, some members of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee seem dissatisfied with the information they obtain from the Ministry of Defence.

48. In the United States Congress, during the discussion of the defence budget, committees may often demand that military personnel or a minister's staff testify on specific programmes. Individual members of Congress have access to information, including classified information, if they show their "need to know" so as to carry out their functions. Requests go through the chairmen of the committees investigating specific questions. For security reasons, such hearings are often taken in closed session.

5. *Links with industry*

49. Both the governmental and the non-governmental bodies cited so far obviously maintain close relations with their own national industry which is concerned with the supply of defence equipment. Here one should immediately note the specific situation of Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark.

50. These countries possess relatively little production capacity in the armaments sector (exceptions being the Belgian Fabrique National, Denmark's naval dockyards, and some electronics firms). Major weapons systems acquired are thus both developed and produced abroad or alternatively developed abroad and then produced under licence either internally or in collaboration with other allies. These countries' industries thus produce largely components which have usually been developed abroad.

51. Luxembourg does not have an arms industry at all in the true sense of the word. There are a few companies which mainly produce protective materials with military applications, but they do not produce military components for the Luxembourg army.

52. In the remaining countries, private, semi-public and public industry is involved in the procurement process from the initial research stage; in the United States there is close collaboration between private industry and military research centres even in the research stage.

53. In general, relations with industry are the responsibility of specific bodies in defence ministries with the Ministry of Industry playing a consultative rôle.

54. It is unnecessary to point out the peculiar nature of the relationship between government and industry in countries such as the United Kingdom or Italy in which the arms industry is mostly nationalised.

6. *Links with multinational allied bodies*

55. Finally the various ministerial bodies responsible for arms procurement maintain a series of ties not only with other sectors of the administration, with parliament and with national industry, but also with multinational bodies both inside and outside the Atlantic Alliance in which their respective countries participate. These bodies provide an institutional framework for those transnational contacts essential for weapons standardisation and for interoperability. We thus see representatives of the chiefs of staff and national armaments directors participating in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC); the independent European programme group (IEPG); and Eurogroup, and in the meetings of

army representatives of the WEU countries (FINABEL).

56. In its reply the United States emphasised the work of its Ambassador to NATO, whereas Canada confirmed that the policies worked out in these bodies are important factors in the national defence programme and expressly referred to conflicts between the requirements expressed in multilateral bodies referred to above and the safeguarding of specific national interests, for example, the needs of the domestic economy. According to the Canadian reply these conflicts are considered and resolved at the government consultative and decision-making levels.

7. *Decision-making procedure*

57. Despite the differences between the systems and procedures used by the various national administrations, an analysis of their replies gives a general picture of the weapons procurement process with variations from country to country and from weapons system to weapons system. The process may be summarised as follows: definition of needs; ideas for solutions; feasibility studies; preliminary marketing research; definition of the operational equipment requirements; marketing research; definition of the technical-financial parameters of the problem; evaluation of alternatives; selection; technical-operational opinions; global opinion within context of joint planning and relevant technical/financial programming; preliminary approval; procurement order; draft contract; opinions on economic, legal, administrative and industrial questions; drawing up of development contract; development of prototype; delivery of prototype; technical testing; final approval; advertising for tenders; drawing up of production or purchasing contract; allocation of funds; registration of contract; delivery of weapons system to the bodies responsible for technical testing; technical and operational testing; entry into service.

58. In the questionnaires the stages described above are divided into five phases (B, C, D, E, F) so as to facilitate a detailed investigation into parliament's rôle in each of these and in particular so as to determine whether parliamentary intervention favours increased standardisation and interoperability in NATO armaments and if so at which stage this occurs.

B. Definition of the military need for a new weapons system

1. *General*

59. The aim in this section was to summarise a whole series of actions which for convenience were listed as the first four of the items enumerated in paragraph 57. In other words

Stage B (the "preconceptual" stage) begins with long-term defence policy planning, which occurs over ten or fifteen years (this varies from country to country). During this stage long-term discussions are held on military equipment, on whether or not to keep equipment which is already operational, and on the quantitative and qualitative structure of national armed forces.

60. Given that many different variables are involved in long-term analysis this phase involves feasibility studies. These, along with preliminary market availability studies, are usually conducted by national chiefs of staff.

61. In the majority of countries the formulation of needs is a continuous process. The exceptions to this rule are Italy and Denmark where needs are formulated at regular intervals. Needs are formulated separately by the three armed services; where there are problems involving joint responsibilities there exist various forms of inter-force co-ordination.

62. Once military needs have been defined they are transformed into objectives to be attained (equipment policy). These may involve research and development if the equipment required is unavailable on national or foreign markets, or alternatively through an order for supply if the equipment is available. This may involve production within the ordering country, production under licence of the whole or part of a given weapons system, joint production, or purchase abroad. By the end of this stage funds have already been assigned to each stage. The responsibility for the decision depends on the importance of the weapons system in question and may involve the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence or the chiefs of staff. If research and development or the order for equipment involve international collaboration the decision is usually submitted, even at this early stage, for approval by the highest authorities.

2. Inputs from allied bodies

63. This section attempted to investigate whether and to what extent the bodies responsible for procurement give importance in this "preconceptual" phase to the co-ordination of their needs through the various multilateral allied bodies thus leading to decisions which are as homogeneous as possible and which satisfy the need for weapons standardisation.

64. The conclusion is far from optimistic. In this phase the factors given most weight are strictly national considerations. The need for standardisation and interoperability is taken into account "as far as possible". This impression arises primarily from the replies to the questions which asked which factors influence the formulation of new military needs (the threat, an adversary, changes in tactical or strategic

doctrine, the formulation of needs by allied bodies, the results of research and development, the effects on industrial production and employment).

65. For various different reasons and with different nuances the answers received from Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and the United States constitute an exception to the general rule. According to the Belgian reply all the factors mentioned, from the perception of threat to the evolution in technology resulting from research and development, depend on the work done by allied bodies. Denmark and Luxembourg, which possess no significant arms industry and have no specific economic interests to protect, emphasise the importance during the formulation of their military needs of the needs formulated by the CNAD, the IEPG, FINABEL and Eurogroup, the aim of these being to encourage weapons standardisation. Finally the United States cites Defence Department Directive 2010.6, paragraph IV D2, which directs each of the services to seek agreements within NATO on their military needs.

66. Of the other countries the Netherlands and the United Kingdom give priority to changes in tactical and strategic doctrine formulated at a NATO level (long-term defence plan — LTDP) whereas Italy and Canada give priority to the perception of threat. As far as changes in doctrine are concerned it is interesting to note how different allies give differing explanations of the same phenomenon. Whereas nearly all the replies state that national strategic and tactical doctrine is co-ordinated, discussed and formulated at NATO level, Italy insists on the national characteristics of its doctrine which may be influenced by "possible adjustments or modifications formulated in allied bodies".

3. Rôle of parliament

67. Whereas governmental bodies give little attention to standardisation at this stage it is useful to examine the rôle of parliamentary bodies (if these have a rôle to play). The majority of countries state that parliament is not involved in the formulation of needs. At most, parliament is informed of the situation, with all the limitations usually imposed by the administration on parliamentarians interested in this field. In Belgium and Italy, on occasions, the parliaments have been informed when negotiations between the government and national industry concerned were already in progress. It has even happened that trade unionists have been informed of a certain project in a particular industry before parliamentarians even knew of its existence. In fact, defence research seems to be very sensitive to security and, in the majority of European countries, it seems that there is no parliamentary scrutiny

at the research stage and it is possible to believe that many expensive projects not properly controlled are hidden under research and development heads.

68. Nonetheless the information received by national parliaments is not limited to what defence ministers decide or are able to tell them — although the French Defence Committees replied that they based their work almost exclusively on information received from the government. The committees possess their own independent means of gathering information: public and private research institutes; foreign sources of information; hearings of experts; visits to industrial plants; private sources of information; participation in international parliamentary assemblies (WEU and the North Atlantic Assembly). In the United States the House Armed Services Committee includes a Standing Sub-Committee on Investigations which together with other committees which can be set up under special circumstances may undertake major investigations into any question including the definition of the need for a new weapons system.

69. The means of acquiring information independently are not in other words lacking: it is nonetheless interesting to see whether these are used in practice during the "preconceptual" phase in the arms procurement process. The Belgian Senate Committee states that "theoretically" it is capable of informing itself but complains about delays and incompleteness in the information provided. The same applies in France. The German Defence Committee believes that at this stage standardisation falls under the competence of the respective executive bodies. A very different reply from the United States House Armed Services Committee states that it is always informed when a new military need is translated into a real objective to be pursued, that is, at the end of the stage at which needs are formulated. What is more, whenever United States armed forces stationed in Western Europe are to be equipped with the weapons system, the American Congress is obliged by law to take into account — even at this early stage — the standardisation or at least the interoperability of this system with equivalent systems used by other allied countries.

C. The formulation of operational equipment requirements

1. General

70. This section includes those phases (described in paragraph 57 of section A of this report) which go from the definition of the operational equipment requirements to the preliminary approval of the order. The general technical directorates and other technical bodies responsible to the chiefs of staff define the military

characteristics of the equipment in line with the needs formulated during the preceding stage in the process. In the United Kingdom as we have already noted, unlike the situation in other countries, these responsibilities are concentrated in the procurement executive.

71. The formulation of operational equipment requirements is also a continuous process, which proceeds as new needs are formulated by the chiefs of staff. The French reply states that the results of research may at times lead to equipment being proposed to the chiefs of staff before the latter have formulated a need for that equipment.

72. At the end of this stage the weapons system corresponding to the requirements is given preliminary approval by the chief of army, navy or air force staff or by the chief of defence staff (at times, as in the United Kingdom and the United States, by the Secretary of Defence).

2. Inputs from allied bodies

73. As far as the factors which influence the definition of requirements are concerned, it is clear that in this phase changes in tactical and strategic doctrine are less important than at the earlier stage. At the same time the perception of threat, the results of research and development and the formulation of needs in allied bodies are all of much greater significance; indeed this will be recognised as the crucial stage for standardisation. Once a project is in its full development stage it is more difficult to work towards standardisation or interoperability. Hardly any of the replies give particular attention to this stage.

74. Apart from the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium and Luxembourg, which for different reasons tend not to distinguish between phases B and C, the other countries say very little about this phase. The exceptions are France, the United States and Germany. According to France not only the various CNAD working groups but also, in recent years, Panel II of the IEPG have provided an important framework for consultation which helps to provide a precise definition of the European allies' needs as well as better knowledge of them.

75. The United States, as well as referring to Defence Department Directive 2010.6 on the need to seek agreement on standardisation within NATO — mentioned above — states that NATO standardisation and interoperability requirements shall be considered where mission needs can only be satisfied through an equipment modification or new development. Finally there is a reference to Defence Department Directive 5000.2, in which it is stated that, where feasible, mission needs will be satisfied through the use of existing military or commercial items. In Germany

the study groups which draw up operational equipment requirements have to consult with NATO partners and they should lead — after proper analysis — to initial ideas for solutions and to their concretisation in the form of tactical requirements.

3. *Rôle of parliament*

76. As for the information received by parliament during this stage, and parliament's ability to exert effective control, the same considerations apply as to Stage B.

77. The Belgian Senate Committee states that the government keeps it informed when it is about to take decisions concerning the purchase or renewal of military equipment, but it is impossible to say at what stage this information is received because it is provided when the Minister of Defence or the committee feels that it is necessary. The Italian Senate Defence Committee states that it "can be informed" through the *leggi promozionali*, but expresses a wish for improved international contacts so as to give better evaluations. The same occurs in France where parliament is consulted when the project for a new weapons system has been given final approval and the order is placed. Finally, in the United Kingdom, committees obtain information only when specifically called for.

78. As stated in paragraph 40 of section A of this report, the most satisfied Defence Committees outside the United States seem to be the Netherlands and German bodies. The Netherlands Committee states that it exerts some form of control over all the various stages in the arms procurement process, right from the initial stages B and C. Each year the government presents parliament not only with the budget but also with an extremely detailed explanatory note of some hundreds of pages. This note contains, *inter alia*, views on the necessity of new equipment even if the budget itself makes no provision yet for expenditure on such a project. If it concerns important investments, the Defence Committee receives an extremely complete "material situation report" which includes the motivation given for the need, operational requirements, the budgetary consequences, the evaluation of the various alternatives, etc. What is more, the government always informs the committee of its final procurement decision. Finally, between this government decision and the signature of the contract, the Netherlands parliament has at least a fortnight in which to hold a parliamentary debate, if necessary.

79. The Bundestag also states that it is informed, if not always consulted, at every stage in the process. It points out that when the question of Euro-American collaboration arose on

AWACS, it put its own point of view on standardisation and interoperability. For the United States the same considerations apply as in section B.

D. *Development of the prototype*

1. *General*

80. This phase begins with the procurement order which usually comes from the Ministry of Defence and concludes with final approval which, in the case of systems yet to be developed, is subsequent to the delivery of the prototype. If the equipment to be purchased has already been developed by national or foreign producers, Stage D and the following Stage E (production) merge into a single stage. This occurs particularly often in those countries which as we have already noted have no important arms industry, namely Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg. Given that the weapons systems involved are of minor importance, in these countries the decision to begin work on the development of a prototype is the sole responsibility of the director of the company concerned.

81. Development work is conducted by the arms industry together with ministry bodies in the technical-military area (as defined in paragraph 23 of section A of this report). The development order is always given by the service concerned, although it cannot be excluded that at times account may be taken of previous development work conducted independently by the company concerned. This has only a marginal influence on the financial burden of research and development which is usually borne by the service concerned and which falls under a different budget heading from individual weapons programmes (the exceptions being Denmark, the Netherlands and to some extent Canada). Company financial contributions to development costs are usually if not always the exception, and occur either when there is a private contract with a single company or, as in the example cited in the Canadian case, when a foreign country is believed to have an interest in the system under development. When industry does its own development work it may be decided to pursue this work with full or partial government funding. The American regulations afford greater possibilities to private industry in that Defence Department Directive 5000.2 requires that mission needs should be satisfied through the use of existing military or commercial items.

82. Once the prototype has been developed the armed forces technical services are responsible for supervision, testing and acceptance. In projects in which other allied countries are involved a special agency is set up for trials, tests and final acceptance.

2. *Inputs from allied bodies*

83. In general, the earlier there are multilateral contracts, the greater is the possibility of multinational collaboration aimed at facilitating standardisation. The beginning of development work represents an important threshold after which attempts at co-production become more difficult. This is why the questionnaires give great weight to the question of how far government bodies and parliamentary committees are aware of allied countries' development projects.

84. The majority of countries stated that they were aware of allied projects. Canada however complained of the inadequacy of available information and Italy, stating that this information was received, added that it was "necessarily" limited.

85. The United States again referred to Defence Department Directives 2010.6 and 5000.2 cited earlier. These require the bodies with responsibility in this field to collaborate with allied countries at the highest possible level before reaching a decision, and to study all systems and their components under development in allied countries. Finally the directives require that the Defence System Acquisition Review Council, which is responsible for the review of all procurement programmes, should ascertain that this co-ordination has taken place. Even the United States Defence Department however confirmed the practical difficulties involved in obtaining information on allied projects.

86. Industrial information may be exchanged between allies both in the IEPG and the CNAD (where the United States and Canada are also present). These bodies were set up not only to explore possibilities for future co-operation but also to ensure that standardisation and interoperability would be taken into account in all circumstances. In practice this has only occurred on a limited number of occasions. In other cases there has been consultation before the beginning of development work but this has been outside the framework provided by these multilateral bodies and has involved the countries or country with which an agreement has already been signed for collaboration in the development of a specific system.

87. The majority of countries stated that in these multilateral allied bodies the need for standardisation and interoperability is taken into account before the beginning of development work "when this is possible".

3. *Rôle of parliament*

88. The impression to be derived from relations between government and parliament before

and during development leaves equally little room for optimism.

89. The Italian Ministry denies the existence of any kind of relationship with parliament at this stage with the exception of the *leggi promozionali* the debate on which serves to make parliament aware of the ten-year plans for the armed forces. The Italian Senate Committee states that it learns about these plans in this way. At the same time the committee states that it is able to intervene only when planning is far advanced, rather than during the definition of operational equipment requirements, and cites the examples of the MRCA and of AWACS.

90. The two French Committees deny that they are consulted when a new weapons system enters the development stage. The Netherlands, German and United States Committees reconfirm the positive view they expressed in sections B and C.

E. *Production and pre-production*

1. *General*

91. This stage begins — in those cases where it has not already been decided to purchase abroad or to purchase a licence abroad — with an invitation to bid and the award of a contract. Naturally in those cases in which only one company is capable of producing the equipment there is no competitive bidding. Once the winning bid has been chosen the contract is signed. Pre-series and production in series follow immediately. Here too, as in the development stage, the product has to be subjected to technical trials so as to be accepted by the technical services of the armed forces. Immediately afterwards the equipment is assigned to operational service.

2. *Inputs from allied bodies*

92. At this stage, too, we have attempted to understand whether and to what extent the need for standardisation is taken into account and whether there exists any form of consultation with national parliaments. At this stage, the last in the procurement process, it is very unlikely that parliamentary action could help favour standardisation.

93. At this stage, too, the factors which influence the decision taken seem to be very closely tied to specific national situations: the obsolescence or otherwise of existing equipment, considerations as to whether or not it is opportune to begin the production of equipment on an *ad hoc* basis, the economic advantages to be gained from the decision to limit production to national companies or to give them a large share in production, the relative costs of different sources of supply, etc.

94. What occurs before the beginning of production is not so much consultation with allied countries as consultation between different sectors of the national administration.

3. *Rôle of parliament*

95. As is easily understood the majority of replies on parliamentary intervention during the production stage were completely negative. Any information given on the production situation is usually given during the debate on defence expenditure. Here too however a number of committees reconfirmed what had already emerged from earlier replies, namely that very often parliament is given insufficient information during the intermediate stages of a programme and that there is usually a lack of information concerning the situation in other countries, even though there exists a widespread political awareness of the need for joint programmes. Given this situation what actually occurs is that in all countries and in every case parliament is informed during the budget debate. At the same time an explanatory note is supplied containing opinions and evaluations of the alternative options.

96. The Netherlands and the United States are the only countries to refer to parliamentary intervention during the pre-production and production stage. When the Starfighter and Neptune aircraft had to be replaced the Netherlands parliament, at the last moment, requested a further parliamentary debate on the question, in view of its importance. In the United States the Congress Committees are also consulted before pre-production and production in series. They thus exert their control at the end of every stage in the procurement process. As far as interallied co-operation is concerned every year these committees receive the so-called Culver-Nunn report on United States activities in the field of NATO standardisation.

F. *Budgetary control*

97. For convenience all financial questions relating to the various stages in the procurement process have been grouped together in this last section, although not last in chronological terms.

98. The government body responsible for allocating funds for equipment to be purchased during the various stages of research, development and supply is the army, navy or air force staff and for inter-service projects the defence staff.

99. Parliament is involved in the allocation of funds during the debate on the defence estimates. During the annual debate on the budget in parliament defence committees may propose amendments. If these are approved they may lead to

significant changes in the content of the budget presented by the administration.

100. In Denmark only the Finance Committee is involved in the final decisions with regard to allocation of funds for a project. But in the case of high-cost programmes extending over several years other committees may also intervene.

101. In the United Kingdom parliamentary approval is not given project by project; rather a total is approved for all projects in progress whether they are in the research and development or the production stage. These overall figures are accompanied however by an explanatory note which allows them to be understood in detail. As noted above, in the absence of a defence committee proper, these figures are considered by the Expenditure Committee, which does not approve the budget as in other parliaments. The estimates are merely considered, usually without any debate on the floor of the house. The balance of power between government and parliament has got out of hand and parliament in particular is unable to scrutinise the enormous defence expenditure.

102. In Belgium the budget is debated item by item and paragraph by paragraph. In Italy the budget debate, unlike the debate on the *leggi promozionali*, may involve discussion of an individual programme. In practice however there is never an item-by-item debate, even if this is theoretically possible. The existence of the *leggi promozionali* leads to increased flexibility in a budget which it is difficult to expand due to the fact that the rise in fixed expenditure leaves little room for manoeuvre. In France the budget is divided into chapters and paragraphs and is debated en bloc rather than programme by programme; voting is on a chapter-by-chapter basis. In the Netherlands the budget is first debated en bloc and then item by item. On occasions it may also be discussed programme by programme. In Germany there is the opposite procedure. The debate is initially chapter by chapter, then item by item, within each chapter. Finally the budget is debated en bloc.

103. In the United States, Congress begins by establishing the objectives of the whole budget (first budget resolution). It is then decided within this broad outline what proportion of expenditure should go to defence. These allocations of funds are then re-examined and approved by the committee and in plenary session. Finally in the second budget resolution Congress re-examines the whole budget in the light of the allocations approved or modified. Congress may debate the budget as it sees fit: by chapters, by single items or by programme. In general the latter solution is preferred. The budget is only discussed en bloc during the first and second budget resolutions.

104. The only country in which important modernisation projects for the armed forces are not included in the annual budget is Italy where these projects are included in *ad hoc* ten-year laws (re-debated each year), the so-called *leggi promozionali*. In other countries even research programmes extending over several years are voted year by year. In Luxembourg the most important pluriannual programmes cannot run for more than two or three financial years. In Denmark, when at the end of the financial year there is a conflict between pluriannual development programmes and the annual budget, a small supplementary budget item is added.

105. In the United States, Congress allocates funds for defence at the beginning of each financial year. The Defence Department then re-allocates these funds to the three services. Conflicts between procurement programmes which span several years and the requirement for annual appropriations is resolved by budgeting for the full cost of each procurement item when funds are first requested for the item. In this way Congress is immediately aware of the total cost of a programme when it is asked to appropriate funds for it, and the manager has an incentive both to estimate better and to manage better since his resources are limited once appropriations have been approved.

G. Political difficulties and attitudes

1. Criteria on which procurement decisions are based

106. Having examined the answers given concerning the various stages in the arms procurement process in the countries under consideration and having studied the answers given to section G of the two questionnaires your Rapporteur arrived at a series of conclusions.

107. Section G of the first questionnaire shows the criteria on which decisions on new arms systems in the various countries are based. The British, Danish and United States Defence Ministries refer to economic, industrial and political as well as strategic considerations, without specifying the relative importance of each of these factors or making any explicit reference to the need for standardisation or interoperability.

108. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Canada are agreed that for economic and industrial reasons the smaller countries have a greater interest in standardisation whereas for distinct economic reasons interoperability is mainly of interest to the larger countries with fully developed defence industries covering the whole range of products. In these countries the need to keep the national defence industries alive and to ensure a continued supply line in time

of conflict (as emerged from the United States reply) may influence the decision to procure a given weapons system to a considerable extent. In the smaller-sized countries whose armaments industries cannot fulfil all their equipment needs, the accent lies more on consideration of co-production and compensation such as co-production and/or other compensating orders. In the smaller countries, too, the need for standardisation and interoperability may be more strongly felt due to the relatively modest quantities of equipment required and to the need for operational co-operation with the allies.

109. In both cases the aim is to protect national interests. This was clearly stated by the Belgian, Norwegian and Italian Defence Ministries. According to the Belgians once a short list of possible systems has been drawn up on the basis of operational needs the final decision depends mainly on economic considerations. This concept is confirmed by the reply from the Belgian Senate which confirms that parliament is mainly concerned with budgeting problems and with gaining some form of economic compensation for the worsening of the economic crisis and the increase in unemployment. The Italian Ministry of Defence, unlike the other allied countries, refers to the existence of national economic and financial interest in contrast with the need for standardisation. Among the factors influencing procurement decisions Italy refers to the need to reduce defence expenditure as far as possible, to stimulate its national arms industry and to weigh as little as possible on the liabilities side of the balance of payments. Finally, according to the Italian replies, the great powers should concern themselves more with strategic operational questions.

2. Attitudes and steps taken by parliaments towards standardisation and/or interoperability

110. These criteria cited by Defence Ministries are matched by a number of political worries which emerged from replies given by the parliamentary defence committees although the former did not always coincide with the latter. In general the European parliaments replied that they have made continuous efforts at requesting their governments to insist on promoting NATO-wide standardisation either through intensifying two-way street procurement (as suggested by the Bundestag Defence Committee) or through improved industrial co-operation at a European level (as indicated by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies). Reference was also made to "American industrial imperialism", seen as an obstacle to concrete moves towards standardisation, and to a "hopefully reduced need" to deploy American troops in Europe (as indicated by the Italian Senate Defence Committee).

111. European parliaments were far from explicit in their replies to the questions concerning the legislative steps they had taken or which were under discussion in their parliaments and which might be said to improve arms standardisation in Europe. The only exception was the reply from the German Bundestag which refers to an interesting initiative taken by the Chairman of the Defence Committee who addressed a letter in this connection to the Chairman of the United States Senate and House Defence Committees.

112. Given that several parliaments complained about the lack of sufficient information on allied weapons projects in the research and development stage and in view of the fact that your Rapporteur believes that greater knowledge here might enable the parliaments of the allied countries to intervene more actively in favour of standardisation and/or interoperability, he has reached the conclusion that the WEU Defence Committee could play an important co-ordinating rôle by guaranteeing the exchange of information between parliamentarians in the member states once the various national parliamentary bodies have succeeded in obtaining adequate information from governments, industry and other sources concerning projects under way in their own countries.

III. Conclusions

113. From our analysis of the replies it is possible to draw a number of conclusions. All the parliaments receiving questionnaires have stated that they possess sovereignty and final authority over defence procurement and that in the majority of cases they exercise this power only during the annual debate and vote on the budget. However, the degree to which this constitutional principle is translated into reality differs very substantially from country to country.

114. Once account is taken of the special nature of defence problems (which include delicate issues such as national security aspects, technical complexity of weapons systems and the long-term nature of many of the decisions) it may be noted that the degree of control exerted is a function of the quantity of information available to parliaments on their respective government procurement policy and on discussion in progress at an Alliance level. As was described in section A of the draft report there are different kinds of information available to parliamentarians. Information may be obtained from public government sources of varying levels of classification, it may be obtained independently by individual parliamentarians or by parliamentary committees or from public or private research bodies.

115. The problem of security has yet to receive a satisfactory solution in all the European countries. The Rapporteur refers here to the report presented on behalf of this Committee by Mr. Goedhart concerning military security and parliamentary information¹. From this report it emerged that parliamentarians with no access to classified information are only able to make a very limited contribution to the work of parliamentary control.

116. Your Rapporteur would thus propose that the allies agree on common criteria (in addition to existing NATO procedures for the classification of military information) enabling a distinction to be made between national military information which should be made available to public opinion, information which should only be circulated in restricted circles (e.g. to parliamentarians) and secret information and suggesting agreed procedures and precautions so as to ensure the maximum access to information compatible with an adequate degree of security. For instance, the doctrine of showing the "need to know" which is applied in the United States and Germany is one which should be applied in other countries. This could avoid an unpleasant situation in which parliamentarians in one country receive insufficient information vis-à-vis their parliamentary colleagues in other allied countries. What is more it is even possible to find this kind of "first" and "second class" parliamentarian within the same national parliament.

117. The information which parliamentarians most need in order to exercise effective control over the purchase of military equipment so as to optimise defence policy and to ensure weapons standardisation and interoperability in Europe includes:

- (a) the criteria on the basis of which national military staff determine the threat and thus the need for a particular weapons system;
- (b) the evaluation given by multilateral allied bodies of the military threat and thus of military needs;
- (c) projects at the research and development stage involving national and allied companies capable of meeting the needs identified at a national and an interallied level.

118. From the replies received to the questionnaires it emerged that generally speaking the information received is insufficient to guarantee parliamentarians an incisive influence over defence policy formulation in general and arms procurement in particular. The exception to this rule is the United States.

¹ Document 511, 12th May 1970, on the basis of which the Assembly adopted Recommendation 197.

119. The American legislator exerts a greater control than his European counterpart over his country's arms procurement policy. In the United States, Congressional approval is required for such broad issues as the total defence budget, total force levels and structure, the adoption of major weapons systems and the approval of any strategic arms limitation agreements right down to the armed forces' hymnals. As far as defence policy is concerned the American Congress exerts a major influence over the decision on types of aircraft and ships more than any other commodities, mainly because of the high cost of these items.

120. What happens in Western Europe on the other hand is that while party political pressures have over the years affected the size of national defence budgets, parliamentary pressures never seem to have clearly affected, either positively or negatively, any government's major procurement preferences or any decision to alter the shape and deployment of the armed forces.

121. It is arguable how far it could ever be possible to graft the American system with its special relationship between the executive and the legislature onto European political systems which are themselves very different from one another. Nonetheless co-operation between the American armed forces and Congress has produced on several occasions positive results as well as helping to prevent Congress from cutting appropriations requested by the President. It has occurred that at the same time as one of the three services learned that an important project was about to fall to the budget-cutter's scalpel in the Pentagon, it began a campaign in Congress even before the announcement of the President's budget.

122. A similar mechanism may sometimes be observed in a number of European countries. In the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Germany, for example, Defence Ministries are aware of the usefulness of keeping parliament well informed so as to have it as an ally to help withstand the expenditure-cutting enthusiasms of other economy-minded ministries. Where parliamentary committees are very powerful, the military and government authorities have become accustomed to consulting parliament at early stages of defence planning, so that breakdowns in understanding between parliament and the Ministry of Defence are avoided.

123. In other countries where parliamentary enquiry into defence spending is more of a formality than a reality, reduced communication between parliament and the administration has been justified by the political situation (e.g. by the presence of strong communist parties in parliament). Recently however there has been a tendency towards improved collaboration between government and parliament due to the fact that

opposition parties present in parliament have tended to reduce their hostility towards their countries' presence in an integrated western alliance. Besides the quantity and the quality of the information necessary for parliamentary control, the time factor is just as important: that is the moment during the defence equipment procurement in which information is made available. Many defence committees of European parliaments seem to deal with these questions only *post facto*, even though it is very important to receive information in the preliminary stages. An interesting approach for the solution of this problem could be to examine in more detail the pluriannual defence programmes. It is impossible to control defence projects on an annual basis when the cycle from planning to entry into service extends over ten to twelve years. In some parliaments, as in Norway, Italy and France, long-term defence programmes are discussed, but all too often, parliaments limit themselves to being only vaguely informed of them, while they should instead be able to examine them in detail through the help of the very competent staff of the committee. Also interesting in this case is the example supplied by the American Congress which prepares numerous reports published by the General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office and the Library of Congress.

124. Finally as far as concerns the possibility of parliaments using their power of control to shift procurement policy towards a higher degree of arms standardisation and interoperability your Rapporteur believes that this would be easier:

- (a) if procurement procedures, budget structures and voting procedures were made as similar as possible;
- (b) if there existed a common European policy on weapons procurement with a special European armaments agency set up for this purpose;
- (c) if it were possible to exert parliamentary control at a European level.

125. To this end parliamentarians should receive sufficient information on weapons systems (other than those available at a national level) available from allied countries and on the needs, analyses and evaluation carried out at an allied level so as at least to be able to intervene in national procurement during its initial stages and not simply through the budget vote.

126. In the case of co-productions — which are desirable on account of the improved standardisation and interoperability to which they lead — parliamentary control has to be continuous so as to ensure that parliaments do not suddenly find themselves with their hands tied behind their backs. I refer here to the possibility of parliaments being faced with international agreements for co-production of a given weapons

system already signed by their respective governments. At times it may occur, as has occurred in the past, that rising costs (with respect to those planned for during the initial stage of the project) lead to loss not only of parliamentary but also of government control, for the simple reason that the project has reached a stage at which it is very difficult to reopen a question already settled by international agreement.

127. Thus your Rapporteur believes that while waiting for the setting up of an international arms procurement body subjected to international parliamentary control — a move to be taken as soon as possible — national parliaments should begin to exert greater control over their own national procurement policies through greater parliamentary involvement not only in defence but also in industrial policy (at least in those countries where the arms industry depends primarily on government spending). This might lead to a greater involvement of the committees for industry and trade as well as the defence and budget committees. Nonetheless your Rapporteur is convinced that the problem is not so much that of increasing the number of parliamentary bodies for control over the procurement process as to make better use of existing bodies and procedures.

128. From the foregoing survey the Committee draws the following conclusions :

- the extent of parliamentary information and influence on defence matters, especially defence equipment procurement matters, varies considerably between parliaments in different countries of the Alliance, and even between parliaments in the WEU countries ;
- in some parliaments, perhaps in the majority of parliaments, the defence information made available by the government is insufficient to permit an informed debate and proper parliamentary participation in the formulation of defence policy ;
- in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there is sufficient mutual confidence between government and opposition parties concerning basic defence policy to permit a universal parliamentary demand for information, which appears to be satisfied to a considerable extent in Germany and in the Netherlands, but not yet in Italy or the United Kingdom. In Belgium and Luxembourg, there appears to be little tradition of active parliamentary investigation of general defence policy.

In France, the state of relations between government and opposition parties does not permit agreement on the need or desirability of information being provided to parliamentarians other than the chairmen or rapporteurs of the committees concerned ;

- in only a few cases, namely the Netherlands and Germany, are parliaments able to exercise sufficiently close financial control of defence expenditure to influence the defence equipment procurement process and the choice of equipment ;
- in most cases parliaments are not informed, and in some cases governmental defence equipment procurement authorities appear to be inadequately informed about the availability of competing defence equipment projects in other allied countries, which in many cases might advantageously be selected for joint production and standardisation in preference to a nationally-developed project.

129. *The Committee's proposals to remedy these observed short-comings are set forth in the draft recommendation addressed to the Council, and through it to member governments, and in the draft resolution addressed to the parliaments of member countries.* The texts of Recommendation 197, referred to in the preambles, and of Recommendation 9, referred to in Recommendation 197, are attached at Appendices III and IV. As far as paragraph 3 of the latter text is concerned the Committee proposes that the defence or other appropriate committees in national parliaments should institute a systematic procedure for obtaining from their own governments information about future national defence equipment projects in the planning stage, with a view to exchanging this information with the corresponding committee of the national parliaments in other member countries. The Committee suggests that such exchange could be conveniently arranged at special meetings which it would convene from time to time, to be attended by a few members of the defence or other appropriate committee in each of the national parliaments of the member countries.

130. The Committee concludes further that there is a need to unify as far as possible the equipment procurement and budgetary procedures employed in the Ministries of Defence of the member countries, with a view to creating in the future a European defence procurement agency.

APPENDIX I

Questionnaire addressed to Ministries of Defence**Introduction**

The Rapporteur has been asked to investigate the extent to which parliaments of allied countries investigate and control expenditure on defence procurement, and their ability to influence policy in the direction of standardisation and joint production.

The Rapporteur is addressing this questionnaire¹ to the Ministries of Defence of the countries of the Alliance. It is designed to elicit information, comparable between countries, to enable the Rapporteur :

- (a) to describe clearly the equipment procurement process, from initial research to entry into service, in each country ;
- (b) to identify in some detail :
 - (i) the manner in which the national process fits into the allied process, or the points at which and the extent to which allied needs and requirements, and the resources of allied countries, are taken into account in the national procurement process ;
 - (ii) the extent of parliamentary consultation or of parliamentary control that is practised or required at each stage of the procurement process, and the extent to which parliament is made aware of allied needs and requirements, or of the resources of other allied countries.

The Rapporteur would much appreciate the co-operation of Ministries of Defence in completing this questionnaire. Copies are also available in French.

Note on security classification

It is assumed that most of the information requested in this questionnaire will be "unclassified"; the Rapporteur will feel free to use in a published report all information that is not given a specific security classification by the country replying.

*
****A. General**

A.1 List the principal consultative and decision-making bodies involved in the defence procure-

1. A separate questionnaire, a copy of which is attached for information, is being addressed to the chairmen of the parliamentary defence committees in the same countries.

ment process, and include an organisational chart showing, in particular, the relationship between the bodies.

A.1.1 Describe the functions of these bodies (political, technical, operational).

A.1.2 Describe broadly the composition and size of these bodies (ministerial, military staffs, technical, representatives of industry). Show which are tri-service bodies, and which separate bodies exist for each of the three armed services.

A.1.3.1 Describe the links between the above-mentioned bodies themselves.

A.1.3.2 Describe the links between the above bodies and other branches of the administration (Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economics, etc.).

A.1.3.3 Describe the links where they exist between the above bodies and the national parliament.

A.1.3.3.1 In this connection state what right if any individual members of parliament or parliamentary committees have to obtain classified defence information from official sources. Never? At the discretion of the Minister? Other?

A.1.3.4 Describe the links between the above bodies and the armaments industry, private and public sector.

A.1.3.5 Describe the links between the above bodies and multilateral allied bodies concerned with arms procurement [NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); independent European programme group (IEPG); Eurogroup Conference of National Armaments Directors (EURONAD); FINABEL; WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), other...].

B. Formulating the military need for new weapons systems

(By "military need" is meant a general indication of the kind and type of equipment required, quantities and date in service.)

B.1 Which bodies are responsible for formulating the military need for a new weapons system? (Describe composition and nature, or refer, if applicable, to bodies already described under A above.)

B.1.1.1 Describe the relationship between the bodies involved.

B.1.1.2 Describe the relationship between the bodies involved and the national parliament.

B.1.1.3 Describe the relationship between the bodies involved and the armaments industry, private and public sector.

B.1.1.4 Describe the relationship between the bodies involved and multilateral allied bodies (specify CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, other...).

B.1.2 Is the formulation of new military needs a continuous process, or carried out at regular or irregular intervals, and how long does it usually take?

B.1.3 Is the process inter-service, or is it conducted separately by the three services?

B.2 Factors leading to the formulation of new military needs. Describe the relative importance of the following :

B.2.1 The threat from an adversary (intelligence).

B.2.2 Changes in tactical or strategic doctrine (specify whether formulated nationally or in NATO).

B.2.3 Formulation of needs in allied bodies (specify CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, other...), the requirements of standardisation ; interoperability.

B.2.4 Results of basic or applied research or of development.

B.2.5 The effects of the military need on industrial production and employment (distinguish between the state and private sector).

B.3 How is the formulation of a new military need finalised, and what authority is responsible ?

C. Formulation of operational equipment requirements

(By "operational equipment requirements" is meant a detailed military description of equipment sufficient to guide the design, development and production phases.)

Describe the procedure for formulating operational equipment requirements (under the same heads and sub-heads as those for the military need under B.1 to 3 above) designating the answer C.1, C.1.1.1, etc., to C.3.

D. Prototype development stage

D.1 Initiating authority. What body(ies) or person(s) are finally responsible for ordering work to begin on development of a prototype ?

D.2 Factors involved in development decision :

D.2.1 Is prototype development ordered only in respect of a military need and operational equipment requirement formulated as in B and C above ?

D.2.2 May continued development be ordered of a project started independently by private industry ?

D.2.3 Is parliament consulted or parliamentary approval required in any way before development begins, if so in what way ?

D.2.4 Are multilateral allied bodies always consulted, informed, or is their approval sought, before prototype development is authorised (specify CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, other...), and is the need for standardisation, interoperability taken into account at this stage ?

D.2.5 Are other comparable projects under development in allied countries always taken into consideration bilaterally before national development is initiated? Is sufficient information available from other countries concerning projects under development ?

D.3 Finance :

D.3.1 Is the cost of research and development accounted for separately as such in the defence budget, or as part of the total cost of procuring the equipment concerned ?

D.3.2 When research and development contracts are placed with private industry, is the whole cost borne by the state, or may the contractor finance part of the cost ?

D.4 Supervision, test, evaluation and acceptance. What bodies are responsible :

D.4.1 For supervising progress of prototype development ?

D.4.2 For technical testing of the completed prototype ?

D.4.3 For operational testing of the completed prototype ?

D.4.4 What body or person is responsible for final acceptance of a prototype at the end of the development phase ?

D.4.5 What multilateral allied bodies participate in each of the four foregoing functions (specify CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, other...) ?

E. Production and pre-production stage

E.1 Initiating authority. For new equipment what body(ies) or person(s) are finally responsible for ordering (a) pre-production ; (b) full-scale production or (c) procurement abroad ?

E.2 Factors involved in production decision. In what bodies and through what procedure or at what stage are the following factors or alternatives taken into account before production or procurement abroad is ordered :

E.2.1 Availability of nationally developed and accepted prototype.

E.2.2 Views of multilateral allied bodies (specify CNAD, IEPG, EURONAD, FINABEL, SAC, other...) and need for standardisation, interoperability.

E.2.3 (Bilateral) availability of fully-developed prototype or in-service equipment in an allied country for (a) production under licence ; (b) joint production (bilateral, multilateral) ; (c) procurement abroad.

E.3 Consultation outside Ministry of Defence. Before (a) pre-production, (b) full-scale production or procurement is ordered :

E.3.1 What other branches of government are consulted ?

E.3.2 To what extent and how is parliament consulted, or parliamentary approval required ?

E.4 What body or person is responsible for acceptance testing of series production ? Are bilateral or multilateral allied bodies involved (specify) ?

F. Budgetary control

F.1 What body is responsible for allocating funds to equipment projects in the various stages of research, development, test and procurement ?

F.2 To what extent and in what way is parliament involved in decisions to make budgetary allocations to specific projects ?

F.3 Is there any conflict between pluriannual research, development and procurement programmes and the normal basis of the defence

budget (yearly, two-yearly, etc.) ? If so how is the conflict resolved ?

F.4 Do multilateral allied bodies express views on the allocation of resources within the defence budget (a) as between main heads "personnel", "equipment", etc. ; (b) as between specific equipment projects (specify bodies concerned : NATO defence review ; CNAD ; IEPG ; EURONAD ; other...) ?

G. Conclusions

G.1 In practice, considering the major weapons systems today in use by your country (battle tanks, fighter bombers, air superiority fighters, frigates, destroyers, major battleships, heavy helicopters, missile systems, etc.), how often has the theoretical procurement procedure been followed ?

G.1.1 Have there been important exceptions to the general rule ? In which cases ? Why ?

G.1.2 Which specific projects, if any, have been affected or largely determined by decisions in multilateral allied bodies (specify) or in bilateral negotiations, and by the need for standardisation and interoperability ?

G.1.2 Which specific projects, if any, have been affected by parliamentary decisions ?

G.2 In the decision to procure a given weapon system with specified requirements, is particular importance attached to economic and industrial considerations as well as to political and strategic needs ? In your opinion, is the relative weight of these factors, and the need for standardisation and interoperability different for superpowers than for medium- and small-sized countries ? If so, where does the difference lie ? (For example, in the Belgian, Danish, Norwegian and Dutch decisions to purchase the F-16, which of these considerations do you believe to have been most important ?)

APPENDIX II

Questionnaire addressed to Chairmen of Parliamentary Defence Committees**Introduction**

The Rapporteur has been asked to investigate the extent to which parliaments of allied countries investigate and control expenditure on defence procurement, and their ability to influence policy in the direction of standardisation and joint production.

The Rapporteur is addressing this questionnaire¹ in the first place to the chairmen of the parliamentary defence committees of the countries of the Alliance. It is designed to elicit information, comparable between countries, to enable the Rapporteur to describe the extent to which different parliaments or their committees :

- (a) control, supervise, or involve themselves in the defence procurement process and its various stages ;
- (b) debate various aspects of defence procurement policy and the broader political and strategic issues which affect it ;
- (c) obtain the necessary information from national and other allied sources.

The Rapporteur would much appreciate the co-operation of chairmen of the parliamentary defence committees and of their staffs in completing this questionnaire. Depending on the particular circumstances and usages in different parliaments, chairmen may feel it appropriate to forward copies to chairmen of other committees (budget, finance...) or to other persons in their parliament. Further copies of the questionnaire are available from the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly, and copies are also available in French.

Note on security classification

It is assumed that most of the information requested in this questionnaire will be "unclassified"; the Rapporteur will feel free to use in a published report all information that is not given a specific security classification by the person replying.

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1. A separate questionnaire, a copy of which is attached for information, is being addressed to the Ministers of Defence of the same countries.

A. General

A.1 Is your parliament consulted on, or is it able to exercise control over, the various stages of the defence equipment procurement process, or is supervision limited to the discussion and approval of the defence budget as a whole ?

A.1.1 Through what internal bodies does your parliament exercise such supervision (specialised or *ad hoc* committees or sub-committees working in this field) ? What are their powers (do they refer back to parliament, have they legislative powers or are they simply commissions of enquiry) ? How often do they meet ?

A.1.2 List any recent reports of parliamentary committees dealing with defence procurement. (Please enclose copies of such reports with reply.)

A.2 Quite apart from its powers of supervision, how far does parliament play a rôle in gathering information and in informing the public on questions related to defence equipment procurement ? How is this done ?

A.2.1 Do individual members of parliament have the right to put questions to ministers on defence procurement matters ?

A.2.2 Does parliament possess its own independent methods of investigating these questions (hearings, commissions of enquiry, task forces, etc.) ? If so what do these consist of ? How many such commissions are there ? What subjects have they dealt with over the last five years ?

A.2.3 What are the rights of (a) individual members, (b) parliamentary committees, to be provided with classified defence information ? Never ? Or in certain circumstances ?

A.2.3.1 May a committee (a) require, or (b) only request (i) a minister ; (ii) senior officials, (iii) senior officers of the armed services, to give evidence to a committee in closed session ? May they refuse ? How frequently is this right exercised ?

A.2.3.2 May a committee demand the communication of classified information in writing ? May it be refused ? How frequently is this right exercised ?

A.2.4 Does parliament, do its committees, rely solely on national government sources for information ? Or is use made of other bodies (a) for information, (b) for independent evaluation of government proposals or projects ?

A.2.4.1 Is use made of private research institutes, industrial establishments or other independent

sources? If so, which and how frequently or on what occasions?

A.2.4.2 Is information obtained directly from, or are ties maintained with: bodies outside the country? governmental bodies in allied countries? private industry or research establishments in allied countries? organs of NATO or other allied bodies? parliamentary bodies in other allied countries? international parliamentary assemblies with defence responsibilities (North Atlantic Assembly, WEU Assembly)?

A.2.4.3 Is parliament informed of the need for standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment? Is it informed of NATO requirements or recommendations? Is it informed of the development or production of equipment projects in other allied countries that would have a bearing on national development or production proposals?

A.3 Are (regular, occasional, *ad hoc*) debates held on changes in the nature of the threat, in strategic and tactical doctrine, in the doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance, etc., specifically as they affect defence procurement, or in the general context of defence and foreign policy?

A.3.1 Please attempt to assess the amount of parliamentary time devoted (a) to general defence debates; (b) to defence procurement policy. (Number of hours in past year; proportion of total parliamentary time.)

B. Formulating the military need for new weapons systems

C. Formulation of operational equipment requirements

D. Prototype development stage

E. Production and pre-production stage

(Please refer to corresponding sections B to E of attached questionnaire as addressed to Ministers of Defence.)

B, C, D, E.1 To what extent is parliament informed or consulted, or its approval sought in each stage B to E of the procurement process? To what extent is it made aware of the process and kept informed on the progress of individual equipment projects within it? In particular:

B.3 Is parliament or its committees consulted, or informed, when a new military need is finalised or, C.3, when new operational equipment requirements are finalised? Is parliament made aware of the views of NATO or other allied bodies concerning operational requirements of specific projects, and can parliament take account of the need for standardisation and interoperability at this stage?

D.1 Is parliament or a committee consulted or informed when development of a new prototype is put in hand? Is it made aware of any other allied proposals or projects at this stage or of the possibilities of joint development with allied countries?

D.4.4 Is parliament involved in any way in the final acceptance of a prototype at the end of the development phase?

E.1 Is parliament or a committee consulted or informed when (a) pre-production, (b) full-scale production or (c) purchase from abroad of new equipment is decided? Is parliament made aware of allied requirements or of alternative allied equipment available at this stage? Or of the possibilities of joint production with allied countries?

F. Budgetary control

F.1 Over what kind of defence budget does your parliament exert control?

F.1.1 The PPBS (planning, programming, budgeting system)?¹

F.1.2 Apart from the annual defence budget, do there exist pluriannual expenditure plans? In respect of individual equipment projects?

F.1.3 Is the defence budget sub-divided into separate items and chapters according to some common scheme discussed at NATO level?

F.2 What procedures does your parliament use when it approves the defence budget?

F.2.1 Does parliament exert any influence over the drawing up of the defence budget and, in particular, over the funds allotted for arms procurement? If so, how is this done?

F.2.2 Is the defence budget debated en bloc or chapter by chapter? Within each chapter, are single allotments also debated?

1. The planning, programming, budgeting system (PPBS), originated in the United States, has been adopted in many NATO countries. It is a budget-planning system designed to identify the costs and benefits of the various options. To this end the budget is drawn up according to functional criteria. From the point of view of methodology the PPBS operates in three phases:

- (i) the planning phase concerned with definition of the chief objectives (usually a ten-year span);
- (ii) the programming phase concerned with drawing up medium-term programmes (usually of five years) designed to make the best use of available resources as specified through systems analysis techniques;
- (iii) the budgeting phase, when the annual budget necessary for implementing the programmes is drawn up in functional terms, and a critical examination of the whole procedure is undertaken.

F.2.3 Does it ever occur that the budget is debated by individual programme rather than chapter by chapter, or that single tactical or strategic missions are debated ?

F.2.4 Are funds for procurement normally included in the defence budget or are they mainly a matter for *ad hoc* legislation ?

F.2.5. What effect, if any, does this *ad hoc* legislation have on overall defence expenditure ?

F.3 Are opinions or decisions of parliamentary bodies on budgetary matters binding or have they a purely consultative value ?

G. Political attitudes : United States-European relations

G.1 (For European parliaments only) :

G.1.1 Are the following attitudes at all widespread among members of your parliament :

G.1.1.1 Suspicion of American "gadget" solutions and technological panaceas ?

G.1.1.2 Suspicion of "American industrial imperialism" ?

G.1.2 Has your parliament in any way discussed ways of reinforcing the European options ?

G.1.3 Which legislative steps, if any, have been taken or are under discussion in your parliament which might be said to reflect any of the foregoing attitudes ?

G.2 (For United States Congress only) :

G.2.1 How does Congress assess the need for better United States-European co-operation in the field of arms procurement ?

G.2.2 Which legislative steps have been taken or are under discussion to effect this ?

G.3 (For all parliaments) :

What attitudes are currently manifest in your parliament concerning the need for continuing American military presence in Europe and the problems of arms procurement ?

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 197¹***on military security and parliamentary information²***

The Assembly,

Considering that both the requirements of democracy and a policy of deterrence call for the fullest publicity for defence arrangements compatible with their effectiveness, and that members of parliaments must have sufficient access to classified defence information to comprehend policy and justify expenditure ;

Considering further that the integration of national defence efforts in the Alliance calls for this dual information effort to be conducted by both national and NATO authorities ;

Commending the arrangements in the German Bundestag for informing members about defence matters as a model for all parliaments, but aware that particular conditions and traditions in the other parliaments make fully uniform arrangements impracticable ;

Aware that it is the only parliamentary body constituted by an international treaty of collective self-defence, and that consequently it is responsible for keeping under constant review the arrangements made for discharging this obligation, whatever the organisation to which the Council may have delegated executive responsibility ;

Recalling that the Council in its second annual report appreciated the Assembly's desire "to consider broader aspects of defence than those to which the Council must limit themselves, and to debate these activities against the background of a general policy" ;

Recalling further the procedure introduced by the Council in 1957, in response to Recommendation 9 of the Assembly, whereby it communicates to the Assembly the texts of statements on defence matters made by member governments to their parliaments ;

Regretting that the procedure agreed between the Council and the North Atlantic Council in February 1958 should have led to a general ruling by the latter that the NATO authorities may communicate only unclassified information to members of parliament ;

Believing that this ruling, whereby the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments receives less information from NATO authorities than from the national authorities of countries of the Alliance, seriously restricts the ability of the Assembly and its Committee to discharge their duties,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it urge on all governments of the Alliance the advantages of a deliberate policy of maximum publicity for defence matters and full information of members of parliament, at both national and NATO level ;
2. That the procedure introduced in response to Recommendation 9 of the Assembly be fully implemented ;
3. That the member governments be urged to approach the other NATO governments with a view to securing a ruling from the North Atlantic Council authorising the NATO Secretary-General and military commanders to exercise their discretion in determining on a case by case basis what classified information should be made available to members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1970 during the First Part of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Goedhart on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 511).

APPENDIX IV

RECOMMENDATION 9¹*on the communication of information to the Assembly*²

The Assembly,

Having regard to its duty recognised by the Council in its second annual report "to consider the broader aspects of defence than those to which the Council must limit themselves and to debate these activities against a background of a general policy";

Considering the statement made by the British Government on 21st December 1956, that in order to provide more extensive information for the Assembly "there is scope for improvement, to begin with, in the exchange and pooling of information available in the seven national parliaments";

Considering that in its second report to the Assembly the Council have endorsed the British position and expressed the view that "as the governments would not normally be expected to give more detailed information to the Assembly than they are prepared to give to their own members of parliament", "the exchange and pooling of information made available by governments to national parliaments might be useful",

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That they communicate, beginning on 1st September 1957, to the Assembly on the first day of every second month the text of information concerning defence matters communicated by the governments of the seven member states to their national parliaments and to the committees of those parliaments, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII (c) of the Charter.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th May 1957 during the First Part of the Third Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Teitgen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 40).

Parliaments and defence procurement

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Schlingemann

1. After paragraph C of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows :
“D. To agree to the Assembly of WEU, at its seat in Paris, having access to national data banks, documentation centres and other sources of information on defence-related political matters.”

Signed : Schlingemann

1. See 6th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment withdrawn).

Application of the Brussels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Roper (Chairman); MM. Bonnel (Alternate: *Verleysen*), *Roberti* (Vice-Chairman); MM. *Ahrens*, Baumel, Bechter, *van den Bergh*, Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin (Alternate: *Lambiotte*), Fosson, Grant (Alternate: *Banks*),

Handlos (Alternate: *Büchner*), Hardy, Konen (Alternate: *Spautz*), de Koster, *Lemmrigh*, *Maggioni*, *Ménard*, *Pawelczyk*, *Pecchioli Péronnet* (Alternate: *Sénès*), Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, *Tanghe*, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction that the Council, aware that the Assembly is “the only European assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence”, is continuing the dialogue with it “on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora”;

Welcoming the meaningful dialogue established with the Council in most cases, in particular through recommendations and replies, and noting in this connection that the Council will invite the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information “in particular when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO”;

Considering that the essential commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty — automatic mutual military assistance and the maintenance of appropriate levels of forces — retain and must continue to retain all their initial value;

Noting that the Council considers the Standing Armaments Committee to be “a useful instrument for thought and analysis” but that the organisation of “European co-operation in the field of armaments production . . . is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Withdraw its refusal to publish in its annual report the true level of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty;
2. Communicate to the Assembly the juridical section of the study on the European armaments industry made by the Standing Armaments Committee;
3. Consider the possibility of incorporating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly among the new tasks which the Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Armaments Committee;
4. Include in future annual reports a section on the work of the independent European programme group.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction and relations with the Council

1. The Committee welcomes the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council recognises at the outset that the Assembly is "the only European assembly with responsibilities in the field of defence" and that it is continuing "the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora". Indeed, the Council's replies to recommendations and questions from the Assembly have continued to make a substantial contribution to the discussion thus started on major political and defence questions. To quote only one example among several, in its reply to Recommendation 313 the Council did not hesitate to declare, as the Assembly had requested, that it supports "unequivocally the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status".

2. In Recommendation 320, the Assembly recalled the procedure whereby NATO may in appropriate cases provide material for replies to Assembly recommendations. In its reply, the Council confirmed that it requested "the Secretary-General of NATO to provide information whenever they consider this to be necessary and, in particular, when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO". But in its reply to Recommendation 313, already mentioned, in which the Assembly considered adjusting NATO command arrangements in the Mediterranean, the Council merely considered "that command arrangements are primarily a matter for NATO" without having resorted to the procedure which, as the Council recognises, would have first allowed it to obtain NATO's opinion on the question of integrated commands.

3. During 1978, the year covered by the annual report, the Committee had an opportunity of meeting the Council or its agencies on two occasions. In Bonn on 5th June, the Committee met the Council at ministerial level for an informal talk during which the joint production of armaments, the MBFR negotiations and arms exports were discussed. The tenth meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments — the official title of a joint meeting between the Standing Armaments Committee including governmental representatives specialising in armaments production, on the one hand, and the Committee on the other — was held in Paris on 30th October 1978.

4. Last year, in its report replying to the annual report of the Council, the Committee regretted the tardy communication of the annual

report. Again this year the last chapters did not reach the Office of the Clerk until 26th March. However, the twentieth and twenty-first annual reports were communicated to the Office of the Clerk at the end of February 1975 and 1976 respectively when the Council and its secretariat appear to have applied the "appropriate administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current basis" advocated by the Assembly in Recommendation 183. Communication of the annual report of the Council in February allows Assembly committees to carry out the in-depth study which it deserves.

II. Activities of the Council

(a) Defence activities

5. In its second annual report, communicated to the Assembly in 1957, the Council reminded the Assembly "that the seven WEU powers considered that their mutual defence obligations could and should be fulfilled through NATO... they consider that the activities of the Council in the field of defence questions and armaments relate to :

- (a) matters which the contracting parties wish to raise, especially under Article VIII ;
- (b) the level of forces of member states (Protocol No. II) ;
- (c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the continent ;
- (d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments ;
- (e) the Standing Armaments Committee."

6. In Written Question 191, Mr. Roper asked whether the Council still took this view, if so what matters under (a) above had been raised by member governments since 1957 and whether the Council would include a statement in future annual reports concerning any matter so raised. In its reply, which took three months to prepare, the Council "confirm the statement made in their second annual report regarding the range of activities assigned to them in the field of defence questions and armaments". It then quotes as having been raised in accordance with Article VIII¹ : the consequences of France's withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO,

¹ Article VIII, paragraph 3, reads as follows : "At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise...".

examined in 1967, and disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, discussed in 1968, 1969 and 1970. The Council concluded its reply by declaring that "with due regard for the confidential nature of their deliberations, the Council will continue to inform the Assembly in the appropriate manner of any questions raised by the member governments in this context". Apart from matters relating to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, the Council apparently did not have to discuss any matters relating to defence raised by member states in 1978, the year covered by the present annual report. Since the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community, in fact, and the start of nine-power political consultations, there do not seem to have been any such discussions in the Council.

7. Although the Council asserted in 1957, and has reiterated on many more recent occasions, "that the new arrangements [the transfer to NATO of the European union defence machinery] would in no way affect the obligations they had assumed towards each other under the Brussels Treaty", since 1973 only the Assembly, and not the member states, seems to have drawn the attention of the Council to matters relating to general defence policy. The Committees therefore conclude that it is the Assembly's duty to make sure that it regularly informs the Council of all important matters concerning the defence of Europe which may involve the application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(b) British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

8. Under Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom is committed to maintain on the mainland of Europe forces "assigned to SACEUR", the number now fixed by the Council being 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. This task of the Council, which is in fact to decide on the level of the British commitment, is undeniably one of its most important tasks at the present time.

9. Since 1972, in response to Recommendation 213, the Council has mentioned in its annual report "the total level of British forces on the continent of Europe". According to the present annual report, on 31st December 1978 the figure was 59,883 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force. But in 1976, in the Council's replies to Written Question 170 and Recommendation 284, the Assembly learned that the figures thus given in the Council's reports in no way correspond to the British commitment under Article VI of Protocol No. II because this commitment "relates not to the total level of United Kingdom forces on the mainland (which includes personnel in Berlin and Gibraltar), but only to those which are assigned to SACEUR". Although the Com-

mittee has demonstrated that the real level of British forces corresponding to the commitment was to be found in published documents, the Council has refused to give this figure in the annual report or to confirm whether or not the commitment was being fulfilled.

10. The situation with regard to the level of British land forces is at present as follows :

Total number of British forces on the mainland (according to the annual report of the Council)	59,883 men
Minus forces re-deployed in Northern Ireland (annual report of the Council)	3,243 men
Minus the British garrison in Berlin (1979 white paper on defence)	3,100 men
Minus troops stationed in Gibraltar (1979 white paper on defence) ¹	500 to 1,000 men

Total level of British forces in Germany, supposed to correspond to the commitment approved by the Council

53,000 to 52,500 men (plus the Second Tactical Air Force)

Level of the commitment approved by the Council

55,000 men (plus the Second Tactical Air Force)

11. In its reply to Recommendation 320, in which the Assembly again asked that this comparison be published, the Council claimed that "comparison between the figures in the report and those in the British white paper on defence is misleading, as the figures are for various reasons not comparable... The Council must repeat that, in view of the security requirements of the governments concerned, additional information such as the Assembly has requested would not be suitable for inclusion in future annual reports to the Assembly". If the figures quoted by the Committee in the previous paragraph are not comparable, any difference, apart from the forces in Berlin and Gibraltar referred to by the Council, might possibly concern the British troops assigned to logistic support in Germany which are supposed to remain under national

1. Estimate corresponding to one infantry battalion plus units of engineers.

command. Since the total level of British forces in Germany is known, however, details about those supposed to remain under national command and those assigned to SACEUR cannot compromise security. That is why the Committee challenges the Council's interpretation and repeats its request for the real level of the United Kingdom's commitment to be published.

(c) Amendments to the lists of prohibited weapons

12. Since the modified Brussels Treaty was signed in 1954, the Council has amended a dozen times the list given in Annex III to Protocol No. III which defines the conventional weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendment to this list was communicated by the Council in 1978, the period covered by the present annual report.

13. In Recommendation 320, adopted last year on the Committee's report replying to the annual report of the Council, the Assembly recommended that the Council "3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory". In its reply, the Council stated that: "Annex III to Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels Treaty can be amended by the Council under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down in the treaty itself, in Article II of Protocol No. III. If the required conditions were fulfilled, the Council would have recourse to the procedure laid down in the treaty". But the procedure in question provides for the modification of the list concerned if a recommendation "is made by the competent supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly..."

14. Informed of the contents of paragraph 3 of Recommendation 320, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his letter to the Chairman of the Committee dated 27th July 1978, declared: "I welcome the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to delete the restriction on the construction of permanent auxiliary vessels imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The lifting of these restrictions would not only better serve the needs of the FRG navy but also would be of considerable benefit to the Alliance. In view of the recommendation by the Assembly of WEU, I am prepared to support a request to the Council by the Federal Republic of Germany to delete the restrictions on the construction of naval auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement."

15. The Committee is pleased to note that should Germany submit a request for this restriction to be deleted, it would have the support of SACEUR.

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) Non-application of controls

16. Regarding the control of armaments in member states in accordance with the treaty, the present annual report shows no change in the situation. The Committee has always underlined the inadequate application of Protocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty on the control of armaments. Like previous reports, the present annual report of the Council refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

"The situation described in previous annual reports, regarding certain armaments, remained unchanged in 1978.

In present circumstances, the Agency's activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in one member state, to what that state calls "strategic forces". Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments."

17. The annual report subsequently adds:

"(d) As the convention for the due process of law¹ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1978, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld." [Previous reports referred to "some six weeks' notice".]

18. The Committee has noted many cases of shortcomings in the application of controls referred to in earlier reports by the Council², two of which are worthy of mention: the "strategic" forces not covered by the Agency's work include not only the nuclear warheads of French strategic forces but also their means

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

2. Document 700, paragraph 20 *et seq.*

of delivery — nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, Mirage IV aircraft. With regard to the control of the non-production of chemical weapons in Germany, in the absence of the guarantees provided for in the convention mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency is not authorised to take samples, essential for any control worthy of the name.

(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

19. Although the attitude of governments, or of some of them, limits the Agency's scope, it is

active and efficient in the fields open to it. In its report, the Council says that in 1978 the Agency "was able to make certain improvements to the questionnaire to member countries, to the despatching arrangements and in the preparation of combined ACA/SHAPE inspections; in addition, in planning the inspection programme account was taken of measures completed or in hand, to reorganise the armed forces of certain countries". This is most welcome news. The number of inspections carried out each year by the Agency shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table :

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Control measures at depots		Control measures at units under national command		Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)		Total quantitative control measures		Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)		Total control measures (all categories)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)						
1961	29	15	12	66	7	63						
2	26	20	11	57	7	65						
3	35	13	13	61	10	74						
4	39	19	13	71	9	80						
5	26	16	11	53	7	60						
6	*	*	*	*	*	78						
7	*	*	*	*	*	70						
8	*	*	*	*	*	79						
9	*	*	*	*	*	77						
1970	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b		
1	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	82	72		
2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	82	72		
3	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	66	66		
4	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	71	71		
5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	72	72		
6	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	71	71		
7	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	70	70		
8	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	68	68		

Note a, b : from 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style — *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

Sources : Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 6 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 5), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1977 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

20. The Committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced given in Section E: "State and problems of control in certain particular fields", which is a summary of all present armaments production programmes in member countries. A comparison of the present list with that of last year shows that the production of Roland, Hawk (Helip) and Rapier surface-to-air missiles has now come to an end; the Committee wonders whether this information is accurate.

Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts

21. The annual report mentions visits by Agency experts to enable them to keep their knowledge up to date. For instance, in the biological and chemical fields visits were paid to establishments in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. But there have been press reports about the closing and dismantling of the toxic nerve gas production plant at Nancekuke in Cornwall during the week of 12th March 1979, when the British Government organised a visit of the factory by experts from twenty-one countries, including Romania and Yugoslavia, to show that it was actually being dismantled. The Committee considers that the WEU Agency might have been invited to take part.

22. In conclusion, the Committee believes it may be asserted that the controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty are being applied on the mainland in respect of aircraft and non-strategic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads. No controls are applied in respect of the French strategic force and the other European mainland countries have no strategic forces. Nuclear bombs and warheads in United States custody are not subject to control by the Agency. The Council partly confirmed this situation in reply to Written Question 142 put by the Rapporteur on 27th May 1974. As stated in the annual report:

"When drawing up its programme of control measures, the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured."

The 1976 annual report added:

"Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased."

23. The Committee has already noted that the usefulness of the few controls now being applied is disputed, particularly in the case of the non-production of certain conventional armaments on German territory. Annual reports no longer state that non-production controls are the

Agency's "primary task" as was the case in earlier annual reports.

Production of satellite launchers in Zaïre

24. Last year, in its corresponding report, the Committee referred to the activities of the West German firm OTRAG (orbital transport and rockets) which is testing cheap liquid-fuelled satellite launchers. The Committee said press reports about possible military implications were absurd and is pleased to note that in reply to Written Question 181 put by Mr. Boucheny the Council confirms this interpretation.

25. However, for the time being OTRAG is still in Zaïre although it announced in March 1978 that it was moving to Brazil. According to the press¹, the firm has set up offices in Paris, is considering building two additional test sites in America and South-East Asia and had been in contact with Brazil. On 16th November OTRAG announced that it intended to place its operations under United Nations control², and on 27th April 1979 the official Zaïre press agency stated that the Zaïre Government had directed OTRAG to halt its activities in the country. Up to June 1978, OTRAG is believed to have fired three launchers in Zaïre. The German Government has asserted that it has no link with OTRAG and that in any event Germany's renunciation of the production of certain conventional weapons applies only to its own territory; the controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have no application outside the territory of member states.

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

26. In its reply to Recommendation 325 on a European armaments policy, the Council said the Standing Armaments Committee was "a useful instrument for thought and analysis which can be used to good purpose by the governments. Like the Assembly, the Council consider that the resources of the SAC should continue to be fully employed and when the current study has been completed they will consider the possibility of giving it new tasks in areas where its resources can be used without duplicating the activities of other bodies". On the organisation of "co-operation in the field of armaments production", the Council in the same reply considered that "this is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work".

27. In the same reply, the Council added that the Assembly's suggestion that the restructuring of the European armaments industry be done

1. Guardian, 16th October 1978.

2. International Herald Tribune, 17th November 1978.

under the aegis of the European Community "would therefore imply a wide interpretation of the field of application of the Treaty of Rome ; such an interpretation has already been opposed by a number of governments".

28. The Council's interpretation of the responsibilities of the SAC and of the IEPG is moreover taken up at national level in the reply by the French Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, on 18th January 1979 to a question put by Mr. Jeambrun : "The Standing Armaments Committee of WEU is ... an excellent instrument for reflection and analysis as borne out by the first results of the study it made... on the situation of armaments industries in WEU member countries". Mr. Barre continued : "The independent European programme group, which brings together all the European members of the Alliance, is more particularly responsible for organising co-operation for the joint development and production of specific weapons systems or equipment."

29. In Recommendation 320, adopted on the Committee's report last year, the Assembly proposed that the Council "set up a European centre for defence studies at the disposal of inter-governmental defence bodies and the Assembly making use of the resources of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and its Standing Armaments Committee". In its reply, the Council could not accept the suggestion, specifying that "furthermore, the written material held by the ACA and the SAC relates exclusively to the highly technical matters within their particular competence, and the staffs of these two bodies are selected precisely for the specialised duties which they have to perform". However, in view of the Council's intention to use the SAC as "an instrument for thought and analysis" and give it "new tasks", the Committee sees no reason why such expert knowledge, not used to the full at present, should not be made available to Assembly Committees or to governments. The Committee therefore proposes that any studies that the Assembly might propose should be borne in mind by the Council for the new tasks which it is considering entrusting to the SAC. For example, the Committee recalls that in 1971 it proposed that five studies be undertaken by experts to be appointed for the purpose,

including "a concerted long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement"¹ — that study still remains to be undertaken, and the subject is well within the competences of the SAC. Again past reports of the Committee on related subjects have relied on the assistance of outside experts, but the expertise of the SAC, had it been available, could well have proved of equal or greater value².

30. In the abovementioned reply to Recommendation 325, the Council did not accept the Assembly's proposal that the IEPG submit a report on its activities to the Assembly. The Council prefers that "WEU Assembly delegates... be briefed through national channels on IEPG activities". However, in view of the IEPG's responsibilities as envisaged by the Council (see paragraph 26), which correspond approximately to the rôle which the Council initially planned for the SAC in its decision of 7th May 1955 setting up that body, the Committee proposes that the Council report on the activities of the IEPG in future annual reports.

31. At the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on the joint production of armaments referred to above, the Committee was most interested to hear what progress had been made in the part of the study dealing with the juridical aspects of the European industry now being made by the SAC. According to the annual report, this part of the study was transmitted to the Council on 24th April 1978. The Committee proposes that the text of this interesting study now be published. The SAC is pursuing its work on the economic part of the study.

V. Conclusions

32. The Committee's main conclusions are set out in the draft recommendation. The first two paragraphs of the preamble are based on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present explanatory memorandum. The third paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 1 of the operative text are commented on in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the explanatory memorandum and the fourth paragraph of the preamble and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the operative text in paragraphs 26 to 31 of the explanatory memorandum.

1. Document 559, 16th November 1971, A conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts, Rapporteur Mr. Rivière.

2. Document 689, 1st December 1975, European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments, Rapporteur Mr. Lemmrich ; Document 738, 10th May 1977, A European armaments policy, Rapporteur Mr. Dankert ; Document 786, 31st October 1978, A European armaments policy, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley.

*Application of the Brussels Treaty —
Reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹
tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot

1. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considers appropriate, of the results already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its work is directed ;”.
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :
“3. Take the fullest account of the Assembly’s recommendations in defining any new task allotted to the SAC ;”.

Signed : van Waterschoot

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979 (Amendment 1 agreed to ; Amendment 2 amended and agreed to).

The balance of force

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; MM. Bonnel (Alternate : *Verleyesen*), *Roberti* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Ahrens*, Baumel, Bechter, *van den Bergh*, Boldrini, Boucheny, Critchley, Dejardin (Alternate : *Lambiotte*), Fosson, Grant (Alternate : *Banks*),

Handlos (Alternate : *Büchner*), Hardy, Konen (Alternate : *Spautz*), de Koster, *Lemrich*, *Maggioni*, *Ménard*, *Pawelczyk*, *Pecchioli*, Péronnet (Alternate : *Sénès*), Hermann Schmidt, Scholten, *Tanghe*, Whitehead.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

8. Possible shape of armed conflict

- (a) Statements by NATO countries
- (b) Statements by Warsaw Pact countries

9. Troop levels in Central Europe

- (a) Statements by NATO countries
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10. Balance of forces for security and détente**II. The Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions**

- 1. Developments in the Vienna negotiations since 1973
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Draft Recommendation
on the balance of force

The Assembly,

Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force ;

Believing that the overall East-West economic and military balance is favourable to the West, but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet military doctrine of "daring thrusts" against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;

Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate differences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that there is some advance towards agreement on the concepts of parity and common collective ceilings ;

Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through improved warning and verification facilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment ;
2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly on maintaining military capabilities required for credible deterrence ;
3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on :
 - (i) the assessment of present force levels in the area ;
 - (ii) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances ;
 - (iii) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better warning and verification facilities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Pawelczyk, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The Rapporteur was asked to examine critically the balance of force as presented by worst-case analyses from the standpoint of both NATO and Warsaw Pact military commanders. He was to take account of the sources which control the release of information publicly available and their probable tendencies in interpreting unpublished intelligence data. The report was to consider these matters in the context of the MBFR negotiations.

2. In an attempt to follow these terms of reference the Rapporteur has sought to compare published Warsaw Pact statements and writings, where these are available, with those from NATO sources, when considering various aspects of the balance of force.

3. A recent perceptive study¹ of the estimating process within the United States intelligence community is prefaced by a quotation from Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass":

" 'I was wondering what the mouse-trap was for,' said Alice. 'It isn't very likely there would be any mice on the horse's back.'

'Not very likely, perhaps,' said the Knight; but, if they *do* come, I don't choose to have them running all about.'

'You see,' he went on after a pause, 'it's as well to be provided for *everything*.

That's the reason the horse has all those anklets around his feet.'

'But what are they for?' Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity.

'To guard against the bites of sharks,' the Knight replied. 'It's an invention of my own...'

This is perhaps an extreme example of a worst-case analysis, but not more alarmist than some statements by a few individual generals in the West who have differed from their governments. These the Committee had in mind in embarking on the present report.

I. The balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact as declared by each side

1. Uncertainties in comparing forces

4. For some time, the West has been openly and resolutely involved in discussions on the East-West balance of forces.

¹ United States Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, Laurence Freedman, The Macmillan Press, London.

5. Some politicians and military authorities say that there is a balance of forces. Others claim that the West as a whole still has military superiority, and a growing number asserts that the balance swings in favour of the East. Why such contradicting views and what is the true position? The questions thus arising are:

- What is a comparison of forces?
- On what is it based?
- What can or cannot be expected of it?

6. The defence potential includes all active combat-ready armed forces that can be used by a state and their operational availability in a given area at a given time.

7. The military potential is an essential factor, particularly when comparing forces, since it directly concerns the armed forces.

8. To have a basis for comparing forces, the units, troops and equipment of the armed forces of both sides must be determined quantitatively and, as far as possible, in terms of their principal qualitative aspects. However, few qualitative factors can be quantified and this seriously limits the list of comparative data and the comparison itself.

9. Such factors include:

- troop morale;
- level of training of troops;
- ability to mobilise, deploy and bring in reserves;
- geographical conditions;
- tactical and strategic doctrine;
- unit mobility;
- precision of weapons in terms of their reliability under enemy fire;
- maintenance of equipment, etc.

10. These various factors are included in the notion of capability.

11. The list of data includes another group of factors which cannot be included in a data bank, i.e. those which come under the general heading of "intentions", which include:

- for the possible aggressor: shaping public opinion and political decision-making; covert preparations for war; the political and military play of partner states; convincing soldiers and civilians of the legitimacy of war;
- for the country under attack: the question of the precise moment at which the

threat is recognised and defined as an aggression ; the time and scale of the political decision, for instance in respect of mobilisation and defensive measures ; political and military co-operation with allies ; the will to resist of the population, governments and soldiers of allied states.

12. Despite the numerous restrictions listed above, it is nevertheless possible, reasonable and necessary to make a comparison of forces, but without forgetting the overall restrictions applying inevitably to an assessment of the results of political aims and the ensuing defence plans.

13. With regard to NATO and Warsaw Pact declarations on the balance of forces, this means that a full and realistic estimate of the balance of forces of the two sides must include :

- a comparison of the strength of the armed forces in terms of troop levels, available weapons systems, armaments, reserves and all data which can be translated into figures for the forces of both sides ; once ascertained in accordance with compatible criteria, these figures constitute "*the quantitative comparison of forces*" ;
- a comparison of unquantifiable factors which on each side determine operational availability, combat potential and fighting ability of the armed forces, including instruction, training, reliability of troops or the technical performance of weapons systems, not to forget the factors listed above under the heading of "intentions". This qualitative comparison of forces must be complementary to the quantitative comparison since not everything can be expressed solely in terms of figures ;
- the setting of these two comparisons in the context of given conditions influencing the conduct of hostilities including geo-strategic conditions, ethnological considerations, technical and scientific potential, the potential of technical and economic weapons, and many others.

14. Thus, an assessment of the balance of forces embraces many factors. Most publications confine their examination to a few data stemming mainly from the quantitative comparison of forces.

2. Availabilities and critical assessment of sources of information

(a) NATO publications

15. Contrary to the practice observed in Warsaw Pact countries, many publications in NATO

member states cover the qualitative and quantitative comparison of forces and describe in detail the military potential of their countries. These publications may be divided into three groups as follows :

- (i) official Ministry of Defence publications known as white papers, annual Defence Department report (United States) or programme law (France) ;
- (ii) statements or publications by politicians and military authorities ;
- (iii) The Military Balance, published by the IISS in London, a study of the world's armed forces prepared at international level.

16. The first group is of a documentary nature (progress reports, for instance). Whereas in most countries these publications are used for reaching political decisions in parliament, the programme law also provides a detailed basis for planning the development of French forces. In support of the measures presented, these documentary publications contain qualitative and quantitative comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and their specific armed forces. Many of these documents also give an overall picture of hostilities.

17. The Pentagon's annual Defence Department report gives a good overall view of the balance of strategic and nuclear forces, although it refers only to United States, Chinese and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons ; it is therefore an estimate of the strategic potential of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for :

- the Soviet Union controls the whole strategic nuclear potential of the Warsaw Pact ;
- the United States, with a few exceptions, represents the strategic nuclear potential of NATO ;
- the British share is relatively small ;
- the French strike force cannot just be taken into account in the balance of forces since it is essentially an instrument of French political strategy and it is impossible to foresee at what moment it might be used, nor to what extent and with what degree of co-ordination with the allies.

18. Generally speaking, current American publications affirm that there is essential equivalence, the quantitative and qualitative advantages and disadvantages of both sides being more or less equivalent.

19. Because of the abundance of documentation on the balance of forces, statements by politicians or military authorities are limited to specific

aspects or assessment. On the whole, such publications express the personal opinion of the author without indicating the official position of the governments or generals concerned. The only exceptions are the major strategic decisions taken by political leaders or changes in the politico-military course introduced by a new government (for instance, the strategic discussion in the United States).

20. The IISS Military Balance is the only known international publication to give a quantitative comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. The IISS has been producing its estimates for twenty years now, and has achieved international recognition; its estimates are widely quoted in the press, even by Warsaw Pact writers who have no comparable public source available in their own countries. The Military Balance is understood to be prepared from published sources only, but a questionnaire is circulated to many countries, and in general countries are invited to comment on assessment of their own forces. For levels of Warsaw Pact forces, estimates provided by several NATO countries are compared — some of these sources provide consistently higher estimates of Soviet forces than others.

21. The Military Balance provides a more reliable estimate of force levels than do the unclassified figures published by various NATO governments, the latter vary among themselves, but the Committee has no means of comparing the IISS estimates with the unpublished classified estimates used for planning purposes in Ministries of Defence. The German Ministry of Defence believes the IISS underestimates Warsaw Pact forces and equipment.

Comparison of estimates of the balance on the central front from three sources in 1976 (latest year for which the German defence white paper is available) Ratio of NATO : WP forces

	German defence white paper	United Kingdom defence white paper	IISS Military Balance (nothern and central fronts combined)
Tanks	1 : 3.1	1 : 2.7	1 : 2.7
Combat aircraft	1 : 1.4	1 : 2.3	1 : 2.0

(b) Warsaw Pact publications

22. In the Warsaw Pact countries, so far there seem to be no publications giving comparative qualitative and quantitative data on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces on the lines of the IISS Military Balance. There are no official publica-

tions by Defence Ministries (white papers) such as exist in the NATO countries. Publications in the press or specialised magazines giving a partial comparison of forces appear in the Warsaw Pact countries for propaganda, educational or information purposes. These are admittedly claimed to be official statements but bear no resemblance to the objective assessment made by the Soviet leaders which provides the basis for decisions. If a comparison is to be made of publications issued in the East and the West account must first be taken of these facts.

23. Specific data on forces are given only for western and neutral countries with no reference to the corresponding forces of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, according to public Warsaw Pact sources, it is impossible to know the government's views on the quantitative comparison of forces. Conversely many indications may be drawn from these publications where the qualitative comparison of forces is concerned; principally, they cover the strategic intentions and military capability of the Warsaw Pact and the so-called opinions and alleged capability of the enemy. These two considerations are sometimes combined for propaganda purposes, e.g.:

- strengthening Soviet intentions or developments favourable to the Soviet Union by means of verbal attacks on western countries or political powers;
- justifying the need to extend and develop the Warsaw Pact's military potential;
- justifying the Warsaw Pact's internal and external activities;
- strengthening the confidence of the population of the Warsaw Pact or other groups.

24. In these publications, statements by the same author may vary according to the aim sought in the public declarations.

25. In any event, interpretations given by Warsaw Pact bodies reveal trends and broad lines which frequently betray an overall basic assessment of the strategic balance. Indications may thus be obtained on the following points:

- the estimated strategic situation in the light of the social, economic and military forces as compared with the Soviet Union and its allies;
- an idea of the (presumed) intentions and capability of the enemy;
- declarations on the fundamental importance of the military capability in the political and social conflict and on the tasks of forces and their components;

- data on (presumed) military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries and the need to continue to develop it ;
- concepts regarding a possible future war.

26. Of the many factors mentioned above, only statements by leading authorities have been selected, e.g. :

- Defence Ministers of Warsaw Pact states ;
- chiefs of staff ;
- heads of political bureaux ;
- divisional commanders or generals holding equivalent posts ;
- senior officers of the Warsaw Pact allied commands ; and
- a few experts in specific fields.

27. Soviet military views constitute the "socialist military doctrine", compulsory throughout the Warsaw Pact. At the very most, there are minor national particularities due to geographical position, the specific structure of a country's capability or the tasks assigned to a country in the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

28. To avoid unnecessary repetition, mention will be made only of publications of the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Poland among the Warsaw Pact countries. In addition to constituting the main strength, they also represent Central Europe, an area of geographical and political importance.

29. Several of the ideas adopted already date back several years, but as they emanate from leading authors, it may be considered that they are still perfectly valid.

3. Selection and description of publications

(a) NATO publications

30. NATO publications, or more precisely those of NATO member states, deal first and foremost with security policy and military strategy with a view to maintaining the integrity of the Alliance.

31. Similarly, statements, by politicians in particular, refer to maintaining a free democratic order, but there is no question of well-defined common ideological or scientific bases which would provide a starting point for or initiate political decisions on security policy and military strategy. This also applies to publications on comparisons of forces.

32. With the exception of the German white paper, the fullest and most detailed data are

given in American publications, particularly the annual Defence Department report, although the latter is mainly concerned with a world-wide comparison of United States and Soviet forces.

33. Information given in United Kingdom and Italian white papers, for instance, is far less abundant and less precise.

34. French publications, and primarily the programme law, make no comparison of forces. The main publications selected are therefore American.

(b) Warsaw Pact publications

35. (i) An assessment of the strategic situation forms part of the normal rôle of the political and military supreme command in the Soviet Union and its allied states. It includes the representation and assessment of all major forces and capabilities — in current conditions at world level — and provides the framework for military strategic planning.

36. Such an assessment does not ensue objectively but scientifically, i.e. from the standpoint of classes.

37. This means first that the legitimacy of one's own interests and of the intentions expressed must never be called in question. In every publication, the antagonism between socialism and capitalism/imperialism is the starting point of every thought. A systematic and moral premise is that socialism is the benefactor of mankind, and therefore does not need to be justified but develops automatically, whereas capitalism/imperialism is an obsolete form of society which wishes to defend its lost position by means of force.

38. Socialist military efforts are therefore considered to be defensive although, according to western criteria, their aims are purely expansionary.

39. Among the expressions used, the concept of a world socialist system covers all states and forces considering themselves socialist (of Soviet allegiance) ; members of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon are generally known as the socialist community or socialist brother countries.

40. (ii) In official statements, the capability and intentions of the potential aggressor are always described in such a way as to justify the need for a counter-offensive by the Warsaw Pact. It is difficult to pinpoint criteria for forming an opinion ; they should be considered rather as different starting points for assessing the same factors.

41. (iii) Forces in the Warsaw Pact are taken to be all the armed forces of a state, an alliance or one side in a civil war, whatever their declared purpose. All armed forces serve the interests of

the dominating class. What determines the internal and external structure of these forces is always based on the firm intentions of the dominating class.

42. (iv) In describing the capability of the Warsaw Pact forces, three levels of command must be distinguished, i.e. strategy, operational technology and tactics. Where strategy is concerned, the capability of Warsaw Pact forces is included in the context of a fundamental political intention. Conversely, tactical considerations are often related to concrete matters for training purposes in many cases. Operational descriptions tend to be abstract and refer more frequently than others to events during the second world war.

43. (v) When referring to possible wars, publications are also based on the actual current situation of the Soviet Union and its allies. Future wars are therefore not described in terms of their possible technico-military shape but primordially according to their nature. What is decisive is the aim pursued by a belligerent for it can thus be determined whether the means available will really be used and to what extent.

4. Assessment of the overall East-West situation at world level

(a) Statements by NATO countries

44. There is no full and exhaustive assessment of the overall East-West situation at world level in NATO publications or those of its member countries. By their very nature, national publications deal with special interests and from a geographical point of view too. However, they contain much information which can be considered as basic factors for making an assessment. For instance, General Haig said that :

- the Soviet Union had acquired quantitative superiority in many decisive fields;
- technologically, it was in the process of catching up with the West in qualitative terms ;
- Soviet forces had every category of military, nuclear and conventional capability :
 - for the conduct of war on land, sea and in the air ;
 - with permanent combat-readiness and long-term supply capability.

General Brown said that :

- the Soviet Union would certainly spark off crises of which it would take advantage but would avoid direct military confrontation ;

- the Soviet Union would become more aggressive insofar as it became aware of the relative improvement in its military power ;
- the divergent aims of the United States and the Soviet Union were still a source of conflict between the two states ;
- the two countries would nevertheless endeavour to reduce tension in order to avoid total war.

(b) Warsaw Pact statements

45. The recurring theme of Warsaw Pact publications on the strategic situation is the swing of the balance of strategic forces to the side of socialism since the second world war. This is justified by :

- the increased capability of the Warsaw Pact ;
- the decline of western influence in the third world ;
- domestic, economic and social difficulties in capitalist countries.

All this was possible in Europe without war and without interference by the Soviet Union.

46. The increased military capability of the Warsaw Pact is generally considered as a decisive condition of this positive trend. The Soviet Union visibly considers that this suffices *inter alia* :

- to prevent the enemy from taking military action against the Soviet Union and its allies ;
- to prevent the enemy from making full use of its military means to defend positions throughout the world ;
- to afford support to allied forces, even very indirectly ;
- to guarantee the security of its own sector.

Here, military and economic capabilities are considered jointly.

47. However, this situation seems to be constantly threatened by general technico-military progress and the western economy being supposedly directed towards armament, which makes the Soviet Union and its allies increase their military potential even more.

48. Yet is this compatible with the assertion of Mr. Ustinov, Soviet Minister of Defence, which remains to be proved, that the Soviet Union and its allies have not increased their troop levels ?

49. Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet navy, in particular, describes and justifies the spectacular strengthening of Soviet

naval strength as an instrument which must be capable of neutralising American seaborne strategic weapons and is already able to back Soviet state interests throughout the world.

50. The analysis of local warfare since 1945 and criticism of "western efforts to extend NATO's sphere of interest" must be seen in this context.

51. Warsaw Pact publications underline the special importance of Europe and of Central Europe, the main theatre for war. Warsaw Pact military strength is considered sufficient to wipe out NATO forces in the event of war despite their degree of combat-readiness and superior combat potential including conventional means. Here, the views of the German Democratic Republic are particularly significant. They underline the world repercussions of the situation in Europe and in Central Europe in particular and warn against any deterioration in the present balance of forces, which might jeopardise the MBFR negotiations.

52. Conversely, the present weakness of NATO's southern flank is presented as a possible starting point for political action, but it is immediately made clear that in the event of war account would have to be taken not only of NATO itself but also of all the capitalist forces led by the United States.

53. The Poles seems more reserved, although their position is similar on this point. It would appear that Poland too accords particular importance to the balance of forces in Europe especially since in the event of war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, Polish forces would be fighting side by side with Warsaw Pact forces outside Polish territory.

54. Moreover, the strengthening of the country's internal defences bears witness to the emphasis placed on national interests. Efforts to limit strategic weapons are considered more positive in Poland than in the other countries; the West's superiority in this respect is challenged openly. Balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is considered an essential condition of world stability.

5. Possible Soviet perceptions of the historical military background

(a) Assessment of the potential enemy

55. Few western assessments of the East-West military balance make any systematic attempt to examine the likely Soviet perception of the balance of force in the world in which the Soviet Union finds itself. In this respect the Soviet Union is a poor publicist in its own cause; this is partly because of traditional secrecy on most official, especially military, matters — practised

to an extent that inhibits dissemination of information within the Soviet bureaucracy — and partly because most published Soviet descriptions of potential adversaries are unrecognisable portraits in the West.

56. The Committee in this section does not seek to act as a public relations adviser for the Soviet military authorities, although to many observers they appear to be in need of one, but to mention three factors which need to be taken into account when contemporary levels of Soviet forces and equipment are interpreted in terms of both capability and likely intentions. These factors are :

- (i) the total strategic environment of the Soviet Union¹ — the population, the economic resources and armed forces of all neighbouring countries and potential adversaries ;
- (ii) the time-lag between a planning decision to develop and produce a particular piece of military equipment and its appearance in service, which will not be shorter than in the West where it is assumed to be between five and fifteen years depending on the complexity of the equipment and the amount of new technology involved. Thus new weapons now observed to be entering service with the Soviet forces must presumably be meant to meet a military requirement perceived to exist some five to fifteen years earlier, based in some cases no doubt on Soviet projections of western military developments which may not have materialised, and at a time when the climate of East-West relations was substantially different to that now prevailing ;
- (iii) the modernisation of existing weapons systems both by NATO and by the Soviet Union and its allies, which should be considered a normal process. It will hardly benefit either the requirements of defence or of arms control if the modernisation of NATO weapons systems is viewed as necessary to stabilise NATO's defence capability, while at the same time comparable Soviet measures are viewed as an additional threat.

(b) Statements by NATO countries

57. All publications of NATO and its member States indicate that in recent years the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in particular have

1. See Appendix I.

considerably strengthened their fighting potential in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Moreover, it should be specified that their attack capability is increasing and the time required to prepare an attack is now only a few days. It is noted that :

- there is a balance of strategic nuclear systems between NATO and the Warsaw Pact ;
- there have been major improvements in tactical nuclear weapons which are partly responsible for the Warsaw Pact's superiority ;
- a comparison of conventional forces clearly demonstrates the Warsaw Pact's superiority in Central Europe.

(c) *Warsaw Pact statements*

58. All Warsaw Pact publications clearly show that imperialism, i.e. the West as a whole, is considered to be the principal enemy. The People's Republic of China, although also seen as an enemy, is considered less important in military terms. Military studies concentrate almost entirely on NATO and the United States in particular, but also the Federal Republic of Germany. NATO is said to have aggressive intentions ; its armed forces are described as offensive ; the United States economy in particular is considered very productive in the armaments sector.

59. Western statements that Soviet military superiority is a military threat are said to be slanderous in the context of an ideological war whose sole aim is to justify high military budgets and discredit the Soviet Union in the eyes of the third world.

60. All Warsaw Pact publications are adamant about the possibility of a war with the West and consequently the Soviet Union must not relax its military efforts. It is clear that western nuclear weapons are a source of special concern.

61. Since the end of the sixties, the accent has been more on localised war but mainly in the framework of hostilities resulting from positions occupied in the third world.

62. Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, has made a very objective assessment of western naval strength. He recognises its geographical advantages and admits the effectiveness of its naval forces in the third world. He attaches particular value to the possibilities of action by American seaborne strategic nuclear weapons, even against the Soviet Union.

63. However, other service representatives indicate that training is shaped according to NATO force capabilities. The tank defences of the western armies in particular are in the centre

of many practical tactical discussions in which it is made clear that all available means will have to be used to overcome them.

64. The German Democratic Republic's picture of the military enemy is drawn with especial clarity. Its publications are mainly concerned with NATO forces stationed in Central Europe and in particular with the capability of the Bundeswehr which is said to have a high degree of combat-readiness and a high combat potential which should be met by the German people's army. A positive assessment of NATO military integration by a responsible East German author may be considered original. For instance, a statement about the importance of Spain and the obvious account that must be taken of France indicate that in the event of war, apart from NATO, the Warsaw Pact has other capitalist enemies in mind.

65. Polish publications also depict the West as the principal and most aggressive enemy. However, they underline more clearly than publications in the GDR for instance that the strength of the Soviet side forces the West to moderate its military posture. The image of the direct military enemy reflects Poland's geographical position surrounded by socialist countries : it is considered that there is a greater threat to Polish territory from subversive action and air attack than from ground operations.

6. *Rôle and tasks of the various armed forces*

(a) *Statements by NATO countries*

66. The United States is increasingly seeing its own armed forces as holding a key rôle in the Alliance system, although its main technological and military task is to maintain a second strike capability. The fundamental concept for meeting a threat from the Warsaw Pact and possible attack is the maintenance of a deterrent force and a flexible response capability. In the view of the United States, the aim is to keep the Alliance intact or to restore its territorial integrity. In this respect, conventional forces are of growing importance.

67. The United Kingdom is also concentrating its defence efforts increasingly on its tasks in the Alliance. It considers the nuclear component of its armed forces as one of its principal contributions.

68. Since it withdrew from the Alliance's military organisation, France has occupied a special place. The main features of France's security policy are based on the maintenance of its freedom to take national decisions and preclude in principle :

- a return to the NATO integrated military organisation ;

- the inclusion of France's nuclear deterrent in the strategy of the Alliance ;
- French participation in the concept of forward defence in the Federal Republic of Germany by acceptance of an assigned wartime position ;
- French participation in any negotiations on the limitation or reduction of nuclear weapons.

69. However, these principles do not exclude :

- the use of French nuclear weapons on the side of the allies or on the territory of an allied state *after appropriate consultations and with the formal agreement of the state concerned* ;
- defence of French territory — mainly in accordance with national views — even on the other side of the Rhine in concert with the Alliance's operational command. France reserves the right to decide on the time and extent of its participation.

(b) *Statements by Warsaw Pact countries*

70. All authorities in the Warsaw Pact countries consider the military strengthening of the Warsaw Pact community of socialist states to be a decisive condition for the move towards worldwide socialism. Wars for socialism are still justified, which means that the Warsaw Pact commands consider this move to be a political process of which the armed forces are the decisive instrument.

71. It is considered that the specific task of the armed forces is direct deterrence and the exercise of political pressure or the affirmation of a military presence and the demonstration of military strength, particularly in the third world. This is where the Soviet navy plays a leading rôle. A high degree of readiness for combat and nuclear war might allow the Warsaw Pact forces to ensure freedom of action for their political commands, even in unfavourable conditions, and effectively to neutralise western military pressure.

72. Armed forces are assigned a stabilising rôle, particularly in order to maintain the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact as an alliance.

73. Whereas, according to the German Democratic Republic, the task of military strength is seen as being exclusively for the socialist bloc as a whole, which suggests the total subordination of the German people's army, Polish publications indicate that part of the potential is to be used for more limited national tasks and presumably remains under national command.

7. Capabilities of the various armed forces

(a) *Statements by NATO countries*

74. In the publications of NATO and its member states, the capabilities of the respective armed forces are measured in the light of their ability :

- to deter a potential enemy ;
- to avoid, by their very presence, the use of their military means to exert massive military pressure ;
- to repel the enemy in the event of attack.

75. In general, with the exception of France, NATO's strategic nuclear potential (United States and the United Kingdom) is now considered to have second strike capability.

76. However, there is concern about the inability of the Alliance's armed forces to carry out the following tasks :

- deterrence in Europe ;
- to intercept and drive back a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe, even with only a short warning (mainly with conventional forces) ;
- the maintenance of sea links between the United States and Europe ;
- the timely strengthening of the European front by calling on reserves from the United States, for instance.

77. NATO's long-term defence programme measures have allowed this concern to be overcome.

78. France considers that its strategic nuclear weapons systems have operational capability. Where the armed forces are concerned, the ongoing reorganisation of the major army formations should be emphasised.

79. The French army is not at present in a position to ensure a triad comparable to the NATO triad (strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional forces), its conventional component being too weak. It must therefore retain a structure which allows it to move cautiously from the all or nothing of de Gaulle's day to greater flexibility. Despite many divergences, this attitude is close to NATO's present doctrine.

(b) *Statements by Warsaw Pact countries*

80. Warsaw Pact publications bear witness to the effort made by the Soviet Union and its allies to deploy their military capability in every field. Particular importance is attached to a common ideological approach and common scientific and military bases.

81. The level of instruction of the population allows the most up-to-date command techniques to be used. A particularly strong point is considered to be the fact (borne out by experience during the second world war) that liaison between all action taken by the command, including allied commands, is co-ordinated by a central body in the Soviet Union, which allows maximum advantage to be taken of the economic potential. The armed forces are considered capable of carrying out widespread co-ordinated ground operations (beyond the front line = theatre of manoeuvres) in modern conditions, attack being the essential point.

82. Skilful use of artillery in greater numbers and with increased mobility thanks to self-propelled guns should allow western tactical nuclear weapons and tank defences to be countered. The emphasis laid on the time factor may be interpreted as an effort to precede defence preparations and the enemy's arrival on the battlefield. However, these aims would appear to be limited by an inadequate decision-taking capability and insufficient mobility at the lower command level.

83. The navy should be capable of carrying out independent operations :

- to hold its own in face of strong enemy naval and air forces ;
- to launch strategic nuclear weapons deep into enemy territory ;
- to fight enemy offensive forces at sea, thus limiting, from the sea, the strategic threat to its own hinterland.

84. Despite the geographical position of their country, Polish authors consider that this is not enough to remove the threat of an air attack on their territory. Effective civil defence is therefore considered to be an essential accompaniment to the armed forces.

8. Possible shape of armed conflict

(a) Statements by NATO countries

85. Annual reports and official statements by NATO and its member states contain little about this subject which on the other hand is frequently referred to in statements to the mass media by politicians and military commanders (e.g. Ministers of Defence, General Haig, General Schulze, General Wust, Major-General Close).

86. Since NATO and its member states have adopted a purely defensive military strategy, the shape of hostilities, at least at the start of a war, is determined by the potential enemy. Consequently, all imaginable forms of war are expected, starting with wars waged with con-

ventional weapons. To meet every possible variation, it is necessary for NATO to have the maximum mobility in the framework of the flexible response.

87. So far, France's political and military command has generally avoided making formal public statements on this subject.

(b) Statements by Warsaw Pact countries

88. Fundamental views on war have already been described above. Publications show that the Warsaw Pact is undeniably considering the possibility of world-wide nuclear war and that it still considers such a war to be a realistic or even licit means. Even in the nuclear age, local wars are still a reality. The fact that a war in which nuclear powers are involved remains limited depends on the aims of the war and political intentions. However, any war of this kind may turn into a world war.

89. The deployment of nuclear weapons at sea may deter the enemy from using such weapons against the Pact's hinterland and adds a new dimension to the theatre of naval operations. This means therefore that appropriate naval forces must be already commissioned in peacetime for such an expensive and lengthy process cannot be carried out successfully in wartime. The need for armed forces to conduct operations in modern conditions, with or without recourse to nuclear weapons, explains why freedom of manoeuvre is sought in the event of a threat or use of such weapons. Concurrently, there is no doubt about the fact that enemy means of action are also the main target of conventional weapons and tactical manoeuvres on the battlefield.

90. Finally, the notion of co-ordination of all available means in modern warfare should be emphasised, which implies unified political and military command.

9. Troop levels in Central Europe

91. The question of troop levels in Central Europe will be considered in detail in Chapter II of the report dealing with the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, but some general statements may be mentioned here and now.

(a) Statements by NATO countries

92. Only a few official published figures concerning forces deployed in Central Europe by NATO and the Warsaw Pact are available.

93. The 1975-76 white paper on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the federal armed forces is revealing with regard to a comparison of the

forces in Central Europe which are the object of the Vienna MBFR negotiations.

94. This white paper reaches the following conclusions :

“The correlation of forces continues to be unfavourable to the Atlantic Alliance, upon introduction of the reserves of both sides.”

95. In reply to questions put by parliamentary groups in the Bundestag, the Federal Government summed the position up as follows on 7th June 1977 :

“The conventional military potential of the Warsaw Pact states in Central Europe is quantitatively greater than that of NATO and far surpasses defence requirements.”

96. Referring to the MBFR negotiations, the 1975-76 white paper indicates that “the Warsaw Pact is clearly superior in ground forces in Central Europe”.

97. White papers issued by other governments since 1974 often only hint at the balance of forces in Central Europe.

98. For instance, the Netherlands 1974 white paper mentions “the imbalance of forces to the detriment of the West” in connection with the aims defined by the two alliances in the MBFR context.

99. The Italian 1977 white paper also mentions the imbalance of conventional forces in Central Europe which justifies the need for the MBFR negotiations.

100. The British 1977 white paper is more explicit. It found the unequal balance of forces between East and West “destabilising”, estimating, in the context of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, that the Warsaw Pact ground forces in Central Europe outnumbered western forces by 150,000 men according to the figures tabled by NATO.

101. The German and British white papers refer to the growing combat strength of Soviet divisions stationed in Central Europe. The British white paper concludes that “although the number of divisions has remained unchanged since... 1968, their real combat strength, in terms of additional tanks, guns, armoured personnel carriers and manpower, has increased by the equivalent of six complete pre-1968 divisions”.

102. Communiqués issued after ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council give considerable information about the threat and, in particular, the comparison of forces. The final communiqué issued after the meeting on 8th and 9th December 1977 called for the elimination of “the existing ground force manpower disparity in Central Europe” and “noted... the steady

growth in the military strength of the Warsaw Pact”. The communiqué issued after the last session, held in Brussels on 7th and 8th December 1978, underlines that “Ministers noted with concern the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments, both conventional and nuclear, notwithstanding repeated eastern assurances that their aim is not to seek military superiority”.

103. Government statements on the comparison of forces deployed in Central Europe are rare. Statements by certain politicians on the subject are even more vague than official statements. Addressing the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on 28th October 1977, Mr. Schmidt, Federal German Chancellor, said :

“Since the start of the MBFR negotiations, the Warsaw Pact has further increased the disparities in military strength in terms of both conventional and tactical nuclear forces.”

104. In the United States, Senator Nunn asserted in a speech on 14th November 1977 that the MBFR negotiations would be marked by Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional military plans in Europe and that the increase in Soviet forces noted since the start of the negotiations had raised the number of troops well above the level from which it was planned to make reductions.

(b) *Statements by Warsaw Pact countries*

105. Statements by NATO authorities, governments or individual politicians in the NATO countries on the balance of forces in Central Europe contrast with those of politicians in Warsaw Pact countries. The first official position on the overall situation was given by Mr. Brezhnev himself at the twenty-fifth conference of the Soviet Communist Party on 24th March 1976. In his progress report, he referred to the MBFR negotiations as follows :

“Our proposals are based on the maintenance of the existing ratio of forces in Central Europe and, in fact, their balance, which we consider to be the only realistic basis.”

106. In his official speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the October revolution on 2nd November 1977, Mr. Brezhnev described his position on the balance of forces in Central Europe :

“We do not wish to upset the approximate balance of forces which has now been attained, for instance between East and West in Central Europe.”

and in his speech in the Kremlin on 2nd March 1979 he said :

"Take the negotiations in Vienna. At present they have become bogged down in a dispute over the methods of counting the manpower of the armed forces of the two sides, right down to the last cook or medical orderly. Frankly speaking, this is simply a tactic on the part of the western countries, an attempt to evade agreement right at a time when the positions of the two sides on the substance of the matter had come considerably closer. After all, it is a fact that a general military equilibrium does exist in Europe, even if there are differences in the structure of the armed forces of each side. And it is from this fact that one should proceed."

107. In an interview with *Neues Deutschland* on 23rd November 1977, General Hoffmann, Defence Minister of the German Democratic Republic, saw no "major difference" in the balance between the "two main groups of forces in Central Europe", despite certain quantitative and qualitative features.

108. In contradiction with this view, General Hoffmann, speaking at the Party's Karl Marx college on 1st December 1975, said that :

"The military superiority of the Soviet Union and of its allies over the imperialist powers is that it has made peace more certain."

10. Balance of forces for security and détente

109. A comparison of forces is one of the principal means of assessing the overall situation, the basis of security policy and hence defence policy planning and military programmes.

110. For forces to be comparable, identical criteria must be available for the calculations. It is even more difficult and complex to make a rational comparison of the quality of weapons systems if account is taken of the fact that they are always built for a specific task. It is therefore impossible to place side by side weapons which are obviously of the same type, such as the T-62, 64 and 72 tanks and Leopard, without taking into account and assessing a host of influencing factors.

111. The comparison of forces reaches its limits when purely qualitative factors are involved such as morale, the quality of the command, the will to take decisions, the level of training and, in the words of Adelbert Winstein in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, "The number is not everything that counts".

112. The trend of the measurable balance of forces indicates however whether the balance on

which our security is based is changing or has remained stable.

113. The difficulty of making an accurate comparison of forces stems from the multiplicity of numbers, qualities and other influencing factors and the interdependence of the various elements. The danger of drawing conclusions from purely numerical comparisons without previously subjecting them to serious expert interpretation must be underlined. Politicians and military authorities should take account of these restrictions when they wish to make political and military use of the results of force comparisons. Only a carefully-prepared comparison of forces can provide the true base which politicians need to pursue realistically a policy of security, détente and arms control.

114. A successful policy of security and détente depends on the maintenance of a balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which takes account of all strategic, tactical, nuclear and conventional factors. After years of inferiority in strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has managed to achieve parity with the United States.

115. A comparison of all the potentials shows that the North Atlantic Alliance has, at world level and taking into account all these factors, a defence potential which is capable of effectively countering the strength of the Warsaw Pact. Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact can pursue aggressive political aims directed against the other alliance by military means. Neither side is vulnerable to pressure.

116. Since 1968, NATO's security policy has been based on two fundamental principles : first, the maintenance of a military potential and enough political solidarity to deter an aggressor and to defend the territory of the Alliance ; second, the pursuit of efforts to establish a lasting relationship allowing fundamental political matters to be settled. Military defence capability and political détente are not contradictory but, on the contrary, complementary.

117. The aim of détente is to appease tension in areas of possible hostilities by means of treaties and agreements. Attempts to eliminate tension, slow down the arms race and define controlled disarmament more effectively cannot be dissociated. They meet the desire for security by ensuring stability at a lower level of armaments. The SALT and MBFR negotiations are directed towards this end.

118. Backed by a reliable defence capability, a responsible security policy must therefore leave no stone unturned to establish parity by political means, i.e. negotiations for the control of armaments.

II. The Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions

1. Developments in the Vienna negotiations since 1973

119. In June 1973, the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed after five months of consultations to hold negotiations in Vienna on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe". It was agreed that the general objective of the negotiations would be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. The parties agreed that specific arrangements would have to be worked out in such a way that they would in all respects and at every point conform to the principle of undiminished security for each party.

120. In November 1973, the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact each submitted a draft agreement on the MBFR negotiations. When comparing these original proposals with the present stage reached in the negotiations, it can be seen that the positions of the two parties have drawn closer together on the main points, without NATO departing from its fundamental position on parity and collectivity.

121. Basic proposals by NATO and the Warsaw Pact outlined the following framework for the agreement on reductions :

122. *The NATO proposal* included two distinct and separate stages (in fact, two separate agreements) :

- Stage 1 provided for a reduction of 15 % in United States and Soviet troops only, i.e. the withdrawal of 29,000 troops for the United States and 60,000 for the Soviet Union. It was specified that in the case of Soviet troops this applied to certain tank units but there was no such provision in the case of the United States.
- Stage 2 provided for reductions in all allied forces, limiting allied forces in Central Europe to a maximum level of 700,000 troops, i.e. a reduction of 48,000 for NATO and 157,000 for the Warsaw Pact. During this stage, a limit was also to be placed on manoeuvres and troop reinforcements. To date, little information has become available on the stabilising measures which NATO considers to be an essential part of any agreement.

123. *The Warsaw Pact proposal* called for a single three-stage agreement to reduce ground and air force levels and weapons, particularly nuclear weapons :

- Stage 1 provided for a symbolic withdrawal of 20,000 troops by each

side, thus reducing the forces stationed in the MBFR area to 757,000 NATO¹ and 905,000 for the Warsaw Pact.

- Stage 2 provided for a 5 % reduction by both sides in 1976. Applied to initial ground force levels in the area, this percentage meant a reduction of 39,000 for NATO and 46,000 for the Warsaw Pact, leaving a total of 718,000 for NATO and 859,000 for the Warsaw Pact.
- Stage 3, planned for 1977, called for a 10 % reduction by each side, which would have meant a further reduction of 78,000 for NATO and 92,000 for the Warsaw Pact. Once these reductions had been made, NATO would still have had 640,000 troops and the Warsaw Pact 767,000.
- All in all, total reductions on each side would have been 137,000 for NATO and 158,000 for the Warsaw Pact.

124. No reference seems to have been made in these proposals to the "associated measures" included in the negotiations.

125. Western proposals are based on the following conditions :

- European security can be guaranteed only by approximate equality of troop levels on both sides; one of the aims of the MBFR negotiations in respect of existing disparities is to establish approximate parity between ground forces by adopting collective overall ceilings for both sides and reducing disparities in respect of armoured vehicles ;
- agreements on reductions and levels of forces covering the American and Soviet reductions included in Stage 1 must be collective. The breakdown of the volume of collective reductions is an internal matter for NATO and the Warsaw Pact ;
- the principle of the full maintenance of security must be guaranteed for all parties ;
- the negotiations must be held in two stages.

126. The East's proposals are based on the following considerations :

- there is no imbalance in the present ratio of forces ;
- the present ratio of forces has allowed peace to be kept in the last thirty years

1. NATO estimates.

and should therefore be retained. Any modification in this ratio would lead to instability;

- the MBFR negotiations must take account of all forces and weapons systems, ground forces being only one part of a complex equation ;
- reductions must be of an equal percentage and apply to all armed forces and weapons systems ;
- a national reduction percentage must be adopted for all states concerned.

127. Data supplied by the Warsaw Pact on 16th June 1978 on the levels of its ground forces in the reduction area as at 1st January 1976 reveal a figure 150,000 lower than the figure given by NATO for Warsaw Pact forces in the NATO guidelines area (i.e. the reduction area). Clarification of this discrepancy has been a central aspect of the discussions in Vienna since early 1977.

128. On 15th July 1977, following the twelfth round of negotiations, in order to clear up this point and revive mutual efforts to advance the Vienna negotiations, NATO made a proposal to overcome the stalemate in the discussion of these figures. In accordance with the principle of collectivity, its proposal was that both alliances should elucidate the data in question.

129. On 25th October 1977, during the thirteenth round of negotiations, the Warsaw Pact responded to this proposal with one of its own, taking up the main elements of the NATO proposal.

130. On 19th April 1978, following the fourteenth round of negotiations, Ambassador de Vos stated at a press conference on behalf of the western delegation that :

- participants had agreed on procedure for a fuller exchange of data ;
- data had been exchanged in accordance with this procedure ; and
- a detailed study of these data had been started.

131. While seeking means of advancing the discussion on these figures, the North Atlantic Alliance considered the initiative taken by the Federal Republic of Germany for negotiating concrete reduction measures once the question of the figures had been settled. The exchange of data in accordance with the procedure adopted was a prior condition for implementation of this initiative. The exchange was made on 15th March and 5th April 1978. The NATO initiative was presented by the western participants at the plenary meeting on 19th April 1978.

132. On 8th June 1978, the Warsaw Pact replied to the western initiative of 19th April on the

MBFR negotiations. This reply was the most important step made by the Warsaw Pact since 1973 when the Vienna talks began. The NATO proposal and the East's reaction underline the interest shown by both sides in the MBFR negotiations and their positive conclusion.

133. According to the press, new developments in the Vienna negotiations may be summed up as follows : the NATO initiative of 19th April 1978 contains the following major details, subject to agreement on the figures :

- NATO proposes to reduce, in equal proportions, troops on both sides over and above the joint ceiling of 700,000;
- members of NATO taking part in the MBFR negotiations also undertake, in the Stage 1 agreement, to fix the collective total reduction of non-American troop levels during Stage 2. The two stages of the western proposal on the MBFR negotiations thus become more interdependent than before ;
- NATO modifies its request that the Soviet Union withdraw an entire tank army from the reduction area during Stage 1. Instead, it is calling for the withdrawal of five divisions. The withdrawal of 68,000 Soviet troops and 1,700 tanks called for in Stage 1 remained unchanged;
- furthermore, the West suggests that 29,000 American troops be partially withdrawn in complete units during Stage 1; the other basic western elements and positions remain unchanged.

134. Subsequently, in its reply of 8th June 1978, the Warsaw Pact again modified its position:

- this reply was still based on the same eastern assertion, i.e. that there was approximate numerical parity in forces of both sides in the reduction area;
- on the basis of the figures it had proposed, which were supposed to justify this so-called parity, the East was prepared to accept the NATO objective of fixing a common ceiling of 700,000 men, i.e. to give up the advantage — which it considered minimal — of 14,000 troops in the ground forces ;
- the NATO proposal not to take account of levels of air forces in the reductions but to fix a common ceiling of 900,000 for levels of ground and air forces was adopted by the Warsaw Pact but subject to the common ceilings for ground and air forces being fixed separately — 700,000 and 200,000 respectively — to

- prevent, once reductions had been made, a possible transfer of troops — unacceptable to the Warsaw Pact — between ground and air forces ;
- for Stage 1 of the reductions, the Warsaw Pact proposed withdrawing 7% of present levels of both Soviet and American forces in the reduction area. In other words, the Soviet Union was prepared to accept numerically asymmetrical reductions in its forces as compared with American forces ;
 - for Stage 1 of the reductions, the Soviet Union took up certain elements of the former nuclear offer (Option III), thus accepting the western proposal of a mixed package (tanks against nuclear weapons). However, its offer stopped well short of NATO's requirements and it also appeared to wish reductions in equipment to be applied to all direct participants ;
 - on collective ceilings, the Warsaw Pact now seems prepared to reach agreement with the West. The eastern counter-proposal admittedly contained a number of provisions qualifying its concessions on a collective ceiling ; however, the member states of the Warsaw Pact proved flexible, even on this last point.

2. Assessment of progress in the negotiations

135. Your Rapporteur considers that the Vienna talks are an essential part of East-West relations and should be included in this framework. The *political* aim of these negotiations should be to contribute to a stable relationship and consolidate peace and security in Europe.
136. To attain this aim, the total security of all participants in the Vienna talks must be protected, as is guaranteed by the following basic principles of the NATO position :
- European security can be consolidated only by an approximate balance in the troop levels of each side ;
 - agreements on reductions and levels of forces which exceed the Soviet and American reductions provided for during Stage 1 must be collective. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are responsible for the national breakdown of reduction percentages.
137. Progress with the discussion of figures during the fourteenth round of negotiations in Vienna has not yet clarified the reasons for the difference between western and eastern figures for eastern troop levels in the reduction area.

However, considerable additional data now available will facilitate a more concrete and appropriate study of this matter. It is essential to solve the dispute over troop levels and agree on data in order to conclude an agreement on limitations and reductions. Your Rapporteur considers that the question of figures should be elucidated so that mistrust does not hold up the negotiations.

138. It is the quantitative assessment of approximate parity which gives the discussion of figures a political dimension.

139. In its reply of 8th June 1978, the Warsaw Pact accepted the principle of conventional parity for the MBFR reduction area. This formal agreement with the western side will have no practical worth until the question of figures has been solved. Theoretically, asymmetrical reductions in forces exceeding the common collective ceiling nevertheless remain possible. However, the response of the Warsaw Pact is still dependent on the figures it gives for eastern troop levels.

140. The principle of parity was recognised in a joint declaration issued by Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. Brezhnev on 6th May 1978 which states *inter alia* that :

“Both sides deem it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed on the assumption that approximate equality and parity suffice to safeguard defence. They believe that adequate measures of disarmament and arms limitation in the nuclear and the conventional fields, which meet that principle, would be of major significance.”

141. Thus, to the agreed parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in inter-continental strategic nuclear weapons, was added conventional parity in Central Europe, essential for the stabilisation of peace. Whereas there used to be an issue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact about recognition of the principle of conventional parity of ground forces in Central Europe and also about the true level of Warsaw Pact troops, the two parties now agree on the principle of parity.

142. This trend makes a major contribution to the policy of arms control and disarmament, particularly as there has been a long struggle against the East's maxim, described *inter alia* by General Hoffmann, Defence Minister of the German Democratic Republic, as follows :

“The political content of the combat-readiness of our land, sea and air forces and of our frontier troops is to contribute to the all-round superiority of the community of socialist states, thus compelling

the enemy to make further concessions with a view to establishing peace in Europe."

143. An explanation must now be given for the differences in numerical levels. NATO and the Warsaw Pact declare they are in favour of parity. The West considers that the Warsaw Pact may not be using the same criteria for their calculations as NATO.

144. In future, the threat will lie increasingly clearly in the sphere of weapons systems. In this connection, Chancellor Schmidt very rightly stated :

"First there is the discussion on data which I consider has been going on for too long. Nevertheless, it has helped to bring both sides to the point where they are beginning to accept the idea of balance and speak of parity. The new western proposals are realistic and seek to leave behind the discussion on figures and give a new turn to the negotiations. As presented by us, these proposals will not be accepted by all participants, but they will provoke concrete reactions. This will make it possible to go beyond the stage of simply interpreting statistics and of all-or-nothing proposals which have no chance of success. An agreement on the true number of troops and tanks included in the reduction area defined for each side seems possible only if we insist on absolute accuracy."

145. Numerical differences might be explained by differences in the definition of armed forces, the division of tasks between military and civilian forces and the rate of recruitment of regular army formations and the resulting fluctuations.

146. Discussion of data affords an opportunity to reach agreement on figures which correspond to the balance of forces and troop levels, are recognised by both sides and allow mutual and balanced reductions to be made. If both parties continue to study all these questions now that they are drawing fundamentally closer together in Vienna, and if they are prepared to accept a compromise wherever possible, a rapprochement may be hoped for.

147. In any event, the figures put forward by the two sides will have to be revised when reductions are started. This raises a problem insofar as it will be difficult to insist on western figures for the East in the face of the East's assertions. Moreover, neither side will allow the other to make enquiries anywhere or at any time in its military headquarters without warning.

148. The second problem, of major political importance, concerns the principle of collectivity. The NATO countries will sign no agreement or

contract which allows the Warsaw Pact to oppose the process of Western European unification.

149. According to NATO, the reduction percentages adopted jointly must be shared between the various states by decisions taken within the alliances. The Warsaw Pact would like a national breakdown. This course must not be embarked on if it implies that decisions taken by the Alliance depend on the agreement of the eastern partner. The latter would then at the same time have access to the strongest ground force in Western Europe, i.e. the Bundeswehr. Some assert that this is the true aim pursued by the Soviet Union in Vienna.

150. The proposal made by the Warsaw Pact on 8th June 1978 contains elements which will have to be studied in future negotiations to ascertain whether worthwhile concessions are made on the question of collectivity.

151. NATO and the Warsaw Pact already agreed in preliminary talks in spring 1973 to negotiate reductions in troops and weapons and associated measures. Here, the follow-up embodied in the East's reply of 16th December 1975 to the proposal in NATO's Option III is worthy of special attention. This means that all parties to the negotiations are prepared to reduce troop levels and make a balanced reduction in specific weapons. In its reply of 8th June 1978, the Warsaw Pact accepted the mixed package concept set out in the NATO proposal of 16th December 1975 (Option III) as a procedure which might be used for the balanced reduction of weapons applied to all parties to the negotiations.

152. It must be specified however that so far the Warsaw Pact is still not prepared to make the reductions in conventional forces called for by NATO in return for a reduction in nuclear means as set out in Option III. If the Warsaw Pact fails to change its position, NATO may be compelled to modify its offer.

153. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact should respect the provisions of the agreement of June 1973 and participate unreservedly in the preparation of associated measures in the MBFR framework as well as appropriate reciprocal measures designed to guarantee respect of the agreements concluded.

3. Prospects

154. Henceforth, the primary task will be to sound out the area of negotiations with scrupulous respect for the principal bases, i.e. parity and collectivity, and to define possibilities for compromise through political decisions.

155. In the current seventeenth round of negotiations, apart from continuing the discussion on numerical data, it must be ascertained whether the Warsaw Pact is prepared to modify its offer

of 1,000 battle tanks and 250 armoured vehicles by raising it to 1,700 tanks as NATO requires. A mixed package on this scale — withdrawal of 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads, 54 Phantom aircraft with a nuclear capability and 36 medium-range Pershing missiles as well as 29,000 American troops in exchange for 1,700 Soviet battle tanks and 68,000 troops — is, together with acceptance of the concept of the second stage and the principles of parity and collectivity, one of the requirements expressed by NATO in its proposal of 16th December 1975 (Option III).

156. In the MBFR discussions and negotiations, another matter now requires greater attention both in the Atlantic Alliance and in Vienna: i.e. the concrete preparation of the associated measures decided on in June 1973 and reciprocal measures for safeguarding and respecting agreements in force. The question is whether all the participants in the Vienna negotiations can strengthen the subsequent application of confidence-building measures mentioned in the Helsinki final act and conclude a new compulsory agreement on specific measures adapted to the reduction area, including:

- military confidence-building measures adopted in the CSCE final act: prior notification of large-scale military manoeuvres, invitation of observers to attend military manoeuvres;
- prior notification of large-scale military movements: going into the MBFR reduction area, leaving the area, and inside the area.

157. The MBFR talks, which have now been in progress for five years, have made it clear to the Warsaw Pact that the members of NATO will not accept agreements which make the Federal Republic of Germany a special area. It is also evident that for the interpretation of a treaty the Federal Republic would not face the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union alone. The Vienna nego-

tiations are pursued collectively and agreement on MBFR is worked out collectively. Consequently, NATO will interpret such agreements jointly and reply jointly to any criticism.

158. A first agreement will be more to strengthen political confidence than to change fundamentally the military situation in Central Europe. However, it must not be forgotten that it will serve as a model for future agreements. From the outset, therefore, the first agreement must include elements which will be important for the effectiveness of future agreements, including the content and further pursuit of reductions, confidence-building measures and the satisfactory verification of agreements in force.

159. The foreign policy matters between NATO and the Warsaw Pact have become difficult. If this trend continues, it may in the very near future produce an international atmosphere in which the arms race might be resumed. On the one hand, countries might feel that this would strengthen their security but on the other hand the introduction of new weapons systems might lead to political developments which would be difficult to control.

160. In the MBFR negotiations, the NATO countries abided by the Alliance approach of military security and détente in working out a constructive policy. A policy based on military security and détente aiming at overall balance should prevent a worsening of the arms race which would threaten all the states concerned. Without reliable military backing, any policy of détente would be irresponsible and a danger to security.

161. Foreign policy, directed towards détente, must continue to be covered by defence policy. To meet the Soviet armaments effort which, in the view of many observers, exceeds the level necessary for defence purposes alone, the heads of state or government of the NATO countries have adopted a long-term defence programme allowing NATO to maintain its defence capability during the eighties.

APPENDIX I

Strategic indicators as seen from Moscow

	GNP \$ bn.	Defence budget \$ bn.	Popula- tion m.	Active armed forces thousand	Tanks	Total combat aircraft	Major surface combat ships	Sub- marines (other than strategic ballistic missile)
1. NATO countries								
United States	1,890.0	115.20	218.63	2,068.8	11,000	4,900	172	75
Canada	197.9	3.64	23.70	80.0	32	214	23	3
Total WEU	1,520.7	58.94	255.28	1,865.4	10,083	2,320	198	81
Rest of NATO	169.3	6.33	69.66	811.6	4,817	864	53	42
<i>Total NATO</i>	3,777.9	184.11	567.27	4,825.8	25,932	8,298	446	201
2. Neighbouring potential adversaries								
Yugoslavia	37.8	2.36	21.95	267.0	2,150	329	4	5
Iran	72.6	9.94	36.37	413.0	1,620	459	11	—
Afghanistan	2.3	0.06	20.47	110.0	740	144	—	—
Pakistan	17.6	0.94	76.78	429.0	1,065	257	8	4
China	350.0	35.00	975.00	4,325.0	10,000	5,000	23	75
Japan	677.0	8.57	115.12	240.0	790	358	58	14
<i>Total neighbouring potential adversaries</i>	1,157.3	56.87	1,245.69	5,784.0	16,365	6,547	104	98
3. Total NATO and neighbouring potential adversaries								
	4,935.2	240.98	1,812.96	10,609.8	42,297	14,845	550	299
4. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries								
Bulgaria	18.6	0.43	8.85	150.0	1,925	263	5	4
Czechoslovakia	49.6	1.82	15.07	186.0	3,400	613	—	—
German Democratic Republic	54.6	3.15	16.83	157.0	2,500	362	19	—
Hungary	25.2	0.66	10.67	114.0	1,100	180	—	—
Poland	86.1	2.55	34.95	306.5	4,100	725	14	4
Romania	51.4	0.92	21.67	180.5	1,700	437	6	—
<i>Total non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries</i>	285.5	9.53	108.04	1,094.0	14,725	2,580	44	8
5. Soviet Union								
	1,083.0	130.00	261.31	3,638.0	50,000	8,896	243	243
6. Total Warsaw Pact countries								
	1,368.5	139.53	369.35	4,732.0	64,725	11,476	287	251

Ratio 6 : 3

1 : 3.6

1 : 1.7

1 : 4.9

1 : 2.2

1 : 0.7

1 : 1.3

1 : 1.9

1 : 1.2

Ratio 5 : 3

1 : 4.6

1 : 1.9

1 : 6.9

1 : 2.9

1 : 0.8

1 : 1.7

1 : 2.3

1 : 1.2

Notes: The table takes no account of countries close to Soviet territory — Finland, Sweden, Austria — although there are presumably Soviet military contingency plans for possible opposed operations in these countries; it takes no account either of countries more distant from Soviet territory with which the United States has bi- or multi-lateral defence treaties (Spain, 1976; Australia and New Zealand, 1951; Organisation of American States 1948) although the Soviet General Staff presumably take account of the armed forces of these countries when considering the capability of Soviet forces for "projecting Soviet power".

Source: ISS Military Balance 1978-79. Figures are the most recent there given (1978 or 1977). Soviet GNP in dollars estimated on assumption defence budget is 12 % of GNP.

FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices					Defence expenditure (US \$ million) ^a					GDP in purchasers' values (US \$ million) ^a					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values ^a					Defence expenditure per head (US \$) ^a					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^f	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^f	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^e	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^e	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^{ef}	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^{ef}	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978 ^f
		(- 5)	(- 4)	(- 3)	(- 2)	(- 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million Frs.	57,395	69,936	81,444	89,480	99,008	1,474	1,902	2,110	2,497	3,152	53,709	62,686	67,912	79,205	96,805	9,772	9,801	9,818	9,830	9,857	2.7	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	151	194	215	254	320	3.54	3.86	4.28	4.49	4.65
France	Million Frs.	47,878	55,873	63,899	73,530	83,414	9,944	13,035	13,369	14,965	18,484	265,507	338,510	349,254	380,659	468,501	52,460	52,700	52,891	53,084	53,278	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.9	190	247	253	282	347	23.87	26.43	27.10	26.91	27.29
Federal Republic of Germany	Million DM	35,644	37,589	38,922	40,184	42,588	13,775	15,267	15,456	17,307	21,203	381,499	419,494	444,552	514,045	636,623	60,020	59,825	59,564	59,462	59,147	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.3	230	255	259	291	358	33.06	30.95	31.34	31.12	31.30
Italy	Million Lire	2,852	3,104	3,608	4,533	5,223	4,391	4,756	4,335	5,137	6,154	156,605	176,270	172,836	196,045	235,980	55,413	55,812	56,156	56,446	56,697	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.6	79	85	77	91	109	10.54	9.64	8.79	9.24	9.09
Luxembourg	Million Frs.	710	836	983	1,029	1,160	18	23	26	29	37	2,347	2,297	2,399	2,778	3,467	357	359	356	355	354	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	51	64	73	82	105	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	6,254	7,246	7,817	9,260	9,367	2,324	2,865	2,957	3,773	4,330	70,718	82,909	90,012	106,394	130,273	13,545	13,654	13,770	13,853	13,937	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.3	172	210	215	272	311	5.58	5.81	5.99	6.78	6.39
United Kingdom	Million £	4,160	5,165	6,132	6,822	7,492	3,736	11,476	11,075	11,907	14,381	191,930	228,096	220,831	244,502	308,855	56,011	55,981	55,959	55,919	55,941	5.1	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.7	174	205	198	213	257	23.37	23.28	22.45	21.41	21.23
TOTAL WEU							41,662	49,324	49,328	55,615	67,741	1,122,315	1,310,262	1,347,796	1,523,628	1,880,504	247,578	248,132	248,514	248,949	249,211	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.6	168	199	198	223	272	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million \$	2,862	3,127	3,589	4,124	4,597	2,926	3,075	3,640	3,878	4,030	152,237	164,019	196,141	200,253	206,270	22,395	22,727	23,025	23,280	23,499	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	131	135	158	167	171	7.02	6.23	7.38	6.97	5.95
Denmark	Million Kr.	4,439	5,281	5,680	6,343	7,135	728	918	940	1,056	1,294	31,826	37,508	41,188	46,016	54,897	5,045	5,060	5,073	5,089	5,105	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	144	181	185	208	253	1.75	1.86	1.91	1.90	1.91
Greece	Million Drachmas	24,126	43,917	804	1,363	18,807	20,854	22,512	26,207	31,480	8,962	9,046	9,167	9,268	9,334	4.3	6.5	90	151	1.93	2.76
Norway	Million Kr.	3,938	4,771	5,333	5,934	6,756	713	910	977	1,115	1,289	23,488	28,362	31,049	35,592	40,123	3,985	4,007	4,026	4,043	4,060	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	179	227	243	276	317	1.71	1.84	1.98	2.00	1.90
Portugal	Million Escudos	25,108	19,898	18,845	22,082	26,111	985	780	624	577	594	13,271	14,754	15,375	16,302	18,058	9,218	9,633	9,694	9,773	9,858	7.4	5.3	4.1	3.5	3.3	107	81	64	59	60	2.36	1.58	1.27	1.04	0.88
Turkey	Million L.	15,831	1,140	29,496	36,008	41,051	47,445	46,344	39,036	39,927	40,888	41,820	42,757	3.9	29	2.74
United States	Million \$	85,906	90,948	91,013	100,928	105,135	85,906	90,948	91,013	100,928	105,135	1,406,777	1,526,508	1,694,968	1,878,835	2,095,465	211,901	213,559	215,142	216,817	218,502	6.1	6.0	5.4	5.4	5.0	405	426	423	465	481	206.20	184.39	184.51	181.48	155.20
TOTAL NON-WEU ^b							91,258	96,631	97,194	107,554	112,342	1,627,599	1,771,151	1,978,721	2,176,998	2,414,813	252,544	254,986	256,960	259,002	261,024	5.6	5.5	4.9	4.9	4.7	361	379	378	415	430
TOTAL NATO ^b							132,920	145,955	146,522	163,169	180,083	2,749,914	3,081,413	3,326,517	3,700,626	4,295,317	500,122	503,118	505,474	507,951	510,235	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.4	4.2	266	290	290	321	353

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

Prior to 1977 tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower than the percentages of GNP previously published.

For the period 1974-78, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$	Country	Unit	US \$ per unit	Units per US \$
<i>Belgium & Luxembourg</i>	Franc			<i>Italy</i>	1,000 Lire		
— 1974		0.02567	38.95	— 1974		1.53952	0.64955
— 1975		0.02719	36.78	— 1975		1.53183	0.65282
— 1976		0.02590	38.60	— 1976		1.20151	0.83229
— 1977		0.02790	35.84	— 1977		1.13329	0.88239
— 1978		0.03184	31.41	— 1978		1.17832	0.84866
<i>Canada</i>	Canadian Dollar			<i>Netherlands</i>	Guilder		
— 1974		1.02248	0.97802	— 1974		0.37163	2.69
— 1975		0.98313	1.01716	— 1975		0.39539	2.53
— 1976		1.01416	0.98604	— 1976		0.37822	2.64
— 1977		0.94034	1.06345	— 1977		0.40745	2.45
— 1978		0.87664	1.14073	— 1978		0.46224	2.16
<i>Denmark</i>	D. Kroner			<i>Norway</i>	N. Kroner		
— 1974		0.16408	6.0947	— 1974		0.18106	5.52
— 1975		0.17392	5.7499	— 1975		0.19073	5.24
— 1976		0.16543	6.0450	— 1976		0.18327	5.46
— 1977		0.16658	6.0032	— 1977		0.18785	5.32
— 1978		0.18134	5.5146	— 1978		0.19076	5.24
<i>France</i>	Franc			<i>Portugal</i>	Escudo		
— 1974		0.20770	4.815	— 1974, 1975		0.03922	25.50
— 1975		0.23331	4.286	— 1976		0.03309	30.22
— 1976		0.20922	4.780	— 1977		0.02613	38.28
— 1977		0.20352	4.913	— 1978		0.02276	43.94
— 1978		0.22159	4.513	<i>Turkey</i>	T. Lira		
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany</i>	Deutschmark			— 1974		0.07199	13.89
— 1974		0.38647	2.59	— 1975		0.06936	14.42
— 1975		0.40616	2.46	— 1976		0.06229	16.05
— 1976		0.39714	2.52	— 1977		0.05555	18.00
— 1977		0.43070	2.32	— 1978		0.04118	24.28
— 1978		0.49785	2.01	<i>United Kingdom</i>	£		
<i>Greece</i>	Drachma			— 1974		2.3401	0.427
— 1974		0.03333	30.00	— 1975		2.2219	0.450
— 1975		0.03103	32.23	— 1976		1.8062	0.554
— 1976		0.02734	36.58	— 1977		1.7455	0.573
— 1977		0.02714	36.84	— 1978		1.9195	0.521
— 1978		0.02729	36.65				

Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not available for the most recent years; for purposes of comparison all data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO.

^e = Preliminary estimate.

^f = Forecast.

GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(78)20.

APPENDIX III

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7. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 30th May 1977 : Interview in United States News and World Report.
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10. Carter, President J., 12th May 1977 : Press conference, Washington.
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12. Carter, President J., 22nd May 1977 : Speech at Notre Dame University, South Bend (Indiana).
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6. 1975-76 white paper on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the federal armed forces, Bonn 1976.

France

1. Extracts from government directives, the draft 1972 budget and the 1976 programme law on :
 - the essential tasks of the armed forces ;
 - the rôle of nuclear forces ;
 - the rôle of ground forces.
2. Barre, Raymond, Prime Minister, 21st June 1977 : Quoted by J. Isnard in *Le Monde* on French nuclear forces.

3. Bourges, Yvon, Minister of Defence, 20th May 1976 : Speech in the National Assembly debate on the level and development of French armed forces.
4. Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, President of the Republic :
 - 24th October 1974 : Press conference on the rôle of the armed forces and strategic nuclear weapons ;
 - 12th November 1975 : Televised interview on military concept (basis, objective, threat).
5. Harmel, Dieter, November 1977 : *La force nucléaire française, Truppenpraxis*.
6. Isnard, Jacques, journalist and defence expert of *Le Monde*, 13th July 1977 : *La lente évolution de la doctrine officielle*.
7. *Informations de politique de défense*, 14th July 1977 : *Le désarroi de la politique de défense française*.

United Kingdom

1. Mulley, F., Secretary of State for Defence, 16th November 1977 : Speech to the Royal United Services Institute.
2. Mulley, F., Secretary of State for Defence, 17th October 1977 : Speech to the Foreign Press Association, New York.
3. Statement on the defence estimates, 1977 (white paper).

Italy

1. 1977 draft defence budget : Italy's security and the problems of the Italian armed forces, Rome 1977.

Netherlands

1. Memorandum on disarmament and security submitted to the Second Chamber of the States-General by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Kooijmans, Secretary of State.
2. Our very existence at stake — the defence policy in the years 1974-83, The Hague, 1974 (white paper).

NATO and miscellaneous

1. Atlantic News, 10th June 1977 (Brussels information service).
2. Haig, General Alexander M., SACEUR : Statement to the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 1st March 1977.
3. Haig, General Alexander M., SACEUR : Speech in the WEU Assembly.
4. Hörhager, Dr. Axel, April 1976 : *Die MBFF Gespräche — Probleme und Aussichten, Internationale Wehr-Revue*, No. 2.
5. Final communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 8th and 9th December 1977, Brussels.
6. The Military Balance, IISS, London.

(b) List of Warsaw Pact personalities

- | | |
|------------------------|--|
| 1. Grechko, Andrei A. | Marshal of the Soviet Union
Minister of Defence until 1976 |
| 2. Ustinov, Dmitri | Marshal of the Soviet Union
Minister of Defence since 1976 |
| 3. Ogarkov, N. V. | Marshal of the Soviet Union
Soviet Chief-of-Staff since 1976 |
| 4. Yepishev, A. | Army General, Head of the Political Bureau of the Soviet armed forces |
| 5. Kulikov, Viktor | Marshal of the Soviet Union
Soviet Chief-of-Staff until 1976
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact armed forces since 1976 |
| 6. Yakubovsky, Ivan I. | Marshal of the Soviet Union
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact armed forces until 1976 |
| 7. Tchemenko, Sergei | Army General
Chief-of-Staff of Warsaw Pact forces until 1976 |

8. Gorshkov, Sergei
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet fleet
9. Shavrov, I.
Army General
Head of the Soviet staff college
10. Mant, M.
Colonel, Soviet forces
11. Peredelsky, G.
Marshal of Artillery
Commandant, missiles and artillery, Soviet ground forces
12. Kondratkov, T.
Colonel
Expert in war plans at the Lenin Political Academy of the Soviet forces
13. Honnecker, Erich
Secretary-General of the SED
President of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic
14. Hoffmann, Heinz
Army General
Ministry of Defence of the German Democratic Republic
15. Kessler, Heinz
Colonel-General
Chief-of-Staff of the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic
16. Verner, Waldemar
Admiral
Head of the Political Bureau of the armed forces of the German Democratic Republic
17. Hoch, Peter
Military History Institute of the German Democratic Republic
18. Wilhelm, F.
On the staff of the revue *Militärwesen* in the German Democratic Republic
19. Franke, Klaus
On the staff of the revue *Militärwesen* in the German Democratic Republic
20. Fiedler, H.
Colonel
Expert in military economy at the Friedrich Engels military academy of the German Democratic Republic, Dresden
21. Weber, W.
No rank
On the staff of the revue *Militärwesen* in the German Democratic Republic
22. Siwicki, Florian
Major-General
Chief-of-Staff of the Polish people's army
23. Chocha, Boleslaw
Major-General
Head of the staff college of the Polish people's army
24. Molczyk, E.
Major-General
Head of the Training Section of the Polish people's army
25. Wojcik, Edward
No rank
Polish army
26. Brezhnev, Leonid
Secretary-General of the Soviet Socialist Party and Chairman of the Praesidium of the Soviet Union
27. Dabrowa, S.
Head of the Polish Delegation to the MBFR negotiations

The balance of force

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6¹

tabled by Mr. Baumel

1. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :
“Noting the East-West economic and military balance, but concerned by the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in several fields on the central front and by the Soviet military doctrine of ‘daring thrusts’ against NATO forces which can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;”.
2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble, leave out “approximate”; after “in the area” insert “and throughout the continent”.
3. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “Urge member governments :” and accordingly leave out “to” in lines one and two of paragraph 1.
4. At the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “Urge member governments”; leave out “allied” and insert “their”.
5. At the beginning of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “Follow efforts by member governments of the NATO integrated organisation”.
6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows :
“4. Examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent.”

Signed : Baumel

1. See 4th Sitting, 19th June 1979, and 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 negatived; Amendment 6 agreed to).

Study on collective logistical support

DRAFT ORDER ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
by Mr. Roper, Chairman***

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DRAFT ORDER

on a study on collective logistical support

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

Draft Order
on a study on collective logistical support

The Assembly,

Recalling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ;

Noting the wide attention attracted by the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front and the valuable contribution it made to allied defence planning ;

Aware of the need to study fully means of rationalising logistical support for forces of the Alliance, especially on the central front,

1. INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on collective logistical support proposed in Document 810 to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;
2. DECIDES that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman)

I. Background

1. The Committee in implementation of an earlier Order of the Assembly (No. 36) established a sub-committee which held extensive hearings and discussions throughout 1971,

“to examine the possibility of organising a conference on the rationalisation of the defence efforts of the European countries, members of the Alliance.”

This proposal had arisen from observations in an earlier report of the Committee¹ which are relevant here :

“41. A detached observer of the European defence scene, his mind uncluttered with the preconceptions that have accumulated over the years, might well conclude that the present manner in which the not negligible contributions of the European countries in cash and manpower are translated into fighting units on the ground are about the least rational and least efficient that could be devised. After all, the whole of the defence effort of most European NATO countries is concerned solely with providing defence in the NATO framework. Of the total of the defence budgets of all European NATO countries, probably more than 90 % is spent on NATO related defence. Yet twelve sovereign defence ministries are maintained, many with three often autonomous armed services within them. The largest European defence budget is ten times that of the smallest.

.....

43. (iii) *Rational deployment and logistical support*

... A more intensive effort can however be made to provide an integrated logistical organisation, at least for the WEU forces in Northern Army Group, instead of leaving logistical responsibility in national hands. The Committee knows from practical experience that incompatibility of nationally-supplied equipment has prevented NATO forces from operating as effectively together as they should. The multiplicity of makes and models creates a logistician's nightmare. Such relatively simple things as non-standard couplings can adversely affect the ability of ships and aircraft alike to operate effectively when away from home stations. Even with

the best of intentions, such matters as configuration control and quality assurance can be so differently treated among two or more nations which are co-operating to produce spares for standardised equipment as to render 'identical' spares non-interchangeable. To solve problems of logistical support, managerial techniques must be devised to cope with them on a NATO-wide basis. Efforts to mount even an exploratory effort in this direction have consistently run foul of the shibboleth that logistics is a national responsibility.”

2. At the conclusion of the 1971 hearings the Committee finally recommended¹ that five preliminary studies be undertaken prior to any decision on the convening of a conference :

- (i) (a) a rational distribution of defence tasks between countries ; and
- (b) a rational deployment of forces on the central front ;
- (ii) (a) a concerted long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement ; and
- (b) collective logistical support ;
- (iii) a comparative study of the structure of national defence organisations.

3. The Assembly endorsed this proposal in Order 40² and Resolution 50³ adopted on 1st December 1971, and in implementation of Order 40 the Presidential Committee approved a supplementary budget based on the financial proposals in Document 559, to provide for the studies envisaged. The Council however declined to make this finance available, although it stated that it shared the Assembly's aims.

II. Partial implementation of Order 40 — Study on rational deployment on the central front

4. The five proposed studies remained in abeyance through lack of funds until the spring of 1973 when the Committee in another context⁴ proposed that the report on rational deployment

1. European security and arms control, Document 527, 3rd November 1970, Rapporteur : Mr. van der Stoel.

1. A conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts, Document 559, 16th November 1971, Rapporteur : Mr. Rivière.

2. Text at Appendix I.

3. Text at Appendix II.

4. European security and relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, Document 604, 3rd May 1973, Rapporteur : Mr. Critchley.

of forces on the central front should be initiated urgently. On the report of the Committee, the Assembly, on 21st June 1973, adopted Order 43, instructing the Committee "to arrange for the study of the rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith... and to be printed and published on completion" and deciding "that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly".

5. In implementation of Order 43 General Ulrich de Maizière, former *Inspekteur der Bundeswehr*, was appointed as the expert to undertake the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, and the Committee appointed one of its members, Mr. Dankert, to be associated with General de Maizière in the study. Mr. Dankert and General de Maizière, in the course of 1974, visited the capitals of countries maintaining forces on the central front, and the various NATO headquarters concerned, for discussions with Ministers, senior officials and officers concerning the subject of the study. A first, classified, draft of General de Maizière's study was communicated to the Ministers of Defence of the countries maintaining forces on the central front.

6. The final text of the study was amplified in some particulars to take account of suggestions made by Mr. Dankert as the Committee's representative, then, after submission for declassifying to the authorities who supplied information for the first draft, it was published as an unclassified document¹ with a preface by Mr. Dankert which, after explaining the procedure leading up to the study, made its status clear :

"10. The following study is the responsibility of General de Maizière, although in accordance with the procedure envisaged by the Assembly in adopting Order 43 I have been associated with him chiefly in the fact-finding interviews which we undertook together. It was always the Committee's intention, however, in proposing the five studies in the first place, that the essential drafting should be entrusted to an expert, who would be free to express his own views. This General de Maizière has done, and the study has not been submitted to the Committee prior to publication.

11. I myself do not entirely share all the views expressed in General de Maizière's

study. As Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I am responsible for a chapter on the same subject in the Committee's forthcoming report on the state of European security to which reference should be made for a statement of the Committee's views. I do, however, commend the whole study by General de Maizière as a most authoritative basis for discussion of a subject of great urgency."

The preface concluded with an expression of the Committee's thanks to General de Maizière.

7. Not long after the publication of the study plans were announced for the deployment of certain United States forces in the Northern Army Group area, very much as the Committee had envisaged.

III. Procedure for a study on collective logistical support

8. If the Assembly adopts the draft order, the Committee would appoint one of its members to be associated with the expert chosen to undertake the study. Subject to the financial provisions described below, the study would be carried out in accordance with the now tried procedure used for the study on rational deployment of forces on the central front, described above.

The Presidential Committee, on the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, would appoint a recognised expert in the field of logistics to undertake the study, which it is intended would be some 20,000 to 50,000 words in length. The terms of reference proposed by the Committee are at Appendix IV.

IV. Finance

9. As it is thought unlikely that the Council will modify its original refusal to approve a supplementary budget for a study¹, the Committee intends that the study now proposed be financed from the ordinary budget of the Assembly, as was the study on rational deployment of forces on the central front, on conditions to be approved by the Presidential Committee².

1. Rational deployment of forces on the central front, study by General de Maizière (Rtd.) arranged by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in implementation of Order 43, Document 663, 2nd April 1975.

1. Paragraph 3 above.

2. Cost estimates at Appendix III.

APPENDIX I

ORDER 40¹*on a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts*²

The Assembly,

1. Instructs its Presidential Committee to take a decision on a draft supplementary budget for preparatory work on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts and transmit it to the Council for approval ;

2. Instructs its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments :

(a) To organise the preparatory studies on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts proposed in Document 559 once the Council has approved the corresponding supplementary budget ;

(b) To report further if in the light of progress on the preparatory studies the Committee deems it desirable to organise a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1971 during the Second Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Rivière on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 559).

APPENDIX II

RESOLUTION 50¹

on a conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts²

The Assembly,

Recalling its Orders 36, 38 and 40,

APPROVES the proposals for preparatory studies and a possible conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts put forward in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 559).

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1971 during the Second Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Rivière on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 559).

APPENDIX III

A. Cost estimate for a study on collective logistical support based on the original estimate for the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front

(adjusted to December 1978 prices)

	F. frs.
1. Travel, translation, secretarial work and expert's fee	251,000
2. Printing	9,000
Total	<u>260,000</u>

This sum is 3.05 % of the total 1979 Assembly budget approved by the Council, or would be 1.5 % of the annual budgets if expenditure straddled two financial years.

B. Cost estimate for a study on collective logistical support based on actual costs incurred for the study on rational deployment of forces on the central front (Document 663)

(converted from 1974 and 1975 prices to December 1978 prices)

	F. frs.
Travel and expert's fee : not more than	87,830
Printing : 59 pages + 3 maps in colour	54,600
Total	<u>142,430</u>

This sum is 1.67 % of the total 1979 Assembly budget approved by the Council, or would be little more than 0.8 % of the annual budgets if expenditure straddled two financial years.

Note : In converting to December 1978 prices on the basis of the consumer price index in France, 1973 prices have been multiplied by 1.73, 1974 prices by 1.52, 1975 prices by 1.37.

APPENDIX IV

Terms of reference for a study on collective logistical support

(adapted from Appendix III to Document 559)

The study should first define "logistics" for its own purposes, in the light of the extensive literature on the subject and the varied uses of the term. A particular definition should be adopted for the main body of the study to deal with the problems of Allied Forces Central Europe, which in any case would exclude the broader procurement functions¹.

The study would describe the present situation concerning forces assigned to NATO, where logistics remains essentially a national responsibility with the NATO headquarters exercising certain planning and advisory functions. The study should concentrate on the situation in Allied Forces Central Europe because purely national logistics systems are least adapted to the theoretical optimum on this front where so many different national forces are deployed. Under present circumstances it might be profitable to concentrate in particular on Northern Army

Group, but account should be taken of any proposals for radical redeployment¹. The study should examine the functions of existing NATO agencies, such as MAS; NAMSA; Hawk; NADGE, etc.

The study should formulate proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the logistics system, whether through the harmonisation of national logistics systems or improved co-operation between them. It should examine the extent to which a multinational system for collective logistical support could be compatible with national responsibilities.

The possible enlargement of the scope and responsibility of existing NATO agencies may be suggested, or the creation of new agencies with specific logistic functions. An attempt should be made to assess any cost savings and/or increased military efficiency which might be expected to result from the proposals.

1. Which functions the Committee in Document 559 envisaged would be dealt with in a separate study on standardised armaments procurement.

1. Such as the present deployment of certain United States forces in the Northern Army Group area.

Study on collective logistical support

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Valleix

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft order proper and insert :

“INSTRUCTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for a study on collective logistical support by member countries for integrated military structures and on that of the French forces, as proposed in Document 810, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with the terms of reference and procedure set forth in that document, and to be printed and published on completion ;”.

Signed : Valleix

1. See 5th Sitting, 20th June 1979 (Amendment negatived).

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 322 to 328

RECOMMENDATION 322¹
*on Europe's external relations*²

The Assembly,

Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved ;

Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states ;

Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples ;

Considering that the security of Europe, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance ;

Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts ;

Considering further that an arms race between East and West cannot increase our security, but only precipitate new dangers ;

Convinced that the continuation and extension of détente with the objective of arms control and balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security ;

Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should be continued on a stable basis ;

Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as possible the gap between North and South ;

Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the interest of industrial and developing nations alike ;

Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability ;

Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western Europe ;

Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western democracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields ;

Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively exercised through other international organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited ;
2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations on the controlled reduction of armaments ;
3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue ;
4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports, recognising that any effective agreement on arms transfers will require the participation of both supplier and recipient countries ;
5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the European Community and their share in the process of European integration.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (8th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Gessner on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 790).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 322

1. The Council wish to point out that they have always sought to perform fully the task assigned to them under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Determined to maintain this approach, they will continue to use the powers granted to them under the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. Similarly, in addition to the discussions held on the subject in the framework of European political co-operation and in the North Atlantic Alliance, the Council will continue to devote special attention to the various aspects of East-West relations. They are aware of the importance attached to the continuation of a realistic policy of détente and to progress in the field of arms control and disarmament within the context of the collective security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance.

3. The Council fully recognise the importance of progress in the North-South dialogue and the benefits which this would produce for world security. They therefore strongly support all work designed to advance the dialogue and improve the economic position of third world countries.

4. Member governments are aware that the growth rates in the acquisition of arms reached by third world countries in recent years are cause for serious reflection. As the Council recalled in their reply to point 3 of Recommendation 318, the final document of the United Nations special session calls for consultations between major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons. They added, however, that it must be borne in mind that all states have an inalienable right to security and that there can be no question of imposing limitations on buyers in an authoritarian manner. The Council continue to believe that a possible solution might be to approach the problem on a regional basis through regional restraints in the form of agreements or understandings among recipients, with which suppliers should be associated. In this connection, member governments welcome the efforts undertaken by a group of Latin American and Caribbean countries in Mexico City in August 1978.

5. The Council welcome the forthcoming enlargement of the European Community to include Greece, Portugal and Spain, as an important contribution towards ensuring a lasting stabilisation of their democracies and hence towards strengthening and safeguarding the free part of Europe as a whole. By uniting the majority of European democracies the enlargement can thus be seen as a mark of success of European integration policy.

In the negotiations with Greece a decisive breakthrough was achieved on the substantive issues at the end of last year. The talks on Portugal's entry opened on 17th October 1978. On 19th December 1978, the Council of the European Communities decided that negotiations on Spain's accession would be started at an early date. The official opening meeting was held on 5th February 1979.

In the field of political co-operation there have been intensified contacts, in view of the forthcoming European Communities enlargement, between the nine European Community countries and the countries seeking entry, i.e. Greece, Portugal and Spain so as to familiarise these countries with the joint positions adopted by the Nine on foreign policy issues.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 323¹**on disarmament²**

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that world expenditure on armaments has now reached \$400 billion per annum and that some of the poorest countries are devoting more than half of their public expenditure to defence ;
- (ii) Noting that, apart from the biological warfare convention of 1972, no arms control agreement since the war has yet achieved any measure of disarmament ;
- (iii) Believing that new impetus must be given to negotiating certain urgent and concrete measures of arms control and disarmament but that the ultimate objective must remain general and complete disarmament under effective international control ;
- (iv) Welcoming the conclusions of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly to the extent that it has focused world opinion on the urgency and importance of arms control measures, and transformed the Committee on Disarmament into a more effective negotiating forum ;
- (v) Recalling its proposals of 1972 and 1974 for a United Nations satellite observation capability ;
- (vi) Recalling further the expertise acquired by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments and urging that it be placed at the disposal of any international disarmament organisation ;
- (vii) Recalling the annual publications of the League of Nations : "Armaments Year Book" and "Statistical Year Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition" ;
- (viii) Recalling the work under the diplomatic conference of 1975-77 of the ad hoc committee on inhumane weapons and the associated conferences of government experts ;
- (ix) Accepting the responsibility shared by WEU members with other major arms suppliers to seek agreements to reduce the world trade in armaments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view :

1. To secure universal agreement on a programme of immediate disarmament and arms control measures to be concluded in the next five years, including :
 - (a) a comprehensive test ban ;
 - (b) a chemical weapons treaty ;
 - (c) a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation régime with rigorous safeguards at all stages of civil nuclear fuel cycles, linked with appropriate security assurances to non-nuclear countries ;
 - (d) a substantial reduction to restore the balance of forces and armaments in Europe ;
 - (e) agreements involving both supplier and recipient countries to restrict the international transfer of conventional arms which recognise the special responsibility of the major arms-producing countries to exercise restraint in their arms transfer policy ;
 - (f) the scrupulous and systematic application of measures provided by the CSCE final act to strengthen mutual confidence in the military field ;
 - (g) the extension to other areas of confidence-building measures of the type included in the CSCE final act ;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 788).

- (h) agreements to restrict the development of new generations of inhumane conventional weapons and incendiaries ;
- (i) the creation of denuclearised zones and zones free of military bases in various regions of the world ;

and, concurrently if possible with the first agreement providing for independent verification :

- (j) the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with arms control agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, and responsible *inter alia* for publishing, on the basis of its own sources of information as well as mandatory reports by all countries, annual reports on the forces and armaments of all countries and arms transfers between countries ;

2. To secure the participation of all nuclear weapon powers and previous members in the transformed Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations in that body of agreements on the foregoing items 1 (a), (b), (e), (g) and (h) ;

3. To examine sympathetically the proposals for an all-European conference on disarmament convened with the participation of all signatory states of the CSCE final act with a view to ensuring the progressive achievement of a programme of confidence-building measures and controlled limitation of forces ;

4. To maintain the expectations of progress on concrete measures of disarmament engendered by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, by the convening of a further special disarmament session in 1981 to review progress.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 323

1. The Council take the opportunity of confirming their frequently-repeated undertaking to support all efforts to further progress towards general and complete disarmament under close and effective international control.

In this context and in line with the results of the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member states will continue to work for the definition of a series of priority measures for adoption as a matter of urgency.

However, while this undertaking still holds good, there would seem to be no possibility of setting a precise term for the conclusion of universally acceptable agreements on all the specific points listed by the Assembly, although some are now sufficiently advanced to offer the hope and possibility of achieving this goal in the near future.

Furthermore, disarmament and arms limitation are usually understood to cover agreements aimed at preventing *inter alia* the use or introduction of specific types of weapons when they have been identified in concrete terms. Mention should, therefore, be made of the success not only of the convention on biological weapons but also of other agreements of undoubted significance and value such as the ENMOD (convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques).

(a) (b) Negotiations are now in progress between three nuclear powers for the complete banning of nuclear tests.

As regards the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is hoped that the Committee on Disarmament will in due course produce a draft treaty.

(c) Strong nuclear non-proliferation arrangements are among matters of vital concern to the member countries of WEU. They are one of their primary objectives in the appropriate fora and are no obstacle to international co-operation in the field of peaceful applications of the atom.

(d) No practical opportunity will be neglected by the members of the Alliance participating in the Vienna negotiations on MBFR of strengthening stability in Europe by mutual balanced force reductions to achieve a common collective ceiling.

(e) The problem of limiting transfers of conventional weapons should be dealt with through agreements worked out on a regional basis between purchasers and forming the subject of subsequent consultations with supplying countries; in this connection, mention should be made of the Mexican proposal for an agreement to limit the acquisition of conventional weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

(f) Reinforcement of the confidence-building measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE undoubtedly constitutes a significant factor and its progress should match that of all the measures provided for in the final act of the CSCE.

(g) At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, member countries sponsored a resolution, calling for consideration by all states of arrangements for appropriate confidence-building measures.

(h) The chances of limiting the use of certain conventional weapons are to be assessed by a special United Nations conference which will convene in Geneva in September this year and will take appropriate decisions arrived at by consensus.

(i) The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones would unquestionably make a positive contribution to disarmament and non-proliferation. The Council and member states reiterate their undertaking to support the establishment of such zones, wherever nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain the balance and therefore to guarantee the safety of all states, and provided the countries in the region concerned agree.

(j) Finally, as regards the establishment of an international disarmament agency under United Nations aegis, equipped with its own means of verifying compliance with international arms limitation agreements and peacekeeping arrangements, the Council and member states hope that it will be possible, in the future, to examine the substance of such a proposal, by such means as the United Nations may consider appropriate.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th June 1979.

2. During the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, member states gave proof of their determination to set up a negotiating body in which all nuclear weapon powers and major military powers can take part, taking due account of the need to keep numbers small so that the proceedings do not become unwieldy. To this end, the existing members of the CCD were reappointed in order to ensure the continuity of work already started and the total number of participants was increased to make the negotiating body more representative without loss of efficiency.

In this context, the Council and member states are most anxious that all the states nominated and, in particular, the nuclear weapon powers should take up the seats reserved for them from the outset. As regards the agenda for the Committee there is nothing to prevent the negotiating body from discussing, by consensus and within the terms of its own standing orders, any question submitted to it and in particular those listed by the Assembly.

3. The proposal for a European disarmament conference on conventional weapons with all participants in the CSCE attending is at present the subject of close study and of consultations between member states and all the countries concerned.

4. The member states of WEU will make every effort to ensure that the objectives laid down by the tenth special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly are fulfilled as far as possible before the next special session fixed for 1982 by the thirty-third General Assembly for the purpose of reviewing the progress of work on disarmament, of reporting on its findings and possibly of setting new objectives.

RECOMMENDATION 324¹
on the limitation of strategic arms²

The Assembly,

Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely both on a credible nuclear deterrent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater than the stake represented by the territories defended, and on sufficiently numerous conventional forces ;

Considering that the United States strategic nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the allied deterrent but that the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which they face Soviet planners, make a greater contribution than their size would suggest ;

Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 assigns to the British and French strategic nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own ;

Deploing the inadequacy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-West relations ;

Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategic arms race ;

Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Work together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking account of the results of the strategic arms limitation talks ;
2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly participating in the talks ;
3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in respect of nuclear weapons ;
4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact ;
5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente ;
6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategic arms limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in this field.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 787).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 324

1. The member governments have recently reaffirmed their resolve to seek further improvement in East/West relations and their continued commitment to a policy of détente as the best means of promoting stable and mutually beneficial relationships between governments and better and more frequent contacts between individuals. Concrete, balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament measures would in their view contribute significantly to this search for security, stability and peace.

2. In this context a SALT II agreement which contributes to strategic stability, maintains deterrence and responds to the security interests and concerns of the North Atlantic Alliance is considered to be in the common interest. Member governments have recently welcomed the progress made in the negotiations, and have expressed support for American efforts to bring them to a successful conclusion.

3. SALT bears directly on the interest of member governments because of the rôle of American strategic forces in the "NATO Triad" of conventional forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces, which provide a spectrum of military capabilities enabling NATO to meet aggression at any level with an appropriate response, while also making it impossible for an aggressor to calculate in advance the nature of the response his attack will provoke, or how the conflict may develop thereafter.

4. Conscious of this direct interest, the Americans have kept the North Atlantic Council informed of the progress of the negotiations and, in particular, there have been regular discussions on issues of special interest to member governments of WEU.

5. Notwithstanding repeated eastern assurances that their aim is not to seek military superiority, member governments have continued to note with concern the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments, both conventional and nuclear. In the face of these developments, it remains the view of member governments that there is a need to devote the resources necessary to modernise and strengthen allied capabilities to the extent required for deterrence and defence.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 325¹
***on a European armaments policy*²**

The Assembly,

Aware that the growing cost of modern armaments technology and current economic trends can lead to unilateral disarmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance ;

Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and standardisation of military equipment ; to ensure the survival of a viable European armaments industry ; and lastly a two-way street in armaments with the United States ;

Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the independent European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and Military Agency for Standardisation, in all of which all WEU countries participate ;

Believing that only if the European armaments industry as a whole is restructured on a viable and competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made ;

Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessary for the security of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be concentrated in the independent European programme group with such assistance as the Standing Armaments Committee can provide ;
2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European armaments industry under the aegis of the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and research ;
3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist in the foregoing tasks ;
4. Request the governments concerned to arrange for the IEPG to submit an annual report on its activities to the Assembly.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 786).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 325

1. For the reasons previously stated in the reply to Assembly Recommendation 297, the Council consider that efforts to organise European co-operation in the field of armaments production are essential and should be vigorously pursued. This is the aim of the independent European programme group in its work on the joint development and production of weapons systems or equipment of major importance for the preservation of European armaments industries. Although detailed programmes have not yet been worked out, considerable progress has been made in some fields such as the harmonisation of equipment time-tables, the defining of certain specific projects and the study of problems relating to practical aspects of co-operation.

At the same time, the IEPG has succeeded in working out a common European line of approach to offers of co-operation from the North Americans in the framework of the "transatlantic dialogue". Current discussions relate to the possibility of sharing development and production between Europeans and North Americans for certain "armaments families", with the Europeans seeking to redress the balance of production and trade in terms of both quality and quantity. Indeed, the search for standardisation must not be allowed to operate exclusively to the advantage of equipment of American origin, leaving the European industry with only a subordinate rôle as subcontractors which in the long term would be a threat to its existence.

2. The restructuring of the European armaments industry raises a number of complex problems which are not limited to industrial and customs policy or research policy, but directly involve the security of states.

The Assembly's suggestion would therefore imply a wide interpretation of the field of application of the Treaty of Rome; such an interpretation has already been opposed by a number of governments.

3. The first results of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the European armaments industry confirm that this body is a useful instrument for thought and analysis which can be used to good purpose by the governments. Like the Assembly, the Council consider that the resources of the SAC should continue to be fully employed and when the current study has been completed they will consider the possibility of giving it new tasks in areas where its resources can be used without duplicating the activities of other bodies.

4. The independent European programme group brings together representatives of all the European states which are members of the Alliance, except Iceland. The submission of a report on the activities of the IEPG to the WEU Assembly, with which they have no organisational links, would undoubtedly give rise to difficulties for some of these states. It is more appropriate for WEU Assembly delegates to be briefed through national channels on IEPG activities.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 326 ¹
on application satellites ²

The Assembly,

Considering the continuing high level of Soviet space efforts which might result in the Soviet Union occupying a dominating technological position with dangerous consequences in the economic, political and military fields ;

Aware that the United States space efforts are levelling off and that decisions are not being taken for a detailed long-term United States space programme ;

Convinced that the European space policy to be defined in the near future should take into account the danger which might result from this world situation ;

Considering the vast industrial potential which has been developed during the last fifteen years and especially since 1971 when the space applications programme started ;

Taking into account the need to provide mankind with knowledge of and the means to attenuate the consequences of drought, energy shortages, pollution, famine and natural disasters,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states :

A. To instruct ESA to study the possibility of :

(i) establishing a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data gathered by remote sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined ;

(ii) building a small prototype solar power satellite providing electrical capacity ;

and to release the financial means necessary for these studies ;

B. To indicate at the next ESA Council meetings which elements of ESA's draft spacelab follow-on development programme are to be carried out ;

C. To prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and their financial implications and to have a draft long-term budget drawn up, *inter alia* to ensure, in the future, the existence of a study group to draw up a coherent programme ;

D. In the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and in its sub-committees, to afford strong support to steps to oblige states launching satellites, in addition to measures governing security and the provision of mutual assistance, to accept specific commitments to provide information about their satellites which have sources of nuclear energy on board.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 784).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 326

While ESA's Earthnet programme for the acquisition and distribution of remote sensing data also possesses decentralisation features in the form of national points of contact to satisfy users with predominantly regional requirements, the Meteosat programme within the scope of the telecommunications network of the World Meteorological Organisation involves global acquisition and distribution of weather data. Therefore, prior to detailed studies on an alternative or supplementary global telecommunications network, ESA should collaborate with the World Meteorological Organisation in carrying out a preliminary study examining both the user requirements and the advantages and drawbacks of the technical possibilities.

Numerous studies are already available on the subject of solar power satellites for supplying the earth with energy. In view of the enormous expense necessitated by such systems, the realisation of even only a "small prototype" is at least premature. In any case, every precaution should be taken to ensure that no environmental problems can arise. ESA is examining the possibility of collaborating with NASA in the contemplated construction of a power module for space flight functions, which could also be used for subsequent Spacelab flights.

At the current discussions on future ESA programmes and their financial implications the ESA Council will also decide whether ESA's draft Spacelab follow-on development programme, or elements of it, should be carried out. The medium-term goals of the European Space Agency are clearly defined by the agreements and undertakings entered into by the member states in the context of the numerous optional programmes approved for both application satellites and launchers. The Agency also has funds available in its own general studies budget to finance preparatory work on the desirable aim of formulating a coherent programme setting long-term goals for Europe.

The Council welcome and will support the efforts already undertaken by individual member states of WEU in the United Nations Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space and in its sub-committees to ensure the security of satellites having sources of nuclear energy on board and to provide information particularly in the event of re-entry into the earth's atmosphere.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 327 ¹
on improving the status of WEU staff ²

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a joint pensions administration section as a first step towards the creation of a truly independent body to deal with pensions ;

Reiterating its regret that provision has still not been made for a reversionary pension to be granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

Deploring the fact that no reply was given to the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations ;

2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ;

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy ;

II. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a fund from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU ;

III. Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff already serving in the organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 783).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 327

I.1. In April 1978 the Council approved the 149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee concerning the principle that a joint pensions administrative section should be set up as an inter-organisation unit of the co-ordinated organisations.

The stage now reached in recruiting staff and in the organisation of such a unit makes it likely that it will start work in the course of 1979.

I.2. The Council approved on 21st March 1979 the 161st report of the Co-ordinating Committee concerning the granting of reversionary pensions to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff with effect from 1st January 1979.

This implies the reopening of the option for those female staff members concerned and includes the appropriate amendments to the Pension Scheme Rules.

I.3. The Council indicated in their reply to Recommendation 302 that the functioning of the machinery for co-ordination was under review by various authorities ; this is still the case.

II. The Secretary-General and the Budget Committee are at present considering various solutions to the problem of loans for the construction, purchase or improvement of living accommodation following the introduction of the Pension Scheme.

III. The Council are aware of the limited scope for internal promotion due to the small size of the organisation, the need to respect the distribution of posts as between nationals of the member states and specific technical qualifications for certain appointments.

The Secretary-General, however, while taking account of these restrictions, seeks every available opportunity to promote staff within the organisation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th April 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 328¹***on weather forecasting***²

The Assembly,

Aware that meteorology for both civil and military purposes is a national responsibility but by definition it is an international co-operative science calling for continuous international collaboration ;

Considering that co-ordination at civil level is conducted in the World Meteorological Organisation, its regional organisations and technical commissions and at military level in the NATO meteorological group of the Military Committee ;

Noting that the availability of adequate data on surface weather and upper air conditions over the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa is of vital importance for weather forecasting in Europe ;

Regretting that the network covering the North Atlantic has been reduced to four stations and that the USSR has replaced the United States as an operator of weather ships ;

Considering ESA's success in pursuing the Meteosat research and development programme and convinced that the time is now ripe to urge the users, i.e. the national European meteorological services, to launch the operational phase of a European Meteosat system ;

Aware that civil and military agencies in the United States have to share the same meteorological satellites, ocean surveillance satellites and also the space shuttle, but that in Europe, since countries such as Sweden and Switzerland take part in the Meteosat programme, this is not possible for political reasons ;

Considering that the need for a defence meteorological satellite programme nevertheless exists in Europe, possibly linked to the NATO communications satellite system,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Draw the attention of member governments to the need to provide more reliable but cost-effective meteorological information covering the North Atlantic and North and Central Africa by increasing the number of observation posts in these areas, and, especially in the North Atlantic, by establishing a network of ocean buoys, organising automated meteorological data collection by specially-equipped aircraft and placing a system of meteorological satellites in polar orbit ;

B. Promote the formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system "Eurometsat" similar to the "Eutelsat" of the European postal authorities ;

C. Afford its active support to the study of the establishment of a meteorological satellite system for defence purposes, possibly linked to the domestic United States and NATO satellite programmes, together with an appropriate network of mobile ground stations ;

D. Invite member governments to test existing military meteorological co-ordination by means of more frequent exercises to verify the implementation of recommendations made by the meteorological group of the NATO Military Committee ;

E. Encourage member states to engage their efforts jointly and fully in fundamental research so as to understand the mechanism which determines weather conditions and climate, as well as the possible disturbances human activities can bring about.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 785).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 328

A. The acquisition of additional data from "data sparse areas" such as the North Atlantic and the polar regions can be considered of vital interest for the meteorological services in Europe. While observations over land areas are a national responsibility, observations over ocean areas are carried out individually or jointly by many countries operating in a world-wide system. The World Meteorological Organisation co-ordinates the collection, processing and transmission of data gathered by, for example, merchant ships from where observations are being made on a voluntary basis, and by a system of North Atlantic ocean stations jointly operated and financed by several European countries and even one Central American country. Recently WMO has initiated a study on an integrated observing system over the oceans in which special attention will be given to factors such as reliability and cost effectiveness.

The results of the first global atmosphere research programme (GARP) experiment which is taking place in 1979 and is also being co-ordinated by WMO, will form an important contribution to the study.

It is likely that this study will result in a recommendation for the introduction of an "optimum mix" of observing systems, containing many components, such as satellites, buoys, ships and aircraft. Polar and geostationary satellites might form an integrated component in such a system, and in this connection it should be noted that by their nature, polar satellites have an observation capacity which is not restricted to certain (limited) areas. Hence these satellites derive their importance from their usefulness for both land and sea areas all over the world. The Council are aware that the realisation of an optimal meteorological observing system depends on close co-operation between all countries in and around the areas and regions involved. The Council hence welcome and recommend the active participation of the member states in both regional and world-wide efforts in the maintenance and improvement of observation and data collection systems now available for the North Atlantic and for North and Central Africa.

Moreover, the Council draw the attention of member states to the need for close co-operation in the evaluation of new observing techniques and to the need for integration of those systems which prove to be cost-effective in the longer term.

B. In order to provide the most comprehensive information, satellite data can best be analysed together with processed data from all other meteorological sources. In order to ensure the availability of an operational European meteorological satellite capability, which might form a vital part of the global observing system co-ordinated by WMO, special consideration should be given to :

- (a) a further intensification of the co-operation between the satellite operating agencies and the national meteorological authorities ;
- (b) the outcome of the studies on medium-term planning which recently have been initiated by the European Space Agency ;
- (c) studies of the effectiveness of satellites and other special observing systems including cost-benefit analysis ;
- (d) a further improvement of international meteorological communication facilities for the exchange of both basic and processed information. In this respect it should be mentioned that the developing countries may benefit considerably from an improved international meteorological communication network.

C. In the case of an armed conflict, military satellites are unlikely to be less vulnerable than satellites for civil purposes. Therefore, in such a case, duplication does not provide substantial additional guarantees in respect of the availability of the required satellite data. With regard to the remarks under points A and B on the importance of a world-wide "optimum mix" of the different observing systems, it seems extremely unlikely that a separate European military contribution can be provided which does not duplicate the already existing satellite observing systems.

The Council stress the importance of continued close co-ordination between military and civil meteorological authorities in order to ensure an optimal use of the available systems.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th June 1979.

D. The Council welcome all initiatives to incorporate meteorological forecasting between army, navy and air force for combined operations, both national and international.

E. During recent years, the co-operation between European states in fundamental research related to meteorology has intensified considerably. Problems related to the provision of medium-range forecasts (5 to 10 days ahead) are dealt with in the framework of the activities of the European centre for medium-range weather forecasts at Reading (United Kingdom). With regard to changes in world weather conditions, in the longer term it should be noted that the mechanisms of climate and man-climate interactions form an essential part of the proposed second four-year climatology research programme which will be executed as an indirect action programme in the framework of the co-ordinated research and development activities of the European Community. Furthermore, the WMO has recently proposed to launch a world climate programme. Recognising the threat to mankind resulting from human activities which may cause alterations in world-wide climatological conditions, the Council believe that joint research must be undertaken and that joint action programmes should be worked out.

The Council therefore welcome these initiatives and invite member states to participate actively in the abovementioned programmes.

