ESDP, Enlargement and Exclusion

(Mark Webber, Loughborough University)

Paper prepared for the EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference
Nashville, March 2003

Session 6G 'ESDP RIP?'

Contact: Mark Webber
Department of European and International Studies
Loughborough University
Loughborough
Leics, LE11 3TU
United Kingdom
<M.A.Webber@lboro.ac.uk>
Introduction

The association of non-EU members has been a major preoccupation of those invested with responsibility for the development of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This so-called inclusion or ‘third-party’ issue has taken up a considerable amount of diplomatic energy but has resulted in a set of institutional arrangements that have, to varying degrees, accommodated the interests of states both minor and major who lie outside the EU’s formal membership. In short, in the course of the few years since the launch of ESDP, a new institutional relationship has been constructed with NATO (and thus, by proxy, certain objections of the US have been addressed), a special arrangement has been fashioned with Russia, and an artful compromise has been reached with Turkey. Add to this, the overcoming of less noted but not insignificant reservations held by Canada, Norway and Poland among others and the case could be made that the development of ESDP has witnessed a concerted, wide-ranging and, arguably, successful, exercise in EU foreign policy and institution building.

Judgement on how effective and robust these arrangements are, however, cannot yet be reached with any confidence and await their testing in actual or potential ESDP operations. In this respect, some early success has been registered in relation to the shift from a NATO to an ESDP operation in Macedonia in March-April 2003. This operation, along with the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia inaugurated in January 2003 and the suggested takeover of SFOR operations from NATO sometime in 2004\(^1\), may, however, be the limit of ESDP ambition. An ESDP confined to the Balkans would not be without note and would involve a continuation of managed relations and cooperation with those third countries that have an interest or a say in the region, not least the US, Turkey and Russia. Here, the EU would deploy military means of stabilisation alongside existing instruments of an economic, diplomatic and political nature already apparent in its approach to the Balkans and in so doing would continue to develop an operational relationship with NATO that rests upon the so-called ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The EU declared its ‘willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR’ at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002.

\(^2\) ‘Berlin-plus’ relates to the following as laid out in NATO’s 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué:
This rather cosy scenario, however, competes with others of a more problematic character. I leave aside in this connection issues of capabilities, political will and so on which are amply covered by my co-presenters and stick instead to ‘third-country’ issues. These are issues, essentially, that revolve around patterns of enlargement (as they relate to both the EU and to NATO) and associated matters of inclusion and exclusion. In order to explore them, this paper will, to adapt an earlier formulation of erstwhile US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, consider three Ds: discrimination, deployment and doctrine.\(^3\) In so doing, it draws upon some of the author’s earlier work on the subject,\(^4\) but extends it to consider scenarios that appear if not probable, at least possible, following the geopolitical watershed of September 11\(^{th}\) and the enlargement watershed of December 2002 (the date of the Copenhagen European Council and NATO’s Prague summit). Scenario-setting is, of course, a risky business and in the case of this paper it is that much more so given its reliance on two underlying assumptions. The first of these is relatively uncontroversial, the second is more contentious. It is worth stating them at the outset.

**Assumptions**

The first assumption is that ESDP lacks the military capacity and operational planning capability that would allow the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) to undertake, entirely autonomously all but very small missions. This is hardly worth commenting on as a position of fact. Most commentary recognises the underdevelopment of ESDP as a military instrument autonomous of NATO; the main difference among commentators concerns whether or not this is a desirable state of

\(^1\)assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute militarily to military planning for EU-led operations (b) the presumption of availability [i.e. on a case-by-case basis] to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations (c) identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR (d) the further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.

\(^3\)Albright’s three Ds referred to discrimination, duplication (of NATO assets) and decoupling (of the transatlantic link). See M. Albright, *The Right Balance will Secure NATO’s Future*, Financial Times, December 7, 1998.

affairs for the EU to endure. The EU itself also recognises the nature of the condition. EU documentation on ESDP is largely written with an eye precisely to ESDP's reliance upon NATO and while specifically EU-only missions are foreseen (and have been executed in the case of the Bosnian police mission) the Berlin-plus arrangements are, in effect, the modus operandi by which serious ESDP operations are envisaged.

The second assumption is that the much-trumpeted crisis in NATO does not spell the demise of that organisation. This is a point worth making because it has a direct relevance to ESDP. If one accepts the counter-proposition that the Alliance is beyond repair owing to the capabilities gap, the weakening effects of post-Prague enlargement and American disillusionment with the political unreliability of Alliance structures (as evidenced most recently in the dispute over Iraq and assistance to Turkey), then it follows that the ESDP-NATO link is not, in the long-run, a viable one. In other words, that part of Berlin-plus which lies in Brussels and Mons (and, by extension, Washington) would be deemed uncertain and it would thus seem best for ESDP to develop greater autonomy in expectation of an irreversible hollowing out of NATO owing to American indifference. Further, the logical extension of this state of affairs is that lacking American commitment, confidence in NATO's core function of collective defence will be seriously undermined, thereby making the alternative, the 'institutionalisation of defence' in Europe that much more desirable. NATO, by this logic, may not be dead, but its inexorable decline should finally put paid to the reluctance of most Europeans to invest the Union with a defence competence and thus the presently meaningless 'D' of ESDP would acquire a real importance.

NATO's present condition, however, does not offer reliable grounds for these assertions. In the first place, the Alliance has survived similar crises in the past - over

---


7 NATO's persistence has been the subject of considerable academic attention. Even neo-realists who had once predicted a withering away of the organisation have been required to explain its longevity. Neo-institutionalist and social constructivist approaches, meanwhile, have been much more comfortable in analysing the phenomenon. The fact that NATO's survival can be fitted within the three mainstream theories of International Relations is indicative perhaps of just how rooted the organisation is. For indicative analyses see C.A. Wallander, 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organisation*, Vol.54(4), 2000; F. Schimmelfennig, 'NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation', *Security Studies*, Vol.8(2/3), 1998/1999; K. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', *International Security, Summer, 25* (1) 2000.

flexible response in the 1960s, INF deployments in the 1980s, the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s – and on each occasion the Alliance endured. Questions regarding NATO’s relevance, similarly, have been asked before, most loudly at the point of the Cold War’s end and here the answer was a ‘transformed’ Alliance with new missions, strategic rationale and, via links to Russia, political importance. It is by reference to the record of NATO’s persistence in troubled circumstances that the Alliance’s defenders (most notably, its Secretary General, Lord Robertson) have been able to answer charges relating to the organisation’s decline. Even its advocates, however, have conceded that the organisation has been damaged by divisions over Iraq. Indeed, some analysts have referred to the dispute as the worst in NATO for forty years.

In such circumstances the suggestion that the US has little interest in an obstructionist Alliance makes apparent sense. An inability of the Alliance to agree upon supportive action for US-led action against Iraq, so the argument goes, will render NATO in American eyes ‘too irrelevant to merit debate’. Such a position, however, reflects a very narrow view of NATO’s function. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq may well demonstrate the limitations to the US of NATO as a war-fighting body (and even this view requires some qualification in the first and second of the three cases). But NATO is, and always has been, much more than an organisation geared to combat. Throughout its existence it has, among other things, been the principal institutional vehicle of American influence and leadership in European security affairs. Alternative frameworks exist (the UN Security Council, EU-US dialogue, bilateral relations with individual European powers), but NATO offers to the US the benefit of familiarity, multilateral scope (made that much more extensive with enlargement) and, simply put, membership. This latter point is obvious but it gives the US a presence it will never have in the EU and it is via NATO that the US has been able to exert influence over European-oriented defence initiatives be these the WEU, ESDI or, more recently, ESDP. Throughout the 1990s the Clinton Administration used NATO precisely as a vehicle of American strategic and foreign policy preferences. Partnership for Peace, enlargement, the formation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and peacekeeping in the Balkans were ultimately

---

only possible when backed by Washington.\textsuperscript{14} Even the much more sceptical Bush Administration has not lost sight of this. The Administration was largely responsible the enlargement decision at Prague, and at the same summit was the sponsor of the NATO Reaction Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitment. Shortly after the row over assistance to Turkey had subsided Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested that NATO take on a greater role in support of peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. Whatever troubles the US has had with NATO decision-making and whatever the gap that exists in capabilities - the convenience to it of an organisation with a vast experience of routine cooperation, interoperable capabilities and force planning remains.\textsuperscript{15}

The claims of NATO's irrelevance seem equally specious when applied to Europe. Even if we consider only the NATO-EU relationship - leaving aside enlargement, NATO's stabilising roles in Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the socialising impact of Partnership for Peace on civil-military relations in post-communist states, and the institutional dialogue with Russia and Ukraine - then NATO's ongoing significance is plain to see. Eleven of the EU's current fifteen members are members of NATO and the vast majority continue to regard the Alliance as the principal instrument of collective defence. Article 17 (TEU) does refer to the possibility of a 'common defence' of the Union, and France, Germany and Belgium have argued in favour of such a development within the Convention working group on defence.\textsuperscript{16} Yet this is a minority position, a fact acknowledged in the working group's final report.\textsuperscript{17} ESDP has expressly not been geared toward collective defence; it 'does not involve the establishment of a European army', in other words.\textsuperscript{18} ESDP does overlap with NATO's non-Article V missions, but as EU documentation makes plain, the Petersberg Tasks of crisis management and NATO's own roles in this field are meant to be 'mutually reinforcing'.\textsuperscript{19} The attractiveness of the Alliance also extends to


\textsuperscript{17} 'Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence' (Brussels, 16 December 2002, CONV 461/02), p.21.

\textsuperscript{18} See the Introduction to the French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, in Rutten (comp.) (note 6) p.168.

\textsuperscript{19} French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, Annex VII to Annex VI, 'Standing Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between the EU and NATO'. in Rutten (comp.) (note 6), p.204.
the EU candidates. An enlarged EU is, if anything, likely to be even less disposed to
the development of a specifically EU defence posture as an alternative to NATO. Of
the ten states named at the Copenhagen European Council as likely members in 2004,
three (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) are already in NATO and five more
are likely to be having been invited at Prague to begin accession talks. Of the
remaining three EU candidates noted at Copenhagen, Turkey is, of course, a NATO
member of long-standing and both Bulgaria and Romania are Prague invitees. The
preference for NATO is important because if the case for a Europeanisation of
defence does gather momentum it is as likely to take place within NATO as outside
it.20

NATO, then, is clearly not as ‘dead’ as some would have it.21 Yet, to be fair,
the ‘declinist’ argument is rarely put in such stark terms. Much recent analysis of
NATO recognises the organisation’s durability, but suggests that in the face of altered
American priorities and on the back of a significant enlargement its interventionist
inclinations will be curtailed. In this sense, NATO may be viewed as a much as a
political organisation as a military one - a political union of states capable both of
maintaining peace among its broad membership and reaching out to non-members.22
A NATO of this sort, however, would still be significant to ESDP on three counts.
First, because even a more political NATO need not dispense with its valuable habits
of military coordination and organisational infrastructure; thus the resources which
the EU lacks but which NATO possesses would continue to matter for ESDP
operations where NATO cannot or will not venture. Second, a less interventionist
NATO is not the same as a non-interventionist NATO. Compelling circumstances
could still call forth NATO action even if US commitment to it may be limited (as is
the case, in fact, in KFOR and SFOR where European Allies and partners make up the
bulk of forces). The Macedonian case noted earlier may be an important precedent in
this respect for further joint action in the Balkans. Third, there is no inverse
relationship between a less militarised NATO and a more militarised EU. As Timothy
Garden has argued, questions regarding NATO’s relevance have not made the
materialisation of an EU military capability any more assured (as the debate in the

20 On this see the suggestion of Gustav Hägglund, the Chair of the EU’s Military Committee, that ‘the
EU could constitute the European pillar of a renewed NATO’ (EU Observer, 28 February 2002). See
also G. Verhofstadt (Belgian Prime Minister), ‘Europe Has to become a Force in NATO’, Financial
22 M. Clarke and P. Cornish, ‘The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit’, International
Convention noted above suggests) or the task of filling the deficiencies in the Helsinki Headline Goal any more urgent.23

NATO thus remains an important reference for ESDP. It is this state of affairs that provides much of the context for the continuing prominence of third-country issues.

**Discrimination**

Discrimination is an issue that has been recognised by the EU since the inception of ESDP. Specifically, it refers to the potentially disadvantaged position of states outside the EU but with an interest in the development of ESDP. Such states fall into distinct categories: the non-EU European NATO states (the ‘six’) and the thirteen EU accession candidates plus Norway and Iceland (the ‘fifteen’) have been the subject of most attention, but in addition the French Presidency report on ESDP drew attention to ‘Russia, Ukraine, other European states with which the Union maintains political dialogue and other interested states such as Canada.’24 One should also not forget that although the US is not directly referred to in ESDP documentation, it is clearly an interested party in the EU-NATO dialogue.

Since the launch of ESDP at the Cologne European Council, the EU has made great strides in attending to the discrimination issue. These efforts reflect a number of considerations: the EU’s military insufficiencies (hence the need to establish a workable relationship with non-EU NATO states); a view of the UN Security Council as the mandating authority of EU-led operations (hence keeping the US and Russia informed and involved of ESDP’s development); and the broader context of ESDP involving EU enlargement and the post-September 11th world of ‘new’ security challenges (hence, the value of cooperation with proximity and partner states). The upshot has been a variety of mechanisms to enhance third-party dialogue and participation in crisis-management operations. The development of an institutionalised EU-NATO relationship has been an additional format in which this issue has been addressed.

---

23 T. Garden, ‘NATO: Decline and Fall’, *The World Today*, March 2003, p.5. The Helsinki Headline Goal was set at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. The aim is that under ESDP, ‘[M]ember States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks’

By the time of the Seville European Council (June 2002) the EU could point to progress on all of the following:

- formalised and detailed arrangements between first, the EU fifteen and the non-EU ‘fifteen’ (fifteen-plus-fifteen) and second, the non-EU, European NATO ‘six’ (fifteen-plus-six);
- a structured dialogue and set of mechanisms for EU-NATO interaction;
- specifically-tailored mechanisms relating to Canada, Ukraine and Russia.
- a NATO-EU dialogue which had largely satisfied the US.

The subsequent Brussels and Copenhagen European Councils (October and December 2002) also elaborated further detail regarding the fifteen-plus-six relationship – the end result of an exhausting diplomatic effort aimed at overcoming Turkish objections to EU access to NATO and, in parallel, Greek acceptance of concessions offered to the Turkish side. As well enhancing the fifteen-plus-six consultations, the more specific outcome was two provisions of direct interest to Ankara and Athens. The first was a pledge on the part of the EU that Cyprus and Malta would ‘not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become members of the EU’. Formally, this position was arrived at as a consequence of the status of the two island states as non-participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme; but it was clearly a political gesture designed to ease Turkish concerns at the role of (a possibly unified Cyprus) within the EU. The second provision related to the scope of ESDP action. Turkey had insisted that any operation not infringe upon its interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. During the course of negotiations with the EU brokered by the UK and the US, Turkey had agreed (in December 2001) to the so-called ‘Istanbul text’. This stipulated that ‘in no case, and in no form of crisis, will ESDP be used against an ally’ (i.e. against Turkish interests) and that even in cases of an autonomous EU-led operation (i.e. not having recourse to NATO assets) a non-EU NATO member would be able register its concern and seek participation if the mission touched upon its security interests or was in close

---

geographic proximity to its territory. These provisions were subsequently incorporated into the Presidency Conclusions presented at Brussels in October 2002 with the additional proviso (to meet Greek concerns) that any NATO crisis-management operation ‘will not undertake any action against the EU or its Member States’ (for which read Cyprus). These provisions paved the way to a formal agreement between the EU and NATO in December 2002 and allowed the General Affairs Council to note at the end of February 2003 that the practical negotiations on the implementation of Berlin-plus had been concluded.

The diplomatic successes reflected in these various arrangements do not make them foolproof. A good part of their continued viability is dependent upon harmony in Turkish-EU relations, on the one hand, and EU-US relations, on the other. Turkish disillusionment with the reluctance of the EU to set a date for accession talks at Copenhagen did not lead Ankara to re-open issues seemingly closed in negotiations on ESDP. However, continued dissatisfaction on this score could well lead to such an outcome and could complicate the implementation of Berlin plus arrangements in operation scenarios.

As for the US, its position on ESDP is a story in itself. Initial American anxieties over ESDP had largely been overcome once it was clear that ESDP would be anchored in NATO (making it akin to the ESDI initiative of the mid 1990s). A more autonomous ESDP would no doubt raise shackles in Washington once more but at the time of writing the ESDP issue has little prominence in transatlantic relations. The US welcomed (and was instrumental in) the EU-Turkey dialogue and the elaboration of the Berlin-plus formula, precisely because they entrenched the EU-NATO linkage. The US position under George W. Bush is clearly in favour of a downsizing of US commitments to Balkan peacekeeping. While this can be done while retaining NATO’s key role in the region (simply because the vast majority of NATO peacekeepers are already not from the US), the waning interest and engagement of Washington there means that an EU role is that much more tolerable to

---

27 Greece as a NATO member would be able to veto any such operation in any case, but the political importance of this clause is nonetheless obvious - to register a balancing concession to that offered to Turkey on the EU.
28 And it should be noted that there is plenty of scope in this connection. Berlin-plus as agreed in late 2002-2003 provides for assured EU access to NATO planning, but access to other NATO assets and capabilities on a case-by-case basis, something that requires a positive decision of the North Atlantic Council on each occasion. See A. Monaco, ‘NATO and EU in “Harmony” over Macedonia’, NATO Notes, Vol.5(2), 28 February 2003 at http://www.cesd.org/natonotes/notes52.html#t11.
it. Hence, American support for the EU take-over of NATO duties in Macedonia.\textsuperscript{30} This does not mean, however, a trouble-free relationship. Any EU mission that relies on UN support, relies too on American political backing. In June 2002 in a dispute relating to American immunity at the International Criminal Court, the US used its veto thereby jeopardising an extension of the UN policing mission mandate in Bosnia. Linkage with similar disputes could be used to withhold UN-backing for comparable EU missions.

These two important states aside, ongoing issues of discrimination are also inherent in future patterns of EU and NATO enlargement. At its Prague summit in November 2002, NATO invited seven states\textsuperscript{31} to begin accession talks with a view to their admittance to the Alliance no later than May 2004. At the Copenhagen European Council that same month, the EU announced the conclusion of accession negotiations with ten states\textsuperscript{32} and stated that these ten would be welcomed as full members from May 2004. These two enlargements will be partly overlapping, but not entirely. Five of the seven NATO candidates are likely to simultaneously join the EU, but two – Bulgaria and Romania – will be left outside of the Union in 2004. They will thus join the ranks of the non-EU European NATO states. As such they may seamlessly fall under the equivalent of fifteen-plus-six arrangements (by 2004 this would be rendered as ‘twenty-five plus five’) and, as such, would be satisfied with this solution to their discrimination as a non-EU NATO state in relation to ESDP. The condition of discrimination could, in any case, pass by 2007, the target date noted at Copenhagen for their accession to the EU. In the meantime, keen not to upset this timetable, Bucharest and Sofia would stick to the largely supportive position on ESDP they have adopted since 1999.\textsuperscript{33}

Things, however, could also work out somewhat differently. Bulgaria and Romania have a considerable amount to do to make EU membership viable in 2007. The ‘Roadmaps’ for these two countries produced by the Commission in November 2002 reported fulfilment of the political criteria for membership but go on to outline

\textsuperscript{29} The detail up to mid 2002 is covered in Webber et al. (note 4), pp.81-84.
\textsuperscript{30} Testimony of US Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones to the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Europe, 13 March 2003 as carried by NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, 14 March 2003.
\textsuperscript{31} In alphabetical order: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
\textsuperscript{32} Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
common deficiencies in the areas of administrative and judicial capacity, economic reform and conformity with the EU *acquis*. The list of necessary reforms in these areas is daunting and unlikely to be achieved in such a short period. The optimism of Commission reports on the political situation in each of these two states may also be overstated. Bulgaria has made significant strides toward a stable parliamentary system but as Freedom House reported in 2002, the potential still exists for the ‘slow erosion of Bulgaria’s democratic institutions’ owing to stagnant living standards, elite-level corruption (among politicians and within the criminal justice system), high levels of crime and a general dissatisfaction with established political parties. Romania similarly is marked by political stability but this reflects political clientalism and the circulation of power among a narrow political elite. Freedom House have described this as ‘a dominant power model […] a de facto electoral authoritarian regime’ rather than ‘a balanced pluralist system’. If these trends continue, Bulgaria and Romania are likely to stabilise as systems which possess the procedural but not the more substantive characteristics of democracy. In such circumstances, the EU will either have to lower its entry standards to effect their admission or will have to deny them entry indefinitely. Because NATO can tolerate lower political and economic standards of entry when strategic considerations are important then one can well imagine Bulgaria and Romania in the Alliance after 2004 but still outside the EU until well after 2007. The position of these two then becomes akin to Turkey, another NATO state disillusioned with the long-road toward EU membership and capable of using its Alliance membership to frustrate ESDP. Indeed, by this point, Turkey’s own objections to ESDP may have been revived in view of a more general dissatisfaction with the EU. In such circumstances these three would form a non-EU caucus within NATO sceptical of ESDP. It is unlikely that such a caucus could undo the careful compromise that led to the Berlin-plus breakthrough, but the particulars of EU-NATO

---

34 Something implicit in the annual European Commission progress reports on the two countries and also, in the economic sphere, from IMF reporting. Of the two countries, Romania is seen to be the more problematic.
37 Bulgaria and Romania have made readily available national assets in support of NATO operations in Kosovo and have supported US/ISAF operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bulgaria and Romania’s geostrategic proximity to the former Yugoslavia, their status as a bridge between existing NATO members Hungary, Greece and Turkey have also marked them out favourably with the US as has their diplomatic and military support for US operations against Iraq. In the spring of 2003, the NATO SACEUR Gen James Jones suggested that US forces in Germany would be scaled back in favour of greater use of bases in new and candidate members of NATO, namely Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
cooperation in effecting these arrangements would certainly be that much more complicated.

The existence of other possible cases for discrimination will depend on enlargement decisions after 2004. It is possible that a NATO summit in that year could extend invitations of accession to Albania, Croatia and Macedonia – countries currently with little prospect of joining the EU. Looking still further ahead, one can even conceive of Russian and Ukrainian membership of NATO if some current trends are extended. These include the development of the NATO-Russia Council and its equivalent the NATO-Ukraine Commission; a continuation of the already fairly extensive military-to-military contacts between the Alliance (and its individual member states) and Ukraine along with a deepening of tentative contacts with Moscow; and the ongoing transformation of NATO into a collective security-cum-political alliance. The latter, interestingly, would make Russia no more difficult an Alliance partner for the US than say France. With the exception of the 2003 crisis over Iraq, Russian and US strategic interests have converged to a considerable degree after September 11th. In addition, both the Clinton and Bush administrations have entertained the long-term possibility of Russia inside NATO as a logical conclusion of Europe’s post-Cold War strategic transformation. Relations with Ukraine have been a bit more prickly, owing to charges that the Kuchma administration had tolerated weapons sales to Iraq, but overall the US-Ukrainian relationship since the dissolution of the USSR has been a productive one.

There is also a European dimension to all of this. While some of the new and aspiring east European members have been outspoken in putting the case against Russian membership of NATO, among the longer-established members there are, in fact, very few issues of strategic divergence. The dialogue that already exists with

---

38 The Iraq crisis may have upset the Russian-US strategic concord but there are solid reasons to suggest that it may still endure in the long term. On the Iraq issue it is notable that the animus of the Bush administration has been reserved for France and not Russia even though both made clear they would veto a UN resolution authorising the use of force. On the broader context see B. Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (London: Chatham House Papers, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003), pp.115-132.

39 This has not been a publicly-declared policy given Russia’s coolness to the idea. It was, however, the private conviction of President Clinton. Bush, meanwhile, has referred to Russia forging ‘an alliance with the Alliance’. His Warsaw speech of June 2002 referred to the possibility of NATO membership for ‘all of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea’ – a geographic formula that would, at first, seem to exclude Russia. However, given that it includes Ukraine and Belarus, the next step eastwards is not such a quantum leap. Hence, perhaps, Bush’s insistence that European unity ought to be inclusive of Russia. See Talbott (note.14), pp.131-32; ‘Bush Says New NATO-Russia Council Will Strengthen Security’ US Department of State press release, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/bush-europe/bush-council0528.htm; and ‘Transcript: President Bush Speech in Warsaw’ (15 June 2002) http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/15/bush.warsaw.trans/
Russia in the EU context (both in relation to ESDP and more broadly via EU-Russia summits, and the variety of arrangements attached to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Common Strategy) attests to this. The existence of a post-2004 NATO of 26 members or a post-2006 NATO of 29 (given Albanian, Croatian and Macedonian candidacy) would make both Russian and Ukrainian exclusion from the Alliance seem increasingly anomalous and might be perceived in both Moscow and Kiev as injurious to any pretensions toward playing the roles of European or regional power.\footnote{In the Russian case, the broader context is the pragmatic judgement pursued by Putin that the best chance of maximising Russian influence and standing is not to oppose European (or more often American) positions over which it has no influence but to pursue more cooperative actions and thus carve out a major role within (or in partnership with) existing international organisations or powerful configurations of states. Russia had been groping toward this position during the 1990s, but the strategic choice offered by September 11\textsuperscript{th} clarified it. The subsequent Iraq crisis has presented Russia with a difficult choice, but its ultimate objective of greater integration with the West (or perhaps more properly ‘the North’) has not been deflected. See D. Trenin, ‘From Pragmatism to Strategic Choice: Is Russia’s Security Policy Finally Becoming Realistic?’, in A. Kuchins (ed), \textit{Russia after the Fall} (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 187-204.} In such circumstances, both countries may seek to develop to the full existing arrangements of partnership, rendering Russia and Ukraine \textit{de facto} Alliance members. They may even resolve their long-standing ambivalence on the question of membership and make a serious pitch for accession.\footnote{In Russia, Presidents Yeltsin and Putin have occasionally raised the possibility of Russian membership, but without following these initiatives up with serious proposals. Russian suggestions have also usually been accompanied by conditions to the effect that NATO be transformed from a military to a political organization. The latter, interestingly, is arguably now in train. Ukraine, meanwhile, had from 1991 adhered to an official policy of neutrality as a means of cultivating relations both with its powerful Russian neighbour and with Europe and the US. The stability of Russian-Ukrainian relations and the tempering of Moscow’s earlier hostility toward the Alliance permitted Ukraine in mid-2002 to make an unambiguous bid for NATO membership.}

Russian and Ukrainian membership would have considerable operational and decision-making ramifications for the Alliance and would require a level of military reform as yet unseen in these two countries. As a strategic and geopolitical proposition, however, it would certainly have advantages for all concerned. But what would it all mean for ESDP? Up to 2002, both Moscow and Kiev had displayed a generally positive attitude toward the initiative. On the part of Russia, this stemmed not from any assumption that ESDP would undermine NATO, but from a positive assessment of EU-framed possibilities in light of the operational limitations of the UN and OSCE.\footnote{In Russia, Presidents Yeltsin and Putin have occasionally raised the possibility of Russian membership, but without following these initiatives up with serious proposals. Russian suggestions have also usually been accompanied by conditions to the effect that NATO be transformed from a military to a political organization. The latter, interestingly, is arguably now in train. Ukraine, meanwhile, had from 1991 adhered to an official policy of neutrality as a means of cultivating relations both with its powerful Russian neighbour and with Europe and the US. The stability of Russian-Ukrainian relations and the tempering of Moscow’s earlier hostility toward the Alliance permitted Ukraine in mid-2002 to make an unambiguous bid for NATO membership.} Should Ukraine and Russia accede to (or become ever more closely integrated into) the Alliance, then clearly the calculation alters. A situation could be envisaged (let’s say by 2015) in which Russia and Ukraine obtain a position within the Alliance akin to the US and Turkey: politically and, to some extent, militarily
important states outside of ESDP but with an influence over its operationalisation. By this point ESDP may, in any case, be either defunct or autonomous of NATO. If, however, it develops in its present form of dependence upon NATO, then the quartet of the US, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine would, in effect, constitute the rough surface of the ESDP-NATO interface. Moscow and Kiev would, in other words, assume a say over EU access to NATO assets and the development of whatever format Berlin-plus is at by this point.

How this might work out is, at present, impossible to judge, but at a minimum case-by-case consideration by NATO of EU requests for access to capabilities would be slower and more complicated. How problematic this turns out will, in part, depend upon whatever broader calculations Russia and Ukraine bring to bear (conceivably, these two may be EU candidates by this point43), and, in part also, upon how consequential ESDP actually becomes. This latter theme is taken up in the following section.

Deployment

It was suggested above that the decline of NATO has been overstated. Even in the face of altered American priorities, the Alliance retains a robust ability for crisis management and force projection. Indeed, the new NATO Response Force (NRF) approved at the Prague summit is intended to enhance this ability by developing ‘a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force [...] ready to move quickly to wherever needed.’44 The NRF is not, strictly speaking, a competitor to the ERRF. Whereas the latter is geared to conflict management under the Petersberg Tasks, the NRF is seen as engaging at short notice in high-intensity war fighting tasks and interoperable with modern, high-tech American forces.45 As such, it reflects an American view of what NATO ought to be doing to support US global

43 Turkish reluctance in 2001-2002 to formalise NATO-EU arrangements was conditioned by resentment at the slow progress of its membership application. In comparable circumstances Russia and Ukraine could behave in a similar fashion.
strategy. This is a vision that is less and less fixed on Europe.\(^46\) The US was, of course, the lead contributor to Operation Allied Force in 1999, but this is widely regarded as NATO’s first and last war in Europe. The more protracted task of keeping the peace in this part of the world is a burden that has increasingly fallen upon Europeans. In part, this has been accomplished through the Alliance itself, where European allies and partners already comprise the majority of forces in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Yet it is an open question whether NATO continues as the instrument of choice for peacekeeping and crisis management. And if ESDP is to assume a greater importance, one might reasonably ask where and how it might be deployed.

In this regard, plenty of scenarios have been posited.\(^47\) The EU has not officially endorsed the geographic scope of ESDP missions, but an ‘operational radius’ of 4,000 km from Brussels has been informally adopted.\(^48\) This would rule in EU-led missions in the conflict zones of the former Soviet Union – in Abkhazia (Georgia), the Trans-dniester (Moldova) or Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) – where they would be more palatable to Russia than NATO operations.\(^49\) It would also cover the eastern Mediterranean where the EU would have a particular responsibility following the accession of Cyprus. Outside of Europe, ERRF peacekeeping deployment could occur in Africa as signalled by the Franco-British statement on ESDP in February 2003.\(^50\) This might build upon the precedents of British and French involvement in Sierre Leone and Rwanda, humanitarian missions akin to that in Mozambique in 2000, or rescue efforts such as those mounted in 1991 by Belgium and France in Zaire. In the broader Middle East, an EU force might conceivably police a peace agreement in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza and play a role in post-conflict Iraq. One should also bear in mind, the broad range of ESDP operations in light of the Petersberg Tasks as originally formulated. ‘[H]umanitarian and rescue tasks’, for instance, offer boundless possibilities to the EU in Africa, the Middle East and the


\(^{47}\) An interesting discussion is A. van Staden et al., Towards a European Strategic Concept (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2000), pp. 27-32.


\(^{50}\) The relevant paragraph states: ‘We will [...] propose to our Partners that the EU should examine how it can contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa, including through EU autonomous operations, in close cooperation with the United Nations’. ‘Declaration on strengthening European
Transcaucasus.\textsuperscript{51} The same could also be said with regard to any reformulation of these Tasks to include activities such defence outreach and anti-terrorist assistance to third countries.\textsuperscript{52}

There is certainly scope, therefore, for the EU to act in ways distinct from and/or autonomous of NATO. Some of these scenarios have a direct bearing on relations with ‘third-countries’. The US would be particularly sensitive to operations that affect Israel. EU-led operations in the former Soviet Union, meanwhile, are of direct concern to Russia. These would require the political support of Moscow at the UN (should any mission require Security Council cover), the exercise of Russia’s diplomatic muscle in the target state (be this Moldova, Georgia or Armenia/Azerbaijan), the participation of Russia within ESDP consultative mechanisms, and perhaps even Russian military assistance both on the ground in areas with which it is familiar and in terms of facilitating ERRF deployment via the leasing of airlift capacity.\textsuperscript{53} Turkey too would be sensitive to a number of scenarios. It may be willing to support EU-led peacekeeping in the Transcaucasus or even an EU humanitarian mission in Kurdish northern Iraq, although its support for either could not be guaranteed. An ESDP deployment in Cyprus, meanwhile, is a non-runner.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{54} Considerable attention has been given to the consequences of Cyprus’s accession to the Union in 2004. Following the collapse of unification talks in March 2003, it is entirely plausible that accession will occur on the basis of a divided island. Under a formula agreed at the Copenhagen European Council the entire island would formally accede (the EU does not formally recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC]), but the EU acquis would only apply to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Nonetheless, the TRNC still argues that this will mean the Republic of Cyprus in Nicosia acceding on the basis of a claim that it is doing so on behalf of the entire island. This is a claim it rejects and it is joined in this sentiment by Turkey. Accession in such a manner would have potentially destabilising consequences. Turkey itself might seriously downgrade its relations with the EU and thereby jeopardise existing ESDP-NATO ties. It may also be compelled to increase its already extensive relations with the TRNC. The Justice and Development Party elected in 2002 has back-pedalled on the claim of previous governments that Ankara would pursue the immediate integration of the TRNC if a partial accession were to occur. A successor government could revert to this position, however. This would result in an entrenchment of the division in Cyprus and further reduce the possibility of Turkish accession to the EU. More alarmingly, a deterioration of relations between the communities on the island, perhaps accompanied by a bolstering of the Turkish military presence, might provoke Nicosia to request formal EU assistance. An EU response in the shape of an ESDP operation would be extremely unlikely, however. Not only is it expressly ruled out under the terms of the Istanbul Text, but the political price of an irreparable break with Turkey and a breakdown of the EU-NATO relationship would probably be judged too high. The obvious alternative in these circumstances would be an augmented UN force along the ‘green line’.
All these possibilities, then, are subject to external limitations. Factors internal to ESDP are also a constraint to action. These include the much-reported deficiencies in EU-flagged military capabilities, disagreement and an absence of strategic consensus among Member States on the proper scope of ESDP, and an insistence among some on the necessity of a UN mandate to authorise EU-led intervention. While it is conceivable that missions of limited scope and duration could occur in far-flung areas (the African examples cited above), for the most part, one could well conclude that ESDP’s geographic scope is likely to be confined to the Balkans,\(^{55}\) that its operation will require, if not dependency, then close cooperation with NATO, and that its real value will be to reinforce more effective civilian instruments of EU crisis management (including policing) within a UN-approved context.\(^{56}\)

Present missions in Bosnia and Macedonia, as well as the slated take-over of SFOR in 2004 (and later, possibly the KFOR mandate in Kosovo) fit with these assumptions. None of these missions is new as such but rather a continuation of UN or NATO-led operations. They are also entirely compatible with the panoply of other EU activities aimed at Balkan stabilisation, and enjoy some UN-backed legitimacy.\(^{57}\) Comparable missions could be envisaged in the longer-term – preventive missions in southern Serbia or in Montenegro, for instance.

In view of these neutered ambitions for ESDP deployment, are third-country issues really of any great consequence? Part of the answer follows from the likely long-term reliance upon NATO already discussed. As a European Parliament report put it in September 2002, ‘[t]he sooner ESDP comes to being operational on the ground, the clearer it is that without recourse to NATO’s military structure, the EU Rapid Response Force in the field would find its options severely limited.’\(^{58}\) In the case of civilian missions such as the EUPM in Bosnia this is not an issue, but for military operations it clearly is. Organising the EU mission in Macedonia, as already noted, required prior agreement on the principles of Berlin-plus. The protracted negotiations on this matter meant the EU missed a declared deadline of mid-

\(^{55}\) This region is distinguished by direct proximity to current and future EU members; it is also one against which the very credibility of EU ‘foreign policy’ has been staked.


\(^{57}\) The EU’s decision to establish the EUPM in Bosnia was welcomed in UN Security Council Resolution 1396 of March 2002. Macedonia is a more problematic case. The Irish government, for instance, announced in March 2003 that it would not participate in a EU-led mission in Macedonia because it lacked a proper UN mandate.

December 2002 for assuming operational responsibilities. The agreement finally reached on Berlin-plus that same month was then followed by three months of detailed EU-NATO discussion on the modalities of transferring the NATO mission. The operational commander of the consequent EU operation was to be NATO’s Deputy SACEUR who was to report to the EU’s Military Committee. Operational headquarters was to be located at SHAPE, NATO military HQ in Mons with a support role being played by NATO’s southern command (AFSOUTH) in Naples. AFSOUTH would oversee coordination between the EU mission and ongoing NATO operations in Kosovo and Bosnia, and would also provide an extraction force should the Macedonian situation deteriorate. In Macedonia itself, an EU force commander was to work alongside a retained Senior NATO Military Representative in the capital Skopje.  

As already noted, progress on these arrangements was made possible by the unblocking by December 2002 of Turkish and Greek reservations. Given the subsequent fracture within NATO over Iraq and the related dispute concerning military assistance to Turkey, it is of some note that Ankara did not then reverse its stance. Such goodwill cannot, however, be regarded as permanent. Apart from unresolved issues concerning Turkey’s candidacy of the EU and the status of divided Cyprus, Turkish concerns might also be generated by the Balkan focus of ESDP. Ankara has, in the post-Cold war period developed a close interest in Balkan developments. It has consequently been an active participant in multilateral efforts in the region, be these through NATO-led peacekeeping (SFOR and KFOR), NATO’s Operation Allied Force, or participation in ad hoc arrangements such as the Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania and the nascent SEEBRIG peacekeeping force. An ESDP that assumes increased functions in the region would undercut these efforts. In particular, shifting tasks away from NATO would mean downgrading a major vehicle of Turkish activity while substituting it with one in which Turkey has a much less certain position.  

While most attention has been given to Turkey, other third-parties are not insignificant players in the Balkans. With regard to Bulgaria and Romania, an enlarged NATO in 2004 that includes these states (along with possibly Slovenia, plus existing members Hungary, Turkey and Greece) would be one that would have imported into it sub-regional politics. EU-NATO coordination thus becomes subject

---

to a harmonisation of the sometimes divergent positions of these states within the Alliance.

Russia also is of significance. It has a claimed special interest in the Balkans, something it has sought to demonstrate in its opposition to NATO coercive activities and, more constructively in participation in UNPROFOR, SFOR and KFOR. Russia also has, of course, a potential veto over UN authorisation of new missions in the region or extending the mandates of ongoing ones. In this light, ESDP operations in the region would require giving full effect to existing arrangements for consultation and cooperation on crisis management.\textsuperscript{61} as well as clarifying (in much the same way that NATO did in Bosnia and Kosovo) special command arrangements pertaining to the involvement of Russian peacekeepers on the ground.

**Doctrne**

The point is often made that the EU needs to develop a strategic concept or doctrine that would give purpose to the military and civilian instruments intrinsic to both ESDP and the CFSP.\textsuperscript{62} In this regard, the EU is sometimes contrasted with NATO, an organisation which has an explicit Strategic Concept and which has long had a set of operational guidelines.\textsuperscript{63}

In fact, ESDP has been a spur to the elaboration of strategic thinking. The trend here runs from the so-called ‘Food for Thought’ paper on the elaboration of the Helsinki Headline Goal\textsuperscript{64} through to the Final Report of the Convention Working Group on Defence via the numerous Presidency Reports on ESDP. The latter alone, in conjunction with key Treaty texts, for some, provide sufficient indication of ‘how and why’ an ESDP operation would be deployed.\textsuperscript{65} In broader political terms, there is also now a consensus within the EU, so Cornish and Edwards have argued, on the need to

\textsuperscript{60} F.S. Larrabee and I.O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica: Rand, National Security Research Division, 2003), pp.95-96.

\textsuperscript{61} These arrangements are detailed in Annex IV of the Presidency Report on ESDP presented to the Seville European Council in June 2002.


\textsuperscript{63} NATO can also be said to be more forthright in this respect in that it has made an explicit effort to adapt its own Concept in light of changed circumstances. Hence the 1991 to 1999 Strategic Concepts, the endorsement at Prague of a ‘military concept for defence against terrorism’ and the direction at Prague to develop a 'comprehensive concept' for the NATO Response Force.

\textsuperscript{64} 'Elaboration of the Headline Goal “Food for Thought”', Press Release (14/3/00), Nr: 6756/00 at http://www.bis.de/CESD-PA/19-1e-f.html

\textsuperscript{65} M. Ortega, 'Military Intervention in the European Union', *Chaillot Paper*, No.45,
develop and deploy military instruments. ESDP can still be construed as part and parcel of ‘an active, comprehensive and ambitious crisis management policy’ for the EU that marries military with civilian approaches. But at the same time it amounts to an implicit recognition among the member states of the need to evolve beyond ‘civil power’.

Some, however, remain unconvinced as to the worth of all this. In operational terms, the ‘Food for Thought’ paper itself noted that the Headline Goal set for ESDP provided ‘insufficient detail for the purposes of military planning, raising questions such as where EU-led task forces might be expected to operate, with whom and how often.’ Some two and half years later, a report of the WEU Assembly could still declare that the EU needed to draw up a strategic concept ‘sufficiently precise to provide clear guidelines to military planners’. Progress here, however, requires a meeting of political minds, problematic enough in an EU of fifteen and more difficult still in an EU of twenty five. A. Missiroli has thus pointed to divergent interpretations among the EU’s military powers over the meaning and application of ‘high-end’ Petersberg Tasks. Julian Lindley-French, meanwhile, has viewed a continued absence of agreement on the application of military force as deleterious to the whole ESDP project.

In short, while a considerable documentation exists on ESDP, the initiative still lacks a clear, concise set of operational and political guidelines that reflects a more broadly based consensus on the purposes of ESDP. If this is the essence of a strategic doctrine, how would it appear in more concrete form? Following Howorth, it might refer to agreement on ‘situation assessment, approaches to problem-solving and policy-making, and strategic objectives’. As such, this is a definition largely concerned with the practicalities of action. It avoids, in other words, issues of culture.

---

68 ‘Elaboration of the Headline Goal “Food for Thought”’, Press Release (14/3/00), Nr: 6756/00 at http://www.bits.de/CESD-PA/19-1e-f.html
72 Howorth refers to these as features of a ‘strategic culture’, but the functional meaning of culture he adopts is, in essence, the same as strategic doctrine or concept. See J. Howorth, ‘The CESDP and the Forging of a European Security Culture’, Politique européenne, No.8, Autumn, 2002, esp. p.89.
which might lead to a dangerous juxtaposition with the different strategic approaches of those outside the EU, be this Turkey, Russia or the US.\textsuperscript{73} Proceeding from such a definition, three possible levels follow; all have a relevance to third parties.

The first of these relates to clarity on technical matters of intelligence gathering (and sharing), decision rules and institutionalisation. This, of course, has a considerable significance within the EU given the established emphasis placed upon civilian methods of transparency, consensus and institutional reliability. How far these methods transport into the military sphere has been a subject of some attention.

Potential problems on this score aside, the EU is generally regarded as having accomplished a successful move toward the institutionalisation of ESDP. As part and parcel of this, it has developed a permanent relationship with NATO. This has involved dialogue between the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative, regular meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council, formal meetings of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers and the activities of joint NATO-EU ad hoc working groups. Agreement on the Berlin-plus mechanism is the practical fruit of these institutional efforts, as is a NATO-EU agreement signed in March 2003 on security of information.

A second, and more problematic level is concerned with guidelines relating to the circumstances of deployment. It is at this level that much discussion is pitched. Anne Deighton, for one, has put the case for the identification of a ‘strategic space’ for ESDP based upon ‘coherent policies supported by an adequate institutional framework and an effective range of tools.’\textsuperscript{74} This would presumably entail a notion of when, where and how to intervene and with what (appropriate civilian and military) capabilities. The implication also is that existing texts and conflicting interpretations of the Petersberg Tasks are an insufficiently precise basis upon which to act. The debate in the Convention Working Group on Defence over the revision of the Petersberg Tasks reflects concern at the absence of such guidelines as does commentary on the relevance or otherwise of the Helsinki Headline Goals after September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001.\textsuperscript{75}

Such guidelines would be of interest to a third country such as Russia but their main significance is with regard to NATO (and thus, by extension, Turkey and the

\textsuperscript{73} This, of course, is the subject of Robert Kagan’s \textit{Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order} (London: Atlantic Books, 2003). See also I. B. Neumann, \textit{Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation} (Manchester etc.: Manchester University Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{74} Deighton (note 5), p.728.

US), not least in defining when ESDP operations would involve the Alliance and when they would not. In practice, it might be argued that guidelines of this sort are unnecessary. As the Macedonian example illustrates, the circumstances of action are best defined on a case-by-case basis even if this does occur within a more permanent and general framework (i.e. Berlin-plus). There is a sense, however, in which such an approach may be an insufficient foundation. The EU has already borne the consequences of moves away from Alliance peacekeeping: a further attenuation of Alliance activity in crisis management is something an EU strategic concept ought to anticipate. Such a document would thus reaffirm the EU’s strategic ambition to act in cases when NATO as a whole cannot or will not act. Of course, gestures in this regard would touch upon sacrosanct national positions, yet even stalwarts of NATO such as the UK have recognised the necessity of enhancing ESDP in this respect.\(^{76}\)

The third level of an EU strategic concept concerns the very purposes of ESDP and, related, of the CFSP. This, of course, has a much wider context for the development of ESDP can only be seen in the context of the EU’s standing as a key agent of European order. Here, the role of the EU is premised upon certain strategic interests and, more grandiosely, a vision of how an EU-Europe ought to develop, what its relationship should be with the outside world, and what constitutes the main threat to the order it represents. As such, it presumes the extension of the security community that is located within the Union (hence, enlargement) and active engagement to promote stability in proximate regions (hence ESDP itself and other instruments of ‘soft power’ geared toward conflict management).\(^{77}\) In such broad terms, the role of the EU can only be posited in relation to other institutions of relevance to European security. A strategic concept that touches upon these matters thus has echoes of earlier debates on ‘security architecture’, interlocking institutions’ and parallel or congruent enlargements. These themes were all very apparent in NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement, and as that document noted, ‘[t]he enlargement of NATO is a parallel process with and will complement that of the European Union. Both NATO and the EU share common strategic interests’.\(^{78}\) While parallelism seemed to have been lost in the latter 1990s, as Antonio Missirioli has noted, by 2004 the EU and NATO will have an unprecedented level of membership overlap (19 states

---


\(^{78}\) Study on NATO Enlargement (September 1995), paragraph 18. at http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9503.htm [17.3.03].
in common among memberships of 25 and 26 respectively) such that '[t]aken together, the two organisations will cover almost all of continental Europe'. 79 Although (as noted above) important discrepancies will still remain, it is precisely the extent of this overlap that makes conceptual clarity all the more necessary. This is a matter not just for an EU strategic concept. Defining the nature of the EU-NATO relationship is something that, following Stanley Sloan’s recent suggestions, requires a ‘contract’ or treaty between the two organisations. 80  This would have a functional significance in terms of how the two institutions relate to one another, and also be of considerable political consequence at a time of transatlantic uncertainty. It would also have clear bearing on third country relations, directly in the cases of the US and Turkey, and indirectly in the case of Russia. 81 Ultimately its real significance would be to render in succinct form the purpose of NATO and the EU in post Cold War Europe.

Conclusion

The Iraq crisis has, according to some, drained power away from three of the essential props of European order, the UN, NATO and the EU. 82 Whether one agrees with such an assertion, its logic does seem forceful in a context of Anglo-American military action that has circumvented these bodies. Any defence of their efficacy suffers in this context by reference to the military power and diplomatic single-mindedness of the US. Thus, by the same logic, the conclusion of the military campaign against Iraq will probably hasten a return to institutions accompanied by a patching up of divisions among their key members. The much-heralded crises in the EU and NATO, both of which had promised to deflect the onward development of ESDP, will not, therefore be terminal. Indeed, during the very crisis itself, at a point when Anglo-French bitterness had reached new levels, important decisions were

80 NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community (Lanham etc.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), chapter 11.
81 The following NATO/EU pairings suggest how useful such a document might be as an exercise in functional competence and political clarity: ESDP/ESDI, ERRF/NRF, Prague Capabilities Commitment/European Capabilities Action Plan, NATO-Russia Council/EU Russia Cooperation Council.
82 Prins (note 21).
reached on Macedonia, and Paris and London showed a joint determination to extend ESDP’s remit into Bosnia and possibly Africa. Further, whatever the significance of Iraq, the compelling priority of stability in the EU’s own ‘near abroad’ and in the Balkans more particularly has not altered. Indeed, the assassination of the Serbia Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 only showed its continuing relevance.

A European commitment to military as well as civilian crisis management is thus vital. For all the reasons outlined in this paper, such an effort requires close cooperation between the EU and NATO and continued attention to the inclusion of third countries, be these currently in the Alliance or outside it. NATO, for all the doubts levelled against it, remains – and is likely to remain - the principal military instrument in Europe. An ESDP that breaks free of this primacy may be politically desirable, but it is for the foreseeable future unlikely. This does not mean its goals ought to be modest. NATO has begun to delegate peacekeeping responsibilities to the EU. Even if limited to the Balkans, an ESDP engaged in Macedonia, Bosnia and, perhaps further down the line, Albania would amount to a significant military commitment and a not inconsequential contribution to European stability. This would take us beyond the cliché that NATO provides the force, the UN provides the mandate and the EU provides the money. The currency of the cliché remains, however, until the EU’s newly-acquired mission in Macedonia has been effected. Should this relatively small mission falter, and should the institutional arrangements cohering around ESDP prove unequal to the task then taking over the 12,000 strong SFOR contingent in Bosnia would be a step too far. In these circumstances, that mission would remain a strictly NATO concern or conceivably (and more embarrassingly for the EU) be transferred to the responsibility of the UN. If the opposite occurs, however, and ESDP progresses beyond Macedonia then third-party issues obtain a considerable significance. EU-NATO coordination would be very much required (with the accompanying interest of the US and Turkey) as would the political support and involvement of Russia.