Turkey’s Response to Proliferation in the Middle East: Implications on Integration with Europe

Introduction

Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) assumed a new course after Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership was declared at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. The EU now expects Turkey to fulfill the accession criteria in order to begin the negotiations for eventual membership. These criteria include, among others, short and medium term political and economic criteria, for which Turkey should go through a number of reforms. Integration with the EU has been a state goal almost since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Now that Turkey’s primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do its best to start the accession talks as early as possible. The previous and the current administration have worked sincerely hard to that end. However, a smooth ride to the final destination seems unlikely due to the issues that started to occupy Turkey’s external security agenda in the post-Cold War period.

Turkey is faced with a potential and increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile proliferation from the Middle East. Its Middle Eastern neighbors, namely, Iran, Iraq and Syria have WMD and their delivery capabilities that can hit targets in Turkey. Turkey lacks the adequate systems to defend against them. So far, it has been considering involvement in the US “Missile Shield” project, working with Israel on ways to procure state-of-the-art missile defense technologies, and to a lesser extent developing its own missiles. Turkey’s responses to the proliferation threat at the national level are likely to unfavorably impact its relations with Europe in security matters, and impair the fulfillment of some of the accession criteria. The two dynamics pull Turkey towards opposite ends and result in a paradox.

This paper analyzes the incompatibilities between Turkey’s security policy and its decades-long aspiration for integration with Europe with a focus on proliferation threats emanating from the Middle East. After an outline of Turkish security policy, the paper demonstrates the proliferation threat with a discussion of the WMD and missile capabilities of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors and security perceptions. The next section provides an overview of Turkey’s responses to the threat under its strategic partnerships with the US and Israel. The incompatibilities of this security policy are analyzed in the following section with references to European positions and the accession criteria that Turkey needs to fulfill. These incompatibilities render the status quo unsustainable. The discussion makes use of the need-based analysis of conflict resolution theory in order to find the strategic political decisions that Turkey can take which will uphold its vital national security interests while at the same will fulfill the expectations of Europe. The underlying parameters are twofold: First, a state would seek adequate defenses to maintain its survival: Thus, Turkey will respond to the WMD and missile proliferation threat to meet military needs, i.e. it will cooperate with the US and Israel. Second, eventual membership to the EU has been a state policy since the Republican years. Now that it is a candidate, Turkey is supposed to meet the accession criteria. Next is the stage where the conflict resolution theory is in play to move from the status quo to the desired outcome, where Turkey is converging towards satisfying the EU while at the same upholding its own security interests. To that end, the paper basically proposes a national non-proliferation strategy. The argument of the paper is that viable strategic political decisions can be a way out of the paradox between Turkey’s security policy and its relations with Europe.
Turkish security policy towards WMD and missile proliferation in the Middle East

"Geographical destiny placed Turkey at the virtual epicenter of a 'Bermuda Triangle' of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty with the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East encircling us."

"...Turkey is situated in a region having an uncontrollable inclination to the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means..."


Turkey’s foreign and security policy have been primarily shaped by its geographical location. Turkey has historically exercised realpolitik, which evolved to become defensive in the Republican era. Since then, Turkey sought security through alliances and pursued a cautious foreign policy.¹ The end of the Cold War led Turkey to identify the new risks and threats to its security, which included, inter alia, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in its neighborhood. In terms of its post-Cold War security policy, Turkey defined the concepts of strategic partnership and strategic cooperation,² and became strategic partners with the US and Israel in the 1990s.

The Middle East is particularly important in Turkey’s national security agenda, because it is the very region from where the new post-Cold War security threats emanate.³ In the early years of the Republic, Turkey endorsed upholding the status quo, and distanced itself from the politics of the Middle East.⁴ The end of the Cold War, however, represented a significant shift from the previous policies,⁵ exemplified by Turkey’s exclusive cooperation with the West, especially with the US against Iraq during and after the 1991 Gulf War.⁶

An urgent but not quite discussed issue for a long time in the media, foreign policy or academia is the threat of WMD and missile proliferation from the Middle East. Iran, Iraq and Syria have WMD and ballistic missiles that envelope Turkey’s critical civil and military centers and infrastructure in their target range. None of these states have been capable of putting together effective air forces, or carrying the theater of war to the territories of the adversaries with their ground forces due to shortcomings in their military establishment. Consequently, they based their military strategy on ballistic missile attacks,⁷ and started developing mass destruction weapons. Considering that Turkey is not yet adequately prepared for nuclear, biological and chemical

² These concepts cover joint action and cooperation in regional problems and incidents that occur in different areas of the world, military partnership agreements, and formation of permanent commissions in economic, military, political and social fields and as a result of agreements between mutually favored states. Source: Erol Müttercimler, "Security in Turkey in the 21st Century," Insight Turkey, Vol.1, No.4, (Oct-Dec 1999), pp.16-7.
³ Apart from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, these threats include, regional and ethnic conflicts, political and economic instabilities and uncertainties, religious fundamentalism, arms and drug smuggling and international terrorism.
⁴ A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, op.cit., p.208.
(NBC) contingencies involving or including missile attacks, the increasing proliferation trend left Turkey with a new but a pressing threat from the Middle East. The threat became urgent in the aftermath of 9/11 due to Turkey’s geographical proximity to the Middle East and strategic partnership with the United States.

WMD is defined as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems. Along with the various means of delivery and dispersal, proliferators usually seek to acquire ballistic missiles so that they can be certain of penetrating the opponent’s defenses. For Turkey, the threat of WMD and missile proliferation is real and very important. The main concern of the security circles pertains to insufficient export controls of dual use items and fissile material. Practically, Turkey has contributed to collective efforts to revert the proliferation trend. It became a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, and was one of the first to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Turkey is a member to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a founding member of the Wassenaar Agreement regarding export controls of conventional weapons and dual-use equipment and technologies. It joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1997 and became a full member of Zangger Committee in 1999. Regarding biological and chemical weapon proliferation, Turkey is a member of the Australia Group, which is an informal arrangement that seeks to prevent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation by the enactment of national legislation to ensure that internationally banned material do not reach to potential proliferators. Turkey joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that established a set of guidelines for the transfer of nuclear-related dual-use items, material and technology to ensure that they would not be diverted to misuse.

The international community is concerned about states which possess WMD and their delivery means, and whose governments do not abide by international norms or whose leadership is irrational or hostile. Such states are usually described as ‘rogue states’, or ‘states of concern,’ whose list includes Iran, Iraq and Syria. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey became increasingly anxious of the increasing efforts by these states to develop CBW capabilities, and missiles with greater ranges.

Iran has CSS-8 missile systems, Scud-Bs and Scud-C missiles with a range of 150 km, 300 km and 500 km respectively. It has successfully tested its 1,300-1,500 km-range Shahab-3 missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and is reportedly developing some 2,000 km

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8 Though they are grouped together as WMD, they differ in terms of the lethality of their effects. Nuclear weapons are the most destructive in that they kill large numbers of people, destroy buildings and infrastructure, and contaminate large areas with radioactive fallout. Biological and chemical weapons do not destroy buildings or infrastructure but they claim life. Source: A Primer on WMD,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a.html>

9 A ballistic missile is a rocket capable of guiding and propelling itself in a direction and to a velocity that, when the rocket engine shuts down, it will follow a flight pattern to a desired target. Ballistic missiles burn most of their propellant (fuel) in the initial portion of their flight, called the boost phase. Most fly fast enough to hit targets 100s or 1000s of miles away in a few minutes. Once launched, they are fairly easy to detect with radar or other sensors, but difficult to intercept. Source: Ballistic Missiles/A Primer on WMD,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a5.html>

10 Fissile material are those that are essential for nuclear explosives. They are Uranium-233, Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239 isotopes. Dual-use items are those that have both civilian and military applications, such as precursor chemicals used to manufacture chemical weapons which also have legitimate civilian industrial uses. Source: WMD 411- Glossary, N77, <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/gloss.html>

range Shahab-4 missiles. Iran has a large nuclear development program for peaceful purposes, however, it is suspected that it seeks to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{12}

The proliferation record of the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein is alarming. As a matter of fact, Turkey became aware of the missile threat in the Middle East during the Gulf War, after seeing the Iraqi missile capability and the threat to use WMD. Iraq seeks to develop its current WMD and ballistic missile capability to include a nuclear bomb. It may still maintain 650 km-range Al-Hussein (modified Scud-B) missiles, their components and domestically produced Scud missile engines as well as biological and chemical weapon munitions. It has reconstructed much of the facilities that were destroyed in 1998 allied bombing and is developing Ababil-100 and Ababil-50 missiles with 150 km and 50 km range respectively, and extended the range of Al-Samoud missiles to 180 km.\textsuperscript{13} Iraq recalls Turkey’s strategic partnership with the US and its role in the Gulf War, and observes its close cooperation with the US for the operation in Iraq.

Syria has the largest and most advanced chemical weapon capability in the Middle East. It also has SS-21, Scud-Bs and Scud-Cs missiles with a range of 120 km, 300 km and 500 km respectively. It is domestically developing the capability to produce 600 km-range M-9 missiles.\textsuperscript{14}

None of these states is party to the MTCTR, which constrains the development of missiles whose range exceeds 300 km and 500 kg of payload. Turkey’s historically strained relations with these neighbors increase volatility and reinforce mutual threat perceptions. The ongoing disputes with its neighbors and areas of disagreement include, inter alia, support for terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, Turkey’s strategic partnership with Israel and the long-standing unresolved water disputes with Syria and Iraq, which create a potential WMD and missile threat in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern borders.

An analysis of the motivations to use WMD against Turkey reveals that the threat perception from Syria is low. A 2002 national security analysis of Turkey did not include Syria in its list of priority concerns, but it cited Iran as the chief military threat due to its WMD and missile programs.\textsuperscript{15} Iran’s missile capability and its favorable geography have shown that Turkey lacks sufficient air defense systems. Regarding Iraq, Turkey’s key role in the US operation makes it a close target of a missile attack. An Iraqi decision to use ballistic missiles, and perhaps with mass destruction warheads for tactical purposes against allied bases in Turkey would rest upon its assessment of Turkey’s retaliation. Turkey’s most important deterrent against the WMD and missile threat is its military power which is capable of operating in vast territories. Iraq did not use WMD against Turkey during the 1991 Gulf War. For military analysts, it did not and would not want to risk an all-out military response for a limited tactical advantage. However,

\textsuperscript{12} "Iran: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," \textit{Center for Nonproliferation Studies.} <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm>

\textsuperscript{13} "Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," \textit{Center for Nonproliferation Studies.} <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm> The recent UNMOVIC inspections proved that Iraq developed the al-Samoud missiles that exceeded the allowed range of 150 km.


Turkey is concerned that Saddam Hussein may not refrain from using destructive weapons this time\(^{16}\) since what is at stake is his leadership.

Turkey’s NATO membership with the ensuing security guarantee has been the most important deterrent against threats emanating from the Middle East. However, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Turkey felt that NATO’s commitment was weakened,\(^ {17}\) making Ankara think that it should augment its defenses against Middle Eastern threats. Different from the other NATO allies, Turkey’s geography necessitates a deterrent posture that focuses on defending the homeland against WMD and missile attacks. Thus, Turkey shifted its military deployment towards its eastern and southeastern borders as a response to the changing nature of threats of the post-Cold-War.\(^ {18}\) Currently, Turkey’s land and air forces constitute a credible deterrent that an attack will be massively retaliated.

Turkey’s most notable response to the missile proliferation threat in the Middle East has been to seriously consider involvement in missile defense projects.\(^ {19}\) Turkey got interested in Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems to defend against the capabilities that might threaten the movement of its land forces. Current CBW threats are likely to initiate the need for an enhanced air-defense system.\(^ {20}\) Turkish security analysts agree that effectively counter-proliferation measures require enhancing Turkey’s air power, which necessitates the procurement of advanced assets and modernization of the existing military equipment of the Turkish Air Forces. In accomplishing these tasks, Turkey was faced with hesitancy from Europe due to human rights concerns. Therefore, it turned to the United States and Israel, and developed strategic partnerships to address common security challenges in the Middle East.

The Turkish military agrees on the convenience of obtaining a missile defense system from either Israel or the United States.\(^ {21}\) Turkey’s defense circles put forward numerous reasons to opt for Israeli defense industries. They cite certain advantages, such as high-level, US-based technology, a willingness to share information and benefit from development, and readiness to involve Turkish firms in the production process.\(^ {22}\) Israel and Turkey have signed several defense

\(^{16}\) In a press briefing in February 2003, the Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey, Talip Abid Salih, declared that if a state provides assistance to the US in an operation against Iraq, that would mean for that country to be in the war. They would understand in the future that they made a big strategic mistake. He said that Iraq is not threatening Turkey but making recommendations and calls not to give support to the US. Source: “Irak Buyukelecisi: Usleri Acmak Savas Anlamina Geilir (The Iraqi Ambassador: Opening the Bases Would Mean War),” Miliyet (www-version), February 6, 2003.

\(^{17}\) Even when the then Turkish Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut visited Iraq in May 1990, Saddam Hussein told him that Turkey is without the NATO guarantee, that the US is not powerful enough and will not be able to help Turkey. Akbulut’s answer was that Turkey will defend itself and that Turkey started to question its previous borders (referring to Karkuk and Mosul). Source: Nuray Babakan, “Akbulut Saddam’a Cevabını Vermiştir (Akbulut Had Given the Answer that Saddam Deserved)” Hürriyet, January 14, 2003; NATO is split with respect to operationalizing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which foresees collective defense. See Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the threat to Turkey. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030210e.htm>


\(^{19}\) Serkan Demirtaş, “Türkiye Füze Kalkanını İstiyor (Turkey Wants the Missile Shield)”, Cumhuriyet, May 4, 2001, p.11.

\(^{20}\) After 9/11, the threat of CBW terrorism became clear and Turkey’s cooperation with the United States made it a target.

\(^{21}\) “Israel, Turkey, US Agree to Launch Missile Cooperation,” Middle East Newslinel, June 18, 2001.

\(^{22}\) “PM to Turkey Today for Strategic Talks,” Ha'aretz, August 28, 2000.
cooperation, free trade, and military training agreements since 1993. Military agreements between the two countries allow Israeli pilots to train in Turkey's vast air space, provide Turkey with reliable access to sophisticated Israeli and US-produced weapons systems, and enhance Israel's ability to collect intelligence on Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Overall, the deterrent power and maneuverability of both states significantly increased as a result of this strategic partnership.

With the United States, Turkey is studying involvement in the US 'Missile Shield' project. The (National) Missile Defense (NMD) is the last project of the US plans to deploy a missile defense system to defend the homeland against ballistic missile attacks, by a 'state of concern' to the United States or its allies. Originally, the NMD was designed to destroy hostile missile warheads in the midcourse phase of the missile trajectory, but it faced technical challenges. Thus, the Bush administration articulated the 'boost-phase missile defense,' whereby a ballistic missile would be destroyed during its boost-phase of flight, which offered advantages over the mid-course intercept. This system must be positioned near the opponent launch site, either in neighboring countries or on ships patrolling nearby. In the Middle East, the United States envisaged a role for Turkey—which is to provide necessary bases to deploy interceptor missiles in its eastern and southeast to destroy ballistic missiles fired by Iran or Iraq soon after they are launched. Apart from its material support, Turkey could give political support to Missile Defense in European security institutions: It can explain the risks to European security better than any other European ally since it straddles Europe and the Middle East and follows regional developments very closely. In return for the deployment of these interceptors, the United States offered the deployment of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles in Turkey to ensure Turkey's national security. These missiles would either be Patriot or Arrow missile defense systems. Thus, Turkey got interested in the US missile defense project.

Turkey also welcomed the Israeli offer to help establish a missile defense umbrella including the Arrow anti-ballistic system. In 1999, Turkish defense officials contemplated that Turkey needs a sophisticated missile defense system like the US-Israeli joint production Arrow anti-ballistic missiles to defend vast territories, as opposed to other systems capable of defending

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24 Mid-course phase of a ballistic missile trajectory refers to the stage where the ballistic missile is burned out and released its warhead, but the warhead has not yet entered the atmosphere.


only relatively small areas.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, the acquisition of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile systems became a significant part of Turkey's strategic planning. However, rather than simply buying the Arrow systems, Turkey preferred participating in their co-production in order to establish a certain infrastructure on anti-ballistic missile technology. So, a process of detailed discussions began with the US and Israel on missile technologies and architecture, and on the establishment of a Middle Eastern Theater Missile Defense (TMD) project as part of a bigger US missile defense system.

9/11 attacks had a serious impact on Turkey's involvement in missile defense projects. It introduced new variables in security policy making by increasing Turkey's geo-strategic significance as well as its vulnerability. After 9/11, Turkey's cooperation became a priority matter for the new US policy in the Middle East. Iraq is the target of post-9/11 US security policy which seeks to eliminate anti-US regimes or groups with WMD capability. This made Turkey vulnerable to retaliatory missile attacks or a target of international terrorism, and gave a spur to the talks with the US and Israel regarding anti-ballistic missile systems.

In March 2002, Turkish Armed Forces adopted the 'Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept' as an important element of the plans to establish a National Space Board, which would form the legal basis for Turkey's efforts to acquire ballistic missile systems. In the meantime, Turkish anxiety increased after intelligence reports of Iran's missile test to extend the range of its Shahab-3 and its development of Shahab-4, which reached to alarming levels.\textsuperscript{30} In June 2002, Iran tested its Shahab-3 missiles. In response, the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that prevention of the spread of WMD and their delivery systems is an issue of priority for Turkey. In July 2002, American experts came to Turkey to work on the US missile defense project, and the Turkish General Staff (TGS) prepared a wish-list of equipment, in which the establishment of a regional missile defense system was one of the priorities.\textsuperscript{31} As the war trumpets in Iraq increased, Turkey's need and demand for defenses against WMD and missile attacks became evident more than ever.

\textit{Impacts of Turkey's security policy on integration with Europe}

While Turkey adopted the policy that would more effectively address the proliferation threat than others,\textsuperscript{32} it is likely to constitute a tough issue in Turkey's pre-accession process to the EU regarding security-related matters. In his analysis of Turkey's response to the WMD proliferation, Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu identifies some three drawbacks of this policy with respect to Turkey's commitment for European integration:

First, the US 'Missile Shield' project is not quite appealing to the Europeans because of the difference in security perceptions in either side of the Atlantic. Turkey's unilateral involvement in the project as an outcome of its security strategy may create rifts in handling European security. Second, an enhanced trilateral partnership with Israel and the United States in

\textsuperscript{29} Lale Saribrahimoğlu and Greg Seigle, "USA and Turkey Will Talk on Arrow 2 Missile," \textit{Jane's Defense Weekly}, November 17, 1999, p.3.
\textsuperscript{30} Metehan Demir and Arieh O'Sullivan, "Turkish Intelligence: Iran to Start Building Long-range Missile," \textit{Jerusalem Post}, May 15, 2002.
\textsuperscript{32} Sebnem Uдум, "Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense," Paper submitted at the International Relations Conference-Middle East Technical University, July 4, 2002.
military affairs do not bode well with Europe’s political, military and strategic goals that include minimizing US influence in European security affairs. Finally, and most pertinent to the accession process is the outcome of the policy. One of the medium-term EU political criteria is the alignment of the role of the military in Turkish politics; however, Turkey’s involvement in costly missile defense projects will lead not only to an increase in Turkey’s military spending, but also in the role of military in the National Security Council in order to frame Turkey’s nonproliferation policy.

European views about the US Missile Defense project do not overlap with those of Turkey’s, let alone the likely controversy that may arise due to Turkey’s cooperation with the US and Israel over missile defense projects. The United States and European allies have clearly different threat perceptions of WMD and missile proliferation. Key European states, such as Britain, France and Germany, do not favor national missile defenses as the best way to respond to the missile proliferation threat though they accept that it is legitimate to get—ever increasingly—concerned about proliferation trends.³³ Most European states perceive Iran, Iraq and Syria as future economic partners rather than countries of concern with a potential WMD and missile threat. This is basically due to the different assessments of technological capabilities and political intentions, i.e. for the Europeans the possession of a capability constitutes a potential risk; what makes it an urgent threat is political intent. Thus their threat perceptions are based on their political relationships with ‘states of concern.’ Historically, Europeans have preferred to apply political criteria in assessing security threats, and have responded to existing threats politically and diplomatically rather than militarily: Their geographical position has also been an important factor in their approach. The EU is a major political and economic partner of Syria³⁴ and it has recently started negotiations with Iran for trade cooperation linked to the progress in a political dialogue that seeks to address, inter alia, the proliferation issues.³⁵ Therefore, one can expect that political judgments would have the most decisive influence over their stance for a ballistic missile defense policy, rather than concerns about the existence of technical capabilities.³⁶ The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU endorses a nonproliferation and disarmament policy that “...insists on the respect, development and effective implementation of international multilateral treaties and conventions...”³⁷ that form the nonproliferation and arms control regimes, and it upholds export controls and safeguards as important complementary measures to reduce risks.³⁸

Behind the European position towards the US Missile Defense project lies the concern over the consequences of possible Russian and Chinese reactions to a unilateral US policy. Recently, the United States scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to proceed with the Missile Shield project. The Treaty that was signed by the United States and the Soviet

³⁵ Commissioner Chris Patten to visit Iran, Turkey and Lebanon 2-7 February 2003, IP/03/161, Brussels, EU Official Website, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/ip03_161.htm>
³⁶ ibid, p.8.
³⁸ ibid.
Union in 1972 forbids the deployment of nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses. The strategic doctrine of the treaty is the principle of deterrence by the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, missile defenses eliminate the strategic balance among states that possess nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China have viewed the project as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities that would undermine cooperation with the US on disarmament and nonproliferation. In this context, Europeans are worried that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will encourage proliferation: That Russia and China will react by slowing down cooperation in tasks embodied in arms control and nonproliferation regimes.

China’s pronounced commitments and undertakings for nonproliferation do not overlap. It is not a member of key multinational export-control regimes including the MTCR. American intelligence community identifies China “as one of the key suppliers of materials and technologies that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.” Chinese nonproliferation experts assess that to put leverage on the US regarding NMD or TMD, China may choose not to live up to its nonproliferation commitments as a retaliation to a perceived national security threat. The Russian contribution to arms control and nonproliferation regimes is integral. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an important task was to properly safeguard the unemployed sensitive material, technology and know-how necessary to develop WMD. Paucity in the proper implementation of programs to that effect would give impetus to illicit trafficking of the NBC material and drain of ex-Soviet expertise to aspirant states or terrorist groups-most of which are in the periphery of Europe. The bottomline for Europe is that the US project will be counterproductive, and that when Turkey goes along with the project, this would lead to its decoupling from Europe.

A second controversial issue may arise out of Turkey’s strategic partnership with Israel and the US, particularly in military matters, which improved over the 1990s. As opposed to Turkey’s contentment with the nature and context of relations with Israel, Europe is concerned that Turkey’s growing partnership with Israel may eventually result in an enhanced trilateral alliance between Israel, Turkey and the United States due to common responses to proliferation in the Middle East. This, in turn, would cause Turkey to slow down its steps towards Europe, because Europeans argue that such a strategic relationship will barely overlap with the objectives of the EU in political, military and strategic fields.

Most of the key EU states and the European allies are trying to keep a considerable room of maneuver free from the United States, so they would oppose the idea of including a member that would be its advocate in Europe. The EU has defined its security and defense policy in its second pillar, namely the CFSP. The long-term politico-military objectives of the EU are about attaining an autonomous security and defense capability that would address security threats to Europe. In the debates surrounding European security and defense policy, one of the main issues has been to decrease dependency on the United States and taking EU-only decisions while making use of NATO assets and capabilities whenever necessary. The accession of a country which maintains a reinforced military partnership with the United States would offset the EU efforts to minimize American influence over European affairs. Apart from that, Turkey’s involvement in a trilateral TMD project with the United States and Israel would make some European NATO allies concerned and may lead to a rift in the Alliance. Most notably, Greece

40 ibid.
can be uneasy of the establishment of a Middle Eastern TMD due to its geographical proximity: Greece perceives Turkey as the prominent security threat, and would not welcome an increase in Turkey’s military posture or deterrent.

Besides, the EU would be reluctant to import out-of-area security issues by accepting Turkey so close to Israel. Historically, the EU has adopted a Middle East policy which tried to maintain equidistance to the parties involved. Not only it served as a facilitator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but it is the first trading partner of Israel, and a major economic partner of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.\(^{41}\) Israel is the only nuclear-capable state in the Middle East and is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which would make it a non-nuclear weapon state as the other regional parties to the conflict. The absence of such a status for Israel is assessed to motivate regional NPT signatories, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria, to proliferate. This constituted a major deadlock in peace talks, and the EU would not want the inclusion of dynamics that will compel placing hard security issues over economic partnership on its agenda with these states.

The final issue area is directly related to a critical artery in Turkey’s roadmap toward eventual membership to the EU, i.e. increased role of military over civilian administration and increased defense spending that will have political repercussions in Europe. The 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions, which declared Turkey candidate for EU membership, stated that:

"...the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union."\(^{42}\)

Turkey was then provided with a roadmap enshrined in the 2000 Accession Partnership Document, which set out short- and medium-term accession criteria. The EU opened up accession negotiations with all candidates, but Turkey since the latter “...does not yet meet the political conditions,”\(^{43}\) which include, *inter alia*, “...align[ing] the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the [g]overnment in accordance with the practice of the EU [m]ember [s]tates.”\(^{44}\)

The criterion referred to the role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in politics based on the 1982 Constitution, which granted the military an equal right to vote and say with government members in a constitutional body, thereby making them a “covert partner” of the government; whereas in a properly functioning democracy, the civil administration and the ruling government should be above all governance. There has been no conflict of views with the civilian administration and the military as long as the Turkish governments applied a national security policy that foresaw fighting against ideologies that threaten the integrity of the Turkish state or its secular and republican regime. These internal security threats are Islamic fundamentalism and secessionism. The crisis in the National Security Council in 1997 was the most recent example of


\(^{44}\) The EU Council decision of March 8, 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, (2001/235/EC), Official Journal of the European Communities, L85/19.
the influence of the military over the civilian administration that in these matters the government needs to adopt the position of the military or it will be induced to do so.45

European uneasiness over the role of military in Turkey is already a very sensitive subject in Turkish-EU relations. Turkey’s strategic partnership with Israel and the US, particularly their cooperation to respond WMD proliferation in the Middle East will require military assessments, policies and substantial expenditures. Hence the influence of the military is likely to increase in the National Security Council, which will put Turkey in opposite currents with the EU.

These three issue areas suggest that Turkey may put full membership at risk while trying to address its security concerns from the Middle East.46 The following section will try to find a way out of this dilemma by the help of conflict resolution theory.

Conflict resolution theory: A way out?

The above analysis has so far demonstrated the opposite forces that are driven by Turkey’s security policy and the prerequisites for European integration. The paper now tries to find the ways out of this apparent cul-de-sac by applying the conflict resolution theory. The theory argues that human beings are inherently peaceful, yet aggressive when they are frustrated about their unsatisfied needs. Protracted conflicts usually emerge as a result of the denial of basic needs, and conflicts can only be resolved when such needs are satisfied. Thus, the process of conflict resolution should start with identifying positions (i.e. concrete demands) of the parties and their underlying interests and needs. Basically, the theory argues that as long as the conflict is translated into the language of needs, an outcome that satisfies the needs of the parties can be attained.47

A bare reflection of the theorem on international relations is the hypothesis that states resolve their conflicts when their needs are satisfied. Survival is at the core of being a state, which then leads to main needs including security-physical and economic-, recognition, and prestige.48 The theory notes that sustainable settlements of conflicts are possible only with integrative (win-win) outcomes whereby interests and needs of the groups in conflict are recognized and satisfied mutually.49 Therefore, to attain a sustainable outcome out of an international conflict, one should break down the positions and interests of states into their needs and devise policies that would directly address the latter.

The analysis indeed studied how Turkey responded to meet its security needs, and how it clashed with the positions and interests of the EU. Based on the basic premises of the conflict resolution theory, one can argue that if Turkey considers the needs that lie beneath the interests of the EU, and applies the policies that would address those needs, then Turkey’s security policy and its steps towards integration with Europe can proceed more smoothly. The underlying parameters of policymaking to that goal are twofold: First, to maintain survival, state response to a threat is to seek adequate defenses: Thus, Turkey will respond to the WMD and missile

46 Mustafa Kibaroglu, op.cit.
47 Conflict Resolution Online Learning Project, Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/objectivunit1.html>
49 Conflict Resolution Online Learning Project, Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/objectivunit1.html>
proliferation threat to meet security needs. As the analysis explained above, it started to cooperate with the US and Israel and it will continue doing so. Second, eventual membership to the EU has been Turkey’s state policy since the Republican years. Now that it is a candidate, Turkey is supposed to meet the accession criteria for full membership, and cannot expect the EU to bend its principles for the unique circumstances of Turkey. Now is the time to revisit the points of controversy by keeping the theory handy. The following analysis will eventually constitute the outline of the national nonproliferation strategy that the paper proposes.

First, as an integral part of the accession process, the EU would like to see a diminished influence of the Turkish military over politics. The alignment of the constitutional role of the National Security Council is constrained by other security challenges that do not pertain to Turkey’s external security policy. As a matter of fact, the security issues that are related to religious fundamentalism and secessionism still dominate the security agenda; and it will be wishful thinking to expect that the Turkish military will agree to give up its status in order to comply with the EU criteria. Moreover, the Turkish opinion polls suggest that the military is the most trusted institution by the people, because there is a strong conviction that a chaos that may be created by these two issues can be overcome or mitigated by the military rather than the civil administration. Thus, the military is perceived as a balancing factor of Turkish democracy rather than a disrupter. Currently, the threat assessments, responses, policy planning and budgeting are all within the realm of the military. To find a mid-way between its domestic and international policies, and to convey intent and cooperativeness to the EU, Turkey can choose to increase the weight of civil actors in security policy- in our case, its nonproliferation policy, by engaging the foreign and the defense ministries into Turkey’s efforts for disarmament and nonproliferation. The implications of the proposed policy will be an increased role of civil circles in the National Security Council, thereby leveling the weight between the government and the military. That would also be appealing to the TAF because not only civil agents will speak the same language with them, but also it will not put the military under the spotlight to hinder the EU integration process.

Second, adding to the European criticisms about the US missile defense project are the increased European concerns about Russian and Chinese reactions to the US missile defense policy since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in December 2001. The position of Russia and China is an extension of the need/interest to preserve the strategic nuclear balance with the United States, which would be disrupted by a US missile defense system. National missile defenses basically leave the missile-capable states without a second-strike capability. The Treaty had enshrined mutual vulnerability by stipulating that the United States and the Soviet Union would not pursue nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses. However, in the case of Turkey’s missile defense involvement in a Middle Eastern TMD, the area that would be covered does not target in its range Russian and Chinese missiles that can be launched from deep inside their territories. In this context, Turkey can communicate this detail to Europe as well as Russia and China by a technical and political assessment that stresses the underlying motives and intentions of a TMD between Israel, Turkey and the US, and demonstrate that it is aimed at defending against threats from the Middle East, and not directed against Russia and China. The concerns of Greece can be soothed in the same vein- that the facilities are not deployed in the west, but in the east against Middle Eastern threats, and to augment the air defenses of Turkey’s land and air forces, hence not intended for altering the strategic balance in eastern Mediterranean. In NATO, with US political support, Turkey should also emphasize that instead of creating rifts, missile defense assets and capabilities at the southern flank of Europe will be to
Europe’s interest indeed: In the short and medium-term, a TMD can be employed to provide a defense umbrella to the Rapid Reaction Force of the EU in future out-of-area missions. Basically, Turkey should take on a strategy that focuses on making the deployment beneficial to Europe.

Third, like the Europeans, Turkey is equally concerned about horizontal proliferation which can be spurred by a Russian or Chinese retaliation to US policy. The potential proliferators and aspiring groups are around Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders are especially porous and smuggling is a fact. When it comes to smuggling of sensitive material, inaction is too costly to afford. Thus, bolstering export controls and safeguards of sensitive material should become a prior task in nonproliferation strategic planning. In this sense, Turkey’s quest should be to elevate its tone in export control regimes and other efforts, and to become increasingly involved in safeguards and export control regimes as it will also overlap with the policies of the EU: The Council of the EU has a regulation for export controls of dual-use items and technology that set up a regime at the community level. EU assistance programs are available for Russia, the Newly Independent States and North Korea to support efforts for nonproliferation and disarmament. A specific area that Turkey can contribute is the CFSP EU Joint Action on nonproliferation and disarmament, which was introduced in the context of EU Common Strategy in the Russian Federation. The Joint Action envisages the implementation of projects on nuclear and chemical disarmament with a focus on the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium (i.e., Pu-239 isotope, which is the most suitable for manufacturing a nuclear weapon). However, the projects under the Joint Action will expire in June 2003 despite increasing concerns over horizontal proliferation through illegal means or loopholes in current regimes. At this point, Turkey can come up with additional projects for the EU, or it can offer the advantages of its geography and get involved in new or existing projects as a physical contributor to oversee the transfer of sensitive items. This can start Turkish-EU cooperation in a brand-new field that would complement Turkey’s contribution to European security. That would demonstrate that Turkey would work for the CFSP, thereby soothing the worries that it will be a US agent in the EU despite a likely reinforced strategic partnership.

Turkey’s strategic partnership with Israel in military matters seems to remain as long as cooperation with European states is blocked by human rights concerns. Turkey already attaches great value to the strategic cooperation with the United States and Israel, and is not likely to put a restraint in order to accommodate with the positions of major European capitals. Basically, since EU membership is not in the horizon for the short-term, Turkey will continue to define its security perceptions differently from the Europe. In this sense, we should expect continuing efforts to obtain anti-ballistic missile systems in cooperation with allies. The EU need to attain an autonomous capability in security matters is conceivable. The differences between the US and some European states became crystal-clear in the context of the debate on Iraq. With the Nice Treaty, the EU has already blocked Turkey’s possible overriding influence in the EU due to the population of the country, which would otherwise assign equal number of votes as Germany, France and the UK in the European Commission. So, it is unlikely that the EU will be forced to deal with issues by Turkey’s pressure. Regarding the Middle East policy, Turkey has always tried to pursue a balanced policy in the region, and its interests dictate that it continues doing so.
Conclusion

This paper tackled the WMD and missile proliferation in the Middle East, as an international security issue that is likely to constitute an important agenda item in Turkey’s integration with the EU. WMD and missile proliferation is important though not one that is much discussed either in Turkey or in Europe due to threat perceptions that are not solely based on technical capabilities, but more on political relations with aspiring states. The paper referred to the work of Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu, who observed that Turkey’s responses to the proliferation threat would create certain points of controversy that may jeopardize Turkey’s full membership to the EU. The paper took Dr. Kibaroglu’s findings one step further by adding the phrase “unless effectively dealt with...” Thus, after explaining in detail the implications of Turkey’s responses to the proliferation threat on the pre-accession process to the EU, the paper tried to overcome or alleviate the hurdles with the “good offices” of the conflict resolution theory. To that end, the paper borrowed the theorem of satisfying the needs and operationalized it to get out from the apparent paradox, and suggested policies or actions that would address the needs of both Turkey and the EU.

The paper basically suggested that;

- in order to level the weight of military and civilian members of the National Security Council, Turkey can involve the foreign and defense ministries more to its nonproliferation strategic planning instead of trying to decrease the role of the military, which is a tough task due to Turkey’s internal dynamics,
- to address European concerns about the US Missile Defense project which eliminates the strategic balance between nuclear weapon states, Turkey should underline that a missile defense system set up with the United States and Israel against Middle Eastern threats does not threaten the capabilities of Russia and China, which are uneasy about the US ‘Missile Shield,’ and
- to prevent horizontal proliferation, which can be directly or indirectly influenced by Russian and Chinese reactions to the United States, Turkey should increasingly get involved to export controls and safeguards regimes, and work with the EU by providing projects or assistance on the basis of its geographical advantage.

The solution alternatives are not comprehensive or exhaustive at this point of research. To fill in the gaps for a comprehensive national nonproliferation strategy, the paper suggests an action plan that has the following steps:

- identifying the proliferation threats and responses at the national and international level,
- carrying the proliferation debate onto headlines and course schedules in the academia with due focus on its extent and content,
- planning a clear-cut nonproliferation policy by upholding Turkey’s natural tendencies, and
- reflecting this policy on relations with the EU by highlighting proliferation threats to Europe and demonstrating Turkey’s role in mitigating such threats.