

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1981

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly Documents.

Volume II: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	Soc. Chr.
Mr. VAN DER ELST Frans	Volkunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DRUON Maurice	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FORTIER Marcel	RPR

MM. JAGER René	UCDP
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
VISSE René	Communist
WARGNIES Claude	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BAHR Egon	SPD
CORTERIER Peter	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JAGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Hans-Werner	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
PUCCI Ernesto	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
Mrs. BONIVER Margherita	Socialist
MM. CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo	Communist
Atilio	
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J.H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne-Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Sir Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Tony DURANT	Conservative
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
James HILL	Conservative
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
Sir Thomas WILLIAMS	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 15th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 868).
7. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 869*).
8. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 880*).
9. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 875*).
10. Nomination of members to Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Brugnon, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. *Opening of the Session*

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. *Attendance Register*

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *Address by the Provisional President*

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. *Examination of Credentials*

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes listed in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratifica-

tion by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Coleman as a Substitute for the United Kingdom.

5. *Election of the President of the Assembly*

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Mulley.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Mulley was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Mulley took the Chair.

6. *Address by the President of the Assembly*

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. *Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly*

Three candidates had been proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. Gessner, Tanghe and Maravalle.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

MM. Gessner, Tanghe and Maravalle were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session

(Doc. 868)

On the proposal of the President, the Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

9. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 869)

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Hurd replied to questions put by MM. Hardy, Tanghe, Wilkinson, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Spénale, Lord Duncan-Sandys and Dr. Miller.

10. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 880)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Page, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Urwin, Hanin, Osborn and Cavaliere.

Mr. Page, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 364) ¹.

11. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 875)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 365) ².

12. Nomination of members to Committees

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows:

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium :</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Tanghe	MM. Van der Elst Lambiotte Peeters
<i>France :</i>	MM. Bizet Bozzi Ménard Péronnet N...	MM. Bechter Ferretti Jung Louis Schleiter Caro

1. See page 19.

2. See page 20.

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Bahr Kittelmann Lemmrich Schmidt Hermann Vohrer	MM. Ahrens Lenzer Wittmann Büchner Rösch
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Fosson Maravalle Pecchioli	MM. Calice Giust Tripodi Mondino Amadei
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Prussen	Mr. Glesener
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw Scholten	MM. Tummers Mommersteeg van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Edwards Grant Smith	MM. Wilkinson Brown Dr. Miller Mr. Beith Lord Duncan-Sandys

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Hanin Lagneau Mangelschots	MM. Michel Van der Elst van Waterschoot
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Brugnon Deschamps Druon N...	MM. Baumel Forni Grussenmeyer Koehl Couderc
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Gessner Jung Kurt Müller Reddemann	MM. Corterier Büchner Schmidt Hansheinrich Sprung Amrehn
<i>Italy:</i>	Mrs. Boniver MM. Conti Persini De Poi Valiante Vecchietti	MM. Rubbi Patriarca Benedikter Cavaliere Calamandrei
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Thoss	Mr. Berchem
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Mommersteeg Porthoine Voogd	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra MM. Schlingemann Lamberts

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Hardy Lord McNair Lord Reay Mr. Urwin	MM. Page Pavitt Sir Anthony Kershaw Mr. Atkinson Sir Thomas Williams

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens van Waterschoot	Mr. Brasseur Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Malvy Péronnet Valleix N...	MM. Bizet Wargnies Lagourgue Petit
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Lenzer Männing Spies von Büllenheim Topmann	MM. Böhm Horn Müller Pensky
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Amadei Antoni Fiandrotti Forma	Mr. Orione Mrs. Rosolen MM. Maravalle Spitella
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Prussen	Mr. Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Cornelissen Konings	MM. Portheine Lamberts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Garrett Hawkins McGuire Wilkinson	MM. Gourlay Hill Coleman Jessel

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Peeters	MM. Mangelschots Bonnell
<i>France:</i>	MM. Depietri Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	MM. Lemoine Belin Pignion N...
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Althammer Schulte Sprung	MM. Bardens Jäger Schmidt Manfred Müller

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Martino Orione Petrilli Tripodi	MM. Cafiero Ajello Bonalumi Pozzo
<i>Luxembourg</i>	Mr. Krieps	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands</i>	Mr. Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Voogd van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Durant Fletcher Lord Hughes Mr. Stainton	Sir Anthony Kershaw Mr. Urwin Lord McNair Mr. Grieve

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Brasseur Michel	MM. Lagneau Lambiotte
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bozzi Lagourgue Pignion N...	N... Mr. Bechter N... N...
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Schmidt Manfred Schulte Spies von Büllesheim Unland	MM. Büchner Eickmeyer Schäuble Wittmann
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Battaglia Giust Mondino Sterpa	MM. Patriarca Spitella Fiandrotti Romano
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Glesener	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van Hulst Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Edwards Grieve Lord Hughes Mrs. Knight	MM. Cox Osborn Sir Thomas Williams Mr. Jessel

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Tanghe	MM. Dejardin Hanin
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	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France:</i>	MM. Lemoine Visse	MM. Sénès Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Enders	Mrs. Pack Mr. Bardens
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Agrimi Rubbi	MM. Forma Maravalle
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Berchem Glesener	MM. Prussen Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Schlingemann Stoffelen	MM. Mommersteeg Lamberts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Howell Lord Northfield	Mrs. Knight Mr. Gourlay

13. *Date and time of the next Sitting*

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 16th
June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Bahr</i> (Männing)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens	Müller, Günther	MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Cornelissen)
<i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell)	Reddemann	van Hulst
Hanin	<i>Schmidt</i> , Hermann	Portheine
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Topmann</i> (Schulte)	Stoffelen
Peeters	<i>Amrehn</i>	Tummers
Tanghe	(Spies von Büllesheim)	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
<i>Michel</i> (van Waterschoot)	Sprung	
	Unland	
	Vohrer	
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Brugnon	MM. Agrimi	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
Jung	Bernini	Sir Frederic Bennett
Schleiter	<i>Orione</i> (Bonalumi)	MM. Cox
Spénale	<i>Amadei</i> (Calamandrei)	Grant
	Cavaliere	Grieve
Federal Republic of Germany	De Poi	Hardy
MM. <i>Schmidt</i> , Manfred	Maravalle	<i>Osborn</i> (Hawkins)
(Ahrens)	<i>Spitella</i> (Petrilli)	Lord Hughes
<i>Wittmann</i> (Althammer)	Pucci	Mr. Jessel
<i>Pensky</i> (Bardens)	Tripodi	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i>
Böhm	<i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	(Sir Anthony
Büchner		Kershaw)
Enders	Luxembourg	Mrs. Knight
Gessner	MM. Berchem	Dr. Miller
Jung	Margue	Mr. Page
Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Kittelmann)		Lord Reay
		MM. Urwin
		Wilkinson

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Sénès	Luxembourg
MM. Berrier	Valleix	Mr. Thoss
Bizet		
Caro	Italy	
Depietri	MM. Antoni	Netherlands
Deschamps	Forma	Mr. Scholten
Ferretti	Fosson	
Grussenmeyer	Mondino	United Kingdom
Jeambrun	Pecchioli	Mr. McGuire
Péronnet	Rubbi	
Petit	Valiante	
Pignion		
Poncelet		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 364***on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Considering that the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council demonstrates its wish to inform the Assembly of co-operation between member states in foreign policy matters even when such co-operation has been pursued outside the framework of WEU;

Considering that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has improved in recent years;

Considering however that in several areas the Council does not provide the Assembly with the information to which it has a right, particularly on questions connected with the actual work of some organs of the Council;

Considering that for the Assembly's work to be effective it must be able to have a genuine dialogue with the Council at all times;

Considering that the efforts to rationalise the organs of WEU undertaken by the Council, together with its efforts to limit non-essential expenditure, must in no case compromise the future of an organisation which may be called upon to play an essential rôle for the security of Europe,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Reduce the time taken to prepare texts for transmission to the Assembly, be it the annual report or replies to recommendations and written questions;
2. Improve the clarity of the drafting of its annual report by including in an appropriate manner the texts referred to in the report;
3. Ensure a high-level ministerial presence on each day of sessions and arrange for Ministers to give collective views on the texts which are being debated;
4. Communicate to the Assembly as full information as feasible about the activities of all the organs of WEU;
5. Strengthen its arrangements for giving the media regular information on its activities;
6. Ensure that in everything it undertakes, while rationalising the work of WEU and maintaining the budget of the ministerial organs within acceptable limits, the present and future opportunities for action by WEU are in no way compromised;
7. Ensure that budgetary preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in no way diminish the means available to the only European assembly with responsibility in defence questions.

RECOMMENDATION 365***on the application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in Articles IV, V and VIII.3, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the security system of the signatory countries;
- (ii) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group;
- (iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its dialogue with the Council;
- (iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to adapt the latter to present conditions;
- (v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Recommendation 348 of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Conduct an investigation into:
 - (a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV that should be maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles II and V of Protocol No. III;
 - (b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff among all the WEU organs in the light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities;
 - (c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments;
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on the rôle and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the European armaments industry.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 16th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. European security and the Mediterranean (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 876 and Amendments</i>). | 2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. |
|--|--|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. *Adoption of the Minutes*

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. *Attendance Register*

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly*

Two candidates had been proposed for the three remaining posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. Berchem and Cornelissen.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

MM. Berchem and Cornelissen were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents so far elected was as follows: MM. Tanghe, Berchem, Gessner, Cornelissen and Maravalle.

4. *Change in the membership of a Committee*

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nomination to the Committee on

Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- Mr. Pucci as a titular member in place of Mr. Battaglia.

5. *European security and the Mediterranean*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 876 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, on behalf of Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Grant, Günther Müller, Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. *Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe*

General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, addressed the Assembly.

General Rogers replied to questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Mommersteeg, Gessner, Louis Jung, Kurt Jung, Hardy, Prussen, Amrehn, Wilkinson, van den Bergh, Lord Duncan-Sandys, MM. Osborn and Cavaliere.

7. *Date and time of the next Sitting*

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller, Günther Reddemann <i>Schmidt</i> , Manfred (Schulte) Spies von Büllenheim Sprung Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Unland)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Cornelissen) van Hulst Portheine Scholten Stoffelen <i>van den Bergh</i> (Tummers) Voogd
	Italy	
	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Orione</i> (Bonalmi) Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Mondino) MM. <i>Amadei</i> (Pecchioli) Pucci Triodi <i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	United Kingdom
France		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grant <i>Osborn</i> (Grieve) Hardy <i>Howell</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Durant</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (Sir Anthony Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Fletcher</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson
MM. Brugnon Jung <i>Baumel</i> (Péronnet) Schleiter <i>Fortier</i> (Valleix)		
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Althammer <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens) Böhm Büchner Enders Gessner Jung <i>Wittmann</i> (Kittelmann) <i>Bahr</i> (Männing)	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) <i>Krieps</i> (Thoss)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Petit Pignion Poncelet Sénès Spénale	MM. Schmidt, Hermann Vohrer
MM. Berrier Bizet Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
	Mr. Ahrens	MM. Calamandrei Petrilli Rubbi Valiante

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 16th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and the Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 876 and Amendments*).
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and*
- Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 879 and Amendments*).
3. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on the draft revised budget, Doc. 872 and Addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. European security and the Mediterranean

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 876 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers: Mr. Bernini, Mrs. Knight and Mr. Baumel.

Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

1. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:

“(i) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment to the values of parliamentary and pluralist democracy, the result of free elections by universal suffrage, and to the fundamental freedoms set out in the European Convention of Human Rights;”.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Spénale; Grant, Miller (points of order); Cavaliere.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 8) was tabled by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni:

8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“Considering that the serious bombardment of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is an act to be condemned and which increases the danger of war in the Middle East and that the justifications invoked by the Israeli authorities are unfounded;”.

Speakers: MM. Bernini, Miller and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following:

“(vi) Believing that the maintenance and the strengthening of present links between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European

institutions depend on true and steady progress being made towards the early restoration of democracy in Turkey in the interests of that country and of the Alliance, ”.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by MM. Urwin, Stoffelen and Hardy:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ even the strengthening ”.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Grieve and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni:

9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

“ To encourage international and regional agreements, with the participation of the great powers, to restrict and control sales of arms to countries in the area, particularly those at war, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, respecting their independence and interests and guaranteeing mutual security; ”.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ 2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of the Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterranean with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries; ”.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“ To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries; ”.

Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Dejardin and Grant.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Gessner, Stoffelen and Urwin:

5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ and defence planning ”.

Speakers: MM. Gessner, Günther Müller and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni:

10. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

“ To support the immediate resumption of negotiations on the Middle East which have become even more urgent after the Israeli attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order to find a fair solution to the crisis based on sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, including the state of Israel, on the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and on the unity and independence of Lebanon; ”.

The Amendment was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Hanin.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 50 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions; 9 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 366) ¹.

4. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 879 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur.

Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Bahr, Antoni, Baumel, van Hulst, van den Bergh, Hardy, Blaauw and Lord Reay.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

¹. See page 29.

Speaker: Mr. Scholten.

Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. van den Bergh and others:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv).

Speakers: MM. van den Bergh, Scholten, Cavaliere, Hanin, van den Bergh, Cavaliere, Hardy (point of order) and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) were tabled by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffelen:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "earliest" and insert "urgent".

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "at" to the end of the paragraph and insert "greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons".

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after "at" insert "much".

4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

"6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe."

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Mommersteeg, Cavaliere and Hardy.

The Amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 24 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions; 36

Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 367)¹.

5. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on the draft revised budget, Doc. 872 and Addendum)

In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to continue to sit after half-past six o'clock in order to complete the Orders of the Day.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Martino and Mulley.

Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft revised budget.

The draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 was agreed to.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 17th June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m.

¹. See page 30.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Sprung Unland Vohrer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnel) Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen) van Hulst <i>Blaauw</i> (Portheine) Scholten Stoffelen Tummers <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bizet <i>Baumel</i> (Péronnet) Spénale	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. Stainton (Sir Frederic Bennett) Cox Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes Mr. <i>Durant</i> (Jessel) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Brown</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. Page Lord Reay MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Urwin) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Mondino) MM. <i>Orione</i> (Petrilli) Pucci <i>Spitella</i> (Valiante) <i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	
MM. <i>Bahr</i> (Ahrens) <i>Wittmann</i> (Althammer) <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens) Büchner Enders Gessner Jung Kittelmann Männing Müller, Günther Schmidt, Hermann	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Pignion Poncelet Schleiter Sénès Valleix	Italy
MM. Berrier Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun Jung Petit		MM. Bonalumi Calamandrei Pecchioli Rubbi Tripodi
	Federal Republic of Germany	United Kingdom
	MM. Böhm Reddemann	Sir Anthony Kershaw

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on European security and the Mediterranean (Doc. 876)¹:

Ayes	50
Noes	4
Abstentions	2

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Gessner	MM. <i>Blaauw</i> (Portheine)
Agrimi	Grant	Pucci
<i>Bahr</i> (Ahrens)	Grieve	Lord Reay
<i>Wittmann</i> (Althammer)	Hardy	MM. Schmidt, Hermann
<i>Pensky</i> (Bardens)	Hawkins	Scholten
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	Lord Hughes	Schulte
MM. <i>Stainton</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)	MM. van Hulst	Spies von Büllenheim
Berchem	<i>Durant</i> (Jessel)	Sprung
<i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell)	Jung, Kurt	Stoffelen
Büchner	Kittelmann	Tanghe
Cavaliere	Mrs. Knight	Thoss
<i>Mommersteeg</i> (Cornelissen)	MM. <i>Brown</i> (McGuire)	Tummers
Cox	Männing	Unland
De Poi	Margue	<i>Garrett</i> (Urwin)
Enders	Dr. Miller	Vohrer
Fosson	Mr. Page	<i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)
		van Waterschoot
		Wilkinson

Noes:

MM. Antoni
Bernini
<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)
<i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)

Abstentions:

MM. Hanin
Müller, Günther

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe (Doc. 879) ¹:

Ayes	24
Noes	2
Abstentions	3

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Fosson	MM. Männing
<i>Wittmann</i> (Althammer)	Gessner	<i>Blaauw</i> (Portheine)
<i>Pensky</i> (Bardens)	Hanin	Schmidt, Hermann
<i>Stainton</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett)	Lord Hardy	Scholten
Berchem	Lord Hughes	Schulte
Cavaliere	MM. van Hulst	Unland
<i>Mommersteeg</i>	Kittelmann	<i>Spitella</i> (Valiante)
(Cornelissen)	<i>Brown</i> (McGuire)	Vohrer
		van Waterschoot

Noes:

MM. Stoffelen
Tummers

Abstentions:

Lord Reay
MM. Spies von Büllenheim
<i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 366***on European security and the Mediterranean***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the continuous growth of Soviet military power and the strategic advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union, and considering however that these factors have not led to any significant increase in the last three years in the direct *conventional* military threat from the Warsaw Pact countries in the Mediterranean region;
- (ii) Condemning the invasion of Afghanistan and the continued occupation of that country by Soviet forces;
- (iii) Concerned at the growing risk in parts of the eastern and southern Mediterranean region of conflicts or crises arising which can directly or indirectly involve the interests of allied countries;
- (iv) Drawing particular attention to the unprecedented levels of modern armaments in those areas, supplied both by the Soviet Union and certain countries of the Alliance, and which exceed in quantity and quality those of local NATO countries;
- (v) Welcoming the return of Greek forces to the NATO integrated military structure;
- (vi) Considering that as long as the process which should lead to the creation of new democratic parliamentary institutions in Turkey is not placed in doubt, the interests of that country and of the Alliance presuppose the maintenance of the links which now exist between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions;
- (vii) Believing however that European security depends also on diplomatic efforts to reduce the many local causes of tension, and on arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL.

Call for concerted action, where appropriate, in the North Atlantic Council or other bodies:

1. To establish more clearly the indivisibility of the Alliance and the will of all members to maintain security in the Mediterranean area;
2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of Greece, and even more urgently Turkey, for the purpose of fulfilling their contribution to NATO with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries;
3. To improve communications and air defence installations in the Mediterranean area;
4. To take diplomatic action to deter non-member countries of NATO from allowing bases or other military installations on their territory to be used by Warsaw Pact armed forces;
5. To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries;
6. To develop reasonably flexible defence arrangements to counter rapidly any unexpected threats to peace in the area, and to diversify the ability to bring in reinforcements to replace those currently earmarked that may prove to be required outside the NATO area;
7. To encourage Greece and Turkey to reach an early settlement of their disputes and to expedite the command reorganisation in the Aegean area;
8. To consider arrangements to permit Spain to participate in NATO exercises pending a possible completely independent decision by Spain to apply to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty;
9. To promote diplomatic efforts with a view both to endeavouring to reduce local causes of tension, and to expediting the convening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

RECOMMENDATION 367***on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe***

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue between the two both possible and desirable, especially on mutual security;
- (ii) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common constructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in particular on security matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces;
- (iii) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 360;
- (iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December 1979 on LRTNF as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons;
- (v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-range and battlefield so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world;
- (vi) Stressing the urgent need for the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear weapons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with reduced levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance;
- (vii) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the central front;
- (viii) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling therefore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as perceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the Soviet Union before the end of the year;
- (x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear policy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative Group, and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate constructively in formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council :

1. To ensure that negotiations on LRTNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without further delay;
2. To call for the urgent resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole with a view to securing broad parity at greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons;
3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT II limits and of the SALT I agreement and ABM treaty;
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at much lower levels of battlefield nuclear and conventional weapons;
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole;
6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 17th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 874 and Amendments*).
2. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 883 and Amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of Committees proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation:

- Mrs. Knight as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Page ;
- Mr. Howell as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mrs. Knight ;
- Mr. Page as a titular member of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in place of Mr. Howell ;
- Sir Thomas Williams to cease to be an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

4. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 874 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hermann Schmidt, Antoni, Hardy, Wilkinson, Brasseur, Forma and Kurt Jung.

Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Forma and Maravalle:

4. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “British, French and German Governments” and insert “interested governments”; consequently, in line 2 leave out “three”.

Speaker: Mr. Antoni.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Antoni, Bernini and Martino:

1. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “British,

French and German Governments” and insert “governments of the WEU countries”; consequently, in line 2 leave out “three”.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Antoni, Bernini and Martino and an identical Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Forma and Maravalle:

2 and 5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “other”.

The Amendments were agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Antoni, Bernini and Martino:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 1; 4 becomes 2; 1 becomes 3; 2 becomes 4.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 33 votes to 8 with 8 abstentions; 17 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 368)¹.

5. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and
Aerospace Questions, Doc. 883 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Topmann.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Atkinson, Konings, Cornelissen and Brown.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Topmann:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an established demand for it;”.

Speaker: Mr. Topmann.

The Amendment was agreed to.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

1. See page 35.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Spies von Büllesheim) Sprung	MM. <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) Thoss
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) <i>van der Elst</i> (Peeters)	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Unland) Mr. Vohrer	Netherlands
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Tanghe) Mr. van Waterschoot	Italy	MM. Cornelissen van Hulst <i>Blaauw</i> (Porthoine) Scholten Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
France	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle	United Kingdom
MM. Brugnon <i>Baumel</i> (Péronnet) Spénale	Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Mondino) MM. <i>Amadei</i> (Pecchioli) <i>Orione</i> (Petrilli) Pucci Tripodi <i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Cox) <i>Howell</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Kershaw) Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) <i>Durant</i> (Page) Urwin Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Topmann</i> (Ahrens) <i>Amrehn</i> (Althammer) <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens) <i>Wittmann</i> (Böhm) Büchner Enders Gessner Jung, Kurt Kittelmann Männing Müller, Günther <i>Lemmrich</i> (Reddemann) Schmidt, Hermann	Mr. Berchem	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Jeambrun Jung Petit Pignion Poncelet Schleiter Sénès Valleix	Italy
MM. Berrier Bizet Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer		MM. Calamandrei Rubbi Valiante
		United Kingdom
		Sir Frederic Bennett Dr. Miller Lord Reay

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments (Doc. 874) ¹:

Ayes	33
Noes	8
Abstentions	8

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Hanin	MM. Müller, Günther
Agrimi	Hawkins	<i>Durant (Page)</i>
<i>Amrehn (Althammer)</i>	Lord Hughes	<i>Orione (Petrilli)</i>
Berchem	MM. van Hulst	<i>Blaauw (Portheine)</i>
<i>Wittmann (Böhm)</i>	Jessel	<i>Lemmrich (Reddemann)</i>
<i>Lagneau (Bonnel)</i>	Jung, Kurt	<i>Lenzer (Spies von</i>
Cavaliere	<i>Atkinson (Sir Anthony</i>	<i>Büllesheim)</i>
<i>Edwards (Cox)</i>	Kershaw)	Sprung
Forma	Kittelmann	Thoss
Fosson	Mrs. Knight	Mrs. <i>Pack (Unland)</i>
<i>Howell (Grant)</i>	MM. <i>Garrett (McGuire)</i>	Mr. Wilkinson
Grieve	<i>Glesener (Margue)</i>	

Noes:

MM. <i>Topmann (Ahrens)</i>
<i>Pensky (Bardens)</i>
Büchner
Enders
Gessner
Männing
Schmidt, Hermann
Schulte

Abstentions:

MM. Antoni
Bernini
Hardy
<i>Dejardin (Mangelschots)</i>
Stoffelen
<i>Martino (Vecchietti)</i>
Vohrer
<i>Konings (Voogd)</i>

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 368***on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments***

The Assembly,

Considering that several European countries will need to procure a new combat aircraft in the early nineties to replace, *inter alia*, fighter aircraft which will then be obsolete;

Considering that this aircraft must be designed in the light of the then prevailing threat to European states;

Considering therefore that this aircraft will involve the use of very advanced technology and will have to meet a wide range of requirements (air-to-air, air-to-surface, ease of handling, short take-off, etc.);

Considering further that the time available for the study and design of this aircraft will thus allow detailed technical studies to be made (new designs) and the necessary financial means to be provided;

Considering that the standard of industrial activity, employment and technological know-how in the European states is directly linked with the future of the civil and military aeronautical sector and hence to the maintenance of its order books,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Recall the need to design a multi-purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific requirements of the various WEU member countries;
2. Insist on such co-operation being organised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on the lessons of twenty years of European experience of co-operation;
3. Ask the interested governments to tackle their present study in greater detail and harmonise the specifications required by the staffs of the air forces so that the development of a European combat aircraft may be undertaken;
4. Ask the governments of the WEU member states, in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Independent European Programme Group, to show their interest in the development of this aircraft which should be available for procurement in about fifteen years' time;
5. Consider extending European co-operation to other types of aircraft (helicopters, transport aircraft, etc.).

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 17th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 883*).
2. Relations between parliaments and the press (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 873*).
3. Developments in Poland (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 870 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty sixth annual report of the Council

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 883)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 369)¹.

4. Relations between parliaments and the press

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 873)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Enders and Hawkins.

Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman of the Committee, and Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

5. Developments in Poland

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 870 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Gessner, Atkinson, Bernini, Grieve, Blaauw, Cavaliere and Hawkins.

The Debate was adjourned.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 18th June, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 5.10 p.m.

1. See page 38.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mr. <i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)	MM. Stoffelen <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Italy	United Kingdom
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Tanghe) Mr. van Waterschoot	MM. Agrimi Bernini Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Kershaw) Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) <i>Fletcher</i> (Miller) <i>Durant</i> (Page) Lord Reay MM. Urwin Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Althammer Büchner Enders Gessner Jung, Kurt Kittelmann Männing Müller, Günther Schmidt, Hermann Sprung	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)	
	Netherlands	
	MM. Cornelissen <i>Blaauw</i> (Portheine)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Schleiter Sénès Spénale Valleix	MM. Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Pucci Rubbi Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti
Mr. Peeters		
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Berrier Bizet Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun Jung Péronnet Petit Pignion Poncelet	MM. Bardens Böhm Reddemann Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland	Netherlands
	Italy	MM. van Hulst Scholten Tummers
	MM. Antoni Bonalui Calamandrei	United Kingdom
		Mr. Grant

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 369***on the future of European space activities –
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Considering the continuous efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of civil and military space research and applications;

Considering also the growing space budgets of Japan, Brazil, India and other non-European countries;

Concerned about the slow progress in establishing a new European space programme and the low total budget proposed;

Regretting that too many parts of this programme are optional, not mandatory;

Welcoming the successful test-flight of the shuttle Columbia which will allow full use to be made of the European Spacelab;

Regretting the reluctance to prepare and convene a meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council to give political impetus, direction and commitment to the European Space Agency,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member states:

1. To elaborate long-term European space planning: to identify a space strategy for Europe and the related technical, industrial and commercial objectives to be met;
2. To ensure that Spacelab's potential is fully utilised for scientific trials and experiments in such areas as earth and stellar observation and microgravity research in life sciences and materials processing;
3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an established demand for it;
4. To agree on an earth resources satellite programme further to the Meteosat meteorological programme and to intensify the telecommunications technology programme;
5. To promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance context, the exploitation of European military communication and observation satellites and the investigation of the military implications of space technology;
6. To mobilise political and public opinion for an expanded European space programme in view of the scientific and industrial benefits to be derived from such potential future programmes as interplanetary missions and manned space flight.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 18th June 1981

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Developments in Poland (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Votes on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 870 and Amendments*).
2. European security and events in the Gulf area (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 871, Addendum and Amendments*).
3. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 877 and Amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Developments in Poland

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 870 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Günther Müller, De Poi, Dejardin, Rösch, Baumel and Kurt Jung.

Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Porthoine and others:

2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "in 1980".

Speaker: Mr. Blaauw.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Porthoine and others:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "foundation proper, leave out from "Poland" to the end and insert:

"which would constitute a flagrant violation of the principles laid down in the Helsinki final act and which would have consequences for the future CSCE process;"

Speaker: Mr. Blaauw.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Hanin, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Müller:

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "Poland" to the end and insert:

"which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in question their content;"

Speaker: Mr. Hanin.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 3 and 4) were tabled by MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "planning what measures all member countries should take in application" and insert "implementation".

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "application of these measures" and insert "implementation".

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Dejardin and Hanin.

Amendment 3 was negatived.

Amendment 4 was not moved.

Amendments (Nos. 5 and 6) were tabled by MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

Speakers: MM. Blaauw, Baumel, Gessner and Hanin.

The Amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 34 votes to 18 with 1 abstention; 11 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 370)¹.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett (explanation of vote); MM. Stoffelen and Hanin (points of order); MM. Hanin and Günther Müller (explanation of vote).

4. European security and events in the Gulf area

(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 871, Addendum and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, in place of Mr. Forni, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:

"Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially

of the United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area;".

Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

"Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that country with the armaments it urgently needs for its own security;".

Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett.

A manuscript Amendment to the Amendment was moved by Sir Frederic Bennett to insert "defensive" before "armaments".

The Amendment to the Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Blaauw and Vohrer:

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "assistance" insert "in particular in the political and humanitarian field".

Speakers: Mr. Blaauw and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

"Offer active support to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security and envisage giving them a unilateral European or western guarantee for their independence, if so requested;".

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Hughes, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Blaauw.

A manuscript Amendment to the Amendment was moved by Sir Frederic Bennett to insert "and help" after "support" and to leave out all the words after "security".

The Amendment to the Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

1. See page 44.

4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

“Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever.”

Speaker: Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 371)¹.

5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 877 and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.

In accordance with Rule 23 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to continue to sit after one o'clock in order to complete the Orders of the Day.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Hughes and Mr. Stoffelen.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Stoffelen was withdrawn.

Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 67)¹.

6. Adjournment of the Session

The President adjourned the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

¹. See page 45.

¹. See page 46.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹.

Belgium	MM. Schulte Sprung Unland <i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)	MM. <i>Glesener</i> (Margue) <i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)
MM. Adriaensens <i>Lagneau</i> (Bonnell) Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)		Netherlands
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters)		MM. Cornelissen van Hulst <i>Blaauw</i> (Porthoine)
MM. <i>van der Elst</i> (Tanghe) van Waterschoot	Italy	Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
France	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle	United Kingdom
MM. Brugnon <i>Baumel</i> (Péronnet)	Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Mondino)	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Amadei</i> (Pecchioli) <i>Orione</i> (Petrilli) <i>Giust</i> (Pucci) Tripodi Valiante <i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)	Sir Frederic Bennett
MM. Ahrens Althammer <i>Pensky</i> (Bardens)		MM. Cox Grieve <i>Edwards</i> (Hardy)
Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm)		Hawkins
MM. Büchner Enders Gessner Jung, Kurt Männing Müller, Günther <i>Topmann</i> (Schmidt, Hermann)	Luxembourg	Lord Hughes
	Mr. Berchem	MM. Jessel <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Kershaw)
		Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Fletcher</i> (McGuire)
		Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Durant</i> (Page)
		Lord Reay Mr. Urwin

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Sénès Spénale Valleix	Netherlands
MM. Berrier Bizet Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun Jung, Louis Petit Pignion Poncelet Schleiter	Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Scholten
	MM. Kittelmann Reddemann Spies von Bülllesheim	
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Calamandrei Rubbi	MM. Grant Wilkinson

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on developments in Poland (Doc. 870)¹:

Ayes	34
Noes	18
Abstentions	1

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Gessner	MM. Giust (Pucci)
Agrimi	<i>Edwards</i> (Hardy)	<i>Topmann</i> (Schmidt,
Ahrens	Lord Hughes	Hermann)
<i>Pensky</i> (Bardens)	MM. van Hulst	Schulte
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	<i>Fletcher</i> (McGuire)	Stoffelen
MM. Bernini	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Prussen</i> (Thoss)
Bonalumi	Männing	Tummers
Büchner	Dr. Miller	Urwin
Cox	Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Mondino)	Valiante
Enders	MM. <i>Amadei</i> (Pecchioli)	<i>Martino</i> (Vecchietti)
Forma	<i>Blaauw</i> (Portheine)	<i>Rösch</i> (Vohrer)
Fosson		<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)

Noes:

Mr. Althammer	Mr. <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony	MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Péronnet)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Kershaw)	<i>Orione</i> (Petrilli)
Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm)	Mrs. Knight	Lord Reay
MM. Grieve	MM. Müller, Günther	MM. Sprung
Hanin	<i>Durant</i> (Page)	<i>van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)
Hawkins	Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters)	Tripodi
		Unland

Abstention:

Mr. Berchem

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 370***on developments in Poland***

The Assembly of WEU,

(i) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, constitutes the charter of détente in Europe;

(ii) Recalling that this text stipulates that:

“ The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

.....

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them. ”;

and that

“ The participating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating state.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind. ”;

(iii) Considering that the events in Poland concern only the internal affairs of that country;

(iv) Considering consequently that any external intervention designed to impose on Poland measures which it has not freely decided upon would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki final act and would therefore terminate any process of détente;

(v) Recalling that in Order 53 the Assembly requested its President:

“ To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention ”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Announce without delay the principles which will guide its reactions in the event of Soviet intervention in Poland, which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in question their content;

2. Proceed forthwith to hold consultations with a view to planning what measures all member countries should take in application of these principles;

3. Draw up proposals for member states to submit to the North Atlantic Council in order to extend application of these measures to all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;

4. Request member states to respond as favourably as possible, under present circumstances, to any requests for credit facilities which the Polish Government has made or may make insofar as they are destined to improve living conditions for the Poles.

RECOMMENDATION 371***on European security and events in the Gulf area***

The Assembly,

Recalling its Recommendation 361;

Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse;

Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern Asian countries as well as to peace in the world;

Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East;

Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran;

Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area;

Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern countries;
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance movement;
3. Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that country with the defensive armaments it urgently needs for its own security;
4. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area;
5. Offer active support and help to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security;
6. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents;
7. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption;
8. Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever.

RESOLUTION 67***on the revision of the Charter and of the
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To adopt the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly as set out in Document 877 presented by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 15th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of Credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 868).
9. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 869*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hurd (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom).
10. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 880*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Page (Rapporteur), Mr. Urwin, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Page.
11. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 875*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tanghe (Rapporteur).
12. Nomination of members to Committees.
13. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Brugnon, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, a man who, owing to his exceptionally long political life, for many years held the more or less enviable position of oldest member

of this Assembly, Marius Moutet, used to say that he particularly appreciated this rôle because it allowed him to say what he wanted and what he thought without having to worry about political strings and without any fear of rejoinders. Actually he was an exceptional orator who made brilliant impromptu speeches, some of which were epoch-making.

As I cannot claim to be as eloquent as he was, I have a few notes, but these do not prevent me from claiming a privilege of which Marius Moutet used to take advantage, speaking to you as I am at a time when the political situation makes it difficult for a French parliamentarian to say anything without committing others. The fact that I am not a candidate in the current elections will perhaps give particular weight to a cautious attitude which is not just an oratorical device.

In this connection I hope that the Assembly will excuse the parliamentarians of the French Delegation, who, being engaged in the electoral campaign between the two ballots, will not be able to attend regularly during this session. I thank the Assembly in advance.

As I cannot talk about the present, I shall confine myself to reviewing some aspects of a past which is not yet very distant and which may throw some light on the future.

¹ See page 18.

The President (continued)

The thought that I shall no longer be with you at the next session of our Assembly prompts me to ask myself what the institution which brings us together here, and the modified Brussels Treaty which gave birth to it, may have meant to the men of my generation. This is perhaps not devoid of interest, if we bear in mind that several of those who, in France at least, were members of the government which worked out and negotiated this treaty have recently returned to government office from which they had been excluded for nearly a quarter of a century.

There is no doubt that the considerations which led to the revision of the Brussels Treaty were primarily European. The Atlantic Alliance was already in existence and had just set up a political organisation and an integrated command structure when the Brussels Treaty was modified. The security of Europe was based on this Alliance, and the problem at that time was to increase its effectiveness by organising European participation in the defence of Europe. It is well known that this participation ran up against difficulties, which are very understandable when we recall that it was only ten years after the end of the second world war and that the wounds which it had opened were far from having healed. But it was already apparent that the organisation of a new Europe, beginning with the creation of the OEEC and the Council of Europe followed by the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, could not be restricted to economic affairs alone. Without a political expression of European solidarity to meet the dangers then threatening our continent there would have been no Europe. Without concertation of defence policies, a political Europe could not be established.

It is easy and fashionable nowadays to complain about the lack of progress by Europe since 1954, but allow me to say that we Europeans have nevertheless made considerable headway since then. Although the institutions are still not as we would like them to be, and although co-operation is still inadequate in many cases, the rapprochement between the peoples of Western Europe has become a fact of our daily lives. The relations which we maintain in political forums such as ours bear witness to this, and European parliamentarism has become an important fact not only for us who are involved but also, in large measure, for public opinion in each of our countries.

The modified Brussels Treaty has certainly contributed to this, particularly through some of its provisions, which may subsequently appear to have been overtaken by events to some extent, but which made possible the

incredible rapprochement between France and Germany which is still vital for any progress by Europe.

I am thinking here not only of the rôle which WEU played in settling the dispute over the Saar, or even of the military commitments which the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris Agreements entail, but also of an entirely new factor which these agreements introduced into the international order.

For what was, I believe, the first time in history, a military alliance directed against an external danger also included clauses designed to reassure the partners about each other by giving them a guarantee that none of them would increase its armaments beyond a level fixed by mutual agreement. I do not think that the significance of this clause, whereby a military alliance is at the same time an agreement on arms limitation, has ever been sufficiently appreciated.

I should add that this agreement not only covers the principles of such limitation but also specifies all the actual procedures and controls involved. The creation of a control body based not, as had nearly always been the case, on mutual distrust but on trust, represented a major contribution to reconciliation between the states and peoples of Europe.

The need for such an institution may not be as obvious today, since the problems facing Europe no longer stem from the fear that one of the partners will over-arm but from the fear that none of them will arm sufficiently to match the scale of the armed forces and armaments which we can see building up in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, this novel feature of the modified Brussels Treaty and the new ethic of the Alliance which it brought into being ought, I think, to inspire Europe's relations with the rest of the world.

For, while it is fashionable to emphasise that security and disarmament must go hand in hand, it should be added not only that disarmament and control are indissolubly linked but also that controlled disarmament has become, and must become more than ever during the coming years, one of the cornerstones of the international order. In other words, the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, created by it, are by no means outdated institutions but, in a way, foreshadow what the shape of a new international order should be, to give Europe, if not the world, the era of peace which it so sorely needs.

Another aspect of the modified Brussels Treaty, whose importance should not be underestimated, is that which calls upon European arms manufacturers to join forces and work together. True, it has often been stressed that

The President (continued)

such an association ought to make it possible to keep down unit production costs and should thus lead to better and more economical performance. That is probably so, but it is perhaps even more essential that, in this field as in others, solidarity among Europeans should be reflected in joint production, that is, in close co-operation, which in itself furthers the cause of disarmament by separating the effort required to ensure the security of our society from the individual interests which have too often determined the armaments policy of states.

Admittedly, the progress made in this direction is very limited and the summary which the Council has just given us of the economic chapter of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU does not give the impression that the cause of Europe has already triumphed. Nevertheless, the association, from the outset, of a military alliance with a determination to produce armaments jointly and a determination to limit the military power of each member represented a contribution to international practice which was new and, it is to be hoped, decisive.

While designed to meet the requirements of the situation as it was in 1954, the modified Brussels Treaty remains the cornerstone for a continuing balance and co-operation between the signatories and, at the same time, retains its full significance as a bold anticipation of the organisation of world peace.

For all these reasons, there seems to be no need today to despair of the institution which brings us together here. True, it has not produced the results expected by some people. Nor, however, has it justified its opponents' reservations and fears. The modified Brussels Treaty is in fact applied both in the field of political consultation and in its military aspects and has provided the backcloth against which other institutions are developing, even if they are taking over the position which the Brussels Treaty assigned to the Council of Western European Union. There is no reason to regret this, as it has enabled countries unwilling to enter into a military alliance to associate themselves in fact with the practice which the authors of the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty wished to promote. The judgment which will be passed by those who look back on this institution with the historian's detachment and impartiality will probably be far more favourable than that which some of today's politicians feel entitled to pass.

These considerations lead me, now that I am about to leave you, to express to you my good wishes for the work which you still have to do together. There is every reason to have confi-

dence in an institution which has succeeded in extending military co-operation beyond its own limits and, in particular, in giving it a very special moral significance. As during the last twenty-six years, your rôle today is still to ensure that neither governments nor public opinion be allowed to forget what was intended by the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty. This calls for watchfulness, imagination and a keen sense of what is possible. These, I know, are virtues which European parliaments do possess, and it is therefore with confidence in your future and in the future of Europe that I say goodbye to you. (*Applause*)

4. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Orders of the Day provide for the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the credentials have been ratified by the Council of Europe, as notified by the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, with the exception of those of Mr. Coleman, a Substitute for the United Kingdom, who has been appointed since the adjournment of the Parliamentary Assembly. It falls, therefore, to our Assembly to ratify his credentials, in accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The appointment has been properly made in accordance with our rules and has not been contested.

If the Assembly is unanimous, these credentials can be validated without prior reference to the Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections?...

The credentials of Mr. Coleman are agreed to subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Accordingly, Mr. Coleman may take his seat in the Assembly of Western European Union in his capacity as a Substitute for the United Kingdom.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Orders of the Day now provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

The President (continued)

Rule 7 (2) of the Rules of Procedure stipulates that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives, and Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Fred Mulley, a Representative of the United Kingdom. This nomination has been correctly submitted in the form prescribed by the rules. If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that we elect Mr. Mulley by acclamation. (*Applause*)

Is there any opposition ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore proclaim Mr. Fred Mulley President of the Assembly of Western European Union and invite him to take the Chair.

(*Mr. Mulley then took the Chair*)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Members of the Assembly, I am sure that you will agree that my first pleasant duty is to thank Mr. Brugnion as *doyen d'âge* for giving us such an excellent start to this year's deliberations. It will be with regret that we have learned that he will no longer be eligible to be a member of our Assembly.

I feel that this will also apply to a number of valued members of the past, and I am sure that you now wish me to say how much we have valued their contributions over the years, both to the work of this Assembly and in building Europe over the past decades. I am sure that all of us in our several countries will convey these remarks to those colleagues who are not seeking re-election to our delegations.

I must now also thank you for the great honour that you have paid me of again electing me your President. I confess that when you did me the honour of electing me President last year, I did not foresee the full extent of the problems both in the small world of our own internal affairs and in the wider international scene that would arise in the past twelve months. It will be recalled that, within a few days of my election, Mr. Humblet, who had been Clerk of the Assembly on a part-time basis since its

inception twenty-six years ago, intimated his desire to retire at the end of 1980. Like all former members of the Assembly, I have the highest opinion of Mr. Humblet's judgment and competence and I did not relish the task of finding a successor, not least because it was the first time that the procedures set out in our Charter and Rules of Procedure had to be applied. If I may say so, they are perhaps not ideal.

However, you will know that the Assembly elected Mr. Georges Moulias, for many years full-time Clerk Assistant, and it is with great pleasure that I welcome him to this first Assembly as our Clerk. The procedures for selecting and electing a new Clerk and consequential considerations throw an extra burden on the Bureau of the Assembly, and I am most grateful for the support that I have received from the Vice-Presidents in carrying out these tasks.

I should also like to pay a warm tribute to the work of all the staff of the Assembly – probably the smallest staff of any international organisation, now reduced from twenty-eight to twenty-seven, and covering all grades from the Clerk to the lowest grades. Very many of them have been with the Assembly for twenty years or more, and against the background of booming international bureaucracy, it is worth recalling that the Assembly staff has not been increased since 1966 and that there have been no regradings or promotions since 1974. We are greatly indebted to them all.

We shall later be discussing how best we can ensure that the decisions of the Assembly – indeed, the Assembly itself – become better known in the media and among the people of our respective countries. Despite the excellent work of our staff, the outcome of our achievements in terms of public relations and influence depends upon ourselves – we, the members of the Assembly. Although, like all our national assemblies, we have budgetary problems, I do not believe that it is only or even mainly a matter of money. I can recall this Assembly receiving great publicity in the late 1950s when we anticipated NATO and, indeed, President Kennedy, in moving from the doctrine of massive retaliation to the so-called flexible response. We also had great coverage for our proposals for a European Community deterrent, and at that time we had a minute information budget and had only the part-time services of our excellent Chief of Information, Mr. Borcier.

Although there are many other bodies that seek to become involved in parliamentary discussion of European defence issues, I am convinced that defence questions within the context of the NATO Alliance must in existing circumstances remain matters for national governments and national parliaments and,

The President (continued)

accordingly, this Assembly, comprised of members of national parliaments, is the proper European parliamentary forum for discussion of and decision on defence and related questions.

This Assembly, therefore, still has and must have an important rôle to play. Its success or failure depends almost entirely on the contribution and dedication of its members, not only on what we do here but to the extent that we are willing to pursue the issues we debate here within our national parliaments and with our own constituents. It is, of course, unfortunate that the Brussels Treaty, which is difficult or almost impossible to amend, prescribes that our membership must be based on membership of the Council of Europe and that this dual membership imposes obligations and attracts members with diverse interests detrimental to their full-time participation in our work. However, this problem has always been with us, and I believe that peace and security are matters that must command the interest and concern of all members of parliaments in all their countries.

The world situation has changed in many respects since our last meeting and, while it is tempting to comment on the main issues of international affairs, I feel that I must resist the temptation as almost all the relevant considerations will be discussed in the next few days.

Both Poland and the Middle East present problems of great concern and we still have to assess the impact of the new Presidents in France and the United States of America. Although I would not wish for any other basis, an alliance of democratic states presents problems. There is hardly a time when there is not an election pending, or a government still to be formed or about to collapse, and consequently decision-making is not easy.

I need hardly say that when the Presidential Committee selected this week for our Assembly – the traditional first week of June having been pre-empted by the Council of Europe – we never thought that it would be the period between the first and second ballots of the elections for the French National Assembly. If I may be permitted a personal observation, apart from congratulating President Mitterrand and his colleagues on their remarkable success, it would be to hope that France may in future play a larger rôle in the integration of European defence planning within NATO and in building a better system of communication between Europe and our American allies.

The appointment of Secretary of State Haig, who both knows the European scene from his period as SACEUR and who is widely respected here, should assist us to avoid some of the prob-

lems of the past. It is, however, necessary to say emphatically that it is essential for progress, and real progress, to be offered by the United States in the SALT process if there is to be agreement here in Europe on its general NATO strategy. There is widespread concern that we are at the beginning of an arms race which, particularly in the depressed economic circumstances, we cannot afford and which will in no way enhance our security. It must also be understood that the protest movements against nuclear weapons – and, indeed, in some cases, against the use of nuclear power for civil purposes – have in many of our countries a deeper and wider support than had their counterparts of a decade or more ago.

An effective and united defence policy for NATO will be possible only if it is combined with a determined and meaningful effort to achieve multilateral arms control agreement, in both nuclear and conventional areas. In all these matters this Assembly has a contribution to make, and I thank you again for your confidence in asking me once more to preside over your deliberations in the coming year. Thank you all very much. (*Applause*)

7. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The Orders of the Day provide for the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7 (2) of the Rules of Procedure states that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. Rule 10 also states that no Representative may be a candidate for the office of Vice-President if his nomination is not made in writing by at least three Representatives, and that Representatives who are members of a national government may not be members of the Bureau.

Only three Vice-Presidents have been nominated so far. I propose that we approve their appointment now and that, when the political groups and delegations come forward with other nominations, we deal with them as we proceed. I have valid nominations for Mr. Gessner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Tanghe of Belgium and Mr. Maravalle of Italy. If the Assembly agrees, I propose that those candidates be elected by acclamation.

Are there any objections?...

There is none, and I therefore declare that the three candidates are elected Vice-Presidents and that we fill the remaining places when nominations are received.

8. *Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session*

(Doc. 868)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the adoption by the Assembly of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session of the Assembly.

The draft Order of Business has been distributed as Document 868 dated 4th May 1981.

We have a proposal that, for personal reasons, the Order of Business on Wednesday should be changed so that Mr. Brasseur's report is taken before that of Mr. Wilkinson. That is a matter that we shall have to consider in view of the question that was raised with us this morning.

Are there any objections to the adoption of this Order of Business?...

As there are no objections, the draft Order of business is adopted.

The day is warm, and it is not my intention to raise the temperature of the proceedings, but I propose to take my coat off and I invite my colleagues who wish to do so to follow suit.

9. *Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

(Presentation by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 869)

The PRESIDENT. – I now have the most agreeable duty of welcoming the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for the United Kingdom, Mr. Douglas Hurd, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to present the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, Document 869.

Those who recall his previous visit and speech will know that we are in for a good account of the Council's position and for comments about particular matters of concern to the United Kingdom. I should also say that I have a personal message from Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, expressing his personal regret that he was unable to be with us today. I know that he will take a close interest in our work. He has invited me at any time to approach him, and I know that, while a good deal of the work may fall on Mr. Hurd, Lord Carrington will want to be involved as well.

If I may say so, in anticipation of what may be said in other contexts later, we should be conscious of the enormous burden that foreign

ministers carry these days. I believe that when we next meet – in December – not only will the United Kingdom have the important office of Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Western European Union, but Lord Carrington will be the Chairman of the Council of the European Community and of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe. United Kingdom foreign affairs ministers therefore have a busy year ahead of them. Against that background we are particularly glad to welcome Mr. Hurd and his undertaking to answer questions at the end of his speech.

I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – First, Mr. President, I congratulate you on your re-election as President of the Assembly. That gives many of us great personal pleasure. The permissive style of your presidency has already been illustrated by your ruling about dress, and, if I may, I shall take advantage of what you said. It is a great pleasure for us all to see you re-elected.

I am delighted to have this second opportunity of addressing the Assembly. The first opportunity was as Chairman-in-Office. I confirm what you have said about Lord Carrington's regret that, because of his crowded programme, it has not been possible for him to be present. I also confirm what you said about the interest that he takes personally in the affairs of this Assembly. I have already reported to him personally about the meetings that were held in The Hague last week. He has encouraged me to do the same after this present meeting.

It is my privilege to present to the Assembly the Council's twenty-sixth annual report. I shall make a few observations under two headings. The first is relations between the Council and the Assembly, and that is dealt with in the first chapter of the report. The Council continues to appreciate the rôle played by the Assembly in watching over the evolution of the problems of security and European union and in submitting its thoughts to governments for their attention. We believe that the standard of these reports is generally high and that the Assembly, which is the only parliamentary institution empowered to debate defence questions, exercises this prerogative with remarkable consistency and insight.

The Council is concerned to maintain close and constructive relations with the Assembly, and that is demonstrated by the detailed accounts of the Council's activities given in the twenty-sixth annual report and by its responses to Assembly recommendations on a number of important questions connected with implemen-

Mr. Hurd (continued)

tation of the Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with in other international institutions.

The Council's interest is further demonstrated by the informal contacts designed to give added depth to the political dialogue with the Assembly. These include the working dinner with the Presidential Committee after the ministerial meeting of 14th May in Luxembourg last year, and, previously, a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee. On the occasion of the recent ministerial meeting in The Hague last week, there was a working lunch with the Presidential Committee. There were the two joint meetings in the afternoon with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and with your General Affairs Committee.

I understand, because several people have spoken to me about it, the importance that members of the Assembly rightly and naturally attach to ministerial attendance and attention on such occasions as I have just described. You have pointed out, Mr. President, that the rhythm and pace of international meetings involving ministers are now intense – almost feverish – and that poses its problems.

I have very much enjoyed the meetings which I have attended with your Assembly. I have found that they added considerably to my own education. I shall try to convey this interest and enthusiasm to my colleagues in other countries.

Secondly, I refer to the implementation of the Brussels Treaty by the Council, assisted by its subsidiary bodies. This is dealt with in the second, third and fourth chapters of the report. The modified Brussels Treaty, Article V of which requires the member states to afford each other mutual assistance in the event of aggression, is in our view one of the keystones of the security system embracing the signatory countries. The validity of all the provisions of the treaty and its protocols and the determination of member countries to carry them out have been reaffirmed in the annual report.

As emerges from the second chapter of the report, the Council continued in 1980 to keep a close watch on the application of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols concerning the levels of member states' forces and others. The procedures for that purpose functioned normally. At its meeting on 21st July last year the Council, following accepted procedures, cancelled paragraph V of Annex III to the protocol and you, Sir, were duly informed of the Council's decision.

The responsibilities of the Armaments Control Agency, described in Chapter III of the

report, were carried out meticulously, as in previous years.

The Standing Armaments Committee completed the first section of the economic part of its study of the situation in the armaments industries in member countries. At their meeting in Luxembourg, ministers expressed their appreciation to the Standing Armaments Committee of its painstaking and original work, which will be carefully studied.

In addition to questions relating to the implementation of the treaty, ministers discussed East-West relations at their meetings of 14th May last year in Luxembourg and 3rd June this year in The Hague. At the last meeting we also exchanged views on the situation in the Mediterranean.

I now wish to say a word about the future activities of the Council and to refer briefly to two valuable and interesting reports which you will be debating in the near future. I refer to the reports prepared by Mr. Tanghe and Mr. Page. They welcome what they see as a readiness on the Council's part to be as helpful as possible both in the annual report and in reply to questions and recommendations. While we in the United Kingdom provide the Chairman-in-Office, that will be our intention and resolve.

It is not always possible to accede to every request from the Assembly, as I am sure members recognise. From time to time you may feel that we are not living up fully to our own good intentions. For example, the annual report this year was later in coming out than you would have wished. We shall try to do better next time. I am sure that you understand the practical problems.

You would also like more information about the Independent European Programme Group. This is not an easy problem, because the group's discussions are confidential, and it does not issue communiqués after its meetings. But in other respects I believe that the Council's thinking is close to that of many members of this Assembly. We subscribed fully to the aim stressed in Mr. Tanghe's report of avoiding duplication of work between WEU and many other bodies, especially the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Council and now the Independent European Programme Group.

With the emergence of these other bodies it is inevitable that the rôle originally envisaged for WEU has contracted somewhat. But the resources provided by member states have not contracted to match, and the staffing and structure of the various organisations have remained almost unchanged. That is why the Council has decided to take a fresh look at the tasks of the ministerial organs of WEU. The aim will be to achieve greater efficiency leading to

Mr. Hurd (continued)

worthwhile savings. This is referred to in Mr. Page's report, and I am glad to have this opportunity to put the record straight.

A working group has been set up charged with the task of listing the tasks carried out currently by WEU bodies, excluding the Assembly, and recommending steps to achieve economies and greater efficiency in the organisation's methods of work and use of staff. I stress that this mandate says nothing about rationalising the structure of the ministerial organs of WEU or about the Assembly, because neither is a current issue.

Mr. Tanghe's report concludes that there is now a large question mark over the need for some of the controls for which Protocols Nos. III and IV make provision. He suggests that, if the modified Brussels Treaty is to be credible, WEU must be seen to have a continuing rôle.

You may be interested to know that at our meeting on 3rd June in The Hague ministers instructed the permanent Council to prepare the ground so that in twelve months, when ministers meet again, we could have a serious and informed discussion leading, I hope, to decisions on what WEU should be aspiring to achieve for the remainder of its treaty's life. It is implicit in Mr. Tanghe's report – certainly it came through strongly in our own discussions at ministerial meetings – that the time has come for such a review.

Mr. Tanghe's report also hints that such a review might result in more money being made available to the Assembly. I can make no promise on behalf of the Council about that, but the Council will pay very close attention to your debates on the Tanghe and Page reports and the draft recommendations which they propose.

I turn briefly, as a British minister, to some general remarks about one aspect of defence policy with which all of us in this chamber are concerned. We live in democratic societies, and it is precisely because we do that our defence effort depends on our ability to convince our own people that the effort is needed. The Soviet Union has no such difficulty. The views of the Soviet people are irrelevant to their rulers, who can thus spend 13% of their country's wealth each year on armaments without worrying about disarmament petitions or campaigns. We, thank heaven, live in different societies, and we have to justify to our electors what we do. So it should come as no surprise that we are asked by our electors searching questions about our defence policies and the need for nuclear weapons.

It is natural enough that on any matter concerning nuclear weapons there should be honest though sometimes confused anxieties, which need a full, clear and forceful response. We need to explain once again the nature of the world in which we live and the threat that we face.

In the Soviet Union we deal with a power that has been notably unsuccessful in achieving prosperity for its people or in constructing a political and social framework within which its people are content. Because of this, it is tempted constantly to use the military power in which it excels to counterbalance those economic and political weaknesses. We saw the Soviet Union yield to exactly that temptation in Afghanistan, and we see the temptation facing it again today in Poland.

We in Western Europe have to live with the Soviet Union on peaceful terms. We can do so only if we ourselves retain and display the determination to be strong. If we do not show that determination, if we give the impression that we are being softened by the various disarmament campaigns, which have no effect on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is less likely to feel the need to reach serious, balanced agreements with us.

That means that we need credible deterrents and, whether we like it or not, that must include credible nuclear deterrents. We must have nuclear weapons with a high likelihood of reaching their targets, having modern warheads and with modern delivery systems. That is why we in the United Kingdom shall be replacing Polaris with Trident to ensure our contribution to the overall western deterrent for another generation and why we in Great Britain, together with many others here, are in favour of better nuclear force modernisation and why we attach importance to the Alliance as a whole fulfilling the 1979 NATO decision on that subject.

Certainly nuclear weapons are not enough. Effective deterrence must convince the Soviet Union that it could not hope to gain by attack at any level, and we must maintain strong conventional forces. Many of us may have seen speculative stories in the press about possible changes in the scope and scale of the British defence effort. I welcome this opportunity to say something on that subject so far as I can, because my impression is that the media have allowed imagination to run pretty wild, with the danger that a good deal of quite unnecessary anxiety has been caused, or might be caused, among our friends.

First, let me say on this subject that we are not proposing to cut our published defence budget. On the contrary, our public expenditure white paper makes absolutely clear that we

Mr. Hurd (continued)

remain on a 3% real rate of growth in defence spending, in line with the NATO aim.

We expect to achieve 8% real growth in three years since we took office in 1979, and that is a performance which, so far as I understand it, in real growth terms is surpassed among our major NATO allies only by the United States. The following two years should see further increases of 3% in each year in real terms. My colleague, John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, has already denied press reports that the Royal Navy is to be reduced to little more than a coastal defence force. Nor is there any question, so far as the British Army of the Rhine is concerned, of our going back on our commitment under the Brussels Treaty. It is right that I should make that very clear before this Assembly.

As I have explained, therefore, we intend to continue to honour the NATO commitment of increasing defence expenditure. The argument in Brussels is not about reduction: it is about how to spend the increase. What my colleague is concerned about is an exercise to build from the bottom up, as he described it, as a core programme, providing a basic structure to which we should gear the equipment and manpower requirements of our armed forces for the next ten years and beyond.

People may ask – and it is a question that may occur to members of this Assembly – why, if we have been able to increase our expenditure, we have to reassess the way in which our forces fulfil their rôle. The answer is that even the increased expenditure in real terms is not enough to cover what is called technological inflation, that is, the upsurge in cost caused by the sheer complexity of modern defence systems. To take just one example, the Seacap missile, which was in production ten years ago, has now led on to the Sea Wolf missile, and in real terms that costs three and a half times as much as that other weapon, which was deemed perfectly adequate ten years ago.

So to maintain future operational effectiveness and enhance our frontline capability despite rising costs we need to work out how technological and other changes can help us to conduct ourselves within the alliance. New ways must be found of coping with the inevitable pressures on our resources. This is not a problem only for Britain. It is one which presents difficult choices for all member states of WEU and, indeed, all members of the western Alliance.

There is another fact that enforces the examination that we are now conducting. It is that the threat that confronts us is changing all the

time. The massive forces of the Warsaw Pact continue to grow remorselessly and are armed with increasingly sophisticated weapons. We know that the Soviet Union is now deploying an Oscar class submarine capable of attacking surface ships with missiles from a range of 250 miles and we are all aware of the formidable air power provided by the new generation of Soviet aircraft, such as Foxbat and Backfire. For that reason also we have to take a new and searching look at the way in which we ought to meet the evolving threats, whether on land, sea or in the air, and we must also – this is an important point – look at the problems and requirements that we may encounter in areas outside the boundaries of NATO. These, then, are the main reasons why we have felt it necessary to carry out a thorough examination of defence priorities, and I thought it might be sensible and useful to lay those reasons before this Assembly.

What we are trying to do in Britain is to re-establish in a long-term programme the right balance between our resources and our necessary defence requirements. Our solutions must be reached, of course, within the context of the Alliance and our allies will be kept informed. Work is still in progress and final decisions have not yet been made, but my colleague, John Nott, intends to announce his plan before the summer holidays.

Finally, I should like to stress, because it is crucial, the need to explain to our electorate the reasons for our defence effort. I have spoken of the need for effective deterrence, and without that there would certainly be no stability in East-West relations; but we need to look at the problem more widely, because no sane person can be content with a situation in which the peace of Europe and the world is secured only by the piling up of arms at increasing cost. We all wish to see an end to the ruinous arms race so that these precious resources can be diverted to better use. That means that we should always be looking for areas of possible negotiation and agreement with the Soviet Union and its allies.

The British Government are fully committed to the search for balanced verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements and we have played and will continue to play a leading part in this search. For example, we strongly support the NATO proposals for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on theatre nuclear force arms control within the SALT framework. We were glad to associate ourselves last month with the endorsement by NATO ministers in Rome of the intention of the United States to begin such negotiations with the Soviet Union by the end of this year, and we welcome the news that preparatory discussions between these two governments – the

Mr. Hurd (continued)

Soviet Union and the United States – have now begun. We would certainly be much further down this road if the Russians had not invaded Afghanistan.

As a second example, we strongly support the proposal now being discussed in Madrid for a conference on disarmament in Europe. Everyone knows that this proposal was originally made by the French Government and we have been glad to help it forward at different stages of its life. We believe that the agreements to be reached in the first stage of such a conference will be devoted to the elaboration of confidence-building measures, which must be such as to make military dispositions on both sides more open.

If such measures are to work, they must satisfy four basic criteria: they must be mandatory; they must be verifiable; they must be militarily significant; and they must be applicable to the whole of Europe, including the European part of the Soviet Union. This is absolutely clear in the French proposals and is an essential part of them. The Russians have gone part of the way to meet these criteria, but we still have some way to go. We must be patient but we must also ensure that these criteria are included in the mandate for the conference on disarmament in Europe and not left for discussion once that conference is convened.

My last point is that I am sure that it is right to continue to look for other opportunities for negotiation and agreement. Equally, though, we are absolutely convinced that such negotiation will be successful only if the Soviet Union recognises on the western side a willingness to maintain at an adequate level our nuclear and conventional forces.

Once the Soviet Union believes that we shall disarm or allow our armaments to become obsolete without any concessions on its side, it will no longer have any incentive to make such concessions. This is the crucial point which sometimes gets lost in the democratic argument with those who, naturally, abhor nuclear weapons.

If we fail to show determination to keep our armaments modern, the prospect for durable agreement with the Soviet Union is bleak indeed. I do not underestimate the political difficulties. We have had a taste of them in Britain and I know them well enough. They are, perhaps, even more intense in some other countries. We understand clearly the political difficulties involved in constantly showing determination to maintain and modernise our defensive armaments. But the prize is great, because if we can continue to show that deter-

mination, it is possible – one cannot say more – that, by patient negotiation, durable, balanced agreements on limiting and controlling the arms race will come within our reach. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that I speak for all distinguished representatives when I express our warm appreciation to Mr. Hurd both for his excellent account of the work of the Council over the last year and his very good intentions, which I have no doubt that he will do his best to fulfil after the direction that the Council will follow under the presidency of the United Kingdom in the twelve months to come. I am sure also that representatives will have been very interested to hear from a United Kingdom minister an account of the United Kingdom Government's thinking on current questions.

Mr. Hurd has kindly undertaken to answer questions.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – To some extent, Mr. Hurd has answered the two questions which I had proposed to ask.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that members will not ask questions if they have already been answered.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Then may I say that Mr. Hurd has answered half of one of the two questions and I should like to ask one and a half questions.

The Minister properly said that he would draw to the attention of the Council the desirability of ministerial involvement in the meetings with the Assembly and the Committee. Will he suggest to his colleagues not only that they should attend but that they should at all times be as forthcoming as possible in responding to questions? Presence alone would not entirely suffice.

Mr. Hurd may recall the serious question about Poland which I asked in The Hague. He will agree that, although we were delighted that two of the seven countries were represented by ministers, the answers were not as acceptable as some of us might wish.

I should like to ask Mr. Hurd a more serious question. He referred to the disarmament campaigns which are noticeable in some of our countries but are not noticeable, as he properly said, in the Soviet Union. Would he not agree that this might be inevitable in a free and increasingly questioning society and that, given this inevitability, given the existence of these disarmament movements, it is essential for us and all other western governments to demonstrate, both severally and jointly, our clear commitment to international peace and our willing-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

ness to disarm on a multilateral basis, and that this commitment needs to be clearly demonstrated, for otherwise the nature of our society will mean that these campaigns will thrive and perhaps too many slogans will be offered and too many serious questions ducked?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I can only stress again that I understand the feeling in the Assembly in favour of stronger ministerial participation in the meetings. I shall do my best to convey that feeling to other ministers, together with my own impression that the meetings which I attended were of substantial interest and importance.

I agree with Mr. Hardy that it is necessary for all of us to explain over and over again that we are not just piling on armaments for their own sake but that we are engaged in the search for multilateral disarmament. I tried to give two examples. I wonder how many of Mr. Hardy's constituents or mine could pass even the easiest examination on either the French proposal for a European disarmament conference or the proposals of the alliance for TNF arms control discussions. These are difficult technical points, but as democratic politicians we have an obligation to put them across at the same time as, in my case, we are defending the decision to accept cruise missiles in the United Kingdom or modernise our own British deterrent: it is the dual power.

If we are to succeed in the democratic task, we have to stress both. We are looking for multilateral agreements, which will not be achieved by circulating petitions or forming committees. They will be achieved by hard, tough, slow bargaining among governments. That is one side. The other side is that we shall succeed in these tough, slow negotiations only if the Soviet Union perceives on our side a determination to remain strong if the negotiations are not successful.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Minister.

I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*). – The Chairman-in-Office of the Council said that there was no question of Britain going back on its BAOR Brussels Treaty commitments. Can he confirm that the United Kingdom has no intention in the foreseeable future of requesting the Council to authorise a reduction in the present agreed level of 55,000 men?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. Tanghe pursues this question relentlessly from meeting to meeting. I have no objection to that, because it is highly important. It is absolutely implicit in what I said – and I took care to check that my remarks were wholly valid at the time that I answered his question in The Hague and again when I answer it today – that it is our intention to maintain our obligations under the treaty. It is therefore clear that we would not come to any part of this organisation to ask to be relieved of those obligations.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister of State referred to the alarming increase in the capabilities of Soviet sea and air power and, in particular, to the Oscar class submarines and Backfire and Foxbat aircraft – to which I add Fencers and Fitters. This Assembly has always had a great concern in the wider world outside Western Europe and in this part-session we are discussing, for example, European security and events in the Gulf area, as in recent part-sessions we have discussed Afghanistan.

The Minister will have seen an admirable article in "The Times" by Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Can Mr. Hurd reassure the Assembly that the Council will provide impetus towards securing a realisation within Western European Union of the growing threats to our joint security from events in the wider world? He mentioned this *en passant*; and in a recent tour of the Arabian Gulf the British Prime Minister has given political expression to her commitment to supporting the line on these matters adopted by the President of the United States. Will the Council of this organisation also give backing to what I regard as the valuable initiatives by the President of the United States?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I hope that when asking questions members will come quickly to the point and that we shall not have such long prefaces. I am sure that Mr. Wilkinson will realise that the Speaker of the House of Commons would have called him to order some time ago.

I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I cannot speak for the Council off the cuff, but members of the Council will note the points that Mr. Wilkinson has made. Speaking for the British Government, we accept that much of the threat – to some extent, the most

Mr. Hurd (continued)

difficult part of the threat to counter – falls outside the NATO area. We agree that a great deal of thought must be given, including thought in concert with the United States, to the best political and military means – the two cannot be divorced – effectively of countering this threat without antagonising the governments and peoples who live in the countries concerned. This is not an easy problem to solve or an easy puzzle to which we can find the answer. As Mr. Wilkinson indicated, a good deal of discussion and thought has been given to this matter, and I agree with the emphasis that he put on finding the right answer.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to return for a moment to what the Minister of State said about the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which I believe is largely composed of sincere and genuine people. However, there is a tiny minority of manipulators preying upon the fears and concerns of the majority and endeavouring to bring pressures to bear on member governments to adopt disarmament policies unilaterally.

Such manipulators are greatly helped if there is not sufficient information about why there cannot be an easing of effort. Can the Minister say whether it is possible to embark upon a firmer and clearer public relations policy, as this is a question of winning the hearts and minds of the people?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I entirely agree with that. It is a question that we perhaps need to consider further – whether the effort to which Mrs. Knight referred is best conducted purely on a national basis, because the political ingredients vary from country to country, or whether there is perhaps scope within NATO to consider a joint effort on persuasion. Britain is well aware of the problem.

It is a mistake to dismiss all such protest questions as if they were inspired by the far left. That is not the position, as Mrs. Knight pointed out. We must deal patiently and forcefully with the various arguments. It is a terrific task which should engage members of our political profession perhaps more thoroughly than it does. I very much welcome Mrs. Knight's encouragement in that direction.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Spénale.

Mr. SPÉNALE (*France*) (Translation). – Does the argument – which I believe is the main

conclusion of your report – that we must arm ourselves more in order to be able to preach the gospel of disarmament effectively, although it may be fairly easy to understand among ourselves, seem to you really convincing, firstly for the other side and secondly for outsiders – especially the third world – who see us pouring into defence a far greater volume of resources than we are devoting to re-establishing international justice and developing the third world?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I think that the Soviet Union perfectly understands the situation and in my view perfectly understands the position adopted by the new United States Administration. We intend to strengthen the forces in the United States, but we are willing to negotiate arms control agreements. That was the stand taken by President Nixon in the past, and in a way it is a stand with which the Soviet Union is well at home.

Of course, the Soviets hope for an easier answer and hope that we shall become so frightened and softened by campaigns in our own countries that we shall lose the determination to strengthen ourselves so that the question of concessions by the Soviet Union will not arise. I think the Soviet Union will perfectly well understand the position adopted by the governments of the Alliance at the present, because it is a hard-headed, rational line with which it would feel at home.

Mr. Spénale may be right in indicating that we have a problem in relation to the third world. The arguments that we use must be the same as those that we address to our own electorate. It is not simply a matter of dismantling our armaments in order to give more aid to the third world. In fact, the future peace of the world largely hangs on the willingness and ability of the West to maintain its strength, because without that other countries in the third world, besides Afghanistan, would understand at first hand the full impact of Soviet policy and strength.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – Having regard to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the main pillars of NATO and enjoys the total confidence of her allies, is it not quite idiotic and highly insulting to continue indefinitely to maintain special limitations on her armaments under the Brussels Treaty? Will the Minister arrange for the Council to consider this matter seriously without further delay?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Lord Duncan-Sandys is right in saying that the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the strong pillars of the Alliance. I am sure that everyone in this Assembly appreciates that. As I mentioned in the report, we have asked the Council to examine the future activities of WEU over the remaining twenty-three years of the life of the treaty. We have done so within the framework of the treaty – that is, we are not asking it to examine changes in the treaty, logical though such changes may appear to be at first sight. I am sure that the reason is known by the government of the Federal Republic. If we begin to reopen the treaty in order to change one element, we shall rapidly come under pressure to change other elements. Mr. Tanghe has already reminded us of one element that is of particular importance to my country. Frankly, we are not keen on a renegotiation of the Brussels Treaty. We fear that, if one were to embark upon an operation of unpicking the treaty, the consequences would be different from the original intentions.

I believe that the historical basis of the treaty and the balance within it are widely understood in the Federal Republic. I believe it is also understood that the rest of us know the extent of the German contribution to the Alliance. That is fully understood and applauded.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister of State lays a great deal of emphasis in his report on the fact that, if we do not support the continuation of a build-up in nuclear arms, it would produce no effect either on the Soviet leaders or on their people. How can he be so sure? Have we not reached the stage where the enormous escalating cost of more modern nuclear arms ought to make us think that we can take the chance and perhaps adopt an attitude that we are willing to relax this dangerous build-up?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hurd.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – But we are giving that indication to the Soviet Union day by day. We are willing to relax this expensive build-up as they are willing to relax, but not before them or without them. That is the message we send day by day to the Soviet Union. I believe that it is the only message that will get a clear response.

Thirty or forty years ago it would have been understandable for people to argue that by its instincts and policies the Soviet Union was a

peace-loving, progressive country. It was wrong then, but at least it was possible to argue that. I do not honestly see how anyone who has studied the Soviet Union's actions since the end of the second world war can with any responsibility hold out the prospect that if we started to weaken our defences, the Soviet Union out of some sense of world citizenship will begin to do the same. It seems that all the evidence accumulated over the years is in the opposite direction.

Therefore, it must be right patiently – even though it is difficult politically – to continue to put across the message to the Soviet Union, the third world and our own people. We seek these agreements, first to put a ceiling on these arms and, secondly, gradually to reduce the arms race. But, on the basis of history and experience, we are absolutely sure that the only way of achieving that agreement is by showing a certain minimum determination on our own side. Without that evident determination, the chances of agreement are bleak.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Does any other member of the Assembly wish to ask the Minister a question? If not, I am sure that I speak for all of us when I again thank Mr. Hurd for his address, and particularly for the excellent and forthright manner with which he dealt with the questions. We are very much in your debt, Mr. Hurd.

10. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 880)

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to the next Order of the Day which is the political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council. Mr. Page will present the report and there will be a debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 880.

I call Mr. Page, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour for me to be able, for the second time running, to present the draft report of the General Affairs Committee. It is really the Assembly's reply on the Council's political activities contained in its twenty-sixth annual report.

Mr. Page (continued)

We have had two distinguished speeches this afternoon – from you, Mr. President, and from the Chairman-in-Office. I am afraid that my contribution is the suet pudding after the smoked salmon and fillet steak that the Assembly have already consumed.

Last year was a cheerful occasion for the presentation of the report. It was the silver jubilee for Western European Union, and a halfway house in its career. This year seems to be more like the morning after the night before.

We are meeting in a thoroughly destabilised world. As the minister said in his speech, we are the only European parliamentary institution which is wholly committed to the discussion of defence questions. We are conscious of deteriorating world security. I cannot remember a time when there were more highly sensitive areas of tension around the world. These are in Europe, with Poland, in Afghanistan, in the Middle East, in Africa and in the Far East. These all have their particular effects on the defence attitudes of our member countries.

We in the Assembly are deeply conscious of our responsibility. That is why the draft recommendations seem to demand, with more insistence than usual, closer and more regular contact with the Council of Ministers and with individual ministers. The Assembly is determined to see that the work done by its Committees is more effective in its impact on the Council and on member parliaments. I believe that the Chairman-in-Office, who is well known in the United Kingdom for his willingness to listen to the views of British parliamentarians, will persuade his colleagues on the Council enthusiastically to seek to improve the dialogue between the Assembly and its Committees and the Council of Ministers. We should also like an improvement in the speed with which our reports and questions are dealt with.

On the fifth and sixth pages of our report, it can be seen that it can sometimes take up to two years from the time when an Assembly Committee considers a matter for it to be informed of the collective view of member governments. I was also grateful to the Minister this afternoon for mentioning the late hour at which the twenty-sixth annual report was received. It was received not at the eleventh hour but rather at a quarter to twelve, which made life difficult for the Committee of which I was Rapporteur.

As a personal view directed at you, Mr. President, may I ask whether you could devise a way of ensuring that matters that are considered by this Assembly to be urgent could be dis-

cussed and dealt with more expeditiously with the Council of Ministers?

Of course, it is an impossibly difficult task to expect to achieve a result at the drop of a hat, given that so many ministers and governments are involved. However, if on urgent matters we could find a new procedure, that would be greatly valued by members of the Assembly.

I also feel that it is time that we parliamentarians accepted perhaps a greater willingness to play our part in advertising the activities of Western European Union.

There is another report due to be discussed on Wednesday, the Rapporteur of which is Mrs. Knight. It discusses how the means of projecting our views can be improved. This deserves careful consideration. We have only a very small, albeit a very active, press and public relations section. However, as members of parliament we ourselves have platforms locally, nationally and internationally where we could make a greater effort ourselves to put across the ideas and views of the Assembly.

I do not want this speech, Mr. Chairman-in-Office, merely to be a catalogue of grouches. However, we in the Assembly long to know more about the activities of the other organs which are associated with Western European Union. I listened with great care to your speech, and I was a little disappointed by your comments about the Independent European Programme Group. Of course, I appreciate the confidentiality of the matters discussed and the point which you made about there not even being a statement issued after its meetings. I realise that I am giving you a great deal of extra work to do, but I wonder whether it might not be possible for you or your bureau in some confidential way to receive progress reports periodically of the IEPG.

It was agreed in the Presidential Committee recently that this report of the General Affairs Committee could shine a torch on how Parts V and VI of the Council's report dealing with public administration and budgetary affairs affected the union politically. It is no secret in this connection that rumours have been circulating that the Council was looking at the structure of the union with a surgeon's knife in its hand, if not an axe.

All of us are conscious of the need for economy expressed in our parliaments and by our governments, and we shall not shy away from accepting our fair share of any economies which have to be made. Therefore, we shall be studying with a magnifying glass your remarks today on this subject, Mr. Chairman-in-Office. If I heard you aright, the terms of reference of the working group which has been set up to study the economies and the structure

Mr. Page (continued)

do not include the Assembly. But we are grateful for that, because we want to ensure that the future opportunities and freedom for action of the Assembly are not compromised.

After your speech today, on behalf of the Council of Ministers, it is hardly necessary to say that this is only a tiny international organisation with a staff of only 150, whereas the EEC has 18,000, NATO about 2,000 and OECD about 2,500. I hope that the Chairman-in-Office will retain his well-known sense of proportion in guiding his colleagues in this respect.

I feel conscious that my speech and the report which I am presenting on behalf of the Committee as a whole is rather pedestrian and ordinary, perhaps leaning too much on internal structures rather than being sufficiently a political commentary. I accept that criticism, but I feel that there are not many occasions when it is possible for the Assembly to be introspective, and introspection does no harm if it is not carried to excess.

I remind you, Sir, that we are essentially a highly developed political assembly with sensitive antennae and, what is important and valuable to the Council of Ministers, widely-based sources of information and intelligence centred round the world where our members travel and have had parliamentary and political contacts for many years as individuals.

The governments of all our countries remain committed to the wide concept of deterrence. I believe sincerely that there is no body better qualified to make well formed political judgments on defence matters than this Assembly. The basic philosophy behind the draft recommendation is to try to find ways in which the political views and the actions of the Assembly can be made known more effectively, more speedily and with greater impact on an international and European political stage.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page. Just in case there is any misunderstanding about the figures which you quoted, I ought perhaps to make it clear that the staff of the Assembly is only 27 of the 180. Under the rules, I have budgetary responsibility only for those 27. If I had greater budgetary responsibility, it may be that the number would be fewer, but that is another matter.

We proceed to the debate.

The first speaker is Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – As a member of the opposition party in the British House of Commons, I want unstintingly and unhesita-

tingly to congratulate the Minister on his presentation and on the excellent manner in which he answered questions. I also extend to him a very warm welcome in his new office of Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and, although I accept entirely what he said about good intentions, I hope sincerely that they will become practicality.

The Rapporteur, Mr. Page, continuing the mission which he accepted last year for this similar report, has presented us with a much stronger report than that which we dealt with in 1980.

Mr. Page stressed that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly had improved over the last year. I shall try to avoid to as great an extent as possible some of the criticisms which Mr. Page expressed in his oral presentation, but I believe that there has been very little improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly over the last twelve months. There are continuing complaints which have arisen not just over one year but throughout the period of my service as a member of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union. I have been one of the foremost critics of the lack of liaison between the Council and ourselves as parliamentarians.

It is true that in our files today we have information about two organisations which has been very scarce in the past. Mr. Page was correct to refer to our justifiable aspirations about exacting more information about SAC and IEPG. I do not think it is good enough to see on the answer we have here to Recommendation 362 that one of the handicaps with which the Minister is faced is the fact that not all the member states of the IEPG are members of WEU. I am sure some way could be found round that relatively small difficulty, as I see it.

I am also concerned about the forfeiture of certain functions from Western European Union and the apparent willingness of many people increasingly to recognise the EEC as having a defence rôle. This is personally unacceptable to me; and I say for the umpteenth time that the European Parliament simply has no place so far as the policies of Western European Union on defence are concerned.

The Minister has, in common with representatives of many other governments, said this afternoon – and I am pleased to hear him reiterate it – that the British Government fully support Western European Union and all that it stands for; and the Minister will recall the words I used in The Hague two weeks ago. This is the only parliamentary forum with defence responsibility.

I come now into contact with the Council. You said in your opening remarks, Mr. Pre-

Mr. Urwin (continued)

sident, that the success of Western European Union depends on the contributions of its members. I was not sure whether you meant contributions of the member states or the contributions of the parliamentarians. I am sure what you said is equally apposite to both. I turn to The Hague meeting with the ministers.

We have this contact with the ministers only once a year. Reference has already been made in the course of questions to ministers to the fact that only two ministers were present on that occasion. Mr. Hardy has referred to the unsatisfactory nature of some of the answers to questions posed; and I confess that I was deliberately provocative with my questions in relation to the Middle East, provocative in the sense that I was hoping for a reply from a ministerial representative of another government rather than the Dutch or British Governments, from other member states of WEU. I confess that afterwards when I realised that I was not getting a response from a minister of another country, I then discovered that there were only two ministers present.

With every respect to the supporting team that ministers must inevitably have, and paying full respect and regard to their own individual ability, I feel that on this one occasion of the year member states should be represented at that dialogue by ministers directly representing their own governments and therefore with responsibility in turn to the parliaments that they represent. I have said that governments generally reiterate their belief not only in the validity but the importance of WEU. On that occasion we were asking questions about the approach of ministers to Poland, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the invasion of Aghanistan; and, frankly, the replies left a good deal to be desired. It is understandable that someone who is not a minister but nevertheless is representing his government would have some diffidence about rising to answer questions posed by parliamentarians. In turn, we have to pay more attention to relationships with the media. My understanding is that Mr. Borcier is employed by the Assembly and certainly does a very good job, but the Council of Ministers themselves have no publicity media or publicity organisation. Bearing in mind the fact that from time to time there must occasionally be a need to publicise activities, they should begin to pay more attention to that aspect.

In conclusion, when we talk of the future of WEU and its future work programme I hope that the importance of WEU in relation to this proposal for a working group will not be in any way diminished. Bearing in mind what you

have said, Mr. President, of the importance of member states being contributory factors to the success of WEU, I would say to many of my parliamentary colleagues, and not only those present, that we have a very important rôle to play in the fulfilment of our responsibilities as members of WEU. All too often we arrive at committees and have to kick our heels for a long time before we can determine whether we have a quorum which will enable us to continue our business in a statutory manner.

An important responsibility devolves upon all of us. I can tell the Assembly that the British Labour Delegation at least is elected by franchise of the parliamentary Labour Party and in that context perhaps there is a more percipient willingness on the part of some members to come more regularly than they used to do under the patronage system. So let us all rally round WEU and ensure that it continues to be the success that it has been in the past.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Urwin. I am sure members will take your message to heart. I am only sorry that so few are present to hear it. Perhaps they will read it in the report tomorrow.

The next speaker is Mr. Hanin, to be followed by Mr. Osborn of the United Kingdom.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have read with close attention the remarkable report prepared by Mr. Page, who, I think, has given a good summary of the present situation. This examination gives us a unique opportunity of looking into the effectiveness of our work and also, therefore, into the nature of our relations with the Council of Ministers.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that the conclusion we arrive at should be negative, but I do say that at present I am not fully satisfied on either of these two points. I think that we could be more effective and that our relations with the Council could be better organised.

On the latter point, first of all with regard to the slowness in answering our questions, when I hear Mr. Page say that some of the questions put by the Assembly are answered only after as long as two years, I maintain that it is not consistent with the dignity of our Assembly for it to accept such a delay, and that it should protest when this happens. Because if the Assembly does not protest, the Council may feel that it can let it wait.

I am not entirely satisfied, either, with the nature of the debates and the way in which they are conducted, but I should like to say that this remark does not apply at all to today's debate nor to the way in which Mr. Hurd has behaved

Mr. Hanin (continued)

towards our Assembly, since his behaviour seems to me, on the contrary, exemplary. There have been occasions when ministers have spoken and then left without waiting to hear what we had to say, whereas the statement made to us this afternoon, the precise answers given to the questions asked and the fact that Mr. Hurd is still present after this item of the Orders of the Day has been dealt with is, to my mind, a perfect example of how things ought to be.

Moreover, I maintain that, if we want to improve our relations with the Council of Ministers, the responsibility for this lies first of all with our Assembly. I consider that it ought to prepare itself better for encounters and debates of this kind. I, personally, find it very difficult to join in a debate such as today's – other members doubtless have quicker and more agile minds than I have – when I do not know what the Minister is going to say, but even harder when I do not even know exactly what he is going to talk about.

Now this is not his, but our, responsibility and I consider that when a representative of the Council of Ministers is going to address us, it is up to the Assembly to look back over the various resolutions it has adopted, to ask what action has been taken on these resolutions and to see what is satisfactory and what is not.

I am very glad to hear that, on a number of questions, the Council of Ministers shares our opinion, but this still does not convince me of our usefulness. What would convince me of my usefulness would be if a person I was speaking to, who originally held an opinion differing from my own, agreed to change it because of my having spoken to him.

It is my wish, therefore, Mr. President, that our Assembly should devote a little less time to preparing reports and a little more to thinking about what action has been taken on the reports which it has drawn up and the resolutions which it has adopted, and should inform the Council that on this or that important point it has not obtained the desired results and that it would therefore ask the representative of the Council of Ministers to give an explanation.

That is what I am interested in. I want to know why the Council of Ministers' opinion differs from ours. I want to know why, when we have expressed an opinion, it has felt that it cannot agree with us, although it may be right in not agreeing. I want to be able to talk it over with the Council. I think, incidentally, that when we become capable of doing this, we shall have much less need to worry about how the press reports our debates.

I have some experience of political life and I am well aware that the press takes an interest in our discussions when there is a real argument, when something happens at a meeting, when there is a divergence between the government and the parliamentarians, so that one wonders who will come out on top.

Admittedly we only have an advisory function here, whereas in our national assemblies we can question ministers and ask them how the government has pursued its policy and the reasons why it has adopted this or that attitude. And we are then entitled, in these national parliaments, to table motions of confidence or no confidence.

We should therefore radically rethink the organisation of our work, our way of conducting our debates, our relations with the Council of Ministers, and this rethinking should ultimately lead to a genuine dialogue covering points of both agreement and disagreement. If it will act in this way, WEU will have all the influence it wants, which depends as much on the determination of its members as on the terms of the treaties.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hanin.

I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to speak to Mr. Page's excellent report and his presentation roughly on the theme of how WEU can be made to work better, which has been the theme of the last three speeches.

I welcome the fact that my colleague Douglas Hurd is present. He referred to the future of WEU during the lifetime of the Brussels Treaty as well as the work of the Council of Ministers. I should like to know more about that work, and perhaps I should like to participate in it, but how to do it is another matter. We have dealt with the relationship of the work of the Council of Ministers to this Assembly. I could refer to many of Mr. Hurd's comments, but particularly I welcome the disarmament initiative arising from Madrid and the conditions which are relevant to WEU. I was not in The Hague. I know that Mr. Hurd, like me, is a firm believer in European co-operation in all fields. I reiterate our appreciation of his attendance at this debate.

The debate is about the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council. Mr. Page, alluding to the importance of the rôle of WEU, refers to it as a guarantor of the future shape of Europe in foreign policy and defence. He goes on to refer to the rôle of the Assembly and the way in which the Council intends to fulfil its rôle, and he suggests that the work of the Council is out of step with the work of the Assembly. Plainly, this raises how to put into practice the

Mr. Osborn (continued)

Brussels Treaty, the rôle of this Assembly and the rôle of the Council.

How can European countries co-ordinate their interests and rôle in defence, that is, curtailment of the arms race with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the one hand, and the need to maintain a proper level of European defence and rearmament to match what is happening in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, on the other? Obviously, there is a special relationship among members of the NATO Alliance and NATO ministers. Also, the EEC is concerned with this matter and with procurement. Mr. von Hassel has made a report on this issue which is still to be considered by ministers and the Assembly.

In my view, European countries should have common policies on foreign affairs, defence and defence procurement. However, the arrangements for this may appear to conflict. First, NATO is now beginning to take an interest in the Gulf. Secondly, WEU – and this is referred to in Chapter III of the report – is concerned with the work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and why it came into being. Thirdly, the EEC has a desire for procurement and the harnessing of industries to defence needs. The European Democrats and Christian Democrats have shown increasing agreement on armaments and foreign policy among members of the EEC. This involves careful dovetailing and co-ordination of the work of WEU.

There has been concern about relations between the Council of Ministers – that is, ministers of governments who are represented in WEU – and this Assembly. However, there is equal concern in the Council of Europe and, as a former member of the European Parliament, I believe that it is a concern of the European Economic Community.

This morning Mr. Page and Mr. Hanin and the Christian Democrat Group discussed the twenty-sixth annual report. I intervened to express the view that this was no new problem and that it existed eight years ago when I first attended meetings of this Assembly. My view is that, among member governments, foreign ministers and defence ministers know the importance of the international approach, particularly of WEU – and by “ministers” I mean those who hold responsibility for these matters, whether inside or outside national parliaments. This is a function of the rôle of our respective parliaments.

Last week Mr. Hanin chaired a meeting of the Council of Europe’s fifth Parliamentary and Scientific Conference. Mr. Hurd may have lis-

tened to a programme on the BBC last night called “No, minister”. I did not because I was travelling here. It questioned whether ministers or civil servants ran our respective governments. The theme was “Who runs Great Britain?”.

You, Mr. President, as a former minister, could better answer the question, but you might rightly feel constrained from doing so.

At the Helsinki Conference I implied that in matters of international co-operation permanent officials like to have control of research and development of science and technology. In the EEC, let alone the Council of Europe and WEU, international budgets are more easily cut than national budgets. That is because permanent officials like to keep activities that are within their responsibility under their control. If that is true of the subject that we are discussing, it is true also to a certain extent of the European Space Agency and Eurocontrol, which our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has examined.

In foreign affairs and defence I have always believed that defence chiefs and diplomats in our respective countries have taken a reasonably outward-looking attitude to this international approach. However, there are other ministries in government. You expressed the view, Mr. President, that defence was the concern of national governments and national parliaments. That is a paraphrase of what you said. But in each national government there are other ministries and departments, such as education and social services – which I admit are more the concern of the Council of Europe – energy, industry and science and technology, which are the concern of this Assembly. From time to time I have found – I encountered this for the first time eight years ago – ministers and their permanent officials in these departments to be unaware of the rôle of the Council of Europe and of Western European Union unless those ministers have been delegates to those bodies.

I therefore suggest to Mr. Hurd, particularly since he has an important rôle in the next six months or so, that in this age of supercontinents and of industrial and technological importance, European countries must work together. Europe has imposed limitations upon itself. We are composed of divergent communities, different sovereign states and different cultures and languages. Each country wishes to preserve its individual sovereignty. The key link in defence must be through Western European Union. The international approach must be all-important.

I suggest, therefore, that it is urgent that the members of this Assembly accept two challen-

Mr. Osborn (continued)

ges. The first is of close collaboration with our colleagues in the European Parliament. That has acquired importance as a result of the von Hassel approach and the work that is being done there. The second is close collaboration with the defence committees in our national parliaments to ensure that members of those committees are aware of what we are doing.

I hope that Mr. Hurd will discuss with Lord Carrington and the other ministers how best ministers and members of Western European Union can work together to achieve a co-ordinated defence policy within Europe. I go further than Mr. Page's recommendation requiring ministerial presence. I reinforce what he said. We in the Assembly want to know more of what the Council of Ministers is doing. We seek a way of working more closely with it. I shall be grateful if Mr. Hurd, during his period of office, will discuss this matter fully with his fellow ministers. If you and the Council will do the same, Mr. President, we can have a closer co-ordination in this subject and use Western European Union as a basis for it.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I should like to say a few words in full support of Mr. Page's report.

This afternoon we heard the President say again that ours is a very important Assembly and the only Assembly entitled to discuss defence matters and to make suggestions. We welcome these statements, these fair words, but we are obliged to note somewhat bitterly that the behaviour of the Council does not live up to them in practice. While it is true that relations between the Assembly and the Council have recently improved considerably, and that the Council has paid more attention to our recommendations and has by and large shown us greater consideration, it is equally true that relations are still not yet wholly satisfactory to the Assembly and do not guarantee that it can work to better effect and in closer accord with its responsibilities and importance.

There has already been a ban affecting proceedings at the recent meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee with the Council of Ministers at The Hague. In my modest capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I feel obliged to endorse the harsh remarks which were made because, truth to tell, we were not completely satisfied. There were deficiencies

which I trust will not be repeated in future. If the work of our Assembly is specialised and is bound to increase and become even more demanding in view of what the Minister stressed earlier, namely that NATO is now thinking more and more urgently of having to take action outside the sphere of the Atlantic Treaty, it is equally true that this will call for ever closer collaboration between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers for the support which these European countries will have to give any recommendations and decisions adopted by NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty countries to meet any European defence requirements which may arise if the individual members of NATO have to intervene in areas outside the NATO sphere of competence.

One last word, Mr. Minister: replies to our recommendations and questions must reach us more quickly particularly when the subjects are of immediate concern. In reality, I have the impression that in very many cases the replies are out of date when they arrive and serve no further purpose. For example, at its session last December, the Assembly adopted a recommendation on Afghanistan and asked whether the Council was not of the opinion that they should consider the matter and enquire of member countries whether the Afghan resistance movements should be supplied with arms to meet the increasingly large-scale and destructive intervention of the Soviet Union. I feel obliged to observe that this was a very important matter which should have received an immediate reply; instead, not only did we not receive a reply but the reply to Question 225, which drew the Council's attention to this fact, said everything. This reply stated that humanitarian action was being taken to help the refugees and that was all. The specific question regarding the possibility of supplying the Afghan resistance movements with arms was in practice ignored. Perhaps the Council did not discuss the problem; if it did we should like to know whether we can be told anything.

Recently, we have learnt that, as though in direct reply to the position carefully thought out by the Assembly, trade relations are being resumed with the Soviet Union, thus giving something to the refugees, much more to the Soviet Union and nothing to the Afghan resistance. There is nothing to stop this but the Assembly cannot in my opinion be ignored. The Assembly at least deserves a reply; the Assembly is entitled to know the Council's attitude and what it thinks. Otherwise, we must say that our work is completely useless. But even if our work may serve no purpose as far as other people are concerned, I must say, Mr. Minister, that we consider it to be useful and responsible and will continue to press for adequate replies.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I would only thank those distinguished colleagues who have spoken. I hope that they will always look upon the speeches that I make in the future with the same good will as they have shown today. I should also like to thank the Minister of State, who has stayed throughout, and it will be valuable to all our colleagues in the Assembly that this message has got to him firsthand.

The PRESIDENT. – It is greatly appreciated, Minister, that you have stayed throughout the criticisms. I happen to know that your only reason for leaving now is that you will be having an immediate consultation with one of your colleagues on the Council of Ministers. I have no doubt that you will convey to him the flavour of our discussion. We could scarcely ask for more rapid action. If you have time before you go back to London, I am sure that many of your colleagues would like the pleasure of your company at a reception that we are giving at 7 o'clock. Thank you very much indeed.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

The debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 880.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections or abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save time by not having a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

11. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 875)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 875.

1. See page 19.

I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*). – As this is the only meeting of the Assembly at which I am allowed to speak my own language, I hope that you will allow me now to speak in Dutch, which also means Flemish, my mother tongue.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, all too often in the past the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, when reading the annual report from the Council, has had to note with regret that little or no notice has been taken of some of this Assembly's proposals. Not so this time – on the contrary. Reading the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, one was spontaneously reminded of a biblical phrase: "Keep on asking and knocking, and it shall be opened unto you"!

The Council has in fact at last responded to our repeated recommendation to give precise details in the annual report of the manning levels of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe under the command of SACEUR.

This time, the answer is quite clear; in 1980 the average strength of these forces was 56,985. We can see at once that, after deducting the 2,480 men of the British Rhine Army regularly detached to Northern Ireland, there are 54,505 troops in Germany, compared to the 55,000 in the commitment.

It is the first time, too, that the report has given details of the composition of the Second British Tactical Air Force, also stationed in continental Europe.

The persistent asking and knocking this Assembly has been doing has also been rewarded in respect of its recommendation – made to the Council as long ago as 1978 and adopted again last year as Recommendation 348 – calling for the deletion of paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Brussels Treaty, laying down which warships may not be built in Germany. This year's report does in fact show that at its meeting on 21st July 1980, the Council deleted paragraph V, and consequently the Alliance's defensive capability at sea can be improved.

The Committee has also voiced its satisfaction at the fact that the Council has given a detailed reply on other points in Recommendation 348 adopted by this Assembly on the Committee's proposal. Indeed, paragraph 3 of this recommendation having asked last year for approval of the assignment of German naval forces to SACLANT as well as SACEUR, the annual report announces the decision by the

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

German Federal Security Council on 19th June 1980 expressing Germany's willingness to let German naval and naval air forces henceforth be deployed also outside the area limits at present existing for the German navy in the northern flank command.

There is perhaps less cause for satisfaction about the Council's reaction to paragraph 7 of the recommendation you adopted last year at the Committee's proposal, asking for clarification in the annual report of the present situation as regards stocks of chemical weapons in the member states, and publication in it of the list of chemical products to be monitored by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the list approved by the Council and currently in force.

In its reply the Council recalls that the Agency for the Control of Armaments asks all member states to indicate clearly whether or not they possess chemical weapons, and that they have all replied in the negative. But the approved list of chemical products to be checked is not in the report, as once again requested by the Assembly.

This refusal is all the more regrettable since this list, marked "unclassified", has been given to anyone who asked for it, and details from it are included in the publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

To go a little further with the activities of the Agency, the Council says in its annual report that the situation has generally remained unchanged. No activity by the Agency in the nuclear sector other than in connection with missiles and other special equipment, except as regards the weapons of one member state, France; no controls in the biological weapons sector; where chemical weapons are concerned, only a check on whether they are being manufactured - no check on quantities, since the member states have invariably stated that they do not possess such weapons.

So for the Committee there are no fresh arguments to change its opinion that the usefulness of these controls is still debatable. What about the member states which have not given up production of chemical weapons? Here the Council says that all these countries gave a negative answer when asked whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had progressed from the experimental stage to actual manufacture. So, there, too, there is no need for quantitative controls. And that's that!

To close this chapter, I would like to draw your attention to a passage in the annual report where the Council stresses that the programme

of field controls, and certainly that of visits to private firms, is a limited one; and it says that the close co-operation between the Agency and the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has resulted in the best use of available credits by avoiding duplication, to the greater benefit of both bodies.

I am mentioning this because the statement is in a way the starting point for paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the recommendation now presented for the Assembly's approval, where the Council is asked to investigate the best possible allocation of financial resources and available staff among all the organs of WEU, in the light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities.

Now a few words about the chapter on the Standing Armaments Committee.

The first section of the study on the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries, entrusted to the SAC in 1977, has now been completed; a declassified version is ready. A couple of weeks ago, at the last meeting of the Defence Committee in The Hague, this version was finally given to members of the Committee, and has probably been sent to all members of the Assembly. The Committee has not yet had an opportunity to examine and discuss its contents. My immediate reaction to the report was to want more explanation - perhaps by the Council, perhaps by the SAC itself.

Meanwhile, here too we note that paragraph 3 of our recommendation of last year was complied with at the last minute. For this reason we would like to delete from our report the last sentence of paragraph 4.1 as well as paragraph 3 of the recommendation.

For the rest, our report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee is very brief. Some people might gain the impression that this denotes a lack of appreciation of a so far well-esteemed organ of WEU, but we had no such intention.

The reasoning that led to the recommendation now before you is as follows:

First, having studied the various chapters of the Council's annual report devoted to the activities of this organisation in respect of defence problems, the Committee - and perhaps the whole of the Assembly - are in agreement with the Council that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty are still just as valid as they were in 1948 when the treaty was signed.

But to be, and remain, credible any treaty and certainly a mutual defence treaty, must be the focus of visible and continuing activity.

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

For many years now, the activities of this Assembly, its analysis of defence problems and its permanent dialogue with the Council have been the principal visible activities in the framework of the treaty. This genuinely political activity is the best way of ensuring the credibility of the Brussels Treaty. At the same time, the continuation of activities that no longer serve any political or practical purpose is a waste of public money, and might bring the whole organisation into disrepute.

Second, for years the Committee, with the evident support of the Assembly, has commented in reports covering the application of armaments controls provided for in the various protocols to the treaty, that the practical usefulness of these controls is debatable. Indeed, the Council has never authorised application of the controls to nuclear and biological weapons. Controls on the non-production of chemical weapons apply only to Germany. As to the remaining controls on the non-production of certain conventional weapons in Germany, or on the quantities of certain conventional weapons in all member countries on the European mainland, the list of these weapons has already been, or can still be, reduced in the way laid down in the treaty or its protocols. Lord Duncan-Sandys has just had some very blunt words to say about this.

Third, regarding the work of the Standing Armaments Committee – a body set up not by the treaty or protocol, but by simple Council decision on 7th May 1955 – the Council has informed the Assembly that arrangements for co-operation in the field of arms production are the subject of work in the Independent European Programme Group, and that any duplication of work with that body must be avoided.

Fourth, on the other hand there is the fact that, in view of the difficult economic position, all the member countries are trying to make economies in the budgets of international organisations, including WEU.

For all these reasons the Committee is recommending the Council to examine the usefulness of the various organs of the organisation, in order, taking account of the scope and importance of their respective activities, to arrive at a fresh and sensible allocation of the resources still made available by our governments.

I was glad to hear the Minister say a moment ago that the Council had set up a special working group. This has been instructed to make a study of the work of the various bodies, while being kind enough to leave out of consideration the activities of the Assembly itself. My intention is that the organ directly supported by the

Assembly shall also be looked at, to see whether the resources are adequate. The aim is to be able to do more with funds that are still limited.

It is a question of maintaining the credibility of the treaty, which we too still consider to be essential. And that, Mr. President, is what lies behind the recommendation, which we hope the Assembly will adopt. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tanghe.

No members have put their names down to speak in the debate.

I will ask the Assembly to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 875.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections or abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save time by not having a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

Having had, as has been mentioned, a model ministerial address, we had a model presentation of a reply to the Council, a very persuasive speech which has the immediate and unanimous support of the Assembly.

12. Nomination of members to Committees

The PRESIDENT. – We have now to deal with the next Order of the Day, the nomination of members to Committees.

The candidates for the six permanent Committees of the Assembly have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Is there any objection to these nominations?...

There is no objection.

The nominations to the Committees are therefore agreed to.

¹. See page 20.

**13. *Date, time and Orders of the Day
of the next Sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 16th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. European security and the Mediterranean (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 876 and Amendments).

2. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

I have now to declare the sitting closed and to say how much my wife and I are looking forward to receiving you in about an hour's time.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 16th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
4. Change in the membership of a Committee.
5. European security and the Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 876 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Jung, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Grant, Mr. Günther Müller, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh.
6. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.
Speakers: The President, General Rogers (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*).
Replies by General Rogers to questions put by: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Louis Jung, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Prussen, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Cavaliere.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

I stress again that each Representative, or, in the absence of a Representative, the Substitute on his or her behalf, should sign the Register of Attendance. This is important not only for the purpose of recording his or her presence but in order to conform with our rules should we need to take a roll-call vote.

1. See page 22.

3. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I have received further nominations for the posts of Vice-Presidents which have still to be filled. These are as follows: Mr. Berchem of Luxembourg, and Mr. Cornelissen of the Netherlands. In each case the nomination conforms to the rules. If the Assembly agrees, I propose that our colleagues Mr. Berchem and Mr. Cornelissen be elected by acclamation pending further nomination for the remaining place.

Are there any objections?...

The Assembly is unanimous. Therefore, the candidates are elected.

The order of seniority of the Vice-Presidents so far elected is as follows: MM. Tanghe, Berchem, Gessner, Cornelissen and Maravalle.

4. Change in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT. – The Italian Delegation has proposed the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Pucci as a titular member in place of Mr. Battaglia.

Are there any objections?...

The nomination is agreed to.

5. *European security and the Mediterranean*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 876 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 876 and Amendments.

Mr. Bozzi, understandably, is not able to be present because of commitments in connection with the French elections. Mr. Cavaliere, the Chairman of the Committee, has kindly undertaken to introduce Mr. Bozzi's report on his behalf.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it falls to me to introduce the well-argued and vigorous report prepared by our colleague Mr. Bozzi who, to his regret, is unable to be present today.

I should, therefore, like to apologise in advance if my exposition is not complete: in any case the report was circulated to all members some time ago and I should imagine therefore that everyone has read the explanatory memorandum, which is very detailed and contains all the elements necessary for assessing the proposals in the draft recommendation.

The last time our Committee dealt with the problem of security in the Mediterranean was in 1978, when, on 31st May, it approved the draft recommendation and report submitted by the Rapporteur, Mr. Grant. Since then quite substantial changes have taken place and it is fair to say that two factors have aggravated the situation in the Mediterranean: these are, firstly, the strengthening of the military capacity of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in general and, secondly, the rising tensions between countries in the area, which involves the Mediterranean and European security in general. There is tension between well-armed countries which in most cases are better armed than the Mediterranean countries belonging to NATO. As everyone knows the Warsaw Pact countries have become stronger in all directions. In case of nuclear armaments, everyone has said – and this is regularly repeated by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – that the situation is extremely serious and alarming, particularly with the deployment of the SS-20 and the new Backfire bomber.

In the case of conventional armaments, matters are even more urgent and the situation is even more disquieting because the previous imbalance has recently tipped still further and if, for example, we compare the armoured divi-

sions available to NATO in this area with those available to the Warsaw Pact countries, there are real grounds for concern.

Turning to seaborne forces, the Soviet Union has now become the second naval power, capable of ensuring its presence and carrying its offensive to all parts of the world.

I should like to make a few specific comments on this point, and to recall what was said in February 1981 by Admiral Shapiro, Head of United States Naval Secret Services. He stressed that the Russians have Typhoon-class missile submarines with a tonnage of 25,000 tons which therefore substantially outweigh the Trident. Admiral Shapiro also observed that the Soviet navy can deploy Alfa-class missile submarines and so on.

Unquestionably, therefore, the naval presence of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact has become a matter of great concern. On this point I should like to refer to the remarks made by Admiral Crowe, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, in an interview in October 1980. He pointed out that the situation had changed completely since 1952 because, precisely as a result of the tensions developing in areas affecting the Mediterranean zone and Europe, and of increased Soviet naval power, consideration had now to be given not only to a land war, as in 1952, but also, and most importantly, to the possibility of a sea war in the Mediterranean. Admiral Crowe added that the southern region had ceased to be peripheral and had become central and that the threat had shifted from the northern to the southern front, with the consequence that all the problems created by this new situation had to be met and resolved. Nor could the threat be regarded as less because the Soviet Union would have no naval bases in the Mediterranean; the new relationship and the new pact with Syria tell us that the Soviet Union is present in the Mediterranean. But one has only to think of possible early developments in the policies of Libya where we have Colonel Kadhafi who is completely unpredictable and extremely dangerous because of his unscrupulousness. We could find the Soviet Union with bases which would make it very troublesome if not outright difficult for us to defend the Mediterranean. Hence the need to suggest solutions as does the draft recommendation.

In my view, one of the most important measures we suggest is that diplomatic action be taken to deter Mediterranean countries which are not members of NATO from allowing bases or assistance to the Soviet fleet. This point in the recommendation seems to me to be very important and with particular regard to the situation in the Mediterranean I should like to recall what the Defence Minister Mr. Lagorio,

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

who is a socialist, said to the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 14th April 1980. He said quite specifically that "The global threat in the Mediterranean has undoubtedly increased in both absolute and relative terms". Hence, the need to think about what is to be done.

At this point I think that special reference should be made to the problem of sales of arms to third countries because, as I mentioned earlier, the growing tension in those areas which directly affect European security and therefore the defence of the Mediterranean even more, involves countries which are much better and more heavily armed than the Mediterranean countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance and NATO. It is therefore essential that the WEU countries – and indeed all the NATO countries – should agree on a specific policy regarding sales of arms to third countries. The Committee has submitted an amendment on this point, adding to the draft recommendation. There must also be a complete policy for supplying the countries mainly involved in the defence of the Mediterranean with the defence material they require. Reference is made to Greece but we stress the urgent need for adequate assistance to enable Turkey to modernise and strengthen its armaments. As concern is now beginning to be felt regarding the defence of the Straits – Dardanelles and Bosphorus – which in fact falls to Turkey, the special reference to that country seems to me to be more than justified. All this must be done quickly without further loss of time.

As I reach my conclusion, I should like to remind the Assembly that for some years there has been growing talk here of looking into problems arising outside the NATO sphere of competence; today it is well known that events in countries outside Atlantic Alliance territory have a direct influence on European security. In the interview which I mentioned earlier, Admiral Crowe referred for example to the subject of oil supplies. I may add that other very important lines of communication such as the Cape route could be threatened; I could add that some raw materials which we import for industrial development and defence purposes from certain countries on those lines of communication constitute a vital problem for Europe's survival. The British Prime Minister, General Rogers whom we shall be hearing today, and all the leading military and political authorities in the United States of America, reinforced by the political authorities of the member states of WEU – and I could mention another point in Mr. Lagorio's statement – have made it clear that the time has come to think of intervention, including armed intervention, out-

side the sphere of the Atlantic Alliance; and this cannot be a matter for NATO because that would mean modifying the treaty and would involve serious problems on which all the NATO countries are not agreed but would have to be a matter for individual countries concerting their intervention and acting in general with NATO. We therefore realise even more the urgency of taking action to provide the Mediterranean countries, which have to ensure the security of Europe in conjunction with that of the Mediterranean, with the help required to modernise their armaments and strengthen their defence because, in the event of movement of the forces at present deployed in Europe for the defence of Europe, the defence of the Mediterranean could not be left to those countries alone.

These, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the points I wished to make and I would strongly urge you to approve this draft recommendation which I feel to be of great immediacy and importance; of an importance vital for the survival of the Mediterranean and Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere, for your readiness as Chairman to step into the breach created by the unavoidable absence of your Rapporteur. The Assembly is indebted to you both – for the excellence of the report and for your introductory speech.

We now have the debate on the report, and the first speaker is Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for at least enabling me to state my views on this major report by Mr. Bozzi, which I was unable to do in Committee as Mr. Cavaliere, the Chairman, managed to block the discussion, doubtless in order to please his Turkish military friends.

In fact I had to leave the meeting in protest at the methods employed by the Committee Chairman. Preventing one's opponents from speaking is equivalent to driving nails into a potential WEU coffin; and that I would regret.

In regard to this major report by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Bozzi – a report marked by Corsican, and therefore Mediterranean, sensitivity – I would express a basic criticism of a general nature, as well as firm opposition to the substance and form of paragraphs 3.23 to 3.40, which relate to Turkey. However, Mr. President, I have reservations about criticising a colleague in his absence, reservations which have apparently not always been shared in WEU bodies.

My basic criticism is this. In reading the report I wonder, like many other members, whether, as someone who refuses to participate in the North Atlantic Assembly, I really ought

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

to be here at all. If we persist in confusing our own responsibility and the terms of reference of WEU with those of NATO, we may involuntarily weaken ourselves to the point that, in the face of the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament, our own WEU Assembly could appear redundant and come under threat of abolition by our own governments.

My opposition is to the major section on Turkey, which, in my view, reveals a complacent if not sycophantic attitude towards generals who have taken power by means of a military coup.

Some technical details. We note once again, that Turkey is the sick man of Europe: on the economic level, the suffering of the people, endemic unemployment, galloping inflation; on the political level, a military régime tending towards dictatorship of the most vulgar kind; on the military level, an army that is indeed large in numbers, but under- or badly-equipped.

Now, we are told that for five years defence expenditure has averaged 5.3 % of gross national product; in fact we know that it accounts for over 25 % of the budget – a quarter of the Turkish national budget – despite the fact that the Turkish army does not suffer the same problems, particularly in respect of personnel costs, as western armies, since all the lower ranks are comprised of militia men who receive no pay for two years.

What are we to make of this? Where is the money going? In fact, we have seen for too long now that the armed forces, which Mr. Bozzi refers to as playing an important educational rôle – what a joke; have we ever seen the army playing an educational rôle? – are structured and trained to deal not with an external enemy but with what is called “internal subversion”.

The army is actually constituted and trained for use against the people, mainly the Kurdish people. Mr. Bozzi himself mentions the great cultural diversity in Turkey, which is true. It is therefore regrettable that the Turkish authorities do not recognise that cultural diversity and deny the Kurdish people, in their laws and constitution, even the right to be called by their name.

And when we refer to destabilising events on the eastern side of the Mediterranean, we must bear in mind that for many years the main part of the Turkish élite forces have been in the eastern zone, not in order to guard the frontier but in order to subjugate the Kurdish people, who are basically claiming the right to cultural self-determination.

More than two-thirds of the Turkish military forces are assigned to the maintenance of order, even though today – and fortunately so – terrorism has been throttled and is therefore far from being what it was before. This gives the game away: it is not against terrorism that order is being maintained, but against the popular forces, against the workers who might claim their due and might be prepared to fight in order to improve their situation.

We are told that the air force, in particular, is being modernised. Last week in the Belgian Parliament I had occasion to ask a question about the sale by Belgium to Turkey of seventy-five F-104G Starfighters, the very planes which we were told had to be replaced immediately in Belgium because they were becoming a permanent danger for the civilian population owing to lack of safety in flight. I regret that the safety of the Turkish people is not valued as highly as that of the Belgian people. Modernising the Turkish air force with Starfighters seems to me rather curious!

As to the political aspect, I would refer – without reading them out, but I am prepared to do so for I have the texts before me – both to Article 55 c of the United Nations Charter and to the preambles to the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. All of them declare the will of the signatories to fight for respect for human rights and the maintenance of basic freedoms. Is the mention of these things in our treaties simply a matter of literary convention, folklore or political argument, or are we saying “Do as I say but not as I do”?

It was the Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, who mentioned the aggravation of tension in the Mediterranean area, but in my view the source is not the same in every case. Tension there is: increased tension in the Mediterranean; a coup in Turkey, where democracy has been murdered; an attempted coup in Spain, happily abortive; a very unstable political situation in Italy; a threat to Greece, and a threat even in Portugal. Yes, there is tension in the Mediterranean, but it does not always spring from the sources unilaterally denounced in this Assembly.

It is true that European solidarity with the poorest peoples must be given practical expression. Those who still enjoy a comfortable standard of living despite the crisis have a duty to grant substantial economic aid to their weaker companions. I fully agree with this, on condition that together we are able to maintain respect for human rights and basic freedoms for all.

I do not accept the postulate contained in paragraph 3.38 of the report, which expresses confidence in the military.

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

Are the members of the Assembly aware of the press release by the National Security Council announcing, on 2nd June last, a new series of bans on political activity in Turkey? Former parliamentarians are henceforth forbidden to make statements or write articles commenting on the previous period. Among the other decisive restrictions imposed by the Council are the following: disputes, particularly political disputes, are forbidden at all levels, the decrees instituting the state of siege may not be discussed – nor even commented on – and publications are censored.

I am afraid, unfortunately, that I have been right since September: it is impossible for soldiers to establish a democratic régime because democracy as we parliamentarians understand it is incompatible with the democracy of the barracks.

I shall vote against the draft recommendation.

I have tabled four amendments. If they are not adopted I shall abstain since I, like certain other colleagues, intend to remain faithful to the United Nations Charter and to the preambles to the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. European security will never...

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – What about the Russians!

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Jung, I am not a communist and I make no reservations, unlike a certain former President of the French Republic!

European security will never be properly assured if it is based on tyranny and the oppression of the peoples of a member state of NATO. NATO has endured the opprobrium caused by the presence of fascist Portugal. Are we going to accept that of the encouragement of military coups?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Our next speaker is Mr. Grant.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I cannot allow Mr. Dejardin to get away with the outrageous remarks that he made in opening his speech. I am a member of the Defence Committee, as he is, and I can tell the Assembly precisely what the facts are.

There was a meeting of the Committee at which a decision was taken. Mr. Dejardin was not there; nor was I. At the next meeting, he sought to raise the matter again, because he had been absent from that earlier meeting. However, Committees cannot be conducted to meet the convenience of Mr. Dejardin, and the

conduct of the Committee by the Chairman, Mr. Cavaliere, was perfectly proper. It commanded the support of the remainder of the Committee, and Mr. Dejardin left in a fit of pique.

The conduct of that Committee was quite proper. Mr. Cavaliere is one of the best Chairmen of the Defence Committee that I have known.

This is an admirable report, and I am only sorry that our colleague, Mr. Bozzi, is not here to present it, because he has a great interest in the subject and has done a great deal of work. The report brings up to date the earlier report which I presented to the Assembly and it provides a number of additional facts. I agree entirely with Mr. Cavaliere that the situation is more dangerous than it was when I presented my report.

I said then that we regarded the Mediterranean as a place of tourism, sun and blue skies. But it is also worth remembering that it is a place where as likely as anywhere in the world there could be a conflagration and the start of World War III, especially because of its proximity to the Middle East. I am also reminded of a remark by Sir Winston Churchill who, during the last war, described it as the “soft under-belly of Europe”. Therefore it is a place of immense importance to NATO.

Generally, the view can be taken – and I have no doubt that Mr. Dejardin takes it – that we do not like NATO, that we are not worried about the Warsaw Pact countries, that it is not very important to resist them, and that we would not complain at all if NATO folded up. That is a perfectly logical and sensible point of view. On the other hand, if we believe in NATO and that it is the most important defence of the West and of freedom against the Soviet bloc, as I do, it is essential to maintain it in as strong and efficient a condition as possible. It is not logical to say that we believe in NATO but that we are not prepared to keep it strong and vigorous.

I wish briefly to mention three countries. First, I must refer to what is probably the most important, which is Turkey. We went to Turkey with the Defence Committee. Mr. Dejardin was with us. I do not know what he was doing there, but it became clear to me and my colleagues that enormous relief was felt by the Turkish people that law and order were being observed and that they were able to walk the streets again without the risk of being slaughtered or injured in some way.

There was immense support expressed by those whom Mr. Dejardin calls “the people” for the measures which have been taken and, in that sense, the army commands the support of

Mr. Grant (continued)

the overwhelming majority of the Turkish people. That may not appeal to Mr. Dejardin's extreme left-wing friends, but the majority of the people are relieved that they are no longer being slaughtered and injured. Therefore, we have a duty to Turkey to see that, in view of all its difficulties and not least its serious economic difficulties, it is able to fulfil its rôle in NATO; and that is for the rest of us to sustain.

As Mr. Cavaliere said, Turkey's position alone is vital: it is up against the borders of the Soviet Union, Iran and so on. There are all sorts of danger spots surrounding Turkey. Therefore, this report is right to emphasise that it is in the interests of the West and of the free world that we support Turkey in its present difficulties. If we construct a brick wall against our enemies, it is no good our saying "Because we do not like the colour of one of those bricks, we shall knock it out." We must instead maintain it and sustain it if we want to maintain the defence as a whole.

The second country to which I refer is Spain. It was a great day for democracy and freedom when Spain became converted from dictatorship and subsequently was able to join the Council of Europe.

It would seem to me wholly logical that at one end of the Mediterranean a free country, a democratic country, a large and important country controlling the western end of the Mediterranean, and indeed the Atlantic to some extent, should be a member of NATO. That may not be the wish of those of all political views in Spain but certainly it is the wish of the present government and one which, if we are interested in NATO and defence, we should support in every way. Therefore, I strongly commend the references in the recommendations to arranging for Spain to participate in NATO exercises and defence planning pending its complete joining of NATO, which I hope it will certainly do in the very near future.

Having moved from the East to the West, I now wish to consider the middle of the Mediterranean. Paragraphs 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 on the subject of Malta – and I know this is only in the report itself – cause me and some others anxiety when they draw attention to the fact that whereas, on the one hand, there is an agreement between Italy and Malta whereby Italy gives aid to Malta on condition that Malta maintains a non-aligned profile, only in January of this year Malta concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union to provide facilities and bases. Quite rightly, the report asks whether this can be reconciled with the neutrality agreement concluded with Italy. This is a matter

that I regard as serious and at which we should look in much closer detail in relation to the overall defence and security of the Mediterranean.

In conclusion, contrary to the slightly excited remarks of Mr. Dejardin, I greatly hope that the Assembly will see fit to maintain the report in its entirety, without amendment. It points out the dangers and says what should be done. The message in the report which should go loud and clear to the ministers is that any watering down or weakening of these recommendations will only give comfort to the enemies of Western European Union and of everything for which we stand.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grant.

The next speaker is Mr. Günther Müller, who will be followed by Dr. Miller.

Mr. Günther MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this morning a speaker criticised Mr. Bozzi's report for paying too much attention to the military situation in the Mediterranean area. I would like to emphasise that it is precisely this which I applaud. After all, it is precisely the military and security aspects that Western European Union and this Assembly exist to deal with. We owe Mr. Bozzi and the whole Committee a debt of gratitude for the wealth of material made available to us here for this debate.

The previous speaker, Mr. Grant, pointed to the need to keep an eye on the real adversaries, the real threats to the member countries of Western European Union. In his report Mr. Bozzi is indeed primarily concerned with the strong naval build-up of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area. We all know that it was an old goal of Russian imperial policy – not simply of communist policy since 1917, but of earlier policy too – to penetrate into southern waters and gain influence there. Russia's interest in the area has been constant ever since Catherine the Great first sent a fleet into the Mediterranean under Prince Orlov.

As we know, we in the West especially, and also in Turkey, do not really apply the Montreux Convention as we should. You will remember that the convention lays down, for example, that no aircraft carrier may pass through the Straits – the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. However, the Soviet Union has sent a helicopter carrier, the Kiev, through the Straits of Bosphorus. One would have to take a very generous view not to see this as an infringement of the Montreux Convention. In point of fact we are very liberal towards a potential adversary, the Soviet Union, in regard to the

Mr. Müller (continued)

build-up of naval forces in the Mediterranean area.

Mr. Dejardin, who was the first speaker in this debate, expressed concern about one country. I shall return to this point. He spoke of unpredictability in this point. He spoke of unpredictability in the Mediterranean area. Such unpredictability does exist. But at the present time Turkey is certainly one of the least unpredictable factors. There are other factors. There is Mr. Kadhafi in Libya. There is also the Prime Minister of Malta, a man who is not all that predictable, as we have seen repeatedly in the past.

There is above all the unpredictability of the whole eastern area of the Mediterranean, if we consider the conflict between Iraq and Iran or the conflicts in Lebanon. Indeed, even a country like Israel is now one of the factors that are difficult to predict, if only because of the reprehensible attack on the Iraqi reactor – all events in this area capable of contributing to a constant increase rather than a reduction of tension.

Of course, there have also been positive developments in the area. For instance, Egypt has become an element of stability there. We can be glad of this. The balance of power has been to some extent restored here. But of course this area remains inherently problematic, if only because of the situation that has built up there over the years.

Let me say one more thing about Turkey. I would have done so even if Mr. Dejardin had not spoken, although he has of course given me a particular incentive in the form of his very emotional speech to this Assembly.

If Mr. Dejardin were a politician guided by ethical principles, he would have condemned the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces years ago, and I would have applauded him wholeheartedly. Only, this attack on another area was carried out not by the perpetrators of a military coup, as he calls them, but by democrats, under a Prime Minister, moreover, who belongs to the same International as Mr. Dejardin's party. I want to state this quite clearly here.

Our experience in Turkey and in the discussions with the leading people in Turkey today – I was a member of the delegation – has shown after all that in relation to Greece, for example, it is apparently easier now than it was to find a spirit of compromise among the present Turkish leaders.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are all supporters of democracy. There have already been two

military interventions in Turkey which led, after a certain time, to the re-establishment of democracy under better conditions. I hope and firmly believe that this will also happen in the present case. But I know that in a country in which 4,000 people have been murdered, in which, for example, the pupils at the German school in Istanbul extracted pass marks from their teachers at machine-gun point, things could simply not go on like this, and it was necessary to institute in Turkey what I would call a cooling-off period.

We should really be asking where the 160,000 hand-guns in Turkey came from. Who was interested in stirring up trouble there? Who was interested in destabilising the country? If we were to examine these questions in detail, we would conclude that international terrorism, which has struck in Turkey as well, has certain common roots, common roots that threaten both the security of democracy and the security of our member countries. This is another aspect which must be considered in connection with security in the Mediterranean area.

I am glad that Mr. Bozzi has tabled this report. I shall of course support it. I believe the majority of this Assembly regards the report as a necessary and distinguished piece of work.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I often speak after my German namesake. I hope that I have a little more in common with him than merely a similarity in name.

I have a dual mandate. I have to speak on behalf of Tom Urwin, who is not too well, who would, I believe, have represented the views of the Socialist Group. Also, I must combine what I believe he might have said with some of my own views on the subject.

I regret that Mr. Bozzi is unable to be with us. I know that similar words are often used, but it is right to say that his report is comprehensive, extensive and far-reaching. However, I must express some relatively mild reservations of the Socialist Group.

I regret that Mr. Dejardin did not voice to the Socialist Group his objections to the report. He appeared at the very last minute but did not indicate in the short time that he was with us on Monday morning that he intended to advance such a vociferous objection to the report. I am sorry that even now he is not present, and I have no intention of addressing any criticism towards him in his absence, but it is very much a matter of regret that we in the Socialist Group were not informed of his objections.

Dr. Miller (continued)

I think that I should be voicing the general views of the group – and I associate myself entirely with them – if I were to draw the attention of the Assembly to paragraph 6.1 headed “Opinion of the minority”. The words which I feel express our view are:

“A minority of the Committee opposed the report on the grounds that it was too oriented to military measures of security.”

I should like to develop that theme.

There is no sense in the Socialist Group of non-commitment to NATO. Certainly I am a supporter of NATO. However, we are concerned, and I think that everyone should be concerned, about the military build-up and the generation in the world of an atmosphere of pessimism in which there seems to be a decided and unequivocal polarisation of the West and East into two blocs – the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact bloc. According to some views, the polarisation is immutable – never to change – and the possibility, even the probability, of conflict with the Soviet Union is uppermost in everyone’s mind.

I do not suggest that human rights flourish in the Soviet Union. It is not beyond pushing its objectives by military as well as by other means, and I can understand people’s reservations, worries and fears about its intentions. It is continuing the kind of expansionism and imperialism that took place under the tsars. I say that advisedly. However, the build-up of arms and its escalating cost could bankrupt us. We may soon be able to buy nothing except arms to defend ourselves – and then what shall we have left to defend? I am concerned about this polarisation, this apparent acceptance of a situation that is fraught with all kinds of danger. It may well be that now is the time to give peaceful approaches a greater chance than they have been given in the past. I abhor the build-up of large business concerns, not simply for the selling of arms, but for the purpose of providing to nations advisers, experts and specialists of all descriptions who do very well in building up little empires for themselves.

Having expressed those general reservations, may I say that I appreciate the way in which Mr. Bozzi tackled the report? He covered extensively the subject of the Mediterranean, showing clearly that he had a commendable grasp of the subject. He dealt with the question of non-NATO countries and other areas in the Mediterranean where problems have arisen and other problems could arise.

I wish to say a few words about two countries which exercise the minds of members of the

Socialist Group – Turkey and Spain. I appreciate the delicacy of the problem about Turkey which confronts democrats. There is a danger that, if we do not show willingness to give Turkey a chance to return to the democratic process, we shall push the Turks into hands totally opposed to western concepts, western culture and everything else western. I would not wish to be party to pushing them into such hands. We must, however, accept that Turkey is a military dictatorship – and a military dictatorship is a military dictatorship, regardless of what we say to show that it is different from other military dictatorships. The longer it goes on and the firmer the hold it develops, the more despotic and tyrannical it becomes.

We must therefore be careful about appearing to accept the situation in Turkey and giving it too long to return to what we consider to be normality. If we make excuses for Turkey for too long, it will be asked what difference there is between the military dictatorship there and other military dictatorships which do not come within the purview of NATO or the western circumference. I therefore enter this caveat, reservation and fear about Turkey.

Spain also is a democracy under strain. We must do everything we can to hold it together. That is why I should not object in the slightest if Spain wished to become a member of NATO. What we are worried about is being seen by the third world and by other non-NATO countries to be pushing Spain into membership. If Spain made overtures to NATO, if she wished with the willingness of her people to join NATO, not only would I have no objection to that but I would welcome Spain with open arms.

I am sure that my colleagues later today will be thoroughly competent to deal with the amendments tabled by the Socialist Group. I shall leave the matter there for the moment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

As members will have seen, with punctilious military efficiency General Rogers arrived at exactly 11 o’clock. However, I said yesterday that he might not arrive until 11.15 because of the traffic. Therefore, with his ready consent, we shall have one more speaker before asking General Rogers to address us.

I am sure that the General is not unfamiliar with the problems of the Mediterranean that we are now discussing.

I understand that Mr. Baumel is not present and that Mr. Fortier does not wish to speak. Therefore, the next speaker is Mr. van den Bergh. Are you happy about that, Mr. van den Bergh?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – There is no problem, Mr. President.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to make a few supplementary remarks. Although the report does not wholly reflect my views on the situation in the Middle East, I voted for it in Committee, so I cannot go back on it now.

I wish to make three comments which affect an important aspect of the Mediterranean area. I refer specifically to the Middle East, the situation in Turkey and the situation in Spain.

Although I largely endorse the Rapporteur's analysis, I feel that too little attention has been paid to a number of political aspects of the matter.

As already observed, I believe that in military terms there is an overall balance in the Mediterranean area. As a rule, relatively little prominence is given to the considerable geographical and strategic advantages which NATO enjoys in the Mediterranean area by comparison with the Warsaw Pact countries. A finely modulated approach is vital here from the military standpoint. Various other members of the Committee share my view that current political developments represent a major threat to security in the Mediterranean area. There is unfortunately no doubt that the situation in the Middle East is deteriorating. These developments, whether they are caused by economic, military or political factors or by differences between various Arab countries, affect the military and political situation throughout the area.

Let me list some of the danger points in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq and the state of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Developments in another part of North Africa are also affecting the situation in the Middle East. It is a major political challenge to the European countries and the member states of NATO to bring the deteriorating political and military situation in the Middle East under control. Furthermore, in addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian side of it, there now appear to be genuine developments in the Arab world which have nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict but are aggravating the political situation in the Middle East and thus represent a growing threat to the political situation in the Mediterranean area. We must make more use than before of political resources in order to ensure increasing stability throughout the Middle East in future years, since the military situation in the Mediterranean area depends on it.

The Council of Europe has frequently discussed the situation in Turkey. We in WEU must also discuss Turkey. Many arguments can be advanced as to why Turkey needs time. I am opposed to those who describe the régime in Turkey as fascist. That is not true. In this I agree with Mr. Eçevit, Turkey's former President. During a recent visit to Turkey I realised that statements of this kind may in fact be counter-productive to the restoration of democracy in Turkey. There are sufficient grounds for advocating patience over the restoration of democracy, but we must also keep a keen and critical eye on the present situation. After my visit I came to the conclusion that there is cause for hope. We could trust the Turkish military government to restore democracy. I do not know whether that is the situation today. It must be remembered that terrorism was widespread in Turkey and that it had to be stopped. The big question is why the present Turkish Government maintains restrictions on rights in Turkey, which in my opinion have nothing to do with putting an end to terrorism. I cannot understand why restrictions on trade union freedoms persist. I cannot understand why censorship is now stricter than it was a few months ago. I cannot understand why Turkish politicians now have less freedom than they had a few months ago. At the moment I cannot be sure that the present political climate in Turkey is conducive to gradual progress towards the restoration of democracy. We do not hear much about the time-table announced for the restoration of democracy in Turkey. There is good reason for concern about all kinds of statements by the military leaders in Turkey on the kind of democracy that is to be restored. In my view, it is not for the Turkish generals to decide on the substance and content of democratic organisation. It is not for them to decide which Turkish politicians may return and which may not. I find developments in Turkey more worrying now than in February and March of this year. I also feel that we must pay closer attention to this, here in WEU and in NATO, than we do now. If the Turkish situation continues to go badly, the cohesion of the Alliance will be threatened.

To conclude, I should like to make just one comment on Spain. Here again, we must be cautious, because we are currently faced with an East-West situation which is unsatisfactory in many respects. Although some of those present, including General Rogers, think differently, I feel we must beware of creating the impression that we are always bent on increasing military strength. We must aim at a global balance and above all at reducing the level of the armed forces. In view of the prevailing military balance, I feel it is unwise to go on placing the emphasis on strengthening the mili-

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

tary potential on both sides. The question is whether Spanish membership of NATO would not add still more to the tensions between East and West. A few years ago Willy Brandt said that the entry of Spain might lead to an intensification of pressure on some eastern bloc countries, especially Yugoslavia. That would be a bad thing in itself. I need not remind you of the unfortunate developments in Poland.

We must be very cautious about the question of Spain's accession and we should tell the Spanish Government that there is no need for us to discuss it, because it might lead to an exacerbation of the situation between East and West.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. van den Bergh.

The debate is adjourned.

6. Address by General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The PRESIDENT. – Now it is my extremely great pleasure to welcome General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to address us. He is well known and has carried on the excellent arrangements and relations that have existed between the Assembly and SHAPE headquarters. Many members will have met him on committees or in other contexts, but it is the first time that we have had the privilege and pleasure of welcoming him to address our Assembly. That is not from any want of a desire to arrange it sooner, but simply because it has not been possible, with the limited choice of dates that we are able to offer, to fix a date. From the inception of my presidency a year ago General Rogers readily agreed to come and I am most happy today to welcome him as Supreme Allied Commander. We look forward to hearing what he has to say.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Thank you, Mr. President. Distinguished members of the Council and the Assembly, it is a great pleasure for me to be here with you today. I have had the privilege in the past of consulting and holding discussions with members of the Council, and now I am particularly delighted that I can be in the presence of the Assembly.

At the outset I should like to express publicly and strongly the gratitude that I and all of us in Allied Command Europe feel for the support that Western European Union has given to our defence efforts in NATO. It was particularly gratifying recently to share with you actions which led to the removal of the treaty restrictions on German naval armaments

production and disposition. That event, I believe, signified the stability of relationships among the nations of Western Europe, towards which WEU has striven for these many years. In no small measure the ending of those restrictions also strengthened western security.

WEU has special responsibilities for European security – responsibilities that parallel those I bear as SACEUR. Our interests are alike. We seek to promote the peace and security of Europe. In my view, there are serious dangers to our security in the current international environment. My intent today is to outline the gravity of the menace we face, to suggest several key tasks which we must undertake in the 1980s, and to solicit your assistance in their accomplishment.

Dominating our considerations must be the increasingly adverse force balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO which emerged in the last decade. In the 1970s we witnessed the Warsaw Pact outdistancing the forces of NATO. We have seen the Soviet Union go beyond equivalence in the strategic nuclear area. We have seen it and its allies surpass NATO in the long-range theatre nuclear force area, and increase its traditional advantages in the conventional area.

Over the past few years the West has become aware of these trends in the European security environment. Yet I am not convinced that most of our peoples realise the full scope of our deficiencies. Far more is involved than just a matter of comparing defence budgets, although it is instructive to note that the Soviet Union's allocation of resources to defence, in terms of percentage of GDP, is more than triple the NATO average. My concern is more for what this massive scale of investment in modern weapons means for us today and tomorrow.

As is well known, the Warsaw Pact continues to outnumber NATO by more than two to one in all the key areas, such as divisions, tanks, theatre-deployed aircraft, artillery and submarines. In recent years the Soviets have made a determined effort to overtake the qualitative lead upon which we in the West have depended for our security. They have succeeded, and the change is indeed stark. In the 1970s the USSR deployed four new intercontinental ballistic missile systems. It deployed the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, forces that provide an unprecedented capability to reach into Asia, all of Western Europe and to most of North Africa. NATO has made no like nuclear deployments in that time frame.

The Soviets also field a chemical warfare capability against which we have no adequate and modern retaliatory deterrent. Their new generations of armoured and mechanised wea-

General Rogers (continued)

ponry at least match the quality of those that we in the West field, and they are fielding theirs at a much more rapid rate. The latest Soviet attack aircraft have three times the range and twice the payload of those that they have replaced, and we see more evidence of a large surface fleet with a seaborne air capability, modern missile cruisers and submarines that are faster and deeper diving than our own.

This rapid modernisation of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces has been noted in past reports to this Assembly. It is of grave concern to all of us. Whereas the Soviet Union entered the 1970s as a continental land power with air and naval forces defensively oriented, it entered the 1980s as an offensively oriented global power. In my view, the Warsaw Pact has now surpassed NATO – or soon will – in all force categories necessary for us in NATO to carry out our strategy in the conventional, the theatre nuclear and the strategic nuclear areas.

That is a harsh conclusion that I draw, but I assure you that it is based on consideration of Warsaw Pact weaknesses as well as strengths. Soviet forces today, and to no lesser extent those of their Warsaw Pact allies, have done more than simply add tanks, ships and aeroplanes. They have also vastly improved in the more esoteric areas, such as the reliability of their communications, the mobility and lethality of their air defence and artillery systems, their capabilities for warfare at sea and, across the board, their ability to sustain offensive theatre combat operations through extensive transport improvements, forward stockage of matériel and a ready defence industrial production base. This military effort has been as balanced across the spectrum of military capabilities as it has been extensive, and we must face the reality today that our own advantages have waned considerably.

The extent of the military build-up by the Soviet Union contrasts sharply with the internal problems within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact which they will have to face in the 1980s. They are problems with declining productivity, agriculture, agricultural deficiencies, impending leadership changes, a declining percentage of Russians in their society and the fidelity of their Warsaw Pact allies. Poland is but the latest manifestation of discontent with the Soviet brand of communism.

Some western observers point to these trends in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as signs of weakness. I agree. They are signs of weakness. But there is another side of the coin which is troubling for me. Despite the potential for greater political and economic problems, there is no evidence that the Soviets'

rate of investment in military power will be restrained by domestic need or will decrease in this decade. If, as many predict, the Soviets experience more failures and anticipate the future declining appeal of their ideology, they may increasingly resort to the one area of success in which they are a superpower, and that is the exercise of military power.

The broader strategic environment contains ample evidence of a demonstrated Soviet willingness and capability to employ their military power for political purposes. The recent events in Poland demonstrated their continued readiness to use their forces to intimidate members of the Warsaw Pact. In Afghanistan the Soviet Union pursues a policy of extending the Brezhnev doctrine to justify military intervention in non-Pact countries. We have seen this display of power in Afghanistan without any detectable impact upon the readiness of those forces opposite NATO, and we have strong indications now that the Kremlin is preparing for a long-term occupation of Afghanistan, politically as well as militarily.

Obviously, the greatest danger for the allied nations in this latest aggression in Afghanistan is that the Soviets have acquired a better position to threaten a region whose resources are indispensable to the West. Thus, the menace that we face today is a dual one to which we must have a dual response. It is a menace internal to the boundaries of NATO and one external to those boundaries where we have collective and vital interests.

This, then, is the challenge to the West posed by the Warsaw Pact in the East. A comprehensive modernisation effort and a growing power projection capability bolster an already offensively oriented Warsaw Pact military establishment. How this military potential will be used in the international arena cannot be judged with any precision. Much depends on internal developments within the Warsaw Pact, on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, on events throughout the world, predictable or not, and on the Soviet calculus about the opportunities to exploit those events.

We might argue at length whether the Soviets are pursuing a long-term master strategy or one that seizes on events opportunistically. In either case one matter seems clear to me. It is that the single most important factor determining the bounds of Soviet behaviour will be the degree of resistance which they expect to encounter. That, to me, sets a clear overall direction for the defence policy of NATO in this decade. Where Soviet activities threaten our vital interests, we must be prepared to deter or counter them.

Within the NATO area this means that we must bolster our strategy of flexible response

General Rogers (continued)

through measures that we have already agreed and by means of new measures as appropriate. We must also recognise that to an unprecedented extent our security will depend on providing resources to protect common interests – the collective vital interests beyond NATO. More is required than just the mere redistribution of already inadequate resources. Greater amounts of resources must be devoted to meet this greater threat.

Today, in my opinion, the ability of NATO both to deter attack within our boundaries and to respond to the external menace are causes for major concern. First, there is the continuous relative decline in NATO's military capabilities in comparison with those of the Warsaw Pact. I say that even while acknowledging that the Alliance has considerable strength, able leaders, good troops and good equipment and that we have devoted substantial resources over the past several years to enhance those security arrangements.

Secondly, despite the size of the sacrifice by some member nations, too many security commitments are becoming what I call "overdue promissory notes". As my staff deals with nations on force proposals it notes slippages, reductions and cancellations of essential programmes in almost every allied nation.

Thirdly, this pattern of inadequate response is not changing, even in the backwash of Afghanistan, in most nations – the United States seems to be the exception – even though new defence requirements have been generated by Soviet actions during recent months. Although Allied Command Europe, with which I am associated, gets stronger every year, the gap between NATO force capabilities and those of the Warsaw Pact gets wider every year. As a result of this relentless accumulation of military power coupled with our inadequate and oft-times faltering response to commitments by nations, the very credibility of our deterrent is in jeopardy.

It must be the urgent business of the nations of the Alliance to redress the current imbalance, and I should like now to outline the broad areas to which I believe we must devote our attention in this decade. The first in my list of priority tasks is to take the immediate and sustained actions necessary to ensure that our military deterrent posture is credible. The Alliance must provide the full range of military forces that the strategy of flexible response requires – that continuum from the conventional through the theatre nuclear to strategic nuclear.

Our strategic nuclear forces remain the ultimate arbiter of our deterrence. They must be

maintained in a credible posture and they must remain coupled with the security of Europe. Allied strategy also requires credible theatre nuclear forces, an area in which we lag dangerously behind the Warsaw Pact. As an integral part of our deterrent, NATO must also be prepared to conduct a conventional forward defence. We face major challenges in all areas of conventional readiness, such as having sufficient forces which are adequately manned, equipped or trained, suitably deployed, capable of going to the defence quickly and in an effective manner, and able to sustain themselves in that defence until we have accomplished our missions. As a consequence of those challenges and the expense of overcoming them, the bulk of our nations' investments must go to those conventional forces.

A critical aspect in building a credible conventional deterrent is strengthening the flanks of the Alliance. In the north, it is essential to counter growing Soviet maritime power, which threatens Norway and Denmark as well as the transatlantic lines of communications upon which we depend. In the south, Mediterranean security is an ever-increasing Alliance concern, as the agenda today indicates. NATO's southern region is now less a flank than a bridge to the vital Middle East and South-West Asia areas. We have witnessed the steady growth of Soviet power opposite NATO's southern nations and on the Mediterranean Sea. To improve our posture we require upgrading of local force structures, extensive allied military and economic assistance programmes for Turkey, Portugal and Greece, and the provision of more reinforcements in our mobilisation planning. These and other steps are included in the report on Mediterranean security which is before you.

There is, of course, an agonising irony to this need to prepare to prosecute a war in order to deter it. It is all the more agonising, given the fruits of peace we have enjoyed for more than three decades, which often add to our complacency and wishful thinking and given the competing social welfare programmes our people have come to expect. But, as NATO's Secretary-General has recently reminded us:

"However high the price of protecting the free western way of life might be, it is incomparably cheaper than the price that would have to be paid to regain that life should it ever be lost."

A second, closely-related task for the Alliance in the 1980s is to define a more concrete programme for NATO's response to challenges arising outside the boundaries. We must acknowledge the political infeasibility of changing those boundaries of NATO while acknowledging also that some nations must be prepared to

General Rogers (continued)

provide the capability to protect our vital interests.

In the past year we have seen the welcome development in several member nations, particularly in the United States, of concepts for the rapid deployment of forces to external areas where our interests lie. The transformation of these concepts into factors for NATO planning will occupy a prominent part of the agenda at SHAPE and elsewhere in Allied Command Europe for the next several years.

It will also entail the obligation by nations to ensure the fulfilment of their commitments to a new division of labour to compensate for the assumption by the United States of America and other members of out-of-area responsibilities.

To carry out the dual response will demand of our nations intensive efforts to maintain the substance as well as the appearance of allied solidarity. This constitutes a third major task. The past three decades have taught us that major Alliance initiatives depend ultimately on the achievement of a broad consensus based on close and continuing consultations. We cannot afford major rifts to emerge over our defence policy. Instead, we must build on the unity displayed in the Alliance in adopting the two-tracked long-range theatre nuclear force decision of December 1979, the post-Afghanistan measures in December 1980 and the resolute stand taken in respect of possible Soviet intervention in Poland by ministers in the Council in recent months; and we must be alert to preclude threats by the East to divide us on issues on which firm commitments have been made.

As a fourth task we must ensure that we are exploiting, on a collective basis, our technological and scientific superiority in the West and seeking breakthroughs that will enhance our defence and thereby our deterrent capabilities. We must, at the same time, take care that we do not export our high technology to the East where it will be used against us.

Next, and most important to me, we must, with all the vigour that we can muster, produce verifiable and equitable arms control measures that lend predictability to the military situation and by so doing also add to the stability and manageability of the situation and lead towards a reduced and balanced level of arms and forces. I share with this Assembly the hope that the United States of America and the Soviet Union will achieve such a result in their upcoming negotiations concerning theatre nuclear forces.

You will be discussing theatre nuclear forces this afternoon. It is not my desire to pre-empt

that discussion, but it is such an important matter that I should like to present some of my views on it on this occasion. First, I believe that no single issue today is more critical of NATO's security and credibility than that the nations follow through on that two-pronged decision of December 1979. We must proceed with NATO's plans for a long-range theatre nuclear force programme, because, contrary to Soviet propaganda, their fielding of more than 225 highly accurate SS-20 missiles each with three warheads has upset the balance. That deployment continues at the rate of five more SS-20s per month, fifteen warheads. NATO's planned force of 572 missiles, each with one warhead, a force not due to be fielded for two and a half years, has already been exceeded by the 675 SS-20 warheads the Soviets have deployed to date. The goal of our deployment is not to match the Soviets warhead for warhead but to field a visible and survivable theatre force to fill an extremely dangerous gap in our continuum of deterrence.

Allied solidarity in carrying out this long-range theatre nuclear force programme is also an essential prerequisite for progress in arms control measures for theatre nuclear forces. Given the current imbalance of theatre forces, even with the prospect of full NATO deployment, it will be difficult enough to reach a balanced agreement with the Soviet Union. Any shortfall or failure in NATO deployment will leave us with no more than a plea to the Soviets that they follow suit and destroy their SS-20s. We have only to recall the complete Soviet disregard of western calls for restraint in this area during the past decade to realise how naïve that hope would be. No matter how virtuous our intention, the security of the Alliance will not be advanced by a policy of unilateral restraint, which failed in the 1970s. It would also be imprudent for us to pursue arms control for its own sake without regard for the overall conventional balance. Arms limitations must remain instruments in the quest for a more secure environment, not just ends in themselves. They should not obscure the greater goal of a stable balance of all forces, but they can and should serve to complement that goal by allowing such a balance to exist at lower levels of armaments.

The twin issues of long-range theatre nuclear force modernisation and arms control are complex. They do not lend themselves to simple explanation before the publics of our democratic nations.

Yet they are subject to daily often simplistic appeals to the emotions, appeals which more often than not run counter to NATO's security initiatives. In this regard the two-tracked NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces pro-

General Rogers (continued)

gramme is not alone. It shares the trait of being poorly understood and arbitrarily maligned with other areas of the West's defence efforts.

Among the reasons for this is the natural inclination of all our peoples to want peace, which is of course a virtue. Another is that the desire to maintain a high standard of living often leads to reality being blurred by wishful thinking. There is also the reluctance, also regrettably natural, of many leaders in the free world to underline the threat and to state openly that peace with freedom requires sacrifices by our people. That leads to the sixth and last task, perhaps the most basic facing the Alliance today. We who occupy positions of responsibility for and in the nations of the West, both military and political, must inform our publics fully on the nature of our security challenge. We must not by our silence let our peoples be deluded into a false sense of security or complacency. We must convince the people of the criticality of the times and of the jeopardy to our freedom and seek their willingness to make sacrifices for their own security.

They must also be made to realise that, despite the continuing and growing imbalance, the situation is not yet unmanageable or beyond restoration. There are many positive advantages in our democracies to include collectively having the necessary superior resources with which to fulfil our common defence needs if we resolve to do so. Our peoples must also understand that these efforts will take time, patience, and the allocation of major resources. But, as we know, freedom cannot be bought on the cheap. In the long run, it is upon peoples' educated commitment to their own security, a commitment that must be transmitted to political leaders with unmistakable clarity, that the collective Alliance will, to face the future robustly, ultimately depend. Thus, our readiness to inform and to lead our publics toward a collective resolve to preserve their freedom ranks with the other five tasks that I have mentioned; indeed, it is essential to each of them and should perhaps occupy the position of primacy.

It is with all these tasks, but especially with this last, that of informing and leading our publics, that I solicit your assistance and that of your colleagues in your nations. For, to my mind, it is only when we recognise the scope and continuing growth of the dual menace which threatens us, and we respond in a manner which can be clearly perceived by the Soviet Union as displaying the collective resolve to pay whatever price is necessary to preserve our freedom of action, our values and our way of life, that we can hope to deter the

Soviets from achieving their ultimate objective – the domination of the West.

It has been a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity of appearing before your Assembly, Mr. President. Would it be in order for me to call for questions? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – We hope very much that you will do so, General. However, may I first say how grateful we are to you for your comprehensive assessment, serious and sober though it has been, made from your great knowledge and sense of responsibility within the Alliance. We shall find it beneficial to our work not only here but in our national parliaments. We are much indebted to you.

I hope that questioners will be brief.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I heard the General speak very recently in Brussels at SHAPEX. I am delighted to have had the opportunity of hearing him again today. Subsequent to his speech in Brussels, or Mons, I asked a question in my own parliament about the present tactical nuclear forces land based in Europe and was shocked to learn that, compared with the more than 600 Russian warheads, if we include the triple warheads, which could reach Western Europe and beyond, we do not have one land-based tactical nuclear weapon which could penetrate further into the Warsaw Pact countries than the unfortunate East European satellites.

In the event of the outbreak of war, one way of winning potential allies among countries dissatisfied with Soviet rule is not first to destroy those countries. It does not seem to be a good way of making friends or influencing people. Does the General agree that my statements are correct?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – They are. We have no missiles that can reach into the Soviet Union. We have two types of aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons into the western part of the Soviet Union. One of them will shortly be deactivated – taken out of the structure. Sir Frederic raises a key issue and I should like to add a fairly sizeable footnote in my response to his question.

When we view a scenario and consider whether theatre nuclear forces might be used, because of the guidance to SACEUR, it is incumbent upon us to distinguish that time when there is still cohesion conventionally in our defence and before we seek, through the potential of a breakthrough, or after a breakthrough, the use of theatre nuclear forces. The

General Rogers (continued)

purpose of the initial use of theatre nuclear forces is to send a message to the other side that we are prepared to do whatever is necessary to defend ourselves. We must send that message when there is still cohesion – a coherent defence on our part conventionally. We do not wish to send that message in our country. We like to have the option to send it where we think it could do the most good and to get the kind of response for which we would hope.

That, among other reasons, is why, in my opinion, it is so important to add these 572 long-range theatre nuclear missiles to our inventory – not to match the 675 already deployed and the fifteen being deployed every month, nor the SS-4s and SS-5s which they still have in the inventory, nor the Gulf submarines which we have in the north whose missiles can reach us, but to point out to the other side that we know that there is this strength and that we intend to deter it, and that to deter it we shall deploy the 572 – to send that message to them that an attack by them using nuclear weapons from their soil in Western Europe would be responded to by NATO using weapons on its soil against them.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Mommersteeg, who is the Rapporteur for the report on theatre nuclear forces, which we shall be considering this afternoon.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – How many of the SS-20s are targeted to you and how many are far away in the Far East? What is the meaning of that?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – We estimate that one-quarter of the Soviet forces are aligned in the Far East with the exception of the SS-20s – and our estimate of that is one-third. Therefore, today the estimate is that two-thirds of the 675 warheads are targeted against NATO. We are also aware of X number – an X I happen to know – of sites which have been prepared for additional SS-20 launches. The majority – in fact, almost the entire number of those that we have noted through our intelligence are being constructed – are in a position where they will be directed towards the West. But I remind you that the SS-20 system is a mobile system – it can be moved fairly rapidly from point A to point B – so that even though one-third of the SS-20 force is now targeted to the East, it would take little effort to get the weapons to move so that they were targeted to the West. The direct answer is, two-thirds of the force.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, General.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We have listened to the General's statements with great interest. He has described how the Soviet Government is arming more and more vigorously and how its military potential has been constantly increasing. Now I would like to ask him what, in his view, is the motive of the Soviet Union for this accelerated armament? Does he believe, for example, that the Soviet Union is interested in embarking with us on an accelerated arms race? Does he believe that the Soviet Union is preparing for war? Or what other motive does he see for the Soviet Union's behaviour?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – First, if we trace the genesis of this massive growth in military power, we find that it relates closely to the Cuban missile crisis. At that time the Soviet Union was face down and said "Never again". Therefore, this build-up really began in the middle of the 1960s and with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

Secondly, those who are much more expert in this area than I say that, because of the régime's support of the army and the armed forces, this is a fly-wheel that keeps turning and cannot be stopped. I cannot confirm or deny that.

Thirdly, let us look at it with Soviet eyes. They look to the east and see China. They look to the south and see forces in the Indian Ocean. They look to the west and see NATO – a sizeable force. The USSR knows our weaknesses and strengths as well as we do, and she has decided to take whatever action is necessary to ensure that she can defend herself against what she might presume to be an attack by our side.

We know that NATO is a defensive alliance and that WEU is devoted to defence and not to offence. But sometimes it is difficult to convince the Soviet Union of that. All these factors play a part. When I asked a returning ambassador from the Soviet Union the same question, he replied that whenever additional plants are developed – you would be amazed at the number of plants in the Soviet Union that are devoted to the production of military hardware – a number of people become more equal than others, and they like that within the Soviet Union.

That view is based upon the judgment of a man who served in the Soviet Union for a number of years. All four of those factors play a part in the equation when trying to determine why the Soviet Union continues this massive growth. That is why it is important to move ahead with arms control measures. In

General Rogers (continued)

my opinion, we cannot continue this growth. It is to the advantage of both sides to find mutual, equitable, balanced and verifiable arms control measures.

As I said, such measures lend predictability, even in SALT II. There were ceilings on certain types of weapon systems, and there were ceilings on the number of warheads that one could place in a particular type of missile. All those things added predictability to that situation and, therefore, added to its stability and manageability.

That is the best that I can do without having to get the direct answer from the Politburo why the Soviets continue with this massive growth.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, General.

I now call Mr. Louis Jung, to be followed by Mr. Kurt Jung.

Mr. Louis JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I was very happy to hear what you had to say, General, and I would take the opportunity to express our thanks once again to all the countries of NATO, particularly the United States of America and Canada, for all their efforts for the defence of Europe.

For once, however, I would like to reverse the rôles. Generally it is the soldiers – your predecessors and yourself – who appeal to politicians for an increase in the defence budget. In the situation in which the European countries now find themselves, we are very aware of our responsibilities but we are also very sensitive to the economic crisis that is upon us. You know very well that in this respect any weakness is a danger. I believe you understand that I am referring to monetary problems.

May I thank you once again for the frankness with which you have alerted us to the present situation. Indeed, my personal experience proved to me, in 1937-38, that people who claimed to be idealists and defenders of human rights were in reality – and they were exposed – nothing other than Nazi agents. I hope that those who today preach about human rights and the defence of peace are not agents of the Comintern.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall try to call all those representatives who wish to ask the General questions. However, I must ask that questions be much shorter than the question of Mr. Jung, for otherwise we shall run out of time. I ask members not to make speeches but to ask questions.

I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Thank you, Mr. President. This is my opportunity to continue to make speeches, which I regret doing, in response to questions. However, some of the questions do not lend themselves to short answers.

I should like to comment on what Mr. Jung said. It is true that it is easy for me as a military man, charged with military responsibilities by our countries, to speak in terms of primacy for military needs. But I am not unmindful of the economic, cultural, social, diplomatic and political problems with which the political authorities and leaders must deal. However, as I am Commander-in-Chief, European Command, all the intelligence from the United States of America is made fully available to me, as well as intelligence by other nations from SHAPE. Important as economics are, the fact is that every nation in the Alliance has economic problems today. I believe that if the people became aware of the jeopardy in which their freedom is now placed, they would say to the political authorities that they were prepared to make sacrifices in other areas and programmes to ensure their security.

That is my plea to you today as well as to any other forum in which I find myself. We must try to get that message across. I lack credibility because I am in uniform. Commanders in uniform are always accused of wanting more men, money and materials. People say that we are never satisfied. As Al Haig used to say when he was SACEUR, “If you only knew what I know, you would believe what I say”. What I know is based upon intelligence information which, unfortunately, cannot be made available. However, steps are being taken to try to declassify some of this information so that it can be made available to the public via the newspapers, periodicals and so on, to undergird the credibility of those of us who possess this information and to assist in getting the message across.

Thank you for giving me an opportunity to re-emphasise the theme of my speech.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, General.

I call Mr. Kurt Jung to ask a question, to be followed by Mr. Hardy.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In his speech the General stated that NATO is constantly considering how, in order to secure Europe's energy supplies, among other things, these rapid deployment forces can best be developed. In discussions with leading politicians of the Gulf region I have been forced to conclude that readiness to accept such rapid deployment forces in the region is very, very slight and that there

Mr. Jung (continued)

is therefore considerable aversion to them. What alternatives exist?

My second question to the General is this. In connection with the Eurostrategic systems he pointed on the one hand to the SS-20s that are directed against Europe, and on the other hand, in reply to a question from another member, he confirmed that with the exception of the eighteen French systems there are no land-based systems in Europe. The Soviet Union is now demanding the inclusion of the forward-based systems in arms control discussions and claims that if the forward-based systems are included there are 1,000 systems against 1,000. Would he confirm or inform us of the number of Eurostrategic systems, including the forward-based systems?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – Certain strategic systems are assigned to me as SACEUR by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, but they are carried as part of the central strategic nuclear forces and they come under the SALT negotiations, not under the negotiations on theatre nuclear forces. One should remember that it is not just the United States of America and other nations that have forward-based systems in Europe. The Soviet Union has them, too – in Eastern Europe. We do not find the Soviets discussing their forward-based systems. They speak of SS-20s versus our forward-based systems. I cannot say how that will develop in the negotiations.

I cannot say under what conditions the rapid deployment force would be deployed to the Middle East. That is a decision that the United States of America must make in consultation with its allies. I should think that there would also be consultation with nations in the area into which the forces would be placed. There has been a general feeling that, implicit in the creation of the force, is the fact that it will be deployed to an area irrespective of the desires of the nations in those areas. I do not believe that that is accurate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, General.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Does General Rogers accept that, while the immense Soviet military capacity must cause great concern, classified and unclassified technological superiority will mean that western defence capability will certainly outstrip that of the Warsaw Pact during the mid-1980s? Does he also agree that this possible superiority could avail us little, and that the wholehearted public

commitment to defence which he rightly perceives to be necessary could not be secured without a fully demonstrated, vigorous and genuine effort to achieve multilateral disarmament, perhaps to a more extensive level than is currently envisaged?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I am not sure that I agree with your premise that the West will surpass the East in its modernisation efforts in the second half of the 1980s. I say that because nations must meet their commitments. I ask only that they show the resolve to do that. Why do I ask that? Let us consider the infamous 3%, the symbolic figure. What does 3% mean? If nations meet the commitments to which they agreed in May 1980 – their force goals – under which we have subsumed the long-term defence programme – that will require an average real increase of 4% per country. If we add to those force goals the meeting of the phase 2 post-Afghanistan measures agreed in December 1980 that will require a 4.5% real increase per nation per year. I echo my plea, therefore, that nations should meet their commitments, which will cause them to reach out in the conventional area. The theatre nuclear aspect is being handled separately. The strategic aspect is being handled by the United States of America and the United Kingdom individually. If those nations will reach out in the conventional area, that will enhance our conventional capability and raise the nuclear threshold.

Disarmament on a larger scale can come only after the negotiation of arms control measures in the two most dangerous areas – at the strategic nuclear and theatre nuclear levels – while we are expanding our conventional forces. My desire as the commander is best described as follows. We do not expect that we shall have an attack from the East by the Warsaw Pact out of the blue. The most plausible scenario is that an attack will result from a spillover from a confrontation of superpowers elsewhere – in South-West Asia or the Middle East. There would therefore be a time of tension. I would hope to get the political authority and guidance to start mobilising, bringing in replacements and doing what is necessary.

I want to be able to hold conventionally the initial thrust of those lead armies until I can take under conventional attack the follow-on second echelon tactical divisions of those lead armies, and then the follow-on armies and the follow-on fronts, because they have to come through choke points – narrow places, bridges and so on.

General Rogers (continued)

If we can do that and then counter-attack, which is the essence of defence, two things happen. It is worth stressing here that we should not get ourselves into the position of saying that defence is a question of delay, delay, delay to the Rhine, to the Channel and so on. The essence of defence is counter-attack. If I am successful – I shall need additional conventional strength which I do not currently have to accomplish that – two things will happen. The other side will be forced to decide whether to escalate to using theatre nuclear weapons. The other side knows as well as we do that there is no empirical evidence upon which to base a projection of whether the initial use of theatre nuclear weapons will escalate to the strategic level. Which country would want such an exchange on its soil?

I come to the second eventuality. Even thinking of trying to hold the position conventionally may be naïve, but I do not think so. I am convinced that the fidelity of the Warsaw Pact allies to the Soviet Union will correspond to the direction in which the forward edge of the battlefield is moving. If it is moving west, they will be much more faithful than if we stabilised it or if it moved east through a counter-attack.

So I want to place a doubt in the minds on the other side about whether to escalate. It is not a viable solution to reduce ourselves to the options of giving up or of using theatre nuclear forces. I am trying to preclude that by strengthening conventional theatre forces and raising the nuclear threshold.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Prussen.

Mr. PRUSSEN (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – How can SS-20s be intercepted?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – The way to destroy the SS-20s is to hit them on the ground before they are fired. As you are aware, efforts have been under way for years to try to find a means of destroying a missile in flight. It is difficult. Our anti-ballistic missile capability in the United States was eliminated after the ABM treaty. But the United States Army has continued to receive funding from the Congress to try to develop a technology to bring back the ABMs if necessary. But it is difficult today to develop the technology of hitting a missile with another missile, or with whatever type of weapon we might use.

The short answer is to hit them on the ground first. They are mobile and tough to

find. But so will our SS-20s be once we get them deployed from the base.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMHREN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – How can the European strategic balance, specifically, be re-established, when the SS-20s have a range of 5,000 kilometres and the Pershing IIs have a range of only 1,900 kilometres?

What is there against the Pershings being sea-based rather than land-based?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – The ranges of the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II will provide for the West the capability to hit the soil of the Soviet Union with missiles where today she has a sanctuary from missiles. As I have mentioned, we have two types of aircraft – but they are not missiles – which can reach that distance, but relatively few of them.

The aim is not to match range for range or missile for missile. It is just to have that capability. The Soviet Union knows that we have that capability, and that to my mind enhances the coupling of the strategic nuclear force of the United States of America and the United Kingdom to the conventional and theatre nuclear forces, because they will be United States of America systems which will be deployed.

I am afraid that I have forgotten the second part of the question.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – Submarine-launched.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – This was discussed at great length prior to the decision being made in December 1979, and I believe that these are the factors which were taken into account by those who made recommendations to the decision makers.

First, submarine-launched missiles would not carry with them the symbolism of solidarity of a number of nations having the weapons on their soil and their being deployed and employed from their soil. They would be another United States of America system or NATO system but not directly associated with a country such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium or the Netherlands.

Another factor which is very important from the military standpoint is the accuracy of sea-launched missiles. We do not yet have the capability to provide the same accuracy with sea-launched as we have with ground-launched missiles. That is especially true when one

General Rogers (continued)

compares a Pershing II type missile on a sea-based platform with a land-based platform.

Secondly, whether we like it or not, there is anxiety about the communication capability with those weapons systems which are deployed under the sea. We do not have the absolute communication capability today that we have with land-based missiles.

Those are three of the factors that were taken into account by the high-level group that made the decision. There may have been others.

The PRESIDENT. – On my list I have Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Osborn, and the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Cavaliere. I understand also that Lord Duncan-Sandys wishes to ask a question. I think that I ought to close the list at that point.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The security of Western Europe is totally predicated on the capability of the Alliance to reinforce from North America. Are you confident, General, that our forces in the East Atlantic and Channel areas and our air forces for the defence of the United Kingdom air defence region are adequate to make possible that reinforcement, especially in view of the very grave weakness on the northern flank, particularly Norway, to which you referred?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I have to give you the evaluation made by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral Train, who is very much concerned about having that capability, especially by 1985, as he projects what will be in our programme and in our structure by 1985 vis-à-vis what the Soviet Union will have in its naval structure in 1985 and 1986.

He is very concerned about being able to carry out the tasks which have been assigned to him, recognising that, if there is an attack as a spillover from elsewhere in Western Europe, we can expect that to be a global war. At that time it would be very difficult to release those American naval forces in the Pacific to come to our assistance in the Atlantic. I think that you will find the Commander-in-Chief of Channel Command, at least, the man who has just left that position, Admiral Eberle, would concur in that in spades.

May I go back to one question which I failed to answer completely? The point was made that by 1985 or 1986 we would start surpassing the Soviet Union in technology and perhaps in numbers. I do not agree with that because of

what I see of its programmes and of ours. If we had all the resources that we needed today to provide the production just of equipment, we would not get the pay-off on it until 1985. That is why I think we face a critical period in the first half of the 1980s.

I believe that all that we have to show is that collective will and that collective resolve. We know that the threat is greater. Therefore, we shall have to provide additional resources to meet that threat. Primacy goes to security arrangements. Sacrifices will be made in other programmes to do that. I come through the revolving door one more time, because that is when we have to meet the people face to face and convince them.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I thank General Rogers for his address, although I feel that we have been listening to the same address from SACEURs for many years. As always, General Rogers has said that the situation between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO is disquieting. I should like to hear the General's comments on a statement in a report to this Assembly dated 17th November 1980. This report says that for many years NATO has been spending substantially more on defence than the Warsaw Pact countries. In 1979 it spent 44 % more than the Warsaw Pact. The report also states that the two have approximate parity in numbers of armed forces and that in the thirty systems in which high technology is used the United States of America is superior in fourteen, the United States of America and the USSR are equal in nine and the United States of America is inferior in seven. The report also shows that in the twenty basic technology areas absolutely essential to the future of military technology and referred to in the fiscal year 1981 programme, the United States of America is superior in fifteen, while the United States of America and the USSR are equal in five.

I should like to ask the General whether, in the light of these figures, he can continue to maintain that NATO's military position is as bad as all that.

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – You will see that, as I have said, SACEURs have no credibility but I can guarantee that if you go back to 1949 when the Alliance was founded and look at the balance and then go back to 1955, and then to 1962 and then come to today, you will find a major difference has occurred in that balance. I am only saying what I happen to believe, with just as much seriousness as I can muster – that they

General Rogers (continued)

have surpassed us, or soon will, in all three areas of force capability, and we need to supplement our strength. They have gone beyond essential equipment. I was a member of the joint chiefs of staff before this assignment and I can say to you that the Soviet Union has gone beyond the essential equivalent at the strategic level.

I say also that we have that major gap in the modernisation of our long-range theatre nuclear force that we must fill. Thirdly, traditionally they have been superior in conventional numbers that they have concealed and in numbers that they have trained for reserves, and in numbers of equipment that they can field. Now, with respect to technology, let us never put ourselves in a position, I would plead, where we believe that their weapons are not sophisticated. I have seen them. I have driven them. I have ridden in them and I tell you they have made much progress in the 1970s because they made the decision at that time.

Now you speak of the sums of money that you spend. Surely, we pay more to our soldiers in the West. For example, in Vietnam a United States private got \$ 78. Today, when a recruit comes in he gets \$ 501.

Certainly, of the United States defence budget 52 % to 53 % goes to manpower. That is true in some but not in all countries. It is certainly not true in the Soviet Union and it certainly is not true in the Warsaw Pact. They have been devoting 12 % to 13 % of their gross national product every year to defence – three times the level that we have in NATO. I cannot confirm or deny the figures that you use. I just happen to know those figures that I use, which I believe are right, as you believe your figures are accurate.

I am paid as a commander to make my assessment and to make it to the ministers and to bodies such as this. It does no good for me to stand before you when I know it is not true and say “We are still on that knife edge”, or “It is still marginal”, the kind of language that we have used for so many years. The time has come to stand up and be counted and say it as it is. That is what I have done today. Whether or not I have convinced you is dependent upon two things – you and me. But I say to you that there is no question of how I come out of this and “If you knew what I know, you would believe what I have said”.

The PRESIDENT. – We still have Lord Duncan-Sandys and Mr. Osborn and, appropriately, to finish, the Chairman of the Defence Committee. I have a sense that we are subjecting the General to a very long and intense

cross-examination, but he seems to be taking it very well. I hope that the three remaining members will bear the time in mind.

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – While thanking the Supreme Commander for his frank and challenging remarks about the dangerous situation that we face, I should like to ask two very short questions. First, does he agree that the possession of effective, up-dated strategic nuclear weapons by Great Britain and France makes a worthwhile contribution to the western deterrent? Secondly, is he satisfied that the decision-making procedure of NATO is adequate to ensure a sufficiently rapid decision, when necessary, to use theatre nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – I believe that having strategic nuclear weapons possessed by Great Britain and France makes it much more difficult for the Soviet planners and I believe it adds to our deterrents. Lord Duncan-Sandys did not ask the follow-up question, which I shall certainly not get into – which would one rather have, this one or that one, when one has to make difficult choices as to whether something will go.

With respect to the decision-making process within the Alliance, a year ago I would have been much more pessimistic than I am today. I will tell the Assembly why. In August we watched what was occurring around Poland and became concerned. I went to the staff and said: “Tell me what guidance I should seek from political authorities if something occurs.” We developed seven items. By early December it became apparent to me that I should go and knock on the door of the Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, and say “Secretary-General, these are the items for which I will seek political guidance should the Soviets intervene in Poland.” There were just the two of us, Secretary-General Luns and myself. I said to him: “Joseph, I want to remind you of what happened in 1968. The then SACEUR tells me that he sought political guidance and is still waiting to get it. You and I do not want that to happen.”

Before I got back to my headquarters that evening I had telephone calls and I found that Secretary-General Joseph Luns had called a meeting of the DPC and had tabled these seven items. The call was “Do you wish predelegation or what are you seeking?” I said that these were the things I was going to seek guidance on within a week. It was fortunate that the ministers were meeting within that week as well at Brussels. Within a week I had predele-

General Rogers (continued)

gation authority to take six of the seven actions upon which I was seeking guidance, predelegated before any intervention, which was almost unheard of and was certainly a surprise to me.

Having witnessed that, I am more optimistic now than I would have been a year ago. That being said, it is so important that the political authorities do not abdicate their responsibility when a war starts. Why do I say that? It is because in peacetime we fight to have political authorities in charge. We insist on that and that is the way it must be. But it must be the same in wartime. They should not come in wartime and say "We will let all decisions be made by SACEUR." That is wrong. Political authorities must still remain in command of our lands. To do that, though, they have to be able to respond very swiftly to the requests that the SACEUR makes.

If one speaks to them I think one will find that they say that they will be able to do that fairly rapidly with their system, perhaps even more rapidly, of course, depending on where the political authorities locate themselves should an attack come from the East. Political authorities should not remain in Brussels if an attack comes and they may put themselves in a position where decisions can be more quickly reached than otherwise. Does that come out hopeful? I think that that is the best I can say.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – General Rogers, may I say that it has been a privilege for members of parliament of Western European Union to listen to your assessment. May I raise two quick issues? In my area there are many church groups and others who seek disarmament almost at any price, unaware of the considerations that you have so lucidly put to us. Most of us here support your view that the only road to peace is through strength. You mentioned task No. 6. How best can we present your case? Have you illustrated documentation to put to small audiences so that we can project your work and your image to those who believe entirely differently?

Secondly, Douglas Hurd and Ministers of Defence in Britain have outlined in white papers a true appreciation of the scene that you have put to us. It is important that we should understand what we mean by "adequate monitoring of disarmament". We should like to know what you mean by "adequate monitoring".

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – With regard to how to get

my message across, I have available here a number of copies of the text which I followed, which is obviously unclassified, and I believe that we left copies with the public information office. I gather that we have some more. We can therefore provide you with those copies until they run out. That gives the textual content of what I have said.

As for the pictorial content, I believe that we shall have to wait upon the release of the information from the intelligence community to be made available to ministers of defence. The ministers of defence, both at the Nuclear Planning Group in April and at the ministerial meeting in May, pleaded – and that is a correct word to use – with Secretary Weinberger to make that available, and I know that he is working quite diligently to do that. I also believe that Her Majesty's Government have available to them a considerable amount of material that can be used to get the message across.

The verification of disarmament measures is crucial and difficult. For example, in SALT II one of our major concerns was whether we could verify that there would be only ten re-entry vehicles on an ICBM and only fourteen on a sea-launched ballistic missile. I had to satisfy myself by ascertaining from the experts how they would intend to do it. They convinced me that they could, so I accepted that.

You talk about numbers of troops. As I mentioned in my talk, it is not good enough to have arms control measures for theatre nuclear forces, important though they are, or for strategic forces. It is important to have arms control measures for conventional forces. I do not have the solution. We have the so-called confidence-building measures associated with the CSCE and with the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. As I have analysed them, these are some good confidence-building measures. They permit us to put people at critical points where we can observe, or observe flying above in certain areas. It is difficult to get some nations in the West to agree to that.

However, confidence-building measures of that kind will lend themselves to leading towards adequate verification. Whether they alone will be adequate, I do not know. In fact, I doubt whether they will be, and I doubt whether we shall expect them to be. Therefore, we have to find others. I do not have the solution, though I am prepared to work on it and to assist with it.

The PRESIDENT. – The final speaker is, appropriately, the Chairman of the Defence Committee, Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – General, as you know, the Assembly is discussing the report on European security and the Mediterranean. I should, therefore, like to ask you a specific question which may help us in reaching our decisions this afternoon.

There is a growing belief that the threat to NATO which has hitherto been regarded as directed against central Europe now points more to the southern areas, with the result that the Mediterranean is ceasing to be a peripheral region and is becoming a central region. What are your views on this point?

I should also like to know whether you consider that the probable accession of Spain to NATO is likely to be of positive assistance in meeting this changed situation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call General Rogers.

General ROGERS (*Supreme Allied Commander Europe*). – SACEUR faces the greatest challenges in the southern region. Those challenges are the greatest that I have. I mentioned them in my text and said what I believed needed to be done to enhance our capability there. I say that so that you do not think that I believe that all effort must go to the central region. I mentioned our difficulties on the flanks.

Spain can make a contribution to us on the southern flank for a number of reasons. The first relates to the navy, in the Mediterranean, probably under me, and in the Atlantic under SACLANT, although those command control arrangements would not be worked out until she joined. Secondly, we need the air force. We look across the Mediterranean at the littoral countries and what may be occurring there. It may be helpful to get Spanish assistance there. With regard to her ground forces, it would be very helpful to me if we could get a division or two divisions to the point where we could meld them into our rapid reinforcement plan to be used on the southern flank. Finally, as you well know, it would enable us to deploy additional facilities and reinforcements to the central or southern flank, depending on where SACEUR decides that he must have them. Therefore, I can see a number of advantages which could come from Spain joining, and many of them would be associated with helping us on the southern flank.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that you will understand, General, how greatly we have

appreciated your remarks and your full and comprehensive replies to questions. We should also like, through you, to thank the members of your staff, who help us in the year in our work.

Like us, you are greatly concerned with public debate on these great issues and it is very good to know that you are seeking, within the bounds of security, to ascertain what additional information can be declassified. We hope that you will continue to help us to give to national parliamentarians, through our Assembly, the maximum possible information. This has been a memorable experience for the Assembly, and we are very much in your debt.

7. *Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting*

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. European security and the Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 876 and Amendments).
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 879 and Amendments).
3. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on the draft revised budget, Document 872 and Addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.*)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 16th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. European security and the Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 876 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Bernini, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Spénale; Mr. Grant, Dr. Miller (points of order); Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Bernini, Dr. Miller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Cavaliere, Dr. Miller, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Grant, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Müller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hanin (explanation of vote).
4. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 879 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bahr, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van Hulst, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Blaauw, Lord Reay, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hanin, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy (point of order), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hardy.
5. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, and Vote on the draft revised budget, Doc. 872 and Addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Adriaensens (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Martino, Mr. Mulley, Mr. Adriaensens (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 26.

3. European security and the Mediterranean

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 876 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 876 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Bernini as the first speaker.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am impressed by the documents now before us and should also like to thank Mr. Bozzi, despite his absence, for the wealth of detail he has assembled. At the same time, I have to declare myself totally opposed to the line taken in both the report and the recommendation, which I consider to be unilateral in their arguments and wholly and seriously unsuitable in many respects – as regards the suggestions made to the Council – for the problems of European security and the Mediterranean.

Mr. Bernini (continued)

The explanatory memorandum in fact contains two basic judgments on the situation in the Mediterranean zone with which I am in agreement: First, it is stated that, taking account of the deployment of forces and the relative strengths of the two military blocs, the threat has not increased over the last few years and is even less than it was at the start of the 1970s. Basically, the military balance has not changed significantly over that period. Second, on the other hand, there are more armaments of higher quality in North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and South-West Asia adding fresh dangers to the unstable and strife-torn situation in the area and thus increasing the threat to the security of Europe.

How does the draft recommendation respond to these assessments, which were in fact fully endorsed during the meetings with the NATO commands on the southern flank? The preamble is mainly devoted to criticising the Soviet Union's growing military strength and ignores other contributory factors which we believe should also be blamed and which cannot be overlooked in any objective assessment of the situation: the failure to ratify SALT II; the breaking off of the Geneva negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons; and the drive by the new American Administration to achieve military superiority, which emerged clearly from some of General Rogers' remarks.

Then again, regarding the spread of armaments, the preamble is particularly concerned to blame the USSR, forgetting that the Soviet Union is only the second supplier of arms while the United States is first with 48 % of world turnover, going in increasing proportion to the Mediterranean area and South-West Asia. The truth I am afraid – as must be clearly stated – is that we are faced by a dangerous and uncontrolled arms race between the two superpowers which are at the same time taking advantage of disputes between states to try to extend their areas of influence by military means beyond the limits of their existing alliances and in particular to the area beyond the southern flank of the two alliances. For the sake of real security in Europe, it is therefore becoming more and more essential to halt this ruinous arms race and the spread of new weapons to all parts of the world, by a speedy resumption of negotiations, not only on theatre nuclear weapons but also on the reduction of military forces in Central Europe, with the aim of reaching international agreement for the limitation and control of sales of arms, particularly to the areas of worst conflict, thus making the recourse to arms more difficult.

In view of the particular deployment of their forces and of their relationships and interests

linking them with countries outside the two military blocs, the countries on the southern flank of NATO and the Warsaw Pact can and must contribute to the achievement of these objectives, by furthering new confidence-building measures, by looking for ways and means of starting negotiations for the controlled, balanced reduction of military forces and by promoting stability and co-operation in the Mediterranean area while, of course, respecting the two alliances. This should in our view be the first commitment of the Council of WEU. The recommendation, however, does not call for any agreement on the reduction and control of arms sales but in points 4 and 5 first calls on countries which are not members of the Alliance to refuse bases to the members of the Warsaw Pact and then calls for co-ordination between member countries with a view to possible military intervention in the area.

This, when it is a matter of increasing urgency to reduce the use of force and to remove the underlying causes of the crisis and of instability, by calling for and furthering the peaceful settlement of disputes, by way of multilateral agreements, with the participation of the great powers and of the countries involved, providing guarantees of autonomy, independence and security for all the peoples concerned. Failing this, as the speeding up of events in Lebanon and the disgraceful bombing of Iraq's nuclear power plant by Israel so dramatically prove, stability cannot be achieved and conditions for real security in Europe and the Mediterranean cannot be created, with ever-growing risks for peace and the future of mankind.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Bernini, you have already had your ten minutes. I hope that you can conclude your remarks very shortly.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – For this reason also, Israel's aggression must be severely condemned; and the gravity of the act for which there can be no justification calls even more powerfully for the immediate resumption of negotiations for a just solution to the Middle East crisis, based on secure, guaranteed frontiers for all the states, including Israel, on the unity and independence of Lebanon and on the right of the Palestinian people to have a homeland.

It is against this background that the problems of the Alliance's southern flank must, in my view, be considered: European co-operation for the modernisation of armaments; the neutrality of Malta; relations with Spain, the question of whose possible accession to NATO must not only be left to the Spanish people to decide in complete freedom but must also be assessed in terms of balance between the two military blocs; and, lastly, Turkey and its contribution to the Alliance on which a completely unaccep-

Mr. Bernini (continued)

table and disputable judgment is offered. Not only because credit is given to the people who organised the military coup and because the destruction of democracy is in fact regarded as justified, while nothing is said about the continuation of an illegal situation and of repression, contrary to human rights and the principles of freedom which are the basic beliefs of the members of the Alliance, but also because any real strengthening of links with Turkey can only come about through condemnation of the illegal acts of its present régime and by the speedy restoration of democracy in that country.

For these reasons, Mr. President, we are opposed to the report and will vote against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bernini.

Mrs. Knight is the last speaker.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I find this an excellent report. It is full of information, and all of it is most important.

In what will be a short speech, I wish to refer to Malta. The report, quite rightly, speaks of the unpredictable leadership of Malta, but I want to comment on two other facts about the country which should cause all of us great concern. One of them is mentioned in the report.

I want first to draw attention to the position of the courts in Malta. They have been manipulated, and they have even been suspended. I cite the example of the legal dispute between the state of Malta and the Blue Sister nuns over the use of the famous Maltese hospital run by that order. I shall not go into the wrangle in detail. I say only that it was a scandalous affair from beginning to end, assuming that it has ended. At the moment, the state's case has been discarded as being gravely at fault, and the sisters have won. But, having observed how the Maltese Prime Minister operates, I fear that the case will not rest there.

History shows us again and again that, where the due process of the law is destroyed by the state, the freedom of the individual in that state is gravely at risk. I have always found it to be a very competent red light to the rest of the world that, where any state denies the freedom of its individuals, almost invariably it becomes a wider danger. Therefore I suggest that this matter of the courts in Malta is not an unimportant internal issue. It indicates a basic approach that has sharp and most uncomfortable implications for external policy. I fear for Malta and, in doing so, I fear for stability in the Mediterranean.

The strategic geographical position of Malta is still vital. It may be, as some say, that the way in which defence capabilities have developed means that this is no longer so, and I know that an argument is carried on along those lines. But I do not believe that this contention has been proved and, time and again, those so-called experts of hostilities and campaigns have told us that A is the case and, when trouble breaks out, it transpires that it was B. I believe that Malta is strategically vital, which brings me to my second question which is whether, in the event of hostilities in Europe – and God preserve us from them – Malta would be used and, if so, by whom.

Mr. Mintoff promised Britain solemnly that no Warsaw Pact country would be permitted to station forces in Malta or to use its military facilities. It is true to say – and the report refers to this – that the British presence was withdrawn mainly on that promise. There was concern enough when Malta and Libya were intertwined in friendship. The implications of that were extremely worrying. But that has now ended, apparently, and the two states are no longer friendly. However, the agreement between Malta and the Soviet Union on 26th January this year smashed Mintoff's solemn promise to Britain to smithereens. As the report says, it is strongly at odds with the neutrality agreement with Italy.

We hear sometimes about the desire of the Soviets for warm water ports. People who say that often give the impression that the Soviets have no warm water ports. Yet, very rightly, the report draws attention to the fact that there are Soviet fleet anchorages in Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Libya, Cape Gata and Syria. The Soviet Union has plenty of warm water ports there, and I believe that the Soviets have in mind the possibility of another one in Arabia.

All these implications are of immense importance. My suggestion is that at home Malta is denying her citizens not only the protection of the courts but very often the protection of the police. The deputy leader of the opposition was beaten up by the police. Abroad, Malta is breaking the most solemn promise to member countries of WEU. I submit that the implications are frightening.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight.

I am glad Mr. Baumel has joined us. We understand why he was not here this morning. He has come straight from his successful election fight. I understand, Mr. Baumel, that you are not interested personally in the second ballot. We are glad that, despite the preoccupations

The President (continued)

pations of the French elections, you are able to participate in our work this week.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. President.

I wish to make some brief comments on the excellent report by my colleague Mr. Bozzi, who is unfortunately absent, relating to European security in the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean is not a secondary theatre but a strategic area of the highest importance for the defence of Europe, on the one hand because of Soviet penetration and the presence of a number of Soviet naval units, and on the other because it is Europe's "soft underbelly", as Winston Churchill said long before me. Moreover it forms an indispensable link between Europe and Africa – not only North Africa but also black Africa which, as you know, is exposed to the threat of destabilisation. Lastly it borders one of the world's "hot" theatres – the Middle East – with the ever-present danger of hostilities between certain countries in that region.

This is the reason why the document submitted to us is of immense importance.

As its title indicates, this report concerns European security in the Mediterranean. Yet we can see that for the moment this means Atlantic security; in other words – and this is something we rejoice in – the presence and influence of the American forces in the Mediterranean constitute the only real factor which restores the balance in the face of the Soviet threat. I mean by this that the Mediterranean states, which consist of European states and African states, are unable effectively to oppose Soviet infiltration. This is a reality and serves to confirm Europe's powerlessness.

It is a fact that Europe is unable to defend itself on its southern flank, the Mediterranean, without American help. Consequently we must do all we can to strengthen European strategic power in this area. France is contributing to this very actively, but better co-ordination is needed; Spain in particular should be more involved in the strategic effort in the Mediterranean, for that country, once a world power, represents a significant factor of equilibrium in the western Mediterranean.

We rejoice over Greece's return into the Atlantic defence organisations. This is of considerable significance. On the other hand, the continuing quarrels between Turkey and Greece must be ironed out and the burning issue of Cyprus must be settled at last. For

Cyprus is like a painful thorn in Europe's side. Until we find a solution to the Cyprus problem, whatever we accomplish in the southern part of the Mediterranean will unfortunately be inadequate.

It is vital, at once for human rights, democracy in Europe and defence strategy, that a genuine solution be found to the Cyprus problem and that, instead of clashing and opposing each other, those two nations so vital to the defence of Europe's southern flank – namely Turkey and Greece – should co-operate in any plan to safeguard the free western world.

Finally, there can be no doubt that political developments not only in the Middle East but also along the southern shores of the Mediterranean need to be watched carefully, and here I refer to North Africa and to Libya in particular.

As long as an arsenal of such magnitude and a hotbed of terrorism and subversive activity remain concentrated in Libya, there can be no real security in the Mediterranean. Free communications between southern Europe and Africa will be permanently threatened. And the value of this report lies in the timeliness with which it has drawn our attention to the problems of European security. It is my most fervent wish that it will be followed by practical achievements, for what is at stake is not just the security of southern Europe but global stability.

The Mediterranean, for a long time the *mare nostrum* of our ancestors, which has lost a great deal of its influence in the last seventy years, is becoming a vital area once more together with Europe's central and northern fronts, particularly in view of the Soviet effort to build up an ever more powerful fleet and implement a long-range strategy, directing its policy especially at certain countries in the Middle East and on the African continent, in order to outflank and isolate Europe, the more so as a Europe deprived of its natural extensions to the Mediterranean and Africa would be a weakened Europe.

For this reason the report presented by my colleague Mr. Bozzi has my approval, and I thank the Committee for having submitted it to us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. We are particularly appreciative of the fact that you have come from your election campaign to participate in our affairs. Naturally, we are extremely sorry that, because of events, Mr. Bozzi has been unable to present his excellent report; and as I understand it, it is unlikely that he will remain a member of the delegation of the French Parliament. I should like to place on record our appreciation of his work and his contribution to our work in the

The President (continued)

Assembly. I hope that you, Mr. Baumel, will convey to him our thanks and good wishes.

That concludes the list of speakers. I ask the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Cavaliere, who is doubling in the rôle of Rapporteur – so that we shall have only one speaker – whether he wishes to respond to the debate.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is now my duty to answer a number of speakers. First of all I should like, with your permission Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to offer my warmest thanks to Mr. Grant for his firm rebuttal of the unfounded accusations and untruths uttered by Mr. De Jardin in an attempt to gainsay the Committee's wishes.

Regarding the discussion on this important report, I should like to thank all speakers and wish simply to refer to a number of points brought up.

First of all, on the subject of Malta, I should like to say that Italy, which has concluded an agreement with that country, feels that it has prevented Malta from falling under the extremely pernicious influence of Colonel Kadhafi and the Soviet Union.

As regards the agreement concluded early this year between the Soviet Union and Malta, I can say that the Italian Government is keeping a close watch and is aware that this agreement covers only the revictualling of merchant ships. Italy will be vigilant to ensure that the limits of this agreement are not exceeded. I consider, therefore, that no threat can arise to the security of the Mediterranean and Europe.

I wish to thank everyone who agreed that this is a good report and to observe to Mr. Baumel that the title is not "Mediterranean security" but "European security and the Mediterranean". In other words, the actual title shows that we are discussing the situation in the Mediterranean in the context of its significance for the overall defence of Europe. Indeed, this was the principle underlying all the Committee's work.

Then I should like to inform everyone who made points concerning the part of the report and of the draft recommendation dealing specifically with Turkey, that the Committee took account of both the time and the political situation in that country; particular account was taken of Turkey's position and its importance for the defence of the Mediterranean and Europe. I was rather impressed by Mr. van den Bergh's remarks, as it seems to me that, since our visit to Turkey, there have been no changes which could justify the fears expressed regard-

ing the chances for a return to democracy. On the contrary we learnt that a time-table for such a return has virtually been fixed. I therefore believe that there are no grounds for any of the reserves expressed. So far as our Assembly is concerned, however, it remains a fact that Turkey is absolutely essential for the defence of the West and of Europe. The fullest attention must therefore be given to that country so that it can fulfil its rôle and discharge its responsibilities adequately.

I should next like to say a few words regarding the speech made by Dr. Miller who argued that the polarisation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO – and more generally the Atlantic Alliance – could have disastrous consequences because it would result in an endless spiral of expenditure on new weapons. I would observe that, if we do find ourselves in this position, this is due not to the United States of America or to NATO but to the Soviet Union. Why? Because we have marked time, the United States of America has marked time, we have marked time too long and have allowed the Soviet Union to make up any gap between the defensive potential of the Warsaw Pact and that of NATO. Indeed, the unanimous view today is that the Soviet Union, after having achieved parity, has moved ahead of NATO so that we are now in the position of having to make up for lost time and to repair our omissions, in order to achieve a degree of parity.

I would remind the Assembly, and Mr. Bernini first and foremost, that the Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Lagorio, a true socialist, referred to this situation in the report which he made to the Defence Committee of the Italian Parliament on 14th April last. Regarding the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weaponry, Mr. Lagorio said that the current deployment of the SS-20 created an offensive capacity equal to that of the West's modernisation programme when it was completed. I am quoting what Mr. Lagorio said, as recorded in the verbatim reports of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. According to his statement, the position is such that when we have completed modernisation we shall be able to declare ourselves equal to the present strength of the Soviet Union. This being so, how can it be said that NATO has engaged in a completely unjustified arms race?

May I conclude my replies by reminding Mr. Bernini that, when the Committee approved the draft recommendation, it reserved the right, as time was short, to submit an amendment on the extremely important and serious question of arms sales to third world countries. But as I announced this morning in introducing the report, the Committee has submitted an amendment on the subject and has therefore covered all questions. Finally therefore, in thanking all

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

speakers, I am confident that this excellent report and this important draft recommendation will be approved by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere, for your comments and for your work during the year as Chairman of the Committee.

We have concluded the debate on the report and we come now to the numerous amendments. A group of amendments has been proposed by Mr. Dejardin and another group by Mr. Bernini. I hope that the remarks which Mr. Dejardin will naturally want to make in introducing his amendments will cover all of them. We shall have a vote on each amendment, but we do not need a repetition of the debate. The amendments tend to follow a theme. If Mr. Dejardin agrees, perhaps we could have only one debate with a separate vote on each amendment.

Would you like to move Amendment 1, Mr. Dejardin?

1. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:

“(i) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment to the values of parliamentary and pluralist democracy, the result of free elections by universal suffrage, and to the fundamental freedoms set out in the European Convention of Human Rights;”.

Perhaps you would agree to discuss at the same time the other three amendments in your name:

2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following:

“(vi) Believing that the maintenance and the strengthening of present links between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions depend on true and steady progress being made towards the early restoration of democracy in Turkey in the interests of that country and of the Alliance,”.

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of the Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterranean with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries;”.

4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – If I have understood correctly, Mr. President, you

would like me to introduce my four amendments together.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps that will be convenient to you. If you agree, we shall have only the one discussion on the amendments with a separate vote on each. However, if you prefer to move each amendment separately, you are at liberty to do so. The amendments seem to me to hang together as a group. It is a matter for you.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – This is not a group of amendments. However, I am prepared to oblige you as far as I can, Mr. President, providing what you suggest does not restrict my speaking time. This said, I have no intention of delaying either the labours of our Assembly, as the speeches, particularly the last one we have just heard, are all sufficiently explicit.

The PRESIDENT. – Let me make it clear that there will be no restriction on time if you wish to deal at the same time with all the amendments. However, it would save time if we had one debate. I shall not call you to order on a matter of time. You will have all the time that you need.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am not going to haggle and nor are you. I therefore agree to go along with what you suggest. However, at least one of the amendments I have tabled must be kept separate from the others: Amendment 4.

In accordance with your wish, Mr. President, I shall therefore defend my first three amendments together.

Amendment 1, which falls within the framework of this important report being debated, tends to reaffirm what I said when I spoke, namely the bases on which our action rests, both within the United Nations and within NATO and Western European Union. In this text I merely recall a sentence in the preamble to the Brussels Treaty, stating that the heads of state of the participating nations are resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. The text of this amendment, which I do not propose to read out again, reaffirms our democratic option, which it may not be superfluous to recall once again.

My second amendment relates to paragraph (vi) of the preamble. I tabled it because I disagree with the wording of the draft, as submitted to us, and because I prefer to look at things the other way round, as it were. The wording of paragraph (vi) in fact reflects the content of paragraph 3.40 of the report which, though I

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

am convinced such was not Mr. Bozzi's wish, could be interpreted from outside as a typically neo-colonialist view that takes into account only the strategic interests of Western Europe and not those of the Turkish people.

In his reply Mr. Cavaliere stated that he himself placed trust – and this he is entitled to do – in the process for a return to democracy in that country.

But this is only a postulate, and all of us know that in mathematics a postulate is never demonstrated. For my part, I have noted not a single act – show me a single concrete fact, or even the smallest gesture on the part of the Turkish generals – to suggest that the process of restoring democracy is under way.

On the contrary, I would refer you to the declaration of the National Security Council of 2nd June which, contrary to your hopes, still further restricts – if that is possible – the freedom and even the right to speak of former Turkish members of parliament, now reduced to complete silence. In Amendment 2, confident of the common desire to respect democracy all over the world, I assert that it is our duty to press for, or at least encourage, the process of restoring democracy in a country dear to us all – and, believe me, to me as much as to you, though perhaps from a different viewpoint.

This brings me to Amendment 3, Mr. President. From the first two amendments it will be clear that I cannot share the point of view expressed in paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper. As I made clear in my statement, my own analysis of the situation suggests to me that, unfortunately for NATO and European security, Turkey's armed forces are in essence not directed against the outside enemy but are organised and used to maintain order in the country. And it does not please me to think that we should be helping to strengthen an authoritarian régime which uses its armed forces to maintain order.

No matter what Mr. Jung may think, having insulted me here and called me a "member of the Comintern" because I do not happen to share his views, I favour responsible action and strengthening the Mediterranean forces, but not at any price! For me, democracy also has its worth.

Such then, Mr. President, is the purpose of my first three amendments. I expect to be permitted later to speak in support of Amendment 4 concerning Spain's admission to NATO, which is a question quite different from the problem of Turkey.

The PRESIDENT. – I accept completely that Amendment 4 is different, and you will be called to move that amendment when the time comes. Mr. Dejardin has moved Amendment 1, and in this discussion we are also including Amendments 2 and 3 standing in the name of Mr. Dejardin.

Does anyone wish to oppose them?...

I call Mr. Spénale.

Mr. SPÉNALE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, all of us here play several different rôles. Sometimes we come together in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, whose main concern is the defence of human rights. On other occasions we meet in a context where defence problems are the main item of discussion.

These are two different viewpoints, to be sure. However, I believe we have but one conscience and that we cannot divorce these problems. Consequently I am with Mr. Dejardin when he states that, even when considering defence problems, we cannot set aside matters concerning human rights. That is why I shall personally, together with my French socialist comrades, vote in favour of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does Mr. Cavaliere, acting as Rapporteur, wish to speak?...

You have already spoken, Mr. Grant, but if you must speak, by all means do so.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I thought that it was the custom that when a person had proposed an amendment an opportunity was given for someone to oppose it. Unless I misheard our friend, I understood him to say that he was supporting the amendment. I heard no voice against it.

The PRESIDENT. – I heard no opposition, but I cannot tell, until someone begins to speak, what he intends to say. I take it from your speech, Mr. Grant, that you oppose the amendment. We can note that. However, if you want to make a speech, of course you may do so, and if you want to be here until 10 o'clock, I am available to the Assembly. That is what we are likely to do if we go on as we are.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I do not want to make a speech, Mr. President, and I shall certainly accede to your wish. But if you ask someone to speak against an amendment, he should at least speak against it. If he speaks in favour, that defeats the whole purpose of the procedure.

The PRESIDENT. – I agree completely, but you will understand that I cannot possibly anticipate what people will say until they begin their speeches.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Is it in order for someone, called upon to put a view contrary to the amendment, to speak in favour of it? Would you not be entitled to call him to order, since he clearly would not be in order?

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that the rules of the Assembly are such that if members want to debate the amendment and nothing else until 10 p.m., I have no power, as President, to stop them. I can express some concern, but I have no power to stop them. The Assembly can debate the subject all night if it wishes, but if it did that it would make a nonsense of itself. Let us simply say, therefore, that there are clearly two views in the Assembly. We should, therefore, now ask for the customary guidance from the Committee from the member who, fortunately, combines the rôles of Chairman and Rapporteur. I therefore ask Mr. Cavaliere to give the views of the Committee, so that we may come to a decision.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Committee has not been able to discuss the amendments tabled and I shall therefore confine myself to giving my views as Rapporteur.

I am opposed to all the amendments tabled by Mr. Dejardin. First of all, I wish to state quite definitely that the Turkish army is not arrayed against the Turkish people but against the enemies of Europe and the enemies of the free world rather than against the enemies of Turkey itself.

I would remind all members of the Assembly that the Council of Europe which is concerned with the protection of human rights recently adopted a decision under the terms of which Turkey remains a member of the Council of Europe. I consider therefore that there are no grounds for the reserves expressed by Mr. Dejardin and other speakers.

I would add that Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Dejardin virtually repeats in another form what is said in paragraph (vi) of the preamble. I could accept this amendment but will not do so because it repeats what is said under paragraph (vi).

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere. Before we vote on the amendment I should like to ask all Representatives and all Substitutes sitting in the seats of Representatives to ensure that they have signed the register of attendance. Our rules stipulate that this is the guide we need for a roll-call vote, and I am advised that there are more members sitting in their seats than have signed the register. A number of members cannot therefore have signed. It will be helpful if they will do so before the vote.

We shall now vote on Amendment 1 by Mr. Dejardin.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We now come to Amendment 8:

8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“Considering that the serious bombardment of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is an act to be condemned and which increases the danger of war in the Middle East and that the justifications invoked by the Israeli authorities are unfounded;”.

I hope, since this amendment is closely related to the other two amendments in the names of Mr. Bernini, Mr. Martino and Mr. Antoni, that they will be prepared, like Mr. Dejardin, to make one speech followed by a discussion on the issue which in turn will be followed by a vote on each amendment.

I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, very briefly, because I tried to explain the intention of this amendment in my earlier speech.

I think it is wrong to speak of growing dangers due to the rising quantity and quality of armaments without proposing measures for an agreement to reduce the spread of armaments. The Committee's proposal, Mr. President, does not deal with this problem, but refers to concerted action. The issue is not one of concerted action but of reducing the spread of armaments and of trying to cut down the use of force in the settlement of disputes.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – That is not the issue.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Excuse me, Mr. President. The amendment is concerned with the question of the Middle East and in my view it is not possible – I refer to the problem raised by Amendments 8 and 10 on the same subject – to talk of the unresolved problems of the Mediterranean and the possible threat which they involve for the security of Europe and not only of Europe, without mentioning a dramatic event which has taken place in the Middle East, namely the totally unjustified attack on the nuclear power plant. I therefore propose the inclusion in the draft recommendation of a clause calling on the Council to further all measures for the resumption of negotiations, so that the Middle East crisis may finally be solved. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bernini.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to oppose Amendment 8.

It is not my intention to justify the Israeli attack on the atom bomb centre in Iraq, although it is strange that there should be no condemnation of an even more serious act represented by the invasion of Iran by Iraq.

I wish to draw attention to the last two lines, to the effect that the justifications invoked by the Israeli authorities are unfounded. They are far from being unfounded. I do not say that the justifications are valid, but there is no doubt that the justifications put forward by the Israelis, far from being unfounded, are corroborated by all the objective evidence of what was happening in that plant in Iraq.

In my view, we should be adopting an amendment in which the accusation lies in the face of the facts if we approved this proposal.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

May we now have the view of the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am opposed to this amendment. Apart from the arguments put forward by Dr. Miller, which I do not share, I have to say that this matter was not discussed by the Committee and therefore falls outside the draft recommendation.

I should then like to say to Mr. Bernini that this Assembly will be discussing the specific problem of the Middle East at an early meeting. That will perhaps be the best time to deal with this particular problem. I shall therefore vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Cavaliere.

It has to be said that these amendments were tabled very late, otherwise I should probably have had to rule that the amendment was out of order in that it went much beyond the subject matter of the text of the resolution on European security in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, I have accepted it, and it has been moved, so I must put it to the vote.

We shall now vote therefore on Amendment 8.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

We come to Amendment 2:

2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following:

“(vi) Believing that the maintenance and the strengthening of present links between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions depend on true and steady progress being made towards the early restoration of democracy in Turkey in the interests of that country and of the Alliance,”.

With the agreement of Mr. Dejardin, we can take it without further debate since it has been dealt with in the discussion.

We shall now vote on Amendment 2 by Mr. Dejardin.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

We come to Amendment 7:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “even the strengthening”.

This amendment is to be moved by Mr. Hardy in the absence of Mr. Urwin.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On behalf of Mr. Urwin, I shall move this amendment briefly. I hope that we shall not have to vote on it and that the Chairman of the Committee will accept that it is reasonable, that we can avoid a division, and that it can be accepted.

We believe that, so long as any question mark hangs over the democratic future of Turkey, it would be quite unwise for the words “even the strengthening” to be included in the draft recommendation.

We did not wish to be provocative and to suggest that there should be any further weakening of the original proposal. However, in our view there might be an enhancement of the military potential in advance of firm progress towards democracy, which could be regarded as inflammatory. We need to be confident that democracy will return to Turkey, but to anticipate an increased involvement of military capacity in advance of that would be quite imprudent.

I hope that the Rapporteur will accept the amendment. It maintains the present involvements and the present relationship, but it does not fuel existing fears about the present political condition of Turkey, and we ought not to inflame them. I hope that we can maintain the wisdom and balance which this proposal would have if the amendment were incorporated in it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

The President (continued)

I hope that the continued absence of Mr. Urwin does not mean that he is still unwell. If he is, I hope that you will convey to him the warm wishes of the Assembly for his speedy recovery.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, Mr. President. Although I understand and respect the motivation of Mr. Hardy in moving the amendment, I should deplore the leaving out of the words “even the strengthening”.

I hope that, like me, my colleagues in the Assembly believe that Turkey is indispensable to western defence. The bona fides and the desire of the present Turkish administration of the generals to return to democracy as soon as possible were recognised fully recently by the Council of Europe by its overwhelming vote in favour of maintaining the position of Turkey in the Council of Europe amongst the fraternity of the free countries of the western world. It would be a grave error if the Assembly now were not to place on record its recognition of the need for the maintenance and strengthening of the links of Turkey with the Atlantic and European institutions.

For those reasons, I trust that my colleagues in the Assembly will defeat the amendment overwhelmingly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve.

Can we now have the views of the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. Cavaliere?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I understand Mr. Hardy's arguments and ask you to believe that, if we were not living through a particularly difficult and important time for the life of NATO and the security of Europe, I would accept his amendment. I therefore endorse the remarks just made by Mr. Hardy but I would ask him and the other signatories to withdraw the amendment while taking note that we understand. If the amendment is not withdrawn I shall be obliged to vote against it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. Hardy, are you willing to withdraw your amendment?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – No. It is the result of serious and mature consideration in the Socialist Group. Not merely will I not withdraw the amendment, but I shall have seriously to consider voting against the report if it is resisted.

The PRESIDENT. – I have now to put Amendment 7 tabled by MM. Urwin, Stoffelen and Hardy, as I understand it on behalf of the Socialist Group.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 9:

9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

“To encourage international and regional agreements, with the participation of the great powers, to restrict and control sales of arms to countries in the area, particularly those at war, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, respecting their independence and interests and guaranteeing mutual security;”.

Mr. Bernini has very kindly agreed that this amendment may be taken without further discussion.

We shall now vote on Amendment 9.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

Next we come to Amendment 3, which Mr. Dejardin has agreed, following the opening debate, may be put without further discussion:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of the Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterranean with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries;”.

We shall now vote on Amendment 3 by Mr. Dejardin.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We come to Amendment 6:

6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph:

“To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries;”.

This has been tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, I do not know whether in his personal capacity or his capacity as Chairman. No doubt he will explain that.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I repeat what I said in my reply; when it approved the draft recommendation, the Committee agreed that this amendment, which it had not been able to discuss, should be tabled. I therefore signed it as Chairman rather than as Rapporteur, in accordance with the Committee's rules.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 6 has been moved. Is there any opposition to this amendment?

Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I oppose this because it is not a matter of concerted action.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Bernini wishes to oppose the amendment. In that case I have to put it to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

We come to Amendment 4:

4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper.

As this is on a separate point from the previous amendment of Mr. Dejardin, I have agreed that he should move it. I call upon him now to move the amendment to delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper concerning Spain.

Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Would it be possible to take Amendment 5 first? These amendments deal with the same paragraph and one will depend upon the other.

The PRESIDENT. – No. If paragraph 7 is deleted, of course it cannot be amended. Therefore, I must first put the proposition that it should be eliminated. If it is eliminated, there is no possibility of accepting the amendment to it, for all amendments to paragraph 7 would then consequentially fall. That will be in the minds of members of the Assembly when they vote on Mr. Dejardin's amendment.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – This morning I heard several remarks which hardly surprised me. It was said that I am indifferent to the expansion of the Warsaw Pact forces. This shows how little people know me. The interests of the free world were also invoked. I am all for the free world personally, but I cannot help but note with regret that, on occasion, it contains negative elements, such as Chile, South Africa and today also unfortu-

nately – though not for too long I hope – Turkey. I was described as an agent of the Comintern. May I ask the Assembly to be heedful of the danger there is in manifesting too much anti-communism today – yesterday it was anti-bolshevism – for that was the reason for which, not so long ago – I was only a child then – French volunteers were dispatched to the eastern front to fight alongside troops of whom they disapproved at the bottom of their hearts. We must beware of “antis”; that is the danger which threatens us most, wherever we may be.

Mr. President, because I am aware of the problems regarding the balance of forces, I might perhaps have been in favour of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation. But it so happens that I fully share my friend Mr. van den Bergh's beliefs concerning any extension of the policy of military blocs and the risks of a general escalation of tension it entails. Therefore all I ask is that we should not start something which we might find getting out of hand and leading to consequences we are not prepared to accept.

This is the reason why I tabled Amendment 4 which, no matter what Mr. Cavaliere may say, was submitted to the Committee on 4th May together with all the others but which I did not have an opportunity to uphold before that Committee – and he knows the reason why.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Is there any opposition to the amendment?

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment. It is completely undesirable. Spain has, by a remarkable process, become a democratic country which is good enough to be a member of the Council of Europe. It is seeking to join the European Economic Community. In all probability, it will seek to join NATO. In the event of a major war in the Mediterranean, it is unthinkable that we could conduct it without Spain. We heard only this morning from General Rogers that Spain had a contribution to make to NATO's defence.

Therefore, if we believe in Spanish democracy, in NATO and in the defence of the Mediterranean, this paragraph is absolutely essential and should remain in the text.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grant. If the amendment is carried, Amendment 5 will fall.

Does the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee wish to speak to the amendment?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President. I am opposed.

The PRESIDENT. – The cases for and against Amendment 4 have been presented. I must put the amendment to the Assembly.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to move Amendment 5, Mr. Gessner? It is:

5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “and defence planning”.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there is undoubtedly broad agreement in our Assembly that Spain is part of the western world. We have very close cultural contacts and very close economic relations. The collapse of the dictatorship in Spain has forged the bonds of solidarity between the western nations and Spain – bonds which, I hope, are both strong and reliable.

There is also military co-operation between Spain and the United States of America. I have no doubt – that is why I am saying this now – that should Spain ever apply to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, it would have a great deal of support in this Assembly.

I say this because I do not want to create the impression that our amendment is designed to prevent Spain's accession to the North Atlantic defence Alliance. But to see this amendment in its proper perspective, we must realise that if, as the draft recommendation says, arrangements should be made to permit Spain to participate in NATO defence planning, we are in fact advocating that Spain become, in a way, a member of the Alliance. This would not be formal, but partial, *de facto* membership. This being so, I do not think we would be doing the Alliance a favour by giving the impression that someone was, as it were, trying to slip into the Alliance through the back door. We must insist on the importance of a precise definition of the rights and obligations of each member state, which would not be so if Spain were to participate in defence planning without otherwise being integrated into the Alliance.

We therefore propose the deletion of the words “and defence planning” from the draft recommendation, because this is in the interests of the Alliance itself. I ask you: how would the Spanish Government look if the Spanish people got the impression that it was trying to creep into the Alliance through the back door, as it were? That would not help the Alliance or the internal situation in Spain.

I am therefore in favour of our deleting these three words, which does not mean that we are generally opposed to Spain's accession to the Alliance. I ask you to approve the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Gessner.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I oppose this amendment because it does not seem quite logical to me, particularly after what Mr. Gessner has just said. If he had pursued the idea he has just introduced to its logical conclusion, he ought to have called for the deletion of the whole paragraph. If we are going to talk about joint exercises as it says here, Mr. Gessner, we cannot of course think only of the United States, which has an agreement with Spain enabling it to maintain bases in that country. When it comes to such joint exercises and the defence of the Mediterranean area, our thinking must obviously extend beyond the United States.

This is not, of course, to prejudge the issue of Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. That is for Spain to decide; it is an internal matter for Spain. The decision on joining the European Community will also be taken in Spain or other countries, but arrangements, talks and agreements take place beforehand – not on military matters but on other areas – and in this way people gradually become accustomed to the possibility of full membership.

Since I regard myself as a democrat, I think it is much fairer and more honest to say: yes, we will have joint exercises if there is a mutual understanding, if an agreement is reached; yes, we will also talk about joint defence planning. Why should democracies not discuss this openly before coming to a decision about it? At all events, it is fairer and more honest than secret diplomacy, from which people may draw quite the wrong conclusions.

So I say again, for the sake of clarity and fairness, either delete the whole paragraph, which I should not like, or leave it as it is. I therefore oppose Amendment 5, seeking the deletion of the three words.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

May we have the views of the Rapporteur and Chairman?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would ask the proposers of this amendment to consider that the possible accession of Spain does not exclude a move by Spain itself, nor could it. It is also true that any participation by Spain in exercises and

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

defence planning is a matter for Spain to decide. Here we say that we hope that Spain will accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and become a member of NATO. As this will take a long time and as we are convinced of the value and usefulness of such participation, it would be possible in the meantime, pending full accession, to make arrangements which would enable Spain to take part in exercises and defence planning. I see no reason why a distinction should be made between exercises and defence planning. In other words, it is not the intention to bring in through the back door someone not wanted through the front but, in any event, it is more and more a bilateral decision to be arrived at with the consent of both parties, that is NATO as at present and Spain, for immediate participation – or when the necessary arrangements have been made – in exercises and defence planning. That is why I am asking our colleagues to withdraw their amendment if possible.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must now put the amendment moved by Mr. Gessner – Amendment 5.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 10, moved by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni, which we have already discussed.

10. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:

“To support the immediate resumption of negotiations on the Middle East which have become even more urgent after the Israeli attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order to find a fair solution to the crisis based on sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, including the state of Israel, on the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and on the unity and independence of Lebanon;”.

With their agreement, I shall put it immediately to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 10 is negated.

I must now put the draft recommendation, as amended. To make it absolutely clear, it has already been amended in three respects: first, in paragraph (vi) of the preamble, the words “even the strengthening” are omitted; secondly, after paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, a new paragraph is inserted:

“To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries;”.

Finally, we have Amendment 5 moved by Mr. Gessner, in paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation leave out the words “and defence planning”.

I must now put the draft recommendation, as amended, contained in Document 876.

Are there any objections?...

Do you wish to object, Mr. Hanin?

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am on the whole favourable to the draft recommendation, but since the adoption of the amendment relating to Spain removes a large part of its significance, I shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We shall vote against.

The PRESIDENT. – We can record abstentions but if there are objections I must take a roll-call vote.

Does anyone else wish to object or abstain?...

There is an objection and an abstention. I must therefore take a roll-call vote. There is no alternative under the rules.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Maravalle.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	56
Ayes	50
Noes	4
Abstentions	2

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

4. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 879 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now move to the second Order of the Day, which is the presenta-

1. See page 27.
2. See page 29.

The President (continued)

tion of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 879 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – This is a short report on highly topical subjects. The report from the Committee follows developments concerning the SALT process in the wake of the Committee's report of last December. The Assembly adopted Recommendation 360 by thirty-five votes to three with ten abstentions. For the convenience of members the text of that recommendation is reproduced in Appendix I to the Committee's present report. Since that recommendation was adopted the new Reagan administration has taken office, and Chapter II of the explanatory memorandum deals with the evolution of United States policy. The new administration has not yet formulated its policy on the SALT process as a whole in respect of its approach to the Soviet Union.

In paragraph 2.5 of the explanatory memorandum the Committee quotes a recent remark by the United States of America's Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, when, asked whether there was a time-table for the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union, he replied:

“No ... Clearly President Reagan has reiterated his willingness and desire to engage in a full range of negotiations that are necessary to provide equitable balanced reductions in nuclear weaponry, and I emphasise reductions. This is a problem associated with a host of technical issues associated with the arms control of central strategic systems themselves, but it is also clearly related to Soviet international behaviour and overall relationships between East and West. And I do not foresee in the immediate future a resumption of those talks.”

Since taking office, the new American Administration has given priority to economic policy. It has been slow to formulate general foreign policy, and in particular policy on arms control. At times it has appeared publicly divided on these issues. The new administration seemed, and still seems, in need of more time than many Europeans, who are anxious for the resumption of the SALT process, expected or hoped for.

In judging these developments we should not forget, first, that President Reagan has committed himself repeatedly and emphatically to the SALT process. Secondly, we should remember that he has decided to embark on TNF negotiations. Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that

Europe can influence United States policy, particularly if it is united and if it takes a common constructive stand. The fourth point is that SALT negotiations have to be carefully prepared, particularly if they are directed not only at limitations but at reductions, of which the American President has spoken repeatedly.

One aspect of the SALT process – the weapons that have become known as long-range theatre nuclear forces – is, for two reasons, the more urgent issue. The first is that the Soviet Union is continuing its rapid deployment of the new SS-20 missile. The second is the important twofold NATO decision of December 1979 to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Europe from December 1983, and for the United States simultaneously to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union on reductions in this type of weapon system. That is based on the assumption that those negotiations will begin urgently and will endeavour to seek reductions in the level of Soviet weapons now being deployed and in the number of missiles in the NATO plan announced in December 1979.

The draft recommendation which the Committee now submits to the Assembly concentrates, therefore, on the urgency of these talks with the Soviet Union. In the preamble there are no new themes which are not already to be found in Recommendation 360, previously adopted by the Assembly, with two exceptions. The first is that the two opening paragraphs stress the possibility of a frank dialogue between Europe and the United States as well as the desirability of a common constructive contribution by Europe to that dialogue. In itself it is not a new theme, but I believe that there are reasons why attention should be given to that subject.

The second is the belief, or rather the hope, in paragraph (v) that the TNF negotiations should provide the political impetus to include gradually all nuclear weapons in a broad negotiating process so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world.

The third paragraph of the preamble calls attention to the vast modernisation of Soviet conventional nuclear forces. I remind the Assembly that the last ten years have seen the deployment by the Soviet Union of three new strategic missiles – the SS-17, the SS-18 and the SS-19 – and of three new submarine-launched ballistic missiles – the SSN-8, the SSN-17 and the SSN-18. Over the same period, the United States has deployed only two strategic missiles, the Poseidon and the Trident.

The preamble continues to reiterate support for the twofold NATO decision of December 1979 as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

on reductions. It can now be said, following President Mitterrand's comments during his meeting with Chancellor Schmidt, that the French Government, too, support that decision in that sense, although France of course, which has its own strategic missile systems, will not be participating in the NATO decision to deploy United States cruise missiles in Europe.

I believe that the rest of the preamble speaks for itself. Paragraph (vi) stresses the need for long-range TNF to be considered in the general SALT framework, as reports of the Committee have frequently stressed, because any attempts to establish a separate regional balance of nuclear forces could only serve to uncouple deterrence in Europe from the overall protection of the main United States strategic nuclear forces.

The eighth paragraph calls for comparable information to be made public.

There is a hint in the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 5th May 1981 that a new assessment of the force balance is being undertaken within NATO. The Committee notes, in the explanatory memorandum to this report, that the Soviet Union never provides information on Soviet weapons systems. At the same time, it has to be said that some of the information on the force balance provided in NATO communiqués is sometimes confusing or misleading rather than informative.

The Nuclear Planning Group, for example, in its communiqué of 8th April 1981, points out that about 220 SS-20 missile launchers are operational and that the Soviets have deployed some 660 warheads. Not mentioned, however – as the military experts know perfectly well – is that a proportion of those 220 missiles, usually reported to be about one-third, are out of range of Europe, deployed in the far east of Soviet territory. Moreover, some SS-20 missiles deployed centrally in the so-called "swing position" would reach Western European targets at extreme range and for this purpose would not carry three warheads each. The true military assessment, at the present time, of the number of SS-20 warheads actually in range of European targets is probably nearer to 350 than the 660 referred to in more general terms in the NPG communiqué.

On the other hand, the SS-20 launchers are mobile and, besides, the deployment process is still going on – to say nothing of the still deployed SS-4 and SS-5. The Committee calls for the sort of balanced and objective assessment to be found in the reports of various

private institutes to be made available officially by NATO. Only by public opinion being properly informed in this way can democratic support for defence policies be secured.

The draft recommendation welcomes the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on the long-range TNF with the Soviet Union before the end of the year, and the operative part of the recommendation calls for these negotiations to begin without delay, and continues in paragraph 2 to call for the earliest resumption of negotiations on SALT as a whole, for, as I mentioned earlier, there is a close link between TNFs and the general SALT framework.

Paragraph 3 calls for the continued mutual respect of the SALT II limits and the SALT I agreement and the ABM treaty. This anti-ballistic missile treaty, signed in 1972 and open for renewal or not next year, is an important element in the SALT framework. Abolition of this guarantee against the build-up of new ballistic missile defence systems would enhance the danger of an unrestricted nuclear arms race.

While SALT II has not been ratified by the United States – and it is not the policy of the present administration to submit that treaty for ratification – it is nevertheless a principle of international law that the provisions of treaties, once signed, must be respected pending their ratification or pending the successful outcome of further negotiations to amend an unratified treaty. In two previous recommendations the Assembly has expressed its support for the existing SALT agreements.

You, Mr. President, in your speech yesterday said:

"It is, however, necessary to say emphatically that it is essential for progress, and real progress, to be offered by the United States in the SALT process if there is to be agreement here in Europe on its general NATO strategy. There is widespread concern that we are at the beginning of an arms race which, particularly in the depressed economic circumstances, we cannot afford and which will in no way enhance our security. It must also be understood that the protest movements against nuclear weapons – and, indeed in some cases, against the use of nuclear power for civil purposes – have in many of our countries a deeper and wider support than had their counterparts of a decade or more ago."

Yes, and in those protest movements against nuclear weapons there is a growing tendency to view the United States and the Soviet Union on an equal footing, forgetting the framework of essential relations – and that is also not only a military treaty – which unites Europe and the

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

United States and which is essential for mutual security. I believe that this tendency, which influences also part of some political parties in Europe, is a dangerous one.

It is the concern of the Committee that equal emphasis be placed on both aspects of the December 1979 decision in the hope that the final levels of long-range TNF deployed by both sides will be much lower than the present levels of Soviet missiles. It is also the hope of the Committee that the TNF negotiations will lead to that broad process of negotiations which I mentioned in which gradually all nuclear weapons are included to secure a balance at continuous lower level.

It is in that spirit that I commend the draft recommendation to the Assembly.

(Mr. Gessner, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I wish to thank the Rapporteur very much for his report, and I now open the debate.

There are ten speakers on the list. I call Mr. Bahr as the first speaker.

Mr. BAHR (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by making two comments. The first is that the report which has just been presented proves that even a short report can contain a wealth of information. We are particularly grateful to Mr. Mommersteeg for this.

The second comment is that this report proves that WEU's opponents are wrong to accuse us of only being interested in armament and not bothering about arms control.

We heard the American Supreme Commander's statement this morning. He is the most senior American soldier in Europe. He receives his orders from the political leaders and gives orders to the units under his command. It is quite obvious that what he has said here is in the Supreme Commander's interests, which does not relieve the bodies to which he reports of their political responsibility.

We must base our decisions on the twofold NATO decision which has already been mentioned several times. I believe this is also reflected in the recommendations made by Mr. Mommersteeg in his report. Both parts of this twofold decision must continue to apply. Without this twofold decision the United States of America would not have been prepared to negotiate, and without negotiations we will not achieve the objectives we have set ourselves in the report.

Having had the opportunity to visit Moscow only a few days ago, I can tell you that the Soviet Union also assumes that the twofold NATO decision applies. I say this particularly in the light of some remarks made by Mr. Mommersteeg about the growing peace movement in a number of member states. I believe we can all sympathise with the concern felt by many people, especially the young, at the growing dangers inherent in an unchecked arms race. But these are the people to whom we must explain that such dangers can only be surmounted by negotiation, and there will be no negotiation if we interfere with the twofold NATO decision. I am quite convinced that if we want negotiations, we must also accept the twofold decision.

I would also like to say a few words about the aim of the negotiations. I think the Soviet Union is undoubtedly concerned about the new missiles the United States of America intends to base in Europe. It is noted that the early warning time will then be reduced to a few minutes and that, practically speaking, there is no defence against the American Pershing II missile. I believe that to be correct.

But we must point out that we are already living under a similar threat in Western Europe. The SS-20 is not to be deployed in two or three years' time: it is already being deployed, and it takes no longer to reach its destination than the Pershing II. It too takes only four or five or at the most six minutes, and there is no defence against this missile either. In other words, we in Western Europe are already living under the constant threat which the Soviet Union wants to avoid.

If we want to change this situation, negotiations are the only way. This is the proposal made in Mr. Mommersteeg's report.

My colleagues will be moving the amendments we should like to see adopted. The first three do not seek to change the tenor of the report in any way, but merely to stress the urgency with which we feel negotiations should begin, with a view to securing a balance at the lowest possible level.

In our fourth amendment we propose an addition to the report to the effect that we are in favour of a conference which was talked about in Madrid as a follow-up to the Madrid conference, and which, as far as I can see, has the general support of the governments of all our member states. This amendment therefore proposes an addition to the proposals made here.

I would be grateful for the widest possible support for them all.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bahr.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the vote we are about to give in favour of the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces means first of all that we are concerned with and approve any political option, initiative and programme which seeks to combat a world arms race and to create conditions for the reduction and limitation of armaments – of all kinds – agreed and pursued through international negotiations. We regret therefore that the draft recommendation as worded does not meet with our entire approval, for the reasons which I shall give.

Our approval is in fact limited to the recommendation proper, the more so if the Assembly adopts the amendments tabled by Mr. Hardy and others, which we support particularly because they set out even more explicitly the call for the earliest resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe. For this to come about and for a start to be made along such a difficult and disputed road, the political will must be expressed objectively on the basis of detailed, logical analysis. Unilateral assessments set limits to the solution of these problems and in our case do not assist a policy for the reduction of armaments.

Our reserves concerning the whole preamble to the recommendation are based on our view that they do not fully meet the need for a complex overall study. We would argue therefore that the basic data should be collected and assessed over a broader spectrum so that, without in any way toning down the criticisms expressed and the charges of responsibility, all aspects of the problem and all areas of responsibility can be grasped, together with all the obstacles to a policy for the reduction of armaments, which is stated to be the aim. In our view it is not possible to achieve such a policy so long as doubts and uncertainties remain.

The approach adopted in the preamble is the standard approach which we have heard repeated so many times. This applies in the matter of responsibility. But if we want to negotiate, this blinkered line of thought must somehow be set aside. And this is possible if we compare responsibilities for example for the non-signature of SALT II, the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations and the armaments race initiated by the new United States Administration.

It is agreed on all sides that defence capacity cannot be separated from the economy or rather from the state of the economy of the individual countries and of the West as a whole. And it is not sufficient in the present situation – and in our view it is not right either – to state the question exclusively in terms of increasing funds for military expenditure.

Is it possible to ignore the extremely harmful effects of the rising dollar for the countries of Europe? Is this or is it not an external inflationary pressure which is damaging the individual economies? Why not argue for genuine economic solidarity and co-ordination between the United States and the countries of Europe instead of insisting on the need for further sacrifices by Europeans, as if what is happening in the monetary and economic fields were not already a heavy sacrifice imposed by external policies within the western camp itself?

It is obvious that such an analysis, which is more objective because it is more complete, reinforces the urgent need to resume negotiations because it is certain that otherwise the danger of war will increase. Above all this seems to us, and not to us alone, if we all “want peace” as General Rogers said this morning, the most likely way of achieving the consensus, which the Rapporteur himself says must be reached between peoples, as the basis for a more trusting and co-operative relationship between countries, opening the way to implementation of the recommendations to governments and, therefore, to establishment of the political conditions for starting and successfully concluding the negotiations, which will free mankind from the danger of destruction and extermination.

Considerable importance should be attached to the statement made by General Rogers, also this morning, to the effect that the technical lead is increasing continuously in all armament sectors so that, while our security systems are being strengthened, the response is already inadequate and out of date. We also noted that the situation can however be handled. It was not very clear to me how it is possible to speak of an “agonising irony” in connection with the need to increase armaments; however, the emphasis on armaments control as a vital necessity and the positive view on the need, which we support, for the resumption of negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union are to be welcomed.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have tried to make a number of points explaining our vote and at the same time to provide the Assembly, the political parties and every representative with further food for thought on the questions now before us.

Mr. Antoni (continued)

We are convinced that in the interests of the West and of the whole planet each one of us should do his utmost, in accordance with his own views, but for a common purpose, to ensure that the peoples can live in freedom and in peace. We are fully prepared to play our part in any action of this kind of such importance for mankind.

And finally, this is the more general significance of our vote in favour of the recommendation proper, by which we also wish to express our appreciation to Mr. Mommersteeg for his report, and to declare our commitment both here and at national level to working for a fair nuclear balance overall, at a much lower level, and to ensuring that the disarmament conference be held as soon as possible in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The report submitted by our colleague Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments appears to me to be both encouraging and ambitious. It is encouraging because it is part of a move to resist the false attractions of the neutralism which, in varying degrees, affects the member states of WEU and his own country in particular. It is ambitious to the extent that it attempts to outline a possible joint armaments control strategy for the Atlantic Alliance.

The essential merit of Mr. Mommersteeg's report is that it clearly underscores the grave imbalance of the military situation in Europe and that it reaches the logical conclusion that the allied potential must be strengthened.

The usual objection to such strengthening has been that the conventional and nuclear imbalance is nothing new in the European theatre, that it has always existed and that for a long time it was not perceived as an intolerable danger since President Kennedy himself dismantled the Jupiter and Thor protection systems which, until the early 1960s, threatened the Soviet Union from the United Kingdom, Italy and Turkey.

The critics of a modernisation of the European nuclear arsenal appear to have overlooked something of major significance, namely that the protection of Europe by America's central system is neither as credible nor as assured as it was before the Russians acquired the ability to unleash a large-scale nuclear attack against the United States of America itself.

It is precisely the Soviet-American strategic balance of forces, achieved in the latter half of

the 1960s and legally sanctioned by the SALT agreements, that today gives reality to the notion of a military balance in Europe.

Since the two superpowers cannot destroy each other, they will be compelled, in the event of an armed confrontation, to test their forces in the theatre of war with the biggest political, economic and strategic stakes, namely Europe.

Actually it is the fact that it can be employed in an offensive rôle on a theatre of operations that makes the notorious SS-20 a very frightening weapon. For is it not a weapon intended to wage war rather than to prevent it by dissuasion? All its characteristics suggest that this is so – its accuracy, its mobility, the number of its warheads and the ability to reload the weapon to suit operational needs.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this: First, the need to restore the coupling of the central strategic systems of the United States of America with the theatre weapons stationed in Europe, so that the notion of a European imbalance of forces will lose its significance and the Russians can be certain that, in the event of an attack against Europe, there would be massive nuclear retaliation by the Alliance. Second, that Europe should again have the means of determining the conditions of its own defence so that the United States of America does not become resigned to the idea of a war limited to the European theatre.

France's allies regard the NATO decision of December 1979 as a factor coupling the central systems and theatre weapons. France has spelt out its position on this matter very clearly – and this over and above any possible changes in the political majority at home. It feels, and still appears to feel, that the best pledge of such a coupling is the independence of European deterrent forces. At the same time, though it could not itself be a party to any such arrangement in view of its own independent nuclear force, it is pleased to note that the need to preserve such a capability is more clearly perceived by the principal European states.

Mr. Mommersteeg deserves the support of all who are aware of the new threats hanging over Europe when he asks the European nations to adopt a common stand in the matter of security and when he reaffirms his approval of the decision to modernise the NATO theatre nuclear forces.

It is not by referring to a SALT agreement which has become more of a historic memory than a future incentive that the Europeans will acquire new credibility in the eyes of the American Administration. The latter has now realised the dangers inherent in any treaty concluded for strictly political reasons without

Mr. Baumel (continued)

sufficient attention being paid to the technical problems of the military balance of forces.

It would be imprudent, to say the least, to abandon the positions worked out jointly for the defence of Europe.

A final comment is called for concerning Mr. Mommersteeg's report. The Rapporteur appears to believe that to negotiate is an activity sufficient in itself and that there is no need to have misgivings about either the efficacy of the enterprise or the linkage with international relations. Yet it is clear that the major cause of the stagnating disarmament effort in Europe stems not just from the purely military phenomenon, namely the considerable build-up of the Soviet potential, but also from the deterioration in East/West relations as a result of the latest international tensions, due mainly to the invasion of Afghanistan.

Consequently the problem of an arms build-up in Europe must be viewed in a wider context. So long as the conditions for a return to mutual trust do not exist, in other words so long as the Soviet Union does not demonstrate in concrete fashion that it is prepared to change its present pattern of behaviour, it will be useless to hope that disarmament negotiations will produce satisfactory results.

Only by demonstrating cohesion among Europeans and within the Atlantic Alliance, by guarding against all feelings of abandonment, resignation or neutralism, and by agreeing to the necessary defence effort can one hope to influence Soviet behaviour. What will lead the Soviet leaders to modify their attitude is the balance of forces, not speeches on disarmament which they regard as nothing but an ideological myth.

Therefore we must not believe in according priority to arms reductions talks. This is an argument for the weak and for those seeking a pretext to do nothing. It is an attitude of resignation and accommodation.

Rather than make any agreement by the United States conditional on a resumption of negotiations, Europeans should adopt an entirely opposite stand and make any negotiations by the United States conditional on the installation of a credible system of nuclear theatre weapons capable of restoring a balance of forces.

To assert, as I have heard it said, that a resumption of negotiations is necessary to avoid a risk of war is a grave failure to understand the situation, and this for two reasons: first, because the danger of war already exists, with or without a resumption of negotiations; and secondly, because if negotiations did take place,

no matter under what circumstances, the risk of war would be greater still because they would sanction the current imbalance of forces.

Having made these points and subject to these reservations, therefore, I would be happy to adopt the report by our colleague Mr. Mommersteeg.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

I call Mr. van Hulst.

Mr. van HULST (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Mommersteeg report we are now discussing is highly topical. The subject with which it deals is being discussed not only in our national parliaments but also in all kinds of social bodies, action groups and above all the churches.

Topical reports have the defects of their virtues. Their defect is that they inevitably fail to cover the most recent developments. This is particularly true of the WEU reports on Turkey and Poland and the talks on long-range theatre nuclear force reductions. To be right up to date on the Mommersteeg report one really needs a radio beside one to pick up the latest news while one is speaking. For example, last week's meeting between the Swedish politician Mr. Palme and Mr. Brezhnev is naturally not in the report. I will refer to this in a moment.

I should like to express my great appreciation to Mr. Mommersteeg for the document he has presented to this Assembly on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. What I like about this document is its objectivity and balance. Its objectivity is evident from the wide range of quotations, from President Reagan, Mr. William Dyess, Mr. Genscher, Chancellor Schmidt, Mr. Brezhnev, General Petrov, President Mitterrand and so on. Strange bedfellows indeed!

The report is certainly full of quotations, but none the worse for that. The various statements quoted represent valuable documentation which we can use in our national parliaments. Its balance is evident from the fact that it discusses three kinds of dialogue: the dialogue among the Western European countries, the dialogue between Western Europe and the United States of America and the dialogue between the whole of the West, united in NATO, and the Warsaw Pact.

The Mommersteeg report expresses a concern which I fully share. Talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union have been indefinitely postponed. Virtually nothing has happened since December 1979. As parliamentarians we must not accept this, and our view is reflected in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation.

Mr. van Hulst (continued)

I must now give you my own humble opinion on the attitude of both the United States Government and the Kremlin leaders, beginning with what Mr. Brezhnev said to Mr. Palme last week. I have not yet seen the complete text of Mr. Brezhnev's statement, but I have read the same words in various European newspapers: "The West is not seriously interested in talks on disarmament." If Mr. Brezhnev were right, the Mommersteeg report would be a hypocritical document. But Mr. Brezhnev is not right.

We members of WEU are in fact thoroughly interested, certainly in arms limitation, and we would like to begin negotiations on this today rather than tomorrow.

I should like to make four brief comments on the report. Firstly, every American President, Democrat or Republican, has needed some time after his election to transform the statements made before his election so that they rise above party politics and become more objective. I feel that the statements made by President Reagan, Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Haig a few days after the presidential election still smacked of the slogans used before the election. Opinions in the White House have mellowed considerably by now and give me hope that there is a readiness for frank talks with the Kremlin.

Secondly, as representatives of the people we have to know not only what our governments want but also what our own people are thinking, and as a rule we do know. The Dutch people want everything possible done – even if it is only clutching at a straw – on behalf of negotiations on long-range nuclear weapons. Just such a straw now exists. Although SALT II has not been ratified by the United States of America, Mr. Brezhnev has said he is willing to continue the dialogue, and we should take full advantage of this opportunity.

Thirdly, the Soviet mentality is such that the Soviets expect to negotiate on a basis of equality, strength for strength. Let me give you a simple example. It would be ridiculous for an amateur lightweight boxer to discuss the possibility of a fight with Muhammad Ali. The Soviet Union quite simply expects to conduct a dialogue with a strong West. Otherwise, instead of being of interest to them the dialogue becomes pointless and ridiculous.

The Mommersteeg report rightly assumes that negotiations will serve a useful purpose only if the West is strong – not, I would add, if the West is stronger. I am deliberately refraining from using a comparative.

Fourthly, a report that places the accent firmly on negotiations is of great importance, parti-

cularly for WEU. WEU has the only treaty under which the contracting parties are required automatically to afford each other assistance should one of our countries be attacked in Europe. Not even the North Atlantic Treaty goes this far: it does not provide for automatic assistance.

Mr. President, I hope this will help to persuade this Assembly to adopt the recommendations. Needless to say, I fully endorse the recommendations contained in the Mommersteeg report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van Hulst.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I believe that if we look at the arms race on the one hand and efforts to control it on the other, we can but conclude that the efforts to exert a modest control over the arms race by means of talks on arms control have increasingly failed, even to the extent that the talks themselves have come to a complete standstill. Take, for example, the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, which have become completely bogged down. Personally I feel that the West has a great deal to answer for here. The SALT II agreement has not been ratified. No real progress has been made in Madrid on the military issues. Nor have talks begun yet on the control of TNF weapons. A few years ago there was still some hope of negotiations on control of the arms race. Today there is no room for hope. All the talks have come to a standstill.

If I understand the Mommersteeg report correctly, it says that a number of arms control forums face the political challenge in the years to come of trying to achieve a breakthrough. Mr. Mommersteeg is quite right. I feel we should endorse his description of the political challenge in the draft recommendation proper.

As regards the specific question of the modernisation of LRTNF, I have said before in this Assembly that I do not think this modernisation should take place, and I have explained why. Above all, I do not consider it is necessary from a military point of view. There are alternatives, and we have the time. However, the Assembly chose not to agree with me on this. I would therefore point out – again General Rogers will bear me out – that it is becoming increasingly fashionable to compare numbers of different types of weapon. We find this in the case of the Eurostrategic balance, too. Particularly where nuclear weapons are concerned, it is extremely dangerous to talk only in terms of equal numbers, rather than

Mr. van den Bergh (continued)

guarantees of sufficient nuclear capacity to act as a deterrent.

Being one of those who consider the nuclear deterrent indispensable at present, I want to say that I think it is dangerous to compare numbers. Plenty of alternatives are available as regards the overall nuclear and conventional balance between East and West. This was one reason why I advocated at the time that NATO should offer a moratorium. NATO rejected the idea. Since then the Soviet Union has made various proposals which were undoubtedly open to criticism. I do not think that NATO has reacted creatively enough to East European efforts to achieve arms control. NATO should respond to these proposals, which are often unsatisfactory, with its own counter-proposals, and it is regrettable that it does not do so.

I have not a good word to say for present developments in nuclear weaponry in the Soviet Union. The SS-20 does in fact represent an additional threat, but not so serious a threat in the short term that we cannot find an answer to it. Here again, the reaction to proposals such as those recently made by the Soviet leader was unsatisfactory. The Dutch socialists have seen this as a reason for maintaining that there are still political opportunities for negotiations between East and West on the limitation of nuclear weapons without setting about the complete modernisation of the nuclear arsenal. In my opinion, a substantial part of these negotiations should be devoted to studying the feasibility of the nil option on both sides. I should like to hear the Rapporteur's views on this.

I feel, Mr. President, that the European member states of NATO have an important rôle to play in the political situation that has emerged in the last year. What is the situation in NATO? On the one hand, we have an American President intent on what I consider to be an excessive build-up of conventional and nuclear armaments, and on the other hand we have a number of European member states, led by the Federal German Chancellor, who are doing their utmost to get the negotiations on arms controls resumed. I think Mr. Mommersteeg's recommendation to begin with negotiations on conventional, TNF and short-range weapons and to respect and if possible ratify the SALT II agreement represents emphatic political support for those European governments which have chosen this course. Mr. Mommersteeg's report is to be commended for this.

As far as the Dutch socialists are concerned, a decision on the report is not so simple. Specifically, paragraph (iv) of the preamble reflects

a sentiment we cannot share, for a number of reasons. You will appreciate why. To be perfectly frank and honest, we are trying to make up our minds whether to say that we endorse the political thrust of the draft recommendation proper, but feel that paragraph (iv) of the preamble must be deleted, or whether, on the other hand, paragraph (iv) is not in fact the determining factor in the position we adopt. It is a difficult decision. I have not yet been able to arrive at a decision with my socialist colleagues. We approve many aspects of the Mommersteeg report. The position we finally adopt will depend on Mr. Mommersteeg's reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van den Bergh.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Mommersteeg report is a very worthwhile document which gives us an extremely topical opportunity to debate a vital matter.

This morning, the Assembly had the advantage of hearing an address from the most senior military figure in Western Europe. It was a most interesting address which provided grounds commanding our thought. General Rogers spoke of the agonising irony of preparations to prosecute war in order to deter it, and I appreciated, as I think we all did, that the word "agonising" was entirely justified, not least because of the enormous cost involved in that preparation requiring, as it does, such an enormous share of our wealth and resources.

I do not rule out the incurring of these enormous costs. They may be necessary. It may be that the intensive efforts about which General Rogers spoke will be required. However, we need to be quite clear that it is a last resort. We need to have an assurance that the increasing of our defence capacity is not something for which we can provide alternatives.

One reason for that is, of course, that our intensive efforts could be matched by further intensive efforts in the East and in the end this may bring our collective resolve – to quote General Rogers again – into greater doubt than there may be today. That collective resolve may be necessary but, given the social costs involved and given the terrific capacity of the weaponry which we will acquire and already possess, we are entitled to pursue alternatives which would allow us more fully to stimulate our prosperity and more readily to serve the case and the cause for the abolition of international want.

I suggest, therefore, that we need to be assured that the resolve for which General Rogers called is wholly justified. It cannot be

Mr. Hardy (continued)

justified if the alternative of peace and reduced tension can be achieved. I believe, therefore, that we need to demonstrate clearly and incontrovertibly that the West has made clear, vigorous, determined and entirely genuine efforts to promote peace. I have suggested some amendments which seek to press that particular case further.

Two weeks ago, following expressions of difference between those in my area who are unilateralists and myself as a multilateralist, I attended a public meeting in my area organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. It was a most interesting and largely civilised meeting and I must confess that I was in a minority. There were many good people there for whom I have a good deal of respect. They represent the pacifist tradition who could be seen, if one liked, as those on the side of saintliness, those who reject violence. There were others present who may not exactly share my own political commitments and attachments. Some of them feel that Western European countries should unilaterally disarm, should abandon weaponry and leave NATO; and some were even very willing to ignore the reality of the Warsaw Pact's military strength. But, whatever the source of the membership of that organisation and disarmament groups throughout Western Europe, they are entirely justified in demanding that, if increased defence expenditure is a last resort, before being committed to it and before committing themselves to the positive resolve for which General Rogers called and which may be necessary, the West should be prepared to make enormous efforts to avoid it.

In Appendix II I noticed a reference to the speech which Mr. Brezhnev made on 23rd February this year in which he offered to stop manufacturing and to reduce the stockpiling of weapons, in which he offered to extend the zones of confidence, in which he offered to break the chains of the nuclear race. It may be that we feel that Mr. Brezhnev is more prepared to promise in speeches than he is prepared to deliver in actual negotiation but we need to demonstrate to the people of Western Europe that, if there is a fault in this field, that fault lies not in ourselves. Therefore, I have tabled amendments so that the West can demonstrate its good faith, so that the West can demonstrate that it is willing to pursue alternatives.

I believe it is necessary for us to adopt such a posture because there is a great deal of cynicism about multilateralists like myself. There are those who feel that the multilateralist has adopted an easy way out. There are those who

feel that the multilateralist has surrendered to the pressure of the armaments industry and the defence lobby. If we are to defeat cynicism and if we are to demonstrate that we are seriously concerned to promote peace, we need to demonstrate it and demonstrate it with a genuine vigour. For this reason, with the approval of the Socialist Group, I have tabled a number of very simple amendments.

It may be that the sophisticated politicians among us will accuse me of being too simplistic in my approach. Unfortunately, there are many millions of people who are not interested in the refinements of political science and are not particularly well informed about the nature of the nuclear horrors that we all possess. They may be too attached to simple words and far too easily prepared to accept simple slogans. In this battle for the hearts and minds of our people we need not be too ashamed to be simplistic. We ought not to be too ready to surrender ourselves to the complexity of defence language and political terminology and therefore I do not apologise for the simplistic nature of those amendments.

If we are to accept General Rogers' thesis, if we are to believe that in the end the collective resolve will require the devotion of our resources, in our democracies we have to carry our people with us – and a bare majority would not suffice. We have to have the hearts and minds of the West determined to join in the collective effort. In the hope that that effort would not be required, we need to demonstrate our will and our desire for peace. It is for those reasons that I have tabled the amendments which I hope Mr. Mommersteeg and his colleagues will be prepared to accept.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by saying how happy I am, as a newcomer to this august and venerable Assembly, to have this opportunity of speaking to a subject as important as the Mommersteeg report. We face many problems in the world at this time: hunger in many areas, universal unemployment, the underdevelopment of various countries and military tension and an excessive arms build-up in various parts of the world. This arms build-up in itself represents a threat of future conflicts. The tension between East and West is certainly not the least significant factor in this context. In fact, it dominates relations between important nations of this world in many ways. We in WEU – as members of the community in Europe – therefore have no alternative but to adopt a strong and resolute position as regards the

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

necessary levels of armaments on both sides. We must adopt a strong and firm attitude towards the threat which devolves from this. WEU has already expressed its appreciation and endorsement of the twofold decision of 12th December 1979 in Recommendation 360, and this is reiterated in the strongest terms by the Mommersteeg report. It is important to insist explicitly yet again that the West wants a dialogue with the East, that the West wants to negotiate with the East on armaments, on the appalling overkill capability which has been gradually built up on both sides, that the West wants to encourage arms control and disarmament and to provide an impetus which will impart greater momentum to this whole issue. An important aspect of the twofold decision is that, if LRTNF arms control could be achieved in this way – meaning for the West that positive results could be achieved by possible talks – the second part of the twofold decision would need to be implemented only in part, or not at all. This is our goal and it has been graphically expressed in the Mommersteeg report.

To conclude, I should like to comment on the amendments, and on Amendment 5 in particular. I consider this to be a destructive amendment. Its adoption would undermine the whole of the Mommersteeg report and Recommendation 360, adopted at the last part-session. We shall oppose this vigorously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome this report of Mr. Mommersteeg. I certainly believe that we in the West should keep open the possibility of negotiation with the Soviet Union while NATO sets about the business of modernising its own theatre nuclear missiles, but, as Mr. Blaauw has pointed out, the Soviet Union has already modernised its own comparable weapons and the urgent need for NATO, as Mr. Baumel argued, is not to negotiate but to modernise. To leave things as they are, in the words of the North Atlantic Council communiqué of last May, would be to freeze NATO forces into inferiority and would be wholly unacceptable.

It takes two to negotiate, however, and I question whether the Soviet Union has a serious interest in negotiating theatre nuclear force reductions at the present time for the simple reason that we in the West, we in Europe, have yet to prove that we are actually willing to install land-based cruise missiles and the Pershing II in Europe itself. For as long as there is

still a possibility that European governments may be too weak or too irresolute to do so, the less incentive the Soviet Union has to enter into any such negotiations, for the Soviet Union is relying on western public opinion, under the influence of those who push for a policy of disarmament, to press western governments into ever weaker responses to the *fait accompli* of Soviet military policy.

For so long as the prospect of its continuing holds out, the Soviet Union will never make any concessions.

I think that General Rogers was right this morning when he drew attention to wishful thinking, based on the fear of hardship and other disagreeable possible consequences, as being the explanation for the pressures brought to bear within our societies against rearmament. This is exactly as it was in the 1930s. To counter these pressures there is no alternative to more information, more widely diffused, more vivid in character, to disclose the threat which faces us from the East.

I hope, therefore, most strongly that the release of previously classified material by the Pentagon, to which General Rogers referred this morning as being under consideration – and presumably this information includes photographic material if it is to have strong public impact today – will take place soon. This at least should make it easier to rebut those who misleadingly argue that NATO has quite enough weaponry already and that SACEUR is simply trying, as usual, to scare us, and therefore why not let us start the process of disarming on our own, for the Soviets will be sure to follow this gesture of good will with similar measures – a process of thought rightly described by General Rogers as naïve.

I was pleased that General Rogers, in reply to a question, reminded us that one of the reasons for stationing cruise missiles on land in Europe was to give expression to the solidarity of the Alliance. It would have a deplorable effect on the Alliance were Europe to refuse to station missiles on its soil, yet accepted that it should station American troops. In this context, I should like to take up a point to which Mr. Mommersteeg referred.

I think that European democratic politicians should take very good care these days not to refer to both superpowers in the same breath as though they were indistinguishable in character and behaviour and in their relationship to ourselves. The fact is that to one of them we owe the survival of our freedoms; by the other those freedoms are potentially threatened. It is lamentable to talk in such a way, and I can conceive of nothing more harmful to the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

Lord Reay (continued)

I support Mr. Mommersteeg's recommendation although, I think, without the proposed amendments of Mr. Hardy and Mr. Stoffelen, which show traces of wishful thinking; and, as I have attempted to argue, it is precisely wishful thinking which it should be our duty to eradicate rather than encourage.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Reay. Mr. Scholten is the last speaker.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as a member of the Dutch Christian Democratic Party, I should like to express my very sincere appreciation of the report by my fellow Christian Democrat Mr. Mommersteeg. The *Christen-Democratisch Appèl* (CDA) has had a lively debate on the absolute necessity to reduce the number of weapons by the process of arms control. The nuclear arms race in particular is a source of grave concern to us Christian Democrats.

The world and mankind are threatened by man himself. This gloomy fact calls for a creative effort to break through the vicious circle of the arms race. I feel that so far neither side – neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO – has put forward enough promising proposals.

The Mommersteeg report has the merit of calling in the recommendation proper for five practical initiatives, the first relating to LRTNF weapons. The second applies to the strategic arms area, the central systems. Mr. Mommersteeg also appeals for continued respect of the SALT I and II limits. I consider this particularly important. The fourth recommendation concerns battlefield nuclear weapons, known as short-range weapons. He also feels that the disarmament negotiations should extend to conventional weapons. That too is important. The fifth recommendation refers to the need for overall nuclear balance. This is very important, since it may prevent us from paying too much attention to nuclear balance in individual areas, such as Europe.

I share Mr. van den Bergh's view that the proposals formulated by Mr. Mommersteeg as Rapporteur represent a major political challenge for the West and for the world. His recommendation should therefore be supported.

If the Assembly adopts the Rapporteur's recommendation, it will be emphasising that we for our part are willing to negotiate. We attach the greatest possible importance to negotiations. After all, this is a question of arms control processes designed to reduce the rôle of nuclear weapons in particular.

To counter the vicious spiral of the arms race, we need a system geared to preventing war, at the lowest possible level of armaments. A similar idea has been advanced by Federal Chancellor Schmidt.

We are now in Paris. I expect President Mitterrand's Government to move towards new prospects in Europe, in the field of human rights and the North-South relationship, for instance. The Mitterrand Government has referred to the Soviet SS-20 as a destabilising factor in international relations. It has also emphasised the need for a new policy on the part of the Soviet Union. My colleagues and I agree with the Mitterrand Government on this. The Soviet attitude is a danger which we must on no account overlook.

In December 1979 NATO took what is known as the twofold decision. This is also referred to in paragraph (iv) of the preamble to Mr. Mommersteeg's draft recommendation. So far the Netherlands has not agreed to have LRTNF weapons based on its territory. The CDA, my party, also disclaims any responsibility for the decision to produce such weapons. This is part of our election programme. I would point out that my party gained the most seats in the elections in the Netherlands on 26th May of this year. Bearing in mind its election programme, my party does not consider the Brussels decisions on production to be the most balanced reaction to the present Soviet threat.

Against this background and in view of my personal objections, Mr. Mommersteeg will appreciate that I cannot agree to paragraph (iv) of the preamble.

I attach great importance to the process of arms control. This is the most important aspect of the recommendation before us. The process is under way, but it is taking too long, and from the United States we hear far from encouraging noises, by which I mean the statements by Mr. Haig's director of military policy. He is now one of the chief American negotiators on nuclear arms control. He is rather reticent in his attitude. I agree with what my colleague Professor van Hulst said about this. The West should consider every opportunity for détente and arms control to see how realistic it is. In the same context, I should like to hear what the Rapporteur thinks about a remark by Georgiy Arbatov, the leading expert of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, on the situation in the West and relations with the United States of America. He said in Moscow last Sunday that the United States might continue its research on and production of LRTNF weapons while negotiating with the Soviet Union on these weapons. The Soviet Union would be pre-

Mr. Scholten (continued)

pared to discontinue the deployment of new missiles until 1983. If I am interpreting this correctly, this may represent an important variation in the Soviet offer regarding the moratorium. I should like to hear what the Rapporteur thinks about this.

I repeat that I hold Mr. Mommersteeg's work on this report in high regard. I fully endorse the five recommendations he has put forward. What is needed is arms control at production level. Arms control demands good will on both sides, both West and East.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Scholten.

That concludes the list of speakers. Does the Chairman wish to speak? Does Mr. Mommersteeg wish to reply to the debate?

In view of the time, I hope that you will make your remarks brief. We shall take the amendments separately.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – I appreciate, Mr. President, that in view of the time I must be brief. However, on this occasion I shall speak in my mother tongue.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, I am very impressed by what Mr. Bahr has said. I agree with him.

All I wish to say now is that I disagree with Mr. van den Bergh's Amendment 5. Really, we want no more of the twofold decision. This is how I see it: negotiations have been decided on, so this is the starting point for real, constructive negotiations. This is an important point to remember if we want to achieve anything in these negotiations.

Mr. Baumel's opinion and mine on this matter differ. This is of course partly because I represent a non-nuclear country. That also applies to the German, Belgian and Italian members. France has an independent nuclear capability of its own. That is also true to some extent of the United Kingdom, although this is linked with NATO.

I agree with Mr. Baumel that the need for negotiations and for armament should perhaps be viewed in a broader, international context. I am not keen on a broad linkage. There was talk of this last year. I hope that there will be a possibility of concrete agreements which provide a pattern for both sides. The international climate naturally affects negotiations of all kinds.

I now come to the amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall be dealing with the amendments later, and you will have the opportunity to reply, Mr. Mommersteeg. Perhaps you can leave it at that, because we must allow members to move their amendments before you give your views. Will you please conclude your other remarks?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I wish to express my special thanks to all those who have made such a valuable contribution to this debate. I await the result of the vote with confidence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. The Assembly is indebted to you for the work that you have put into this report. It is an extra report for which the Committee asked. That is one of the reasons why our agenda is somewhat overburdened today. I am sure that everyone agrees that it is an extremely important and topical issue, and it is only right that the Assembly should be concerned with it.

We must now proceed to the amendments before the draft recommendation in Document 879 can be taken. Five amendments have been submitted, four in the name of Mr. Hardy and one in the name of Mr. van den Bergh.

The first amendment to be moved is Amendment 5:

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (*iv*).

I call upon Mr. van den Bergh to move it.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am quite willing to reply to the Chairman of our Committee. As I said, I took the position as long as a year and a half ago that the modernisation decision ought not to be adopted and that political means should first be sought in order to curb the production and stationing of the SS-20.

It seems to me a matter of political integrity to make the following point. Since I argued a year and a half ago against adopting the decision to modernise, to accept paragraph (*iv*) of the preamble would imply that we now felt able to assent to the modernisation decision as such. I note of course – but this does not mean that I am expressing my political agreement – that if negotiations take place between East and West part of these negotiations will be about the twofold decision taken by NATO.

I am not prepared to withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. van den Bergh. Is that opposed?

You have already spoken, Mr. Scholten. Does anyone else wish to speak?

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not exactly wish to speak against the amendment. My problem is as follows. I will put it to the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – It would be better if someone who wanted to speak against the amendment were to speak. Does anyone wish to do so?

Since no one does I call on Mr. Scholten.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I do not agree with the Brussels decisions with regard to modernisation. The decisions themselves have become a reality. I agree with Mr. Mommersteeg on that point. We now have to go on working on this basis.

If I vote for Mr. van den Bergh's amendment, it means discarding the whole of the existing situation from the recommendation. That seems to me rather too far removed from reality – a reality which, in itself, I do not welcome. Paragraph (iv) of the preamble implies, if I am not mistaken, a certain amount of enthusiasm for the NATO decision of December 1979. This strikes me as agreement after the event, and that, as far as I am concerned, is definitely not possible; I cannot associate myself with this decision. I am thus faced with a problem. I am quite prepared to admit the reality of the fact that a decision has been made, but I do not wish to display any enthusiasm for it after the event because I feel none.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Scholten.

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman wish to speak? Perhaps, Mr. Cavaliere, you should have had the opportunity to speak in the general debate. I gathered that you did not wish to do so. We should like your views on the amendment, however.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am speaking on this amendment on behalf of the Committee, or rather as Chairman, because we were unable to put the matter to the Committee itself. We are firmly opposed to the amendment. I would remind Mr. van den Bergh that this matter is now closed, that the Assembly has already discussed it and reached a decision which I must regard as irrevocable because it is in fact the linchpin of NATO policy on the subject. I therefore strongly urge that the amendment be withdrawn; if not, I am sorry Mr. President that I shall be forced to ask for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. – If there is no further debate, I shall put the amendment to the vote.

Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would point out that the Chairman of the

Committee called on Mr. van den Bergh to withdraw his amendment, saying that otherwise he would ask for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. – It is entirely up to Mr. van den Bergh. He has given no indication of a desire to withdraw his amendment. I took it that he did not wish to do so. Is that so, Mr. van den Bergh?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – In asking for paragraph (iv) to be left out, I am standing by the position I initially adopted two years ago. I cannot agree to withdraw my amendment because I do not agree with the modernisation of nuclear weapons and the Brussels decision should be called in question if East-West negotiations are to be resumed.

The PRESIDENT. – You are entitled to press the amendment if you wish, Mr. van den Bergh. I must therefore put the amendment to the vote.

I have had no indication, as is required by the rules, that members wish to have a roll-call vote. For there to be such a vote ten members must give such notice, and therefore the vote on the amendment will be by standing and sitting.

Do I gather that you want to speak again, Mr. Cavaliere? It is most irregular for members to make two or three speeches. It is half past six.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have asked for a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. – Under the new rules, one member cannot ask for a roll-call vote. Ten members must give notice that they wish to have such a vote. There can be a roll-call vote on the main recommendation, but ten members have not given notice that they wish a roll-call vote on the amendment. I must rule that it is not possible to have a roll-call vote on the amendment.

(Several members rose)

Under the rules I need the names of ten members seeking a roll-call vote. If members insist, we can have a roll-call vote, but the numbers will be the same whether we vote by standing and sitting or by a roll-call. Very well, we shall have a roll-call vote. I must have the names of the members seeking it.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Would it help those who wish the amendment to be adopted if we took a vote quickly so that we could demonstrate whether they would win? That would save a lot of time.

The PRESIDENT. – I have no discretion in the matter. I am stretching the rules in allowing a roll-call vote, because those who wish it

The President (continued)

should have submitted their names in writing. If they wish to have a roll-call vote, I do not intend to stand in their way. We have a quorum and so that aspect is not in question. We must therefore proceed.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I am no expert on the rules. As you know, I am not all that worried about them. But if you say that the procedure of having a roll-call vote is against the rules and since it will add ten or fifteen minutes to our sitting today, I cannot help feeling that the rules should be adhered to strictly.

The PRESIDENT. – The rules are not terribly clear. I have to be given notice by ten representatives that they require a roll-call vote. Ten representatives stood in their places, so I suppose that it means that we encounter one of the flexibilities of the rules.

I think that our best course will be to start the roll-call vote with those representatives who stood in their places. It is not a desirable practice, but this is a new rule and was adopted only in December. However, I make it clear that in future I shall require written notice, as the rules provide, before we have a roll-call vote on an amendment. I do not wish to deny anyone the opportunity to vote by a roll-call. However, I cannot see that it means anything, because the votes will be counted whether the vote is by a roll-call or by representatives standing to be counted.

In order not to waste any more time, we shall have a roll-call vote. According to the rules, we shall start with those who were standing in their places originally. We shall take their votes first.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I withdraw my request.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Cavaliere has withdrawn his request for a roll-call vote. However, I do not know whether the other representatives who are still standing withdraw it. I do not know whether they still want a roll-call.

Apparently the request for a roll-call vote has been withdrawn. We shall therefore vote in the normal way on Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. van den Bergh.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

The PRESIDENT. – We turn to the amendments moved by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffelen. They fall into one group, so perhaps Mr. Hardy will group them all together. They are:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “earliest” and insert “urgent”.

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “at” to the end of the paragraph and insert “greatly-reduced levels of nuclear weapons”.

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “at” insert “much”.

4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe.”.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – It would be odious, offensive and hypocritical of me to make a long speech. I share your view, Mr. President, that the four amendments can be seen together.

In my view, we need to offer a clear demonstration of our commitment to peace. We need to recognise that there is a need for the immediate pursuit of whole-hearted and genuine disarmament negotiations. It would be good for the whole of Western Europe to demonstrate that we regard this matter as important and the procedure as desirably urgent.

For those reasons, I beg to move all four amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy, for your brevity and clarity.

Does anyone wish to speak for or against any of these amendments?

Apparently no one does. Therefore I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am in sympathy with Amendments 1 to 3, but I think the balance is being tipped too far in the direction of verbal refinements. In Amendment 1, for instance, I do not really see the distinction between “earliest” and “urgent”.

(The speaker continued in English)

The expression “earliest” and “urgent”, calling for the earliest resumption, is not clear. However, in my opinion the subject matter is urgent, and I wonder whether it is not provoking too great an expectation for the short term in difficult negotiations to say “greatly-reduced levels of nuclear weapons”. I am not against that, so I shall leave it to the Assembly, because I was to some degree impressed by the speech of Mr. Hardy.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

I come to Amendment 4. If I may use a German word, I find a *Fremdkörper* in the recommendation, which concentrates itself expressly on nuclear weapons. Of course I am for the pursuit of a disarmament conference for Europe. However, we do not have any elaboration of the situation in the report.

I am not against the amendment, but I leave it to the Assembly. I find a *Fremdkörper* – a foreign body – in the context of this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak to these amendments?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to ask Mr. Hardy and the other proposers to consider what I am about to say. Amendment 1 requests that the word “earliest” be replaced by “urgent”. I would observe that “urgent” has no meaning because it refers to a whole series of situations for which responsibility lies not with the United States alone but also with the parties. I think, therefore, that the term used in the recommendation is the most meaningful and suitable. Otherwise if we say “urgent” we shall be saying nothing.

As regards Amendments 2 and 3, I would observe that the words “greatly-reduced levels” are much more general and equally can have no meaning, in particular because the negotiations involve not only one party, the United States, but also the Soviet Union. The same applies to Amendment 2. I would like to propose an amendment to the amendment: instead of “greatly-reduced” I should like to have “the lowest possible” – that is “at the lowest possible levels” – to show that these negotiations involve both parties and that the aim must therefore be to achieve the best possible results, and for us these are the lowest possible levels.

As regards Amendment 4, I agree with Mr. Mommersteeg's comments.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

I do not know whether Mr. Hardy is willing to accept the Chairman's proposal for an amendment to his Amendment 2.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am extremely grateful but I do not think that the suggested change to the amendment would help at all because recommendation 2 reads “with a view to securing... lower levels”. All we are saying is “with a view to secu-

ring greatly-reduced levels”. The same can be said of Amendment 4 where Mr. Mommersteeg suggests there is a foreign body. I would draw his attention to Appendix II in the report where the same matter is included; so it is not entirely irrelevant to have a recommendation which refers to part of the content of the report.

I do not see that any of the suggestions that have been made so far improves the amendment in any way whatever and I do not believe they change the meaning. The word “earliest” is far less emphatic than “urgent” and I believe the appropriate emphasis is desirable.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. It is clear that the movers of the amendment are unable to come to terms with the proposals of the Chairman and the Rapporteur, so we have to put these amendments to the vote.

The first is Amendment 1:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “earliest” and insert “urgent”.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on Amendment 2:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “at” to the end of the paragraph and insert “greatly-reduced levels of nuclear weapons”.

(*Mr. Cavaliere rose to speak*)

We cannot have a point of order in the middle of a vote. We must conclude the vote and then I will listen to the Chairman of the Committee.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

I am sorry, Mr. Cavaliere, but it is contrary to normal practice to have a point of order in the middle of a vote. If you now wish to speak, I shall be very happy to listen.

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak? No. I am sorry, but we cannot have a debate in the middle of a vote.

Next, Amendment 3:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “at” insert “much”.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

Next, Amendment 4:

4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ 6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe. ”.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Each of the four amendments moved by Mr. Hardy is carried.

I now have to put the text as amended by Mr. Hardy's four amendments.

If there is no objection or abstention, we need not have a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation?

Mr. Stoffelen, do you object? Are you asking for a roll-call vote? If there is an objection, there must be a roll-call vote under the rules.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I, too, have to obey the rules. Personally, I do not want a roll-call vote, but I certainly intend to vote against the amended text.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case I have no alternative. We must have a roll-call. It will be a roll-call vote on the draft recommendation, as amended, in Document 879.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Maravalle.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Are there any other Representatives or Substitutes for them who have not taken part in the vote but wish to do so?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	29
Ayes	24
Noes	2
Abstentions	3

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

1. See page 28.
2. See page 30.

5. Draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Vote on the draft revised budget, Doc. 872 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT. – I want the guidance of the Assembly. I hope very much that we shall be able to finish the Orders of the Day and deal with the budget – it need not take very long – because of the inconvenience it causes representatives if we cannot complete the business which we started out to do. Is there any objection to our continuing in order to complete the business concerning the amended budget? There is no objection. Therefore, I ask Mr. Adriaensens to present his amended report on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, at the last part-session of our Assembly we accepted a revised draft budget for 1981, Document 872. We pointed out at that time that we had no assurance at all of its being approved by the WEU Council. Despite the personal intervention of our President, our respective governments could not be persuaded to make larger appropriations available to WEU. We were officially notified of the Council's decision by the Secretary-General of WEU in his letter dated 29th May 1981, which you will find among your documents. This means that the maximum monies available are the same as in 1980, plus 12 % to cover inflation.

At a meeting in The Hague the President again tried to persuade the Council, but Lord Carrington's reply was as follows:

“ They will be pleased to study at the earliest opportunity an Assembly budget for 1981 revised in accordance with the terms of and following the suggestions contained in the letter sent to you by the Secretary-General on 29th May: within this framework the Assembly might be allowed some degree of latitude in the allocation of resources, provided that a maximum increase of 12 % over the 1980 budget is respected. ”

Taking these views into account, the Presidential Committee of WEU once more reviewed the draft budget for 1981; a new, amended version was approved and is now submitted to the Assembly for approval. In view of the lateness of the hour, I do not think it is necessary to read out this document – you have it in your files, and you will find the final result on the last page.

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

The total of the 1981 budget is 10,886,000 francs, or 1,164,523 francs more than in 1980, representing an increase of 12 %. I ask the meeting to accept the amendments to the already approved budget for 1981.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – First, I want to say that I speak on behalf of my group.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – My first comment refers to the original budget. I considered this budget well-founded and justified, because, for instance, we welcomed the possibility of replacing the Clerk in the case of illness or absence. This is a perfectly reasonable demand. We wanted each Committee to have its own clerk. We wanted better information services because of the confused state of public opinion – people regularly mix up all the European institutions – and to enable the political groups here to operate in such a way that this Assembly bears some genuine resemblance to a parliament.

My second comment is that the Council's very unsympathetic reaction is understandable. We know that in every country the financial and socio-economic situation is extremely worrying and that economy campaigns are being conducted in every country. In connection with the formation of the cabinet which is in progress in the Netherlands, cuts of many billions of guilders are being discussed. In every country, everyone – except for the lowest-paid – is expected to lose ground in earnings, to make sacrifices. Against this background there is no reason to make a fuss about the now twice-revised budget which has the approval of the President of the Assembly and of the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. It has our approval.

My third comment concerns a point which is seemingly only indirectly connected with the subject of the budget. The subject is "top salaries in European institutions". We are fully aware that this relates to a European arrangement, to the co-ordination of the salary structures of the Council of Europe, for instance, and WEU with those of other European institutions; salaries in the European Communities are in fact at an even higher level. We could say that the subject is therefore not open to discussion here. The same could be said if it were to be discussed in the Council of Europe

or the European Parliament, which would mean that it could not be debated in any parliament at all. The financial situation is exceedingly worrying in every country. In every country there is talk of economies, moderation and retrenchment. In the Netherlands there is a willingness to accept retrenchment, but on condition that everyone – except the lowest-paid – participates in the retrenchment operation and that those with higher incomes make the greatest sacrifices. The trend is thus towards a levelling of incomes. It would be improper of me to advocate fixing a maximum income in my country and to say nothing about it here.

Last week I again argued in the Netherlands in favour of a maximum level for all top civil service and political salaries. For the sake of comparison I have converted the figure: the top salary in question is 271,000 francs. Looking at the budget I see that the Clerk earns a salary of 354,000 francs plus 21,000 francs in allowances, making a total of 375,000 francs. The Senior Counsellor, in Grade A6, earns 314,500 francs plus allowances and Counsellors in Grade A5 receive 301,000 francs. I understand that these salaries are tax-free. That in fact means that all the officials just mentioned earn considerably more than any of the top civil servants or politicians in my country and that all these officials, if they wanted to become Prime Minister of the Netherlands, would have to accept a sharp drop in income. This makes it quite clear that in a situation where the lowest-paid, who can hardly make ends meet, have to make sacrifices, it is absolutely essential to address ourselves to the subject of the high top salaries in Europe.

I therefore ask you, Mr. President, via the Assembly and the Council and in consultation with the other European institutions, to ensure that discussion does at last take place with a view to restoring a more realistic situation as regards the salaries of top European officials for the sake of more equitable relative income levels in all our countries.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the amendments to the Assembly budget for 1981 are really of little account in relation to the overall budget now submitted to us for approval with those amendments.

The available funds are in fact little more than half a per cent less than the initial estimates of expenditure for staff, reduced, and general administrative costs, slightly increased.

Mr. Martino (continued)

What is again perplexing is that the Council continues to hold the view that Assembly expenditure on some items is excessive, will not agree to any increase in real expenditure and, in a very artificial manner, takes account of inflation in one country only, France, with a highly contestable forecast.

The consequence is that the available funds are inevitably almost wholly devoted to expenditure for staff which is clearly becoming incompressible, with the consequence that the cuts are applied to expenditure on the activities of the Assembly and its Committees.

It must be recognised that this seriously limits the Assembly's activities thus giving the impression that, despite what is affirmed, its function as the only European parliamentary assembly with defence responsibilities is not in fact recognised.

Everyone is aware of the discussions and arguments in which we ourselves took part regarding the functions of our Assembly, following the election of the European Parliament by the member countries of the Community.

We now reaffirm the very clear attitude we adopted at that time.

We believe therefore that it is for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly to discuss and propose changes in the current procedures for the preparation of the budget as the existing procedure does not leave sufficient margin for independent decisions by the Assembly.

Clearly, this again involves a political option and the political will of member countries and governments but it is also true that it is for us to say that we are not satisfied with this state of affairs and to put forward reasonable alternative solutions which will better safeguard the work of the political groups and the Committees.

Comparison with the expenditure of other European organisations, including those linked with WEU, argues strongly for a reform of the kind we are suggesting. Such a reform does not of course dispute the right of the Council to suggest possible economies and increasingly careful and strict control over all use of funds; there is certainly no objection on our part to resolving the question of the Office of the Clerk at much lower cost, as appears possible to the Council, without specific reasons being given however.

We also regret that the original proposals for funds for information and for the political groups have not yet been met. There remains however the wider question of a new procedure and the political approval of a real function

which is both unrecognised and lacks financial support.

In our view all the most recent developments on armaments questions and on the armaments policy of the WEU countries mean that they must be subject to the control and initiative of elected representatives. For that reason we have once again expressed, during discussion of the budget, the ideas which we feel should govern its preparation and therefore its allocation in order to avoid the imposition of damaging conditions and excessive restrictions, and to ensure that our Assembly can pursue its political activities to better effect. These critical comments will not prevent us from voting in favour. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Martino.

I call Mr. Mulley.

Mr. MULLEY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am extremely grateful to you – at some personal inconvenience to yourself – for presiding over this part of our discussions. I understand that the precedents are that, if the President of the Assembly wishes to speak on budgetary matters, he does so from his seat as a representative. Uniquely in these affairs, the President is charged by our rules – I think Rule 48 – to be personally responsible for the expenditure of the Assembly. Of course, it is the Bureau and the Presidential Committee, over which I have the honour to preside, which have made the recommendations that are now before you.

To avoid misunderstanding, I should say that it has been the custom and, indeed, the rule since the beginnings of our Assembly that the Council must approve our budget. Not only that, but there must be a rather unnecessarily detailed examination and approval of even the minute sums amounting to a few thousand francs. They have required the specific approval of the very senior members of the permanent Council and, indeed, of the Council of Ministers itself.

As members know, for reasons with which we may not agree but appreciate, there was widespread agreement among all members of the Council that they would not agree to the proposed increase in the budget for the current year. As a Bureau, we are obliged to examine the staffing of the Assembly following our decision in December to appoint a full-time Clerk. The arrangements that we have made are satisfactory and provide a clear line of communication and responsibility for persons to act in his absence.

In addition, my hope was that we could appoint an extra member of the staff because our small staff of twenty-seven is under heavy pressure if there happens to be illness or any

Mr. Mulley (continued)

unforeseen emergency. But in present circumstances, unhappily, that is not possible.

After our informal discussions on these matters with the Council of Ministers at The Hague, and as a result of the exchange of correspondence I had with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, it was made quite clear that it would be unrealistic for the Assembly to ask for any growth in last year's budget, other than the 12 % allowed for inflation. On the other hand, if we are prepared to accept that proposal, I understand that we would have discretion over how we expend those sums. It is possible to make some small improvements in information and sums to the political groups as well as small financial promotions that will help the structure of the Office.

It is realistic, therefore, that we should now go to the Council, accepting the unhappy economic circumstances that prevail in all our countries. We are asking for no growth this year. The Budgetary Committee will be examining the budget for next year, and we may want to return to some of these matters. However, I hope that we can approve the recommendations now before the Assembly and that the Council will be able also rapidly to agree to them so that we may plan for and work through the rest of the year with some certainty.

This is a realistic, practical and reasonable proposal to put before the Assembly. I hope that it will be agreed. I repeat my thanks to my colleagues in the Bureau for the tremendous efforts they have made in dealing with these problems. I also express the debt I owe to Mr. Adriaensens and his colleagues on the Budgetary Committee for the attention that they have given and will continue to give to our budgetary problems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Mulley.

I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think Mr. Stoffelen's intervention is in line with what was said during the first discussion of the budget.

It is indeed regrettable that we do not have greater resources both for information services and for political groups and, possibly, staff. As Mr. Stoffelen has already said, the present situation is such that we cannot obtain increased appropriations for WEU from our seven respective national governments. We felt obliged to consolidate this *Realpolitik* in the form of a revised budget. That means dismissing any wishful thinking and working solely on the income allocated to us.

I think that Mr. Martino's intervention is in the same spirit and that we therefore really must work on the basis of the limited resources now available to us.

The explanation given by the President, Mr. Mulley, also made it clear that, despite his own efforts and those of the Presidential Committee, it was not possible to obtain a higher budget. I think we should be well-advised to approve the revised budget submitted to us today and to bear in mind the various suggestions made both now and previously when we draw up our budget for 1982.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981.

If there are no objections to it, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The draft revised budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 is adopted unanimously.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 17th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 874 and Amendments).
2. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 883 and Amendment).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 17th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Changes in the membership of Committees.
4. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 874 and Amendments*).
Speakers: Mr. Brasseur (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hermann Schmidt, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Brasseur (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Forma, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Lenzer (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Antoni.
5. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 883 and Amendment*).
Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Topmann, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Konings, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Brown, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Topmann.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. – We have information of changes in the membership of Committees. The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the following alterations:

General Affairs Committee: Mrs. Knight as an alternate member in place of Mr. Page. Sir Tom Williams to cease to be an alternate member.

Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Howell as a member in place of Mrs. Knight. Sir Tom Williams to cease to be an alternate member.

Relations with Parliaments: Mr. Page as a member in place of Mr. Howell.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

They are agreed to.

4. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 874 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 874 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. BRASSEUR (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as the

1. See page 33.

Mr. Brasseur (continued)

international crisis worsens, as tensions between nations and power blocs grow, efforts to promote peace are certainly essential. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of several governments, such initiatives have been limited in scope, and the major powers in particular are continuing to expand their offensive and defensive potential.

This is perhaps the logical outcome of a confrontation that serves both the capitalist economy and authoritarianism in the communist world. In such a context it seems to me that the fundamental question for Europe – both East and West – is to decide whether to be part of this confrontation or whether to guarantee its independence and chart its own course towards progress. If the choice is firmly in favour of European independence, then Europe must ensure its own defence and provide itself with the economic and technological means to make this defence fully effective. Consequently I plead here in favour of European armament and, since this is the subject we are dealing with today, for the development of a European combat aircraft.

Most of the member states of Western European Union are now faced with a most important choice to make, namely to develop a single European combat aircraft for the 1990s or to pursue their individual national policies without any real co-ordination.

The United Kingdom, for example, could cooperate with the United States to develop a successor to the Harrier vertical take-off aircraft. Or France could produce a new version of the Mirage 2000 before the introduction of the Mirage 4000. Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany could adopt a modified version of the Tornado or buy a McDonnell-Douglas design.

Obviously, Ladies and Gentlemen, each of these approaches might secure for the individual member state concerned certain immediate if trivial economic advantages. But at the same time this kind of approach would in many cases reduce our aircraft industry to a mere subcontracting industry, ultimately hiving off its design and research and development departments, which would be most detrimental to our mastery of technology.

The idea of designing a European combat aircraft has already been considered several times, and notably by the French, British and German Governments which decided several years ago to undertake economic and technical studies to determine whether or not it was possible to achieve the goal of building a European combat aircraft. The high commands were asked to

identify the requirements and to see whether they could be met by a single type of aircraft.

What results did this produce ?

Certain requirements of the French, British and German air forces are fairly similar and could be met by a single type of aircraft. Such an aircraft would have to be highly manoeuvrable and be capable of flying at supersonic speeds at low altitudes in poor weather conditions. It would also need to have an air-to-air and air-to-ground capability, the ability to destroy aerodromes and tanks and to operate from fairly short strips, and a range of nearly 1,000 kilometres. The three countries concerned should be able to agree on common requirements concerning not only the type of aircraft and its structural characteristics but also its engine and armament. Naturally, some of the avionic components might differ with the type of armament demanded by individual high commands. The aircraft's performance could thus be modified without any big increase in development costs.

In 1978 the French, British and German Defence Ministers decided to undertake a study to identify the aircraft characteristics required by all three countries. They instructed their armaments directors to set up working groups within the three ministries with the object of preparing a joint report on the industrial possibilities of a partnership for the purpose of developing a European combat aircraft.

This report was sent to the three governments in the summer of 1980. The reaction of the ministers to it was highly favourable but they pointed out that the projected costs were probably too high in view of the current budget problems. Nevertheless the three governments invited the high commands to pursue the study, to look into areas of convergence more exhaustively, and to reduce the cost of the aircraft. Difficulties remain however, particularly concerning the type of weapons with which the aircraft should be equipped, as the specifications laid down by the three high commands in this respect still differ somewhat.

A hope of unification is emerging nevertheless. In the report that was circulated, I spell out the advantages of such an undertaking on the European scale, indicating at the same time what difficulties would need to be overcome.

Concerning the industrial aspect, for example, it is clear that as far as the three countries interested in this project are concerned, the European aeronautical industry, after hesitations which some of us have bitterly regretted, now has a very real opportunity to unite for the purpose of building a European combat aircraft. It would be disastrous if Europe were to fail once more to grasp this chance and to fall

Mr. Brasseur (continued)

short of what has come to be referred to as "aeronautical Europe".

The budget aspects are probably those which pose the most real difficulties. We are aware of these difficulties and know too well how governments, mainly on parliamentary initiative, find their defence budgets curbed and frequently reduced. As I realised from talks I had with various senior officials in several European countries, the chief obstacles to the implementation of this project are the very real funding difficulties and the resolve of certain parliaments to restrict defence and armament budgets as much as possible.

I believe nevertheless that there are real possibilities. The problem of designing and building an aircraft is essentially a market problem. Home markets remain narrow and restricted whereas a European market offers invaluable assets to our industries. Indeed the fact that so far the growth of the aircraft industry, particularly in the field of military aircraft, has been greatest in the United States is due to the existence of a market wide enough to guarantee the success of such an enterprise.

Well, we too must take steps to ensure that the market is wide enough and that prospects for our industries are encouraging and the outlets offered genuinely promising, so that they can take the necessary initiative, first at development and later at production level. If we plan to build a European aircraft, we must exercise care in choosing the kind of organisation to be set up for the purpose. Indeed previous experience in Europe shows that we invariably tend to set up cumbersome administrative structures, so that if for some reason or other one wishes to change even a bolt on an aircraft, one immediately has to convene four or five panels of experts from the different nations. This can be very expensive, for it increases the cost of the aircraft and of the whole venture.

We must take advantage of past experience and set up flexible structures and leave a great deal to industry, which has become increasingly accustomed to international collaboration. I am convinced that if our market is wide enough, the aircraft we build in this way could be exported extensively to many parts of the world.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the European chiefs of staff know that ten years or so hence our defence needs in terms of combat aircraft will no longer be covered. This is true of most of the member states of our organisation. We therefore have ten years in which to design our air defence system. And ten years

is the time it takes to design and produce an aircraft. Consequently, if we so desire and if we have the political will to do so, we have a decade before us in which to develop a new advanced-technology aircraft embodying the fruit of research which we can have the ability to undertake successfully in Europe. Ten years is not a long time to build an aircraft.

We must make it a European project which pools our capabilities and our potentials – which are so great – so as to bring about collaboration on the European scale by our aircraft industries which, if they are to survive, must conceive and work on new projects, failing which they will become mere sub-contractors completely deprived of all aspects of research and design.

If we wish to preserve for Europe its rôle as a continent of progress, it seems to me that we must grasp this opportunity before us and rise to this new challenge to our intelligence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brasseur.

As Mr. Hardy is not present, I call next on the list of speakers Mr. Hermann Schmidt.

Mr. Hermann SCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all express my special thanks to the Rapporteur for his remarks, which, while I do not agree with them – and I would like to emphasise that – nevertheless deserve recognition, particularly as regards the recommendation before us, which speaks of European co-operation. I am a very staunch advocate of co-operation by the Federal Republic of Germany with, for example, France and Britain and all the other countries, including the NATO ones. However – and this is the stage of reflection I have just gone through – we have been dealing with this matter at national level in the Federal Republic itself, in connection with a new combat aircraft, the Tornado, in a parliamentary study committee. We are therefore on the ball, so to speak, and in a position to say something about the combat aircraft of the future. That is what I will now do.

I would like first of all to ask a question about the second paragraph of the preamble, which states that this aircraft must be designed in the light of the threat to European countries in the nineties. Who can say now what the threat will be in 1990, 1991 and 1992? It is quite impossible. We are being overtaken by events as it is. I think it is wrong to be so categorical. It is no good our embarking now on a design stage and possibly a development stage and saying that all the threats in store for us in 1992 or 1995 have already been covered by that design or that development.

Mr. Schmidt (continued)

The third paragraph, as the Rapporteur has just remarked, states that the aircraft will involve the use of very advanced technology, etc. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been in the Defence Committee of the Federal Parliament for twenty years. When the soldiers have specified their requirements and discussed them with us, we have sometimes said, with a chuckle, "There they go again, asking us for a cross between a sheep and a dairy pig," in other words, an all-purpose instrument. All I can say is that the Tornado system costs 170 million DM today because everything has been packed into it, all the requirements have been taken into consideration, in the belief that a plane like that could do everything.

We need a change of attitude, a new way of thinking that is not reflected in this report but that we, who sit in the parliaments, must eventually adopt. We do not yet know what functions that are now still performed by manned aircraft can in future be taken over by unmanned aircraft. We should concentrate our research capabilities – and each national budget has a sizeable allocation for research and development – more intensely on this subject, in order to return to the previous state of affairs – which will also pertain in the future – when weapons systems can be both usable and affordable. Paid for they must be, at all events, but they must be usable too. We cannot have a situation in which we go on needing specialists for every weapons system in the army. Our armies include conscripts. Weapons systems – leaving aircraft aside for the moment – must be capable of operation by conscripts. Therefore our slogan must be: make things simpler, not more complicated. We must get away from the idea that the latest technological gimmick has to be incorporated.

This is where I see an important rôle for our parliaments. At one place in the report, for example, we are told that the specifications drawn up by the general staffs of the three air forces need to be harmonised. I have to point out that our air force does not have a general staff, nor indeed does a general staff exist anywhere in our armed forces.

We are also told that there is a need – which has to be "recalled" – to design a multi-purpose aircraft which is nevertheless adaptable to the specific requirements of the various WEU member countries. I ask myself: adaptable also to the requirements of the various branches of the armed forces, e.g. the navy, but in particular the air force? Where will it end? We must take the other path, we must have machines we can both use and pay for. I believe that we have a whole series of special tasks, both as members of our national parlia-

ments and as members of the WEU Assembly. We must keep on telling the various countries that of course we must continue to develop our weapons systems, but only within the limits of our budgets – the Rapporteur mentioned the tightness of the budgets – and that the systems themselves must be usable. Here the bounds of possibility have already been reached in some respects.

May I briefly mention that, in co-operation between organisations, we have had some problems with NAMMA, the organisation that has been supervising the development of the Tornado. I acknowledge the restrictions arising from the opportunities for European co-operation, but if anything similar is considered again in the future we shall have to draw some conclusions from NAMMA's mistakes. We in the Federal Republic of Germany have learnt a few lessons. Our plans for the nineties had included the tactical combat aircraft, the TKF-90. After thorough consideration the aircraft has been scrapped, that is completely removed from our plans. Consequently we have not currently allocated any development funds for a new combat aircraft. We shall of course carry out further studies, including joint studies with our friends in the WEU countries and in NATO, and above all with France, Britain and Italy. For the immediate future, however, we have blocked trilateral co-operation on the development of a new combat aircraft and believe that this problem should be tackled again, perhaps in 1983 or 1984, after a pause for reflection, in friendly co-operation – as I have said – with all the interested parties.

I would also like to add a word about the rate of technological development in other areas, for example in regard to armoured vehicles. For instance, we know that the development of armour-piercing ammunition has overtaken tank development. We need some new ideas; we must develop a new philosophy of the tank force and its future operation. However, one more point must be made in this connection: the discussion must be initiated by parliamentarians. Generals and soldiers cannot be left to decide on the action needed and the nature of the threat, and then to ask the parliaments to pay for the ideas of these thoroughly highly-qualified, good people. We must be involved, come to grips with the necessary technology and not leave everything to those whose work is deemed to be a matter for experts. I can understand that even now an admiral would prefer a battleship on whose bridge he himself could stand. We do not need that any more – things have developed in quite a different way. The parliamentarian must therefore assume much greater responsibility for these matters than in the past. He must acquire the necessary knowledge and make a contribution in

Mr. Schmidt (continued)

committee, naturally with the help of the officers and men of the various armed forces.

My colleagues in the Social Democratic Party of the Federal Republic of Germany and I have considered this report very carefully. We are unable to give it our support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Schmidt.

The next speaker is Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the frequent references made by our German colleague to our duties as parliamentarians, I must at once make serious reservations regarding the basic options underlying the general line of the report and the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Brasseur, while at the same time paying tribute to the work he has done with such thoroughness.

Basically, it seems to us that what is suggested is a repetition of an unsuccessful experiment and that the Rapporteur's own regrets regarding the F-16 affair, which struck a blow at the establishment of a European aircraft-building community, have ended up in bitterness, preventing positive conclusions from being reached. Why? Because, starting from the assumption that a new multi-purpose aircraft, adaptable to the individual requirements of all the WEU countries, must be available by 1990, basically what is advocated is European co-operation and planning in the hope of succeeding where there has definitely been no success in the past. But what happens in reality, Ladies and Gentlemen? In my opinion, what happens is planning which, at most, commits all the countries in different ways but commits some of them more especially.

I realise that this is a delicate question, particularly as the past attitude of the various countries does not inspire any great hopes. In any event, it has to be recognised that, while the term European planning is used, the countries are really divided into a first group – France, United Kingdom and Germany – which would have to study and build the aircraft and a second group – all the other countries – which would have to assess the possibilities and would primarily have to undertake to buy it. In my view, this kind of planning is bound to fail and I would at once like to make it clear, in all humility as regards my scientific knowledge but very firmly as a politician, that I have no intention of questioning the capacity of the three countries I have named to study and build the aircraft. On the contrary, I not merely respect but fully appreciate the technical capacity and initiative of the three countries. But

what I am asking myself and my colleagues is what kind of co-operation we want to see promoted in Europe and on the basis of what European experience over the last twenty years.

It hardly seems realistic to me to say that the way proposed is the only possible one and the only one which could successfully produce an aircraft in the short span of ten years. Why? As I have said already, I am not a technical expert. Like our German colleague, I am trying to make a political assessment, on the basis of what the Committee decided to submit to us for approval. The way proposed is not the shortest, if it is true, as it is at present, that there is not much agreement between these three countries on options and studies and, therefore, on decisions.

It is clear from Mr. Brasseur's report that France, the United Kingdom and Germany have no common view. The type of aircraft which these three countries believe they need is different. France is in favour of a versatile, multi-purpose aircraft differing from that required by the German air staff. The RAF proposes a solution similar to the French but not the same. It is stated that Italy is, in turn, closer to Germany's ideas. The military budget of any one of these countries could not meet the financial cost. I have heard a figure of something like 40 billion and finding the necessary finance remains a problem; nor, in my view, is the Rapporteur's proposal strengthened by his own forecast that the other countries are unlikely to buy the aircraft – the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark. Finally, it is repeated that no definite decision has yet been taken by the Italian Government.

I shall not allow myself the thought that the choices we shall have to make will be unduly influenced by other interests, which I hesitate to call illicit but which certainly cannot represent the overall interests of the WEU countries. The uncertainties, doubts and differences are, therefore, so great, that the Rapporteur feels it necessary to postulate other possible arrangements to be based on bilateral agreements between the individual states and almost all between an individual state (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and the United States; and this, I consider – as in fact the Rapporteur himself says in connection with Germany and I believe that the same can be said of all the WEU countries – would be a serious blow to the prospects for a concerted European policy in this sector.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am well aware of the difficulties in the way of a planned policy but I should also like to point out that it is difficult to accept as a concerted policy for Europe a proposal with the many alternatives I have drawn to your attention – I believe I have interpreted them correctly. I consider, there-

Mr. Antoni (continued)

fore, that what should be advocated is European co-operation based – and I shall elaborate on this when I speak on this morning's Orders of the Day – on national realities which should be stressed and not slurred over. This means that efforts should be directed to establishing the conditions for combined technical progress and a combined WEU commitment.

In my view, therefore – and this also emerges from the report and the draft recommendation – the requirements for a common policy in this sector cannot be met in full. That is why, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our group has tabled three amendments, to which I shall speak briefly, without having to elaborate further on the point, seeking to affirm that a concerted policy is a policy of all the WEU countries. The intention is therefore to replace those parts of the draft recommendation which distinguish between the two groups, that is, I repeat, between the countries which are to be responsible for study, research and construction and the countries which will only be purchasing the aircraft. From the purely formal standpoint, we shall be able to explain the amendments better – very quickly if necessary – when they come up for discussion, but this is our choice. It is a choice consistent with every position we have taken up and declared in this Assembly whenever we have discussed problems relating to the concertation of armaments policy and the management of that policy.

Finally, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to thank you for your attention and to confirm in advance that we cannot vote for the draft recommendation in its present form. Our decision may change according to the view taken by the Assembly of our proposed amendments to the draft recommendation. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

The next speaker in this debate is Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I had not realised that our business had been changed or I should have attended the whole debate, in spite of our earlier start and the multiplicity of meetings here before the Assembly began.

I recognise that enormous advantages can accrue from international co-operation, especially in this sphere of advanced technology. Economy of scale can provide substantial benefit. If we each produce separate aircraft, separate weapons systems, or almost any sophisticated manufacture, each of us will incur high design and development costs. However, with projects such as Tornado those costs are shared. Even so, they are enormous, especially in the light of international needs and the alter-

native placement of the resources which these projects consume.

In spite of the savings from international co-operation, there are difficulties, the chief of which in this context being that different nations have different requirements. The report makes clear that the Federal Republic of Germany requires aircraft with an air-to-air capability. The United Kingdom seems to favour a vertical take-off specification. The French seem to be much less enthusiastic about that type of aircraft. Currently in Britain it is reported that the Royal Air Force is interested in the P-106, a single-engine lightweight combat aircraft – the modern version of the cavalry – and in the P-109, a swivel-engine design which can fly from an ultra-short take-off. Both would be supersonic.

It is possible to take co-operation to the point of absurdity. If one country wanted a lorry and another wanted a motor cycle while a third wanted a bus, none would be satisfied if a taxi were the common result. We could reach the situation in which three potential customers regarded the aircraft they received as very much second best. I am concerned that we may reach the position in which specifications would vary so enormously that the economic advantages would be destroyed, where there would be so many meetings, so much consultation, paper and travelling, and so many committee deliberations that the economic advantage would be rapidly eroded.

I am reminded of the recent arrangement within the Community for the energy-labelling project that was approved not long ago. I recall estimating in the House of Commons that it would take 250 years before there was any net gain from the energy labelling requirement because so much paper, so many meetings and so much energy had been used in bringing that requirement about – more than would ever be saved in anything less than a quarter of a millennium. We are in danger of proceeding along those lines in this project as well.

I am neither an aeronautical engineer nor a statistician, and I am not qualified to assess the technological potential of this project. Instead I want to make a different point. By far the greater part of the service life of the aircraft that may develop will be spent in the next century, and by that time, I am convinced, we shall have more sophisticated weapons systems and a much greater missile capability. The aircrew who would have to fly these aircraft would have to be young men with swift reactions, quick minds, of extremely high intelligence and highly educated. Before they were placed in a squadron they would have had to spend months in training, and that training would – certainly in our case – cost many millions of pounds. We are in danger of designing aircraft in order

Mr. Hardy (continued)

to ensure that we continue to employ pilots with this level of ability.

I recall visiting a Royal Air Force squadron a few months ago. I discovered that all but two of the pilots had been virtually flight lieutenants before entering squadron service. A majority of the squadron pilots were physics graduates. We should question whether we need to employ physics graduates – extremely able young men – to fly aircraft when we may not need manned air vehicles for the purposes envisaged in this project. Generals clung to cavalry for generations longer than it was required for frontal assault purposes. It may be that air marshals are pursuing the same path with manned combat aircraft.

I am not suggesting that we shall not need air crew. We shall need pilots for helicopters, for transport purposes, for training, reconnaissance and high-level flying. But are we right to envisage that we shall need young men to fly supersonically at low level in the twenty-first century? There may be a more economic alternative.

Cannot the Committee turn its mind to that purpose? I do not believe that we should be envisaging a situation in which young men of scarce talent will be required to be the kamikaze pilots of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I now call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I greatly welcome the report by my friend and colleague, Mr. Basseur, which is, I think, the first political report of its kind on European combat aircraft. That aircraft is potentially for service in a number of European air forces. It is of crucial significance not just for their capabilities, but for the industrial potential of many important European companies. I therefore again welcome what Mr. Basseur has written, and I broadly support his recommendations to the Assembly, upon which we are to vote later.

This Assembly is in grave danger, in its understandable scepticism about international co-operation, of forgetting the broad objectives of collaboration. They are not just to share the cost. Without co-operation very few, if any, of our member countries could go it alone on the research, the development, the production and the maintenance in service of aircraft of this calibre. There are also benefits of standardisation and interoperability which it would be wrong to overlook.

There is no sphere of military activity in which the importance of standardisation and interoperability is greater than that of combat aircraft. The aircraft, by its speed of reaction

and its capability for rapid dispersal, requires common facilities to turn it around, and to rearm, refuel and maintain it if it is to be used effectively in our common defence. Just because the Tornado may, for example, have cost us rather more than we envisaged originally, it would be quite wrong to throw out altogether the concept of collaboration and not to support the joint development of a new European combat aircraft for the future.

Let us look more closely at that Tornado experience. It brought to the air forces of three countries a broadly similar type of aeroplane. That brought with it standardisation. We must include also the Tornados that will serve in the fleet air arm of the German navy. It has brought with it close personal contact among the military personnel of the user services. Only a few months ago, the trinational training establishment at Cottesmore began operation, and the joint training of that unit is an example of what will happen in the future. I repeat that there is no way that the user countries could have procured for themselves unilaterally an aircraft of that capability and done so within any reasonable parameter of cost.

Then we must remember that the Tornado is a highly versatile aeroplane. It was, after all, known originally as the multi-rôle combat aircraft. It is fulfilling both missions for the interdiction and strike rôles but also for the air defence of the United Kingdom through its F-2 variant.

That is one example of co-operation, and I recognise that the superimposition of an official management agency, the NAMMA, perhaps over-bureaucratised the management and perhaps inhibited rapid decision-taking. But we have learnt from that experience, and the industrial co-operation was effective and sound and the aeroplane is much respected by the user services.

The other prime example was the F-16, the aeroplane which gained the *marché du siècle* at the expense particularly of the Mirage and which is now in service with the air forces of the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. This aeroplane, too, is a remarkable success in its way. It has entered service, broadly speaking, on time and to cost, and it has brought benefits once more of standardisation and interoperability. It has enabled the participating companies to provide work for their employees, and the air forces have an aircraft in service of the very highest performance obtainable for the cost which they were prepared to pay. They have also benefited from the operational experience of the United States Air Force, with which it serves, and the participating companies have been able to benefit from sales to third world countries.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

I recognise that the future of European co-operation is in doubt. In terms of helicopters, for example, there is a question mark over the Franco-German new anti-tank helicopter. In terms of anti-submarine activities, there is a question mark over the newly-proposed Anglo-Italian helicopter. It would be quite wrong for this Assembly, which is *par excellence* the Assembly which cares for the joint defence of Western Europe, to inject a further note of uncertainty and pessimism.

I know that there are industrial difficulties to be overcome, for example, over the engine. Do we accept a proven power plant, for example, the RB-119, which powers the Tornado? Do we accept a French design, the SNECMA M-88? Do we even go to an American proven power plant, the General Electric F-404, which powers the F-18? These are difficulties. I recognise that there are rivalries. Marcel Dassault may prefer design leadership. That is the way that it has worked over the Alpha-Jet, and very successfully. British Aerospace may have its own rightful pride. Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm is now, thanks to the Tornado, a company of the very highest capability.

But surely we can resolve these difficulties to our mutual advantage. What is required is the will. It is possible that we have rather more time than we thought although, like Mr. Brasseur, I do not accept that we can wait for another fifteen years, because the improvement in the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact air forces is such that we shall need – certainly in the United Kingdom we shall need – to bring into service an aeroplane to replace the Jaguar sooner than 1995. Until then, we can improve the capabilities of the Jaguar and we can at least meet our staff target 409 with the introduction to service of the AV-8B improved Harrier, to be built jointly in collaboration between British Aerospace and McDonnell-Douglas.

I welcome this report. It is timely. It is well researched. It is thoughtful. In its broad objectives, it deserves our wholehearted support.

It would be ironic if, on the day after General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, reminded us of the magnitude of the Soviet threat and the growth in the potential of Soviet air power, we denied ourselves, by the conscious negative decision of this Assembly, the way forward to continue to maintain an independent advanced industrial capability that would keep us in Europe in the forefront of aeronautical development and also denied ourselves the possibility of standardised equipment

and interoperability which would greatly enhance the effectiveness of our armed forces.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Wilkinson.

We are in a slight difficulty in that the Rapporteur, Mr. Brasseur, who has come here at great personal inconvenience in the middle of an important parliamentary engagement in his own country, has to return immediately. He wishes to say a few words about the debate so far. I think that the Assembly will agree that we should permit him to do so. The Chairman of the Committee has undertaken to reply to the debate and amendments in the usual way.

We appreciate your coming, Mr. Brasseur. If you wish to comment on the debate so far, perhaps you will do so now.

Mr. BRASSEUR (*Belgium*) (Translation). – As you say, Mr. President, I have to chair a very important parliamentary committee at 2 o'clock this afternoon, which compels me to return home at the end of the morning. I wish to apologise to the Assembly for this and to thank you, Mr. President, for permitting me to say a few words now to the representatives who spoke in the debate. I will also give you my views concerning the amendments tabled by Mr. Antoni and several of his colleagues, and those tabled by Mr. Forma.

Let me say first of all that I endeavoured to submit an objective report, stressing not only the possibilities and opportunities offered to Europe but also the difficulties it might have to overcome. The question now is whether our Assembly has the political will to promote true European co-operation on a combat aircraft.

I am aware that, as some have pointed out, the aircraft's technology could well be challenged in ten to fifteen years' time because other types of armament are deployed – whether unmanned aircraft or missiles. However, all the contacts I have had with experts indicate that, irrespective of how new weaponry develops, aircraft will retain a specific mission capability primarily because of their great manoeuvrability. Consequently the future aircraft's specification will have to provide for this mission within the overall defence capability for, as I emphasised in my report, aircraft will remain an important element in combat thanks to their manoeuvrability and very short response times.

Admittedly, the project would be very costly, and Mr. Antoni has stated that it would lead to heavy expenditure. I am aware of this, but at the same time I believe that the development of separate aircraft would likewise be a very expensive business. Moreover, to defer the

Mr. Brasseur (continued)

project or to incur delay would cost just as much – as experience has shown in case of delays with other aircraft projects in which the initial estimated cost was found to have doubled, trebled or even quintupled.

Of course, a common project would still pose certain difficulties, but it would be a mistake to want to do everything with the one aircraft and to refuse to accept certain compromises. Co-ordination is not to add together the various specifications and requirements. It involves making choices, and it would be up to the governments to negotiate these. The politicians must accept their responsibilities and WEU can play an important rôle. To attempt to develop an unduly complex aircraft capable of satisfying all requirements could result in failure of the project. And as has already been suggested, I believe that this project, were it to be adopted by the member states, should have a comparatively flexible structure, for an organisation based on bureaucracy would be costly and would imperil the project.

The amendments tabled by Mr. Forma and Mr. Antoni are consistent with this thinking and in fact take up the previous suggestion that a distinction be made between countries willing to commit themselves to the project and the remaining member states of WEU. I accept the spirit of these amendments even though this position is somewhat less realistic in view of the intergovernmental contacts which have already taken place and the fact that relatively precise projects have been formulated.

In adopting these amendments, then, we shall perhaps be adopting a rather less realistic position, but since we are a political assembly it is up to us to chart the main courses. I also believe it would be useful for all those WEU members interested in the project to join in.

This being so, I personally accept Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Antoni, which proposes that in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation the words “interested governments” be substituted for the words “British, French and German Governments”. I also accept the second part of this amendment, which is common to the second paragraph of Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Forma and proposes that the word “three” be deleted wherever it appears in the text, as this would broaden the possibilities. I also accept Mr. Antoni’s Amendment 2 proposing that the word “other” be left out as, once again, we have all the countries in mind – this being a point made by Mr. Forma.

As for Amendment 3 concerning a change in the order of the paragraphs of the draft

recommendation, I accept it as well since it in no way affects the intention of the draft and makes it more logical.

However, we must not automatically involve all the WEU states as some of them may have reservations on the matter. Consequently I prefer the amendment which proposes the words “interested governments” rather than “governments of the WEU countries”. It seems to me that this leaves the governments free to join the others or not; furthermore this would not compromise the project, which could therefore be undertaken.

These were the comments I wished to make, Mr. President. I am truly sorry to leave you, but the Chairman of the Committee will certainly be glad to deliver the rest of my reply. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brasseur. I hope your enthusiasm for the subject and your dedication to duty do not cause you to miss your train. You have gone on rather longer than you had thought and may have now to run.

The next speaker is Mr. Forma.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – If there had been any need for clarification of certain key points in the arguments advanced by Mr. Brasseur for the building of a common combat aircraft, I feel that this point may have been partly covered by the speech which we heard yesterday from General Rogers and by his replies to a number of questions. I cannot of course pretend to go into the consequences which the type of aircraft required for certain specified purposes may have. Perhaps this is a matter for the staffs. I shall confine myself to making a few political points and a number of proposals, which have already been favourably received by the Rapporteur, whom I wish to thank.

Substantially, it is an old argument that Europe should prove itself to be capable of defending itself, with the strategic support of its allies of course. Quite clearly any defence is inconceivable unless the component forces and their armaments complement each other in a co-ordinated overall structure, suitably adapted to the needs of the fronts held by the individual countries. Even I, as a politician, can understand that the same aircraft can be armed differently with the help of the air staffs.

I think that another preliminary remark, this time of a rather different character, may be acceptable even to those who, while wishing Europe to remain faithful to the Atlantic Alliance, do not wish it to be powerless and incapable of taking independent decisions and contributing constructively to the policy of the

Mr. Forma (continued)

blocs created by the need for a balance between systems and rooted in the now distant events of Yalta. In other words, a Europe wholly geared to allied technology and production could never be self-sufficient and autonomous, within the strategic context of world politics; nor could it, if it continued to be influenced by nationalistic pressures which are unfortunately not lacking, or if it became a thing of "shreds and patches" by donning the multicoloured costume which we Italians attribute to Harlequin. It may be that this character is the image not only of my country but also of all of us in a small way. To use the words of the Risorgimento we "are not a people but are still divided" and we find it hard to think of ourselves as one people.

This explains the Council's replies to Recommendations 329 and 339 on the need to identify systems which can be produced in collaboration and to improve European interoperability. In the report, therefore, we accept these basic principles which should certainly encourage the individual governments and even more the European authorities, and ourselves in particular, to remove the few points of disagreement which seem to exist between the various countries and the air staffs and which, according to the report, have reappeared in the efforts to define a successor to the RB-199, the Jaguar, the Harrier, the Mirage and the latest type we have just mentioned, the Tornado.

As the Rapporteur says, technical developments are so swift that when a new type of aircraft comes into service work must already have started on designing the next. The time-scale is long, techniques are racing ahead and equipment becomes obsolete at a rate which is perhaps faster than that which marked the change from the cavalry to the aeroplane.

The Rapporteur gives us an excellent summary of the motives, the points of agreement and disagreement, and the technical, economic and market arguments in favour of co-operating seriously and as flexibly as possible in this field. He also lists a number of difficulties which have arisen with the Tornado and other earlier programmes, but which he qualifies as "a good exercise in European collaboration". He recognises the relationship between markets, costs and prices as regards both the harmonisation of armaments and, therefore, of procurement within the WEU countries and the possibilities of supplying external markets. I agree on all these points, except possibly that of sales to third countries, which the Rapporteur himself treats with some caution. I also agree on the "chronicle of events" which led to the tripartite decision of the French, German and British ministries to associate British Aerospace, Dassault-Breguet and MBB in a joint report on

the possibility of building a European combat aircraft. This report appeared in 1980 and revealed the divergences which I have already mentioned.

All these points, supplemented by the course of the "talks" mentioned in paragraph 50 of the explanatory memorandum, resulted in the drafting of the recommendation in a form which seems to me to be out of step with the memorandum and to show little respect for the present or future technical and industrial capacity of the member countries of WEU. The fact that they have not so far been willing to take part in projects – with the disagreements and results we have been discussing – does not seem to me to justify our adopting a recommendation which ignores the capacity, knowledge and equal rights of all the member countries; even less in my view can we adopt a recommendation that account be taken of the requirements of three air staffs which make up the allied forces represented by WEU. It may have been stressed already; there will be other ways of participating but it is not up to us to say how. This will depend on the situation of the various countries, on whether the industries – because this concerns the industries – will be able to make the "instrument" which Europe needs and on the needs of the various countries in the context of a harmonious development adapted to the specific technical and military requirements of the individual countries. Naturally, these requirements differ and are geared to different purposes, in the context of the weapons with which the European army will be equipped. To overcome these difficulties, I together with my socialist colleague, Mr. Maravalle, proposed a number of amendments, which the Rapporteur favoured. I thank him for his judgment and I may add that, if these amendments are accepted, I shall have no further hesitation about voting for the report, as my sole doubt was concerned with the relations needed between the countries of WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forma.

The last speaker of whom I have notice to speak is Mr. Kurt Jung.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as Mr. Schmidt has already made some remarks about our experience of the Tornado project, I think I can be brief. I welcome the Brasseur report in principle because it deals with a problem that I think WEU needs to go into in rather more depth. The report recognises that we should not, as in the case of the Tornado, develop one aircraft or one project designed to cover every requirement, but that a major future defence task is the development of an aircraft specifically for interception purposes. I welcome this very sensible restriction.

Mr. Jung (continued)

In the case of the MRCA, which was originally envisaged as a multi-rôle combat aircraft, we have, as Mr. Schmidt pointed out, developed "a cross between a sheep and a dairy pig", an all-purpose instrument that is not in fact suitable for all purposes. In the Tornado committee we also noted that the military requirements for the project were not established until a later date. I was interpreting "MRCA" in the Bundestag back in 1969-70 as "Military Requirement Comes Afterwards".

The Brasseur report lays the basis for the recognition that we shall in future have to develop differentiated systems for the great variety of different tasks.

I am very grateful to Mr. Schmidt for pointing out that we also need to consider whether, in the circumstances, we should continue to develop manned aircraft only or whether we cannot develop much cheaper unmanned systems - for example cruise-missile type systems - for specific purposes. It emerges clearly from this report - which is why I welcome it - that a project of this kind will be developed in the interests of standardisation and harmonisation within WEU or among the various countries interested.

The Tornado experience must be taken into account from the outset, for it has been dreadful. From the beginning of production in 1976 to the reference date of 31st December 1979, the cost of the Tornado rose by approximately 45 %, i.e. 15 % per year. Mr. Schmidt gave the cost of the system as 70 million DM per unit. That was a polite understatement. The cost is already much higher than that. If we project current trends, we arrive at a unit cost of 110 million DM for the system at the end of the project period.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our studies in Committee made it quite clear that at least some of the blame for this cost escalation must be attributed to mismanagement by the international agency NAMMA. Unfortunately, we were unable to establish this precisely, because the members of NAMMA were not authorised to make a statement. I regret this very much and would like to record that fact here.

Western European Union is therefore faced with the task of solving the problems of co-ordination, standardisation, interoperability and compatibility of the various aircraft of the air and naval forces of the NATO or WEU member states and of considering the possibility of integrating them under some kind of European armaments agency. Such an agency would of course have to be democratically controlled by this Assembly. Its terms of refer-

ence would include the problems of arms exports, arms limitation and the harmonisation of the activity of all participants in such a scheme. It is no good having several countries collaborating on a project and some of them obeying self-imposed national restrictions while others cheerfully export the jointly-developed product to areas of tension.

I believe these ideas should be linked to the Brasseur report. There would then be a possibility of achieving the ideal situation, in which a European armaments agency of this kind would enable us in the future to have systems that are interchangeable, technically advanced and highly sophisticated, at a cost that would make them acceptable to all the countries concerned.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Jung.

Does any other member wish to take part in the debate ?

If not, does the acting Chairman wish to say a few words ?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, as you correctly pointed out, I am standing in for the Chairman of the Committee, our French colleague Jean Valleix, who because of the internal political situation in his country has of course somewhat more complex affairs to attend to than the presentation of his Committee's report to this Assembly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank those who have taken part in the debate for their suggestions, criticisms and proposals. I would like to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Brasseur, and again apologise on his behalf. As you already said, Mr. President, he has unfortunately had to leave.

May I make some comments on the contributions to the debate. As far as the amendments are concerned, the position taken by the Rapporteur has clearly already led to a solution. The Rapporteur stated his willingness to accept all the amendments tabled by our Italian colleagues. I would endorse that on behalf of the Committee. Mr. Antoni and Mr. Forma have already given us to understand in their contributions to the debate that, in the circumstances, they are satisfied that their objections to the draft recommendation have been met.

With regard to the other contributions, two lines of thought have emerged. My colleagues Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Jung, in particular, have expressed doubts as to whether we can possibly predict, at this stage, technical and tactical requirements that will not have to be defined until the early nineties. This is certainly a serious objection. The question was then

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

raised as to whether an all-purpose system is feasible at all, or whether we should not go over to unmanned aircraft, or whether, instead of trying to develop an all-purpose system, we ought not to adopt a more flexible approach and develop different weapons systems for the different tasks involved. This – it was claimed – would certainly be less costly, present fewer technical difficulties and, finally, be simpler to use.

I agree with the speakers who have pointed out that it is not enough for an army to possess technically sophisticated systems – Mr. Hardy made this point – but that these systems must also take account of their human operators. What he seems to me to be saying is that as a matter of principle these systems should be so designed that they do not necessarily have to be flown by physics graduates.

In my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany, the tactical combat aircraft TKF-90 has had to be deferred for budgetary reasons. This should certainly not mean, however, that the project will not be given further thought in design studies and resumed at a later date, possibly in 1983 or 1984.

All these points are important and deserve consideration. In concluding my reply to the individual contributions I would like to refer once again to the new element which the last speaker, Mr. Jung, introduced into the debate, the idea of establishing a European armaments agency whose terms of reference would include the very thorny problem of arms exports to areas of tension. I would ask Mr. Jung not to pursue this matter in the context of today's report. What he is proposing is something so difficult, in political terms as well, that to discuss it today would be right outside the scope of this report and would therefore necessitate another debate.

Both the report and the recommendation were adopted unanimously in Committee. It would certainly have been easier, Ladies and Gentlemen – if I may say so – if some of the suggestions we have heard today in plenary session had been made at the Committee stage. The point of this report is quite simply to consider, on the grounds of cost, greater interoperability and increased standardisation of our weapons systems, the possibility of a single solution for the nineties in the field of aircraft design and the design of tactical combat aircraft in particular. It may well be that after detailed study we shall reach the conclusion that this is not feasible and that we must fall back on a variety of systems. This, however, in no way contradicts the intention of the report, which is to look first for the most comprehensive pos-

sible European solution. I believe we should support this.

A final point is that we in Europe are constantly having to decide whether to buy ready-made systems off the peg from the United States, or whether, for a variety of reasons, we must maintain our own European technological and industrial capacity in this field. This was another question which the report was intended to stress and I think we should bear it in mind.

I admit that some mistakes have been made in the management of joint projects, as several speakers have pointed out. That is a criticism of the management, not necessarily of the projects themselves. The Europa rockets were a case in point. The failure of the Europa rockets – Europa I and II – was not, in my opinion, the result of a lack of the necessary technology in Europe, but of mismanagement for a variety of reasons – including the jealous pursuit of the principle of fair return.

May I conclude by once again thanking all those who have taken part in the debate. The amendments have been accepted. In these circumstances I would urge you not to withhold your support for the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Lenzer.

That concludes the debate, but before voting on the draft recommendation, we must deal with the amendments. I ask members to listen carefully. Although I understand that the amendments are acceptable to the Committee, as they overlap I shall have to explain what will happen. If Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Forma, is carried, and if Mr. Antoni wishes, I shall then put the amendment to insert: "governments of the WEU countries" in place of "interested governments". However, we shall have to see whether that is what Mr. Antoni wishes.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I support Amendment 4 proposed by Mr. Forma and Mr. Maravalle. This being so, I withdraw Amendment 1 tabled by myself and a number of others. If the Italian proposers agree, Amendment 4 will have the support of both myself and my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT. – That is most helpful. I understand that Mr. Forma wishes to move his amendment formally.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – No thank you, Mr. President, I do not wish to add to what I said earlier.

The PRESIDENT. – Amendment 4:

4. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “British, French and German Governments” and insert “interested governments”; consequently, in line 2 leave out “three”.

has been moved and we shall now vote on it.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Amendment 1 is not moved.

I put Amendment 2, and with it the identical Amendment 5.

2 and 5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “other”.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendments 2 and 5 are agreed to.

We come finally to Amendment 3:

3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 1; 4 becomes 2; 1 becomes 3; 2 becomes 4.

I gather that this amendment, in the name of Mr. Antoni, is also acceptable to the Committee and we shall now vote on it.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 874 as amended.

Is there any abstention?...

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Yes, I abstain.

The PRESIDENT. – Is there any objection?...

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I and some of my colleagues wish to vote against the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case we must have a roll-call vote.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. van Hulst.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	49
Ayes	33
Noes	8
Abstentions	8

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

5. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 883 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – We move to the next Order of the Day, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 883 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Wilkinson to present his report on the future of European space activities.

(Mr. Berchem, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great privilege to be able to introduce this report on the future of European space activities on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and to use this occasion also to provide the reply of our Committee to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council.

This report merits very careful consideration, because it is an example of the continued interest of this Assembly in an area of European industrial and technological activity which is of great significance to the security of our member countries and of great importance also for the Western European member countries' technological capabilities in the future.

Over many years, WEU has taken an interest in space affairs, and this Assembly has shown its primacy in these matters. Those who question the importance of our work would do well to look at our preoccupation with space and the recommendations which we have made.

We are deeply conscious of the energy with which the Soviet Union and the United States pursue their space programmes for military applications. We do not believe that Europe can follow their path. However, we feel that Europe should take note of the military impli-

1. See page 34.

2. See page 35.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

cations of space and utilise space technologies which Europe has developed for peaceful purposes where those technologies have a military implication. But, of course, Europe should do so only in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance. It should seek to pursue military objectives in space not unilaterally but only as part of the effort of the Alliance.

Looking further afield, we are aware of the great efforts being made by industrial nations other than the superpowers and outside Europe to develop for themselves a space capability. This applies to Japan, Brazil and India. Even the Arab world is now interested in this activity.

But we live in straitened economic circumstances. At a time of recession, proposals which we make must be practical and, obviously, must take note of the severe economic difficulties that we face. It would be quite unrealistic for member governments of WEU to present to their electorates exorbitant budgetary demands for space. However, it is up to us to make it quite clear to our electorates that there are technical, industrial and employment benefits to be derived from space as well as the application benefits from such activities as remote sensing, telecommunications and so on.

If Europe is to be effective in space, it is *par excellence* an area where we can be effective only if we collaborate – if we concert our efforts. For that concerted programme, the national components must be strong. I do not see any fundamental incompatibility between what the nation states themselves are doing and the capacities which they are creating – for example, the activities in France, those of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the United Kingdom – so long as those activities are harmonised within the context of an overall European strategy. In other words, the national activities must be compatible with and complementary to the overall European strategy.

The trouble is that until now we have had far too little strategic thinking on the part of ministers in Europe about space. You will recall that it was only last year that the ESA convention was ratified. We suggested last year not only the ratification of the ESA convention but also ministerial participation at Council meetings of the European Space Agency. This happens far too seldom. If the space programme of Europe is to acquire direction and purpose, this is dependent in my view upon ministerial support and active ministerial participation in ESA.

The European Space Agency has many critics, but they tend to be negative and they do

not usually suggest what else should be done other than stressing the complication of European space activities in the European Space Agency. It is unrealistic just to imagine that nation states can go it alone. It would also be short-sighted if Europe were consciously to opt out for lack of political will, for lack of political vision, from an area of industrial activity which must necessarily grow and which is attracting the interest and, of course, the participation of other countries who are competitors of ours in so many fields.

We have therefore to make the European Space Agency effective, and it is particularly appropriate that Western European Union should have a part in this as the seat of our Assembly is here in Paris, as is the headquarters of the European Space Agency. ESA has a budget for its administration and upkeep. It also has a scientific programme and these are mandatory upon the member governments. With the accession of Ireland to the European Space Agency, there are now eleven member countries and there are three others – Canada, Austria and Norway – who are associated to some degree with ESA.

The trouble has been that so much of the work of the European Space Agency has not been part of that mandatory programme but has been an optional programme carried out under the aegis of ESA but not part of the mandatory joint funding. If one looks at what the European Space Agency has undertaken, one sees that part of its work is purely European but part is an example of effective transatlantic co-operation. I welcome this. It is all very well to decry single nation chauvinism and old-fashioned nationalism on the part of nation states in Europe, but it would equally be wrong for us to set Europe aside as purely and simply a competitor of the United States because space is above all a human endeavour which should transcend national boundaries and transcend power bloc rivalries.

So many of the benefits of space activity are benefits which should accrue to the world community as a whole; for example, remote sensing, the development of the third world, the agricultural resources of the developing countries, the potential of the oceans and the seas. These are the kind of benefits that would apply worldwide and we should not therefore be narrow in our view.

I am very glad, therefore, that the European Space Agency has been so active in the space programme, which is primarily a European component funded to the tune of \$ 850 million by ESA as against \$ 155 million by the National Space Administration as part of NASA's shuttle activities. The space shuttle is a

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

dramatic and revolutionary development in space. The concept of a reusable launcher makes possible the economic exploitation of space which was not practicable to any meaningful degree before. On the other hand, it is crucial also that Europe develop its own capability, and the greatest emphasis in this regard has been placed on the development of the Ariane launcher. That launcher has great significance, because without it Europe will not on its own be able to place payloads in space without dependence on American boosters such as the Thor Delta rocket, and all the signs are that, if the launch due to take place almost any time now is successful, Ariane will be the economic and sound basis for a European capability. That capability should be fully utilised and that booster development should continue.

I recognise, however, that Spacelab, on the one hand, and Ariane, on the other, and to a certain extent the British effort in marine communications, have largely pre-empted European funding for space at the cost of important scientific developments. The scientific development to which I want to draw attention particularly now is the international solar mission, again an example of European-American co-operation whose future is in doubt due to the withdrawal of budgetary support by the United States administration.

It will be remembered that the Americans were to have placed one spacecraft in orbit in 1985 as part of that mission and the Europeans, under ESA, were to have placed in orbit another. If agreement cannot be reached and if this programme cannot be carried through successfully, that must, I think, call in question transatlantic space co-operation, and that would be a tragedy.

To conclude, I must just summarise the main recommendations. We in Europe should evolve a clear objective of what we want to do. If I may in a way mix metaphors, it has to be a down-to-earth, feet-on-the-ground approach. We have to say quite clearly what we can economically fulfil which will be complementary to what the Americans are doing and which will add to the totality of western Alliance capability. Secondly, as Spacelab has assumed so large a share of our resources, we have fully to utilise that system. The number of Spacelab missions has gone down from an annual predicted total of twelve a year to only one or two missions a year. That is not adequate, and in particular missions for the years beyond 1985 have not been finalised.

Thirdly, we should pursue the further development of Ariane because it is illogical to pro-

duce a system and not to develop it as far as is economically practically possible. But at this stage, in view of the budgetary constraints, I would be very well prepared to accept Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Topmann to leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: "3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme taking into account an established demand for it;".

There is clearly a demand in as much as an industrial company, Ariane Spatiale, has been set up to benefit from the commercial exploitation of the potential of the launcher, but at this stage Mr. Topmann's amendment is realistic. Then, as we agreed last year, we should pursue an earth resources satellite programme beyond the Inmarsat programme. This will comprise two satellites in the first instance, an oceanographic satellite, Oceanographic 1, and ERS 1 and ERS 2 for land sensing. We have the technology for an effective remote-sensing satellite programme and, particularly as a military application, we should pursue it.

In an Alliance context, and only in an Alliance context, we must make use, at least, of the technical capabilities we have developed in space where they have military application, and when I speak of "military application" I quite explicitly exclude the use of space for nuclear bombardment or offensive missions of that kind. What I suggest is that we use the technologies we have developed to ensure our security, to enhance our defence. The kinds of things one can envisage are reconnaissance, because obviously that gives warning and is a political tool to arms control measures and to disarmament, and early warning. Early warning is essential and, in view of the development of offensive systems, we need to enhance our early warning capability, and that can realistically be done in a space context.

Last but not least, it is our duty to create a sense of vision among our people about the potential of space. It sometimes astounds me that this continent, which has been so inventive, which has led the world in, for example, supersonic flight, the evolution of the jet engine, of radar and so on, should, after its own initial strides in rocketry and space, have almost opted out in terms of scale compared with the superpowers. The Americans, for example, spend \$8,000 million a year on space. ESA's budget is less than one-eighth of that: it spends only \$700 million. Europe spends only \$1,000 million on space. We must emphasise the benefits which will accrue and the longer-term, almost visionary, objectives.

I regret that two French air force officers should be the first European astronauts thanks only to participation in a Russian space pro-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

gramme. I do not think that that is right for a Western European Union member country, and that needs to be said loud and clear. I do not say that just because our French friends are not here. I do not believe that that is the way forward for Western Europe. The way forward is through the European scientists who are taking part in Spacelab and who are active in that work.

It is necessary to concert a European strategy which takes into account our national capabilities as well as the importance of ESA, because, without an effective European space agency, the smaller countries of Europe will be squeezed out and will not have an effective space programme.

I hope that the report, which has the unanimous support of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, will be unanimously supported by the Assembly. Its purpose is purely peaceful. Its objective is to enhance the technological and employment opportunities of our countries, and to make our countries richer in the fullest sense of the term.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Mr. Topmann.

Mr. TOPMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I too first thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson, very much for his report on European space activities, which gives a balanced and accurate picture of the present state of affairs.

Like Mr. Wilkinson, we see the need for close co-operation among the ESA member states on future European space activities. Of course, the point that is giving us increasing cause for concern in other political areas, for example in relation to the previous item on the agenda, arises in this report too: the ever-pressing constraint of financial feasibility. It is therefore of fundamental importance to take realistic account of these difficulties here as well.

I have a comment to make from the German standpoint. The Federal Republic of Germany is advocating a total ESA budget below the 450 million units of account mentioned in the report, partly because, for budgetary reasons, it is forced to limit its contribution to a maximum of DM 403 million per year. I would suggest, in regard to the optional programmes, that it might be sensible to work out a system in which contributions are determined according to the gross national product.

As regards the Ariane programme, the space shuttle and Spacelab, we do not feel that any

final decision can be taken at this time. Systems that have been developed at high cost should first be consolidated and exploited. Further development should be limited to what one might call keeping the model going. Only after further experience and proven demand should comparable further development be considered. This is the sense of the amendment to paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation tabled by the German Social Democrats in this Assembly, which the Rapporteur has already mentioned. It subordinates the further development of the Ariane programme to established demand. We feel, largely for financial reasons, that further development of Ariane 4 is out of the question at present.

One more word about the development of satellites for military purposes. For us this is not entirely straightforward, since there might be allied objections with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, corresponding developments are already taking place in NATO. For that reason we think it would have been better to refer to the NATO developments that have already taken place in the draft recommendation as well.

Participation in telecommunication satellite programmes does not appear to us appropriate at the present time. The definition of new tasks, like the second generation of Eutelsat and Inmarsat, are in our view not, or not primarily, the concern of ESA but that of the users.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are receptive to the idea of preparatory work on systems that promise well for the future. Thank you.

(*Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Topmann.

The next speaker is Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on our reasons for voting for the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, whom I should like to congratulate for his very detailed and thorough report.

Among the conclusions reached by the Rapporteur and the Committee, we find particularly praiseworthy the overall approach stressing the need to overcome the persistent failings and difficulties in the way of a policy for space activities in Europe, which have so far made very little progress.

Scientific developments often take place at national level without sufficient co-ordination which would assist joint choices; as can be gathered from the Council's annual report itself,

Mr. Antoni (continued)

the political directives and guidelines have not been either adequate or in time.

Our Rapporteur quite rightly expresses the view that progress in the space field has been too slow; it is regretted that the ESA Ministerial Council has not met to give political direction designed to give new impetus to the European Space Agency. The report gives us a valuable picture of the situation in Europe and of co-operation with the United States.

We believe that we interpret this correctly when, side by side with positive achievements such as that of the Columbia space shuttle, whose success will enable the European Spacelab to be used, we draw attention to the widespread concern over the delays which have occurred, the excessive variation from country to country, the absence of a common response in the matter of space research and technology for which the resources made available are inadequate.

We also regard as highly relevant the criticism of the recognised inability of the EEC Council of Energy Ministers to work out a short- and medium-term energy programme. This is a real problem which has a major effect on space activities as well. What is needed, therefore, is that Europe should give itself a space programme, failing which, as the Rapporteur also fears, it will fall behind and become dependent.

We support the Rapporteur's request to governments for such action in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and we also endorse the subsequent suggestions regarding fields of action and possible measures to be taken – full use of Spacelab's potential; meteorological research; strengthening of telecommunications technology programmes; study of the military implications of space techniques.

In our view, the capacity and initiative of the individual countries should be increased and not reduced, and must in any case be safeguarded, and here I confirm the statements made in the document in question. It is only on the basis of the situation in each country that a European space policy can be elaborated and organised.

The Council's annual report certainly justifies the Rapporteur's statement that progress is essential. But progress will only be possible if Europe works out a genuine space strategy, planned at European level, borrowing from national experience and based on concrete technical research, industrial and commercial objectives, geared to the real situation and for genuinely peaceful purposes as the Rapporteur reiterated a short time ago. The governments

of member states can be committed at this level.

For these reasons, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall vote in favour of the draft recommendation. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

The next speaker is Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. First, I join in the congratulations to my colleague, John Wilkinson, on a first-class report which contains a set of recommendations which I wholly support and which are based on a comprehensive memorandum.

I very much welcome this debate on European space activities. It is a subject in which we as politicians do not take sufficient interest, with the result that so-called European co-operation through the European Space Agency has been disappointing. For far too long the agency has been in total disarray. I regret that such disinterest is widely spread among all WEU member states, including my own.

For example, a few weeks ago you, Mr. President, may know that I initiated a debate in the House of Commons on British space activities, and that was the first time for seven years that the British Parliament had debated space.

As politicians we know that the main reason for that disinterest is that there are no votes to be had in outer space – at least, not yet. To campaign for even greater investment of taxpayers' money on space research and technology risks unpopularity as well as the criticism of unjustified public expenditure, particularly during a recession. It therefore becomes much easier for politicians to ignore the challenge and opportunities which space presents to European industries and expertise.

However, one can argue that it is precisely because of the recession and the high and growing level of unemployment in all European nations – perhaps caused in part by many of our traditional industries being overtaken by the emerging industries of other countries led by Japan, such as India, Korea and Brazil – that we in Europe cannot afford not to turn to the exploitation of these new space industries of which we are wholly capable.

If we ignore opportunities with which space provides us, that would represent a misjudgment of classic proportions. It would certainly fly in the face of the experience of the United States of America, whose participation in space for the last quarter of a century has shown just how labour-intensive the industry can be and how substantial can be the spin-off in contracts for large and small firms alike. Moreover, it would amount to a total

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

misjudgment of public attitudes, which I believe accept the enormous opportunities available in space. There is a fast-growing public interest in space, and I do not say that because of the widespread popularity of science fiction films such as "Star Wars". It was significant that in my country the television programme that attracted the highest viewing of that particular week was the live coverage of the re-entry and return to earth of the space shuttle Columbia.

Our rôle as parliamentarians is to make it our business to understand fully the extent to which mankind has already benefited from space and the future opportunities. We must establish the right kind of intergovernmental framework that will ensure that private enterprise delivers the goods on a European scale.

Europe must differ from the experience of the United States in that, instead of spending vast quantities of public money, we must encourage private enterprise to pursue, with strictly commercial objectives in mind, worldwide markets that exist for the benefits available from the exploitation of space.

If I have any criticism of Mr. Wilkinson's report, it is that it does not go into sufficient detail about the opportunities open to European private enterprise. I was, however, pleased to see the reference in paragraphs 96 to 99 to how space can be used to help solve the problem of European reliance on imported oil and gas. So long as we rely on OPEC, all our industry – indeed, our very way of life – is at risk, for example, to the continuing inability of Arab and Jew to live together in peace. We must never allow ourselves to forget that world progress, particularly progress in the third world, was put back by a decade at least as soon as the Egyptian army fired across the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur war in October 1973, which resulted for the first time in a united Arab policy on oil prices.

Western Europe has not yet fully come to terms with the consequences of that war. It would be extremely unhealthy if the economies of Western Europe came to rely on the supply of oil and gas from the Soviet Union, as the proposed natural gas pipeline from Siberia would imply. Free nations cannot be dependent upon communism in that way, for otherwise there will be very little room to condemn and retaliate in the event of any Soviet aggression in Poland or elsewhere.

As Mr. Wilkinson's report suggests, the answer lies in a priority programme to harness solar energy through satellites for European domestic and industrial use. We have the technology; all we lack is the political will and trust in each other.

One project with potential to which the report does not refer is the concept of the European small shuttle. By using existing Ariane and NASA shuttle hardware and technology, a mini-shuttle – which has been termed the "Space Cab" – can be developed at comparatively low cost for supplying manned space stations, servicing unmanned satellites, crew transportation to larger stations and other applications. This space cab could provide Europe with a realistic and versatile space transportation system for the late 1980s, and it deserves an immediate feasibility study.

Successful European co-operation in space requires new initiatives and new attitudes on the part of the European Space Agency member states, a new willingness to put European co-operation above national ambition and, undoubtedly, a new system of financial contribution to replace the present complicated arrangement by which member states contribute different sums for different projects.

It is a nonsense and it must be a scandal that the Council of Ministers on European space co-operation has not met since 1977. I look forward to seeing its reply to this report, which I strongly support.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at the risk of boring you, I too should like to begin by complimenting the Rapporteur on this very good report, which represents a valuable source of information for anyone who wants to catch up on developments in space technology. As the Rapporteur said in his introduction, the report shows that there is no genuine European space programme. Obviously no long-term planning exists. I have gained the impression, from my own and other parliaments, that priorities are fixed annually in the various countries; this is not consistent with long-term planning. I agree with the Rapporteur that clarification is needed here.

Experts in the western world all agree that further development of space travel and space technology is exceedingly important, both scientifically and technologically speaking. Employment is another argument put forward in this connection. The previous speaker deduced, from the great interest shown in spectacular developments in this field, that there is also great interest in technological developments. I do not agree. I think we are faced here by a difficult phenomenon, that of human estrangement from technology. Firstly, people do not know what is going on in the

Mr. Konings (continued)

technological field and, secondly, they often feel threatened by technical developments.

I would mention in this connection the development of the chip, which people recognise as a threat to their jobs. I would also draw attention to developments in the field of nuclear energy, which people feel to be a threat to their safety, and to the development of nuclear weapons, which are a threat to human life. The educational system is also responsible. In the Netherlands we have an educational system in which many people never acquire even the rudiments of technical knowledge and I know that the same is true of many other countries.

Paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation calls for mobilisation of public and political opinion; I think this should be tackled in a very fundamental manner. It is a long-term operation. If we want to interest people in technical developments, they will have to begin by understanding the problems, and then it will be a question of removing the threat.

There is another problem inherent in the educational system. We teach people about technology without giving them any idea how to explain the subject to others. Experts have scarcely any opportunity of explaining in broad outline what is going on. While I do think paragraph 6 is important, I do not think its effects can be other than long-term.

As we all know, politicians usually work on a short-term basis, which is particularly important in periods of economic recession.

People have quite different problems at such times. They are thinking about minimum incomes and social security benefits. I think politicians are right to give these top priority. The result is that space activities, in particular, receive a lower priority. Various countries are also economising in this field. Moreover, the employment created by ESA's activities is very unevenly distributed among the various participating countries, nor does its distribution correspond to the contributions made by the various countries. If each country were to receive employment in return for the investment made, this could provide particularly welcome support at a time of economic decline and might be conducive to co-operation among the various countries concerned. This division of labour will, however, also lead to fragmentation. As already stated in this Assembly, the European Space Agency is meant to be a co-operative body; but some of the ESA member states also have bilateral and trilateral agreements with other countries. All kinds of research projects are being pur-

sued independently of ESA. I think that all this should be co-ordinated by ESA, with a fair distribution in terms of resources and employment.

I find the report rather on the optimistic side as far as foreseeable developments are concerned.

The report also mentions Brazil and India as countries said to be spending more and more on their space development projects. In view of Brazil's enormous inflation rate I think this is unlikely. I have grave doubts as to whether such prestige projects are well-advised and whether we should be trying to promote them. I think we ought to be very cautious about this.

Lastly, a few remarks about paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, concerning military activities. This advocates the exploitation of European observation and communication satellites in a North Atlantic Alliance context – I believe Eastern Europe is using satellites of this kind. These are NATO projects, a matter for co-operation between the Western European countries and the United States. I should like to ask the Rapporteur to explain what he has in mind. ESA cannot act in this connection, because it is not at liberty to consider military projects, since a number of ESA members do not wish to. ESA is therefore ruled out.

I should consider it wrong for a new, possibly military organisation to be created in Europe in order to launch European satellites. I do not think such an organisation is necessary.

The outlook is far from bright as regards space programme developments in Europe. This report will certainly help, but I am not optimistic about the rate of progress. We must continue to discuss the subject, both here and in our parliaments, however, and do our best to speed up the pace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Konings.

I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to start with just one remark about the Council's activities in the field of energy policy. I am not impressed by them. All the Council really does is to issue statements and communiqués saying that a short-term or medium-term energy programme must be drawn up. This actually amounts to no more than a series of pious hopes. It is indeed disappointing to observe that eight years after the first oil crisis – by now we are already talking about the third oil crisis – all of us together in Western Europe have still not succeeded in even making a start on

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

actually implementing programmes which have been pouring out uninterruptedly since 1973.

Nor are there any grounds for satisfaction over the aircraft industry. Here, too, we have failed as a body to design and build the European aircraft for about one hundred and fifty passengers which has been discussed for such a long time. I think it might have something to do with the fact that a dynamic and creative firm like Fokker is based in a small country like the Netherlands, rather than in France, for instance. But perhaps everything will become new and better when the new French Government has worked itself in. I should not be surprised to see several models of this type of aircraft on the market quite soon. To speculate for a moment: a British industry model, an Airbus model, one built by McDonnell-Douglas and Fokker jointly and perhaps yet another by Japanese industry, plus – let us not forget – one by Boeing.

As usual, the cost of this fragmented national approach is passed straight on to the taxpayers, who naturally have to foot the bill again for the inevitable, massive government subsidies. We shall never, of course, be able to compete properly on the world market in this way.

I now come to space technology. Mr. Wilkinson has given an interesting survey of the European activities which will be necessary in the 1980s. Space activities lead to a great deal of technological innovation and can therefore give an important boost to European industry to help it out of the dead end of huge unemployment. Moreover, it has become apparent over the last twenty years that the European satellites are of extremely high quality. I believe that this is another way in which Europe can make an important contribution to the development of third world countries in areas such as soil exploration, topography, communications, etc. I should therefore like to urge the Council of Ministers of ESA actively to investigate what initiatives could be taken in this field. The ESA Council could also do with some political guidance in this field, but of course it will be necessary to press hard for this. I believe that the ESA Council has not met since 1977. I wonder whether this is not rather a poor showing for an organisation with a budget of 600 million units of account.

With regard to relations with the United States, I deplore the fact that the new government in Washington has thought it necessary to remove the so-called solar-polar mission from the programme. And this, please note, without consulting ESA! In Washington, too, it really must be appreciated that we cannot treat each

other in this way. All twelve governments have rightly instructed their ambassadors in Washington to make joint representations to the United States Government for the withdrawal of this unilateral decision. I hope they will succeed, because otherwise the results of ten years' study by many scientists, probably on handsome salaries – this society is like that – on both sides of the Atlantic will be virtually thrown away. That does not strike me as exactly inspiring, nor do I think it will help to increase mutual trust.

I regard the last point as so important because I agree with the Rapporteur that the nature of space development in itself calls for greater co-operation among all the countries working in this field, and of course particularly with the Americans. I share the Rapporteur's opinion that European space plans are rather on the meagre side. I had in fact expected more of ESA. I refer to the dismal events taking place in connection with Eurocontrol. I hope that we have learnt our lesson from this. The paring-down of ESA's mandate undoubtedly plays into the hands of small-scale, national interests. It is my firm conviction that this is the biggest threat to the future of European space technology.

For a healthy space industry the military component – the production of military satellites – is also important. In the United States about six military satellites are built for every civil satellite. I should therefore like to urge that in the forthcoming disarmament talks a great deal of attention should also be paid to the use of European satellites for surveillance.

Lastly, I would point out that space programmes cost money, a lot of money. And if our countries are short of anything at the moment, it is money. So I would point once more to the contribution which space activities can make to the vital processes of industrial renewal on which we in Europe are so anxious to embark. They are essential if we are to escape from the trap of unemployment. To obtain the necessary funds, it is always important for public opinion to see the advantages. I would therefore like to tell the people concerned with space activities that it is best to work absolutely openly. It must, for instance, be made quite clear what rôle space can play in development for people in the third world, a matter to which we – many of us, at least – assign top priority. We must make it clear what space can mean, and already means, in our everyday lives.

In conclusion I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his interesting report. I would add that I also enjoyed not only the enthusiasm with which Mr. Wilkinson prepared his report in the Committee but also the enthusiasm with which he explained it to us today. I am most grateful to him.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cornelissen. I believe we would all warmly endorse your complimentary remarks to the Rapporteur not only on his report and his introduction of it today but on the active and informed part that he has taken since he became a member of the Assembly in the scientific and technological aspects of our work. We are very much indebted to Mr. Wilkinson.

We have only one speaker remaining, Mr. Ronald Brown. My intention therefore would be, if we can, to finish the debate this morning, including, if it is not opposed, the amendment. But I would not in any circumstances – I believe there would be procedural argument if I did so – put the draft recommendation to the vote this morning. That will be taken during the afternoon.

I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I am very grateful to you, Mr. President, for calling me and I would endorse your view on the work of the Rapporteur. In following my friend from Holland it is almost as if we have an old boy network.

When I read my colleague's report I felt somehow that I had been here many times before, and I was then activated to think of your remarks, Mr. President, when you made the same comment about me sixteen years ago. I hesitate to believe that we have moved on all that time. I will come in a moment to the point on which you made those grandiose remarks to me at that time.

When we started out, those of us who were endeavouring to get Europe concerned about and interested in space had a hell of a fight in trying to get parliamentarians in all our nation states to be interested. When we finally decided to try to find an alternative to ELDO, which had just been killed off, we decided to go for the new organisation of the European Space Agency. I was one of those who pioneered and argued for such an agency and in this very Assembly I said that I considered such an agency would be useless unless we could define its objectives. I see that paragraph 1 of the recommendation is virtually an image of what I said the new agency would have to do. I said it would have to elaborate long-term European space planning. It would have to identify European space strategy and Europe would also have to examine and determine the technical, industrial and commercial objectives to be met.

That was sixteen years ago and I see that we have now arrived there. We are now recommending exactly the same things to the Council. Since the Council has not met, as I am told, since 1977, I suppose we should have a reunion in sixteen years' time to remind

ourselves that sixteen years earlier we did it and that thirty-two years before we had also done exactly the same thing. It is sad to look around this Assembly, again, exactly sixteen years later. I recall that I expressed exactly the same view in that meeting. Looking around one can see the vast interest of parliamentarians in space, that is to say, their space. We are all here: they are all away. That epitomises the situation.

We do not have to convince just the Council of Ministers. We might well start by convincing ourselves and our colleagues that this is an important issue. In paragraph 6 the Rapporteur clearly illustrates how the issues have moved. He refers to the 1960s when he says: "The main motive was science and technology." He tended there to rewrite history a little. Unfortunately, the motivation was much more mercenary than that. The United Kingdom Government had Blue Streak and did not know what to do, and the French had a launcher called Coralie which they were developing. They did not know how to develop it and wanted more technology. The Germans wanted to get back somehow into space through launcher development and the Italians were happy to have the nose cone to play with. Therefore, those groups came together to form ELDO, the only European launcher development organisation that we had in mind at that time. It was brought about simply to find some way of using Blue Streak and Coralie and to give the Germans and Italians a chance to come back into launchers.

The result was that we designed a launcher of undefined size to do an undefined job and the result was that it failed. It is interesting that we should be discussing it today, because the Assembly may not have noticed it but your own expertise in this field, Mr. President, ought not to go unnoticed since it was you who took Britain out of ELDO and killed that project stone dead. It was as a result of your decision, as the minister responsible, that we had finally to set up the European Space Agency. It is a pity that you are not on the floor, Mr. President, when you could give us the benefit of your knowledge of how you killed ELDO and why it has taken us all this time to reach a situation where the Council of Ministers has not met since 1977.

I would also draw attention to paragraph 94 in which the Rapporteur refers to the EEC and its failure to achieve a common energy policy. I can only say that those of my colleagues who served in the European Parliament tried desperately hard to encourage the Commission and the Council of Ministers to agree. The Commissioners always agreed. There was no doubt the Commissioner responsible for energy fought manfully to persuade the

Mr. Brown (continued)

Council of Ministers to have a common energy policy. The only movement that was ever made in that respect was by my own colleague, Mr. Benn, who gave a total commitment that he would place our energy supplies in Great Britain under the EEC in a crisis. That is the only major step that has ever been made towards a common European policy on energy. Once again it was not done by the Commission but by a politician. Parliament kept calling for a common energy policy, but it was ministers who refused to agree with that.

I would draw attention to paragraph 2. One of the problems over giving encouragement to our member states is that the Voyager programme has been very successful and looking beyond outer space at the planetary system has in a way made it difficult for us in Europe to argue a special case because of that most successful programme. We have some difficulty in trying to argue that we want to cover stellar observations in that way, but again that will be a joint effort beyond Europe rather than ours.

We come to paragraph 4. We have tried to deal with the earth resources satellite programme on an international basis because from the earlier days it was argued that it was not fruitful to try to undertake earth resources satellite programmes on a regional basis.

We felt that probably it was an international basis and I argued at that time that it should be under the control of the United Nations.

In the past I have argued strongly not only for telecommunications satellites but for educational satellites in respect of which Europe could make a major commitment to the countries of the third world. I am sorry that the Committee did not think it worthwhile to put in the report an item on educational satellites. I tried long ago to catch people's imagination in this respect but failed. I still believe that educational satellites could be extremely valuable in the development of the third world.

I support completely paragraph 6 of the recommendation. We have to keep on arguing and to mobilise political and public opinion. We have to go on arguing for an extended programme, although some of us will be happy if we maintain the existing one. Although I have been arguing that our commitment in Europe to space activity should depend on a commercial and industrial spinoff, the issue is bigger than that.

I support the report; it is extremely valuable. It rehearses many of the arguments. I hope that some day ministers will be as

willing to be brave and courageous about putting Europe in the forefront of this battle as this Assembly has been in past years.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. As you said, I was involved with ELDO fifteen years ago. However, I was not there when the decision to end the project was taken. When I was concerned with it, I seem to remember ministerial meetings taking place once a week for several weeks.

I must ask the Rapporteur and the Chairman whether they wish the debate to finish now, although the vote will have to come this afternoon. I do not think that we shall have time for the amendment if it is contested. If it is accepted, we can deal with it now. I do not want the sitting to go beyond one o'clock because our colleagues have engagements to fulfil.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for your indulgence, Mr. President. I am sure that the whole Assembly greatly appreciates your personal interest in space matters.

This has been a wide-ranging and well-informed debate, and I greatly welcome the contributions made from the floor which have greatly added to our perspective of this subject.

Mr. Topmann was right to emphasise the budgetary constraints. We have to be practical. He was correct in suggesting that the system of financing the European Space Agency leaves much to be desired and should be based more on gross national product. We should aim at an annual expenditure of 450 million units of account on the programme for the next ten years. I think that the Director-General himself has suggested that that is the minimum amount which is practically feasible if we are to have a worthwhile European programme. I express the hope to my friend Mr. Topmann that as the expenditure on Space Cab diminishes – and Germany spends far more on Space Cab than any other member country of ESA – the disproportionate burden on the Federal Republic will also diminish. That, I hope, will allay his anxiety.

Dealing with the speech of Mr. Antoni, our Committee, which went only in the spring to Italy, will be well aware of Italy's contribution to the Earthnet system and the importance to Italy of an active energy programme for Europe – a point which was emphasised by Mr. Cornelissen.

My friend and colleague, David Atkinson, whose expertise is well known to the Committee – he was a rapporteur for the Council of Europe and did an invaluable service by raising this subject in an adjournment debate in the British Parliament – was right to emphasise the

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

neo-Keynesian benefits of an active space programme in a recession. He was also right in referring to the importance of private investment. Here I draw a distinction between the rôle of ESA and that of nationally funded government programmes. Governments should pursue the question of the necessary research and development, whereas the applications can more properly be left to private enterprise.

I was interested in what Mr. Atkinson said about a mini-shuttle. The British Aerospace Corporation has a project called Mustard which I saw at Warton in the mid-1960s which looked to me exactly the same as the space shuttle Columbia.

Mr. Konings made a thoughtful contribution. He was right to emphasise the estrangement that people feel in their practical daily lives from technical progress. We must make the benefits clear to them. This involves a *juste retour* for the investment that nations make on their behalf through ESA, albeit on a national scale.

We should not be over-optimistic; we should not paint too rosy a picture. What Mr. Atkinson said about time scales was absolutely right in view of our experience, so well demonstrated.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Wilkinson, but you can continue this afternoon. You will not be able to speak until one o'clock because I have to deal with the Orders of the Day for this afternoon. If you wish to go on this afternoon, that will be all right, but we shall not be able to conclude the debate unless you are able to finish your speech in two or three minutes.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Atkinson was also right in what he said about the rôle of politicians. Without Kennedy, I do not think that the Americans would have put a man on the moon by the end of the 1960s.

We should not be put off by our experience; we should learn from it. Mr. Brown's warning was salutary.

I recommend the report to the Assembly. I hope that the Assembly has taken note of our response to the Council. I thank my colleague the Clerk, whose work was absolutely invaluable. I am also grateful for the assistance of the staff of the European Space Agency, who made the report possible.

The PRESIDENT. – I was sorry to cut short your interesting remarks, Mr. Wilkinson, but I am bound by Rule 23, which provides that unless the Assembly otherwise decides we

should finish at one o'clock. Mr. Lenzer, do you wish to speak?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – For one minute.

The PRESIDENT. – One minute exactly.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – With your permission, Mr. President, just one minute. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to add my voice to the chorus of those who have referred to and praised the excellent work and the commitment of our friend, Mr. Wilkinson. For us in the Committee, that is a foregone conclusion.

A second remark – very briefly, to keep within my time limit – Mr. President, to hold the vote now if the rules of the Assembly permit might help to expedite proceedings this afternoon. The fact that the draft recommendation was adopted unanimously in Committee leads me to hope that you, Mr. President, might consider whether we cannot take a vote on the report straight away. That was my request. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I well understand that, and that would be my wish, but I have been advised that as it was not put on the Orders of the Day, if a member came this afternoon and said that he wished to vote and required a roll-call I should be in great difficulty. There is an amendment which we have to dispose of, and we have already reached 1 o'clock. I have to deal with the Orders of the Day for this afternoon.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. We accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – It is a question of whether the Assembly accepts it. It will have to be put this afternoon at the beginning of the proceedings unless Mr. Topmann is prepared to move it formally. If so, I shall take the amendment, but not the draft recommendation. Are you willing to move the amendment now, Mr. Topmann? If you wish to make a speech, you must do it at 3 o'clock.

Mr. TOPMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to move the amendment now. I move that paragraph 3 be worded as follows: "To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an established demand for it;".

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much. The amendment has been formally moved. I understand that the Committee accepts the amendment.

We shall therefore now vote on Amendment 1.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We are obliged by rule to take the vote on the draft recommendation – and I hope that it will be non-controversial – at the beginning of our proceedings this afternoon. In the event of a roll-call vote being required, we shall take that later in the afternoon, after item 2.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 883).
2. Relations between parliaments and the press (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 873).
3. Developments in Poland (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 870 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 17th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 883*).
4. Relations between parliaments and the press (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 873*).
5. Developments in Poland (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 870 and Amendments*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

Speakers: The President, Mrs. Knight (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Enders, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Stoffelen (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mrs. Knight (*Rapporteur*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Hanin (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Gessner, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Bernini, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Hawkins.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

Let me again stress the importance of all Representatives or Substitutes signing the Register of Attendance, both from the point of view of recording their presence and also as it forms the basis of our quorum if a roll-call is required.

3. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 883)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation

on the future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council, Document 883.

This morning, we concluded the debate and accepted the amendment proposed by Mr. Topmann.

I will now ask the Assembly to vote on the draft recommendation itself contained in Document 883 as amended.

If there are no objections and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

I am sure that it will be your wish for me to thank the Committee in general and Mr. Wilkinson in particular for an extremely interesting report.

4. Relations between parliaments and the press

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 873)

The PRESIDENT. – The second Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on relations between parliaments and the press, Document 873.

1. See page 37.

1. See page 38.

The President (continued)

I call Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I should first like to express my gratitude and that of the Committee to you for altering the position on the agenda of this presentation. We are grateful to you for heeding our pleas and allowing us to change the position on the agenda.

Let me say at the outset that no intention exists in my report from beginning to end other than the intention of improving the workings of WEU and thus its interest for the press. There is certainly criticism in it, but only by pointing to some of our failings can improvements be wrought. Some have criticised my criticisms, but if none questions, none will reform, and there can be no valid claim that no reforms are needed.

I am saying plainly in the report that some things are wrong with the way we work. I have not invented these things. They exist whether I point to them or not. We cannot make them go away if we shut our eyes or behave like ostriches and stick our heads in the sand. Eventually our eyes must open, our heads must come out of the sand, and the faults will still be present. Therefore, let us resolve to look our failings bravely in the face and to do our best to remedy them.

I should also like to make clear at this stage that in no way am I seeking to criticise our permanent staff or those who work on the administrative side of WEU. We are excellently served by these men and women who do their utmost to make WEU work well. As Shakespeare might have said, had he thought of it at the time, "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not with our permanent officials but with ourselves."

The report is called "Relations between parliaments and the press". All of us are aware that as parliamentarians we depend greatly on the press. Although I do not agree with those who sometimes say that no publicity is bad publicity, many of our tasks here depend on publicity to be fully effective. If we cannot capture the interest of the press, we fail.

As colleagues will note from the report, I was unable to carry out a study of the success or otherwise of our past contacts with the press, because we keep records for only one year. I very much hope that now that this has been pointed out, consideration will be given to preserving press archives for at least five years and perhaps even ten.

The report contains a section on budgetary matters and deals with how much is set aside

for the cost of WEU. Some people believe that all problems can be solved by greater injections of cash. I do not believe that at all. My report makes plain that I am not asking for more money for WEU, even though, compared with some bodies, the amount is sparse. I am saying that we can do much more ourselves. I want more activity.

First, that activity must be carried out by ourselves. We, whom I might describe as the individual foot soldiers, must change our attitudes to our work here. It is an honour and a privilege to be part of this body, but few of us seem to believe that at all. I refer in paragraph 14 to a questionnaire that was taken by the German parliamentarians. I point to only one sentence, which states:

"When asked whether the work of the WEU Assembly occupied an important place in their political work, two said yes and seventeen no."

If we have no faith in our work, how in the world can we interest the press in what we are doing?

Many members indicate this lack of interest by failing to turn up at meetings. On receipt of an agenda, they are seized with a positive frenzy of lethargy. Not infrequently, Committees faced with the need to make important decisions find that they cannot do so because there is no quorum. Diligent members who have properly arranged their affairs and flown off at monetary cost to their governments and convenience cost to themselves are angry and disheartened when this occurs. I am not saying that we can all be here all the time. We all know that that is impossible. At present there are four separate national obstructions to attendance here. First, there are the French elections. Secondly, there is the crisis in Italy. Thirdly, although the Dutch elections are over, they still represent a barrier because no government has been formed as yet. Then there is the German national holiday. So there are four reasons why this is a bad time. However, an attendance of sixteen members out of a possible eighty-nine, as happened on Monday, is not good enough, especially when one remembers that the full number is 178 if we include the substitutes. There were, however, more than eighty members in the hemicycle when General Rogers spoke.

Members must do more to pursue WEU decisions in their national parliaments and in the press. The chances are there. How many of us use them? Some do. There is, however, so much more that we could do. In giving information to the press and in telling it what we have done – even individually – we have to remember the time constraint within which it

Mrs. Knight (continued)

works. It is no good giving it a splendid hand-out at 8 o'clock at night and expecting the story to be in the newspapers the next day. That is too late.

I spoke about the foot soldiers. Now I come to the captains, the generals and the Supreme Allied Commander himself. Greatly daring, I make these suggestions. The Council should meet more than once a year. When it meets, it should have an important and effective meeting. It should be for the Council to consider the reports passed by WEU and to decide what should be done with them. Each decision of the Council greatly interests the press. If the Council were a little more active, that would be a good thing. We should ensure that agendas are set down sufficiently in advance and are adhered to. We shall be hearing Mr. Grieve's report tomorrow about the change in the rules. Some of these matters are catered for there. These matters are important, because if people do not know sufficiently far in advance what we are debating, they cannot produce a meaningful report and they cannot tell the press about it.

From the press's point of view it is most important to ensure a ministerial presence here. We have been told already this part-session that ministers are busy. Of course they are, but so are we. If WEU is an important body, surely it is worth while for ministers to be here and to participate. We pride ourselves on being the only European assembly with a defence responsibility. However, we hardly ever have a defence minister from any country to address us. The last was in 1979. If we are a defence-oriented body, surely one defence minister from one country could address us once a year.

There was a ministerial meeting recently in The Hague. Ministers from all our countries were supposed to be present. Only two were, in fact, present. I am glad that one was the British minister. The other was the Dutch minister. If it is not general practice for ministers to attend and to answer questions, the few who come will think that it is not worth while. They will ask themselves why they should bother when no one else does.

We must try - I appreciate the difficulties here - to secure the attendance of more important speakers. I have in mind the privilege we enjoyed yesterday of hearing General Rogers. There is interest not only among members but in the press - the latter to a tremendous extent. There is wide coverage of that speech in the press today. There always will be when we do something of importance and of interest.

The Council should never pass to other bodies those matters that are rightly the responsibility of WEU. That has happened and it still does. It seems to indicate a lack of faith in ourselves as an effective body. If we keep shuffling off to other people matters that are our responsibility, we shall believe that we are incapable or incompetent to handle these issues. That would be bad. The Council should sometimes cast off the mantle of secrecy under which it sometimes seems to like to work. For instance, there is a report from the Standing Armaments Committee which was made on the instructions of the Council. It has never been reported to the Assembly. One might assume that it was a highly secret matter. It was not. It related to juridical problems. It could easily have been reported to the Assembly. It may be biblically wise not to let the left hand know what the right hand is doing, but it makes no sense in the context of WEU. That is particularly the case if we hope to interest the European press.

I may have been provocative in what I have said. I may have been harsh. Whatever I have said has been said for good reason. All I seek is improvement in our method of work. The press is our ally. It is not our distant acquaintance. We ought not to bore it to tears. We ought to interest it, assist it, feed it and welcome it. We in WEU have the potential to be a great force. We could be an important and influential arm for Europe's defence. Let us not throw away the chance. I have pleasure in presenting the report.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mrs. Knight. Your report was thoughtful, constructive and, perhaps, provocative. I am sure that it will meet with a response from the Council. I noted that its representatives were closely following your remarks. Perhaps we may have some results from that quarter.

It is not for want of trying on my part and that of the Presidential Committee that a defence minister has not spoken to us this part-session. With great help from my Italian colleagues, the Italian Defence Minister was all ready to come. I understand, however, that there is no Italian Defence Minister now. He was unable to come because there is no government.

It is not for me to reply to your interesting remarks. On the organisation of business, however, I would certainly welcome more speeches from ministers and others, including SACEUR. Our Committees must understand this, however: if more time is devoted to ministerial and other speeches, there will be no time to discuss and decide upon three or four reports from each Committee. The more outside speakers there are, the more must our Committees

The President (continued)

exercise a self-denying ordinance. Our dilemma always is that we have more business than our time permits us properly to dispose of.

I have, perhaps, said more than I should. Thank you, Mrs. Knight, for your interesting contribution trying to promote the outside image of WEU.

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I congratulate Mrs. Knight most warmly on her excellent report, in which she deals with matters of interest to us all. The essential point is publicity for the WEU Assembly and proper recognition of its work by the public and in political life. After all, this interparliamentary assembly is concerned on the one hand with interlocuting the Council and on the other with promoting co-operation in Europe. It is officially empowered to discuss matters transcending national frontiers and publicly to address to the national governments joint recommendations which, if the WEU Assembly did not exist, might be seen as an offensive interference in internal affairs.

Given this institutional framework one has to look for the reasons for the relatively scant coverage in the press. In one year, from 1979 to 1980, the recorded number of articles dropped from 434 to 295, and many of the debates which we considered important received little or no coverage in our national papers. Clearly, the newspapers themselves are not responsible for this negative trend – on the contrary, the cuttings on the board in the press room today show that yesterday's debate was relatively well reported. Unfortunately the German press could not report it, because today and tomorrow are national holidays, when no newspapers appear.

We have to take our full share of the blame for many missed opportunities. Mrs. Knight gives us, as an example of their estimation of the WEU Assembly, the results of an enquiry conducted among parliamentarians, and his analysis of their replies, in a paper by Lutz Leinert. Out of thirty-seven members of parliament to whom the questionnaire was sent, nineteen replied. Although that represents 52 %, I would have some reservations, because the sample does not appear to be altogether representative. The significance of the nineteen should therefore not be overestimated. Half of those approached were undoubtedly unaware of the purpose and significance of the enquiry, and so, as usual, many questionnaires will have found their way into the wastepaper basket unread. Nevertheless, I believe that,

despite the fortuitous nature of the replies, Leinert's intuitive interpretation of the assessment of the WEU Assembly by its own members is correct.

I would like to emphasise two points which, on the basis of ten years' experience of this Assembly, I regard as serious. The fact that debates are often interrupted has a bad effect on press coverage. For example, we begin in the morning with a certain subject. At 11 o'clock we hear an address by an eminent politician which, together with the ensuing debate, takes up the rest of the morning. Amendments are debated in the afternoon. By the time we come to the voting the ranks may have become so thin that we no longer have a quorum. What can we do? The vote is postponed until the following day. There was even one occasion when the vote had to be postponed to the next part-session six months later. I do not think this is a good thing and I suggest that we put an end to laxity and bring our debates to a conclusion. This implies no criticism of the Chair, it simply reflects my desire to take account of the interests of parliamentarians actually in the chamber rather than of those who may be talking outside in the lobby. If debates drag on for days before reaching a conclusion, who can wonder if the press does not give due prominence to these rather enigmatic speeches and procedures?

Many groups from neighbouring countries, schools, members of various organisations and tourists come to Paris in the course of a year. Their programme includes a visit to the Louvre, Notre Dame, the Eiffel Tower and perhaps the night-club district. I have never heard of a tourist coming to Paris to visit the WEU Assembly. Why not, after all? Is everyone so unaware of our work? One would think so, to look at all the empty seats in the gallery today. And it is the same at every part-session. In our home parliaments things are quite different. Groups of visitors come crowding in, and there is a ten-month waiting period before an application can be considered.

In my view it would do our Assembly and its image some good if, instead of the stacks of reports and minutes of colloquies outside these doors – including yearbooks from 1963 on – we put out a short, readable, illustrated brochure about WEU. And visitors should be able to come here not only during sessions but the whole year round. Guided tours – perhaps including an easily understandable film, yet to be produced – would explain our activities and provide the necessary information.

I admit, Mr. President, that such publicity costs effort and money. But I am firmly convinced that it would be very well spent if it increased young people's knowledge of the

Mr. Enders (continued)

WEU Assembly. Finally, instead of our isolated, indeed sometimes invisible, existence here in the Palais d'Iéna, interest should be aroused among the general public in our work and in our Assembly, which is an important instrument of European security and European co-operation. If Mrs. Knight's report contributes towards the achievement of this goal, it will be of great service. I ask members to act accordingly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Enders. I am very much attracted to your idea of our becoming one of Paris's tourist attractions, although I am bound to say we would meet with quite a lot of competition. This building does not belong to WEU. We are privileged by the Economic and Social Council to have the use of it, for which I believe we have to pay some rent. Certainly, we are indebted to the Council for letting us use the building for two weeks a year, but I am sure the Council would not agree to our turning it into a daily tourist attraction, because it is the centre of the Council's work as well. If your government were to come along with money in the same generous spirit as yourself, we could consider what we might be able to do.

The next speaker is Mr. Hawkins.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for calling me. I will try to be brief.

I have raised matters of this kind on several occasions. I greatly welcome Mrs. Knight's forthright statement. We in the British Parliament have learned that Mrs. Knight says things with great emphasis, but what she says is said from the head and the heart and that she hits upon the right things to say and the way to say them. There is a lot in this report of which we must take notice – that we must take notice of, not that we can take notice of.

I wish to draw attention to only a few matters which I think want emphasising. First, I must seek to speak to the President here. The Presidential Committee must try better to control the agenda and the number of reports coming forward. We want far too many reports. We want to speak too much and no doubt we all bore each other. That may be the reason why not enough people are present in the hemicycle. But the work of the defence of Western Europe is of great importance. Nobody who listened to General Rogers could think otherwise. I have been in one war and many other people here have been, too. I do not want to see my grandchildren and children in another.

We must rouse our people. This is what this is all about. We must get through to the peo-

ple whom we represent. Unless we do so then, in General Rogers' words, we are not informing the people and we are not putting over, uniquely as we, as members of European parliaments, can put over, the truth to our own people, through our parliaments, through the governments and through our contacts with our constituencies. I agree with the President that far too many reports come forward, but he has to be a bit of a dictator. He and his Presidential Committee have to set up some bounds and rules on the numbers of reports coming forward. He must guide us as to the general coherence of the whole of the reports so that we produce something at the end of each Assembly that comes out as a whole. That is what I would like to put forward.

We must have more information on the budget alone. It seems extraordinary that we have no knowledge at all of two-thirds of the budget expenditure. I was a prisoner of war in Germany. Now allies of Germany and Italy, we were former enemies, but I sincerely hope and believe that we shall never be again. But we must drop some of this enormous expenditure on inspections and other things by retired admirals, generals and air vice-marshals. We must have information as to what is going on in that quarter. I do not know and I am only guessing, but I believe that that would enable us to concentrate more on what I believe are the important things of today rather than what the Brussels Treaty thought of many years ago.

The President has referred to this as a building, which has been kindly loaned or rented to us. For practical reasons, frankly it is an impossible building. We have knocked a hole in the wall. Now, unlike when I first came here, we no longer have to travel up and down so many stairs. There is no lift in the place, though probably that is a good thing because one tends to get stuck in lifts. There is no clock in the building. We do not know when things are happening or what is the correct time. There are two small clocks here which I believe I can just read, but we have no television communication to tell everybody when something is starting to happen. That is a development at which we shall have to look.

Finally, I want to speak about something which Mrs. Knight has put forward which we can do ourselves. As individuals we may not be able to talk to "The Times" in Great Britain, or a newspaper in Germany – I hope it is no longer the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Perhaps individually we cannot influence the national newspapers, but we can influence our own local newspapers. We can put in a report after each Assembly telling those newspapers what WEU is doing. We should do so.

We must also report to our own governments. If we do not get answers to questions

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

about what our governments are doing in relation to WEU reports, we should demand answers in our own parliaments.

I sum up by saying that I believe that the report by Mrs. Knight is most welcome but, as she has said, it must not become useless. It must not be left lying on the table. We must insist upon action and I hope that we shall all back that excellent report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hawkins. I should say, just to make it clear in case there is some misunderstanding, that we are here as the guests of the French Economic and Social Council. It allows us the use of this hemicycle without charge. I paid my respects to the President when I was elected and had a chat with him. He was kind enough to come to our reception only on Monday of this week. He has said that we are welcome and that the Council will do all it can to assist us. We have of course to pay the cost of the rather expensive interpretation facilities that we have to install and remove, because the Council, being an organ of the French parliamentary system, does not need interpreters.

As far as the Council can, it is willing to help us, but certainly this is not our building. As we have the use of it for only two weeks in the year, while we might like to do some of the things that have been suggested, we have to be practical. Naturally, if all of us were to go back to our national parliaments and vote a lot more money for the Assembly of WEU, that would be beneficial. I take it that the reference to the two-thirds of the budget about which we do not know is two-thirds of the ministerial and Council organs, not the Assembly, for we account to the Assembly for our expenditure.

I must now congratulate Mr. Stoffelen, whom I understand has been elected Chairman of this important Committee. Perhaps Mrs. Knight, the Rapporteur, wishes to speak first, or does Mr. Stoffelen wish to speak? Mr. Stoffelen, I congratulate you on behalf of the Assembly on your election.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Thank you, Mr. President. First, I want to thank Mrs. Knight for her extremely frank and interesting report and speech. I well remember the speech she made last year and I am wondering which was the better. I assure every member of the Assembly that the report is well worth reading. Perhaps there may be two or three members who have not had the time to do so, but I can assure them that it is worthwhile.

Secondly, we all share the opinion that the work that we are doing is important, at least

more important than some of our colleagues in our parliaments may think.

It is clear that we all share the same opinion about the reasons for some of our problems. One problem relates to the attendance of members at Committee and Assembly meetings. As the Rapporteur and Mr. Enders have said, we must, and we can, make improvements in that respect. As Chairman of the Committee, I feel obliged to say that it is the responsibility of, for instance, the chairmen of political groups – and I know one chairman who accepts this responsibility – to ensure that members of his or her group are present at Committee and Assembly meetings. It is the responsibility of national delegations to ensure that as many of their members as possible are present.

We agree with Mr. Hawkins that we produce too many reports. How can we expect the press to deal every week with seven, eight, or nine reports? It is completely impossible. We share the opinion of Mr. Hawkins that we should organise our work in such a way that we produce fewer reports. We must produce interesting reports of great political relevance. We cannot expect journalists to write about reports which do not have great political interest.

I agree with Mr. Enders that we have a duty to see whether we can organise our debates more strictly. However, it would be bad if we spent only one hour each half year on this important aspect of our work. How can we improve the image of Western European Union and our Assembly for the benefit of our work and of our countries?

I thank the Rapporteur for her analysis of the problems and suggestions for improvements. I assure you, Mr. President, that our Committee will continue to analyse the problems and to make improvements. I thank again the Rapporteur and all those who have taken part in the discussion. I hope that in the near future we shall find ways of improving the situation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

Do you wish to reply, Mrs. Knight?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Very briefly, Mr. President.

I thank those who have taken part in the debate. Some very constructive suggestions have been made which no doubt will be acted upon. I express my pleasure about the fact that, apparently, no colleague thought that an amendment to the report should be tabled. I leave the report confidently and happily with the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight. I understand that there is no recommendation, so that there is no formal question to put to the Assembly.

I am sure that the representatives, in noting your report, Mrs. Knight, will wish to thank you and your colleagues for bringing it to their attention. We are also indebted to Mr. Burgelin, who, in addition to his onerous duties as Clerk to the General Affairs Committee and in the absence through illness of Mr. van't Land, has been acting as Clerk to the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. We hope for the return to health of Mr. van't Land, who formerly took care of the Committee.

5. *Developments in Poland*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 870 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The third Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on developments in Poland, Document 870 and Amendments. This is an extremely important subject, and I am glad that we shall have sufficient time to permit a good debate.

I call Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, in my brief statement I shall not be following the order of items as they appear in my report but picking out what seem to me to be the salient aspects of this problem and explaining what prompted the solutions I propose.

What has happened in Poland in recent months can only be regarded as completely exceptional. For the first time in an eastern bloc country a move towards democratisation has begun without provoking – at least not immediately – either internal repression by the police or Soviet military intervention, as was the case in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The process is characterised not by a challenge to the communist system as such or by the formation of independent political parties, but by the formation of trade unions independent of the power structure and the established system. However, although this process was triggered off by the trade unions, with all the social implications that that normally entails, it quite obviously has political implications too. In a country with such a homogeneous structure, to avoid using another term, in a country with a single political party and a single trade union, the formation of an independent trade union that speaks its mind and has the power to force through its demands on issues it considers fair and worthwhile is an extraordinary development.

We have asked ourselves why the dreaded intervention has not taken place, and there are, we feel, several reasons for this.

The first is undeniably the unanimous desire of the Polish people to settle Polish problems internally and to reject any external intervention. The Solidarity trade union has not been alone in taking up this position. It seems clear that the party, the government and the army – the whole establishment – agree that, while their views may differ on the roots of the problem, it should be solved by the Poles and no one else.

The second reason, it seems to me, has been the moderation – sustained with difficulty – of the free trade union. The action taken by Solidarity has consisted not in subversion but in making its demands known, and it has been taken by non-violent means, combining, admittedly, shows of strength and a willingness to negotiate. It must also be said that Solidarity has shown skill in toning down social demands which it would be difficult to meet because of the economic situation in Poland. This moderation has not been easy. Everyone knows that, like any movement, Solidarity includes a number of extremists who want to go further more quickly and so risk jeopardising the situation as a whole. The union deserves high praise for resisting these people.

A third reason, I feel, is the risk which armed intervention involves for the Soviet Union, not the risk of failure, because the balance of forces is such that it would not fail, but the risk inherent in a bloody confrontation which would even further strengthen the unity of the Polish people and would undoubtedly be followed by a period of underground resistance with no end in view.

The fourth reason is, in my opinion, that the Soviet Union has not wanted to make its image any worse, if that is possible. It is quite obvious that, after what has happened in Afghanistan, military intervention in Poland would have given the whole world, including countries near the Soviet Union, and particularly the Arab countries, an image of the USSR which it certainly does not want.

The fifth reason, which is of particular interest to us, is the desire to maintain détente. I believe in fact that the Soviet Union sets store by détente, from which it derives various advantages. There are aspects of the Helsinki conference which the USSR values. We must realise this and say so. This is why, I feel, it has agreed to certain concessions: freedom of expression for some of the peoples now within its sphere of influence and the possibility of challenging the extremely homogeneous structure into which the countries under its influ-

Mr. Hanin (continued)

ence are fitted. It is impossible to see why it should have agreed to these concessions unless it wanted to preserve certain aspects of its policy.

I now come to what concerns us, the reaction of the West. Firstly, the western countries have said from the outset that they have no intention of interfering in Poland's internal affairs. Secondly, they knew full well that there was no question of military intervention by the West even if there had been military intervention by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the West has stated very firmly – and I feel WEU must do the same – that Soviet military intervention in Poland would have extremely serious implications for the process of détente. To tell the truth, it is difficult to see how a process of détente could have had any further meaning or how it could have continued if, after the signing of the Helsinki agreements, which recognise the right of nations to self-determination and affirm the principle of non-interference by the powers in the internal affairs of another country, the essential feature of this process of détente, the minimum of confidence nations can have in each other and in the commitments they have entered into, had been immediately spurned and trampled under foot.

This has been the background to our deliberations: what should the West say, what should Western European Union say now? And so I come back to the draft recommendation we have drawn up, with the almost unanimous approval of the General Affairs Committee, there being only one abstention, although this has not prevented the tabling of various amendments, on which I feel I should state my views. These amendments are not all of equal importance or significance, and they can be taken into account to some extent as long as they do not deprive our draft recommendation of all meaning.

It must be admitted that certain points are not covered by the draft recommendation. It does not, of course, refer to armed intervention for the simple reason that armed intervention is inconceivable in the circumstances and also because it would serve no useful purpose to arouse false hopes or to encourage members of Solidarity who might tend towards extreme solutions. In fact, as Solidarity's leaders have done, as the Catholic church has done in its contacts with Solidarity, the call should be for moderation so that the essence of what has already been achieved may be preserved.

What is proposed is firstly economic aid, which our countries owe to Poland. This country is in a critical economic situation, which was obviously partly responsible for the

explosion of popular feeling. Dissatisfied with the way their country has been run, the Poles want economic and social reform. The western nations have a duty to perform in this respect.

The report describes what has already been done, particularly at the level of the European Economic Community, and what further action is contemplated: specifically, supplies and postponement of the repayment of certain loans that have been granted. This being so, however, the only other action we can take is to address a stern warning to the Soviet Union. What is the justification for this?

If there were no cause for fear, if there were no threats, we should not say anything, of course. But the situation that has existed for some months, the verbal and written action that has been taken, the meetings that have been held, the continuation of military manoeuvres beyond the time they were scheduled to end, the criticisms which have appeared in the Soviet press justify the fear felt in the West. Consequently, it seems essential to me to warn the Soviet Union that, if it goes into Poland, if it decides on military intervention because what is happening in Poland is incompatible with what it considers to be the proper status of countries within its sphere of influence, it will be committing a serious violation of the Helsinki agreements and of two basic provisions of these agreements in particular.

The Soviet Union must, of course, realise that it would then be jeopardising the Helsinki agreements themselves and that the western countries would have to think about the situation created not by them but by the Soviet Union and review their position. It would be too easy if a country could accept the provisions of an agreement to its liking and reject those it considered a nuisance. Agreements and treaties have always been regarded as a cohesive whole, and everyone knows full well that the participants would not have agreed to sign a treaty if they had thought parts of it not worthy of their signature.

This is, it seems to me, one of the basic elements of our proposals. I stress this point because one of the amendments – on which I shall be stating my views at greater length at the appropriate time – questions this proposal.

Personally, I am quite prepared to drop the possibly over-rigid wording of the Committee's proposals, but I cannot go back on the assertion that, if the Helsinki agreements are violated through the invasion of Poland, the western countries would have to review their position. There can be no denying that such an invasion would endanger the whole process of détente as well as the negotiations on disarmament.

Mr. Hanin (continued)

ment. All negotiations are based on mutual trust. How could such trust be maintained if agreements only recently signed were renounced and if the action of certain signatories was diametrically opposed to their undertakings?

The final question is, whom do we address? As the Assembly's interlocutor is the Council of Ministers, we shall of course initially be sending the draft recommendation to it.

The question then arises, could we not go further? Could we not, like all international bodies, approach the other European organisations and say to them, here is the recommendation we have adopted and have forwarded to the Council of Ministers? Do you not think, you European organisations – NATO, the European Communities, with your particular interest in economic questions, the Council of Europe – that your attitude might be similar to ours?

The General Affairs Committee discussed this point. Personally, I believe that our organisation – and in the last few days various speakers have regretted that it does not have a large enough audience – might do the other European and western organisations a service, provided of course that they have not already decided on their attitude, since some of them have already adopted positions partly in line with what we want.

We could therefore call on these organisations to join with us so that the position we are suggesting the seven member states of WEU should adopt would not be confined to them but extended, for example, to the twenty-one countries of the Council of Europe. I do not think there is anything in the Charter of Western European Union to prevent us from adopting this approach. No one has ever claimed that WEU may not speak to the outside world but must confine itself to internal discussions. That is why I hope that these proposals will be approved.

Finally, we shall never fully appreciate the extraordinary, unprecedented nature, the cardinal importance of what is now happening in Poland. There is today a tiny glimmer of hope that freedom will be introduced into the system of an eastern bloc country. Something extremely important will have been achieved if the people of one eastern bloc country can escape from the rigid pattern of institutions and can join freely together to make themselves heard – but this is precisely what makes the process so difficult and so dangerous.

Acting with the greatest possible caution but also with all the necessary determination, we

must therefore help Poland in every way we can.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hanin. I am sure that you have properly underlined the great importance to all of us of events in Poland.

The debate is open.

Mr. Günther Müller is first on the list of speakers but is not here. I therefore call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank the Rapporteur very much for his report. One cannot fail to be aware of the great care and discretion with which he has worked. I was particularly impressed by the analytical section, much of which I can endorse without reservation; much of it has my full agreement. That is one side of the problem.

I do not wish, however, to conceal the fact that I have some reservations about the draft recommendation, although there can be no doubt whatsoever that all the recommendations formulated by the Rapporteur are well meant. I am, however, rather concerned about the consequences of these recommendations. After all, when you ask for something you must be prepared to accept the consequences as well.

Before explaining this in detail, I would just like to say that we are all observing the policy of regeneration that has begun in Poland with interest and great sympathy. The Polish nation is fighting for more self-determination, and this fills us with great admiration. Poland today is no longer the Poland of two years ago. The Solidarity trade union has been established and an agricultural union set up, not to mention the efforts to secure greater freedom of action for the Catholic church and the attempts to free the Polish economic system from its bureaucratic fetters. Finally, we should not forget the process of democratisation in the Polish Communist Party itself. All this deserves our undivided sympathy.

Each of us also knows, however, that the Soviet Union is not pleased at the way things are going. It feels challenged; it would like to reserve any developments that have taken place. I have no doubt that the possibility of military intervention cannot be ruled out. May I remind you of what happened in 1953 in the German Democratic Republic, 1956 in Poland and 1968 in Czechoslovakia? The question for the Soviet Union is how, or by what means, it can reverse the developments initiated. The danger in Poland is far from over; on the contrary, I believe Poland has now

Mr. Gessner (continued)

reached an extremely critical stage of development. This, however, places certain obligations on us: we must avoid anything that might injure the men and women who initiated the process of Polish regeneration. We must behave in such a way that the process can continue to flourish without outside influence. In concrete terms, we must avoid anything that could be construed and exploited as external intervention.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is precisely with this in mind that I am somewhat unhappy about the draft recommendation. I believe we are all united in seeking to stabilise the situation in Poland. We should therefore refrain from any planning consultations with regard to contingencies in Poland, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, since this is the very thing that could be construed as attempted intervention. Of course I am well aware that this was not the Rapporteur's intention. I am in no doubt about that. Nevertheless, we must remember that the Soviet Union will naturally be at pains to adduce proof that the western states are staging an intervention. I would regard it as extremely distressing if the Soviet Union were to use in its campaign a document produced by Western European Union. How would we feel then? Would we not be asking ourselves if we should not have been more restrained and cautious?

Another point I must mention is in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation, which recommends that we announce the principles that will guide our reactions in the event of Soviet intervention. I must admit that I find this recommendation rather strange, because it gives the Soviet Union the chance to prepare specifically for our reaction in advance. Can this be in our interests? We cannot be as effective if we have already announced the principles of our behaviour in detail. I do not think it advisable to blurt everything out and give away the details of our future conduct.

Obviously the Soviet Union must know what intervention in Poland would mean, for example in terms of the East-West dialogue, détente, trade relations and anything else one can think of. We all know that this has been repeatedly spelled out in the past by the Western Alliance. The Soviet Union must know that it would thereby set in train processes that would no longer be in its own interests.

May I quote from the final declaration of the European Council of 22nd-23rd March 1981:

“The Council is following recent developments in Poland with great concern. It underlines the obligation of all states signa-

tory to the Helsinki final act to base their relations with Poland on the strict application of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the final act.”

It goes on to say that any other attitude would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world.

In any case, it seems to me simply a matter of intelligence not to lay all your cards on the table beforehand. What I have just said in relation to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation also applies, in my view, to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. May I remind you that yesterday in this Assembly General Rogers reported that the political leadership of the Alliance had also given the go-ahead for specific actions in the event of intervention. General Rogers mentioned yesterday that he had made seven proposals, six of which had been accepted by the political leadership of the Alliance. I do not, however, recall the Alliance announcing any details of these items. I think that was a sensible way to behave, and one which we should emulate.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as you will have noted, a number of amendments have been tabled by my political associates. If these amendments are accepted we shall vote for the draft recommendation; if not, we shall abstain. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Gessner.

Mr. Atkinson, are you willing to speak today?

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – If I may, I shall say just a few words. However, I shall not repeat my speech to the last Assembly of the Council of Europe, nor the previous speech I made to this Assembly when I said that I had not felt until then that the allies had learnt the lessons of Afghanistan. Of course, I welcome the recommendations of this report, which at least indicate that some eighteen months after Afghanistan we are coming round to learning the lessons of Afghanistan and deciding the kind of retaliatory measures which the West needs to take in the event of further Soviet aggression.

But let us appreciate that we have almost gone back to square one in terms of those comparatively feeble, ineffective and disunited measures which were taken in the wake of Afghanistan – the grain embargo has been lifted by both the United States of America and Europe, and a number of other anti-trade measures have been abandoned. There is very little left, apart from the rather ineffective Olympic Games expression of our disapproval of the events in

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

Afghanistan, of the West's indication of disapproval of that aggression.

Soviet troops are still in Afghanistan. Clearly, there has been very little deterrent, and the Soviet Union may still think that, despite all the talk of retaliation, it may be able in Poland, as in Afghanistan, to get away with an invasion.

The purpose of this report is to show that that will not be the case.

Of course, the western strategy may be that we should have gone back on those rather ineffective retaliatory measures in the wake of Afghanistan and returned to normality, so that the Soviet Union depended upon western grain and, if we needed to retaliate properly next time in the event of an invasion of Poland, it would hurt all the more. That may be the strategy.

I also think that it is very important that the western allies appreciate that retaliatory measures in the event of Soviet aggression in Poland will require a great deal more unity – a kind of unity which has not been experienced in the recent past. For those measures to work, they must be extremely harmful to the Soviet Union, but they will also be harmful to certain Western European countries. I repeat the warning which I gave in the debate on space technology this morning when I said that it was extremely unwise for some western economies to be moving to a point where they relied on importing Soviet oil and Soviet gas, as the Siberian pipeline scheme appeared to imply. I have in mind France, Germany and some of the Benelux countries. If they are to depend on this oil and gas, what kind of position will they be in if it comes to Soviet aggression in Poland? How will they be able to retaliate? I feel, therefore, that they ought to be thinking twice on this.

Recommendation 5 refers to an embargo on the transfer of advanced technology to the Soviet Union. I have said before that here is an area where we have yet to learn sufficiently the lessons of our past follies on the part of the West. In the last ten years, I suppose in the interest of détente, we have made a major contribution to the strength of the Soviet Union and the might of the Soviet Union in lending that country our technology. To cite a few examples, it is as a result of our technology that Soviet missiles are now very much more accurate than they were, because we have shown the Soviets how to manufacture more accurate ball-bearings. It was an American manufacturing company that established the factory which built the trucks and engines which the Red

Army used in the invasion of Afghanistan. This is foolishness and it does not appear to me that we have fully learned the lesson.

I understand that the Soviet Union's computer system is based entirely on two IBM computers which the KGB were able, in effect, to steal – it was certainly an illegal transaction – from the United States of America. I hope that the Assembly will consider in due course that a separate study is deserved of the way in which the West has in recent years contributed to the strength and the might of the Soviet Union, which might be used, though we hope it never will be, against us.

In concluding my remarks I refer to recommendation 4, which asks that member states be involved in support from the Council of Europe. May I point out to the Rapporteur and to the Assembly that ever since the report on freedom of assembly in Eastern Europe was received unanimously by the Council of Europe just over a year ago – I was the Rapporteur on that occasion – we in the Council of Europe's Committee for Relations with European Non-Member Countries have kept a watching brief on the developing situation in Poland. At every single meeting we have had a report with a chronology of events and would be delighted to accept and would most certainly welcome this particular recommendation and to be involved in it. We look forward to the response from this Assembly should this recommendation be agreed and to being involved in eventually producing the kind of measures of which the Soviet Union needs to be fully aware should it decide to risk intervening militarily in Poland.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

The next speaker is Mr. Bernini to be followed by Mr. Grieve.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was greatly interested in Mr. Hanin's speech. Although we can agree with some points in the explanatory memorandum and the draft recommendation we have serious doubts regarding the suggestions made to be Council. We say this because of the extreme complexity of the present situation in Poland and in line with the position which we Italian communists have always taken, supporting the autonomy and independence of peoples.

We fully endorse the reference in the preamble to the draft recommendation to the final act of the Helsinki conference and in particular to the undertaking given by states "to refrain" in international relations "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" and consequen-

Mr. Bernini (continued)

tly "from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, military, political or economic, or other, designed to subordinate to their own interest any other state".

These are principles which have guided us throughout our history, in the service of our country and for the recovery of its liberty and independence; and we have reaffirmed them in all circumstances and have declared our complete solidarity with all peoples whatsoever who have had to fight to win or defend their national autonomy or independence in any part of the world. And we have always held consistently to these principles in this Assembly, as elsewhere, when the sovereignty of a state has been threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union, the United States of America or any other country.

I do not believe, Mr. President, that as much can be said by many of our critics and the representatives of other political parties, who often – in this Assembly too – talk or remain silent about freedom and the right of peoples to autonomy according to whether the subject of discussion is the eastern or the western countries, the people of Afghanistan, El Salvador or Turkey, the rights of Israel or the right of the Palestinian people to have a homeland.

Poland, which is at grips with the deep-rooted and difficult problem of economic recovery and democratic reform and development has – as its present leaders have declared – reached a critical point in its history as a free and independent nation.

May I recall that for us Italian communists, what is on trial in Poland is the ability of socialism, in the form that it has taken, to free itself from authoritarian and repressive deviation resulting from the particular historical circumstances in which it came into being, to maintain all the progress made towards emancipation and to move forward to new goals of progress, liberty and respect for human rights.

But, above all, developments in Poland can affect relations in Europe, which we all wish to see improved for the sake of co-operation and the progress and security of our peoples. For this reason, people who realise the value of the present equilibrium and the danger of any attempt to upset it and who look upon the freedom and independence of all peoples as the condition of peace and stability in Europe and the world, cannot help but feel a spirit of solidarity with what is happening in Poland while at the same time maintaining an attitude of discreet respect; in the knowledge that these events – as is confirmed by the happenings of the last few days – can have a happy outcome only through the will and responsible determi-

nation of the Polish people and its institutions, without exposing themselves to any unacceptable outside interference.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, every attempt so far made – as in the recommendation to the Council – to define possible retaliatory measures, whether economic, diplomatic or even military, is objectively an expression of lack of faith in the Polish people and brings grist to the mill of those inside and outside Poland who are seeking justification for external intervention and trying to call a halt to the process of reform in that country.

It is surprising and significant that there is no reference in the recommendation to the serious consequences which the worsening of the Polish situation can have for East-West relations and world co-operation; nor is the hope expressed that the move towards liberty and independence in Poland shall achieve complete success, with consequently favourable effects on relations between countries in Europe and throughout the world. In our view, however, this should be the central feature and underlying spirit of the recommendation. Hence our reserves.

The most recent decisions of the Sejm and the Polish authorities and the reaffirmation of the policy of reform mark a major stage in the process and the next few weeks look like being decisive.

We Italian communists, rejecting any measure which might add to the difficulties or even threaten the movement towards reform, declare our solidarity and our faith in that movement and wish it complete success, for the sake of the freedom and independence of Poland, the cause of co-operation and security in Europe and throughout the world.

It is in this spirit, Mr. President, that we shall vote on the recommendation according to the amendments made to it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Bernini.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Unlike Mr. Bernini, I have no reservations about the recommendations in Mr. Hanin's report. It is cautious and courageous and recognises with common sense our limitations in the West in the face of the dangerous situation in Poland. It recognises our solidarity with the desire of the Polish people for greater freedom as expressed in their movement Solidarity. It recognises, as surely it must, the appalling dangers to any policy of détente and any rapprochement between East and West which would automatically and inevitably ensue if

Mr. Grieve (continued)

Russia were to be persuaded to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of Poland.

It is inevitable that we in this Assembly should have the deepest sympathy with the aspirations of Solidarity for greater freedom. It is inevitable, too, that we should recognise the limitations on what it is possible for us to do to help the Poles. However, I have no doubt that, although there are limitations upon what we can do – there are no limitations on our sympathy – there are many things that we can do. I do not resile from the recommendation in paragraph 1 of the report that we should make absolutely plain the principles which would guide us in our reactions in the event of a Soviet military intervention.

The lessons of history teach us again and again that the most appalling cataclysms have ensued precisely when freedom-loving countries have not made their position and their defence of freedom absolutely clear. We should make plain our position. We should make it plain that a Russian military intervention in Poland would destroy any beneficial results which we might expect from the Helsinki final act. We should make it plain that we should regard such an intervention as a complete breach of the undertaking given by Russia in the Helsinki final act.

I commend the report for the spirit in which it is written. In particular, I commend its approbation of the extremely cautious, statesmanlike and courageous attitude of the Roman Catholic church in Poland. I hope that we shall give concrete expression to the recommendation in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation which refers to the :

“... economic, financial and commercial measures which the Communities would then have to decide upon and which should necessarily include an embargo on the transfer of advanced technology to the Soviet Union”.

That is a subject on which my friend David Atkinson has enlarged.

We in the West must give every possible commercial and financial help to the Polish people. Poland's debts to the West are enormous, and it would be a disgrace if bankers in the West were to be parsimonious and cheese-paring in their approach to Poland's economic and financial problems. Here is a way in which we can give concrete help to the Poles in their desire and search for freedom. I therefore hope that a harsh attitude will not be adopted and that it will not be suggested that Poland's debts must be repaid. On the contrary, the West, not only in its parliamentary aspect represented in assemblies such as this but in the

corridors of financial and commercial power, must give all the help it can to the free Polish people.

We must make it plain that, if there should be a Russian military intervention in Poland, it would be cataclysmic for any hopes of détente. Goodness knows we live in a dangerous enough world as it is. From this I draw a lesson, following on the statesmanlike speech of General Rogers which we heard in this Assembly yesterday. We must, in the words of Queen Elizabeth I of England, look to our moat. The moat now is not the English Channel and the other waters around England and Scotland; it is our defences. We live in a dangerous world in which nobody can predict the consequences of any act. It is vital that we should not allow the Soviet Union and its satellites to achieve an overwhelming military preponderance, either in conventional weapons or in nuclear weapons, over the West.

I know that in all our countries there are those who, for various reasons and often from the most profound ideals, think that we should disarm and seek to abandon the nuclear deterrent. I do not believe that we should be fulfilling the will of God in any free country if we were to leave ourselves defenceless before our enemies. I hope that we in this Assembly will get that message across to those who have elected us to office to represent them in our respective parliaments.

I was particularly impressed by paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum to the report. It is not true that all the countries of Eastern Europe were in some way ceded to the Soviet Union at Yalta. I regularly receive a European journal with European aspirations with which I have great sympathy. But it regularly publishes a map of Europe which shows in black the countries of Eastern Europe west of the Soviet Union and stating that they were what Churchill ceded to Russia at Yalta.

That simply is not true. Inevitably, in the aftermath of war, there was a zone of influence. But it is no more. As Mr. Hanin makes absolutely plain in his report, there is a contradiction between the final act of Helsinki and the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. We would be well advised to make that absolutely plain in all our communications with the Soviet Union.

With those few words, Mr. President, I give the report my unreserved support and I hope that it will have the unreserved support of the overwhelming majority of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Grieve.

I now call Mr. Rösch, to be followed by Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. RÖSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you asked earlier who wanted to speak when, so may I say on a point of order that I had intended – in the interests of a lively debate – to wait until after the speeches by Mr. Müller and Mr. Dejardin. I accordingly put my name down in the appropriate order. As they will not now be speaking this afternoon, I would ask you to allow me to speak tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – Very well, if you insist on speaking tomorrow. However, if everyone waits until tomorrow, we shall not get through the business. Someone must always speak before someone else. Everyone likes to be last, but under the rules that is the privilege of the Chairman of the Committee. It is a pity, but that is position.

Mr. Blaauw, are you willing to speak?

Thank you very much.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although I sympathise with the remarks made by the previous speaker, I appreciate your problem and I will say what I have to say now.

The peoples of Western Europe have been following recent developments in Poland with intense interest and often with bated breath. What is happening there has come as a surprise to many people. A country that has been held in the iron grip of the Soviet Communist administration may yet in some way or other develop into something like the western democracies. We must therefore continue to observe and, where possible, support these developments. In Poland we are seeing the economic bankruptcy of the Soviet system. On the one hand, we can but feel satisfaction at seeing this system proved wrong. On the other, we must feel deep sympathy for the Polish people, suffering as they are under great economic shortages. The present developments not only constitute a political movement: they are also a reaction to the poor economic situation in Poland.

I should like to express my appreciation for the information and analysis Mr. Hanin has provided in his report. It is an extensive report which gives a very clear picture of how developments have proceeded to date. But we do not know today what will be happening tomorrow, and in this respect we too have to keep an ear to the radio all the time.

All kinds of things can still happen. The countries of WEU are therefore wise to examine this subject with a view to preventing a repetition of what happened in Afghanistan and when the American hostages were held in Iran. This meant assenting *ad hoc* and after the

event to things one would not have done at the time. Everyone knows the outcome. It was nothing to be proud of. It would therefore be wise to arrange things better this time.

What do we want to achieve by this? We want the process of development in Poland to continue, and we do not want it disturbed by external intervention from the Soviet Union, and certainly not by military intervention. What we say in the recommendation must therefore not be provocative. It must be a sign to the Polish people, to let them know that we are behind them. It must be a sign to those who may be contemplating unilateral intervention in Poland. We must ensure that the unique process now taking place in Poland is not interrupted. The Liberal Group as a whole has therefore tabled a number of amendments. We have tabled them because we feel we should not act provocatively. We must ensure that the Soviet Union cannot intervene in Poland, armed with this recommendation. The amendment of the wording will not detract from the contents of the Hanin report but will assist the process of development and the people in Poland. It will say, loudly and clearly, what we in WEU think about the developments in Poland. Mr. President, we would be delighted if a very broad consensus could be achieved in WEU on a declaration concerning Poland.

It is not a good thing for reservations to be expressed on a large number of issues, simply because every political group would like to see its own shade of political opinion reflected to a greater or lesser extent. It is nice to be right, but it is far, far better and more important to carry one's point. We must produce a statement which demonstrates a great unity within WEU, which fosters the process of development in Poland, expresses support for the Polish people and also issues a clear warning to everyone, and to the Soviet Union in particular, against disturbing this process. We shall discuss the contents of the amendments later.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

I do not think Mr. De Poi, Mr. Baumel and Mr. Dejardin are present.

The next speaker is Mr. Cavaliere. I am grateful to those members who are willing to speak, for otherwise much valuable Assembly time would be lost.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this report and draft recommendation come at a very significant moment in the course of events in Poland and both, therefore, deserve our full support.

I have listened with interest to earlier speakers and I was struck in particular by two ideas

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

expressed by Mr. Gessner and Mr. Bernini respectively. Mr. Bernini urged the adoption of a cautious attitude to the difficult developments now taking place in Poland and regretted that the draft recommendation failed to express the hope that Poland would itself succeed in establishing freedom and democracy. But whatever we do and say, we do and say because we stand by the Polish people in all that is happening there, so that they may win a place among the truly free and democratic countries. And I believe that our concern over the continuing threats, including serious threats of armed intervention, from Russia is a clear expression of our solidarity without any intention of intervening.

Mr. Gessner said that we should cut out anything which might look like interference and thus give the Soviet Union an excuse to intervene. In that case, what should we do? We should say nothing because if we tell Poland that we stand at its side and that the free countries are prepared to give it the help it is requesting to overcome its internal problems, we run the risk of appearing as the ones who want to interfere in its internal affairs. If we cannot say that we will not tolerate armed intervention by the Soviet Union – and we are tolerating all the threats which are a clear violation of the Helsinki final act – what can we do?

Thus, Ladies and Gentlemen, those who say that we stand by Poland and hope that Poland will achieve complete freedom and democracy warn us at the same time to be careful about what we do, to watch our words and to do nothing, for pity's sake, because anything else might look like interference and the Soviet Union would be able to use it as an excuse to send in its armed forces. This seems to me to be nonsense. What have the NATO countries said? They have so far said that, even if the Soviet Union sends in its troops, there would be no military response. I think that this should allay everyone's fears. And we should say to everyone that we are moving with the greatest caution. But is it possible that there is no need to say what we intend to do, and then not do it or even go back on our words, as happened in the case of Afghanistan after a while? In my opinion this really means wanting us to do nothing and to wash our hands of the matter completely. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, I consider that without addressing ourselves directly, which we are not doing, to the Polish people but addressing ourselves to those who are constantly threatening and stepping up their intervention in Poland's internal affairs, we should let it be known that in the event of an armed invasion measures will be taken.

Should we not even say that? We should say so, it is our duty to do so, if we want to keep any shadow of credibility.

The Soviet Union has always violated the spirit and terms of the decisions taken at Helsinki, Ladies and Gentlemen. What have we done about the total disregard for human rights? We have talked but we have done nothing practical or perhaps we could not do anything practical. But is it possible that we should not even talk about it? And then, when we talk, we must be able to show that we are determined to do what we say we intend to do. Should we not even be able to say for example to the Soviet Union that we shall supply it with no more technology, no more wheat – no more, that is, of the economic resources which go to the upkeep of the armed forces used for this repressive action? I think not, Ladies and Gentlemen. Then if we still serve some purpose, if we want to retain the least measure of credibility, I believe that we should give our full backing to this draft recommendation. We should also urge our countries to stand firm so that their firm attitude will really show the Soviet Union that this time we really mean business.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hawkins, the last member who is willing to speak today. I should be most grateful if others were prepared to speak after him.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – If Mr. Rösch likes to wait until he has heard all the other speeches so that he can alter his own, he would find in the British Parliament that he would never make a speech, because the Speaker would not call him. It is time we altered our rules so that if you called someone, Mr. President, and he did not want to speak, he should not have the opportunity subsequently to do so. I am most surprised by his attitude.

I have many Polish friends. There are a large number of Poles in my constituency who fought for the allies during the war and returned afterwards to settle in Norfolk. They have made first-class workmen and first-class farmers. They are good, solid citizens who bring up their families in a God-fearing and Christian manner.

I first visited Paris during the war when a kindly transport officer suggested that if I did not catch the first train from where I was taking a course – down at the Maginot line – I might have to spend a night in Paris. I accepted that opportunity with alacrity. I got as far as the Champs-Élysées – the only place in Paris of which I had heard at that time. I emerged from the métro to be hailed by someone who asked me whether I was a Scot. I was wearing a peculiarly coloured hat. He was a Pole who

Mr. Hawkins (continued)

had formerly been a journalist on the "Liverpool Daily Post". He had returned to fight with Polish forces, to which he belonged. In fewer than twenty-four hours I became a very close friend of that Pole. What happened to him subsequently I do not know.

With my friends in my constituency and with the friends I made on the first and only day that I spent in Paris during the war I have a close and warm feeling for Poland. Poland is an example to our own people of what could happen to them and of how long it takes to show some signs that a country which has been repressed and which exists under a régime which does not tolerate opposition is capable of demonstrating its objections to that system.

I say to my friends in Great Britain that they must awaken to the dangers of the type of politics which Mr. Wedgwood Benn, formerly Lord Stansgate, is propagating. We must realise that Poland remains a socialist society. Though I am a capitalist without capital, I recognise that it is not likely to become a capitalist country. However, Poland wants to be free from the stifling inefficiency and corruption that surround its people and that result in the Poles being without the basic necessities of life, including food. That is what is happening in Poland today. Anyone who has lived, as I have, on one-seventh of a loaf of bread and two bowls of thin soup a day knows how important food can become. Indeed, it becomes far more important than anything else in life.

Today, Polish people are queuing for the basic necessities of life. We must help, but we must not interfere. As capitalist societies, we cannot say to Poland "If we are to help you, you must change your whole system". That will not happen, but we must support the Polish people in their desire to have more say in their country's affairs.

I congratulate Mr. Hanin on his report. I believe that the real fear of our Polish friends is not so much of military intervention, although it has been spoken about a great deal today. I believe that they fear a gradual takeover once again by the hardliners in Polish politics who are tied to Russia. It is in that way that the Soviet Union hopes to bring Poland back fully as a country subservient to all its aims.

As my colleague Mr. Grieve said, individually we can help. Our bankers in the West have made enormous loans to Poland. We cannot expect those bankers to waive their loans and forget about them, but we must urge our governments to support the banks should they decide not to demand repayment.

In my opinion, we can help individually in other ways. Poland has been hit by three bad harvests. The trouble with British and possibly other politicians today is that they do not understand how food is produced. It is not produced under an umbrella. It is not produced in a large tin shed. It is produced on land, which is open to the elements.

Three bad harvests in a row have brought Poland to near starvation and have produced the feelings of unrest. Individually, through the churches and in any other way that we can, bearing in mind the large surpluses of food in the EEC and in the western world generally, we can divert much of that food to Poland. If we did, I am sure that it would not be objected to by our peoples in the way that they resent the cheap selling off of food and wine to Russia.

Because of my emotional and real feelings for Poland, I hope that we shall vote unanimously in favour of this excellent report.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Hawkins.

I want to express my pleasure at your mention of the warmth and affection which those of us who spent part of our prisoner-of-war period in Poland feel towards the Polish people for the many acts of kindness that we received from them, often at great risk to themselves, when they, like us, were living in conditions of great adversity. That feeling exists in all former prisoners of war in Poland, and it is right that we should be reminded of it.

Does anyone else wish to speak in this debate tonight? Exceptionally, because we brought forward this debate, I felt it right to indicate that those who were not here this afternoon would have an opportunity to speak tomorrow and, because of the way in which the time-table worked out, not to have any votes on the subject today because of the absence of colleagues who were not aware that the debate was taking place today. Normally, if people are not here when they are called, a debate is not held open for their convenience.

If no one else wishes to speak, I shall close this sitting.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 18th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

The President (continued)

1. Developments in Poland (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 870 and Amendments).
2. European security and events in the Gulf area (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 871, Addendum and Amendments).
3. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Document 877 and Amendment).

Members will have noted that we have put down, on the possibility that they might be reached tomorrow, all outstanding items on our

agenda. I should make clear that I do this more in hope than expectation and I would ask everyone to make plans on the basis that, as we have circulated the time-table in advance, it is more than likely that we shall have an afternoon sitting tomorrow, although we happen to have put down all the votes and all the business in case there is time in the morning. That does not mean that if the other business is not concluded we shall be able to finish tomorrow morning. We shall go on in the afternoon with any business that is not concluded in the morning.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 5.10 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 18th June 1981

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Developments in Poland (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 870 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Günther Müller, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Rösch, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Kurt Jung, Mr. Hanin (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Hanin; (explanation of vote): Sir Frederic Bennett; (points of order): Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hanin; (explanation of vote): Mr. Hanin, Mr. Günther Müller.
4. European security and events in the Gulf area (*Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 871, Addendum and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett, Lord Hughes, Sir Frederic Bennett.
5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 877 and Amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Lord Hughes, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Grieve.
6. Adjournment of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m., with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

I again stress to Representatives and Substitutes the importance of signing the Register of Attendance, both to record their presence and because it is the basis of a roll-call should one later become necessary.

¹. See page 42.

3. Developments in Poland

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 870 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on developments in Poland and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 870 and Amendments.

The first speaker is Mr. Günther Müller.

Mr. Günther MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Hanin has presented a report which gives a very good and up-to-date analysis of the situation in Poland since 1980. It shows the danger in which Poland stands and expresses our concern for developments there. As we discuss all these points and turn them over in our minds, we realise that we here in Europe are in a really serious situation and that, depending on developments there, decisions may be taken which will have serious repercussions for Europe and for the member states of WEU.

Let me add to what Mr. Hanin said in his report a few words to indicate how this situation has arisen in Poland. Without wishing to give a detailed account of the history of the

Mr. Müller (continued)

Polish nation's struggle for freedom, I should like to point out that what is now happening is due, in no small measure, to an agreement between two dictators, the Hitler-Stalin agreement of August 1939, whereby, for the first time in this century, a country was once again carved up between major powers. In 1939, as you all know, Poland was invaded not only by Hitler's armed forces but also from the East by the Red Army, because this had been decided in advance in a treaty. In 1939 any Polish officer was lucky to be taken prisoner by the Germans instead of having to set out on the road to Katyn, for instance.

After 1945 this process, initiated in 1939, began to speed up. As you know, there was a Polish government-in-exile in London. There were strong resistance forces in Poland itself: the home army, which, when it rose against Hitler's troops in Warsaw, was left in the lurch by the Russians waiting on the other side of the river. We know that the Polish government-in-exile was ousted by the so-called Lublin Committee, which, via a popular front or national front government, was to start the transition to socialism in Poland.

Just by the way, it is interesting to note that in 1945 a Christian Democrat Party was not allowed in Poland because it was regarded as reactionary. It did not fit in with the national front's policy. The Communist Party's régime consolidated its position. The communists assumed complete control and have in fact ruled the country since 1946.

Now one might wonder why this difficult internal situation happened to develop in Poland precisely in 1980, since the basic elements of communist domination had already existed for over three decades. There were two main reasons for this, which we must bear in mind here. One, certainly, was the difficult agricultural situation, after three bad harvests, combined with the constant efforts to deprive the independent farmers, who still exist in Poland, of the resources needed for any farming at all to be done on a reasonably economic basis. The second reason was Poland's desire to accelerate its transformation into a modern industrial country. Machinery and western technology were imported before the country was ready to make any use of them, and all this really led to was corruption among the country's leaders.

I should like to add, as a parenthesis, that it might have been better if the western countries had not lent Poland so much money at this time, since the loans were used to embark on economic developments which, because they

were too rapid and precipitous, had a catastrophic effect on the Polish economy.

These are the facts, the historical background. We are all afraid now, hoping that the internal process which has been started in Poland will lead to the establishment of a greater degree of democracy in that country without endangering the security of Europe. Let us be plain: I feel sure that none of us, however strongly we may believe in democracy and the democratic system and however opposed we are to a one-party system, would wish to see a movement beginning in Poland which could lead to its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. We all know that such a policy would lead to immediate intervention by the Soviet Union. The question is simply how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in tolerating a degree of development which would enable a slow process of reform to take place in Poland.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we must not view the Soviet Union's policy in the light of an ideology. I am always on my guard against judging the behaviour of a country by the political party which happens to be in power there. That applies to the Soviet Union as well. I am certainly no lover of communism, but I prefer to ignore altogether the details of the Russian Communist Party's ideological principles or intentions. I can see that it has always been one of the aims of Russian policy to gain the upper hand over Poland.

We are aware, when we speak about the danger of intervention, that psychological intervention, pressure on a neighbouring country, has been going on for a long time and is still going on. I will give you a wonderful example of this. A little while ago the Russians celebrated the anniversary of one of their great marshals, an aristocrat - Marshal Suvorov. The Soviet press made much of the fact that Marshal Suvorov quelled the Polish uprising of 1794. Because of this, historians have nicknamed him "the butcher of Warsaw". The fact that a reactionary nobleman, a general and marshal, was lauded at a time like this as a defender of Russia's interests, shows the extent of the ideological pressure being exerted on the Polish mentality. It was intentionally framed as a warning to the Poles, that is quite clear.

Ladies and Gentlemen - another parenthesis - the Marshal Suvorov who is being thus honoured is in fact the same Marshal Suvorov who quelled the Pugachev revolt against Catherine II, a revolt which actually deserves to be included in the annals of a proletarian party like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, because Pugachev fought against serfdom and for the little man. But today it is not Pugachev who is acclaimed, but Marshal Suvorov, the very paragon of imperialism. Nothing, I

Mr. Müller (continued)

think, more clearly reveals the continuity of Russian history, with regard to events in Poland as well.

What are the implications for us today, as we contemplate future developments in Poland? Mr. Hanin brought out very clearly in his report – and of course we have to vote on the recommendation – that a military intervention in Poland would inevitably give rise to a response in Europe and probably all over the world which would render the entire previous policy of détente null and void.

The consequences of this would obviously be serious so we must show others that we take it seriously. I am therefore also prepared to write into a recommendation: yes, measures will be taken if there is military intervention; yes, détente is at an end if military intervention takes place.

After Afghanistan, we cannot again pursue a policy which says: “Next time you are naughty, we will rap you over the knuckles”, as one might say to a child. Anyone who knows anything at all about bringing up children will know that this method does not work. In the case of a child, all it does is to push him into breaking the rules. The same applies in this case to international politics.

I should therefore like to support what the draft recommendation says: all of us, the WEU countries, free Europe as embodied in the member countries of the Council of Europe, and other parts of the free world must consult together on the measures to be taken if such a military intervention occurs. This seems to me to be the only chance of showing the Soviet Union the cost – the great and grave costs that could flow from such intervention.

Experience of Russian policy – even if you study Stalin’s policy when he withdrew the troops from Iran in 1946, or the position in Asia, or the Truman doctrine of 10th March 1947 which led to the end of the civil war in Greece – has always shown that it reacts, not when certain phrases are formulated somewhere, but when the leaders of the Soviet Union are convinced that there is a real possibility of measures materialising which must be contrary to their own interests. That is why I am in favour of the draft recommendation.

May I make one last remark, Mr. President – I shall soon be finished.

Even those Poles who are fighting for greater freedom in their country would, I believe – and I have had the opportunity of talking to such Poles, including some from the Solidarity trade union – like the countries of the free West

to adopt a clear and firm position, because they believe that this clear and firm position will provide a better safeguard for them in their own country.

I hope we shall obtain a big majority for the draft recommendation on Poland.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

I welcome the large number of visitors in the gallery this morning. I understand that many of them have come here to listen to you, and I am sure that they were delighted to hear your speech.

The next speaker is Mr. De Poi, to be followed by Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, some of the anxieties which we expressed when the draft order on the situation in Poland was submitted last December have unfortunately proved to be justified. The situation in that country has deteriorated and there have since been ever-growing threats to the Polish people, to its independence and to its freedom to decide its own future. Fortunately, one of our chief anxieties has not yet been fulfilled and there has been no open invasion of Poland by Warsaw Pact troops and by the Soviet Union.

What has happened, however, is certainly enough to cause us serious concern regarding the future of the Polish people and so far as we, the countries of Western Europe are concerned, over the proper continuation of the East-West dialogue. These anxieties are quite rightly highlighted in Mr. Hanin’s excellent, fully detailed report on the Polish situation from 1980 until now, with special emphasis on the potential threat to undertakings solemnly entered into at Helsinki and subsequently confirmed, despite difficulties at Belgrade and Madrid. Undoubtedly, the bases of the Helsinki agreements could be seriously imperilled and the goodwill established for the first time between the two parts of the continent would lose all meaning.

But I would remind Mr. Hanin that the Helsinki agreements are still a very important instrument in the hands of the Polish people and of all the peoples of Eastern Europe. For Solidarity and for the Polish workers they are and must remain a point of reference. In some ways, they are and must remain a finger pointed against a return to violence.

I would ask Mr. Hanin to tone down the phrase in the first clause of the recommendation, which declares that such intervention would render the Helsinki final act null and void. I ask this, not so much because I do not

Mr. De Poi (continued)

share his concern, but because I think that, so long as we regard this instrument as valid, even if others who signed and supported it to begin with at least are now riding over it roughshod, it is still a point of reference, if not for certain governments, at least for the peoples who believe and have believed in it.

The renewed sabre-rattling mood in the Soviet Union is unquestionably a matter of serious concern. And this mood has not been triggered off by greater firmness in the West but rather calls for such greater firmness. Another cause for concern is the new balance now emerging in the Soviet Union after the disappearance of Kosygin from the political scene. It would appear that, basically, the technocrats have lost ground and that Brezhnev no longer holds the balance between the technocrats and the military in the Soviet Union but has rather become no more than a counterweight to the military. This is an objective matter of concern which shows how the shift in the situation in the Soviet Union could open the way to dangerous and ill-advised ventures, as happened in Afghanistan and is about to happen – although we hope that it will not – in Poland.

I believe – and this point would require a long speech but I can be brief – that some aspects of the system itself prevent the required technological development. It is the experience of Poland with its economic difficulties, it is the feeling of the whole pure socialist East, it is the experience of the developing countries that this pure socialist world is substantially unable to give the required assistance, because technological progress, which involves differences in earnings and jobs in society would also involve unacceptable pluralism, which appears to be in direct conflict with certain specific demands of the workers belonging to Solidarity and of the peoples of Eastern Europe. It would appear therefore that technological progress in the eastern countries is solely directed to increasing armaments which are much more easily controlled by rigid planning of the kind applied in the eastern countries.

Brezhnev himself is probably aware of all the perils of such a situation and of the seriousness of the further blow to the credibility of the Soviet Union not only among the peoples of Europe but also among all the peoples who are striving for development. But what I fear is not so much and not solely a direct invasion. I believe that the present Soviet leaders in fact realise the obvious danger of a direct invasion. I am more afraid of a kind of creeping invasion through an internal military coup – and this seems to me to be desperately likely –

through a takeover of the party, through a takeover of the union, so that everything falls back into the hands of whoever gives the orders in Poland, making out that the Poles themselves are resolving their own problems. This, I feel, is a very real danger in view of the party's weak grip and of Poland's inescapable position in the heart of the Warsaw Pact, in view of the traditional prestige of the army in Poland, in view of the sole possibility of maintaining an appearance of sovereignty by presenting a takeover by the Polish armed forces as an internal settlement of the problem.

Finally – and I am concluding, Mr. President – the Soviet Union is concerned that the thirty thousand million dollars missing from Poland's budget should not continue to be purely Soviet debts, leaving it to shoulder something which the West would unquestionably be unwilling to take on. This should remind us, therefore, that the next negotiations will have to be based on certainties and not on sheer good faith; it is also a reminder of everything which could harm the Soviet Union and certainly the Polish people if such a terrible development should ever take place.

In approving the main lines of Mr. Hanin's draft recommendation and reminding him of this specific point in the first paragraph of the recommendation proper, I would urge that the dialogue must be resumed and continued on a more solid basis because this, in my opinion, is the only way of saving Poland, its people and peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

Our next speaker is Mr. Dejardin, from Belgium.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I for my part shall refrain from recapitulating the history of Poland or of communism, Polish or otherwise.

There is at least one problem on which I believe the Assembly can at least today show unanimity, namely our concern for the future of Poland and the Polish people. And this time the concern in Europe is more directly the result of a fresh display by a superpower – in this instance the Soviet Union – of its determination to be dominant. Perhaps, Mr. President, it is rather the striving for domination itself, whether hidden or open, that we should be denouncing.

May I remind you, Mr. President, as well as other members, of the little incident in this chamber three years ago when I and others were questioning General Haig on the statement he had made in his capacity as SACEUR to the effect that the security of the United States would be endangered by the entry of

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

communist ministers into the Italian Government.

Of course, the two things cannot be compared. On the one hand we have what I would call an unfortunate or at any rate clumsy statement, and on the other, unfortunately, more and more frequent cases since the last world war. There were the whole series of events – coups d'état, in fact – which took place in the countries of Eastern Europe immediately after the cease-fire of 8th May 1945.

There was also Prague, in August 1968. There was Kabul. There was also, Mr. President, another event which prompts me to inform my friend and colleague Charles Hanin that I am not greatly in agreement with his report or analysis, from the very first paragraph on.

There was the war – what was called the civil war – in Greece, where the Soviet Union handed over the communist leaders to the British and other troops fighting the Greek resistance, the majority of whom were communists.

There was Yalta – and here I must disagree with my friend and colleague Charles Hanin. I deplore the fact that European and even world politics are today still dictated by the atrocious Yalta Conference, where those who considered themselves the great powers shared the world – shared the spoils – among themselves. They made a mistake. Refusing to admit the virtues of historical materialist analysis, they let themselves be snared by the Soviet Union. They would not admit the prospect of decolonisation, which turned almost everything upside down.

Still today the whole doctrine – what is called the Brezhnev doctrine, which we all condemn – of the ageing Soviet bureaucrats is based on the idea wrongly inspired by the share-out of 1945.

If ever there were a case in which we must resist the temptation to act like the man at the fairground boxing-booth, who says to his friends: "Hold me back, lads, or I will knock his block off" this is the one. If ever there were a situation in which such behaviour must be avoided, this is it.

I am not as old as some of our colleagues. It is true that I was born only shortly before the war and do not of course remember the appeals for Danzig. All the same, because of what I have read, learnt and heard, I know how close Poland is – essentially, as Charles Hanin quite rightly says, because of its history – to our hearts, particularly the hearts of the French – for reasons, dare I say, of royalist sympathies, the royalist past of Poland – and close to all our hearts.

Nevertheless, as far as I am concerned, the Hungarian, Chilean, Czech or Turkish people are just as close. I make no distinctions in this respect; human happiness cannot be divided according to frontiers. However, I call for caution in regard to Poland. Caution! We can see with what prudence the Solidarity movement is developing its activities, with what prudence, need one say, and what resistance to what Mr. Hanin himself calls extremists, those who want to go "all the way" who want to demand more than they can obtain. Caution against contributing to any increase of tension in Polish society! We have nothing to gain from any form of instability. I hope we are all convinced of this.

I would like to put two questions to Mr. Hanin. He will excuse what is perhaps my naïvety.

In paragraph 19 he says that one of the disturbing problems about Poland is its growing external debt. I note however that in the rest of the report and the draft recommendation he advocates new financial assistance to Poland. I would like more explanation. What does he mean by "economic and financial aid to Poland"? Does he mean an interest-free loan? An outright gift? It would be helpful if we all knew. I am not saying that I would be either for or against – simply that this should be made clear.

And then, Mr. President, comes this terrible paragraph 66, and here I must say to Mr. Hanin "Steady, steady! No crusades, for heaven's sake!" What does Mr. Hanin say? "Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons in Europe precludes the use of conventional forces by the West".

What does that mean? Does it mean that if we were to gain superiority in this respect we should invade Poland? Are we again being asked to "die for Danzig"? Well, Mr. Hanin, justify this sentence! I dare say I am giving it the wrong interpretation, but I have apparently misunderstood it. Well then, please be precise! Because I am saying that, if we had sufficient power – sea power, obviously – we could perhaps do what we are ready to accuse the Russians of doing.

Mr. President, evidence of the prospect of Soviet intervention in Poland is mounting. Our colleague De Poi is looking for explanations of rather subtle plans. We have become accustomed to less subtlety on the part of the Russians. They at least are frank enough that when they go in, they go in openly. They do not send military advisers under some cover or other; they go straight in with their tanks. And everything leads us to fear that, as some of us were saying months ago, the intervention

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

is going to happen. When? As soon as it becomes clear that the Madrid Conference has failed. And this perhaps raises certain questions for us. I do not say that the failure of the Madrid Conference will account for the Soviet intervention, but if intervention takes place, that is when it will happen.

Mr. President, I could perhaps agree with taking certain measures. But what measures?

After Prague 1968 we made great speeches. We made great speeches and great recommendations after Kabul. But where do we stand today? We are tributaries of the Soviet Union! Dare we say it? Each of our countries has vested interests in the Soviet Union. I would like to say in all conscience to the workers of my region that sanctions should be imposed in regard to Soviet industrial contracts because of Russian intervention, but the Soviet Union has just concluded a contract worth almost a thousand million dollars in industrial products which will save 2,000 jobs for at least two years in my region. Go and tell that to the workers? I would not be well received, believe you me. You would at least have the good fortune not to have to listen to me here any more, because I would not be re-elected.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin, will you now finish your speech please?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I shall finish quickly, Mr. President.

Supplies of natural gas, industrial contracts, trade. That is the context. Does the Soviet Union know the price it will have to pay? Only one price is acceptable to it.

Mr. President, may I conclude by saying: let us be on our guard. I do not question Mr. Hanin's intentions, but we must be careful. The emancipation of the Polish people, in freedom and prosperity, must remain the work of the Polish people itself.

And finally I ask myself: do we have such a right to preach? If we want to do so, let us set a good example by implementing sanctions of a similar kind imposed on other totalitarian and dictatorial régimes. Follow my eyes and you will all understand what I mean... There cannot be two different levels of belief in democracy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

The next speaker is Mr. Rösch, to be followed by Mr. Baumel.

Mr. RÖSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gen-

tlemen, in my opinion one essential point has not been properly appreciated in the discussions yesterday afternoon and this morning. People are always saying: "If the Soviet Union invades Poland as it did Afghanistan", rather as if it would be doing this for the second time.

But the truth is that the Soviet Union has already been in Poland for decades. The truth is that the Soviet Union has imposed an internal and external political system on the Polish people by force. The truth is that the problems which have arisen in Poland are mainly due to the Soviet domination of that country.

What, Ladies and Gentlemen, have thirty years of communism produced in that country? Nothing but starving people, nothing but a nation which is now prepared to go to the bitter end because it has nothing more to lose. So what has the Soviet Union and its system achieved, what has communism achieved in that country? Precisely the situation which we now see!

The Poles expelled from the areas now occupied by the Soviet Union, the Poles who came into the areas from which the Germans had been expelled, came into a region which used to be called "the granary of Germany". What has become of that granary? It does not produce enough to go round. There is not even enough to provide an ordinary Polish family with its weekly bread.

Ladies and Gentlemen, all the ideology and all the rhetoric about this must be seen against the background of this one clear fact: Russian aggression started long before the point when the Soviet Union may in fact bring to a conclusion what it has been doing in that country for decades, namely imposing its will on Poland and reducing it to penury.

The question which really faces us is this: we naturally view what is happening in Poland with great sympathy. All of us, I am sure, have applauded and sympathised with the courage which sections of the population have displayed in opposing this domination. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we are talking about realities we must also be fully aware of the realities both of our ability to threaten and of the range of measures open to us.

The situation we face in Poland is different from the one which existed in Czechoslovakia, for instance. In Czechoslovakia the population's reforming impetus and reforming aspirations had been transferred to the government. In other words, in order to change the situation, the Soviet Union had to reimpose its power over the government. The aggression was then directed, you might say, against the government, against the party leadership.

Mr. Rösch (continued)

In Poland it would be different. In Poland it would be directed, not against the government or against a section of the population, but against the population as a whole. So what would the Soviet Union actually gain by an invasion? It would cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands or millions of people. It would have to expect to assume responsibility for meeting the international commitments of the People's Republic of Poland. It would have to feed a hostile nation of thirty-five million people. The entire credibility of the Soviet Union in the countries of the third world would collapse. The Soviet Union would no longer be able to prevent anyone from creating a climate conducive to worldwide rearmament and preparedness for armed conflict.

Those, Ladies and Gentlemen, would be the consequences – consequences not decided upon by us, but resulting automatically from such a step by the Soviet Union. Because, if the Soviet Union is determined to take this step or does take it, it will not – I am firmly convinced – allow itself to be deterred by declarations made either by us or by anyone else. That would appear to me to mean that the Soviet Union – possibly against the background of internal power struggles over the succession to the country's now aged leaders – may perhaps have finally eschewed in some fields the policy which it has tried to pursue during the Brezhnev period. The world will see many changes then – not because of our recommendations, but because of the changed situation in the Soviet Union.

That, Ladies and Gentlemen, is why I believe that we should name the aggressor openly, and state openly what is going on in Poland. But what can we possibly threaten? A threat is only as strong as the will to maintain it and the ability to put it into effect.

One of our colleagues asked earlier: "What happened in Czechoslovakia?" Protest notes were sent. And what happened when the German Democratic Republic felt obliged to build a wall through the middle of the capital of Germany, through Berlin? The bells rang, we put out candles, and after a while things returned to normal. The wheat embargo lasted only until the American farmers protested against it. When the Federal Republic of Germany decided to impose an embargo on pipes, British firms got round the agreements and supplied them. And there are many other examples.

None of us – and I believe this is inherent in our structure – is either willing or able actually to carry out our threats. Here, too, we should base our attitude on the real facts and not offer

threats which we are then unable to back up. Nor should we allow those who have always been opposed to a policy of détente in Europe to use such threats now as a vehicle for ultimately destroying the policy of détente. I hope Mr. Müller of the Christian Democratic Group will not take it amiss if I point out that anyone who refers, in a recommendation, to Helsinki and the agreements reached there must surely blush to recall that on his home ground, in the German Bundestag, he has not been able to ratify the Helsinki final act. Surely we must see this! Anyone striking a moral attitude here must know exactly where it will lead and what he really wants to achieve.

No, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we should name the aggressor, but we should be careful, in voicing our threats, to keep them in proportion to our ability to carry them out. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Baumel, who is to be followed by Mr. Kurt Jung.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the situation in Poland is disturbing and likely to become dramatic within weeks. Precise information from very reliable sources indicates that in the next few weeks certain eastern bloc countries will probably be making a number of moves with regard to Poland. It is in a climate of concern and expectation that we are today studying Mr. Hanin's excellent report. I would like to congratulate him at the outset for the thoroughness of his work and the excellence of the recommendations now before us.

In this matter we must avoid both extravagant language and a weak attitude. Our position in regard to Poland must be crystal clear. We in the West must in no event provide food for a campaign of provocation by laying ourselves open to exploitation of our statements and attitudes by certain of our partners who want nothing better. But the caution we have just been speaking about must be neither weakness, nor resignation, nor complicity. The importance of today's debate in WEU goes far beyond this chamber. May I remind each of our colleagues here today that in this matter we must take great care to avoid any rash remarks and any statement not backed up by precise facts.

I would like to add to Mr. Hanin's excellent report a number of facts which the rapid development of the crisis did not allow him to take into account. These facts are unfortunately extremely disturbing. The situation is growing worse by the day – I have had definite proof and precise information for several days now – not only inside Poland but above all along its frontiers. A well-informed journalist could

Mr. Baumel (continued)

write in *Le Monde* yesterday: "The possibility of foreign intervention will never be as great as in the next four weeks."

The 5th June last saw the publication of a letter from the Soviet to the Polish party demanding the resignation of the present leadership, the speedy organisation of a congress under the unconditional authority of Moscow, and the immediate adoption of repressive measures against the press, the most active figures in Solidarity and, of course, all those usually referred to as "dissidents". In that letter, which some of you may not have read, the situation of the Polish party is assessed in unqualified terms: the revisionists and opportunists are manipulating preparations for the congress; Solidarity is now in the hands of counter-revolutionaries and is organising a criminal plot against the power of the people; the press, radio and television are no more than an instrument of anti-socialist activities.

In these circumstances it is clear that, for Moscow, the limits of the acceptable have been over-stepped by a long way. It is clear that, for Moscow, developments in Poland mean the repetition in Eastern Europe of a situation which the Soviet Union cannot accept, on the one hand because it is a threat not only to Poland but to all the eastern bloc countries and, on the other, because a relaxation of Soviet control over Poland would mean – objectively – calling into question Stalin's conquests, for which the Soviet Union sacrificed millions of lives. We must therefore make a clear-headed assessment of the situation without being dragged, on one side or the other, into extravagant or risky lines of argument.

The harshness of the Soviet letter, the extent of the demands it formulates, with a brutality quite exceptional in the normally coded and measured language of relations between foreign and Soviet communist parties, the threats it contains, cannot but recall the warning addressed to the Hungarian and Czechoslovak parties shortly before the events which we well remember.

The Central Committee of the Polish party – and this is exceptional – replied to what was nothing less than an ultimatum by refusing it. The openly pro-Soviet elements, like Grabski, who are calling for the heads of Mr. Kania and Mr. Jaruzelski, were put in the minority. The congress, planned for mid-July, will go ahead on schedule despite the demand from Moscow.

It is precisely in the weeks between now and that date that the situation is most dangerous. Did not the invasion of Czechoslovakia take

place a few days before a congress was due to be held in the Federal Republic of Slovakia at which the pro-Soviet elements would have been eliminated from the leadership?

We must bear in mind that, in Soviet thinking, the congress is the final authority for political legitimisation. If, by a massive majority, the Polish congress pronounces in favour of moving in a direction contrary to Soviet wishes, intervention, which according to the Brezhnev doctrine must be cloaked in the form of assistance to a fraternal party under threat, would become much more difficult.

It is therefore in the weeks and even the days to come that new and very serious Soviet threats may be expected. Let us understand clearly that the Soviet Union will do everything to prevent a congress of this kind reaching conclusions which according to present information are likely to result in the elimination or neutralisation of people Moscow can count on.

Moreover, there is to be a meeting in Sofia in the next few days. Its purpose is to enable the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries to issue a joint public statement of their position on the Polish situation in order to avoid the initiative for operations appearing to come from the Soviet Union, and to place it upon the shoulders of the reliable partners in the Warsaw Pact who would thus play the convenient rôle that Moscow expects of them.

Confirmation comes from reports predicting new Soviet manoeuvres on the Polish frontiers and in Poland itself. Given the imminence of the danger, it is very difficult to understand the almost total silence of the European heads of state and government. If this silence were to continue Europe would have a very heavy responsibility to bear.

Nor is it easy to understand the difficulties which the Poles are now encountering in obtaining new credit facilities, particularly from the banks, when such financial support is of crucial importance for a country whose external debt has reached 120 thousand million francs and whose home supplies of basic goods have been reduced to a state of desperate shortage, perhaps not without ulterior motive on the part of their Soviet neighbours.

The PRESIDENT. – You have exceeded your time, Mr. Baumel, and perhaps you will bring your speech to a conclusion.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – I shall conclude, Mr. President.

It is thus particularly fortunate that today we have an opportunity to say where we stand on the Polish crisis. Of course, our possibilities for action are limited, but they are not non-

Mr. Baumel (continued)

existent. And although they are not very significant in material terms, they are morally essential. The text we adopt must serve as an encouragement to our governments, and solemnly remind the Soviet Union that Polish territorial integrity and sovereignty are vital elements in the European security for which Europe has already fought two world wars.

We must also say that détente would be finished, that the Helsinki agreements, which have just been mentioned, would be null and void and that the severest diplomatic and economic sanctions would have to be imposed in such an event. Nevertheless, hope remains. Poland has a long historic tradition. Let us not forget that, among the different factors that make Soviet intervention difficult, the positions adopted by Europe should not be underestimated. Nor should we forget the decisive influence that His Holiness the Pope can have in this matter, an influence which, although he has no military divisions at his disposal, is not negligible. Let us not forget that our support for Poland is also a duty to ourselves. The greatest enemy of the West is not the power of our opponents, but our own weakness.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

The next speaker is Mr. Jung.

Mr. Kurt JUNG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in his final remarks Mr. Hanin refers to the possibility of the situation in Poland having changed or the problem no longer being topical by the time his report is debated in June. But, on the contrary, as speakers in the debate have already said, the situation in Poland flared up again during the Whitsun holiday. Mr. Baumel has just said that developments in the last few days in particular are leading to crisis point. The postponement of the sitting of the Sejm until the 12th, and corollary events, prompt us to consider very seriously what we in WEU can do. As Mr. Hanin was not in a position to discuss the very latest developments in his report, I should like to examine recent events again. With the renewed growth of unrest since the end of May, the strikes and demonstrations, the suicide of two ministers, the anti-Soviet incidents, the deterioration of the economic situation and not least, of course, the episcopal See standing vacant since the death of the Primate, the Polish situation has entered a very critical phase shortly before the Ninth Party Congress, due to take place from 14th to 18th July.

The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee met on 9th and 10th June to consider the threatening letter, already mentioned here, from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Notwithstanding the Soviet warnings – this must be pointed out – the Polish Central Committee adhered to its previous course of reform while professing Poland's loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and its socialist partners. I will not go into the details of this letter, since Mr. Baumel has already quoted from it. We should recall that the letter speaks of the deadly peril looming over the revolutionary achievements of the Polish nation, criticises a number of things and makes it clear that the Soviet Union is particularly concerned about the preparations for the party congress. We should also recall that it concludes with a threat, a quotation from Mr. Brezhnev, to the effect that a fellow socialist country will not be abandoned in its hour of need.

However, the proceedings of the Central Committee also show – and Mr. Kania's main speech before the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee is proof of this – that the dilemma for Poland's leaders is that they cannot halt, let alone reverse, the trend and yet must also take account of Soviet objections in some way. That is the dilemma.

Moscow's tune was played on the first day of the Central Committee's Plenary Session by Mr. Grabski, a member of the Central Committee, who called for Mr. Kania's replacement and fresh elections for the Politburo. The reformers counter-attacked, led by Vice-Premier Rakowski, and rejected the demand that each of the eleven members of the Politburo be subjected to a vote of confidence. In the final declaration Mr. Kania confirmed that the reforms would continue, but he also reasserted his faith in the ideals of socialism and his willingness to continue to co-operate with Solidarity. However, this was accompanied by the announcement that in future resolute action would also be taken against anti-socialist elements in Solidarity.

I have given this account in order to arrive at an assessment which we must bear in mind when we come to the final votes here in the plenary session of WEU. The Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee has made it obvious not only to Moscow but to the world at large that Poland does not in fact have a leadership. The proceedings of the Congress, the dramatic confrontation, especially over the question of confidence in the Politburo, the deep schism between the two wings of the party, do not augur well for Poland – we must realise this – in view of the growing Soviet threat, the pressure on the country and the

Mr. Jung (continued)

dangerous economic situation. Poland can now be saved from national disaster only by adopting an approach based on reason, as outlined by Mr. Kania: the exercise of self-discipline by the social forces and the avoidance of confrontation of any kind.

The preparations for the Party Congress, the elections of delegates, are still in progress. At the voivodeship conference in Gdansk, for instance, we have seen a clear victory for the reformers, with 90 % of the votes. This will, of course, prompt the Soviet Union to increase its pressure. As has repeatedly been said here, the military situation remains unchanged. The high level of preparedness of the Soviet troops in particular means that intervention could take place within a matter of days. In early July – we should bear this in mind too – Warsaw Pact manoeuvres are scheduled to take place, as they do every year, and we can safely assume that they will represent an unmistakably menacing backdrop to the Ninth Party Congress.

In view of these developments in the last few days, I should like to endorse what Mr. Rösch has said and ask you to remember that what we decide here must, of course, be feasible. Our approach must be dispassionate; above all we must not give the Soviet Union any further pretext for claiming that we are trying to exert an influence on the internal affairs of a country that belongs to the Warsaw Pact. But we must also give the Soviet Union a clear indication of the risks it will be running if it intervenes in Poland. As one of the liberals who have expressed every support for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe – the Soviet Union is still interested in the CSCE, but we do not know how long this interest will last – I believe we must include a reference to the CSCE in our efforts to avert the threat to Poland, besides, as Mr. Baumel has said, continuing to provide the aid to Poland promised by the western countries in order to help it out of its difficult economic situation.

To conclude, I can but hope that the recommendation which we intend to adopt today – the Liberal Group has tabled a number of amendments – will not fail to convince the Soviet Union of our common determination to support developments in any European country which lead to self-determination and are based on the principles of the CSCE.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jung.

Perhaps I may be allowed to explain our procedure very briefly to the large number of young visitors listening to our debate, whom we welcome warmly.

This is the conclusion of a debate which began yesterday on a report from our General Affairs Committee, introduced by the Rapporteur. The general debate is now concluded. The Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee will reply to the debate, then we shall consider a number of amendments which have been tabled by representatives, and after that we shall take a decision on the recommendation presented by the Committee for the consideration of the Assembly.

I shall now ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Hanin, to reply to the debate.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to thank all the speakers, by far the most, if not all, of whom have expressed their approval of the contents of the report itself. My thanks also go, of course, to those who have been kind enough to approve the draft recommendation originating from the report. I hope they will forgive me if in my reply I concentrate more on the critics of the draft recommendation than on its supporters. This is not to say that I have not listened carefully and been impressed by what they have said in support of our draft recommendation.

I will begin with a brief comment regarding procedure: I am rather surprised that the draft recommendation has met with some opposition and that a number of amendments have been tabled. The report and draft recommendation were, after all, only made public after a long discussion in Committee, which approved both parts unanimously but for one abstention. Be that as it may, everyone has the right to change his mind or, not being a member of the Committee, suddenly to realise that what has been proposed does not coincide exactly with his views.

From the criticism which I have heard certain members level at the draft recommendation and which has led to the tabling of amendments, on which I shall be speaking at the appropriate time, two things are clear, it seems to me: firstly, a misinterpretation – perhaps because the text is poorly worded – of what is proposed and, secondly, a difference in the assessment of the results which the proposals may produce.

As regards the misinterpretation, I listened closely to what Mr. Bernini had to say yesterday. He said that the report went so far as to talk of military retaliation. I find this astonishing. I ask you to read the report again: nowhere does it refer to military retaliation, which is in fact out of the question. So that point is quite clear.

Then I heard Mr. Gessner asking, “Why reveal to the Soviet Union now what we intend

Mr. Hanin (continued)

to do? If we want the positions we adopt to have any effect, the last thing we should do is reveal what our intentions are."

We do not in fact in any way advocate that the measures the various states will actually take should be revealed straight away. We simply feel that it is a good thing for these states to agree straight away on the measures they would take, but we do not suggest that they should be announced. Two days ago General Rogers talked to us about various measures he had in mind, measures envisaged at military level. But at no time did we contemplate questioning him on the nature of these measures, knowing full well that they must remain secret.

The only specific reference to be found in the draft recommendation is to the transfer of advanced technology, which goes without saying, it seems to me. Everyone can agree on that point. So it is a question not of publicising straight away the specific nature of the measures but simply of calling on the western nations to agree on them among themselves. It is the differences of assessment that are at the root of the matter and divide us.

Mr. Gessner said in particular – I took careful note of this – that the measures we propose would be regarded as a provocation, that these proposals might provoke the Soviet Union to intervene in Poland's internal affairs and that we must not be responsible for provoking such intervention by the Soviet Union.

We fully realise that, if the Soviet Union intervenes one day – unfortunately I do not know what is going to happen – it will be because it decides that it can no longer tolerate the course taken by events in Poland. It will then find, believe me, any excuse that suits it and it may invent a few if it thinks necessary. Do you really not believe that the positions adopted by the western powers, the action taken by trade unions in the West to provide the free trade union with material aid have not been regarded, and would not be duly cited, by the Soviet Union as a provocation, as interference in Poland's internal affairs?

Things have not changed a great deal since La Fontaine. The fable of the wolf and the lamb is eternally true, and when the wolf wants to eat the lamb – I am not saying that the Poles are lambs; thank God they are not – he will always find an excellent reason to justify his action.

The truth is that we must not be afraid of our own shadows. We are told that we must act wisely. I claim that the measures we are pro-

posing are wise and moderate. We say there is no question of military intervention and, in this respect, everything has already been done to reassure the Soviet Union. I should like to reply at this point to Mr. Dejardin, who is unfortunately no longer here. What an excellent colleague he is: he is a speaker I can never hear without feeling the desire to answer back. Unfortunately, I have heard more statements from him than I have had opportunities to reply to in his presence. I should like to answer Mr. Dejardin, who implied in a quite extraordinary manner that, if the military power of the West was comparable to that of the Soviet Union, it would mean that we would be invading Poland: when, Mr. Dejardin, while the balance of power was better than it is now, did we intervene in any country to install a liberal, capitalist régime in place of a communist régime?

When have we ever done that? When have we ever talked of doing so? When have we ever threatened to do so? That is the question I ask. There is no rhyme or reason to this. I say this with deep conviction.

Together with Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Günther Müller I tabled an amendment yesterday which seeks to tone down the provisions of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation. This paragraph would no longer say that every aspect of the Helsinki final act would automatically be made null and void, but that in this event the western powers would have to review their attitude towards the final act. Is that really saying too much? I am prepared to go this far, but not to water down the recommendation to the point that it says nothing and becomes no more than a series of vague, inconsistent and hollow resolutions. So do not count on me. I would prefer this recommendation on Poland not to be adopted.

When faced by a grave situation, countries must, of course, maintain a due sense of proportion. But this must not be carried so far that our sense of proportion is again interpreted as weakness. It is unfortunately true that we live in a violent world. It is unfortunately true that a power such as the Soviet Union sees its policy only in terms of the balance of power. I feel that, if the balance of power is allowed to tilt too far to one side, world stability will be destroyed. Everything that is happening at the moment shows this to be true, and the misfortune is that the risk of destabilisation becomes even greater when steps are taken to restore the balance to some extent because the other side knows that the imbalance will not last for ever.

All we can do at present is state that we shall not sit idly by if so vile an act as the invasion of Poland should be perpetrated, so vile an act as denying a nation the right to acquire a mini-

Mr. Hanin (continued)

mum of freedom, and that we shall do everything in our power short of unleashing a war.

I am well aware that threats should not be uttered unless there is a will to carry them out if the need arises. I personally hope that the western countries will this time be resolute not only in approving but also in taking the measures we envisage and taking them with such persistence that it is realised that the fate of the world does not rest in the hands of one nation or one government.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hanin, both for your introduction and for your reply to the debate and also for the immense amount of work you have done in preparing the report.

Does the Chairman of the Committee, Sir Frederic Bennett, wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have kept silent with difficulty during the course of this debate, but as Chairman of the Committee I also have a right to explain my own view, particularly since changes are now proposed to a document which was unanimously agreed on 27th April by people of different nationalities within the Alliance, and of different parties. It is odd that those who now want to soften this document suddenly since 27th April yet admit that the situation has also become more serious. This is a difficult logic for me to follow.

There have been two broad arguments against this report and its recommendations during the course of the debate. One is that it is useless because the Russians will take no notice of it and we have no power to do anything at all. It is an odd attitude to adopt when, at the same time as claiming that we are the only parliamentary organisation in Europe competent to deal with security matters, we say that anything we do is in any case useless. If that is true, it may be an argument for the abolition of WEU, but it is not an argument for failing to do one's duty so long as the Assembly is here.

A second argument is that it is provocative. Yet this document has been published and has been public property since 27th April last as a united decision of the Committee, with only one abstention. It does not seem to have provoked anything in the meanwhile, unless anyone here is seriously to suggest that the worsening in the last few days arises out of a document published on 27th April, which I do not think is a serious proposition for anyone to adopt. The number of books and statements that must have been written and spoken since the last war, very often from liberal and social-

ist sources, have all held unanimously that, if only the free countries of Europe, the United States of America and others had warned Adolf Hitler where his aggression would lead when he went into the Sudetenland, into the Rhineland, when he occupied Austria and later Prague, events would have been very different.

We have all been told for the past twenty-five years that the biggest mistake of statesmen at that time was to allow the then aggressor to believe that he could get away with it. As far as I know, not one person has written, especially from liberal sources, except along those lines. What has changed today? I wonder what our consciences will feel like if this aggression takes place and all we can say afterwards is that, despite all the lessons of the 1930s, we decided not to tell the aggressor what the consequences of his action would be.

We have also had the complaint that our lack of success on the Afghan question was because we gave no indication and took no united action when it took place. But different arguments are being adduced again today. If we talk of provocation, I will only say as Chairman that I have very good contacts with Poland, and I am not talking only of free Poles living in my country. It is an open secret that I have friends amongst Polish Solidarity.

Not one comment from those sources alleging that this is provocative or will not help their cause has been made to the Rapporteur or myself. There has not been one suggestion along these lines ever since this document was first passed on 27th April. Why is it that we are suddenly told today that this will only hurt the situation, with speakers going on to say that in any case it will have no effect at all on the Soviet Union?

I will put one new thought. If our reaction is to have any impact on the Soviet Union, if it should go into Poland, it will have to be with the close collaboration of the United States of America and Canada, because it is from there that measures such as a lasting grain embargo will have to emanate. How can we expect the Americans and others to make their opposition clear and to take remedial measures if we in Europe do not say where we stand? This is the failure behind what has happened in Afghanistan.

We are at risk in Europe of saying that we are not able to help and then looking to other countries to make their opposition clear. The impact then will be very much greater than the impact of Afghanistan, because, fortunately or unfortunately, many Poles – there were no Afghans – live in Canada, the United States, Argentina, Australia and so on, and their voice will not remain silent unless firm action is

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

taken. All that we seek to do in the document is not to say what measures will be taken but to concert our action and to avoid the mistakes of the past and to avoid charges being made against governments of not warning aggressors about the consequences of their actions.

I come finally to my own personal position. I have no intention of issuing threats, but I agree with what the Rapporteur has said. He fairly pointed out that, although there was an overwhelming vote in April, people are entitled to change their minds. So am I. I say without wishing to make any threats that if the report is weakened or softened beyond the point indicated by Mr. Hanin, it will profoundly disappoint the Poles, who are looking to us for moral support, as they have made clear in the last few days, and it will encourage the Soviet Union to believe that if it does enough sabre-rattling, we in the West will retreat.

I shall vote against all the amendments with the exception of the one tabled by Mr. Hanin and Mr. Müller, which I signed, because there are positive merits in it. If the other amendments are carried – this is a democratic assembly and they could be carried – I shall have pride in voting against the report, hoping that some of my friends will follow me, so that at least in Poland there will be those who know that there are still voices strong enough to support them. I shall give an explanation of that vote if that should become necessary.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That concludes the general debate.

Before we can vote on the draft recommendation, we have to take the amendments. I shall, as usual, take them in the sequence in which they relate to the text.

Amendment 2 has been tabled by Mr. Porthoine, Mr. Vohrer and Mr. Blaauw:

2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “in 1980”.

I do not see Mr. Vohrer or Mr. Porthoine. Mr. Blaauw, do you wish to move the amendment?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The amendment simply makes the draft recommendation accord more to the time in which we are living.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Committee accept the amendment? Amendment 2 has been formally moved and accepted by the Committee. Is it agreed by the Assembly?

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We come now to Amendments 1 and 7:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “Poland” to the end and insert:

“which would constitute a flagrant violation of the principles laid down in the Helsinki final act and which would have consequences for the future CSCE process;”.

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “Poland” to the end and insert:

“which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in question their content;”.

The amendments are almost the same, but not quite. Unless Mr. Blaauw, on behalf of his colleagues, will accept Mr. Hanin’s amendment, I shall have to put the two amendments separately. I do not know what Mr. Blaauw’s reaction is to that.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I accept the amendment of Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hanin and Mr. Müller.

The PRESIDENT. – That is most helpful. Amendment 1 is withdrawn.

Mr. Hanin, you need only formally to move Amendment 7. You have already spoken about it. Will you formally move it?

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I move Amendment 7.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr Hanin has moved Amendment 7, which is supported by the Committee.

We shall now vote on Amendment 7.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

Amendment 3 has been tabled by the Liberal Group:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “planning what measures all member countries should take in application” and insert “implementation”.

Mr. Blaauw, do you wish to move the amendment?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, those who were present during the discussion yesterday will understand that this amendment is a translation of what I said

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

then. I have no desire to pare down the recommendation, nor am I suggesting that it contains empty phrases, but I do think that we must state clearly what we want and what course we propose to take. We are opposed to military intervention in the events proceeding in Poland, but we must not say that we want measures to be taken.

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation we have stated clearly that the principles to be followed in the event of an intervention by the Soviet Union must be announced. When we speak of measures in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, I really wonder whether we are using the right terminology. Implementation of principles covers a wide field. If we only speak of measures, others might construe this as an intervention in internal affairs. There is a possibility of misinterpretation here which I want to avoid. I want a clear, lucid recommendation which can be followed if the national parliaments wish to take steps.

When I think of the debates in the Netherlands Parliament about taking measures following the invasion of Afghanistan in order to express our condemnation and horror, when it was impossible to do certain things within a very small field, I consider it wrong to go so far now as to speak of measures in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation. That is why I have tabled this amendment which is closely linked with the amendment to paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation. They go together.

I shall return to Amendments 4 and 5 later.

The PRESIDENT. – This amendment goes with Amendment 4:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “application of these measures” and insert “implementation”.

The amendments deal with the same point. If the first is carried, the second amendment will fall. If the first falls, I shall take the second amendment.

Mr. Hanin?

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I tabled the amendment, I have nothing further to say.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin, do you wish to speak on the amendment?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to speak on a point of order and here I address myself to the French-speaking members of the Assembly. The text as proposed by Mr. Blaauw and his colleagues does not strictly mean anything in French.

Mr Blaauw would have us say: “... *de procéder dès maintenant à des consultations en vue de mettre en œuvre...*”. In French, “*mettre en œuvre*” requires an object. I therefore propose to Mr. Blaauw that he use the following expression: “... *en vue d’agir...*”.

Is that what he means? In French “*mettre en œuvre*” requires an object. So there is something missing after “*mettre en œuvre*” or it should be replaced with “*agir*”. Is that what Mr. Blaauw means?

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to speak, Mr. Hanin?

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I find myself with a problem here: either this amendment does not change anything and it is therefore pointless to approve it or it has a quite specific purpose, but although I have listened very carefully to yesterday’s speeches and to the one made today, I still cannot understand what is wanted. After all, “take in application” and “implementation”, strictly speaking, mean the same.

What do the authors of the amendment mean? They are telling us to be careful because it might be thought that we are referring to military measures. But the amendment itself might be thought to refer to military measures. That is quite obvious. In fact, all the measures we propose are clearly non-military. We are therefore asking that it be possible for the non-military measures concerned to be implemented in practice and that it be established how this should be done.

I therefore call on the Assembly to reject the amendment because, I repeat, either it changes nothing and there is really no point in adopting it or it seeks to change something that is beyond me. Above all, it would do nothing to change the interpretation to which the author of the amendment refers.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment? If not, I put Amendment 3, which has been tabled by members of the Liberal Group, and we shall now vote on it.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

An equal number of members have voted for and against the amendment. Accordingly, as I have no casting vote, the amendment falls. I take it that Amendment 4 also falls.

Amendment 3 is negatived.

We come to Amendment 5:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.

The President (continued)

It may be convenient if we also discuss Amendment 6:

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was not present, of course, at the discussions in the General Affairs Committee. I wonder, however, what is the purpose of paragraph 4, once paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 have been accepted.

What can the Council of Europe add with regard to measures to be taken by virtue of the announcement of principles in paragraph 1? What can the Council of Europe do, beyond invoking human rights? In view of this I propose leaving out paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel to speak.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Blaauw wonders what the Council of Europe could do. As the General Rapporteur of its Political Affairs Committee, I can tell him that the Council of Europe can do a great deal. I am surprised by this scepticism, the resignation I note in certain of our members, to the point that I wonder whether it would not be advisable to table an amendment of a more general nature seeking to replace "WEU" by "UEN", standing for the Union for European Neutrality.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid that I would rule that amendment out of order if it were to be put as a manuscript amendment.

I hope that we shall not take too long over these amendments as time is against us.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to speak in support of this amendment and begin by taking up a remark made by the Rapporteur this morning, quoting from the speech I made yesterday. He said I believed that what we did here would provoke an invasion by Soviet troops – or military intervention by the Soviet Union in Poland. Please believe me when I say that I am by no means naïve enough to suppose that a recommendation adopted by this Assembly might in any way influence the Soviet Union's thinking on intervention. If the Soviet Union wants to intervene, it will do so. I believe we are generally agreed on that here.

The point I was making yesterday was quite different. What I said was that the Soviet Union would like to produce evidence to show that western countries are indulging in external intervention and that we must not do anything which would enable the Soviet Union to parade any papers we might adopt here before the public in confirmation of its thesis. That is the point I was making. The recommendation is not intended as a provocation, of course. The point is that it might be misinterpreted by people who are not well-disposed towards us. That is my point, Mr. Hanin. I believe we will weaken our position if we adopt the draft recommendation as it now stands.

All the statements that have been made by the Alliance, the European Community and the heads of government have avoided giving any descriptions of procedures. That is no coincidence. As I said yesterday, we should follow the example set for us here by General Rogers, who also refrained from describing individual measures, because this is a wise approach.

That is why I advocate the deletion of paragraphs 4 and 5. I do not think they represent a provocation, but I should not like to see the Soviet Union going around waving a Western European Union document and saying: here is the proof that the western nations want to interfere in Poland's internal affairs.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Gessner.

I call Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall not prolong the debate unnecessarily.

I understood what Mr. Gessner said yesterday and I feel I have replied to his remarks. What he is really saying is that, if we do not want to annoy the Soviet Union, we must not talk about this. The Committee should not even have begun to consider this question, as that was the best way not to annoy the Soviet Union. I am therefore against the amendment, Mr. President, since it would clearly be most valuable if the same position were adopted not by seven but by twenty-one states of Western Europe. That is quite obvious. If the recommendation adopted by the Assembly serves any purpose – and we shall clearly think it does if we adopt it – it would obviously be helpful for it to be endorsed by the largest possible number of western countries.

A British statesman once said: "Good speeches may have changed my mind, but they have never changed the way I vote." What we are witnessing here today is another example of this. I do not claim that mine was a good speech, but I find that these days speeches do little to change the way people vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur. I hope that the Assembly will now come to a decision on Amendment 5, which has been proposed by the Liberal Group.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

The remaining amendment is Amendment 6:

6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak? We understand that the Chairman has said that he would be against the deletion.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I am, of course, opposed to this amendment. I am deeply disappointed at the turn this debate has taken, and I wonder if there is any point in anything we have done.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on Amendment 6.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

I now have to put to the vote the draft recommendation, as amended, to Document 870.

If there is unanimity we can dispense with the need for a roll-call vote.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I object.

The PRESIDENT. – We must therefore have a roll-call vote.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Ferretti.

Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to give an explanation of vote, but as I am not sufficiently familiar with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure – I hope the President can help me on this – I do not know whether this is possible as it is in other assemblies.

The PRESIDENT. – The explanation of votes must take place after the vote has been held. I hope that the rule will not be too generously interpreted, because that could lead to another debate. As Rapporteur, Mr. Hanin has made two speeches. If he wishes to speak to explain his vote, I hope that he will keep it brief and that the same will apply to any other explanations of votes.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	53
Ayes	34
Noes	18
Abstentions	1

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

We now have a number of explanations of votes.

Sir Frederic.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful to those who decided that to send out this document as the unanimous feeling of the Assembly would be utterly wrong. In its present form, it will prove to be of profound disappointment to the Poles. What is more, it will encourage those in the Kremlin to continue to believe that by bluster and pressure they can achieve their ends.

I am proud still to be one of those who would like to send an assurance to the Poles that they have some staunch friends left in Europe, apart from those who for one reason or another have decided to abdicate a position which they took up in April of this year.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order Mr. President. Will you rule on whether it is in order not to give an explanation of a vote but to start a discussion again and to insult other colleagues?

The PRESIDENT. – It is not an approach that I recommend to the Assembly. I am afraid that the explanation of a vote is an alien custom in British parliamentary practice. In our view, when a member has made a speech and voted, that is it. However, in our rules here it is in order for a representative to explain his vote and, until he starts to speak, I do not know what he intends to say. But I hope very much that it will not open up another debate and, of course, any derogatory remarks directed at other colleagues are to be deplored.

Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Rule 26 (6) of our Rules of Procedure states: "When the examination of the text has been concluded only explanations of vote

1. See page 43.

2. See page 44.

Mr. Hanin (continued)

may be made before the vote is taken on the text as a whole." I should therefore have given my explanation before the vote was taken, and I regret, Mr. President, that you did not give me the floor at that time.

I do not want to make an issue of this. I did ask to speak, but I quite understand that you cannot look in all directions at once. I am not therefore accusing you of not being impartial. I am simply saying that the Rules of Procedure were on my side.

The PRESIDENT. – May I rule on that point immediately? I gather that the practice on former occasions has been that, during votes on amendments, explanations of votes are permitted while the amendments are being considered. You did not rise to ask to explain your vote, Mr. Hanin, until the roll-call vote was in progress. Strictly speaking, I should not have allowed you to raise any matter when the roll-call vote was under way. You should have asked to explain your vote before the roll-call vote began and it was clear that there was to be a roll-call vote. However, I did not rule you out of order because I wanted to give you that opportunity. You now have that opportunity, and I hope that you will not spend your time arguing points of order.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I voted against the draft recommendation for two reasons: firstly, to protest against what I consider to be an extraordinary procedure because all the amendments could very easily have been tabled beforehand; secondly, and above all, because I did not want to associate myself with the adoption of a recommendation which I now consider to be virtually meaningless.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Hanin.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. Günther MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to give the following explanation of vote. I voted against because I feel that, now the vote has been taken on the amendments, the final outcome of our work has become a sign – a negative sign, of course – to those pursuing certain democratic aims in Poland.

These matters could so easily have been discussed if only the relevant wording had been submitted to the meeting of the Committee in April, for example. But the document was then adopted unanimously, and now we have gone back on it. There can be no clearer sign

that democracy in Western Europe is weakened in its dealings with totalitarianism.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller.

That concludes the explanations of votes.

4. European security and events in the Gulf area

(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 871, Addendum and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We proceed to the next Order of the Day, which is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on European security and events in the Gulf area and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 871, Addendum and Amendments.

Unfortunately, because of the French elections, our Rapporteur, Mr. Forni, is not able to be present. The Chairman of the Committee will introduce the report on his behalf. I am sure, however, that the Assembly will wish me to convey its congratulations to Mr. Forni who, I understand, has already been re-elected on the first ballot in the French elections.

I ask Sir Frederic Bennett to introduce this report.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – It is with a genuine sense of regret from my point of view that I confirm that Mr. Forni is unable to be here to present his report. It is always better for the Rapporteur himself to undertake the task. I was informed only last night that Mr. Forni would not be coming today, so I had no alternative but to take on the additional task of presenting this report. I hope that my colleagues will understand that I have not had the usual time to prepare my presentation of the report to the Assembly.

The report was adopted by the Committee on 27th April 1981 with complete unanimity. There was not even an abstention. That has remained the position, with the exception of the tabling of one comparatively minor amendment – assuming that others have not been tabled. I am now presenting the document as drafted by Mr. Forni, with an addendum by myself. Because of the French elections, I had to undertake the task of visiting the countries to which Mr. Forni had been authorised to go by the Presidential Committee, namely, Pakistan and its borders with Afghanistan, and two countries in the Middle East, Kuwait and Jordan.

Before going on to my exposition of the report, which I shall keep as brief as possible

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

because of what I have said already and because of the lateness of the hour, I should point out that I have myself proposed certain amendments about which I had the good fortune to telephone the Rapporteur, Mr. Forni. He agrees without qualification with the amendments that I have suggested. That means that I am able to ask my colleagues to appreciate that the amendments which I shall propose and the original draft are the property of the Rapporteur as well as of me acting in his place.

Perhaps the best way that I can explain the preoccupations that we in the General Affairs Committee have had about this subject is, without indulging in a travelogue, to give a brief account of my own recent travels in these troubled areas and of my impressions.

I regret to tell the Assembly that in Pakistan itself and on the borders of Afghanistan the situation has deteriorated and is continuing to deteriorate very gravely. When I went there a little over a year ago, there were only some 600,000 refugees. One would think that would be enough, out of a population of eighteen million. The figure has now reached 2,100,000 refugees living in Pakistan, and in addition those coming in each month now total somewhere between 80,000 and 110,000.

Even without taking into account the unknown number of refugees who have crossed into Iran, the figure, it has been suggested to me, lies somewhere between 500,000 and 1,500,000. In Pakistan, one can get the figures because the United Nations has registered them, but even if we take for Iran the lowest figure of 500,000, it means that by the time this Assembly meets again, unless there is a dramatic and unexpected change in the course of events, there will be no more than 75 % of the population of Afghanistan who were living in that country at the time the Soviet invasion took place and 25 % will have left the country, with very little prospect that one can see of their being able to go back.

Who are these refugees? A certain number are elderly people and there are women and children who have been taken across the border by their menfolk so as to get them out of danger while the men continue their own resistance inside the country. Those refugees have been conducted out of Afghanistan across the border into Pakistan, and the men have then gone back to join in the resistance. The other kind of refugees, of which there are increasing numbers, arise from the latest Russian military strategy there, which is utterly to destroy, to rase to the ground, all the inhabited villages in the country. In that climate, without a house one dies. Therefore, those people have had no

alternative but to seek sanctuary in Pakistan where the climate is different and where they can survive.

The resultant strains on Pakistan are enormous. The Russians are exerting day after day threats and pressure of every conceivable kind, military and otherwise. There have been seven military incursions into Pakistan to try to make Pakistan stop the true moral support that it has given – not material support, for it has given none to Afghanistan, so as to avoid provocation. Nevertheless, the pressure on Pakistan, economic and otherwise, is getting worse.

Pakistan sees itself threatened also from another source in that there is a suspicion, justified or not, that there may be an opportunity for some kind of collusive act by India against the integrity of Pakistan, possibly up in Kashmir. It is impossible to foresee this, but I will give the assembly two figures. The Pakistan army consists of eighteen divisions. Of these fourteen are on the Indian border, facing thirty-three well-equipped Indian divisions and only four Pakistani divisions are left guarding the long frontier of Pakistan with Afghanistan; so one can see how Pakistan's resources are very strained at the present time.

The suggestion of the Committee and myself, which has now been reinforced, is that we should provide urgently more aid under three headings; first, humanitarian aid for refugees. At present some aid is coming from individual countries, some has come through organisations and some has come through initiatives taken by the Council of Europe. The main part has come from United Nations agencies and from the League of Red Cross Societies; but still more is needed and it is an appalling burden on Pakistan at the present time.

Pakistan has taken on itself the burden of providing these people with what I would refer to as pocket money. Over and above the aid that they get by way of food and sleeping accommodation, they get only five dollars per month. That is not an excessive amount but, when it is multiplied by 2,100,000, we get some idea of the financial burden that is falling on Pakistan, one of the poorest countries in Asia. The suggestions in the document are that we should if at all possible do our duty and help on the humanitarian side.

Some initiatives have already been undertaken by the United States of America, and more are being actively considered, I understand, by the Nine, to give more economic aid. In addition, the Pakistanis are looking for strictly defensive aid against the threat which faces them. At present they are under-equipped and have a small army. It appears that some agreement will be reached with the

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

United States for some limited defence aid, but that will not be forthcoming until October 1982 for budgetary reasons applying to the conduct of these matters within the United States of America.

There is therefore a need for other steps to be taken, even on a limited basis, to provide Pakistan with some of the purely defensive equipment that it needs to protect its own integrity against the huge threat it now faces.

I shall now move to the Gulf area. When I went there I was in a reasonably optimistic mood, feeling that the beginning of a European initiative towards a solution of the Palestine problem was under way, because it had been made quite clear that it would be undertaken. Lord Carrington had suggested that he would be carrying on with that work when he became President of the Council and he had also gone some way to get at least some degree of Arab co-operation by saying that he was ready, in the name of Europe, to meet the PLO leader later this year if that would be helpful. This was a break in what had previously been the rigid American position that they were unprepared to do that. Therefore, I was reasonably optimistic when I went out there not that an easy solution would be found, because it is a highly intractable problem, but that something would be accomplished by way of improving the atmosphere in which ultimately, possibly with a different Israeli Government, decisions could be taken to deal with the vexed problem of the Palestinian homeland on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

I regret that when I was on the point of leaving Pakistan there came the announcement of the Israeli raid on the nuclear energy plant in Iraq. I have to tell this Assembly that which I am sure they will have learnt for themselves – that at the moment all hopes for a rapid initiative, or any progress even in the foreseeable future, have evaporated. Now there is no doubt whatsoever that there is a feeling of outrage, humiliation and apprehension throughout the whole of the Arab countries, and do not forget that I went to only two states, the most moderate, Kuwait and Jordan. What I should have found had I been to some of the others I can only guess at from reading newspaper reports of what their leaders have said.

There is no doubt that a vast new area of tension has now been formed and it is very difficult to see how the situation could do other than worsen in regard to any settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. That would be bad enough in itself but as a side effect it has also made any co-operation for the time being involving the United States and the Gulf states

impossible. Rightly or wrongly, the United States of America is regarded as a close ally of Israel, and that makes any conversation in that field much more difficult, indeed, altogether fruitless for some time ahead. I am sure that my colleagues here will accept what I have said as being a realistic interpretation of events and that we have had a serious setback in regard to a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem and a setback in the realm of any co-ordination on defence matters within the Gulf area against any future aggression. This is a sad state of affairs. I do not think that we can leave it to time alone to heal it. We must take measures in the United Nations and elsewhere, not only to condemn – anybody can condemn – but to make sure that events like this never happen again, because it has for the time being upset the whole apple cart in that part of the world and upset any chance of co-operation with the West.

I have had the help of my colleague, Mr. Burgelin of the secretariat, in my task. Although he does not hold political views, I am sure that he will not mind my saying that the impact of the sense of disappointment and outrage was staggering. I wish that I could have gone at almost any other time than two days after that event. Therefore, I have modified and brought up to date the recommendation in the document, which received no criticism when it was in Committee. It was adopted unanimously, without abstentions. Plainly, I have not been able to have a Committee meeting when my amendments, which I tabled as a result of this threat, could have been considered, but I have telephoned Mr. Forni. The documents and changes have been read to him, and he has authorised me to say that, as Rapporteur, he is in agreement with them. I have pleasure and pride in presenting what I am afraid is in some ways a melancholy report, but it is at least factual and objective. It contains few personal opinions and is simply a record of the facts. I hope that the controversies which have occurred in the past twenty-four hours on another subject will not be repeated because on this subject I think that we are virtually united about the need to try to restore some stability to the most destabilised area of the world at present.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I am sure that the Assembly and your Committee are extremely grateful to you for having stepped into the breach created by the unforeseen calling of French elections, which prevented Mr. Forni from undertaking the visit and fulfilling his appointments and for being here today to present the report.

Mr. Gessner put his name down to speak, but I do not think he is present. There is no one else inscribed to speak in the debate.

The President (continued)

Does any Representative present wish to speak ?...

There is no debate.

We must now examine the Amendments.

Amendment No. 1 has been tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett :

1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert :

“Deploring, in condemning Israel’s air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area;”.

May I ask you, Sir Frederic, to deal with the amendments ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have received no objections to the amendments and there is only one amendment, tabled by Mr. Vohrer, to which I should speak. I move Amendment 1 not only on my own behalf but on behalf of Mr. Forni, who agrees with it.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? I can hardly call Sir Frederic to reply, because it is his amendment and he has already moved it. If no one wishes to speak, I put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 2 :

2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :

“Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that country with the armaments it urgently needs for its own security;”.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment flows directly from my remarks in my introduction. Again, it has the agreement of Mr. Forni and of everyone else I have spoken to about it. In view of the threat to Pakistan’s security, I should like to insert the word “defensive” before “armaments”, towards the end of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will accept that as a manuscript amendment. Therefore, will repre-

sentatives note the insertion of the word “defensive” before “armaments” ?

Does anyone wish to speak on or against the amendment ? If not, I put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The manuscript amendment to Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on Amendment 2, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

I apologise to Mr. Blaauw, because strictly I should have called his Amendment 5 before Amendment 2. I notice that he has just come into the Assembly. Please excuse me, Mr. Blaauw, for not calling the amendment earlier. Would you like to move Amendment 5 :

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “assistance” insert “in particular in the political and humanitarian field”.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The reason for the amendment is that I do not wish the wording of the draft recommendation to be too harsh. I stress that the main aid must be political and humanitarian.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw, for a very clear explanation of your amendment.

Do you wish to speak to the amendment, Sir Frederic ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that Mr. Blaauw will not press the amendment, because this Assembly is concerned with security. It so happens that I am Rapporteur for the Committee concerned with refugees in the Council of Europe and a report on humanitarian aid is being prepared by it. Since this Assembly is concerned with defence, I hope that, as a report is being prepared which will, I am sure, meet with complete acceptance in the Council of Europe, Mr. Blaauw will not press the amendment. I assure him that I have taken the point on board. It will be dealt with in the Council of Europe report which I am preparing and which will deal specifically with humanitarian aid.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – In view of that explanation I withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – That is extremely helpful. Thank you very much indeed. Amendment 5 is withdrawn. I invite Sir Frederic to move Amendment 3.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*).— I beg to move Amendment 3 :

3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :

“ Offer active support to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security and envisage giving them a unilateral European or western guarantee for their independence, if so requested; ”.

This amendment arises because I was unable to say everything from the podium. During our visit we found – to put it crudely – that the days of mutual pacts between the western and Asian countries are over. There is no longer a wish in that area to become overtly involved in what is called the East-West struggle. They want to be left alone and as far as possible to assume collectively their own security.

The King of Jordan put forward the idea that he would like all the great powers to give a collective guarantee of non-intervention in that area and at the same time he would welcome any assurances that if help was requested it would be forthcoming from any country to which such a request was made. This amendment is therefore an interpretation of the wishes expressed to us in Pakistan and other countries in that part of the world.

Contrary to what some people believe, the people there do not want a direct military presence anywhere on their soil. They do not mind a rapid deployment force at sea, but they do not want to become involved directly. That was the majority view put to me and, whether or not it is a view that is always shared by my own government, I should stress that I speak today as a Rapporteur and Chairman. As such, I have correctly conveyed the feeling that the days of pacts are over. The people in that area want to be left alone, but would like the right to put a request to us for support if they are threatened. They do not want to enter into bilateral arrangements which they believe would increase the danger.

This is an attempt on my part to put in one short paragraph what I believe to be the majority Arab point of view. I hope that I have done enough to explain the amendment. I should have done so from the podium, but because of the lateness of the hour I was trying to keep matters short.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Does anyone wish to speak to the amendment ?

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – In our previous debate, Sir Frederic led opposition to his own report because, he said, that the chan-

ges in it had been meaningless. I am doubtful about this amendment for the very opposite reason. The amendment talks about “ a unilateral European or western guarantee for their independence, if so requested ”. In spite of what Sir Frederic has stated, that conveys a willingness to give military intervention if asked in order to help their independence. That might be useful to those countries if they request it, but to give them the impression that there is any chance of military intervention in such a circumstance is to lead them to believe something that will not happen.

The first part of the amendment presents me with no difficulty, but as soon as we indicate that military intervention from the West will take place, particularly on a unilateral basis, it becomes a nonsense. I could not possibly support that part of the amendment. Unless it is changed, I shall have to vote against the amendment in its entirety.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Hughes.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I understand what Lord Hughes has said. That may have been his impression, but it was not what the King of Jordan said with the support of his colleagues. A unilateral European or western guarantee could have the meaning suggested by Lord Hughes, but those countries at least want to be able to ask for support for their independence if they feel threatened.

If I left out the phrase “ a unilateral European or western guarantee ”, perhaps that would meet Lord Hughes’ point of view. They want expressions of support for their independence, not just purely negative ones such as “ Get on with your own business, it is none of our business at all ”. Therefore, perhaps I can meet Lord Hughes’ point by suggesting that the amendment read : “ envisage giving them support for their independence, if so requested ”. That is what I meant in any event.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps I can help. Clearly, this matter could not be pursued fully by the Committee. Perhaps the amendment should stop after the word “ security ”. If I understand what Sir Frederic wishes, it is that we should offer active support to the efforts that they are making to assume collectively their own security. If we stop at that point it might make acceptance possible.

At this stage of the Assembly, it would be better if we could get agreement on the amendment rather than having a vote on a matter of such importance.

I call on Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – As we are amending an amendment, I should like to suggest an amendment. It is that Sir Frederic's amendment should read :

“ Offer active support to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security and their independence ”.

The PRESIDENT. – Are there any other speakers ?

What is your response, Sir Frederic, to the suggestions ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I am more than happy to meet the wishes that have been expressed. However, I would be failing in my duty if I did not say that it would not be fair to leave it at “ security and ... independence ”. That could be read as meaning that we have no further interest in the area.

If we could insert the words “ our full support ” somewhere in the amendment, that would be acceptable to me.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – We are near to agreement, but what Sir Frederic has just said is repetitive because the amendment begins with the words “ offer active support ”. Therefore, we do not need to talk about support a second time.

The PRESIDENT. – We must bring this discussion to a close. I understand the points that have been made, but I should say from the chair that this type of proceeding is very much to be discouraged, because new amendments have come forward the texts of which have not been before the Committee. We are, therefore, presented with a problem. I know that Sir Frederic has strong views on this matter, but it is an important policy consideration for the Council of Ministers. We should therefore be clear about it. I am sorry that, because of the time of day, more members are not here so that we could come to a decision about it. Unless Sir Frederic meets the views of Lord Hughes, we shall have to take a vote on the amendment, and it will be a tiny vote.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I make one last attempt to assist. If the amendment were to read “ offer active support and help ” and finish at the word “ security ”, perhaps that would meet Lord Hughes' point of view.

The PRESIDENT. – The suggestion is that the amendment should read.

“ Offer active support and help to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security ”.

Are Lord Hughes and Mr. Blaauw content with that ?...

We shall therefore vote on the manuscript Amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The manuscript amendment to Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on Amendment 3, as amended.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3, as amended, is agreed to.

Thank you very much, Sir Frederic, for meeting the views of the Assembly.

We now come finally to Amendment 4.

Sir Frederic.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move Amendment 4 :

4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :

“ Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever ”.

This is important. I do not believe that it is controversial in the sense that it is the duty of the United Nations, both through the Security Council and otherwise, to deter aggression.

Recent events in the Middle East have made that much more problematic than before. In view of threats and counter-threats that are being made, I thought it right to introduce the words “ condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area ”. I am seeking also to show that primarily the United Nations ought in that part of the world to accept the responsibility and I hope that there will therefore be no objection on that score. It is only right to mention the United Nations in such a document since it is involved in trying to find a solution in every sphere in the Middle East. We should give it some support in that context.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to oppose or speak to the amendment ?...

Again, we face a new point in telling the United Nations what it should do. That is a matter for the Assembly, however. We shall now vote on Amendment 4.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*).

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

I now have to put the text of the amended draft recommendation, Document 871.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted*¹.

5. Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 877 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – Thanks to the co-operation of all concerned, we are now within sight of finishing our business this morning.

We come to the remaining Order of the Day, the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and vote on the draft resolution, Document 877 and Amendment.

While the Chairman and Rapporteur, Mr. Grieve, is taking his place, may I say how grateful I am for the enormous amount of work that he has done personally, with the support of his Committee, and for the advice and help of Clerks from both the British and French Parliaments. No doubt you will be referring to that, Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, indeed, Mr. President.

Arriving here at a quarter to one to move the adoption of the report reminds me graphically of my experiences as a young barrister in unimportant cases in distant provincial towns. I do not suggest that Paris is a distant provincial town. I regard it as my second home, as does any other civilised man. As a young barrister, in distant provincial towns I would find myself with the last case of the day, wondering whether the judge would go home for tea and put my case over until the following morning. That would have incurred a hotel bill which normally would have swallowed up the fee that I received for such efforts as I was able then to make.

1. See page 45.

The PRESIDENT. – I am afraid, Mr. Grieve, that you will be unable to buy a cup of coffee with the fee that you will receive for your performance this morning.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, Mr. President. I have long realised, since going into parliament, that the days that I never spoke without a fee are past.

It is plain that the rules of our Assembly have for long lagged behind our practice and have needed radical revision. Some of the revisions have been small – in matters of grammar and matters of concordance between the French and English texts. They include matters such as the use of “may”, “shall” or “will”, words which were used by those who originally drafted our rules. It was plain, in session after session, that the rules needed amending. One important amendment was made last December, however, which, at the instance of President von Hassel, was referred to the Committee over which I then had, as I still have, the honour to preside. We made an important amendment to Rule 7.

It was then decided that we should consider the rules in their entirety. You were quite right, Mr. President, to say that we should have been unable to do that without, first, the untiring help of the whole Committee. It is not easy for a Committee of this Assembly to turn itself into what effectively is a drafting Committee, because we all know how difficult drafting is. It is done in our respective parliaments by skilled people who give their whole lives to it. Some of us acquire a certain skill in it in the course of parliamentary careers, but we cannot hope to match the skill of the experts.

So we had the unstinting help of the members of the Committee who were frequently able to put their fingers on points which the experts had failed to observe. In addition, however, we had the help of three considerable experts. These were Mr. Michael Ryle of the House of Commons – I apologise, as a British subject, for mentioning him first – Mr. Desandre from the French National Assembly, and Mr. Blischke from the Bundestag. We are very grateful for their help.

I should be failing in my duty if I did not pay a considerable tribute to Mr. Moulias, our Clerk, who was on the telephone to me on most days at eight in the morning just as I was shaving or having my breakfast, raising points that arose from the revision. I and my Committee are deeply grateful to Mr. Moulias.

The principal amendments to the rules are set out in the explanatory memorandum. I trust that, after the consideration that the Committee most carefully has given to these matters, the Assembly, diminished as it now is on

Mr. Grieve (continued)

its final day, will be able to give unanimous approval to our proposed changes. We say in paragraph 7 of the memorandum that "Most of the other changes" – I shall refer to the principal ones now – "are purely matters of form or are self-explanatory". They have been clearly set out in Document 877. The text of the original rules is set out alongside the text of the proposed changes. The whole of the rules of the Assembly are set out there as, indeed, are two parts of the Charter. We have found it necessary – and I come now to our principal recommendation – to propose amendments to the Charter which will be necessary if we change the Rules of Procedure.

The English are always brought up to *précis*, and I hope that I shall not fail my schoolmaster who taught me as I turn as briefly as I can to the concrete provisions. First, the provisions of Article III(a) of the Charter and of Rule 2, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, which link our Assembly sessions to the Assembly sessions of the Council of Europe, have, we have decided, become obsolete. They are so obsolete that I do not think that they have been observed for a long time. It is time that we brought our rules into accordance with our practice. That is our first main recommended change.

The same is true of Article V (d) and (e) of the Charter and Rule 27 of our Rules of Procedure, which specify various time limits within which the Committee meetings have to be held before the Assembly, and in which documents have to be circulated, and so on. They impose a rigid Procrustean bed for the operation of the secretariat which with the best will in the world it has been unable to comply with. We have provided for greater elasticity in those rules.

We consider that Rules 26 and 27 on the order of debates and the debate on the annual report should also be revised – again in the light of the now current procedure. In other words, we have not been observing the rules. Since it is bad for an Assembly not to observe its rules, it is better to make the rules accord with the practice that has been found convenient. The new Rule 26 therefore provides that:

"A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the report of the Committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the report... When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, Representatives or Substitutes may present explanations of votes lasting not more than three minutes."

I am sure, Mr. President, that that will meet with the approval of all those who have to listen to such explanations. In most cases that time will be adequate.

In Rule 27 we have dealt with the matter of the Clerk sending a copy of the annual report of the Council and the work of the Presidential Committee in referring to the competent Committees the relevant chapters of the annual report. We have made some consequential amendments there.

The revision of the Rules of Procedure has included more detailed definitions of the rules relating to amendments in Rule 29 and procedural amendments in Rule 32. I shall not read them out. I am sure that those who have been interested enough to stay will have read them for themselves. They have the unanimous approval of the Committee and again we have moved more in accordance with the practice that many years have shown us to be convenient.

Rule 32 has been rewritten completely. The new text contains the following changes, and this deals with the previous question. Perhaps I should read it. It defines what the previous question is, because this is a continental notion and one foreign to British parliamentarians. There was a good deal of controversy about what precisely was meant.

New Rule 32 provides:

"1. A Representative or Substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

(a) to move the previous question..."

and then follows the explanation:

"which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;

(b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the adjournment of the debate;

(c) to move the closure of the debate;

(d) to move reference back to Committee.

Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant Committee report.

None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate."

and it goes on to provide that these matters shall take precedence over the main question.

"3. In debate on the above matters the following only shall be heard: the proposer of

Mr. Grieve (continued)

the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the Rapporteur or the Chairman of any Committee concerned.

4. In addition, a Representative or Substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order."

That really is our present rule, but it is incorporated in the new version.

In the new text we have been at pains to define the meaning of the word "Representative" which is used in its strict sense. Whenever appropriate – that is to say, where rights in the Assembly are accorded to Substitutes – we put in the words "Representative or Substitute".

For the sake of clarity, in Rule 35 we have provided that that absolute majority of Representatives has been replaced by a full definition of that majority.

In summary, those are our proposals. They are set out in great detail. I am fully conscious, as is my Committee, that the supervision of our Rules of Procedure, which are the essential tools of our proceedings, must be a continuing process. That is why we have a Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. It is rather like the cleaning of the Forth Bridge – I say that in the presence of Lord Hughes, who lives not very far from it. When they get to one end, they start again at the other. So it is here. Already in Committee two proposals have been made for further changes. One is in the form of an amendment which is to be moved today by Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Voogd. It would result in a substantial change in our rules with regard to the constitution of the Bureau, and they have been good enough to tell me that they intend to withdraw the amendment on my undertaking that it will be considered by the Committee at its next and any subsequent sitting and that we shall make a report to you, Mr. President.

Lord Hughes has another point to which he intends to refer briefly. He too has been good enough to tell me that he will not move any amendment here given, once again, my undertaking that the matter will be considered in Committee. Indeed, if I did not give such an undertaking, I am sure that he would ensure that it was considered in the Committee.

With my grateful thanks for the unfailing support that I have had from the Committee, from our Clerk and from the experts, I ask the Assembly to give its unanimous approval to the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grieve. I am sure that the Assembly is indebted to you and your Committee for your work. But since you rightly say that we must work to the rules,

I remind the Assembly that Rule 23 says that a morning sitting must be closed at one o'clock unless the Assembly determines otherwise. We have only two contributors to the debate, each of whom expects to be brief. Have I the leave of the Assembly to continue the sitting beyond one o'clock in order to conclude this business?...

If there is no objection, that is agreed.

The two speakers will be Lord Hughes and Mr. Stoffelen.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Both the clock and my inclination require my remarks to be brief. However it would be wrong if I did not start by associating myself with what you said at the beginning, Mr. President, and with what Mr. Grieve said about the enormous help that the Committee had from officials in our national parliaments and from our own Clerk. I add to that the tremendous work put in by Mr. Grieve himself. He seems frequently to double the rôles of both Chairman and Rapporteur and does both in a pleasant and satisfactory fashion.

Mr. Grieve said at the meeting of the Committee this week that its work would never be finished because our rules constantly required revision. It was in respect of that that I decided to put down my name to speak. In the course of our proceedings this week you, Mr. President, found difficulty when ten representatives sought a roll-call vote. Afterwards, when I looked at the rule which was adopted in December of last year, it became clear to me that such a request did not require to be submitted in writing. The rule talks merely of ten representatives expressing a desire for a roll-call vote. That does not seem to be a satisfactory position. A roll-call vote should not be sprung on the Assembly in that way, and I shall seek to amend the rule during the next meeting of the Committee.

The other problem which shows that we have not yet completed our task is that we are still in the position where, if there is any opposition or any abstentions on a resolution or an opinion, there must be a roll-call vote. I am reminded that Mr. Stoffelen was opposed to a report but made it clear that he was willing to express his opposition by a standing and sitting vote. The rules prevented it. I think we have to look at that again.

I told Mr. Grieve that I thought it wrong that a change of rules, especially a change of that importance, should be made by an amendment at a late stage in our proceedings and that it should be done only after full consideration by the Committee. Mr. Grieve knows, therefore, that I shall be proposing these changes at the next meeting of the Committee. With that

Lord Hughes (continued)

exception, I am in complete support of the document before us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Hughes. I am grateful to hear that the Committee is looking at these matters. You were right about the problem of ten representatives demanding a roll-call vote. There is a conflict between ten representatives standing and the requirement that their names are read out in the order in which they signed a list. I have no strong feelings about it. We could provide for both, and I shall be happy with whatever the Assembly decides.

The explanation of votes is also a problem. If we retain the system, it may be necessary to have it on amendments as well as on draft recommendations. But these are all matters to which, I know, the Committee will give its attention.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Very shortly, I want first to thank Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur, and all the assistants who have helped the Committee. If I may comment first on Rule 14, it states:

“The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman *ex officio*, former Presidents of the Assembly who are Representatives to the Assembly, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent Committees”.

When we study this composition of the Presidential Committee, whose members no doubt are capable and experienced, we cannot see any reason why a former President should have a place in the Presidential Committee. On resigning as President of the Assembly, he or she becomes a member, like any other member. If there is to be no limitation in Rule 14, it can happen that a President loses his seat in his home parliament and, therefore, in the Western European Union Assembly and may return to the Assembly ten or twelve years later, having regained his seat in his own parliament and the Western European Union Assembly and then automatically becomes a member of the Presidential Committee. In those twelve years he may have had no contact whatever with Western European Union, may have missed developments and be no longer *au fait*. Yet when returning to WEU he becomes a member of the Presidential Committee.

There is a very good chance that this may have more disadvantages than advantages. It was against that background that amendments were tabled.

Having heard what has been said by Mr. Grieve, the Chairman and Rapporteur, I will be

perfectly happy with a reference back to the Committee and therefore I withdraw my amendment and will certainly support the whole of the draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen. You show tremendous faith in the durability and enthusiasm of former members of the Assembly if you think that, after bearing this job for two or three years and after an absence from parliament of ten years, their one ambition would be to come back here and be a representative. That may be the case with others, but personally I should not wish to follow that practice if I had the good fortune still to be in parliament ten years after vacating this chair. No doubt that will be examined by the Committee.

Mr. Grieve, do you wish to reply to the debate?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I am very grateful for the intervention of Lord Hughes and Mr. Stoffelen and for the action which they have proposed.

The PRESIDENT. – We will all be very grateful if you will convey the thanks of the Assembly to your Committee. I will ask the Clerk to do so also to the advisers. Happily, we have one of them with us, and I am sure he appreciates what has been said.

I therefore put to the vote the report and revision of the Charter presented by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Document 877. The draft resolution is the text of all the proposed changes.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Adjournment of the Session

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the business of this part-session of the Assembly. I am sorry to learn that, because of circumstances outside our control, some of our delegates will have travel problems in getting home. Nevertheless, I hope that everyone will get safely back home and I look forward to meeting you again in December.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

I declare the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

1. See page 46.

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