

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1982

II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The proceedings of the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
First sitting	12
Texts adopted	19
Second sitting	22
Texts adopted	28
Third sitting	30
Text adopted	34
Fourth sitting	36
Text adopted	40
Fifth sitting	42
Texts adopted	45
Sixth sitting	48
Texts adopted	55
Official report of debates:	
First sitting	60
Second sitting	89
Third sitting	112
Fourth sitting	139
Fifth sitting	164
Sixth sitting	195
Index	226

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
Mrs. HERMAN-MICHELSENS Lucienne	PVV
MM. MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	PSC
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	Socialist
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
HOYAUX Jacques	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DURAFFOUR Paul	Soc. (App.)
FRÊCHE Georges	Socialist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
MAYOUD Alain	UDF
OEHLER Jean-André	Socialist
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist

Substitutes

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BEIX Roland	Socialist
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERTILE Wilfrid	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist

MM. FORTIER Marcel	RPR
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDF
JOXE Pierre	Socialist
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
ROSSINOT André	UDF
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. BAHR Egon	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JAGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
LORENZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Hans-Werner	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHLÜCKEBIER Günter	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
PUCCI Ernesto	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
DELLA BRIOTTA Libero	Socialist
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	Communist
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
van den BERGH Harry	Labour
van EEKELEN Willem	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne-Maria	CDA

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
EIJSSINK Rudolf	CDA
MERTENS Chel	Democrats 66
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
van der WERFF Ymenus P.W.	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr. James HILL	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	SDP
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Anthony DURANT	Conservative
Kenneth EASTHAM	Labour
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Sir Russell FAIRGRIEVE	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Mr. John MORRIS	Labour
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (Doc. 903).
7. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 910).
8. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 905*).
9. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 913 and amendment*).
10. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments*).
11. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 917 and amendment*).
12. Nomination of members to committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter, and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter

from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Mulley.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Mulley was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Mulley took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Two candidates had been proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. Gessner and Maravalle.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

MM. Gessner and Maravalle were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. Observers

The President welcomed as observers Mr. Jose Luis do Amaral Nunes and Mr. Antoniou Mendes of Portugal, Dr. John Gilbert of the United Kingdom and Mr. Helmuth Möhring of the Federal Republic of Germany.

9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 903)

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the President gave notice that he had received a request under the urgent procedure for a draft order for a debate on the situation in the Middle East, which would be discussed after the presentation of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council. If the request was agreed to, the order of business could be amended by adding a motion for a recommendation on the situation in the Middle East.

Subject to this, the President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

Speakers: MM. Jessel, Urwin and the President.

The Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

10. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee

(Doc. 910)

In accordance with Rule 14 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly unanimously ratified the adoption by the Presidential Committee on 8th February 1982 of Recommendation 378¹ on the evolution of the situation in Poland.

1. See page 19.

11. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 905)

The report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Tindemans replied to questions put by MM. De Poi, van Eekelen, Urwin, Pignion, Mrs. Knight, MM. Sénès and Osborn.

12. Situation in the Middle East

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 922)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure presented by Sir Frederic Bennett and others.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Urwin.

The debate was closed.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 56)¹.

The debate was fixed for Wednesday, 16th June 1982.

13. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 913 and amendment)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Urwin, Page, De Poi, Reddemann and Blaauw.

1. See page 20.

Mr. Vecchietti, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and report to the Assembly within a year".

A manuscript amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Blaauw: after "Assembly" to insert "if possible at the next part-session or in any event".

Speaker: Mr. Vecchietti.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 379)¹.

1. See page 21.

14. *Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 908 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Bernini, Reddemann, Blaauw and Lagorce.

Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

Consideration of the amendments and the vote on the draft recommendation were postponed until the next sitting.

15. *Nomination of members to committees*

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six committees as follows:

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Steverlynck	MM. De Decker Van der Elst Mrs. Herman-Michielsens
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bizet Duraffour Mayoud Ménard Pignion	MM. Caro Baumel Schleiter Jung Louis Spénale
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Bahr Kittelmann Lemrich Schmidt Hermann Vohrer	MM. Ahrens Lenzer Wittmann Büchner Rösch
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Fosson Maravalle Pecchioli	MM. Calice Giust Tripodi Mondino Amadei
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Glesener

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw Scholten	MM. Tummers Mommersteeg Mertens
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Edwards Grant Smith	MM. Wilkinson Morris Dr. Miller Mr. Beith Lord Duncan-Sandys

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. De Bondt Lagneau Mangelschots	MM. Michel Hoyaux Van der Elst
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Bertile Lagorce Prouvost Wilquin	MM. Baumel Koehl Mayoud Grussenmeyer Joxe
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Gessner Jung Kurt Müller Günther Reddemann	MM. Horn Büchner Schmidt Hansheinrich Sprung Lorenz
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Conti Persini Della Briotta De Poi Valiante Vecchiatti	MM. Patriarca Rubbi Benedikter Cavaliere Calamandrei
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Thoss	Mr. Berchem
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman MM. van Eekelen Mommersteeg	MM. van den Bergh Scholten van der Werff
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Hardy Lord McNair Lord Reay Mr. Urwin	Mrs. Knight Lord Hughes MM. Hill Atkinson Eastham

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Biefnot De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Barthe Fortier Fouillé Valleix	MM. Lagorce Bassinat Bertile Bizet

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Lenzer Männing Spies von Büllesheim Topmann	MM. Böhm Schluckebier Müller Günther Pensky
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Amadei Antoni Fiandrotti Forma	MM. Orione Martino Maravalle Spitella
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts Worrell	Mr. van Eekelen Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Garrett Sir Paul Hawkins MM. McGuire Wilkinson	Lord Northfield Sir Russell Fairgrieve MM. Brown Jessel

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Biefnot	MM. Steverlynck Mangelschots
<i>France:</i>	MM. Delehedde Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	MM. Frêche Belin Rossinot Oehler
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Althammer Schulte Sprung	MM. Bardens Jäger Schmidt Manfred Müller Hans-Werner
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Martino Orione Petrilli Tripodi	MM. Cafiero Ajello Bonalumi Pozzo
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Kriepps	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Mertens Tummers	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. van den Bergh
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Brown Durant Lord Hughes Mr. Stainton	Mr. Fletcher Sir Paul Hawkins Lord McNair Mr. Grieve

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Hoyaux Michel	MM. De Decker Lagneau
<i>France:</i>	MM. Beix Joxe Sénès Vial-Massat	MM. Caro Prouvost Delehedde Wilquin

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Schmidt Manfred Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland	MM. Büchner Eickmeyer Schäuble Wittmann
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Giust Mondino Pucci Sterpa	MM. Spitella Fiandrotti Patriarca Romano
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Glesener	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Eijnsink van der Werff	MM. Aarts Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Eastham Edwards Grieve Howell	MM. Morris Cox Osborn Jessel

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (*14 seats*)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Bonnel Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	Mr. Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Poncelet	MM. Sénès Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Enders	Mrs. Pack Mr. Bardens
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Agrimi Rubbi	MM. Forma Maravalle
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Berchem Glesener	MM. Prussen Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Eijnsink Blaauw
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Fletcher Page	Mr. Gourlay Mrs. Knight

16. *Date and time of the next sitting*

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday,
15th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Reddemann Schulte Spies von Büllenheim <i>Lenzer (Sprung)</i> Unland Vohrer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Dejardin		MM. <i>Blaauw (Aarts)</i> Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van den Bergh)
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens		MM. van Eekelen <i>Worrell (Scholten)</i> Stoffelen Tummers
MM. <i>De Bondt (Mangelschots)</i> Michel		<i>Eijsink (Mrs. van der</i> <i>Werf-Terpstra)</i>
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	
France	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Orione (Bonalumi)</i> <i>Martino (Calamandrei)</i> Cavaliere De Poi <i>Giust (Forma)</i> Maravalle <i>Fiandrotti (Petrilli)</i> <i>Amadei (Pucci)</i> Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	United Kingdom
MM. Jung, Louis Lagorce Pignion Sénès		Lord <i>McNair (Beith)</i> Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Edwards (Cox)</i> Sir <i>Russell Fairgrieve</i> (Grant)
Federal Republic of Germany		Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett (McGuire)</i> Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay Mr. Urwin
MM. Ahrens Althammer	Luxembourg	
Mrs. <i>Pack (Bardens)</i>	MM. <i>Prussen (Berchem)</i> <i>Glesener (Margue)</i> Thoss	
MM. <i>Wittmann (Böhm)</i> Büchner Enders Gessner <i>Rösch (Jung, Kurt)</i> Kittelmann <i>Pensky (Männing)</i> Müller, Günther		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Poncelet Schleiter Spénale Valleix Wilquin	Italy
MM. Barthe Baumel Berrier Caro Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Mayoud Oehler		MM. Fosson Mondino Pecchioli Rubbi
	Federal Republic of Germany	United Kingdom
	Mr. Schmidt, Hermann	MM. Grieve Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 378***on the evolution of the situation in Poland***

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53 and Recommendation 370 ;

Considering that the existence of a military dictatorship in Poland constitutes a flagrant violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference ;

Considering that Poland's serious economic difficulties do not justify the replacement of the dialogue between the state authorities and Solidarity by a policy of repression ;

Considering that the public acts of the Soviet Union reveal interference in the internal affairs of Poland and pressure on the Polish Government for the establishment of that dictatorship ;

Noting that the situation thus created in Poland is such as to cause Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to be applied ;

Regretting that no member government of WEU has judged it necessary to examine in the framework of the Council the implications of this situation for the security of Europe ;

Believing that as long as repression persists in Poland there can be no question of re-establishing normal relations with Poland and its allies, starting with the Soviet Union ;

Firmly recalling that the re-establishment of such normal relations depends on :

- (a) the termination of martial law in Poland ;
- (b) the release of all political prisoners and in particular of Solidarity members ;
- (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure close exchanges of views between the European and American members of the North Atlantic Alliance in order to co-ordinate measures taken and to be taken in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in accordance with the statement of the North Atlantic Council of 11th January 1982 ;
2. To this end, continue to work out in the most appropriate European framework a joint policy towards the Soviet Union and Poland, particularly in economic and financial matters, in both the long and short term ;
3. Further, invite member countries to suspend economic and financial assistance to Poland in present circumstances ;
4. Also invite member countries to pursue and develop their humanitarian assistance to the Polish people insofar as it does not strengthen the authorities responsible for the military coup d'état on 13th December 1981 ;
5. Meet to follow closely the development of the situation in Poland and hold a continuing dialogue with the Assembly on this question ;
6. Conduct talks with the countries of Eastern Europe on the application of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe particularly in connection with serious examination of events in Poland.

ORDER 56***on the situation in the Middle East***

The Assembly,

In view of the grave situation in the Middle East,

ASKS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To present a draft recommendation on that matter during the present part-session.

RECOMMENDATION 379***on the political activities of the WEU Council –
reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Noting the satisfactory aspects of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council;

Nevertheless deploring the prolongation of the WEU Council's inactivity throughout 1981;

Drawing attention to the importance of the proposals for reactivating WEU made in December 1981 by Mr. Lemoine, French Secretary of State to the Minister of Defence;

Stressing that these proposals should be explained and if possible further elaborated by the French Government and should elicit a response from its six partners;

Noting that the dangers to peace and security in Europe are now more serious than ever;

Recalling that WEU is still the only European organisation with effective responsibilities in defence questions and, consequently, disarmament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make an in-depth examination of the proposals concerning WEU made by the French Government with a view to determining the extent of agreement France's partners are able to reach on the basis of these proposals and report to the Assembly if possible at the next part-session or in any event within a year;
2. Extend its consultations to questions raised by the evolution of European public opinion in the face of threats to Europe's security;
3. Inter alia, consider the means available to the governments of member countries for countering international terrorism with a view to strengthening them through greater co-operation;
4. Extend its discussions to all threats to the security of Western Europe, wherever they arise;
5. Prepare the ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council by consultations in the framework of WEU on European defence and on the development of Soviet-United States conversations on the limitation of armaments;
6. Undertake, at meetings of the Permanent Council, frequent and regular exchanges of views on topical questions relating to European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
7. Examine how the experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments might be used to contribute to the solution of monitoring problems raised at all international conferences on disarmament;
8. Ensure that the possible extension of tasks given to the SAC does not result in that body being relieved of its present responsibilities.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments*).
 2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and*
- Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 917 and amendment*).
3. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.
 4. Disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 909 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation:

- Mr. Eastham as a titular member in place of Mr. Brown.

4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Speaker: Mr. Urwin (point of order).

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. De Poi:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “most” and insert “several”.

Speakers: MM. De Poi and Prussen.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Prussen:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, before paragraph 1 insert a new paragraph as follows:

“In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;”.

Speaker: Mr. Prussen.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. De Poi:

2. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“1. In the light of the political evolution of Europe and of military technological developments, make a critical reassessment of the list of armaments at Annexes III and IV of Protocol No. III and subject to control by the Agency;”.

Speakers: MM. De Poi, Cavaliere, Gessner, Prussen, De Poi.

Consideration of the draft recommendation was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic

Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments)

Consideration of the draft recommendation was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Urwin (point of order) and De Poi.

The amendment (No. 2) was negatived.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

6. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "cancel" and insert "vary by reducing".

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. De Poi:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. De Poi and Prussen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. De Poi:

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speaker: Mr. De Poi.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Bernini and Gessner.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 42 votes to 4 with 8 abstentions; 22 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 380)¹.

7. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 917 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Fiandrotti, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Forma and Antoni.

Mr. Fiandrotti, Rapporteur, and Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and report to the Assembly within a year".

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Antoni, Valleix and Urwin.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 30 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions; 41 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 381)².

Speakers (points of order): MM. Reddemann and Cox.

1. See page 28.

2. See page 29.

8. *Disarmament*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 909 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Dejardin, van den Bergh and Brown.

The debate was adjourned.

9. *Date and time of the next sitting*

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Enders Gessner <i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt) Kittelmann <i>Pensky</i> (Manning) Müller, Günther Reddemann <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt, Hermann) Schulte Spies von Büllesheim Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung)	Luxembourg MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Dejardin Mrs. Herman-Michielsens MM. Mangelschots Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Unland Vohrer	Netherlands MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts) Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlamun</i> (van den Bergh) MM. van Eekelen Stoffelen Tummers <i>Eijsink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Vial-Massat</i> (Barthe) Baumel <i>Fourré</i> (Frêche) Jung, Louis Lagorce <i>Beix</i> (Oehler) Pignion <i>Jager</i> (Poncelet) Schleiter Sénès <i>Prouvost</i> (Spénale) Valleix Wilquin	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi) <i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle <i>Della Briotta</i> (Mondino) <i>Giust</i> (Petrilli) <i>Amadei</i> (Pucci) Tripodi Valiante Vecchiatti	Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Smith</i> (Grant) Hardy <i>Howell</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. Urwin Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Althammer <i>Bahr</i> (Bardens) <i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Berrier Caro Duraffour Jeambrun Mayoud	Mr. Büchner	Mr. Scholten
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi	MM. Grieve Hill Mrs. Knight

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (Doc. 908)¹ :

Ayes	42
Noes	4
Abstentions	8

Ayes:

MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)	MM. <i>Smith</i> (Grant)	MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt,
Ahrens	Hardy	Hermann)
Althammer	Lord Hughes	Schulte
<i>Bahr</i> (Bardens)	MM. Jessel	Sénès
Berchem	<i>Rösch</i> (Jung, Kurt)	<i>Prouvost</i> (Spénale)
Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van	Jung, Louis	Spies von Büllenheim
den Bergh)	Kittelmann	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung)
MM. <i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm)	<i>Pensky</i> (Manning)	MM. Stoffelen
Bonnel	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	<i>Prussen</i> (Thöss)
Cavaliere	Michel	Unland
Cox	Dr. Miller	Urwin
van Eekelen	MM. Müller, Günther	Vohrer
Enders	<i>Beix</i> (Oehler)	<i>Eijsink</i> (Mrs. van der
<i>Fourré</i> (Frêche)	Page	Werf-Terpstra)
Gessner	Reddemann	Wilkinson

Noes:

MM. Antoni
Bernini
<i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei)
Vecchiatti

Abstentions:

MM. De Poi
Forma
Fosson
Maravalle
<i>Della Briotta</i> (Mondino)
<i>Giust</i> (Petrilli)
Valiante
Valleix

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (Doc.917)¹:

Ayes	30
Noes	0
Abstentions	5

Ayes:

MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)	MM. Enders	MM. <i>Giust</i> (Petrilli)
Agrimi	Forma	Pignion
Ahrens	Fosson	Reddemann
Althammer	<i>Fourré</i> (Frêche)	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Berchem	Hardy	MM. Stoffelen
Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van	Lord Hughes	<i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)
den Bergh)	MM. Kittelmann	Urwin
MM. <i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi)	Maravalle	Valleix
Cavaliere	Dr. Miller	Vohrer
Cox	Mr. <i>Beix</i> (Oehler)	Wilkinson
van Eekelen		

Abstentions:

MM. Antoni
Bernini
<i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei)
Dejardin
Mangelschots

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 380***on the application of the Brussels Treaty
- reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto;
- (ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instrument of European security;
- (iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that "in applying the provisions of Protocol No. III and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situation in Europe";
- (iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by reducing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. III;
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties;
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces;
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February.

RECOMMENDATION 381***on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the need to ensure a better place for Europe in industrial and trade competition with the United States and Japan;
- (ii) Considering how fast technology evolves and the difficulty member countries experience in keeping abreast with progress in the various fields of advanced technology;
- (iii) Considering the need to develop and produce high technology weapons capable of ensuring a balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact;
- (iv) Considering the budgetary difficulties of member states and the problems they consequently have to face because of the sharp rise in the cost of research and development of modern weapons;
- (v) Considering that greater harmonisation of the research and development efforts of the member countries, in spite of disparities in the relevant budgets, and more intensive European co-operation would allow these difficulties to be overcome more easily;
- (vi) Noting the part of the Council's twenty-seventh annual report on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and the indications it gives on energy and security on the one hand and space activities on the other;
- (vii) Considering the reply of the Council to Recommendations 331 and 365 and the statements by Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to the French Minister of Defence, to the Assembly on 3rd December 1981,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite the Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat, in fields within their competence, to assist the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in preparing the second part of its report on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields;
2. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to draw up a list of military research and development programmes which, because of their cost, technical complexity or special interest, might be worthwhile matters for European or international co-operation and report to the Assembly within a year;
3. Study the possibility of increasing the security and energy interdependence of member countries;
4. Invite the governments of member countries :
 - (a) to decide on a choice of projects for European co-operation in fields such as micro-electronics, biotechnology and maritime, nuclear and space technology;
 - (b) to implement these projects with the greatest flexibility and also perseverance in bi- or multilateral frameworks;
 - (c) to make provision for training the corresponding experts;
 - (d) to promote exchanges of research workers between European countries, thus enabling the setting up of European teams ;
 - (e) finally, to ensure the financing of these projects.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Disarmament (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 909 and amendments*).
2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 918 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Disarmament

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 909 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Scholten, Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Smith, Beix, Fosson and Enders.

Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments (Nos. 5 et 6) were tabled by Mr. Vohrer:

5. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is to open" and insert "opened".

6. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "\$ 455 billion" and insert "more than \$ 500 billion".

The amendments were agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "establish preconditions for" and insert "promote".

Speaker: Mr. Hardy.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Beix:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, after sub-paragraph 1(b) add a sub-paragraph 1(c) as follows:

"(c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination;"

Speakers: MM. Beix and Cavaliere.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "establishment of" insert "a substantially-reduced level and".

Speaker: Mr. Hardy.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "force" insert "and dismantling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons".

Speaker: Mr. Hardy.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 39 votes to 14 with 6 abstentions; 10 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 382)¹.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 918 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Wittmann.

Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Bahr, van den Bergh, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Maravalle, Beith, Dejardin and Bernini.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Günther Müller, Smith, Blaauw and Kurt Jung.

Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

5. Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Four candidates had been proposed for the four remaining posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. Berchem, Bonnel, Pignion and Scholten.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

MM. Berchem, Bonnel, Pignion and Scholten were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: MM. Pignion, Bonnel, Berchem, Gessner, Scholten and Maravalle.

6. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 16th June, at 10 a.m..

The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.

1. See page 34.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium

MM. *Lagneau* (Adriaensens)
Bonnell
Dejardin
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens
MM. *Hoyaux* (Mangelschots)
Michel
Mrs. Staels-Dompas

France

MM. Baumel
Fourré (Frêche)
Lagorce
Beix (Oehler)
Pignion
Valleix
Wilquin

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Ahrens
Bahr (Bardens)
Wittmann (Böhm)
Enders
Gessner
Jung, Kurt
Kittelmann
Pensky (Männing)

MM. Müller, Günther
Reddemann
Schluckebier (Schmidt,
Hermann)
Schulte
Spies von Büllesheim
Mrs. *Pack* (Sprung)
MM. Unland
Vohrer

Italy

MM. Bernini
Orione (Bonalmi)
Martino (Calamandrei)
Cavaliere
De Poi
Forma
Fosson
Maravalle
Fiandrotti (Mondino)
Giust (Petrilli)
Amadei (Pucci)
Valiante

Luxembourg

MM. Berchem
Glesener (Margue)

Netherlands

MM. *Blaauw* (Aarts)
van den Bergh
Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman* (van
Eekelen)
MM. Scholten
Stoffelen
Tummers
Eijsink (Mrs. van der
Werf-Terpstra)

United Kingdom

Mr. Beith
Sir Frederic Bennett
MM. Cox
Smith (Grant)
Atkinson (Grieve)
Hardy
Sir Paul Hawkins
Mr. Hill
Lord Hughes
Mr. Jessel
Mrs. Knight
Mr. *Garrett* (McGuire)
Dr. Miller
Lord *Northfield* (Mulley)
Mr. Page
Lord Reay
MM. *Eastham* (Urwin)
Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France

MM. Barthe
Berrier
Caro
Duraffour
Jeambrun
Jung, Louis
Mayoud
Poncelet
Schleiter

MM. Séné
Spénale

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Althammer
Büchner

Italy

Mr. Agrimi

MM. Antoni
Pecchioli
Rubbi
Tripodi
Vecchiotti

Luxembourg

Mr. Thoss

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on disarmament (Doc. 909):

Ayes	39
Noes	14
Abstentions	6

Ayes:

MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)	MM. Fosson	Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Mulley)
<i>Lagneau</i> (Adriaensens)	<i>Fourré</i> (Frêche)	MM. <i>Beix</i> (Oehler)
Ahrens	Gessner	Pignion
Beith	Hardy	<i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt,
Berchem	Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	Hermann)
van den Bergh	Lord Hughes	Scholten
Bernini	Mr. Jung, Kurt	Schulte
Bonnel	MM. Lagorce	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Cavaliere	<i>Garrett</i> (McGuire)	MM. Stoffelen
Cox	<i>Hoyaux</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Eastham</i> (Urwin)
Dejardin	<i>Pensky</i> (Manning)	Vohrer
Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van	Maravalle	<i>Eijsink</i> (Mrs. van der
Eekelen)	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	Werf-Terpstra)
Mr. Enders	Dr. Miller	Wilquin

Noes:

Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. Hill	Lord Reay
MM. <i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm)	Jessel	Mr. Spies von Büllenheim
<i>Smith</i> (Grant)	Mrs. Knight	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Sprung)
<i>Atkinson</i> (Grieve)	MM. Müller, Günther	Mr. Wilkinson
Sir Paul Hawkins	Page	

Abstentions:

MM. <i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi)
De Poi
Forma
Kittelmann
Michel
Valiante

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 382**on disarmament**

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament opened on 7th June 1982;
- (ii) Aware that since the first special session in 1978 there is negligible progress to report on arms control and none on disarmament;
- (iii) Aware that in the meantime world military expenditure has increased to more than \$ 500 billion a year;
- (iv) Recalling its Recommendation 323 of 21st November 1978,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to take concerted action in all appropriate bodies with the following objects in view:

1. To promote disarmament:
 - (a) by fostering wider but balanced commercial relations between East and West, and between North and South;
 - (b) by investigating the possibility of developing weapons systems that would be manifestly defensive;
 - (c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination;
2. To secure a substantial reduction in the level of nuclear weapons in the world as a whole, and in Europe the "zero option" in the INF talks and the establishment of a substantially-reduced level and a proper balance of conventional forces;
3. To seek the earliest agreement on the following specific disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures:
 - (a) at the world level:
 - (i) a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical and mycotoxin weapons, through a resumption of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place;
 - (ii) a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing, through a resumption of the trilateral talks between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in the first place, to conclude an agreement on the terms already agreed in 1980;
 - (iii) amendment of the 1967 outer space treaty to ban all weapons for use in or from outer space;
 - (iv) the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency on the lines of the report of the United Nations Secretary-General;
 - (v) the establishment of a register to be prepared and published by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of international transfers of armaments;
 - (vi) the appointment of a United Nations working group of experts to examine alternative defence systems excluding nuclear weapons;

(b) at the European level:

- (vii) a phase one agreement on MBFR together with permanent measures of verification to remain operative for the duration of the agreement ;
- (viii) a conference on disarmament in Europe on the lines of the French proposal of 1978 ;
- (ix) enhanced confidence-building measures in Europe ;

4. To secure reductions in armaments in third world countries through the example to be set by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in reducing their nuclear and conventional forces and dismantling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons, and, when measures of actual disarmament are implemented, in diverting to developing countries the funds thus released.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The Falklands crisis (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 907 revised and amendments*).
2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 918 and amendments*).
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 915 and amendments*).
4. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 916*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. The Falklands crisis

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 907 revised and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Reference back of the report was moved by Mr. Cavaliere in accordance with Rule 32 (1) (d) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: Mr. Urwin, the President, MM. Atkinson (point of order) and Cavaliere.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was referred back to the committee.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Urwin.

4. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 918 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Gessner:

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming that the United States Government has declared itself ready to respect the SALT II agreements on condition that the Soviet Union does too ; ”.

Speaker: Mr. Gessner.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg :

3. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations ; ”.

Speaker: Mr. Mommersteeg.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 2 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Pignion and Mr. Mommersteeg respectively:

2. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council," and insert "A. Develop a European approach to discussions in the North Atlantic Council so as:".

4. In the draft recommendation proper, renumber paragraph B. as B.1. and add a new paragraph as follows:

"B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council."

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Mommersteeg, Dejardin, Dr. Miller, MM. Kurt Jung, Cavaliere and Pignion.

Amendment 2 was negatived.

Amendment 4 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Wilkinson.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 35 votes to 16 with 2 abstentions¹; 19 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 383)².

5. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Michel, Rapporteur.

Mr. Bonnel, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Leister replied to questions put by MM. Lagorce, Valleix, Osborn, Wilkinson, van Eekelen, Cavaliere and Kurt Jung.

7. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Althammer, Rösch, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Kurt Jung.

The debate was adjourned.

8. Date and time of the next sitting

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

1. Voting figures announced in the Chamber were: Ayes 36; Noes 16; Abstentions 2. After verification of the vote, the result is: Ayes 35; Noes 16; Abstentions 2.

2. See page 40.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt, Hermann)	Netherlands
MM. <i>Hoyaux</i> (Adriaensens)	Schulte	MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)
Bonnel	Spies von Büllenheim	van den Bergh
Dejardin	Sprung	van Eekelen
Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	Unland	<i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
MM. Mangelschots	<i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)	Stoffelen
Michel		Tummers
Mrs. Staels-Dompas		Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
France	Italy	
MM. Baumel	MM. Agrimi	
Berrier	Bernini	
Lagorce	<i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi)	
<i>Beix</i> (Oehler)	<i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei)	United Kingdom
Pignion	Cavaliere	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
<i>Jager</i> (Poncelet)	De Poi	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Bizet</i> (Schleiter)	Fosson	MM. <i>Eastham</i> (Cox)
Valleix	Maravalle	Grant
Wilquin	<i>Amadei</i> (Mondino)	<i>Durant</i> (Grieve)
	Petrilli	Hardy
	<i>Giust</i> (Pucci)	Sir Paul Hawkins
Federal Republic of Germany	Tripodi	Mr. Hill
	Valiante	Lord Hughes
	Vecchiatti	Mr. <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel)
MM. Althammer		Mrs. Knight
<i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm)	Luxembourg	Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (McGuire)
Enders		Dr. Miller
Gessner	MM. Berchem	Mr. <i>Smith</i> (Page)
Jung, Kurt	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	Lord Reay
Kittelmann	<i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	MM. Urwin
<i>Pensky</i> (Männing)		Wilkinson
Müller, Günther		
Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Reddemann)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Barthe	MM. Ahrens
Caro	Bardens
Duraffour	Büchner
Frêche	
Jeambrun	Italy
Jung, Louis	MM. Antoni
Mayoud	Forma
Sénès	Pecchioli
Spénale	Rubbi

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (Doc. 918)¹:

Ayes	35
Noes	16
Abstentions	2

Ayes:

MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)	MM. Gessner	Mr. <i>Giust</i> (Pucci)
Agrimi	Hardy	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Reddemann)
Althammer	Mrs. Herman-Michielsens	MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt, Hermann)
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	Lord Hughes	<i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
MM. Berchem	MM. Jung, Kurt	Schulte
<i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm)	Kittelmann	Spies von Büllesheim
Bonnel	<i>Edwards</i> (McGuire)	Sprung
Cavaliere	<i>Pensky</i> (Manning)	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>Eastham</i> (Cox)	Maravalle	MM. Unland
van Eekelen	Michel	Valiante
Enders	Dr. Miller	<i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)
Fosson	Mr. Müller, Günther	

Noes:

Mr. <i>Hoyaux</i> (Adriaensens)	Mr. Hill	MM. Pignion
Sir Frederic Bennett	Mrs. Knight	Stoffelen
MM. van den Bergh	MM. Mangelschots	Tummers
Bernini	<i>Beix</i> (Oehler)	Vecchietti
Dejardin	<i>Smith</i> (Page)	Wilquin
Grant		

Abstentions:

Lord Reay
Mr. Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 383

on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the balance of all nuclear forces can be assessed only as a whole, but noting that the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and in intermediate-range forces, while the United States lead in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced;
- (ii) Believing that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of a balanced security policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war;
- (iii) Stressing the importance of the conventional component of the NATO deterrent forces;
- (iv) Reiterating its belief that the NATO dual decision of 17th December 1979 remains the basis both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces, an imbalance which has been increased by the deployment of 300 SS-20s so far reported, and for negotiating the zero option;
- (v) Regretting that SALT II remains unratified although at the time of its signature endorsed by the Assembly and all NATO governments as a step in a necessarily continuous process of strategic arms control negotiations, and that nearly three years have elapsed since its signature without further progress;
- (vi) Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations;
- (vii) Believing that in view of the mutual benefits of such control the strategic arms reduction talks should be opened urgently and pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations, and welcoming therefore President Reagan's speech of 9th May 1982 calling for them to open at the end of June, and making realistic proposals for significant reductions of strategic nuclear weapons;
- (viii) Hoping also that the opening of those talks will have a beneficial effect on the INF negotiations which must be conducted in the framework of START;
- (ix) Stressing the need for a verifiable comprehensive test ban in order to block the development of ever more sophisticated nuclear weapons;
- (x) Stressing the importance of concrete confidence-building measures of the type agreed at Helsinki as a precursor and complement of balanced reductions in the armouries of both sides;
- (xi) Seeing in most peace demonstrations both in Europe and the United States, an expression of deep and justified concern about the dangers of an unrestricted arms race and the possibility of nuclear war;
- (xii) Regretting however the unilateral trends and over-simplifications apparent within movements which ignore the need for military stability, both nuclear and conventional, and for objective analysis of the facts in order to negotiate reductions;
- (xiii) Welcoming the publication of "NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons" for which the Assembly has repeatedly called, and believing that a continuing effort must be made by governments and parliamentarians to inform the public objectively about the nature of the threat and the basis of allied defence and arms control policies;
- (xiv) Regretting that in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union public opinion has no opportunity to discuss freely the concepts on which European and international security should be based,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,

1. To continue the present much improved close and continuous consultations to ensure that an agreed allied position is maintained on all aspects of nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control;

2. To ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles less any reductions previously agreed in the INF talks;
 3. To press for the earliest agreement in the INF talks on the zero option for land-based missiles, and the step-by-step pursuit of these talks to include other weapons systems, and the eventual inclusion of battlefield systems in these or the MBFR talks;
 4. To welcome the resumption of the SALT process through the proposed opening of START in June, and to press for the closest linking of these to the INF talks and the continued mutual respect of all SALT limits during the negotiations;
 5. To give increased emphasis to the negotiation and adoption of effective procedures for verification, as essential for any agreement on arms control and reduction;
 6. To ask the United States Government to examine seriously Senator Jackson's proposal for a joint United States-Soviet Union command post in a neutral country to deter the possibility of war by accident or miscalculation;
 7. To bring up to date and publish from time to time on an agreed objective basis the NATO comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, and to urge the Soviet Union to be equally forthcoming and objective in publishing force comparisons;
- B.1. Call on member governments to pursue active information policies, to ensure that public opinion is objectively informed both about the nature of the threat and about the purposes of allied defence and arms control and reduction policies;
 - B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Evolution of the situation in Poland (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 915 and amendments*).
2. Situation in the Middle East (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 923*).
3. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 916*).
4. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 914 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Brown.

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: Mrs. Knight and Mr. Romano.

Mr. Michel, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

A manuscript amendment was moved by Mr. Michel:

In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “on 1st, 2nd and

3rd May” and insert “at the beginning of May”.

The manuscript amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

1. After the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation ;”.

Speaker: Mr. Pignion.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council” and insert “in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations”.

Speakers: MM. Pignion and Michel.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Pignion:

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows :

“Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures and possibly envisage further measures designed to attain the aims set out in the previous paragraph ;”.

Speakers: MM. Pignion, Dejardin, Michel and Pignion.

A manuscript amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Dejardin to leave out from the first “measures” to the end of the amendment.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

A manuscript amendment was moved by Mr. Michel:

In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the state of siege” and insert “martial law”.

Speakers: Mrs Knight, Mr. Michel and Lord Hughes (on a point of order).

The manuscript amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 384)¹.

4. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 916)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Osborn, Fourré and Brown.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Sir Paul Hawkins.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 385)¹.

5. Situation in the Middle East

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 923 and amendments)

The oral report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Della Briotta, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. van Eekelen, Dejardin, Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, MM. Cavaliere, van den Bergh, Dejardin (point of order), Reddemann, Lord McNair, MM. Blaauw, Urwin, Spies von Büllenheim, Vecchietti and Dr. Miller.

Mr. Della Briotta, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

6. Date and time of the next sitting

Speakers: Mr. Spies von Büllenheim.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 17th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.

1. See page 45.

1. See page 46.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Lemmrich</i> (Sprung)	Mr. Stoffelen
MM. <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnel)	Unland	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
Dejardin	<i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)	(Tummers)
<i>De Bondt</i> (Mrs.		Mr. <i>Eijsink</i> (Mrs. van der
Herman-Michielsens)		Werf-Terpstra)
Michel	Italy	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Cavaliere	United Kingdom
	De Poi	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
	Fosson	Sir Frederic Bennett
France	Maravalle	MM. Cox
MM. <i>Fourré</i> (Frêche)	<i>Della Briotta</i> (Mondino)	<i>Osborn</i> (Grant)
Lagorce		<i>Durant</i> (Grieve)
Pignion	Luxembourg	Hardy
Valleix	MM. Berchem	Sir Paul Hawkins
	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	Mr. Hill
	<i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	Lord Hughes
Federal Republic of Germany		Mr. <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel)
MM. Wittmann (Böhm)		Mrs. Knight
Enders	Netherlands	Mr. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire)
Kittelmann	MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Aarts)	Dr. Miller
Reddemann	van den Bergh	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)
Schulte	van Eekelen	<i>Smith</i> (Page)
Spies von Büllenheim		Lord Reay
		MM. Urwin
		Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Poncelet	Italy
MM. Adriaensens	Schleiter	MM. Agrimi
Mangelschots	Sénès	Antoni
	Spénale	Bernini
	Wilquin	Bonalumi
		Calamandrei
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Forma
MM. Barthe	MM. Ahrens	Pecchioli
Baumel	Althammer	Petrilli
Berrier	Bardens	Pucci
Caro	Büchner	Rubbi
Duraffour	Gessner	Tripodi
Jeambrun	Jung, Kurt	Valiante
Jung, Louis	Männing	Vecchietti
Mayoud	Müller, Günther	
Oehler	Schmidt, Hermann	Netherlands
		Mr. Scholten

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 384***on the evolution of the situation in Poland***

The Assembly,

Recalling its Order 53, Recommendations 370 and 378 and the statement by its Presidential Committee of 8th January 1982 ;

Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation ;

Considering that the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly on the occasion of 1st May 1982, to alleviate martial law fall far short of meeting the three conditions set by the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 for re-establishing normal relations with Poland;

Regretting that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council to back up these conditions have not been applied more strictly ;

Welcoming the fact that participants in the Madrid conference have refused to pursue their work in the circumstances created by the crackdown on 13th December 1981 ;

Noting that events in Poland at the beginning of May and recourse to further measures of constraint show that the Polish Government has found no means other than force to impose a policy rejected by the great majority of the population,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that consultations between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance are pursued and strengthened with a view to co-ordinating the measures taken and to be taken in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations for re-establishing normal relations with Poland, i.e.:

(a) the de facto and de jure abolition of the régime imposed by martial law in Poland ;

(b) liberation of all political prisoners;

(c) resumption of the dialogue between the government, free trade-unionism as formerly embodied by Solidarity and the Catholic church;

2. Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures;

3. Assert that if these conditions are not fulfilled the resumption of the Madrid conference on the application of the final act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would be seriously imperilled.

RECOMMENDATION 385***on international aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn
from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982***

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious of the political will it has consistently demonstrated through the organisation in the last ten years of no less than five symposia so as to promote improved co-operation and collaboration in the conception, design, development, production and procurement of high technology defence equipment, especially missiles and aircraft;
- (ii) Reaffirming its belief that the ensuing military benefits of such collaboration, namely enhanced co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in equipment of the armed services of the western Alliance, would to a large extent offset the advantage of commonality of armaments currently enjoyed by the forces of the Warsaw Pact;
- (iii) Aware that the military aircraft, space and guided missile sectors of European industry play an increasingly important social and economic rôle in many regions of Europe in maintaining employment and in stimulating new technological developments, especially in times of recession;
- (iv) Recalling that the incentive for international collaboration in the aeronautical industry must be not just the economic and political advantages for governments, or the military benefits for armed forces but the commercial interests and industrial development of participating aerospace companies;
- (v) Convinced that existing institutions such as the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) of NATO, the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) of Western European Union and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) should be made to operate effectively and their work harmonised, particularly as many of the same people are involved;
- (vi) Recognising that aeronautical collaboration has taken place within a variety of industrial organisational structures from simple prime and sub-contractor relationships through joint companies to complete industrial consortia and that the organisational requirements for one particular aerospace project do not necessarily lend themselves to another;
- (vii) Considering that families of aircraft and of military aerospace equipment represent a cost-effective return on investment, not least for the smaller countries of Europe, and that to this end existing consortia such as Airbus Industrie and Panavia offer the basis for further projects;
- (viii) Appreciating that the fiscal, legal, and financial environment within which transnational consortia have to operate impose impediments to aeronautical collaboration in Europe not shared by competitor aerospace companies in the United States and that the objective for Western Europe should be to provide itself with a comparable industrial aeronautical capability;
- (ix) Convinced that the pursuit of a genuinely balanced North Atlantic market for high technology defence equipment with the United States of America demands not only enhanced collaboration among the member states, but also a change in American policy towards a satisfactory opening for European production,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strengthen the effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee as an agency for the promotion of co-operation, interoperability and where possible standardisation in defence equipment of the WEU countries by increasing the SAC's establishment of expert staff and enhancing the level of political support accorded to its work by the governments of the member nations of WEU;
2. Persuade the governments represented in WEU to reinforce the vital function of the Independent European Programme Group in harmonising national operational requirements and re-equipment timescales on a European scale by assigning the chairmanship of the IEPG to a defence minister on a rotational basis and by regular progress reports by the IEPG to the Assembly of WEU;
3. Seek to make the most effective use of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) since a concomitant to the mutual defence commitments of the Atlantic Alliance must be a common approach not just to strategy but to matériel procurement and logistics;

4. Reinforce political will within the WEU nations at the highest governmental level to pursue a collaborative approach to the re-equipment requirements of the European armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance by placing policies for the achievement of a balanced and equitable European and Atlantic-wide market for armaments firmly on the agenda for heads of government meetings and for the more regular and routine meetings of Alliance defence and foreign ministers;
5. Urge defence ministry staffs of the WEU countries to bear in mind, in addition to the operational requirements of their individual national armed forces, criteria such as overseas marketability of defence equipment, the need to control costs by avoiding a higher degree of technical sophistication than that required to achieve substantial superiority over any likely threat, and the benefits, both industrial and military, of securing other Alliance nations to share in the production and procurement of the high technology defence equipment;
6. Promote the earliest possible involvement of industrial interests including existing European consortia in the conception and definition of future aerospace projects either nationally or through the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG) or preferably both so as to achieve a market and commercial orientation of such projects from the design stage, the first and foremost of which should be a new European combat aircraft;
7. Press the national governments within WEU to pursue industrial policies towards the aeronautical sector more favourable to the development of an independent European capability in aerospace than to the costly maintenance of purely national aerospace capabilities and to ensure to this end that a collaborative strategy within Europe be maintained involving the fullest utilisation of existing consortia for the design, development and production of new aeronautical projects;
8. Invite the member governments of WEU to reaffirm to the European Communities the need for carefully-considered proposals to be put to the Council of the EEC for the establishment of a harmonised framework of company law and of harmonised tax systems so as to facilitate the operation of transnational consortia within the EEC;
9. Emphasise strongly to member governments of WEU the importance of applying the family of aircraft concept in the European framework whenever excessive competition is liable to weaken Europe's industrial potential;
10. Impress upon the governments of the member nations the need to make clear to the Government of the United States that the evolution of a balanced and equitable Atlantic-wide market in military aerospace products is a paramount political necessity, which will also require the support of Congress for the lifting of restrictions on European imports such as the Speciality Metals Amendment.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1982

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Situation in the Middle East (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 923 and amendments*).
2. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 914 and amendments*).
3. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 911*).
4. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 912*).
5. Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 906 and amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Orders of the day

In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed, if necessary, to continue to sit after one o'clock in order to complete the orders of the day.

On the proposal of Mr. Schulte, the Assembly agreed to remove from the orders of the day the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 906 and amendment.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. van der Sanden as a substitute for the Netherlands in place of Mr. Mommersteeg.

5. Situation in the Middle East

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 923 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw, Lord McNair and Mr. van den Bergh:

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "war" and insert "hostilities".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

10. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "due to the invasion of the sovereign state of Lebanon by the armed forces of Israel;".

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 2 and 11) were tabled by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair and by Mr. Dejardin respectively:

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population,".

11. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "innocent".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Dejardin, Hardy and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendments were negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair:

3. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "totally unacceptable" and insert "no solution to this ghastly phenomenon ;".

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

12. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is" and, at the end, add "implies the de facto recognition of the Palestinian people in national rights, as well as the right of each people of the area to live in peace ;".

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 13 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Dejardin and by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair respectively:

13. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Regretting the refusal of Israel to respect wholly the Camp David accords in not following up the provisions concerning the status of the Palestinians ;".

4. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble and insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Welcoming the progress so far of the Camp David accord and pressing for speedy solutions in that framework to the problem concerning the future status of the Palestinians ;".

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Blaauw and Della Briotta.

The amendments were negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 7, 5, 14 and 6) were tabled by Dr. Miller, by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair, by Mr. Dejardin and by Mr. Blaauw and Lord McNair respectively:

7. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Deeply regret the present Israeli intervention in Lebanon while recognising the extreme provocation over many years of PLO rocket attacks on Israeli villages resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians and call for the evacuation from Lebanon of all non-Lebanese armed forces other than a greatly strengthened and more effective United Nations interim force as soon as possible ;".

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "aggression" insert "and the indiscriminate rocketing and shelling of civilians in the north of Israel by the PLO".

14. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "evacuation" to the end and insert "of the Israeli armed forces as well as the reinforcement of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon ;".

6. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "in mandate, in area of operation and in strength ;".

Speakers: MM. Garrett, Blaauw, Dejardin, Blaauw, Hardy (point of order) and Della Briotta.

Amendments 7, 14 and 6 were negatived ; amendment 5 was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Dr. Miller:

8. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "solved" to the end and insert "without recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination".

Speakers: Mr. Garrett, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Dejardin.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

15. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Propose the adoption of economic sanctions against Israel, such as an embargo on delivery of weapons and munitions and the import of Israeli products, so long as Israeli troops remain on Lebanese territory. "

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Della Briotta.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Dr. Miller:

9. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Condemn unreservedly all terrorist activities.”

Speaker: Mr. Garrett.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 34 votes to 4 with 4 abstentions; 9 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 386)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Dejardin.

6. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 914 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Günther Müller.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Kurt Jung, Wilkinson, Lord Reay and Mr. Baumel.

Mr. van Eekelen, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin:

4. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “regretting” and insert “noting”.

Speakers: MM. Urwin, Kurt Jung and van Eekelen.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. van Eekelen:

2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT,”

Speaker: Mr. van Eekelen.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. van Eekelen:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4 and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications;”

Speaker: Mr. van Eekelen.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “weapons” to the end.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Wilkinson and van Eekelen.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 26 votes to 4 with 3 abstentions; 18 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This recommendation will be published as No. 387)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Pignion.

1. See page 55.

1. See page 56.

7. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 911)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Committee.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 912)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Garrett, Atkinson, Lagneau and Durant.

Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

9. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to committees proposed by the Netherlands Delegation:

- Mr. van der Sanden as a titular member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Mommersteeg ;
- Mr. van der Sanden as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Mommersteeg.

10. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Schulte Unland	MM. van Eekelen <i>Blaauw</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers
MM. <i>Hoyaux</i> (Adriaensens) Dejardin <i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman- Michielsens)	Italy	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Agrimi <i>Amadei</i> (Antoni) De Poi <i>Della Briotta</i> (Mondino) Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	United Kingdom
France		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Atkinson</i> (Grant) <i>Durant</i> (Grieve) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire) <i>Garrett</i> (Dr. Miller) <i>Edwards</i> (Mullej) <i>Osborn</i> (Page) Lord Reay MM. Urwin Wilkinson
MM. Baumel Berrier Lagorce Pignion Valleix	Luxembourg	
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	
MM. Enders Jung, Kurt <i>Pensky</i> (Männing) Müller, Günther Reddemann <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt, Hermann)	Netherlands	
	Mr. Aarts Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van den Bergh)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Sénès Spénale Wilquin	Italy
MM. Bonnel Mangelschots Michel		MM. Bernini Bonalumi Calamandrei Cavaliere Forma Fosson Maravalle Pecchioli Petrilli Pucci Rubbi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Barthe Caro Duraffour Frêche Jeambrun Jung, Louis Mayoud Oehler Poncelet Schleiter	MM. Ahrens Althammer Bardens Böhm Büchner Gessner Kittelmann Spies von Büllesheim Sprung Vohrer	Netherlands Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 5 by roll-call on the draft recommendation on the situation in the Middle East (Doc. 923):

Ayes	34
Noes	4
Abstentions	4

Ayes:

MM. Agrimi	Mr. Hill	Mr. Pignion
<i>Amadei</i> (Antoni)	Lord Hughes	Lord Reay
Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel)	MM. <i>Schluckebier</i> (Schmidt, Hermann)
MM. Cox	Jung, Kurt	Schulte
Dejardin	Mrs. Knight	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Enders	MM. <i>Eastham</i> (McGuire)	MM. Stoffelen
<i>Atkinson</i> (Grant)	<i>Pensky</i> (Manning)	Tummers
<i>Durant</i> (Grieve)	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	Urwin
Hardy	<i>Garrett</i> (Dr. Miller)	Valiante
Sir Paul Hawkins	<i>Della Briotta</i> (Mondino)	Vecchietti
Mr. <i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman-Michielsens)	<i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)	Wilkinson
	<i>Osborn</i> (Page)	

Noes:

MM. van Eekelen
Reddemann
<i>Blaauw</i> (Scholten)
Unland

Abstentions:

Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
MM. Berchem
Müller, Günther
<i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 6 by roll-call on the amended draft recommendation on European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (Doc. 914)¹:

Ayes	26
Noes	4
Abstentions	3

Ayes:

MM. Aarts	MM. Durant (Grieve)	Mr. Garrett (Dr. Miller)
Agrimi	Hardy	Lord Reay
Baumel	Sir Paul Hawkins	MM. Reddemann
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	MM. <i>Lagneau</i> (Mrs. Herman-	<i>Blaauw</i> (Scholten)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Michielsens)	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
MM. Berchem	Hill	MM. <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)
Cox	Lord Hughes	Urwin
van Eekelen	MM. <i>Stainton</i> (Jessel)	Valiante
<i>Atkinson</i> (Grant)	Jung, Kurt	Wilkinson

Noes:

MM. <i>Hoyaux</i> (Adriaensens)
Berrier
Dejardin
Pignion

Abstentions:

Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (van den Bergh)
MM. Stoffelen
Tummers

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 386***on the situation in the Middle East***

The Assembly,

Deploring the outbreak of war in the Middle East ;

Recalling WEU Recommendations 341 and 349 adopted by the Assembly by overwhelming majorities;

Endorsing Resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council;

Recalling its often-repeated condemnation of acts of terrorism anywhere in the world and asserting that retaliatory military actions, especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population, are totally unacceptable;

Noting that the establishment of lasting peace in the area is essential for Europe's security and for stability in the world;

Regretfully noting that the provisions of the Camp David accord relating to the future status of the Palestinians have still not been carried into effect ;

Considering that the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government over the whole Lebanese territory is essential for the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East ;

Wishing its General Affairs Committee follow developments in the Middle East and to report to it at its next session,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty and to assist in its restoration;
2. Condemn unreservedly the present Israeli aggression and call for the evacuation of all non-Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon other than the United Nations interim force in Lebanon which should be strengthened;
3. Recall that the problems of maintaining peace in the Middle East cannot be solved without ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers.

RECOMMENDATION 387***on European-United States co-operation for
international peace and joint security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the cohesion of the free world is an essential condition for the maintenance of peace, European security and economic recovery;

Noting that the European and American partners of the Atlantic Alliance remain fully convinced of this fact;

Noting that western cohesion is being challenged by increased tensions in international relations and the present serious economic recession;

Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood by the public and therefore do not receive as much support from public opinion as they might;

Noting that such reactions and challenges, amplified by modern means of communications, give rise to mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic;

Welcoming the initiatives to improve consultations between Europe and North America within the framework of existing institutions;

Considering that events in Afghanistan and Poland require that any measures aimed at improving relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact should be the subject of close collective examination to prevent the impression that faits accomplis are being accepted;

Welcoming the intensive consultations within NATO on the INF negotiations at Geneva;

Expressing support for an early beginning of the START negotiations and vigorous pursuit of the other disarmament negotiations;

Considering the need to arrive at a consensus on the military threat posed to the Alliance and on the balance of forces;

Considering further that public support for armament decisions would increase if these measures were presented as a counterweight to Warsaw Pact programmes and allowed for constraints by that side;

Considering that frequent contacts between parliamentarians from European and North American member countries of NATO are essential for a better understanding of public opinion and should be organised as effectively as possible;

Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort within the framework of NATO on sharing the burden of common defence;

II. Urge member countries

1. In agreement with the United States and the other members of NATO, to specify the principles to which all members of the Atlantic Alliance should conform in their economic relations with the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, with particular regard to those items of strategic or technological significance whose export is limited, the credit conditions granted and the conclusion of long-term contracts;

2. To make full use of existing machinery for consultations in the political, military and economic field to allow them to react quickly and in a concordant manner in an emergency or crisis;

3. To consider ways of improving transatlantic consultation, in particular by informal meetings at ministerial and high official levels, thus improving the effectiveness of existing institutions;
4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of the balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications ;
5. To present new decisions in the armaments field against the background of specific Warsaw Pact programmes and capabilities in order to discourage new incentives to the arms race;
6. To support a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for a controlled limitation of nuclear weapons ensuring a balance of forces as a prerequisite for the security of Europe and of the whole western world.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 14th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Observers.
9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 903).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Urwin.
10. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 910).
11. Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 905*).
Replies by Mr. Tindemans to questions put by: Mr. De Poi, Mr. van Eekelen, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Pignion, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Sénès, Mr. Osborn.
12. Situation in the Middle East (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 922*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Urwin.
13. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 913 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Vecchietti (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Page, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Vecchietti (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Vecchietti.
14. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 908 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Prussen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bernini, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*).
15. Nomination of members to committees.
16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹. See page 18.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT. – It is the privilege of the Provisional President now to say a few words, and I use this opportunity to speak very briefly.

We are met today in a world of great uncertainty. Unfortunately, armed conflicts are taking place in the South Atlantic, in the Middle East and between two Arab states. It is a dreadful state of affairs that many of the people who are involved in these military campaigns are being supplied with sophisticated weapons from most of our developed countries.

It seems to me the ultimate degree of madness that we should supply sophisticated weapons of destruction to some of the poorest peoples of the world. Some of them have not even coats on their backs. In their lands people die of malnutrition. In our world today

The President (continued)

800 million people are registered as destitute and 20 million little children die of malnutrition before they reach the age of five. Fifty years ago it took ten tonnes of sugar from Jamaica to purchase one tractor. Today it takes fifty tonnes of sugar to purchase the same tractor. So the countries that produce primary goods are unable to buy the equipment they need to increase the volume of food production to alleviate the starvation that plagues our world today; and millions of skilled engineering workers are denied the right to work, those who could produce the very agricultural equipment that the third world desperately needs.

Here in our Western European Union it is our purpose, indeed our sole function, to defend and maintain human rights. If we are not able to defend human rights and extend them we are all wasting our time, because that is our function and that is our primary purpose. But to defend parliamentary rights and the right of a free press, the right to have free trade unions and to move from country to country freely is not the end of human rights. Shakespeare put into the mouth of Shylock the words: "He owns my life who owns the means whereby I live" – and here in our Europe nine million of our people are denied the right to do useful work.

It seems dreadful that we political people have the power but are not using it to co-ordinate the skills of our labour force in Europe to solve some of the world's problems of poverty and scarcity. Our function, however, is to maintain and advance human freedom, and in so far as we still have to fight for these great principles, this Western European Union is an important contribution to our civilisation.

Those are the few words I wanted to say. I shall now proceed with the business of the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the ratification of credentials. The list of representatives and substitutes attending the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, I have to inform the Assembly that all credentials were ratified by the Council of Europe on 26th April 1982 and have been communicated to us by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) provides that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, Rule 10(2) states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of the President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives. Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Fred Mulley, a representative of the United Kingdom. This nomination has been correctly submitted in the form laid down by our rules. If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that we elect Mr. Mulley by acclamation.

Is there any opposition?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

Accordingly, I proclaim Mr. Mulley President of the Assembly of Western European Union and I invite him to take the chair.

(Mr. Mulley then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Edwards, fellow members of the Assembly, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank Mr. Edwards for having presided as Provisional President *doyen d'age* and for his inspiring remarks. I deem it a privilege to have been elected under his presidency. As well as having a long career as a socialist, as a trade unionist and as a member of parliament, he has also been a good European since those days when he fought, unhappily unsuccessfully, for freedom and democracy in Spain more than forty years ago.

I should also like to thank members of the Assembly for paying me the honour of electing me your President for the third time. I should like to say how much I have been supported by the staff, the all too small but nevertheless extremely competent staff, of the Assembly, and also the support I have received from members of the Assembly, particularly members of the Presidential Committee. I shall seek, with your support, as I have in the previous two years, to try to enhance the status and the importance of this Assembly. We can measure our success only in terms of our influence on public opinion and the impact that we have on our national parliaments. That success will

The President (continued)

come only through the work of members of the Assembly itself.

While we are all extremely familiar with the problems that face members of the Assembly, we are obliged also to be members of the Council of Europe. It is an old difficulty with which we have had to contend since the inception of the Assembly. It has been much discussed but no solution has been found to the problem of dual membership of the two bodies that make conflicting demands from time to time, together with the increasing demands of our national parliaments and our constituents.

It is nevertheless essential, if our Assembly is to do its work, that we get the full support of members in the Assembly itself but more particularly in the committees where the great majority of the Assembly's work has to be done, and where the great impact is made. I should also like to express my personal thanks for the courtesy and help that I have received during the year from the often abused permanent representatives of the Council of Ministers. They have worked extremely well with us in the past year. I wish to make that clear.

I do not think, however, that anyone would deny the importance of the function and the rôle of the Assembly. We are, of course, as is frequently stated, the only European assembly with specific responsibilities in defence, security and disarmament, the only one that reports directly and has a dialogue with the Council of Ministers of our member countries. We all seek to increase its influence and importance. I welcome particularly the intention of the French Government to seek to present ideas for a bigger rôle for the Assembly. I look forward immensely to the speech that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Cheysson, is to deliver tomorrow.

I should also say in passing that, following the decisions of the Assembly last December, I have been in touch with the President of the European Parliament. While the Bureau of the European Parliament is unwilling in present circumstances to see any form of institutional link, it has been agreed that we should work at secretarial, rapporteur and informal levels closely with the European Parliament in matters of common interest. The Presidential Committee invited the European Parliament to send two official observers to this part-session but, because they are meeting in Strasbourg, they have not been able to do so on this occasion. I hope that they will be able to send some official observers to our next meeting, at the end of the year.

As Mr. Edwards said, we are constantly faced with new problems. We meet at a time when

the international situation is most difficult and uncertain. It is immensely worrying that we constantly get additional problems but never seem to solve the old problems. Only in recent months a new problem has arisen in the South Atlantic in which my own country is involved where the Argentine took possession, in violation of all canons of international law, of the Falkland Islands and where the British Government saw the need to restore British possession. More recently still there have been serious developments in Lebanon.

At the same time, although there has been little reason in recent years to feel encouraged, there are signs at least that something may be happening in disarmament.

All wish well the new session of the United Nations on disarmament that began last week. I believe that our ministerial guest today, the Chairman-in-Office, has already addressed the United Nations. Many leaders will be doing so in the next week. The intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations are due to begin at the end of the month, on 29th June. We should like to see a start to the talks that have replaced SALT in the politics of defence technology with negotiations on the reduction in nuclear weapons.

That means that we in the Assembly have more business than ever to transact. I have often wondered why it is put on the agenda that the President should make an address before we adopt the order of business for the session. I have a feeling that there might be objections to the President's making an address and so that address is given first. There is a temptation for me to give a personal view of all the enormous issues that will face us as an Assembly during the week. However, I feel that I should resist that temptation and should seek by example as well as precept to stress the importance of short speeches by rapporteurs, chairmen and delegates if we are to have any chance of completing our business and of meeting the objective that I know will appeal to many delegates - finishing before 6 o'clock on Thursday evening. Therefore, I do not propose to address myself to those issues. I shall be forbidden by the rules to speak on them after the next few minutes.

However, I believe that we can make a success of the Assembly. Although there are basic and fundamental differences of view in the Assembly on many of the issues that will come up, I believe that we can demonstrate by democratic debate and decision that, as European parliamentarians representing our national parliaments, we are prepared to face up to the serious problems of defence and security. I stress once again that in talking of defence and security I do not exclude the importance of

The President (continued)

arms control and disarmament. I should not be so active and fervent a supporter of the North Atlantic Alliance if I did not believe that a collective will for disarmament and arms control was equally important and needed collective decisions.

Talking of the North Atlantic Treaty, important though it is, it is worth reminding ourselves as well as the nations that we represent that the Brussels Treaty that created this organisation is far more of a commitment to mutual assistance in defence than is the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, we have a responsibility as parliamentarians to put the issues clearly before our people. I am confident that we shall do so during this afternoon's sitting. Thank you very much.

7. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. Rule 10 also states that no representative may stand unless his proposal has been submitted in writing in the approved manner, and that representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

So far two candidates have been nominated, Mr. Gessner of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mr. Maravalle of Italy. I understand that we shall receive nominations for the other posts later in our proceedings. If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of Vice-Presidents should be by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

There is none and I therefore declare that the two gentlemen are elected in the following order of precedence, following the alphabet, Mr. Gessner and Mr. Maravalle.

8. Observers

The PRESIDENT. – We have as observers Mr. Jose Luis do Amaral Nunes and Mr. Antoniou Mendes of Portugal, Dr. John Gilbert of the United Kingdom and Mr. Helmuth Möhring of the Federal Republic of Germany. On behalf of the Assembly I should like to extend a warm welcome to our col-

leagues. We invited the European Parliament to send two official observers but, for the reasons I have given, it has not been able to do so on this occasion.

9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 903)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the next order of the day, which is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly

I should now inform the Assembly that I have received under the rules a motion for a request for urgent debate tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and a number of colleagues on the question of the grave situation in the Middle East. I give notice that that request has been received. It will be necessary for the Assembly to take a view on whether we should add it to our order of business. I propose to put that purely procedural debate – there can be only a speech for and a speech against and a vote – at the conclusion of the Minister's address, which will follow our adoption of the order of business. Is there any one wishing to speak on the order of business?

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Would it be in order for us to congratulate Belgium and our Belgian colleagues on their success in the world cup first round when they defeated the previous champions?

The PRESIDENT. – We have a full agenda. While I should like to discuss the world cup, I do not think that we can put it on the agenda. I am sure that you are not alone, Mr. Jessel, in welcoming the victory of Belgium yesterday. We have the privilege of the Belgian Foreign Minister being with us. He would probably say that the whole of Belgium is equally delighted.

Are there any other points of order on the business? If not, may I take it that the order of business has been adopted? It is obviously subject to change and depends on how long we take on each of the items.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – Without seeking to delay the proceedings, I should like to rely on your advice, always assuming that you are prepared to give it, Mr. President, on whether it would be appropriate to comment on certain of your presidential remarks.

You appealed to members of the Assembly to fulfil their responsibilities in attending meetings and committees, and I support that appeal. It

Mr. Urwin (continued)

is within our competence in some respects to improve the attendance of members at committees. As recently as a few weeks ago, when the Political Committee of the Council of Europe was meeting in Jerusalem, several members of the committee decided not to visit Jerusalem with the committee but to attend the meeting of this organisation in London. The time is ripe as never before for there to be greater co-ordination of the respective secretariats to ensure that that clash of major responsibilities does not recur.

The PRESIDENT. — That point has been discussed by the Presidential Committee. The date with which you are concerned, Mr. Urwin, is that given to us by the Council of Ministers for the annual meetings with the Presidential, Defence and General Affairs Committees. We can check the record. That decision pre-dated the decision of the committee of the Council of Europe to go to Jerusalem. That decision was finally made in April.

Your general point, Mr. Urwin, is sound. We try to avoid clashing with Council of Europe meetings. We hope that as you are an important member of the Council of Europe and Vice-President as well as chairman of a political group and a committee there, you will use your influence to see that they do not clash with our activities. That complaint has been discussed. It was due to the fact that the date was given a long time ago by the British Government, by the British Foreign Minister, who was Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The date was to meet his convenience. As it happened, he was not in office when the meeting took place, but that was not foreseen.

If there are no other points, perhaps we may proceed with the adoption of the order of business for the first part of the twenty-eighth session.

As members will see, we have a heavy work load, apart from the probability that we shall have additional work given to us in due course. Therefore, I propose, under Rule 33(1) of the Rules of Procedure, that for all our debates in this part-session there should be a limit of five minutes on all speeches, with the exception of those of chairmen of committees and rapporteurs. Nevertheless, I hope that the chairmen of committees and rapporteurs will exercise maximum restraint. If we are to have restraint on speeches, it should be done uniformly throughout rather than imposing a limit of two minutes on speeches towards the end of the week, as has been known to happen on other occasions. It is for the Assembly to decide without debate. Of course, if we find that we have time in hand, we can change our

minds later. However, for the present I propose that all speeches, other than those by chairmen of committees and rapporteurs, should be limited to five minutes.

Is there any objection?...

As there are no objections, the draft order of business is adopted.

10. *Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee*

(Doc. 910)

The PRESIDENT. — We now come to the order of the day dealing with the ratification of decisions taken by the Presidential Committee.

In the course of the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 8th January, we invited the General Affairs Committee to undertake a review of the evolution of the situation in Poland. At our meeting on 8th February we adopted Recommendation 378, Document 910, which the Assembly is now called upon to ratify on the understanding that, in accordance with the order of business, the Assembly will be asked on Wednesday to consider a report and further recommendation on the same topic.

Is there any opposition to the ratification of Recommendation 378 on the evolution of the situation in Poland?

That recommendation is adopted¹.

11. *Twenty-seventh annual report of the Council*

(Presentation by Mr. Tindemans, Belgian
Minister for External Relations,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
Doc. 905)

The PRESIDENT. — The next order of the day is the presentation of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 905 by Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

I am particularly glad to have reached this point at precisely 3.30 p.m., which was the best time that I could forecast, because Mr. Tindemans, whom we welcome as Chairman-in-Office of the Council to present the report of the Council, is an extremely busy man because he is also the Chairman-in-Office of the European Community and, in that capacity, he has to leave this afternoon to address the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

1. See page 19.

The President (continued)

I am sure that he will have noted what was said about the success of his country's football team yesterday. I shall go further than Mr. Jessel and wish his team the very best of success, so that it comes top of that particular section, because it might avoid some possibly embarrassing football matches later in the world cup competition.

Mr. Tindemans is well known in European circles as a former Prime Minister and Minister of his country. It is a tremendous pleasure, Mr. Tindemans, to welcome you at the beginning of the most convenient time for us, though perhaps not for you, to present the report of the Council so that we may have the Council's views before we debate our suggested response.

I invite you, Mr. Tindemans, with great pleasure, to address us. I should tell my colleagues that you have kindly undertaken to answer questions at the end of your speech. Would you care to come to the rostrum? (*Applause*)

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. President, perhaps you will allow me to thank you and especially Mr. Jessel for the point of order, which has been well taken and fully appreciated.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to thank you first of all for your kind words of welcome. And on behalf of the Council, as well as personally, may I take this opportunity to congratulate you on your re-election as President of this Assembly.

It gives me great pleasure to speak for the Council in conveying its admiration for the good humour and firmness you display in presiding over the discussions held in this Assembly.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is an honour and a pleasure for me to take the floor here today in order to submit to you first of all, in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office, the Council's report on its activities in 1981, together with a few observations on the first months of the current year.

As Belgium's Minister for External Relations I shall devote the second part of my statement to the ideas provoked by and the means of meeting the challenges which Europe must face in order to ensure its security in a deeply-divided world.

As it noted again at its last session in London, the Council fully appreciates the very considerable services which your Assembly renders to Europe's cause by regularly studying the basic problems affecting the security and essen-

tial unity of Europe, and by submitting its views to the governments of the member states.

Your Assembly, it is hardly necessary to repeat, is the only European parliamentary body empowered, by virtue of a treaty, to discuss defence matters which are of crucial importance to our countries, and of which – as the current climate requires – the general public in our countries must be made more aware.

It is the constant concern of the Council to assist in the proper accomplishment of the Assembly's rôle by maintaining a sustained dialogue with it on all matters which come within the scope of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those which are dealt with by the governments of the member states of WEU in various other international institutions.

For its part, the Council is convinced that more regular contacts – both formal and informal – with the representatives of the Assembly's various committees would be useful, as shown by the excellent climate in which the joint meetings took place in London last month. It wishes to underline the importance it attaches to the participation of representatives of the member governments, and especially the ministers of defence, in your deliberations. The Council will continue to encourage such participation in response to your legitimate desire to be better informed about our governments' views on all matters of concern to us.

During the period in question, the Council pursued its activities with the dual objective of ensuring that the obligations defined under the treaty are properly fulfilled and avoiding duplication of its own work with that of member states in groupings such as European political co-operation, the Atlantic Alliance and the Independent European Programme Group.

As part of its last two annual sessions, the Council had in-depth discussions on various political matters of current interest. In the military sphere, the Council continued to maintain a close watch over the implementation of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols relating to the levels of forces and armaments in the member states. The procedures laid down for this purpose functioned normally.

The Agency for the Control of Armaments continued to perform efficiently the tasks assigned to it under the treaty. In this connection I should like to pay tribute to the excellent service rendered by General Leonelli, whose term of office with your organisation ended recently. His successor as head of the Agency, General Rambaldi, has embarked on his new functions with the most commendable perceptiveness and energy.

Mr. Tindemans (continued)

As part of its mandate from the Council, the Standing Armaments Committee is continuing with its work in the armaments sector of the member countries' industries, without neglecting its other areas of activity. The high standard of the work done by this government body illustrates its ability to make a useful contribution to the vital reinforcement of European co-operation in the realm of armaments.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have examined with great interest the reports prepared by the Assembly committees in response to the Council's annual report. You may be sure that the Council will pay the closest attention to your recommendations to it following your deliberations.

By way of conclusion to this part of my statement, may I reaffirm WEU member countries' adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols and their determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into. They stress once again the importance they attach to the commitment to collective self-defence contained in Article V of the treaty, which is one of the cornerstones of the European security system.

The Council, whose rôle is to discuss a wide variety of subjects, continues to be a flexible body and has sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the application of the treaty.

In the matter of armaments control, the Council has repeatedly indicated its wish to take account of the changing situation in Europe and can always take advantage of the procedural rules which empower it to make whatever adjustments may be required as a result of technical advances in the armaments field.

The Council expects all the constituent bodies of WEU to continue to contribute harmoniously to the effective implementation of the treaty's objectives, without losing sight of the pressing need for moderation in financial respects which is incumbent on all international organisations in the present budget situation.

Mr. President, consideration for others often makes one reluctant to repeat the apparently obvious, and one is often wrong. There are things one must have the courage to repeat, if only to ensure that they are not forgotten by the public, or to prevent people from failing to react to them through sheer familiarity.

So let me repeat before this forum that there is a growing number of sources of tension, instability and conflict in the world today and they are becoming increasingly acute and increasingly dangerous.

It is a paradox of our times that, as the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament opened in New York a few days ago, a series of wars which have been tearing several regions of the world apart should have taken a more violent, more alarming and more explosive turn than ever. I could not forbear from pointing this out in the speech which I delivered at this special session.

Hardly a region in the world has escaped the contagion: the Middle East, the Near East, South Africa, Western Asia and – with Poland – Europe. In varying degrees, and more or less directly, all these conflicts affect the security of our countries.

Experience has shown it was possible to preserve that security only in a context of European and Atlantic solidarity. No one, I believe, would think of questioning this truth. Yet because of the very success of this policy which has preserved peace in Europe for over thirty-five years, some people, especially among the younger generations, are no longer sufficiently aware of the cause-and-effect relationship between the peace they enjoy and the policy of European and Atlantic solidarity pursued by our governments.

I do not think it would be superfluous, therefore, to reaffirm once more the principles on which our security policy is founded.

In the first place, this policy rests on European and Atlantic solidarity, in conformity with the United Nations Charter which explicitly recognises the right to legitimate individual or collective self-defence.

Secondly, our alliances are essentially defensive in character and aim at "resisting any policy of aggression", as stated in the preamble to the Brussels Treaty, and at uniting "their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security", as stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Thirdly, our alliances are not merely military organisations or mere defence mechanisms; they are also a group of countries with common values – human dignity, civic and individual liberties, the traditions of pluralistic democracy, respect for law and order.

Although this Assembly is well aware of these facts, it is worth proclaiming them once more from this platform, for while in the past we have made frequent pronouncements regarding the dangers threatening our societies, perhaps we have not always given sufficient prominence to what we mean to defend. For the values I have just listed are often taken for granted, and it may, therefore, be worth recalling that this common heritage could be threa-

Mr. Tindemans (continued)

tened and that it must and should be defended at the cost of ceaseless effort.

Fourthly, from its inception, but even more explicitly in the report on future tasks of the Alliance prepared on the initiative of my illustrious predecessor, Mr. Pierre Harmel, the Atlantic Alliance recognised that it had a dual function to fulfil: to defend us whilst remaining open to dialogue and détente.

Where defence is concerned, we must hold to a principle which has served us well over the past decades, that of deterrence, which I would define as the art of minimising the danger of war by maximising the risks a potential aggressor would run. He must, on this account, be left in doubt as to the means which the allies intend to use for their defence. This is the concept of flexible defence in a nutshell, and it seems clear to me that, in this context, the Atlantic Alliance cannot, as some have advocated, renounce the right to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons. What the Alliance can and must do is to affirm that it will never be the first to attack and will never engage in an act of aggression. But where its own defence is concerned, the choice of means must be in its own hands.

At the same time, however, allied policy seeks to preserve security through dialogue and negotiation. Indeed, we recognise that we can strengthen our security by endeavouring to reduce the balance of forces to the lowest possible level. Our position in this respect is perfectly clear: we decline to be placed in a position of inferiority that would expose us to the danger of attack or to restraints placed on our independence. Consequently, our target is a balance of forces, which we are prepared to secure by arming ourselves if necessary, but which we ardently desire to achieve through negotiation if possible.

In this regard, the position of the members of the Atlantic Alliance has been clear-cut. In a speech he made on 18th November last, President Reagan indicated the willingness of the United States to negotiate on all levels: strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate range nuclear weapons, conventional forces and confidence-building measures. As the deliberations of the Atlantic Council and the declarations made by our governments show, this programme was approved by all the allies and is currently being applied in practice.

On 30th November last, negotiations began in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear systems (INF).

On 9th May the President of the United States made an offer to the Soviet Union to

begin negotiations on a substantial reduction in the strategic systems. This offer has now been accepted and the START negotiations are to begin on 29th June next in Geneva.

At the Bonn Atlantic summit on 10th June we worked out a proposal for reviving the Vienna MBFR negotiations on conventional forces.

It is our hope, finally, that when deliberations resume in Madrid next November it will be possible for the CSCE process, to which our western nations firmly adhere, to result in a conference on disarmament in Europe at which confidence-building measures would be adopted.

If the allies are open to negotiation, it is because we recognise that far from being a concession to the other side, this is in line with our own interests. Unilateral decisions, dressed up as they are to look good, remain precarious because they are unverifiable and revocable. Concrete, binding and verifiable agreements are a far better guarantee of security.

It is clear, moreover, that for such negotiations to be successful, the parties involved must not only negotiate seriously and in good faith, but must demonstrate, by their general behaviour, a certain moderation without which even the atmosphere of the talks would be jeopardised.

Firmness and resolution in defence, openness to dialogue: these, in short, are the two pillars on which Europe's security policy must rest.

Fifthly, where and how should this policy be applied? This is the question on which I should now like to dwell for a moment.

It seems to me that here we must allow ourselves to be guided by a principle and an idea.

The principle requires that our security policy be pursued in complete solidarity with our allies on the other side of the Atlantic. Indeed it would be entirely illusory to seek some sort of purely European way of maintaining security. The Atlantic Alliance is and must remain the cornerstone of our entire edifice.

Within the Alliance it is sound and legitimate for the European countries to make every effort to recognise the security interests specific to our continent. The idea then would be for us to endeavour to develop the European pillar of the Alliance by spelling out the mechanisms and procedures we propose to use to that end. I do not think all the possibilities here have yet been exploited.

Western European Union is a privileged forum and your Assembly possesses unique

Mr. Tindemans (continued)

competence in defence and security matters. Even if all our interested partners do not at present belong to it, it is none the less a well-tryed and tested tool, particularly by reason of its dependent bodies.

For their part, the Ten, by reason of their economic cohesion and increasingly close political consultation, provide another channel which should prove promising. I salute the very timely initiative of Mr. Genscher and Mr. Colombo, which as you know, gave rise to organised deliberations on the part of the Ten. A working group has devoted several sittings to this, and in a few days time, on 20th June, my colleagues and I will be doing our best to explore the matter still more deeply.

In any event, we have the necessary tools, and while it may be premature to make a final choice among them, it is clear that we must make greater use of the existing institutions. In my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, I am ready to seize any opportunity offered to me for in-depth consultations, to try to reconcile viewpoints and, in a word, to help to develop our thinking. With regard to Belgium, she is prepared to listen to any useful suggestions and to make use, without prejudice, of any formula likely to foster European co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance.

It seems to me that, in this respect, public opinion is ahead of our governments' achievements so far. The public is sensitive to everything connected with Europe's destiny, unity and activity in the world. It is up to us to seek patiently, but with obstinacy and perseverance, the ways and means of responding adequately to their hopes. WEU is certainly the appropriate instance for such deliberations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure, Minister, that I speak on behalf of all members of the Assembly in thanking you most warmly for your comprehensive and succinct report on behalf of the Council. We shall all take to heart your underlining of the keystone of the North Atlantic Alliance and the fact that we must work closely with our North American colleagues and allies. We all greatly welcome your undertaking to do all you can to consult and to work on behalf of the organisation during your term of office.

Minister, you have generously undertaken to answer questions. As a parliamentarian I know that you would wish to answer every question directly but, since time is against both you and us, it would be convenient if members of the Assembly could try to group their questions so that if we get several on the same subject you could reply to them together.

I notice that Mr. De Poi wishes to raise a question. If he will do so, we shall then see whether anyone wishes to come in on a similar point.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I agree with the general spirit of Mr. Tindemans' statement. I am pleased at what he has just told us, but I would like to underline a passage in his speech concerning the Agency for the Control of Armaments. For the last twenty-six years the Agency has been operating a control system which has proved itself from the technical point of view but which applies solely to lists of weapons many of which have been rendered obsolete by technical progress. I ask the Council's Chairman-in-Office whether he considers that the lists appended to Protocols Nos. III and IV still correspond to the technical realities of 1982, whether it is possible and desirable to update them and whether he thinks the experience gained by the Agency could be used in other contexts in order to help resolve problems arising out of armaments control. At the same time, I wish General Rambaldi, who has just become head of the Agency, a satisfying term of office.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

Does any other member wish to raise a point concerning the Agency for the Control of Armaments?

If not, you might like to deal with that straight away, Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Council is always prepared to consider proposals for amendments to the annexes to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty in accordance with the procedure laid down. No specific proposal has currently been referred to it. The conventional weapons which are subject to control under the terms of Protocol No. III of the treaty are classed in two separate lists – Annexes III and IV of the protocol. These two annexes can be amended only by virtue of different procedures and texts. In the case of a certain number of conventional weapons, the limitations and bans on manufacture stipulated in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Annex III, which concern one of the member states of the union, can be amended or cancelled, and in particular if a Council resolution is voted in by a two-thirds majority. This procedure has been used on several occasions, the last time being in July 1980 in connection with warships other than small defensive vessels.

As for Annex IV, it contains the list of armaments whose levels must be controlled in all the member states on the European continent. By virtue of Article V of Protocol No. III, "The

Mr. Tindemans (continued)

WEU Council may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision". So far, the annex has never been modified. If there were grounds for the Council to re-examine these lists, it would do so in total compliance with the procedures laid down by the treaty.

I join in your tribute to the Agency and am fully in agreement with you. I would like to look into the idea you have just put forward, suggesting that the Agency might work for the Assembly, but I cannot give you a definite answer today.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The Minister has reviewed a great number of problems in a short space of time, but I was struck by a certain discrepancy between the Council's report and the work of this Assembly, concerning specifically West-West relations, or relations between the countries of Western European Union and the United States. I should like to ask the Minister whether he shares the view of various members of the General Affairs Committee, which recently visited the United States, that consultations between the two sides must be improved, and this means not only official but also, and in particular, more informal contacts.

I am referring to some extent to the line adopted in the reports by Ministers Genscher and Colombo, but I should like to go a little further. What I have in mind is informal contacts between the Counsellor for Political Affairs and what is known as the Political Committee for European Political Cooperation. The Europeans sometimes see each other once a week. The Europeans and Americans see each other only twice a year.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to ask a question relating to consultations between ourselves and the Council, in particular with the United States?

I call Mr. Tindemans.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – With your permission, Mr. President, I should now like to reply in Dutch. I completely agree with the General Affairs Committee that relations between Europe and Western European Union, or the Community, on the one hand and the United States on the other can never be good enough and that, in addition to official contacts, any kind of unofficial contact should be encouraged. In this connection, I am trying to persuade the Council to agree to the Genscher-Colombo proposals as a cohesive whole. I

cannot deny, however, that this is an extremely difficult task. The Council will be devoting an evening meeting to this question next Sunday.

Secondly, I should like to point out that it has now been decided that there should also be political contacts and talks within NATO. The first of these will take place in Canada in September. This has already been decided.

Thirdly, I wish to say that it is my personal conviction – I am not now speaking as President of the Council – that we must find a forum in which both the economic and the political problems that may arise in relations between the United States and the European Community can be freely discussed. I have defended this idea with great conviction, but so far without success.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I shall call next Mr. Urwin, then Mr. Pignion, followed by Mrs. Knight.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – In the light of the Minister's last few remarks, perhaps I could have associated my question with that of Mr. van Eekelen, at least to some extent. I should like to ask Mr. Tindemans for his appraisal of the progress towards European union. In the light of the rôle of Western European Union and its right to be regarded as the only European forum with responsibility for defence questions, I should like to know how he sees the rôle of Western European Union within the development of full European union.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As I said in my speech, so far the only European forum with competence in defence matters is Western European Union. For some years, however, there has been much talk of moving from the European Communities phase to the European union phase. In the early 1970s heads of state and government in Europe had already declared their wish to bring the European union into being within the decade. But that decade has already gone by. A European union, by definition, should also have competence to deal with external relations and defence and security.

Implicit in the concept of European union, therefore, is the idea of competence in security or defence matters. For the time being, however, we are still in the European Community stage; your question is therefore premature. Nevertheless, I am aware that the Genscher-Colombo proposals also refer to security policy, that is to say the political aspects of defence and certain economic aspects; these proposals have not, however, been approved so far. I should like to add a detail: in 1975 the Nine went to the Helsinki Conference and authorised

Mr. Tindemans (continued)

their President of the time, the late Aldo Moro, to be their spokesman. The official title of the conference was Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Alas, I have to record that when this conference was being prepared no debate on security had taken place within the Community or among the Nine, as they were then. The same was true of the Madrid meeting held in February this year. Although the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, whom you know, was invited by the Ten to be their spokesman on security and co-operation in Europe – for there is awareness of the need for a debate on security in Europe – I repeat that at this time the Ten have competence neither in the area of political co-operation nor, of course, in that of the treaties. That is how the matter stands.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask a specific question which follows directly from Chairman Tindemans' remarks, inasmuch as it would seem that there has not always been concerted action. In connection with the conflict over the Falkland Islands, we deplored the fact that the Council did not make its presence felt more.

Were any demands for the withdrawal of the British forces from the army of the Rhine referred to the Council following the Falklands crisis?

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Ten naturally devoted several meetings to the crisis in the Falkland Islands; they even published a communiqué on two occasions. But the matter you have just raised has never been discussed.

The PRESIDENT. – Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – The Afghanistan section of the report rightly calls attention to the intervention by the Soviet Union. The section must have been written before we were aware that germ warfare had been involved in the conflict. The report mentions the effort by the Islamic conference, the European Council and the United Nations Secretary-General and recalls the proposal by the European Council, all with a view to getting some recognition of the fact that the Soviets must withdraw.

As we appear to be utterly impotent in all those efforts, as it is now over two years since the invasion took place and as there are over two and a half million refugees in Pakistan, which I recently visited, I wonder whether Mr.

Tindemans has any hope of an initiative being taken, such as imposing sanctions, to impress upon the Soviets that the world expects them to withdraw.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that members will ask questions that are not in the form of a speech.

I call Mr. Tindemans.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – With regard to the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan: Firstly, the Council initially proposed that the European Parliament should ask all the member states of the Community to organise a day to be devoted to that country, and it then invited the governments of the member states to deliver a statement on television on that occasion. I believe this was done in all the member states. Secondly, the Ten proposed negotiations of a political nature aimed at resolving the Afghanistan problem. Thirdly, the Ten took steps in relation to the Soviet Union, designed to exert pressure on that country in order to find a solution to the Afghanistan problem and enable the Afghan people to recover their freedom.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sénès.

Mr. SÉNÈS (*France*) (Translation). – My question concerns the Falkland Islands conflict, and to some extent follows from Mr. Pignion's question.

At its meeting on 5th May last, the NATO Eurogroup condemned Argentina's aggression against the Falkland Islands. Why did not the government involved refer this affair to the WEU Council, as Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty invites them to? Why did they not mention it at all at the inter-ministerial meeting on 19th May last?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tindemans.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Following the occupation of the Falkland Islands, the Ten met and immediately took economic measures against Argentina in order to exert pressure on her to agree to negotiate and seek a political solution. Measures were also taken within the framework of NATO. So the organisations did react, on both these levels.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Those of us who have been in the European Parliament know only too well how much Mr. Tindemans has done over the years to bring about European unity.

Mr. Osborn (continued)

I should like to follow Mr. Urwin's question. Does Mr. Tindemans see a closer tie between the European Community and Western European Union readily emanating in the next decade? Does he see a will at Council level, through the Commission and within Western European Union, to achieve the aim to which he referred?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tindemans.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as matters stand at present, I see no change in the relations between the European Economic Community and Western European Union.

As I said before, since the early 1970s there has been talk of moving from the Community phase to the European union phase. But such a union would have to be given competence in matters of security or defence and in external relations, or international politics shall we say. This has not happened up to now, and so I do not see what could be done for the time being.

At one point, the following question came up: if competence in the area of security were given to the European Parliament tomorrow – though, as I say, I am somewhat sceptical as to any immediate realisation – then the problem of relations between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Assembly, i.e. the European Parliament, would arise; however, it does not arise now.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to ask the Minister a question? I know that you are under pressure because of the time available to you Mr. Tindemans. I would not wish you to go without expressing how grateful we are to you for your presentation of the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council and for the admirable way in which you dealt with a wide variety of not exactly easy questions from our experienced parliamentarians. Those questions were also about activities beyond those of Western European Union.

We look forward to continuing a close association with you during your year of office as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and also with your colleagues on the Permanent Council. We hope very much that you will have a safe and successful journey to Strasbourg and will come away without too much difficulty from our colleagues there. Thank you very much.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish

to thank you for the welcome you extended to me. Let me say that I have great hopes of this contact in the course of my tenure as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU.

12. *Situation in the Middle East*

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 922)

The PRESIDENT. – As I indicated earlier, we now have to turn to the procedural motion of urgency that has been tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and a number of his colleagues, Document 922.

I think that Sir Frederic intends to move the motion. In that case, the question of the chairman of the relevant committee speaking additionally will not arise. We do not yet have a Bureau. The Bureau will not wish to speak. Therefore, it will mean there being one speaker in favour of the motion. If there are any members against the motion, there will be one speaker against the motion that we should consider the grave situation in the Middle East as a matter of urgency.

I should stress that at this stage we are discussing not the substance of the motion but only the limited question whether we should make provision on our agenda for this item. Apart from the decision at an earlier stage that speeches should be limited to five minutes, the rules also in this instance limit speeches to five minutes.

I invite Sir Frederic Bennett to move his motion of urgency.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I should not have thought that there would be any need to take advantage of your ruling on the five-minute limitation even on this subject.

My task this afternoon is to ask for the Assembly's support for a matter on which there ought to be unanimity. Having listened to Mr. Tindemans, who has just departed, I believe that during our proceedings this week we should take account of an event of obviously overwhelming and almost frightening potential importance in regard to the security of Europe – namely, the current tragic situation in the Middle East.

As you have rightly said, Mr. President, this is not the occasion – and you would rule me out of order – to talk about the merits of this obviously grave situation. All too often, since Western European Union meets only twice a year, we have debates on events that have not yet happened but that may happen or on events that are largely out of date. It so happens that

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

we are meeting on an occasion when a situation of enormous gravity has arisen, affecting the security and stability of the Middle East and the security of Europe, which is our primary responsibility.

I am asking that during these days, at a time to be selected according to your discretion, Mr. President, we should have what need not be a long debate on a recommendation, yet to be prepared as a matter of urgency by the committee of which I have the honour to be chairman, on the gravity of the situation in the Middle East, so that this Assembly can take account of something that is happening and that affects our security and can at least let its voice be heard at a time when national parliaments and other organisations are letting their voices be heard.

I hope that, having in no way entered into the controversial merits of the situation, we can unanimously agree that there should be a debate, as suggested in this motion, with your consent, Mr. President, and that of the Assembly, on the grave and dangerous situation in the Middle East.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic. The motion has been circulated as Document 922. It says:

“ The Assembly,

In view of the grave situation in the Middle East,

ASKS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To present a draft recommendation on that matter during the present part-session.”

If the motion is carried, it will be necessary to find time in the timetable for such a debate. That is most likely to be on Wednesday afternoon after the debate on Poland.

First, does anyone wish to oppose the motion that we should allow time for a debate on the situation in the Middle East?

Do you wish to oppose the motion, Mr. Urwin?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – No, I am not rising to oppose it.

The PRESIDENT. – Under the rules, only one speech is permitted in favour and one against the motion. I must ask whether anyone wants to speak against the motion. There can be no general debate. I am bound by the rules. I have no discretion.

Does anyone wish to speak against the proposal?

If not, unless you have a point of order, Mr. Urwin...

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I could use the subterfuge of a point of order but I refuse to do that. I simply want to make a brief observation.

I took a quick glance at the signatures appended to the notice of motion and was surprised to see that no member of the Socialist Group was included among the signatories. That being so, as a member of the Socialist Group, I should make it absolutely clear that the Socialist Group fully supports the principle involved and the request for a special debate on the situation in the Middle East.

The PRESIDENT. – You have not used the subterfuge of a point of order, Mr. Urwin, but you have used another subterfuge to get me into great trouble, because I am in breach of the rules.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have a genuine point of order, Mr. President. I am sure that Mr. Urwin, a most erudite gentleman, has not noticed that the first thing that I did on arrival was to seek the support of Mr. Stoffelen, who is a prominent member of the Socialist Group, and he has seconded the motion to which I referred.

The PRESIDENT. – Unfortunately, for some reason, that is not on the printed list.

As no opposition has manifested itself, I take it that there is no opposition to Sir Frederic Bennett's motion. That being so, I declare it carried. As I said, subject to the progress of business, we shall seek to take it on Wednesday following the debate on Poland.

The draft order is adopted¹.

13. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 913 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the next order of the day which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 913 and amendment.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

¹. See page 20.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we have heard some good proposals from the Minister Chairman-in-Office of WEU, Mr. Tindemans, whose intentions are unquestionably favourable. But we have observed at the same time that so far as WEU is concerned and not WEU alone, the questions have perhaps not remained unanswered but have been referred to other political institutions.

Personally I feel that this is not the time to dwell on the political activities of the Council of WEU or on the reports which it sends to this Assembly. I will merely say that while the Council formally fulfils its obligations to the Assembly, the modified treaty and its protocols, the reasons which led to the formation of WEU and the rights and duties of member states have long been completely bereft of any material content.

I would recall that even last year the governments belonging to WEU did not find it necessary to call any meeting of the Council apart from the now customary session held at The Hague in June 1981. Yet there was certainly no lack of subjects for discussion, including some specifically within the competence of WEU, or of others which, while within the competence of WEU, involve other international organisations from the Council of Ten to the North Atlantic Council. In my opinion, decisions by the Council of WEU on this second group of subjects would not have been pointless duplication, but would on the contrary have made a useful and in some respects indispensable contribution on such important matters as those involving the security of member countries and of Western Europe.

The Council's inertia is now in blatant contrast with the deterioration of the international situation to the point where three wars are now actually being fought between Iran and Iraq, between Israel and the Palestinians and Syria and between the United Kingdom and Argentina, while the Afghan problem, tension in Poland and the crises in southern Africa and South East Asia are still with us. Has the Council of WEU nothing to say on any of these dramatic issues which seem to be the start of a chain reaction that can now only be halted by the sense of responsibility of the superpowers? And yet with the exception of the Polish crisis, WEU would appear to be the only forum for discussing and arriving at joint decisions on these wars and crises which also involve the security of Europe and the vital interests of our countries. As regards the Soviet and NATO rearmament programmes and the opening of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on medium-range missiles, which are now being extended to strategic nuclear weapons and possibly also conventional

weapons, can we feel satisfied that the individual WEU states are adopting what they consider to be the correct position, either alone or through occasional consultations or in NATO only, but without calling on the headquarters and technical services of WEU?

I feel that I am not mistaking the true facts when I say that we have now reached a turning point in the existence of WEU. Either the organisation to which we belong will be revived by such means and in such ways as are deemed appropriate, on the basis of the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols, or it is destined to a slow and inevitable decline leaving it more and more on the sidelines of European politics. The Council's inertia affects the future of the parliamentary Assembly which is still the forum for major debates and decisions, for extremely valuable and intensive work by its committees and for very close personal co-operation, transcending frontiers, between the parliamentarians taking part.

But the Assembly cannot fill the gaps left by the Council; the activities and responsibilities entrusted to the Assembly by the Brussels Treaty can only be carried out effectively in association with the work of the Council. It may be argued that this decline of WEU is one aspect of the serious crisis through which the other European organisations, including the economic institutions, are now passing. This is true but it is not the whole story. This is proved by the fact that no government has declared itself against WEU or has criticised it seriously; no government considers that our organisation has now been superseded, either politically or militarily by other European international organisations or by NATO. On the contrary, the Council's inertia contrasts with authoritative statements made by governments and individual ministers who have recognised and continue to recognise that WEU is the only forum where the European countries can and must discuss common problems of political and military security and therefore all questions relating to armaments, arms control policy and disarmament. Nor should it be forgotten that the decisions which WEU is empowered by treaty to take would have to be implemented automatically without territorial limits; these are powers which NATO itself does not possess.

In the draft recommendation which I am introducing on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and to an even greater extent in the accompanying report, attention is drawn to the proposals which, as members will recall, the Secretary of State, Mr. Lemoine, put forward in the Assembly in December 1981 in the name of the French Government. We felt that these proposals should not be dropped but rather should be discussed by the Assembly both to

Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)

assess their real value and to ascertain the views of the European governments other than France belonging to WEU.

Precisely for these reasons, the General Affairs Committee felt that the Assembly should not confine itself to a vote expressing general support for a reactivation of the WEU Council but should go further and propose specific forms of action which the Council should take, all within the powers assigned to WEU by the treaties signed and ratified by the countries concerned.

I shall comment only briefly on the proposals in the draft recommendation.

First and foremost, it is the Rapporteur's view that for a variety of reasons, of which I will quote only the main ones, real use should be made of the Standing Armaments Committee. Especially in the very serious international situation of today, it is not only worthwhile but essential that the Council of WEU should make use of the services of an international body qualified to give technical advice on European armaments co-operation and, within the Atlantic Alliance, on European defence problems. Such collaboration could also be valuable for arms reduction and control which are of vital importance today and are subjects on which your Rapporteur believes it to be essential that WEU should agree a joint policy to be put forward during the negotiations now in progress and those shortly to be opened between the United States and the Soviet Union. I shall simply add the obvious remark that within the overall context of security and the balance of nuclear and conventional weapons, a prior consideration is the security of Europe and of our countries which now more than ever need to make their voices heard and to press their arguments during these Soviet-American negotiations which we all hope will produce concrete positive results, favouring peace guaranteed by genuine measures of military and political security.

It is, however, alarming to note that even today our governments are not using the European organisations available to them and that when they do discuss such important questions they only do so elsewhere. These facts are even more alarming when we consider that in some cases differing views are now emerging on defence and disarmament policy not only in national parliaments and among the general public but also as between governments and the WEU countries themselves. If WEU worked properly all these differences and any disagreements would be removed and would appear as genuinely held views expressed in discussions between countries and would not result from

misunderstandings, lack of information or ill-considered confrontations between WEU member governments. The subject becomes even more important because of the fact that the disagreements between European countries are sometimes lumped together with disagreements between Western Europe and the United States, thus creating in that country a frame of mind in which it may assess the situation in a potentially dangerous manner and be encouraged to ignore Europe and to deal directly with the Soviet Union on questions involving Europe's security.

The delicate situation in which we find ourselves can no longer be ignored and must be assessed in all its aspects. On the one hand, we have the political and military weight of the United States which, in Europe, is still the dominant factor in matters of European security and East-West relations and in the Mediterranean in the matter of relations between the Arab countries and Israel. On the other hand not all the European governments accept this dominance as being legitimate but, at the same time, there is at present no alternative policy offering a better guarantee for European security and peace.

For these reasons, which I have touched on only briefly in the draft recommendation I am introducing, the General Affairs Committee feels that it has identified a number of questions and proposals to serve as a basis for reversing the present trend and therefore for starting to breathe fresh life into the Council of WEU, starting from assessments and proposals which may appear limited and in some cases modest – which they are to some extent – but which seek to be realistic in the present circumstances.

I should first like to deal with the delicate question of the pacifist tendencies which have now become so strong particularly among young people in Europe and the United States itself. We must understand the reasons for this which are to be found in the prospect that these young people now have of living, at best, under the threat of nuclear war, a prospect which we all reject but which is even less tolerable for young people who have their whole lives ahead of them. Furthermore, a number of countries have special views regarding their own security because of their special geopolitical position in Europe. If we do not wish these neutralist tendencies and this opting out to gain strength, I feel that the only possible line of action is to adopt and implement, with the necessary resolution and determination, a peace strategy realistically adapted to the present world situation, and, so far as relations between the western world and the Soviet Union are concerned, a peace strategy leading not to a truce or unilateral concessions but to controlled disarmament measures and a form of security

Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)

based on the balance of military strength at the lowest possible level, as Mr. Tindemans himself said a few moments ago. WEU could make its indispensable contribution to this genuine expression of peace from Europe.

In practice, appeals for solidarity, which is particularly essential at present, would be in vain if the effort were not made by the Council of WEU, as by the Councils of the EEC and NATO. Only then would the move towards neutrality and disengagement from the headlong rush to nuclear rearmament appear as what they really are – strong reactions to the present world tension but politically negative. They are negative, because instead of establishing conditions favouring security guaranteed by arms control and the balanced reduction of armaments, they create alarm in Europe and distrust in the United States and may be wrongly interpreted by the Soviet Union. In the one case they are likely to arouse exasperation while in the other they can lead to misunderstandings which will not advance progress on the difficult road towards European and world détente.

We believe that, in a Europe divided between military blocs and in a world where security is first and foremost a matter of the balance of nuclear weapons, the spread of neutralist tendencies and the promotion of unilateral disarmament measures within both the North Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact can only add to the present tension and could lead to a world crisis and even to catastrophe.

While pacifism tending towards neutralism and unilateral disengagement is the wrong answer to a problem which is nevertheless a real one, terrorism has now reached such a scale and spread to so many countries in Western Europe that it is no longer of concern only to the countries directly affected, but to the whole of Europe and therefore to the Council of WEU which cannot continue to ignore a serious, direct threat to European security itself.

I would simply remind the Assembly that international terrorist links are now a proven fact as recognised by the courts. While states may not have certain proofs of terrorism and its ramifications, we now have ample court records and statements by repentant terrorists which prove not only the links between national terrorist organisations but also the determination to extend the crises affecting certain European countries, to destroy internal stability and to wreck not only civilian security and political democracy but also the national and NATO institutions responsible for military security. I shall not recount the cases of terrorism in

France, Germany and Italy, and of leading citizens as well as American officers, who have been attacked and murdered. By virtue of its international attributes the Council of WEU should also be involved in the fight against this kind of terrorism.

There is also the matter of European security in parts of the world outside NATO territory. The fighting now in progress is all taking place in areas outside Europe. But I do not believe that any member here thinks that these flashpoints, including those furthest away from us, do not involve in some way or other the interests and security of our countries and of WEU as a whole. Each of these could trigger off further conflicts and each affects in some way or other world equilibrium and the great powers. Some affect Europe directly; we need only mention the war between Iran and Iraq, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the Falklands crisis in which the United Kingdom, a major member of the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, is directly involved.

Now, these questions are under discussion in the North Atlantic Council, in meetings between the world's most highly industrialised countries, in the Council of Europe and of course in the United Nations Assembly and the Security Council. The only European body empowered by treaty to authorise appropriate measures including military action – the Council of WEU – has not even been convened. Yet, a position discussed and decided in WEU on Latin America, on southern Africa, on the Middle East, on Afghanistan and even on Poland, to mention only the main areas of tension in the world, would not only restore prestige and life to the Council but would be tangible proof that Europe wishes to present a united front to the rest of the world not only on East-West relations but also on issues outside Europe, at least on serious questions which have led to armed conflict.

These examples of Council activities and of the collaboration required between the Council and the Assembly as part of a revival of WEU, call for measures from member governments within their specific competence, so that it would be inappropriate to discuss them in detail here. On the other hand, I believe that it is the function of our Assembly to verify and stimulate the political determination of the governments involved, on which the future of the Council ultimately depends.

The draft recommendation submitted to the Assembly by the General Affairs Committee is exclusively political in scope and in no way seeks to go beyond the powers of our Assembly in relation to the Council.

Within these limits we feel it right to propose that the Council should normally meet at least

Mr. Vecchietti (continued)

twice a year, instead of its present single annual session, and that meetings should always be held at ministerial level, immediately before meetings of the North Atlantic Council. These two ordinary sessions each year would obviously not rule out other meetings in the course of the year if considered necessary by the governments concerned. Presentation of the considered views of WEU in the North Atlantic Council would of itself be a major political fact proving that Europe is using the institutions it already possesses to work out a coherent policy on fundamental questions involving its own security and therefore that of the rest of the world.

In this context it is most important that the other European members of the Alliance which are at present outside WEU should become members. The treaty provides for this and European security demands it.

Lastly, in the report accompanying the draft recommendation, your Rapporteur stresses that relations between the WEU Council and Assembly have been good and correct over the past twelve months but cannot be regarded as satisfactory for the reasons I have given. Very briefly, by tacit and hitherto unanimous agreement the WEU governments have decided to reduce the activities of the Council to a minimum, thus preventing it from discharging its duties under the modified Brussels Treaty. Another consequence of this state of affairs is that the individual ministers who are members of the Council sometimes contribute very little to the work of our Assembly. Admittedly this limited contribution by the Council to the Assembly's debates and work has not led to differences of view between the Assembly and the Council, at least on major questions such as East-West relations, the approach to security and disarmament and the links between them and the serious political crises and war situations in Europe and outside, but this is due to the fact that this consensus is arrived at in other institutions and at different levels, rather than in the Council and Assembly of WEU. I shall be extremely frank; sometimes this identity of view is achieved because it relates to general positions and political assessments which have no practical consequences within WEU or if they lead to anything this takes place elsewhere. Mr. Tindemans himself told us that some issues have been discussed elsewhere, in the Council of the Ten which has adopted a position that our Assembly probably shares but these matters have not even been raised in the Council.

The Council's annual report does not and cannot fill this gap which is due to the reduced activity of the Council with adverse consequen-

ces above all for our Assembly, whose work and duties are closely linked with those of the Council. For these reasons the draft recommendation which I am introducing seeks in limited but concrete manner to remedy the present situation in the spirit and letter of the international treaty under which we exist and are brought together.

As long as the Council is virtually inoperative, the activities of WEU will be concentrated in the Assembly and its committees and these activities, although important and of very high quality, will remain limited and will be directed to public opinion or to the governments concerned chiefly through action taken by our parliamentarians in their national parliaments.

These activities will therefore not match the aims of the institution for both remote and recent reasons. These stem largely from the economic and partly political crisis through which Europe is now passing. But there is a determination to move forward. Mr. Tindemans spoke of the proposal for a European union which has been prepared, has been submitted to the organisations concerned but at present is at a standstill and the reasons are quite apparent.

I should like to stress that this crisis hanging over Europe after the many hopes and expectations recently demonstrated by the first direct election of a European Parliament in Europe's history, cannot be allowed to disappoint these hopes and expectations without serious blame falling on the governments, parliaments and peoples of our countries.

To this end, we submit this draft recommendation to you as a contribution to the revival of the European spirit and the organisations in which it finds expression. Thank you Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I did not put a time limit on the speeches of rapporteurs but you have continued for rather a long time. This is not fair when everyone else is asked to show restraint. If you can bring your remarks to an end, it will help us very much. I am sorry that I did not impose any form of restriction on rapporteurs, but this would be unfair in view of the complexity of the various subjects with which they have to deal. I would, however, ask rapporteurs, having regard to the severe restraint placed on everyone else, to seek to curtail their remarks so far as they are reasonably able to do so.

We now proceed to the debate on the report that Mr. Vecchietti has introduced. In each case the maximum time allowed is five minutes.

Mr. Pignion is the first speaker, to be followed by Mr. Urwin.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, everyone will understand that Mr. Vecchietti's report calls for a French intervention – indeed, for one by a representative of the majority party in the present French Government. I should like straight away to express my satisfaction with this report, to say that it has my full support and to express the hope that the draft recommendation accompanying it will be adopted with a very big majority.

I should like, however, to clarify certain matters.

This clarification mainly concerns Mr. Vecchietti's analysis of the statements made by our Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Lemoine, who has been quoted twice, at the last session of the Assembly. Mr. Vecchietti can rest assured that, when Mr. Lemoine laid special emphasis on the importance attached by France to the work of our Assembly, this did not imply any restrictive conception on his part of the activities of any of the ministerial organs of WEU. Those of us who attended the joint meetings with the Council in London last May received the most authoritative confirmation of this. I would add that the statements made by the President of the Republic and by the ministers concerned with our problems, including the Prime Minister, do not differ at all in substance and that people should get used to the idea outside my country, as they are learning to do within it, that we are determined to act in accordance with our statements.

But these cannot be repeated indefinitely. Why should France, if its proposals are not favourably received by its partners, be expected to continue, as it already has done several times, to present constructive proposals for the Council of WEU, for the Standing Armaments Committee and for the Agency for the Control of Armaments?

Admittedly, as far as the Assembly itself is concerned, the governments of the member countries of our organisation have not been sparing with their kind, indeed flattering words, but they have not given any undertaking with regard to the resources which they could place at its disposal. Now everyone knows that, compared with those available to the other international assemblies, the resources actually at its disposal are ridiculously meagre, and that is a point to be noted.

This is not without significance or without importance at a time when a certain other European assembly, with substantial financial resources, has declared its intention of extending its work to the field of security. Up to the present the subtle distinction between security and defence – for which the Council constantly repeats that we are the only competent

European assembly – has remained very fine and very vague in the language employed by the government spokesmen and we may wonder whether we are not witnessing, in some quarters, an ill-concealed attempt to give de facto pre-eminence to a parliamentary assembly which hitherto had no powers and hence no political weight in the field of defence.

If we now take a look at the activities of the Council, we cannot fail to observe that the only response to the French proposals – and this was emphasised just now in a question to the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Tindemans – came from the Eurogroup of NATO, which, at its meeting on 5th May last, declared its intention of improving its procedures in order “to make way for more politico/military consultations”.

So we see that, just when France is proposing to make better use of WEU, its partners are opting for a procedure which they well know is unacceptable to any French Government because of its link with the integrated NATO structures, as a way of extending politico/military consultations, for which, by virtue of the very letter of the modified Brussels Treaty, the framework should be the Council of WEU.

Are all of us in this chamber fully agreed on this aim? My country speaks plainly. A clearer political will ought therefore to find expression within WEU! Need I recall the campaign waged last year against the Standing Armaments Committee by some of our partners and the proposals contained in the report on the application of the Brussels Treaty adopted on 20th April last by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments virtually advocating the abolition of all armaments control within the framework of WEU?

It does in fact look as if we are witnessing an outright attack on WEU and on all its institutions. If it were to succeed, the Assembly itself would not escape, whatever we may say.

If this is indeed the response to proposals which, as Mr. Vecchietti recalls in his explanatory memorandum, do not come from the French Secretary of State for Defence alone but reflect an attitude which has been stated and confirmed by the highest authorities of the French Government, it may be understood why the French Government hesitates to define positions which appear destined to be systematically opposed by some of its partners.

I must repeat with emphasis that the ball is now definitely in our opponent's court.

The great virtue of our colleague's report seems to me to be precisely the fact that it does everything possible to unjam a situation from which there might appear to be no way out. The eight points of his recommendation do in

Mr. Pignion (continued)

fact constitute an admittedly modest but realistic programme for restoring genuine substance to the institution which brings us together here.

The recent Falkland Islands crisis and the non-appearance of the Council on that occasion only serve to demonstrate the importance of the recommendations in Mr. Vecchietti's report and the need for them to be endorsed by our Assembly in order to ensure that such a default cannot occur again.

There are a great many things that could be said both about the Standing Armaments Committee and about the Agency for the Control of Armaments, but, as the President has just reminded me of the time-limit for speaking, I shall refrain from repeating everything that has been said about our institutions, which can be of definite use.

It is through these institutions that WEU can acquire its true significance and fulfil its true rôle of making Europe's contribution to international security and world peace.

The Agency ought to be a model and a sort of test bench which, as circumstances require, could be used and transposed in order to assist in the successful completion of more far-reaching negotiations.

In conclusion, I hope that Mr. Vecchietti's report will be adopted with the biggest possible majority, because this recommendation aims at reactivating WEU in order – it is true – to make it into the instrument of a European security policy, but also in order to steer it deliberately towards peace and disarmament, the only aims worthy of our democracies.

The PRESIDENT. – I have the difficult task of keeping members' speeches to the time-limit of five minutes. I did not interrupt you, Mr. Pignion, although you went beyond that time-limit. We do not have a flashing lights mechanism and I do not want to interrupt every speaker. If some members speak for longer than the time-limit, they will make it impossible for us to complete our business. I propose to give a sharp rap with my mallet after four and a half minutes of a member's speech. I hope that all speakers will then conclude within the next half minute.

I call Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I sincerely hope, that my fingers are well removed from your mallet, Mr. President.

I apologise to Mr. Vecchietti that I could not be present in London for the meeting of the General Affairs Committee when he presented his report. That was because of the collision

of responsibilities between this organisation and the Council of Europe. However, I assure my colleague that I have read his report in depth. I agree with its recommendations.

I gather that the task of rapporteur dealing with the report on the activities of the Council was easier on this occasion than it has been in past years. The issue in the report is less controversial than it has been in previous years. I recall having sympathised more than once with my British colleague, Mr. Page, who had a most difficult task in the General Affairs Committee when dealing with similar reports.

Some of my socialist colleagues felt this morning that the inclusion of recommendation 3 on terrorism was superfluous. Extensive activity has been undertaken by the sister Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe over the past two or three years on the Convention on Terrorism. I sympathise with my colleague, knowing that he comes from one of the countries that is in the front line of terrorist activity. I hope that he will not press the suggestion that is made in the report, which could lead to further institutionalisation of this organisation. He might prefer to rely on the convention that already exists.

The Rapporteur has succeeded once again in recapitulating that Western European Union is the only parliamentary assembly with responsibility for defence questions, armaments and also disarmament. Therefore, I have some reservations about Mr. Tindemans' replies, excellent though his presentation and his treatment of questions were on the important question of European unity.

I appreciate that in the exchange of letters between you, Mr. President, Mrs. Veil, a former President of the European Parliament, and the present President, Mr. Pieter Dankert, there has been a rejection of the suggestion in the De Poi report, which I vigorously opposed, that there should be some institutionalisation between this organisation and the European Parliament on defence. That pleases me enormously. While there are specified occasions when it is necessary for observers to be present, I agree with the President of the European Parliament that it is not necessary to set up the committees to which the De Poi recommendations referred.

Our rôle is important. That is probably one of the reasons why Mr. Vecchietti allocated so much of his report to the French initiative. I should like to hear a great deal more about the Mitterrand proposals for a European defence policy. As I see it, it is within the bounds of possibility that such a policy could be developed without being in any way injurious to the NATO Alliance in its accepted form.

I understand the repeated references by my French colleague, Mr. Pignion, to the ball

Mr. Urwin (continued)

being in our court, but I believe that we have more to learn. I look forward to hearing the French Minister tomorrow. He may be able to teach us more about the French initiative and what it means in terms of encouraging the support of this Assembly.

I have my watch in front of me, Mr. President. I have been exactly five minutes.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Urwin.

The next speaker is Mr. Page. He will be followed by Mr. De Poi. I hope that they will take only five minutes each.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Before you start your clock, Mr. President, should we not get some light mechanism? It is always useful for members to know whether they are...

The PRESIDENT. – I had it in mind to do that, but I could not get it before you started your speech. You have already wasted half a minute.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – That is accident time.

As a previous rapporteur on this report, I was going to call myself an elder statesman, but perhaps I should say just an older member of parliament.

The twenty-seventh annual report is elegant, readable and diplomatic, but it is not very exciting or controversial and it does not cover much new ground. However, it has a beauty which is known only to the Rapporteur, Mr. Vecchiotti, and some of the staff of the Assembly – namely, that it arrived in time. The committee and the Rapporteur had more time than usual to do their homework on it before having to produce the report.

The report did not give Mr. Vecchiotti much straw with which to make bricks. If you will forgive a few mixed metaphors, Mr. President, I feel that he grasped at the straw of Mr. Lemoine's important speech, though it was a little vague in places, which proved to be too much for the main camel's back of his report.

WEU is always delighted to receive support and encouragement. I do not think that Mr. Lemoine was seeking to give a kind of kiss of life to WEU – it does not need it – but a little transfusion of fresh French blood can do no one any harm. I shall have to talk to Mr. Pignion, because he was going so fast and the translation was very quick. As I want to get the nucleus of what he was saying, I hope to discuss it with him this evening.

Like the Rapporteur, I welcome the good relations between the Council and the Assem-

bly. I believe that the Council has met the wishes of the Assembly by the participation of senior ministers of member countries. This is proved by Mr. Tindemans' effort in coming to speak to us this afternoon in the middle of a very busy day. We greatly appreciated that.

Finally, in order to keep your hammer at bay, Mr. President, I should like to make two small points. First, I agree with Mr. Urwin about paragraph 3 on international terrorism. It is unnecessary for WEU to take too much of an initiative in this connection in view of the Council of Europe's resolution and others. All that WEU needs to do is to confirm and agree with the Council of Europe's resolution, which covers a wider number of countries, including the United States and Canada.

Secondly, I should like to use paragraph 7 as a hook on which to make a point that is causing me and others a great deal of anxiety. One of the sad side-effects of the Falklands conflict, which will demand a re-think by all member countries and those in the North Atlantic Alliance, is the supply of arms of a highly technological nature to countries outside the Alliance. The use of certain European-manufactured weapons supplied by allies and the use of British-made aircraft against British forces must cause great anxiety to all of us.

I hope that this difficult and challenging problem will be the subject of deep consideration in the near future not only by the Assembly but by the Council, and that the uncomfortable economic consequences of the further limitation of arms sales will be faced.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page.

The next speaker is Mr. De Poi, to be followed by Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I hope I shall not have to make you use your terrible hammer. I merely wish to offer a number of comments which will in no way detract from my favourable view of Mr. Vecchiotti's report and of the very constructive manner in which he has introduced it. Indeed, I would say that it is one of the greatest contributions offered to our Assembly for strengthening our union and for a worthwhile continuing dialogue between the Assembly and the Council and regarding the positions to be adopted by the Council in the course of its activities.

I would observe to the Rapporteur and fellow members that when reference is made to the "gradual disappearance of the two military blocs" or as for example in paragraph 4 to the excessive military political and economic part played by the United States in the defence of Europe, there is no need to give so much

Mr. De Poi (continued)

weight to the disappearance of the military blocs or to believe that the United States plays too big a part in the defence of Europe, in order to hope that Europe will take greater responsibility for maintaining the balance and sharing defence commitments. I believe that the United States itself has constantly expressed the wish that Europe should play its part as President Kennedy urged in his famous Philadelphia speech when he spoke of a European community based on two pillars. Indeed, I would add that European union – of which Mr. Tindemans spoke a short time ago – can be achieved by agreement between the Western European countries on the major options of a European defence policy demonstrating not only its existence but its determination to play a constructive part in maintaining overall stability and peace.

It seems to me therefore that some surprise has been caused by recent statements regarding confusion concerning the rôles of the Eurogroup and of WEU, which in addition suggested that a country like France was not involved in the specific work of WEU in Europe. I think that Mr. Pignion was quite correct in referring to this problem which should in no way lead to confusion between the members of WEU and the western countries in general, whether or not they take part in our defence union.

I therefore look upon Mr. Vecchietti's report as a contribution to building the European pillar of the Alliance; this being so despite the friendly criticisms which I hope Mr. Vecchietti will accept, I can definitely vote for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

The next speaker is Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall make it short, but I am afraid that I cannot make it sweet.

To begin with, I should like to thank the Rapporteur for the particular emphasis he places in his report and draft recommendation on the Council's inactivity. But I must say that we may be blaming the wrong people, since the members of the Council can only do what their governments have proposed. In other words, we are blaming the ambassadors, rather than the governments. Or, as the saying goes, we are getting the wrong sow by the ear – though I hasten to add that I am not trying to compare the ambassadors with a sow.

The chief cause of my criticism, Mr. President, is a sentence which I will briefly quote in English: "Noting that the dangers to peace and

security in Europe are now more serious than ever;..." This is simply not true. Since the second world war we have had far more difficult situations, not only in Europe but also in East-West relations, and we cannot therefore make this false claim that the situation is now more dangerous than it has been before.

Of course, I realise that the party the Rapporteur represents is currently propagating this view with large-scale campaigns in Europe. Nevertheless I feel that we of the Assembly of Western European Union cannot endorse it.

I should like to make a third point. The Rapporteur has referred to the speech made by Secretary of State Lemoine last December. I listened to that speech very attentively. Afterwards I spoke to the Secretary of State, and welcomed his activity. However, I regret that I cannot accept his proposal that the peace movement and the fight against terrorism should be discussed by the Standing Armaments Committee. That would conflict with the spirit of my country's constitution, since countering terrorism is a matter for the judiciary and the police, not for defence institutions. I trust you will understand, Mr. President, that, with all due respect for the Rapporteur and particularly for the work he has done, I cannot agree to this particular proposal of the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

The final speaker is Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the Liberal Group I should like to congratulate Mr. Vecchietti on his report, which raises some old questions but also refers in plain terms to certain problems which concern WEU at the moment. I say "plain" because Mr. Vecchietti has some fairly harsh things to say in his conclusions. For example, he says in paragraph 54: "Everything indicates therefore that the Council's annual report for 1981 is a masterpiece of diplomacy on the part of those who wrote and adopted it." And in paragraph 55 he says: "However this may be, the present annual report, like its predecessors, if only by its references to what has been done outside WEU, mainly underlines the inexistence of the WEU Council in 1981." Harsh though these words may be, they must be true, or there would certainly have been a strong protest from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Tindemans.

We of the Liberal Group feel that this report must provide an opening for WEU to do something of substance. I am thinking in this context of the Falklands crisis, which we shall be discussing in greater depth when the report on it is debated. I must point out that Article

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

VIII (3) of the Brussels Treaty has not been invoked to permit a debate on this crisis in WEU. In reply to a question on this, Mr. Tindemans said that the subject had already been discussed within the EEC and NATO and that there was therefore no need for WEU to do the same. Mr. President, the Brussels Treaty, the Treaty of Rome and the NATO agreement are three different things which cannot be regarded as alternatives. I still maintain that WEU should have had preliminary consultations before the matter was considered by the EEC, where the only possible framework for its discussion is that of European political co-operation. Consultations at that level are not subject to the control of a parliamentary body, of the representatives of the people. As a representative of the people, you can only find out what has been discussed by ministers meeting in political co-operation if you happen to be on good terms with your minister or head of state.

The draft recommendation suggests that an in-depth examination should be made of the proposals put forward by Secretary of State Lemoine on behalf of the French Government six months ago. Not a great deal has happened since those proposals were made. It is because the proposals are still hanging fire that they have been reiterated in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation. On behalf of the Liberal Group I have therefore tabled an amendment seeking to add to paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation the words "and report to the Assembly within a year". Reactions to the Assembly's proposals and requests are often so long in coming that there is little point in continuing to discuss them in any depth. If we receive an answer within a year, we can roughly assess the Council's opinion of the views put forward by Secretary of State Lemoine, and discuss them at length.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

That concludes the debate.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Vecchietti, wish to reply?

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In my view, among the comments which have been made, special consideration should be given to those concerning the responsibilities of the WEU Council in the matter of terrorism. It seems to me that both the draft recommendation and the report state clearly that there is a sharp distinction; the Council of WEU should, if appropriate, concern itself with the aspects of terrorism involving international military organisations which seek to strike at international commands. Unquestionably, it cannot intervene in questions relating to internal order which

are matters for the individual states and for the courts in each country. But, since terrorism is now seeking to blow up international military bases and to strike at senior officers with international responsibilities both within and outside NATO, we as a committee felt it right to suggest that the WEU Council should concern itself with this aspect only.

As regards the proposals and a number of comments that have been made we are not in fact making major proposals; I think I said that the proposals were relatively modest and were aimed solely at advancing from the present negative situation to start constructing something and start reversing the trend. I feel that if we suggested anything which might appear more attractive, more impressive or even more necessary, it is unlikely that with the present attitude of WEU governments we should achieve maybe the little that may be achieved. This cautious approach is dictated by the real situation in which we find ourselves.

As regards relations with other organisations, there should be no interference in either direction or confusion of responsibilities because this could create political and not only political difficulties. All our suggestions in the draft recommendation come within the treaty responsibilities of WEU and do not interfere with other organisations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vecchietti.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The Rapporteur deserves the commendation of all of us, as was recognised in the committee, for realising that the saying "the art of politics is the art of the possible" applies to Western European Union as it does to national parliaments; and that, as he claimed in his closing remarks, his effort was to achieve something constructive within the limits of what it was possible to achieve in present circumstances and in the present rôle of WEU. It may well be that in future, as a result of French or Italian initiatives, or initiatives by others, there will be a bigger, different or expanded rôle for WEU, but that is not for me to say. Taking into account the present situation, the Rapporteur has to be commended by all of us on achieving all that can be done in this report because, as he has rightly said, an exciting one would certainly not necessarily be productive in achieving the kind of progress we want to make.

Finally, I would say as my last word that any arguments that may have been adduced critical of this report had ample opportunity to be considered in the discussions we had in committee on it; and I would remind the Assembly

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

that, irrespective of party and country, the report was adopted by thirteen votes to one, and the one in question did not even give at the time the reasons why he objected to it. I would say myself that that has some lesson for the rest of us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Before we come to the draft recommendation, there is an amendment in the name of Mr. Blaauw. Will you move your amendment, Mr. Blaauw?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I did so in my speech.

The PRESIDENT. – I have to put it formally. You certainly spoke to your amendment, I know, but will you formally move it?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I formally move Amendment 1:

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add “and report to the Assembly within a year”.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Blaauw has formally moved his amendment.

Does anybody wish to speak against it?

May we have the opinion of the committee on the amendment?

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I think that the amendment can be accepted with the following additional change: “at the next part of the session or in any case within a year”. We would in fact prefer that these replies should be given at the next session of the WEU Assembly; however as six months may be too short, we would accept a time-limit of one year.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry, Mr. Vecchietti, but you cannot amend on your feet. You either table an amendment or you say you are in favour of or against this particular amendment. We must have a precise form of words before I can put the proposition to the Assembly. Are you making such a proposal now or not? We cannot have a discussion now about whether there could be better amendments in place of this. You must be either in favour or against it.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am not against, I simply suggested adding “one year” to “the next Assembly” as the time-limit. If the proposer agrees, I cannot see any difficulty. I repeat that I have no serious objection..

The PRESIDENT. – I take it that there is no objection by the committee. Mr. Blaauw, will you accept the committee’s modification in essence? I do not think we can ask you to change the text.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Informally, I have an amendment to my amendment. The amendment is to replace the words “within a year” by “if possible at the next part-session or in any event within a year”. The Rapporteur would like to have an answer by the end of this year and I was a little more humble and wanted an answer by the middle of next year, but I agree with the change.

The PRESIDENT. – It makes the job of the Chair extremely difficult if at the very last minute representatives come along with manuscript amendments. We go through the process of asking for texts to be written down and it is not fair to those who take the trouble to do so to get these amendments.

I will now read what I understand is now being proposed: “to report to the Assembly if possible at the next part-session or, in any event, within a year”. Is that the form of words that will be acceptable?

I put that amendment to the Assembly.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.

I now have to put the draft recommendation proper to the Assembly as amended by the amendment we have just carried.

If there is no objection, we could dispense with a roll-call vote, but if there is opposition, under the rules we have to have a roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation in Document 913?...

There is no opposition.

I therefore declare the amended draft recommendation adopted unanimously¹.

Thank you, Mr. Vecchietti, for your report.

14. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 908 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the

1. See page 21.

The President (continued)

Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 908 and amendments.

I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The report presented on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is the logical continuation of the previous reports in which, as in its present report, the committee examines the sections of the Council's annual reports which are referred to it by the Presidential Committee, that is, those dealing with the Council's activities relating to defence, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee.

It is worth recalling briefly the report which the committee presented last year, mainly because Recommendation 365 – which the Assembly then adopted – and the Council's reply mention the wide measure of agreement between the two organs. That is also the subject of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

In Recommendation 365 the Assembly stated that the Brussels Treaty remains one of the key factors in the security system of our countries, although, for greater effectiveness, the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in wider frameworks. It added that the continuing activity in the framework of the Brussels Treaty, essential to its credibility, is chiefly carried out by the Assembly and through its dialogue with the Council. The Assembly finally recommended that the Council should investigate the appropriate allocation of the resources assigned, in particular, to the Assembly, in the light of the present importance of its activities, and examine the extent of the armaments controls that should be maintained.

This subject met with wide approval. Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State for Defence, speaking for France last December, talked of the important rôle played by this Assembly as a parliamentary organ for debate and study, as has just been confirmed by Mr. Tindemans, and proposed that the Assembly should undertake, for instance, a study of the history of pacifism. In Paris three weeks ago, Mr. Lemoine reverted to this argument that the present importance of WEU as an instrument of collective European defence lies in our Assembly and he recalled the influence which we can have on public opinion. What he said was:

“ There can be no defence of Europe without a will on the part of the peoples of Europe, without the support of public opinion for this will as regards defence. That is one of the reasons why the representatives of the people

meeting in an international parliamentary assembly such as that of WEU have a fundamental rôle to play in this connection... The defence of Europe is not just a matter for the military or for politicians. It is a matter for all Europeans and, beyond the specialised institutions, every European ought to be keenly aware that his own security is indissociable from the security of all Europeans. ”

We shall doubtless receive confirmation of this point from the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, who will be speaking to us tomorrow morning.

I am now coming, Mr. President, to the main points of the report which the committee is presenting today. In view of the increased interest in WEU and particularly in its Assembly, WEU should be adapted to the requirements of the 1980s, and the committee considers that most of the provisions of the treaty relating to armaments control no longer serve any useful purpose. These provisions, which were incorporated in the modified treaty in 1954, actually stem from the EDC Treaty which the modified Brussels Treaty superseded. In view of the international situation and the armaments efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries, controls on the already inadequate armaments produced by the countries of WEU seem inappropriate. These controls have largely been overtaken by events and by the political climate of the Atlantic Alliance, in which Germany has for many years shown itself to be a full partner.

I would recall that the controls provided for by the treaty are in three categories. Firstly, there are those relating to the list of A, B and C weapons which Germany undertook not to manufacture on its territory. The treaty makes no provision for the amendment of this list; the German Government has stated many times that it has no intention of manufacturing weapons belonging to this category. There is therefore no question of trying to alter this. The second category covers certain conventional weapons which Germany likewise undertook not to manufacture on its territory. The treaty lays down a procedure for the amendment, deletion or cancellation of this list by a Council resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority. This list, originally fairly long, has been amended by the Council on ten occasions, the most recent amendment, in 1980, having been the cancellation of the paragraph concerning “ warships ” in this prohibited list, a cancellation advocated by the Assembly in the recommendation which it adopted in response to the Defence Committee's report at that time. Consequently, all that remains today of the list of conventional weapons which are not manufactured in Germany is long-range surface-to-surface missiles and bomber aircraft for strategic purposes, which are deemed to be aircraft cap-

Mr. Prussen (continued)

able of reaching targets situated at a distance of more than 2,000 kilometres from their base. Now Germany is not at present seeking to manufacture these two categories of armaments and the committee is not at the moment making any proposal concerning the modification of this list, which has become negligible.

However, in agreement with the committee, I shall propose, in order finally to eliminate any discrimination in future, an amendment worded as follows:

“In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III.”

There remains the third category of controls: those relating to the list of armaments the levels of which are controlled in all our countries on the mainland of Europe. The treaty states that the Council may vary this list by a resolution adopted by a unanimous vote. It comprises A, B and C weapons and certain important conventional weapons such as guns, missiles, naval mines, tanks, warships, bombs, shells and military aircraft. The committee simply proposes that the Council should amend, indeed reduce or cancel, this list in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty.

I should like to add a few comments on these quantitative controls which the committee proposes should be abolished. With regard to atomic and biological weapons, the Council has never authorised the application of the controls provided for by the treaty and the committee, in its reports in previous years, has deplored the illegality of a situation where the provisions of the treaty are not applied, especially with regard to the French nuclear forces. We understand, of course, the political reasons for this and the discriminatory aspects of the provisions which, applying as they do to the mainland of Europe only, leave the equivalent British forces uncontrolled. The quantitative controls on conventional weapons on the mainland are absolutely useless nowadays and, here again, represent a source of discrimination and non-application, because the aircraft and missiles associated with the French nuclear forces – which, however, according to the definition in the treaty, are not themselves nuclear forces – are not controlled by the Agency.

By varying, reducing or indeed cancelling this list, the Council could put an end not only to an activity of WEU which has become useless but also to these cases of non-application of the provisions of the treaty, and would thus re-establish legality.

One remark, Mr. President, concerning the so-called field controls. In the case of forces and depots under NATO authority, Protocol No. IV to the treaty lays down that the visits and inspections are to be undertaken by the authorities of NATO and not by WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments. The main purpose of these visits carried out by the officers of SHAPE is to enable them to satisfy themselves of the effectiveness of the forces and armaments assigned to NATO, and these will, of course, be maintained in accordance with the NATO regulations. I wonder, personally, whether in the future, if the negative controls of WEU were abolished, the Council could not find some way of associating the experienced staff of our Agency for the Control of Armaments with the SHAPE officers who carry out these positive inspections of behalf of NATO.

I now come to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of the draft recommendation. I have mentioned certain discriminatory features of the control of armaments which will be eliminated by the cancellation of the list referred to in substantive paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation.

There is one other discrimination: under Article VI of Protocol No. II concerning the level of forces, only the United Kingdom undertakes to assign certain minimum forces to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and to station them on the mainland. The committee is glad to see that, according to the Council's annual report, the United Kingdom has in fact fulfilled its undertaking. In substantive paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft recommendation the committee proposes that similar undertakings be entered into by the other member countries, not by modification of the Brussels Treaty but by way of unilateral declarations, and that future annual reports of the Council shall include a statement on the levels of the forces so assigned to NATO, as the present annual report does for the British forces. The committee considers that, in conjunction with the abolition of the quantitative control on armaments, this would eliminate two discriminations at present inherent in the treaty and that at the same time a constructive contribution would be made to the defence of Europe.

Lastly, the committee, as it has often done in the past, regretted that it was not able to examine the Council's report for 1981 until April 1982. That is why, in substantive paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation, the Council is asked to communicate its annual report, as it has done in the past, before the end of February.

These, Mr. President, are the proposals made by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in order to adapt WEU to the

Mr. Prussen (continued)

requirements of the 1980s. Our Assembly will have a big rôle to play.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

We shall now have a general debate.

The first speaker is Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although Mr. Prussen's report has a number of interesting features, my colleagues and I disagree with the draft recommendation on a number of fundamental points. Firstly, we disagree with the request that the list of armaments in Annex IV to Protocol No. III should be cancelled; in our view this cannot be proposed because it conflicts with Article V of Protocol No. III, which provides that the Council of WEU can vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision and therefore cannot cancel it as proposed in the draft recommendation.

Firstly, I consider that this proposal misrepresents and oversteps the Council's powers to which I call the Assembly's attention; I would further call the Assembly's attention to the changes taking place in the European situation and in military techniques which call for changes in control methods. Secondly, this proposal conflicts with terms of the Brussels Treaty itself.

There are also objections to the request to member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO and are not bound by Article VI of Protocol No. II to make unilateral declarations concerning the level of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and furthermore not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the signatories of the Brussels Treaty.

This proposal also tends to modify and extend the terms of Protocol No. II which is an integral part of the Brussels Treaty; *inter alia* it raises questions concerning the deployment of forces and the organisation of defence which in my view go beyond the competence of our Assembly.

The sense of those two proposals is quite clear; the first seeks to lift the restrictions imposed by Protocol No. III by removing all controls on all types of armaments instead of proposing perhaps an extension of such controls; the proposal also opens the way to the winding up of the Agency for the Control of Armaments which, in addition to maintaining and developing control relationships and mutual trust between the allies, can gradually help to give credibility to a policy aimed at a balanced reduction and control of armaments which forms an integral and essential part of allied defence policy.

Substantially, the proposals appear to be directed more to favouring uncontrolled rearmament than to seeking agreement on the reduction and control of armaments which is vital for European security.

The second proposal based on the undertaking given by the United Kingdom under Protocol No. II and introducing new clauses for which the treaty makes no provision, tends to establish a distinction between integrated forces at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander and forces under national command the balance of which is an essential element in our present defence system. Any change in this balance, without assessing all the consequences, could therefore, in the extreme case, affect the strength and defensive capability, and even the foundations of our alliance.

I should like to make it quite clear that I am not saying that problems of this kind do not arise and should not be discussed in the light of the changes which have taken place in Europe and in the world, but this should happen in the framework and in implementation of existing treaties, through the participation and with the full responsibility of the contracting parties; otherwise, there will be no strengthening of European security and of the rôle which Europe must play in favouring peaceful solutions throughout the world.

We therefore wonder whether the report should not be referred back to the committee for proposals within the terms of the existing treaties, whether the Brussels Treaty or the North Atlantic Treaty. Failing this we shall vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Reddemann, to be followed by Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will be very brief. I should like to express my sincere thanks to the Rapporteur and the committee on whose behalf he has submitted this report. I believe this proposal caters for political changes in Western European Union.

However, to avoid any misunderstanding, I should also like to say that all the democratic parties in the Federal Republic of Germany will, of course, continue to support the decision to forgo ABC weapons as laid down in Protocol No. III, even after these provisions have been relaxed. The Federal Republic has no desire to manufacture ABC weapons. After what Mr. Bernini has said, I feel this should be restated clearly, so as to nip any misunderstandings in the bud. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for being so brief.

The President (continued)

The next speaker is Mr. Blaauw, to be followed by Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I shall be brief. The Liberal Group supports Mr. Prussen's report.

We would like to draw the attention of the Assembly and, through the Assembly, the Council to paragraph 33 of the Vecchiotti report. Regarding the Agency for the Control of Armaments, it says:

“Inter alia, the Council should examine whether the experience gained by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which makes it an instrument whose efficacy is unique in the world in its field, could not be used for purposes less narrow than those assigned to it in the protocols to the modified Brussels Treaty.”

When we adopt the Prussen idea and unseat the Agency for the Control of Armaments, for which we do not have any work at the moment, we should not waste all that is invested in the group, because it is the only group in the world which is working on armaments control.

I suggest that WEU should use this body, which is probably the envy of other bodies, because it is already operational in regard to disarmament and armaments control.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

The next speaker is Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our Assembly's debate on the military aspects of the application of the Brussels Treaty is of an unusual nature, since the text submitted to us contains a proposal by the Assembly aimed at further reducing the credibility of any attempt at a specific regrouping of the European countries in the military field.

Mr. Prussen's text may produce this result by cancelling a provision of the modified Brussels Treaty which, while admittedly not fully applied at present, nevertheless has the advantage of providing a legal basis for our knowledge of each other and, subsequently, for possible joint European thinking about armaments.

This provision, which is contained in Articles III to V of Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty, stipulates that the member countries of WEU must notify to the Council the level of their forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and that these notifications may be verified by the Agency for the Control of Armaments. Is this not a clear expression of the very close solidarity between our peoples and of

the determination to be as open as possible and to achieve the greatest possible degree of mutual trust with regard to the organisation of our defence?

This is unquestionably a valuable asset for the creation of the European military space which France is calling for and which would in future permit not only the exchanging of information but also the undertaking of systematic, organised projects for co-operation on armaments.

Admittedly, the machinery for the notification of armaments and for control by the Agency is very incomplete or, partly, unsuitable. For it is obvious that, as the lists of armaments subject to control by the Agency were compiled twenty-eight years ago, the development of modern weapons requires that they be updated in the light of the new realities.

In particular, since the United Kingdom has come closer to the continent both economically and politically, it may be regretted that the armaments stationed on its territory have a special set of rules and are not subject to the controls of notifications provided for by the treaty. Consideration must therefore be given here and now to Articles III to V of Protocol No. III, not in order to deprive them of their substance and thus cancel them for all practical purposes, in contravention of the procedures for the revision of the treaty, but in order to adapt them to present circumstances. As the instrument exists, let us not do away with it, but transform it.

The broad lines of this adaptation might, for instance, be recognition of the specific nature of strategic armaments, action to take account of the ways in which military equipment has developed, the devising of machinery sufficiently flexible to ensure the effectiveness of the control without offending national susceptibilities and – why not? – the extension of the notification and control procedures to the whole of Europe.

In any case, thought must be given to one of the major aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty, namely the control of armaments. It would be deplorable if, as Mr. Prussen proposes, we were to cancel all the relevant provisions, leaving only the requirement to which one of the member countries is subject, thus giving these provisions a discriminatory character which they must not have.

We must not abandon the established legal basis which the Paris Agreements represent for the creation of an overall European defence system in which the level and nature of armaments would be determined in close consultation and with the greatest respect for national sovereignty.

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

It should furthermore be emphasised that the Agency for the Control of Armaments is at present the only international authority with effective means of verifying compliance with the undertakings entered into with regard to armaments by the countries under its jurisdiction. The Council furthermore says in its twenty-seventh annual report that the Agency was able to perform its functions effectively last year.

A time when questions of disarmament and control are becoming so very important is not the right moment to abandon a structure and a machinery which are a model in this field. On the contrary, as is emphasised by Mr. De Poi in his Amendment 2, we should endeavour to adapt them to political changes in Europe and to technological developments in the military field. It is to be hoped that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will include this subject in its agenda at an early date. In any case, that is what I hope.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

The debate is now almost over, but we wish to conclude by asking Mr. Prussen to reply if he wishes to the debate on his excellent report and to ask the Chairman of the committee to reply. As several amendments may be the subject of votes, we will begin tomorrow with the amendments and votes, instead of trying to get them done tonight. We shall conclude the debate, deal with the committees and start the amendments tomorrow.

Do you wish to reply to the debate, Mr. Prussen?

No? In that case, I call upon the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I should first like to thank previous speakers but I am most concerned to clarify a number of points which have led some speakers to declare against parts of this draft recommendation. The political significance of the original proposal to cancel the list referred to in Article V is very far-reaching, but the committee has this afternoon considered an amendment proposed by me and has approved it with only one vote against. This amendment stems from the consideration that Article V of Protocol No. III in fact refers to the possibility of varying the list and therefore to something different from cancellation of the whole list. Furthermore it should be noted in particular that the reference to cancellation in Article II relates explicitly to the amendment or cancellation of the list of weapons which cannot be produced in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This is the precise reason for

the amendment proposing that the word "cancel" be replaced by "vary by reducing"; this wording is in fact more consistent with the spirit of Article V. I think therefore that in the light of this amendment and my explanations Mr. De Poi may be able to withdraw the second amendment which refers to clause 1 of the draft recommendation.

I believe that on this basis discussion can take place on a basis of greater understanding and fuller consideration of the real facts especially bearing in mind that Mr. Prussen has proposed - and the committee has unanimously adopted his proposal - a further amendment designed to eliminate all discrimination by making use of the possibility allowed under Article II of cancelling the list of arms which may not be produced on German territory.

Consequently, it seems to me Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that on this basis we have before us an important draft recommendation, submitted by Mr. Prussen and approved in Brussels on 19th April last with only one vote against. At that time all members of the committee but one voted in favour of the original proposal but I believe that the explanations I have given combined with the new amendments may now convert this into a vote in favour.

I strongly urge therefore that after the amendments have been discussed and voted on the Assembly should approve the draft recommendation under consideration.

The PRESIDENT. - The debate is closed.

Consideration of the amendments and the vote on the draft recommendation are postponed until the next sitting.

15. *Nomination of members to committees*

The PRESIDENT. - We have now to deal with the next order of the day, the nomination of members to committees.

The candidates for the six permanent committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Is there any objection to these nominations?...

There is no objection.

The nominations to the committees are therefore agreed to.

The President (continued)

**16. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 15th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 908 and amendments).
2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific,

Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 917 and amendment).

3. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.
4. Disarmament (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 909 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Change in the membership of a committee.
4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 908 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Urwin, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Prussen, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Prussen, Mr. De Poi.
5. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Resumed vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 908 and amendments).
Speakers: The President; (point of order): Mr. Urwin; Mr. De Poi, Mr. Prussen, Mr. De Poi; (explanation of vote): Mr. Bernini, Mr. Gessner.
7. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 917 and amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Fiandrotti (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Forma, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Fiandrotti (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*); (points of order): Mr. Antoni, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Cox.
8. Disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 909 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Brown.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I stress that it is of the utmost importance that substitutes who are sitting in the place of

1. See page 25.

members, in order to participate in the votes, sign the register. The register, as well as being a record of attendance, is a record of the quorum of the Assembly. It is therefore important, before coming to the possibility of votes, that all those who are sitting as full representatives should have signed the attendance register and that all representatives should also do so.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is a change in the membership of a committee. The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Eastham is to be a member in the place of Mr. Brown.

Are there any objections?...

The nomination is agreed to.

4. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, Document 908 and amendments.

We have concluded the general debate and come now to consideration of the amendments.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. In view of the welcome news from the Falkland Islands this morning, may I ask what is the intention of the executive for tomorrow's debate. Is it the intention of the Defence Committee to withdraw the document and so avert a debate on the Falkland Islands?

The PRESIDENT. – I have had no such intimation. While sharing my colleagues' delight over news that the fighting, we understand, was stopped on the Falklands and that the islands are again under British possession, I would not suppose that this marks the end of all the problems relating to the South Atlantic. I cannot speak on behalf of the Defence Committee. No suggestion has been put to me at present that the document should be withdrawn. It is not due until tomorrow. I would ask Mr. Urwin, who is normally a very patient man, to be a little more patient and wait until the end of today's proceedings. We may be able better to advise him when we come to tomorrow's business.

Now we come to the amendments. I propose to take them in the following order: Amendment 1 in the name of Mr. De Poi, followed by Amendment 5 in the name of Mr. Prussen, followed by Amendments 2 and 6 in the names of Mr. De Poi and Mr. Cavaliere, which can, I think, be discussed together, although votes on them will be taken separately. If Amendment 2 should be carried, Amendment 6 would fall. The remaining two, Amendments 3 and 4, are in the name of Mr. De Poi. I call Mr. De Poi to move the first amendment which reads:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "most" and insert "several".

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am not going to repeat the arguments already advanced for accepting the draft recommendation with certain reservations. I shall confine myself to presenting the amendments the first of which is partly a matter of wording and form and partly

a matter of substance. I propose that the word "most" in paragraph (iii) of the preamble be replaced by "several". This is because I consider that the substance of the treaty is not confined to the control of armaments and that in fact some but not all the rules cover this aspect. Those which concern the functions of our Assembly and the Council and those which concern the other bodies are of equal importance and essential for our organisation.

I therefore call on fellow members to approve the amendment I have introduced both for greater accuracy of wording and for proper representation of the substance of our organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

Is there any objection to the amendment?...

May I have the opinion of the committee from either the Rapporteur or the Chairman?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The committee accepts this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that the committee is willing to accept the amendment.

Does anyone else wish to speak to it?

I shall put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Will you, Mr. Prussen, move Amendment 5 which is:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, before paragraph I insert a new paragraph as follows:

"In application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III;"

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, to eliminate once and for all any discrimination against the Federal Republic of Germany, I propose that, in application of Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III should be cancelled.

Paragraph V was cancelled in 1980 by the same means.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Prussen.

Is there any opposition to the amendment?...

I take it, Mr. Prussen, that the amendment has the approval of the committee.

I shall put the amendment to the vote.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 2:

2. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ 1. In the light of the political evolution of Europe and of military technological developments, make a critical reassessment of the list of armaments at Annexes III and IV of Protocol No. III and subject to control by the Agency; ”.

I ask Mr. De Poi to move the amendment. I shall ask Mr. Cavaliere to explain his amendment. I shall then put the votes separately, should the need arise.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I voted in favour and would have spoken in favour of Mr. Prussen's amendment because I believe that he has recognised an element of obsolescence in the treaty which has been overtaken by new strategic balances and by the political events of recent years.

I think therefore that this amendment, which also proposes in general terms a critical re-examination, in the light of political developments and changes in military techniques, to some extent includes the previous amendment and at the same time supplements the point concerning the list of armaments in Annexes III and IV to Protocol No. III.

I consider therefore that Mr. Prussen's amendment, of which I would stress the importance and value, becomes more complete and I think, therefore, that in order to avoid misinterpretation of the treaty, paragraph 1 should be deleted and replaced by the wording I propose which fits in better with what has been accepted from Mr. Prussen's proposed amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

I shall ask Mr. Cavaliere to put his amendment and then we shall discuss the two together as they are alternatives. If one is carried, the other will not stand. Will you, Mr. Cavaliere, explain your amendment, which reads:

6. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “cancel” and insert “vary by reducing”.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I spoke yesterday afternoon on this amendment which would maintain paragraph 1 of the recommendation but would replace the word “cancel” which has raised so many doubts by the words “vary by reducing”.

The committee has already declared against Mr. De Poi's amendment which although, as usual, beautifully worded would leave our Assembly saying nothing. Indeed, the words “make a critical reassessment of the list” mean nothing and give no indication.

The problem is quite different and quite precise because, in the light of what has happened over many years, and particularly in recent years, what is needed is not to make a critical reassessment, which is very vague, but to vary the list because there may be new weapons which should be included and subjected to control while there may be many others on the list which should be taken off. In other words we are deciding on an overall reduction of the list of arms to be controlled by the Agency to which we should not assign general and perhaps impossible control, because control over twenty-seven years has no real value. Instead we wish to give value to controls and to limit them to the sectors which should be taken into consideration for a shorter period of time.

That is why Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Prussen and I, in reiterating the reasons for the formulation of this draft recommendation and reiterating that the committee voted against this amendment, are calling on the Assembly to reject Mr. De Poi's amendment and to approve my amendment which has been endorsed by the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak to those two amendments?...

Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the good intention behind Mr. De Poi's amendment is very evident. If I nevertheless speak against it, it is because I think it would be inconsistent to adopt this amendment now that we have accepted Amendment 5. In my view there is a contradiction between the two amendments – the one tabled by Mr. De Poi and the text we have just decided on. Logic therefore dictates that we follow the committee's proposal.

I would also remind you that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, which – there is no doubt about this – were inherently justifiable at the time, have been overtaken by events and the passage of time. If the committee wants to introduce up-to-date controls, which would be sensible in today's situation, and to delete what is perhaps no longer quite so sensible, then we should accept the committee's proposal and reject Mr. De Poi's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone else wish to speak?...

If not, will you give us the opinion of the committee, Mr. Prussen?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was very surprised by the reaction of two speakers as regards the quantitative control of conventional weapons. At a time when we have sophisticated conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, and satellites both for detection and surveillance and for strategic uses, is it really practical and realistic to spend our time counting numbers of tanks, bombs and aircraft and to submit ourselves to symbolic controls, when the Warsaw Pact far exceeds NATO's military potential, is controlled by no one and categorically refuses to be controlled?

With due respect to France's impressive military effort, I have one question: who keeps a check on the French vehicles, the Mirages, and the French nuclear submarines?

I would also observe that the sophisticated new defence weapons cannot now be manufactured in an alchemist's kitchen or some craftsman's workshop; they must be produced in collaboration with the parties to the Brussels Treaty backed, as envisaged, by either the Eurogroup or the Standing Armaments Committee, as has been done on several occasions.

My amendment seeking the cancellation of paragraphs IV and VI from the list at Annex III to Protocol No. III – paragraph V having been removed in 1980 – will eliminate any discrimination against the Federal Republic of Germany once and for all. The Brussels Treaty has laboured under this discrimination, which could be regarded as a sign of distrust, considering that the war ended 37 years ago and the Brussels Treaty was signed 27 years ago.

Furthermore, the recommendation to cancel Annex IV to Protocol No. III and, accordingly, to remove controls which have outlived their usefulness, would place all the member countries on an equal footing.

The same is true of the recommendation that fixed minimum levels of forces should be assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as the United Kingdom has done for many years, though this has not been subject to any controls.

As for the arguments for and against the draft recommendation, I am confident that the Council of Ministers will have the wisdom to take the appropriate decision.

I therefore call on the Assembly, Mr. President, to reject Mr. De Poi's amendments, to accept mine and Mr. Cavaliere's and to record a massive vote in favour of the draft recommendation, in order to restore a climate of absolute confidence within WEU, strengthening its cohesion and helping to re-establish its value, which has often been in doubt.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Prussen.

Mr. De Poi, you cannot make another speech. If you want to make a point of clarification, it must be brief.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think that the amendment is essential because the subject is so delicate that some points must be made clear. I would not like to see an emotional vote however. I fully agree with Mr. Prussen's first amendment; it is illogical that discrimination against the Federal Republic of Germany should continue. I voted against. My amendment seeks solely to bring up to date and clarify the lists of armaments for which there can be no suggestion of a reduction at first sight. Reduction in relation to what?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I have a point of order to make from the Chair. I must suspend the debate immediately. We shall continue later. Mr. Cheysson has just arrived. As you may have read in the press, he is due to leave almost at once for Saudi Arabia to present the French Government's condolences following the death of the King. Rather than cancel his engagement here, he has come early. I have promised to allow him to make his address immediately. When he has finished his address, Mr. Urwin, you will have the floor to make your point of order. That is the only way. I do not think that the Assembly would wish to lose any of the Minister's precious time with us.

The Minister has just arrived. I think that I should greet him.

Consideration of the draft recommendation is adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that the Assembly will wish me to welcome the French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson. We are indebted to him for coming, knowing that he has to leave Paris within the hour to fulfil an important national engagement on behalf of the President of the Republic and of the French people. We are extremely pleased that he has, nevertheless, agreed to address us:

We understand, of course, that you will have to leave at the conclusion of your speech, Minister. However, that does not in any way detract from our tremendous appreciation of your coming here.

We have been looking forward to hearing your views, because we are all interested in the

The President (continued)

support that your government gives to Western European Union and in the ideas that you are formulating to give the Assembly an even more important rôle. I ask you to come to the rostrum to address us. It may be that on a future occasion you will have the opportunity, as I know was your intention and desire today, to spend longer with us and to answer questions. We understand that today you will have to leave immediately after you have made your speech. Minister, would you please come to the rostrum? (*Applause*)

Mr. CHEYSSON (*Minister for External Relations of the French Republic*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honour and a great pleasure for me to be in this chamber today.

For several months now I have in fact wanted to meet you formally as a representative of the French Government to tell you, as my colleague Mr. Lemoine has done, of the importance we attach to Western European Union and, more specifically this Assembly. I am sorry that I shall have to be brief, but I am caught this morning, among my Middle Eastern commitments, between the visitor I have just received and the journey I am about to make on behalf of the President of the French Republic, as your President said.

Yes, we attach very great importance to your Assembly, and we have a lot to ask of you. Allow me very briefly to remind you of our immediate situation: we have a major economic crisis and international order is disturbed, or let us say international disorder prevails. And that, of course, is reflected by tension, conflict and anxiety among our peoples.

A few days ago I had the honour to explain – in another forum – France's approach to disarmament – or rather the controlled limitation of armaments – and I began, as I am doing today, by pointing out that the arms build-up is a result of tensions rather than tensions of any kind being a result of the arms build-up. Nonetheless, the problems of defence, of armaments, must be studied in this context.

I pointed out at the United Nations that all the conflicts since the second world war had taken place in the South, and on behalf of the French Government I then stressed the importance we attach to regional efforts to rebuild confidence, to reduce tension, and to achieve, wherever possible, a limitation and control of the armed forces at regional level. We believe that is the reply which can be offered to the conflicts in the South. In fact, we regard it as a basic principle that East-West tension must not be artificially grafted on to conflicts in the South.

Having first dealt with this important subject, let us now turn to East-West tension, a subject of direct concern to us – and the word "concern" may soon prove to be an understatement.

What is the situation and what is the threat? I shall again pass over the most terrible threats one can think of, which are normally discussed in the United Nations under the heading of "terror weapons" – I use the same term – in other words, chemical and bacteriological weapons. I shall also pass over the weapons of a future generation, anti-satellite weapons, missiles, anti-missiles, all the elements which would disturb or jeopardise the present balance or imbalance. To analyse the present situation, I shall refer to the essential data.

The President of the French Republic said a long time ago that the condition for peace was the balance of forces. This is our guideline and, in the search for this balance of forces, the Atlantic Alliance will naturally be our framework. In other words, there should be a balance of forces between East and West, and we should form an integral part of it, as a prime mover in the Atlantic Alliance.

A more careful examination then leads us – and far from being embarrassed, I feel a certain satisfaction in being able to say this to elected representatives of the people – to note the position of nuclear deterrence in this global balance of forces.

The imbalance of conventional weapons since the end of the war has been such that peace would have been impossible without the nuclear deterrent. This is a fact. It may displease some people but it is an undeniable fact, and simplistic proposals for "no first use" commitment, or for total nuclear disarmament should therefore be considered with all due care or, to be more precise, with all due intelligence.

Then should we regard the present balance of nuclear forces as satisfactory? Certainly not. Little by little, with the advance of technology, in an infernal race in which each of the two superpowers imagined it was overtaking the other, or the other was trying to regain the lead it thought it had lost, we have achieved a nuclear over-capacity, an excessive level of armaments.

We must therefore do all we can to encourage the negotiations that have begun in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and also the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons which should begin very soon following President Reagan's proposal.

The balance must be struck between the two superpowers at the lowest and most stable level

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

possible. But this in no way detracts from the importance of the imbalance of conventional weapons, which we must therefore discuss at the same time. And this time we shall all be sitting round the table. France believes it should be possible to hold the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, for which provision was made within the framework of the CSCE, largely on France's initiative. Let us not forget that it was because of the imbalance of conventional weapons that the nuclear deterrent became necessary, and that it still is.

France is in a special position in this respect, since its independence with regard to deterrent forces stands at the minimum level of credibility, which it must therefore maintain as long as this nuclear deterrent is needed.

You are well aware of all this, Ladies and Gentlemen, so why have I repeated it? So that I can now tell you what we expect of you.

Nowadays we hear our people crying out in fear. Yes, the fear which had lain dormant for twenty years has been reawakened: fear of war — of nuclear war. And it is a good thing that our people do show this fear; it is a good thing that they should incessantly urge governments, and political and economic powers to limit arms, to limit the threats, to seek balance at the lowest possible level, which, I repeat, is the condition for peace.

But this spontaneous, profound movement of public opinion in our countries must not be diverted, exploited or caricatured. A peace campaign, yes, but it must take place everywhere. Information on armaments, yes, but it must be universal. Disarmament debates and demonstrations, yes, but the problems must be seen in perspective. As you very well know, there is no greater threat to peace than unilateral disarmament, than reducing our forces to an inferior level. It is therefore absolutely essential for the problems of peace, the balance of forces and disarmament to become the subject of a great debate which gets to the very roots of our opinions.

At the United Nations I challenged the eastern European countries to join in a live television debate between well-informed people of all shades of opinion and all political complexions, a debate held wherever our people regularly meet, from schools to barracks, through all the meetings and movements in between, but a debate first and foremost between and among the elected representatives of the people. Let me ask you this: how many years is it since our national parliaments last had any real debates on peace, the balance of forces, security and disarmament?

You are an elected Assembly, the only one in our European countries at present to have the competence, the qualifications and the interest to discuss these matters. You must help the governments, you must help those responsible by enabling this debate to take place. Furthermore, you are the elected representatives of our European countries, and in this debate the European countries have an interest, an approach and ideas of a specific and particular nature.

Do not misunderstand me. There is no question of dividing the defence of Europe from that of the other countries of the Alliance. With the present imbalance of forces on the continent of Europe itself that would be a fatal risk. And at the point of balance of strategic nuclear weapons which we have reached, would we have any assurance that, having taken this risk, the guarantee we need would be credible? It would probably be effective, but would it be credible enough to prevent the side considering itself the stronger on the continent from putting its strength to the test? Let us not forget that all the wars which have caused wholesale bloodshed in the world began because at a given moment one side misjudged the other's potential, will and determination.

So there must be absolutely no doubt that defence on the continent of Europe and global defence go hand in hand. Nothing could be more dangerous than to doubt this, until there is something like a balance of forces on the continent itself, a balance of forces and weapons capable of reaching the continent and sited there. But while nothing must be done which might separate the defence of Europe from that of the Alliance as whole, it is nevertheless extremely useful for us to be able to express our own ideas. They do exist, and in some variety, too.

Our peoples do not react to these problems in the same way, which is understandable. The man who may have a Pershing in his back garden tomorrow does not react in the same way as someone who needs the Pershing, but knows it is further from his own hearth and home. Each of us lives with his historical past, with his roots. Reactions differ from one part of the continent to another and it is only natural that all these shades of difference should be expressed. The positions we, as Europeans, have adopted also differ in many respects from the American view, for the very reasons I have just mentioned. So it is a good thing, when public attention is at last involved and a genuine debate on these defence problems begins, that the opinions and constraints peculiar to the people of these countries should be expressed.

Mr. President, this is the French Government's appeal to this Assembly. It must

Mr. Cheysson (continued)

become the main forum in which our peoples can discuss, through their elected representatives and with the necessary feedback, all the problems connected with our security, that is to say, all the aspects of disorder which at present create this need for armament and the means of limiting armaments at the lowest possible level in pursuit of that balance on which peace depends.

That, in brief, is what I wanted to say to you on behalf of the French Government. It is an appeal to you, as members of parliament. I thank you in advance for your efforts to respond to it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, I am sure that I express the appreciation of all members of your coming to make your speech with the difficult duties you have to carry out today. We hope that on a future occasion you will be able to spend more time with us, but I am not unaware of the undertaking you gave in June to come here, and we are very much indebted to you, Minister, for coming.

6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 908 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now resume the discussion of Amendments 2 and 6 to Document 908. Mr. Urwin was on his feet on a point of order. I felt it right to interrupt the proceedings to give the Minister the maximum time that he had available for us.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – As I was saying, Mr. President, when you interrupted the proceedings, my point of order takes the form of a question. In your capacity as presiding officer you quite properly gave the floor to Mr. De Poi so that he could involve himself in a point of enlightenment for the rest of us. I want to ask you whether it is now within your consideration that Mr. De Poi was well advanced in what I would describe as a second speech in support of his amendment. If that is so, it would be wholly out of order.

The PRESIDENT. – That could be a possible difficulty but it is going to be very difficult for me if we are to have more than two chairmen trying to preside over our affairs. When someone wishes to speak, I do not know what he is going to say until he has spoken, and I had hoped that Mr. De Poi was responding to my request to withdraw his amendment. I quite agree with Mr. Urwin that your subsequent

remarks, Mr. De Poi, should be a fairly short clarification rather than a new speech.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you Mr. President for your valuable intervention. In order to explain my true position I should like to explain my amendment to bring it into line with the remarks of our German colleagues so that it reads: “the list of armaments in Annex IV to Protocol No. III”; this is in line with what I originally suggested.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that I cannot allow verbal amendments. Verbal amendments are becoming a very bad habit. The verbal amendment was small, but we cannot have amendments to amendments at this stage. They must be tabled in the proper way. We shall have to vote on the amendment before us. It is not fair to those who are not familiar with the languages that they should have to try to follow verbal amendments to amendments. Mr. De Poi, I am afraid that you will have to stand by your amendment as it is tabled. We cannot negotiate in public.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, yesterday an amendment was accepted for a conciliatory solution... I would simply ask...

The PRESIDENT. – That is quite right. I said at the time that in future I would not accept such verbal amendments. It was probably a mistake to do so yesterday. You have to stick to the two amendments as written in both cases, Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Very well, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – If there is no further debate on the amendments, I have to put them. Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. De Poi is to leave out the existing paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and to insert the words on the order paper. If it is carried, Amendment 6 in the name of Mr. Cavaliere and supported by the Rapporteur, Mr. Prussen, would fall.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I now put Amendment 6 in the name of Mr. Cavaliere.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

We continue with Amendment 3 in the name of Mr. De Poi. I am sorry, Mr. De Poi, if you feel aggrieved but I have to be very firm in not permitting verbal amendments to amend-

The President (continued)

ments. Amendment 3 is, I believe, very simple. It is:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The amendment is self-explanatory; we cannot ask for a unilateral assessment of decisions which have to be agreed by countries. I consider therefore that the deletion of paragraph 2 is wholly consistent with the undertakings given by the countries when the treaty was signed.

I would simply observe that, unfortunately, the preceding amendment has not received the same treatment as that given to another amendment yesterday afternoon. I believe that if it had been passed in the same way as the previous one we might have been able to achieve a measure of give and take. I regret what happened to the previous amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Can I have the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I made several references in my statement to the recommendation put forward by the committee, which also agreed that Amendments 3 and 4 by Mr. De Poi should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that the committee advises the Assembly to reject the amendment.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

If not, I shall put the amendment to leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is negated.

We come now to Amendment 4:

4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 4 obviously follows from the previous one. As this kind of declaration would be purely theoretical, it is logical that, having proposed the previous amendment, I should also propose the deletion of paragraph 3 of the recommendation proper.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

The committee indicates that it would be opposed to it.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negated.

I have now to put the draft recommendation itself, as amended by Amendments 1, 5 and 6.

If there is no opposition and there are no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

There are objections. We have therefore no alternative but to have a roll-call vote on the draft recommendation.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Vohrer.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

A point of order was raised by Mr. Urwin on the Falkland Islands crisis. While the votes are being counted, I shall read out the text of a news agency report, which states:

“An announcement by the British Prime Minister’s office said the surrender took place at 9 p.m. Falkland time (01.00 GMT).

It quoted Major-General Jeremy Moore, Commander of the British land forces, as saying the islands were once more under the government desired by their inhabitants. Arrangements were being made to repatriate the Argentine troops, he said.

There was no immediate confirmation from Argentina. But shortly before the British announcement, the independent *Noticias Argentinas* news agency reported that the Argentine garrison at Port Stanley was in no condition to resist a new British offensive.

The surrender, reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to be unconditional, came after British troops had fought their way to within 4 km of the island capital.

A cease-fire took effect yesterday, allowing military commanders of the two sides to discuss an end to the 74 day-old Argentine occupation of the Falklands.”

I give that information because I know that not everyone has been able to hear the broadcast.

I hope that we now have the result. I am sorry for the delay with the roll-call. We are always in some difficulty when people do not sign in place of others or leave their votes until the end of the counting.

The President (continued)

It is clear that the draft recommendation has been carried. There is a slight dispute about one of the numbers.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to explain briefly the meaning of our vote against the recommendation, in addition to the full explanation we gave yesterday.

Our vote is not meant to discriminate against the Federal Republic of Germany. We think that controls have to be maintained and we have therefore supported all Mr. De Poi's amendments.

As these amendments have been rejected, there is now no possibility of control which is contrary to the Brussels Treaty itself; this is our reason for voting against because approval in fact means cover for an arms race, which has nothing to do with the problems of European security for which our Assembly should be working.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

We now have the result of the vote which is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	54
Ayes	42
Noes	4
Abstentions	8

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the draft recommendation that has been adopted includes reference to matters concerning the Federal Republic. You will have noticed that we took very little part in the debate. I myself, as spokesman for the delegation, did not adopt a position. We have always held back when this subject has been discussed in the past, and wanted to do so again now, for good reason.

Nevertheless, the committee having broached the subject itself, we quite obviously could not vote for the maintenance of discrimination against the Federal Republic. I wish to make it quite clear that the Federal Republic is a peace-loving country, loyal to its treaty obligations. We have long since renounced the production and use of A, B and C weapons and this position will remain unchanged.

1. See page 26.

2. See page 28.

I believe that, all in all, the attitude displayed by the Federal Republic since the second world war, has been rewarded by the members of this Assembly today and I am most grateful for this. You may be sure that the Federal Republic will continue its endeavours to maintain peace and protect our freedom. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Gessner, for that important statement on behalf of your delegation.

7. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 917 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – We now move to the next order of the day, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 917 and amendment.

Before calling the Rapporteur, I should explain to the Assembly that the Clerk to the committee, whom you will all know, Mr. Huigens, has sustained a painful injury to his back and has not been able to work for some weeks. The news is that he is making good progress. Although he is unable to be with us this week, we hope that he will be able to resume his duties before too long. I am sure that it will be your wish and that of the committee to send to Mr. Huigens the Assembly's warm wishes for a speedy recovery.

I now call Mr. Fiandrotti to introduce his report, Document 917.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – My report is the first part of a longer report, the second part of which will be submitted later. This first part is therefore concerned basically with civil research and its harmonisation, while the second part is to deal with the harmonisation of military applications and advanced technology.

May I say at once that this idea of harmonising civil research in high technology between the various states, within the different organisations where they collaborate, is the basis of the report; but this concept of harmonisation has other aspects and meanings which should be considered and perhaps should be given special

Mr. Fiandrotti (continued)

attention. The first is the link between civil and military research, that is the two-way influence and application of advanced civil and military research; this is not always valued at its true worth and is not always applied to good effect. Every country has a different policy in the matter, producing different results.

Harmonisation also means considering East-West relations and North-South relations – between the developed and the developing countries – which is a problem that comes up whenever the harmonisation of countries' high technology policies is mentioned.

My report, which I shall summarise very briefly, begins by analysing the different ways in which research is organised in the various countries. There are basically two approaches: that of Anglo-Saxon countries where research is strongly decentralised with considerable delegation to ministries and largely independent organisations and associations and that of all the other European countries, where there is usually one ministry responsible for research policy which co-ordinates, encourages and promotes the work of the bodies which carry it out. I have no need to describe in detail the position in each country as this information is given in my report.

Again, scientific and technological research takes a different direction in the various countries, according to its actual quality and content; in some countries the main emphasis is on civil research and in others on military research. In this respect, there is a marked difference between research in France and the United Kingdom, where the major effort is directed to the defence sector, 48 % and 54 %, and in Germany, 10 %, Italy, 3 to 4 %, and the other countries.

Even within this allocation of funds there are further differences; in the civil sector, for example, research in Germany is directed in large measure to health, social security, information, technology and energy while France and the United Kingdom devote more attention to biogenetics, computers and telematics. There are therefore major differences between countries not only as regards structures and the relative proportions of military and civil research but also as regards the subjects of civil research. This naturally leads to wide differences between the results achieved by research in each country and at the same time poses the problem of harmonising at community level the use of the various countries' research, enabling each country's results to be used by the others under the terms of a Community agreement.

In fact, however, there is very little tendency to collaborate either within the United Nations

or within the EEC, which concerns us more closely, and recent budgets have taken a line opposed to this requirement and to this opportunity of increasing by a policy of harmonisation the overall return on research carried out in the different countries. In general, it is fair to say that harmonisation takes place mainly through multilateral co-operation rather than through Community action or activities. There are both multilateral and bilateral relationships with the small countries preferring multilateral and the bigger countries bilateral collaboration. Preference generally goes to collaboration on the civil side and there is very little collaboration on the military side.

My report gives fairly full details of budget appropriations, that is the sum which the various countries invest in defence research. It should be remembered that in 1974 the Community tried to improve on the previous situation; up till then, research by the Community was carried out in application of the three Community treaties and was therefore directed to very specific subjects. In 1974, the European Community set as its objectives an overall expansion of member countries' economies, the improvement of its scientific and technical potential, and the incorporation of existing programmes for energy and raw materials; it also aimed at improving the competitiveness of agriculture, at establishing a more productive relationship with the third world, at providing firms with easier access to research findings and at concentrating efforts on new technologies. It was also planned that the Community should intervene where the individual states were unable to make their own provision because of the scale of the investment involved.

These guiding principles formed the basis of the work of the Scientific and Technical Research Committee and the Consultative Committee on Industrial Research and Development. Research was directed more especially to agriculture under Article 41 of the treaty and to computer science, textiles and the work of the ECSC. Here, it should be emphasised that for the European Community to achieve effective results in the field of scientific and technological research, the aims of the individual states must be precisely defined so that the Community can identify subjects for study and hence the opportunities for collaboration. It is also important that the Community's programme should be reviewed from time to time and that financial resources and personnel should be moved around within the Community in order to increase the overall potential.

Another section of the report summarises budget trends in the various countries over the past twenty years. Between 1960 and 1970 substantial sums were allocated to scientific and

Mr. Fiandrotti (continued)

technological research but during the seventies, when funds were, of course, short because of the oil crisis, the trend was reversed and investment was cut in varying degree in the different countries; lately, there has been a revival in the countries where the biggest cuts were made, in particular in France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

I would recall that in general 75 % of resources go to the civil sector, and in the particular case of the funds allocated by the various governments to the Community for scientific and technological research, 72 % go to the energy sector; in this context, the Community's two projects on nuclear fusion (JET and NET) are important. These decisions should enable the Community to maintain its competitiveness with the United States and Japan in the energy sector. I have already mentioned that the different percentages of resources allocated to the military and civil sectors result from the different distribution of expenditure in the various countries; more goes to defence in France and the United Kingdom, less in Germany and progressively less in the other countries.

It must be stressed, however, that it is becoming increasingly clear that the ability of the European countries to continue competing with the other countries depends on their collaborating on their scientific and technological policies. This was stated by the President of the Commission, Mr. Thorn, who said that Europe must take up the initiative at Community and not national level in the new advanced sectors.

But these statements conflict with the facts: because of their current difficulties, the various countries are opting for national policies and the funds available to the Community have been fairly substantially reduced while the individual states are at the same time devoting more funds to research.

The overall consequence is that Europe's economy is at a disadvantage because, even though the resources applied to research are the same as in the United States and Japan, Europe achieves less by way of results; for example, Japan, with the same number of technicians and smaller resources achieves greater results, particularly because of the close links which can be established between government research, industry and private research. In Europe, these links between government research, industry and commercial applications are completely inadequate. This raises a very important question, because the members of the Community must realise the serious damage caused by the fragmentation of research and delay in its use, including the application of

military discoveries to the civil sector, which is a major feature, especially in the Soviet Union even more than in Europe. The problem is obviously aggravated by the differences which exist between the countries.

One section of the report deals with industrial innovation. I would simply remark that there are obvious differences between countries as regards the way in which funds for research are used by universities, institutes and industry. The German system is perhaps more effective while those of Italy and the other countries are less effective. Everyone is fully aware of the fact I have already mentioned, namely that we are in a period of great changes and that the eighties are a period of transition to the nineties, when a major industrial revolution will have taken place. It would be very dangerous for the European countries to miss the bus at this time and to fail to adopt policies which will produce maximum results.

As regards the International Atomic Energy Agency, I simply stress that the main emphasis has been on the problem of the underdeveloped countries which are asking for more opportunities to use the results obtained by countries with advanced nuclear techniques; reference is also made to the problem of controlling plutonium stocks.

The problem of harmonisation in OECD is highly complex. I refer to the meeting of the Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy held in March 1981, when the situation was reviewed and three basic themes were identified: innovation policy, the future consequences of science and technology and international collaboration. A number of priorities were formulated.

In conclusion, it seems to me that the political problems now likely to arise even allowing for the limited nature of the report are the following: firstly, despite declarations recognising it as being essential, why has it still not been possible for the various countries to work out a common energy policy? Secondly, the need to produce such a policy has been stressed by the Council and reiterated on all sides, but the delays are serious. The Assembly stressed that the Community must have a measure of autonomy in the matter of energy; hence the question of Siberian gas or the purchase of such gas by European countries. Some of them have already signed an agreement and supplies of Siberian gas will probably be available within six years. The United States has raised objections on the subject and these are summarised in the report. A choice has to be made between two principles involved: the advantage for the various countries of having several sources of supply as a guarantee for themselves, as against the risk of leaving the Soviet Union in a

Mr. Fiandrotti (continued)

dominant position as regards decisions on energy policy. It seems to me that the present tendency is to opt for the diversification of sources, bearing in mind that in addition to supplies of Soviet and Algerian gas, there may be further exploration in the North Sea.

As regards fast-breeder reactor policy, it is important to stress the difficulty of separating peaceful from military uses, particularly in the case of Phoenix reactors. This is therefore an especially delicate question for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Proper account must be taken not only of the problem of controls but also of that of relations with the countries of the third world.

In the case of aeronautics, the Wilkinson report will certainly be very detailed. I would simply put one political question: the bodies responsible for expansion and for working out a policy for standardisation and harmonisation in the aeronautics field have so far proved ineffective. Should they be changed, therefore? Is this enough? In my report I refer to the subject of the Franco-German tank which despite being given priority at the highest political level, has so far not been built. This means that there are objective declarations in favour of action or initiative at state level which in practice conflict with what happens at departmental level.

I conclude with one or two remarks on European space technology. Here good results have been obtained with applications allowing competition with the United States: this I was able to observe during a recent visit to that country. But here again we are moving backwards; a number of countries, and France and Germany in particular, are tending to give preference to national policies on the basis of the results already achieved by the European Space Agency, on the grounds that specialisation in this field should be in the hands of industry. This could prove to be a serious mistake, repeating another mistake already demonstrated by United States' experience, when NASA had to make a sharp U-turn on some aspects of the use of satellites. Technical and scientific results could be jeopardised by countries dispersing their efforts.

These briefly are the policy questions dealt with in the report which concludes with a request to the Standing Armaments Committee to give its assistance so that the second part can be carried through in the most profitable manner and so that a list of priorities can quickly be formulated and accepted – a priority list of military questions on which the countries might collaborate giving due thought to the possibilities for increasing the reliability

and autonomy of member countries' energy supplies.

I recall that at the committee's meeting in London, it was observed that even the very major effort required in the advanced sectors of our industry and in the space, aeronautics and future sectors should not be allowed to obscure the important fact that Europe should devote more attention to resources for agricultural research which is in danger of not being able to meet member countries' needs.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Fiandrotti. We shall now have the general debate. I remind delegates of the decision taken by the Assembly yesterday that all speeches apart from those of the rapporteurs – who, we nevertheless hope, will be a little restrained in the length of their remarks – should be limited to five minutes. We now have some electrical devices. As representatives will know, we do not own this building and therefore the possibility of a permanent installation is out of the question.

The Clerk will put on the light on the extreme right after four and a half minutes and the red light, if it works, will go on after five minutes. Members will be able to see these lights, and I hope that those who are speaking will look first at one light and then at the other.

I gather that Mr. Bassinet does not now wish to speak. The first speaker is Mr. Blaauw, who has five minutes.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall probably not even use up my five minutes' speaking time since I do not mean to go into the report before us in depth. I shall rather take this opportunity to compliment the Standing Armaments Committee on Document SAC (82) IA, finally published in April 1982. This document is the result of a task begun in 1977, but it nevertheless bears witness to thorough work. Hence my congratulations to the Standing Armaments Committee.

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to speak to my amendment. The amendment is in fact also addressed to the Standing Armaments Committee. I have tabled an amendment designed to introduce a time-limit in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, by means of the words "and report to the Assembly within a year". Why? Because although the document before us is a good one, it took too long to produce. That may not be the fault of the Standing Armaments Committee. The point of my amendment is to indicate that work must proceed somewhat faster in future so that we can keep more up to date and comment sooner on material produced by so valuable an

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

instrument as the Standing Armaments Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw, both for explaining your amendment and for the brevity of your speech.

The next speaker is Mr. Forma, to be followed by Mr. Antoni.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it seems to me that the title of the report with which Mr. Fiandrotti introduces the recommendation we are asked to approve in reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council, reflects more than ever a need which concerns not only the specific matter under consideration – I mean subjects which concern WEU – but goes beyond joint organisation for common defence to a different form of European existence.

To keep to the subject, after congratulating the Rapporteur and saying that I shall be glad to vote for his proposal, I should like to refer to the point mentioned in paragraph 4 (*b*), namely the need to persevere with determination in working together to set up teams capable of operating as real European research groups, financed continuously by the various countries so that they can function efficiently, without being strangled by U-turns in every annual budget and the difficulties of the individual member countries.

To tell you the truth, it seems to me that the recommendation of the United Nations conference for the formation of an intergovernmental committee and of a scientific and technical centre with its own budget of at least \$ 250 million has remained a dead letter and that progress in earlier years has been halted by economic difficulties which have sidetracked all that has been attempted. The various countries – the report describes their differing mechanisms – communicate by different methods and through different and little co-ordinated organisations and finance research out of funds directly allocated under other heads. There is no constant, common rule such as would be needed to back an adequate effort and to bring the Western European countries into better balance with the United States and other advanced countries: we do not have the overall strategy which, as the Rapporteur mentioned, the committee previously proposed in 1981 – in fact the proposal is repeated textually. It seems absolutely essential that objectives should be defined in accordance with the committee's proposal. But the Rapporteur is quite right to use the conditional tense in this part of his report; this is confirmed by the example which he quotes of the way in which funds are allocated in the various budgets. We trust that good proposals

will not as has often happened, stifle the intentions they express, for lack of oxygen – in this case for lack of the necessary funds. I believe that, with all due respect to certain economists, updating and innovation are the only way out of the crisis of post-industrial society and I am also convinced that it is only by working together that the individual countries can avoid being overwhelmed by competition from the giant powers which surround and dominate Europe. Furthermore, it would appear that the OECD has finally turned in this direction its proposals to make the eighties into a period of transition towards less negative nineties and to establish a better balance between national and joint programmes. I wonder, however, whether we shall really be able to achieve this; we shall have to rediscover the will for union which inspired the authors of the Rome Treaty. When I look at their portraits in the corridors at Strasbourg I sometimes have the feeling that I am being looked down on with a degree of pained sarcasm as being one of those who have helped to bury the Europe they believed they were holding at its christening.

Consideration of other individual points in the annual report, which are here summarised so succinctly, leads to no more favourable conclusions. Each seems to repeat what is said about energy and security: there is a threatening return to nationalism and to inertia on our part too. There is an old saying "Divide and rule". I wonder whether we are not letting ourselves be divided by those who want to rule.

The Rapporteur has promised us a second part with concrete proposals. We shall look forward to this with hope. I trust that this hope does not mean that we are blinking the facts.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forma.

I now call Mr. Antoni. Again, Mr. Antoni, you are allowed five minutes.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I first wish to pay tribute to Mr. Fiandrotti for his work which has provided us with a great deal of useful information on a subject of such vital interest: the only surprising feature is the almost total lack of information on Italy.

The overall picture presented is certainly not encouraging: research is progressing too slowly; resources are limited; efforts are greatly fragmented; international co-operation is too limited; the different approaches of the bigger and the smaller powers are a problem. Lastly, links between government research, industry and commerce are inadequate and there is no common energy policy. But what is needed is a greater and more determined effort from Europe in the field of scientific research and in the development of technology in a wide

Mr. Antoni (continued)

variety of sectors, and particularly in those with which we are concerned – aerospace, energy and defence. This calls for closer collaboration between the WEU countries and the more precise formulation of a policy for science and technological development which will include and involve all the member countries so that, as has just been said, the transitional eighties may lead to more advanced and developed societies.

I think therefore that there may be some need to review the judgment that international collaboration is to be regarded as complementary to national potential and as desirable for major projects which cannot be met out of national resources. On the contrary, I consider that collaboration should be extended to include a wide variety of experiments and research where interchangeability is certainly advantageous. Consequently, the separate international initiatives of the United Nations, the OECD, the EEC, the Standing Armaments Committee, the United Nations intergovernmental and scientific committees should be collected together and better co-ordinated.

In my opinion, the committee was quite right to cut out the part of the draft recommendation which adopted a less open – I would even say backward-looking – attitude as compared to the view expressed by the Council on the question of Soviet gas. This is the amendment to paragraph 3 of the recommendation which, as amended, is more in line with a policy of diversifying sources of energy by using alternative sources, does not affect the question of security and is consistent with the policy of member countries and governments.

This leaves the question covered by paragraph (iii) of the preamble which declares the need to develop and produce high technology weapons capable of ensuring a balance of forces with the Warsaw Pact. Put in this form the question does not appear to me to express the true present requirements correctly or to allow for the contradictory changes in the world situation. As Mr. Tindemans said yesterday and as declared in the recommendation introduced by Mr. Vecchietti and approved by the Assembly, the line now emerging in face of terrifying over-armament and the fear of war – these were the words which the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Cheysson, used this morning – is to support the negotiations on medium-range weapons now in progress and on long-range strategic weapons due to open shortly in Geneva; this is the line taken by President Reagan when he says that the United States is prepared to negotiate on conventional weapons also. The direction is therefore towards negotiations and disarmament and to a balance of armaments at the lowest possible level but certainly

not towards unilateral disarmament, as the French minister said this morning, or towards rearmament. It is not by chance that this debate is to be followed today by consideration of the draft recommendation on disarmament submitted by Mr. Vohrer. I would therefore ask the Rapporteur and the Assembly to change this position and to delete paragraph (iii) or to bring it into line with the policy of disarmament. Otherwise, we cannot agree on this point and will have to vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

That concludes the debate on Document 917.

Does Mr. Fiandrotti wish to reply to the debate?

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have not a great deal to say. The committee and I can accept the formal amendment. As regards the last speech, I would first like to observe that information on Italy is included among that given concerning the other countries, because Italy's investment in military research is less than that of the other countries, which perhaps accounts for giving it less prominence. On the other hand, I feel that sufficient emphasis is given to what Italy has achieved in the field of scientific and technological research and to its successes in the matter of telecommunications and satellites, the possibility of collaboration with other countries and with co-operation institutions. It is probable that as an Italian I took some things for read.

But in the case of Mr. Antoni's objection, I would recall that paragraph (iii) should be taken in the context of WEU's general policy which must be based on the points recalled this morning by Mr. Cheysson. Clearly, WEU hopes for a reduction in armaments to the lowest possible level and it is our hope that the negotiations now in progress in Madrid and Geneva will produce concrete results for medium-range and, in particular, nuclear weapons. The statement that the European countries should have high-technology weapons is to be seen in this context. In the final issue, the firm points of our policy line on military questions are always the usual ones: the balance of forces is today regarded as the guarantee of peace. The hope is for an agreed reduction of armaments to the lowest possible level. What matters is a substantial measure of equilibrium between the armed forces.

As there has been no specific amendment, I think that the question can rest there, with a statement of the general spirit which should inspire the policy of WEU and the negotiations between the various countries.

I should like to take this opportunity of thanking all speakers who have expressed appreciation of my report and I am prepared to submit the second report with specific proposals, for

Mr. Fiandrotti (continued)

which I would request all necessary assistance so that the Assembly can express itself in practical terms.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Fiandrotti.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I do not want to prolong this debate unnecessarily since we appear to be very largely agreed on the matter in hand, which proves that the report and particularly its conclusions are very sound and well argued.

Mr. President, on behalf of the Assembly and especially the committee of which I have the honour to be Chairman I should, however, like to begin by associating myself with your wishes to our Counsellor, Mr. Huigens, for a speedy recovery. He has been untiring in his efforts for the committee and the Assembly this year, as he has been in the past. I also welcome Mr. Messina, who is standing in for him on this occasion and has boarded a moving train, as it were, with all that that entails.

As you have said, Mr. President, the work of our Rapporteur, Mr. Fiandrotti, has been very comprehensive, and his verbal comments were very complete: a further reason for not prolonging this debate on requirements on which we are all agreed.

The report is based on our work last year in the United States during the visit by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I ask the President and the Presidency and also the Bureau of the Presidential Committee and our Assembly to note this.

The conclusions you have before you, Ladies and Gentlemen, broadly take account of this mission, which was a serious undertaking, as was demonstrated both by the participation and presence of the members of the committee and by their activity. I should like to take this opportunity to stress how fruitful missions of this kind can be.

Although I did not personally discover Japan – nor did the committee – I recall that this country, where advanced technology has not followed the same direction as in the United States, can pride itself on the fact that over 90 % of its working population have a diploma equivalent to university entrance level in France while 35 % or 36 % have the equivalent of a French university degree.

It is thus evident that, thanks to the basic technical, scientific and technological training it provides, Japan has in its “human capital” an extremely powerful springboard for the development of its economy and industry.

As Mr. Fiandrotti has so aptly put it, the whole of our debate hinges, of course, on this dual consideration. If we do not co-ordinate our action, we waste our resources. But a further consideration is that for research in particular and high technology, which originates directly from it, it is not enough to invest in a sure thing. If the United States has a greater capacity for invention than we Europeans – and especially Europeans who are still far from united – it is because they always invest far more heavily in a single objective, which leaves room during the research aimed at achieving this objective for a number of secondary discoveries which always prove very productive later. We in Europe work on a more limited range of technological research and investment projects, which may save us from suffering various losses, but also deprives us of pleasant surprises and, in the long run, of greater capacities.

This report essentially concerns the civil aspects. The second part will deal with all the military aspects, which fully justifies the appeal the Rapporteur makes in his conclusions to the Standing Armaments Committee in particular.

I am pleased to stress the merits of this approach since once again – as Mr. Forma has rightly said – the Standing Armaments Committee has done a great deal of work and drawn some extremely valuable conclusions which, following Mr. Blaauw's suggestion, we shall attempt to put to good use by publishing, with the specific aim of improving the effectiveness of our work as parliamentarians.

The Standing Armaments Committee, let us never forget, is by virtue of its function a powerful instrument of WEU. It will therefore increase the strength of WEU as soon as we manage to make more effective use of it.

Ladies and Gentlemen, after Mr. Forma's sound statement and that made by Mr. Blaauw, with its useful conclusion – the amendment he has tabled – I was rather sorry to hear Mr. Antoni's comments, for it is important that we should achieve the widest possible consensus on a report which, although partly technical, also has political and military implications, which is quite natural since this is, after all, WEU.

I should also like to apologise for my colleague, Mr. Bassinet, who wanted to speak this morning but has been prevented by other commitments. I therefore thank the Rapporteur for very largely taking account of the many statements Mr. Bassinet made during our committee meeting in London. I think I can say, therefore, that his contribution has made the report both more attractive and more effective.

In conclusion, I can do no more than ask you, as the Rapporteur has done, to give very

Mr. Valleix (continued)

wide and, indeed, unanimous support to this report. What I would like to see is a highly effective recommendation, because scientific co-operation in Europe is still very fragmentary. This places us at a disadvantage compared with our major competitors, and we run the risk of falling behind powers which are today less industrialised than we are but are advancing.

The recommendation should, of course, also call for an improvement in budgetary efficiency: harmony also means economy of resources. It should further call for industrial efficiency and consequently for better opportunities of resisting and overcoming the crisis. Finally, it should call for military efficiency and so for an active contribution to peace.

These, Mr. President, are my personal reflections, which I wished to state publicly, and I thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, for your contribution to this report and our Rapporteur again for the magnificent work he has done which, I hope, you will endorse with your vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

That concludes the debate.

I endorse the remarks of Mr. Valleix saying how grateful we are to Mr. Messina, who has helped us as a temporary member of the Assembly over many years in many capacities and who since January, additionally, has been helping the Committee on Scientific Technological and Aerospace Questions on this report. We thank him very much and hope that he will continue to come and give us the benefit of his experience and knowledge.

We now come to Amendment 1 which reads:

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and report to the Assembly within a year".

That amendment has been tabled by Mr. Blaauw, who spoke to it in the course of his speech and may therefore just wish to move it formally.

I understand from Mr. Antoni that he wished to move an amendment. I ruled earlier that we could not accept amendments to documents during the course of a speech. It is impossible for members, particularly those who may not have heard that part of that speech, to form a view on such oral amendments. Indeed, I am required under Rule 29 not to select amendments if I consider that there has not been adequate time for the Assembly to study them. Therefore, I cannot accept Mr. Antoni's suggestion regarding a verbal amendment.

There is only the one amendment by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Liberal Group. Will someone move it formally?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I move the amendment formally.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that the committee is willing to accept Mr. Blaauw's amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak to Mr. Blaauw's amendment?...

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to make a proposal to the Chair. The Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee have asked for a unanimous vote. We have said that we feel unable to vote for paragraph (iii). I note the Chairman's criticism: but the Assembly might be able to resolve the problem if the President ruled that, as the report was drafted by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions whereas the subject of the point in question might better be attributed to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the parts of paragraph (iii) referring to a balance might be replaced without other formality – I believe the rules allow this. The text would then read: "considering the need to develop high technology production". As the draft recommendation is submitted by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the content of this point could be limited to this. This would allow a unanimous vote of the Assembly; otherwise, we repeat that we shall abstain completely as we cannot vote for the amendment which, as the President has observed, cannot now be proposed.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Antoni, had you tabled such an amendment, it might have found favour with the Assembly. This idea of negotiating across the floor with the members of the committee must cease. We cannot conduct our business on the basis of oral amendments. Whether you should vote is for you to determine.

I am not prepared to go on. I was rightly criticised by Mr. De Poi this morning because yesterday, in order to avoid a vote, I accepted a tiny verbal amendment – namely six months instead of a year. I was criticised for that. I must therefore stick to the rule that anything of substance – and what you are suggesting is a matter of substance – if notice has not been given to members in writing, cannot be put to the vote. Everyone knows that that is the rule. Indeed, Mr. Antoni, you have put down amendments many times in the past, so you are not unfamiliar with the working of the Assembly. I must rule that your verbal amendment cannot be put to the vote.

The President (continued)

I shall call Mr. Valleix, followed by Mr. Urwin.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in the circumstances I believe that we all agree with your analysis and interpretation of our Rules of Procedure.

I am sorry therefore that Mr. Antoni should feel dissatisfied. But, quite apart from the Rules of Procedure, I would remind Mr. Antoni that he himself said that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions had presented its proposals and its conclusions this morning.

Of course, we are only the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, but as such we have adopted a position. We naturally form an integral and active part of our parliamentary assembly. By this I wish to convey to you that in this instance, in particular, the committee is not primarily expressing a political viewpoint.

The text is as it is. It cannot be touched now. I can therefore only hope that Mr. Antoni will abstain in the vote.

The PRESIDENT. – There is a great danger, Mr. Valleix, that you may discuss an amendment that has not been moved.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to emphasise, Mr. President, that the committee is not seeking to make any political judgment in paragraph (iii).

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix. I am sorry that I interrupted you, but we might have gone on to debate an amendment that I have ruled not to exist. I call Mr. Urwin to speak.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to follow up what has been said and to declare my support, as well as my sympathy, for you as President of the Assembly. During the past one and a quarter days you have had to spend a considerable amount of time quite properly dismissing amendments tabled at the last minute. It does not accord with the best interests of the Assembly to allow that procedure to continue. I suggest that this is a sufficiently important matter to be taken up by the Presidential Committee in order to eradicate such a possibility.

The PRESIDENT. – The rules are clear. The President has a discretion and I have to take responsibility for exercising it. I can conceive of certain circumstances, such as that which you mentioned earlier about the Falkland Islands, in which events develop rapidly and the normal rules of 24 hours' notice

may have to be waived. The rules are clear, but the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges might have to look again at the whole question of taking roll-calls. It is far from clear whether abstentions require a roll-call.

I must now proceed to put the draft recommendation to Document 917, as amended by Mr. Blaauw. His amendment seeks to add, at the end of paragraph 2,

“and report to the Assembly within a year”.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation? If there is no opposition and there are no abstentions, we can proceed without a roll-call.

I am sure that you do not wish to oppose your own report, Mr. Fiandrotti. In that case you cannot speak.

As there is no opposition and, I understand, no abstentions, the draft recommendation is carried. I am much obliged to all concerned for their co-operation.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We have said that we shall abstain, Mr. President; we have said so three times.

The PRESIDENT. – I asked whether there were any abstentions, but I did not hear anyone.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am not attempting to speak against the committee's draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – If there are three abstentions we must have a roll-call.

We shall now proceed to a roll-call starting, as previously, with Mr. Vohrer.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	35
Ayes	30
Noes	0
Abstentions	5

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to ask why we had to have a roll-call vote.

1. See page 27.
2. See page 29.

The PRESIDENT. – As Mr. Reddemann knows well, I am not able to interpret the rules other than as they are laid down. The rule provides that there should be a roll-call vote on every draft recommendation, but in practice over the years it has been accepted that if there is unanimity we do not have to have a roll-call. However, if people object or wish to abstain I have no alternative. We cannot have a debate on this, Mr. Reddemann, but I shall allow you to make a comment.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my interruption was not a criticism of you but of those members who did not even vote against the draft recommendation but held up the work of the Assembly by demanding a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. – It is not the first time that that has happened and, unless the rules are changed, it will not be the last. Fortunately, we have changed the rules about a quorum; otherwise, it would not have been possible to take that vote.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I have no wish to debate this matter, but representatives have a right to make observations and obviously it would appear that there are a great many members – though I would not wish to include you, Mr. President, though I probably understand your thoughts on the matter – who feel that this is a sheer waste of time. May I suggest to you, therefore, that this is an item that should be referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure? Representatives have a right to abstain, but it is a sheer waste of time of the Assembly when there are many other items needing discussion. The need to have a roll-call vote in these circumstances needs looking at.

The PRESIDENT. – The subject has already been referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure, which has made suggestions but did not go as far as you or I would wish. I know that it is not the practice in the British parliament to register abstentions, although in some parliaments it is; and the only way one can have one's vote recorded is by having a roll-call vote. As the rule stands, if only one representative wants his name to be shown as abstaining, we have to have a roll-call vote to allow him that privilege. Unless the rules are amended, that is how things stand. At its very next meeting I shall draw the attention of the Committee on Rules of Procedure to this issue and ask whether a better way out of this situation can be found.

8. Disarmament

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 909 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament, Document 909 and amendments.

I call Mr. Vohrer to present the report.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, behind the security policy debate of the eighties lies the awareness, accompanied by malaise and fear, that existing arms capabilities are sufficient to eradicate the human race. This widespread concern is reflected by the peace movements in the various countries of the East and still more in the West, which differ in detail and emphasis but have one thing in common: fear of these disproportionate arms capabilities.

Experience since the second world war – and we have after all now had thirty-seven years of peace – has shown that a balance of forces is an important factor in the maintenance of a stable peace. However, since the Harmel report we are also more aware that an upward movement of arms capabilities is not the only way of achieving a balance of forces, but that security policy can also be geared towards achieving a balance through arms reductions, that is, a balance of forces at the lowest possible level – as the French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, emphasised once again in the clearest possible terms from this very place.

There are no contradictions between security policy or defence policy on the one hand and arms control or disarmament considerations on the other. They are two complementary facets of security policy. I emphasise this because the discussion on my report showed again and again that there are people who reject the idea of any form of disarmament at present, on the grounds that the only subject of discussion at this time should be increased exertions towards armament, not ideas about disarmament.

I have no sympathy with this minority opinion, which also finds expression in the report, and hope that the majority of members will follow me in this.

Disarmament is a very comprehensive concept. Disarmament talks and negotiations are not at all easy to follow. They take place in widely varying arenas. Bringing the different elements together has therefore proved a laborious task. They are now available to you in two reports, Mr. Mommersteeg's and my own.

Mr. Vohrer (continued)

Compilation of these facts involved various trips and discussions. The report indicates that I obtained information in Vienna, Geneva and London, but I should like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude for the very constructive collaboration of the secretariat, particularly Mr. Whyte. This certainly helped very considerably to make the report before you as broad and far-reaching as it is.

As you already know, the report is intended to survey the present state – it can deal only with the position at 20th April, when it was adopted – of the various disarmament talks. It begins with regional talks, which concentrate on Central Europe, concerned with conventional weapons and forces, the MBFR talks in Vienna. The aim there is to achieve balanced force reductions in Central Europe. A few days before we were able to speak to the ambassadors in Vienna the Warsaw Pact had made proposals for a first-stage reduction in forces.

The report, however, also deals with the second level – the confidence-building measures of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Madrid, currently adjourned but due to continue in the autumn, and the consultations taking place in connection with the French proposal for a European disarmament conference.

One matter which I have not dealt with, but which is covered in Mr. Mommersteeg's report this afternoon, is the problem of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, about which negotiations have been going on in Geneva since 30th November 1981, and strategic weapons, talks on the reduction of which begin in Geneva on 29th June.

My report further includes the level of world-wide efforts towards disarmament within the framework of the United Nations, the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly which is taking place in New York parallel to our part-session here in Paris. The purpose of those endeavours is to end the arms race throughout the world, put a stop to the irresponsible world-wide waste of resources already running at \$ 500,000 million, and at the same time make quite specific proposals. In the report the committee firmly endorses the proposals for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a final ban on chemical, radiological and space weapons – to mention only a few of the proposals under discussion in New York.

All these various negotiations on aspects of disarmament are, however, interrelated. We should never get the idea that disarmament

talks are a mere technical event for playing the numbers game and failing to see the wood for the trees. Disarmament negotiations must be backed by a political will, a clear position in favour of the reduction of military capabilities, if any progress is to be made, if we as politicians are ever to bring negotiations like the MBFR talks now taking place in Vienna for the first time in nine years, to a successful conclusion.

However much one appreciates the contribution of the officials working so hard on disarmament, technical questions, questions of verification, all these important matters, I must stress the need for political pressure if any progress is to be made.

The report gives an overview of the world military situation, military expenditure, and the present state of disarmament negotiations. But it also makes some suggestions of its own. Among these is that we in Europe have reached the conclusion that our relations with the East should be stepped-up in the form of trade.

For, as economists, we are aware that the convergence theory – the theory that the market economy on the one side and the centrally managed economy on the other are moving towards each other – is not working out in the textbook fashion assumed by some theorists. On the other hand, we are aware that trade constitutes a link between peoples and creates a mutual dependence that is in every nation's interest. Trade in this sense encourages trust and understanding between peoples, and can therefore also contribute to peace.

In addition, we have a whole range of confidence-building measures. One such – as the report makes clear – is the United Nations arms export register. Another is greater budget transparency which would reveal not only the amount of each country's budgetary commitments for military expenditure but also how much it spends on development aid. Another such measure is the proposal, which also comes from France, that the United Nations should establish in the long term a satellite monitoring system for better verification of military developments. For the time being such instruments exist only at national level; it would be better if they were in international hands.

The report makes yet another proposal: to replace existing weapons systems, which are as a rule suitable for both offensive purposes, by weapons systems that are primarily suitable for defence. The idea behind this is that a country would be prepared to reduce its military capabilities only if it could defend its territory without the weapons necessary for such defence constituting a threat to its neighbours.

Mr. Vohrer (continued)

The whole debate on the question of defensive weapons is still in its beginnings. I am not trying to offer some infallible patent recipe, but I think these ideas are worth following up.

In striving to spend less on armaments we must also thoroughly investigate the field of defensive weapons systems designed to repel aggressors, meet tanks with anti-tank weapons, develop anti-aircraft weapons. The necessary expenditure would be considerably lower, and not only could the arms race be ended but the entire cost of armament could be reduced. I would therefore ask you to consider this proposal sympathetically, since it could make a contribution to defence policy discussions in the future.

The report brings out the connection between disarmament and development policy in the clearest possible manner. In our view military expenditure designed to achieve a balance of power is a factor in making peace more stable. However, if we manage to achieve a balanced low level of military expenditure through disarmament, we should use the money thus released primarily to help to stabilise peace elsewhere.

Development aid is a factor in stabilising peace, since social conflicts in third world countries are reduced and, by helping to ensure that tensions in the third world do not arise in the first place, we may be able to prevent wars. I would like to stress this connection, and I am very happy that these considerations were shared by the committee.

The report cannot go into the results of the special session of the General Assembly, because it goes on until the beginning of July, but we thought it might be possible to supplement the report at a later stage. The results of the special session of the General Assembly could then be communicated to this Assembly in November and made available for debate here.

May I express my thanks once again for all the contributions made during the consideration of the report in committee, the majority of which were useful in improving it substantially. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Vohrer. I thank you in particular for an extremely full and well documented report, which will be of great assistance not only to members of the Assembly but to others who have been following disarmament questions.

We turn to the debate on the report.

The first speaker is Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report on disarmament introduced by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments meets with our general approval. Our comments relate more particularly to the political background to the report which, in our view, does not bring out the seriousness of the international situation with the renewal of the armaments race, contrary to the decisions taken at the last United Nations session on disarmament, particularly as regards the failure to ratify SALT II which was to open the way to measures for the reduction and control of armaments and for control of the production of new nuclear weapons - the N bomb - and chemical weapons; contrary to the Assembly's recommendations, proposing conventions even if they have not yet been worked out.

Unfortunately many Assembly directives have led to no progress except in the case of radiological weapons on which it seems that a convention may be signed. There is not enough emphasis on, or criticism of, the increase in defence expenditure, which the Assembly recommended should be reduced, this increase being responsible for the heightened tensions, the encouragement to use force in relations between countries and the growing threat to peace. Higher defence expenditure has aggravated the economic crisis in the industrialised countries and has aggravated the underdevelopment of large parts of the third world. We think that the Rapporteur is right in stating that the armaments race must be halted for economic reasons also. The report is not correct however in stating that the drive to rearmament stems basically from East-West distrust, so that the development of economic relations between the two areas, leading to their interdependence, is vital. What we are in fact witnessing is a progressive liberation of nations into which the great powers are thrusting their logic in order to extend the alliances and their influence; the development of East-West economic relations is therefore important but we regard the following as vital: first, abandonment of the bloc attitude of mind; second, respect for the nations' drive for independence; third, the development of new relations not only between East and West but also between North and South, for the construction of the new world order. On this point we believe we have the Rapporteur's agreement.

Europe has a vital interest in these objectives and can and must make its contribution, although this is not mentioned in the report. Lastly, there is insufficient emphasis on the importance of the Geneva negotiations and on the part which Europe should play in contributing to their success. At the same time, I believe that the report is an important contribu-

Mr. Antoni (continued)

tion to the work of our Assembly; I agree, with some reservations, on the importance of economic relations even more generally than the report indicates as a means of reducing the risks of conflict. In this context, I would stress the importance of defining more effective confidence-building measures and mutual safeguards in order to press for the signature of agreements on the banning of weapons, and especially weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons; to press for essentially defensive regional agreements; to reduce the trade in arms throughout the world. As the report stresses, the question of controls is also important; but it is on the report as a whole that we believe that we can vote in favour because of the way the problem of disarmament is approached, because of the way in which the political and economic questions are stated and because of the proposals submitted to the Assembly for consideration.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

The next speaker is Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to congratulate Manfred Vohrer on the quality of his report, and these are not just empty words.

At the risk of perhaps compromising him, after hearing what Mr. Antoni of the Italian Communist Party had to say, I can tell him that he also has my support. That is usually a fairly compromising thing to say in this Assembly, and I warn him right away. He is right not to pay attention: it says more for his optimism.

The Rapporteur is right to mention that progress has been negligible since 1978 and, it might even be said, since the end of the second world war. But I would warn – and this warning no doubt goes more to other members of the Assembly than to the Rapporteur himself – against the rubbish we too often hear about the balance of terror allowing us to live in peace for thirty-seven years.

Thirty-seven years of peace for whom? For selfish Europeans, because the world has been at war since 1945 and the major powers, particularly the Europeans among them, have often settled their disputes on the backs of the peoples of the third world. And I would warn against being optimistic in this respect.

This morning we heard Mr. Cheysson developing the thesis, with which I am familiar as a French-speaking socialist, that disarmament is not an end in itself and the arms build-up is not an effect. But, to be logical, should it then be said that there is no point in talking about

disarmament or efforts to this end if the primary objective is not to eliminate or at least alleviate the causes and conditions of insecurity and threats, to ensure through the North-South dialogue – because, as Mr. Cheysson said, the conflicts occur in the South – equitable economic development and social progress as well as political equilibrium through respect for human rights?

As regards human rights, it is sometimes surprising to see certain countries dear to us having no hesitation in lowering the human rights banner if it means a significant improvement in their balance of trade through the supply of arms to countries which violate human rights. No country exporting arms, including my own, is beyond that. As the elected representative of a constituency which includes the FN armaments factory, I must say that I am particularly sensitive to this issue.

Do countries which export arms really want disarmament? It is a question that arises when it is realised what effect these exports have on the trade balance of some of these countries and also how many jobs are involved in certain of their regions. When it is remembered that the national market is far too small to offset the cost of weapons research, arms have to be sold to permit the manufacture of other arms, and the vicious circle is then complete.

Mr. President, as speaking time is limited, I can but hope that talk about human rights will match deeds more closely and vice versa and that perhaps these strictly national interests will one day be abandoned in favour of supranational control of trade in arms and a code of conduct for those whom I always call the salesmen of death, those who go around the third world and sell goods that are often out of date as soon as they are delivered. But that is another problem.

Leaving aside all the analyses of the balance of conventional and nuclear weapons and so on, I am convinced today – after so many years of fighting over this subject – that disarmament is essentially and above all a question of political will.

I agree with the report and I shall vote for it, but I would also warn parliamentarians in Europe against the selfishness of Europe, which can look back on thirty-seven years of peace in Europe while countless thousands have died in the third world in Europe's interests.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. van den Bergh asked to speak later, but do you wish to speak now? You seem to be in an extremely receptive mood. I shall call you now.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I am not sure that it is my turn to speak.

The PRESIDENT. – You asked to speak later but you seem to be in the right frame of mind now.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel inspired by Mr. Dejardin's argument. Although I cannot put it as well as he does – though perhaps as loudly – I, like Mr. Dejardin, wish to congratulate Mr. Vohrer on his report. I mean that sincerely. Although it is frequently a platitude to congratulate each other on the brilliant things we have said in reports, I really mean it when I say that Mr. Vohrer has produced an excellent report. But he must not take it amiss if I repeat a few remarks I made earlier in committee.

The Rapporteur is right in saying that what is required first of all is the political will to get governments to make any progress in disarmament. No doubt brilliant texts will again be accepted at the end of the month in New York, but I fear that all the governments will then return to business as usual and do what they consider to be in their national interest. I am attempting to persuade our Rapporteur to look for ways of making world public opinion, particularly in the democratic countries, more conscious of the dangers of armament. As politicians, we are often accused of being unable to achieve sufficient breakthroughs and progress in the field of disarmament. Let me say in passing that our politicians frequently exaggerate the possibilities of making a breakthrough. It is, however, important that there should be an informed public opinion which understands the dangers and recognises the limitations under which the politicians are labouring in seeking opportunities to register some progress.

I consider that the problem of disarmament, although it must be looked at as a whole, will in the years to come be largely – and probably increasingly – a problem of local conflicts. Since the second world war there have been some 180 conflicts, of which at least 160 have been fought out by military means. In my view the report pays too little attention – however difficult this may be – to methods of overcoming local disputes. We rightly maintain that the rôle of nuclear weapons must be kept in check, but the remarkable fact remains that in that part of the world where the danger that a military conflict might be fought with nuclear weapons exists, there have been no conflicts in the last thirty to thirty-five years. This is probably because of the danger that a nuclear conflict might break out. By this I naturally do not mean that we should encourage the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world – although some suggest this conclusion

to us, and in logical terms it is difficult to refute. It is much better to consider how we can contain conflicts at the local level. In this respect Mr. Vohrer's report has a number of shortcomings.

Another important point is the arms trade. The arms trade is still dominated by the super-powers. The largest arms dealer – and it gives me no pleasure to say so – is now the Soviet Union. Up to a year ago it was the United States. The third world is increasingly providing itself with military equipment. We must think twice before suggesting – if indeed we are at all entitled to suggest – that third world countries should not procure defence systems for themselves. I should prefer this not to happen, but in that case the necessary political conditions must exist. It is a dangerous form of colonialism, when we in the democratic countries are ourselves enormously over-armed, to tell the third world that it must not defend itself.

Another point is that we, the industrialised western world use, indeed abuse, the third world's justifiable need for defence in order to spread our own arms industry. If we are serious about disarmament, the western world will have to exercise restraint in this respect. I therefore have an earnest appeal to make.

All European countries export weapons systems, but they employ different export criteria. If there is something you cannot get from the Netherlands, because we pursue a strict export policy, then you can undoubtedly get it from country *x*, *y* or *z*. Is Mr. Vohrer prepared to promote a system whereby the European countries would agree on a common export policy which would prevent an excessive arms build-up in the third world?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. van den Bergh.

I propose now to call Mr. Brown and then Mr. Scholten. They will conclude the speeches for this morning. The debate will be continued during the afternoon. I remind both speakers about the five minute limit.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I am glad, Mr. President, that you have called me at this late hour. I support my good friend Mr. Harry van den Bergh in his comment about the need for political will and the pressure on politicians. The politicians are today talking about disarmament. At best today there have been twenty members present. At the moment, only about five remain. That attendance illustrates what Mr. van den Bergh was saying about the pressure on politicians. Even the person with amendments has not found it possible to be present to discuss them. One of our basic issues is the attempt to underline the impor-

Mr. Brown (continued)

tance of disarmament. I congratulate Dr. Vohrer, as I have in committee, on his extremely valuable work.

Paragraph 1 sets out the objective of the elimination of conflict and the securing of peace. If the Falklands crisis has done anything, it has highlighted the fact that the United Nations, as now constructed, is wholly unable to cope with any crisis effectively. Harry van den Bergh made the point that one hundred and sixty incidents in recent times had had to be resolved by military means. In paragraphs 6.2 and 6.4 Dr. Vohrer rightly identifies economic and trade relations as being vital. He concludes that increased trade relations between blocs, between the North and South and between states in general, will be the key to removing the economic cause of conflict.

An additional factor to be considered is the safeguarding of human rights. I would have hoped that a paragraph could be included to emphasise the need for all states to implement all the requirements of the Helsinki final act, specifically those related to human rights. While paragraph 6.5 identifies confidence-building measures necessary to establish the grounds for disarmament, I believe sincerely that, unless human rights and the dignity of man are supreme, grounds will always exist for conflict.

Those of us who enjoy the privilege of freedom must never forget the plight of those who do not. The Rapporteur has underlined in paragraph 6.6 the conflict that exists in closed political systems when one is discussing confidence-building measures. In the end, if one can obtain agreement on, first, the advance notification of military movement and manoeuvres, secondly, on the exchange of observers at those manoeuvres and, thirdly, on military exchange visits, substantial progress can be made. Since these objectives were first agreed at Helsinki, much progress has undoubtedly been made. The report of my colleague, Mr. John Roper, to the Assembly in Document 788 made clear the value that these three principles could contribute to peace.

I agree with Dr. Vohrer that verification forms the key to disarmament. I find the argument in paragraph 6.8 for defensive weapons extremely interesting.

However, the search for such weapons has always eluded us. Even the most inoffensive object can so quickly be transformed into a highly offensive weapon. For example, we can think of an ordinary lady's comb with a curling end, which is completely inoffensive when used by ladies for curling their hair. However, someone who wants a weapon can sharpen the

long end meant for curling. He now has a four inch dagger that he can use immediately without fear of being detected.

I do not dissent from the general theme in Dr. Vohrer's report, which is research into disarmament and the use of defensive weapons only. In committee I said that we had all sought definitions of such weapons, but they had eluded us. If such weapons were recognised, that would be of value.

I support the general thrust of the report. I also support its contribution to disarmament, security and the campaign for peace. I am only sad that more attention has not been paid by politicians the world over to the value of talking about disarmament than to the limitation of weapons. It is to be welcomed that the President of the United States has made the concept of a reduction in armaments rather than limitation the important issue.

I welcome the report, which has added much to the knowledge of those who are prepared to read it. I hope that it will make its mark in the history of the Assembly as a step forward by us in arguing for disarmament in the interests of peace and security in the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

As it is 1 o'clock and as Mr. Scholten would prefer to speak this afternoon, I propose to suspend the debate.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Disarmament (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 909 and amendments).
2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 918 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 15th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Disarmament (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 909 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Smith, Mr. Beix, Mr. Fosson, Mr. Enders, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Beix, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
4. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 918 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wittmann, Dr. Miller, Mr. Bahr, Mr. van den Bergh, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Maravalle, Mr. Beith, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Günther Müller, Mr. Smith, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

It has not been possible during the luncheon interval to distribute the minutes of the last sitting. They will be submitted to the Assembly later.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I must again draw attention to the register. We have had difficulty because, in a number of instances, both the representative and a substitute claiming to take his place have signed. A substitute can sign the register and take the place of a representative only if the representative is not exercising his right of participation. Clearly, we cannot have both taking part. Neither a representative nor a substitute in his place can take part in the proceedings unless he signs the register. Substitutes cannot speak or vote unless they are properly accredited as taking the places of representatives.

A representative who has ceded his place to a substitute for the day cannot then come along and speak or vote. Otherwise, we get more people than we should have. We have already had complications in compiling the roll-call on

that account. I hope that all delegations will pay attention to this matter.

2. Disarmament

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 909 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 909 and amendments.

Mr. Scholten is the first speaker, to be followed by Mr. Hardy.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the celebrated British statesman Sir Winston Churchill once said that a pilot can only take off into the wind. If this world of ours wants to make progress in the fight against the continuing arms race, we must resist all kinds of autonomous processes, which are also occurring in the West and are themselves leading to an increasingly serious form and level of armaments.

I am pleased to see that popular opposition to the arms race is growing in the free world. This is evidenced by the many demonstrations in Western Europe and by the world's largest demonstration ever, which took place in Washington the day before yesterday, not as an appeal for pacifism or neutralism but as a sign of deep concern about the threat facing us all.

1. See page 32.

Mr. Scholten (continued)

I believe that we politicians should be grateful for the process of growing awareness in our societies and that we have a duty to translate it into policy so that the people do not ultimately feel frustrated and turn away from us and from the system for which we stand. I call for a policy of disarmament, a policy full of creativity to match this process, although we must avoid being naïve. I am fully aware that our opponents in Eastern Europe certainly cannot be handled with kid gloves.

Against this background, I believe that Mr. Vohrer has drawn up an outstanding report. It contains an excellent analysis, and I shall be endorsing his recommendations. But I do have one important question to ask. His recommendations appeal for international action and activity in many areas. I wish to ask him – and I should be very grateful to him for a reply – what practical steps we can take to stimulate these processes from the West.

I have nothing against pious statements – they too have a rôle to play in politics – but I am certainly just as interested in knowing how we can translate statements into practical policy.

I am – practically speaking – a supporter of his proposals where they concern the establishment of a United Nations register of arms exports. I am also in favour of a United Nations satellite monitoring system. Our Rapporteur calls for greater emphasis to be placed on defensive weapons systems and alternative defence strategies, and I feel the necessary independent experts must definitely be put to work under the auspices of the United Nations. We, the free West, must try to pursue a defence strategy which might be known as “defence without provocation”. I do not have enough time to discuss this in detail, but Western European defence, and particularly its land-based component, could well be organised differently.

I endorse the remarks my Belgian colleague Mr. Dejardin has made about the international arms trade. He referred to it as trade in death. If we in Western Europe are prepared to co-operate more closely with the United States of America in the manufacture of weapons, each of our countries can make do with a smaller production capacity. There will then be less economic need to export weapons. And we could convert part of the armaments industry – we get appeals to do this in the Netherlands too – to the manufacture of more desirable products.

I shall support Mr. van den Bergh’s proposal.

The PRESIDENT. – I draw your attention, Mr. Scholten, to the fact that your five minutes have expired. Perhaps you could bring your speech to an end at a convenient point.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – To conclude, I shall support Mr. van den Bergh’s proposal for a joint policy on arms exports. I should also like to congratulate the Rapporteur again and ask him if he will support my suggestion that an analysis should be made in Western Europe of the possibility of co-operating more closely in the manufacture of arms as a means of reducing total production capacity in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Scholten. I again remind delegates, particularly those who were not here yesterday, of the Assembly’s decision to restrict all speeches – except those of rapporteurs and of committee chairmen – to five minutes. This morning, we introduced the system that the light would go on after four and a half minutes and that the red light would go on after five minutes. Although I do not expect delegates to stop in mid-sentence, I should like them to bring their speeches to a conclusion when the red light goes on. Otherwise, it will not be fair on the others. If everyone oversteps the mark, we shall not have time to get through our business.

The next speaker is Mr. Hardy, to be followed by Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*) – I hope that my speech will not exceed five minutes. If it does, it is because I propose to be brief in presenting the three amendments. Therefore, I hope, Mr. President, that you will not cut me off at the end of five minutes. If you do, it could well take longer to present.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that you will have to conform to the five-minute rule like everyone else.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – In that case, what I omit to say in this speech will have to be said when I move the amendments.

I compliment the Rapporteur, particularly on the quality of the preamble. It is brief and stark, and needs to be. It is appropriate to discuss this subject not only because the United Nations is anxious about it but because our considerations today will reflect the growing interest in disarmament. Some politicians may not like that and many of us may feel extremely uncomfortable when considering it. Some of the comments on and attitudes to disarmament could be described as credulous, naïve, or perhaps worse. However, whether they are credulous or naïve the fact remains that there is a growing determination that a desire for disarmament should be more vigorously expressed.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

There is a widespread suspicion that the armaments lobby is too powerful and that politicians and governments have proved inadequate in their interest, and have lacked sufficient determination to achieve the necessary disarmament. However, disarmament can be seen to be necessary when one considers the wider realities. Today, 4,500 million people are on our planet and in less than twenty years there will be 6,000 million people. Today there are five million square miles of desert and six million square miles of land that is in the process of becoming desert. One-third of the planet's land surface is at risk. Our tropical forests will last no more than thirty or forty years at the most. Every day, forty thousand children die and for the price of one jet aircraft we could save most of them. One jet aircraft would pay for thousands of pharmacies in the villages of hungry Asia. Twelve hours of military expenditure could eradicate malaria. Given that scale of need, it is essential that those who call for disarmament should feel that that call is treated cynically.

The report is generally well balanced. Disarmament and a reduction in weaponry must be controlled. That cannot be entirely unilateral. In saying that, I am being neither credulous nor naïve. If mankind concentrates on the real needs of our planet, it will accept that world military expenditure should not increase beyond the \$4,455 billion being spent this year. We should no longer hear a politician in this Assembly, or in any other, saying that there has been negligible progress in reducing weaponry during a four-year period.

Therefore, I have tabled three amendments, which I hope the Rapporteur will accept. I do not particularly like the beginning of the first recommendation, which may unduly limit the demand and desire for disarmament. I hope that we can replace the words "to establish preconditions" with the word "encourage". We should seek not merely to establish a proper balance of conventional forces, but to go much further, and to seek a substantial reduction. Given the recent developments in the world and the multitude of wars that have taken place in the southern hemisphere, in the underdeveloped world, when one set of weaponry becomes obsolete, or another set of weaponry becomes surplus, we should not automatically try to find a distant and impoverished land to buy it and to devote its resources - which are badly needed in the cause of survival - to a war, so that another round of killing can be financed.

I have not exceeded the time-limit. I hope that I shall be able to save the Assembly's time by moving my amendments formally, but I also

hope that the Rapporteur will give me an assurance that he will accept them.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Hardy, for being so co-operative.

The next speaker is Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). - I make no application for extra time. I do not believe that my conservative friends and I will take part in the debates on amendments. I have three short points to make, which I made over and again in committee. My conservative colleagues and I voted against the report and will do so again today.

I am in favour of disarmament and peace. I am also in favour of freedom for our people. The only difference between members is how best to achieve those objectives. Everyone accepts - as does the report - that there is a gross imbalance in military capacity between East and West. Therefore, unless or until we reach agreement on remedying that imbalance, it is irrelevant, misleading and even unfair to public opinion to talk about disarmament in the way outlined in the report.

That is not a harsh point of view. Negotiations are beginning to see whether that imbalance can be rectified. This Assembly is not concerned with general questions - as the Council of Europe and the United Nations are - but seeks to defend our freedom against threats from the East. Therefore, this type of presentation is not helpful to that cause.

It is noticeable that, although we continually talk about disarmament, no popular support for disarmament can be expressed within the Warsaw Pact countries. Groups in favour of peace are strictly not permitted. Until some genuine evidence to show that the imbalance will be rectified is forthcoming - as I hope will be forthcoming in the talks between East and West - the sentiments expressed in the report will not help the cause of peace or the continuing freedom of our people. Therefore, without entering into amendments and the rest that go with it, certainly I myself and I believe my friends will be voting against this report.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Sir Frederic.

The next speaker is Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). - I, too, will be brief in saying that, like my colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, I am in favour of disarmament but not disarmament at any price. There is no question but that we are still at a very considerable disadvantage compared with the East. I would submit that, worthy in many respects though this report is, this is not the time and place to consider the recommenda-

Mr. Smith (continued)

tion. We are a Western European union. This is the kind of document that perhaps ought to be looked at by the United Nations. It is not something on which we at this moment should embark by giving it a vote.

I have always felt that on defence matters realism is essential and if ever there was a case for realism it was the recent action we have seen in the Falkland Islands, where the need to be prepared to take action has been fully justified by the course of events. I can understand the emotional – I will not say sentimental – approach of someone like my British parliamentary colleague, Mr. Hardy, who talked about 4,000 million people in the world today and the fact that so much more could be done for them instead of spending the money on highly expensive weapons. I agree with him that defence is an essential safeguard of the true liberties and spirit of those individuals.

A reduction in armaments must be two-way. Provided it is a genuine reduction on all sides, I am wholly in favour and believe it ought to take place; but the balance of which Mr. Hardy spoke must be maintained. What on earth is the use of eradicating malaria or improving bad housing conditions, irrespective of the countries involved, when in fact we might substitute some kind of oppression, such as is all too rife in the eastern bloc. I would have thought that in those circumstances the case was made for those who believe that, whilst there must be disarmament, it must be on every side, it must be genuine, and it must be understood.

There should be an investigation into purely defensive weapons. I am not sufficiently expert to say what purely defensive weapons are, but in my humble view the defensive weapon went out with the barrage balloon in the second world war, and was fairly negative. I am old enough to remember that war and how ineffective, on the whole, barrage balloons were. The other aspect of defensive weapons is that if we can say something truly defends, inevitably an aggressor will succeed, either through numbers or through methods, in outwitting it. Weapons must be offensive as well as defensive.

The vexed subject of chemical warfare is mentioned. I agree that it is hideous, but we know that the Soviet Union has a considerable stockpile of chemical weapons. We understand that America has a certain number. Certainly there are no chemical weapons whatever in Europe. We face a serious situation, which was last debated in the Assembly about eighteen months ago. This makes us all slightly less than up to date in our approach to disar-

mament, because chemical weapons and their use could seriously affect the whole of Europe in the event of hostilities.

Those of us who oppose motions of this kind sometimes are branded as believing that warfare eventually solves the problems facing us. That is not so. Many of those who vote and think as my colleagues and I do are perhaps the most fervent believers in disarmament – provided it is genuine and carried out properly. Until that day arrives it behoves all of us to remain on our guard.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Smith.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report submitted by Mr. Vohrer has the virtue of presenting the results of the recent negotiations together with a discerning assessment of their progress and of their inadequacy in the light of the arms race.

While, for many countries, arming themselves seems to be an inevitable necessity, it is not possible for us fighters for disarmament, denying this inevitability, to allow ourselves – as the President of the French Republic so succinctly put it – to “confuse pacifism as a premise with peace as a result”.

Efforts towards disarmament are today encountering, perhaps more than yesterday and in any case more than ten or fifteen years ago, the difficulties experienced by a world which is feeling the cold winds of international tensions more than the warmth of friendly relations.

These obstacles to our efforts became very clear during the debate at the special session of the United Nations held in New York on 7th June 1982. The main barrier is undoubtedly the revival of international tensions. This is now leading to the use of force and failure to respect the security of states, so that we now see the logic of East-West confrontation dominating not only questions of security in Europe, as is to be expected, but also North-South relations; the Pershing versus the SS-20, but also South Africa in Namibia, Vietnam in Kampuchea – all in disregard of United Nations resolutions.

North-South relations should not be involved in the East-West confrontation. But there are very few international relationships nowadays that are not interwoven with the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States.

That is why it seems to us essential to draw attention again in this debate to the respect which France and all its European partners owe to the principles of the United Nations Charter – and especially its Articles 33 and 51, which call for the peaceful settlement of disputes and

Mr. Beix (continued)

also assert the right of nations to security and legitimate self-defence as well as their right to self-determination – so that the countries which are not directly in the areas of tension can escape being caught up in the chilly web of strained East-West relations.

This is why France's representatives attach great importance to the United Nations Charter. This is the meaning of Amendment 4 which I have tabled to the draft recommendation in the hope that it will be favourably received by the Assembly.

Let us nevertheless be absolutely clear in our minds, however strong may be the convictions and however ardent the voice calling upon us to search our hearts. The arms race is attributable to two superpowers because, if there is anything that the medium-sized and small powers can hope to do in this debate, can it be more than to give their full support to the SALT and START negotiations or to the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, whose aim is to arrive at a balance at what we hope will be the lowest possible level? These Geneva negotiations can, however, also lead to positive results within what we hope will be a short period – in any case before December 1983.

Will the Soviet Union realise that it is up to it to make possible the non-deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles by dismantling a significant number of SS-20s? The political majority in France and the French Government ask, in view of the negotiations on disarmament, that it be borne in mind that the French nuclear deterrent is a minimum deterrent. It is the instrument of our security and cannot be the subject of the Geneva negotiations on Europe's strategic nuclear potential. We are saying this not because we think disarmament is a good thing provided it is others who disarm but because we are determined that this minimum deterrent shall be maintained.

If the Russians and Americans see the Geneva negotiations as having only a marginal effect on redundant resources, as the French Prime Minister said, the stake for France is a reduction of its deterrent below the credibility threshold, which is not acceptable nowadays to any Frenchman.

That is why we expect these negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on a complete stoppage of nuclear tests to open the way to an agreement on a total ban.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Beix.

I call Mr. Fosson.

Mr. FOSSON (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at a time when a new war had just broken out in the Middle East and fighting was still going on in the Falkland Islands, between Iraq and Iran and in other parts of the world, the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament was opening in New York. This coincided with the adoption by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of a general report on the various aspects of arms control and disarmament which Mr. Vohrer, the Rapporteur, has just presented to the Assembly.

The Rapporteur has expounded the various aspects of the problem; I should like to congratulate him. Having recalled the reports adopted in 1978, he regretfully observed that since then there has been negligible progress on arms control and none on disarmament.

Since I could not be present when the report was adopted in committee, I should like to make a few points today.

The first special session of the United Nations Assembly took place in an atmosphere of relative indifference. The two superpowers, which doubted its usefulness, did not play a very active rôle then. Probably one of the most positive results achieved was that France and China joined the Disarmament Committee. The atmosphere in which the second session is taking place seems to be very different.

A significantly growing section of public opinion both in Europe and in the United States has decided to make itself heard by the various governments. True, the peace marches have sometimes been "orchestrated" in one direction only, which is bad, but faced with the prospect of a nuclear apocalypse which would be unavoidable if military capability continued to increase, it is desirable that world public opinion should be steadily mobilised in favour of disarmament, without forgetting the need to establish military stability, and an objective analysis of the facts so that gradual reductions can be negotiated.

In the tense situation of our times, when each of the two great powers feels that its existence is threatened by the other, one first step, that of arms control, is essential. Pending the establishment of the preliminary conditions for disarmament, arms control could enable disputes to be settled by peaceful means in implementation of the principle of renunciation of violence enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations.

These problems are extremely complex and closely bound up with the state of international relations. I therefore share the opinion of the Rapporteur when he says that the fundamental

Mr. Fosson (continued)

political condition for avoiding conflicts and securing peace lies in agreement between the democratic and communist countries and the third world, as well as in the credibility of their intention to avoid war. I also agree with his analysis of the relationship of third world countries to the armaments policy and the problem of disarmament.

We are all aware that development aid contributes towards the prevention of conflicts, détente and the consolidation of peace. It is therefore right to advocate a substantial increase in such aid, provided that the beneficiary countries do not use these funds to buy arms. We should remember that, in the ten years up to 1978, the biggest increase in defence expenditure took place in the poorest countries of the third world.

Military expenditure must therefore be very carefully considered. Calculations show that world expenditure on arms in 1980 totalled \$ 450 billion. Comparison of this figure with the \$ 17 billion spent on development aid in the same year, 1980, reveals the extent of the madness which is sweeping humanity along in this arms race.

If we consider that each year twelve million children under five die of hunger in the third world, that from 1945 to 1981 the cumulative budgets of the FAO - \$ 1.2 billion - were only a little higher than the billion dollars which the world spends on arms every day, we must express the hope that enlightenment will come to the mind of man and enable him to discern the frightening reality underlying these figures.

Mr. Windsteig, at the end of his recent report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the world food situation, rightly said that "man, in his distrust of man, squanders fortunes on blowing up the world if need be, and devotes only scant resources to its salvation".

I should have liked to make a few further points, but the time allowed is too short. I will therefore conclude by recalling the urgent appeal made by the Pope on his return from Argentina: "Nations are not bound to make war and destroy each other, but to understand each other and agree to live in peace".

Whatever efforts have to be made, that is the target towards which all of us must work together.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, Mr. Fosson.

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I thank Mr. Vohrer expressly for the excellent report on disarmament which he presented so impressively this morning. The issues here are, on the one hand, the necessary measures for external security and, on the other, the senselessly excessive expenditure on armaments.

Governments and cabinets will soon be spending \$ 500,000 million a year under the delusion that it can buy them absolute security. This amounts in practice to not kilograms but tons of explosive for every person on this planet. With the weapons now available the human race can be exterminated not once but several times over. Is one extermination not enough? Does a surplus of possibilities of total elimination give a greater guarantee of a secure future? The survivor of a nuclear conflict would certainly have a worse time of it than someone who was killed immediately.

What conclusions should be drawn from this horrific scenario, which is not far-fetched but a very real possibility? First of all, an end to nuclear tests and the continuing arms race, and in their place a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons. Rational negotiations must take place before weapons with even more warheads and an even greater capacity for mass destruction are produced. I wish complete success to the first steps taken in such negotiations in Geneva. Weapons systems of an unambiguously defensive character and a genuine balance of conventional forces must be the order of the day. Constant danger of war should not be the norm of international coexistence, nor should the policies of nations be primarily directed towards survival in the event of conflict. Our overriding policy aim should be the ability to live in peace, now and in the future.

To this end we need nuclear-free zones, a ban on chemical and bacteriological weapons, and a ban on weapons of any kind in space. These proposals cannot succeed unless there is an appropriate system of international controls.

The Rapporteur sees opportunities for reducing the military threat in the elimination of economic conflicts. In other words, the cause of peace is served, not by economic boycotts, but by the strengthening of trade relations between the power blocs and between North and South.

While the industrialised nations - and nowadays even developing countries - spend untold sums on armaments, great tracts of land are turning into desert, the foundations of life are dwindling, and millions of people are starving to death. The cost explosion in the armaments

Mr. Enders (continued)

sector is preventing the implementation of social welfare measures, investment and development programmes. In contrast, the North-South gap could be narrowed by savings on armaments, and the developing countries could be supplied with non-military goods and given access to the discoveries of medicine, science and technology.

This worthwhile aim, Ladies and Gentlemen, can be served by adoption of the draft recommendation before us and by our personal intervention in our national budget debates. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Enders.

The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?...

I call Mr. Vohrer.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I thank members very much for their contributions to the debate. Mr. Dejardin, Mr. van den Bergh and Mr. Scholten pointed to the need for stricter control of arms exports. I know from my own parliament how difficult it is to establish criteria for restricting exports, but I believe there are two suggestions in the report that go in the desired direction: first, an arms export register at the United Nations; second – however controversial – the restriction of arms exports to defensive weapons. This would help to put a stop to the negative effects to which various members, including Mr. Fosson and Mr. Enders, have referred.

My British colleague, Mr. Brown, pointed out that there was a lesson to be learned from the Falklands. He said how difficult it was for the United Nations to resolve or cope with conflicts. For all those who have disarmament and the resolution of conflicts at heart, it also became clear during the Falklands crisis that warning periods of several weeks are often not enough to get both parties to relent. Of the lessons learned from the Falklands conflict this, against the background of warning times of minutes in other areas, was the most alarming.

Mr. Hardy pointed to the juxtaposition of ecology – the need to satisfy basic necessities – and military expenditure. If the report has made one or two members more aware of this connection, it will have been worthwhile for that alone.

The views expressed by Sir Frederic Bennett and his colleague, Mr. Smith, are in fact in contradiction to my own. In my opinion there is something wrong when Sir Frederic claims to

be in favour of disarmament while making it clear in committee that now is not the time for disarmament, but for increased arms expenditure. That is a contradiction, and I shall be glad if Sir Frederic Bennett votes against the report, since our positions really have little in common.

Our French colleague, Mr. Beix, has tabled an amendment. He would like to see more account taken of the principles of the United Nations Charter. This is common ground, and few would disagree. I can therefore support this. I was much more interested to hear that he takes a positive view of a nuclear test ban. I would be very pleased if this were to be the official French position in Geneva.

Many thanks for your contributions. I shall be happy if, when the time comes, you will vote for the report, which was received very favourably in the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vohrer. As has been said by many delegates, the report is a valuable source of information. Whatever view delegates take about the conclusion, we are greatly indebted to you and your colleagues in the secretariat of the Assembly for putting together so much useful information.

I call the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Cavaliere.

* Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, unlike the Rapporteur, Mr. Vohrer, I am not happy that Sir Frederic Bennett and his conservative colleagues have voted against. I am sorry, if not sad, that this should be so, because I think that the attitude of the conservatives is based on a serious misunderstanding. The misunderstanding lies in the fact that I do not consider that the proposal of this draft recommendation by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments or its approval – I hope – by the Assembly means raising the white flag of surrender or blinding ourselves to the reality of the existing imbalances.

This proposal on disarmament certainly does not ignore the fact that there is imbalance between the offensive potential of the Warsaw Pact and the defensive potential of NATO and we believe that the Assembly is quite right in all that it is doing to draw attention to this imbalance and to call for the necessary action to bring it to an end. We are indeed completely convinced – and we now reaffirm this conviction – that peace depends on a balance of forces and on the deterrent strength which the West and the members of the Atlantic Alliance must maintain at all times and in all circumstances.

That is why I feel that a more considered judgment on Mr. Vohrer's proposals might lead

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

our conservative friends to take a different view. The basic aim here, which confirms and reaffirms the policy directed to achieving a balance, is that the greatest possible effort should be made to bring about reasonable disarmament and therefore a reasonable balance, which will guarantee security and peace; the way to achieve this aim is also indicated.

I hope therefore that the Assembly as a whole will appreciate the real significance of the draft recommendation and that it will be approved unanimously or at least by a very big majority. In conclusion, I must associate myself with other speakers who have thanked Mr. Vohrer for the work he has done.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

We turn now to the amendments. I hope that Mr. Vohrer can help us. The first two seem to me to be factual in view of the passage of time since the report. Perhaps Mr. Vohrer will move the following amendments:

5. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “is to open” and insert “opened”.

6. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “\$455 billion” and insert “more than \$500 billion”.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I move Amendments 5 and 6.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Assembly agree to these factual amendments?

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendments 5 and 6 are agreed to.

I now call Mr. Hardy to move Amendment 1:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “establish preconditions for” and insert “promote”.

Mr. Hardy, you spoke to your amendments earlier. Would you care to move them formally?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – You will recall, Mr. President, that I said that I would be happy to move the amendments formally if I had an intimation from the Rapporteur that he would accept them. I have not heard whether the Rapporteur accepts them. I recognise that it would be insensitive for me to make a long speech. Therefore, in Amendment 1, I suggest that we improve the text of the recommendation by changing language which may inhibit progress to peace. Hence, my suggestion that we

use the word “promote” instead of “establish preconditions for”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy.

May I have the opinion of the committee on that amendment?

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has been unable to discuss the amendments. However, I as Rapporteur support Mr. Hardy's amendments and ask you to vote for them.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall therefore vote on Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 4:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, after sub-paragraph 1(b) add a sub-paragraph 1(c) as follows:

“(c) by guaranteeing respect for the principles set out in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 33), the right of security and legitimate defence (Article 51) and the right of peoples to self-determination;”.

I call Mr. Beix.

Mr. BEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I understood from Mr. Vohrer's reply just now that he was quite willing to accept my amendment, which refers to Articles 33 and 51 of the United Nations Charter. We in fact consider that, in a period of particularly acute international tension, the developed countries and nations which set up this instrument of the United Nations should, when speaking of disarmament, refer to what is still their institution in order to emphasise once more the desire for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right to security and legitimate self-defence and the right of peoples to self-determination.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Beix.

Is there any opposition to Amendment 4? May we have the committee's confirmation whether it recommends acceptance of the amendment?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I said earlier, the committee has not been able to study these amendments and I am therefore expressing a personal opinion on Amendment 4 which proposes the insertion of a new paragraph as paragraph 1(c).

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

We can accept the substance of this amendment but I do not think that it fits in with this point of the recommendation; it would stick out like a sore thumb!

That is why I personally am against the amendment, although I am fully in agreement with the principles it seeks to lay down. I think that we should not appear to advantage if we included it, as regards logic if not otherwise. I would therefore ask Mr. Beix to withdraw it.

The PRESIDENT. – We have heard from the Chairman that the committee has not considered the matter. Both he and I understand that the Rapporteur has no objection to this text, but the committee does not think it appropriate for it to be inserted. It is for the Assembly to decide whether it should be included.

Does anyone else wish to speak to Amendment 4? If not, I shall put it to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We now come to Mr. Hardy's Amendment 2:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "establishment of" insert "a substantially-reduced level and".

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I feel it right to stress that the western alliance should be or should become consistently and determinedly eager to pursue balanced disarmament. Therefore, to achieve a mutually and substantially reduced balance of weaponry I am obliged to the Chairman and Rapporteur for accepting my earlier amendment. I hope that they will feel able to accept this, which is consistent with the spirit of the earlier amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment? I understand that the committee supports the amendment.

We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We now come to Mr. Hardy's Amendment 3:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "forces" insert "and dismantling and scrapping surplus or obsolete weapons".

Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 3 becomes more important now that we have just adopted Amendment 2. If we are to have a lower level of weaponry in both the East and the West, we must ensure that that weaponry is scrapped and dismantled rather than supplied to the countries in the southern hemisphere to wage another one hundred and thirty-two wars in the next twenty or thirty years.

I believe that it is time that, particularly in recent weeks when British servicemen have been killed by obsolete British weaponry – perhaps sold at relatively low prices – the Alliance and the East agreed not merely on a balanced reduction of weaponry but on the disposal and scrapping of that weaponry rather than having it sold on a profitable market and finding, or partly finding, further military technological advance.

I hope that, in the spirit of moral rectitude, the Assembly will support Amendment 3 as it supported Amendments 1 and 2.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy, for introducing such a high moral tone into our discussions.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?

I understand that the committee is in favour of it.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

All six amendments have been adopted.

I now have to put the draft recommendation, as amended. As usual, if there is no opposition, we can avoid a roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you therefore wish to have a roll-call vote?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I do not want a roll-call, but you asked whether there was any opposition.

The PRESIDENT. – There is no alternative. If there is any opposition to the draft recommendation, under our rules we must have a roll-call. I understand that some colleagues are trying to find a way round that.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Duraffour.

The President (continued)

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	59
Ayes	39
Noes	14
Abstentions	6

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

I am sorry that most members were not here at the beginning of the sitting when I said that it was important to sign the register. If a representative is not present, the substitute should only sign once. The representative and the substitute cannot both sign and both vote. If members do not sign the register, we shall have problems.

4. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 918 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We move to the next order of the day which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Document 918 and amendments.

I will ask Mr. Mommersteeg to move his important report.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – I have introduced reports in this house using, or perhaps abusing, the English language, for practical reasons because as a Rapporteur I used to work with English texts. Speaking for the last

time from this rostrum and belonging to about twenty-five million people speaking Dutch I shall read my introduction partly in English, partly in my mother tongue. I am very happy that for the first time some members of the European Parliament, now colleagues of mine, are present here today.

The report first examines the present levels of nuclear forces and known plans for their modernisation, comparing data from a variety of official and other established sources. It welcomes the appearance of several new sources of information, noting the particular limitations of each, and it calls for the continuous provision of objective official information. It concludes that the balance of nuclear weapons can be assessed only as a whole, for assessing the balance in separate categories of strategic and theatre weapons raises a range of objections, as mentioned in paragraph 2.6 of the report. It is particularly for the purposes of negotiation that such a division in categories has been made.

The report concludes that the lead which the United States still retains over the Soviet Union in total numbers of nuclear warheads has been reduced, while the Soviet Union has acquired a disturbing superiority in heavy ICBMs and, most disturbing, in intermediate-range forces. In particular, the Soviet SS-18 with its enormous throw-weight and warhead and with the theoretical possibility of deploying about thirty or even forty warheads now has stimulated public debate on the issue of United States superiority or inferiority in strategic weapons.

When, however, President Reagan on 31st March at a press conference said that the Soviet Union "on balance" had "a definite margin of superiority, so that there is what I have several times called a window of vulnerability", he was immediately challenged by Senator Jackson, Senator Moynihan and others. In any case, it is assumed by many that in the strategic field, not in the intermediate field, there is a rough balance, rough parity; but that situation is a far cry from the overwhelming United States superiority after the completion of the Kennedy programme of Minuteman missiles and Polaris submarines, and again when the United States were the first to deploy MIRVs, a sufficiently big United States margin to offset at the same time the Soviet intermediate weapons targeted on Western Europe. But in the meantime the Soviet Union has overtaken the United States in numbers of missiles deployed, very heavy ones, and considerably reduced the gap in the total number of warheads.

There is, moreover, the underlying concern of the United States with the relative age of the weapons system in service, a fear that the tech-

1. See page 33.

2. See page 34.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

nology of deployed systems might be overtaken by the momentum of the much more recent Soviet programmes. This fear has undoubtedly been a major spur for the United States strategic modernisation programme. That programme is examined in some detail in the report in paragraphs 2.16 to 2.26, as are the levels of the long-range INFs, now called intermediate-range nuclear forces, referred to in paragraphs 2.27 to 2.37.

The report then discusses in some detail the status of bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, pointing out that arms control and adequate defence measures are two sides of the same thing: "a balanced security policy designed to prevent war, not only nuclear war". The NATO position is that the Brussels dual decision of 12th December 1979, paragraph 3.1, remains the basis both for adjusting the imbalance in intermediate-range forces and for negotiating the "zero option" requiring the removal of all Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles worldwide in exchange for the non-deployment in Western Europe of the cruise missiles and Pershing II.

It welcomes the START talks which are to open in Geneva on 29th June – the date was announced shortly after the date the report was adopted by the committee – stresses the link with INF talks, urges continued respect of the SALT limits and calls for the talks to be pursued independently of other aspects of East-West relations.

The report cautions, however, that practical difficulties may lie ahead in the negotiations because of the Soviet Union's recent experience with changing attitudes of successive United States administrations and Congress on non-ratification of SALT II, while a change in the Soviet leadership in the not too distant future might limit freedom of international manoeuvre. A major problem will be the question of verification, both in the INF and START negotiations. The United States position is that there is need for verification beyond national technical means. The Soviet Union seems to have become more flexible. According to Mr. Rostow, in paragraph 3.6, Moscow responded to a United States question saying that while they regard national technical means as the primary method of verification in these treaties "under circumstances of trust, co-operative means to supplement national technical means might be possible".

That is a more flexible position. A considerable part of the report has been devoted to a description of the peace movements in Europe and the United States and of the attitudes of the main political parties of WEU member states to

the various peace movements. It is a first effort at factual description – a sort of first general reconnaissance. It is not a thorough, exhaustive analysis of many diverse movements, their aims and arguments. I stress that we should take the peace movements seriously as a general political phenomenon, even if we do not agree with all or most of what they propagate and even if we distrust them.

The report finds in the peace demonstrations an expression of justified concern among many people over the nuclear arms race and the possibility of nuclear war but regrets the omissions and over simplifications in the demands of many movements. It calls for an effort by governments and parliaments to inform the public objectively about the threat and about the basis of allied defence and arms control policies. Since the report by the committee was adopted about a month ago, events have occurred that should be mentioned in the context of the report. I refer to the levels of nuclear forces, the negotiating process and public opinion. I shall give a brief summary, which cannot be complete.

An interesting report, entitled "Common security – a programme for disarmament", has been published by the Palme Commission, mentioned in paragraph 4.56 of the committee's report. As I have already done, the Palme report also reviews the historical trend of United States and Soviet strategic forces, the levels in 1967 on completion of the Kennedy programme, the MIRVing and its quantum leap in the number of United States warheads and the catching up by the Soviet Union particularly since 1975. In that year United States warheads numbered 8,500 compared with 2,500 for the Soviet Union.

By 1981, following several years of the Soviet MIRV programme and the introduction of four new types of missiles, the Soviet levels were about 8,000 compared with 9,500 for the United States. Drawn partly from SIPRI and partly from official United States sources, I note that according to the Palme report each of these figures is greater by about 1,000 than those quoted in paragraph 2.9 of the committee's report where we show 8,700 United States warheads compared with 7,000 Soviet warheads. But the magnitude of the United States lead in this measure of strategic nuclear strengths, not all measures, is broadly the same.

The Palme Commission gave a range of arms control recommendations. It is convinced that results will come only gradually in a continuous negotiating process. A joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union on 31st May announced that negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments would begin in Geneva on 29th June. Speak-

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

ing in Arlington Cemetery on that day, President Reagan said: "As for the existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the USSR shows equal restraint."

Reserved reactions to specific United States proposals for START have been coming from Moscow. Republican Senator Pressler, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, spoke to Mr. Karpov, who has been appointed the Soviet negotiator to START, in Moscow on 1st June and reported Soviet doubt about the reliability of the United States negotiating commitments in view of political uncertainties and the Senate's failure to ratify SALT II. It was, according to him, not realistic to expect a new agreement before the end of President Reagan's term of office in January 1985.

The committee's report does not gloss over the difficulties ahead and reflects the views reported by Senator Pressler in paragraphs 3.25 to 3.27. A detailed editorial in Pravda on 4th June was critical of specific United States proposals formulated by President Reagan on 9th May and summarised in paragraphs 3.18 and 3.19 of the committee's report. The Pravda editorial, among other things, criticised the proposal to limit to one half of total warheads the number to be installed on ground-based missiles, pointing out that the Soviet Union has 70 % of its warheads on such missiles compared with only 20 % for the United States.

Although there are undoubted difficulties ahead in both sets of bilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons, chiefly concerning the particular weapons systems and particular parameters that should be included in any agreement, the willingness of both parties to negotiate is widely welcomed, as is the fact that, although each side may have different preferences concerning weapons to be included in a first-phase agreement, neither side has refused flatly to discuss the preference of the other.

Since the committee adopted its report, there have been a number of demonstrations. I have mentioned a pro-NATO demonstration in Bonn on 5th June organised by the CDU/CSU, which attracted 100,000-120,000 demonstrators according to party estimates, or 60,000-80,000 according to the police, while similar demonstrations in Munich attracted about half that number of participants. I would add to the comments in the committee's report under Chapter IV of the explanatory memorandum on public opinion and nuclear weapons that there was actually a case in Germany of the CSU expelling one of its members who became involved in the activities of the so-called peace movements. I

acknowledge a supplementary CDU reply to my questionnaire, which unfortunately was received after the committee had adopted its report.

The committee's report notes the existence of certain independent anti-nuclear peace groups in Eastern Europe. In Moscow on 4th June, a group of eleven Soviet citizens calling themselves "The group for establishing trust between the United States and the USSR" began collecting signatures on a statement calling for the greater involvement of the public in both countries and efforts to secure total nuclear disarmament. The Soviet police began last week to suppress that action.

I wish now to make some remarks in Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). - Mr. President, it became clear in the committee that opinions differ very widely on what is meant by "the" peace movement. This is understandable, since the term covers a very heterogeneous conglomerate. I have often heard it said that we must not overestimate the peace movement. I agree, but I recall that after the great demonstrations in Europe last year The Economist remarked that the people who stayed at home were frightened, too. Why is this? In an article in Die Zeit on 15th January 1982 which is still worth reading, Christoph Bertram, then director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, tried to answer this question and to explain the underlying reasons for the substantial decline in popularity of the security policy and its nuclear component. Not content to find an answer in the horror of nuclear weapons, he quotes and analyses four other reasons: first, widespread uneasiness about nuclear technology; second, the undermining of the deterrent idea by the fear of limited nuclear war, fuelled by fairly warlike language from Washington; third, anxiety about peace in general; fourth, the widespread feeling of insecurity due to uncertainty about economic development.

I cannot discuss Bertram's detailed analysis any further in this context, but I do urge that it be given careful consideration. For those who are interested, I have prepared an English version of the article. Bertram goes further: he examines objectively and expertly the debate on the arguments advanced by the peace movement, and he is also critical of NATO strategy, and specifically of NATO's rôle with regard to battlefield weapons. He believes the consensus will grow again if and when the arguments become sufficiently objective and down-to-earth to be convincing, and if and when political leaders make an out-and-out commitment to this debate. I agree with this, as I do with most of Bertram's article.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

If foreign policy, and particularly security policy, is to be credible, it must have the support and confidence of the majority of the population. Gaining or regaining this support and confidence is a challenge to us politicians.

I therefore urge the committee and the Assembly constantly to pursue and intensify their study of the problems connected with the nuclear arms build-up. Anyone who remains unconvinced that this is useful or necessary should read what Kissinger said some time ago in a lecture at The Hague. He was afraid there would be "unilateral psychological and even physical disarmament", a "psychological imbalance, indeed a form of unilateral disarmament" - "unmatched as it is in the East". He accepted that there is real and justified anxiety and that the effects of the protest movements are not all negative. He went on to say that "the moral concern about nuclear weapons touches upon an issue crucial to our future: mankind's new-found ability to exterminate itself makes new modes of thinking imperative. But they do not require a flight from concreteness; hysteria is a poor guide to policy. Moral concern must be coupled with a willingness to think through the central issues with a seriousness and in a detail that do justice to dangers as complex as they are enormous".

A more detailed study by us is also necessary in view of the current and future arms control talks, INF and START in Geneva, which are still at the stage of the American opening bid, and MBFR in Vienna, where there should at least be a breakthrough, and where nuclear option three concerning battlefield weapons might also be revived. This study should also cover, in my opinion, the three ideas which, in various forms, have recently attracted attention or attracted attention again: first, a freeze on the levels of all nuclear weapons; second, a no-first-use declaration; third, establishment of a nuclear-free zone.

The committee has rejected these ideas for the moment and advanced a number of arguments in paragraph 4.62. I agree with this. But this does not mean that these ideas should not be examined more closely. They may contain some useful elements.

The term "nuclear-free zone" can be interpreted in various ways. Bertram, whom I have already quoted, argues strongly, for example, for a reduction in battlefield weapons. McNamara et al. advocate a "careful study" rather than rapid action as regards the declaration of no-first-use. I do not think a freeze on the level of strategic nuclear weapons, without completely excluding the possibility of modernisation, is a bad idea. After all is SALT II

not a move towards such a freeze? I see it as one reason for advocating ratification now, as an interim agreement in a necessary, continuous negotiating process, not frustrated by linkage.

Mr. President, I am not a member of the Reagan fan club. I was and am still unhappy with some of his statements during and after his election campaign. But he is the President of the United States, the democratically elected leader of our largest ally, who has enormous responsibilities, an ally with whom we have more in common than a security treaty, vital though that is. Of course, there are also major differences of opinion and interests between Europe and America. That is why Europe should stand up for itself, objectively and critically. That is what the dialogue, the on-going consultations are for. The dialogue should also take place in the parliamentary arena. The more the European countries succeed in acting in unison, the greater Europe's influence will be. This influence was quite obvious last year, as was the influence of the Reagan administration's confrontation with the "real world". The NATO summit in Bonn may not have produced much that was new, but it was important that President Reagan also reaffirmed the aims of the Harmel report: both adequate military defence and efforts to achieve détente. For all these reasons, Mr. President, I oppose the sometimes virulent anti-Reaganism and anti-Americanism in Europe, which is based on stupidity, arrogance or malice, or all three. They are prejudicial to the necessary dialogue to which our Assembly must also contribute.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg. I am sure that we have all learned with regret that this is the last occasion on which you will visit us as a delegate. Although your reports and speeches often have not been received with unanimity and sometimes you have been controversial, as perhaps now, we all pay tribute to the tremendous work that you have done for the Assembly over a number of years. You have made a good contribution to the discussion of the important problem of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The debate will start with a speech by Mr. Wittmann.

Mr. WITTMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I too would like to thank Mr. Mommersteeg for this report, which is very thorough and presents a clear position for our Assembly to adopt. One thing needs special emphasis.

If we in Europe mean to pursue an effective defence policy, we need - as the report makes clear - an active information policy aimed at

Mr. Wittmann (continued)

those many people who are afraid, and are misled by their fear.

In the current peace debate we are re-living the period of the late fifties and the anti-atomic-death campaign, which was similar if less widespread. And there was a similar campaign in Germany in the late sixties, too, when we had to adapt our constitution to the requirements of internal and external security. Today's debate and campaign are much more widespread, and not only in Germany. The main thrust is against the United States – I was grateful for what the Rapporteur said on that subject towards the end – and against the existence of the North Atlantic Alliance, and constitutes in my view a very dangerous factor in public opinion.

It was not the purpose of the report – this was neither possible nor perhaps desired, since otherwise the discussions in committee would have been even more controversial – to investigate the rôle which the Soviet Union may be playing in this campaign. Perhaps we can make up for this later, with the documentary evidence before us. I believe it is a masterpiece of Soviet propaganda that, generally speaking, one now talks in the free West only of compensatory armament, and not of the NATO dual decision as such, nor of the Soviet arms build-up, or not in general.

There seems to be a danger – and we must do all we can to prevent this – of what the head of the Comintern, Dimitri Manuilski, said in 1931 coming true. He said, and I quote:

“In order to win we need an element of surprise. The bourgeoisie must produce the most dramatic peace movement that has ever existed. There will be electrifying proposals and extraordinary concessions.”

That was said fifty years ago. Perhaps we have NATO and our policy to thank for the fact that it has not come to that in the last thirty years and the Soviet Union has not yet prevailed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in discussing the peace movement – the fears of many, which must be taken seriously – let us not forget the guideline given to the military staffs of the Warsaw Pact in the early seventies:

“To conduct these talks and reduce tensions is permitted. But this must be done in words only, for the purpose of misleading and weakening the adversary. Anyone who takes such phrases seriously himself is a traitor.”

We have already seen this in the treatment, mentioned earlier on, which is meted out to people in the East who also wish to espouse the cause of peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Soviet apparatus, which is divided into many organisations and also has access to many organisations quite undetectable as being communist or subservient to Moscow, is undoubtedly attempting to control these movements in our countries through agents and organisers, as well as by financial means.

The Finnish communist Kuusinen once said in 1926 – and this appears to be coming true – that it was necessary to construct a kind of solar system of organisations and small committees in a tight circle around the Communist Party – meaning the Communist Party of Finland and the Soviet Union.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we now have rather more information about the so-called peace demonstration on 10th October 1981 in Bonn. We now know for sure that three out of the five columns marching towards the square were organised and led by the communists and their front organisations. This is now established beyond doubt.

What is to be done in this situation? The propaganda strikes at people's real fears. It strikes at the information gap among those who – thank God! – are unfamiliar with the aims and methods of a dictatorship – I mean the Nazi dictatorship – and know little about the Soviet Union and its aims. I believe that the essential condition for a policy of information on NATO's necessary tasks is an understanding of what communism intends to do, can do, and is capable of doing. Only then will we be able to produce the information needed to counter it.

One thing is certainly important: we must also make the value of freedom evident to people and show that it is worth standing up for. Thank you, Mr. President.

(Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much.

The next speaker is Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It is still my view that the atmosphere engendered by the pessimistic acceptance of the Soviet Union as our implacable enemy is the greatest danger to peace. That atmosphere, with its psychological acceptance of a view held by many, creates in my mind the feeling that psychologically, whether we like it or not, we are being prepared for the inevitability of nuclear war.

This valuable report contains a great deal of information. I pay tribute to Mr. Mommersteeg for the work that he has done on it and for the work that he did on it previously, which came to little – at any rate at that time.

Dr. Miller (continued)

However, he has now produced a report of great interest to the whole of WEU. I am sorry that Mr. Mommersteeg is not to be with us in future. We shall lose a valuable colleague.

I am glad that the report recognises the genuine nature of peace demonstrations and does not simply pass them off as Soviet-inspired subversion. I am not a pacifist. I believe that if you are attacked, you have the right to defend yourself. Individuals may take their own view of that matter. It is for them to decide for themselves only; they cannot decide for others.

I agree with one noted observer of the situation: if countries dissolve their armed forces, violent groups within those societies will take over the government.

I am afraid of the nuclear possibilities in the world today. The report contains many tables showing nuclear balances, weapons and lists of all kinds. However, the emphasis is on the fact that balance can be assessed only as a whole. That was a very good point made by Mr. Mommersteeg. The debate about the superiority of nuclear weapons is still going on. There is no complete acceptance by one side or the other of superiority. On 31st March this year, Mr. Reagan said:

"On balance the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority, enough so that there is what I have called, as you all know, several times, a window of vulnerability."

On the same day, Senator Patrick Moynihan said:

"Either side could destroy the other side in a counter-strike."

What does it matter if one side can destroy the other ten times over whereas the first side can destroy the second side only nine times over? I do not think that it makes any difference.

I was attached to the medical profession until some years ago. The medical profession's activity in relation to nuclear danger has become more and more pronounced.

Last year an organisation called Physicians Against Nuclear War held an important conference in Washington. The conference concluded that an all-out nuclear war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union would lead to two hundred million dead and that the sixty million injured would be left without attention, as four-fifths of hospital facilities and medical staff would have been destroyed. The meeting concluded that any organised medical response to nuclear war would

make "no significant difference to its catastrophic effects".

This year in Cambridge, England, the Physicians Against Nuclear War held another conference. It was addressed by an American cardiologist, Professor Bernard Lown, who said:

"We have to compel society to face the simple fact that nuclear weapons and human beings cannot coexist."

I agree with those in the West who say that our economic and political systems are very different from those in the Soviet Union and its satellites. I agree with those objections. None of us would choose to live under those régimes. However, the Soviet Union's influence has regrettably spread to other countries. It should be stopped by the better propagation of our system. Therefore, we must pursue that course even more vigorously than at present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bahr.

Mr. BAHR (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Mommersteeg, whose report was up to his usual high standard, was kind enough to mention the Palme Commission and its report. However, I would point out that in our opinion security, in an age of mutually-assured destruction, can be achieved only in the form of joint security. I believe it is true to say that security can no longer be achieved against a potential adversary but only with him. I would refer explicitly to what the Chancellor of the Federal Republic said about this yesterday at the United Nations. When we speak of security in Europe and joint security, this naturally means that we cannot achieve security without the Alliance and the United States. I consider it an illusion to pursue any train of thought, however well-founded, which might lead to our becoming detached from the United States.

In this connection, may I say something in response to the appeal addressed to us this morning by the French Minister for External Relations. In his view the history of Europe over the last twenty or thirty years has been, as far as security goes, nothing short of tragic. Europe has not been in a position to guarantee its own security. I myself am convinced that it will not be in a position to organise and guarantee its own security without the United States in the future either. However, I think Mr. Cheysson was right in saying this morning that this Assembly is the only elected assembly empowered to make recommendations to governments in this field. I would like to give his appeal my explicit

Mr. Bahr (continued)

support. It would indeed be worthwhile for the Assembly to take an opportunity to clarify its thinking on the question of European interests within NATO.

The negotiations between the two super-powers are proceeding at the level of intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles. Meanwhile, Europe, has not been in a position to formulate its own interests.

In speaking of European interests we must of course recognise that Europe is not identical with the countries represented in this Assembly. I would refer simply to the extremely interesting speech which the Spanish Prime Minister delivered in Bonn on the occasion of Spain's accession to NATO, in which he indicated – in addition to a passing reference to Gibraltar – that Spain would continue to pursue its Latin American interests within NATO. We shall therefore have to make decisions and distinctions: how should Europe's interests in the framework of NATO actually be defined and formulated? This is worth considerable effort, particularly since no systematic work has yet been done on the positions which Europe should adopt in the current strategy debate.

We note with satisfaction that in Bonn NATO put an end to an argument. There is no longer any argument about whether or not to pursue détente. Both pillars of the Harmel report were confirmed by the NATO conference. However, NATO was, or at any rate felt it was, unable to express an opinion on the strategy debates taking place both in the United States and in Europe: the question of the first use of nuclear weapons and – perhaps even more important for Europe – the danger of the early use of nuclear weapons, a point specifically referred to in the report of the Palme Commission.

I am therefore convinced that it is important for us to make such an attempt in our Assembly. That is why I take this opportunity to support Mr. Pignion's proposed amendment to the report. It is very natural that Europe should formulate European views of its own. It is very necessary that this should take place within NATO. Both points are made in his amendment. I would ask you to support this amendment along with the report. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– Thank you very much.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although the Dutch Delegation will, of course, be saying its own

farewell to Mr. Mommersteeg later this week, I should like to begin by thanking him most sincerely for the way in which he has repeatedly made a constructive and provocative contribution to the debate on security in Europe in recent years, both in and outside the Assembly and in the Netherlands and elsewhere. I therefore think I am right in saying that we shall miss Joep Mommersteeg. We shall, of course, follow his activities in the European Parliament.

I referred to his “provocative contribution”. This is also true of the report we are debating today. I should like to put forward a few very general ideas in this respect. I confess that not only am I disappointed by Mr. Mommersteeg's arguments on behalf of the balance of nuclear forces: I actually disagree with the substance of his views. I believe that anyone who has kept a close watch on nuclear developments in the last ten to fifteen years – and I am thinking of both intermediate-range and strategic weapons – can reach only one conclusion: that East and West have an over-capacity of nuclear weapons so enormous that thinking in terms of nuclear balance as a mutual deterrent is, in my view, out of date and traditional. I will explain why I take this view. Somewhere in his report Mr. Mommersteeg says that, even if the Soviet Union destroys 90 % of the United States' strategic weapons, 10 % will remain. He then says – and this is an important point – that, since many strategic weapons are submarine-based, they will continue to act as a deterrent. What does this mean? It means, in my opinion, that our technological capacity in the West is such that it is hardly relevant whether the other side has one thousand, two thousand or even more missiles or nuclear warheads.

This is what I would call the traditional theory of balance, traces of which I have now also found in Mr. Mommersteeg's report on nuclear weapons. Traditional thinking is, in my opinion, one of the reasons why no progress is being made towards a reduction in the rôle and the numbers of nuclear weapons.

I wish to put it to this forum that in both East and West, and – mainly for technological reasons – particularly in Europe, we do possess a permanent nuclear deterrent, no matter how many weapons the Soviet Union may keep trained on us. Those who dare not admit that this situation exists in both East and West, Mr. President, fail to appreciate that we can in fact manage with far fewer nuclear weapons in Europe, whether the other side wishes to follow suit or not. I find this such an essential technical and above all political question that I should like to discuss it with Mr. Mommersteeg. On this point, as described in his report, I differ from him completely.

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

I trust, Mr. President, that you will not take it amiss that my opinion of Mr. Mommersteeg is naturally coloured by his experience and political activities in his own country in recent years. In the recommendation the report contains, Mr. Mommersteeg says that preparations for the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles must continue. But the party to which Mr. Mommersteeg belongs, the Christian Democratic Party, agreed that preparations should not begin in the Netherlands until the Geneva negotiations on the deployment of cruise missiles had or had not come to a decision on the matter. I interpret the views Mr. Mommersteeg puts forward in his report as meaning that he is also recommending the Dutch Government – I regard this as an important and serious political fact – to abandon the position it has hitherto adopted – and this also applies to the new interim government which is preparing the way for elections – and to begin preparations for the deployment of cruise missiles. I consider this – it was what Mr. Mommersteeg himself said – to be a serious and regrettable political fact.

I gather, Mr. President, that I have very little speaking time left. I should not have uttered the last sentence, then I would have had more time. I nevertheless await Mr. Mommersteeg's answers with interest.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – It has been my task here today to attempt, even though without complete success – although that does not deter me or my friends – to introduce a note of realism into our discussions; and this I propose to do again in a very brief intervention.

First, however, I wish to pay tribute to my personal friend, Mr. Mommersteeg. Naturally, we have often differed politically. I understand that this is his last appearance here. We have established very good personal relations over the years, even though we have from time to time differed, as I fear we shall today, although for different reasons from those expounded by his fellow countryman, Mr. van den Bergh.

If we can reintroduce reality, it is a fact that a very large banner was flown behind an aeroplane during some of the Bonn peace demonstrations some months ago which asked in German "Where are the protesters in Moscow?". I am still waiting for the answer to that question, either from Moscow or elsewhere. Secondly, it is a fact that what I will broadly call the protesters, the supporters of the

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in various countries have had a rather chequered career. They began and grew in force and strength in the 1950s, by coincidence at the time when it was very much in the interests of the eastern bloc to stop the nuclear development of the western powers, because at that time the Soviets were in a position of very considerable inferiority.

It is amazing that as the Soviet bloc started to catch up, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament of the 1950s languished and died and only came to life again recently when the Soviet Union and its allies saw threatened the superiority in nuclear weapons which they have now obtained and which they wish to maintain.

I want to point to one other factor of reality. At the moment, there are nine hundred warheads, SS-20s, actually sited along the iron curtain and behind it, each with a capacity of destruction seven times that of the single bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Can we not in this Assembly ever get back to just a few facts rather than living in an Alice in Wonderland situation?

As we discuss this report there are nine hundred SS-20s – and I have left out some of the others – sited in Europe, each with a capacity seven times greater and more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and each, even if moved behind the Urals, would still have precisely the same capability. It is in that atmosphere that I have to judge this discussion. I simply cannot accept a situation in which we are talking as though there were some kind of even-handed balance over the prospects of nuclear disarmament.

I repeat what I said during the last debate: it is only when that imbalance has been rectified that we can seriously look forward to the peace, security and freedom of all our peoples to which everybody in this Assembly, whatever his party political attribution, subscribes in his own personal faith and thinking.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you.

I call Mr. Maravalle.

Mr. MARAVALLE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I also wish to associate myself with the compliments paid by other speakers to Mr. Mommersteeg and I too regret that he will no longer be among us after his years of thorough and thoughtful work on the problems dealt with by our Assembly. My thanks are more than purely formal because the ground covered by Mr. Mommersteeg in this report is of a very delicate nature because of the concern felt by the public on these subjects which created many difficulties for the Rapporteur

Mr. Maravalle (continued)

and members of the committee in drafting this text for submission to the Assembly.

I shall be brief and I have no wish that either of the lights on the President's desk should be switched on; I simply wish to say that I am very favourably impressed by – and therefore wish to stress – part B of the draft recommendation calling on the member governments of WEU to ensure that public opinion is informed of this report and in particular of the present situation.

Reference has been made here to the peace demonstrations which have been taking place in every European country including Italy. These demonstrations are not to be criticised as such because I believe they are a genuine expression of a certain side of public opinion but I do think that the special orchestration of these demonstrations is to be condemned. For example, there were no demonstrations when Russia installed its SS-20 missiles, whereas demonstrations took place in every European country immediately it was decided to install missiles – or there was a threat to install because none have yet been deployed – as an American or Euroamerican counter to a decision taken by the Soviet Union.

I therefore consider it more than ever necessary to keep our countries properly informed and I believe that the work done by Mr. Mommersteeg is of the greatest importance.

We certainly welcome what Mr. Cheysson said this morning on the need to try to restore a balance of forces because equilibrium ensures peace – as in fact Mr. Lagorio said when he spoke strongly in favour of the zero option – and we are glad to see a glimmer of light in the East-West dialogue for a reduction not only of nuclear but also of conventional forces but I must repeat and re-emphasise the point, which the Assembly should also stress to the full, that our countries must be informed so that they can form a sound judgment and have a true idea of the real position on the two sides.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you.

I now call Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*) – I wish to make two points about the report, which is a valuable legacy by Mr. Mommersteeg to the Assembly as he is moving on to work elsewhere.

First, we cannot ignore peace or unilateralist movements, as I think it is more correct to call them. They are not entitled to claim to be the only people in favour of peace. I am glad that

the Rapporteur dealt extensively with those people. They represent a wide range of opinion in the United Kingdom, where they range from outright pacifists to people who are committed to a major increase in conventional defence expenditure as part of an alternative defence strategy. They include communists, people from the centre and the centre right. They include many people who have not thought through the issues with sufficient care and a few who have not appreciated the harsh reality of the Soviet threat. They have also brought into their ranks many people who are motivated solely by a genuine desire to reduce the risks, which is what we are trying to do, although many of us believe that we must go about reducing those risks in a different way.

The report states that the harsh reality of the Soviet threat was brought home to the Swedish people recently. I welcome the robust attitude taken by my liberal colleague, the Swedish Foreign Minister, who was confronted with what appeared to be a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine, which was well within Swedish territorial waters.

Those of us who believe in deterrence and multilateral disarmament must engage in arguments and discussion with the peace movements and those who are attracted to them. We must take part in public debate to make our position and the issues clear. Those of us who accept that Europe must share the burden of the deployment of the weapons that protect us, such as cruise missiles, must counter the arguments of those who are taking an irresponsible line when they seek still to shelter behind those weapons but do not accept the deployment of them in their own country. Many of us must engage in arguments, public presentation and discussion if we are to win the public debate on the issue.

My second point concerns the Trident programme, to which the Rapporteur referred, and Britain's and France's nuclear deterrent capacity. Let us be clear about that. I am not sure that the report is clear. Britain's nuclear deterrent is a strategic system designed to enable Britain to threaten nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union. This is where I part company with many people whose convictions I share on the reality of the Soviet threat.

I cannot envisage circumstances in which a British Government would be right to launch a nuclear retaliation when the rest of our allies felt it wrong to do so. For that reason my party has opposed the Trident programme, just as it opposed the Polaris programme and the modernisation of Polaris undertaken by the Labour Government, which was based on the same principle that Britain should have its own strategic nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Beith (continued)

The effect of the Trident programme, as many military experts have said, is increasingly to distort our defence expenditure and to preclude programmes which are needed to strengthen conventional forces. If Britain has occasion to act alone, it is likely to be in a more localised and non-nuclear context. In any case, Britain's best contribution to NATO can be in the conventional area.

The Falklands affair has demonstrated many things. We shall discuss the lessons of the Falkland Islands for a long time. It has demonstrated the logistic efficiency of the British navy and the support for the navy, which enabled the task force to be assembled and dispatched so quickly. We have long been making that contribution to NATO. I hope that we shall long continue to do so.

The Falklands crisis demonstrated the fighting skill of British land forces and the army, which is professional and not a conscript army. When I discovered, as I did in the last half hour, that we have taken 15,000 prisoners of war on the Falkland Islands, I realised that we were dealing with forces that were numerically superior by about 50% to the forces that Britain deployed on the islands. That is a demonstration of the professional fighting skill of the British land forces and part of the contribution that we make to NATO.

The Falkland Islands crisis also demonstrated the importance of air superiority and the need for better defence systems for our ships against the Exocet missile, which was used with such devastating effect. It demonstrated the value of the hunter-killer submarines. It demonstrated the vulnerability of our programme if we allow Trident to prevent us from bringing in effective mechanisms and means to deal with some of the aspects that I have described.

We have our windows of vulnerability, as the British Secretary of State for Defence admitted, using the same phrase. Heavy expenditure on a strategic system, which I believe we cannot properly deploy independently of our allies, will distort our programme away from the essentials. It was worrying to many British people to see that the task force was launched in ships some of which were due to be sold or scrapped and from dockyards that were about to be closed. A major reassessment is due.

My fear is that the Soviet Union will be able to use the coercive power of military superiority against the western democracies, because, although we can match the nuclear threat, we cannot necessarily deal with an incursion at a lower level of force. That is a fundamentally weak position that we should seek to correct.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am very sorry that this last debate on a report by Mr. Mommersteeg in which I am participating causes me to go against him and oppose his conclusions. For his report, which is not without interest, is marred by an omission, that of failing to recall when the decision to station intermediate-range missiles in Europe was actually made.

It was in fact in December 1957 that the Atlantic Alliance decided to deploy intermediate-range missiles – the ancestors of the Euromissiles which are being talked about today – after the success of the first Soviet firing of an intercontinental missile. It was then that the Americans, threatened on their own territory, proposed shifting the theatre of operations to the continent of Europe.

We, the members of the Defence Committee, learned on 4th March 1980 in San Diego, at the headquarters of General Dynamics, that the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe represents, for this firm and the capitalist interests associated with it, the substantial turnover of \$4 billion. And it was in 1972 that the programme in question was decided upon by the United States Government.

I would point out that at that time NATO circles and those which support that organisation had not embarked on any campaign against the presence of the Soviet SS-4s and SS-5s, which, despite their unreliability, represented threats against cities – in the case of Belgium, especially Antwerp, Liège and Brussels. No mention is made, either of the existence of intermediate-range missiles, which are apparently reliable because, according to Mr. Beith, the British striking force is just as reliable as that of France; I am referring to the French multiple-warhead M-20s, S-3s and S-4s and the British A-3s and A-3 TKs. It is untrue to say that there are no similar weapons in the West.

But that is not where the problem lies. In view of this competition between dealers in nuclear weapons, the voice of reason must be heard.

Is it in fact going too far to ask whether it is worse to be killed by twenty bombs or twenty kilotonnes than by a single kilotonne? That, too, is part of the problem. And, with regard to a counter-weapon to the SS-20, did not General Gallois – who is not a pacifist as far as I know – say in 1979 that these weapons will not change the situation in any way, as the SS-20s will always be capable of destroying them by a pre-emptive strike?

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

Need one mention the correction of the existing imbalance between conventional forces by means of the nuclear deterrent, an old refrain which was heard again this morning? It was true yesterday perhaps, because of the horror inspired by the possibility of fantastic, enormous massacres; but today, with these limited-effect missiles – I was going to say clean missiles – is the proliferation argument based on this still equally relevant?

Is the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles a way of strengthening a nation's defence potential? I think we are missing the mark there; because, unless we are absolutely blind, we must take note of the many demonstrations which have taken place and of the fact that, especially in New York, the seven hundred thousand demonstrators on Sunday were not all, I assume, financed by Moscow, any more than those in Bonn, Amsterdam, Madrid or Brussels.

This shift from the anti-city strategy to the anti-forces strategy, with the prospects of a pre-emptive war which it opens up, makes that which was improbable yesterday foreseeable now, and that is what is at the root of psychological disarmament.

But another thing which is also doubtless involved is the growth in Europe's dependence in relation to its powerful ally on the other side of the Atlantic. Apart from the fact that this gives the enemy a priority target in the event of a pre-emptive strike, it is also for the Americans a way of actually increasing their strategic nuclear force, while letting the Europeans face the risks entailed by the stationing of the weapons. This also represents a new – perhaps extreme – dependence on the strategic and political decisions of the United States in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In conclusion Mr. President, the stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in our countries, intended to re-establish the balance of forces, will, on the contrary, on the one hand considerably weaken the social consensus essential for any defence policy – what would you do with the modern weapons if you did not have public opinion behind you enabling you to spend money on buying them and on keeping up the population's belief in defence? – and on the other hand increase the dangers of a limited nuclear conflict at the expense of Europe and the Europeans.

For my part, Mr. President, I have made my choice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to thank Mr. Mommersteeg for his valuable contribution to our Assembly. I appreciate both his report and the draft recommendation. At the same time, I do not think that either the analysis in the report or the proposals in the recommendation fully reflect the growing threat posed by recent moves towards rearmament. The comparative data provided by the Rapporteur, showing the enormous destructive capacity now available in the world, are certainly interesting. But the dangers to be met now stem from other factors which must be assessed with an eye to the future; firstly, the nature of the present nuclear arms race and the progressively more rapid development on both sides of increasingly sophisticated weapons are making control more difficult, are increasing the chances of mistaking intentions and adding to mutual uncertainty. In these circumstances, it hardly seems correct to talk of a balance of deterrence. It is the actual perception of the "potential threat" which is changing, leading to general uncertainty.

The second point to consider is proliferation, the growing number of countries which having achieved the necessary economic, financial and technological capability, already have or are in a position to equip themselves with nuclear weapons, in a world situation where the risk of conflict is increasing. We cannot fail to be concerned at this development. Judgments as to the possibility of nuclear warfare are also based on this new factor. Consequently, not only are ideas concerning the "potential threat" changing, but countries could also be dragged into a nuclear war, against the wishes of the superpowers, by crises outside the area of the Alliance and it is hard to see how such a war could be limited and not involve the whole world in catastrophe.

The pacifist movement and its headlong growth are an expression first of all of the growing awareness of these dangers. It seems wrong to me, therefore, to refer to this as unilateralism because even though it has limits and unilateral aspects, the pacifist movement expresses and interprets the demands and growing concern shared by all, to which an adequate response must be given. This adds great significance to the proposals for "no first use" of nuclear weapons, even allowing for the new problems relating to conventional armaments and the freezing of all nuclear arsenals which have now attained levels capable of destroying the world. These demands have been taken up by eminent names on both sides and are designed not only to remove the danger but also to create the climate of confidence which is vital for the success of negotiations on European strategic weapons and the START negotiations in

Mr. Bernini (continued)

Geneva, because we realise the complexity and difficulty of these negotiations which more than ever need to reach a positive outcome because of the spread of nuclear weapons.

In this context, the zero option and a straightforward denial of Soviet anxieties do not appear to me to provide a possible basis; nor do the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union. A realistic and feasible basis for the continuation of negotiations will be maintained only if due account is taken of the genuine anxieties of both sides, starting from an assessment of the true position regarding nuclear weapons both in Europe and outside, but aimed at trying to reach an agreement which, with mutual safeguards, will first of all halt and reverse the present trend and open the way to further broader agreements on both nuclear and conventional weapons and on the not less important problem of confidence-building measures and mutual security. This should be Europe's first aim and this is the contribution our Assembly should make.

There are three important conditions for this: firstly, information on the progress of the negotiations and on any disputed points so that they can be jointly assessed and joint efforts can be made to overcome them; secondly, participation and control by Europe so that, beyond the interests of power and the attempt to achieve superiority, the more general need for a balance and the reduction of armaments to the lowest level are given priority; and lastly, the rôle – on which many members may not be able to agree – of public opinion and the peace movement, with its single-minded opposition to all nuclear weapons, to the SS-20 which it seeks to have dismantled and to the cruise and Pershing missiles, calling for the reversal of the second Brussels decision; and also with the movement's extension to all countries involving everyone both East and West and North and South, so that the policy of force may give way to a policy of agreed disarmament leading to the increased security in which Europe is vitally interested as the proponent of peace and progress throughout the world.

This is the position taken by us communists in our international relations with all democratic forces and in the peace movement in our country. For these reasons, although many of the points made are sound, I consider the recommendation before the Assembly to be completely inadequate.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.
I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. Günther MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a few years ago the Soviet Union donated to the United Nations a monument which stands in front of the United Nations building in New York and represents a smith beating a sword into a ploughshare – a symbol of the peace movement and something acceptable to everyone.

Now we know, for example, that in the other part of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, there is a movement with the slogan "swords to ploughshares", but those who use this slogan are the very ones to be persecuted there. This shows the two-edged nature of the sword wielded by certain parties within the peace movement.

I do not believe that anybody would accuse the hundreds of thousands, wherever they demonstrate, of being convinced by the aims of Soviet policy, or of being advocates of Soviet policy. But it must be said that many of them can naturally be exploited to this end. Exploitation in connection with the word "peace" is, of course, nothing new. I recall that even a party like the Social Democratic Party, which was convinced it could see clearly its relationship to fascism and national socialism in Germany, allowed itself to be taken in by a man like Adolf Hitler when he tabled his peace resolution in the Reichstag on 17th May 1933, although it was well aware that he had already prepared a different policy in secret.

What lesson do I draw from this historical episode? The lesson that one should not be deceived by words but consider the realities of the process of militarisation taking place in certain parts of the Warsaw Pact, a process that begins not with missiles or conventional weapons but with toy guns and tanks and the teaching of military ways to children in the classroom and the nursery school. This is, of course, what makes it so difficult to get the emphasis right within the peace movement.

In my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany, we know, for example, that the leaders of the peace movement or such driving forces as the magazine *Konkret* owe their influence or their existence to money from the German Democratic Republic. They have been established and financed for this specific purpose. Once you know that, you realise, of course, that peace slogans must be treated with caution.

On another point, I would like to correct something you said, Mr. Mommersteeg, which was not quite accurate. You claimed that Mr. Mechtersheimer had been expelled from my own party, the CSU, because of his connections with the peace movement. That is not true.

Mr. Günther Müller (continued)

He resigned from the CSU. He was never expelled. He resigned while his case procedure was still being examined. Nor were proceedings taken against him – and this is crucial – because he belongs to the peace movement. Quite a few of the members of my party are involved in this movement. Whether I think this right or wrong is quite beside the point. Mr. Mechttersheimer was threatened with expulsion because he had published articles in a communist newspaper. We do not think it makes much sense for somebody to belong to one party while writing for the official publications of another.

Permit me to make one final comment on public relations. This point, which you mention in your memorandum, seems to me of decisive importance. Take, for example, Appendix III to your excellent report, in which you quote the Soviet representative here in Paris. He gives the number of western missiles, and we find that it differs only very slightly – by about thirty – from the figure quoted in western statements. We know that it is not the Soviet Union's policy to publish information on its own weapons. A lack of balance in information policy has a one-sided influence on public opinion.

We find again and again, for example, that the mass media are extremely biased in their activities. We know that almost all the editors of the most important news programme on German television supported a newspaper advertisement in favour of the Krefeld appeal. As we all know, this was masterminded by the German Communist Party. Even here in this Assembly you can see how the television people from my country react in individual cases, how biased they are, what they film and what they do not film. This shows that there are certainly differences of degree between television in the eastern bloc countries and television in the West, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany. Picture quality is definitely much better in the West. As for objective reporting, we find that gaps occur, and that, of course, makes it easier to produce one-sided information on peace demonstrations. This does not unfortunately contribute to the détente we all want; it merely serves to blur the lines.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

The next speaker is Mr. Smith, who will be followed by Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I recognise the sincerity of the Rapporteur's report, but I am not happy with the report's emphasis on several issues. During our debates, I made that

plain to him and to members of the Defence Committee, of which I am happy to be a member.

I am sorry to have missed several important speeches, but I was listening to the radio and to the British Prime Minister speaking in the House of Commons on a historic day for the United Kingdom. She was asked several questions which went wider than the Falkland Islands issue. She was asked about the conference taking place on disarmament in the United Nations, which she is to attend. She emphatically said that unilateralism led to weakness and to the encouragement of aggression by the strong. I have heard her say that before and I wholeheartedly subscribe to that attitude.

However, unilateralism is the keynote of the peace movements that were so extensively referred to in the memorandum and in the Rapporteur's report. I see that he is shaking his head, but assure him that unilateralism figures highly in reports in the press and on television about the peace movements that operate in Britain. Some of those who take part in the peace movement are misguidedly sincere, but others are downright Machiavellian. That is why peace movements, which concentrate on unilateralism, are founded on a false premise. That false premise could lead many Assembly members into the equivalent of the Lubianka or the Gulag. It could lead those whom we represent to be suppressed and subjugated as they are in Poland and in Afghanistan, in a way that has been rife for too many years behind the whole of the iron curtain.

The Assembly should always take account of the fact that history shows that appeasement never pays, that the strong ultimately survive and that those who are prepared, survive. History shows that at the end of the day the weak go under. The compromisers lose in the long term. That is inevitable. History shows that they do and they will in this case. All those who are sincere and are in their right minds will be disarmers, but multilateral disarmers. That is the overriding issue in any consideration of the various peace and disarmament negotiations that have taken place, are taking place and will take place.

Verification is allied to multilateral disarmament. That is the key point in any consideration of national disarmament, whatever countries are involved. Verification must be the priority no matter which country is heavily armed and which countries feel vulnerable. We would do well to concentrate on that issue, both now and in future. It is probably the biggest issue that is of interest to WEU. Without it, everything is valueless and falls to the ground. We can continue to negotiate at a

Mr. Smith (continued)

high political and official level, but without verification there will be no tangible consequences.

I recognise the Rapporteur's hard work and sincerity. However, the Assembly would do well to bear in mind the points made by my good friend Sir Frederic Bennett and by others time and again. Unless we get our priorities crystal clear and approach this subject with the hard-mindedness necessary to protect the freedom and interests of those whom we represent in Western Europe, we shall inevitably get things wrong. If we get them wrong, those whom we represent will suffer well and truly in the end.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Smith.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to say a few words about the report drawn up by my colleague and good friend Mr. Mommersteeg, his last before he leaves us.

This report has had a rather chequered history. Various problems arose while it was being drafted owing to the differences of opinion on this subject, ranging from those completely in favour to those completely against. However, the liberals believe that the report that has finally emerged provides an extremely detailed analysis of the whole question of nuclear armaments in Europe and in particular of the peace movements which have now become so strong in our societies, on both sides of the Atlantic, as recent months have shown. It must be said that today's peace movements are not what we used to consider them, a movement of suspect groups of conspirators. They now have popular feeling behind them. They are seriously concerned about the level of armaments in both the western and the eastern world. They are concerned primarily with nuclear weapons, but also with armaments as a whole, and this is a good thing.

In its analysis of the peace movement and its search for the causes of the problems and solutions to them, the report provides a most admirable stimulus. This is not the end of the study. We must continue to discuss the matter in the future. Never before have I read so extensive and sound a review in any publication.

There is another point on which I should like to compliment the Rapporteur. I am referring to his dual approach, his parallel track policy. On the one hand, he places the emphasis on disarmament and the peace movement. On the other, he places equal emphasis

on the fact that this course alone will not produce the desired results and that in this respect we in Europe certainly cannot adopt a one-sided approach. The position he thus adopts in his report is that we must stand by the dual decision of December 1979. I congratulate him on this, because in the Dutch context this is undoubtedly a courageous attitude for a member of the Christian Democratic Group. This subject poses quite a few problems. As the doyen in foreign policy matters in the Netherlands, he has made a clear choice. I hope this will be echoed by his colleagues in the Netherlands.

This is a worthy report and a worthy recommendation. It is above all a worthy parting shot from someone who has been a member of this Assembly for a very long time and a very good friend to many in Dutch politics and outside them.

The PRESIDENT. – The concluding speaker is Mr. Kurt Jung, who has come specially from the United States to take part in our debate.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank Mr. Mommersteeg and congratulate him on the pertinence of his report. I am sure, Mr. Mommersteeg, that it will continue to serve many European politicians as a basis for deliberations on this most important subject, long after you have left WEU.

It is quite impossible to deal in just a few minutes with all the problems you cover in the report. I shall therefore confine myself to a few aspects. May I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor although I have only just put my name down to speak. In fact, I have come here straight from the second special General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, and I still have fresh in my mind the memory both of the peaceful mass demonstrations there and of the insistent demand from the third world for an end to the madness of the arms race and for the resources now being spent on arms to be devoted to the fight against hunger and poverty in the world. This was one reason why I asked to speak.

Many speakers today have said that the peoples of the world yearn for peace more strongly than ever before, the public debate having been focused on the subject by the peace movements in many countries. This is true not only of countries like our free democracies, where freedom of expression is taken for granted as a fundamental right, but also of Warsaw Pact countries, for example, where freedom of expression continues to be denied. There too the fears are growing. We must recognise this. Our task, indeed our duty, is thus to see secu-

Mr. Kurt Jung (continued)

rity policy as a part of a policy for peace throughout the world, and to base this security policy – as has been the case in our own countries since the Harmel report in 1967 – on two firm pillars.

In Europe, Ladies and Gentlemen, there can be no security without an approximate balance of military forces. We Germans are, of course, situated where the superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies in conventional weapons is most clearly felt, and are particularly affected by the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Mr. Mommersteeg referred to this, mentioning the figure of three hundred intermediate-range nuclear missiles, most of which are aimed at us. That is why we want to see East and West agreeing to a military balance by treaty.

But efforts to strike a military balance are not enough, since they entail the danger of escalation, as each side in turn raises the level of its armaments. Of course, we realise that one reason for this is the for us totally incomprehensible Soviet obsession with security. We must not therefore break off the negotiations on arms control and disarmament. On the contrary, they must continue. We must also expect the nuclear powers to honour the obligations they entered into under the non-proliferation treaty and to conduct negotiations on effective means of ending the nuclear arms race.

We therefore welcome General Secretary Brezhnev's acceptance of President Reagan's proposal for an early start to negotiations. Regrettably, SALT II has not, of course, been ratified, but we hope that on 29th June, when the START talks begin, progress will be made in the question of strategic nuclear weapons in the negotiations between the two superpowers.

President Reagan recently introduced a new theme in Berlin, that of confidence-building measures designed to prevent nuclear conflict by accident or misunderstanding.

I should also like to thank Mr. Mommersteeg for including the Jackson demand in his report and recommendation. We fully support the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear systems which began in Geneva last November. And we most certainly endorse the United States proposal that land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles should be renounced, since that would eliminate a whole category of weapons.

We must, however, be quite clear that military stability cannot be restricted to nuclear capabilities. We all know that twenty-five to thirty million people were killed with conven-

tional weapons in the second world war, and that today conventional weapons can have just as devastating an effect as nuclear weapons. At the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid we therefore intend to pursue the French proposal for a conference on disarmament. Stability and predictability must also be improved with a whole series of measures applicable throughout Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

I therefore consider that all our efforts should be concentrated, as Mr. Mommersteeg's report indeed suggests, on breaking once and for all the vicious circle of first one side, then the other raising its level of armaments and on taking proper account of the impatience of the people. Let us not underestimate the great positive and moral strength clearly present in the movement for effective disarmament. We must regard it as a stimulus and a moral obligation in our political activities. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Jung.

That concludes the debate.

I am not proposing to take any of the votes either on the amendments or the recommendation itself tonight. It would, however, be for our general convenience if we concluded the debate, which means asking the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the committee to reply to the points that have been raised this afternoon.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I sincerely thank you – and many of my colleagues from various groups – for your kind words. I am very grateful. My answer will be very brief because most speakers have made my task easy. At least they have not, with a few exceptions, been very harsh in their opposition to the report and draft recommendation.

Mr. Wittmann referred to the dissemination of information, especially to our own citizens. What did I say in my report? The report and the recommendations say the same thing. They are one long plea for a closer examination of this subject. Other speakers should note this too. We have to delve more deeply and bring the arguments to light. And those of our colleagues who are not constantly discussing the question in their own parliaments are asked to debate this important subject and are provided with the arguments they need.

In Mr. Miller's statement, I was struck by his reference to the activities of the medical profession, which is understandable because he is a doctor himself. This movement began in America and now, I believe, has branches in

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

twenty countries, all taking an interest in these problems. This activity is certainly not unimportant. The movement is not unilateralist. It represents an addition to our knowledge of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. I consider this an extremely laudable activity and I hope it will continue.

I agree with Mr. Jung, however, that it is not only nuclear war we must prevent, but war in general. We must not have any illusions as to the consequences of a conventional war, as we now say – a war fought with conventional weapons. The consequences of such a conflict would be terrible. Mr. Bahr dwelt on the subject of collective security. I was impressed by this, and I agree with him. But it does mean thinking in terms of a balance of forces.

Harry van den Bergh, a colleague and friend, though no political friend, fulminated against thinking in terms of a balance of nuclear forces. What expert knowledge I have of this area leads me to support the balance of forces theory. I agree, of course, with Harry van den Bergh – who would not? – about overkill on both sides. But the point is this: the military balance theory means a policy of negotiation aimed at reducing armament to the lowest possible level while nevertheless striking a military balance. I am not saying that unilateral measures by NATO are excluded. There are a number of possibilities, but in general there may be some scope where battlefield weapons are concerned, and this possibility is being considered.

But to Mr. Smith and others I must say that I am opposed to real unilateralism, which seems to be uppermost in the minds of certain people in the peace movements. It cannot be said that the peace movement is unilateralist through and through. It is an extremely mixed company. It includes people – and I refer also to the demonstration in the United States – who are not all calling for unilateralism. The same applies to Europe. Unilateralism is not always the order of the day!

I now return to what my friend Mr. van den Bergh had to say. He accuses me of actually exceeding my authority and running counter to the policy of my party in the Netherlands. That is what his statement amounts to, there are no two ways about it. I would remind him that the election programme does not refer to preparation as such. The programme on the basis of which I was elected to the Second Chamber and to which I appended my signature does not exclude the siting of long-range TNFs, or intermediate-range weapons, in the Netherlands. I am well aware that there is discussion about this in my party, but the pro-

gramme does not exclude the possibility. This is undoubtedly the line followed by the Dutch Labour Party, irrespective of what the Soviet Union does or does not do. The Labour Party – it was Mr. van den Bergh who provoked this argument – has decided that we must not have these things in the Netherlands. The christian democrats do not exclude the possibility. Nor do other parties in the Netherlands.

The Netherlands has not taken a decision on this issue. I venture to say – and I shall go into this in greater detail tomorrow – that the point made in the second paragraph of the draft recommendation – urging the continuation of preparations for deployment – does not conflict with the position adopted by the Netherlands. Did Mr. van den Bergh think that I had not considered the position of Belgium and the Netherlands? I will revert to this tomorrow, Mr. President.

Sir Frederic Bennett called for a “note of realism”. I must reject the comment that this report is unrealistic. Unrealistic means in conflict with reality. The report contains an accurate analysis. This is difficult, because we are not party to the Pentagon’s innermost thoughts. Not all the information is available to us, but the report contains a realistic appraisal of the situation and of the peace movements. It also makes a strong appeal for negotiations, because the level of both nuclear and conventional armaments must be reduced. What is needed, in my view, is the lowest possible level of armaments and a balance of military forces. If that appeal is not allowed, what policy is NATO pursuing? I am thinking in this context of the policy formulated at the Bonn summit.

Mr. Smith has stressed that he is opposed to unilateralism. I repeat – since criticism is implied – that the question is whether the report is unilateralist. I deny that this is true, either of the report itself or of the draft recommendation. You will have to show me, word for word, where unilateralism occurs. This is a balanced recommendation and a balanced report. It is not a complete report. My reaction was to some extent provoked, although he also had some kind things to say about me, for which I am grateful. He rejects any kind of appeasement, but I have not noticed any tendency towards appeasement during the discussions in committee or in this Assembly. I repeat: there is no hint of it, either in the report or in the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Mommersteeg.

As I said after you concluded your introduction, unhappily this is the last occasion on which we shall have the pleasure and honour of

The President (continued)

your presence, because you have left your national parliament and are going to the European Parliament. We wish you well in your new activities there.

I think that we should again place on record your devoted service to this Assembly. You have sometimes, as perhaps today, been a bit of a controversial character. Nevertheless, I am sure that we all agree that you have done a tremendous amount of work and, as with this report, made a great contribution to the debate that we are properly conducting here.

On behalf of the Assembly, Mr. Mommersteeg, I thank you and wish you well for the future. (*Applause*)

I now ask the Chairman of the committee to reply to the debate.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to thank Mr. Mommersteeg, both personally and on behalf of all members of the committee for the thoughtful, sometimes deeply felt, objective and enthusiastic contribution he has made to the committee's work and also for this, his last report; I offer him my very best wishes for the greatest possible satisfaction in his new work.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we all remember that Mr. Mommersteeg had prepared a report and a draft recommendation for the sitting of last December. He had to withdraw them, however, because the committee was not satisfied, arguing that – if Mr. Mommersteeg will allow me to say so – they represented a personal or perhaps a national view which could not be the same as the view which WEU had and has of the problem. This time, however, I am bound to say that we have a report and a draft recommendation which are fully acceptable and objective and take account of all the issues dealt with by our Assembly.

I wish simply to recall a number of points precisely in order to refute the charge of unilateralism which has been laid against this recommendation. A point of the utmost importance is the one which draws the Assembly's attention to the present imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact. This is a reminder to our Assembly and to NATO to work, through a degree of rearmament and through negotiations, to restore the balance needed for deterrence and hence the maintenance of peace.

This point alone would be sufficient to qualify the report and the draft recommendation as completely objective and in line with the present situation. I should like to mention also paragraphs (x) and (xi) of the preamble which refer to the pacifist movements. We should

not forget the draft recommendation because, while Mr. Mommersteeg may have expressed a personal view in the report, it is the draft recommendation which the Assembly has to approve and endorse. In its references to the pacifist movements, the recommendation makes it quite clear that there are some unilateral tendencies which must be rejected.

As there follows a recommendation to the WEU member countries to pursue active and appropriate information policies in order to inform public opinion of the threat and of the need for NATO and our countries to contribute actively to defence and the restoration of balance, I believe that we have all the evidence needed to confirm that the report is objective.

I would like to mention one last point. Paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper should reassure everyone; member countries are in fact urged to ensure that preparations continue in the countries concerned for the deployment from 1983 of the agreed levels of ground-launched cruise and Pershing missiles, unless any reductions are agreed in the talks and unless the zero option planned by our countries and NATO is achieved.

I am sorry that our conservative colleagues are not here because I believe that, in the light of these facts, they should have reviewed and should review their position, as this is a document which genuinely merits the unanimous support of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

We now adjourn further consideration of the report and debate on the amendments and vote on the draft recommendation until tomorrow.

5. Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Yesterday the Assembly was called upon to nominate the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Four places had been reserved for France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium to be decided upon later.

I have received the following candidatures – in alphabetical order: Mr. Berchem of Luxembourg, Mr. Bonnel of Belgium, Mr. Pignion of France, Mr. Scholten of the Netherlands.

Is the Assembly willing to approve them unanimously?

That is the case.

I therefore nominate them Vice-Presidents of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The President (continued)

I recall that since all the Vice-Presidents have been elected by acclamation, under our practice the order of precedence is in each case determined by age.

The Bureau of the Assembly is now composed as follows: President: Mr. Mulley; Vice-Presidents: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Bonnel, Mr. Berchem, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Scholten and Mr. Maravalle.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. - I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 16th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The Falklands crisis (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 907 revised and amendments).
2. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 918 and amendments).
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 915 and amendments).

4. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 916).

I have put down a rather long list of items for tomorrow because it is somewhat difficult to predict the course of the debate since Mr. Urwin, as required by the rules, has given me notice of his intention to invoke Rule 32 (1) (a), namely, to move the previous question, immediately following the presentation of the Cavaliere report on the Falklands crisis on Wednesday, 16th June. If that motion is carried by the Assembly it would mean that there would be no further debate on that particular report; so I have made provision in case - which I think is unlikely - we run out of business.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. The Falklands crisis (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 907 revised and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Urwin, Mr. Atkinson (point of order), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Urwin (point of order).
4. The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 918 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Dejardin, Dr. Miller, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Wilkinson (explanation of vote).
5. Evolution of the situation in Poland (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 915 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Michel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Atkinson.
6. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mr. Leister to questions put by: Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van Eekelen, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Kurt Jung.
7. Evolution of the situation in Poland (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 915 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Althammer, Mr. Rösch, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Kurt Jung.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10 a. m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. The Falklands crisis

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 907 revised and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the Falklands crisis, Document 907 revised and amendments.

Before I call Mr. Cavaliere to move his report, I must remind the Assembly of what I said before we rose yesterday. Mr. Urwin has given notice of a proposal to move the previous question.

The procedure under Rule 32 provides that motions on the previous question are to be put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the committee's report. On procedural matters only one speaker for, one speaker against and the Chairman may speak and each for a maximum of five minutes.

I shall call Mr. Cavaliere, whose time is not restricted, to move his report. If necessary, I shall call Mr. Urwin to move the previous question.

1. See page 38.

The President (continued)

Mr. Cavaliere to present his report on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, today our frame of mind as we consider the important, difficult and serious problem of the Falklands crisis is quite different from what it would have been a month ago or even a few days ago; today we can approach it in the happy knowledge that the bravery of British troops has overcome all resistance and has brought the fighting in the Falkland Islands to an end.

In paying tribute to the courage of the British troops, I am sure that I speak for the whole Assembly in saying that, at this moment of rejoicing, we are saddened and moved by the thought of all the victims of this conflict, without distinction, even if we cannot avoid thinking back to the causes of the destruction and loss of life.

The cause of all this was the rash decision of the Argentinian military junta to use force to resolve a dispute and to assert alleged rights, possibly as a way of distracting public opinion from serious domestic problems. This was why our condemnation and the universal condemnation of Argentina's aggression and its use of force remains firm and unconditional.

This has been a very serious event both because it has been a blatant and intolerable violation of international law which prohibits the use of force to resolve disputes between states and because the recourse to armed force followed immediately on the appeal issued on 1st April by the President of the United Nations Security Council to refrain from rash acts of violence, as soon as information was received that this might happen.

Argentina's attitude and behaviour must therefore be condemned out of hand both because of the violation of international law and because that violation took place immediately after a specific appeal from the President of the Security Council.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that there is another point to be considered, a point already taken up by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments when it discussed all aspects of the Falklands war problem very thoroughly. It unfortunately has to be said that the United Nations have lost a great deal of their credibility because, when faced with the *fait accompli*, the numerous resolutions calling for a return to the status quo were all ignored as was special Resolution 502 adopted by the Security Council. When an organisation is unable to respond effectively to events and

when its resolutions are no longer complied with, it is clearly losing credibility and this is also perhaps the reason why the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General came to nothing following the failure of the American Secretary of State Mr. Haig and the President of Peru to find a peaceful solution before the armed forces took over.

I consider therefore that we should reaffirm our solidarity and our understanding for Great Britain which, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, intervened to restore international order which had been violated and therefore to implement Resolution 502 of the United Nations Security Council. If we did not do so, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe that we should be failing in our duty and that we should above all be losing a good opportunity of warning anyone in the world who may have used or, above all, may be thinking of using a *fait accompli* to resolve an international dispute. And there are any number of areas of tension, including some in Latin America itself. I hope therefore that what has happened in the Falklands will discourage anyone with evil intentions.

There is another aspect which should be mentioned – namely the attitude of the Soviet Union and the other countries within its orbit. After the invasion of the Falklands had been condemned by the United Nations, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to side with Argentina, that is with another dictatorship. But I believe that it took this line, Mr. President, not merely in order to try to widen its zone of influence but also to justify other earlier actions and the use of force every time a right or an alleged right is at stake. The Soviet Union's attitude is therefore highly dangerous and should give rise to serious thought; there is a specific reference to this point in the draft recommendation submitted by the committee.

Ladies and Gentlemen, although the changed circumstances mean that the discussion can no longer be continued on some of the original points, we cannot fail to express concern regarding the possible political, economic and military consequences of what has happened and is happening in the Falklands where the present position is that the war is over on the spot but there has still been no declaration of the cessation of hostilities between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

In concluding, I should like to refer particularly to two very important points affecting European security and therefore a matter of concern for our Assembly which, as we heard yesterday from the French Minister for External Relations, is the only forum where aspects of our security can be discussed. The first of these is the question of relations between the

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

Latin American countries and the Western European and North American countries. There has been a serious and dangerous deterioration of these relations and action will have to be taken in future to prevent any further deterioration or above all to ensure that these relations return to their previous state of normal, fruitful collaboration and to prevent any extension of Soviet influence in that continent.

The second point is concern over the weakening of the North Atlantic Alliance's forces as a result of substantial British forces having to be despatched outside the Alliance area. When events oblige a member country to take action outside the actual NATO area, NATO should consider taking compensatory action in order to prevent any dangerous weakening of its and Europe's defence system.

These and other points should be followed up in more detail because we cannot ignore the fact that there will be certain developments.

At this point my conclusion is that...

(Interruption by Mr. Urwin)

Please do not get excited Mr. Urwin, because I think that I have been very objective. At this point, as I was saying, my conclusion is that I would not wish this very important problem to be removed from the register of Assembly reports as though nothing had happened. I consider - and the Committee on Defence Questions agrees unanimously so that I am not giving a personal view but speaking for the whole committee - that events must be kept under review and developments and the points I have mentioned should be studied very thoroughly by the committee. I therefore request, Mr. President, in accordance with Article 32 (1) (d) that the report be referred back to the committee which would reserve the right to resubmit it after going fully into all the problems in due course. Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that this is the best course of action because I am convinced that we are not in a position today to debate all aspects of the question. I am sure that my request will be accepted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere. I understand that on your own account, and on behalf of the committee, you have moved a procedural motion under Rule 32 (1) (d) to move that the Falklands report be referred back to your committee. If that motion is carried, we shall not continue debate on the subject now; the matter will be referred back to the committee. On the other hand, if the motion is opposed and rejected, we shall proceed, in the usual way, to consider your report. I take it that Mr. Cavaliere has pro-

posed that, and under the rules it is possible only to have a speech in opposition and, if necessary, a speech from a member of the committee.

Does anyone wish to oppose?...

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). - I reserve any right that I may have to oppose Mr. Cavaliere's proposition. However, first, I wish to seek your advice, Mr. President. Does the motion moved by the Rapporteur to refer the matter back to the committee under Rule 32 (1) (d) take precedence over the written notice of motion that I submitted to you yesterday, showing my intention to move reference back under Rule 32 (1) (a)?

The PRESIDENT. - Yes, I understand that that is so. Under our rules, the previous question can be moved only after the report has been presented. A procedural motion takes precedence over anything else. Mr. Cavaliere's recommendation raises a difficult point of procedure. However, the Assembly's practice is that, when a committee unanimously asks that its report should be referred back without discussion, that meets with the approval of the Assembly.

If that motion is not carried, the previous question can be moved. If you insist, Mr. Urwin, on moving the previous question now, it can be put. In either case, the objective of stopping the debate would be the same.

Do you wish to oppose the motion, Mr. Atkinson?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). - I thought that I had the floor, Mr. President. I said that I wanted to ask you a question first.

The PRESIDENT. - You have the floor for five minutes if you wish to oppose the motion.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). - No. Clearly, questions arise as a result of what you said. Is it clearly understood that, if Mr. Cavaliere's procedural motion is adopted, a debate would not arise on the report this morning and that it would be referred back to the committee?

The PRESIDENT. - That is so. When and how the report comes before the Assembly - if at all - is a matter for the future.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). - The timing is very important. I understand that, according to the rules, if the motion is accepted by the Assembly, a report can be retabled within the session. If that is so, I must reconsider my position on opposing the procedural motion. I should be given some priority when it comes to procedural motions, if only because I gave you written notice yesterday. It is

Mr. Urwin (continued)

beyond any shadow of doubt that Mr. Cavaliere's motion would not have been presented had it not been for the action that I took yesterday. You are in a difficult situation, Mr. President, and I respect you and your authority as President, but I now feel that I ought to be allowed to present my procedural motion under Rule 32 (1) (a) and I shall then explain why I have taken such action.

The PRESIDENT. — The rule makes it quite clear that, if the motion to refer back to the committee is carried, the report will not and cannot come up again at this part-session. Whether it comes up at the next session would, like all matters for the agenda, be a recommendation from the Presidential Committee, and it would be a matter for the Assembly whether to accept it. It is the general practice for committees themselves to determine to which subjects they give priority and which reports they present. Under the rules, you had to give notice yesterday of your intention to move the previous question or I could not have taken it, so there is no question of there being priority on that account.

It is very difficult to interpret the rules in these cases. That is why I say it is very difficult when we do not get these rules clarified by our Committee on Rules of Procedure. The rule says that any of these procedural motions, one of which Mr. Cavaliere has moved, takes precedence over the main question, and the debate is suspended while it is being considered. Therefore, I have to suspend the debate and I cannot have two procedural motions running together. Clearly, Mr. Urwin, your motion will be called if Mr. Cavaliere's fails, although for practical purposes both seem to me to have the same result if they are carried. I do not know whether you could accept that or whether you wish to oppose reference back to the committee. Of course, if you are successful in that, the way could be open for you to move the previous question.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I believe both you, Mr. President, and the Assembly will appreciate the rather difficult situation in which I find myself but I have a twin objective and I feel that it is possible for me to take advantage of the rules to oppose the Cavaliere procedural motion for reference back to the committee. If that motion is carried, I presume that I should then have the right to move my own procedural motion under Rule 32 (1) (a).

The PRESIDENT. — Let us get this quite clear. If the reference back to the committee is carried, you cannot move the previous question, because the report will already have been taken off the agenda so there will be nothing on

which to have a previous question. You could move it then, but that would cancel the Polish debate.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry to have delayed proceedings for so long. You will appreciate, as I do, Mr. President, that this is an important matter and, with respect to all concerned, I still hold to the opinion that a notice of motion submitted in writing the day before the event ought to have taken precedence over one presented to us more or less as a result of developments. However, I now begin to oppose the procedural motion, with your permission.

The PRESIDENT. — You have a maximum of five minutes.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — I would have said much the same thing if I were proposing my own motion. I want to make it abundantly clear that I have the greatest respect for Mr. Cavaliere and the work that he has done in the preparation and presentation of this report. I was one of a number who, at the outset, felt that a mistake might have been made in referring the subject of the Falklands crisis to the Defence Committee of Western European Union rather than to the General Affairs Committee. Indeed, there was a possibility that it could be referred to both committees, not by any means an unusual situation, having regard to the heavy political undertones of the decision of the Argentine military junta to conduct an armed invasion of the Falkland Islands.

It is primarily with that objective in view and against that background that I now seek to oppose this procedural motion. My reason is so that the Presidential Committee will have the opportunity to examine the options much more closely in the light of the new situation following the capitulation of the Argentine military forces in the Falklands yesterday and the fact that very intensive and important negotiations have probably already begun between the British Government and the Argentine Government, possibly with the assistance of other bodies. The situation thus has begun to assume even more political than military importance.

In such circumstances some responsibility devolves upon this Assembly to ensure that the whole political aspect is taken into consideration by the reference from the Presidential Committee, if necessary back to the Defence Committee for a further report at the next session of this Assembly but certainly to the General Affairs Committee, to consider the political implications of what has happened in the Falklands.

Mr. Urwin (continued)

I trust that I have the sympathy of my colleagues in the Assembly in my own delicate and rather embarrassing position, through no fault of my own, having yesterday presented a written text to the President believing that I would have priority in moving the previous question. Thank you very much for being so patient.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Urwin. I believe we would all agree that we are in a difficult situation, not least because we are dealing with an important subject which is developing very fast. None of us would claim to be fully up to date on all the events in the past few hours. However, I must make it clear, Mr. Urwin, that the reason that you were required to give notice before the opening of the sitting is the rule itself. Had you not done so, you could not at any time have proposed the previous question.

It is quite clear also in my reading of the rule that that does not give you a priority. Although I admit that the rules are not couched in the most precise language, the rule goes on to say that, as soon as a procedural motion has been moved, it takes precedence over any question then before the Assembly. As such a motion was moved by Mr. Cavaliere, it must be disposed of before I can take anything else. As you rightly say, if Mr. Cavaliere does not succeed with his motion, your motion can be moved and a further decision taken.

I must now proceed to put Mr. Cavaliere's motion. He, or someone speaking on behalf of the committee, has the right to give the committee view. The rules provide for a five-minute speech in favour – which Mr. Cavaliere has already made at the end of his general remarks – a speech against and the comment of the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the committee concerned. Mr. Cavaliere, do you wish to make further observations? There is no possibility under the rules for any further debate.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I seek your guidance? We have not yet had the speech opposing the motion before us, which is that the Assembly should not now debate the Falklands issue but that the report should be referred back to the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I must rule you out of order, Mr. Atkinson. We have had such a speech. Mr. Urwin has said that he is opposed to the report being referred back to the Defence Committee and that is a speech of opposition to Mr. Cavaliere's motion. There can be no doubt about that.

Mr. Cavaliere, do you wish to speak? If not, I shall put the motion to the Assembly.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have nothing to add and I think you are quite correct: my motion should now be put to the vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I am grateful to have your confirmation of my decision, but I was asking whether you had any views to put on behalf of the committee.

The motion has been moved that the Falklands report be referred back to the committee. That means that it will be taken off the agenda for this part-session. Its future will obviously be determined at a later stage if the motion is carried. If the motion is defeated, I shall call Mr. Urwin to move the previous question. If that is carried, the report will be taken off the register of the Assembly as well as today's business. If that motion were defeated, we should continue the debate on the Falklands.

We shall now vote on the reference back to the committee of the Falklands report.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

It is therefore decided that the Falklands report shall be referred back to the Defence Committee.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to put a very quick point.

The PRESIDENT. – Is this a point of order?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I always believe in having an absolutely correct record.

The PRESIDENT. – Would you address the Chair, Mr. Urwin, not the other members? Would you address them through the Chair?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I heard so many groans when I rose that I felt compelled to address the groaners for once. I wish to correct the record.

With respect to you, Mr. President, I did not say that I objected to the report going back to the Defence Committee. I thought that I had stated clearly that, while I had some reservations about that, I thought that it should be partly the responsibility of the General Affairs Committee because of the importance of the political overtones.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. I am bound to say, to correct the record, that I took your speech to be a speech in opposition to the motion...

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – No. It was not.

The PRESIDENT. – ... or I could not have called you to speak at all. That business has gone. We cannot discuss indefinitely the decision we have just taken, not least because it was unanimous, as I understood it, and included, I believe, Mr. Urwin, your own vote.

4. *The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe*

*(Vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 918 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe, Document 918 and amendments.

We have a slight problem with the amendments. It seems to me that Amendment 3 of Mr. Mommersteeg and Amendment 1 of Mr. Gessner go together and that if Amendment 3 is agreed, Amendment 1 would fall. Similarly, it seems to me that Amendment 2 of Mr. Pignion and Amendment 4 of Mr. Mommersteeg are alternatives and that if Mr. Pignion's amendment were to be carried, Mr. Mommersteeg's would fall. I think the best procedure, if they would be so kind, is to ask Mr. Mommersteeg and Mr. Gessner to move their amendments and then to put them to the vote on that basis.

Mr. Gessner's amendment reads as follows:

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Welcoming that the United States Government has declared itself ready to respect the SALT II agreements on condition that the Soviet Union does too;”.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I was merely concerned to introduce a passage into the draft recommendation expressing our satisfaction that both superpowers are behaving as if the SALT II treaty had indeed been ratified. As we know, that has not actually happened, but we also know that both superpowers have in fact reached agreement on their behaviour.

However, since my amendment is covered by what Mr. Mommersteeg has said, I am withdrawing it and would ask for Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment to be adopted instead. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – That is most helpful. Amendment 1 is withdrawn in favour of Amendment 3.

Would you, Mr. Mommersteeg, like to move Amendment 3 which reads:

3. After paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Welcoming the declaration of the United States Government that it will refrain from actions which undercut existing strategic arms agreements as long as the USSR shows equal restraints, and comparable statements of the Soviet Union, and appealing to both governments to formalise those statements at the opening of the START negotiations;”.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in the light of the appeals made here and elsewhere for the ratification of SALT II, ever since the treaty was signed, and in view of the disappointment also expressed here at the fact that it has not been ratified, I consider it right that the proposal initiated by Mr. Gessner and added to by me should be supported. I ask the Assembly to do so unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 3?...

There is no opposition. I take it that, as the amendment is moved by the Rapporteur, it is supported by the committee.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We now turn to Amendment 2 to be moved by Mr. Pignion.

2. In paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “A. Call on member governments acting in the North Atlantic Council,” and insert “A. Develop a European approach to discussions in the North Atlantic Council so as:”.

I shall then call Mr. Mommersteeg to move Amendment 4, but if Amendment 2 is carried, Amendment 4 will fall.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my amendment introduces a more precise formulation, making the Council fully and directly responsible in this matter. In other words, the Council would concern itself with the work of the other institutions in order to develop a European approach to discussions in the North Atlantic Council.

This involvement is entirely in keeping with the nature of the Council's work. It means therefore, that the question could be followed up at Council level, with our Assembly in a

Mr. Pignion (continued)

position to ensure a certain continuity of action.

As Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment is consistent with mine – except that I am inserting mine at the beginning of the text while Mr. Mommersteeg proposes that his should come at the end – I should like the more precise wording which I propose to be inserted in place of the first phrase of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

Mr. Mommersteeg, do you wish to move your Amendment 4?

4. In the draft recommendation proper, renumber paragraph B. as B.1. and add a new paragraph as follows:

“B.2. Develop a European approach to the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council.”

Alternatively, are you prepared to withdraw it in favour of Mr. Pignion's? It seems to me that there is very little difference between them, but you are entitled to move your amendment if you wish.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I consider that my amendment, which expresses the thinking of Mr. Pignion's amendment under B, is clearer than his proposal. I have also – and this is in accordance with the debate now in progress in Europe – inserted the words “political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council”. That must, of course, take place in the Council of WEU. There is also a discussion in progress among the Ten as to whether political aspects of security in Europe ought to be included in European political co-operation. I therefore emphasise, partly in order to avoid complications, the need to discuss the political aspects of the discussions in the North Atlantic Council. That is why I prefer to maintain my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thanks to the rather curious procedure adopted by the Assembly, I think that I can speak against Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment while being in favour of Mr. Pignion's amendment.

With his wisdom and his smooth manner, Mr. Mommersteeg says that, on the whole, his

amendment would be better because it is clearer. That is true, it is perhaps more precise, but it is also a great deal more restrictive. For if we refer to the draft recommendation, we can see the distinction between parts A and B of the operative text – indeed, the problem of efforts to achieve better European co-operation within the North Atlantic organisation arises here.

For my part I cannot accept Mr. Mommersteeg's view, as it tends to restrict this consultation as narrowly as possible; in particular, the insertion of the word “political” before “aspects” is obviously intended, in Mr. Mommersteeg's mind, as a restriction on the European approach and European consultation.

That is why I cannot accept Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment. On the other hand, I support that proposed by Mr. Pignion.

The PRESIDENT. – It seems that we have two alternative texts without a great deal of difference. It is for the Assembly to decide which amendment it prefers.

Dr. Miller wants to speak, but I do not want to prolong the debate. Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I take the opposite point of view to Mr. Dejardin. My objection to Mr. Pignion's amendment is that it illuminates and emphasises an aspect that I do not want to emphasise, which is what I believe to be a slightly anti-American attitude. It could be construed that way. I believe that Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment is better. We want a European approach, but we do not want to highlight it. We do not want to make it the beginning of the recommendation. Mr. Mommersteeg's approach to bringing in the political angle is better than Mr. Pignion's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak before I call the Chairman? I hope that we can progress quickly, because this is only a drafting matter.

Mr. Jung.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, with all due respect to Mr. Pignion, I must say that Mr. Mommersteeg is right. Adoption of this amendment would lead to a confusion of powers. We cannot simply assume powers, here in the WEU Assembly, that lie with the North Atlantic Council. I believe the path suggested by Mr. Mommersteeg is the only right and practicable one. I would therefore support Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment and reject Mr. Pignion's.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Cavaliere, on behalf of the committee.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The committee did not have time to consider these amendments. Speaking personally, and I think interpreting the views of other members of the committee, I must declare against Mr. Pignion's amendment. It is one thing to develop a European approach but it is quite another to subordinate all other action and all other facts, that is the whole recommendation, to that approach.

Reflection is a good thing but can also be a bad thing; in any case, we cannot subordinate all our decisions and all our attitudes and positions to such a vague approach.

I am therefore opposed to Mr. Pignion's amendment and in favour of that proposed by Mr. Mommersteeg.

The PRESIDENT. – It is now for the Assembly to decide on the rival amendments, Amendment 2 moved by Mr. Pignion and Amendment 4 moved by Mr. Mommersteeg.

(*Mr. Pignion rose*)

Mr. Pignion, there is no provision for you to speak against, so I hope that you will be brief.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Just a word, Mr. President. We are seeking to give our Assembly and the Council their full responsibility. As I am proposing that the Council should develop a European approach – within the framework of our respective activities that is – on all questions relating to the issues covered by the draft recommendation, I am giving importance and full responsibility to the Council, and hence to our Assembly. That is all.

I refuse to accept Dr. Miller's assessment. I deny his right to tell me that there is a political intention in my amendment and, in particular, a kind of distrust of the United States. I ask him to believe that when I have to define my attitude in this connection there will be no nuance or error of interpretation – and he can trust me – if I am given the chance.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion. There is no provision for a second speech on amendments. I am trying to get through the business in the best way. I hope that a second speech will not become a general practice.

We must take the texts as they appear on the amendment sheets. As Amendment 2 arises first under our rules, it must be put first. If Mr. Pignion's amendment is carried, Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment will fall, but if Mr. Pignion's amendment is defeated, I shall put Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment to the vote. Therefore, those who prefer Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment will vote against Mr. Pignion's amendment and vice versa.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Therefore I put Mr. Mommersteeg's amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I shall now put the draft recommendation as a whole, as amended by Amendments 3 and 4, to the Assembly. If there is no opposition and if there are no abstentions we can dispense with the roll-call.

Is there any opposition?...

(*Mr. Dejardin indicated his opposition*)

Mr. Dejardin is opposed to the draft recommendation. In that case, we must proceed to the roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Grant.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other representative wish to vote?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to make a brief explanation of my vote, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Would you wait until we have finished counting the votes?

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

I call Mr. Wilkinson on an explanation of the vote.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Rather, Mr. President, it is an explanation why I did not vote in favour of this excellent report, for which I give credit to Mr. Mommersteeg.

I abstained because there was confusion in the report about the British and French strategic nuclear systems both as to their classification and relevance to arms control. The report stated that the British Trident system should be counted by the Soviet Union as part of the threat from theatre nuclear weapons. I dispute that view. That is the sole reason why I abstained.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. Are there any other explanations of votes?

The President (continued)

The result of the vote, after rectification, is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	53
Ayes	35
Noes	16
Abstentions	2

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

5. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the evolution of the situation in Poland, Document 915 and amendments.

I call Mr. Michel, Rapporteur.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the General Affairs Committee was instructed by the Assembly to follow developments in Poland and report to it on this question at the next part-session. My predecessor, Mr. Hanin, submitted a report in June 1981. On that occasion the Assembly in fact adopted, after amendment, the draft recommendation submitted. The committee's mandate was not ended and it was renewed by the Presidential Committee on 8th January 1982. We are therefore concerned today, not with the events which have taken place since the summer of 1981, but with the consequences of the coup d'état of 13th December 1981, from the point of view of WEU's specific competences.

The events which have taken place in Poland since 13th December 1981 can be explained only as the result of the pressure constantly exerted by the Soviet Union on the Polish authorities, which makes them a matter within our specific competence.

To analyse briefly the events which led up to the military takeover of 13th December, i.e. the evolution of the internal situation from June to December 1981, these developments were influenced by three factors. Firstly, the economic slump, the food shortage, the deterioration in relations within Poland, and the increasing conflicts between the state and Polish workers.

The second factor was the remarkable development of the trade union, Solidarity, which by 1981 was representing practically the whole Polish people. As soon as it included farm workers and even students, it became the face of the Polish nation. But this total representation actually complicated its task, made its composition less homogeneous and clearly created tensions. Remember, Solidarity held its first congress in Gdansk from 5th to 10th December and then from 29th September to 5th October 1981. It is worth noting that the moderates remained in the majority until the end, which meant that a dialogue with the state authorities was possible. At one stage, remember, this congress requested a referendum on the self-management of business, sent a message to the workers in Eastern Europe and drew up a programme for the radical transformation of political and economic life in Poland.

The third factor was the crisis in the Polish Communist Party, the PUWP. At the same time, at the special congress held from 14th to 20th July, the two thousand delegates elected for the first time, by the militants, voted by secret ballot to re-elect Mr. Kania as First Secretary. But on 18th October Mr. Kania found himself in a minority and was succeeded by the Prime Minister, General Jaruzelski. On 28th November Jaruzelski asked the Sejm to pass a law giving the government full powers, and it can be said that from then on he knew where he was going.

On 13th December martial law was proclaimed and a Military Council of National Salvation set up.

Let us analyse the crisis of December 1981. The purpose of the takeover was not to correct a jeopardised economic situation but to solve a political crisis by restoring the absolute authority of the state. There then followed the arrest of the Solidarity leaders, the suspension of union activities, the institution of a single television programme, the cutting-off of communications and the imposition of military control on all activities. Thanks to this sudden crackdown on 13th December, General Jaruzelski was able to silence Solidarity.

We now come to the question of Soviet intervention. The Soviet Union never made any secret of its hostility to the evolution of Poland towards political or unionist pluralism. From June 1981 onwards, Soviet warnings to Poland increased in frequency. Mr. Gromyko visited Warsaw from 3rd to 5th July 1981 and declared, in particular, that "Poland was, is and will remain a lasting link in the socialist community".

The Solidarity congress was sharply condemned by TASS. We then note that, contrary to the Soviet Union's previous attitude,

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

Mr. Michel (continued)

Russia approved of what was going on in Poland from the time of the coup d'état of 13th December 1981 onwards. General Jaruzelski had the steady support of Moscow from then on and Moscow stated that it considered this to be an internal Polish matter and went on to accuse the United States of intervention in Poland's internal affairs, as if everything had changed.

Let us now examine the evolution of the situation since 13th December 1981.

The "state of war" was confirmed by the Sejm on 25th January 1982. At that time the government was mainly supported by the military and police system it had set up. It has no social foundation, as Polish society is hostile to it. The Polish Communist Party is now being built up again around the WRON – the Military Council of National Salvation; its statutes, made more democratic at the last congress, have been suspended.

In order to revive the national economy there has been talk of re-establishing certain forms of market economy and of independent private enterprise, as has been done in Hungary. But during this period there has been a sharp rise in prices, particularly after the freeing of prices and the 71 % devaluation of the zloty.

The economic situation is worsening and industry is running at half capacity. Polish leaders see their position weakened by Poland's debt to western countries. They are increasing their economic, commercial and financial agreements with the Comecon countries and one might thus say that the Polish economy is being reintegrated into the Soviet orbit.

Everything shows that the measures taken in Poland since January 1982 have not been designed primarily to bring about an economic recovery but rather to restore political order and put an end to an opposition regarded as too dangerous by the Polish leaders.

What is the attitude of the Catholic church in this overall situation? It seems to be the only possible instrument for mediation; it is therefore aiming at putting an end to the state of siege, improving the conditions of political prisoners and restoring the possibility of social activity for the trade unions. Religious services are still the only public gatherings allowed. Hence, many social and public views will find expression via religious services.

What of the measures announced on 1st May? At that time the government announced the freeing of a further contingent of political prisoners, the ending of the curfew, the re-establishment of long-distance telephone calls and the lifting of the requirement for prior

permission to hold meetings of authorised associations. These measures appear to be very tentative and liable to be withdrawn. After five months of iron rule, this is really not very much.

The social picture is that the government stands alone in a society which rejects it. The demonstrations which took place in the main Polish towns on 2nd and 3rd May last provided confirmation that the government is unable to mobilise the people in spite of the means available to it; on the other hand, Solidarity is succeeding in doing so without any means or by clandestine means.

A second point about this period following 2nd and 3rd May is the precariousness of the relaxations allowed in the state of siege, since the previous state of affairs was re-established in the big towns a short time afterwards.

What has the Soviet attitude been since 13th December 1981? The coup d'état of 13th December 1981 was regarded as a step towards restoring socialist unity. In contrast to the previous situation, there has been no further mention of errors attributable to the Polish Party and Government.

Moscow's line is that the United States wishes to make Poland a hotbed of destabilisation. Hence, according to them, the takeover averted such a situation by forestalling it.

The Soviet Union's main aim has been to minimise the political impact of American sanctions by making sure of western food assistance in Poland and forestalling Poland's failure to pay its debts to the West, since Poland's bankruptcy would undoubtedly endanger the credit of the whole Soviet bloc. In other words, a meaningful concerted policy of western sanctions is not without effect on Moscow, nor on Warsaw. This can be seen from the reaction of the two countries.

What of western reactions?

Firstly, the western position in 1981. The members of the Atlantic Alliance – should we admit it? – had plenty of time to consult each other. They were not taken by surprise, or caught napping, by the events of 13th December 1981, which had been expected since the beginning of 1981. Public opinion had, on the other hand, just become aware of the overwhelming superiority of the USSR in continental-range missiles.

But the weakness of western reactions to the invasion of Afghanistan and the campaigns against the deployment of NATO's new weapons helped to persuade the Soviet leaders that in December 1981 the time was favourable for a show of force in Poland. It was then known

Mr. Michel (continued)

that there would be no violent reaction from the Western European countries.

The United States position was much clearer and much harder. The reactions to the take-over came quickly. President Reagan several times condemned the repression exercised by the Polish Government, particularly when he announced retaliatory measures in his statement of 29th December in Los Angeles. He then referred to the heavy responsibility of the Soviet Union. To recall some – not all – of these measures urged by the United States President: there was the requirement of licences for the export of oil and gas equipment, the postponement of negotiations on a new long-term agreement for the sale of grain, the suspension of Aeroflot flights to the United States, the suspension of all export licences for electronic equipment, as well as other measures of a more secondary nature.

These measures, I should stress, were intended far more as means of pressure than as reprisals, and should be seen as such. The United States did in fact announce its intention of relaxing them or tightening them depending on the evolution of the situation in Poland. By their very nature, these measures can be effective only if the United States' European allies adopt similar ones, or at least do not apply any which run counter to those of the United States. The announcement of these measures seems to have preceded any true consultation of the United States' allies, even though these decisions were announced on the eve of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The United States' failure to consult the other allies in advance and to a sufficient extent was a mistake.

What were European reactions?

The countries of Western Europe have shown little unity and little firmness – in any case they have been far less firm than the United States. They have, however, all expressed their disapproval of the Polish Government's policy.

At the NATO Council meeting, on 30th December, Mr. Genscher informed his colleagues of the representations made by Germany in Warsaw and of the steps which the Polish Government had been asked to take; in particular, the ending of martial law, the release of those interned since 13th December 1981 and the re-establishment of the dialogue between the government, the Catholic church and Solidarity, the three major facets of the Polish nation.

On 4th January the Ministers for Foreign Affairs adopted a joint declaration to the same effect, but they were very cautious in their atti-

tude to the Soviet Union, merely saying that they "note with concern and disapproval the serious external pressure and the campaign directed by the USSR". They also merely "take note" of the measures decided upon by the United States Government.

On 5th January, Chancellor Schmidt went to Washington and undertook, on behalf of the Ten, to take no measures liable to detract from the effects of the measures decided upon by the Americans. Europe therefore showed itself relatively incapable of defining a policy in the Polish question, despite the amount of time that the Europeans had. This inability is disquieting because it undermines relations with the United States.

Let us now examine western positions since the NATO meeting on 11th January 1982.

The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 11th January 1982 brought together the United States and its European allies. They issued a joint declaration announcing their decision to suspend all trade credit for Poland except for food products. They declared that they were prepared to continue their humanitarian aid to the Polish people.

The United States tried to persuade its European partners to take more effective measures against the Soviet Union, including the cancellation of the agreements for building the gas pipeline, the abolition of low-interest credits and additions to the list of products which may not be exported to the Soviet Union. This attempt was not very successful, because the Europeans pointed out that the United States was not restricting its exports of grain to the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, let us ask what Europe can do.

First of all, the West is still determined – as it stated emphatically at the outset – not to use force to check the repressive measures taken in Poland on 13th December 1981. Europe has always stated clearly: no military intervention of any kind. The West nevertheless has considerable means of exerting pressure on the Polish Government and on the Soviet Union.

A special problem arises in connection with the Madrid conference. On 4th January, it will be recalled, the Ten called for the support of neutral countries for the Polish question to be placed on the agenda of the Madrid meeting. The Soviet Union and its allies did not agree; it was therefore out of the question for the West to resume the dialogue in the framework of the Madrid conference, since the basic provisions of the final act of the Helsinki conference had clearly been violated. It was thus natural that the Madrid conference should include these cases of violation of human rights

Mr. Michel (continued)

in its agenda, since the country concerned is a signatory of the final act of the Helsinki conference. It is difficult, therefore, to see how this conference can be resumed until such time as an explanation has been given and the Polish problem has been included in the agenda of the conference.

It is also difficult to see, from the economic point of view, why exceptional measures should be maintained to assist the Polish Government in present circumstances. The European countries must be more specific about tangible, effective means of pressure and the precise conditions under which such measures might be terminated.

Finally, the Polish affair should remind Europeans that Europe must put an end as quickly as possible to its position of inferiority in the field of defence and security, and this obviously entails the redeployment of missiles capable of deterring the Soviet Union from attempting any form of attack.

To sum up, words, decisions and means must match each other if the policy of 13th December 1981, the policy behind the Warsaw coup d'état, is to be swayed. Europe does not have to consider the present situation as an irreversible established fact but as a point in time when it is still possible to act, first of all in order to bring about relaxations of martial law and secondly in order to induce or encourage a return to the policy of dialogue pursued by the Polish Government up to the fateful date of 13th December 1981.

Europe must therefore be told that it must pursue, in consultation with the United States, the measures which it has undertaken to adopt and which have in fact had an effect on the course of events, because there has not been any direct military intervention by the Soviet Union in Poland. This effect, even if it has been the only one, shows that the pressures and reactions of the western world have produced some result. We may regret the hesitant, unorganised or unco-ordinated way in which the western world has reacted, but we should not regret the measures which were subsequently taken and we must hope that these measures will be maintained until such time as a dialogue and some measure of harmony have been re-established between the Polish Government and the Polish people.

(Mr. Bonnel, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel.

I call Mr. Atkinson to open the debate.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by congratulating Mr. Michel on an excellent report. He will know that I have a special interest in Poland, being the Rapporteur on the situation in Poland for the Committee on Relations with Non-Member Countries of the Council of Europe, and he will know of the debates that that assembly had at its last meeting in April, in January of this year and in September 1980. That committee has been monitoring events in Poland since that time, the same events which Mr. Michel has so carefully and accurately described in his report.

Since the Council of Europe last debated Poland in April last and since this report was drafted we have seen the riots and strikes of 13th May coinciding with six months of martial law, or "state of siege" as Mr. Michel has spoken of it in his report. Six months of martial law has seen the state of Poland go from bad to worse, which cannot be what General Jaruzelski had hoped for. The economy continues to decline. We have seen a 10% reduction in output this year over last year. The Communist Party, or what remains of it, is divided and confused, and the people of Poland continue to demonstrate that they will accept no substitute for Solidarity.

We in the West are commendably holding firm and united in refusing further loans to service Poland's debts and to improve its currency-earning capacity. There is only one way to provide for the permanent improvement of the Polish economy and upon which we can entertain any new requests for further credit. That is the realisation of the conditions set by the NATO Council and referred to in the recommendations of Mr. Michel's report – the lifting of martial law, the freeing of all detainees and the resumption of dialogue between the government, Solidarity and the Catholic church. Only then can the Polish Government hope to begin to experience the kind of economic co-operation from its own people that will offer hope for economic salvation.

Even then, I think we must accept – as Solidarity leaders no doubt do themselves – that a genuinely free and independent trade union that can elect its own leaders and have access to the media as provided for by the original Gdansk agreement will continue to require the recognition, regrettably, of the leading rôle of the Communist Party, whatever that phrase may mean within the context of Polish nationalism. If, however, the situation deteriorates still further, we shall perhaps see a Polish summer of violence brought about by further food shortages and price rises that may still produce confrontation with the Polish army or maybe even with the Red Army. In that event, the West must be prepared to turn the screw still further on Poland and on the Krem-

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

lin without further hesitation. That will be the time when the Siberian gas pipeline deal with Western Europe, I suggest, must be shelved, when American grain shipments must be shelved, and when we must see the Madrid review conference further adjourned.

Fortunately, we have seen Poland over a degree of firmness and unity on the part of the western alliance that was sadly lacking following the occupation of Afghanistan. We in Western European Union have a responsibility to maintain and encourage that unity without any degree of compromise whatever. That is why I hope that Poland will be on the agenda during our next plenary session in December, one year after martial law. In December, it will be inconceivable that Lech Walesa and the remaining two thousand Solidarity prisoners should still be detained without trial. It would be inconceivable that trade union activity should remain outlawed in Poland, that curfews should continue to be imposed and that freedom of assembly should continue to be denied the Polish people. Poland and the Soviet Union should be warned now that we will need to discuss new initiatives in December if these conditions still prevail when we next meet. Thank you, Mr. President.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

The debate is adjourned.

6. Address by Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT. – It is now my pleasure to welcome our ministerial visitor today, Mr. Leister, Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. We like to have ministers in our presence. We have been privileged to have two ministers for foreign affairs this week. It is particularly satisfactory, in addition, to have a minister who will speak primarily about defence matters, a minister with defence responsibilities. It is some considerable time since we welcomed a defence minister from the Federal Republic. It is therefore a particular pleasure, Mr. Leister, that we welcome you to address us today. I understand that as an additional courtesy you will be willing to answer questions at the end of your remarks. I invite you, Minister, to come to the rostrum to address us.

Mr. LEISTER (*Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like first of all to thank you very much indeed for your kind words of welcome and your invitation to speak on present aspects of German security and defence policy. In view of the many and varied discussions on strategy and security in the Alliance I think it is important, in the interests of better mutual understanding, that our positions and views be stated clearly.

Let me begin with a basic observation. For a country as strategically exposed as the Federal Republic of Germany, with its territory dividing the two power blocs, it is obvious that an individual, purely national security policy cannot satisfy German security requirements. For the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, security and defence policy means first and foremost an alliance policy.

There is no doubt that when speaking of collective security policy for Europe we have to think above all of NATO and the NATO security system which includes our North American partners. However, against the background of the present global – and not exclusively military – threat to our free way of life, it appears increasingly necessary to direct our deliberations to the possibilities arising from European co-operation in the various existing forums.

In this connection the WEU Assembly is of particular importance as a forum for the discussion of European security policy. Not only is WEU the sole European parliamentary forum dealing with matters of security and defence policy, but by pledging military assistance in the form of a treaty it also contributes decisively to deterrence and, consequently, to the safeguarding of peace.

The Federal Government is following with interest and attention the Assembly's endeavours to adapt the WEU treaty to present requirements. We were therefore pleased to note that the Assembly passed, by a large majority, a proposal to cancel some provisions of the treaty which seem outdated. Let me stress, however, that the Federal Government's commitment to its WEU treaty obligations will remain as unreserved as in the past.

With its political objective of reaching European unity by way of collaboration and integration, the European Community represents a bold design. However, the road to unification is still very long, particularly with regard to security policy. The Federal Government is in favour of this broadly-based European unification especially because we regard a politically and economically strong European Community as an essential factor both for the security of the West as a whole and for stability in the world.

Mr. Leister (continued)

This is why the Federal Government, together with the Italian Government, proposed the adoption of a European Act designed to improve the political organisation and effectiveness of the European Community.

The significance of discussions and consultations on security policy was taken into account this spring by the members of the Eurogroup as well.

I shall refer later to the significance of the Independent European Programme Group.

Close bilateral co-operation with our friends in Europe rounds off the security system of which the Federal Republic of Germany forms a part, in which it trusts and to which it makes concrete contributions, for instance in the form of defence aid and matériel. Spain's recent accession to NATO and its accession to the European Community in the foreseeable future confirm us in our belief that the various existing relations in the field of security policy will remain effective and attractive. In the present circumstances they afford a maximum of national security and freedom of action.

To confirm and explain its security policy the Federal Government issued, on 31st March 1982, a statement in which it declared its support for the two elements of the Harmel report of 1967, which forms the basis of North Atlantic Alliance policy.

The essence of German security policy is accordingly the will to maintain defence capability and political solidarity within the Alliance, coupled with a readiness for dialogue and co-operation with the East and the countries of the third world. Nobody can today pursue an exclusively national security policy: the security of one nation always involves the security of the other.

The Federal Government's statement reinforces current NATO strategy. But let me add one thing: there can be no doubt about the concern caused by the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, a concern all the more justified because the Soviet Union obviously is prepared, as in the case of Afghanistan, to pursue political objectives by military means if its calculation of the risks involved makes this appear feasible.

The Falklands conflict and recent hostilities in the Middle East clearly show that nowadays there are no conflicts in any part of the world which do not have direct or indirect repercussions on all countries.

Security therefore can and must no longer be considered as the military ability to win wars but as the political ability to prevent them.

This ability cannot be achieved by one country alone but only in the form of joint security arrangements between states.

Let me make a few remarks on the current public debate on strategy. Developments in the balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, in particular the disparity in intermediate-range nuclear missiles, have raised the question whether current NATO strategy still meets present requirements.

In my opinion, the answer is clear. There can be no alternative today to the concept of preventing war by deterrence. NATO is and will remain a purely defensive alliance. Furthermore, deterrence by means of a common defence capability and a common will is the only basis for a successful policy of arms control and confidence-building between East and West.

The purely military aspect of the question of the validity of NATO strategy can also be answered unambiguously. There is at present no alternative to current NATO strategy. However, its appropriate implementation depends on the availability of the right resources in adequate quantities. Dr. Apel, the Federal Defence Minister, recently referred to NATO strategy in an article in the *Europa-Archiv* of 10th June 1982, and I quote:

"NATO strategy aims first and foremost at preventing war. It is therefore a strategy of no first use of forces or weapons. Likewise, our strategy of flexible response is not a doctrine of the first use of nuclear weapons. Although it does not exclude the first use of nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, it is based above all on defending the Alliance with the same means used to attack it, even against superior conventional forces. This explicitly rules out the deployment of nuclear weapons to make good deficiencies in conventional forces. The Alliance must therefore on no account neglect its conventional forces. We must continue to be able to halt any conventional aggression by means of conventional forward defence."

There are many indications suggesting that we shall have to face a long-term, multiple and increasingly complicated threat, a threat not merely restricted to the possible intention of a potential enemy to achieve its political ends by military means, but also one arising increasingly from competition for resources and for relations with third world countries. Moreover, the potential threat has been considerably increased by non-military means which are no less lethal.

The question of overcoming the problems of the third world must therefore be taken very seriously. The West will earnestly seek

Mr. Leister (continued)

genuine solutions for the elimination of poverty and instability in these countries. However, the Federal Government is of the opinion that the North-South problem should not be seen primarily in East-West terms.

The theory that the Soviet Union is the natural ally of non-aligned nations has lost credibility in the third world, especially since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Efforts to achieve genuine non-alignment have increased however, although this has not always reduced distance from the West. The Federal Government supports genuine non-alignment.

The events in Poland have again aggravated tensions in East-West relations and deepened the crisis of confidence between West and East provoked by the Soviet Union.

However, the answer to setbacks in East-West relations can be neither resignation nor emotionalism, nor a return to cold war and confrontation. The answer must be a joint western policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that reflects our determination to maintain the military balance and calls for the Soviet Union to display moderation, restraint and responsibility, coupled with a readiness for dialogue and negotiation, especially on arms control. Only western unity and effectiveness, grounded in consultation and co-ordination among equal partners, will impress the Soviet leadership.

An impressive example is the NATO dual decision which created the conditions for bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table in Geneva and consequently also formed the basis for new negotiations on the reduction of the strategic capabilities of two superpowers.

This unanimity must be maintained and the decision, both parts of which are supported by the Federal Government, must be implemented according to the terms agreed. It must be made clear to the Soviet Union that the Alliance is of one mind in supporting this decision and cannot be divided.

The assistance and support of the parliaments are essential to the Alliance in this respect. A section of the public which is beginning to vacillate, mainly because of lack of information, must be made aware of the substance of the decision, including for instance the already completed withdrawal of one thousand warheads, to help dispel their fears, since fear is a poor counsellor and provokes emotional and irrational conduct. I see a rôle for the WEU Assembly in the dissipation of these fears.

The Federal Government hopes that the resumption of the arms control talks will effect a breakthrough towards the zero option for

SS-4s, SS-5s and SS-20s proposed by the West, in return for non-deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

The Federal Republic of Germany considers the announcement by the President of the United States and the Soviet head of state on 31st May 1982 of the commencement of START talks by the end of this month as a step in the right direction. The United States START proposals aim at a long-term restructuring of the strategic balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to increased stability and security for both sides. This would present the two world powers with an historic task, achievable only by determined co-operation in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

We hope that the beginning of the START talks will have a positive effect on other important East-West talks also, in particular the MBFR talks in Vienna, which continue to be of great significance to us because of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe.

The Federal Government therefore supports the United States initiative, welcomed by NATO, for the Vienna talks, in which the western participants are putting forward a comprehensive approach to the solution of all controversial questions on a basis of undiminished security for both sides. We hope this proposal will give new impetus to the dialogue and bring the talks nearer to agreement.

The Federal Government's support extends without reservation to all confidence-building measures by the West, whether in the MBFR talks or in the framework of the CSCE, whose task is to create the basis for a European disarmament conference, whether at the second special General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament in New York or the Geneva consultations on a total and verifiable ban on chemical weapons, which, however, I do not want to discuss in detail here.

The Federal Government's policy of safeguarding peace is clear and calculable. We want the dialogue and genuine détente with the East, which in recent years have produced, for both Germany and Europe, a number of positive changes which should not be underestimated. But there are also facts which give cause for concern and cannot be overlooked.

The comparative study of existing forces published by NATO last month has confirmed and revealed to the public what experts had known for some time, namely that the balance of forces has shifted clearly to the disadvantage of the West in the last twenty years. The West is therefore faced with new demands in terms of its own defence efforts. These demands coincide with economic, budgetary and financial

Mr. Leister (continued)

difficulties in all the countries of the Alliance, including the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is therefore all the more important to seek ways of easing the situation through co-operation on armaments. Various bodies have studied these problems and submitted a number of proposals whose feasibility needs to be examined thoroughly.

Now more than ever, armaments policy is caught in a situation which on the one hand makes co-operation even more urgent and, on the other, sharply reduces the possibilities of achieving it in the short and medium term. The scarcity of resources, in particular for defence investments, will cause serious problems for armaments planning in the next few years.

The cost increases caused by abrupt developments in technology from one generation of weapons to the next have become so great that the limits of fundability are being reached. To mention only two examples: the unit price of the Leopard I tank was DM 1.1 million, while that of its successor, the Leopard II, is approximately DM 4.2 million. The MRCA Tornado costs about ten times as much as the Luftwaffe's Starfighter. The comparison is over-simplified, as the two systems are of course scarcely comparable technologically because of subsequent developments, but it nevertheless illustrates the basic problem that the replacement of one weapon system by another no longer involves a mere doubling of the cost, but a huge increase.

At the same time, the economic situation has changed world-wide. The growth rates of the seventies are no longer feasible today or in the near future. This limits the development of public budgets, including the defence budget. Armaments planners will have to adjust to the new situation. As you know, it was this problem which induced the German Minister of Defence to conduct special studies on the future long-term planning of the Bundeswehr. These will be published shortly, but three brief comments can be made now. Firstly, owing to population trends, the Bundeswehr's central problem from 1986 on will be to meet its manpower requirements. Secondly, there appear to be no spectacular technical alternatives available as regards the work of the armed forces, or effective relief of the personnel and financial situation. Thirdly, technological developments can nevertheless be applied to cut down on personnel and costs. Let me stress that these efforts should be made not only nationally, but throughout the Alliance.

In spite of the lack of funds we shall as far as possible complete the major projects already

under way for the modernisation of the Bundeswehr on time. This will have repercussions in other areas of military planning. Adverse effects will be felt particularly strongly in the research and development field, since it is when money is scarce that research and development are particularly important. They are important for the implementation of necessary processes of adaptation and the maintenance of national capabilities which in turn are necessary for co-operation.

We are therefore endeavouring to increase budget appropriations for research and development again in the medium term. At the same time, we are working on a technology plan which will permit optimum direction of research and future technology.

However, I believe it is necessary, not only nationally but also at Alliance level, to develop an agreed programme for the technology required in the Alliance. No European country will in future be able to develop by itself all the major weapons systems required to maintain deterrence by conventional weapons. Co-operation is therefore indispensable, and can be made much easier if we succeed in developing common programmes with mutually complementary areas of emphasis, in which costs can be reduced by larger production runs and standardisation.

In the European area the Independent European Programme Group should take on this task. I am aware that the group's achievements so far leave something to be desired, and we must all work to overcome the problems, while consistently following up and developing the constructive beginnings that have also been made by the group.

Armaments co-operation is a difficult business, particularly when it transcends European frontiers and the transatlantic component is involved. This is not surprising, especially in view of the increasingly difficult economic situation and the resulting differences in national interests.

The European demand for a more balanced relationship between Europe and the United States as regards armaments policies has met with quite a favourable response from the administration in Washington, although the practical results are unfortunately still relatively modest. In particular, national interests in the United States can be seen to be working in favour of a self-sufficient armaments policy. As you know, the United States Congress only recently introduced a number of restrictive provisions in the 1982 budget. The European governments rightly objected to these restrictions. The United States Government has since – and we must give it credit for this –

Mr. Leister (continued)

taken steps to lift these restrictions, and its efforts have met with some initial success in Congress. However, I must stress here again that long-term armaments co-operation is possible only if there are no restrictions – if a two-way street really exists between Europe and the United States.

Standardisation and co-operation are paths towards the common goal of maintaining the readiness of our forces into the nineties. However, an increasing number of people believe that further new initiatives are required to get more value for money on defence. This is an ambitious approach and the difficulties should not be underestimated. It requires, after all, a balancing of such politically sensitive areas as national independence, industrial capacities, jobs and national technological know-how. However, these proposals too will have to be carefully examined, since we cannot afford to leave any avenues for possible rationalisation unexplored.

Let me say something about the body with which you have especially close relations, the Standing Armaments Committee. The Standing Armaments Committee has prepared a study on the armaments industries of the member countries which I consider useful and for which the committee and the international secretariat deserve our thanks and appreciation. Nevertheless, the central body for European armaments co-operation, as agreed by all partners, is still the Independent European Programme Group. Overcoming the recognised difficulties of armaments co-operation requires, in our opinion, the involvement of all the European partners.

I will sum up. In spite of a considerable shift in the balance of forces the political and military state of the Alliance affords, in our view, good prospects for the maintenance of deterrence and the defence capability in central Europe. The Alliance is the guarantee of our security. Immense political and economic strength continues to reside in this alliance of sovereign democracies, even if that strength is not always easily or quickly mobilised and coordinated.

That the Alliance is determined to deploy its strength for the maintenance of peace and freedom was strikingly confirmed at the NATO summit in Bonn last week. The Bonn summit endorsed the outlines of our common security and defence policy in the eighties. The summit declaration and the two protocols on arms control and disarmament and on common defence were adopted, after intensive joint endeavours, as authoritative declarations which

have had an undoubted effect on public opinion.

The main German concern from the beginning was to emphasise the fundamental approach to security policy laid down in the Harmel report, which has held good in the Alliance for fifteen years. Moreover, we wished to confirm NATO strategy, which is based on the combination of the three elements, without undue emphasis on any one of them, including the conventional element. We also emphasised the need for statements of equal weight on arms control and defence capability. We likewise insisted on stating clearly from whom the threat comes, and on mentioning Poland and Afghanistan in this connection.

In the general part of the summit declaration we wanted to present a balanced view of third world problems, to underline the importance of consultations, and to obtain a clear pledge on Berlin. Above all, we consider timely and comprehensive consultations an essential prerequisite for the solidarity and effectiveness of the Alliance.

This is also the purpose of the proposal to hold informal meetings of the NATO foreign ministers. Such meetings, without agenda or minutes, provide a personal atmosphere of confidence and a high measure of communication.

As host to the Bonn NATO summit a week ago, the Federal Republic of Germany demonstrated the importance it attaches to the North Atlantic Alliance. I wish to emphasise in this connection how much we appreciated France's invitation to the NATO foreign ministers for their next meeting in the spring. The European partners must not leave it to the United States alone to correct the shift in the balance of forces in Europe. For one thing, the United States will not be able to raise the funds required to guarantee the balance of forces in Europe and the world without the other partners in the Alliance. For another, it must be in Europe's interest, by making substantial political and material contributions of its own, to avoid falling into a situation of dependence incompatible with the importance of the European countries.

The objective of pursuing a form of European union within the appropriate existing bodies should be the concern of us all. Opportunities for concentrating parallel efforts and turning them to account for the common good will then arise automatically.

Events like the Bonn summit will continue to underline our determination to safeguard peace in freedom, through our defence capability and readiness for dialogue. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much for that comprehensive account of the Alliance's defence policy, of your government's attitude and of their strong support for the Alliance. We were all impressed by the details that you gave us of the enormously increased cost – all too common in all our countries – of defence equipment. I am sure that your speech will give rise to several questions, which you have kindly agreed to answer. I think that we agreed that the most convenient course would be to take several questions together and that you would indicate when you felt it right to deal with a group.

I have received notice that Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. van Eekelen wish to ask questions.

Would you like to ask the first question, Mr. Lagorce?

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, in November 1981 and again in June 1982, massive, clearly anti-American pacifist demonstrations took place in the Federal Republic of Germany. Do you think that the development of a specifically European defence policy would be likely to take the heat out of these pacifist demonstrations in Germany? If so, under what conditions?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. Valleix, will you put your question now?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Following on from your very interesting presentation, my first question, Minister, is as follows: Does Germany consider that the lists of arms subject to control by the Agency under Annex IV of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty still meet the requirements of up-to-date, effective control of the armaments of the member countries?

With your permission, Mr. President, I shall ask a second brief question. As I have the honour to be the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the subject is of particular interest to me.

Mr. Minister, is the Franco-German tank project still feasible and desirable despite certain well-known attitudes expressed in the Bundestag? In your opinion, is there any possibility of extending the project to other European countries?

The PRESIDENT. – Will Mr. Osborn now put his question?

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to thank the Minister for giving us such a comprehensive review. He touched on the supply of arms and co-operation. I wonder to

what extent this is a reality rather than an ideal. We have mentioned tanks. The Minister referred to the Leopard tank. Britain has the Challenger. Could we get greater co-operation in this respect? My questions are primarily: first, what is the relationship of our defence ministers in connection with defence procurement through the EEC and the rôle of Commissioner Davignon, bearing in mind that we have had the von Hassel report here within the last two years; secondly, does he see greater co-operation within NATO; thirdly, bearing in mind that he referred to the Independent European Programme Group and the Standing Armaments Committee, does he see a stronger rôle for Western European Union at official rather than parliamentary level in bringing about this co-operation?

The PRESIDENT. – Next, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Minister on his most admirable address, which complemented excellently that by his counterpart from France, Mr. Lemoine, in December last.

May I ask him about conventional defence to which, quite rightly, he attached such importance, particularly in the context of global security; that is, security outside the NATO theatre? Does the German Minister feel that the conventional defence of the western Alliance could be enhanced by a greater degree of specialisation, that is, Arbeitsteilung between Alliance members?

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, will you let me know when you wish to intervene?

I call Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think the Minister was right to point to the importance of the Independent European Programme Group for material co-operation among the European countries. Following on this, I should like to ask him to what extent this group is continuing to play a constructive part with regard to the two-way street, the relationship between Europe and America. When our General Affairs Committee was in Washington, we had the impression that the emphasis there is tending to shift from government activities to industrial activities. I think it is of great importance that European governments should also continue to stress to the United States Government that no real results are to be expected without support from the authorities and encouragement of the two-way street.

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, would you like to come in now? Afterwards the Chairman of our Defence Committee wishes to ask a question.

Mr. LEISTER (*Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the first question concerned peace movements and the possibility that a more unified approach in Europe to security and defence matters might weaken or undermine them. It is not easy to answer this question with a simple yes or no. I believe that the debate in all our countries on questions relating to security, the deterrent and defence has grown in scale irrespective of whether or not there has been progress towards European unification. I do not believe we could have prevented this, even if we had made greater progress towards European unification. Nevertheless, the debate being carried on by the peace movement, the churches and all manner of organisations does place considerable emphasis on the question of whether the European countries should not have a greater say in their own defence and security. My answer to the question would therefore be that progress in the sphere of European co-operation will undoubtedly have a good and positive effect on the public debate on defence and peace, which is not to say that we should therefore advocate separation from America in any way.

I pointed out in my statement that security policy is particularly important for the Federal Republic of Germany in its association with its North American partner, but I believe that European unification in the political area and in that of armaments policy will have a positive effect on the public debate.

As regards the second question, which was in two parts, I should like to say that the list of armaments in the Brussels Treaty to which you referred is in some respects no longer in keeping with the times, as I said in my statement. We welcome the proposed adaptation and hope that the WEU Council will accept your recommendations.

I come now to the question about the Franco-German tank project. As you know, the Federal Government – and I should like to emphasise this – still favours co-operation with France in this particular project. However, all three parties in the Bundestag have serious reservations, not about co-operation with France or about this specific project, but about the financial situation and budgetary considerations. They feel that it is premature at present for our army to be looking for a new tank, a successor to the Leopard II, which is still in the introductory stage. The Bundestag, and the budgetary experts in particular, have grave doubts about approving expenditure now which would not produce a new tank until 1995-96. It therefore remains to be seen what the Bundestag's final decision will be. But that

is where the main resistance, the main objections are coming from.

The third question concerned co-operation among the defence ministers within the European Community and WEU. There is no specific co-operation among the European defence ministers within the Community, no agreements on individual aspects of defence planning, but close consultation does take place within NATO with respect to co-operation in armaments planning and armaments themselves. I would welcome any contribution WEU might make to better co-ordination of the European defence policy debate. But this should not in any way hamper but complement the activities of the Independent European Programme Group that already exists; it should complement these activities.

The fourth question concerned the conventional defence of the western alliance. I should like to emphasise what you said in your question, that greater specialisation and thus more extensive standardisation could and should strengthen the conventional defences of the West. As I said in my statement, I consider this necessary for two reasons, firstly to increase military strength – and I also see this as helping to improve the deterrent capability of the western alliance – and secondly, for financial considerations. I consider it absolutely essential for our partners' military leaders to agree on their military requirements as far as possible and for these requirements to be harmonised, because this will have an effect on costs and because we in Europe are basically concerned with the same battle area in our defence planning. We should and could therefore reach greater agreement on the various military concepts of the same weapons system.

Mr. van Eekelen's statement concerned the two-way street to America. I can only endorse what he said about this. With very few exceptions, I still see the present situation as a one-way street. All our European countries should do everything in their power to come to an agreement enabling them to offer the Americans competitive armaments projects. But we should also persuade the Americans on political grounds to see this as an exchange of armaments projects between the two sides.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Minister.

I call Mr. Cavaliere, the Chairman of our Defence Committee.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Following the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina, the United Kingdom, by fully-justified necessity, had to deploy and maintain large naval and other forces and large numbers of men outside the NATO area. This certainly

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

weakened the defence of the Alliance's northern zone or at least aroused some concern. Did the NATO summit consider this problem? What steps were taken to remedy the situation?

The PRESIDENT. – Are there any other questions to the Minister?

I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to take up the last question. It is true that the withdrawal of a large part of the fleet assigned to NATO – from 30 % to 100 % in some cases – has weakened the northern flank. In his statement the Minister placed considerable emphasis on the need for better consultations. After what has happened – as regards both the Falklands and the present state of war in the Middle East – how does he think these consultations could be improved and to what extent can NATO's crisis management be improved? This is, after all, decisive if our defence concept is to become credible.

My second question concerns co-operation on armaments. The Minister considered this very important, and one of his criticisms was that the two-way street was not working. Mr. van Eekelen reported on our mission to the United States. We can confirm what he said. I should like to ask the Minister whether there is any hope, in the case of trilateral European developments, of our making progress not only with regard to interoperability and standardisation but also in the reduction of costs. For the first time he has today confirmed that the cost of the trilateral MRCA Tornado project is well over DM 100 million, since he said that the Tornado costs ten times as much as the Starfighter, which is a bilateral project. My question is, therefore, whether such trilateral or multilateral projects must be so enormously expensive.

I have one final question in this connection.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps you can put your question, Mr. Jung. I am afraid that you are making a speech.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Minister did not say anything about exports when he was discussing armaments. Was that intentional, seeing that the Federal Government has just issued new guidelines, or was it an indication that these guidelines will not be effective, as some critics have claimed?

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to ask a question – I mean a question – and not to make a speech?...

If there are no more, you will perhaps agree, Minister, to answer the substantive questions.

Mr. LEISTER (*Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, one of the questioners said that the Falklands conflict had weakened NATO's northern flank, since British naval units had been moved to the Falklands area. I must point out that the British Government kept NATO informed, that the withdrawal of these units was discussed by the NATO partners, and that the military view is that this should and must result in no more than a temporary weakening of the northern flank. We assume – and so far there have been no indications to the contrary – that the British Government will quickly return these forces to perform their duties at their original positions as soon as the conflict is over.

Secondly, it must be said that the speed and preparedness demonstrated by the British navy is a positive factor. It has shown the eastern bloc the high level of preparedness of all NATO forces. The precision and speed with which the British mobilised their forces, even if the northern flank was momentarily weakened, is, in my opinion, a positive indication of our deterrent capability.

The questioner also asked whether the NATO summit had considered this question. I can confirm that it did. The German Foreign Minister suggested that the foreign ministers should have informal meetings without a fixed agenda, so that they might consult and co-ordinate their views on topical matters more closely than hitherto.

Turning to Mr. Jung's question about crisis management, I can refer to the last part of my answer to the previous question. The agreement that the foreign ministers should meet informally, as proposed by our foreign minister, the idea being that such meetings should become a regular occurrence within NATO, will make for a stronger and better system of crisis management than we have had in the past.

As regards the second part of Mr. Jung's question, concerning co-operation on armaments and armaments projects, I did not say in my statement that the Tornado will cost DM 100 million, but I cannot at the moment allay fears along those lines at the moment when the last Tornado is finally delivered. His question specifically concerned ways of reducing costs. My reply is very clear. I answered this question just now. It seems to me essential for there to be greater harmonisation in future of the military and tactical demands made on a weapons system and for individual military forces not to try to introduce their own

Mr. Leister (continued)

special tactical specifications into a weapons system. This increases the costs of a co-operative project from the outset. So much for the military side.

Where the industrial side is concerned, it seems to me absolutely essential for our European industries to make greater efforts to keep costs down than they have done in the past. I believe it is absolutely essential to realise that our weapons systems do not need to incorporate every advance in high technology. Industry must make a contribution here too: it must take a critical view of the military demands, which will also have to be limited, and say to us: "You can achieve 95 % or 98 % of the effect of this weapon or weapons system with technology that costs so-and-so much less." Such advice, together with the harmonisation of military requirements and less demand for absolutely the last word in technology, can then be followed by the manufacture of each system in larger numbers on a co-operative basis. I see this as a genuine contribution to measures calculated to reduce costs. If we co-operate, we can have less costly weapons systems. This will also entail the incorporation of control and supervisory systems in such expensive intermediate bodies as Panavia and NAMMA in the trilateral Tornado project, which are difficult to supervise and control, so that we can keep a firm check on costs at all times. This is easier in a bilateral project than in trilateral co-operation, or when four or five countries are involved. Nevertheless, the lesson to be learnt from Tornado is that we must have stricter control and supervisory systems if we are going to have co-operation on this scale.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister. I am afraid that we have worked you very hard, with a wide range of questions to which you have been good enough to give a full reply.

For a moment I shall abandon my presidential neutrality and speak as a British citizen and former Defence Minister. Thank you for the tribute that you properly and fairly paid to the efficiency and readiness of the British forces, as demonstrated by their recent achievements in the South Atlantic. I am sure that my British colleagues will appreciate that commendation.

Thank you for coming, Mr. Leister, and for the information that you gave to us, which will assist our committees in their further deliberations and in preparing reports for future conferences. I ask my colleagues to show our appreciation of your visit. (*Applause*)

7. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the evolution of the situation in Poland, Document 915 and amendments.

The next speaker is Mr. Althammer, to be followed by Mr. Rösch.

Mr. ALTHAMMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Poland has now had six months of martial law, six months of a state of siege, six months of a communist military régime. During this period thousands of people have been imprisoned without trial, some in the worst conditions imaginable, foremost among them the leader of the Solidarity trade union, Lech Walesa. It is not generally known that many of those who have been released were forced to sign a declaration of loyalty and that many have not been released because they did not do so. We hear that tough penalties continue to be imposed when people try to exercise their right to demonstrate or to assemble peacefully, as was the case after 3rd May and 13th June of this year. We also hear that a number of associations have been banned. We also hear that the Solidarity trade union is not to have its old rights restored to it. I would warn western governments against agreeing to a proposal that leading personalities who championed the cause of democracy and freedom in Poland should be expelled, because this would make it easy for the Polish Government to remove these people from their own country against their will.

I come now to the West's reaction to this situation. Yesterday and today there has been repeated reference to the peace movement, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is significant that the people in the Federal Republic of Germany who demonstrated for Vietnam and now demonstrate for El Salvador do not have a word to say about the sufferings of the Polish people. I believe this is indicative of the situation. We should ensure that the Polish military régime does not gain a reputation for itself in cultural, scientific or any other area of co-operation.

I should like to refer to one particular aspect of the proposals for possible action by the West to help the Polish people. This is the question of economic sanctions. Ladies and Gentlemen, the danger is that the result will be the same as it was in the defence sector in the seventies, when the West substantially reduced its efforts in the armaments field and the Soviet

Mr. Althammer (continued)

Union did not respond with anything like the same restraint but in fact increased its military lead in those ten years. The West may therefore face the same situation as regards the area of application of economic sanctions. Instead of seizing opportunities to bring pressure to bear on the Polish Government or on the Soviet Government, we see trade with the eastern bloc declining for purely economic reasons. For one thing, a long-lasting recession has prevented the West from expanding this trade, but more importantly Poland and other eastern European countries are finding it very difficult to pay for imports.

It is not surprising that private firms in a market economy should want to do business with the eastern bloc. One is sometimes reminded of Lenin's comment that capitalists even want to make money on the rope used to hang them.

But it is very surprising that a number of European governments are not ready and willing to draw the necessary conclusions. The weapon of refusing credit on favourable terms and other means of supplying goods could well be applied to the governments in Warsaw and Moscow. Regrettably this is not being done to the extent required, and equally regrettably there is no agreement here between the United States and some European governments as a result.

Nor is it true to say that unemployment would result. In the Federal Republic of Germany trade with the eastern bloc accounts for 4.7 % of the total. Many of the products we import from the eastern bloc could be manufactured at home, which would help to reduce unemployment.

The general impression is that some governments feel that, as long as a certain amount of meat is thrown to the tiger in Moscow, it will refrain from eating the European countries. But it is evident that as a result of the trade policy with the eastern bloc that has been pursued in recent years, the tiger has grown in strength and size, that it has meanwhile struck elsewhere, in Afghanistan, for example, and that all hope of pacification through the expansion of trade has been an illusion.

To conclude, I should like to mention the relationship between the German and Polish peoples. In 1950, five years after the expulsion of ten million Germans, a formal note of conciliation was issued in Stuttgart to the peoples of Eastern Europe by these displaced Germans. Conciliation between the peoples is now a reality, and in the crisis which has now hit Poland we have succeeded in providing impressive evi-

dence of the willingness of the German people to help their Polish neighbours. It is now for us to ensure that events in Poland are not simply glossed over like the uprising of the workers in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, now the German Democratic Republic, on 17th June 1953, or the popular uprising in Hungary, or the bid made by the Czechoslovakian peoples in 1968. These three dates should be considered together.

Tomorrow the Federal Republic of Germany will be commemorating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the workers' uprising in the German Democratic Republic. Let us hope, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the efforts of the free West will help the Polish people to regain the modicum of freedom and civil rights they previously enjoyed. The Polish people are still fighting for these rights in the most difficult of circumstances.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Althammer.

The next speaker is Mr. Rösch, who will be followed by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mr. RÖSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as Mr. Althammer has just said, we must not allow this opportunity to pass without repeating yet again which régime is responsible for the situation in Poland, as we have done at recent part-sessions both here and at the Council of Europe. The present system is so inefficient and inhuman that the people in what used to be known as the granary of Germany do not even have enough bread to live on today, a factor which cannot be stressed often enough. For it must be made clear to young people in Europe who sympathise or come into contact with communist ideas what real communism in Europe actually means to the people.

As we all know, Ladies and Gentlemen, the situation in Poland is in violation of the Helsinki final act. And it is also, of course, a violation of everything that communist parties say about their own aims.

What is the present situation in Poland? The attempts to stabilise internal developments, by releasing one thousand detainees, for example, have so far been unsuccessful. The disturbances, particularly on 3rd April and 13th May, have shown that Solidarity is still well enough organised to co-ordinate purposeful activities. From the reports received it is clear that the disturbances on 13th May were not token strikes but were in fact in the nature of a temporary general strike affecting the whole country. The relaxation of martial law was revoked after these disturbances. The authorities arrested three thousand three hundred people, of whom over two hundred and eleven

Mr. Rösch (continued)

were again detained. The attempts by the church to continue playing a mediating rôle and to appeal for moderation and discretion are becoming increasingly ineffectual. The régime is becoming more and more barefaced. The appointment of military personnel to senior party and government posts continues. The trade union question has been shelved.

Mr. Althammer has already referred to the economic situation. The downward trend in Poland's economy has admittedly slowed, but if you consider that workers' real incomes have fallen by 23 % from what was already a low level in 1980 and 1979 and that productivity has declined, you can imagine roughly what situation the people in Poland actually face.

What can we do about this, Ladies and Gentlemen? How can we influence the situation? The Helsinki final act gives us an opportunity to accuse the Soviet Union. It gives us an opportunity to move beyond the previous possibilities, to take moral and political action and to publicise the situation.

The situation is still such that we must continue to provide humanitarian aid on the same large scale as hitherto. We must continue the dialogue with the other side, because if we reach the stage where the two sides are no longer talking to one another, we shall not be able to change anything. We must therefore persist in our policy if we are to help bring about real change in Poland – in addition to providing humanitarian aid.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Rösch, you have already taken your five minutes.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think it is a good thing that we should be discussing Poland today in connection with Mr. Michel's report. When one thinks of all the misery in the world in recent months – to mention only the Falklands and the situation in the Middle East – one is in danger of forgetting the continuing situation in Poland. It is therefore, I repeat, a good thing that we are thinking of Poland again today.

The situation there is still bad, there is no other word for it. During recent months it looked as if there might be some relief, but very little happened. I read in *The Times* of 14th June – let us hope it is true – that in connection with the Pope's intended visit to Poland, the Polish Government will probably take steps not only to improve living conditions for the Polish people but also perhaps to release Lech Walesa and other trade union leaders and politicians

who are still in prison. Let us hope so. Then at least the Pope's visit will not be merely a formality.

I now come to Mr. Michel's report. I am very glad that in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation as formulated in the final version of the report we have no longer included unconditional terms for the resumption of the Madrid conference. Mr. Rösch has just said that we should continue to put the Russians in the dock. I do not agree. I consider that in the dialogue with the Russians we should constantly draw attention to the things we condemn. In other words, I believe in the dialogue. In my opinion it is the only possible way of reaching a solution together.

I do not agree with the Rapporteur's statement in paragraph 85 of his report. He says that the situation in Poland is a reason for unconditional acceptance of the deployment of cruise missiles on the territory of Western Europe. I do not believe this, nor do I agree with that kind of approach. In your introduction you said, in relation to economic measures, that you thought America had acted well, after what you called the weak and half-hearted reaction of the Western European countries to the events of 13th December 1981. I think that America is in a different position – if only geographically speaking – from, let us say, West Germany. I therefore also think that neither economic measures nor any other steps should be taken without very careful discussion and consideration.

I do not believe that we are – as one speaker said yesterday – in wonderland. I certainly do not regard myself as Alice in Wonderland. If I remember only the negative reactions expressed yesterday to the reports of Mr. Vohrer and Mr. Mommersteeg I think they are enough to show us that even in this Assembly we definitely cannot talk about a wonderland.

In my opinion the world situation does not allow us to think that peace prevails. I believe we are faced with a situation which has not led to a world war as such, but which means that in very many countries – I am thinking in this connection of the third world and the Far East – conditions prevail which cannot possibly be described as a state of peace.

Nor do I think that we should play at war. Partly after hearing yesterday's debates, I feel that we talk very loosely about war; we talk about armaments, but we are not concerned with what I believe should be happening.

Mr. Leister said in his address that he believes in dialogue and in genuine détente. So do I. I do not believe in armaments as a deterrent. I refuse to play at war. In my opinion we ought in any case to treat peace

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

with more circumspection than we have shown up to now.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. I am not sure whether that was your first speech in the Assembly, but we congratulate you and hope that you will speak more often.

I do not need to encourage Mr. Jung, as he is a frequent speaker. He will be the last speaker before we adjourn for lunch.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on the whole I agree with Mr. Michel's apt description of the situation in Poland, although the press reports which have just been mentioned also state that the Polish leaders intend to continue to relax martial law on a selective basis. The military council headed by General Jaruzelski has, according to these press reports, instructed the internal affairs ministry to take this line. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* has also reported this, and Poland's Foreign Minister, Mr. Cyrek, implied the same at the United Nations the day before yesterday. I do not believe, however, that such announcements on their own improve the situation in Poland, because instructing the various *voivodes* to "consider concessions" does not, of course, mean that concessions have been made. And decisions to allow scientific, cultural and other associations to resume their activities must, of course, be followed by actual resummptions, and we should not have to wait too long for them. The curfew should also be lifted as soon as possible. We should not be over-enthusiastic about the release of two hundred and fifty seven detainees, either, because well over two thousand are still in prison. The Polish Government must naturally be forced to release these detainees as well.

Everything seems to me to be slightly geared to improving the situation a little for the Pope's visit to Poland, which will, of course, give the Polish people an opportunity to show what conditions they are living under.

But, as I have said, none of these announcements yet means that peace has returned to Poland. Therefore, as Mr. Rösch has said, on the basis of the promises and undertakings of the eastern bloc, the Soviet Union and all the eastern bloc governments, we must demand – not just express our moral indignation, but demand – an improvement in the situation of the people in accordance with the CSCE agreements. Above all we must try to have an effect on the actual situation of the people in Poland by taking practical action. And this involves the three points I have mentioned, the

abolition of martial law, the release of detainees and the resumption of the dialogue between the church, Solidarity and the government. We must give strong support to these demands here.

We also endorse the decisions taken by the European Community to suspend further deliveries of cheap Community food aid to the Polish Government, while granting DM 84 million in direct humanitarian aid via non-governmental organisations. That should be stressed here once again.

I also feel it is right to draw up a list of selected goods and to impose restrictions on imports other than energy and raw materials from the country that is chiefly responsible for the present situation, the Soviet Union. This would be a political demonstration and an indication of the Soviet Union's part in the development of the situation in Poland.

Having heard the perfectly correct figures quoted by Mr. Althammer, I should like to take up the demands voiced by Mr. Atkinson. He said that the Siberian gas pipeline deal with Western Europe must be shelved. I do not think the benefits from this deal are weighted in the Soviet Union's favour, but that – and this is what tips the balance for the Federal Republic of Germany – it will diversify our energy supplies. The natural gas supplied will account for the same proportion of our total energy supplies as the figure quoted by Mr. Althammer for trade with the eastern bloc compared with total trade: 5 %, in round figures.

I do, however, share Mr. Atkinson's view that the member states of the European Community must act in a spirit of unity and not, as they did after Afghanistan, at such variance one with another. But I do not think that this pipes-for-gas deal will be the best opportunity for this.

Mr. Althammer has pointed out that Poland's economy has continued its downward trend, that industrial production has declined further and that the volume of trade between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany has also continued to drop. I feel we should bear all this in mind. I also believe that the banks, which help to finance this trade with the eastern bloc – our economies are free, not state-controlled, we should never forget that – will automatically reduce their special credit concessions to the eastern bloc accordingly.

To conclude, however, I should like to say one thing.

The PRESIDENT. – I think, Mr. Jung, that you must conclude your remarks shortly, as we are running out of time.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am coming to the end, Mr. President.

Mr. Kurt Jung (continued)

I have my doubts about one point made by Mr. Michel. He proposes that the Madrid conference should be suspended until all the conditions have been satisfied: the abolition of martial law and so on. I do not know whether that is being realistic. I feel, therefore, that this proposal goes rather too far and I am certain it would not help to consolidate peace in Europe. We should be somewhat more flexible in this respect and make it possible for peace to be restored in Poland over a longer period. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jung.

That concludes the debate for this morning. We shall resume after lunch.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Evolution of the situation in Poland (Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 915 and amendments).

2. Situation in the Middle East (Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 923).

3. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 916).

4. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 914 and amendments).

I think that members will understand that we have had some difficulty in arranging our orders of the day because of the uncertainty about the debate on the Middle East and the change this morning following the Assembly's decision not to proceed with the report on the Falklands.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 16th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Brown (point of order).
2. Attendance register.
3. Evolution of the situation in Poland (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 915 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Romano, Mr. Michel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Michel, Lord Hughes (point of order).
4. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 916*).
5. Situation in the Middle East (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 923 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Della Briotta (*Rapporteur*), Mr. van Eekelen, Mr. Dejardin, Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Cavaljere, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Dejardin (point of order), Mr. Reddemann, Lord McNair, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim, Mr. Vecchietti, Dr. Miller, Mr. Della Briotta (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall take comments on the minutes first and points of order later. Are there any comments ?

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – Unfortunately, I was called out of the chamber at about 12.45 p.m. and was not present when you declared this afternoon's order of business. I wish to question whether what you have done is in accordance with natural justice. I was not aware that another committee had met during lunch to determine whether to hold a debate this afternoon. Although this morning item 5 was clearly the next business and although one had every reason to assume that it would be taken next and that anything resulting from the committee meeting during lunch would be taken afterwards, I now understand that before

adjourning for lunch you said that you would call that other business before item 5 on this morning's orders of the day.

The PRESIDENT. – I can probably help you, Mr. Brown. I asked whether there were any objections at the end of this morning's sitting, but there was none. I merely followed what had been decided before you arrived on Monday. The Assembly decided to have a debate on the Middle East. It was then decided that that debate should take place after the Poland debate which, as it happens, is likely to terminate fairly soon. I have not seen the text, but as any text on the Middle East is unlikely to be ready, we shall almost certainly proceed, as you would wish, with the debate on international aeronautical consortia after the debate on Poland, as long as Mr. Wilkinson is ready. That will prove to be the best way of arranging our affairs, although the debate will not arise as a result of your point of order.

Things have not been easy. A block of business on the Falkland Islands was taken away this morning and another block of business on the Middle East was inserted after we had adopted the orders of the day. Perhaps we can move on, for there is no time to waste.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with that, but may I suggest that in future such

Mr. Brown (continued)

debates are placed on the orders of the day in the morning so that we know whether a debate has come on in the right place?

The PRESIDENT. – I cannot predict the Assembly's view on such matters. If you had been present this morning and at the end of yesterday's sitting you would have heard me make it clear that in each case the business was provisional, because I could not predict the Assembly's view of motions of which I had only been given notice. Let us get on with the business.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I was present last night and this morning. My point is that the debate was not on the orders of the day and that the orders of the day, under your direction, should have included an item 4 (a) on this morning's orders of the day. I am trying to point out that there is nothing on the orders of the day to confirm what you are saying.

The PRESIDENT. – The item was not on the orders of the day this morning because it could not, in any circumstances, have been taken this morning. We provide the orders of the day for each sitting at the end of the previous sitting and I do not put the afternoon business on the orders of the day in the morning. I included the debate on the orders of the day at the end of this morning's sitting for this afternoon. We must have a little flexibility. The Assembly takes decisions that are outside my control.

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Evolution of the situation in Poland

(Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 915 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the evolution of the situation in Poland and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 915 and amendments.

1. See page 44.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am very conscious of the rule that you have wisely imposed that we should speak briefly. Therefore, I shall cut short my congratulations to Mr. Michel and simply mention four small points, which, if he accepts that an alteration might be in order, would improve the report.

In paragraph 2 of the preamble to the draft recommendation a state of siege is mentioned. My friend and colleague Mr. Atkinson made brief reference to that this morning. However, in English a state of siege is quite different from martial law. It is martial law that obtains in Poland. A siege we would understand as being armies at the gates and people inside trying to fight them off. It would be a much more accurate description of the situation in Poland if our friend Mr. Michel were to alter the wording to "martial law" from "a state of siege".

The second point is also on the recommendations. Mr. Michel regrets that the economic measures agreed by the North Atlantic Council have not been applied more strictly. In defence of my own country, Great Britain, I must say that we have applied all the agreed economic measures very strictly. There are, of course, differences in the individual measures undertaken by the allies, but I must say there is firm unity on the agreed economic measures, that is to say, the suspension of discussions on the rescheduling of the Polish official debt and on the decision that no new credit will be extended to Poland.

It is extremely important to acknowledge that a great deal is being done along those lines. Mr. Michel, absolutely rightly, refers in paragraph 66 specifically to the fact that there is not the unity that one would wish to have had on this matter, and I believe Mr. Michel is right. It is regrettable that there has not been the measure of agreement that one had a right to expect.

Our power and strength in Western European Union must be acting in concert, by applying the unity rule. Only then, if we all agree and all follow a set of rules laid down and accepted, can we hope to exert any influence.

Again, I suggest to Mr. Michel that in paragraph 5 of the preamble to the draft recommendation it would be better if he did not refer to the dates 1st, 2nd and 3rd of May, because, to be absolutely accurate, I believe that the events to which he refers were on 1st, 3rd, 4th and 13th May. Purely as a matter of verity he might wish to change his report in that respect.

Mrs. Knight (continued)

Paragraph 2, which seems to indicate that there may be no resumption of the Madrid conference, cannot, in truth, be accurate, because, if I am informed correctly, the Madrid conference, proceeding on the basis of consensus, agreed when it adjourned on 12th March that there would be a reconvening of this conference on 9th November. All I am suggesting to Mr. Michel is that as a matter of pure fact it cannot be suggested that the Madrid conference may not be reconvened, because it has already agreed to reconvene. I believe that there is no procedure for varying this decision or making it conditional.

Therefore, I ask Mr. Michel to look at the facts of the matter and perhaps consider whether it is a little unwise to suggest that, because of what has happened – although I very much agree with the thoughts and intentions behind what he has said – the Madrid conference may not be reconvened. It has to be reconvened on 9th November and nothing we say here will alter that. It is purely to make this excellent report even more excellent by being absolutely accurate that I put forward those few observations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mrs. Knight.

I call Mr. Romano.

Mr. ROMANO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, anyone who accepts the values and institutions of democracy is bound to agree on certain fundamental aspects of the Polish crisis. The use of armed force to suppress free cultural, political and trade union discussion is a sign not of strength but of great weakness and of inability to understand and manage the historical processes which have produced our characteristic modern societies and distinguish them from all earlier societies.

One essential feature of democracy is that it not only allows opposition but that opposition is part of its institutions. The political régime now governing Poland reveals its limitations in its intolerance of any institutionalised form of the opposition which emerged in that country in the early eighties in the shape of the trade union movement Solidarity.

Our condemnation of military repression was outright from the beginning – by “our” I mean my political party. We therefore agree substantially with the line taken in Mr. Michel’s report but with one addition and clarification, pointing out, because we feel this to be required of any responsible political view, that the Polish crisis is only one of the crises at present afflicting the world and that there are

places where tension has reached the point at which actual fighting has broken out – we have been talking about them, we are still doing so and we shall be discussing them in this Assembly this week: the Falklands, the Middle East and of course Central America.

We reaffirm our absolute conviction that everything that happens in the world in this age of communication and interdependence takes place within one overall system and therefore that the problems require an overall approach. This is essential in order to prevent the conflicts from becoming worse and in order to tackle, not the worst, visible symptoms of the crises, but their root causes which are to be found in the serious economic imbalance, the social inequalities and the injustices of the way the world is moving.

Efforts should be directed, therefore, to increasing the effectiveness of bodies and institutions concerned with conciliation and mediation and to planning a new world order where tension will be kept in check, controlled and stifled at birth and where solidarity will replace exploitation and expansion. I believe that this offers the only real way of escaping from the present crises, including that of Poland, from which the world is now suffering.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much Mr. Romano.

That concludes the general debate.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Michel, wish to reply to the debate?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on the whole speakers appear to agree with the terms of the report and the recommendation. Some, however, have made specific points which I should like to take up briefly.

Mr. Atkinson emphasised that we must not lose contact nor change our way of reacting to the events in Poland. This is precisely the line taken in the report. We shall have the opportunity, especially at the Madrid conference, to take stock of the situation both on the international level and with regard to the work of WEU. We cannot lose contact, I fully agree.

Mr. Atkinson also mentioned the importance and effectiveness of the financial and trade sanctions. The report specifies the nature of these trade sanctions. We can now see, especially since the United States and Europe have come into line and begun to act, that these sanctions – at least those which have been proposed and implemented – have had some effect.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, like other speakers, including Mr. Kurt Jung, stressed the need on

Mr. Michel (continued)

the one hand to continue the dialogue and on the other to qualify the terms of the last paragraph of the draft recommendation about the Madrid conference. You will have noted an important qualification in the text; it does not state that there will be no resumption of the Madrid dialogue. We fully agree that we must meet again on 9th November. You will have noted the conditional nature of the end of the sentence which says: "would be seriously imperilled". That is a warning, a pressure, and that is the line which we have taken throughout. We have never said that there would be no resumption of the Madrid conference. On the contrary, we want it to take place because, if we wish to move towards peace, the dialogue must be continued. We do not want the dialogue to be seriously endangered, not by a fault on our part but by an attitude.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman also stressed that we must not at any time have the feeling of living through a war or in a war atmosphere. We do not want to create this impression, as the preamble to the report clearly states. That is in fact the whole tenor of the report and the recommendation, and I thank you for having made the point.

Mr. Rösch spoke in particular about the attitude to young people. I agree with him when he says that we must make this into a lesson for the young and make them aware of the serious consequences of a state-controlled monopolistic system which has crushed certain types of initiative and is leading, in some regions which were the granary of the old Germany, to a shortage of bread and a failure to produce enough to meet the region's own basic needs.

As Mr. Romano did not contradict the terms of the report, either, I can express my agreement with his remarks.

Mrs. Knight would like the expression "state of siege" to be replaced by the term "martial law", in order to make the English and French texts absolutely consistent. I agree. However, Mr. President, there may be no need to table an amendment, because this is a formal linguistic clarification. We could therefore adopt the term "martial law", which would make possible a better translation from English into French and from French into English. We should then all be in agreement, but I would emphasise that we had no intention of saying anything different. The expression "state of siege" has perhaps a much wider meaning in French than in English.

Mrs. Knight also emphasised that the United Kingdom had acted much more positively,

which is true. The United Kingdom, by its nature, is generally closer to the United States, but that does not contradict the terms of the report, which regrets a lack of co-ordination – on both sides, incidentally – which meant that for several weeks we marked time, reacted inadequately. That is an obvious, undeniable fact. Mrs. Knight also pointed out that in the fifth paragraph of the preamble I referred to 1st, 2nd and 3rd May, and that she herself would prefer a broader expression.

I therefore propose – which again does not in any way mean that I am tabling an amendment – that we should say "at the beginning of May". This would enable Mrs. Knight to agree with me on all the dates which I propose and would be historically accurate. Let us not quibble about a question of days. The basic points are not contradicted, they are still there.

With other speakers, Mrs. Knight expressed the hope that we should not move towards breaking off the Madrid conference. On this point, Mrs. Knight will probably agree that my reply to the other speakers also applies in her case.

These, Mr. President, are my very brief answers to members who have spoken. If you consider that an amendment is necessary in order to introduce the expression "martial law", the Rapporteur may be considered to be tabling it himself. As for this question of the date, I am verbally tabling an amendment to read "at the beginning of May" leaving the rest of the text unchanged.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Michel. That concludes the debate. We must now consider the amendments. Before doing so, I should perhaps say that I understand from the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee that they have a text that they wish to submit to the Assembly under the Assembly's decision of urgency on Monday. It is not yet ready. I shall inform the Assembly as soon as copies of the text are available.

I have been asked whether I will accept verbal amendments to such a text. That will obviously present great difficulties. We cannot clearly observe the normal rule in regard to a text that is only just available. On the other hand, I cannot conduct the business properly if people propose amendments in the course of speeches. I propose, therefore, that it will be in order within half an hour of the announcement that the text is available to table amendments in writing. It may not be possible to circulate the amendments, in which case I will read them out. I must, however, have them in writing within half an hour of the text being available. I shall then consider, as charged under Rule 29(2), whether it would be reason-

The President (continued)

able to put the amendments to the Assembly in view of the amount of time that members will have had to consider them. I shall have to examine that difficult obligation when I see the amendments.

I shall advise the Assembly as soon as the text of the General Affairs Committee is available. There will be thirty minutes thereafter for members wishing to table amendments in writing. It may not be possible for them to be circulated. I have already remarked, but I shall repeat for the benefit of those who have only recently arrived, that we shall be taking, with his co-operation, the report of Mr. Wilkinson before starting the Middle East debate. I hope, however, that the Middle East debate can be completed today in view of the difficulties over travel which I understand are likely to arise tomorrow.

Although I am criticised for accepting verbal amendments, I believe that there is a factual amendment that the Rapporteur wishes to put to substitute "early in May" for 1st, 2nd and 3rd May. I think that we can accept this if the Rapporteur agrees. Mr. Michel, would you like to move an amendment to replace 1st, 2nd and 3rd May by "early in May"?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I confirm that I am tabling an oral amendment to replace "1st, 2nd and 3rd May" by "at the beginning of May".

The PRESIDENT. – That seems a matter of fact.

Is there any objection?...

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment is agreed to.

We now have the amendments moved by Mr. Pignion. I do not know, Mr. Pignion, whether you wish to speak to all three. I shall, of course, put them separately. I wonder, however, whether you wish to speak to them separately?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall not be surprising anyone when I say that the object of my amendment is to enable our European institutions to regain their full importance.

In other words, my first amendment is:

1. After the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Recalling the decisions taken in the framework of European political co-operation ;".

rather than referring merely to the North Atlantic Council.

We exist, or ought to exist, and that is what I want to emphasise.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Is there any objection to Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pignion?...

Can we have the opinion of the committee?

The committee agrees with the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Do you wish, Mr. Pignion, to speak to Amendment 2 or shall I put it formally? Amendment 2 is as follows:

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council" and insert "in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments in order to convince them to meet the conditions set by the North Atlantic Council and the European organisations".

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be brief.

My Amendment 2 does, it is true, have a political aspect, because I ask for the words: "in respect of both Poland and the Soviet Union..." to be replaced by the words: "in respect of both the Polish and the Soviet Governments..." in order to bring out clearly the distinction, which is one which we do not, of course, make in our pluralist democracies. For as we are helping the Polish people, I should like us to refer to the Polish and Soviet Governments, rather than to Poland and the Soviet Union.

On this first point my amendment is therefore not simply a matter of wording; it is political. I wish a distinction to be made between the government and the people.

The last part of my amendment aims at consistency with Amendment 1, which has been adopted. I ask that we should add "and the European organisations" to the reference made to the North Atlantic Council alone.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the view of the committee?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I urge the Assembly to adopt this amendment, which is completely in line with

Mr. Michel (continued)

the text and the spirit of the report. It is natural, as Mr. Pignion suggests, to distinguish between the government and the people. This amendment is therefore wholly appropriate.

The PRESIDENT. – The Rapporteur has strongly recommended the amendment to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We now turn to Amendment 3:

3. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures and possibly envisage further measures designed to attain the aims set out in the previous paragraph;”.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is an amendment purely for the sake of consistency and follows on logically from the first and second amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask Mr. Pignion a question.

Is it within the competence of the Council of WEU, which is composed of the representatives of seven governments, to examine the application of European measures decided upon by the Ten and to envisage further measures? I wonder whether this might not lead to friction concerning spheres of competence. The three governments which are members of the Ten and not members of the WEU seven might well find this procedure at least somewhat odd.

I shall therefore be obliged to abstain. Out of friendship for Mr. Pignion, I will not vote against his amendment, but I will not vote for it, because I am not convinced.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

May we have the committee's view?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It would probably be possible to reconcile Mr. Pignion's point of view with that of Mr. Dejar-

din by adopting the first part of the amendment reading as follows: “Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures” – which is obviously within our competence. The words “and possibly envisage further measures” might suggest that we are encroaching on the competence of other organisations or countries.

If Mr. Pignion accepted this, the end of his amendment could be deleted, and Mr. Dejardin would then probably approve this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I do not like this way of proceeding and trying to amend an amendment as we go along. In the interests of harmony, if no one will object or criticise me and if Mr. Pignion wants to proceed in that way, I shall agree, but I would prefer to put the amendment as tabled.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Agreed.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I also agree.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that this will not become a bad practice of the Assembly, but as the mover of the amendment wishes to amend his amendment, I will accept that. Will Mr. Michel tell me how he wants the amendment to be changed? Does he want to leave out everything after “measures”? What is his proposed text?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there is such a possibility of consensus that I fully agree.

I should just like to point out for the benefit of Mr. Dejardin that when I speak about Europeans I am not thinking exclusively about the Ten but also about us, as we are all, both the seven and the Ten, Europeans. The distinction can, however, be made.

That having been said, I can go along with our Rapporteur, Mr. Michel, whom I would also like to thank for having been so kind as to accept my amendment proposals.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we should be retaining only the first two lines of the amendment, which would read as follows: “Continue for its part to consider regularly the application of European measures”.

We do not retain the phrase: “and possibly envisage...” etc., which asks for something not within our competence.

The PRESIDENT. – With the permission of the Assembly, I shall put the amended amendment.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3, as amended, is agreed to.

The Rapporteur drew attention to a variation between the English and French texts in the second line of the second paragraph of the preamble. He said that the phrase "state of siege" should be replaced by "martial law". Is that correct?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. When I raised that point in my speech, you were occupied. I asked Mr. Michel whether he would alter the text, because in English "state of siege" is not the same as "martial law". We were considering my suggested amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I have often said that the text cannot be amended by comments in speeches. I heard your comments, Mrs. Knight, but I cannot make that change. The bad practice of moving amendments during speeches must cease, otherwise I shall not be able to put in a comma on that basis. That is contrary to any proper way of running a parliamentary assembly. If the Rapporteur wants the text to be changed, so that the English is put in its proper form, that can be done, but unless members move amendments properly, I am not prepared to accept them.

If Mr. Michel wants the amendment to be made, I am willing to do so if the Assembly wants it. We cannot amend texts because people mention amendments in their speeches in passing.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I repeat what I said a moment ago; and this is merely a "tidying-up" of the text, but it may be important. When this text is studied from the historical angle, people will ask why it refers to a "state of siege". It appears that here the English term is not exactly equivalent to the French. The situation in Poland is not a state of siege but one of martial law.

I therefore prefer that we should use a closely similar expression in both languages; "martial law" in English, which means *loi martiale* in French. I propose this amendment, which seems to me reasonable, if it can be of help to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Michel has proposed a textual change in the English text and correspondingly, if necessary, in the French text to delete "state of siege" and substitute "martial law". Will the Assembly accept that? Is there any objection? There are no objections. Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It has been previously held in this Assembly and in the Council of Europe that a report is the possession of the Rapporteur and it is not the business of a committee or of the Assembly to alter it. Therefore, any alteration...

The PRESIDENT. – On a point of order. We are talking about the draft recommendation, not the report. As I have said, it is in line 2 of the second paragraph of the preamble.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry, Mr. President. I did not see that in the draft recommendation and was referring to the report. I apologise.

The PRESIDENT. – Can we now make that small change? Is there any objection?

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment is agreed to.

I now have to put the draft recommendation as a whole. If there is no opposition, and if there are no abstentions, we can avoid a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted¹.

Thank you for your co-operation. I am sure that members would like me to express our thanks to the committee, particularly to our Rapporteur, Mr. Michel.

We do not have the text for the Middle East debate, so, with Mr. Wilkinson's co-operation, we shall move to Item 3.

4. International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 916)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on international aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 916.

I call Mr. Wilkinson to present the report.

¹. See page 45.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great honour to present this report, Document 916, entitled “International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982”, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

This report was adopted unanimously by the committee. It represents the considered conclusions which we drew from the symposium at Lancaster House on international aeronautical consortia. That symposium was the fifth of its kind to be held by Western European Union. The first was held in Paris nine years ago. The Rapporteur of that first symposium was the Chairman of our committee, Mr. Valleix, to whom I pay tribute for his support in the preparation of this symposium in London. The essential message from the colloquy was contained in Mr. Lemoine’s speech to the symposium, in which he said that the member countries of WEU must co-operate or die.

The reasoning behind that conclusion is simple. Defence budgets are limited. We know that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Rogers, in this very hall, in an excellent speech to the Assembly last June, called for an increase in defence spending by the Alliance of no less than 4 % in real terms. At present, not all the member countries of the Alliance are able to achieve even the present agreed target of an annual increase in defence expenditure in real terms of 3 %.

At the same time, we are facing the consequences of a sustained armaments programme by the Soviet Union, which is nourished by an expenditure of 13 % of the Soviet Union’s gross national product on military preparation. That 13 % expenditure does not include spending on space and science, and much of that expenditure has direct military ramifications.

We are all deeply conscious that at this time economic growth in our member countries remains extremely limited. The French people are facing an austerity programme such as we in the United Kingdom have known only too recently. That being so, it behoves us as an alliance to make absolutely certain that we use our limited resources for defence to the maximum possible effect.

The Minister of State for Defence Procurement for the United Kingdom, Lord Trenchard, at the symposium in London reminded us of the relative price effect whereby the cost of advanced weapons systems is escalating at a rate greater than the rate of inflation by no less than 5 % on average. Unless we get our act

together, to use a colloquial expression, as an alliance, we shall inexorably face a process of disarmament through inflation unless we are prepared as SACEUR suggests to spend more on defence or – and I would recommend that we do both – utilise our resources more rationally and coherently.

(*Mr. Pignion, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

We should not be put off by disappointments. Everyone is conscious of the disappointments over the proposed Franco-German new battle tank. We are all too well aware of the problems involved in the development of a proposed Franco-German anti-tank helicopter. But if the will to collaborate is there, the way can be found.

There is a great danger of false deductions being made from experiences not only over the Falkland Islands operations, but over weapons procurement. In this regard, I cite the example of the Tornado. I am an ex-Royal Air Force officer who used to fly aeroplanes. Many of my friends are flying the Tornado and they are thrilled with the performance of that aeroplane. The entry into service of the Tornado has, touch wood, been better than that of any comparable aeroplane.

It is an inspiring as well as an impressive military fact that crews from the Royal Air Force, the Luftwaffe, the German fleet air arm and the Italian air force are training together at the trinational training establishment at RAF Cottesmore. This surely is the way forward for the future. Therefore, let us not draw false conclusions from the Tornado programme. The advent into service of that aeroplane, despite the fact that some national weapon fits are still retained, constitutes one of the most significant advances towards interoperability and standardisation which NATO has known in recent years.

However, for goodness sake, because the cost has escalated – and Mr. H.J. Klapperich, the Managing Director of Panavia explained that it was not nearly as much as some supposed and that the escalation was in large measure due to changes in specification demanded by the armed services in response to evolution of the threat – let us bear in mind that the F-14 Tomcat for the United States navy also escalated considerably in cost, as did the F-18 Hornet. Let us go forward on the basis of what we have learnt over Tornado to develop a new European combat aircraft.

As General Rapporteur and as Rapporteur for this report, I particularly did not advocate the development of any particular project except the development of a new European combat aircraft, which I specifically recom-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

mended in recommendation 6. The Luftwaffe will need a replacement for the F-4 Phantom. The Italian air force, perhaps somewhat later, but by the mid-1990s, will need a replacement for the F-104 Starfighter. The Armée de l'Air and the Royal Air Force will require a replacement for the Jaguar. Let us, as far as possible, harmonise the requirements of those air forces and the entry into service time-scales to produce a new European combat aeroplane. In my judgment, there is no project of greater importance operationally or industrially. In fact, one could almost say that if a new European combat aircraft is not developed, the future of the European aircraft manufacturing industries will be bleak indeed.

I realise that some projects are best developed on a purely national basis. There are many successful examples – the Mirage F-1 and the 2000 for the French air force; the Rapier for the British army and the Royal Air Force Regiment; the Leopard II for the Bundeswehr; the Hawk for the Royal Air Force and, we trust, the United States navy; the Agusta 109 anti-tank helicopter.

The list is long and impressive, but it does not mean that in every case a national approach is best any more than the success of the collaborative Atlantic programme, the collaborative Transall programme, the collaborative Jaguar fighter programme, the collaborative Hot air-to-surface missile, the Milan hand-held anti-tank weapon or the Lynx, Puma and Gazelle helicopters necessarily mean that collaboration is ipso facto good.

Each and every case must be examined on its merits.

The report and the symposium made it clear that the pragmatic approach is right. There will be instances in which a transatlantic arrangement is appropriate. With the benefit of hindsight, no one would say that the Dutch, Belgians, Danes and Norwegians were wrong to opt for the F-16 and the consequent collaborative manufacturing programme for it. Nor would anyone say that Agusta or Westland were wrong to build Sikorsky helicopters under licence for an anti-submarine rôle. For example, the Sea King is a very successful helicopter.

However, we should be clear in our minds that the impetus towards collaboration is not only military with the advantages of standardisation, interoperability and this logistical simplification, or industrial in order to ensure longer productive programmes and the involvement of the smaller nations in the Alliance, whose industries would die without collaboration, but also commercial. Collaborative

programmes must be in the interests of the participating industrial companies.

In the report, we do not recommend any new bureaucratic or institutional structures. I am not prejudiced, for example, against the Genscher-Colombo initiatives on concerting European foreign policy, but I do not believe that an EEC approach to weapon procurement is right. I say that not only because the Treaty of Rome does not grant any *locus standi* to Community institutions in this area and because the involvement of a neutral country such as Ireland would be difficult, but also because there is no military expertise in the Commission of the European Communities and because there are enough rows already about the EEC budget, fishing rights, agriculture, the regional fund – let alone the Luxembourg compromise – to risk an EEC row over weapon procurement. Let us make existing institutions work. If the political will exists, a way can be found.

To conclude and summarise, I shall briefly go through each recommendation. First, the Standing Armaments Committee exists within WEU. Let us reinforce it. Mr. Lemoine has suggested as much and that would be sensible. Secondly, the recommendations state that the Independent European Programme Group should concert operational requirements and time-scales. That is very important. However, if there could be greater political involvement by the deputy defence minister who chairs the group and a system of reporting to the Assembly – although I recognise that one or two members of the group are not signatories to the Brussels Treaty – it would be valuable.

Thirdly, the transatlantic dimension to the Conference of National Armaments Directors in NATO is crucial to the Alliance in the procurement field, as in all others. Fourthly, without the political will to achieve collaboration, we shall not get anywhere. I regret that collaboration was not on the agenda at the Bonn summit and that more was not said about it then. Fifthly, of course operational requirements staffs should bear in mind factors that are additional to the requirement of their respective services. For example, they should bear in mind how equipment will sell overseas and whether we always need the very best to meet a particular threat. Sixthly, we should suggest that tenders be submitted by existing consortia, such as Panavia and the Euromissile Dynamics Group when a new requirement has to be met.

Seventhly, there are occasions – and this point is also relevant to my sixth recommendation – when we should see the consortium approach as a means of sustaining a European capability instead of maintaining a purely national industrial capability. Eighthly, I refer

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

to a point brought out by Ambassador Plantey. Of course, the consortia operate in a transnational context. Therefore, they would find it much easier if the EEC achieved greater harmonisation of company law and fiscal structures. I hope that our Council will make such representations to the EEC.

Ninthly, we believe that the family of aircraft approach will prove to be the right approach. In that approach one partner leads on one project and another leads on a different project in order to achieve a balance. An example is, of course, the AMRAAM-ASRAAM programme for air-to-air guided weapons, whereby the Americans will lead on the medium-range guided weapon and the Europeans on the short-range guided weapon.

Tenthly, Mr. Leister, the head of the procurement side of the German Defence Ministry, made it clear that we must try to achieve a partnership of equals in procurement within the Atlantic context. That will never be possible as long as obstacles are placed in the way of the American importation of European equipment. At present, those obstacles are legislative. I brought one example to the committee's attention and it is included in the recommendations. I refer to the speciality metals amendment, which is making it difficult for the American navy's desire to equip its flying training school with the British Hawk trainer to be realised.

Finally, I can think of no subject of greater practicality or importance for WEU than aerospace collaboration. As you are well aware, Mr. President, WEU has taken a consistent and constructive interest in it. I am only glad that the United Kingdom Government was able, on this occasion, to be host to this important symposium.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson for your report.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). - Before opening the general debate I must inform you that the draft recommendation on the Middle East is now available and can be obtained from the document distribution office. Amendments in writing - I emphasise "in writing" after the incidents of a few moments ago - to the draft recommendation on the Middle East must be tabled by 4.30 p.m. at the latest.

In the general debate Mr. Osborn has the floor.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). - The supply and the industrial capacity to produce arms on a European scale are very much the

concern of Western European Union and this Assembly. This colloquy has been about these issues, which were the responsibility of the Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Leister, when he addressed us this morning. My colleague Mr. Wilkinson has shown his competence in this field. I congratulate him on his colloquy and on the report.

I attended part of the colloquy as a Vice-Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee of the Council of Europe and as a Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee of my own country; and for the last ten years I have been well aware of the work of Western European Union, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. This colloquy and the work was held before the lessons of the Falkland Islands, and in this connection I would make two observations. The first is political.

This Assembly, but more so the Council of Europe and European Parliament, are political bodies, and all politicians are aware that politics is the art of the possible. Mr. Leister reminded us this morning that security is not only the capacity to win wars but also the capacity to prevent wars. In my view, the Falkland Islands campaign was one of those events that should never have happened, perhaps because peaceful overtures by democracies of which I was a part in this case with the junta in the Argentine can be seen as weakness, a lesson some of us learned forty years ago and which was instrumental in bringing about this body. The Argentine committed an act of aggression against a minority of Irish, Welsh, Scots and English origin who chose to remain under the British crown and in no circumstances to fall under the dictatorship of the Argentine. My country, under the firm leadership of my Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, and with the support of the EEC perhaps, as some from my country have also said, at the expense of other issues, whether budgetary or agricultural policy, decided to go ahead and expel the Argentine from the Falkland Islands. We are not certain today whether the war is at an end but the peace has still to be won.

The United States has been divided in its loyalties to Europe and to the rest of America and South America; and in the middle of this plenty the armaments industries have been selling arms throughout the world, whether to the Middle East to buy oil or to South America, but it was British Canberras and perhaps the Exocet which caused so much damage to our own troops in the last few weeks. What perhaps has not been realised is that up to 100,000 people in the Argentine were of British as against Spanish and Italian origin. Whether that figure is 17,000 or 100,000, they have

Mr. Osborn (continued)

very many more than the number of people in the Falkland Islands, and European and British investment in the Argentine has far exceeded that in the Falkland Islands.

There has been reference to football matches and the Belgians' success but the British team were booed in Madrid by the people who make up the electorate who decide governments. Therefore, although governments have been strong in Europe the people of Europe have perhaps vacillated over the rightness or not of the British case. Therefore, politics is the art of the possible.

I will not dwell on my second series of military points, the relationship between the missile, the anti-missile and the rôle of vessels at sea. I will not dwell too much on the vulnerability of ships at sea, the rôle of the frigate and perhaps the rôle of ships when there is air superiority. There are minor details like insulation against fire, the vulnerability of fire hazards and the danger of the aluminium superstructure, all of which are part of the pattern of design; but the political point and this military point are very relevant to the theme of this colloquy and to the report by Mr. Wilkinson. Strategy and policy may concern governments and ministers collectively but they also involve national parliaments, this Assembly, the EEC and NATO parliamentarians.

I welcome Mr. Wilkinson's recommendations, and I share his view that what he has said must be given thought by the Council. Security tends to deny parliamentarians access to information. I welcome the reference to the work of the Standing Armaments Committee and to the Independent European Programme Group, but in democracies the public must know what defence and security are about. That is why we have the peace movements which have been referred to today.

On top of this, cost effectiveness is all important, as is value for money. The theme of the Helsinki conference was technology and democracy. Members of parliament must know what designers, engineers and industry are up to. The public want value for money. They look to members of this and other assemblies on an international scale, whether the scale of NATO or of Western European Union, to see to this. Limited resources must be put to good effect. Mr. Wilkinson has done much to ensure that these matters are aired and looked at, and I hope that his recommendations and his work have the support of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Fourré has the floor.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Wilkinson's report on international aeronautical consortia lays strong accent on the place of Europe, and especially of WEU, in the development of co-operation in the building of aircraft. It also insists on the importance of restoring a balance in relations with the United States. The idea of a two-way street therefore appears to be dear to Mr. Wilkinson, as it is to us French socialists, and I can only welcome this, as well as the emphasis on the rôle of WEU, of which we were reminded yesterday by the French Minister for External Relations.

The need for such European co-operation should indeed be stressed, especially as the necessary frameworks for this co-operation exist. This is the condition for more effective and more purposeful solidarity among Europeans. It is on this condition also that Europe can acquire real substance both for the member countries in general and for certain countries which have so far not been sufficiently involved in aeronautical production. Is it not, in fact, important to reaffirm this solidarity, for the United Kingdom for instance, when the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, does not conceal his enthusiasm for a strengthening of European co-operation, and states in his book "The Uncertain Ally" that one of the topics of a summit conference on strategic questions should be the "co-ordination of new arms programmes?" He also speaks of the need for the United States and Europe to co-operate in production, in order to avoid expensive duplication of effort.

We, for our part, are convinced that while interoperability is a move in this direction, as it preserves our independence, the idea of standardisation, if implemented without qualification, might have the effect of establishing the pre-eminence of American equipment among the European countries, whereas there should be an opening of the market for European products. In this spirit, the draft recommendation makes the distinction, and I welcome this. For it is indeed towards co-operation aimed at the creation of a balanced and equitable European and Atlantic-wide market for armaments that we must work.

An equitable market means that the armaments industry of all of the countries concerned must participate in it. This was the purport of the statement made by Mr. Lemoine, the French Secretary of State for Defence, when he said in London last February that France was in favour of support for small European arms industries.

A balanced market means that we must seek to establish Atlantic co-operation under conditions which are acceptable to everyone. That means, firstly, the stepping-up of co-operation

Mr. Fourré (continued)

among the European partners in drawing up and implementing aeronautical programmes and, secondly, a redefinition of the American position to provide satisfactory openings for European products. For the reality of American commitment to the two-way street policy remains to be proved. It recently suffered a setback through the United States' refusal to purchase a significant quantity of Roland missiles. But balanced Atlantic co-operation is dependent on the success of this policy. Europe cannot accept co-operation which pushes it aside into a subcontracting rôle.

I should like to give a reminder, however, that there must not be any prior commitment to co-operation. Because, when production programmes are drawn up, account must be taken first and foremost of the nature of the arms involved. Joint arms production is pointless, as Mr. Wilkinson recalls in his book, unless it enables expensive duplication of effort to be avoided. It also makes sense when it enables common requirements to be met, a large market to be satisfied. Thus, for instance, it would be absurd to adopt an identical attitude with regard to both aircraft and engines; as engines have a much shorter life, engine output must be as high as possible in order to meet the requirements at any given time.

Secondly, and this links up with my first point, a co-operation policy cannot exist *a priori* because it must take into account the specific nature both of national interests and requirements – all the more so, in my opinion, because identical weapons are not necessarily a military advantage – and of the situations of the national aeronautical industries.

Thus, European co-operation in the production of military equipment must be stepped up and extended, with due regard for the specific interests of the countries concerned. United States policy must be reshaped so that the two-way street becomes a reality. This is the dual condition for the establishment of fruitful co-operation and the encouragement of joint projects.

It is in the light of these few observations that I wish to give my support to the text which has been submitted to the Assembly, taking the opportunity to congratulate the Rapporteur on the document which he has presented to us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Fourré, I thank you for keeping within your speaking time.

Mr. Brown has the floor.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on his report and on drawing together the various illustrations of the co-operation between states in the final production of weapons. My only reservation about his narrative concerns Part IV, which relates to the development of Tornado. On reading paragraphs 45-62, I thought back to the days when I questioned the President of the Assembly, Mr. Mulley, who was then Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom, and various ministers under him, about the multi-rôle combat aircraft, as it was then known. Any relationship between the factors as I then knew them and what is contained in paragraphs 45-62 of this report is, I believe, purely coincidental.

It will be within Mr. Mulley's memory the feeling of anger that existed over the manner in which various contracts were distributed by Panavia and also the unsatisfactory way in which the operational requirements of the aircraft were changed by the United Kingdom because of the inability of contractors to meet requirements. That led, in turn, to a British version of Tornado being developed, which meant breaking away from the common operability of the aircraft among the three states.

One recalls also the frustration of the Federal Republic of Germany over delays and changes, resulting in their decision to go it alone. This meant another variant and less opportunity for common operability. As a result of those feelings of anger, I began closely questioning ministers of defence in the United Kingdom. From that came about the phrase "interoperability" that I see now occurs in Mr. Wilkinson's report on two occasions.

I had asked the minister whether he would tell me, or give me an assurance, that a British Tornado, damaged in combat, could land in either Italy or Germany and be repaired, rearmed and returned to combat. It seemed to me that the assurances that I was seeking should have received a simple reply. I thought that it would be "Yes". In fact, I received a long, involved and complicated reply which introduced the word "interoperability" whatever that meant. Attempts to find out what it meant did not help very much. I understand now, a year or so later, having visited one of the stations where Tornado is located, that it means in practice that an aircraft can land in any of the three states and be refuelled and rearmed. But that is all. It is not possible to carry out full repairs as we had hoped. What we really wanted was common operability, allowing a Tornado aircraft to land in any of the three states' advanced areas and be repaired and renewed for combat.

Mr. Brown (continued)

Mr. Wilkinson indicated that one of the failures of Tornado was that the states retained what he called national weapons fits. This makes it impossible for the aircraft to be properly serviced in the manner that the three states, working together in co-operation, had had in mind. I agree with Mr. Wilkinson that we have achieved an excellent aircraft. I have grave doubts, however, about the description that he gives in paragraphs 45-62 of its history. There can be no doubt about the need for close co-operation. Much more work needs to be done to iron out the difficulties. First, satisfactory management arrangements need to be established. Secondly, operational requirements need to be determined. Thirdly, partners must be willing to agree to high technology and associated employment going to the country that is best able to carry out the development. Only then can we be satisfied that the objective of paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation is achieved.

Those of us dedicated to the principles of standardisation still hope that one day it will be possible to achieve the ultimate. With those remarks, I support the report put forward by Mr. Wilkinson and trust that the Assembly will accept it.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

I call Mr. Spies von Bülllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in this part-session we have talked a great deal about how to give our organisation, Western European Union, more to do. Time and again we ask ourselves how we can be more active and various proposals are made. It has been suggested that we Europeans should join together to give more emphasis to European concerns within NATO. I must say I always feel rather uneasy about this, because I fear that meeting more often on behalf of European points of view might lead to something none of us wants. That is, it might involve the risk of our finding ourselves in some kind of opposition to the United States in NATO. However, if there is one area in which we can be active for reasons of very immediate concern to us, which at the same time assist in the joint operation of NATO, it is the area discussed in Mr. Wilkinson's report. The question is whether we Europeans ought not to pursue, and pursue with still more determination in future, a collaborative approach to armaments programmes. Mr. Brown has said that he was

disappointed to find that a Tornado built in Britain or Germany could not be repaired in Italy, and vice versa. Actually I do not believe that this experience is as common as all that.

We discussed Mr. Wilkinson's report in detail in our committee, and I would like to take this opportunity to say how grateful we are to Mr. Wilkinson for bringing to the drafting of this report not only his own involvement as a pilot, but also – as was evident time and again – his personal contacts with military pilots who have flown this plane in France and Germany. I congratulate him on his report. It was of course very easy for him, with his brilliant mastery of all three languages, to bring these contacts with former colleagues – as he said, he was once a military pilot himself – into the report. What we heard in this context in fact contradicts the views expressed by Mr. Brown.

Not only does it contradict these views, but I can add a personal experience. The Tornado project is one which has received great publicity. The project "made waves" in Germany because of the famous Tornado "hole", a hole of hundreds of millions of deutschmarks. I cannot give you the exact figure, but it put our government, or at least the defence minister, in jeopardy. A committee of enquiry was set up to establish why no one had known by how much the cost of the project would exceed the forecasts. The amount of publicity surrounding the Tornado "hole" was probably no secret in neighbouring countries either. However, it was precisely on the subject of the financial difficulties of this project that we parliamentarians were lobbied by the pilots who fly this aircraft. They said to us: "Please do not be so petty; do not wreck the whole project. It is a fantastic plane. We all want it. We never expected it to be so good, and we have had joint training on it with pilots from the other European countries." So the pilots were asking us parliamentarians, particularly those of us belonging to the opposition, not to attack the government too fiercely, because they liked the Tornado very much and saw it as the beginning of further development.

I must conclude. The military co-operation we want in the development of military projects naturally presupposes harmonisation. If the military men want us to co-operate – and they do – then they will have to co-ordinate their objectives in advance and the various countries will have to co-ordinate requirements and planning schedules. Provided that these three conditions, two of which are a purely military matter, are fulfilled, I believe we should advance along the road upon which we first set foot with the great Tornado project. Let us not throw away the positive results gained from the development and production of Tornado. I shall conveniently ignore the question of

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

finance just for once! As I said at the outset, this is a joint European venture. We should continue our work on this foundation into the next generation. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. — The last speaker is Sir Paul Hawkins. I think that I am speaking on behalf of all your friends of all nations and parties in the Assembly, Sir Paul, in saying how delighted we were to see recognition being accorded to you when you were made a knight by the Queen in the Birthday Honours List last Saturday. We warmly congratulate you.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). — That was kind of you, Mr. President. I have received warm congratulations from colleagues in the Assembly from every nation. It is due to all my friends that I have received this honour. Thank you.

I have sat on the committee with John Wilkinson for a year or so. I have never been so impressed by anyone's dedication and thoroughness in producing reports as by Mr. Wilkinson's. He was the mainspring of our symposium in London, which was excellent and went extremely well. We got much information out of the report. He has great knowledge not only of flying but of the aircraft industry. He is fortunate to speak very good French. Our French colleagues believe that also. I would not know enough to be able to tell whether he was speaking French or Hindi, but I am sure that that knowledge of French is a great help to him.

I was glad to hear my colleague's praise of the Tornado. The main RAF station in my constituency will be the base for Tornado in Great Britain. I have spoken to pilots who have had experience with that plane and they have given it nothing but high praise. That praise comes from people who have to risk their lives in the air, which makes it highly impressive.

As everyone else has said, the Falkland Islands war gives us much to think about. We may have to revise some of our ideas in the report or our thinking on materials, weapons and planes that have been used in that conflict. With every force we must have systems of radar as well as the right aircraft for the job. Some forty-two years ago I was captured after a month's fighting. I saw neither an RAF plane nor a French plane during the whole of that time. I may have kept my head down in a bunker, but I do not remember seeing any. Although we were "poor bloody infantry", as we say in Great Britain, we realised how important air superiority was in any conflict. It prevents casualties and achieves victory if one

can have air superiority, not necessarily in numbers, but in quality and co-operative possibilities between the nations forming our European alliance against aggression.

I was glad to hear Mr. Wilkinson mention the need for political will. Most members, to whichever nation they belong, realise that we have been extremely fortunate in having at the head of our government a lady of great determination and with a real will to win. Without that, we could not have succeeded as we have. All the countries of NATO and the EEC have shown great courage in supporting us. It must have been great courage because many people in the population of those countries and even in Great Britain felt to begin with that sending a force eight thousand miles away was an adventure that might end in disaster.

Political will was necessary. I pay tribute particularly to the President of France, Mr. Mitterrand, and his Foreign Secretary, who spoke so magnificently here yesterday, for the support that they have given to Great Britain and to the Alliance, be the countries in NATO or not. That was a marvellous encouragement to us all.

We must have the right weapons, if possible produced by co-operation. The most important deterrent to aggression is political co-operation and the will to win. Therefore, I hope that we shall give the report great backing.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Sir Paul.

I ask Mr. Wilkinson to respond to the debate.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — This has been an important debate — more important perhaps than its duration might suggest.

First, I pay tribute to the contribution made by my friend and colleague Mr. Osborn, who has taken a long and consistent interest not just in this Assembly and the Council of Europe, but in the European Parliament and the House of Commons in science and technology matters. He is keener than anyone that legislators should understand scientific problems. As an engineer, he is especially well qualified. He was absolutely right to emphasise the lessons to be learnt from the Falkland Islands conflict with regard to arms sales. I think that European countries should look very carefully at the end use to which the purchasers of our equipment might put such armaments. He referred to the Aérospatiale Exocet missile and the Canberra bomber. There are other examples, such as the German diesel submarines and the British Sea Dart missiles which the Argentines bought. There are many of them. I think that we shall all take that lesson to heart.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Mr. Osborn also made clear that the evolution of strategy should involve national parliamentarians and that these parliamentarians must explain the issues to their public and mobilise public opinion in the right direction. That is why I believe WEU is of such paramount importance. There is a degree of specialisation in security policy issues in this Assembly which is second to none. I think that we can transmit that expertise through our own parliaments to our electorates and ensure that in this area of weapon procurement they obtain value for money.

Mr. Fourré rightly injected a note of realism into the debate. I thank him for his kind personal remarks and pay tribute to his well-informed and balanced contribution. He was right to introduce into the argument an analysis of the relative merits of interoperability and standardisation. I remember the discussion of this issue by Ingénieur Général Cauchie who, in previous colloquies, used to remind us that there could be military merits in the Alliance's presenting to the Warsaw Pact a variety of threats. I think that Mr. Fourré was right to draw that to our attention today.

I also greatly welcomed the considerable emphasis that he laid upon achieving a balanced and fair market between the Europeans and the Americans. This will not be achieved until the Europeans concert their resources more effectively. We should, at the same time as we are promoting industrial co-operation in Europe, make sure that there are no inhibitions against the import of our equipment, as we made clear before. However, if we do not get our own act together, as I said, there is a danger that the industries of the smaller European countries will decline and that they will necessarily be forced to buy equipment off the shelf from the United States. There are occasions when this is right, just as there are occasions when a purely national programme is the right solution for a national requirement. All in all, I thought that Mr. Fourré brought us down to earth. I entirely welcome what he said.

As befits an SDP member, Mr. Brown injected a note of scepticism. There was a sense of *déjà vu*. I am glad that he brought us back to the inception of the Tornado. The Tornado originated because the British cancelled their own national programme, the TSR-2. The AFVG British Aircraft Corporation-Marcel Dassault collaboration was still-born. It was as a result of that failure that Tornado ensued.

I think that Mr. Brown was a bit harsh. Because Tornado is not the optimum solution

does not mean that it does not represent progress. He referred to the problem of battle damage repair and turning round combat aeroplanes if they land away. Battle damage repair would be greatly facilitated by the degree of commonality that exists in the airframe. Of course, there are national specifications for certain systems – avionics systems particularly and weapon fits – but the basic airframe and engine are common, and those are the most important ingredients of the aircraft. So long as national stocks of weapons exist, we cannot at this stage deny to the individual user forces the possibility of operating national weapon fits. Therefore, Tornado represents progress, but, as he said, it is an intermediate stage and a lot more work needs to be done.

The Tornado management agency (NAM-MA) in particular was over-bureaucratic. In official quarters there was a desire to ensure that good cost control existed. I agree that the division of work on the Tornado, which was based on the financial division between the partners, in some instances entailed the choice of less than optimum equipment for the aircraft. However, all in all, I think that the programme is a success.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, whose wholehearted and enthusiastic contribution to the debate, as in committee, I wholly welcome, was right to make it clear that we should not seek to achieve a European identity in defence at the expense of our relationship with our NATO allies across the Atlantic, in particular the United States. After all, we have a common heritage and tradition. Divided we shall fall, but if both parts of the Alliance – the European and the transatlantic American elements – remain united, our common security will be assured. In that regard WEU should enhance cohesion within the Alliance rather than create a European identity at the expense of our NATO Alliance.

I was pleased that Mr. Spies von Büllenheim mentioned the expertise and dedication of the pilots and crews who have to operate Tornado. The cost of the aircraft has been a great saga in German affairs, and I understand that, but in the last analysis it is the operational effectiveness of the aeroplane that counts. The safety of the aircraft and its ability to penetrate enemy defences and thereby to deter war are what it is about. It is a price worth paying if it helps to preserve peace. But, as he said, we should do more to co-ordinate operational requirements and time-scales so that this experience of Tornado may be put to good use for the next generation of aeroplanes. That is absolutely right.

Last, but by no means least, I again publicly – like you, Mr. President – pay tribute to Sir

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Paul Hawkins, whose contributions in the committee we greatly admired and whose dedication to the cause of WEU as, among other things, a whip, deservedly ensured the honour that he has received. I was glad that he mentioned the Royal Air Force station at Marham. I think that that is what he would call it, although the crews over the radio telephone would probably call it "Maram".

We all realise that many lessons can be learnt from the Falklands war. I shall not pre-empt the analyses of experts and staffs, but as far as Tornado and the aerial balance in Europe are concerned, the need for stand-off weaponry on the central front and adequate defence suppression weapons has been made clear. There is also a need for an appropriate electronic warfare environment. As has been brought home to us, air superiority is not only a question of numbers. Ultimately it involves the quality of equipment, the training of personnel, the "engagement" - to take Mr. Spies von Büllenheim's words - the commitment of the men on the ground and in the air, as well as the commitment, will and courage of political leadership.

We hope that the commitment and courage of our political leaders will lead us along the path of co-operation and towards subsuming our national interest to our collective security. In that way deterrence will be enhanced and the chances of peace will be increased.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson. I think that you already know that the Assembly owes you a great debt for your excellent report and for the important and leading part that you took in organising the very successful colloquy earlier in the year.

There are no amendments to the report and, therefore, I put the draft recommendation to the vote.

Is there any opposition to it?...

Any abstentions?...

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*¹.

5. Situation in the Middle East

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 923 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. - The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee on

the situation in the Middle East, Document 923 and amendments.

Given the long list of speakers, it is clear that we shall unfortunately be unable to reach the report tabled by Mr. van Eekelen. I apologise to him. I think that he understands the difficulty. He has kindly twice undertaken to come in much earlier than envisaged if necessary. However, it looks as though the debate will take place at the time that we had in mind at the beginning of the session.

However, I express my appreciation and that of the Assembly to Mr. van Eekelen for his co-operation and understanding.

We now turn to the report to be submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Della Briotta. Although there is no time-limit on Rapporteurs, I think that the Assembly would appreciate it if they showed some restraint.

I call Mr. Della Briotta.

Mr. DELLA BRIOTTA (*Italy*) (Translation). - This is not the first time - and perhaps will not be the last - that the Assembly has discussed the problems of the Middle East, which is geographically so close to all of us and so important for the life of our countries because of the embroiled political situations with wider implications, and the entanglement of general interests - I have certainly no need to repeat the facts - and of histories and cultures.

There are any number of precedents, judgments, studies and explanations but the list of concrete results and objectives achieved is much shorter. There are some "successes" but not enough to satisfy us. The proof of this is that the Middle East was one of the most unsettled areas in the world fifteen years ago and still is today.

The document I am submitting to the Assembly is very straightforward and very short. It outlines the main problems, formulates firm judgments, which I hope will be endorsed and concludes with three proposals to the Council. The aim is to strengthen the action which the Council should take to reduce tension, to prevent the fighting from flaring up again - a cease-fire is not peace but a suspension of fighting - and to promote a negotiated solution for the complex problems which afflict the Middle East.

Some points may appear obvious but I feel that it may have been useful to recall them, provided the Assembly does not wish to change earlier judgments. Reference is made to Recommendations 341 and 349 which were approved by a very large majority of the Assembly of the day - I was not a member but I would have voted in favour if I had been there

1. See page 46.

Mr. Della Briotta (continued)

– which reflect the firm views of our peoples on the problems of the Middle East and I do not believe that these views have changed since.

These texts are not concerned specifically with the problem of relations between the Arab countries and Israel but set them in a wider context. Today the situation has not changed in general although some of the area's problems have become more acute and others now appear in different form.

I shall not go into details for the sake of brevity. But I would like to stress that if we speak of Lebanon we cannot ignore what is going on in neighbouring countries, in that part of the world which analysts refer to as a whole as the "critical quarter".

We cannot go over the whole history of what has happened there and of all the wars that have been fought between Israel and the Arab countries. The text declares the restoration of the authority of a legitimate government over the whole territory to be essential for the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East. This is why, as stressed in paragraph 1 of the recommendation, Europe should assist in achieving this goal.

It may be asked what form such action and assistance should take. We are not an executive body. We must confine ourselves to making suggestions and recommendations. It is important that we should state the objectives clearly and unambiguously. I would recall that the remainder of the statement issued by the EEC foreign ministers at their Bonn meeting on 9th June confirmed this view: "The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon are essential for peace in the region and must be ensured".

I do not see how we can say more but I believe that we should not say any less. We should condemn the invasion of Lebanon, as the EEC foreign ministers and the United Nations Security Council have done. We cannot accept the Israeli claim that it is a reprisal or an act of self-defence against the PLO. We say this in paragraph 3 of the preamble and we say it in the knowledge that the situation on the border between Lebanon and Israel has become much worse over the last few months and not through Israel's fault alone.

We have all witnessed the blind intransigence of the Palestinian resistance, the wild statements of some of its members and the inability of its most influential spokesman, Yassir Arafat, to impose negotiations or to establish the political preconditions for negotiations, and finally the part played by Syria.

We must reiterate our condemnation of acts of terrorism wherever they occur in the world and therefore also and most particularly in Israel. The heart of this terrorism is to be found in the complicated and disturbed world of the Palestinians, but we cannot accept reprisals and indiscriminate "cleaning up" as being legitimate. Israel is entitled to exist secure within internationally-recognised frontiers – this is very firmly stated – but it is not entitled to occupy Lebanon to find such security and then to remain in occupation. The action taken by Israel and its radical strategy threaten to remove a mediating country like Lebanon from the map and to impose a settlement by military might and occupation. Europe cannot support such a design.

This would in fact be dodging the basic issue which is that of ensuring the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory and at the same time ensuring the right of Israel to have secure frontiers and to have its existence recognised.

These are two sides of the same coin, two problems which go together. This was recognised in the Camp David accord. I have never changed my favourable view of this accord and I would stress that progress has been made, with the implementation of the agreements between Israel and Egypt and the evacuation of Sinai as the final stage.

This is not mentioned in the text for the sake of brevity, but so that the positive achievements are not ignored. One specific question must be mentioned, however: the Camp David accord has made no progress on one vital aspect of the complex Middle Eastern problem, namely the status of the Palestinians which is the crux of the whole very complicated question. We all know this. We can and must recognise it.

Camp David now seems far away. Two of the three leaders involved have disappeared from the political scene. Only Begin is still there and many of us fear that he is no longer on the same negotiating wavelength if we are to judge from the recent tragic events we are now witnessing. But failure to restart negotiations and the use of armed force, whatever the justifications offered, is a move in the wrong direction and a return to a world where extremism on the one side plays the game of extremism on the other. This is why the draft recommendation calls for the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government and, at the same time, the evacuation of all non-Lebanese armed forces other than those of the United Nations. This in fact is what Israel has always asked for: the departure of all foreigners from Lebanon.

Mr. Della Briotta (continued)

We all remember that the martyrdom of that country began about eighteen years ago when it ceased to be a buffer country, a mediating country and a happy oasis of peace at the gateway to the East to become a battleground, a training ground and the scene for tactical alliances and political discord. No longer a ground for diplomatic encounters or for voting for or against documents however inconclusive or suitably anodyne, but a ground for fighting between factions and armed bands, on problems linked with the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

I have no need to recall the history of Lebanon over the last twenty years. I am not in fact an expert on Lebanese questions and I doubt whether many of us present are specialists on such an intricate problem. We all remember, however, the part played by Syria, the ambiguity of its policy, the to-ings and fro-ings of Arafat within the Palestinian movement and the vagaries of his strategy. We say that there are perhaps no definite positions and that a peace strategy may be found. Camp David pointed the way. We can and must rediscover it.

The least that can be said is that Israel's intransigence has always thrown Arafat into the arms of anyone who could give him military assistance or force him to seek the support of the extremist elements in his movement. And we are well aware that there are extremists amongst the Palestinians. We therefore start by reiterating Lebanon's right to live in peace which is now the only way that we too can live in peace; and Israel's right to the security to which it is fully entitled so that it ceases to be a breeding ground for fighting and international conflict. We call for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces. Europe should help in bringing this about. We also call for strengthening of the United Nations interim force. I know that Israel may not be enthusiastic but, realistically, I see no other way.

The text recalls the Camp David accord both by the reference to Recommendations 341 and 349 and more explicitly under the heading of the status of the Palestinians. I have already said that this is the real crux of the problem; Israel cannot, as a matter of principle, accept the idea of the Palestinians being incorporated into the state on a completely equal footing. Nor can Israel expel them because world opinion would reject such radical measures and because this would create further insoluble problems.

The constructive point of departure, offering realistic prospects, is to be found in the Camp David accord and the suggestion which it

contains for giving status to the Palestinians; this means negotiations, involving the Palestinian people and its representatives. Israel wrongly believes that it can use the heavy hand against the more radical element to win the collaboration of the more moderate wing. The risk is that this will strengthen the hand and increase the prestige of those Palestinians who have never wanted to negotiate and have always said no when there were signs of a possible basis for negotiation.

After the Venice summit it may seem no more than a pious hope, which seems unattainable, to dream of negotiations between the PLO and Israel in an effort to find a solution. But there are no other solutions.

Israel's interest is not simply to win safeguards for its northern frontier as it already has in the south, but to see peace in the Middle East not based solely on military supremacy. And this is also the interest of Europe and of the world as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Della Briotta, for introducing the report. I appreciate the great difficulties with which your committee has been faced. Now the Assembly faces the difficulty of a very long list of speakers and the need to get the business concluded.

I ask representatives to stick very rigidly to the five-minute limit, and I hope that they will not think that because there is that limit they need necessarily take five minutes for their speech.

The first speaker is Mr. van Eekelen, who will open the debate.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall confine myself to a few general remarks.

I think we have done ourselves a disservice by holding this debate at such short notice. Despite Mr. Della Briotta's valiant efforts, the text before us does not, in my opinion, bear witness to the balance that has always been a feature of this Assembly's recommendations in the past. We are being both over-ambitious and under-ambitious, in that the main aim at the moment should be to stop the bombing and shooting. We are thinking too much about what has to be done after that.

Secondly, I feel that a recommendation entitled "Situation in the Middle East" should concentrate less on the situation in Lebanon. As the Rapporteur has explained very clearly in his supplementary remarks, for which I thank him, many other problems and countries in the region are involved. My thoughts turn in particular in this context to the Camp David

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

accord. The proposed text states that many of the elements of the Camp David accord have not yet been implemented. But one has certainly been completed, and that is Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, which is undoubtedly a help to relations between Egypt and Israel and, moreover, has a much wider significance. I hope that Egypt will again play a constructive rôle in the Arab world.

The negotiations on autonomy, to which the draft recommendation refers, are proceeding in accordance with the provisions of the Camp David accord. We must, of course, try to ensure that they are brought to a successful conclusion. Europe should, however, adopt a somewhat modest stance, in view of the criticism it has levelled at the Camp David agreement as a whole in the past.

It seems to me that it is now most important to look to the future. What chance is there of restoring the authority of the national government in Lebanon? This authority did not disappear overnight. On the contrary: there has not really been any national authority in Lebanon for years. With hindsight, I believe that we in the West have not made sufficient effort to ensure freedom in Lebanon, particularly at the time when we agreed to the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. If it had been decided four or five years ago to extend the authority of this force to cover a larger area, there would have been less opportunity for the recent hostilities. I therefore believe we must go further in our recommendation and state even now that the rôle of the United Nations in southern Lebanon should be increased, not only in terms of the size of the peacekeeping force but also as regards its mandate and the area it covers. Mr. Blaauw will be moving a number of amendments on this subject. I hope that they will make the recommendation more balanced and more useful as a practical expression of our views.

What is needed is a vision of the future, with our countries playing a larger diplomatic rôle. I believe the European countries can play a major part in this.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. van Eekelen, for sticking so closely to the time.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I do not share Mr. van Eekelen's view, and the fact that WEU is giving immediate consideration to a problem may perhaps cause the world at large to take more interest in our work. Talking of experience, I may say that I too, have some experience of the Assembly. We

have had to take immediate action before under different circumstances.

Mr. President, nail after nail is being driven in... but these are bloodstained nails. They are the bloodstained nails of the crucifixion of human rights and of the right of peoples to self-determination. Yesterday there was Argentina's aggression against the Falkland Islands; today, once again, there is a new aggression by Israel against Lebanon. We should not have short memories; the affair of the river Litani is not such ancient history, and for the second time Israel, dealing with a country, Lebanon, with which it has never been at war, is arrogating to itself the right to exact retribution, to penetrate into, invade, destroy and mutilate this country and the populations living there. In a democracy, is one entitled to take the law into one's own hands?

Either Israel should withdraw from the United Nations or it should recognise the authority of the United Nations to settle disputes between nations. The assassination attempt in London – which I condemn as everybody does – is a pretext. Such invasions cannot be prepared in a week, no one could believe that! An operation of this kind requires lengthy military preparations. Do not be so gullible; I feel sure that you yourselves know what it is all about.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – And what about the Palestinian infiltrations?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Infiltrations? People talked of nothing else in our country in 1940-45. Please don't talk nonsense!

The problem is the violation of the sovereignty of a state; the problem is also that of the bombardment of civilian populations, often blind bombardments, as they are most of the time, if not always, like today. When you bombard someone from forty kilometres away it is difficult to avoid making mistakes.

I put the question, concurring with the statement made yesterday by President Kreisky to the effect that the Begin government is behaving like a semi-fascist government: might the southern Lebanese perhaps become Mr. Begin's Sudeten Germans? Is Mr. Begin contemplating an *Anschluss* with southern Lebanon? I am weighing my words, I know what I am talking about with regard to Mr. Begin and the members of his government.

But, beyond Lebanon, there is also the bomb dropped on Damascus; there are also the battles against the Syrian forces, about whose policies I will say nothing. But, as far as I know, no one has the right to arrogate to themselves authority over Lebanon. Rightly or

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

wrongly, the Lebanese have regarded it as acceptable, or even useful, to have in their country, in addition to UNIFIL, Syrian forces, Arab peacekeeping forces. And no one other than themselves is entitled to say anything about this.

Mr. President, I shall not go on any longer. I merely express a hope, probably a vain hope – other people would say “pious”, but as far as I am concerned it is more complicated... I hope that we, as free parliamentarians of democracies, will not use different languages according to whether the arguments are to our advantage or otherwise. Together, we called for economic sanctions against Argentina for its aggression against the Falkland Islands, for its aggression against a territory held to be British. Are we going to take a different line today when Israel is torturing a neighbouring country which has already been tortured so much in the past? Are we going to deny our share of responsibility? Israel could not pursue its present imperialistic policy were it not sure of having the support of Western Europe, and the support of the United States.

Are we going to be consistent and also call for an embargo on deliveries of arms and munitions to Israel, as well as an economic sanction against imports from Israel, for as long as a single Israeli soldier still remains on Lebanese territory?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Contrary to Mr. van Eekelen, I believe that we could not have let the unjustifiable invasion of Lebanon pass without recording our reaction to it in a resolution. I support the recommendation that Mr. Della Briotta has tabled.

The claim that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon is a justified response to PLO terrorism and bombardment is spurious. Mr. Anthony Lewis, the distinguished New York Times correspondent, stated in an admirable article published last week in the International Herald Tribune that Galilee was perfectly adequately protected from rockets and shells by the cease-fire, at least for as long as Israel wanted that situation to continue. He went on to say:

“For nine months not a rocket or shell was fired by PLO gunners into Israel. When Israeli planes bombed Lebanon on 21st April for the first time since the truce started, the PLO did not respond. After another bombing on 9th May, there was a limited

response: about 100 rockets that Israel said caused no damage or casualties.”

Then came the massive Israeli bombing last Friday week, which caused 50 deaths and 150 civilian casualties. It was to that that the PLO responded with a full-scale barrage of northern Israel. In other words, the Israeli invasion was not provoked by PLO bombardments: on the contrary, PLO bombardments were provoked by Israeli air raids to give Israel an excuse for an invasion that she wished to undertake for different reasons.

Israel plainly wishes to eliminate the PLO in its last strongholds as part of a policy of removing from practical international consideration the possibility of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, which within a few years will have effectively been annexed by Israel. Israel's objective in Lebanon is probably either a puppet Christian state covering the south of Lebanon, under Israeli protection, or – and possibly more likely in view of Syria's military defeat – the placing of the whole of Lebanon under leadership approved by and dependent on Israel.

Will those latest developments bring peace to the Middle East, this time on Israeli terms? Palestinian fortunes have reached a low ebb. Arab solidarity is completely in tatters. The weaknesses both in their motives and in their military capacity have been humiliatingly exposed. However, Israel has experienced similar triumphs before, only within a few years to find herself facing more formidable combinations. Nor can Israel be so sure that the United States will for ever put up with her ever more unrestrained and excessive behaviour.

One of the most shocking, and perhaps the most durable, impressions of this war has been the brutal and careless disregard of civilian life and property shown by the Israelis. The casualty figures are horrifying – tens of thousands are dead and hundreds of thousands are homeless refugees.

Another victim of the attack, I am afraid, is the United Nations. I fear that the call in paragraph 2 of our recommendation for a strengthened United Nations force may be wishful thinking. No United Nations cease-fire force can survive unless both sides wish to preserve the cease-fire. In this case, Israel wished to break the cease-fire. Eventually she created the opportunity.

Now it is no longer plain where such a United Nations force could be placed, nor which parties it would separate. Moreover, the way in which the invading force treated the United Nations force is unlikely to act as an encouragement for United Nations member states to provide a larger force in the future.

Lord Reay (continued)

I support the recommendation. It is the very least response that we can make to this latest aggression by Israel to put on the record this fairly minimal recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – It is right that we should debate the situation in the Middle East following what has happened in Lebanon, but I approached the report with uneasiness because of its brevity. I appreciate why it is so short, but it is like trying to cover the whole map of Europe with a postage stamp to cover the situation in Lebanon with this brief report. The report cannot pretend to encompass the subject.

I wonder how we shall achieve recommendation 1. I am all for it. I wish that we could achieve it. If we express clearly Europe's determination to uphold Lebanon's sovereignty. I am all for doing that, but how do we achieve it? We have set ourselves such an enormous task, bearing in mind the troubles and tribulations that that poor country has intermittently, but fairly constantly, suffered for the past seven or eight years. The report is a little unrealistic in that it cannot even pretend to suggest how we shall achieve what we wish to do.

I join with the Rapporteur and my colleague, Lord Reay, in unreservedly condemning the present Israeli aggression. It cannot be said to be justified in any way by the appalling assassination attempt on the ambassador in London.

The report also mentions the United Nations. With the United Nations I am like a child who wishes devoutly to believe in Santa Claus but who has recognised father's trousers beneath the red gown and who has noticed that it is father's hand on the sack of presents. The more we look at what the United Nations has achieved, the more worrying it is for us to place our faith in that body. I agree, however, that there are few other places where we can place our trust.

None the less, when one recognises that there has been a United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon for at least three or four years and recalls the pictures of the United Nations peacekeeping force officers standing by when the Israelis went in, one begins to think that we must try to exert some influence within the United Nations so that it becomes a more powerful body with the aim that we have placed in its hands.

It is worrying to recognise how minuscule is the influence that we can exert, but I would not wish for one moment to give up on that score. We must continue to exert all the influence that we have. Pious words are not enough. We must follow through and back up sterner measures towards peacekeeping, not only in the Lebanon but elsewhere.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight, for being so brief.

Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the most interesting part of the recommendation before us would seem to me to be paragraph 2, which calls for the evacuation of all non-Lebanese armed forces from Lebanon. I wonder which armed forces these are. The Israeli forces have been there for the last few days. Of course, there are other armed forces which are stationed in Lebanon and have invaded the country, and these – apart from the Syrians and the Christians – include the Palestinians. I think we should bear this fact in mind and ask ourselves what the United Nations forces have done. There is a United Nations contingent there and it is recommended that it should remain, perhaps that it be reinforced; but what have these forces done? They have served no purpose because they have not prevented armed forces from other countries, or even armed forces in general, including Palestinian forces, from installing themselves in Lebanon. We therefore call for the evacuation of all armed forces and then there will perhaps really be a Lebanon.

In my opinion, there has been no real Lebanese nation for many years; this is what we must bear in mind, Ladies and Gentlemen. The Israelis have invaded Lebanon; have they done so for conquest or for some other reason? This is another question which must be asked and borne in mind. Of course, all armed aggression must be condemned and this applies to what Israel has done. But the real facts must be recognised, as otherwise no measures will ever be taken to resolve a serious situation involving world peace and European security.

As a modest man of law, I know that homicide is punished in different ways according to the circumstances. If it is committed for vile or petty reasons, this is an aggravating circumstance, but if there has been provocation that is an extenuating circumstance and the punishment is much less. If death results from the use of force in legitimate defence it is not murder but manslaughter and, being legitimate defence, will not be punished. We must ask ourselves all these questions if we are to make a

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

genuine contribution. I am speaking quite calmly without taking sides. There is a great difference between what the Argentinians did in the Falklands and what the Israelis have done. The Argentinians invaded to annex a specific territory; the Israelis have not invaded to annex a stretch of territory or a country but to take action which is perhaps coming to an end.

There is no reason to laugh because when someone is speaking with sincerity, his listeners should give a hearing to what he has to say even if they do not agree. I am convinced that Lebanon will again become a free and independent nation, rid of all the armed forces whose evacuation is called for – and these are not only Israeli forces as a result of the action now in progress. After what has happened over the last few days Lebanon may become truly free again and we hope so for the sake of world peace and European security.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should also like to say a few words in this debate. Although I would have phrased some parts of the draft recommendation differently, I think we have after all been presented with a text which – with some reservations, Mr. President – does have a number of sensible things to say. I shall be supporting a number of amendments to it.

In the last few days I have constantly been asking myself what would be the most effective course to adopt when we discussed the Lebanon problem. It is, of course, true, if we are honest about it, that the behaviour of the Israeli armed forces in Lebanon is absolutely unacceptable. Although we must acknowledge everyone's right to defend himself, we cannot accept that the presence of PLO forces in southern Lebanon, violations of the truce and the build-up of forces there, which I myself have seen, in any way justify the excessive military action that has been taken. This must also be the basis of our condemnation and indignation. Some of us had talks with our counterparts in Israel a month ago at a meeting arranged by the Council of Europe. I feel that we members of the Assembly will fail to act effectively if we do not consider the broader context of a given problem.

No European rôle, which everyone constantly mentions without really saying what it entails, can be envisaged without noting with some cynicism that the situation has deteriorated since 1975. Lebanon is a completely devastated country, with numerous paramilitary and

military groups. I recall the way in which only three months ago the Syrians murdered some fifteen thousand to twenty thousand people in Hama, without giving rise to the same indignation as the event we are now discussing. I feel that, if we are going to express indignation, we should do it in such an effective way that we cannot be accused of bias. That would be unwise and I am afraid that in this respect there is considerable room for improvement in the countries of Europe and the Community. The European task we have to perform amounts to this.

Alas, Mr. President, I fear that the chances of bringing the Israelis and the Palestinians closer together are more limited than ever after the invasion and all that has happened in Lebanon in recent years. I nevertheless believe that we must repeat with greater emphasis than ever before that the problem of the Middle East arises very largely from the fact that Jews and Palestinian Arabs do not wish to accept each other's national and political identity. This is unfortunately true, not only of Begin and his friends, but also of those who have been paying attention to what the PLO has been saying in the last few years. If European countries face one real political challenge in the longer term, it is that we must adopt an intelligent approach in our efforts to convince the Israelis, the Jewish people, that coexistence in Palestine is an inescapable necessity, one that cannot be avoided through the excessive use of military force, of which Israel is now unfortunately guilty. The aim must be mutual national and political recognition. Only if the use of military resources is renounced can a political solution be found.

I will conclude by referring to the UNIFIL force, to which the Netherlands made a substantial contribution in past years. I feel that the Netherlands and other European countries – France, Italy and Ireland, for example – should maintain this force for the time being, that a United Nations force of this kind should be maintained and stabilised with a substantial European component. They can increase its strength as much as possible, without making it into a peacekeeping force. I do not think that young Dutch, Italian or French soldiers need be sacrificed to the problems in this area. If there must be fighting, they can do it themselves. We need not be involved. But the mandate of the UNIFIL force must be maintained and extended so that an effective contribution can be made in that area, and in southern Lebanon in particular.

The PRESIDENT. – It may be for the convenience of the Assembly to know that I still have nine or ten speakers listed for today. I understand that, although they have

The President (continued)

not yet been organised, there are fifteen amendments. Therefore, it would not be reasonable to think that, if we sat rather late, we could manage the whole of the report including the amendments and the vote tonight.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, is it true that you wish only to announce the amendments verbally and that they will not be distributed in writing?

As the voting is to take place tomorrow I do not see why it would not be possible to distribute the amendments this evening, even if there are a large number of them.

The PRESIDENT. – You were probably not aware that earlier I said that as soon as the amendments had been typed and translated they would be made available in photocopy form this afternoon. At that time, I did not know how many amendments or speakers there would be. As the votes are to take place tomorrow, all the texts will be available before tomorrow's debate and, it is hoped, they will be available tonight so that everyone can study them. However, fifteen are enough to be getting on with. I do not see why I should invite any more. I understand that they will be distributed in a few minutes.

Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I always admire those members of the Assembly who can pursue a straight line unburdened by intellectual doubts. I must confess that in this respect I have the most wholehearted admiration for some of the previous speakers. I must add, however, that the acoustic level of at least one of them was too high for me to believe that everything he said could really be like that.

The draft recommendation before us is entitled "Situation in the Middle East". This immediately brings to my mind a whole series of subjects, for example the war between Iraq and Iran, with its tens of thousands of dead. I think of the persecution of the Baha'i in Iran, with at least fifteen thousand victims. I think of the activities of the Syrian secret police against the fundamentalists and other opposition groups, to which Mr. van den Bergh has referred, which have caused fifteen thousand deaths, if not more, in recent months. I think of the constant aerial and artillery bombardment of the Kurdish minority in Iraq. I think of the public executions in various Middle Eastern countries.

I have to say that in this document I cannot find a single word about any of these grave contraventions of human rights. It refers only

to one aspect of one subject – admittedly a topical one – the present hostilities in Lebanon.

Mr. President, because everything else is left out, the title of the document is like a deliberately misleading label. What the report sets out to describe is not the situation in the Middle East, but only one aspect of that situation. We cannot possibly make a proper assessment of this aspect if the other matters I mentioned are not covered in the debate and recommendation.

The draft recommendation contains a series of topics for consideration, some interesting and correct, but others which I can only regret. When the Rapporteur says – as he just did – that for most people Camp David is apparently far away, I can only wonder if he has not been following the subject for the last eight weeks. I recall that in the last eight weeks Israel has given up the whole of Sinai on the basis of the Camp David accord. I would simply ask this whole Assembly if there is a single member state of Western European Union that has, by peaceful agreement, given up such a large territory, so vital to its defence policy, although it could not have been forced to do so.

Mr. President, I have listened to this debate on the subject of Lebanon with some surprise. The document gives the impression that Lebanon was a peaceful state, whose government had full authority in the past, and was shattered only by the Israeli attack. Please let us not forget that the state in question has practically not existed as such for the last seven years! Let us not forget that in the north a Christian minority has had to defend itself for years against all kinds of forces in order to prevent a new genocide! Let us not forget that in this country, Lebanon, a Syrian army, which one of our colleagues – wrongly, I believe – described as a peacekeeping force, has reduced the Lebanese Government's field of action practically to nil. Do not forget that there was a region known as Fatah-Land, in which Lebanese Government officials no longer dared to set foot. The last time I was in Beirut, a very well-known Lebanese said to me "My government is the most peaceloving in the world; it does not even dare to interfere in the internal affairs of its own country!" Unfortunately this is a reality that cannot be ignored.

That we have kept silent all these years about the destruction of Lebanese sovereignty, and now suddenly denounce this new blow to it with such intense feeling, is something I can understand, but I am afraid I cannot accept that such a one-sided attitude constitutes a balanced report of the kind we normally prefer to see here.

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

Please do not think me naïve, Ladies and Gentlemen. I know how much the local civilian population has suffered. I know what air raids mean. I know what it means to be overrun by an enemy army. And I know what it means to be a refugee without a roof over your head, without food and possibly even without a regular water supply. But that, Mr. President, is precisely why I wish we had included in this recommendation an appeal to all governments to provide humanitarian aid as quickly as possible, so that the people affected by the fighting no longer have to suffer as they are doing at the moment. But, unfortunately, there is not a single sentence to that effect. Instead, we find the ritual demand for recognition of the rights of the Palestinians. Ladies and Gentlemen, there would have been a Palestinian state long ago if the Arab armies of Jordan and Egypt had not destroyed the beginnings of that state in 1948. Let us be honest for once. Where has there ever been any solidarity with the Palestinians in the Arab region? I almost get the impression that there has been more vigorous support here today for the PLO than among the governments of the Arab states.

I must tell you, in conclusion, about a personal experience: like many other members I was in Israel four weeks ago. I spoke to a woman whose family I have known for years. On that particular day the woman was very upset. Her eight-year-old daughter...

The PRESIDENT. – I must ask you to bring your remarks to a close.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Half a minute. Her daughter had found, in the school playground, a bomb with a timing device set exactly for the long break when children from six to ten years of age would be playing there. Mr. President, I would like to be able to look that mother in the face. I therefore register my protest against even this somewhat improved recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman does not wish to speak. Have you withdrawn your name?

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Lord McNair.

Lord McNAIR (*United Kingdom*). – An eminent British academic once said of Marxism that it was impossible to argue about it and that one just took sides. For some of us the same is true of the Arab-Israeli problem. Ever since the Council of Europe obliged me to study Palestinian refugees, which involved extensive

travel in Israel and in the three neighbouring Arab countries, and a lot of research, for which I depended largely not on Israeli or Arab propaganda but on the early yearbooks of the United Nations, I have tried to preserve a difficult equilibrium. I greatly sympathise with the Palestinian people and with the Israelis, but I find the leadership on both sides almost equally deplorable.

I think the most enduring memory I have of those travels was a remark made to me by the Mayor of Bethlehem, a Palestinian Arab who happens to be a Christian. "We Arabs", he said, "are paying for our mistakes and our first mistake was in not taking what was offered to us in 1947". As Virgil put it: *Hinc illae lacrimae* – hence all those tears. Everything stems from that historic mistake, which was made not so much by the Palestinian Arabs as by the governments of their Arab neighbours. Once again the people were the victims of the governments, which is a depressingly recurrent theme in the whole of human history.

Now, of course, the Palestine Arabs do not have a government in the normal sense of the word, for they have no country for it to govern; but they yearn for a country and therefore for a government. Their misfortune is that if they got a country and a government it would almost inevitably be a PLO government, which I fear would be a tragedy for them as well as for Israel and for the Middle East as a whole.

Turning to the recent events in Lebanon, I cannot bring myself to condemn, though I certainly deplore, what seems to me to be the unjustifiably violent reaction of the Israeli Government to a considerable provocation. But I ask myself, if King Hussein of Jordan found it necessary to deal with the PLO as he did in Black September, why should Lebanon be expected to put up with them, and can we blame the Israelis for finding their presence in Lebanon in the end intolerable?

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, so I think do nation states find it difficult to tolerate on their borders an area of anarchy, a kind of political vacuum. Inevitably they are tempted to intrude, as the Syrians intruded and as the Israelis have now intruded. Surely it follows that the efforts of our member states should not be concentrated on the task of reconstituting Lebanon as a sovereign state – which for all too long it has not been. In this task it seems to me that for historical reasons our French colleagues may be uniquely well placed to help. It would, of course, have to be as agents of the United Nations, to forestall the inevitable cry of neocolonialism which we could be quite sure the Soviets would set up; but if we could in some way put poor, tragic Lebanon back on its feet, and if the PLO would grow up and recog-

Lord McNair (continued)

nise that the armed struggle to which it is committed is never going to succeed, it is just possible that out of the horror of the last week or two some good might come.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord McNair.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a subject we discuss regularly. Many years after the foundation of the state of Israel as a result of a decision taken by the United Nations, we cannot fail to see that peace has not yet come to the Middle East.

I will reiterate what has emerged during various debates and discussions. We now have a new event in this perpetual problem, this everlasting military confrontation, the continuing non-recognition of the state of Israel in the Middle East. This is a facet which we must not overlook here. There is a state of Israel, which is not recognised by its neighbours, despite a United Nations resolution on the subject, despite the view of most of the countries in the world that there is a state of Israel. In addition, there has been a growing tendency to believe that, when the state of Israel was founded, the existence of the Palestinian people was ignored. Since then we have had perpetual conflict. I will not go into the problems in any detail. The last speaker, my political friend and fellow liberal, Lord McNair, made an impressive statement on the present situation and the problems in the various countries. I will simply refer to the draft recommendation and the preamble proposed by the General Affairs Committee.

The situation in the Middle East is not a happy one. I did not ask for the floor in order to make a grand speech. I agree with much of what Mr. van den Bergh said. I think it important to adopt a balanced, even-handed recommendation. What one side is doing may be wrong, but what the other side is doing is equally wrong. Mr. President, I will conclude before you turn on the light to show me that I have gone on too long. This is the first time I have known a speaker to be informed in this way that he is in danger of exceeding his speaking time. I have tabled a number of amendments, which we shall be discussing tomorrow. If the Assembly adopts my amendments, it will have a more balanced recommendation and assessment of the situation in the Middle East than the somewhat one-sided approach now before us.

The people and the state of Israel feel just as threatened as the Palestinians do by Israel's actions. We must support the state of Israel as

an entity and condemn the action being taken against it by terrorist organisations and by groups with more legality, such as the PLO, which the Netherlands and the EEC also regard as an entity with which discussions must be held if a solution is to be found to the problems in the Middle East. I therefore propose that we should adopt a more balanced approach to the problems of the people and state of Israel and of the people living in the north of Israel, who have always borne the brunt of these problems. They are constantly having to take to the shelters for protection against illegal bombardment from behind Israel's frontiers. We must also adopt a more balanced approach to the problems of the Palestinian people, who are spread over various countries, where their presence is also illegal.

We shall be discussing these amendments tomorrow. I call on my fellow parliamentarians from the various countries of WEU to adopt a WEU recommendation which is balanced and does justice to the wishes and prospects of the people of Israel and the Palestinians.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw. I am afraid that I had to put the light on you although you said that you would try to avoid that. I do not know whether that was intended as a jocular remark or whether you thought it a criticism that we have a time-limit. I ask everyone to reflect how much progress we would have made on our agenda if speeches had been twice as long as they have been. We should not have got anywhere near completion, whereas we are in sight of completion provided that members come tomorrow morning.

Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you very much, Mr. President. One has gained the impression today and indeed from this week's activities in WEU that we are heading down a road that we have traversed many times before in regard to the turbulent area of the Middle East. I recall in particular the number of debates that have taken place in this Assembly and in the other body, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The first speaker in the debate following the Rapporteur, Mr. van Eekelen, complained that there had not been enough time to prepare the report and that for this reason we had before us a text that had been prepared somewhat hurriedly. It was unfair, in his words, to consider what has emerged as an unbalanced report. He and Mr. Reddemann have referred to the ease with which people take sides in this kind of argument or debate. I have to say to my parliamentary colleagues, for whom I have

Mr. Urwin (continued)

the greatest regard, that it has been easy for them, too, to take sides on the issue of the Middle East. What faces us surely is the clear simple fact that there has been fairly large-scale military aggression conducted by Israel against Lebanon. That of itself constitutes a grave breach of international law. It is so serious as to threaten the very sovereignty of the state of Lebanon. Regrettably, it has brought in its wake a substantial loss of life to many innocent people who can be described only as non-combatants.

I disagree entirely with Mr. van Eekelen's suggestion that we should not be debating this subject. It is of sufficient importance to demand debate. Indeed, it is our duty as parliamentarians in WEU to debate and to adjudicate on this issue. We often make the proud claim that we are the only parliamentary assembly with the prescriptive right to debate issues bearing on the collective security of Europe. I submit in all earnestness that the Middle East with all its turbulence and so frequently boiling over can pose a serious threat to European security. I am surprised if not a little amazed by some of the comments in this debate. I welcomed the support at the time of many of my parliamentary colleagues from European countries for British action in defence of democracy against the Argentine invader in the Falkland Islands. If that could be described as a wholly unwarranted military intervention, one is entitled to describe this departure by Israel from the principles of international law in the same way.

This Israeli act has clearly stimulated even further thinking about the Palestinian cause and the plight of the Palestinian people. Surely no one can deny their entitlement to nationhood. What is to be our attitude towards those thousands of Palestinians who are forced to lead a nomadic life? Thousands of them live perhaps a whole lifetime in refugee camps without knowing the comforts or experiencing the privileges enjoyed by the rest of us in democratic societies. I must ask my parliamentary colleagues whether this Blitzkrieg in Lebanon will perpetuate the present appalling situation.

I wish, finally, to congratulate the Rapporteur. It was evident from the first bell when we met this morning that on the issue of this report we were faced with a straightforward black and white situation. Indeed, sides were taken from the very commencement of our discussions. It is in the nature of things in democratic society that this should happen. I content myself by saying that the text before us could have been much more strongly worded. It does no more than to seek to complement

the terms and conditions enunciated in Recommendations 341 and 349 of this Assembly in December 1979 and in June 1980 when an intensive survey of all the problems was conducted.

It was a survey in depth. I simply suggest that we cannot afford to dismiss, not even lightly, this difficult situation in Lebanon. I have no hesitation in supporting the text of the recommendations.

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Spies von Büllenheim to be followed by Mr. Vecchiatti.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLENSHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there are some political situations in the world which lead one to the conclusion, even when one has studied them, that their origins and circumstances are beyond comprehension. The situation in the Middle East is surely one of these. It is therefore very understandable that the draft recommendation before us, which had to be drawn up so quickly, could not deal with all aspects of such a complicated and impenetrable situation. The fact that we have also to discuss a whole series of amendments surely does not reflect adversely on the recommendation, but is simply due to the difficulty of comprehending the situation and drawing the proper conclusions.

I do think, however, that in a debate like today's we must ask ourselves why world opinion, or at least a part of it, is suddenly so anti-Israeli, why the Israelis are the villains, why there is now concern for the civilian population and its dreadful sufferings. Why have we European states done so little in the past to end the sufferings of the civilian population? Time and again Israeli civilians have been attacked from the twenty-five-mile-wide strip in question. For months on end, women and children, that is the civilian population, have lived day and night in insecurity, never knowing when a missile or a shell might strike. How little that concerned us; how little attention we European states, and public opinion in our countries, ever paid to it!

We need to remind ourselves that the PLO has repeatedly stated quite openly and clearly, and without any qualification, that its aim is to destroy the state of Israel. That is a fact that no one can deny.

It is no bad thing for a German, indeed especially for a German, to point out that it is precisely the Jewish state of Israel that has learned over the last fifty years that one must act against a threat in the early stages, and that if one fails to take action in good time, serious consequences will ensue. I think one must have some understanding for the fact that the Israelis are taking defensive action in the early

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

stages against the attacks on the civilian population that have been going on for a long time now.

We all accept the Palestinian claim for a homeland. But to accept this claim and wish for its ultimate success, the acquisition of a homeland by the Palestinians, does not mean identifying with the PLO. It cannot mean identifying with the PLO, because the PLO tactics of unconditional rejection of the state of Israel, of the intermittent attacks we have been witnessing for a long time now, of bombardment with single missiles, the tactics of single, terrorist actions, cannot be the right way to gain a secure homeland for the Palestinian people. Violence is not the right way to pursue one's claims. The Falkland Islands are a case in point. It is not the Israelis who have now introduced the use of force; force has been used against the state of Israel by the PLO for a long time. We must all help to find the way to a peaceful solution. Now that the Israelis have attacked, with the resultant dreadful sufferings of the civilian population that we all regret and wish to see speedily ended, I believe that, even if we cannot condone the use of force, we must – in view of past history, which cannot be ignored – have some degree of understanding for their action. I would like to express such understanding, and I hope that our recommendation, which calls for the withdrawal of the PLO and Syrian troops, as well as Israeli troops, from Lebanon as soon as possible, may perhaps create, despite all the victims, the basis for a settlement, a platform on which to build what we are all hoping for, namely peace in Lebanon, a homeland for the Palestinians, and the peace for Israel that we all desire. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree with the text of the recommendation and with Mr. Della Briotta's oral report, but I should like to bring a number of points to the Assembly's attention. First of all, I believe that we should condemn outright any attempt to change the international order by violent means, regardless of the sympathies which each of us may have for a particular country.

I would remind the Assembly that the world is now made up of some two hundred sovereign states; if the use of violence to change the existing order becomes more widespread it is easy to imagine what would happen to our planet, and this breakdown of international order

could lead to a world war, starting with the recently-independent countries.

But it is not my custom to indulge in rhetoric and I must admit that it is not always easy to deal with the Arab countries or the various Arab nationalisms. Nor has it been easy to deal with the PLO in its various phases, and this is still true at present. I would, however, say to the Assembly that if we Europeans fail first to understand and then apply a policy enabling us to come to terms with the Arab countries, the Arab nationalist movements and the Palestinian movement itself we should be very careful, because the present situation cannot continue for long.

The Arab nationalist movement is in itself already very difficult to deal with, but behind Arab nationalism we have the terrifying advance of Islamic nationalism, headed by Iran with the declared aim of a complete break from the civilisation, culture and interests of Europe and from European civilisation. Matters would then become really serious. It is not by chance that Iran has been the only country to declare itself, I would say directly, on the crisis while the other Arab countries have for one reason or another taken the positions of which we are well aware.

Of course, our countries have specific interests which must be defended against Arab nationalism. I do not understand why Israel should consider it disgraceful that we should protect our oil supplies on which Western Europe's economy and the very life of our countries depend: as if Israel did not sell arms to the racist régime in South Africa, caring nothing for international rules. Israel therefore has no right to preach to us: let us leave this point then.

This brings us to the truly serious issues of substance. Western Europe adopted the correct position in Venice, thus regaining much prestige with the Arab countries, but disappointment followed and this position was abandoned for reasons of which we are all aware. We must now make a fresh effort to adapt to the new reality of the Palestinian world with an open mind.

In conclusion I wonder whether it is easier to deal with Arafat or to deal later with his successor who may be a disciple of Khomeini. There is already one man – you all know this – who might succeed Arafat as head of the Palestinian movement.

These are specific responsibilities to be assumed and I consider therefore that the recommendation covers these points relating to both the world in general and to Europe's interests.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I should have made a somewhat different speech were it not for the venomous tirade of Mr. Dejardin and the usual anti-Israel contribution from Lord Reay.

Unfortunately, polarisation is now so deeply in evidence that I shall have to take up my position in opposition to those two speakers. Lord Reay produces a scenario that is plausible, but fanciful. If there is no intention to attack, what are fifteen thousand to twenty thousand heavily armed troops doing in another country? They are deliberately fostered and paid to try to invade Israel. They say that themselves, and it is amazing that such straight, unadulterated Arab propaganda should be used by a member of the Assembly. There have been numerous attacks on Israeli villages, even in the past few months. However, I know where Lord Reay gets his information.

I think that my friend Tom Urwin has got it wrong when it comes to comparing Israel with the Falkland Islands. Although I believe that the Argentine invaded the Falkland Islands, the whole world does not necessarily believe that. It is a question of definition. The Argentinians believe that they were not invading, but merely trying to get back a country that they claim for themselves. I do not agree with them, but one must not put forward one's view as if it were the epitome of all wisdom.

The trouble is that Israel is doing our work for us. We are very uncomfortable about our impotence when it comes to controlling and containing international terrorism. Israel is acting as a police force. There is no effective international force that can do that work, although there should be. There is hardly a country in the world that is not pleased about the hammering that the PLO has received. That is particularly true of Israel's Arab neighbours.

For several years, Lebanon has not existed. That was pointed out by Mr. Cavaliere and by Mr. Reddemann. The Israeli invasion was precipitated by the fact that there is no sovereign and independent Lebanon. There has not been any invasion of an independent country. However, there has been an incursion into a country whose territorial integrity has completely disintegrated under the twin impact of the PLO's terrorism and Syrian military occupation. Therefore, condemnation of Israel is inappropriate. The reconstruction of an independent sovereign nation is now called for.

If one looks at it from that point of view, as I am doing, one sees that Israel has a right to defend herself, under Article 5 of the United Nations Charter. Nobody here will do that for her.

We in Britain sent an armada of one hundred ships and more than ten thousand fighting men to the Falklands. They were all determined to succeed, regardless of cost, and they were defending the liberty of the people of the Falklands eight thousand miles away. Israel is defending her homeland from nearly twenty thousand fanatically determined and armed men – people who are dedicated to her destruction. James Cameron, a well-known columnist, points this out very well. He said that he deeply respects in politicians their quality of detachment, of selective morality, of open hypocrisy openly expressed. He was talking about our Foreign Secretary, who was attacking the Israelis for their invasion. Mr. Cameron said:

“I wonder if Mr. Pym felt the imminent threat of Argentinian aggression on his back garden, as the Israelis have had from the PLO for more than thirty years.”

Another eminent writer, Mr. Connor Cruise O'Brien, in *The Observer* on Sunday last, made the point that Israel's only alternative is the peace of death. That is what Israel is asked to do, to die so that afterwards people can say, “Of course she was right”. I believe that it is called a *post hoc* situation, because one has to die to prove that one was in the right.

I deplore the taking of life. In the attack on Goose Green, for example, which was held by about one thousand or twelve hundred Argentinian troops, British troops went in and killed almost a quarter of them. They were not concerned about the minimum force involved. They were concerned about doing the job that they were sent to do and saving their own lives as well, if possible. I do not believe that it is right that we should expect any other country to behave differently, and I do not believe the Israelis deliberately attacked civilians. I believe that many civilians were killed, but if we look at the situation of our own countries in the last war we see that this is what cynical hypocrisy is all about.

In the last war Britain pulverised Hamburg, Berlin, large areas of the Ruhr and Dresden; and the Dresden action was a terror raid. There were no military installations there. That we should condemn another country for defending its borders from military-minded fanatics who are only a few miles away is really hypocrisy. Of course it is right that there should be no territorial aggression, that there should be no involvement in states by a country

Dr. Miller (continued)

merely to protect itself or to add to its land, but I do not believe that Israel has done anything that member countries here would not have done in similar circumstances, and have done in the past.

I am no supporter of Mr. Begin, but it is rank hypocrisy for us in this Assembly to adopt a holier-than-thou attitude, bearing in mind that if we were in the situation in which the Israelis find themselves, and not just recently, but for the last thirty years, we would have done exactly the same as they have done.

The PRESIDENT. – I thank all those who have spoken for their co-operation. I know that not only is the subject important, but that very strong views are held on both sides of the argument. Everyone has been very co-operative in trying to keep within the time-limit, and for that I am very grateful.

I now ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Della Briotta, to reply to the debate. We very much appreciate the job that he has done in such a short time and in such difficult circumstances.

Mr. DELLA BRIOTTA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President; I shall not detain the Assembly for long. Our debate has been very important and even impassioned; we should take this as proof of the interest of the peoples of Europe in these problems and perhaps interest is too weak a word. Our feelings are rather those of great distress and there have been foreseeable differences of view, not because the discussion necessarily reflects preconceived ideas but because the issue is highly complicated, the sickness is serious and there are many possible remedies, while the facts of the situation are certainly far from clear.

The Rapporteur is unable to change the approach taken in the document. The Assembly is of course the sovereign authority and can act as it wishes.

I should like to answer a number of criticisms, including some which were very harsh and I would say unjustified in tone. I am a new member of the Assembly but I am an old parliamentarian and no one has ever described a document submitted by me as deceptive. In my book this is an offensive word but the fault may perhaps lie with the interpretation. This text was accused of being deceptive because it does not deal with all the problems of the Middle East but concentrates on Lebanon and everything that is happening there. I could reply that I was officially requested to submit a report at twenty-four hours' notice and unofficially only a few hours earlier. But this would be looking for excuses and does not suit me

because I accept full responsibility. I certainly did not try to write a treatise because our assemblies in every country and not only international organisations have plenty of them. I therefore wish to defend my text and the choice which I consider to be reasonable because the world is talking above all of Lebanon: it is the events there which have led us to hold this debate, as was quite correctly said by Mr. Urwin who spoke in my defence, for which I thank him.

Mr. van Eekelen said that the document says nothing about Camp David and that the report minimises its significance. I cannot agree because in my oral report I spoke at some length on the subject, saying that Camp David represented a moment of rationality in the approach to the problems of the Middle East. I also made specific reference to the agreement concluded with Egypt and to the return of Sinai which is a point on the credit side. This issue has aroused considerable argument among the left in Italy but, speaking here, I have said exactly the same as I said in the Italian Parliament, when I argued that this decision represented progress and said that I was in favour of Italy's taking part in the multi-national peace force in Sinai.

Of course, when we see that bombs are falling on Lebanon we cannot forget the Palestinians and the acts of terrorism, but equally we cannot say that we are within the bounds of rational thought and it is no distortion to say that the spirit of Camp David now seems remote, even though I believe that there must be a return to that spirit – as is stressed both in the recommendation and in my report – because there is no other way.

One speaker, I think it was Mr. van Eekelen, said let us therefore look to the future; but it is first and foremost for Europe to look to the future, shedding all hypocrisy, facing up to the facts and saying what must now be said, namely that the Lebanon problem must be solved, that all non-Lebanese must leave the country and that peace must be restored. We are all well aware that the road to hell is paved with good intentions and we also know that hope accompanies every political event in our countries, including those which lead to tragedy, but we must hope at this time and we must behave in a rational manner.

I thank the Assembly for having listened to my report and my answers; the amendments will be discussed tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I rise to make a few remarks. I wish, first, to

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

exculpate completely my colleague, Mr. Della Briotta, who has been criticised for producing too brief a report, and also for producing one that goes too far. He was asked to carry out this task, as the only volunteer, at 4.30 p.m. yesterday, following an indication that you, Mr. President, and the Assembly, by its support, had shown that this was such an important subject that the Assembly could not be allowed to permit such a topical matter not to be considered. Far from criticising him, I think that my colleague has done a magnificent job, whatever one thinks of his views – I share many of them – in producing this report within twenty-four hours. We have not had an easy time in the committee. I thank him warmly for his co-operation.

I do not know how Mr. Della Briotta could have made the report much briefer. During most of the time in the committee, members were trying to make it longer. If the report is criticised for being too long, I can only say that many members were trying in committee to make it shorter. I do not know how my friend could have done any better.

I should like to look back for a moment into history. We have gone a little astray today. The United Nations resolution that originally created the state of Israel, with, I think, the support of all western nations, also authorised the creation of an Arab state within the old British mandated territory of Palestine. That has never been realised. Members have spoken today about people resorting to terrorism and the homeland, but I note that very few people here have said where that homeland should be and was originally designated by the United Nations. It was, in fact, on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is under military occupation, and where the Israelis refuse to permit self-determination in order to implement the United Nations resolution that created the state of Israel. We should get back to the realities of history.

When we talk about terrorism – God knows, I have suffered myself and loathe the whole concept of terrorism wherever it occurs – the present Prime Minister of Israel is not able to wear a very white gown over the use of terrorism to achieve his political aim in the early days of Israel. That must be put on the record now, once and for all.

I propose to read quickly what I think is a matter of fact rather than to express an opinion. So many things have been stated today about the chronology of events that it is worth reading the most authoritative account that I can obtain. On 24th July 1981 the Israeli Government and Mr. Arafat accepted

proposals by Mr. Habib, representing the United States Government, for ending the recent clashes in south Lebanon. On 5th April 1982 an Israeli diplomat was assassinated in Paris. On 21st April there was the first Israeli bombing of the Beirut area since the cease-fire on 24th July 1981, in which 25 people were killed. On 9th May, for the first time since the cease-fire on 24th July 1981, Israeli territory was bombarded by Palestinian artillery. On 14th May General Eytan announced that Israeli forces were deployed along the Lebanese frontier. On 3rd June an attack took place on the Israeli Ambassador in London, which we all deplore and condemn. On 4th and 5th June Israel bombed Lebanon. On 6th June Lebanon was invaded.

That is the chronology of events. It is not true to say that there have been constant rocket attacks since 24th July 1981, when the cease-fire was first arranged, until these other events took place. I have concentrated solely on the facts of the situation.

I have heard many times in debates in this and other assemblies that the right of self-determination is essential and that, if it is denied, people will inevitably resort to terrorism. Are those who have criticised the report today on the ground that it is not even-handed prepared to put their hands on their hearts and say that they support wholeheartedly the process of self-determination being applied on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? If not, why not? That is the question to which they should direct their minds if we are to talk about being even-handed.

I look forward to our sitting tomorrow. At least we can deal with facts rather than prejudices and try to pass a recommendation which is even-handed in the way that it should be.

As I have said, 10,000 to 15,000 civilians in Lebanon are dead. There are not 10,000 to 15,000 dead Israeli civilians because of rocket attacks on Israel. There are no forces from another country inside Israel. Israel occupies the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in spite of repeated United Nations directives. If we are to be even-handed, let us for God's sake look at the facts and not allow prejudice to rule our minds.

The PRESIDENT. – Questions have been asked about whether the fifteen amendments will be available. They will be available, and, as we are not taking them until tomorrow, they will be distributed.

I think that it would be the wish of the Assembly that I should ask the Clerk to express our appreciation to our small, very hard-working few permanent staff and temporary

The President (continued)

assistants. They have been working extremely hard. It was less than two hours ago that some of the amendments were received. Indeed, the text, on which all of us have been working, was available only a little over three hours ago. It has been an enormous job for all the staff concerned. I am sure members would wish the Clerk to express our appreciation to them for the way in which they have tackled this work.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 17th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Situation in the Middle East (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 923 and amendments).
2. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 914 and amendments).
3. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 911).
4. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 912).
5. Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Document 906 and amendment).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I ask another question? The Committee on Rules of Procedure today unanimously decided to address a request to the President that the Grieve report should no longer be taken tomorrow. Since you have now announced this report as part of tomorrow's business – it is indeed the last item on the orders of the day – may I ask when you will inform the Assembly of the proposal to postpone it. It is after all of importance for members' travelling arrangements to know whether the report will be taken tomorrow or not.

The PRESIDENT. – I am aware of the committee's wish. I think that the Assembly would want to accede to that wish, but as the Assembly has adopted the orders of the day, only the Assembly can change them. If you think it important that we decide this early tomorrow morning, I would consider a point of order at the beginning of the sitting and put the matter to the Assembly. I think that it will be a great pity if we do not take the report tomorrow, but, if it is the wish of the committee not to proceed, it would probably be wrong for the Assembly to go counter to that wish.

Tomorrow, we do not want to start with a long debate on the matter. However, if you would like to raise a point of order, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, I shall put it to the Assembly then. Perhaps you will get in touch with the Chairman, because I would like the acting Chairman of the committee to be present when that is proposed.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, neither the committee Chairman nor the first Vice-Chairman is here. I am not sure if the second Vice-Chairman is here either, I therefore propose that we decide tomorrow morning whether to follow the unanimous vote of the Committee on Rules of Procedure not to take the report tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that that is the best way to proceed. You have given notice of your intention, and I do not expect any great difficulty. However, I hope that we shall get our rules in order some time.

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.*)

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 17th June 1982

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Orders of the day.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Schulte (point of order).
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Situation in the Middle East (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 923 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dejardin, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dejardin, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dejardin, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Della Briotta, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Hardy (point of order), Mr. Della Briotta, Mr. Garrett, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Della Briotta, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Dejardin (explanation of vote).
6. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 914 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van Eekelen, (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Günther Müller, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Wilkinson, Lord Reay, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van Eekelen (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Urwin, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. van Eekelen, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van Eekelen, Mr. Pignion (explanation of vote).
7. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 911*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Berchem (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman of the Committee*).
8. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 912*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Garrett, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Lagneau, Mr. Durant, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
9. Changes in the membership of committees.
10. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 52.

3. Orders of the day

The PRESIDENT. – In the original orders of the day adopted on Monday afternoon we envisaged a sitting this afternoon. I hope that, even if we go a little beyond one o'clock, if necessary, we shall be able to finish our proceedings this morning. Is it the wish of the Assembly that we should seek to finish our business this morning and not to sit this afternoon?

Is there any objection to that proposal?...

In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agrees, if necessary, to continue to sit after one o'clock in order to complete the orders of the day.

I think that Mr. Schulte wishes to raise a point of order.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, I request, following a unanimous vote in committee, that the item on

Mr. Schulte (continued)

the revision of the Rules of Procedure be removed from the order of business for this part-session and referred back to the committee. For one thing, the re-elected Chairman, Mr. Grieve, who is also the Rapporteur and directed all the work in this connection, is ill; for another, amendments have been tabled which I feel the committee should examine carefully before they are considered by the Assembly. Otherwise we may find that amendments which have been adopted give rise to further amendments to the Rules of Procedure. The committee would therefore like to meet again and to postpone the adoption of these amendments to the Rules of Procedure until December.

I ask the Assembly to approve this request.

The PRESIDENT. – Strictly, Mr. Schulte, you should have made that point when we came to the item in question. I know that as it is the last item it would be inconvenient for members to wait until that time. If there is no objection, I will take the unanimous request of the committee, which has been made by the acting Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, that the report, due to be debated today, should be withdrawn until the next part-session.

Is there any opposition to that proposal?

There is no opposition. I declare that carried.

I hope, Mr. Schulte, that your committee will be very active. You will be aware that quite a number of questions have been raised during our sittings. I hope that you will come back at the next part-session not only with the proposals that you already have – and I hope that the Presidential Committee will agree to take them early in the part-session – but with proposals on the other matters that have been raised in these current proceedings.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can assure you and the Assembly that this will be done. I believe the right decision has been taken.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. That has been agreed. The debate on the report in the name of Mr. Grieve will be withdrawn. Mr. Grieve is in hospital but I think, and hope, that he is not gravely ill and that he has had only a minor operation. I am sure that members of the Assembly will want to send him their best wishes for his speedy recovery.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – I turn to another small routine matter, namely the notification of a change in the membership of a delegation and the ratification of credentials. Since the ratification of credentials by the Council of Europe on 26th April 1982 the Netherlands has appointed Mr. van der Sanden as a substitute in place of Mr. Mommersteeg. It falls, therefore, to our Assembly to ratify his credentials in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The appointment has been properly made in accordance with our rules and has not been contested.

If the Assembly is unanimous, these credentials can be validated without prior reference to the Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections?...

The credentials of Mr. van der Sanden are ratified subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Accordingly, Mr. van der Sanden may take his seat in the Assembly of Western European Union in his capacity as a substitute for the Netherlands.

If he is here, I give him a warm welcome and ask him to make sure that he signs the register if he is representing someone else.

5. Situation in the Middle East

*(Vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 923 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the situation in the Middle East, Document 923 and amendments.

There are numerous amendments and I shall go through the order in which I propose to take them. Following our Rules of Procedure, we shall take Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Blaauw, followed by Amendment 10, tabled by Mr. Dejardin. Amendments 2 and 11 will be taken together. I shall call both but if Amendment 2 is adopted, Amendment 11 will fall. We shall then take Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Blaauw, followed by Amendment 12, tabled by Mr. Dejardin. We shall then take together Amendment 13, tabled by Mr. Dejardin, and Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Blaauw. If Amendment 13 is adopted, Amendment 4 will fall. I suggest that four amendments should then be taken together. I shall call each mover to speak. I refer to

The President (continued)

Amendment 7, tabled by Dr. Miller, Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Blaauw, Amendment 14, tabled by Mr. Dejardin, and Amendment 6, tabled by Mr. Blaauw. If Amendment 6 is carried, the remaining three will fall. However, if Amendment 7 is defeated and Amendment 14 is accepted, Amendment 6 will fall. We shall then proceed to Amendments 8, 15, and, finally, Amendment 9.

I hope that we can deal with the amendments with reasonable dispatch, because it is important to complete the text fairly early. There is an important report to follow and Mr. van Eekelen and his colleagues on the committee have been extremely patient. I do not want them to be squeezed for time.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move Amendment 1, which reads:

1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "war" and insert "hostilities".

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I move Amendment 1 because in the original preamble to the draft recommendation there is a reference to the outbreak of "war" in the Middle East. However, there has been no peace in the Middle East, because there has been a state of war since the existence of the state of Israel. There has only been peace between Israel and Egypt. Therefore, it would be better to refer to the outbreak of "hostilities" than to the outbreak of "war".

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose Amendment 1?

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, reading Mr. Blaauw's amendment I wondered how he was going to defend it. I must applaud his dexterity when he says that there is no war because there is no peace for a war to break.

Unfortunately, the word "war" is the most appropriate. What is going on at the moment in Lebanon, if not war? With the slight distinction – admittedly important from the legal point of view – that Israel has not actually declared war on Lebanon – not that this has prevented it from invading that country.

I prefer the term "war" to "hostilities". As Mr. Blaauw has emphasised, the fact is that hostilities in the Middle East have been continuous since the 1967 war, or more precisely the Yom Kippur war. On the Israeli side there have been air raids over Lebanon and land forays into the south of the country, and on the PLO side rocket attacks on the

kibbutzim. Thus hostilities have never ceased. Sending in a whole division with tanks, using the navy and the air force, what is that, I ask you, if not war?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Dejardin.

May we have the committee's view?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Both the Rapporteur and I prefer the text as it stands for two reasons. First, the preamble, including this paragraph, was amended considerably. Some of us would have preferred a stronger wording, but we reached this compromise. In accordance with what Mr. Dejardin has said, we would like the text to stand.

Secondly, in our view, "hostilities" does not accurately describe the present situation in which a substantial armed force has invaded and occupied large areas of another country. If that is not a war, we would not talk about war in Afghanistan but about "hostilities". Therefore, the committee chose the word "war" yesterday morning and we stand by it.

The PRESIDENT. – We have heard the committee's view. I shall now put the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We turn to Amendment 10, which is to be moved by Mr. Dejardin:

10. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add "due to the invasion of the sovereign state of Lebanon by the armed forces of Israel;"

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It seemed to me Mr. President, that the text of the first paragraph of the preamble should be made more precise. If one says "outbreak of war in the Middle East", a simple soul might wonder which war – there have been so many! It is much more satisfactory to say "the outbreak of war due to the invasion" – for that is what it is – "of the sovereign state of Lebanon by the armed forces of Israel". That is the historical truth, it seems to me.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin, for moving your amendment so succinctly.

Is there any opposition to Amendment 10? May I have the views of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – If I am to be logical, as I began by saying that the text as drafted was approved as a series of compromises in the committee, I feel that my duty as Chairman, as opposed to my inclinations, which are to support Mr. Dejardin, leads

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

me to say that, having stated that we want to stick to the text throughout, we cannot recommend the change, though I say so reluctantly.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the views of the committee. We shall now vote on Amendment 10.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 10 is negated.

Amendments 2 and 11 will be taken together. I shall ask Mr. Blaauw to move his and then call Mr. Dejardin to move his amendment. We shall then discuss both, and vote on both if necessary. If Amendment 2 is carried, Amendment 11 falls.

Amendment 2 reads:

2. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population.”

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Assembly of WEU has several times – in the course of this week as well – expressed its condemnation of international terrorism. This of course applies particularly to the terrorism engaged in by certain Palestinian circles, especially against Israeli diplomats or against institutions and other persons connected with the state of Israel. I can only echo this condemnation. It is an abominable situation that at this moment anything can happen anywhere in the world leading to the killing of innocent people for a certain cause, at present manifesting itself in the Middle East.

It is equally reprehensible that such acts of terrorism are being responded to by retaliatory military action. The text at present contains a clause: “especially those involving the maiming and killing of innocent civilian population”. This might give the impression that Israel’s military retaliatory actions are specifically intended to maim or kill the civilian population, and nothing is further from the truth. Israel’s armed forces are operating with extreme care in order to hit military targets. The problem is simply that the PLO has again and again failed to comply with the rule of international law that military targets and depots must not be concealed in areas of civilian population. In other words: munitions must not be stored in the middle of a quarter of Beirut. That was done, for instance, in the Beirut football stadium, which consequently exploded in the course of a military engagement, with the result that appalling numbers of civilians were in fact maimed and killed through secondary effects. I consequently

think it will improve the clarity of the preamble if this clause is omitted and the text is allowed to stand as it is: “retaliatory military actions”.

I will speak at the same time about my next amendment. If my Amendment 3 is not accepted, we are left with a sentence which also fails to convey my meaning. The point is that we condemn retaliatory military actions for the purpose of suppressing the ghastly phenomenon of international terrorism. I would in fact like to link my Amendments 2 and 3.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw. I noticed that you explained Amendment 3, which will save time when we come to that.

I call Mr. Dejardin to move Amendment 11. They are alternatives and I shall put to the vote first Amendment 2. If that is not carried, I shall put Amendment 11 to the vote.

Amendment 11 reads:

11. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “innocent”.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I had not understood the text in the same way as Mr. Blaauw. Personally, I condemn all acts of terrorism, all reprisals and all wars, precisely because they always affect civilians, women, children and old people.

I do not like the word “innocent” because it is often used in such a general and vague sense that it can be very ambiguous.

In my view, in a war like that being waged by Israel – as indeed in other wars – those responsible are not the Israeli soldiers or the Palestinian nationalists, but Mr. Begin, Mr. Sharon and the other Israeli ministers. It is they who are responsible for the dead and wounded! That is why I think the word “innocent”, which is often used, is superfluous here. I can moreover support Mr. Blaauw’s amendment because I also think that the text of this paragraph, lyrical as it may be, is out of place in a political resolution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose these amendments, perhaps for the reasons Sir Frederic Bennett gave in response to the last amendment, in that the committee worked extremely hard over two sessions to achieve our wording. An alteration of this paragraph would change the meaning and cause difficulties. For example, it would certainly weaken Amendment 11, moved by our col-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

league Mr. Dejardin, to leave out the word "innocent". He said that the word "innocent" could be ambiguous. It may be ambiguous to adult survivor sects, but it is certainly not ambiguous when it refers to babies and small children, and I think it right to emphasise that. I am worried about Amendment 2 by Mr. Blaauw, because we are well aware that in the Bible and throughout culture we have accepted...

The PRESIDENT. – I do not want to prevent your speaking, Mr. Hardy, but please do not develop opposing an amendment into a speech.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I merely make the point that throughout our history we have accepted the principle that those who live by the sword shall die by the sword. In the present situation, many civilians, innocent or not – and many of them will be innocent – will die and already large numbers have died. That should be deplored.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

May we have the view of the committee, please?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – For both the reasons that Mr. Hardy has given, I as Chairman and the Rapporteur do not find these amendments acceptable. These words were the result of a compromise that took a particularly long time. There was even a vote on whether they should be left out. It was felt right to draw a distinction between what has happened in the past, with acts of terror, rockets and mass killing of what is an innocent population in and around Beirut.

We have news of this this morning. The Red Cross has given the figure. The total of innocent civilians has now reached fifteen thousand, making it abundantly clear that we ought to press this wording as we have, and indeed ought to stress it even more strongly. My advice would be to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic. It is now for the Assembly to decide. I put first Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Blaauw.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I now put Mr. Dejardin's Amendment 11.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 11 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 3, which reads:

3. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "totally unacceptable" and insert "no solution to this ghastly phenomenon;".

Am I right in understanding, Mr. Blaauw, that you did not intend to move this if Amendment 2 were defeated?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Because my Amendment 2 was defeated, I withdraw Amendment 3.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 3 is withdrawn. That is very helpful.

We come now to Amendment 12:

12. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "is" and, at the end, add "implies the de facto recognition of the Palestinian people in national rights, as well as the right of each people of the area to live in peace;".

Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President I have no illusions about the fate of my amendment in view of what might be called the terrorism practised by the committee, which has no intention of allowing its text to be altered. This is something, moreover, which we have already experienced in Strasbourg.

I would nevertheless prefer us to be more precise. I welcome the efforts of the members of the General Affairs Committee to find a compromise, but I do not like compromises that are meaningless. If we have to work for hours to end up with a hybrid, politically emasculated text, I cannot see any point in voting for it.

I prefer to call a spade a spade and to state the facts as they are.

The present situation in the Middle East endangers the security not only of Europe but of the whole world and, as everyone – even in Israel I am sure – is convinced, a solution to this conflict cannot be achieved without a solution to the problem of the national rights of the Palestinian people and respect for the security and right of each people of the area, without distinction, to live in peace.

That is why I am maintaining my amendment, supplementing the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, despite the committee's blanket opposition.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Dejardin.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Can we have the committee's view please?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I can be very brief. I think, with respect, to Mr. Dejardin, that if he had been a member of

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

the committee, this might have been a separate paragraph that could carry support. One must, however, be logical and say that it introduces a new note into what was agreed as a careful compromise proposal. For that reason, I cannot accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – You have heard the advice of the committee. I now put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 12 is negatived.

We now come to two amendments to be taken together, Amendment 13 by Mr. Dejardin and Amendment 4 by Mr. Blaauw. I shall ask each in turn to move the amendments. If Amendment 13 is adopted, Amendment 4 falls. If Amendment 13 is defeated, I shall put Amendment 4.

I call Mr. Dejardin to move Amendment 13, which reads:

13. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Regretting the refusal of Israel to respect wholly the Camp David accords in not following up the provisions concerning the status of the Palestinians;”.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, is it necessary to argue the obvious? Whatever our personal views of the Camp David accords and their effectiveness, the fact is that they have provided the beginnings of a solution which has unfortunately gone very little further because just when a major, if not the most crucial, step was reached, one of the parties refused to go through with it.

It can of course be argued that Israel has given back Sinai. However, I still think it extraordinary that the return by a conquering state to its victim of territory conquered by force should be greeted as a major event.

Apart from the return of Sinai to Egypt, the other part of the accords has still not been implemented. True, in its draft recommendation the committee lets it be known that it regrets this state of affairs, but that is much too weak for my taste. We should have the courage to say things much more clearly. Doubtless my personal temperament has something to do with it. We should at least remind Israel that we expect it to comply fully with the Camp David accords and to implement the provisions concerning the status of the Palestinians.

That is why, despite the committee's total opposition, I am tabling this new amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Dejardin.

I call Mr. Blaauw to move Amendment 4:

4. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Welcoming the progress so far of the Camp David accord and pressing for speedy solutions in that framework to the problem concerning the future status of the Palestinians;”.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the present text of the preamble betrays dissatisfaction with the results achieved by the Camp David accord. I do not think this coincides with the approval of the implementation of the Camp David accord hitherto expressed in WEU. The comment that nothing has yet been done is incorrect. At the end of April the last Israelis withdrew from the Sinai. There is now a multinational force stationed there which is monitoring the continued observance of the Camp David accord. The next phase laid down in the accord envisages talks between Israel and Egypt, and naturally with the Palestinian population there as well, designed to arrive at a different status on the West Bank. If we say that this should have been done long ago, we are going too fast. My amendment is designed to introduce a more positive line of thought into the preamble. Firstly, it expresses our satisfaction that the Camp David accord is continuing to be implemented and has borne fruit. Secondly, my amendment calls for speedy action in the further implementation of the accord. If we adopt this positive approach and not the negative one expressed in the preamble, we shall achieve more and gain more respect on the international diplomatic front.

Sir Frederic Bennett says that the present text is the result of an extremely difficult compromise. It was also a very narrowly achieved compromise. Indeed, the votes were at first equally divided. I earnestly appeal to the Assembly not to adopt an attitude of dissatisfaction with the results of the Camp David accord, to introduce a positive note into the preamble and then to urge all the parties concerned to follow up the accord as speedily as possible.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

Does anyone else wish to speak in the debate?...

Mr. Della Briotta. Only one person can speak for the committee.

Mr. DELLA BRIOTTA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I think that the two amendments are unacceptable not only for the reasons given by the committee Chairman or because we wish to support the whole of the committee's text but because these two amendments seek to divide views on a problem which is clearly stated in the text. Mr. Blaauw's amendment stresses the positive developments resulting from the accords: but while it is true that there have been developments there is no need for further emphasis saying that they are positive. Regarding Mr. Dejardin's amendment I would observe that the text is more balanced from the historical standpoint: in the Camp David accords the question of the Palestinians is not set forth in clear terms, is not written on tablets of stone. We maintain that we should move forward from these accords and that the problem of the status of the Palestinians must be resolved: I repeat however that this matter is not dealt with in specific terms in the Camp David accords. I am therefore opposed to both amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Rapporteur.

I now put the amendments to the vote. I have already explained that if Mr. Dejardin's Amendment 13 is carried, Amendment 4 falls. If Amendment 13 is defeated, I shall put Amendment 4 straight away.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 13 is negatived.

I shall now put Amendment 4.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We now turn to Amendment 7, which reads:

7. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 2 and insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Deeply regret the present Israeli intervention in Lebanon while recognising the extreme provocation over many years of PLO rocket attacks on Israeli villages resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians and call for the evacuation from Lebanon of all non-Lebanese armed forces other than a greatly strengthened and more effective United Nations interim force as soon as possible;”.

With this it will be convenient to take Amendment 5:

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “aggression” insert “and the indiscriminate rocketing and shelling of civilians in the north of Israel by the PLO”.

Amendment 14:

14. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “evacuation” to the end and insert “of the Israeli armed forces as well as the reinforcement of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon;”.

and Amendment 6:

6. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “in mandate, in area of operation and in strength;”.

Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – Dr. Miller is unable to be present and sends his apologies. He has requested that his amendment be laid before the Assembly. Dr. Miller has had a long interest in Middle East matters – I would classify him as an expert – and in Amendment 7 he has sought to achieve a balance, which means that all the forces other than the United Nations forces should be withdrawn from Lebanon. I have been asked to seek the support of the Assembly for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Garrett. Amendment 7 has been moved by Mr. Garrett in the place of Dr. Miller. Will Mr. Blaauw move Amendment 5?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I withdraw my amendment in favour of Amendment 7.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 5 is withdrawn in favour of Amendment 7.

Will Mr. Dejardin move Amendment 14?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in moving my amendment I am also speaking against that of my friend, Dr. Miller, the text of which either conceals purposes that cannot be openly acknowledged or is incorrect. For the removal from Lebanon of all non-Lebanese armed forces, for which it calls, would not affect the phalangist and fascist militias of Gemayel or the militias of other political parties.

What has undermined Lebanon, as you know as well as I, is not so much the presence of the Palestinians but the violent antagonism between political parties which have surrounded themselves with armed militias and are finally tearing each other apart, Palestinians included. And the Syrians have added the necessary pinch of salt.

I want Lebanon to become a peaceful country again, even if it be a centre for dealing in drugs, arms, and such like which, as we must also remember, it has been in the past.

However, I would like to be precise and specific. Let me ask a question. Are we to set

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

ourselves up as judges? Are we in favour of the full sovereignty of Lebanon? Of course. What has to be done, therefore, is to create the conditions favouring a return to legitimacy and sovereignty, but that sovereignty must then be respected. And if a sovereign Lebanon itself decides that a foreign presence is necessary on its territory, that will be its right.

For two hundred years we Europeans have been in the habit of trying to run the affairs of the world, and we have failed to understand that the third world no longer accepts our rule. I would ask you to think seriously about this.

Let us say things clearly, Mr. President. The text as it stands means that we intend to collaborate in, or at least register our desire for, the expulsion of all Palestinians from Lebanon.

Are we going to offer them residence permits in our own countries? Are we going to set up Palestinian refugee camps in France, Belgium and Britain? Moreover, are we going to deny a people the right to fight for its rights?

During the war, people in our countries took up arms against the Nazi occupying forces. Let us then be consistent and ensure that the Palestinian people obtains a homeland and no longer needs to take up arms to defend its dignity and rights.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Will you move Amendment 6, Mr. Blaauw?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, three member countries of WEU are participating in UNIFIL and have troops stationed in south Lebanon in order to prevent a repetition of past events, and to create a situation conducive to the establishment of a central government in Lebanon for the protection of the civilian population. It is customary for a delegation from the Dutch Parliament to visit the Dutch contingent of UNIFIL every six months. During this visit we were able to see that the Dutch contribution is very substantial, as regards both numbers and equipment.

At the same time we observed that the mandate and area of operation of UNIFIL were insufficient to prevent the events that have now taken place and that we condemn, namely the rocketing and shelling of the population of north Israel. The statement that UNIFIL should be strengthened in Lebanon is too broad and might lead anywhere. I should like to make it more specific. We must advocate that governments work in the United Nations to extend the mandate of the United Nations

troops in south Lebanon, to enable them to do their job better. We must insist that UNIFIL should cover a wider area of operation, in order to prevent a repetition of events that could not be prevented in the past, such as the shelling of the population of north Israel. If UNIFIL is given a wider area and a better mandate, it will also need more troops, and possibly different equipment as well.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw. I remind the Assembly that we are taking Amendments 7, 14 and 6 together. If Amendment 7 is adopted, Amendments 14 and 6 will fall. If Amendment 14 is adopted, Amendment 6 will fall.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Did you not say that we were taking Amendments 7, 5, 14 and 6 together?

The PRESIDENT. – I did, but Mr. Blaauw has withdrawn Amendment 5, so I shall not put it to the Assembly. If Mr. Blaauw wishes, I shall put his amendment, but he can put it only if Amendment 7 has been carried. He cannot amend an amendment if it falls. Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. DELLA BRIOTTA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, paragraph 2, to which three amendments refer, was discussed at length at two sittings and we reached a compromise on the basis of a proposal by Lord McNair. I think, therefore, that the text as now worded should be approved.

I should like to comment on the various amendments. I am completely opposed to Amendment 7. It speaks of intervention but there is no intervention, no war, not even hostilities but something much less. This wording is therefore unacceptable. It is stated that we should call for an evacuation as soon as possible. Of course that is what will happen but we must not minimise the situation. The amendment calls for a greatly-strengthened and more effective United Nations force: this may also sound like a negative assessment in the light of what has been done at this stage. I am therefore wholly opposed to Amendment 7 and not only because I wish to maintain the whole of the original text.

Mr. Dejardin's amendment adds nothing to what the recommendation already says. I therefore oppose Amendment 14 also.

Amendment 6 on the other hand relates to a very delicate problem. We are well aware that Israel is not keen that the United Nations intervention forces should be strengthened. In the United Nations, Israel plays an off stage rôle

Mr. Della Briotta (continued)

when a vote is taken. In my oral report, I myself said that if any mediating force is to intervene it must be a force capable of restoring order and of speaking with authority to both sides but must not be heartily disliked and I added that realistically I should find no solution other than to call for strengthening of the United Nations forces. I think however, that we should refrain from setting limits or saying what should be done and how. This is a very delicate problem. In conclusion, I am not totally opposed to the amendment but I would ask that it be withdrawn; failing this I rely on the President's discretion.

The PRESIDENT. – As I understand it, the committee is against all three of these amendments, but it is always for the Assembly to decide. The fact that the committee may have taken one view does not prevent the Assembly from taking another. It is entirely a matter for individual members to decide.

I put Dr. Miller's Amendment 7, moved by Mr. Garrett, to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

I now put Amendment 14 in the name of Mr. Dejardin.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 14 is negatived.

I now come to Amendment 6. Do you wish to put it to the vote, Mr. Blaauw?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President. My amendment 6 is just as applicable to Mr. Miller's amendment as to the original text.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

All amendments so far have been lost.

Now we come to Amendment 8:

8. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "solved" to the end and insert "without recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination".

Will you move it, Mr. Garrett, on behalf of Dr. Miller?

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment once again seeks to get both belli-

gerents in the Middle East to recognise that the state of Israel's boundaries must be accepted by the PLO on an international basis. Dr. Miller, in this amendment, recognises – with his background, it takes great courage to do so – that the Palestine people have the right to self-determination. I unreservedly support the latter part of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Garrett, for moving the amendment so clearly and shortly.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

May we have the view of the committee?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The committee is against the amendment for two reasons. I shall not tediously repeat that these paragraphs were considered not once but twice yesterday at two long sessions and represented a compromise wording. I am aware that the Assembly decides, but it is my duty to report the view of the committee, which I have.

The point that Dr. Miller wishes to make was part of the compromise and it is in the words. The amendment would reverse that situation.

In view of the state of affairs in the Middle East, I should have thought that the wording correctly indicated the right of the Palestine people to self-determination while, in the words of the United Nations, recognising the right of the state of Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers. That is already included. Therefore, the committee took this view, and I support it for the reasons that I have given.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I believe Mr. President that one person, apart from the committee, may speak against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – You may speak against it, but the Chairman of the committee has already done so.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I have read both texts carefully and I am greatly disturbed by what seemed to be simply a change in word order. I recognise Dr. Miller's courage in calling for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but his text lacks four important words: "within a national territory".

I am wary of texts which resemble the original too closely and are liable to confuse mat-

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

ters. To leave out so important a phrase as "within a national territory" constitutes a political choice which thus leads me to oppose Dr. Miller's amendment although I am sorely tempted to accept any amendment if only to annoy the committee, which considers itself the repository of revealed truth and alone capable of judging the relevance of a text.

The PRESIDENT. – You must make up your mind about these conflicting interests before you vote, Mr. Dejardin.

I put Amendment 8, moved by Mr. Garrett on behalf of Dr. Miller, to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negated.

I call Mr. Dejardin to move Amendment 15:

15. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Propose the adoption of economic sanctions against Israel, such as an embargo on delivery of weapons and munitions and the import of Israeli products, so long as Israeli troops remain on Lebanese territory."

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you and others who are members of both this Assembly and the Assembly of the Council of Europe will not be surprised to hear me, as usual, refusing to show two faces like Janus – smiling for my friends and menacing for my enemies. I try to look at things fairly.

In Strasbourg we welcomed, and were prepared to welcome here also, the adoption of economic sanctions against Argentina in response to its invasion of the Falkland Islands. Only yesterday we reaffirmed our wish for the economic sanctions against the Polish Government to be maintained and perhaps even strengthened. We are – are we not? – defenders of human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.

Are we going to take the attitude, which to me is unspeakable, of keeping silent because it is Israel, a friend of the West, that is committing these crimes? Are we perhaps to refuse to take the same attitude to an Israeli aggressor as we would to an Argentinian?

As I said in my speech, the Begin government can only do what it has done and, I fear, will continue to do, because it knows it has the political, economic and even military support of the western world. The key to the only means of preventing Mr. Begin from delighting in his bouts of war hysteria is in our hands.

We must take the same attitude to any aggressor, whoever he is. That is why I propose economic sanctions such as an embargo on supplies of arms and ammunition, coupled with the same embargo on Israeli imports as has been imposed on Argentina. We know very well that if the western countries were to affect nothing more than the market for Israeli citrus fruits that would cause people to think – perhaps not Mr. Begin, who I am very much afraid is no longer capable of understanding anything – but at least those who are still supporting him, and it would be rendering a service to all those democrats in Israel who are calling for a halt.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

May we hear the committee's view?

Mr. DELLA BRIOTTA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this problem was not discussed in committee and when I introduced the committee's text I did not think it necessary to make such a proposal. I can say, therefore, that I personally am opposed but I cannot state any view for the committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Della Briotta. Mr. Della Briotta has fairly said that although the committee did not discuss the matter he advises against Mr. Dejardin's amendment.

I put Amendment 15 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 15 is negated.

We turn to the final amendment, which is Amendment 9, tabled by Dr. Miller. I understand that Mr. Garrett wishes to move it. It is:

9. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph as follows:

"Condemn unreservedly all terrorist activities."

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – I seek your permission, Mr. President, and that of the Assembly to withdraw the amendment on the ground that the issue that Dr. Miller sought to reiterate is stated in the draft preamble.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Garrett. That is most helpful.

Does the Assembly agree that the amendment should be withdrawn?

I see no objection.

The amendment is withdrawn.

The President (continued)

I must now put the draft recommendation, which has not been amended, in Document 923.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation?

If there is some opposition to it, there must be a roll-call.

The roll-call will begin – by coincidence like yesterday – with the name of Mr. Duraffour.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to give an explanation of my vote.

The PRESIDENT. – You will have to wait until I declare the result, Mr. Dejardin. I shall then call you at once. Whether it is carried may affect your explanation.

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹:

Number of votes cast	42
Ayes	34
Noes	4
Abstentions	4

The draft recommendation is therefore adopted ².

I understand that the register discloses that the Assembly has a quorum, so the recommendation is carried.

Mr. Dejardin wishes to make an *explication de vote*. You will know, Mr. Dejardin, that the rules permit you only five minutes. Knowing you to be a very reasonable man I am sure that you will not need that time.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall not even need five minutes.

You may have been surprised to see me vote for the draft recommendation although, at the committee's request, the Assembly systematically rejected all the amendments, including my own.

I consider the draft recommendation very inadequate and very incomplete. On some points, moreover, it is extremely vague. However, in the operative part, our Assembly calls

for the restoration of and respect for Lebanese sovereignty, and for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. I agree, but that must mean all forces, including any Lebanese militias.

It is however extremely important that our Assembly, by such a large majority, is demanding the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination within a national territory.

Leaving aside any quibbles about the text, I consider all these elements extremely important, which is why I voted in favour of the draft recommendation.

6. European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 914 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 914 and amendments.

The report will be presented by Mr. van Eekelen, the Rapporteur of the committee. I thank him for his great co-operation during the week. Because of the uncertainty about when this debate was to take place, the fact that we took a different decision about the Falkland Islands and other uncertainties, we were never quite sure whether Mr. van Eekelen was to present this report on Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday. He has been waiting to do so and I thank him for his personal consideration and help.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – You have no reason to thank me, Mr. President, for we are all impressed by how you have tried to conduct our business expeditiously, and I compliment you on managing a very heavy agenda so that we are now almost on time in consideration of our original draft.

I shall start by saying that much has happened in a turbulent world since the General Affairs Committee paid a visit to New York and Washington. During our visit last March some of us were genuinely worried that so many problems had arisen in the Atlantic relationship simultaneously, so many that we were approaching a crisis of confidence, because in the past, of course, there have been problems and irritations but they seldom coincided with issues in other fields, political, military, econo-

1. See page 53.

2. See page 55.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

mic and monetary. This time all those problems came at the very same moment.

Some of that anxiety has been relieved by new policy statements by the American administration and has been relieved also by the agreements reached at the summit conferences of Versailles and Bonn. Our committee could note some positive examples of allied co-operation already in March and I should like to summarise them again.

First, continued resolve on the double-track decision of December 1979 about intermediate nuclear forces in Europe has brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. I hope that western determination will also make the Soviets realise that they will have to dismantle their SS-20s if they want to avoid western deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles.

Secondly, western reaction to the Polish crisis has been more coherent and consistent than it was over Afghanistan. We are sticking to our demands for a normalisation of our relations.

Thirdly, the Madrid follow-up conference has again produced a unified western position, often shared by the non-aligned and neutral participants in that conference. Fourthly, the accession of Spain to NATO has run its course in a remarkably short time, which I consider a compliment to our parliamentary systems, often regarded as unduly complicated and cumbersome. Our democracies have shown that they are able to act when necessary.

Fifthly, outside our continent some member countries have assumed responsibilities in underpinning the viability of the Sinai agreements. Without that participation we should have forgone any claim for influence in the Middle East, where the situation remains explosive. In the past the Middle East was often an issue where European and American views differed widely. Today there seems to be more convergence of views.

In Namibia the western contact group seems to be about to break the old deadlock and is working towards elections next year, in close co-operation between the European members and the United States. We have already discussed the Falklands crisis in this Assembly and in that context I only note that a possible divergence between the United States and Europe has been avoided, which gives cause for great satisfaction.

Other problems remain, however, and I assume that our debate will focus on them. First, on economic issues, the interest rate in the United States, high also in relation to its rate of inflation, remains an obstacle to econo-

mic recovery everywhere. On the other hand, we should not try to put the blame entirely on the Americans, since our own governments are forcing interest rates up by large budgetary deficits.

Economic issues are often difficult to solve because they translate themselves immediately into financial terms and concrete national interests. That applies, for example, to the controversy about steel subsidies, which many in the United States of America regard as a distortion of competition. They are probably more anxious about Japanese than European competition but the danger of a new protectionism in the United States is real. Already there are proposals to require a certain percentage of United States content in foreign goods such as motor cars.

On both sides of the Atlantic we should refrain from such practices, for they would put us on a slippery slope. In defence equipment, of course, the Europeans have an argument when they point to our large purchases of American equipment while the United States buys only a small part of its needs in Europe. We heard Mr. Leister talking about that yesterday. In that context I have advocated the teaming up of industries in joint projects, thus allowing a specialisation on components where complete weapon systems apparently do not lend themselves to a two-way street approach.

Development assistance is an area where European criticism of the United States is mounting. We cannot hide the need for a continued effort behind maxims like "trade is better than aid" or concepts of self-reliance. The needs of the third world are still enormous and we should continue to appeal to the United States to be generous.

East-West trade has been much in the news. My experience is that the Americans do not object so much to trade on the basis of mutual benefit in which they are engaging themselves following the removal of the wheat embargo. What they resent is the preferential treatment that is often granted by European suppliers to the East. The argument we heard was that the Eastern Europeans get better credit terms than our own Western European firms and citizens. In that context I welcome the agreement, perhaps not perfect but nevertheless an agreement, of the Versailles summit to exercise caution in extending new credits. It was a wise decision also in view of the high indebtedness of the East Europeans and their declining capacity to repay their debts.

I also welcome the American decision to stop opposition to gas deals. In view of our recession, we can, of course, argue that the supply of Soviet gas will slow down the development of

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

North Sea sources, but that is no reason to renege on the contracts already concluded. It could at the most be a reason for a relaxed implementation.

I come now to the problem of burden sharing. It is obvious that the Americans feel that the European partners are not doing enough for their own defence. The administration has submitted a report on allied commitments to defence spending which attempts to place our European defence effort in proper perspective and to give credit where it is due. Similarly, General Rogers has been helpful in stressing that most of the conventional efforts in Europe come from the European partners. But we cannot hide the fact that in terms of the percentage of GNP devoted to defence we lag behind and that in times of severe economic problems most of us will be unable to meet the commitment of 3 % real growth.

These facts have given rise to new initiatives in the United States Senate to threaten the withdrawal of American forces, apparently in the belief that that would shock European countries into larger defence budgets. That belief could be mistaken. Such resolutions would only undermine the faith of our people in the cohesion of the Alliance and in the solidity of the American commitment to our common defence. Far from leading to larger defence budgets, it would strengthen neutralist tendencies in our countries.

Nevertheless, we shall have to do our utmost to correct the impression that the Europeans are unwilling to make sacrifices to defend themselves. For that reason, the draft resolution of my report recommends that the Council prepare a comprehensive report on the European defence effort, precisely to present it in a better perspective to our American friends.

NATO has recently released a document on the balance of East-West forces. It largely meets the intentions of my report and I therefore propose a change in the original text of the draft recommendation to make sure that in future our statesmen use the same data base when they are talking about the Soviet threat. Exaggerations or discrepancies in our presentations are deadly for public understanding of the real situation.

I wish now to deal with new weapon programmes. One of the reasons for the disenchantment of some of our young people with NATO is the lack of perspective that we are able to offer. More and more weapons are being piled up. Every action from one side provokes a new spiral of armaments on the other. One wonders where this is leading us.

That is why I have launched the idea of gearing new armaments decisions on our side to specific Warsaw Pact levels, programmes and capabilities. I believe that some of my colleagues have had difficulty in understanding what I am after. I want to avoid incentives for new spirals in the arms race. I do not want to apply double-track decisions to every new defence programme. On the contrary, I want to introduce an element of unilateral restraint.

If we acquire new systems, we should make clear what Warsaw Pact capability they are intended to counter and what our level of deployment will be if the other side does not increase its capability. I have always felt that a similar incentive in the INF decisions of December 1979 might have constrained the Soviet SS-20 programme. As it was, we only provided them with an incentive to terminate their production and installation programmes as quickly as possible.

On arms control, the proposals on the zero option, deep cuts in START and additional proposals on MBFR have regained the initiative on arms control negotiations for the West. It is important that our people are made aware of the importance of these proposals which, if successful, would mean a revolution in disarmament negotiations. So far these talks have only codified existing or planned capabilities. Now, for the first time, there is a chance of real reductions.

Of course our proposals will be criticised by a public that has little understanding of how negotiating positions are developing. For the moment, the important thing is that President Reagan has shown great sensitivity to European ideas and preoccupations, which has been a tremendous help in clearing the air across the Atlantic. Now we should give our maximum support in carrying them through.

Finally, I come to consultation. The recent past has shown how easily things can get out of hand. Although I do not deny that sometimes there are real difficulties, I am convinced that more intensive consultations would be able to contain them better. European ministers and officials see each other every month and sometimes even more often. In the NATO context there are only two formal meetings a year. I suggest more informal meetings, not only at ministerial level as suggested by the Colombo and Genscher proposals and, thanks to the reply received from Minister Tindemans, now under consideration in NATO in the course of a year as an experiment, but also at the level of high officials.

I am thinking of periodic meetings between the political committee for European political co-operation and its American counterpart. In

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

the past, such suggestions have sometimes met with French opposition. The encouraging reassessment of foreign and security policy in France makes a more positive attitude more likely. There is no reason to fear a *droit de regard*, for the purpose of the informal contacts is to obtain better understanding of the underlying motives and objectives of policy, thus avoiding mutual surprises and disappointments.

Relations with the United States of America are and remain vital to our joint security. They will require our constant attention on both sides of the Atlantic. I appeal to my colleagues to give their full attention to the problem. I thank my colleagues for their co-operation during our visit. I thank in particular our secretary, Mr. Burgelin, for his expert assistance. I have the honour to table my report and its draft recommendation on a note of cautious optimism.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The general debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief. I do not propose to say much now or when I move the amendment in my name and the names of several colleagues. I congratulate Mr. van Eekelen, who has presented a timely, relevant and substantial report. I have little criticism to offer. I hope that the small point that is covered in my amendment will be accepted, thus ensuring that the balance in the nature of the report is enhanced.

The Rapporteur is right to seek to improve the character and level of consultations between the Western European members of the Alliance and the United States. Our main task in Western Europe at present is to insist that in no circumstances will it appear that Western Europe is being taken for granted by what is sometimes felt to be the dominant partner.

The prime task and responsibility of the Western European members of the Alliance is to ensure that there is a more urgent, serious and profound commitment to drive the Alliance forward to ensure that there is balanced – I stress the word “balanced” – and substantial disarmament. International as well as European interests commend that approach. That is the reason for my brief remarks on the report and for the amendment that I shall move later.

The PRESIDENT. (Translation). – I call Mr. Günther Müller.

Mr. Günther MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in 1946 a highly respected European politician, a minister and Prime Minister of Belgium on several occasions and later the Secretary-General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, once said: two hundred million Europeans live in fear of two hundred million Russians, while supported by two hundred million Americans.

His description was quite appropriate to the situation in 1946. We Europeans should never forget the great achievements of the Marshall Plan, without which prosperity, employment and reconstruction would hardly have been possible in Europe after the war.

We know that no long-lasting relationship between two partners can continue unmarred for ever. We know that in recent years in particular there have been repeated arguments between the Europeans and Americans, on burden-sharing in defence and on economic relations for example. In countries with a free market economy, this is an area in which economic interests often play a major rôle. We know that economic interests have been a source of trouble between the partners on quite a few occasions.

We have seen this only recently, with the gas deal between certain European countries and the Soviet Union. I am personally opposed to this deal. On the other hand, I would say that we must, of course, include the United States' sales of grain to the Soviet Union in these discussions.

I believe the decision taken at the Versailles summit meeting – already mentioned by our Rapporteur – to be rather more cautious in future about granting credit to eastern bloc countries was a step in the right direction, even if it is not quite what the American President or even some political forces here in Europe wanted.

Another point at issue – and it is mentioned in the report – is the situation in Central America. We know that there are objections from time to time in the United States to what is said and – even worse – done in Europe. There was criticism of France's agreement to supply arms to Nicaragua. I can well imagine that an American citizen, knowing that American soldiers are stationed far from home, in Berlin, for example, in defence of freedom, has little sympathy with those who transfer millions of marks from Berlin to guerrillas in El Salvador for the purchase of weapons.

These are issues which repeatedly cause tension between Europeans and Americans, although I should like to say that, thanks to the recent summit meeting, there has been some

Mr. Günther Müller (continued)

improvement in relations. I would like to emphasise something said by the previous speaker, Mr. Hardy, a member of a completely different political group from my own: how important it is that the Americans and the Europeans in the Alliance should pull together in the talks on mutual disarmament, which it is hoped will lead to an even, balanced reduction in the arms build-up.

I should, of course, like to add a footnote at this stage: if a decision is not reached in the INF disarmament talks by the autumn of 1983 – and I hope it is – the Europeans must stand by the decisions that have been taken, without fear of any resistance groups in their countries.

It seems to me that a major problem in relations between the United States and Europe is caused by gaps in the information policy. Again and again, the emphasis is placed on the negative aspects. I recall the committee's visit to Washington in late March. One Sunday newspaper had three reports on Europe, but all three concerned demonstrations against the Americans. Regrettably, it is always the negative rather than the positive side that is stressed. It is therefore crucial – and I fully endorse what the Rapporteur says in his report, for which I thank him – that the flow of information in both directions should be improved and that contacts should be strengthened. This is most certainly true of relations between politicians.

We should therefore be grateful for this report and give it our approval.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pity that there is too little time for a thorough debate on this important and highly topical report by Mr. van Eekelen. But we have had an opportunity to discuss certain aspects of it at least during this part-session of WEU. I shall try to concentrate on just a few points.

There can be absolutely no doubt that the United States is the leading and protecting power, the chief ally and the most important economic partner among the free nations of Western Europe and North America. The partnership between America and Europe has not only proved itself over three decades: it has also ensured peace in Europe. This should be stressed from the outset. Even today it is the determining factor in international security and stability, thanks in particular to European-

American co-ordination in the areas of security and arms control with a view to the adoption of a joint western position – as Mr. Müller has pointed out – and in particular, for us Europeans, of course, in the INF negotiations in Geneva.

We should not, of course, disguise the fact that there have been a number of irritations, especially last year, but – and this must be made quite clear – once President Reagan had taken office, a policy demonstrating a high degree of continuity very soon emerged. The misinterpretations in Europe, which gave the new American administration something of a negative image, were undoubtedly aggravated by misleading statements from Washington. That cannot be denied either. But, as we now know, they were the aftermath of the rhetoric of the election campaign and were intended for the American electorate. We politicians are certainly not immune from slipping back into our own election campaigns even in this Assembly.

A turning point in this development was President Reagan's speech on 18th November 1981. I wish to say that we endorse this historic speech by the President and all the aspects it covered, since he put forward a far-reaching programme, extending to all areas of security policy, and announced initiatives for the establishment of an arms control policy, which are aimed at creating a stable peace.

Like all his predecessors, President Reagan seems to have realised, or discovered from experience, that foreign policy and security policy must be adjusted to circumstances. Basic agreement on fundamental interests and goals – this must also be said, and has obviously been realised – does not exclude differences of opinion over individual aspects of foreign policy. We should make it clear that such differences are not the expression of a fundamental divergence of interests but represent the normal thrashing out of differences between friendly states whose interests happen not to be always identical. It is quite normal for societies which profess to be open to have vigorous and controversial discussions on differing viewpoints. In fact it is a characteristic of free peoples and equal partners.

Mr. van Eekelen points out in his report that inadequate information, emotionalism and clichés are likely to obstruct objective discussion. I feel that various problems should not be blown up to the extent that they give rise to prejudice in the Alliance. I refer in this context to the concern caused by the United States' policy of high interest rates, apparent protectionist tendencies, and also the fears which the American administration has about the natural gas pipeline deal, fears which, in

Mr. Kurt Jung (continued)

our opinion – as has repeatedly been said here – cannot be maintained and have no foundation.

What seems important to me is that in Bonn a few days ago the heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Alliance adopted a programme for peace in freedom, which again emphasises that a priority objective of the Alliance's security policy is to prevent war and, while maintaining freedom, to lay the foundations for a lasting peace. The central elements of the Alliance's security policy are geared to the goals of an effective deterrent capability, defence and arms control and disarmament in line with the Harmel report of 1967.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, ...

The PRESIDENT. – I must remind you Mr. Jung, that the five-minute rule is still in operation.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am about to conclude, Mr. President.

I did not have an opportunity before the debate began to table the amendments I wish to propose, because no one was in the office at the time. I should therefore at least like to ask Mr. van Eekelen to consider a few changes to his report. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble could be interpreted as meaning that the West is not willing to defend itself. The question is, therefore, whether these two paragraphs should not perhaps be deleted, or at least amended in such a way that...

The PRESIDENT. – You must sit down, Mr. Jung. You have already gone one minute beyond your time. We shall be coming to the amendments. If they have not been tabled in the proper way, they cannot be considered.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you very much Mr. President. When we come to discuss the amendments later, I will take the opportunity to move my amendments orally. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jung.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – First, I pay tribute to Mr. van Eekelen for a balanced, comprehensive and timely report and for the impressive way in which he introduced it. Unfortunately, I do not share his quiet optimism.

I believe that the growing wave of malign anti-Americanism in Western Europe is a dangerous phenomenon. I also strongly condemn the growing tendency of both superpowers to be

equated in public opinion. People say, "A plague on both superpowers", especially in nuclear matters, but the deterrence afforded by the United States ensures our security. Mr. Müller was right to remind us of the economic support provided by the United States to Western Europe to enable it to rebuild after the second world war.

Yesterday, in a report that I introduced, I urged the Alliance to use its limited resources for defence more rationally and effectively. One part of that process is the creation of an Atlantic-wide market for armaments based on a partnership of equals between the American and European armaments industries. There are encouraging signs that the importance of this process is understood on the western as well as on the European side of the Atlantic.

For example, Tom Callaghan, of Georgetown University, has warned about the structural disarmament of the West, which will occur unless we create this Atlantic-wide market. Recently, Senator Roth of Delaware introduced an important resolution in the Senate which carried forward the previous work of Culver and Nunn and others.

Yet another aspect of ensuring a more effective use of our limited resources is the whole matter of burden sharing, which Mr. van Eekelen stressed and which constitutes the first recommendation.

I wholly welcome his suggestion that the Council should present a comprehensive report on the European defence effort, within the framework of NATO, on sharing the burden of common defence. Nothing is more topical or more important to the Alliance. There is a threat of unilateral American force withdrawals, or at least the growth of public and congressional opinion that that should take place, unless we in Europe make it plain that we appreciate American susceptibilities.

After all, many of the nations of Western Europe now enjoy a standard of living comparable with that of the United States of America. Our American friends can understandably feel sore about the fact that we in Western Europe seem to be happy for them not only to assume a major rôle in the defence of Western Europe but to shoulder nearly the whole of western responsibility for ensuring our collective security in the wider world. That security is increasingly threatened by the Soviet Union's global military capability and by its evident willingness to ensure that Soviet political influence is further projected not only through the use of its military assets but through the mobilisation of its proxies and allies.

Therefore, we must enhance specialisation within the Alliance. Perhaps the British,

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

French and Dutch – to name but three – could do more in the naval sphere, outside the NATO theatre. We are all very aware that the western nations have increased the Soviet Union's military capabilities through the transfer of technology. In addition, by transferring resources and by irresponsible credit policies, they have underpinned the Soviet military potential.

My friend Mr. Müller rightly warned against the Soviet gas pipeline project and that is the only matter – I stress the word “only” – on which I differ from the Rapporteur. We should bear in mind that that Soviet gas pipeline will not only constitute 30% of the gas resources of many Western European countries, but will supply the factories within the Soviet Union that make the armaments that threaten us all.

I greatly support this most timely and admirable report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – There is no matter of greater importance to the free countries of Western Europe than the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance and its good relations with the United States of America. Without the protective umbrella of the United States of America and its continued commitment to the defence of Western Europe, including the commitment of its troops, no objective observer would predict a very long life for the independence of the democracies of Western Europe. Sooner or later, in one way or another, the imperialistic expansionism of the Soviet Union – with its patient, but insatiable thirst for power – would engulf us and stifle our liberties.

The United States of America, thirty-seven years ago, gave Western Europe back its democratic liberties which had been overwhelmed by one conqueror. Today, it still guarantees them against falling into the hands of another. It is not always easy to maintain good relations between Europe and the United States of America. American leaders sometimes come to power with a considerable ignorance of, and even possibly a lack of sympathy for, Europe, its problems and history. That is perhaps more likely to happen today because of the shift of power in the United States of America away from the Atlantic seaboard, with its European ties, towards the South and the Pacific.

Crises blow up suddenly and the immediate, instinctive reaction of the United States of

America may be very different from that of Europe. Perhaps that is more likely to happen because of the way in which Europe, over the past decade or so, has developed considerable commercial ties with Eastern Europe which it is reluctant to see put in jeopardy by sudden decisions from a Washington that views things with a different, and perhaps more detached, perspective.

There have been deliberate attempts by our enemies to try to separate the United States of America from Europe, either directly, for example, by Brezhnev or Jaruzelski making some seductive proposal to European countries while at the same time saying something provocative and insulting to the United States of America, or indirectly by encouraging for example, the anti-nuclear movement. Fortunately, that movement now seems to be having a less divisive effect on the United States of America and Europe, partly because it has spread to the United States of America and partly because some of the steam was taken out of it by the disarmament initiatives taken by President Reagan.

The positive way in which President Reagan has recently addressed himself to subjects of European concern, including his excellent speech to the two houses of parliament at Westminster, must be a source of enormous encouragement and reassurance to us all. For Europe to maintain the vital relationship with the United States of America in good health, it must – as Mr. Wilkinson emphasised – satisfy the Americans on the problem of burden-sharing. Secondly, Europe must not let the United States of America feel that its troops in Western Europe are not properly protected because of restrictions imposed by Europe on NATO strategy, or weapon distribution. Thirdly, a continuous effort must be made to co-ordinate economic policy towards the eastern bloc.

I welcome the conclusion reached at the Versailles summit that there should be caution on the matter of credit policy. I only hope that the western countries resist all the temptations and stick to that conclusion. However, I tend to agree with Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Müller and have my doubts about the wisdom of the decision reached on the gas pipeline. There is something wrong and unbalanced about the fact that at ministerial level transatlantic contacts take place only twice a year compared with the frequency with which they occur within Europe in political co-operation within the EEC. Mr. van Eekelen is right and it is important that the search for the correct forum – as Mr. Tindemans said on Monday – should continue for high-level regular contact between Europe and the United States of America.

Lord Reay (continued)

If we neglect the precautions that I and others have mentioned, we shall risk ending up as the last generation to enjoy freedom in any part of Europe. If, on the contrary, we nurture the transatlantic Alliance, we may be able – with luck – to bequeath to our children a Western Europe that is still worth living in.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay.
I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I, like others, would like to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. van Eekelen, most particularly on the excellent document he has tabled. It is a very full, objective and well-documented report, a study and analysis that makes a major contribution to the great debate we have been pursuing for months, indeed years.

This report on necessary co-operation between Europe and the United States does, of course, raise a number of questions.

First of all, what is the most serious threat to Europe? Does it come from the East or the West?

Listening to certain propaganda campaigns or certain so-called pacifist movements one ends up doubting and undecided. It is therefore worth getting things clear. The fundamental threat to our continent comes from the East – not that it is totally inevitable and necessarily entails the risk of a conflict. One should not take an apocalyptic view of events, and I do not think there is any will for war on either side. But the fact remains that objective consideration of the balance of forces reveals a serious imbalance and an expansionist policy – to say the least – on the part of one of our large neighbours.

Another question comes to mind in the face of this threat. Is Europe capable of defending itself alone?

Obviously not. Firstly, because, having survived the second world war by a miracle, it does not have the necessary economic, military and above all psychological and mental resources; as a result, solidarity with the United States must be the cornerstone of all policy for the continent of Europe. Without the United States we are unable to defend ourselves, and we should be frank enough to admit it – and this comes from a Frenchman. On the other hand, should one, like certain European countries or governments, leave things entirely to the United States and, under cover of a respectable Atlantic attitude, refuse to make any effort, as some of our neighbours do? Certainly not.

Europe should not open its mouth solely in order to yawn. It must have not only the will to arm itself at the technical and military level but also the will to defend itself that is regrettably not forthcoming from some circles and some leaders.

Our future thus depends on maintaining a balance in the Alliance, a balance that is more necessary than ever before, while continuing to respect national identities. The constant family quarrels between members of the Atlantic Alliance, and the kind of permanent paranoia that makes Europeans afraid when America is too weak and afraid when it is too strong must be seen for what they are.

It is time we got over this and tried to establish a real balance between the American and European partners. But for that to happen the Europeans must agree with each other. The sorry sight we make, and the romantic nostalgia which seems to take hold of us when we speak here among a few parliamentarians and the occasional ambassador, clearly reveal our weakness and limitations.

Yes indeed, what do we want to make of WEU? A phantom assembly? A supposed organisation in which a number of governments no longer believe? Or do we want to rebuild it? That at least is what France wants, and on that all political tendencies share a very real consensus. We want to reactivate WEU. But to do so, we need to be understood and supported.

I shall not go on any longer since I am the last speaker. Let me conclude.

The main effort we have to ask of our peoples is not military. The rearmament of Europe will not be achieved by nuclear rearmament alone. The main effort, the main rearmament, is a moral rearmament which we are incapable of presenting to our peoples and which is endangered by a systematic psychological demobilisation supported by movements, tendencies and complacent attitudes which have even penetrated the churches and economic and industrial circles. That is the truth of the matter.

As long as this situation lasts we may meet and adopt the excellent report of our colleague Mr. van Eekelen, but we shall not change the real situation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. That concludes a short but very good discussion on this very important and interesting report.

I now ask Mr. van Eekelen whether he would like to reply to the discussion.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – First, I should like to thank my colleagues most warmly for the compliments they have paid to my report, for their support of individual recommendations, and for the additions they have made to the text and to my introduction. I agree with virtually every word they have said. Mr. Hardy stressed the great importance of balanced disarmament commitments and I fully agree with him. I thank him also for the contribution he made in our committee in making those points more clearly.

Mr. Müller mentioned various points which I did not have time to stress. He spoke, among other things, of the situation in Central America, a topic which often came up during our discussions in Washington. Here the problem is that some Europeans tend to hold the Americans responsible for all the terrible things which happen in Central America, while on our side there are no clear ideas about possible alternative solutions.

Mr. Jung very rightly pointed to the American tendency sometimes to go too far in their rhetorical statements of policy. On the other hand, like me, he has pointed out the more realistic attitude of the Reagan administration; and I believe we should always judge people on their deeds and not only on their words.

Mr. Jung seemed to feel that the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the preamble indicated a lack of public support for defence. I read them differently. I read those paragraphs as signalling some real problems in our societies, fortunately open societies as he himself mentioned, but leading us to the need to present our defence effort more concretely and more consistently and indicating the need for better consultation to avoid irritation and frustration in the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Wilkinson made some important comments and I fully agreed with him when he said that the superpowers should not be equated on the moral and political scale of public judgment. As in his own report, he made a strong plea for an Atlantic-wide market, of which I am in favour. I have tried only to give an alternative solution in industrial co-operation. Sometimes we have attempted to do too much by stressing only the exchange of equipment when it concerns complete weapons systems. Perhaps the scope for agreement and for real industrial co-operation might be greater if there were a teaming up of various industries from various countries in specific projects. That, by the way, might be very helpful to some of the smaller members of the Alliance also. I thank Mr. Wilkinson also for stressing the importance of the study of burden sharing, and his suggestions for more specialisation in our various countries in defence.

Lord Reay made the interesting analysis – I gladly share his view – that one motive, if not the Soviet motive, with regard to the West, is to exploit the division between the United States and Europe. We should guard ourselves against that. I also welcome his plea for a search for more European-American contacts.

I thank Mr. Baumel very much, especially as he is a Frenchman, for what he said about the importance of the American effort for the defence of Europe. It was an important statement which I welcome. I share fully his opinion that Europe should show a willingness to defend itself and that this is probably the most important element in transatlantic relations. If the Americans have one trauma as a result of their experience, it is that they have sometimes aided people who were not willing to make sacrifices for their own defence. I fully endorse his statement. That is really the crux of our defence situation. We Europeans should make clear that, although we cannot stand entirely on our own, we are doing our best to achieve a credible defence effort.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that the Assembly has made clear how much your report, Mr. van Eekelen, and the work you have done in preparing and presenting it, is valued.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – In view of your last remarks, Mr. President, I do not wish to do more than formally place on record our thanks to Mr. van Eekelen and to express our appreciation to our American hosts who answered all questions, both difficult and easy. I should also like to mention the outstanding help that was received from the American embassies in London and in Paris. I should not omit to say “thank you” to our secretariat, particularly Mr. Burgelin, for arranging the visits. Everyone did very well and Mr. van Eekelen lost no opportunity.

Although we should never exaggerate the importance of these visits, the chance to express to a wide range of people how Europe was feeling and its sensitivities came at an appropriate time and helped, even in a minor way, towards greater understanding of the European view revealed throughout the recent visit of the President of the United States.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Sir Frederic.

Before proceeding to a vote on the draft recommendation, we must deal with the amendments. Four amendments have been proposed. According to the rules I take them in the order in which they relate to the draft recommendation – Amendment 4 by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Urwin, Amendments 2

The President (continued)

and 3 by the Rapporteur and Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy and some of his colleagues. I call Mr. Urwin to move Amendment 4:

4. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "regretting" and insert "noting".

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you Mr. President. This is a relatively simple amendment. It appears on the order paper because it was moved in committee some time ago. Since then, there has been a degree of misunderstanding over whether the committee accepted the amendment by a majority vote. My recollection is that it did. However, it did not appear in the revised text of the draft recommendation. I understand that my colleague Mrs. Baarveld has consulted the Rapporteur and has obtained his agreement to the acceptance of the amendment. With those brief remarks I move the amendment even though I do not think that Mr. van Eekelen has heard what I have said. I have impugned him by saying that Mrs. Baarveld informed me that the Rapporteur was prepared to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall see. Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I said just now, I was unable to table a number of amendments because there was no one in the office at the time. I request that an addition be made to the amendment so that it refers not only to nuclear weapons but also to conventional weapons.

The PRESIDENT. – We cannot accept verbal amendments. Although the office might not have been occupied for a few minutes about an hour ago, when I understand that you sought to table amendments, the rules make clear that they should be tabled in time for them to be printed and distributed if time permits so that they can be considered. I have the responsibility and the duty to consider whether adequate time is available. This problem, as you will recall, arose earlier in the week. I cannot accept verbal amendments. Once this is done for one member, it would have to be done for others. This excellent report has been in the hands of members for a long time. An amendment could have been put down before 11 o'clock this morning. Whether or not the Rapporteur does so, I will not accept anything but the written text.

Mr. Rapporteur, do you wish to speak?

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – It is difficult to fight over the words "regretting" or

"noting", especially when the argument is presented by someone like Mr. Urwin, whom I esteem. On the other hand, I prefer the word "regretting". The paragraph says:

"Regretting that measures required for collective security are not really understood".

There may be a difference of opinion over what is required for collective security. When that requirement is not understood, all of us should regret it.

The PRESIDENT. – It is a narrow question for the Assembly to decide.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negated.

We now come to Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. van Eekelen:

2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Welcoming the outcome of the meetings of heads of state or government at Versailles and Bonn which reaffirmed the solidarity and cohesion of the free world in maintaining peace and international security as well as in promoting economic co-operation based on respect of the principles of GATT,".

Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – We discussed in committee whether it was wise to make a statement in the printed document about the summit conferences of Versailles and Bonn. We agreed that we could leave this matter open because we did not want to anticipate conferences yet to take place. On the other hand, some of my colleagues agree about the importance of the consensus reached at these conferences. I think therefore, that we should make a positive statement in our preamble.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on Amendment 2.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 is, I think, of a similar nature but you probably wish to speak to it, Mr. van Eekelen. It is:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4 and insert a new paragraph as follows:

"4. To ensure that NATO governments continue to base their public assessments of

The President (continued)

the balance of forces on a common document along the lines of their recent publications; ”.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – When we drafted the recommendation we were not aware that NATO would work so quickly and present its balance of forces document to the Assembly. I have now changed the sense of the paragraph to a certain extent so that we consider the future and stress the importance that all major governments base themselves on the same public assessment of the balance of forces to avoid the misunderstandings that have arisen in the past through people quoting different figures about the Soviet threat.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We now come to the final amendment, tabled by Mr. Hardy and some of his colleagues, Amendment 1:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ weapons ” to the end.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I advance three reasons in support of the amendment.

First, we need to demonstrate the clear and simple fact that the western alliance is eager for a reduction in nuclear weapons on a balanced basis. I am not suggesting unilateral disarmament. That is why I want to see the word “ controlled ” retained. The Rapporteur intends, by the use of that word, verified and balanced limitation of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the phrase “ balance of forces ” has already appeared in an earlier recommendation in item 4. The existence of balance is implicit throughout the whole report. I do not accuse Mr. van Eekelen of disregarding that important fact. As I said in committee, and as the Assembly recognised earlier this week, we need to demonstrate that we are in favour of peace and disarmament on a balanced basis. It must be made clear to our populations that that is our position. The West needs to demonstrate that if there is to be an escalation of the arms race, it is not our responsibility, but it will be a response to cynical disregard of demands for peace throughout the world. I hope that the report can end on that simple note. That is why I urge the Assembly to accept the amendment.

Thirdly, if we do not accept the amendment, we shall be acting in contradiction of the

important report on disarmament that the Assembly enthusiastically accepted earlier this week.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to speak vigorously against the amendment because I believe it to be extremely dangerous.

I welcome Mr. Hardy’s reiteration of the commitment that he gave earlier to a balanced reduction of armaments – balanced and, I presume, mutual – but that is not made clear in the recommendation. Through the deletion, the second part of the recommendation, the ensurance of the balance, is omitted, as is the fact that we regard a balance of forces as a prerequisite for security. That message cannot be emphasised strongly enough. I am especially glad that Mr. van Eekelen made that crucial point, which is at the heart of the disarmament debate in Europe and in the wider world. He made that his last and key point.

To say, as Mr. Hardy says, that just because we mentioned a balance of forces in an earlier recommendation, No. 4, that is enough, is an argument with which I strongly disagree. It is the need for achieving verified and controlled balance that the full recommendation makes absolutely plain. It is that need that is at the heart of security policy and is a key element of the whole list of recommendations.

Therefore, I urge the Assembly to vote against Mr. Hardy’s amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Mr. van Eekelen.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Netherlands*). – I thank Mr. Wilkinson for his statement. He makes the point much better than I can in advising the Assembly not to accept the amendment.

In paragraph 4 of the recommendation I want to have the same basis as we are talking about. That has nothing to do with the efforts at disarmament. Paragraph 5 is an attempt to avoid new incentives in the arms race. Paragraph 6 insists on a policy of vigorous and determined negotiations for controlled limitation of nuclear weapons.

I may grant, Mr. Hardy, that perhaps it would have been better if we had said “ at a lower level of confrontation ”, or words to that effect. There is no mistake in the Assembly that that is what we are after. That is also what we are after in the Vohrer report. I contest any statement that my report would go against the Vohrer report.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

I take up the words of Mr. Baumel. This is a statement about United States-European relations. In the United States in some circles there is a feeling that Europe is carrying out disarmament for its own sake and is not prepared to look at it in terms of a balance of forces. We should all strive for the balance of forces at as low a level as possible, but any disarmament without a balance of forces in mind is doomed to do serious injustice to our security and will be a most divisive element in transatlantic relations.

Therefore, precisely in this report we should stress the connection between disarmament negotiations and the attempt at a balance of forces.

The PRESIDENT. – May I put the amendment to the vote?

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

I now put the draft recommendation, as amended by Amendments 2 and 3, to the vote.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, we can proceed without a roll-call.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation).– Mr. President, I regret that I cannot accept the draft recommendation. I shall perhaps ask to explain my vote.

The PRESIDENT. – If you are opposed we must have a roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Duraffour.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows ¹:

Number of votes cast	33
Ayes	26
Noes	4
Abstentions	3

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted ².

I call Mr. Pignion.

1. See page 54.

2. See page 56.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation).– Mr. President, I would like briefly to explain my vote.

I deeply regret having been unable to vote for the draft recommendation tabled by our colleague Mr. van Eekelen, although I fully appreciate the quality of his report. However, the very way it is framed prevents me, on behalf of my country, from supporting the recommendation.

Like you, I deplore the fact that we are unable to alter the state of public opinion in our countries. I am not speaking so much of France, in which public opinion still seems to me resolutely prepared to defend the choices we have made. But, as long as the economic battle remains what it is, we shall be unable to convince our peoples that all this is not linked together. This is a problem we have to solve. Only then will we be able to embark on the real struggle for both defence and armament, and, if possible, for the disarmament which we fully support.

Moreover, for me as for several of my colleagues, the natural framework for contacts between parliamentarians is the Alliance, not NATO.

Finally, I feel that anything which, by agreement between the United States and the NATO countries, would tie my country to a number of others in the matter of economic relationships, when trade in agricultural products also needs to be improved, is incompatible with my position.

7. Outline booklet on WEU and its activities

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 911)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the next order of the day, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on an outline booklet on WEU and its activities, Document 911.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Berchem.

Mr. BERCHEM (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the document which I have the honour of presenting is not a report in the usual sense. It has no political purpose nor does it aim at any parliamentary action. It is simply a project for the publication – if the Assembly so wishes – of an information booklet about WEU and its various bodies at the next part-session.

Mr. Berchem (continued)

The need for such a publication became evident to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments last year, when it noted that WEU activities were often not very well known to the public at large and difficult to follow even for those journalists, parliamentarians or civil servants who have to take a more particular interest in them.

Of course other information documents have been published on various occasions, by the Assembly, by the Office of the Clerk or its Press Counsellor, Mr. Borcier, by Admiral Cantù, who for five years headed the Agency for the Control of Armaments, by the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, or, finally, about the organisation as a whole, by its Legal Adviser, Mr. Westhof.

However, most of these publications are old and needed to be updated, particularly as they were often out of print. The WEU Bureau and the committee were thus faced with the choice between reprinting old texts and drafting a new one. Was this not an opportunity for updating what had been done in the past and bringing together elements spread among various old publications?

That at least was the view of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, which was good enough to entrust the task to me.

It goes without saying that I did not undertake this task without consulting a number of people in a position to help me with advice, suggestions or criticisms. Allow me to express my thanks on this occasion to the authors of the documents I have just mentioned and also, in addition to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, to the Secretary-General, Mr. Longestaey, Mr. Westhof, Legal Adviser of WEU, General Rambaldi, Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, General Bourdis and Mr. Plantey, head of the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and Assistant Secretary-General of WEU. They were kind enough to read a first draft of the text and suggest a large number of detailed improvements which I was happy to include in very large measure.

For its part, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments examined the document with great care and also made a number of specific requests which I took fully into account. Some of those requests would however have involved work which I was unable to ask the Office of the Clerk to complete in time to have the document printed for this part-session. They involved a re-examination of the plan of the booklet itself and the introduction of a WEU organisation chart. This would have been dif-

ficult to do without fresh consultations, for which time was too short. Nevertheless, I shall bear these two requests fully in mind in drafting the final text of the booklet.

Finally, I have noted the wish expressed by various people that the future booklet should mention the Assembly's own pronouncements about the WEU institutions, their possible future and the improvements which could be made to their operation.

Bearing in mind that we are not after all dealing only with an information booklet, I have asked for an inventory to be made of the recommendations, resolutions and orders adopted by the Assembly concerning WEU, its constituent bodies and its operation, so that I can take them into account. Only examination of this preliminary work will allow me to judge how far this wish can be taken into account in a booklet which by its nature must be of modest size. However, I fully understand that the concern recently expressed by some people that the implications of the modified Brussels Treaty should be rethought in the light both of a European and international situation that has changed profoundly in the last almost twenty-eight years and of the improvements in military technology, raises questions about the way in which our Assembly and our governments have thought it appropriate to respond to these changes. It might be appropriate for a WEU information booklet to refer to this.

Having said that, the purpose of presenting this preliminary document is twofold. On the one hand, it is an opportunity for me to call upon the talents of all present, whether parliamentarians, members of government, civil servants or journalists, to let me know, by whatever means they consider appropriate, what improvements they would like to see made to this draft. This might take the form of a request to have a particular kind of information included or to see a particular mistake corrected. I have already received some suggestions since the draft was published.

Let me assure you all that I shall examine every suggestion or criticism with the greatest care, and I would be grateful if those who wish to offer them would avail themselves of the floor of this Assembly, or of more administrative or personal channels.

The other reason why the Committee for Relations with Parliaments decided to proceed in this fashion was to allow the Assembly to reach a decision, in full knowledge of the facts, on a booklet which, unlike all its predecessors, emanates from a Rapporteur and a committee, that is from the Assembly itself. It will be for the Assembly, whether it deliberates in plenary session, or leaves the decision to the Presiden-

Mr. Berchem (continued)

tial Committee, to take all necessary decisions concerning the publication of the booklet, particularly as regards languages, format and title. What I have tried to do in the present document is to enable it to do so with the facts before it.

There would be no sense in summarising the contents of the document, so I shall conclude. But let me add just one thing. In undertaking this project, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has sought to demonstrate the way in which it intends to play an increasing rôle, by doing everything within its power to give the widest possible publicity to the work of the whole Assembly. In the information report which he is also presenting on behalf of this committee, the Chairman, Mr. Stoffelen, supported by the committee, asks that the name should be changed to "Committee for Relations with Parliaments and the Public". Providing the parliaments of the member countries and the public with as accurate and full information as is possible in a booklet which must in any event be of modest size is, I am convinced, one way of fulfilling this function.

Such are the reasons which lead me to ask for your views on, and your assistance with, a task in which I would like to be seen as no more than an instrument of the whole Assembly.

Finally let me say that I regret that I had no opportunity to acquaint myself in time with the document on the SAC dated 26th May 1982. It was published after presentation of this report to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and, when I received it, it was too late for me to revise the chapter on the SAC. It goes without saying that I shall do so during the drafting of the booklet on WEU, if I am given the task.

Those, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the brief remarks and comments I wanted to make about the document presented to you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Berchem. I am sure the Assembly is greatly indebted to you particularly and to your colleagues who assist you in the important work of bringing up to date the published information not only about the work of the Assembly but the work of Western European Union as a whole. We have noted your intention further to update this information as you get additional advice and material, and also your generous undertaking to consider any suggestions that we or others may send you in the next months. I am sure that it will be extremely valuable to have this document, and it is very good that the Assembly should have had it brought to its notice during our plenary sitting.

I have had no notice of any representative wishing to speak. Does anyone wish to speak at this stage?...

If not, does the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Stoffelen, wish to say anything at this point?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I wish to say just a few sentences. I wish to advise my colleagues to read the document. I am sure that even members with long service – I have been a member for ten years – will find much new material. My committee is grateful to the Rapporteur and the secretariat, who did a very good job. As you say, Mr. President, it is of great value that Western European Union can have a new booklet giving excellent and up-to-date information about all our activities. I am grateful that the Assembly, apparently, if mandated will promote the publication of the booklet.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. I do not think that we have the means under our rules to have a formal resolution on publication. However, I think you can take it from the complimentary remarks that have been properly expressed to the Rapporteur and the secretariat for their work that if it was your wish it would be a matter for the appropriate authorities to go ahead with the question of publication.

8. Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 912)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the final item on the orders of the day, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on conditions for improving relations between the Assembly and public opinion, Document 912.

I think, Mr. Stoffelen, that you are acting as Rapporteur and Chairman in this matter. Will you present your report?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am fully aware that it is almost a tradition during the last minutes to give a sermon to the few present. I wish to follow that tradition. On this, the first occasion that I do so, I shall speak in Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, after many years of working in this Assembly, as well as in the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, it is clear that public awareness of WEU is still virtually nil. I have the definite impression

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

that the great majority of the public has no idea what WEU is. Most of them are not sure whether it is a football club, a brand of margarine or perhaps, after all, some kind of European institution. In any case it is clear that even our colleagues in the national parliaments rarely know what WEU is and does. I am aware that this situation appears to have improved somewhat recently, but I still believe that we all ought to do some soul-searching about it. Do we, or do we not, want the work we do here to end, for the most part, after four days, as soon as we leave this building? I am sure you would all call that a waste of time and energy. It simply cannot stop there. I am fully aware that a change in working methods is not a miracle cure which will effect a sudden transformation. But I am also aware that we must do everything possible to make WEU more widely known and, above all, to increase the impact of our decisions on national parliaments and national governments. I think that in a very short time I can make fifteen proposals to this effect.

I feel that the first is the most important of all. We the members of the Assembly have to discuss really topical subjects. I should like to draw from this two conclusions, which you can all read in the report.

Firstly, for the sake of our own credibility, the Assembly must confine itself to the main aims of WEU. I do not wish – although the temptation to do so is very great – to make any remarks now about committees' trips to South America or plans to visit Japan, Canada or other parts of the world. I will confine myself to essentials. Committees and reports should be restricted to the real function of WEU, namely European security and defence policy.

Secondly – I am still talking about the same proposal – our recommendations should contain political news, be relevant and include concrete proposals. Can we really expect our colleagues and journalists to listen to us with interest if we repeat what others have already said or if the news element in our reports and recommendations is practically nil? Of course not. Our recommendations must therefore be politically relevant.

Now I come to my committee's second proposal to the Assembly. It is not a formal proposal. I know that this is an information report. I refer to a limitation of the number of reports. Our present task is impossible. We actually have three days available per part-session. This time we have tried to discuss twelve reports in three days, to welcome three guest speakers and even to conduct a few debates on points of order. That will not do,

Mr. President: it is impossible! If we go on like this, the speaking time will continue to be limited to five minutes. Can we really expect our colleagues to be very interested, when the average attendance in this chamber at various debates is so small that it would be possible, if it were not so risky, to fire off a cannon without hitting more than one person! That surely cannot be right. My conclusion is therefore: fewer reports, to simplify our thinking. It would be a good thing if committees were to confine themselves on average to one report per part-session, perhaps by the two committees which I consider to be relatively the most important, namely the General Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee. Two reports would considerably reduce the total.

My third proposal is again about the relationship between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. Our most important function is of course to discuss reports and recommendations. We must not allow this discussion to be side-tracked by guest speakers. What we now have is a meeting between a parliament and ministers in the following form: the parliament is at work, the proceedings are interrupted, a guest speaker mounts the rostrum, speaks on some subject, questions may or may not be asked, and then the proceedings are interrupted again and the parliament carries on. This is not how I see a meeting between a parliament and a government. The report consequently suggests that ministers should speak to a specific report, for instance after the Rapporteur, and finally wind up the debate by formulating a few conclusions connected with the report.

My fourth proposal is that voting should take place as soon as possible after the discussion of the actual reports. It is irritating for journalists, and also for colleagues who have to leave the chamber in connection with other activities, when the voting is postponed to another day.

My fifth proposal concerns the meetings between the Assembly and the Council. I will, to be sure, put it in unusually mild terms during these last minutes; at least I shall try to do so. I shall confine myself to the conclusion that, unless there is a very definite subject to be discussed at the meeting between representatives of the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, we should consider not organising such a meeting at all. In other words, and to put it more positively, we must make sure that the subject can lead to a genuine discussion between the representatives of the Assembly and the Council of Ministers.

The sixth proposal concerns the relations between the Assembly and national parliaments. It is the job of my committee to select from among the large number adopted, a few special texts to be sent to national parliaments.

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

It is our job to encourage their implementation by parliaments. My committee will henceforth choose only those texts which contain practical, concrete and feasible proposals, rather than texts expressing very general principles which cannot reasonably be expected to result in any concrete action by parliaments or governments.

I now come to our seventh proposal. We will allow ourselves to be advised by the rapporteurs with regard to the choice of texts, because a rapporteur is usually very attached to his own text and knows best what pressure groups and authorities are most interested in his report.

Eighthly, we must pay more attention, in formulating model questions, to ensuring that a concrete answer can reasonably be expected from governments. We must no longer ask the model question: what does the government think about recommendation number so-and-so? The question must be as concrete as possible and must force the government to give a concrete answer. It is difficult for us to specify in general terms how this should be done. Our aim is that, prompted by the model question, national parliaments shall examine the situation, and that the question shall be concrete enough to compel a concrete answer.

Ninthly, we should like to encourage the delegations which do not already do so to prepare a written report after the WEU meeting, for their national parliaments. This has the advantage of ensuring that their colleagues who are not members of the Assembly are better informed about WEU's activities, which leads to a better impact on national parliaments and better information to the press.

The tenth proposal concerns the follow-up procedure. We meet for four days, twice a year. We adopt recommendations and five or six months later, as a rule, we receive an answer from the Council. By then hardly anyone remembers the text of the recommendation, yet we are expected to follow up the replies. This is a very odd situation. We must ensure that a procedure is established to follow up the fate of the recommendations, the position with regard to the answers, and our possible course of action. We can and must ensure that the Council is satisfied that the answers have precisely the effect it intended.

The eleventh point is that my committee will once again review its earlier decisions, aimed at improving its effectiveness.

I now come to the twelfth proposal. Some time ago Mr. Berchem presented a report on the documents published by the organs of

WEU. It was a long list. If it were not so late, Mr. President, I would ask you to name eight of these publications in thirty seconds. You would have received a prize, had you been able to, but I do not think you would have succeeded. The aim is to arrive at a publication policy, an evaluation of everything that has happened up to now. We must see if there are any publications which could be grouped together, or dropped. We must work out an up-to-date publication policy. It is not true that we have already reached some conclusions, although I know that there is a certain amount of anxiety about that in this chamber. At the moment we are merely saying that everything must be scrutinised and that we must see if it is necessary and justifiable to group publications together or alter them. This can be done by means of a sensible questionnaire to the national parliaments, the answer to which will show what is needed and what is actually useful.

My thirteenth point: we should like to encourage meetings between delegates and the press, if possible before sessions, before the Assembly meets and possibly at the end of the session. As a committee we will try to arrange meetings with the press in order to ask the opinion of journalists about the way we do our work. I have reason to believe that we shall receive an extremely frank but not always comforting reply. Up to now, between four and ten weeks after each part-session, booklets have been issued describing the activities during the part-session. These publications give the full texts of speeches by the Rapporteurs and the results of the voting. Anyone not in the know could gain the impression that this had not been the meeting of a parliament. In normal parliaments, political groups voice their opinions and decisions are reached along political lines. Difficult though it is, my committee will endeavour to ensure that the booklet gives a truer picture of the political debate which has taken place here.

As I have already said, I am introducing an information report. What we are trying to do can be done, unless you protest today against the proposals which we would like to make to the various committees. We want to change the name of our committee. My committee is called the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. In our opinion the committee should be renamed the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and the Public. The rules should also be changed to enable us to make recommendations. It is a remarkable thing that I can only speak here. Positive or negative views or replies can be registered, but we can never take any decisions. That is not right! It must also be possible for us to present draft recommendations, as is done in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Our work only makes sense if it

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

has an impact on the national parliaments, and also if our supporters at home, the people in our constituencies, know what we are doing. Otherwise our work is almost a waste of time. That can improve only if we improve our effectiveness and our public relations. This week the French Minister for External Relations, Mr. Cheysson, urged us to do our work as an Assembly properly, to discuss political topics. That only makes sense if the work that we do is not confined to the Assembly but also has an impact on the national parliaments and national governments. Our work is done on behalf of peace and security in Europe. I should appreciate it very much indeed if the Assembly would enable my committee greatly to improve the effectiveness of our work and our public relations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. I am sure we are all extremely grateful both for your full account of the work of your committee and for the fundamental look your committee has been taking at the work we do here and our influence, or lack of influence, outside. I have had the privilege and pleasure of your acquaintance and friendship for some years but I confess that I never saw you in a clerical collar or clerical garb. You certainly used the rostrum to good effect today as a pulpit to preach to us a good final sermon of which I hope we shall take note. With your help, perhaps the Presidential Committee can also make a contribution on some of the lines you have indicated.

Equally, I have never seen you as a terrorist, so I hope that you will not bring a gun in here to draw attention to the many vacant places that sometimes happen to exist in the hemisphere.

As you have said, Mr. Stoffelen, we cannot make a decision on your report but we can debate it and I have had notice that Mr. Garrett, Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Lagneau wish to speak.

I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). – I am a new member of this Assembly and this information report seems to me to be a movement towards what we all desire. The aim has been ably stated by Mr. Stoffelen. It is the need to draw international attention to this Assembly's objectives.

I should like to make one or two suggestions on paragraphs 35 and 37. It is a good idea that we should look at our own parliaments and see how we distribute documents. For example, in the British parliament it is comparatively easy to get documents on the activities of

the European Economic Community. That organisation has an office there for that purpose, but if I were asked whether there was an office for the distribution of documents relating to Western European Union I am afraid that the reply would be in the negative. I believe that that is equally so of other countries.

On the matter of relations with the press, which is referred to in paragraph 37, under section (v), "Relations with the press", we should adopt the idea that when a report has been debated and recommendations have been accepted and approved by the Assembly, a press conference should be called.

Critics may take the line that if we call a press conference nobody will turn up, but there is always one reporter who turns up at press conferences and if he is enterprising and has initiative he can make a lot of money by projecting the information to the rest of the world. It is very often the initiative of the reporter that gets the material across, rather than the initiative of the various bodies, and in the short time I have been here I have noticed that some of the subjects that we have debated have been really topical in relation to the increasing international tension in the world.

What this Assembly does will, in my judgment, be emphasised by a closer, more personal approach to the press. We should not treat reporters as lepers. We should not treat them as though they were interested only in what is happening in their own countries. There are international journalists who, given every encouragement, will project our work. Perhaps before the final report is presented to the Assembly we could have another look at paragraphs 35 and 37.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Garrett. I should give you some assurance. I am sure that our excellent Press Counsellor, Mr. Borcier, treats the press very well and not in the manner that you perhaps suggest.

Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Stoffelen on the number of challenging questions that he has posed and from which we must not run away, although this is not the time to debate all fifteen of his points. I did not, however, wish this occasion to pass without commenting upon his suggestion in paragraph 37, headed "Relations with the press" when he asks: "What use do members of the Assembly make of the monthly information bulletin or the monthly index of documents" circulated to all members of the Assembly?

I wish to record that I find both documents extremely interesting, useful and informative.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

It would be for the worst if this information were not distributed to members of the Assembly. Mr. Stoffelen suggests that a questionnaire should be sent to all members of the Assembly to determine what use they make of the information. He will know from his own experience of questionnaires – if not, I will tell him – that members do not always complete questionnaires, and wrong deductions might be drawn from the small numbers of members who would perhaps complete and return such a questionnaire. I hope that if the idea of sending out the questionnaire is embarked upon, he will not deduce from any disappointing reply that this information is not helpful to or is not appreciated by members. I assure him that it is.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson. I think you know that in our own parliament we are invited, at the beginning of each session, to state which documents we wish to receive. If one is careless enough not to fill in the form one does not receive the documents. The committee may care to consider that British practice. I put it forward as an idea.

I call Mr. Lagneau.

Mr. LAGNEAU (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the few remarks I wish to make, after the excellent presentation by our colleague Mr. Stoffelen, follow on from what Mr. Atkinson said.

In all our national parliaments we all receive large quantities of documents. It is up to us to make a choice and read those which interest us according to our activities within our respective parliaments. The same applies to WEU, and we must recognise that our Assembly has the advantage of not flooding us with publications and of supplying us with excellent documentation.

What is the cost of the two reviews that have been criticised? For my part, Mr. Atkinson, I find them very interesting and do not hesitate to make use of them.

If therefore we were tomorrow to receive a questionnaire, it would be quite usual to indicate the total cost of the various publications for one year, so that we do not have to pronounce on the basis of vague information. Otherwise a questionnaire of this kind would lose some of its value. If I understand Mr. Stoffelen correctly, one of the aims is precisely the reduction of certain expenditure.

That, Mr. President, was the little I wanted to add to what Mr. Atkinson has said in favour of these two documents.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Lagneau.

Mr. Stoffelen, would you like to reply?

Mr. DURANT (*United Kingdom*). – May I say a word, although I have not given notice?

The PRESIDENT. – That is in order, because I have not closed the list.

Mr. DURANT (*United Kingdom*). – I merely wish to make one point on this excellent document, which I think is necessary for WEU. Mr. Stoffelen has not covered radio and television in the issuing of information on WEU. We are moving into a new phase of television. In due time, there will be satellite television. These are all aspects that we should consider at an early stage to see what can be done to promote this excellent organisation and to put over its work to a greater extent to the public.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I thank my four colleagues for their remarks. Mr. Garrett suggested that we should consider the way in which documents of Western European Union are distributed, which is logical and wise. The best way for me to react is to say that I accept his remarks and that my committee will consider the distribution of those documents in national parliaments.

It is worth considering the possibility of holding a press conference. In my introductory speech I mentioned the desirability not just of limiting the number of documents and reports, but of reserving speeches for debates on topical subjects.

This week we were to have two urgent debates, one on the Falkland Islands and the other on the Middle East. We must reserve speeches for such debates. Following such a debate it is logical that the Rapporteur should meet the press. The same is true of some other reports. Mr. Garrett is right. If that is possible in the Council of Europe, why should it not be possible in the Assembly of Western European Union?

Mr. Atkinson is right about questionnaires. We want a review of the list of publications and a practical inquiry. He is right when he says that questionnaires sent to members are often not answered properly. I repeat that we must find a way of getting information about members' wishes to have documents. We want to reduce not just costs, but the total amount of paper.

In my parliament, we receive a pile of post about one metre high per week. I am sure that that is true in other countries. Do we not all desire to receive fewer documents? If we can

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

promote that idea, we must do so in a sensible way, not with a questionnaire, as in the past. We must study the idea further in committee. There are several ways of considering the matter.

It is up to us to make a choice, as Mr. Lagneau said. Normally, we produce excellent documents. However, I know that few members have the chance to read all the reports that are discussed in the Assembly. If we were able and willing to speak the truth as politicians, as we should always do, we would admit that we read 50 % of the reports, although we all read the draft recommendations. That is the problem with which we must deal.

Mr. Durant knows of my preference for radio and television. He is right. I said earlier that my committee intends to meet journalists, including radio and television journalists, to ask their advice on what we can do to get better publicity on radio and television. For the first time, a German television group has been present on at least one day, so there has been some progress. Mr. Durant is right about publicity on radio and television having more impact than normal publicity in newspapers.

It is twenty minutes past one. Therefore, I must conclude. I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to my colleagues and the Assembly for the opportunity, on behalf of my committee, to introduce some proposals to improve the efficiency of the work of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Stoffelen. I am sure that the whole Assembly wishes you and your committee well. I would, if I may, from my experience over two years in the Chair, make two points. First, I would not wish to save expense if it meant depriving members of the Assembly of essential matters. However, I am charged under the rules with ensuring that we do not overspend. I know how difficult it is to get extra money from the Council of Ministers. I see the Secretary-General here. I hope that he will make a note of some of the points that have been raised. As I said, I must have regard to expense. That is unavoidable.

Secondly, some members of your committee and you, Mr. Stoffelen, spoke as though you were a committee in isolation. You are all members of national delegations. Indeed, some of you are also members of other committees. Certainly you are members of delegations and political groups which have members on other committees. Unless you can get the other groups to understand that they should abate their appetites for numerous visits and reports, the Presidential Committee is powerless

to take the sensible advice that you have given to have fewer reports and better debates. I agree with that, but I must have the co-operation not merely of your committee, but of all committees.

The record of the debate today, which I hope all members who are not present will read, will, I am sure, lead to some improvement in our procedures. We have the benefit of your presence on the Presidential Committee with two hats – as Chairman of a political group and of an important committee.

9. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT. – Following the nomination of Mr. van der Sanden as a substitute member of the Netherlands Delegation, the Netherlands Delegation proposes his candidature as a substitute member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and as a full member of the General Affairs Committee.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly must agree to these changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Netherlands Delegation.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

The nominations are agreed to.

10. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the business of this part-session of the Assembly. I am sure that, before I declare the session adjourned, you would wish me to express our appreciation to all our staff. It has been a particularly taxing session in many ways, with uncertainties, urgent debates and so on, not only for our small permanent staff, but for the excellent temporary staff. I am sure that you would wish me to express the Assembly's appreciation to them.

We have now come to the end of our business. I wish all members a good journey home.

I declare the twenty-eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned. I hope to see you, unless in the meantime I am discharged from my own parliament, at our next part-session at the end of the year.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.25 p.m.)

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

	Page		Page
A			
Address by:			
- the Provisional President	60-61		
- the President	61-63		
- Mr. Tindemans	65-68		
- Questions and answers	68-71		
- Mr. Cheysson	93-95		
- Mr. Leister	151-155		
- Questions and answers	156-159		
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council			
Presentation of the report	83-85		
Debate on the report	85-87		
Amendment 1 by Mr. De Poi	90		
- Adoption of the amendment	90		
Amendment 2 by Mr. De Poi	91-92		
- Rejection of the amendment	95		
Amendment 3 by Mr. De Poi	95-96		
- Rejection of the amendment	96		
Amendment 4 by Mr. De Poi	96		
- Rejection of the amendment	96		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Prussen	90		
- Adoption of the amendment	91		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Cavaliere ...	91-92		
- Adoption of the amendment	95		
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	96-97		
Attendance lists	18, 25, 32, 38, 44, 52		
C			
Committees			
Nomination of members to-	87		
Changes in the membership of- ...	89, 223		
Conditions for improving relations bet- ween the WEU Assembly and public opinion			
Presentation of the report	218-221		
Debate on the report	221-223		
Credentials			
Examination of-	61, 196		
D			
Disarmament			
Presentation of the report	106-108		
Debate on the report	108-111, 112-119		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy	119		
- Adoption of the amendment	119		
Amendment 2 by Mr. Hardy	120		
- Adoption of the amendment	120		
Amendment 3 by Mr. Hardy	120		
- Adoption of the amendment	120		
Amendment 4 by Mr. Beix	119-120		
- Adoption of the amendment	120		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Vohrer	119		
- Adoption of the amendment	119		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Vohrer	119		
- Adoption of the amendment	119		
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	120-121		
E			
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security			
Presentation of the report	205-208		
Debate on the report	208-213		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Hardy	215-216		
- Rejection of the amendment	216		
Amendment 2 by Mr. van Eekelen	214		
- Adoption of the amendment ...	214		
Amendment 3 by Mr. van Eekelen	214-215		
- Adoption of the amendment	215		
Amendment 4 by Mrs Baarveld- Schlaman and Mr. Urwin	214		
- Rejection of the amendment	214		
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	216		
Evolution of the situation in Poland			
Ratification of action by the Presi- dential Committee	64		
Presentation of the report	147-150		
Debate on the report	150-151, 159-163, 165-167		
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel	168		
- Adoption of the manuscript amendment	168		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Pignion	168		
- Adoption of the amendment	168		
Amendment 2 by Mr. Pignion	168-169		
- Adoption of the amendment	169		
Amendment 3 by Mr. Pignion	169		
- Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel	169		
- Adoption of the amended amend- ment	170		
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Michel	170		
- Adoption of the manuscript amendment	170		
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	170		

INDEX

	Page
F	
Falklands crisis	
News agency report	96
Previous question	138, 139
Presentation of the report	140-141
Reference back to committee	141-143
H	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	
Presentation of the report	97-100
Debate on the report	100-104
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	104
- Adoption of the amendment	104
Manuscript amendment by Mr. Antoni	104-105
- Ruled out of order	104
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	105
I	
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	
Presentation of the report	171-173
Debate on the report	173-179
Vote on the draft recommendation ..	179
M	
Middle East (see: Situation in the -)	
N	
Nuclear weapons (see: Problem of - in Europe)	
O	
Observers	63
Order of business	
Adoption of the -	63-64
Orders of the day	12, 22, 30, 36, 42, 48, 195-196
Outline booklet on WEU and its acti- vities	
Presentation of the report	216-218
Debate on the report	218

	Page
P	
Poland (see: Evolution of the situation in -)	
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council)	
Presentation of the report	73-76
Debate on the report	77-82
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	82
- Manuscript amendment by Mr. Vecchietti	82
- Adoption of the amended amend- ment	82
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	82
President	
Election of the -	61
Address by the -	61-63
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	
Presentation of the report	121-124
Debate on the report	124-137
Amendment 1 by Mr. Gessner	144
- Withdrawal of the amendment ..	144
Amendment 2 by Mr. Pignion	144-146
- Rejection of the amendment	146
Amendment 3 by Mr. Mommersteeg ..	144
- Adoption of the amendment	144
Amendment 4 by Mr. Mommersteeg ..	145-146
- Adoption of the amendment	146
Vote on the amended draft recom- mendation	146-147
R	
Report of the Council, twenty-seventh annual - (see also: Application of the Brussels Treaty; Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields; Political activities of the Council)	
Presentation by Mr. Tindemans ...	65-68
- Questions and answers	68-71
Revision of Rules 14, 29, 34, 38 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure	
Reference back to committee	194, 195-196
S	
Session	
Opening of the -	60
Adjournment of the -	223

	Page
Situation in the Middle East	
Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure	71-72
Presentation of the oral report	179-181
Debate on the oral report	181-183
Amendment 1 by Mr. Blaauw	197
- Rejection of the amendment	197
Amendment 2 by Mr. Blaauw	198-199
- Rejection of the amendment	199
Amendment 3 by Mr. Blaauw	199
- Withdrawal of the amendment ..	199
Amendment 4 by Mr. Blaauw	200-201
- Rejection of the amendment	201
Amendment 5 by Mr. Blaauw	201
- Withdrawal of the amendment ..	201
Amendment 6 by Mr. Blaauw	201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	203
Amendment 7 by Dr. Miller	201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	203
Amendment 8 by Dr. Miller	203-204
- Rejection of the amendment	204
Amendment 9 by Dr. Miller	204
- Withdrawal of the amendment ..	204
Amendment 10 by Mr. Dejardin ..	197-198
- Rejection of the amendment	198
Amendment 11 by Mr. Dejardin ..	198-199
- Rejection of the amendment	199
Amendment 12 by Mr. Dejardin ..	199-200
- Rejection of the amendment	200
Amendment 13 by Mr. Dejardin ..	200-201
- Rejection of the amendment	201
Amendment 14 by Mr. Dejardin ..	201-203
- Rejection of the amendment	203
Amendment 15 by Mr. Dejardin ..	204
- Rejection of the amendment	204
 Vote on the amended draft recommendation	 205

	Page
T	
Texts adopted:	
Recommendations	
- 378 - Evolution of the situation in Poland	19
- 379 - Political activities of the WEU Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	21
- 380 - Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	28
- 381 - Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	29
- 382 - Disarmament	34
- 383 - The problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	40
- 384 - Evolution of the situation in Poland	45
- 385 - International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	46
- 386 - Situation in the Middle East	55
- 387 - European-United States cooperation for international peace and joint security	56
 Order	
- 56 - Situation in the Middle East	20
V	
Vice-Presidents	
Election of -	63, 137-138

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

	Page		Page
A			
Mr. Althammer (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Evolution of the situation in Poland	159-160		
Mr. Antoni (<i>Italy</i>):			
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	101-102, 104, 105		
Disarmament	108-109		
Mr. Atkinson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Point of order	143		
Evolution of the situation in Poland	150-151		
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	221-222		
B			
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (<i>Netherlands</i>):			
Evolution of the situation in Poland	161-162		
Mr. Bahr (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):			
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	126-127		
Mr. Baumel (<i>France</i>):			
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	212		
Mr. Beith (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	129-130		
Mr. Beix (<i>France</i>):			
Disarmament	115-116, 119		
Sir Frederic Bennett (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Situation in the Middle East	71-72, 192-193, 197-198, 199-200, 203		
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	81-82		
Disarmament	114, 120		
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	128		
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	213		
Mr. Berchem (<i>Luxembourg</i>):			
Outline booklet on WEU and its activities	216-218		
Mr. van den Bergh (<i>Netherlands</i>):			
Disarmament	110		
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	127-128		
Situation in the Middle East	185		
Mr. Bernini (<i>Italy</i>):			
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	85, 97		
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	131-132		
Mr. Blaauw (<i>Netherlands</i>):			
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	80-81, 82		
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	86		
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	100-101, 104		
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	134		
Situation in the Middle East	188, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203		
Mr. Brown (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Disarmament	110-111		
Point of order	164-165		
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	175-176		
Mr. Cavaliere (<i>Italy</i>):			
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	87, 91		
Disarmament	118-119, 119-120		
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	137, 146		
Falklands crisis	140-141, 143		
Question put to Mr. Leister	157-158		
Situation in the Middle East	184-185		
Mr. Cheysson (<i>Minister for External Relations of the French Republic</i>):			
Address by –	93-95		
Mr. Cox (<i>United Kingdom</i>):			
Point of order	106		

	Page
D	
Mr. Dejardin (Belgium):	
Disarmament	109
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	130-131, 145
Evolution of the situation in Poland	169
Situation in the Middle East	182-183, 186, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201-202, 203-204, 205
Mr. Della Briotta (Italy):	
Situation in the Middle East	179-181, 192, 201, 202-203, 204
Mr. De Poi (Italy):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ...	68
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	79-80
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	90, 91, 92, 95, 96
Mr. Durant (United Kingdom):	
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	222
E	
Mr. Edwards (United Kingdom):	
Address by the Provisional President	60-61
Examination of credentials	61
Election of the President	61
Mr. van Eekelen (Netherlands):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ...	69
Question put to Mr. Leister	156
Situation in the Middle East	181-182
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	205-208, 213, 214, 215-216
Mr. Enders (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Disarmament	117-118
Mr. Fiandrotti (Italy):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	97-100, 102-103, 105

	Page
Mr. Forma (Italy):	
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	101
Mr. Fosson (Italy):	
Disarmament	116-117
Mr. Fourré (France):	
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	174-175
Mr. Garrett (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East	201, 203, 204
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	221
Mr. Gessner (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	91, 97
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	144
H	
Mr. Hardy (United Kingdom):	
Disarmament	133-114, 119, 120
Situation in the Middle East	198-199, 202
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	208, 215
Sir Paul Hawkins (United Kingdom):	
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982	177
Lord Hughes (United Kingdom):	
Point of order	170
J	
Mr. Jessel (United Kingdom):	
Point of order	63
Mr. Kurt Jung (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	134-135, 145
Questions put to Mr. Leister	158
Evolution of the situation in Poland	162-163

	Page
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	209-210, 214
Mrs. Knight (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ...	70
Evolution of the situation in Poland	165-166, 170
Situation in the Middle East	184
L	
Mr. Lagneau (Belgium):	
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion	222
Mr. Lagorce (France):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	86-87
Question put to Mr. Leister	156
Mr. Leister (Minister of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany):	
Address by -	151-155
Replies to questions	157, 158-159
M	
Lord McNair (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East	187-188
Mr. Maravalle (Italy):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	128-129
Mr. Michel (Belgium):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland	147-150, 166-167, 168-169, 170
Dr. Miller (United Kingdom):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	125-126, 145
Situation in the Middle East	191-192
Mr. Mommersteeg (Netherlands):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	121-124, 135-136, 144, 145
Mr. Günther Müller (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	132-133

	Page
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	208-209
Mr. Mulley (United Kingdom):	
Address by the President	61-63
Election of Vice-Presidents	63, 137-138
Observers	63
Examination of credentials	196
O	
Mr. Osborn (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ...	70-71
Question put to Mr. Leister	156
International aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982.	173-174
P	
Mr. Page (United Kingdom):	
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	79
Mr. Pignion (France):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ...	70
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	77-78
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe	144-145, 146
Evolution of the situation in Poland	168-169
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	216
Mr. Prussen (Luxembourg):	
Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	83-85, 90, 92, 96
Situation in the Middle East	182
R	
Lord Reay (United Kingdom):	
Situation in the Middle East	183-184
European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security	211-212
Mr. Reddemann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council	80

INDEX

Page	Page
Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 85	
Point of order 105, 106	
Situation in the Middle East 186-187	
Mr. Romano (Italy):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland. 166	
Mr. Rösch (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Evolution of the situation in Poland 160-161	
S	
Mr. Scholten (Netherlands):	
Disarmament 112-113	
Mr. Schulte (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Revision of the Rules of Procedure 195-196	
Mr. Sénès (France):	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ... 70	
Mr. Smith (United Kingdom):	
Disarmament 114-115	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 133-134	
Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (Federal Republic of Germany):	
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the collo- quy on 9th and 10th February 1982 176-177	
Situation in the Middle East 189-190	
Revision of the Rules of Procedure 194	
Mr. Stoffelen (Netherlands):	
Outline booklet on WEU and its activities 218	
Conditions for improving relations between the WEU Assembly and public opinion 218-221, 222-223	
T	
Mr. Tindemans (Belgian Minister for External Relations, Chairman-in- Office of the Council):	
Address by – 65-68	
Replies to questions 68-71	
	U
	Mr. Urwin (United Kingdom):
Points of order 63-64, 90, 95, 105	
Question put to Mr. Tindemans ... 69	
Situation in the Middle East 72, 188-189	
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 78-79	
Falklands crisis 141-143	
European-United States co-opera- tion for international peace and joint security 214	
	V
	Mr. Valleix (France):
Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 103-104, 105	
Questions put to Mr. Leister 156	
Mr. Vecchietti (Italy):	
Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Council 73-76, 81, 82	
Situation in the Middle East 190	
Mr. Vohrer (Federal Republic of Ger- many):	
Disarmament 106-108, 118, 119	
	W
	Mr. Wilkinson (United Kingdom):
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 146	
Question put to Mr. Leister 156	
International aeronautical consortia – guidelines drawn from the collo- quy on 9th and 10th February 1982. 171-173, 177-179	
European-United States co-opera- tion for international peace and joint security 210-211, 215	
Mr. Wittmann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Problem of nuclear weapons in Europe 124-125	

