

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1989

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

482.4 W

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II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings:	
First sitting	12
Text adopted	16
Second sitting	17
Texts adopted	20
Third sitting	22
Texts adopted	25
Fourth sitting	27
Text adopted	30
Fifth sitting	32
Sixth sitting	34
Texts adopted	37
Official report of debates:	
First sitting	42
Second sitting	63
Third sitting	83
Fourth sitting	113
Fifth sitting	138
Sixth sitting	160
Index	180

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV
UYTTENDAELE René	CVP

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SOUVET Louis	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STAGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de BEER Leopold	Liberal
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob EISMA Doeke	CDA D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter van der SANDEN Piet	CDA CDA
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward HARDY Peter	Labour Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael PARRY Robert	Conservative Labour
Sir William SHELTON	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BANKS Tony	Labour
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
HUNT John	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David LITHERLAND Robert	Labour Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim REDMOND Martin	Conservative Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
MM. STEWART Allan THOMPSON John	Conservative Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 5th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Doc. 1173.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1189).
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1183).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jung, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Goerens.

In accordance with Rule 10(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Goerens was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Goerens took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates had been proposed for posts of Vice-President, namely, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. de Beer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Soell and Mr. Fourré were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1173)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was adopted.

10. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1191)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation in condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China had been tabled by Mr. Wilkinson and others with a request for urgent procedure.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

In accordance with Rule 43(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request at the beginning of the next sitting.

11. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1189)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Rathbone and Ahrens.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee¹.

12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. van der Sanden, Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Reddemann.

13. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1183 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Müller.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Dudley Smith, Lord Newall and Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The debate was closed.

14. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Belgium

- Mr. Uyttendaele as an alternate member in place of Mr. van Hecke;

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Zierer as a titular member;

United Kingdom:

- Mr. Ewing as a titular member in place of Mr. Hardy.

General Affairs Committee

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Böhm as a titular member in place of Mr. Reddemann;
- Mr. Eich as a titular member in place of Mr. Mechttersheimer;
- Mr. Reddemann as an alternate member in place of Mr. Böhm;
- Mr. Soell as an alternate member;

United Kingdom:

- Mr. Faulds as an alternate member in place of Mr. Ewing.

¹ See page 16.

*Committee on Scientific, Technological
and Aerospace Questions*

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Eich as a titular member in place of Mr. Mechttersheimer.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Niegel as a titular member;
- Mr. Höffkes as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges*

Belgium:

- Mr. Uyttendaele as an alternate member in place of Mr. van Hecke;

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Pfuhl as an alternate member;

United Kingdom:

- Mr. Hardy as an alternate member in place of Mr. Parry.

***15. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 6th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium

MM. *Eicher* (Biefnot)
Kempinaire
Péciaux
Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Mr. *Uyttendaele* (Stevelyneck)

Mrs. Luuk
MM. Müller
Niegel
Reddemann
Scheer
Soell
Mrs. *Pack* (Wulff)

Netherlands

MM. *van der Sanden* (Aarts)
de Beer
de Jong
de Kwaadsteniet
Stoffelen
Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*
(Worrell)

France

MM. Bassinet
Caro
Collette
Durand
Fourré
Lacour (Galley)
Jeambrun
Jung
Pontillon (Matraja)
Hunault (Seitlinger)

Italy

MM. Caccia
Fassino (Fioret)
Stegagnini (Intini)
Kessler
Malfatti
Mezzapesa
Scovacicchi (Natali)
Spitella (Parisi)
Cannata (Pecchioli)
Pieralli
Sarti

United Kingdom

MM. Coleman
Banks (Cox)
Lambie (Ewing)
Gale
(Dame Peggy Fenner)
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
MM. Hardy
Hill
Jessel
Sir Russell Johnston
Lord *Newall* (Earl of Kinnoull)
MM. Morris
Parry
Rathbone
(Sir William Shelton)
Sir Dudley Smith
Mr. Speed
Sir John Stokes
Mr. Wilkinson

Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Ahrens
Mrs. *Timm* (Antretter)
MM. Eich
Hitschler
Klejdzinski (Holtz)
Irmer
Kittelmann

Luxembourg

MM. Goerens
Linster

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium

MM. Adriaensens
Derycke

Federal Republic of Germany

MM. Böhm
Büchner
von Schmude
Unland

Luxembourg

Mr. Burger

France

MM. Baumel
Beix
Croze
Fillon
Forni
Mrs. Lalumière
MM. Oehler
Portier

Italy

MM. Filetti
Gabbuggiani
Martino
Rodotà
Rubbi
Sinesio
Taramelli

Netherlands

Mr. Tummers

United Kingdom

Mr. Garrett

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 467¹***on the establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the proposals to establish a European institute for advanced security studies and noting that these proposals correspond to the wishes expressed by the Assembly, particularly in Recommendations 442 and 463;
- (ii) Believing that there could be fruitful co-operation between such an institute and the services of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That a European institute for advanced security studies be established under the terms of Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence;
2. That this institute be housed in the same building as the Assembly;
3. That members of the staff of this institute be recruited on the basis of specific qualifications required by virtue of their employment;
4. That the Office of the Clerk be made responsible for common services (management of the building, meeting rooms, documentation, security);
5. That the mandate of the WEU security agencies be brought to an end;
6. That this recommendation be implemented without delay.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989, in accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 6th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1191).
2. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1184).
3. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1177).
4. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1183 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1191)

In accordance with Rule 43(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

At Mr. Wilkinson's request, the motion for a recommendation was corrected to become a motion for a resolution which would be distributed before the afternoon session.

Speaker: Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1184)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mrs. Pack, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Dame Peggy Fenner.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Linster, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 468)¹.

The sitting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 11.30 a.m.

5. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1177)

The second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for

1. See page 20.

Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Younger answered questions put by MM. Hardy, Scheer, Ewing, Jessel, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Stegagnini, van der Sanden, van der Werff, Wilkinson, Cox, Irmer and Soell.

**6. State of European security –
intervention forces and reinforcement
for the centre and the north**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1183 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Amendments 1, 2 and 3 were not moved.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Fourré and others:

4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“4. That the development of military exchanges between Norway and France and the joint training of units with similar rôles be encouraged;”

Speakers: MM. Caro and Speed.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 469)¹.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.

1. See page 21.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell	Netherlands
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) <i>Noerens</i> (Kempinaire) Péciaux	Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Unland) Mrs. Pack (Wulff)	MM. Aarts de Beer <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelylnck)		Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Tummers) Mr. Worrell
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Caro Collette Durand <i>Hunault</i> (Galley) <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret Gabbuggiani Kessler Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) <i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli Rubbi Sarti <i>Stegagnini</i> (Intini)	MM. Coleman Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Hill Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. <i>Gale</i> (Morris) Parry Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Mrs. <i>Timm</i> (Büchner) MM. Eich Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Feldmann</i> (Irmer) Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk	MM. Goerens Linster	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Croze Fillon Forni Fourré Jeambrun Jung	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Derycke	Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger	MM. Natali Rodotà Sinesio Taramelli
France		Luxembourg
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix		Mr. Burger

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 468

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1988 (revised) and 1989, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) no decision has yet been taken by the Council on the restructuring of the ministerial organs;
 - (b) the budgets of these organs are still based on former organograms;
 - (c) consequently these budgets are not a valid estimate of requirements in relation to programmed work;
 - (d) consequently the Assembly is not in a position to give an opinion on the budgets in question on the basis of a cost/efficiency ratio;
 - (e) in the framework of budgetary management, a new practice seems to be introduced (which is to transfer from one financial year to the next unused credits within the limits of the total contributions of member states), which does not correspond to Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations of WEU which is referred to as justification;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) the staff of the Paris agencies is still uncertain about its future;
 - (b) furthermore, in the framework of "co-ordination" there is a tendency to limit the participation of staff representatives in the negotiations on determining conditions of employment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow up without delay Recommendation 467 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989;
2. Make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to regularise the procedure for transferring credits from one financial year to another outside the provisions of Article 10 (c) of the Regulations;
3. Afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend the right of their representatives to take part in negotiations in the framework of "co-ordination" on the conditions for the employment of staff;
4. Make a study to determine how to facilitate the transfer of staff between the co-ordinated organisations in order to improve career possibilities.

RECOMMENDATION 469

on the state of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the improved relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the arms reduction agreements that have been achieved or are being negotiated;
- (ii) Noting nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are still maintaining a high level of arms production and that the present disarmament agreements have been reached by NATO maintaining its own high level of security and unity of purpose;
- (iii) Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms, let alone increase them;
- (iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost effective as possible existing procurement, personnel, and command, control and communication systems;
- (v) Stressing the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North America to Europe, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases the importance of the northern flank,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend to NATO:

1. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems:
 - (a) firstly, aircraft "identification friend or foe" (IFF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue;
 - (b) secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units;
 - (c) thirdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle;
2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3 AWACS *ab initio* in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air defence system aircraft;
3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for transatlantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands should reach an early decision on new amphibious ships;
4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action rapide being assigned to Norway;
5. That still greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures;
6. That through the member countries of WEU the following steps should be taken to give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
 - (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
 - (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;
7. That proper recognition and understanding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility in European forces to meet the changing situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment which underly the force d'action rapide and 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that could be emulated and enhanced throughout the alliance (although dedicated helicopter lift capacity for 24 Brigade is an essential priority).

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 6th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1182 and amendments*).
2. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1191*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1182 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Ewing.

Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Klejdzinski, Wilkinson and Feldmann.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The debate was closed.

Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Soell and others:

2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Scheer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. de Beer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Soell and others:

3. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. de Beer.

The amendment was negatived.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Klejdzinski.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

4. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, before "a 10%" insert "at least".

Speakers: MM. Hardy and de Beer.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski and others:

5. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: Mr. Scheer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. de Beer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Kittelmann and de Beer:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after "participate" insert "on a national basis".

Speaker: Mr. Kittelmann.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Feldmann:

6. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“Urge the start of negotiations on SNF weapons”.

Speakers: MM. Feldmann, Wilkinson and de Beer.

Mr. Feldmann amended his amendment by leaving out “Urge” and inserting “Asks for”.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 470)¹.

4. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1191)

The oral report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Hardy, Scovacricchi, Caro, Fassino, Ahrens and Lord Newall.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Antretter, Klejdzinski, Feldmann, Cox, Sarti, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John Stokes, MM. Martino, Gabbuggiani, Reddemann, Müller, de Beer, Eicher and Encarnaçao (*Observer from Portugal*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Ahrens proposed that the text of the resolution be transmitted immediately to the Ambassador to France of the People's Republic of China.

This proposal was agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Cox.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 80)¹.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 7th June 1988, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.

1. See page 25.

1. See page 26.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
Mr. <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot)	MM. Caccia	MM. Aarts
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	<i>Fassino</i> (Filetti)	de Beer
Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelyck)	Fioret	<i>Maris</i> (de Jong)
	Gabbuggiani	de Kwaadsteniet
	Kessler	Stoffelen
France	<i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti)	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
MM. Bassinet	Martino	(Tummers)
Beix	Mezzapesa	Mr. Worrell
Caro	<i>Scovacricchi</i> (Natali)	
Collette	<i>Spitella</i> (Parisi)	
Fourré	<i>Cannata</i> (Pecchioli)	
<i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Pieralli	United Kingdom
<i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler)	Rubbi	MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Coleman)
	Sarti	Cox
		Ewing
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	Dame Peggy Fenner
MM. Ahrens	Mr. Goerens	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Antretter		MM. Garrett
Böhm		Hardy
Mrs. <i>Timm</i> (Büchner)		<i>Hunt</i> (Hill)
MM. <i>Feldmann</i> (Hitschler)		<i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel)
<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)		Lord <i>Mackie</i>
Irmer		(Sir Russell Johnston)
Kittelmann		Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)
Mrs. Luuk		MM. <i>Gale</i> (Morris)
MM. Müller		Parry
Reddemann		Sir William Shelton
Scheer		Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude)		Mr. Speed
		Sir John Stokes
		Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Forni	Mr. Wulff
MM. Adriaensens	Galley	
Derycke	Jeambrun	Italy
Kempinaire	Jung	MM. Intini
Péciaux	Mrs. Lalumière	Rodotà
	MM. Portier	Sinesio
	Seitlinger	Taramelli
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Baumel	MM. Eich	Luxembourg
Croze	Niegel	MM. Burger
Durand	Soell	Linster
Fillon	Unland	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 470***on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the successful outcome of the third review conference in Vienna in January 1989, and more specifically the signing of the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and the promising start to these negotiations;
- (ii) Stressing that the mistakes which hampered the MBFR negotiations should not be repeated, especially the disagreements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel and differences regarding an effective and strict verification régime;
- (iii) Certain that it is in the interests of all twenty-three participants in the CFE talks that the negotiations should be fruitful and harmonious, avoiding any unnecessary obstructive action;
- (iv) Considering that political reality calls for equal ceilings of armaments and troops, visibly lower than the present NATO levels;
- (v) Convinced that the absence of offensive equipment near the contact line would strengthen mutual confidence;
- (vi) Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent – even with a balance of conventional armaments – and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the foreseeable future;
- (vii) Noting, however, that time is required for further technical and tactical research on a replacement for the Lance missile and that a final decision about production does not require to be taken at present in consideration of the CFE talks;
- (viii) Underlining the useful contribution to mutual confidence-building which would result from the publication of detailed and clear defence budgets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings in which qualitative complications should be avoided insofar as possible, and take the view that disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a matter of secondary importance;
2. Advocate that, for the sake of effective and strict verification, the exchanges of information mentioned in the mandate should refer not only to levels of armaments and military personnel but also exact locations;
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure that practical research is carried out by WEU on the vital subject of verification and report fully to the Assembly;
4. Consider the possibility of including in the CFE talks all conventional weapons systems which are not explicitly excluded in the mandate, if this is essential for both parties for the smooth progress of the negotiations;
5. Aim to achieve equal ceilings by asymmetrical reductions, lower than the present NATO levels, at least a 10% reduction in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery being a provisional goal;
6. Participate on a national basis in all the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, but decide on production/deployment at a later time;
7. Ask for the start of negotiations on SNF weapons;
8. Promote the publication of complete, detailed and clear defence budgets by all participants in the CSCE talks;
9. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country's delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.

RESOLUTION 80***on the condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others
in the People's Republic of China***

The Assembly,

- (i) Condemning wholeheartedly the brutal repression and massacre by the People's Liberation Army of students and other freedom-loving people in the People's Republic of China who have been peacefully demonstrating their strong desire for democracy and freedom;
- (ii) Wishing to draw attention not only to the unjustifiable brutality of the action of the Chinese régime but also to the inherent dangers to security and confidence in the region,

RESOLVES that the Assembly protests in the strongest possible terms to the Government of the People's Republic of China against this savage repression.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Development of East-West relations and Western European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1187, addendum and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.15 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Development of East-West relations and Western European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1187, addendum and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Rubbi, Soell, Caro, Klejdzinski, Baumel and Müller.

Mr. de Beer, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Rathbone, Lambie and Fourré.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Atkinson, Mezzapesa, Lord, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*) and Böhm.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski and others:

3. At the end of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:

“regretting, however, that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (such as nuclear artillery) are excluded;”

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Pontillon.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Soell and others:

5. In the new sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “conventional armaments”.

Speakers: MM. Soell, Müller and Pontillon.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others:

6. In the new sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the implementation of this limitation” and insert “their success”.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Pontillon.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others and an amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski and others:

1. Redraft paragraph 4 (b) of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“(b) avoid options which might revive the atomic rearmament race such as the modernisation of very short-range missiles and nuclear weapons and, for this type of weapon, too, resort to the method of holding negotiations;”

4. Leave out paragraph 4 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“(b) define a security system guaranteeing our common security in East and West,

independently of the fact that the deterrence is currently based on conventional and nuclear systems;”

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Klejdzinski, de Beer and Pontillon.

Amendment 1 was negatived.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Soell.

Amendment 4 was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Soell and Stoffelen:

2. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Urge that there should be early negotiations about mutual reductions of all kinds of short-range tactical nuclear forces and battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe;”

Speakers: MM. Soell and Pontillon.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 471)¹.

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3.30 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.

1. See page 30.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium Mr. <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Steверlynck)	MM. Müller Reddemann <i>Steiner</i> (Scheer) <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Unland)	Netherlands MM. Aarts de Beer <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Worrell
France MM. Baumel Beix Caro <i>Alloncle</i> (Collette) <i>Hunault</i> (Fillon) Fourré Galley Jeambrun Portier	Italy MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Filetti) Fioret Gabbuggiani Kessler <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino Mezzapesa <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pieralli Rubbi Sarti	United Kingdom MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Coleman) <i>Lambie</i> (Cox) Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy <i>Rathbone</i> (Hill) <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Bowden</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) <i>Lord</i> (Morris) <i>Banks</i> (Parry) Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. <i>Hunt</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Büchner Eich <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Mrs. Luuk)	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium MM. Adriaensens Derycke Kempinaire Pécriaux	MM. Oehler Seitlinger	MM. Rodotà Sinesio Taramelli
France MM. Bassinet Croze Durand Forni Jung Mrs. Lalumière Mr. Matraja	Federal Republic of Germany MM. Hitschler Irmer Niegel Wulff	Luxembourg MM. Burger Linster
	Italy MM. Caccia Intini Natali Pecchioli	Netherlands Mr. Tummers

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 471***on the development of East-West relations and Western European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the new policy of reforms started in the Soviet Union four years ago has now created conditions allowing decisive progress to be made towards a negotiated limitation of armaments, the opening and development of a sincere dialogue and a wide spectrum of co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe;
- (ii) Noting that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments in Europe;
- (iii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's effort to base armaments reduction negotiations on greater openness by publishing accurate, detailed information on Soviet military strength and to prepare data that are effectively comparable with those provided by the western countries and also welcoming the first unilateral measures to reduce Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the heads of state of or government of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance agreed in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to present a proposal for a substantial reduction in conventional armaments and to say in what conditions they would be prepared to negotiate a reduction in short-range nuclear weapons in Europe;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction that many conflicts in the world calmed down in 1988;
- (vi) Welcoming the exchanges started between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union;
- (vii) Taking into account the fact that the new Soviet concept of "reasonable sufficiency" has not yet been translated into specific measures and cannot therefore yet be considered irreversible, but hoping the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments will be successful;
- (viii) Noting further that the new deployment and reorganisation of Soviet forces are still far from complete and awaiting the implementation of the defensive strategy, the principle of which has been proposed by the Soviet Union;
- (ix) Welcoming the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies in all efforts by the international community designed to restore or strengthen peace in areas where it is threatened and to avoid nuclear proliferation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow closely the evolution of the strategy, organisation and deployment of Soviet forces and report to the Assembly on the conclusions it draws from its analysis;
2. Compare the tables of the two alliances' forces and arms published by NATO and the Warsaw Pact to explain existing differences between the figures quoted by the two sides;
3. For each of the negotiations on limiting or banning armaments in which member countries are participating, hold consultations between their delegations so as to co-ordinate their position on the basis of the principles defined in the platform of The Hague;
4. Hold close consultations with its American allies in order to:
 - (a) apply the principles defined in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to ensure the progress of negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments and to link all initiatives in regard to short-range nuclear weapons with their success;
 - (b) define ways and means of introducing a new security concept which ensures that no part of Europe has its security diminished or made inferior to that of others;
 - (c) define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented;

- (d)* conduct a redefinition of burdens and responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance with a view to a multilateral approach to security;
 - (e)* determine the requirements for effective verification of the application of agreements on conventional and chemical armaments;
 - (f)* take no steps contrary to commitments entered into or liable to jeopardise further progress in the negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments;
5. Urge the earliest possible resumption of the START negotiations;
 6. In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fulfilling the conditions and expressing the desire to take part;
 7. In all appropriate forums, promote the development of exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the Eastern European countries and a rapprochement between those countries and all organisations seeking to foster the free circulation of ideas, persons, currencies, services and goods.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1185 and amendments.*)
2. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. de Beer, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1185 and amendments)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Soell, Caro, Wilkinson, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Antretter and Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 6.10 p.m. with Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

4. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France

Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Chevènement answered questions put by MM. Caro, Baumel, Ahrens, Wilkinson, Steiner, Klejdzinski and Banks.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the Netherlands Delegation:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

- Mr. Maris as a titular member in place of Mr. de Kwaadsteniet;
- Mr. de Kwaadsteniet as an alternate member in place of Mr. Maris;

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

- Mr. de Kwaadsteniet as a titular member in place of Mr. de Jong;
- Mr. de Jong as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Kwaadsteniet;

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

- Mr. de Kwaadsteniet as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Jong.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 8th June 1989, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.10 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Büchner Eich <i>Steiner</i> (Mrs. Luuk) Müller Reddemann	Netherlands
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Adriaensens) Biefnot	Mrs. <i>Timm</i> (Scheer)	MM. Aarts <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers Worrell
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>de Bondt</i> (Steverynck)	MM. <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell	
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Caro <i>Birraux</i> (Durand) <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) <i>Valleix</i> (Portier)	MM. Fioret Gabbuggiani Kessler <i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino Mezzapesa <i>Spitella</i> (Parisi) Pieralli Sarti	MM. <i>Banks</i> (Coleman) <i>Lambie</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Mr. Parry Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm	Mr. Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Derycke Kempinaire Péciaux	MM. Hitschler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Niegel Unland Wulff	MM. Burger Linster
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Collette Croze Fillon Forni Fourré Galley Jeambrun Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Seitlinger	MM. Caccia Filetti Intini Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio Taramelli	Mr. de Beer
		United Kingdom
		MM. Ewing Hill Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Morris Sir William Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 8th June 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

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| <p>1. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (<i>Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1185 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>2. New technologies and their implications for European defence (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace</i></p> | <p><i>Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1186 and amendments</i>).</p> <p>3. Parliamentary and public relations (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1181</i>).</p> |
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1185 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

Two amendments (Nos. 1 and 2) were tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and others:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Believing the attempts of the European Parliament to take over the European security file to be misplaced,”

2. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“9. Ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the single European act does not affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;”

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Pieralli and Ahrens.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 472)¹.

4. New technologies and their implications for European defence

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1186 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Lambie, Lagorce and Banks.

The debate was closed.

Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Lambie and others:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “co-production” insert “, including research and development,”.

Speaker: Mr. Lambie.

The amendment was agreed to.

¹. See page 37.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Lambie and others:

2. Leave out paragraph 5 (b) of the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mr. Lambie, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. de Beer, van der Werff and Klejdzinski.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 473)¹.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

5. Parliamentary and public relations

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1181)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by

Sir William Shelton on behalf of Mr. Burger, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hunt, Tummers and Lord Mackie.

The debate was closed.

Sir William Shelton and Mr. Pontillon, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 81)².

6. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.

1. See page 39.

2. See page 40.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
MM. <i>de Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot)	MM. <i>Spitella</i> (Caccia) Gabbuggiani	MM. Aarts de Beer
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Kessler	<i>Maris</i> (de Jong)
Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelyneck)	<i>Stegagnini</i> (Malfatti) Martino <i>Rubner</i> (Parisi) Pieralli Sarti	de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers
France		United Kingdom
MM. Beix Fourré <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) <i>Lagorce</i> (Oehler)	Luxembourg Mr. Goerens	MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Coleman) <i>Lambie</i> (Cox) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Banks</i> (Hardy) <i>Hunt</i> (Hill) <i>Bowden</i> (Jessel) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull Mr. <i>Lord</i> (Morris) Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Rathbone</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes Lord <i>Newall</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter Büchner Eich <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Reddemann <i>Steiner</i> (Scheer) <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell		
The following representatives apologised for their absence:		
Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Sinesio Taramelli
MM. Derycke Kempinaire Pécriaux	MM. Böhm Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Niegel Unland Wulff	Luxembourg MM. Burger Linster
France	Italy	Netherlands Mr. Worrell
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Collette Croze Durand Fillon Forni Galley Jeambrun Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. Portier Seitlinger	MM. Filetti Fioret Intini Mezzapesa Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi	United Kingdom MM. Ewing Garrett Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 472***on the future of European security –
reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the motion for a resolution in Document 1168;
- (ii) Having taken cognisance of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council;
- (iii) Noting that member governments decided on the occasion of the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU to prepare a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty and noting the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 16th March 1989 that “ the Assembly will be regularly consulted on this matter as the work progresses ”;
- (iv) Noting that the Council has said it is “ willing to meet those needs of the Assembly which are the direct result of enlargement ”;
- (v) Noting that the Council of Ministers has “ instructed the Permanent Council to review the question of an institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU agency ”;
- (vi) Recalling that the Presidential Committee expressed an opinion on these points in Recommendation 467, urging that the Council establish “ a European institute for advanced security studies... in order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence ” and “ that the mandate of the WEU security agencies be brought to an end ”;
- (vii) Considering that the colloquy on the future of European security held in Florence from 21st to 23rd March 1989 allowed a useful review to be made of the new facts of this question which will guide the work of WEU in the coming years;
- (viii) Believing the attempts of the European Parliament to take over the European security file to be misplaced,

I**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Give an organogram of the intergovernmental organs of WEU;
2. In its annual report, give the Assembly detailed information on every aspect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Continue to keep the Assembly regularly informed about all its activities, in particular through regular letters from the Secretary-General;
4. Ensure that it gives more detailed and quicker answers to Assembly recommendations;
5. Make available without delay the premises needed to accommodate the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;
6. To this end, take early action on Recommendation 467;
7. Promote a more active public information policy on the requirements of European security;
8. Define without delay a draft statute for a European institute for advanced security studies and submit it to the Assembly for a joint examination of the implications of its implementation;
9. Ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the single European act does not affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;

II

ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Specify as soon as possible which provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty it intends to revise;
2. Adopt no provision which might weaken the impact of Article V;
3. Retain in full the preamble and Articles I, II and III of the treaty which make WEU an essential factor in the establishment of a European union;
4. Maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the national parliaments of member countries.

RECOMMENDATION 473***on new technologies and their implications for European defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that for the foreseeable future the defence of the Central European front will continue to play a vital rôle for the armed forces responsible for the defence of Western Europe;
- (ii) Warning that the specific attention and high priority given to that area should not lessen alertness regarding overseas lines of communication, freedom of movement on the high seas and pressure on the northern and southern flanks of Europe;
- (iii) Conscious that the governments of WEU nations at the same time have to deal with declining demographic trends and compelling constraints in defence budgets;
- (iv) Aware that high-technology weapon systems have a valuable potential for saving manpower, recognising that they require higher standards of training and maintenance;
- (v) Aware of the greatly-enhanced capabilities in firepower, accuracy, battle management and virtually any area of military activity offered by high technology;
- (vi) Anxious, however, about the vulnerability, reliability and availability of high-tech weapon systems, in particular in prolonged battle conditions;
- (vii) Emphasising that, including research and development, it takes ten to fifteen years to field high-technology weapon systems and other military hardware;
- (viii) Recalling its recommendations on the importance of increased Western European co-operation in research, development and production of defence equipment;
- (ix) Stressing the need for a determined and actively integrated European space policy, which should include an opinion on military aspects and a possibly imminent ASAT weapon race, the latter of which could have a destabilising effect on the security of Europe;
- (x) Aware that NATO is preparing a new comprehensive concept of the military potential of new technologies, the outcome of which could influence existing analyses,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Formulate revised concepts in the light of the new technologies for the security of Western Europe and the defence of the central front;
2. Assess the European effort required in manpower, military equipment, research, development and the production capacity of the defence industry and financial means;
3. Present a comprehensive report on the dependence on military satellites of all nations actually using them and the political/military consequences of this dependence, taking into account the existence of ASAT weapons and the different options for limiting or banning the deployment of these weapons;
4. Examine in which areas of defence high technology the European defence industry has real chances for co-production, including research and development, on an equal footing with the United States defence industry;
5. Urge member governments:
 - (a) to continue their efforts as mentioned in Recommendation 455 and the relevant reply of the Council more vigorously and explicitly;
 - (b) to prevent any unilateral cuts in defence budgets which might cause unilateral rôle changes in their armed forces;
 - (c) to start seriously considering rationalisation and division of labour among armed forces involved in the defence of Europe lest they be trapped by this problem when the next generation of even more expensive high-technology weapon systems is announced for procurement;
 - (d) to insist that military experts and the defence industry make it their first priority to develop more reliable, more available and less vulnerable high-technology weapon systems.

RESOLUTION 81***on parliamentary and public relations***

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the institutional links between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member countries are a crucial factor in the parliamentary supervision of government efforts to harmonise their defence and security policy in WEU;
- (ii) Considering therefore that the work of the WEU Assembly deserves to be even better assessed and examined in the parliaments of most member countries;
- (iii) Welcoming the efforts made to improve the WEU Assembly's information policy;
- (iv) Paying tribute to the organisation by the United Kingdom presidency of a seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence;
- (v) Considering the participation of a delegation from the Assembly in this seminar to be a useful first step towards closer co-operation between the Assembly and the Council in public relations;
- (vi) Welcoming the creation of an association of alumni of European sessions of advanced defence studies following the first European session organised in Paris in November 1988 by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN),

URGES THE CHAIRMEN OF NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. In accordance with procedure in force in their parliaments, to ask that debates be organised in plenary session on developments in WEU and its rôle in consolidating European security, thus:
 - (a) giving governments an opportunity to inform their parliaments of these matters;
 - (b) and giving members of national delegations an opportunity to explain the positions adopted by the WEU Assembly;
2. Following the example of procedure in the French National Assembly, to ask to be regularly heard by the committees concerned with matters dealt with by the WEU Assembly so as to inform them of the latter's recommendations and ask them to follow them up accordingly;

ASKS THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES

To ensure that a number of members of the WEU Assembly are invited to the next European session of advanced defence studies.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 5th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the Provisional President.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Observers.
8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1173).
10. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1191).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson.
11. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1189).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Fourré (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Rathbone and Mr. Ahrens.
12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Caro, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Reddemann.
13. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1183 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Speed (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Dudley Smith, Lord Newall, Mr. Stegagnini.
14. Changes in the membership of committees.
15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jung, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's

1. See page 15.

last session whose names have been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As we open this sitting, ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you are all aware that we are living at a time when the events occurring in various parts of the world command the attention of us all. I am deeply moved when I think of all those who have died in China for the cause of freedom. There are many of us – and I am thinking especially of our younger members – who now realise how quickly political situations may change or be overturned.

Similarly, thoughts probably come to mind following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. In

The President (continued)

the hope that his successors will show more tolerance and respect for human rights, let us all trust that there will be positive changes in Iran.

We should also be pleased at the results of the NATO summit. I believe that the compromise reached is a success, both for Europe and for Atlantic co-operation, and I would express the hope that these proposals will also permit positive developments with the Soviet Union, and progress towards co-operation together with the peace and freedom that this could mean for our peoples.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Goerens. The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that Mr. Goerens be elected by acclamation.

Is there any opposition?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore proclaim Mr. Goerens President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Goerens then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Allow me first to thank you for your renewed confidence. This is particularly precious at the start of my third year as President because a number of matters have to be tackled with the Council which, although of a material nature, are nevertheless delicate, urgent and decisive for the future of the Assembly. In order to find a satisfactory solution, I shall need your full support. Such support has not been lacking in the last two years and it has been very useful to have the backing of a remarkably united Presidential

Committee to defend our Assembly's prerogatives. I wish to convey my warmest gratitude to that committee and to you all, but much still remains to be done.

It is clearly not yet possible to draw political conclusions from the two events which we heard about on Sunday morning: the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the bloody repression in Peking of the people's and student's freedom movement. We shall probably be able to examine the situation in the Middle East at the December session. Where China is concerned, there is already a report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the register of the Assembly and that committee was in Peking at the start of the events in Tiananmen Square.

However, I cannot leave unmentioned our feeling of horror at the magnitude and brutality of a repression that was in no way justified by the peaceful nature of the demonstrations that had been under way for a month. Whatever the reasons for the Chinese Government's action, it bears heavy responsibility for a bloody operation which is liable to jeopardise seriously China's reintegration in the international community. Our Assembly for its part had welcomed the establishment of excellent relations with the People's Republic of China since 1983. Today, it can but express its indignation and reprobation at the Chinese Government's action. I therefore invite you to stand in silence for one minute in honour of the victims of the slaughter in Beijing yesterday.

(The Assembly stood for one minute in silence)

To turn to matters of substance, our session will be marked by the fact that it is being held immediately after a NATO summit meeting which was particularly important. The colloquy organised by the General Affairs Committee in Florence last March allowed us to examine how Europe could reconcile security requirements, where NATO deployment was still the main guarantee, the requirements of the arms limitation and détente in East-West relations that we have wanted for so long and, finally, the prospects offered by the establishment of the single European market at the end of 1992. The first two questions were settled, for the time being at least, by the decisions taken in Brussels last week. By fixing realistic aims for the limitation of conventional armaments and specifying the conditions in which the West can tackle negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons, the meeting opened the way for a process of arms reduction which should be a turning point in the history of Europe.

Since Mr. Gorbachev started his active disarmament campaign four years ago, many people have noted that the Atlantic Alliance had

The President (continued)

achieved most of the aims of its founders, not only by ensuring forty years of peace in Europe but also by convincing the Soviet Union that it was not through a strategy of confrontation but through détente, co-operation and disarmament that its own security and future could be ensured.

However, only a week ago, the most competent observers were wondering to what extent western cohesion could survive détente. Everyone was talking about a crisis in NATO and there was concern about the kind of security that would prevail in Europe in future years. Today, although the danger has not been wholly dispelled, we owe it to our governments, and first of all to President Bush, to have found, or at least accepted, forms of compromise which take account of the legitimate interests and concerns of all the members of the alliance.

The Brussels decision also shows that the West, far from following Soviet arms reduction initiatives with hesitation and reluctance, has the necessary reserves of imagination and determination to promote disarmament and guide it in a direction that can ensure the security of all at the lowest possible risk and cost. We therefore await the response of the Soviet Union and its allies with interest and hope. That response, more than anything that can be said or demonstrated unilaterally, will allow us to assess the other side's sincerity when it claims to want to base peace on new foundations. Admittedly, we now have every reason to believe what Mr. Gorbachev says, but our thoughts about Western European security must be based on negotiated, balanced and verified disarmament.

We shall therefore be able to deal with the matters on the agenda of the present session in a serene atmosphere, even if the reports that we are to consider were adopted by our committees when there was no way of foreseeing the decisions that would be taken at the NATO summit meeting. Yet it is remarkable how closely those decisions correspond to the various recommendations before us for debate. Accordingly, they will probably not have the same impact on public opinion as they would have had a fortnight ago, but the wisdom of our proposals is nevertheless enhanced. This is encouragement for us to continue to study the conditions of European security at this new juncture, in spite of occasional disillusionment about our exchanges with the Council.

We must first ensure that the euphoria aroused by the prospect of swift progress towards détente, international co-operation and arms reduction does not erode Europeans' conviction that the values they have successfully defended have finally won the day. Although it

is now possible to envisage European security being guaranteed with fewer troops and armaments, determination to defend ourselves against aggression must not diminish. Any doubts in this connection would weaken our governments in disarmament negotiations and strengthen the position of those on the other side who are still opposed to a lower level of forces. Such doubts might also give rise to new threats and perils. The rôle of our Assembly, a democratic forum in which elected representatives of public opinion consider together the requirements of joint security, will in no way be diminished by progress in arms limitation negotiations.

To promote the necessary spirit of defence in defence matters and to help to make European public opinion aware of security problems, on 16th March the Presidential Committee adopted and transmitted to the Council a recommendation on the establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies in the conditions set out in Mr. Fourré's report on the action of the Presidential Committee.

Henceforth, the will to ensure Europe's security is not represented solely by the military effort. To an ever greater extent, it leads to political action and, in the case of our Assembly, to a dialogue with our allies and with those who do not share all our views on security matters.

More than ever, we must associate in our work the countries of Western Europe which cannot yet join WEU. The Presidential Committee therefore considered the possibility of increasing the participation of Greek and Turkish observers in our meetings. While the forthcoming elections in Greece prevented parliamentary observers from that country attending the present session, I was pleased to learn, during a visit to Ankara in February at the invitation of the Turkish authorities, that the latter shared our wishes and I invited them to enlarge the delegation of observers from the Grand National Assembly to allow the various tendencies of Turkish opinion to be represented here today now that the Council, for its part, has decided to develop privileged exchanges with both Turkey and Greece.

In regard to the eastern part of Europe, I had the privilege of being invited to Budapest by the Hungarian authorities last January where I established relations that are extremely promising for future links with that country. Furthermore, the General Affairs Committee Rapporteur, Senator Pontillon, visited the Soviet Union, where he was received by eminent authorities. The report that he is to present to us on Wednesday shows the interest and importance of the exchanges of views he held there. We also hope that a delegation from the newly-elected Supreme Soviet will be visiting us in the very near future for talks with several Assembly

The President (continued)

committees on all matters relating to disarmament, détente, understanding and co-operation in Europe.

This obviously does not mean that our Assembly has to compete with the other European parliamentary assemblies in this area. The responsibilities of each one are defined by international treaties and, as members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we all know that that is the organisation which should promote most aspects of what the Soviet Union now likes to call the common European house. We are equally aware that the European Community, and hence its Parliament, with its supervisory vocation, will have a major rôle to play in the development of exchanges and economic co-operation between the two parts of Europe. Conversely, security and arms limitation matters, which are closely linked, are our responsibility alone at European level, and also in relations with the Eastern European countries.

Since the Brussels meeting, there seems to have been less and less doubt that Western Europe will have to assume an increasingly large share of responsibility for its own security in the years to come. It was not without reason that, at the NATO summit meeting, President Bush welcomed the rôle played by WEU. If we want our defence to be ensured through continued close co-operation between Europe and the United States, quite different political and military substance than in the past will have to be given to the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance which has hitherto been little more than a topic of conversation. This was already one of the conclusions that emerged from the Florence colloquy. The Brussels decisions merely make it plainer.

We shall therefore have to continue the reflection that was started in the colloquy on the future of European security by following the three guidelines Pierre Harmel so masterfully depicted: to reorganise co-operation between Europe and the United States in defence matters on new bases, to meet the security requirements of the single European market in 1993 and to introduce the disarmament and détente aspects into our consideration of the requirements of peace in Europe. Strangely enough, although the first and third of these have for a long time been on the agenda of our work and will be prominent at the present session, the second, although essential, seems to have been rather left on one side by our Assembly in recent years, although it had been one of its main concerns from the outset and until about 1972.

It must not be believed, however, that others are better equipped than we are to express soundly-based thoughts on the security of

Europe tomorrow. The single European act recognises our vocation in this area and we ourselves know that, because we represent the national parliaments of member countries, we have special authority to handle the matter. I therefore express the wish that, starting with the next session, this important aspect of WEU's vocation will appear in our agenda, and I welcome the fact that Mr. van der Sanden, in his report on the future of European security, refers to the importance of the preamble and Articles I, II and III of the treaty, which associate WEU closely with both the European Community and the Council of Europe without affecting the specific features of each one. I have no doubt that the Belgian Chairmanship-in-Office, for its part, will not neglect this aspect of the requirements imposed on WEU by present circumstances and that it will use its influence to ensure that the Council examines it.

The parliamentary year that has just come to an end was marked by events of great significance for WEU, first and foremost being the signing of the act of accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty on 14th November 1988. This act will become effective as soon as the parliaments of all the countries concerned have ratified it, and I am happy to say that many of them have already done so. It may still be hoped that it will be possible to deposit all the acts of ratification in Brussels before the end of next month.

There is no need to stress how much the Assembly welcomes the enlargement of WEU to include two countries so close to us which already take part in all the other European and Atlantic organisations and which we expect to give fresh impetus to the activities of WEU. As you know, the Assembly constantly asked the Council to give a favourable answer to the applications from Portugal and then Spain and showed its support by inviting delegations of observers from the two countries' parliaments to take part in all its work. In the last four years, the Portuguese Delegation has played a full part. The Spanish Delegation preferred to wait for the act of accession to be signed before accepting our invitation and, today, I am happy to welcome a delegation of Spanish observers that is larger than previously, pending the day when our Portuguese and Spanish friends are able to take their places with full rights: before the end of the summer, I hope.

While the Assembly gave its unreserved support to the candidatures of Portugal and Spain, their accession to WEU is due to a decision by the governments, the consequences of which they must have well realised, in particular where the Assembly is concerned. As soon as the act of accession has been ratified, our Rules of Procedure will have to be applied without delay to the parliamentary delegations

The President (continued)

from those two countries, that is to say, they must be able to speak in their own languages at committee meetings and have interpretation facilities during sessions. These delegations must have the offices to which they are entitled and the Office of the Clerk must have the wherewithal to meet increased requirements.

I do not wish to dwell on what the Presidential Committee has done in the last six months to obtain from the Council the funds it needs to reorganise our premises. Our colleague, Mr. Fourré, does this excellently in the report on the activities of the Presidential Committee that he is to present to you. In this connection, I merely wish to recall a principle about which we must be adamant, and that is the Assembly's independence. In April 1987, the Council recognised that this independence included budgetary matters, in other words, depending on our needs, we could do as we pleased with the overall budget made available to us. Admittedly, it has to examine whether the supplementary budget we have submitted effectively meets requirements stemming from the accession of two new members to WEU, but it is for us to commit expenditure, to prescribe the necessary work and to ensure it is carried out. We must organise ourselves for this purpose and this cannot be left to the Council or to a body emanating from it.

Furthermore, the Council must grant us these funds without delay. We do not yet know on what date ratification of the act of accession by all the countries concerned will become effective, but there is every reason to think it is close. From then on, we shall no longer be able to hold meetings in our premises until work on them has been completed. There is no need to underline the considerable expenditure and difficulties of all kinds involved in having to meet elsewhere. It is therefore in the interests of the governments, and an obligation, not to defer decisions which have now become urgent.

In the last four years, the Assembly has enjoyed the inestimable assistance of the Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, whose departure we all view with regret, although we know that he will not be far from us in his new post as Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium in Paris.

It is not only external circumstances that made Alfred Cahen the Secretary-General of the reactivation of WEU; as soon as he took up his duties, he became the mainspring of reactivation. It is not for me to assess his action vis-à-vis the Council although, at the most difficult junctures, we were able to guess the effects of the influence he exerted to calm things down, to harmonise the governments' views and to find

solutions that conformed with Europe's interest.

There are three other areas in which the Assembly can, with full knowledge of the facts, convey to him its congratulations and thanks. First, if the whole world knows about WEU, its aims and its achievements, for instance during the European operation in the Gulf, it is very largely due to the activities of Alfred Cahen. He became journalist, writer and lecturer; he played an active part in hundreds of colloquies; in short, he incarnated WEU with the talent that we all recognise. If, at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, the President of the United States felt he should pay tribute to reactivated WEU, this is certainly largely due to the action of Alfred Cahen.

Secondly, relations between the Council and the Assembly would certainly not have been what they have been in recent years if the Secretary-General had not devoted so much effort to informing the Assembly of what the Council was doing and to showing us the scale of the problems raised by intergovernmental co-operation in WEU, when the governments were being particularly parsimonious in fulfilling their commitments under Article IX of the treaty. The letter from the Secretary-General has become a fundamental WEU institution and the principal link between the Council and the Assembly. We also know that Alfred Cahen was the best advocate of parliamentarians' views and the Assembly's interests vis-à-vis the Council.

Finally, he was able to establish confident, friendly relations with everyone, and first of all with the two Presidents of the Assembly with whom he was in contact; such relations of course made a major contribution to the smooth running of WEU and were also very pleasant for us all. On behalf of us all, I wish to thank him very warmly for what he did for WEU and what he has been for us.

The succession just accepted by our friend Willem van Eekelen will therefore be heavy to bear, but we have no doubt that he will be able to take up the challenge because we have known him in turn as a member of our Assembly, then as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and then, above all, as Minister of Defence just when the Netherlands had the Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU Council. In June 1982, he presented to the Assembly a report on "European-United States co-operation for international peace and joint security", which certainly helped to draw viewpoints on the two shores of the Atlantic closer together at the time of the famous quarrel about Euromissiles. In spite of the evolution of East-West relations towards disarmament and détente, the ideas and principles of our former colleague are far from having lost their relevance.

The President (continued)

It is therefore with the experience of a former diplomat and minister, the sensitivity of a former WEU parliamentarian and the authority of an expert in defence questions that he is joining the Secretariat-General. In wishing him every success in his new tasks, we have no need to say that we rely greatly on him to pursue the work started by Alfred Cahen, particularly in regard to relations between the Council and the Assembly, and to solve the problems raised by the restructuring of the WEU ministerial organs.

With his arrival at the Secretariat-General and Belgium taking over the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council, it may be hoped that the parliamentary year starting today will witness a solution of WEU's internal problems and a major step towards the organisation of international peace, which is our essential aim.

7. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome the observers from Canada, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey who pay us the honour of attending our proceedings.

I also welcome the members of the Permanent Council attending this part-session.

8. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Six nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

They are those of Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. de Beer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that these Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare them elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents is as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Soell and Mr. Fourré.

9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1173)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Document 1173.

Is there any objection to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

10. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1191)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – May I at this point, Mr. President, bring to your attention a motion for immediate debate under the urgent procedure which reads as follows:

“That this Assembly wholeheartedly condemns the brutal repression and massacre by the People's Liberation Army of students and other freedom-loving people in the People's Republic of China who have been peacefully demonstrating their strong desire for democracy and freedom, and calls for an immediate debate under the urgent procedure in order to draw attention not only to the unjustifiable brutality of the action of the Chinese régime but also to the inherent dangers to security and confidence in the region.”

This motion has the support of more than twenty-five members of the Assembly, who have signed it already. I would be grateful if you, Mr. President, could give us guidance on the means whereby effect can be given to this motion and, if it is passed, when in our order of proceedings the debate so urgently needed can take place to draw attention to the vile and atrocious behaviour of the Chinese Government, behaviour that is an affront to human values and that threatens security in the region.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have indeed received a motion for a resolution from Mr. Wilkinson and others with a request for debate under the urgent procedure condemning the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China.

This request will be posted up and the relevant text circulated.

Thereafter I shall deal with the request in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure and the Assembly will be asked to vote on the request when the next sitting opens tomorrow morning.

11. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1189)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1189.

I call Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, last year the Presidential Committee's action was marked by its efforts to promote the enlargement of WEU. This having been achieved, this year the Presidential Committee has turned to the implementation of practical measures pursuant to enlargement. On the other hand, the institutional crisis brought about due to the absence of a Council decision on the structure of WEU persists. These are the two points that I should briefly like to raise with you.

The accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty, as you have stated, Mr. President, meets the Assembly's wishes in full. It is therefore to be expected that the Portuguese and Spanish parliamentary delegations will be taking their seats, with full rights, in the Assembly committees at the end of the summer and in plenary session next December.

The Presidential Committee had to make the necessary arrangements to allow these delegations to exercise their rights in full as soon as the enlargement of WEU becomes effective. Not only had the Rules of Procedure to be adjusted, but in addition Portuguese and Spanish Vice-Presidents had to be elected to the Bureau and the two delegations had to be allocated a number of seats in the committees in proportion to the number of their members. It is clear that it will be possible to apply the Rules of Procedure thus amended only if work is carried out in the Assembly premises.

All the work necessary to reorganise the seat of the Assembly was presented in a supplementary budget for 1989 transmitted to the Council on 19th January 1989 after approval by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee. The Council, considering the cost too high, instructed a delegation known as the troika to examine the reasons for the Assembly's requests. It is to be thought that they found the explanations satisfactory. A further study was made and the troika expressed its satisfaction at the savings made.

Nevertheless, the Council felt that a study should be made by another architect for purposes of comparison and that is the present situation. It is to be hoped – at least this is the wish of the Presidential Committee – that the Council will give the Assembly a positive answer at the conclusion of this procedure and that it will at last be possible for it to approve the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for 1989.

The draft supplementary budget does not refer only to the work to be done. It also includes estimated supplementary expenditure that will henceforth have to be included in all the Assembly's annual budgets. The Presidential Committee is thus ensuring that the Rules of Procedure are scrupulously applied so that all parliamentarians may make their contribution to Assembly debates without being hampered in any way, particularly by linguistic problems. A telegram was therefore sent to the Council at the close of the last meeting of the Presidential Committee on 3rd May stressing the urgency of the Council approving the Assembly's supplementary budget in view of the need to make a number of arrangements as soon as possible for preparing forthcoming sessions.

As a corollary to reactivation, the enlargement of WEU makes it more than ever necessary to solve the institutional crisis I referred to a moment ago and yet the ministerial organs have not yet been collocated. The Paris agencies are still without a permanent mandate and are gradually losing their officials.

The Presidential Committee therefore unanimously adopted Recommendation 467 urging the Council to put an end to the mandate of the WEU security agencies and, at the same time, to establish a European institute for advanced security studies in order to promote a European spirit in defence matters.

It is WEU's task to promote the joint will to defend Western Europe. Both the Council and the Assembly are striving to do this, but their means of influencing public opinion are insufficient. Both must have an instrument capable of helping them in this. It is in this spirit that the Presidential Committee proposed the estab-

Mr. Fourré (continued)

lishment of a European institute to sound out European public opinion, arouse its interest in security matters, gather information, organise opportunities for debate and conduct educational campaigns.

In another area, but in the same spirit, I could have mentioned our Assembly's decision that a study be made on a European satellite control agency.

The activities of the European institute would be pursued at two levels: in the institute itself and in the co-ordination of the European activities of national institutes pursuing similar aims in Western Europe. To be effective, however, such an institute would need to work independently though using the institutional framework of WEU and enjoying close co-operation with the Assembly. It would therefore be desirable for the director of the institute to be appointed by the Council in consultation with the Assembly and to carry out tasks defined by a programmes committee in which the Assembly would also be represented. The institute should also be housed in the same building as the Assembly would in turn afford the institute material assistance by making meeting rooms available and providing the assistance of services organised and run by its secretariat.

As a subsidiary body of the Council under Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty, the institute would be financed by contributions from member countries within the overall WEU budget but would also be authorised to receive income from its publications and, possibly, contributions from external resources.

The abovementioned arguments are developed in the report by Mr. van der Sanden, adopted by the General Affairs Committee, which is to be debated by the Assembly on 7th June. The draft recommendation adopted by the committee invites the Council to take early action on the Presidential Committee's recommendation on the subject, define a set of rules for the institute and submit them to the Assembly.

The Presidential Committee thus hopes that the early establishment of this institute will allow the institutional crisis I mentioned to be overcome and help to promote a European spirit of defence.

To complete this review of the action of the Presidential Committee, it should also be pointed out that, in response to the invitation from the Supreme Soviet in 1987 – referred to by you a moment ago, Mr. President – the steering body has invited to Paris the leaders of the new parliament elected under the new procedures which, in many cases, allowed more than one candidate to stand for election. If the dates

proposed suit our Soviet guests, the meetings could take place during the week of 10th July to allow the dialogue that was started two years ago to be taken to greater depth.

From the administrative, budgetary and political standpoints, the Presidential Committee has therefore endeavoured to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action in a period when WEU, after having decided on enlargement and having put this into practice, has been equipping itself to handle the rapid development of international relations and to build on its primary vocation and influence to create an institution capable, in all circumstances, of promoting a truly European spirit of defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open and I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to say a few words on what has just been said and on the report of the Presidential Committee. I shall talk about two separate subjects. The first, as Mr. Fourré so eloquently put it, is enlargement and accommodation. It is clear that enlargement could not have taken place without the positive decision of the Council of Ministers and their deputies. I was always brought up to believe that if one agreed to something, one should will the means. I wonder whether the Council of Ministers or their deputies would like to share the experience of the British Delegation of having thirty-eight people in a small delegation room. I am given to believe that those responsible are demurring about providing proper accommodation for members. I hope that I am wrong. If not – I am sure that my German colleagues would agree – I invite the ministers, with their staff, to have their next meeting in a room meant for nine people. That is a serious point, and I should welcome a visit from any minister or deputy to show them that I am not asking, on behalf of the Assembly, for anything impossible or out of the ordinary. I think that my colleagues would agree with me about that.

Secondly, as we approach the election of the new European Parliament, we must do our utmost to ensure a massive turnout of voters to demonstrate that full public support is seen to be given to democratic elections. The European Parliament itself could do a great deal to reduce the alarming rate of abstentions if it concentrated during the campaign on explaining to the electorate its rôle as the guardian of the Treaty of Rome and of the single European act and as a pacemaker for the major deadline of 1992 and all that that involves. It is a formidable task that has a noble purpose – the prosperity of 350 million Europeans.

Sadly, however, that does not seem to be happening, as is shown by the resolution on the

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

security of Western Europe that was adopted last March by the European Parliament. I am delighted that that is attached to Mr. van der Sanden's report. Instead of strengthening its image for what it is and not what it should be, out of sheer wishful thinking the European Parliament seems to be more and more inclined to intervene in defence and security matters. In terms of effectiveness, that is a harmless and trivial exercise. There is no one at the other end of the telephone on the government side – the Council and the Commission – to take note of the resolutions, since they fall completely outside the scope of the Community's statutes.

The proposal adopted on 14th March by the European Parliament on the security of Western Europe goes deeply into matters of defence that are within the sole competence of Western European Union. I note that the resolution has been forwarded to a vast number of organisations, almost the only one of which concerned with defence is this. At the same time, the interference with the work of our organisation must be a source of confusion to European public opinion and to the media, which the European Parliament hopes to attract. It seriously weakens the image of European institutions. We do not need that, faced as we are with the dazzling public relations performances of President Gorbachev.

As we have said many times, we are the parliamentary defence assembly of Europe – the only official one. Western European Union is the defence organisation of Europe. As Mr. Fourré rightly said, its membership includes nine of the twelve member states of the European Community, and I cannot see why the work done within an assembly of members of parliament responsible for voting the defence budgets in their own national parliaments must be duplicated in the framework of another forum that has no responsibility in this area.

In these days of believing in the "green" world, the stuff that the parliament circulates, which will have no effect because it has no powers, is just a waste of good paper. The countries that mean business about defence in the EEC are, or may be in due course, members of Western European Union. That is the outlook for the foreseeable future, and Europeans should not be led into other directions.

It is high time that official representations were made through appropriate channels to the European Parliament, if only to restate – in case it does not understand it – that the modified Brussels Treaty makes it crystal clear that matters of defence in Europe are the sole prerogative of WEU. Perhaps you, Mr. President, will remind our colleagues in the European Parliament of what WEU stands for. They seem

either to ignore us or to treat us as one of their subsidiaries, which we certainly are not.

Whatever we may belong to, I urge that we concentrate on the tasks assigned to each of our organisations. We should neither duplicate nor intervene in issues outside that competence. It is some decades since we in WEU had the sense to give up our economic and cultural terms of reference for the benefit of others, including the Community. All that we ask for now is an end to interference with our agenda for defence and security. None of this makes us less European; it merely puts matters into their proper legal perspective.

I propose to table an amendment to Mr. van der Sanden's report based on what I have said to lend clarification to a view that we have expressed here over the years, and to try once again to get the message through. It is often said that there is none so deaf as he who does not want to hear. In this year of education and enlightenment, we should give another opportunity to our colleagues in the European Parliament and remind them what their tasks are, not what they are not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to raise two matters on Mr. Fourré's excellent report. The first is an omission. You will be aware, Mr. President, that I made a suggestion at the last meeting of our Assembly, and that we have since corresponded, about establishing a disarmament committee or sub-committee. You have been extremely helpful in your response to that suggestion, and I believe that consideration is being given to retitling various committees of WEU. Mr. Fourré's report makes no reference to this, which I hope does not mean that the idea is dying a slow death.

I appeal to you, Mr. President, and through you to the Assembly, to see that the position is reconsidered, not just in terms of retitling the committees but in seeking a new initiative in the light of the new atmosphere between East and West. In that way, WEU can continue to take a lead and pursue the idea of lowering the threshold of armaments, as well as ensuring through other means the maintenance and modernisation of armaments and thus the future security of Western Europe. In this context, it is worth reminding ourselves that the constitution of NATO is fully committed to disarmament as well as to the maintenance of armaments.

My second point follows upon the first one made by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. That is to do with the proper embrace of Portugal and Spain in the reactivation and enlargement of WEU. The Budget Committee, of which I am proud to be a member, studied the plans with extreme care. We raised questions about their cost. We

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

looked at the object of the execution of those plans – not only the improvement of provision for the present members of WEU but the proper embrace of the new members, particularly in terms of translation.

I add my voice to Sir Geoffrey's fear that ministers, who may have been the catalyst for Portugal and Spain joining WEU, may now withdraw their support for the proper provision of resources which are crucial to the representation in our debates of those two important European countries. I therefore echo Sir Geoffrey's dismay that Mr. Fourré's report speaks of the difficulties that have been encountered in making the necessary arrangements. I hope that they will be brought to a swift conclusion so that Portugal and Spain can play their part in our counsels.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should like to inform you, for the record, that the Presidential Committee has noted your request that the Assembly should establish a disarmament sub-committee. We have transmitted this request to the Committee on Rules of Procedure for study. The committee has not yet completed its study and will therefore be asked to make its views known at a future session.

I hope that this has cleared up the misunderstanding that may have arisen in your mind in the light of the attitude of the Presidential Committee.

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, following on what Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has already said on the subject, I would like once again, and very briefly, to refer to the conditions we parliamentarians have to put up with here. I am not referring primarily to the committee rooms, although of course they too leave much to be desired. This morning, for example, the second largest political group in the Assembly met for four hours in room C. The fact that many of us could not get to the microphones may have speeded up the proceedings, but it certainly did not improve the quality of our discussions.

But I mainly want to talk about the delegation rooms, and here I think I can speak on behalf of all my fellow members in the Assembly. As an illustration, let me take the room allocated to the German Delegation. As you know, we have eighteen representatives and eighteen substitutes. We do not, of course, always have thirty-six people in Paris, but normally there are twenty or more members here at any given time. On top of that, we are accompanied by members of our staff. If my arithmetic is right, we have a total of nine seats for the whole team. Well, standing is supposed to be good for you. Then

we have three telephones, and the queues are often very long. If you are lucky enough to grab a telephone you cannot use it because of the conversation going on around you. After all, you cannot ask your colleagues to be quiet.

Even the charm of this city is no compensation, Mr. President, for those of us – and, of course, that means all of us – whose principal occupation in Paris is the work of this Assembly. Any trade union, any trade union member, would refuse to work in such conditions and before long we too shall refuse to go on accepting them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?...

The Assembly will not doubt wish to approve the action of the Presidential Committee.

Is there any opposition?

It is so decided.

12. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly of Western European Union, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to come to this rostrum in the footsteps of Ambassador Cahen whose enthusiasm in the performance of his mission has made him a living symbol of the revitalisation of our organisation. There are many aspects of his work that merit our praise but I should particularly like to single out the determination he showed in his efforts to broaden the political dialogue between the Council of WEU and the Assembly.

Having been set, by the turn my career has taken, at the very heart of the two sides – Council and Assembly – of the only institutionalised political dialogue on European security, I am well placed to appreciate its original and irreplaceable nature to the full.

This dialogue, whose basis is the fact that the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union is the only European assembly whose responsibility for security matters is enshrined in a treaty, makes our organisation a driving force in the building of Europe in this field in three ways: discussion and study, defence policy co-ordination and the provision of information to the public.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

From the year during which I was joint Chairman of the WEU Council I have memories of excellent and fruitful co-operation with you, Mr. President, with the Presidential Committee and with the Office of the Clerk, not forgetting all those among you to whom I was able to talk on the occasion of the Council meetings. Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you on your impressive re-election and say how much I look forward to working with you in the development of WEU in the coming months. I thank you most warmly for the welcome you have extended to me.

May I assure you of my intention to do everything I can to maintain and develop constructive and high-quality dialogue between your Assembly and the Council.

In addition to the political debate in your sessions, which will continue to be highly relevant and thus help to guide WEU's future work, two further areas can be perceived for co-operation between the Council and the Assembly in the medium term.

The first of these is the definition and promotion of a more dynamic and, above all, more imaginative information policy. The Secretariat-General is studying this subject following the colloquy organised by the United Kingdom presidency. The Assembly, for its part, has improved its relations with the media. The first two issues of Letter from the Assembly gave a clear and convincing account of your last session and of the important colloquy in Florence on the future of European security. Another occasion for diplomats, serving officers, parliamentarians, researchers and journalists to meet together will be the second European session of advanced security studies that Belgium is organising for next November. The Brussels meeting should see the plans to set up an association of alumni put into effect. It will have the support of the Office of the Clerk and the ministerial organs. Co-operative links and working routines are now being formed in this essential field of public relations; they will need to be strengthened and developed.

You may be assured that I shall do my best to encourage them, as your Rapporteur, Mr. Burger, has asked.

The possible establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies is closely related to information policy and its definition. The Council working group on institutional questions addressed this subject last Thursday in an open and pragmatic state of mind which augurs well for the future.

May I at this point, having used the word "institutional" and listened to the debate that

has just ended, digress for a moment. I am very pleased at the agreement recently agreed with you, Mr. President, making it possible for a budgetary decision to be reached this summer on the improvements at the seat of the Assembly made necessary by WEU enlargement. That should enable the work to start and finish between your December 1989 and June 1990 part-sessions.

Turning to the second area of co-operation, namely the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty which will have to be done once the accession of Spain and Portugal has been fully ratified, I am pleased and interested to note that the Assembly has already taken a first step in this connection since Mr. van der Sanden's report contains eight pages of highly pertinent comment on the subject; this will be very useful to the legal experts whose job this task of clarification will be.

(The speaker continued in English.)

I should now like to turn my attention to the reflection and debates on European security.

Your session takes place only six days after the successful outcome of the summit meeting of the Atlantic Alliance dominated by President Bush's proposals, which have effectively enabled the West to maintain the initiative in East-West dialogue on arms control. WEU has every reason to celebrate this renewed display of Atlantic solidarity. Our countries are not only in agreement about the remarkable achievements of NATO over the past forty years but their views also converge on the evaluation of accelerating change and the ways and means to confront new challenges. The texts adopted by the alliance summit fully meet the requirements of the situation. They also reflect European thinking to an unprecedented level. The language of the "comprehensive concept" echoes that of the platform on the "strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary".

With this fundamental document our countries now have a comprehensive and yet flexible instrument both to guide us in taking the necessary measures to ensure our security and to carry forward the negotiations on arms control.

The declaration of the heads of state and government is also to be much praised for its emphasis on the need to overcome the unnatural and painful division of our continent, as symbolised by the unacceptable Berlin wall, in order to shape the future according to our vision of a just, humane and democratic world. There again the European input is clearly present when it states: "Growing European political unity can

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

lead to a reinforced European component of our common security effort and its efficiency." The sixteen heads of state and government for the first time paid tribute to our endeavours within Western European Union and the results of its reactivation and enlargement when they welcomed "the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area".

But the declaration also confirms what is expected from us all in the future by stating the objectives of the common reflection we have undertaken and should pursue in the knowledge that it can only lead to a healthier and stronger transatlantic relationship. Allow me to quote once again: "The process we are witnessing today... opens the way to a more mature and balanced transatlantic partnership and constitutes one of the foundations of Europe's future structure." That is the right message to the outside world. It is now our clear responsibility to match it by further progress in the implementation of The Hague platform and by concrete examples of European readiness to take up more of the burden of the common defence. Six months ago cuts in the military budget led to acute fears in our countries of a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Now we have to face the facts and the likely consequences of the success of the Vienna negotiations on CFE we all hope for. The Soviet Union has accepted western proposals on virtually every aspect of the negotiation except for zones and aircraft. A new approach emerges on that latter point. In addition, a time constraint has been placed on the negotiations that might have consequences for the short-range nuclear forces.

In this context, Mr. de Beer, your Rapporteur on arms control, is right to strike a note of caution in considering that President Gorbachev's success "is far from secure". Any positive answer on the irreversibility of perestroika should be qualified by reservations based on the acute nationality problems and the lack of short-term favourable economic prospects as well as the high level of ongoing spying activities in Western European Union countries by the KGB and GRU agents. As yet, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union are in no way diminished by the stream of reduction proposals or ongoing negotiations. As long as the capabilities for surprise attack have not been effectively withdrawn and dismantled under the provisions of a verifiable agreement and as long as Soviet tank production continues at a high level, our reasons for guarded optimism should not lead us to complacency.

Rapid change also means uncertainty and instability with the consequent potential risks to our security. The events occurring in Beijing

after ten years of liberalisation illustrate the possibility of ruthless authoritarian reactions going, as Minister Dumas rightly said, against the tide of history. To use the words of NATO's Secretary-General: "We cannot, at the moment, afford to lower our guard."

The Assembly can be assured that the Council, through its working groups, will carry on monitoring closely the Vienna negotiations as well as all other arms control negotiations. It will ensure that specific European security interests are fully taken into account.

I welcome the tones of realism that reverberate through the Assembly committees' consideration of the present and future means of ensuring European security. I refer to Mr. Pontillon's emphasis on maintaining alliance cohesion in the new circumstances. That task will be more important than ever as superpower tension in third world areas is decreasing but instability in Eastern Europe is growing. Mr. Speed is to be congratulated on the emphasis that his report places on the need to improve co-ordination of allied assistance and reinforcement procedures on the northern flank and in the central region. There is scope in that respect for the creation of new types of multinational units and further involvement of the French "force d'action rapide". Our attention is also drawn in a very opportune way to the issue of high technology weapons systems.

Mr. van der Werff discusses their advantages and shortcomings in depth. He is right to underline that this challenge will be met only if WEU countries give priority to international co-operation in that field. Finally, as far as space is concerned, work is under way in the special working group on a study to analyse European military needs and the means best suited to meet them.

In the months to come, the ministerial organs will carry on their work as far as the implementation of the platform is concerned. I can assure you that remaining differences on the so-called institutional questions have in no way affected the substance of WEU's work.

Particular attention will be given to those fields of action where concrete co-operation can be undertaken between member states in the short term by the close association of foreign affairs and defence experts. In this respect, it is an encouraging sign that the Defence Representatives Group has found now its right place among the Council's working groups.

A joint meeting, the first of its kind, between the special working group and Defence Representatives Group has recently been held in order to discuss how best to undertake the various tasks. For the special working group, consultations on the so-called topical politico-military questions remain a vital means of concerting

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

member countries' positions. The consultations on the various current arms control issues over recent months have been particularly thorough and wide-ranging. As I have already mentioned, the special working group is also charged with studying Europe's military needs in space and experts will shortly be convened with the aim of presenting an initial report to the next ministerial meeting. The practical military implications of a single European market by 1992 is another subject on which the special group is working. An important facet of the reactivated WEU is its ability to concert and, where necessary, to act – as in the Gulf – on problems arising outside Europe but affecting European security interests. The special working group is currently considering a number of so-called “out-of-area” questions.

The Defence Representatives Group is studying ways of enhancing member countries' co-operation in training. It is also looking ahead at the practical requirements of a verification régime for a future conventional arms control agreement. A number of other problems, such as defence planning, operational concepts and requirements, demographic trends and defence contributions, are also being discussed in that group.

The Mediterranean Sub-Group continues to provide member countries with a valuable forum for monitoring developments in areas of unrest such as the Balkans and the Maghreb, with a new emphasis on naval deployments.

For the medium-term future, I should like to conclude my remarks on the need to focus the work of WEU – Council and Assembly – on the evaluation of European security interests and requirements beyond 1992. Assuming that the CFE negotiations produce concrete results, much remains to be done. The implementation of an agreement on conventional arms control will gradually create a situation in which the threat of surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact recedes and major asymmetries in the balance of forces are being built down. In this new environment, political and military aspects of western strategy and force posture will have to be redefined. WEU has a natural rôle to play in a careful realistic consideration of likely trends by all those who are ultimately responsible for the security of the people of Europe.

WEU will also have to strive to keep the final goal of Europe's cohesion and union high on the agenda of European priorities. The optimism generated by the latest developments in East-West relations must not be allowed to divert our energies from building the European pillar in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance nor from facing the problems regarding the relationship between the Twelve and the Nine. The

sheer size of the USSR as well as its geopolitical position make it necessary for the Europeans to retain an appropriate deterrence capability in the right framework. In his recent Boston University commencement address, President Bush welcomed the coming together of Europe, looked forward to its being a partner in leadership and made favourable references to WEU.

Leadership means the assumption of responsibilities, not waiting till others come forward with initiatives. We are in a period of new hopes and expectations combined with uncertainties and possible instabilities; a period of transition in almost every aspect of international relations. Let us try to go one step further than in the past and expand our co-operation to enable us to meet the future securely and confidently.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General for your address.

I am sure you are prepared to answer questions from the members of our Assembly.

I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, can the Secretary-General give some indication of the timetable the Permanent Council will be adopting for the institutional questions he has just referred to in his statement?

Secondly, I would like to hear from the Secretary-General precisely when applications from Greece and Turkey for accession to Western European Union were received by the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I hope that I will be forgiven for not answering in Dutch, but as Secretary-General I will use the official language of WEU as it is used in the Council.

In response to the first question about the time frame of our institutional discussions, we have had the first meeting of the institutional working group on this question under the chairmanship of my deputy, Mr. Holthoff, and a second meeting will take place on 3rd July. I can assure you that we shall push forward these discussions to the best of our abilities. I hope that by the autumn at least an outline of an outcome will be apparent.

The second question related to the requests of Turkey and Greece for membership. I have little to add to what was said on that question in Document 1177, which sets out the situation about Turkey and then refers to Greece. That was before my time. However, in a previous capacity I was involved in these matters. If I remember correctly, in the spring of 1987, Turkey had

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

made a formal application and tabled a document. Greece tabled its document much later. In the spring of 1987, in oral conversations with my predecessor, it was clear that Greece had expressed an interest in joining Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Secretary-General, you know what our position is regarding any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty: the Assembly has always been very concerned to preserve the substance of the treaty, mainly because of its simplicity. But, with the accession of two new members, it has to be revised, and you know how much we welcome the arrival of Spain and Portugal.

May we have your assurance, Secretary-General, that as soon as there is any sign of a move to revise any article concerning either the member states or one of the institutional organs of WEU, you will take the necessary steps to inform the Assembly immediately?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I can put Mr. Caro's mind at rest. Should that happen, I shall certainly do the necessary. My current impression is that so far even if the treaty is in some ways a little archaic – Mr. van der Sanden has some very useful proposals in his report for improving it – this should be no obstacle to practical co-operation of the most intensive and extensive kind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In his excellent speech, the Secretary-General quickly said that one or two out-of-area activities were being examined. Would he enlarge on that and give us some hint of what is under consideration?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – We are reviewing the matter in a general context. Of course we have specific experience in the Gulf. Many of us, if not all, would like to strengthen and build upon that experience. It is difficult to see where similar crises might arise in other parts of the globe that would involve such concrete European security interests. On the one hand, this activity must concentrate on defining possible contingencies. On the other hand, it must concentrate on some practical measures that must be taken by

member countries. The first that comes to mind is immediate and effective consultation on contingencies.

One of the great pragmatic improvements made during the Gulf issue – I was present in another capacity – was that we established points of contact in capitals and defence departments, and we knew exactly what officer was dealing with what. Immediate contacts were possible on every conceivable question – for example, small practical problems and larger political problems. We managed to deal with them quite effectively. That practical experience must be built on. For the immediate term, we are still making an inventory of security commitments in out-of-area countries. I hope that we shall be able to establish a common framework for action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me first congratulate the new Secretary-General on behalf of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.

You, Mr. van Eekelen, have already worked for Western European Union in many different ways. We met you first as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, when we heard your authoritative judgments, which will certainly carry over into your future work. We have seen you in the Presidential Committee, representing us vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers. We hope that now, as Secretary-General, you will be able to help us pursue the reform of Western European Union.

I would like to ask you a question in this context. You will be presenting your first comprehensive report, including your thoughts on the future, this autumn. What are the prospects for the institute that is intended to replace the agencies but has so far not got beyond the planning stage? Do you see any chance of overcoming the opposition of various governments, so that we can count on some preliminary work by this institute in the very near future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I, too, remember some interesting and pleasant joint activities in the early 1980s. Mr. Reddemann referred to the institute. I must refer him to the answer that I gave to Mr. van der Sanden. The Council has just started work on this. I have referred to the pragmatic and constructive attitude of all member countries. It may be possible to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, provided that we start with a modest set-up. We are motivated by the usefulness of what we are doing. It will add to what is already

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

available in member countries. It will also add a new dimension, finding lacunae in research and subjects that can play a useful rôle in information activities in member countries. It would be a great tragedy if the unfortunate experience with the agencies and the new ministerial organs were to be repeated. We must start with a modest, pragmatic set-up. I feel that all members of the Council are willing to co-operate in that direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to ask a question?...

All that remains is for me to thank you, Secretary-General, for your excellent address and for your replies to the many questions.

13. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1183 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north, Document 1183 and amendments.

I call Mr. Speed, Rapporteur.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I have the honour to submit the report on the state of European security on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which was unanimously approved. I should like to thank the committee for its assistance and say a particular word of thanks to the Secretary of the committee, Mr. Cameron.

Mr. Fourré mentioned the European spirit in matters of defence. His remarks have been echoed by the Secretary-General. I hope that the report that I have the honour to submit this afternoon echoes the European spirit in matters of defence. As has been said, any rapporteur producing a report on defence or security at present must have a stop time for writing his report. Matters are proceeding so quickly that a report that is written this morning may be out of date this afternoon.

Within the past two or three weeks we have had the dramatic NATO summit and the proposals from President Bush. During the past weekend we have had the tragic and bloody events in China. I visited that country with the Defence Committee two and a half weeks ago, and I saw and talked to the students in Beijing, Shanghai, Xian and Canton. Alas, many of those

students may now be dead, shot or crushed by the tanks. The whole process of security and defence disturbances in both East and West, not least the death of the Ayatollah, makes matters difficult, but we must try to draw the line somewhere.

Perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves that the disarmament race between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has happened for three reasons. First, the alliance has always spoken from a position of strength, and the twin-track decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles ten years ago led directly to the INF agreement a year ago. Secondly, the alliance has always given a high priority to military and political cohesion. That is an important factor in decision-making and decision-taking in the Kremlin. Thirdly, Mr. Gorbachev and some of his associates have shown a refreshing realism and willingness to reduce tensions and to reduce arms. I have no doubt that their motives result partly from the chaos and parlous state of the Soviet economy, but there is a genuine spirit abroad that may herald a new era.

It is against that background that I present this report. I make no apologies for reminding readers in the second paragraph of the preamble that the USSR and its allies “are still maintaining a high level of arms production”. The Secretary-General referred to that a few moments ago. Each year, the Soviet Union produces three thousand T-80 tanks and other heavy armoured vehicles. Every six weeks a new conventional or nuclear submarine is produced. New advanced fighter and strike aircraft and helicopters are still rolling off the production lines in large numbers. New artillery, missiles and rockets continue to pour out of the factories, and many other weapons systems are still being produced at the same level as during the past few years. At the same time, the quality and effectiveness of those weapons and systems are greater than they have ever been, partly due to Soviet technology and partly because some people in the West are prepared to sell western technology to the Soviet Union, and it has taken full advantage of that.

The events of the past few weeks show that espionage is still being practised, not only in my country but in many other countries of Western European Union and the alliance. To me, that underlines the need for adequate, effective and mobile allied forces in Europe, both in the central region and in the critical northern region, dominating as it does the Atlantic, which is essential to the reinforcement and resupplying of Europe, and where we must maintain maritime and air superiority.

The very success of détente and reduced tension, to which I refer in the preamble to my report, brings problems with it. We all represent taxpayers in democracies, and it is now clear

Mr. Speed (continued)

that for most if not all of us defence spending in our respective countries will decline in real terms during the next few years. In most of our countries, it is already declining in real terms at a time when defence technologies are becoming ever more expensive. That means that we must make the best use of what we have. We must work more closely together in Europe from a political and defence viewpoint, whether it is in arms procurement, training or in command and control.

When I interviewed General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, when preparing this report last October, he said that his biggest problem was in command and control. Interestingly, three weeks ago in Beijing, when I asked a senior Chinese general on the general staff what his biggest problem was, after a moment's reflection he agreed that it was command and control. Perhaps this weekend the People's Liberation Army has different problems – I do not know. I mention those problems in the report.

A central thesis of my report is, to use the American slang phrase, "getting more bangs for the bucks". We must have a greater concentration on improving what we have and remedying deficiencies in command and control, in the land-air battle and in IFF. We have been talking about those deficiencies for long enough; it is time that we resolved them. We need a tactical communications system so that different sections of the same unit can talk to each other instead of having different radios that cannot communicate with each other. It is all very basic, but, as I saw last year during a major NATO exercise on the central plains of Germany, it is all very important and we are long overdue in getting it right.

As part of that process, I underline recommendation 1: the absolute importance to Western European Union of the European pillar. There is a great deal of talk, some of it ill-informed and some of it malicious, from across the Atlantic about burden-sharing. There needs to be a greater emphasis on the European pillar of defence, and that is underlined in recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. With the political perception of defence as important as the military perceptions, I believe that there are strong arguments for more multinational arrangements being worked out. I mention some of the collaborative arrangements in some detail in my report. There should be at least that number of personal exchanges between countries and units. That directly picks up and endorses the motion for a recommendation tabled by Dr. Hirschler and others last December which I have attached as an appendix to the report.

I believe that the recommendations flow naturally from the preamble and the explanatory

memorandum. I hope that they are all practical and not too idealistic. If implemented, they will enhance our security, but not, I hope, our defence budgets, which I fear will be reduced. Again, it is all a question of better value for money.

If implemented, the recommendations will also carry forward, both in the alliance and in WEU, a series of measures that will demonstrate and stress that Europeans are prepared to work more closely together for their security. This follows naturally the consequences of the NATO summit in Brussels. It means that we can address and overcome the problems and shortcomings that need to be tackled for our defence effort, so that we can be truly effective in a world still beset by strife, conflict and uncertainty. We can afford to do no less. WEU now has a real chance to do things practically and effectively, in unison on an equipment front and particularly on a people front.

I hope that the recommendations can be accepted. They will enhance our effectiveness and will enhance the European pillar. We can do no less. I have the great honour to present the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open and I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think all of us politicians, parliamentarians and in particular the populations of our countries, welcome the desire for disarmament that has been made so clear, at least in words, in recent weeks.

We have to realise that the wish for peace is a powerful motivation in the way the citizens of our countries picture their future.

It may be of interest in that connection that an opinion poll in the Federal Republic of Germany revealed that considerably more people in the Federal Republic believe in Mr. Gorbachev's desire for peace and disarmament than in that of the American President. This must, of course, cause us concern, because it has to be remembered that all the words that Mr. Gorbachev has spoken and will continue to speak – in the Federal Republic, in other countries and at the Council of Europe – need to be followed up by deeds to prove that they are not idle promises.

The speed with which the climate can change seems to me to be clearly demonstrated by what is now happening in Beijing, where the country seemed set on a very reasonable path. China has now made a 180° turn, which will most certainly have major effects in the future.

It is also surprising – if I may mention this in parenthesis – that, whilst there was no such blood bath in the Soviet Union, most people in

Mr. Müller (continued)

the West have really been left largely unmoved by the fact that several people died and many more were injured by the use of poison gas against peaceful demonstrators in Tbilisi.

I would like to thank Mr. Speed for bringing us back to reality. In particular he has referred to the problems on our northern flank. This is something I would like to underline. A few days ago, I myself had occasion to go there and to make some investigations on the spot. I also know that there has been no progress in the negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union regarding the Barents Sea and Arctic areas, although talks have been going on for several years now and this would have been a good opportunity to demonstrate a readiness to negotiate and make concessions.

We know too that the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet in the North Sea and the Baltic continues to be an important factor, that there have been breaches of neutrality, in some cases in Swedish waters, and that both Sweden and Finland are greatly concerned about the defence readiness of their countries, which are not among those to have grown negligent about this. In fact, Finland is one of the few countries, as the Rapporteur himself points out in his report, which has actually increased its defence spending by 10%.

Much of the report is already out of date, e.g. the information that the length of compulsory service in the German forces is to be increased, whereas, under the pressure of events, if I may put it that way, that decision has already been deferred.

The report's comments on Lance missiles will also soon fail to reflect the facts.

I can only endorse the Rapporteur's points about early warning and in particular the deployment of AWACS, where he looks to the French, with their four AWACS aircraft, to play a more active rôle. I am convinced that the NATO slogan "vigilance is the price of freedom" naturally continues to be valid and that, no matter how events turn out, we must always make it a principle that we should have early and timely information on developments.

It is also true that mobile task forces for rapid intervention, the force d'action rapide, that can be transferred and committed very quickly, will become increasingly important in the future. Given the general pressure on defence budgets, problems are certain to arise in this connection as regards readiness for action in individual countries.

I am particularly pleased – I was one of the signatories of Mr. Hitschler's proposal – at what

is said about the Franco-German brigade and the joint United Kingdom-Netherlands amphibious landing force. We should attach considerable value to these developments, because they are evidence that the western alliance is not there to protect national interests but to defend shared ideals and objectives.

In this context it is important that we should create opportunities for national servicemen to serve in other countries' armed services – German servicemen in France, for example, or Italians in Germany. To my mind this would reinforce the united character of the western world and would also surely help to increase readiness to serve in the armed forces, or the perception of the need for such service, particularly in the case of young people.

One last point. Even if one day the East-West conflict were no longer to exist, we should not forget that Europe is not an island of peace on the globe and no one can give us any guarantee in the event of a spread of dangerous weapons or a surge of fanaticism in one country or another, that issues of security and freedom will not be of crucial importance to the member states of Western European Union. You have only to look at the Near East or the Gulf region to see what I mean.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly congratulate my colleague, Keith Speed, on his admirable report, so professionally drafted and so admirably put across. He addressed the issues of his report in their contemporary context, that of arms control negotiations in the aftermath of the Brussels summit and of the developing situation in East-West relations, not least the crisis in China. I want to limit my remarks, both in time and in scope, to just three of Mr. Speed's recommendations – the third, the fourth and the seventh.

Keith Speed has done well by the Assembly in his third recommendation and in reminding us all that, however great our preoccupation with the central front in Europe and with the balance of forces there, our security and freedom in Western Europe depend at least as much on maintaining secure avenues of reinforcement and supply across the North Atlantic and across the air lanes between the United States and Western Europe. For that purpose, it is crucial that the integrity of the northern flank of the alliance be maintained.

The momentum of arms control negotiations may lead to a diminution of the force levels on the central front in Europe. It could also be that the preponderance of forces, which has hitherto

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

favoured the Soviet Union, could also be diminished on the central front in the not too distant future, to our apparent advantage. However, there is as yet little sign that the overwhelming superiority that the Soviet Union enjoys on the northern flank will be diminished.

Our Rapporteur rightly brought home to us a fact that must worry all of us – that the modernisation of the Soviet armed forces continues apace, not least the modernisation of the Soviet fleet and air forces. In no theatre are air forces and naval forces more important than on the northern flank, where our Danish and Norwegian allies, by their own decision, have forgone the option of the stationing either of foreign troops or of nuclear weapons upon their soil in time of war. They are therefore particularly dependent on timely and adequate reinforcements from elsewhere in Western Europe and especially from the North Atlantic. They need reinforcements not only when conflict breaks out but timely reinforcements in advance in order to deter potential conflicts.

We must therefore ensure a sufficient balance of modern naval and air forces, and not least modern amphibious vessels for putting our forces ashore. The British provide the amphibious ships for the deployment of the Dutch-British marine brigade. It is vital that we take early and positive decisions to replace the assault ships *Intrepid* and *Fearless* and to acquire, if necessary, modern aviation support ships for the deployment of helicopters in the amphibious battle. Without air superiority, our amphibious forces will not prevail and unless SACLANT reaches the Norwegian sea early enough, the deployment and the putting ashore of amphibious forces on the soil of Norway in time of war will be difficult to achieve.

It is also important that we adequately reinforce the air forces in northern Norway. In that regard I turn to paragraph 4 and express my regret to the Assembly yet again about the Canadian decision to redeploy its forces in such a way that the Canadian air-sea transportable brigade will not be available for the northern flank. I know that substitute arrangements are being put together whereby a multinational group consisting of a British infantry battalion, a German infantry battalion and a Canadian infantry battalion, with an enlarged United States air force squadron, will take the place of the Canadian air-sea transportable brigade and whereby the two Canadian air squadrons that were previously assigned to the northern flank will be assigned to the central flank, as will further Canadian land forces.

I find it strange logic that Canada, a Nordic and an Arctic country with experience of Arctic operations should reinforce its presence on the

central flank, and yet our German friends should have to make up the deficiency that the Canadians have caused on the north by deploying forces from their homeland, which is in great need of defence – not least in Schleswig-Holstein – to fill the gaps created by the redeployment of the Canadian air-sea transportable brigade. Therefore, I especially welcome our Rapporteur's suggestion that the force d'action rapide should have the northern flank as one of its potential areas of deployment. That is both imaginative and sensible.

Finally, I turn to paragraph 7. If the momentum of arms control negotiations leads to a scenario on the central front whereby force levels are reduced, there will be a greater requirement for speed and flexibility in operations from the NATO forces to meet any offensive challenge. We know that the Soviets are withdrawing obsolete equipment. We remember that the Hitlerian offensive in 1940 prevailed without numerical superiority, but it prevailed because of the professionalism and the high quality of equipment of the Wehrmacht at the time. A leaner, trimmer Soviet war machine, especially with modern equipment, can be a greater threat to Western Europe than an over-large, ill-equipped and cumbersome war machine.

Therefore, we need to make the best possible use of modern technology and tactics, such as those being evolved in the French force d'action rapide, the British 24th air mobile brigade and, of course, in the Franco-German brigade. We shall need helicopters dedicated to the anti-armour battle, yet Europeans have been wilfully improvident in that regard. We do not yet know whether the light attack helicopter programme will go ahead. We do not even know whether the AH-64 Apache helicopter will be procured.

We do not even know whether the most sensible solution would be an enlargement of the Franco-German PAH-2 programme so that the Dutch, British, Italian and Spanish armies could be re-equipped. All that is certain is that we shall need to make up for lack of numbers with greater flexibility and more modern equipment.

I congratulate our Rapporteur on his far-seeing approach in his suggestions in paragraph 7. All in all, I find it a timely, professional and well-researched report. I wholeheartedly support it and I trust that the Assembly will endorse it with approbation and universal acclaim and, above all, with a unanimous vote in its favour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Like the Rapporteur and other members of the Defence Committee, I was recently in China.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

Not wanting to forestall our emergency debate on China, I must state that we saw clearly the way in which the situation was boiling up there. On reflecting about events before the weekend's tragedy, it struck me that we still live in a very unsafe world in which we cannot always take things at face value. Much as we all welcome the refreshing change in opinion in so many respects in Russia and in Eastern Europe generally, it behoves all of us constantly to bear in mind that in a very short time serious repercussions can take place bringing down the wrath of a totalitarian régime on its own citizens. In certain circumstances, it can expand into a challenge to other countries.

While we are talking about what happens in NATO and the interesting and refreshing proposals of the American President and the most astounding revelation of Mr. Gorbachev about the very high military spending in the Soviet Union and his proposals that that should be limited very dramatically, in some respects the situation today overall is more dangerous for the longer term than when the cold war first started. Perhaps some people would challenge that statement. However, I believe that in a time of change there is more insecurity than in stable times that have been brought about as a result of the presence of nuclear weapons in the knowledge that neither side dare try it on. That is why I welcome Mr. Speed's excellent report. I am glad that in the course of the Defence Committee's travels I was able to join him and to debate these matters in committee. With respect, this document is relevant and opportune, bearing in mind what has happened.

A prudent and sensible country today retains an effective and flexible defence system. Long may that be so. Exaggerated ideas that a spirit and a move towards disarmament – which certainly must be encouraged – should predispose us to getting rid of all our weapons as quickly as possible – both nuclear and conventional – are madness in the longer term. A prudent country remains well armed and well defended in case of trouble. As Mr. Speed points out in his report, which is detailed in many respects, the essential points are co-ordination and harmonisation. Without them, the western world cannot be flexible or meet any challenge that might arise. Mr. Speed has tried to underline and bring home to the authorities the need for harmonisation and co-ordination, as I did in a similar report for the Assembly a few years ago.

One of the lessons that we hope to learn now from the interesting proposals put forward by the Soviet President and by the President of the United States is that there must be the most rigid checks and publication of our arms figures

and those of the Soviets. It is important that we bring home to our electorates the exact figures of the Soviet Union nuclear and conventional weapons at any time. As my colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, said in his admirable speech, the Soviets are still arming and modernising extensively. To read and hear some of the comments today, we might imagine that the Soviets had thrown a great deal overboard and were now less extensively equipped than us.

It is essential that we be on our guard and move constantly towards disarmament, but do so intelligently. In remaining on our guard, we must try to implement the kind of policies predicated by Mr. Speed's report. Anyone who has been to the north of Norway, as Assembly representatives have, and seen and heard about the Kola peninsula, the most enormous armed camp in the northern hemisphere, needs little reminding of the constant threat that exists no matter what rhetoric is used by political leaders in world assemblies.

I am grateful that we had the good sense as a defence committee and as an assembly to commission the report and to have it undertaken with such enthusiasm and intelligence by the Rapporteur. I am glad that it achieved complete unanimity when it was debated in committee. I give it all my support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – I support Mr. Speed's report. Few people could have gone further than he to gather the relevant information for his report on the state of European security. After all, how many people could say that they were in Beijing two weeks ago in the company of President Gorbachev?

Of course, I was there as well. I spoke to the students, and I make no apology for mentioning this topical subject. No one could have seen a better behaved, unarmed and spontaneous group of people than the students, who were supported by the workers, the people and the majority of the people in Beijing. Even the Deputy Foreign Minister of China and others in authority told us that they emphatically supported the students' wishes, even though they might not have expressed that in the same way.

People might ask what this has to do with Europe. Just as the Russian intervention in Afghanistan affects us all, just as the possible changes in American forces throughout the world affect us all, so do the reductions in the Canadian forces on the northern flank affect us all. In the same way, events in China, which borders with Russia, and the commercial and political events in China today affect many other parts of the world, including Japan, Russia, Hong Kong and, of course Europe. It is

Lord Newall (continued)

most important to concentrate our discussions on local European security even if other events, both tragic and important, are bound to affect Europe even if they occur in such parts of the world as Asia.

President Bush has taken some new initiatives and they should be studied carefully. Mr. Speed's report has raised some important issues of detail, all of which are vital to the mutual defence of our countries. He mentioned the importance of better multinational co-operation. As an observer of the NATO exercise, Dragon Hammer, six weeks ago, I saw the marines of several nations co-ordinating their efforts in Sardinia, and they learnt a lot from one another. The efforts of the Royal Marines of my country were superb. That is no criticism of the other marines whom I visited by helicopter.

The report emphasises the concept of speed and flexibility that is necessary for success. Circumstances are always changing, and they are unlikely to change more rapidly than they are at present. We must always be ready and flexible in the extreme so that we can be prepared for the next situation. All of us with military training know that flexibility is one of the key essentials of military strategy. In that vein, I commend Mr. Speed's report in its entirety.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, speaking for myself, and also on behalf of my Italian colleagues, I should like to express our great admiration not only for the quality of the report that has been drawn up but also for the proposals put forward and the documentation presented. I do not intend now to contradict the report but simply to make some supplementary comments.

The report deals with questions relating to security in northern and central Europe and is therefore, in our view, incomplete in that it leaves the problem of security in the Mediterranean area and southern Europe – a problem of primary rather than secondary importance to our way of thinking – out of account.

The fact is that the political situation in the countries of the Mediterranean area is particularly volatile. In Yugoslavia, i.e. in the Adriatic area, the internal situation is especially serious and prone to conflict. A few weeks ago strife between people of different nationalities in that country resulted in action by the Yugoslav army against certain communities protesting, as in other countries, in their struggle to assert their civil rights and their rights as nations – I refer to the Kosovo revolution.

Further, the grave situation persists in the Greek and Turkish area and is more critical still in the Middle East, particularly so in Lebanon where, once again, the world looks on at a repeat of the never-ending tragedy. The drama of Palestine and Israel, the intifada and Israel's need, one way or another, to ensure its own survival constitute another cause of serious conflict which, in our view, extends beyond the boundaries of the Mediterranean basin and concerns all the nations of the world.

In Libya too, the situation is not very clear. And in Algeria, something in the nature of a revolution caused hundreds of deaths a few months ago and has since been a source of instability in this part of North Africa. We are therefore in the presence of a serious situation which needs to be addressed and studied by WEU as a warning sign or may be a source of conflict or of political and military destabilisation.

Moreover, as regards the readmission of Egypt to the Arab League from which it had been expelled, whilst this country could be said to be reliable and a point of reference for the West in this political, ethnic and religious area, it is also clear that all this rules out possible territorial solutions and creates conditions of conflict between the Middle East and North Africa that create new solidarities – even vis-à-vis Egypt – in the Islamic and Arab worlds. In this region – the death of Ayatollah Khomeini was mentioned a few moments ago – major problems affecting not only the countries of the Mediterranean basin but also those of Western Europe still exist and this will probably be the case well into the future.

My object therefore is to draw the attention of members and all political leaders to the need to look much more closely at the Mediterranean area than they have done in the past. What has been called Europe's southern flank will increasingly, in our opinion, become its southern front; whilst the state of conflict is steadily lessening between East and West – may it one day disappear altogether, and the sooner the better – we see no sign of any such trend in north-south relations.

Italy plays a leading rôle in the Mediterranean, but it is a part of Europe in terms of the defence of this highly complex and conflict-prone area, for which the only assistance it receives in practical terms is one Portuguese brigade.

I would like at this point to take the opportunity to welcome Spain and Portugal to our alliance and to WEU. It will open the door to a closer relationship in co-operation, training and political solidarity, particularly as regards our defence commitments in the south of Europe.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

Italy is also an advanced frontier, a kind of forward position in the defence of Europe. The effort that it is costing us to buy AWACS aircraft is public knowledge. These will increase our surveillance coverage of eastern and southern Europe and hence our capability in terms of observation, prevention, monitoring and security. I shall not dwell on the FIR, *forza di intervento rapido*, which Italy has set up on the French model so as to be able to intervene without delay in the most exposed areas of the south of our country, Sicily, which today are the outposts of Europe facing this volatile and dangerous region. It is worth remembering that the only military action that has taken place in Europe in recent years has been the Libyan attack on a Mediterranean island under Italian sovereignty.

This commitment is therefore evidence of our country's efforts to secure for Europe as a whole and not just the south the means of keeping a firmer guard on the whole of the area. My purpose in taking the floor was to draw your attention to the fact that it will be essential, from now on, to pay greater heed, in political and military terms, to the southern area. We also hope that with the accession of Portugal and Spain, which have major interests in the Mediterranean, more will be done, possibly including the formation of, say, a mixed Italian Spanish or Italian-Portuguese brigade which, on the pattern of the Franco-German brigade, would offer southern Europe greater opportunities for collaboration in the spheres of training, operations and policy.

Thank you, Mr. President, and my compliments to Mr. Speed for his excellent report.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

The vote on the draft recommendation will be taken after Mr. Younger has presented the annual report of the Council.

14. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the

changes in the membership of committees contained in Notice No. 1 which has already been distributed.

I have also been informed that the German Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Böhm to be a titular member in place of Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Reddemann to be an alternate member in place of Mr. Böhm.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

15. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 6th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1191).
2. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1184).
3. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1177).
4. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1183 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.35 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Thursday, 6th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1191).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Ahrens.
4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1184).
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Pack (*Rapporteur*), Dame Peggy Fenner, Mr. Linster (*Chairman*).
5. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1177).
Replies by Mr. Younger to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Jessel, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Cox, Mr. Irmer, Mr. Soell.
6. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1183 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro, Mr. Speed.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1191)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on the motion for a recom-

mendation on the condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China, Document 1191, submitted by Mr. Wilkinson.

I would remind you that the only members entitled to speak are one in favour, one against, the chairman of the committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau of the Assembly speaking in its name.

Furthermore, under Rule 30(7) no representative may speak for more than five minutes on questions of procedure.

I call Mr. Wilkinson to give his reasons for this request.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must make it clear at the outset that the wording of this recommendation is as I read it to the Assembly yesterday afternoon and not as it has been most strangely printed on the order paper. The motion that I moved, calling for an immediate debate under the urgent procedure on the situation in China, reads as follows:

“That this Assembly wholeheartedly condemns the brutal repression and massacre by the People's Liberation Army of students and other freedom-loving people in the People's Republic of China who have been peacefully demonstrating their strong desire for democracy and freedom, and calls for an immediate debate under the urgent procedure

1. See page 19.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

in order to draw attention not only to the unjustifiable brutality of the action of the Chinese régime but also to the inherent dangers to security and confidence in the region."

The signatories in addition to myself are those listed at the foot of Document 1191, which has been circulated this morning.

There was no recommendation as in the third paragraph of Document 1191, because I hope that the Assembly will unanimously pass the motion and thereby show its total outrage and horror at the unspeakable barbarism perpetrated on helpless civilians who desire nothing more than freedom and liberty in their own country.

I do not think that it is for us, at a time of such gravity and international concern, when major issues of East-West relations and security in the Pacific basin are at stake, to seek at this early stage to mandate the Council of WEU to protest as the third paragraph suggests.

I am sure that the Council of WEU and our governments will wish, in consultation with other interested governments, such as the United States and those in the region, to consider an appropriate response to the brutalities that have been meted out upon students and other freedom-loving people in China. Therefore, I urge action at this early stage in the evolution of what must be an agonising and probably a long-drawn-out crisis. Under the emergency procedure and after an appropriate debate, we shall adopt the motion that I read out yesterday and repeated this morning.

We have been living too long under illusions. Indeed, that happens all too often. One might say of the policy makers in China: "Eyes have they, and see not. Ears have they, and hear not."

We have known what has been going on in Tibet. In our heart of hearts we have realised that at least politically the régime has remained unchanged. The economic changes were superimposed upon a wholly socialised society in which poverty was widespread. Like all such superimpositions, they led to corruption and inflation and to the accumulation of wealth in the upper echelons of the communist party hierarchy. That wealth was not widely shared. Students and others who made sacrifices to acquire the skills necessary to transform the Chinese economy into a modern economy in which all the people of China could enjoy higher living standards found that their sacrifices proved to be in vain because they did not share in the wealth. Further, they did not have the opportunities in that rigid communistic social system to express their strong desire for liberty and to seek an opportunity for political change.

As I have said, that is nothing new. We saw that in 1953, when the Soviet army rolled the tanks out against the workers in East Berlin. We saw it in Hungary in 1956 and in Prague in 1968. We also saw the imposition of martial law by the Soviets on the Polish people and against the Solidarity movement in 1981. Luckily, that did not lead to bloodshed. Now we have the exciting position in which the ideals of the Solidarity movement have been vindicated by the people of Poland in the elections at the weekend.

However, the situation in China is worse than that. It is not a question of alien tanks being rolled out against a foreign people. The People's Liberation Army has turned against its own people. We do not know the course of the crisis and what will happen. It is difficult to discern the outcome either within China or for the peoples around China who are most closely affected, among whom are the people of Hong Kong.

In its wisdom and under the wise guidance of its Chairman, Mr. Peter Kittelmann, the Defence Committee of this Assembly visited China and Hong Kong only a few days ago. We all saw what was happening and the demonstrations on the streets. We witnessed the passivity, the control and the optimism of those who were taking part. Members of the delegation hoped against hope that that pacific movement would somehow prevail against the rigid dictatorial gerontocracy.

It was an opportunity for illusions to prevail over realism. However, history has taught us otherwise. When we saw Mr. Gorbachev come to town and the bicyclists being cleared from the streets so that those streets could be sanitised for the arrival of the great man for the summit, we should have appreciated the spiritual bankruptcy of the régime that has so angered the freedom-loving people of China.

I have said enough and others more eloquent and more qualified than I will continue this debate. We shall need the advice of the relevant committee and of the appropriate rapporteur. There are times in politics when righteous indignation is called for. In the People's Republic we have seen a series of actions of the most fearsome barbarity that have hardly any parallel in the post-war period, which has seen atrocities enough.

I hope that this Assembly, which is still responsible within Europe for security policy in the broadest sense, will move to an urgent debate under the emergency procedure and I hope that in so doing it will wholeheartedly and unanimously pass the motion that my colleagues and I have tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There is a misunderstanding. The duty staff have set out your recommendation in such a way as to ensure that it is in order, so may we have the benefit of your kind understanding. If you wish to revert to your original text, please make the necessary changes before the end of this morning's sitting.

Does anyone wish to speak against the motion?...

Does the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee wish to give his opinion on whether this motion is in order?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at its meeting this morning the General Affairs Committee considered the situation in China. We took two decisions: first, to submit a comprehensive report on China and the situation in that region to the Assembly at its December part-session, and second to support the request for urgent procedure this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

We shall now proceed to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten representatives requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

If the Assembly agrees, the debate on this question will be held this afternoon after the debate on current aspects of arms control on an oral report by the General Affairs Committee.

Are there any objections?...

It is therefore agreed to.

4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1184)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of

Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1184.

I call Mrs. Pack, Rapporteur.

Mrs. PACK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in writing my report I was faced with the same difficulties as my predecessors Mr. Morris and Mr. Linster. The programme of work and the structure of the organisations, the main factors which should have guided me in my analysis, are still uncertain.

The decision of the Council to fuse the three agencies responsible for studying questions of security into a single agency has still not been applied. The 1989 organograms have simply been renewed, adjusted only to take account of retirements or resignations.

Collocation is still no further forward. It is unreasonable for the fixed-term contracts of certain officials to have to be renewed every six months for want of a decision on restructuring. Just imagine the effect of this on the morale and motivation of these employees.

Apart from the negative effect on their work for Western European Union, it conflicts with my idea of staff relations and is incompatible with the value of their work. These officials have a good reputation and it is pure negligence to waste their talents and resources by under-utilising their capabilities in this way.

Because of the uncertainty surrounding the working conditions of the ministerial organs of WEU my written opinion as Rapporteur on the revised budgets for 1988 and the budget for 1989 is confined to an examination of those budgets without reference to any cost-efficiency criterion.

I assume that you will have read my report with great attention, so that today I can limit my comments to just a few points.

One of these is my finding that an irregularity already noted by Mr. Morris has been repeated, without any updating of the financial regulations to this effect. To my mind, Article 10 (c) quoted in justification is not sufficient. I refer to the cancellation of the appropriations in the budget for 1987 and their automatic transfer to 1988. The same applies to the figures for 1988 carried over to 1989.

With my colleagues in the committee I wish to confirm the validity of the new criterion, set out in the explanations in budget document B(88)2, according to which surpluses can be carried forward from one budget year to the next provided this does not mean an increase in member states' contributions, but in this event the financial regulations must be updated appropriately.

Mrs. Pack (continued)

Some changes in the Secretariat-General deserving mention are an increase in staff with the recruitment of a security guard, an increase in expenditure for modernising office equipment and the purchase of a new official car to replace the older of the two existing vehicles.

The net total for the operating budget shows an increase of 19.83%, whereas the net total for the pensions budget shows a decrease of 14.98%, attributable to the fact that in 1988 indemnities were paid to staff wishing to leave WEU before completing ten years' service.

With regard to the budget for the Paris agencies, I would simply single out from the report my suggestion that the fourteen vacant posts in the organogram – for which the sum of 4 950 000 French francs is blocked in Head B1 under “expenditure on staff” – should not be artificially retained year after year.

The governments still disagree as to the rôle, composition and location of the agencies, but it seems to be clear that these vacant posts should be eliminated. Let us therefore end this artificial procedure. It does not help us one iota.

Running like a scarlet thread through my report, which I hope you have read, is the fact that collocation is still no further forward. If it does not happen soon, the next rapporteur on the budgets will be in the same dilemma as I. We urge the Council finally to take definite steps this year.

The fact is that, whilst Western European Union is again arousing public interest and security questions are beginning to become public European issues, the organisational crisis afflicting WEU is still unresolved. We believe – particularly in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration – that this is one of the reasons why we do not present a better external image.

I welcome the decision to create four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. This will make working conditions slightly – I stress slightly – better.

Now a few comments on the implementation of Recommendation 458. Ladies and gentlemen, the mobility of staff within WEU is practically nil. In addition, once the ceiling for a grade has been reached – i.e. after thirteen or fourteen years' service – no further increase is possible. I feel this to be highly frustrating for such staff and I think we ought to find a possible way out.

The government budget experts have yet again worked out new procedures with regard to staff salaries. In this connection I think we really ought to bring our influence as a parliamentary

assembly to bear. We ought to resolve to meet the idea that these budget experts have in the backs of their minds – namely to cut staff salaries as much as they can instead of securing what they ought to secure for our employees, namely a voice in the determination and co-ordination of civil service salaries – with a strong protest, as was done in the Council of Europe. We should demand of the Council of WEU that it safeguard the rights of our employees.

We have submitted a draft recommendation which begins, basically, by summarising what I have just been trying to describe to you. It urges the Council to follow up Recommendation 467 without delay, in other words really to push ahead with collocation. Next it urges – as I have said – that the necessary amendments be made to the financial regulations in order finally to regularise a long-practised procedure, i.e. the right to transfer credits from one financial year to the next. Thirdly, we recommend that measures be taken to improve staff employment conditions and to safeguard the right of employees to be represented through their staff associations. Our fourth request is that a study be made to determine how staff in the co-ordinated organisations may be interchanged in order to improve career prospects for individual staff members so that they do not come to the end of their careers after thirteen years.

I strongly urge you to approve our recommendation and to insist in all the bodies you belong to that real order is finally created within the organisation so that the next budget estimates are in the kind of form that one is entitled to expect from such an organisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open and I call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to intervene briefly in this debate as a member of that committee to comment on the report of my colleague, Mrs. Pack, and to commend it to the Assembly. For more than two years I have been a member of that committee, responsible for the overseeing of the budget and the administration. I know that Mrs. Pack feels, as do other committee members, that their work is well nigh impossible with the continuing delay over relocation and restructuring of the agencies. That uncertainty has undoubtedly dogged our work this year as last year. We are, of course, well aware of the many difficult considerations with which ministers have to be concerned. However, we hope that this continuing uncertainty for our staff, WEU and the agencies will be ended, at least by this year. As stated in paragraph 31 of the report, we all share in the committee the Rapporteur's hope that the uncertainties will end. We welcome the two new member applications to join WEU and we

Dame Peggy Fenner (continued)

believe that its work is assuming an even greater importance now in the light of the current world situation.

I want to refer to the four recommendations put forward by the Rapporteur. I support them and I am sure that they will commend themselves to the Assembly.

I am sure that the Assembly would not wish to continue an irregular practice of transferring credits. The accountants among us would be horrified to know that we do so outside the article in our regulations. We should regularise the practice once and for all.

I am perturbed that in this period of indecision staff face great ambiguity. Staff in other European institutions have representation in discussions, so it is indefensible that WEU staff are not so represented. Furthermore, it has been quite clear to us that the transfer of WEU staff in pursuit of careers or promotions has proved to be impossible. It is equally clear that ministers seem to be under the misapprehension that that is not so and that they have the same rights as staff in other institutions. Surely, if that is proved not to be so, we must produce the means to secure the end and ensure that staff have similar transfer rights.

I hope that this careful report will commend itself to the Assembly. Perhaps 1989 will be the last year in which we face the uncertainties that have truly made the committee's task very difficult indeed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to thank Mrs. Pack, the Rapporteur, for her clear and excellent summary of an equally clear and excellent written report. As Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Morris and myself have done over the years she has rightly put her finger on the same sore spots, namely certain irregularities in the budgets of the ministerial organs.

I do not need to return to them. Dame Peggy, whom I thank for her very succinct statement, has said clearly what these irregularities in the transfer of credits are. The Assembly, even though its rôle is not to take decisions but simply to give an opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs, can no longer accept them.

Mr. President, I am also pleased to say – and this is a point I would make to all my colleagues in the Assembly – that throughout the years that I have been Chairman of this committee, which has just appointed a new Vice-President in Mr. Rathbone and reappointed Mrs. Pack as the

other, we have done a great deal of work without the slightest disagreement on policy. On the contrary, we have worked in harmony for the benefit of the Assembly's administrative and financial management.

I too would like to stress the need for a decision on the restructuring of WEU for, without it, the right budgetary decisions cannot be taken about the ministerial organs.

I shall not expand on all the conclusions that Mrs. Pack and Dame Peggy Fenner have come to. Aside from staff matters, however, we ought to call on the ministerial organs to accept themselves the same criteria of restraint and economy in budgetary matters that they continually demand of the Assembly. Here I am referring to all the aspects of the arrival of Spain and Portugal in WEU and all the problems that this will create as regards working conditions in the Assembly.

Mr. President, when presenting the Presidential Committee's report yesterday, Mr. Fourné covered all these points very well indeed. But clearly when the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration drew up its proposals for better working conditions specifically to do with the accession of Spain and Portugal, we naturally also made proposals to improve the working conditions of the Assembly, its delegations and committees in general. We therefore beg the responsible ministerial organs to improve, not simply the minimum working conditions for the new Portuguese and Spanish Delegations, but also both working conditions in general and security conditions – a point not sufficiently stressed yesterday. In this context, the rules of budgetary restraint and economy should not be applied too strictly.

The accession of Spain and Portugal provides an opportunity for improving working conditions for all delegations and committees which will not occur again.

I should also like to join with the Rapporteur, Mrs. Pack, whom I congratulate on her excellent work, and Dame Peggy Fenner in their comments on staff conditions and remuneration.

I shall end by urging the Assembly to agree with the conclusions of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and to vote in favour of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1184.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

Ladies and gentlemen, I must suspend the sitting for three-quarters of an hour. We will resume at 11.30 a.m. with the presentation of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1177.

The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.45 a.m. and resumed at 11.30 a.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

5. Second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1177)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. Younger, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 1177.

I am delighted to welcome Mr. Younger to the Assembly and to have the opportunity to thank him personally not only for his kind welcome to the United Kingdom during my official visit last September, but for making himself available, together with Sir Geoffrey Howe, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, for a series of meetings with the Presidential Committee during Britain's presidency of WEU – meetings that have proved to be very constructive for our relationship. We have greatly appreciated the positive approach taken during the British presidency, notably in achieving the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain and in trying to resolve various thorny institutional problems.

Mr. Younger, we look forward very much to hearing what you have to say.

Mr. YOUNGER *(Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)*. – I am grateful for the opportunity to join you today, Mr. President, to

say a few words on behalf of the British presidency of Western European Union. The meeting of the Assembly this week is particularly well timed, falling as it does so close to the summit and providing an important opportunity to consider the impact of recent events on European security.

But before moving on to those wider issues, may I say how very shocked and dismayed we all are by the dreadful events that have unfolded during the past few days in China. I understand that you hope to debate that matter later, but I am sure that you will all join me in expressing sympathy for the victims and their families and outrage at the brutal repression that is taking place there. At a time when we have almost come to expect a steady progression on democracy and human rights in the communist world, these terrible events are a saddening reminder of the great differences that remain between communist régimes and the truly democratic West.

I thank you for your kind remarks, Mr. President, about our presidency of WEU. You may remember that when we took up the presidency on 1st July last year, we set ourselves four main aims for our time in office. They were, first, to promote WEU as a forum for the frank discussion of key European security issues; secondly, to secure a satisfactory outcome to the enlargement negotiations with Spain and Portugal; thirdly, to elaborate the commitments of The Hague platform so as to encourage better practical contributions to the common defence; and, fourthly, to develop WEU as a forum for co-ordinating our approaches to out-of-area issues. I am pleased to say that, building on the very firm foundation that we were fortunate enough to inherit from our most distinguished Dutch predecessors, we have made progress in all these areas.

As for discussions on European security, WEU has always been a place for free and frank exchanges of views. Its aim is to promote the closest possible identity of view among its members, and to assist their efforts to sustain and improve their individual contributions to collective security within the alliance. Our discussions at the April ministerial were particularly useful in that respect. They covered the key issues of arms control and Soviet intentions towards Western Europe, and demonstrated the special rôle that WEU can play in this field.

As you know, the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal has already been concluded, although not all countries have as yet ratified the protocols. We warmly welcome their accession: both countries are already making a valuable contribution to our debates and have added a new dimension to our thinking.

1. See page 20.

Mr. Younger (continued)

Work on the platform has also progressed well and a number of promising areas – such as training and the use of space – will be followed up in more detail. This work will take time; but closer defence co-operation is essential and the objective remains to ensure that the Assembly is kept informed of progress. In this context, I am particularly pleased to be able to report that the Defence Representatives Group has proved to have an important part to play. Indeed, one of the great benefits of WEU is the close co-operation between defence and foreign ministries at all levels.

Similarly, WEU has made a unique contribution to co-operation among NATO members outside the NATO area. The joint operation in the Gulf, which has now drawn to a close, demonstrated admirably the ability of European nations to co-ordinate their activities in defence and security outside the NATO context. That operation will have sent a signal that will not have gone unnoticed outside Western Europe. There may not be occasion for similar actions in the foreseeable future, but WEU now has an informal mechanism for responding to such contingencies and will certainly keep developments out of area under review.

These are four areas then in which I hope our presidency aims have been visibly furthered, and, I should add, aims which could not have been achieved without the help of the Secretary-General and his staff. I should in particular like to pay a personal tribute to Alfred Cahen, who made such an enormous and enthusiastic personal contribution to the successful revitalisation of WEU, and I warmly thank him for his personal friendship. I wish his successor, Willem van Eekelen, every success in the future. He can certainly count on the full support of all of us.

Of course, Mr. President, as you know, presidency and Council are but one part of WEU and I am very conscious of how active the Assembly has been in the past year. You have contributed a number of significant studies on European security issues. I am thinking, for example of those concerning the future of European security, East-West relations, the impact of new technologies, and reinforcement arrangements for the centre and the north.

Moreover, I know that your representatives have also kept an eye on the wider international scene. This recognition of our wider security interests is something which I very much welcome.

I should also say that I am well aware of the need to provide more spacious accommodation for the Assembly, to take account of the

enlargement of WEU itself. Indeed, we agreed in April that a mutually satisfactory solution should be found urgently, taking account both of the Assembly's requirements and of budgetary constraints. The Council recognises the need to provide delegation rooms for Spain and Portugal, and three committee rooms of sufficient size to accommodate all nine member states. To meet these needs we are commissioning a further architect's study to identify the most cost-effective way of improving this building. I hope that that will be completed and agreement on the improvement programme reached quickly so that work can get under way as soon as possible. In addition, it may be possible for the Assembly to use some of the space normally occupied by the Agency during Assembly sessions.

Despite suggestions to the contrary, the United Kingdom does not believe that this issue should be linked to other institutional questions such as collocation. Such linkage would inevitably delay the improvements to this building. However, we have noted your support for the idea of a European institute for strategic studies. Both this and Mr. Rocard's similar proposal are currently being examined by an institutional working group, which will report to the Permanent Council.

The United Kingdom approaches the idea with an open mind but it is not self-evident that there is a need for such an institute. There are already over twenty in the field, and the main ones already collaborate through the European Strategy Group, which is currently under French chairmanship. We will therefore need to be convinced that a new institute would have a genuinely distinctive and useful rôle.

Our ultimate objective remains that the ministerial bodies should be collocated in Brussels. It is the only logical location for an organisation that is seeking to develop a more cohesive European defence identity and hence to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance.

Finally, during the British presidency we have sought to improve relations between the Council and the Assembly, and I hope that we have had some success. In particular, I hope that the annual report and replies to your recommendations now reach you promptly, and I was delighted that members of the Assembly were able to participate in our seminar on changes in the public perception of European defence.

The United Kingdom has also been privileged since the beginning of this year to hold the chair of the Independent European Programme Group. Perhaps at this point I might therefore say a few words, as I promised the Presidential Committee I would, about recent developments in the IEPG. The cost-effective provision of modern military equipment remains among our

Mr. Younger (continued)

most important priorities. Although we all share the hope that early progress in Vienna will lead to increased security at lower levels of armaments, such progress will actually increase rather than reduce the importance of ensuring that our defence equipment is kept up to date and effective, or lessen the importance of our sustaining a competitive and efficient defence industrial base – quite the reverse.

Our objective during the United Kingdom chairmanship of the IEPG is to build on the excellent progress made in the revitalisation of this group since 1984 under first Dutch and then Spanish chairmanship. There is no doubt in my mind that, as a result of their efforts, and those of all member countries, the IEPG is now a far more dynamic and purposeful organisation. It is essential that this dynamism is maintained, because, in this time of shrinking or static defence budgets, better value for money has become even more important than in the past.

We believe that the IEPG has a major rôle to play in achieving this. We are all working hard to harmonise more of our operational requirements and to initiate viable co-operative equipment projects. We are also attempting to improve European research and technology co-operation – a subject touched on in the report before you by Mr. van der Werff – and, following on from the report of the European Defence Industry Study, we are moving ahead with the development of a more open and competitive European defence equipment market.

Naturally, none of this will happen overnight. That is why we have adopted a staged approach. At the Luxembourg ministerial in November, we agreed that the IEPG required some restructuring to ensure a proper emphasis on the more important aspects of its work. Thus, although the scope remains unaltered, we decided that research and development should be given a higher profile and that a single body should oversee the harmonisation of requirements as well as equipment programmes.

The result was the creation of a new panel responsible for research and technology, and the amalgamation of the two panels originally responsible for harmonising requirements and overseeing equipment projects. In addition, the IEPG has recently established a small secretariat in Lisbon, since we recognised that it would be difficult to make progress without a permanent secretariat to ensure continuous administrative support for the group's expanding and intensifying activities.

Having agreed the organisational changes, we have since attempted to move forward by agreeing numerous short- to medium-term objectives, together with time scales for their

implementation. This has given us a yardstick against which progress can be measured. Indeed, Panel 3, which oversees open market issues, is already making excellent progress. Nations have nominated focal points with which companies wishing to enter new markets can register an interest, and countries have agreed to begin to publish contract opportunities by the end of this year. Similarly, the new research panel – Panel 2 – is pursuing an ambitious European technology plan aimed at reducing duplication of effort and expense. It is too early to judge the outcome but the signs are promising.

The next step for the IEPG will be to set further short- to medium-term objectives. We must push forward if Europe is to support a viable defence industry and we must do so while avoiding protectionism or giving the impression that we are building a "Fortress Europe". As with WEU, so with the IEPG, our contribution is distinctly European, but our framework is the broader alliance, to which we seek to contribute dynamically.

For the United Kingdom, then, the last year has certainly been important, and for WEU equally a year in which our organisation has made its mark on the international scene. The process of revitalisation has continued and I am delighted that the United Kingdom has been in a position to build on past achievements and to help to take the process a step further forward.

Perhaps I might now turn to broader issues, for, as our seminar recognised, changes in public perceptions of defence are a key consideration at present. Certainly, as our alliance enters its fifth decade, there is much on which we can congratulate ourselves, but while we may look back with pride, there is no time for nostalgia. Nostalgia, I think, belongs to the serenity of a secure old age, with the fond recollections of a bygone day whose time is past; but it is not a luxury that we in the western alliance can yet afford. Perhaps one day we shall enjoy it, but ours, today, is the challenge of the prime of life. As the British like to say, life begins at forty. All around us the world is changing. We must respond with clarity and unanimity of purpose. Today, then, I may allow some reflection on the past, but only to remind each of us of the political and military foundations of our common security so that we can set with enthusiasm the agenda for another forty years.

The recent NATO summit – which, despite all the gloomy prognostications was outstandingly successful – has provided us with just such an excellent basis for moving forward; it also reflected some fundamental lessons, which our very successes often lead us to overlook. First, we should continue to be enthusiastic and pos-

Mr. Younger (continued)

itive about our achievements. The western alliance has a proven, winning formula. It is beginning to bear fruit in radical new developments in East-West relations. Let us by all means praise Mr. Gorbachev's boldness and realism, but at the same time let us recognise that it has been the steadfastness of NATO policies over the years that has played a major part in encouraging the changes now in progress.

Of course, it is not for our convenience that glasnost and perestroika are the ideas propounded to take the Soviet Union into the 1990s, but we can give praise where praise is due, while recognising that historical changes of this potential magnitude reflect not just the mesmerising influence of a dynamic individual but also a longer historical process – including the rivalry between two systems, in which we now see the East adopting our agenda and in part at least the very values for which the western alliance stands.

We must speak out when others sometimes give Mr. Gorbachev all the credit and we must portray the western alliance in a good light, not as wrong-footed and slow to respond. I hope that the summit has changed that perception once and for all. In truth, many of the “bold new initiatives” by Mr. Gorbachev are our own proposals played back to us. The final terms of the INF agreement, when we refused to be bullied by Soviet SS-20s, openness about facts and capabilities, the emphasis on verification and confidence-building measures enshrined in the 1986 Stockholm agreement, acknowledgement of the need for asymmetrical cuts aimed at military parity and defensive postures in Europe – these are the very things for which we have been pressing for years as indispensable to progress in arms control. We can be proud that it has been alliance solidarity and persistence that have laid the groundwork by persuading the Soviet Union that our aim is to do serious business.

The second lesson driven home at the summit is that we must continue to be realistic in our appraisal of the East. There is much to welcome in the changes now under way, but it would be folly to pretend that fundamental differences do not remain. I am not thinking here simply of the massive forces that the Warsaw Pact continues to keep in Europe – forces that, in key areas, will still outnumber ours by more than two to one even after the unilateral cuts announced by Mr. Gorbachev. I am thinking also of the repression we saw on the streets of Georgia earlier this year, and of the ease with which the old attitudes re-emerged when events did not seem to be going according to Mr. Shevardnadze's wishes, such as his threat, perhaps only a half-considered one, to retain SS-23s in breach of the INF treaty as an apparent ploy to stop western

modernisation of its nuclear forces, while of course Soviet modernisation continued.

The summit reminded us also of a third fundamental difference that continues to set us apart from the East. The repeated pressure from the Warsaw Pact for a denuclearised Europe may sound to some like a high-minded call for a better future, but to me, and I believe to most of us, it sounds more like an attempt to serve Soviet interests, and to sow division and weaken western cohesion in the process. For if one lesson stands out more clearly than any other from the past forty years it is that nuclear deterrence works.

No balance of conventional forces alone can take the place of the nuclear guarantee. Even if a Europe without nuclear weapons can be imagined – and since they cannot be disinvented, that is not easy to do – it would not – if war thereby was made more likely – be a safer place. That is a lesson we must hold on to if we are to set course for another forty years of peace. For peace has to be worked for. It can never be taken for granted. We must be open to the prospects for lasting change, without discarding the foundations of our present security. We must avoid drifting towards a measure of structural disarmament.

Of course I understand that a reduced scale of threat makes it more difficult to bear the burdens of defence. Other priorities may seem to take on a new and greater attraction. But that is a path that we must avoid. It is indeed the strength of our alliance that has played such a crucial part in setting us on the path to a new opportunity in Europe and if we are to achieve the goal of heightened security at lower levels of forces we must all continue to pull our weight in the alliance. To do so is essential not only for the cohesion of the West but also to ensure continuing progress in the East.

At the summit we therefore emphasised the continuing validity of the basic tenets of our creed: a continuing reliance on an effective combination of conventional and nuclear forces kept up to date, maintaining the strength of the alliance's transatlantic links, a fair division of the risks, rôles and responsibilities of our common defence, and the avoidance of new barriers that might otherwise lead to a “Fortress Europe 1992”. We also emphasised the importance of growing European political unity. A strong, free and dynamic Europe is as vital to North America's security as is the presence of substantial North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe to the defence of Western Europe.

In addition, we also agreed to exploit to the maximum opportunities for further progress on arms control. Our aims in this respect are set out

Mr. Younger (continued)

in the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament published last week, and they are energetically to tackle the problems that lie at the very heart of our security, such as the massive conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. President Bush's welcome initiative on conventional forces pushes even wider the door to progress on very substantial reductions in conventional forces to parity.

Our vision for Europe remains far reaching and clear: to ensure that war and intimidation are prevented and that military aggression is an option that no government would dare contemplate or hope successfully to undertake, and to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West. As part of this, we also challenged the governments of the East to break down the barriers that continue to divide us, to permit freedom of movement and ideas, and freedom of political choice – a straightforward message, powerfully reinforced by President Bush. These points are equally relevant whether in NATO, in WEU, in the IEPG, or in our respective national parliaments, for the fact is that our institutions are varied, but our interests much less so. There is a unity of purpose that underlies those institutional variations.

As I have argued today, I believe that our destiny lies in an imaginative extension of current arrangements rather than in new structures and we in WEU have an important rôle in educating our respective publics accordingly. The WEU platform is no longer new, but it certainly stands as one of our primary achievements since revitalisation. Yet it does not portray anything fundamentally at variance with our broader loyalties or, indeed, last week's NATO summit communiqué. On the contrary, the platform, despite its primary emphasis on the European contribution to the alliance, is quite clear on the key issues: that our security can be ensured only in close association with our North American allies, that the presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe constitutes an irreplaceable embodiment of the United States commitment to Europe and an indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent, that the balanced policy of the Harmel report – negotiations from strength – remains valid, and that each of us must carry our share of the common defence in both the conventional and the nuclear field in accordance with the principles of risk- and burden-sharing that are fundamental to allied cohesion. It is no coincidence that such words sound equally familiar in NATO communiqués, for they reflect the unity of purpose, the common framework, within which we in WEU seek to promote a distinctive and cohesive European contribution to the broader alliance.

So, what then of WEU in the past year, and its future? Have we contributed to European cohesion on defence issues? Have we encouraged a cohesive European contribution to the broader alliance? We can certainly say that the past year has been one in which WEU – and therefore its *raison d'être* – has most definitely been noticed. Of course, that is not the product of any one country's efforts but rather of shared determination and values some of which I have touched on today.

Nonetheless we set out a year ago with a platform on which to build, and I believe that progress has been made, perhaps not earth-shattering but certainly visible – visible to ministers when we discussed these various issues and visible to the public not least in the successful conclusion of the mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf and the accession of Spain and Portugal to our membership.

The Gulf operation, for example, could have been undertaken on a national or bilateral basis. Yet, when we considered this at our April ministerial in London, we agreed that the exercise was well worth while in terms of demonstrating to the watching world a unity of European purpose and determination that might otherwise have been thought to be lacking. Of course, it is in the nature of most out-of-area crises that their locations, timings and other details are essentially unpredictable and that our primary focus in terms of planning activities should therefore remain on the European theatre. Flexibility in our institutions and operations rather than detailed pre-planning for the unknown is therefore the key to an effective response to this kind of crisis. WEU has a useful rôle as a flexible political forum in which to consider such developments in the future. It should not, however, divert effort into detailed planning unless and until particular circumstances warrant it.

Similarly, I think we should not be slow to learn the lesson of Spanish and Portuguese accession. We welcome our new colleagues, but not just as members of a club: rather because their accession signifies a commitment to a shared ideal under the modified Brussels Treaty. Once again, that is a visible experience of European solidarity in defence of mutually shared values and interests.

These are the obvious highlights of the past year, but beneath the surface the day-to-day work on key issues like arms control, the use of space and military training continues. In all these ways, WEU can continue to complement and enhance the European contribution to the common defence.

May I then draw the threads together with a few closing remarks. WEU does not have a perfectly defined rôle or agenda. It is one of a number of European bodies whose work serves a

Mr. Younger (continued)

common purpose in bolstering the contribution of the European pillar to the alliance. Yet among those bodies, WEU has notable recent achievements and a unique rôle with its parliamentary Assembly's remit to consider defence matters.

It was therefore very fitting that President Bush should have singled it out for praise during Mr. Mitterrand's recent visit to the United States, when he "applauded the defence co-operation developing in the revitalised WEU, whose members", he noted, "worked with us to keep open the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf".

I hope that you, as fellow parliamentarians, will do all in your power to capitalise on such good publicity and the strengths of WEU, emphasising, each to his own respective parliament and public, that the requirement for alliance cohesion – and our determination to ensure it – is not diminished as we contemplate a vigorous fifth decade and a future full of opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address. You kindly told me that you would answer any members of the Assembly who wished to ask questions.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Secretary of State was certainly entitled to say that his visit was well timed. I am sure that many members of the Assembly will have welcomed his comments in his assessment of the future rôle of the organisation and his recognition of the resuscitation that the Ayatollah provided. Probably many Assembly members will share the Secretary of State's appreciation, qualified though it was, of changes within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

The Secretary of State said that the WEU Assembly should serve as a forum for frank discussion. As a contribution to that frank consideration, will the Secretary of State tell us whether he considers that the NATO agreement reached last week means that there will be no prospect whatever, even in the most peaceful of contexts, of any movement away from the short-range nuclear weapon, not only until after the negotiations on conventional weapons have been completed – assuming that that completion is satisfactory – but until the processes of conventional disarmament are well under way? Does that not mean that we shall be into the seventh decade of NATO, well into the twenty-first century, before there is any movement away from SNF in Europe? Will those weapons still be in place, even in the most peaceful context, well into the twenty-first century? Does the Secretary of State accept, especially if that

peaceful context applies, that that protracted timetable could well place serious strain upon the alliance and could cause considerable difficulty for some members of the alliance, especially if the welcome progress in the East is maintained?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Thank you very much, Mr. Hardy. We all know from the communiqué what timescale was laid down for the SNF negotiations and Mr. Hardy mentioned that timescale. It is a clear spelling out that for negotiations on the future of SNF there will need to be not just an agreement on the CFE reductions on conventional weapons, but some progress towards implementing it. The discussions can then start from the point that the implementation of any agreement on SNF would take place only after the completion of the CFE process. That is the technical position.

Mr. Hardy asked whether I thought that that would take for ever. The answer to that question lies in President Bush's suggested timetable. He suggested that it should be possible to make substantial progress on the CFE talks in six months or perhaps a year. That may seem to be very optimistic, but it is a challenge to be approached. If we can get matters moving at speed, it may be possible to move much more quickly than Mr. Hardy and others fear will be the case.

I must stress that the imperative of achieving that is not an imperative of any particular timing – speedily though we should like to make progress. The imperative is to proceed at each stage while maintaining our security. It was the unanimous view of members at the summit that we could not maintain our security if we were to allow the commencement of negotiations on shorter-range weapons before we had the absolute assurance of the conventional disparity disappearing and the prospect of its going. It is the principle of that, and the timing will follow if we make good progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, important though the summit was as regards the speeding up of disarmament negotiations in the conventional sector – provided the timetable is observed – I am critical of the other part of the outcome and I do not, although I am a German, refer only to short-range missiles.

When we look at the results, we see that there have been firm negotiations with stepped-up objectives in the sector of conventional

Mr. Scheer (continued)

weaponry. There are also negotiations on strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union – also referred to in the communiqué. On certain conditions there may be negotiations on short-range missiles.

But there is no mention of nuclear artillery, although there are thousands of such weapons; no mention of systems such as air-launched nuclear weapons or the new sea-launched nuclear weapons, cruise missiles, which also come under the modernisation programme. The whole problem of air- and sea-borne nuclear armaments receives as little attention as the British and French nuclear forces, which are of course also part of the problem.

All of which means that in the 1990s, particularly against the background of the hardening of the nuclear deterrent doctrine, we are probably faced with a decade of nuclear armament and not only in the West, but also, inevitably, by reaction on the other side.

It also means that if, as we all hope, we are successful in the negotiations on conventional disarmament, the status of nuclear weapons will increase. And yet nuclear weapons are the systems that will generate the greatest instability in the future, because of the technological developments now in progress and the high time-sensitivity and destructive capacity of such weapons.

This is undoubtedly a major problem, which we have to solve, and which has not been given its due weight in the evaluation of the summit. The problem embraces a whole series of grey areas, particularly in the European sector. In my view, if we look at the developments that may stem from this summit, in other words, the new problems that may very well be generated by it, the fundamental importance of the need for parallel negotiations on conventional and nuclear arms has not been recognised.

In other words, the crucial question is: when will the need for parallel negotiations be recognised, against the background of this undoubted problem; when will WEU member countries which have their own nuclear weapons begin to participate actively in the nuclear disarmament process – since the issue concerns European nuclear weapons and European security? This question is addressed to Great Britain and France.

My next question – and my last – is this: how, in the face of the strong support for nuclear deterrence, without even a time-limit, do we really picture this security that you have also mentioned in the context of north-south relations, when you spoke about out-of-area problems?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Scheer, I must ask you to confine yourself to one question.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – My problem is this: how can we want to sustain nuclear deterrence in the long term given the dangers of proliferation in other countries, which arise because we ourselves adhere so strongly to the principle of deterrence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I will endeavour to contribute by being as concise as I can. I fully understand that there are many possibilities in disarmament, upon which all of us wish to see progress made. There is a great temptation to take an enormous run at all of them at once. In that way, one might feel a lot better if one were tackling all the problems. I suggest most seriously that that is not a way to make the progress that we hope to make. There are all the individual items of conventional disarmament, nuclear disarmament, third country forces, chemical weapons, and it is enormously difficult to get all the provisions agreed. What is more, if I can take the conventional reductions – the CFE talks are one example – let us suppose that they are completely successful and we end up with parity at very much lower levels as suggested, but it will require Warsaw Pact countries to make the most enormous reductions in forces. It will be very difficult to do that. It is vital that the pressure to keep progress going on should not be diluted by pressure in other directions at the same moment.

Although I see the attraction of having a go at all those subjects at once, I urge all members to look soberly at the need to take them step by step, to achieve our aims in respect of one or two at the most, and then move to the next. That is the wise way that will produce more progress.

I must comment on the point about proliferation in other countries and the instability that it produces. It is of great concern in the nuclear field, certainly, and it is of greater concern in the chemical weapon field, where the ability for proliferation is so much easier and wider. We cannot disinvent those weapons. All we can do, with the maximum pressure against proliferation, is keep our eye on the ball. The ball is the main priority – for example, the START negotiations, CFE talks and progress on chemical weapons in the first instance – leading, under the summit formula, to the other matters later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – As the Secretary of State knows, I am a simple soul. I find it difficult to understand his references to the Soviet Union. He said that we in Britain say that life begins at forty. However, there is another saying, and it is that forty is the old age of youth and fifty is the youth of old age. For a minister who is in the youth of his old age, he shows a very unhealthy trust of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev visits Britain and is welcomed with open arms by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Thatcher. I saw the Secretary of State on the tarmac at Heathrow waving farewell with tears in his eyes. I said to myself: “He is a man who has a new-found friend”. Here in Paris I heard him say: “Like him, but do not trust him”. Is that to be the case in respect of Mr. Gorbachev? If so, we shall not make much progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I have the advantage over many members of the Assembly in that I have known Harry Ewing for many more years than they have. He is not such a simple soul as he makes out. I am delighted to answer his question, which is perfectly genuine, although sadly I was not among those waving farewell to Mr. Gorbachev, with or without tears. But that added a bit of colour to the question.

I see no problem – this happens with all of us in many international relations – in doing business on a trust basis with people in other countries while retaining a coldly practical attitude to precisely what is happening behind that trust. There is no evidence to suggest that that is not how the Soviet Union regards us, and it would be foolish to play by a separate set of rules in very important international negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – The Secretary of State said that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact continued to increase their armaments. What is his assessment of why they are doing that? What are their likely intentions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – There are two answers to that. First, to be absolutely reasonable, I think that to slow down, halt and reverse an enormous military production machine such as the Soviet Union has will be exceedingly difficult and slow, even with the best will in the world. We should

recognise that what we hope they are undertaking is very difficult and we should support them through it.

But in the days of Mr. Brezhnev and his earlier colleagues the objective was to build up an enormous superiority in weapons systems so that it would be possible for Warsaw Pact forces to mount a powerful and effective attack westwards if they wished to do so. What is enormously encouraging about the change over the past two or three years is the acknowledgement of the Soviet Union that it must change that basic aim. Many of us have talked to people in the Soviet Union about this. They recognise that, for them, it is entirely new territory. They admit openly that they have hardly addressed the enormously difficult military and technical problems of converting their posture to one that is defensive. They find it hard to do that, and they will find it very hard to do so in the future, but they say that they will try to do it.

The reason for the build-up was clear. We hope that the build-up will be put into reverse, but we must wait until we see that it has been done before we take the corresponding decisions to reduce our readiness.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – The Secretary of State has understandably stressed the evolving importance of Western European Union. In this process, does he foresee any evolution in the rôle of this Assembly? Will it become more than a sounding board, admittedly with a few more committee rooms whose echo the ministers may ignore?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I certainly see a much more positive rôle than that for the Assembly, and for WEU backed by the Assembly, in the future. The expansion of the rôle of the Assembly in formulating ideas, opening discussion and stimulating the NATO alliance to think about new problems and tackle them is enormously valuable, and, provided that we can equip the Assembly with the proper facilities to do so, and keep very close contact between the Council and the Assembly, we shall obtain a useful synthesis of views between the two sides of WEU.

WEU is not and is not likely to be an executive organ. We shall not have a military structure or any future rôle of that sort. We are ostensibly and definitely a collection of parliamentarians and ministers who can exert pressures in the right direction for the alliance.

Mr. Younger (continued)

I believe that the Assembly's rôle has developed, even during this year, and I support its developing further.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As you will remember, Secretary of State, the single European act provides that European security problems should also be the responsibility of the European Parliament. Recently, it was clearly and I believe irrevocably decided that defence problems should remain the exclusive province of the Assembly and WEU. However, during the present election campaign for the European Parliament the idea has been surfacing that MEPs should have the right to replace the national representatives as members of this Assembly. In our view, this would bring about a division between the decisions of the Assembly and those of the national parliaments. It would also make what you so rightly recommend, i.e. informing public opinion in each of our countries about our activities through the media, impossible.

I should like to know what you think about this proposed new type of parliamentarian in our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – My opinion, which I hope would be shared by most of us, is very clear. It is our rôle in WEU and in other organs such as the IEPG to retain close relations and regular contact with the European Community, its parliamentarians and ministers. But it is most important to preserve the clear definition that the European Community, with all its enormous responsibilities, does not have responsibility for defence. That is not in any way to devalue the importance of the EC to every aspect of our lives. It is to make the essential point that defence is different, for two reasons. First, the Treaty of Rome did not set out to involve the European Community in defence matters, and defence is of such great complexity that there is a strong argument for having a different forum to deal with it. The second reason is a practical one: the membership of the European Community is different from that of WEU, and not all its members are prepared to be involved in defence. One member of the EC is a neutral country. We must respect that.

All the suggestions that are flying about of amalgamating rôles, exchanging parliamentarians or having parliamentarians perform both rôles are wide of the mark. Defence is different.

It requires different people with different skills, but at the same time keeping in close contact with the community that it serves. That line is simple and easy to understand, and we should maintain it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Secretary of State has made an interesting statement, including his comments on the need for NATO and hence for the WEU countries as well, to retain nuclear weapons in the years to come, as part of our general defence concept as NATO countries. My question is in fact in two parts.

Firstly, The Hague platform emphasises that the countries, including the new members, undertake to maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional armaments as a means of preserving peace.

My second point concerns the continuing development of international negotiations. We in WEU want to be the voice, the united voice, of the Western European countries within the NATO alliance. Can the Secretary of State give us an assurance that the remark he has just made about the need to retain nuclear weapons is endorsed by all the member countries of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Yes, Sir, I think that I can give that undertaking. I was present at all the debates about the platform in the Council of Ministers at WEU, and very long and detailed they were. At the end, all the members present, without exception, wholly subscribed to the words in the platform. Those words stand, and I think that they lay clearly on the line our effective views about the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent and how we intend to do it.

It is worth adding also that, in all the NATO discussions that we have, whether in the Nuclear Planning Group or the Defence Planning Committee or wherever, every evidence is repeatedly given that all the NATO members, without any exception at all, subscribe to and support those main principles: the need for nuclear deterrence, the need for everyone to share in the responsibility of having that deterrence, and, of course, the proper mix of risks, rôles and responsibilities. There is no difference of opinion in NATO on the part of any government on those matters. That is something that we need to keep telling our publics, who sometimes get a different impression.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Secretary of State has said a great deal that is worth thinking about. He was kind enough to refer to the report that I am presenting to this Assembly on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, chaired by Mr. Wilkinson. In it you will find some of the ideas that you have just presented to us so I am glad we are on the same tack.

However, Mr. President, I believe a report has appeared in England, *The Politics of British Defence Procurement*, which claims that it is better to buy off the shelf in the United States. This would have two advantages: first, it would be cheaper, and second, it would mean there would be no problem with operational service, because the purchased part could be used straight away.

But what I am afraid of – and I have the impression that you are too – is that this would mean Europe wasting a very great deal of technological knowhow, and that we would then be exposing ourselves to a monopoly position in the United States.

How did the Secretary of State himself react to the report I have just mentioned, and what does he think is the solution to this problem?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I very much appreciate what Mr. van der Werff has said. I know that he has made a very good contribution on this subject in his report.

The dilemma here will remain with us. There is not a simple solution that will put this whole problem to bed. I see it this way. As the expense and the technical complexities of defence equipment get ever greater in every possible way, it is inevitable that there will be fewer occasions – I do not say none, but fewer – when individual systems of defence equipment will be wholly devised, constructed and completed in one country. Already, there are perhaps many fewer such occasions than we think.

There are enormous cross-currents of contracting and subcontracting and of buying and selling in defence equipment. Thus, any idea of a series of different islands of defence industries supplying their own people and exporting a little here and there to others is not the real world. The real world is that the vast majority of our defence equipment is, and more and more of it will be, in whole or part or in small parts, immensely complex and spread among different firms in our different countries.

That helps us in deciding how to deal with the dilemma that Mr. van der Werff has rightly described. The way to deal with it is, first, to encourage everyone to look for better value for money as the main priority. Of course, that sometimes conflicts with the other demands, and that has to be taken into account; but we will be very foolish if we do not start this consideration of the problem by looking for the best value for money. Getting equipment from poor value for money is a very short-term benefit. It is a much longer-term benefit to encourage everyone to look for the best value.

The second approach is to look at the question of defence industries. Here, any country – even including an economy the size of the United States – which tries to set up, run and maintain an independent defence industry will not succeed. We must therefore get used to collaborating. I accept that the report covers this: that collaboration can be more expensive, and that it can be a bit trying to make equipment with four or five different partners; but in the long run, the benefits of spreading the technology, the purchasing and the commercial contacts are infinitely to be preferred to any island mentality.

Therefore, there is no simple answer to Mr. van der Werff's problem, but we should go first for better value for money and then tailor each project according to the specific requirements of the piece of equipment concerned.

Lastly, we should look at the strategic strengths of our individual defence industries. Every one of us has various strengths – things that we do better than others – as well as things that we do not do so well. We should concentrate on, develop and support the strengths in our individual provision.

That is particularly relevant to the countries with less developed industries, which sometimes feel that they are a bit out in the cold for that reason, and which feel that the big contracting firms in the big countries will get all the business. But even there there is an enormously effective rôle for specialisation. Even the country with the least developed defence industry has some things that it can do better than the rest of us, and we must find what they are.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly welcome the range, the scope and the detail of the Secretary of State's report on progress within the IEPG. It was the fullest account of progress within that most important body that I have heard since I have been a member of the Assembly.

Would the Secretary of State carry that further by persuading the Council to institutionalise a

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

formal and regular mechanism whereby, let us say, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, on behalf of the Assembly, is kept fully and regularly informed of progress within the IEPG? As he has admitted, it is difficult to persuade our electorates, and certainly our colleagues in our national parliaments, that the best way of getting value for money is that joint approach through a European procurement which the Secretary of State described so fully. He has friends here, people who have made large sacrifices of their time and their political careers to pursue the common European good. It would help the work of the IEPG if that were capitalised upon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I thank Mr. Wilkinson most warmly for the support that he is giving to the importance of the rôle of the IEPG and I greatly welcome the way in which he presented his remarks.

For a few more weeks we have the coincidence of the presidency of WEU and of the IEPG. We expect that the United Kingdom will hold the presidency of the IEPG certainly for this year and possibly for next year also. When we hand the presidency of WEU to our Belgian colleagues I will pass on what has been said by Mr. Wilkinson and by other parliamentarians during our discussions this year, including the strong wish to have a regular and close update on the work of the IEPG. I am sure that the Belgian presidency will seek to achieve that in any way that it can and as an ordinary member of WEU we shall help in any way that we can.

On behalf of the IEPG I add that we would greatly welcome the closest possible contact that we can achieve conveniently with WEU, because we have a job to do in which you can help.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Although it was interesting to hear the Secretary of State's comments, I am sure that he is aware that there is still a strong body of opinion that says that had it not been for President Bush's initiative last week, there would have been a great deal of chaos among the European members of NATO.

Dealing specifically with one of the President's proposals, that relating to troop reductions, if during the next twelve months we see the Soviets reducing their levels to the same figure that President Bush has suggested as being

the figure to which American troops should be reduced here in Europe, what is the Secretary of State's thinking on fellow European members of NATO reducing their troops based here in Europe? What future discussions does the Secretary of State envisage about reductions in, for example, British troops in West Germany and for those other European countries that also have troops based in West Germany?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I fully appreciate Mr. Cox's concern about this. I envisage that the forum for the enormously difficult technical discussions on the reductions in conventional armaments will be the CFE talks in Vienna. In the coming months the negotiators there will have to plunge into a wealth of intricate detail about how the reductions will be effected, at what speed and with what verification. They will have to deal with such complicated matters as how the reduced armaments will be destroyed, which is what we hope will happen, and who will verify their destruction. The CFE talks in Vienna will deal with an enormous amount of detailed argument and discussion on such matters.

It follows that when those discussions reach their end, we shall have what we hope will be a series of targets for reductions to reach the ultimate aim, which is parity. It will then be necessary to pass those decisions to each side, to the Warsaw Pact on the one hand and to ourselves, on the western side, to work out how they will affect each nation's contribution. At this stage two things follow. It will be and is enormously unhelpful and destabilising and makes the whole process more difficult if individual European nations – and the same goes for the other side – make reductions prior to the establishment of the CFE reductions. It is much better to put all our eggs in the basket of getting the right result at the CFE talks. When we have that result we can work out how it affects each nation.

Of course, I do not know at the moment Britain's contribution to the reduction, or for that matter the contribution of any of the other component countries. That will be a further stage in the happy days that follow what I hope will be the complete agreement reached at the CFE talks. We must not pre-empt the eventual solution by structural disarmament in the meantime. That point is important if we are to achieve sensible negotiations and good results.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Irmer.

Mr. IRMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have two ques-

Mr. Irmer (continued)

tions to put to the Secretary of State, because I have never been able to understand his government's position.

My first question is this: given the Soviet Union's considerable superiority in short-range nuclear missiles, would not any reduction in these weapons benefit the West, irrespective of the progress and outcome of efforts to achieve disarmament in the conventional sphere?

My second question is this: why has the British Government always opposed negotiations on short-range weapons on the grounds that they are bound to result in the third zero option? I am in no way a supporter of the third zero option at the moment, but I feel it must be kept open as an option. In the case of short-range weapons would it not in fact be an advantage if, for example, an agreement was reached on equal ceilings, at the West's present level, for instance, or if the equal ceilings were set at a lower level, without this necessarily meaning the third zero option? These questions apply regardless of progress at the CFE negotiations in Vienna.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I appreciate the reason for that question but I would not consider it irrespective of the progress of CFE talks because the two are intimately bound up together. I see immediately the superficial attraction in that the Soviet Union has one thousand five hundred of those weapons and we have eighty eight. I see the superficial attraction in saying that we cannot lose in that discussion because clearly there will be an advantage to the West in that.

However, we shall ignore at our peril the undoubted fact that it has long been a major objective of the Warsaw Pact to get nuclear weapons out of central Europe so that its conventional strength will be uninhibited in regard to both what it can do or what it can threaten to do. What concerns us greatly about the negotiations on shorter-range weapons, which I am sure would be entered into in the best of good faith, is that, pressures being what they are, the moment that such negotiations were entered into the pressure for going towards zero would possibly blind everyone to the essential importance of maintaining nuclear deterrents. If that were to happen and without shorter-range nuclear weapons, the credibility of the entire nuclear deterrent and of the flexible-response strategy would be seriously impaired. In those circumstances, the enormous conventional

superiority of the Warsaw Pact would be a fearsome threat.

This is a matter of prudence. Moving step by step and maintaining a feeling of security for both sides throughout the process of discussion is important. In those discussions and negotiations it is as important that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact should feel secure as it is that the West should feel secure. Both sides must feel secure.

The CFE talks and the reduction of conventional weapons systems – one hopes to parity at a level that may prove to be lower than that at present held by NATO – is an enormous task. It will involve a complicated mathematical calculation and the reduction of more than half of the present Soviet forces. That is a real objective. Until we have achieved that, we cannot weaken the nuclear deterrent and the flexible response upon which it is based. For that reason we should be foolish, until that has happened, to embark on negotiations to reduce a weapons system which in the present situation is essential to our ability to defend ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in his answer to the last question the Secretary of State emphasised once again that nuclear weapons are necessary to prevent war here in Europe. In his reply to Mr. Scheer's question, on the other hand, he expressed his concern about the dangers inherent in the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons. I detect some inconsistency in this, indeed a kind of schizophrenia among the nuclear powers: on the one hand, the need for nuclear weapons to prevent war, and on the other, the need for non-proliferation. If it were true that nuclear weapons prevented wars, then nuclear weapons would, logically, have to be supplied to the various parties involved in any conflict or war in the world, in order to bring about peace.

Does the Secretary of State agree with me that, since 1945 at least, the various European countries have learnt a little more sense from the experience of the second world war – or, for that matter, all wars in Europe this century – and that this has been far more decisive in preventing war than the existence of certain weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. YOUNGER (*Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I would not agree with that. Those who doubt my disagreement should cast their minds back through history. History shows that wars have arisen with unfailing regu-

Mr. Younger (continued)

larity as a result of all sorts of circumstances. There have been many causes of wars and there are very few common factors. However, if there is any common factor in the ways in which wars have occurred, from ancient times to the present day, it must be that when one side in a conflict believes that it has a superiority that will enable it to prevail over the other side through attack, a war will break out. No one except the irrational starts a war convinced by military advisers that he will lose that war – although we might think of some examples of that happening at which we might wonder.

A rational person plans a war only when he believes that he can win it. I strongly believe that the regrettable arrival on the scene of nuclear weapons – regrettable in the sense that if they had not been invented, we would be facing fewer problems – has produced a weapon that prevents the rational calculation of a war being made with any reasonable degree of confidence.

The existence of a credible nuclear response, even if a country has a superiority in weapons that gives it a good chance of winning a war, causes that country to think twice, as it must, before embarking on a conflict. That is the rationale for why I strongly believe, not that nuclear weapons can necessarily and dramatically prevent any war in future, but that they are a far more effective deterrent to wars than any weapons system that our forefathers may have had.

Mr. Soell asked a very fair question. He said that that must mean that everyone needed a nuclear weapon to remain safe and that everyone who did not have one had better get one as quickly as possible. That is taking a sound argument in one set of circumstances and extending it ridiculously to another set of circumstances on which it has no bearing. The situation in Europe, for better or for worse, and the situation that exists in some other parts of the world, is one in which there is an enormous and sophisticated military strength sitting poised waiting in case it is needed to go into action. In those circumstances, the nuclear deterrent has an effect. In a small state situation somewhere in the third world, the nuclear weapon involves a different set of calculations. I do not advocate that the deterrent principle, which I believe works extremely well in the East-West situation in Europe and to some extent in Asia, can be extended elsewhere. That would not be appropriate even if it could be sensibly organised. Also the nature of the peoples, places and areas elsewhere in the world is such that it could not be sensibly or safely organised. For those reasons, we must stick with the present deterrent posture in central Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That brings us to the end of the debate.

All that remains is for us to thank you, Minister, for your outstanding contribution to the work of the Assembly.

6. State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1183 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the state of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north, Document 1183 and amendments.

The debate was concluded yesterday.

I have been informed that four amendments have been tabled. They will be called in the order in which they relate to the text, that is, Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Amendments 1, 2 and 3 have been tabled by Mr. Fourré and others.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In paragraph *(i)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “NATO” and insert “Atlantic Alliance”.

Amendment 2 reads as follows:

2. In the draft recommendation proper, before paragraph 1, leave out “NATO” and insert “the Atlantic Alliance”.

Amendment 3 reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 1 *(a)* of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “NATO” and insert “Atlantic Alliance”.

I call Mr. Fourré to support these amendments.

I see that he is not here.

Mr. Caro, do you wish to support them?...

Since these amendments are not supported, they will not be put to the vote.

Mr. Fourré and others have tabled Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“4. That the development of military exchanges between Norway and France and the joint training of units with similar rôles be encouraged;”

The President (continued)

Does anyone wish to support this amendment?...

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should be very glad, Mr. President, to speak to Amendment 4.

As regards the first three amendments, I was not informed of the significance of the paragraph. My personal opinion is that it refers to specifically NATO missions and, although the Atlantic Alliance covers the activities of NATO, I personally saw nothing basically wrong.

I now come to Amendment 4. Having studied Mr. Speed's report, Mr. Fourné, Mr. Pontillon and Mr. Bassinet want to amend paragraph 4 to read: "4. That the development of military exchanges between Norway and France and the joint training of units with similar rôles be encouraged;".

The paragraph proposed by the Rapporteur and approved by the committee refers explicitly to "the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank" and then goes on: "apart from their replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action rapide being assigned to Norway".

We all know what the relations are, in the field of strategic studies, between my country and NATO, to which it still does not belong. But the words our Rapporteur uses seem to me vital. They concern first, "the withdrawal of Canadian forces" and then "their replacement by other allies" – which is very important – and among those allies a very specific element, the force d'action rapide which comes under French national authority.

So, Mr. President, speaking at short notice as I am, I support this amendment; but, since it is I who am supporting it, I do so in the following form. I should like to keep the following wording used by the Rapporteur in paragraph 4: "that in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their replacement by other allies...", and then add: "the development of military exchanges between Norway and France and joint training of units with similar rôles" in the words used by the members tabling the amendment; finally, if possible, I would end with the phrase: "and in particular assistance from the force d'action rapide".

Since I am defending an amendment which I had no hand in drafting, that is how I would word it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With all due respect, Mr. Caro, I cannot accept these changes which have not been submitted to me within the time-limits prescribed by the Rules of Procedure to which I, above all people, must adhere. I would, incidentally, urge all members of the Assembly wishing to table amendments to do so in accordance with the rules. An incident of this kind happened once before: the Committee on Rules of Procedure looked into the matter and concluded that such amendments were not in order.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment is wholly unacceptable. I have dealt with this subject very fully in paragraph 8.13 of the explanatory memorandum. The paragraph as it stands refers to the Canadian force and says that consideration should be given to the force d'action rapide, which is a highly professional body and certainly has acting and reinforcement capability in the north. Indeed, last year and this year, units of the force d'action rapide have trained with Norwegian units. I remind everybody that in the past few days we have been celebrating the forty-ninth anniversary of an Arctic action in which the predecessors of the force d'action rapide were doing just what we are advocating in the report. I hope that the amendment is rejected and that paragraph 4 can stand as it is written.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?...

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1183.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

¹. See page 21.

***7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1182 and amendments).

2. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1191).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 6th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1182 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. de Beer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Feldmann, Mr. de Beer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman*), Mr. Scheer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Klejdzinski (point of order), Mr. Hardy, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Scheer, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Feldmann, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. de Beer.
4. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China (*Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft resolution*, Doc. 1191).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kittelmann (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Caro, Mr. Fassino, Mr. Ahrens, Lord Newall, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Feldmann, Mr. Cox, Mr. Sarti, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John Stokes, Mr. Martino, Mr. Gabbuggiani, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Müller, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Eicher, Mr. Encarnaçao (*Observer from Portugal*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. Cox (point of order).
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1182 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on

Defence Questions and Armaments on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1182 and amendments.

I call Mr. de Beer, Rapporteur.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report entitled current aspects of arms control begins by saying that writing a report on this subject at the moment is a fascinating but risky matter: fascinating, because we are experiencing an improvement in East-West relations which until recently very few would have judged possible; risky, because events present themselves at such a high speed that what is written today might land in the wastepaper basket tomorrow. These words had almost prophetic significance, because they have come true.

The report was written two and a half months ago. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments approved it after two meetings, a month and a half ago. This was at a time when there was much disagreement among the NATO partners on future action as regards short-range nuclear weapons. Nor was it clear what was going to happen in Vienna. But, one week before this part-session, agreement was reached at the NATO summit in Brussels and NATO's ranks have closed again.

It is quite astonishing to see how closely the recommendations made by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments correspond

1. See page 24.

Mr. de Beer (continued)

to the decisions taken in Brussels six weeks later. When I look at the operative text of the recommendation I see, for example, that a start is being made at this moment on paragraph 1, which recommends us to strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings for conventional armaments. When I look at paragraph 4, which calls for everything that is not explicitly excluded to be included in the CFE talks, we should realise, of course, that this is a reference to combat aircraft.

As you know, the Vienna mandate does not specify whether combat aircraft should be included in the disarmament talks, because there was no agreement at that time. The Warsaw Pact countries wanted them included, but this was opposed by NATO. We of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments recommended that, if things went well and the talks proceeded more smoothly, combat aircraft should not be excluded from the disarmament talks. But when I, as Rapporteur, and the Clerk of the committee had various preliminary talks with the ambassadors of various countries in Vienna, this was taboo. Aircraft were not to be included in the disarmament talks. This was the climate in which we made this recommendation.

And what do we see now? Mr. Bush's initiative has led to a breakthrough. Not only are combat aircraft being included in the talks – an actual offer of a 15% reduction in combat aircraft and helicopters has been made: a much more radical proposal has been put forward. The proposal is not that the aircraft should be withdrawn to the other side of the Atlantic, which in the terms of the Vienna mandate would constitute an arms reduction, but that they should be scrapped. We made this recommendation six weeks ago. It has now been agreed at the NATO summit.

In paragraph 5 we recommend that the equal ceilings on both sides should be kept well below the present NATO levels, at a suggested 10%. This has been taken up. When we were having our first exploratory talks, this was a subject that could not be discussed. Representatives of NATO countries – I will not quote names – said that we should at least retain the NATO level, because otherwise the proper defence of the West was not possible. Here again, there has been a breakthrough.

In paragraph 6 we propose that the member countries participate in the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, but decide on production and possible deployment at a later time. As you know, this was also agreed in Brussels.

In paragraph 7 the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments propose that more

detailed and more complete figures on our defence budgets should be produced. This, of course, applies not only to the West but primarily to the East, where these figures are still extremely vague. As you all know, the first step in this direction has been taken by Mr. Gorbachev. I read the opening article in *The International Herald Tribune* of 31st May, and I will quote the headline: "Gorbachev reveals real arms budget of \$129 billion". No details have yet been given, of course, though we hope they soon will be. But it is clear that the first step has been taken towards the action requested in our recommendation.

Mr. President, you might almost think Mr. Bush had the report in his briefcase when he went to Brussels. Two possible options or attitudes are now open to us. One attitude would be disappointment because, just one week before this part-session began, a number of decisions were made in Brussels that have taken some of the wind out of our sails. The other attitude could be one of satisfaction at the fact that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has produced a report that hits the nail on the head, in the sense that six weeks before the meeting in Brussels it put forward a number of ideas which seem to form the basis of a unanimous decision in Brussels. I feel, Mr. President, that the second attitude would be the right one: in other words, no disappointment.

None of this means that the recommendation is now completely out of date. There is still plenty left to be done. There is paragraph 2, for example, which concerns verification. As we have seen from the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the INF treaty, verification is a fairly simple matter. After all, all INF weapons have to be destroyed. That makes verification easy. They should not exist, and if they do, something is wrong. But, of course, in the case of the CFE negotiations verification is far more complicated. Not only are many more weapons systems involved, but the aim is reduction rather than complete elimination. As a result, the two sides must not only reveal the numbers of the various types of weapons and of military personnel they have on their territory in the European theatre, but must also state precisely where they are. Otherwise, verification will in fact be impossible. This is true both of verification from the air, with satellites, and of visual verification at ground level. We make a clear recommendation on this, which still stands, of course.

I must also mention paragraph 3, the proposal to ensure that practical research is carried out on verification techniques and to have it carried out by WEU, which has the expertise to draw up the necessary plans.

In paragraph 7 we recommend the publication of details of the defence budgets. Mr. Gorbachev

Mr. de Beer (continued)

has merely given a total figure for the Soviet budget, one that includes all investments. This is a valuable step, but it obviously goes only part of the way towards meeting the terms of our recommendation. More is needed; greater transparency is needed. So there is still quite a lot to be done in this respect.

In paragraph 8 we propose the establishment of a liaison officer to observe the talks in Vienna on WEU's behalf and report back to WEU. He should be provided by the embassy of the country of the current Chairman-in-Office of WEU.

Mr. President, the recommendation needs to be amended in view of the outcome of the Brussels summit. Paragraph 6 calls on all WEU countries to participate in the preparations for the replacement of the Lance missile, but does not envisage a decision on deployment and production at this stage. However, it was decided in Brussels under paragraph 49 of the comprehensive concept that it should be open to each member state of NATO to decide if it would participate in the preparations for the replacement of the Lance missile.

The wording of our recommendation therefore needs to be amended, because we do not want to exclude the possibility of member countries taking their own decisions. Consequently, the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and your Rapporteur have jointly tabled an amendment in their own names with a view to expanding this paragraph to bring it into line with the decision taken in Brussels. Unfortunately, we had no opportunity to consult the full Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which is why we have resorted to this procedure. But we hope the other members will also agree to it.

Mr. President, I should like to conclude this presentation with a few words on the nuclear aspect, since the problem of short-range nuclear forces – SNF – is obviously the most important item in this debate. Considering the amendments that have been tabled here, it is also attracting the most interest.

In the recommendation I have tried to make the kind of proposals and to use the kind of formulations that everyone can accept, albeit with some difficulty. In short, I have tried to reach a compromise. Not everyone will say that the result is precisely what he wanted, but I hope that everyone can live with it. From the results of the voting in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, that is indeed possible, but it would, of course, be unfortunate if differences of opinion were to flare up again during this part-session, especially now that

agreement has been reached in Brussels. I feel it would also be very bad for the standing of WEU's parliamentary Assembly. I therefore appeal to all members to stick closely enough to the compromise not to make a mess of the result achieved in Brussels.

As Rapporteur, it is my privilege to present my own view of the nuclear problem in the report and I will do this very briefly. We must not abandon hope of eventually achieving a Europe free from nuclear weapons but we must realise that this is an ideal which cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future. The British Secretary of State, Mr. Younger, made it very clear this morning how effective the nuclear deterrent has been, and how well it has maintained peace and security, especially in Europe, where the period since 1945 has been the longest without wars since the Middle Ages. I agree with him that we undoubtedly owe this to the presence of nuclear weapons.

It means that we have to maintain something of an arsenal, a mix of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, for the time being if we want to perpetuate this situation and if we do not want to jeopardise our security. This is also set out in The Hague platform, which was signed by all parties.

When I say that I do not want to give up hope of our possibly scrapping even the SNF one day, I am referring more to the political situation. I do not think it is enough for us to have equal ceilings on conventional armaments on both sides at a given moment. That is not enough to justify the complete elimination of short-range nuclear weapons. Something else is needed. Not only must the disarmament negotiations succeed, but the political situation in Eastern Europe must also be such that we can eliminate these weapons without risk to ourselves. We must have sufficient confidence in régimes of the kind represented in Eastern Europe to justify our abandoning some of our security, and that, I am afraid, will be a long time in coming.

There have been encouraging developments. That is why the CSCE negotiations in Vienna are very important, since they must form the basis of a better understanding between East and West. There are also some very encouraging developments in the Council of Europe, for instance the special guest status that has been offered to a number of Eastern European countries. Expectations are high, but we must be realistic and appreciate that results have to be achieved before we can take this step.

Once again, these are personal reflections which, though they appear in my report, are not to be found in the recommendation. I have been very careful to limit myself to saying that a decision on the Lance missile should be deferred until later. I hope the WEU Assembly is able to accept this compromise text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy, the first speaker on the list.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – First, I must apologise for missing the first part of Mr. de Beer's speech. A number of us were meeting our Secretary of State and, as members will understand, we cannot be in two places at the same time, although that might often be desirable. I congratulate Mr. de Beer and thank him for the considerable work that he has undertaken, which is demonstrated by the report. I congratulate also the committee on the serious consideration that it has given to this most important and, I am sure that the Assembly will entirely agree, topical report.

I shall go through the recommendations relatively briefly, because much in both the preamble and the draft recommendations will unite the Assembly almost to the point of enthusiasm. Paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are absolutely first class. They are the sort of paragraphs that some of us have been hoping to see presented in a report to this Assembly for years. Now they can be presented and no one in the Assembly could possibly object to them unless that person was of the most prehistorically outdated mind. The same is true of the eighth paragraph in the preamble and of draft recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, which are all appropriate, wise and acceptable.

However, I have reservations about paragraphs (vi) and (vii) in the preamble and about recommendations 5 and 6. My point about paragraph 5 of the recommendations is only minor. The end of the first sentence of that draft recommendation says: "disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a matter of secondary importance".

That is why I am anxious about the reference in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation to the figure of 10%. I should prefer us not to be tied to that specific figure. I hope that the Assembly will consider carefully an amendment to broaden that provision a little so that it will not seem an inconsistency or clash with the last part of draft recommendation 1.

My real anxiety is about the reference to short-range nuclear weapons. I shall not take long going over that ground, although members will realise from the sixth paragraph of the preamble that we have cause for concern because of a somewhat jarring note which states:

"Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent – even with a balance of conventional armaments – and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the foreseeable future."

I do not believe that one can use the words: "even with a balance of conventional arma-

ments" and then state that it: "remains a necessity in the foreseeable future" because the two things are contradictory to some extent.

I am not in any way saying that the German interpretation of the NATO agreement is entirely inappropriate, but I detect a difference between the German interpretation of the NATO agreement and that offered by the present government in the United Kingdom. Some people are saying: "Nuclear weapons are here almost for ever", and the tone of paragraph (vi) of the preamble seems to endorse that assessment, and other people are saying: "If we can see early progress in conventional negotiations" – which seems very much a possibility – "we could see further early commencement of negotiations on the short-range nuclear weapons". For us to assume – it is implicit in the report that there is such an assumption – that a long time will elapse before there is progress in the conventional negotiations, seems to imply a degree of pessimism that is entirely inappropriate.

I hope that we shall see that slight degree of imprecision in draft recommendation 5, which the present political situation justifies. However, I also hope that when we are considering amendments at the end of this debate, we shall also see an injection of hope into the consideration of short-range nuclear weapons.

We must take a longer view. A great deal has been achieved in recent months. Perhaps the most significant achievement was the publication of the Soviet Union's defence budget the other day. Indeed, many of us regard that as possibly the most significant step of the past two or three years, because it is an acknowledgment of the enormous burden that the Soviet Union bears. We know that it is an enormous burden, but we must understand also the substantial burden upon our own shoulders and on our taxpayers and on our communities.

I end with a request for a long-term consideration. Inevitably, during the past forty years the vision of both East and West has been between the East and the West on the political plane but if one is to consider long-term international stability, an increasing amount of attention will have to be paid to the North-South plane. If we so use all our resources in the East and in the West in preparing for Armageddon, we shall not have available those resources that could promote the stability that we so wish to see in the twenty-first century.

Again, I congratulate the committee and I thank the Rapporteur. I should be particularly grateful if the Assembly would take a favourable view of the suggestions that I have advanced in what I hope has not been too long a contribution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I join with my colleague, Mr. Hardy, in apologising to the Rapporteur, Mr. de Beer, for missing his opening remarks. Like Mr. Hardy, I was at a meeting with the Secretary of State. I sincerely apologise to Mr. de Beer. May I also explain that as a new member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, having moved from the General Affairs Committee to the Defence Committee, I supported the report in the Defence Committee. I congratulate the Rapporteur on the nature of his report, because it was not an easy report to put together. Events were moving quite rapidly at the time and it was difficult to foresee what was likely to happen in the few weeks and months that lay ahead. If later in our proceedings I support some of the amendments, that is not meant as a criticism of the Rapporteur's report. Rather it is a reflection of the way in which events have moved over the past few weeks. Normally, if I support a report in committee, I would stand by that whatever happened in the plenary session of the Assembly.

Having explained the background to what I shall do later in our proceedings, I want now to speak briefly in general terms about arms limitations and the changing scene with which we are faced. I begin by taking up a point made by Mr. de Beer. He said that we must never give up the hope of a world free of nuclear weapons. I share that hope. However, I want to take that a stage further.

As the cold war melts and evaporates, other worries begin to emerge. If that day arrives, and I hope to see that day, my great worry is that there will still be forces in world defence politics which will seek to frustrate that hope becoming a possibility and then a reality. One of the jobs before the Western European Union Assembly over the next two or three years is to keep that hope alive. I see signs at the moment of political forces being lined up to try to prevent that hope from becoming first a possibility and then a reality.

The media continue to talk about world leaders "snatching" and "grasping" the initiative. No one was more delighted than I when President Bush last week, according to the world media, "grasped" the initiative. I hope that in the next few months President Gorbachev will "grasp" the initiative back and then President Bush will "grasp" the initiative again. The massive change in world politics over the past few years means that as world leaders "grasp" the initiative in terms of defence, they reduce the level of numbers of troops and the level of forces deployed throughout the world. Ten years ago, world leaders "grasped" the initiative to increase the weapons stockpiles.

Therein lies the hope. Therein also lies one of the difficulties facing us. Mr. de Beer quite rightly mentioned the difficulties of verification. That will definitely be one of the great difficulties. One of the tasks that the Assembly should set itself during the next two or three years is to ensure that, once the agreements have been reached, the arms and force reductions actually take place. It is possible that so much is on offer that we do not know what is actually happening in terms of arms reductions. I suggest that we should set up an arms force reduction audit commission to ensure that the reductions actually take place. To use a sporting analogy, it is almost as if Real Madrid were bidding £4 million for this player, £4 million for that player and £4 million for the next player instead of actually buying anyone. If we simply enter into bargaining with each world leader presenting proposals for weapons and force reductions without anything taking place, we shall simply be deceiving the people of the world.

I do not intend to detain the Assembly. Basically, I have said most of what I wanted to say. However, over the past few weeks we have seen a massive shift in opinion. The Soviet Union has shifted, the United States has shifted and here, in my natural, open and honest state, I must say that even the British Labour Party has brought about – and I say this seriously – one of the biggest changes in its defence policy of the past forty years. I do not want to reveal to the Assembly whether I agree with that change. However, I make the point that the British Labour Party has brought about the biggest change in its policy on defence for forty years.

The scene is shifting. It is constantly moving and evolving. In that context, surely no one can take up an entrenched position. I am absolutely certain that all the offers and proposed packages must be implemented once all the discussions, talks and negotiations have taken place. Herein I believe that not only has the Assembly a rôle to play, but so has its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I end where I began by congratulating Mr. de Beer on his constructive report.

(*Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Like my British colleagues, I apologise to our Rapporteur, Mr. de Beer, for missing his opening remarks, as I had to be present at the meeting of the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence. However, I most warmly congratulate Mr. de Beer on the balance of his report, the assiduity of his research and the soundness of his proposals, which have been borne out to a considerable extent by the

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

communiqué of the NATO summit in Brussels.

I am deeply saddened by the approach of the socialists in the Assembly. I must be overtly and explicitly political in this respect. My colleague from the United Kingdom, Mr. Ewing, said that we should never give up the hope of a world free from nuclear weapons. That is a hope that he and others may carry to the grave. The reality is that nuclear weapons will not be disinvented in this world. However successful the measures of nuclear arms control that are being pursued by the Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances, proliferation is a fact of life.

The People's Republic of China already has nuclear weapons. Would we wish totally to disarm ourselves? We know what a country that is now, if the scales had not fallen from our eyes some time before. We are conscious that other countries have already acquired nuclear weapons – the Indians certainly, probably the Israelis, maybe the South Africans, conceivably the Pakistanis – and others are seeking them most earnestly, such as the Iranians and the Libyans. In the circumstances, would it be wise for us totally to disarm ourselves of nuclear weapons? I think not.

Mr. Hardy welcomed the fact that the Soviets have published their defence budgets. We are pleased in so far as there is a measure of enhanced candour on the part of the USSR, but we should not forget that a substantial and critically important part of the USSR's defence spending is hidden within the space and science budgets. It is because the USSR has been devoting such substantial resources that it has been able to conduct the major modernisation programme that remains such a threat to the West.

Amendments 2, 3 and 5 are supported by no less than the leader of the Socialist Group in the Assembly, Mr. Stoffelen, the Chairman of the German Socialist Group, Mr. Soell, the leader of the United Kingdom Socialist Group, Mr. Hardy, while Mr. Klejdzinski and Mr. Scheer are consciously distancing themselves from the unanimous agreement of the NATO summit which recently took place so successfully in Brussels. First, on Amendment 2, they are diverging from the WEU platform which clearly stated that we are agreed as members of WEU that an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons is required for our common defence.

Secondly, on Amendment 3, to delete paragraph (vii) of the preamble, they are again distancing themselves from the decision at Brussels to continue with such developments until such time as a final decision is required about the

production, and perhaps eventual deployment, of a Lance replacement.

Thirdly, on Amendment 5, to delete paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation, they are carrying Amendment 3 even further, because it is important that we maintain the momentum of development of the Lance replacement, since we ought to keep in mind the example of what happened over the Doppel-Beschluss twin-track decision of 1979. It was the willingness of NATO to develop and deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons, Pershing IIs and cruise missiles which led eventually to the successful INF accord and the elimination of both sides of that category of weapons. If we were in advance to forgo any developments in this respect as an alliance, it would fatally inhibit the leverage that we could bring to bear on the Soviet Union in this critical aspect of arms control.

Last but not least, I am especially saddened by Amendment 6 from the FDP representative, Mr. Feldmann, who urges the start of negotiations on SNF. The whole point of the NATO communiqué and the joint decision reached by the alliance is that we have to secure conventional reductions first and put pressure on the Soviets to bring about those conventional reductions, to bring about a parity in conventional forces, rather than maintain the preponderance on the Soviet side that impels us to keep nuclear weapons on ours.

These amendments are critically damaging and perplexing. When the report came before the committee it was passed thirteen to nil, with only two abstentions. One gentleman, Mr. Klejdzinski, actually voted in favour of the report and then had the gall to introduce these amendments. That is very strange. If I have misinterpreted him, I apologise. I do not wish to be rude.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I abstained.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I withdraw my remarks. He was being entirely consistent, and I apologise to him. Nevertheless, the socialists here are being far more critical than they were in the committee, even though at the NATO summit progress was made in a direction of which we can all sensibly approve.

Mr. de Beer has done the Assembly a service. I welcome his report, and I hope that our socialist friends will have second thoughts and will withdraw their amendments, recognising them as divisive and as potentially setting the policies of WEU on a course different from that unanimously adopted by the NATO alliance. All strength to Mr. de Beer. Let the amendments be withdrawn and the report be passed by the Assembly *nem con*, as it was in the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I also wish to express my thanks to the Rapporteur and his colleagues. Not only is the subject fascinating in itself, but this was a necessary job, which in my view had to be done by us, as Europeans. The report provides a good review of past and present developments in arms control.

We should feel no disappointment that Brussels has overtaken us and arrived at an agreement. After all, NATO had to give itself a fortieth birthday present of some kind, and we can congratulate ourselves that the gift turned out to be so generous and a cause for general satisfaction. We can all be pleased with the outcome of Brussels, which goes some way to confirming the correctness of the line taken in your report. We should not in this place presume to improve on or to lag behind Brussels, and we should not muddy the clarity achieved by the conclusion reached in Brussels. I make this point with particular regard to the modernisation of the Lance missiles.

I am grateful to the Rapporteur for taking up the suggestion that paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation should be clarified, since we as Germans do not wish to participate in development and research work on short-range nuclear missiles and are in fact prohibited from doing so by our law. We have renounced once and for all the development, research and production of A, B and C weapons, and that is why we simply agreed in Brussels that this was a national decision on the part of the Americans. Nationally speaking, every parliament can express its views on the matter.

With regard to the current aspects of arms control, I consider it very important to say a word on the negotiations, and that, Mr. Wilkinson, is the reason for my tabling this amendment as no category of weapon should be excluded from the negotiations. How is the enormous Soviet superiority in the SNF field to be reduced, if not by verifiable results arrived at by negotiation?

I felt that paragraph 6 of the recommendation should be followed by an additional paragraph of a general nature, providing a stimulus for negotiations. I wished to propose an open formulation which neither approximated too closely to the British view nor stood in the way of German agreement. I believe that we should enter into negotiations with an open formula of this kind, which should be limited neither by time, as we would have wished, nor by content. This was intended to provide a platform on which we could all stand, but this is a matter we

shall be able to discuss further when this amendment is introduced.

As paragraph (iv) of the preamble says, it is in my view most important that we adhere to the principle of equal ceilings. What is at issue here is not percentage reductions but the concrete principle of equal ceilings. In other words: whoever has more must scrap more.

You will no doubt all agree that the 10% limit mentioned in paragraph 5 of the recommendation proper can only be taken as a guide. I should personally be glad if the percentage turned out to be significantly higher.

Paragraph (v) of the preamble is very important. The offensive capability, of the Warsaw Pact forces especially, must be eliminated. Both sides should bring about structural changes which also lay clearer emphasis on the defensive nature of our armed forces.

I would now like to add a word about paragraph (vi) of the preamble. A number of speakers have already referred to the nuclear deterrent and to the mix of weapons which has to be accepted for the foreseeable future. What I say is: “for the foreseeable future in the present circumstances.” This is the Brussels formula. At present there is no acceptable alternative to nuclear deterrence. But I will add this: the shorter the range, the weaker the deterrence and the greater the menace to ourselves. This is particularly true for those whose homes are in what might, God forbid, be the central European battlefield. That is why in the long term we must establish a second safety net under the strategy of deterrence by means of a policy of balance and collaboration as well as a co-operative security policy.

Speaking of deterrence, Mr. President, I have a further comment. We have before us two authentic texts. The wording of paragraph (vi) of the preamble in French is: “Reconnaissance que les forces nucléaires stratégiques”, whereas the English wording reads: “Recognising that SNF weapons”. I believe these are horses of a different colour – the two are very different. NATO refers to substrategic nuclear forces.

I would like to add something else, although it is not within the competence of this forum. The expression used in the German text in this connection is: “nukleare Gefechtsfeldwaffen” or battlefield nuclear weapons. That is completely wrong, and since this is such a sensitive subject I do appeal for extreme care over the correct versions of these terms in particular, at least in the official texts.

In conclusion, I wish to express my satisfaction that President Bush has, by his Brussels proposals, regained the initiative on disarmament and provided a means to putting the Soviet General Secretary's welcome proposals to

Mr. Feldmann (continued)

the acid test at the negotiating table. After all, we want to improve our security by means of disarmament.

I consider that the Brussels document, which runs to over thirty pages, also provides a basis for a joint European policy towards the East, that is to say for a collective European assessment of what is going on in Eastern Europe. For we have to establish a régime of peace which extends far beyond Europe, a peace encompassing the whole of Europe.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by thanking everyone who has taken part in this debate most sincerely for their friendly remarks to the Rapporteur. It really was not easy, at a time when everything was changing, to write a report that would still be accurate two and a half months later.

Mr. Hardy wondered if there was not an inconsistency between paragraphs 1 and 5 of the recommendation. Paragraph 1 says that agreement about numbers of forces should be avoided, whereas paragraph 5 proposes a 10% reduction in numbers. Mr. Hardy's remark is understandable. But the latter paragraph sets out a general idea. The English text refers to "a 10% reduction" not "10% reduction". This indicates the order of magnitude of the reduction. I will talk about this at greater length when we discuss the amendment. Much of Mr. Hardy's speech was devoted to the pessimism which he believes is reflected in the report with regard to the scrapping of short-range nuclear forces. I was not pessimistic then, and I am not pessimistic now. Nor was I in my report. I am firmly convinced the time will have come for discussions on mutual SNF reductions when the reduction of conventional armaments has its first tangible results.

In a sense this decision has already been taken where NATO is concerned. I am referring to the Montebello decision to scrap a great deal of our SNF artillery. NATO – and that means WEU too – have already decided to contribute to this. But I agree with Mr. Younger that we must phase everything. This is not the time to rush into all kinds of things at once. We must concentrate now on the CFE talks in Vienna. As soon as tangible results become perceptible in practice, we must begin talks on mutual SNF reductions.

I would refer Mr. Hardy and others to what I have written about this in the report. On page 12

I have included a table showing the short-range nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, which very clearly reveals the considerable numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact as regards these weapons systems. It is in NATO's interests, of course, for talks on reductions in these weapons systems to take place sooner or later. The same is true of the WEU countries, but we must choose the right moment. I do not need to tell you politicians that the timing of proposals is as important as the proposals themselves. I am not being pessimistic, I am simply saying that this is not on the agenda at the moment. Nor must we abandon hope of ever being able to do without these weapons systems altogether, but that will require more than the reduction of conventional weapon systems. It will require confidence in the régimes of the Eastern European countries. This road will certainly be taken one day, but not, I fear, in the short term. Once again, realism, not pessimism. We shall, of course, achieve our objective one day, but all in good time.

I am also grateful to Mr. Ewing for his comments. He emphasised the changes of opinion that have occurred in the last few months. They have indeed been spectacular, but I still feel that the basic ideas cherished by the WEU countries stand firm. We are prepared to reduce armaments, but we believe that, given the Soviet Union's continuing superiority in real terms, we can only make this reduction step by step. Mr. Ewing made it clear that he too is convinced of this.

I am grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for his kind words. He called the report "balanced", and he referred to the "soundness of the proposals". He opposed the amendments, particularly Amendments 2, 3 and 5. I thank him for his support. I will discuss the amendments in a moment.

Mr. Feldmann said we could be satisfied with the results achieved in Brussels and that they put into effect what the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments had proposed six weeks before the Brussels summit. He thanked me for Amendment 1, signed by the Chairman and myself. He drew my attention to the need for this amendment, and I am grateful to him for that. It was a necessary addition to the Brussels agreement. Mr. Feldmann also referred to the incorrect French translation. We have checked this and found that it was indeed a real howler. SNF has been incorrectly translated as "système stratégique nucléaire". This will be corrected. The Clerk undoubtedly knows what the appropriate procedure is.

I will revert to the amendment to paragraph 6 when the amendments are discussed.

Mr. Feldmann pointed out that the shorter a weapon's range, the less is its deterrent effect in

Mr. de Beer (continued)

defence. I agree with him to some extent. Studies on the replacement of the Lance by a longer-range weapon are therefore bound to be useful. Despite this, I feel we should confine ourselves to the recommendations. In the recommendation I have said that we can now study the situation and that countries so wishing may participate. But this decision is not yet under discussion. I feel we can all agree on this.

As I have said before, Mr. President, I would find it regrettable – as some other members have also said – if differences of opinion should again flare up in the Assembly of WEU, when a reasonable agreement has, I feel, been reached in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and agreement on this aspect has also been reached in Brussels. It would be a pity if this agreement were to be upset here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, after the Rapporteur's explanations I can be brief. I renew my thanks to him on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. We discussed the report several times in detail, and it was unanimously accepted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, with two abstentions. All the political groups participated in the decision and the relevant discussion.

I think we have an unparalleled opportunity, as Western European Union, of expressing our view on this matter immediately following the NATO summit.

I thank the Rapporteur again for his excellent work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to consider the draft recommendation contained in Document 1182.

I have been informed of six amendments which will be considered in the following order: Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Soell, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Soell, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Hardy, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Kittelmann and Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Feldmann.

If Amendment 5 is adopted, Amendment 1 falls.

Mr. Soell and others have tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Scheer to support the amendment.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In support of Amendment 2, we recommend the deletion of paragraph (vi) of the preamble because we think it contains an incorrect assertion. Short-range missiles would be used after the failure of deterrence and are in fact spearhead weapons of war. Given the already existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is not plausible to argue that short-range missiles are essential to deterrence. We therefore ask that this paragraph be deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I notice that the amendment does not bear the name of a French socialist. I remind the Assembly that The Hague platform, which covers this point, was agreed to by all the governments of WEU. We therefore listened to the debate, put two and two together and found that we had some unreconstructed colleagues who did not understand what this was all about.

Many of us of the older generation realised that there were just as many evils in fighting a war with conventional weapons. The whole point about The Hague platform and the part of the recommendation that the amendment seeks to delete is that it holds a balance, with the idea of the use of the deterrent.

I find it almost impossible to understand that some of our colleagues do not understand the sheer facts of life in that way. No one in this room, and no one in any of our governments, wants a war; but, equally, anyone who does not accept what The Hague platform said, which was a balance, is jeopardising the lives of his citizens: it is as simple as that. I urge the Assembly to reject this rather foolish amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – The amendment would more or less take the heart out of the draft recommendation. The same is true of other amendments. This is not an agreement. We had the results of the NATO summit in Brussels last week, and The Hague platform. I strongly urge that the amendment be defeated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

The President (continued)

Mr. Soell and others have tabled Amendment 3, which reads as follows:

3. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Soell to support his amendment.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, having listened to the contributions to this debate by my highly esteemed colleagues, Mr. Wilkinson and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, and heard the use of such words as “foolish”, I will not now respond in the same vein. I simply want to make it clear that we are not concerned here with the fundamental question as to whether or not nuclear weapons in Europe help to prevent wars, but essentially with the fact – and here I also refer to paragraph (vii) of the preamble – that very wide differences of view exist, even among the nuclear powers, concerning the rôle of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The question is primarily one of definition. The French say “pre-strategic weapons” and the Americans say “theatre nuclear forces”, which is a term approximating to the German expression “battlefield weapons”. “Substrategic weapons” is a new term which has now emerged in the Brussels communiqué, and all these usages show how differently the rôles of these weapons in a conflict are interpreted. Furthermore, the NATO manoeuvres and the debate last winter on the rôle of the deployment of nuclear weapons have demonstrated how widely an alliance drifts apart when thinking through a conflict in this way. This is also the subject of paragraph (vii), whose deletion I recommend.

Given the fact that the Soviet Union, with about 1 600 launchers and 6 000 missiles, possesses multiple superiority vis-à-vis the West’s eighty-eight launchers and approximately seven hundred Lance missiles, we also feel that the West certainly has nothing to lose by negotiating on this issue and that negotiations should in any event take priority.

I therefore ask you to approve this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that I do not have to speak again on any of the other amendments but I should like to comment on this amendment. It is slightly different from the earlier amendment as it does not necessarily call into account any

unreconstruction. There is a misunderstanding in that if one looks at the recommendation, one realises that Mr. Soell is trying to remove paragraph (vii), which states that we need time to consider the technical issues and the research that is needed for a replacement. However, the paragraph then goes on – this was endorsed at the recent NATO summit – to make it quite clear that one does not need to take a decision at this stage about putting it into operation. However, one needs to do the research. It is important to accept that because, having accepted that the balance between conventional and nuclear weapons is needed – we accepted that by rejecting the previous amendment – we must accept that SNF will always be needed regardless of the outcome of the CFE negotiations because it is part of that balance.

If we were to give way and delete that provision, we should be saying that we would not carry out the research to enable us to have a weapon ready to put into place. I shall not repeat my earlier arguments except to say that it is logical that, having rejected the first amendment that wanted to delete paragraph (vi), we should also reject this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – I was a little surprised to see this amendment to delete paragraph (vii) although I was not surprised to see the amendment to delete paragraph (vi). If the amendment were accepted by a majority of the Assembly, the present text would no longer exist in our draft recommendation and that could mean that we would have to take a decision right now. I put that consideration into a draft recommendation to make a move towards our Dutch friends, especially towards our Dutch socialist friends. If the provision were deleted, we should have to ask our governments to take a decision now. Therefore, as it is a counter-productive amendment in the eyes of German socialists, I recommend that the Assembly should not support it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as the voting is very open, I wonder if you could give us the voting figures.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Rules of Procedure say nothing about disclosing the result of a vote by show of hands but I will tell you what it was all the same: 18 for and 25 against. So there is no possible doubt about that.

The President (continued)

Mr. Hardy has tabled Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, before "a 10%" insert "at least".

I call Mr. Hardy to support his amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Given the comments of the Rapporteur in referring to paragraph (vi) in the preamble and in the report, it would seem he does not regard the matters covered by this amendment as having quite the same significance. He will have heard a number of members of the Assembly recognising the difficult task that the committee faced in a changing situation. It is simply to reflect that changing situation that this important and I hope attractive amendment has been tabled.

The amendment injects a note of flexibility and hope into a situation in which hope is being engendered. As an unreconstructed member of the Assembly, I hope that the old-fashioned chivalry and generous disposition which I know that Mr. de Beer has frequently demonstrated in the past will lead him to accept the amendment in the hope that it will bring together Assembly members whose differences have just been so dreadfully demonstrated.

The amendment would fit in with President Bush's initiative and with Mr. Gorbachev's proposals. It would fit in with all our governments except those who are of antediluvian or unreconstructed character. I am delighted to move the amendment and I do so with every optimism that the Rapporteur will feel obliged to accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – I do not have very hard feelings towards this amendment. I leave it to the judgment of members.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Mr. Klejdzinski and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads as follows:

5. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Scheer to support Amendment 5.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Amendment 5 calls for the deletion of paragraph 6 of the draft recommen-

ation. As in the case of the vote on paragraph (vii), we are not concerned here with the question that no decision on deployment needs to be taken for the time being. In each case it is the first part of the sentence which is at issue. This concerns the preparations necessary for modernisation, that is for replacing the Lance missiles by a new nuclear weapon. But the problem is that we are faced with a possibility which no one can ignore, that is, disarmament negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. There would seem to be no Soviet objection to such negotiations. Mr. Soell has pointed out the Soviet superiority in missiles, and we have the opportunity to make good use of this in the interests of disarmament. Not to take this opportunity would indeed be foolish, and I address this expressly to our British colleague, who used that term in another connection. We should give priority to the opportunity for negotiation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – We are having a rerun of the debate on Amendment 3. Amendment 3 referred to paragraph (vii) of the preamble relating to "time is required for further technical". We now have the same proposal to remove paragraph 6 which relates to preparations for replacing but which decides later on production and deployment.

My German friend referred to what I had said. I fear that he did not listen to me. I will spare my colleagues a repeat of my words as they clearly heard me and accepted my view, as was shown by the way in which they voted. I hope that they will agree on this amendment that we are simply repeating the fact that we need at this stage to make the preparations for replacement, but decide later on production and deployment.

I hope that Mr. Scheer will accept this from me – that later stage may never come. The Soviets may make such enormous progress in implementing INF and CFE that we decide that we need to revise the kind of production that we need. However, at this stage it is rather like deciding that we will not make preparations to pay the fire insurance on our houses. That would be foolish. In the same way, I believe that the amendment is as misplaced. I hope that the Assembly will reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – In my introductory speech, I said that the Defence Committee could be proud of the recommendation to

Mr. de Beer (continued)

participate on a national basis in preparation for deciding production and deployment at a later time. One and a half months later we found that that was the basis of the Brussels agreement. We were a month and a half in advance of what was decided in Brussels. Would it not be ironic to decide in the preliminary session to delete the paragraph that led to the agreement in Brussels? I strongly recommend that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Kittelmann and Mr. de Beer have tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after “participate” insert “on a national basis”.

I call Mr. Kittelmann to support the amendment.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is basically a clarification. We have inserted the words “on a national basis” to satisfy those of our colleagues who had problems with the previous wording. The recommendation is the same, only more distinct.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

The Chairman of the committee has already spoken.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Mr. Feldmann has tabled Amendment 6 which reads as follows:

6. After paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“Urge the start of negotiations on SNF weapons”.

I call Mr. Feldmann to support the amendment.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, whether or not to negotiate was one of the key points at issue prior to and during the Brussels meeting. Notwithstanding the fact that the preparations go back to a much earlier

date, we find ourselves here in the wake of the successful NATO summit in Brussels. I believe we cannot now decide on anything which does not incorporate the word “negotiations”, which was a vital key word at Brussels.

My wording endeavours to express this plainly, without the accompaniment of conditions. I do not want to refight old battles and reopen old wounds. But Mr. Wilkinson has just expressed some concern, and if it were possible to tone down the word “urge” I would be prepared to accept that.

To this end, and to bridge the gap, I make the following proposal in support of my amendment. The French text contains the words “de demander instamment”, and I would delete the word “instamment”, so that the text then reads: “de demander l’ouverture de négociations sur les armes SNF”.

Must I table that in writing, Mr. President, or is it sufficient for me to make the correction in this intervention? – I understand that it is sufficient.

In the English version the word “urge” is therefore replaced by “ask for”, so that it now reads: “Ask for the start of negotiations on SNF weapons”.

Thank you, Mr. President, I think the message has now come across, and I ask for approval of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The intention is good. I salute the desire to compromise by Mr. Feldmann, but the important thing is that we hope to secure the reduction in conventional forces on the part of the Soviets before we can begin the SNF negotiations. The immense preponderance of conventional armaments and numbers on the part of the Soviets as against the NATO forces make it imperative for NATO to retain SNF. Anyway, it will always be necessary to retain some SNF, as was made clear in the communiqué at Brussels and by the leader of the United Kingdom Delegation, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

I applaud the intention of compromise. Quite candidly, it goes against the clear decision taken at Brussels by the alliance as a whole, and I hope that it will be rejected by the Assembly, because it does not have the crucial timescale that was in the communiqué in Brussels.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – I have mixed feelings about the amendment. I have said that one day we should start negotiations on SNF.

Mr. de Beer (continued)

Everything is in the timing. I fully agree with the Secretary of State, Mr. Younger, who said that we should wait and see what results came from the CFE negotiations. The amendment asks for the start of negotiations on SNF weapons, but it does not state when the negotiations should start. Mr. Feldmann carefully avoided making that proposal. The amendment suggests more than it says. It suggests that the negotiations should start right now, and that is why I have mixed feelings. It will not make a contribution to clarifying the recommendations, and it will leave a lot of things in the dark. I will abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now vote on Amendment 6, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6, as amended, is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1182, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China

(Presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1191)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee on the condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1191.

In view of the number of members down to speak in the debate, I propose, under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, to limit speaking time to five minutes each, except for the Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

Under the same rule, as you know, there can be no debate on this proposal.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the motion for urgent procedure has today been unanimously placed on the orders of the day, and I expressly thank Mr. Wilkinson for his initiative.

I am sure that his motion reflects the indignation and the compassion of every member of the parliamentary Assembly. We condemn the brutal repression and murder of thousands of young people by the communist régime in China. Young, idealistic students, whose sole aim was to open the way for a little more democracy and humanity, have been ruthlessly mown down. But, as history will prove, those who wield power in the People's Republic of China will have to learn by experience that the call for freedom and human rights cannot be permanently suppressed by tanks and brute force.

As you are aware, ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the parliamentary Assembly visited China and Hong Kong from 12th to 22nd May. We witnessed the peaceful demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of peace-loving human beings. These were students who did not desire any radical change in the system but were prepared to speak out against corruption and the dearth of housing, and in favour of greater freedom of the press.

All members took the opportunity to have talks with the people in the Square of Heavenly Peace in Beijing, in Xian, Shanghai, Canton and later in Hong Kong.

We were able to establish for ourselves that these were patriotic young Chinese who wanted to help their country. They were not counter-revolutionaries or ideological social reformers, but ordinary people with a daily familiarity with the worries and needs of over a billion Chinese. All these young people really wanted to do was to help those in power to give communism a human face. They invited the political leaders to take part in discussions and appealed to representatives of the People's Congress and the government for a hearing.

For weeks those who were politically accountable had time to respond to this situation, but still they repudiated their own young people. And yet in our discussions we received the positive impression that even our official opposite numbers felt some good will and in some cases an undisguised sympathy for the demands and wishes of these young people. This

1. See page 25.

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

was true in Beijing of the first deputy minister of economics and the deputy foreign minister, Zhon Nan, as well as of the vice-president of the People's Congress, Ye Fei, and the leading representatives of the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs, headed by its president, Han Nianlang. Our visits to military and naval forces and our discussions with senior officers indicated that none of them regarded the students as enemies or counter-revolutionaries, but as the guarantors of the future of their country.

It is not the students who have failed. What has failed in China is a system with an anti-quoted leadership which is averse to freedom and incapable of debate. Whoever orders soldiers to shoot at the sons of his own people and has thousands murdered because he is incapable of granting greater liberty and more human rights, cannot lay claim to the future.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have evidence that the desire for freedom is stronger than any suppression, democracy is stronger than any dictatorship and humanity is more powerful than any ideology.

As we learn today with what unimaginable cruelty and brute force the appeals of the young, the workers and academics in China are being suppressed, we can feel only contempt for the unscrupulous men who have obviously asserted themselves within the Chinese leadership.

President Mitterrand is right to declare that a government which has ordered troops to fire on its own young people is bankrupt and President Bush is right to stop all supplies and assistance to China. It is inconceivable that weapons supplied by free countries should be used to suppress the desire for liberty of the Chinese people.

I can well understand British members of parliament questioning the return of Hong Kong to China. I share, and indeed reinforce the view of the Federal German Government that the brutal use of tanks and firearms is not merely a grave infringement of human rights but places those responsible for this use of force outside the community of nations.

When non-aligned Yugoslavia and still more when Hungary, a Warsaw Pact country, sharply condemn the Beijing massacres, and when the chief commentator of Hungarian television says that "the murderers in Beijing are faithful adherents of the old order" and that there are "large numbers" of such individuals "in all the other socialist countries as well", this is proof that a basis exists for an initial consensus on human rights which transcends the boundaries of political blocs.

It is to be hoped that the USSR, the Polish Government and Czechoslovakia will very quickly adopt the same attitude as Hungary.

I should like to take this opportunity of voicing my belief that Lech Walesa's outstanding success in the Polish elections on Sunday is a highly satisfactory phenomenon and reason for congratulation on our part, though official silence still reigns in the countries of the communist camp.

As a German and a Berliner I would specially welcome it if the SED leadership in the GDR, which has hitherto cynically supported the position of the communist dictatorship in Beijing, were now to join in the demand for a non-violent solution to the conflict in China, in the interests of the Chinese people and of humanity.

Ladies and gentlemen, the words sound hard, but the communist despots in China appear to be preparing for a departure unprecedented in the history of the world. If the constant flow of new reports reaching us this morning reflects the truth, it is increasingly clear that China stands on the brink of civil war, and this will result in a conflict between Chinese armies in Beijing.

If those in power in China do not relinquish the course of violence and withdraw the 27th army which caused the bloodbath in Beijing they risk a conflagration of unimaginable proportions.

Those with political responsibility must recognise that a régime based on fear and the permanent intimidation of the people cannot last. The students in Beijing will never again follow the injunction of Confucius to bury themselves in their books and let the world go by.

Since 4th June this is a different China. The reform-orientated China in which the free countries of the world placed their hopes is dead. It died together with many of the citizens of Beijing and with the students peacefully appealing for democracy on the Square of Heavenly Peace, which became the scene of hellish violence.

In the interests of humanity, peace and the Chinese people we urge those in power in Beijing to revert to a non-violent solution of the conflict.

Ladies and gentlemen, China is not the only proof that communism is crumbling: witness the events in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

A commentator writes in today's edition of the German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*:

"Communism is tottering, and it is clearly not only the impact of human rights, self-determination, freedom and democracy which has plunged it into crisis. As Gorbachev has admitted, it was primarily the inability of this doctrine, which originally sprang from a crit-

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

icism of capitalism, to create an economic system capable of satisfying elementary human demands.”

The writer continues:

“ And where this was attempted, as in China, it was the inability of the party leadership to grasp the fact that greater economic freedom and increased political liberties are two sides of the same coin.”

The commentator is right:

“ The communist régimes of this world are not capable – either economically or politically – of meeting the challenges confronting humanity on the threshold of the year 2000.”

The sooner this is realised, and the fewer the occasions in future when hundreds, or thousands, of young people have to die to draw attention to this error, the better it will be.

Ladies and gentlemen, today’s motion for urgent procedure has enabled us to express our steadfast solidarity with the admirable young people in China. The following debate will provide further opportunity for doing so.

We salute the young people who were prepared to risk their lives and have tragically had to sacrifice them. Responsibility for the brutal murders rests with the communist régime, which cannot escape the liability for what it has done.

We look to the governments of our member countries to take every political opportunity of exerting their influence to prevent further bloodshed and, through the world community and a major collective initiative, to put pressure on the Chinese leaders which they cannot disregard.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Kittelmann.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – What has happened in China these last few days is a barbaric and brutal crime against the brightest and best of its own people – those who represented the People’s Republic’s hope of a better future for all its inhabitants. We have seen that, in a society in which God is not officially recognised, there is no higher morality for the government and the party leadership than the brute retention of absolute power by all means.

Those who had the privilege of going on the recent visit to the People’s Republic by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may have felt, as I did, that the society there was even more impoverished – in fact, far more – than those traditionally poor societies such as Nepal, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. At least in the sub-continent there is a variety of lifestyles and there are gradations of wealth. One might say that conspicuous consumption by the few is an affront to the impoverished many, but they are all democracies and they all offer the individual a chance to advance by his own efforts.

In the People’s Republic, we stayed in international hotels of great luxury, from which we looked down on virtually universal poverty beneath. There has been some decollectivisation of agriculture, which has undoubtedly brought a much-needed improvement of living standards and vastly increased agricultural production; but I do not feel that there has been the same improvement in living standards in urban society.

In Hong Kong, we were told that people there are paid twenty times as much as they are in the People’s Republic of China for doing the same job.

To demonstrate what I mean by the total impoverishment of that society and the hopelessness that people there must feel, I show the Assembly this foreign exchange certificate from the Bank of China. The inscription says that it can be used only within China at designated places. In other words, those with access to foreign travel, such as the hierarchy of the communist party, those – the privileged and trusted few – who are involved in the joint ventures and other enterprises with foreign firms, can obtain these cherished notes to exchange in privileged places where a range of international goods is available. But those who work to achieve the expansion of the Chinese economy and who have no such privileges do not benefit.

Joint ventures there are aplenty, and special economic zones; all efforts are made to attract foreign money. But without putting in place first a more liberal political system in which the fruits of those labours can be more widely and fairly shared, it is clear that the resentment must run deep. One can comprehend the sense of frustration among the best and brightest of Chinese society – the young students whom we saw so peacefully demonstrating their strong desire for freedom.

Therefore, I most earnestly hope that this resolution, which I humbly submit on behalf of the Assembly, will be unanimously approved, so that we can demonstrate our abhorrence and our sense of shock and revulsion about what has transpired in China. Let us hope that, in future,

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

those who guide the destinies of that country will recognise the error of their ways, and that a more pluralistic, liberal and democratic society can emerge that will give confidence both to those within China and those whose destinies lie alongside that great and important country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for your deeply-felt words.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – First, I should like to make it clear that I was one of those who joined in the request that resulted in this debate and, like my colleagues in the Socialist Group, I view the events in Beijing with horror and distress. We regard the response of the Chinese authorities and the exercise of brutal force as dreadful and horrifying. It is a demonstration of the excess that we regard as intolerable, especially when that excess and violence are applied not only to young students, but to distinguished correspondents from our media. I believe that Miss Kate Adie, who is well known in Britain as a highly regarded and utterly unprejudiced correspondent, was subjected to a grievous assault.

I have two comments to make and, although they may not be popular or fashionable. I must make them in response to the degree of widespread criticism and to the vehement criticism of the position in China that Mr. Wilkinson offered. We did not hear such condemnations of the Chinese system when Sir Frederic Bennett and other members of his group were conducting what I described at the time as a “love-in” with China. We did not hear such criticism of the injustices and inequalities of the Chinese system when it suited the European right to endorse what was happening in China in an uncritical, unquestioning and almost adulatory form. Therefore, it does not become us today to mix our regret and horror of what has happened in Beijing and to use it to denounce a régime that some members of the Assembly viewed almost with admiration not so very long ago.

We must remember that there have been achievements in China despite all that is wrong. Indeed, some on our side of the political spectrum have been critical of China for quite a long time. However, the young students who were demonstrating came from universities that would not have existed twenty years ago. Indeed, if the young students of today had been born thirty, forty or fifty years ago, they would probably have died in large numbers because of malnutrition by now.

Let us recognise that the system that we find unacceptable and repugnant may well have achieved a great deal but that it has failed because it has not adapted to the growth and the

progress that it made possible. Let us recognise that we have an obligation and that the world is too small to rely purely on vituperation and criticism. Let us recognise that it is not in our interests now to send China to Coventry or to heap abuse on the Chinese authorities. Let us recognise that we should encourage China to adopt a policy that would allow energy to penetrate the repression that has been so savagely applied. However, let us also recognise that it may well be that there is merely a difference of scale and that the Chinese incompetence in crisis management that has been manifest in the past few days may not have been possible in our own mature bureaucracy.

For the Chinese to send unarmed troops into that square made it inevitable that the generals and the army would lose face, because they clearly could not have any effect given the fact that martial law had been applied and then ignored. When generals lose face in the Orient, dreadful consequences are inevitable, as we have seen.

When the right uses violence, when General Pinochet operates in Chile, we do not hear protests from the right in Europe. That is a degree of inconsistency that I find unattractive. When we see banana republics with vicious dictators and gangsters in charge who perpetrate horrors but who are still found convenient neighbours by democracies, we must feel the same degree of inconsistency.

We view repression, brutality, excess and incompetence as horrifying, repugnant and distressing. One can only hope that the strictures that have been applied to China will be applied across the whole of the planet whenever such violence and brutality are repeated.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scovacicchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too, Mr. President, along with other members of the Assembly, as Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has already said, was privileged to see the vast numbers of young people demonstrating in Beijing and other Chinese cities from 11th to 22nd May whose composure and calm has called forth universal admiration in Europe and especially in Italy, used as we are to much more vicious behaviour in demonstrations. It was indeed an inspiring experience but it was not appreciated by the communist leaders, concerned as they were to ensure their political survival, undermined by the many years of dictatorship, and continuing inflexibly despite the contagion of perestroika, by misusing the prestige of the state.

Because of their upbringing and instinctively, because of their vast numbers and the obvious backing of the people, these young people

Mr. Scovacricchi (continued)

seemed incapable of any kind of reaction, probably convinced that they were part of the march of history that politicians think they can reverse by the use of arms. We realised this when we spoke to some of them ; they knew they were fighting for the same values as those on which our own political civilisation thrives and against power and corruption. We were all surprised to see similar and simultaneous manifestations in various parts of this immense country of that mysterious collective physiological instinct which, according to one great thinker, inspired the resistance to fascism.

As happened in Budapest in 1956, it is all too easy for those responsible for the carnage to talk about a counter-revolution. With no guide to turn to, no commanders or charismatic leaders like Imre Nagy, or Dubcek or Walesa, these young people, after mature thought and completely of their own initiative, gave expression to an almost religious ideal of freedom worth more than life itself which must compel our respect. I am grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for tabling the motion for a resolution and to the Socialist Group for the communiqué circulated yesterday expressly calling for sanctions. I am also grateful to the socialist member who has made a pointed and well-reasoned analysis indicting not just some but all who share the responsibility for certain sombre events now going on in the world.

With every means at our disposal save force we must help to bring the spiral of armed repression to a halt. Deng Xiaoping, this sinister octogenarian who appears to have ordered the massacre from his hospital bed, has now firmly set his feet on the path traced by Stalin, not that of tolerant reform to which serious harm has been done. There could, unfortunately, be an attempt to repair that harm by further bloodshed, with the grim prospect of civil war becoming a real possibility.

This potential political instability in a sensitive and already gravely troubled area is not merely an internal Chinese matter; it has profoundly struck our conscience and cannot be ignored by WEU which, in this and other documents, must campaign for a clear-cut stance, including concrete measures. Europe is, I agree, about to do this but in open order, with no single voice and with no co-ordination.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first I want to thank Mr. Martino, my fellow-member and friend, for giving me his place on the list of speakers so that I can meet my other commitments.

May I begin by saying how greatly I applaud the initiative taken by John Wilkinson and the

report by Chairman Peter Kittelmann. Consternation and condemnation are indeed the words that come to mind to express the horror and bewilderment felt by all free and democratic countries.

I believe I am expressing a widely-held view when I say that the brutal crackdown ordered by Deng Xiaoping, or as some commentators have it, by a quartet of old men hanging on to power, against a young generation crying out for freedom, is a highly significant event. Here we see one of the leading communist countries, which had begun to liberalise its relations with the West, open the door to cultural exchange, encourage trade and investment within its borders and develop special zones of activity through productive investment by the West and even Japan, slipping back into obscurantism of the cruellest kind.

Does it mean that once a communist always a communist and that, whatever they say, whatever their attitude, whatever the hopes – I was going to say smiles – they raise, we should expect nothing from them?

In the last few days, the Chinese communists and Mr. Deng Xiaoping have, in my view, given Mr. Gorbachev a severe slap in the face.

In the interests of détente, and in particular to help our brothers in central Europe who have lived under Stalinist oppression since the Yalta Agreements and whose eyes are turned towards the Europe of human rights and democracy, we had reason to do everything we could – wisely, carefully and without haste so as not to bring back the evil spirits of the past – to encourage this movement towards pluralist democracy and respect for human rights.

Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia are seeing the first signs of this stirring among people discovering anew their destiny and the right of choice.

Mr. Deng Xiaoping and the men in power in China having – they too – aroused so much hope in the West, have now seriously shaken the West's confidence in their ability to rise above themselves and bring in the system of democracy and freedom that the younger generation, in their hundreds of thousands, are constantly clamouring for.

WEU is thus the first to feel involved having been the first of all the European organisations to establish relations with the changing China.

If my memory serves me, this dates back to about ten years ago and the report produced by our friend and former colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett, associated with a visit to China. Then I had the honour to pick up the baton and I, too, went to China with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union where we were able to confirm the changes and the liberalisation I have just referred to.

Mr. Caro (continued)

Then it was the turn of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments under the chairmanship of Mr. Peter Kittelmann to visit China.

This morning Mr. Ahrens told us how carefully, after this terrible event, we would be updating the western position and looking at any hopes that we may be able to salvage.

Human rights have thus been abused, economic and educational development put in jeopardy and, lastly, there is the fear that the hardliners in Moscow may, in their turn, exploit the events in China to attack Mr. Gorbachev, notwithstanding the position of the Soviet reformers – particularly Mr. Yeltsin as reported in the press – who have condemned the atrocities in Beijing in the most outspoken terms.

This is a fundamental problem for us and, as a member of the Assembly of Western European Union, I warmly applaud the Council of Europe for the statement issued yesterday in which the President of its Council of Ministers and the President of its Parliamentary Assembly and its Secretary-General unequivocally condemn what has taken place in Beijing. I have with me an extract from this statement and I note that it uses the words: “with respect to the human rights and principles of democracy which are essential for the twenty-three countries of the Council of Europe” – and which have been treated with contempt.

Mr. President, we were right in my opinion to follow our instinct as defenders of freedom and approve Mr. Wilkinson’s proposal that we should examine a problem of such importance urgently – forthwith in fact.

We will need to make sure that our protest is accompanied by factual proposals. There can be no question of allowing the present Chinese leadership to go on killing people simply to hold on to power.

Sanctions have to be imposed. President Bush has already announced those applied by the United States. All the European Community has so far done is to refuse to receive a Chinese Delegation in Brussels under their economic agreements, but it has also condemned what has happened in China through the mouth of Jacques Delors. It is important that democratic countries should realise the considerable pressure that sanctions are capable of exerting on public opinion. Certain multinational companies, here in Europe, in the United States, in Australia and Japan have already decided to review the investment programmes they had in mind for the future.

However, let us beware of taking too harsh a line lest we destroy the trust that the Chinese people, and particularly the younger generation,

once had in the West, and more particularly in Europe. Chinese people and Chinese youth have to know that Europe is at their side and standing by them in their fight for freedom.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to speak briefly in support of the motion before us as I also was a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which witnessed the events in China.

As Mr. Scovacricchi has said, I and some other colleagues visited the students on Tiananmen Square one night and had a talk with one who spoke our language. He and the others – in exemplary fashion and, I must stress, spontaneously – said what he was protesting about and what his demands were. In answer to our questions as to who they were fighting against, how and why, this young man, who I hope has survived the massacre, answered: “We are fighting against the corruption which is rife in the party and the government and for a democracy which we have never had and still do not have, and we are also fighting to be allowed freedom of thought, freedom of the press and freedom of association. We are fighting for things which may be familiar to you in the West but which we do not know in China, where the press and the television do not tell the truth but distort the facts.”

The causes, ladies and gentlemen, seem to me to have been building up over the last two years though not yet reaching political or psychological maturity. They only matured during this tragic spring, in the specific form of disagreements within the establishment, between party, governmental and military groups and even within the groups themselves. Last but not least there was Mr. Gorbachev’s visit which was more of a pretext than a cause. Basically it was no longer only the students who were involved.

As I see it, the generation gap was bridged and day after day both young and not so young saw their hopes and dreams crumble away – in spite of which day and night they tranquilly carried on singing the Internationale on the streets.

We were thus able to compare the reality on the square with the false and smiling front put up by a number of very polite political and military leaders, who assured us that the People’s Assembly next June would examine and discuss the students’ requests which they considered to be partly justified and fair and would give them a reply which would at least be partly favourable.

Sure enough, the reply came this spring, but it was given not by the People’s Assembly but by the People’s Army mainly consisting of troops from Mongolia drafted in to Beijing because

Mr. Fassino (continued)

they were not known to the local population. And the answer the People's Army gave was to shoot and drive its tanks at the country's youth who are, even so, still carrying on the fight in Beijing, Shanghai, Canton and all the other Chinese cities. From the press we hear that the struggle is still going on and our only hope is that it does not turn into civil war.

As in the case of the French Revolution of 1789, whose bicentenary we are now celebrating, Chinese history exactly two centuries later could be at a watershed because popular revolutions cannot be stifled by military force. It may kill people but it has no power or ever will to stamp out ideals.

It might be asked why WEU should concern itself with China. The fact is that in other cases, e.g. the crisis in the Gulf, WEU has intervened and been successful. We must be concerned in this case because of the disturbing repercussions it may have on European equilibrium and security and on NATO itself, which, as Mr. Younger, our Chairman-in-Office, reminded us this morning, is now over forty years old and into its fifth decade. For these reasons I believe that our concern is not at all without point. It may relate to the Far East and be "out of area" as we say but it is still an integral part of our concern for world stability. As was pointed out yesterday by one of our British members, the WEU Assembly is the only official forum for discussing the problems of European security and it therefore follows that it is right for WEU to pay close attention to what is happening out of area in order to safeguard the defence of Europe on its eastern frontiers – and, I repeat, Mediterranean frontiers – at all times and in all circumstances in order to protect our interests and keep the peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we have to cast our minds back a good many years to recall the kind of pictures we have been seeing on television since Sunday in the reports of current events in China. We have seen tank units in battle order firing on an unarmed population and women and children being mangled under their tracks. What a cruel irony – murder on the Square of Heavenly Peace! There is no excuse, absolutely no justification for this butchery. Weapons and brutality are at no time and in no circumstances a means of resolving political issues. Nowhere at any time have weapons succeeded in breaking the popular will for freedom. History proves as much.

I hope that the forces of reason in China – and I can confirm Mr. Kittelmann's observation that there are forces of reason even in the Chinese

leadership – learn this lesson as historically aware human beings and that they will acknowledge and draw the full implications from this crime perpetrated against their own people.

Ladies and gentlemen, we shall take very little time in approving this resolution, and I hope we shall do so unanimously. But I believe that this is not enough. It cannot be a matter of indifference to us whether the most populous nation on earth relapses into apathetic backwardness, unrest or even civil war. The world cannot tolerate another crisis centre.

It follows that, in our own interests, we should not sever our links with China, but that we should wherever possible help to pave the way for a new kind of policy of reform in that country.

The policy of reform pursued in China – of which in recent years we have heard many good reports in this forum, in the Council of Europe and in our national parliaments – was built on the ruins of the cultural revolution which, we should remember, led to the closure of all schools, all institutes and universities, with the exception of those research institutes which were absolutely essential to nuclear armament. Had it persisted, this cultural revolution would have plunged China back into the depths of the Middle Ages.

We have heard many negative comments here today on the reform policy initiated at that time, and it is true that this policy was confined to economic problems, while leaving the dominance of the party intact. The policy produced serious distortions and dislocations in the economic, social and political contexts, exemplified by the disparities between the rural and urban population, between the peasantry on the one side and factory workers, office workers, public employees and students on the other. But if, as in the case of China, about three-quarters of the population live in the rural areas, it follows that any reform, any improvement in the economic situation of the population must begin there in order to win over the majority and ensure food supplies to the populace at large.

To us as Europeans, it was also virtually incomprehensible and bizarre that customs barriers were set up to demarcate particular economic areas, the so-called "special economic zones", within the People's Republic of China itself – but who can claim to have a better recipe for this enormous country, with its billion inhabitants?

With all our criticisms, there are some points which continue to hold good. In China nobody nowadays dies of hunger, whereas formerly famine claimed millions, year after year. The supply situation in China is better today than in some European countries. All children receive

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

an education, and China is the only country where birth control has really made a start and where the principle of a single child was restricted to the mass of the Chinese population and made exceptions for minorities. Preliminary attempts were even made to fight corruption, which is a plague whose ravages are not confined to China, and Chinese newspapers carried frequent reports of convictions.

I am completely at a loss as to the factors that have led to such a brutal rupture with this policy. In these circumstances we should not sever our links with China. I do not support the worldwide ostracism of China. The Chinese set great store by their relations with us and by the standing that their country enjoys in Western Europe. I therefore think that we should take advantage of every opportunity, however modest, of restoring the channels of dialogue with the forces of reason in China, and in particular with Chinese youth.

Mr. President, qualified experts on communist dictatorships maintain that countries of this kind cannot be changed at all by a policy of reforms, and it is a fact that such a policy is jeopardised by the staying power and jealously-guarded authority of public functionaries, just as much as by the impatience of the masses. Apart from China, Georgia and the cruel suppression of the unrest in Tbilisi are examples of dangers of this kind. I hope in the interests of us all that the doubters are wrong.

We must continue to keep a close watch on developments in China. I am confident that we shall be better able to evaluate the situation when we come to discuss the comprehensive report to be presented by the General Affairs Committee at the part-session in December. We should unite in condemning the events which have taken place in China since Sunday, but let us not sever our links with the Chinese people!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Newall.

Lord NEWALL (*United Kingdom*). – There is no doubt that the visit by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was very timely, and I make no apology for repeating some things that have already been said. Our memories of that visit are vivid. We saw peaceful parades, peaceful students and people sitting down in protest at the problems in China, with thousands of supporters watching, cheering and giving victory signs. We watched thousands upon thousands of people on bicycles pouring into Tiananmen Square in support of those already there. They were thrilled to see foreigners like us watching them, because they knew that we would carry back the message of hope that they undoubtedly felt. Their mood

was exuberant and happy. They were organised and totally passive. They had no weapons, bombs or sticks – just coloured banners and headbands. Their feelings were deep-rooted and fired by a good knowledge of what was going on in the rest of the world. They timed a major part of their protest to take place during the visit of President Gorbachev, whom they see as a potential reformer in Russia. So, logically, why not a similar change in China?

As you have already heard, this happened not only in Beijing but in other cities in China, and it was supported by workers and others, even those in high places. In at least three other cities we saw the evidence of that. We saw the unprecedented support given by the people of Hong Kong – the biggest demonstration ever held there, not in antagonism to their government, but in support of their kith and kin in China. You have all read about it in the newspapers, and you know as much as the Defence Committee, whose members are certainly not instant experts on the subject. But seeing it makes it very real.

Now there is this awful brutality, with the Chinese leaders treating their people like so many rats, coupled with outrageous official statements trying to justify the carnage. Who knows which way it will go in the next few months, but, as other speakers have said, I believe that the democracy movement is so deep and strong that it will make real headway in the long term.

The leaders in China were obviously divided. There were days of indecision, culminating in the wrong decision. Unfortunately, that is often typical of communism, where group arguments take the place of structured discussion. The Defence Committee saw evidence of that more than once at a much lower level, when on purely financial matters no fewer than twelve officials were unable to agree among themselves.

We must all do what we can, individually and collectively, to show support for the Chinese people. Let us show all the displeasure at our disposal for the leaders who have ordered the mass slaughter of their innocent fellow countrymen.

(*Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think Mr. Ahrens is right to point out that the barbarism of the last few days should not make us forget the real headway which has been made in recent years. To the examples cited by him we might add the successful fight against illiteracy and the sensitivity displayed by the Chinese in

Mr. Antretter (continued)

dealing with their minorities, measured by the yardstick of many other countries.

But today we are faced with a special issue. As one of those taking part in the visit by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I would remind you that twenty-four days ago, at nine in the evening, the members of that committee of our Assembly returned from their talks with Chinese political and party representatives. Some of us went to see the students demonstrating in the Square of Heavenly Peace. They showed no apprehension, no fear or aggression. What we found around the column commemorating the victims of the Long March was an atmosphere of freedom and peacefulness. Hope lived in the faces of tens of thousands – hope for greater justice and a democratisation of the system which would lead to more civil rights. Hardly anybody thought it possible that the People's Liberation Army would fire on its own compatriots.

Yesterday's edition of the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung rightly pointed out that this assessment was by no means naïve, as it was shared by both factory workers and intellectuals, scientists and lower- and middle-ranking party functionaries, and even by official spokesmen and, as Mr. Kittelmann has remarked, by almost all the individuals we met and spoke to, including senior personalities up to the rank of deputy foreign minister.

On our second visit to the students a day later we learned that the daughter of the commander of the military forces was also among the demonstrators.

Three days later – in the meantime we had witnessed demonstrations in Xian and were now in Shanghai, where many thousands were again expressing their solidarity – we read that one hundred senior military leaders were not prepared, as they had declared publicly, to back up with military force the martial law which had by that time been declared. It was also reported that three of the seven military regions were not prepared to give military support to the state of emergency.

And yet the atrocity took place, and we should leave no shadow of doubt that there is no justification whatever for the horrible bloodbath caused by the indiscriminate shooting by police and military units in Beijing.

Anyone who now regards expressions of protest merely as a dutiful exercise, after which he can return to business as usual – after all, when it was a matter of business nobody complained about the absence of the deity – thereby implicates himself in the crimes of the Chinese leadership.

Mr. Ahrens was right to say that we must not sever our links with the Chinese people, but it must also be clear that a government which can cling to power only by the exercise of barbaric brutality disqualifies itself as a partner in the dialogue on peace and collaboration.

What is more, it may be an advantage that this debate is taking place shortly before General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the Council of Europe, where we can make it clear that we are placing our hopes on his reform policy and that reactionary forces which might toy with the idea of a "Chinese solution" can expect some stiff reactions and grave political and economic penalties from the civilised world.

But it is also our duty to support those eastern bloc countries in which reforms are intended to open the door to freedom and initiate the democratic process.

It was therefore right and proper that the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe decided in Norway last week that the parliaments of the USSR, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia should be given the opportunity of collaborating as "special guests" in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This may also help those at all levels of policy-making, government and the armed forces in China who desire reforms. For those who ordered the use of firearms in Beijing have not yet won the day. For the time being they are in power, but they have blood on their hands and have therefore lost their authority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a number of earlier speakers have pilloried the brutalities in China without reservation, while others have said we should not forget how much had been done for the people in China. The two previous speakers, Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Antretter, were certainly not wrong to bring this to our attention again.

But what is true – these are the newspaper headlines – is this: Continuing street battles in Beijing; Thousands killed in the hail of automatic weapons, or crushed by tanks. British television puts the number of victims so far at over 7 000.

The Beijing government describes the situation as critical – what cynicism! The weekend's bloodbath must be seen as one of the darkest chapters in recent Chinese history.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments visited the People's Republic of China in the middle of May. In many talks with Beijing government officials we were assured that the concerns expressed by the students were not mistaken and deserved to be discussed. They were matters warranting debate and reflection.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

When we visited the Square of Heavenly Peace we were able to observe the peaceful attitude of the students for ourselves. They expressed their objectives – freedom and greater justice – in moderate, peaceable terms. We experienced this personally.

The young people were convinced that they were doing their country a service. They were not, and did not want to be, counter-revolutionaries. They wanted internal reforms and answers to the future problems of the Chinese nation.

For their part, the military leaders told us they regarded themselves as an army of the people, which would never fire on its own kind. They were of the people themselves.

In an interview in the *Spiegel* dated 5th June 1989, Major General Zhu Zongguan said that the army would be used to restore social order and for the benefit of the populace. Asked whether he would fire on his compatriots, he replied: "We are a people's army. We are the children of the people, whom we greatly love. We protect the people. Our task here in Beijing is to protect human life."

For the sake of completeness, we may mention a further comment made by the Major General in his interview of 5th June 1989: "I consider the criticism of the privileges and corruption of officialdom to be right and proper."

And what happened, in fact? Those old men who took part in the Long March have once more endeavoured by improper means to retain and safeguard their dictatorial power over a billion people by ordering the People's Liberation Army to fire on the people appealing for greater freedom, on those denouncing corruption and on those calling for more human rights and the elementary rights of citizens. These were the people they had crushed by tanks on the Square of Heavenly Peace.

What can we do? I call upon the free peoples to protest against this inhumanity, albeit in the knowledge that we can do little beyond this moral outcry. But the students, peasants and workers should know that they have not sacrificed themselves in vain.

In the past the Chinese people have suffered greatly from chaos and unrest. The military and the Beijing leadership had set out to liberate the people, but have sacrificed their credibility.

But how can feudalism and the feudal structure be overcome? I sympathise with the three demands made by the student leaders: first, threefold division of power; second, subordination of the minority to the majority; and third the need for democratic awareness.

Human and civic rights must not only be written down but must be capable of implementation and translation into fact.

And there is another truth: the proportion of forces at present in power leaves no room for illusion. Even if the Beijing leadership will not admit as much, it is fighting a lost battle. It has the people against it.

The Chinese people have our support, but our support should be commensurate with the needs of the situation. Demagoguery is not required and we should not unnecessarily add fuel to the fire. Fires are difficult to put out.

However, we must make it plain to those who have brutally suppressed the ambitions of the Chinese people by force of arms: you have won an illusory victory. It will not last.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Feldmann.

Mr. FELDMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the events in China touch us all, and especially those of us who have witnessed the peaceful protests and had discussions with people on the spot in the Square of Heavenly Peace and in other parts of China.

It is therefore both right and necessary for us to express our views here and protest at the orders given by a superannuated official caste to a misdirected army to murder its own population. Military units slaughtering defenceless human beings with such brutality besmirch the proud and self-adopted name of the People's Liberation Army.

I have great respect for the courage and self-sacrifice of the Chinese people in its drive for openness. The peoples of the world must not leave this reform-minded populace, this reform-orientated China in the lurch, and that is why today's motion for urgent procedure is necessary.

Economy liberalisation on the one hand and political feudalism on the other will not do. Economic liberalisation demands outward and inward openness and political reforms, otherwise the whole thing will not work.

It may well be that worldwide ostracism is not the right path now, but we must all consider every possible opportunity for preventing further escalation.

I therefore welcome the measures announced by the Americans. I welcome the fact that my government has put a stop for the time being to all visits designed to make official contact and has postponed the signing of economic aid programmes.

The proposals made by some of our colleagues here are absolutely right. We must adopt a joint European standpoint. We must make it clear to

Mr. Feldmann (continued)

China that if the war against its own population continues, if the army continues to be used in this brutal way, any normal relations with China are out of the question. Military brutality must not be left in possession of the field, either in China or anywhere else in the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I have been fortunate in visiting China three times during the past ten years and over that period I have seen dramatic changes in that country. Indeed, as a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I think that I can say for all of us that, prior to the tragic, sad events of last weekend, during our visit we saw no evidence of hunger. There was plenty of food in the shops. As we travelled around we saw people who gave no evidence that they were being suppressed in any way. The events of the past few days have therefore filled me with deep anger and disbelief, because while we were in China we met government officials, members of the armed services and ordinary people. All were friendly and helpful. They all repeatedly stressed their desire for friendship and for association with the West.

As many of my colleagues have said, we also met and talked to the students. They were convinced that the authorities would listen to them. They wanted a greater say and a more representative government to listen to their views about how they wished to live their lives in their country. Never once did I see any evidence of threats by the students against the state. Nowhere as we travelled through China did we see the threats to the government that we sometimes see in other parts of the world. I thought last week that we would sadly see the student protest crumbling and that there would be bitterness about the fact that they had not achieved anything. However, over a period of, say, one or two years, I believed that voices within the government would begin a dialogue with the students.

The committee discussed changes in that country with Chinese ministers. They expressed their sympathy with what students were seeking to achieve. However, the past few days have sadly seen the most brutal repression of those students and of the Chinese people. It is against that background that it is the duty of this Assembly and of our governments to voice our anger and disgust about what has happened and at what, regrettably, is still happening. We must also give hope to the people of China that their struggle will not be forgotten. I do not believe that the three million Chinese troops will ever crush the spirit of the ordinary men and women who are fighting peacefully for a greater say in how their lives should be run.

The great tragedy of China is its old leaders who are completely out of touch with modern thinking and who are not prepared to listen to or to enter into a dialogue with the people. Those leaders believe that such people can be crushed by the army. We have seen such action attempted in many other parts of the world. It has not succeeded in those other parts of the world and it will not succeed in China in the long term.

We must not only show our disgust and anger; we must also keep the door open for further negotiations and discussions with the Chinese Government, because undoubtedly there will be changes in the leadership in China in the coming months.

While we were in China, Mr. Gorbachev also paid his visit. I believe that he is someone to whom we should look – fortunately, our East-West relations are improving – to ensure that changes occur in China. At the same time we must make it clear to the Chinese Government that they will never regain respect in the world until the rights of Chinese men and women are listened to by that government and until the peaceful changes that those people are seeking are followed by their government.

There are other things that we in Europe must do. I am sure that all of us have Chinese students studying in our countries. None of those students should be put under any pressure to return home at the end of their studies. Those of us who come from countries with overseas broadcasting systems, such as the World Service of the BBC, must continually give a message to China's people to say that we are fighting on their behalf and to tell them what the world is saying to their leaders. I am convinced that the Chinese people will not hear from China itself what is being said by the world's people about the repression that they have sadly had to endure.

We must keep our diplomatic representatives in China. We must also keep China's diplomatic representatives in our own countries, because then neither our representatives in China nor China's representatives in our countries will ever be able to lose sight of the disgust that we feel about what has happened in the past few days.

China and its people may be down today, but I believe that their spirit will never be crushed. They are looking to us and it is up to us in the western world and in the rest of the world to help them and to attain for them the changes that they sought to achieve peacefully in their society. That is the greatest task facing us on behalf of the people of China. We will not forget them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too, of course, wish to voice my dismay, indignation and moral condemnation. The only thing I cannot confess to – and in this I perhaps cannot agree with Mr. Cox's impassioned statement – is surprise. I find nothing particularly striking or surprising in what is happening. It all fits in with the analysis that my political party made a long time ago of the structure and nature of a totalitarian régime. This is not to disparage the unquestionable merits of what the Chinese leadership has done in recent years, as reflected in the practical results achieved by that vast, admirable and extraordinary people which has waged the battle of its own salvation and has solved several of its own problems.

To quote an analysis which I recently read by Alain Peyrefitte, the former French Minister of Justice, the moment a measure of economic freedom was injected into this immense organism, the system exploded because freedom is indivisible. You cannot have economic freedom without political freedom. This fatal contrast has led to the explosion that could have been foreseen.

Our view of communism remains unchanged. Speaking as an Italian – and you will note how many Italian members have spoken with such authority on this subject and there are others equally authoritative yet to speak – this does not mean that we have once failed to keep our general view of communism distinct from our treatment of communists with whom we are engaged in a sometimes vigorous and trenchant but always respectful debate in our country. We have fought a war of liberation together with communists; we signed the constitution of the Italian Republic together with communists, and it is together with the communists who make up the second democratic force in our country that we have been fighting what I trust will be a victorious battle against terrorism.

Our views are not therefore vitiated either by ideological prejudice or memories of the past although, with your permission, Mr. President, I will mention just one which has a message and bears some analogy to what is now happening. It is that of the day in 1905 when thousands of Russians in procession behind the priest, Father Gabon, making their way to the Tsar were mowed down by the Tsar's machine gunners. However, that unsuccessful July revolt brought nearer the successful revolution in 1917.

That illustrates the wish I make for these young people in their struggle and who of course merit our respect and admiration. But allow me to point out, Mr. President, that this noble and authoritative Assembly, which includes some of the leading minds of the democratic political classes of Europe and in which our governments are represented by the permanent ambassadors

sitting in the WEU Council, is first and foremost a political Assembly, an Assembly which cannot be simply a vehicle for the expression of our thoughts, however noble these may be. It is an Assembly engaged, and deliberately engaged, in politics, and which recently, Mr. President, first under the leadership of our friend Mr. Caro and then under your own has achieved appreciable and politically significant results.

It follows that this Assembly must not only express its condemnation but must also voice the need for a spirit of understanding in our policy towards the Chinese People's Republic. In my modest personal opinion, the Assembly should state that what the WEU Council should do is to express our joint assessment not only of the moral values at stake but also of the concrete interests that Europe as a single unit represents. The greater the clarity and precision of what we say to the Council the greater will be the weight and political motivation of the mandate put out by this important Assembly of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Someone more cynical than I might say that Mr. Gorbachev causes trouble wherever he goes and perhaps no more so than in China which he visited at the same time as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. He visited the Hall of the People at the same time as we did.

I was very lucky. It was my second visit to China. I echo what my British colleague, Mr. Cox, said in what I thought was an exceptionally good speech. I agree with virtually every word that he said. Since Mr. Cox and I first visited China, enormous strides have been taken in the infrastructure and the general welfare of so many of the Chinese people. Like Mr. Cox and so many others, I was extremely shocked by what happened.

Because of my connections with a leading British newspaper, I sent a dispatch towards the end of our time in China describing what was happening before the shooting as the biggest change in Chinese history since 1949. If I can coin a phrase, I was guilty of under-exaggeration. What has happened must date back almost to the dark ages with the warlords and strife and killing on an enormous scale.

If we can put the butchery and brutality on one side – and I accept that it is extremely difficult to do that – and consider what is happening slightly objectively from the vantage point of those who visited China with the Defence Committee, I want to draw several very brief conclusions. I believe that the intellectually muscle-bound hierarchy in China sadly mis-judged the situation right from the start. They

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

let matters slide in a welter of indecision. There was a lack of consultation, as Mr. Cox said, between the older brethren who run the country, the army and other leaders. No moderate action was taken which, although possibly objected to, might not have been on the scale of the slaughter that we have seen since. There was a ghastly over-reaction and a tremendous loss of face on the part of the Chinese leadership.

I am very sad about Deng Xiaoping. I thought that he was a man of considerable progress, although getting extremely old. He was a refreshing contrast in years gone by to the granite-like inflexibility of Mao. Goodness gracious, I do not know what the future holds for him or for his protégés.

The outcome for everyone is very salutary, as Mr. George Younger said in his excellent speech this morning. I have three conclusions to make at this interim stage in our debate. First, communists all too often when the chips are down are communists. They do not change their spots, as we have seen over the past few days. Secondly, the world is far from being a safe place, despite the naïveté of some people who accept unquestioningly face values often glibly presented. Thirdly, freedom, or perhaps more accurately the yearnings for freedom, is still on the move despite the Chinese fratricide.

Freedom will be stalked by those who have most to lose from emerging democracy. They will systematically and viciously endeavour to maintain their positions by imposing totalitarianism. History shows that revolution is nearly always bloody – as French historians will testify. The chilling fact was that, alas, much more blood will be spilt before the majority of the world enjoys the freedom that we take lightly and easily in the countries that we represent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Stokes.

Sir John STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – This has been one of the most interesting and worthwhile debates that I have listened to in the years that I have been a member of the Assembly. I was lucky enough to be one of those who recently visited China as members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I strongly support the resolution to which Mr. Wilkinson drew attention.

The most senior politician whom I met on our visit to China was Mr. Zhou Nan, the Vice-Foreign Minister. He seemed to me to be a moderately sensible man. I hope that tomorrow the Defence Committee will send him a telegram showing our abhorrence of the actions of the government, the leaders of the communist party and the People's Liberation Army for killing and wounding so many innocent people in Beijing

and elsewhere. For the so-called People's Liberation Army to shoot down the people of its own country seems an astonishingly foolish and wicked act, and must show the present leaders of China to be bankrupt of respect and not worthy to be called a government.

When we were in China, we saw many enormous demonstrations taking place, first in Beijing, then in Xian, Shanghai and Canton. What struck us was the good order and peaceable nature of the demonstrations. Their demands were not unreasonable. They wanted more freedom, democracy and, above all, an end to the corruption in the rule of the communist party. The students are supported by many other people in all walks of life.

Few speakers have mentioned today that the Assembly must consider not only the terrible lessons of the appalling tragedy in China but the possible implications for other parts of the world that are still under communist domination. In the present arms control talks, we must not be lulled into a false sense of security. I noticed that the International Herald Tribune today stated that in trying to liberalise their economy, the communist leaders find it difficult to dismantle the totalitarian structure without triggering massive unrest. Communism has failed. They cannot even feed themselves. Their shops are empty of those goods that fill the shelves in the West.

The present crisis presents great dangers for the West. For instance, we cannot tell whether Mr. Gorbachev will remain in supreme power. We cannot tell how affairs in Poland will go, although they look promising at the moment. The stern and terrible repression that we have seen in China could also occur in some Warsaw Pact countries. The lesson of the events in China is that we in the West cannot fail to keep up our guard at present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I also remember Jan Palač, the boys of Poland and the men and women of Hungary. The list of those who have died for freedom has now been lengthened by thousands of names unknown to us but perhaps recorded by some god of justice.

And this is because, once again, some wretched old man – or men – exalted by a blind and deaf ideology has ordered armed soldiers to massacre young innocents armed only with the hope they reasonably nurture and encouraged by the warm wind of freedom blowing from the democratic world – our world. We are perhaps too busy, Mr. President, solving defence and security problems within the functional framework of Western European Union and the guidelines of our political cultures, whether right or left.

Mr. Martino (continued)

We can coldly discuss causes and effects, split hairs, imagine hypothetical solutions, developments and complications or simply analyse politics as is our job – rather like surgeons at the dissecting table – tomorrow or the next day. But today, Mr. President, let us not turn a deaf ear to these distant cries of the victims of violence – they are the cries of human dignity at its noblest felled by killing blows.

Mr. President, I shall not use all my five minutes. In the face of these deaths, perhaps we do not need very many words to express feelings which cannot, in any case, really be expressed. Mr. President, I ask you to invite the Assembly to stand for one minute's silence as an expression of our dumb horror and deep compassion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Than you, Mr. Martino.

I would draw your attention to the fact that we observed a minute's silence yesterday after the opening of the sitting.

I call Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. GABBUGGIANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In this important and influential debate I wish to express the out and out condemnation by the communist members of this Assembly of the awful massacre of so many young people demonstrating for democracy and freedom in Beijing and other Chinese cities. Responsibility lies wholly with that part of the leadership which has gained the upper hand in the Chinese Government and party – a political system that has clearly exposed the profound mistake of those leaders who thought that any form of dialogue, pluralism or opposition should be crushed and was contrary to the interests of the people.

We have expressed these sentiments and this utter condemnation in the firmest manner to the Chinese diplomatic representatives in Rome, stressing our indignation on behalf of the young people in China and the democratic elements in the capital. The same steps have been taken in many other Italian cities: Milan, Genoa, Venice, Florence, Bologna and Padua. All this is in line with the statements made in recent weeks by the Italian Communist Party affirming its total support for the young people in Tiananmen Square and their plea for freedom and democracy which was peaceful and non-violent as confirmed by our colleagues in the delegation that went to China a few weeks ago.

You will understand that the opposition of the Italian communists is significant in terms of political principle: it reflects our outright rejection of a collectivist concept which thinks that reform is possible without addressing the problem of political democracy. On the con-

trary, my party, as a European democratic and socialist force, believes that in the work of transformation and renewal initiative and action must be based on the principle of respect for human and civil rights and freedom. The Italian Communist Party also holds that the objectives of socialism can never be dissociated from the universal and enduring values of democracy.

The Chinese leaders have shown that they are obsessed by a reactionary vision of society and relations with the people. They have preferred not to heed the profound meaning of the demonstrations in Beijing or the calls from European and world public opinion not to use violence but instead to hear the voices of Chinese youth.

The group that currently has the power in China has tried to tackle economic and social problems by putting its trust in modernisation and rationalisation alone. This has proved to be a great illusion. On the contrary, the treatment of such problems also needs, concurrently or even in advance, political flexibility, dialogue and recognition for the opposition. Other countries of the East seem to be taking a different path. Poland, Hungary and even the Soviet Union are tackling their big economic problems by way of political reform, in other words on peaceful ground. It is to be hoped that these countries will hold firm to this choice of principle as time goes by.

In expressing our grief at the death of so many young people and repeating how close we feel to the ideals expressed by the demonstrators in Beijing, we consider that it is equally important for the forces of the left and of democracy in Europe and throughout the world, not forgetting the Council of Ministers, this Assembly and the European Community, to make known their firm determination to censure the killings and to take such decisions as become necessary and possible to avoid further massacres and civil war and to develop the conditions favouring a change of course in Chinese policy and in relations between the people and those that govern them.

Democratic forces in Italy have had experience in arriving at joint positions on tragic events before, including first and foremost those in Pinochet's Chile and South African racism. Mr. Sarti has just recalled a number of important and decisive moments in the democratic development of our own country, when the political forces including the Communist Party rallied together in vast numbers. But I would like to remind you of more recent happenings. At a time when we are occupied with the struggle against Pinochet and South African racism, we have to be careful not to distort the facts and the objective truth. We must not behave – as some seem to want to – in such a way as to identify a particular political movement with events occurring far away, or

Mr. Gabbuggiani (continued)

even on other continents. Communists have never behaved like that whether on the occasion of the events in Chile or in any other situation.

What we need now is for all the forces that see themselves mirrored in the ideals of the Chinese students to speak out and act on behalf of that cause so that the movement towards democracy and renewal which those young people were hoping to launch is not for ever stilled.

Thank you, Mr. President. Our group will be voting in favour of the resolution as it stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it has long been held that war is the pursuit of policy by other means. What we are now seeing in Beijing is the war of a self-appointed but bankrupt leadership against its own people. The war is being conducted by brutal means to conceal the fact that developments in the communist Chinese sphere of influence are reaching a point where some degree of balance can no longer be maintained.

We are all particularly hard hit, because we had come to expect a relaxation of tension, a relaxation not only in East-West relations in general, but especially within China, that huge country which once claimed to be the leading power in Asia.

We are also shocked because a man like Deng Xiaoping wanted to go down in Chinese history as one of the great reformers – allegedly, as we now see. He is a man who has clearly striven for economic reforms but who, the moment he came up against what the communists refer to as the power problem, has now hit back in the manner of Stalin and Mao Zedong, which is really incompatible with today's image of communist governments.

I particularly thank the representative of the Italian Communist Party for distancing himself from these events, and in the same context I regret that the communists in my own country, the Government of the German Democratic Republic, have fully endorsed the brutal actions of the Chinese leadership.

We must point out that the unrest which broke out in Beijing and demonstrably spread throughout the country was social as well as political in character, which means that communism, which was allegedly able to deal with all social issues, has again given rise to social problems of such magnitude that the people really had no choice but to rise against the régime.

The old story, which we heard often enough in Mao Zedong's latter days and which claimed that the communists had succeeded – though their methods might have been rather tough – in eliminating the hunger that had existed in China for thousands of years, has now been rejected even by the ruling communists themselves as a fairy story. As we were once told by one of the Chinese intellectuals on the fringe of the cultural revolution, we were all only too willing to believe this story, because it fitted in with our hopes, even if it did not coincide with the reality. I fear that in recent years we have been all too ready to make the jump from the hope to the belief that China would no longer practise that ordinary, run-of-the-mill communism which has characterised the doctrine throughout the world for decades, at least since Stalin.

When we see a so-called People's Liberation Army attacking the people with tanks, artillery and machine guns, we have to say that the people were not being liberated by the army: the government was liberating itself from the people through the army. I must register my respect for those units of the People's Liberation Army which refused to fire on their compatriots in Beijing in order to ensure the short-lived survival of a corrupt system.

I support the remarks made by Mr. Martino and also wish to express my profound respect for the dead and wounded who in recent days have been added to the victims of the cultural revolution of the Chinese leadership against its own people.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have just a few more comments to make. I feel that we should not simply stand here in impotent rage, protesting against what has happened in China, but that we should try in this Assembly to work out the necessary action that should be taken. This Assembly should not only reflect on the deterioration in the international climate brought about by the events in Beijing, but should convert its deliberations into concrete form.

I welcome the fact that the General Affairs Committee this morning appointed a rapporteur, so that at the next part-session in the autumn we should be able to discuss our conclusions and subsequently advise our governments on their longer-term policy towards the present régime in Beijing.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I welcome this Assembly's unanimous condemnation of the events in Beijing. I am always thankful when democrats do not speak of democratic consensus only in celebratory speeches but manifest the same agreement when human rights are really being brutally suppressed once again.

Ladies and gentlemen, I appeal to you to back up your own national governments if they are

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

prepared to take the necessary action following the Beijing massacre, so that one day we need not say: we protested against the massacre, but in the course of normal politics we did nothing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, when our radio and television stations broadcast their first reports of the protest by the Chinese students and their demands for more freedom, more democracy and less corruption, I looked at the television pictures with great respect. I admit quite openly that at that time I also admired the Chinese leadership for its readiness to accept this protest without violence. I was impressed because a few weeks earlier other television footage had shown viewers the situation in European Armenia, where over 3 500 people were seriously injured when special units, armed with spades, not tanks, beat up the demonstrators. I thought to myself: “There you are, you see, modern China is not following the classical path of repression followed in Hungary, Czechoslovakia or now in Armenia.” I think we were all shocked when it became clear that this new way of reconciliation was obviously no longer being followed.

I believe that nobody in this debate has yet brought out the specially interesting fact that the First Secretary of the party, Zhao Ziyang, the man who was said to be number one in the party, was obviously on the side of the students and was repressed in the power struggle within the central committee. We then witnessed the monstrous brutality of the use of troops in the Square of Heavenly Peace. We know that there is still fighting in Beijing, and an hour ago I had a telephone conversation in which I learned that units of the People’s Liberation Army were really worthy of their name and were fighting for liberation on the side of the people against those bent on its suppression. It looks as though a civil war might arise, and that would mean we must take the side of those who are fighting for freedom and against force and terrorism.

The worst aspect of this situation, as was recently pointed out by a Chinese student, is that the suppression is being carried out by Chinese troops, by their own compatriots and brothers. It is this which distinguishes the conflict from, say, the overthrow of the Hungarian uprising, where it was not the Hungarian army but the Soviet forces which quelled the revolt, and which in fact exacted fewer fatalities than are now clearly occurring in Beijing.

It is also regrettable that there are two communist parties which give their backing to the suppressors, the Communist Party of Vietnam

and, inevitably, the German Socialist Unity Party, which here too has something in common with the Chinese, and differs from the Hungarian uprising in that there too the soldiers of a people’s army open fire on those of their compatriots who want to move from one part of Germany to another.

Ladies and gentlemen, I go along with Sir Dudley Smith: we have to acknowledge that freedom has not yet been achieved by all the peoples of the world and that forces still exist which threaten and wish to suppress this freedom. A change of mood can occur very quickly, and these are conclusions of which we must also be aware.

When the First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party is clearly unable to implement his policy of reconciliation, it does not necessarily mean that the General Secretary must also fail in the Soviet Union; nor does it mean that he might not fail, as the Chinese example illustrates.

It follows that we must be ever watchful. Should the situation in China really take a turn for the worse and the terrorism of the past re-emerge, we must on no account be prepared to deliver up millions of Chinese to this régime, even though there may now be treaties to that effect – and I allude here to Hong Kong.

The challenge to us is not to make pretty speeches, but to draw practical conclusions. We must all be prepared to stand alongside those, wherever they may be, in China in the present case, who are fighting for freedom and clearly demonstrating by their peaceful protest that even the pacific demonstrator against a dictatorship will be mercilessly shot down by those who wish to retain power by force.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Let me say first that I agree with those who have referred to the positive sides of life in China today, during this debate as elsewhere. Clearly, no one goes hungry in China today. Housing conditions may be lamentable, but the man in the street is well clothed. There is a reasonable health-care system, and children are able to go to school. This is not bad for a country where there was still serious hunger and abject poverty two generations ago.

But these are economic achievements. When it comes to civil liberties, the Chinese régime is still a very long way from our ideals.

I was a member of the delegation from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments that visited the People’s Republic very recently. We were there during the first few days of the hunger strike, and what we saw has left a very deep impression on us. It was obvious that

Mr. de Beer (continued)

not only students were involved: they had the support of virtually the whole population. In Tiananmen Square we even saw whole families who had brought their children along to see what was happening.

In other cities we visited, Xian, Shanghai and Canton, we saw similar protests, albeit on a smaller scale. Someone who spoke English rushed up to me and asked me – seeing that I was a westerner – if I knew what was going on. I told him that, according to the western press, the aim was to achieve greater democracy and undoubtedly to combat corruption. He was pleasantly surprised to hear that the whole of the world's press, newspapers and television, was keeping a constant watch on what was happening in Beijing and elsewhere. It was also a great encouragement. When we were there, the students were still optimistic. We praised our Chinese hosts for the Chinese Government's restraint vis-à-vis the demonstrators.

And now this. We have obviously been shocked by the events and we cannot help wondering if the people we spoke to in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere are still alive.

We have a duty to give moral support to those who demonstrated in Tiananmen Square. We have a duty to the victims of this brutal suppression. We have a duty to the dead and injured, and we have a duty to their relatives and to the whole of the Chinese people, who were behind them.

Mr. President, I am convinced that the victims have not suffered in vain. The leaders who are still in power will not be able to ignore this protest, nor will they be able to ignore the victims. Sooner or later, I am quite sure, this will turn out to have been a crucial turning point in Chinese history. Let us hope – and do what we can to ensure – that it is a turning point for the good.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In recent months, things in the People's Republic of China seemed to be taking an increasingly positive turn but during the last few days events have come thick and fast. What began two days ago as a surprise one could hardly believe, turned hour by hour into a full-scale nightmare. We are horrified as we learn of the atrocities that have been committed and there is nothing to assure us that the end is in sight. No one can tell what will happen in the next few days in this part of the globe.

What, for example, are we to make of the astonishing communiqué broadcast yesterday morning in Beijing by the Central Committee of

the Communist Party and the government announcing that they had the strength, or the confidence even, to win the war against them completely? What about the statements put out by the army headquarters to the effect that gaining control of Tiananmen Square was only a first victory which would be followed by a long campaign against the dregs of Chinese society? What should we make of the broadcast warning the soldiers that the struggle would be long and involved and that the battle against bourgeois liberalism would be fought to the very end?

Is this, colleagues, the end of the dream of democracy and greater openness in China? We do not know and it is perhaps unwise to try to see the future at the moment. What we do know, on the other hand – and this has been said many times in this chamber today – is that we cannot accept what is happening in China and that we condemn in the strongest possible terms the atrocities which the army, under orders from the government, has committed.

For these reasons we support Mr. Wilkinson's motion for a resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Encarnação.

Mr. ENCARNAÇÃO (*Observer from Portugal*). – Bearing in mind the special relationship between Portugal and the People's Republic of China, arising from many centuries of Portuguese presence in the area and of a traditionally good neighbour policy substantiated in the recent joint declaration of the statute of Macao, the Portuguese Delegation to Western European Union wishes to express the following: a profound concern regarding the recent developments in China and the most shocking violations of human rights and liberties; a serious preoccupation with the consequences of the outcome that such a situation may give rise to in the area in which the People's Republic of China is geographically situated; a special emphasis on the spirit of the joint declaration on Macao, issued by the Portuguese and Chinese Governments, regarding the future of the territory and in which the items relating to the safeguarding of the essential guarantees and rights of the citizens have been given a marked relevance; our full support for the proposed motion for a resolution and, finally, that we will follow all future developments with close attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and the Rapporteur I wish to thank the speakers, all of whom were in favour of the report and strongly supported acceptance of the resolution.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

With regard to our procedure, I suggest that this evening, after we have adopted the resolution, it should immediately be communicated to the Chinese Ambassador, so that he does not have to wait for tomorrow morning's newspaper to learn what this Assembly thinks of the terrible drama which is taking place in his country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put your proposal to the Assembly.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

The Rapporteur does not wish to speak.

I call Mr. Cox on a point of order.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I agree very much with the comments made by Mr. Ahrens but suggest that all member states should relay the terms of the motion to our own governments and that they should send it to the respective Chinese embassies in our countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – All texts adopted by our Assembly are sent on to national parliaments at the end of the session. National members of parliament will therefore be able to urge their governments to implement the suggestion that you have just made.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1191.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten

representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously¹.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 7th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

Development of East-West relations and Western European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1187, addendum and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.50 p.m.)

¹. See page 26.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Development of East-West relations and Western European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1187, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Soell, Mr. Caro, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Baumel,

Mr. Müller, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Lambie, Mr. Fourné, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Lord, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Böhm, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Soell, Mr. Müller, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Soell (point of order), Mr. Pontillon.

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.15 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Development of East-West relations and Western European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1187, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the development of East-West relations and Western European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1187, addendum and amendments.

I call Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the purpose of the report we are about to discuss is to examine the implications of developments in the Soviet Union since 1985 for the security of Western Europe. I was fortunate enough to be in the Soviet Union from 17th to 21st April this year and was also able to talk extensively with senior Soviet officials and I am sure you will not mind, Mr. President, if I address my thanks to the Moscow authorities from this rostrum for their kind welcome, assistance and the ready availability in this genuine attempt at a better and clearer understanding of East-West relations.

This report then is the product of free and open consultation with some of the most highly qualified Soviet officials. It is thus the direct result of the new relationship – which is one of dialogue rather than confrontation. Indeed, and this is the overriding impression we gained from our contacts and the trip to Russia, in Moscow collective security and the approach to disarmament and arms control were couched no longer in terms of confrontation but – at least in what was actually said – in terms of co-operation. Admittedly, in politics nothing is ever final, especially in international relations, but I have the feeling that a new language is being born and that there is a shift of ground in international relations, which are no longer dominated – or at least not exclusively dominated – by the fear of encirclement and the fortress mentality. There is the wish for European security to be mutual, for the defence level to be reasonably sufficient and for there one day to be a “common European house”.

1. See page 29.

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

At the military level the consequence of these developments, whose translation into fact has scarcely begun, is the abandonment of the first strike strategy, an attempt at transparency in defence budgets and a restructuring of the level and composition of the armed forces. In practical terms, this should mean – and it would already appear to be the case with the Soviet contingent stationed in Eastern Europe – an appreciable reduction in offensive weapons or support facilities and I am thinking particularly of bridging units.

Clearly it is Mr. Gorbachev who has to be credited with this progress. He has been its catalyst, sometimes even its inspiration. But it is also a by-product of a whole series of changes due to a variety of factors and circumstances including the Soviet public's appetite for information sharpened by the after-effects of the Helsinki final act and the unbearable economic stagnation, recovery only being possible by cutting back the excessive 15% of Soviet gross national product claimed by defence spending.

For all that, history never follows a linear trend. It has its ups and downs, and perestroika is encountering a multitude of difficulties, not least of which is the wave of regionalism fuelled and exploited by certain conservative elements as a way of obstructing present progress and the man behind it. Events in the Baltic countries, Armenia and more recently Tbilisi in Georgia are disturbing signs of this phenomenon.

The restructuring of the economy for its part has encountered many difficulties too. Put shortly, from what we saw and what we felt, perestroika has not yet led to any real improvement in wellbeing or in purchasing power. Quite the reverse: when we were in Moscow, for example, it was announced that sugar was to be rationed again.

That said, however, your Rapporteur's feeling is that, political uncertainties notwithstanding, the priorities and constraints necessitating present developments will be there for some considerable time and that economic and political imperatives will probably not allow any return to a dictatorship able to impose new sacrifices on the Soviet economy to pay for defence spending.

The priority the Soviet Union is giving to internal reform obviously implies a profound change in foreign policy. Military expenditure cannot be reduced by sustaining tension and confrontation.

Outside Europe, Soviet foreign policy has changed considerably and now appears anxious to end conflicts and to want the United Nations Organisation to play a major rôle in that direction, particularly in the Near and Middle

East. This new trend surfaced in Mr. Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations a few months ago.

The recent visit by the Soviet number one to China, in spite of the disturbing situation developing in that country, also showed this desire to end what was nearly a thirty-year conflict – and on China's terms, namely the evacuation of Afghanistan, a settlement in Cambodia and the reduction of Soviet forces deployed in Asia.

Soviet Union encouragement to progressive countries and parties in Africa and Latin America also appears to have been considerably reduced.

In Europe itself, what is covered by the term "common European house" is as yet vague and ill-defined. However, we should note with interest and satisfaction the Soviet Union's acceptance at the CSCE meeting in Vienna of a number of principles which it seems ready to apply, namely, to allow the people's democracies to decide upon the organisation of their political system, economic policies and external relations, in particular with the Council of Europe and the European Community, to accept that frontiers be opened to information, to trade and, to some extent, foreign capital, and to recognise finally the importance of respect for human rights as a principle of living together in a "common house" and the right of those living in it to emigrate. I have long been a student of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and I am pleased to note that this is being allowed to increase.

What conclusions and lessons can we draw from all this as far as our organisation is concerned? It seems clear that Mr. Gorbachev's policy deserves to be taken seriously by Western Europe, but equally clearly it falls far short of ending every danger!

In particular, it carries the risk of blowing the whole organisation of European security apart too soon. It was once said that the Atlantic Alliance faced two dangers: failure and success. There is, indeed, a danger of opposition between Europe's interests and those of the United States, anxious as that country is that any conflict, including nuclear conflict, should spare American territory and eager as it also is to reduce its defence spending, in particular by withdrawing part of the United States contingent stationed in Europe. In that regard, the recent Brussels summit and the statements by President Bush gave grounds for some lesser worries, the possibility of clashes of national interests within Europe with particular regard to short-range nuclear weapons and the danger of public opinion being encouraged to demand a reduction in military expenditure too early and to a level where Europe's security could be placed in jeopardy.

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

The first version of this report ended with a highly sceptical question about WEU's ability, and more generally Western Europe's ability, to draw up its own plan and fit it into a real disarmament strategy. Against all expectations the summit commemorating the fortieth anniversary partly corrected this impression and gave positive answers to some of our concerns.

As you will recall, the Atlantic summit, which opened in an atmosphere of disagreement, was finally a success in three ways: first, the allies were able to overcome their differences over short-range missiles without anyone losing face; second, they very clearly regained the initiative in a field which is a priority for Europeans, namely, conventional disarmament in Europe; and third, audacity to some extent changed sides with the West showing a certain readiness to open discussions on security questions and disarmament priorities in a fast-changing East-West relationship.

As regards short-range missiles, a point of equilibrium was reached in which the principle of negotiation is now accepted by all, but the opening of that negotiation is subject to conditions clearly indicating the priority we give to conventional disarmament. This agreement, or compromise, was facilitated by the American initiative which brought the Soviet and western positions closer together in three sectors: tanks, personnel carriers and artillery. It thus extends and amplifies the western proposals by suggesting that equal platforms should be established in three areas on which the Soviet Union was being very insistent: fighter aircraft, helicopters and American and Soviet troop strengths.

This development augurs well for the Vienna talks. Furthermore, those able to discuss these problems yesterday evening with the Soviet Minister, Mr. Karpov, were able to hear for themselves the Soviet representatives' favourable reception for all these proposals.

But one successful summit does not make a summer. The successful Brussels exercise was still stuck in the rut of bloc-to-bloc negotiation leaving little opportunity for genuine consultation between allies. The immediate risk, the inevitable trade-off, is that the Vienna talks could become another United States-Soviet event.

WEU's efforts to promote the European dimension thus remain vital. Who else is there to make Europe's voice heard in the East-West dialogue? After all, it is still Europe which is at the centre of the East-West problem; this is where differences will need settling, even when they no longer arise solely in military terms. The

future of Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states, the trend towards pluralist political systems, the new problems of intra-European relations posed by the development of new institutional relations, all these are problems of which Europe is both the setting and the origin.

In this perspective, WEU is both an obligatory and privileged transit point: it is and will remain the forum in which European governments can consult each other and co-ordinate their views on security questions, provided – that is – they agree to tackle the real problems which include: What is the minimum western deployment necessary to be sufficiently deterrent and effective? This is the idea of reasonable sufficiency that both sides now share. What should be the relative rôle of nuclear and conventional weapons in the organisation of joint or, as I would prefer to say, shared security? How should common defence responsibilities and burdens be shared in a redefined transatlantic link? What are the requirements of European security in the area of disarmament and arms control? What are the threats to international peace that could arise in regions outside Europe?

Such a security policy must be closely combined with a policy of détente, co-operation and new or renewed confidence in which the European Community and the Council of Europe need to be very much involved.

It is with this wish that I shall wind up this brief introduction. Your committee adopted this report almost unanimously, which is an encouraging sign. The international environment today, with the exception of the Chinese accident, has become more favourable. The threat of war is receding everywhere in the world, defence spending is on the decline and so is arms dealing. Let us take advantage of this in Europe and try together to build a fairer international order with more trust and openness, where the security of some is not at the cost of the security of others, and where friendship and co-operation once again mean something.

It can be done if we really want to. I hope that, somewhere and somehow, this debate will bring that objective nearer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pontillon.

The debate is open and I call the first speaker on the list, Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our group greatly appreciates Mr. Pontillon's detailed work and his informative report. There are, of course, a few points here and there on which our interpretation might differ, but what we wish to stress is his overall view of the problems covered and the spirit permeating the whole report with its constructive purpose of stimulating and encouraging a

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

gradual improvement in East-West relations with greater security and co-operation for all the countries of our continent.

We shall therefore vote in favour of the report and the draft recommendation provided, as we hope, some amendments we have tabled are accepted.

Between the time that Mr. Pontillon tabled his report and the time we began to debate it, new elements have arisen which must be taken into account, especially in the final draft on the recommendation. I refer in particular to the new proposals tabled in Vienna by the Warsaw Pact countries and the new and interesting proposals made by the American President, Mr. Bush, at the recent NATO Council meeting in Brussels. These two events may make a decisive change to the negotiations in Vienna as regards the rate of progress and the practical results of the talks.

The conditions for advancing towards a significant balanced reduction in conventional armaments in Europe and towards the start of negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons are now in place. We know, even after Brussels, that differences of position remain concerning these latter weapons which could stand in the way of the agreements it is hoped to sign in this sector too. None of us could reasonably believe that all types of nuclear armaments would be totally eliminated overnight.

Committed and tenacious effort combined with a constructive determination on both sides will be needed to make real progress towards this objective, possibly by stages with a fresh lowering of the nuclear threshold each time. What is unacceptable in our opinion is the inflexibility of a doctrine that sees no end to the existence of nuclear weapons. What we welcome most among Mr. Gorbachev's innovations, apart from the concrete proposals he has made, is the new way of perceiving security and defence questions and his objective of freeing mankind from the ever-threatening danger of nuclear weapons. Are these ideas sincere and are they there to stay? Let us study this together in the light of all the facts, and if we are convinced, as our group is, that the objective is worth pursuing with determination let us give it our backing while still safeguarding the balances necessary for reliable levels of security and giving no advantage to either side but negotiating without mental reservations and throwing off the burden of military doctrines like that of nuclear deterrence, which also needs to be phased out.

We believe that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and especially the member states of this Assembly should proceed with this objective in view and support any results in

Vienna which point in this direction. In our view, a recommendation on these lines would be useful and timely.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are discussing this report against the background of a world in the process of rapid change, a world which, as the news of the last few days shows, is also prone to developments giving cause for great anxiety.

The dreadful events in China which we discussed yesterday, as well as the results of the elections in Warsaw, will certainly affect not only the domestic policy of these countries, but East-West relations as well.

It is therefore especially important that the conclusions we arrive at in this report should provide us with a tool which will really measure up to these developments.

We are aware that the path to the attainment of human rights and greater democracy is full of obstacles, and that here in Europe we are advancing at very varying speeds, by very different routes, and with many diversions, and that a few Eastern European countries are even experiencing a regression in some areas.

It is therefore all the more important that the development of the Western European community should forge ahead and contradictions in the Atlantic Alliance be eliminated, while at the same time we register our readiness for greater openness and co-operation with Eastern Europe.

Among the serious contradictions within the western alliance is our assessment of the rôle of nuclear weapons. During yesterday's debate on Mr. de Beer's report I pointed out how even the varying use of terms bears witness to the differences in the definition of this rôle. In times of crisis these differences entail considerable dangers.

Yesterday I referred briefly to the Wintex Cimex exercise. If we consider that the practices learnt in manoeuvres and large-scale exercises naturally have a very strong influence on military behaviour in actual crises, it becomes very clear that these contradictions within the Atlantic Alliance need to be settled.

In my view, we are not concerned here with the rôle of nuclear weapons as a matter of basic principle. I think we shall be keeping these weapons for some years and perhaps much longer than that. The fact is that the world knows how to manufacture nuclear weapons. What we have to decide is the rôle that these weapons should play in the concept of western defence.

Mr. Soell (continued)

It is impossible to explain to the public, not only in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also in other Western European countries, why negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles should not be started as quickly as possible, now that the other side is ready to negotiate and is clearly also prepared to eliminate the existing asymmetries, which are obviously in the Soviet Union's favour.

Mr. Pontillon's report also contains contradictions on this point, but aside from these I specially wish to praise its comprehensive analysis of the changed situation created notably by Mr. Gorbachev's policy – a policy which, as we know, is very strongly influenced by the political and economic constraints in the Soviet Union itself.

The idea that in future a policy of sufficient defence should replace an openly offensive posture may perhaps represent a change of strategic doctrine at least as great as the discussion initiated between the Soviet Union and China in the early sixties, and more particularly after the Cuban crisis of 1962, when the Soviet Union clearly recognised that nuclear weapons were no paper tigers – to use the Chinese phrase – and that a nuclear war had to be avoided at all costs.

We now see a further step, accompanied by a willingness to co-operate in the broadest sense in the economic, cultural, technical and even political areas.

The conclusions of the report contain some very important suggestions, and I refer in particular to the idea that a clearer distinction should be made between the Europe of defence and the Europe of economic, cultural and technical co-operation – as well as the Europe of human rights.

Paragraph 148 of the report contains the following words:

“ To link defence Europe too closely with economic Europe would probably make the development of East-West relations more difficult. ”

This is quite true. If we look upon Europe as a Europe of concentric circles described around the Europe of the Nine, Western European Union and the Europe of the Twelve, we find the opportunities for the co-operative construction of this greater Europe in institutions such as the Council of Europe and also in the conditions formulated by the Council of Europe.

Unlike those who are always talking about the European house, without to date producing any practical design, we not only possess the foundations for this common European house but also its supporting framework, its stairways and above all its open doors. It is important for us to

emphasise this time and time again, and not be merely defensive in adopting this phrase, which did not originate with Mr. Gorbachev, but was already in evidence in the debates of the seventies, though without ever being translated into practical terms.

That is why it is always important for us to see the narrower issue of military security and the relationship between defence, disarmament and arms control within the broader context of political and economic collaboration. Special stress has been laid on this relationship in Mr. Pontillon's report, which is why I regard it as particularly fruitful for our future work.

In conclusion, I would like to revert to the comments made two days ago by the new Secretary-General of WEU concerning the future tasks of Western European Union. In relation to security policy in the narrower and broader senses, and to a policy of stable development in Europe, I believe it is most important that we should direct the activities of WEU more firmly towards the idea of planning for what should follow, if the Vienna negotiations on conventional force reductions and the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons are successful. What form is western defence to take in this situation, and how should collaboration between Eastern and Western Europe then be practically organised?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Robert Pontillon for his excellent report and point out that the WEU Assembly is perfectly entitled to participate in the East-West debate, to state its views on the NATO meeting in Brussels, and above all to claim to understand Soviet feelings, since it is in very close touch with these changes that date from 1986. I am delighted that our Rapporteur went to Moscow and met the leading representatives of the Supreme Soviet.

I would also remind you that the WEU Assembly was the first European assembly invited to Moscow: we went there with the Presidential Committee in 1986, practically simultaneously with Mr. Gorbachev's famous Prague speech in which he announced the first shifts in the Soviet attitude, particularly as regards medium- and short-range missiles. It is a good thing to know that WEU, at this level, is well informed and can speak with authority.

So I do perhaps regret – with due reserve – the fact that Western European Union has not been involved enough in all this work, particularly at NATO level. Perhaps we should look for ways of improving our co-ordination with those in contact with our European negotiators in East-West relations.

Mr. Caro (continued)

I should like to return to a question that has been one of the Assembly's main concerns over the last twenty-four hours, namely, the SNF negotiations. It was raised in the debate on Mr. de Beer's report and again in the debate on that by Mr. Pontillon. Perhaps it will come up again later. We have also asked the Minister and the Secretary-General questions on the subject.

Speaking as a Frenchman, I should like to raise the following points.

The problem is historical, born of the conditions in which WEU was founded and the modified Brussels Treaty signed, i.e. on the basis of attitudes, firmly declared at the time of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany and never repudiated since, to the effect that nuclear weapons should never be part of the Federal Republic's arsenal.

In creating its own nuclear deterrent, France virtually made itself responsible – though political language has since changed, it was many years ago – for the very basis of European solidarity, namely, the security of its neighbours.

With the Federal Republic of Germany, we French find ourselves in a situation that I would not call paradoxical, since we are talking about independent decisions taken by two sovereign countries, but as complementary. Over the years the French have learnt that the security of German territory was meaningless if only the territory of the Federal Republic was involved. There is one German people but two different states. Hence our rôle cannot be imagined without thought for the brothers of the Germans in the Federal Republic who live behind the iron curtain. This point, at varying strengths, has been part of the thinking of all the successive leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany.

So in this field France plays an exemplary rôle of complementarity and solidarity which finds expression in the context of Franco-German relations on every possible occasion and most recently in the unanimous ratification, in the Bundestag and the National Assembly, of the protocols to the Élysée treaty and in particular that on military co-operation.

The very basis of the balance in western thought on denuclearisation and the reduction of nuclear weapons is linked essentially to this Franco-German co-operation, which endeavours to solve the problem while respecting the freedom of peoples and democracy. For us, therefore, this is a fundamental objective.

France should be clear in its utterances on this point, and I am pleased to say that with time this clarity is tending in a positive rather than a negative direction. This will put an end to the

constantly recurring nightmare of Mitteleuropa, an area to be kept outside the great arguments about what force is necessary to protect democracy from attack. If this fundamental dialogue between the two peoples is forgotten, and factors brought in that create disquiet, not about the substance but about the plans that the two peoples have made, difficulties arise.

I am not against those who ask for immediate negotiations on SNF. The principle of negotiations has been adopted. But what is the point of asking for them to take place immediately when talks on conventional forces are not even finished! We know full well that the essential imbalance is in conventional forces and that if ever there was any aggression it would begin with them. The principle is agreed. To attack those who, for the reasons I have just explained, prefer one all-in package but in a phased programme, would be unjustified. I sincerely hope that this is understood.

Of course, as I am speaking as a member of both European and French parliaments, my view is that we are on the eve of a hopeful rather than agonising reappraisal of the methods of co-operation and consultation within the Atlantic Alliance and in particular in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Once we have made some progress with this problem, which essentially depends on Franco-German understanding as regards nuclear weapons in Germany, we will perhaps be able to tackle the fundamental problem which is on everyone's mind, namely the creation of the European pillar whose place, formally, physically and politically, is within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.

The day when we find the American pillar and the European pillar that we represent – including France – face to face at the NATO conference table, Western European Union will have won the right to go forward with the organisation of European defence whilst avoiding the pitfalls of our individual countries' internal politics.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, previous speakers have already expressed their appreciation of Mr. Pontillon's report and I have nothing to add. I am in broad agreement, and also appreciate the care and the extensive information which have gone into the report. I am also aware of the disparities which exist between announcement, intention, implementation and fulfilment, but this does not mean that we should lag behind what is already regarded as agreed.

I specifically welcome the paragraph in the preamble to the recommendation proper which

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

notes that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments. I am for disarmament, and I consider that it needs to be constantly repeated that we desire disarmament, even subject to the proviso that we are not prepared to put our own comprehensive security interests in jeopardy.

This last fact should not prevent us – and we must not shut our eyes to this – from stating in the draft recommendation our specific regret that tactical battlefield weapons such as nuclear artillery are excluded, that the text makes no provision for these, and that there is no declaration that they too should be the subject of negotiation. Because of its range, nuclear artillery poses a threat to one's own population and is therefore of doubtful value as a deterrent. I should like to stress that these are primarily tactical weapons and are to be rejected for that reason alone.

If, as the Rapporteur writes in paragraph 30 of his report, it is important that the new strategic thinking of the Soviet Union is based not only on the concept of reasonable sufficiency but also on that of mutual security, implying an obligation to make joint efforts to ensure the success of arms limitation negotiations, then there is a need to react to this. It is not even necessary to act, in the sense of taking initiatives. It is sufficient merely to react.

The question is whether the updating and modernisation of short-range nuclear missiles can be NATO's only answer. It is alleged in some quarters that we fail to see that the crux of the security issue in Europe is the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces. This is still so, and I am aware of it. Imbalances which work against stability and security have to be eliminated. This too is true, and I agree.

But it is also true that stability and security in Europe can last only if nations and alliances remain capable of defending themselves. This applies to the countries themselves and not only to the alliance, which means that any particular country which is affected must take the necessary decision for itself and genuinely recognise that what it is defending in any conflict does not from the outset simply entail jeopardising the home country.

In this connection I have to ask myself whether paragraph 4 (b), which recommends that the Council "define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented", is not actually counter-productive, because instead of aiming at the

long-term elimination of nuclear deterrence, the use of the word "maintenance" gives it permanence. Some such wording as: "define a security system which guarantees our common security in East and West, regardless of the fact that deterrence is currently based on conventional and nuclear systems" is in my opinion less liable to be misunderstood and would be a step in the right direction and an aim which would demonstrate that we want the situation to change. I think that the aim expressed by this wording is clear and provides a basis for an active dialogue with the East European states, without neglecting or tending to neglect our own essential security interests.

The opinion being expressed in NATO circles, according to which NATO, notwithstanding its willingness to negotiate, would not allow itself to move into the situation of excessive inferiority with regard to very short-range nuclear missiles, may satisfy some members of Western European Union. As a member of the German Delegation and, more particularly, as a social democrat, I reject systems – and here I again refer to nuclear artillery – which primarily pose a threat to my own people.

On this point, Mr. Caro, I have to record a minor disagreement with your remarks. I realise of course that both of us were being translated, and that I may not have completely understood this particular comment which accompanied your specific observations. I have already mentioned that states and alliances must remain capable of assuring their own defence. I have to make it clear to my own people that any defence operation in the final analysis includes the defence of one's own population. It is self-evident that we are doing this in the great alliance of Western European Union or within the NATO alliance.

Whether we like it or not, I believe we have to react to the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate. When they offer negotiations we should respond convincingly and positively. We owe as much to our own peoples and to Europe, and we can do this without carelessly jeopardising our own security interests. We should discuss how to solve this problem together. Statements which I see from time to time in the press, according to which some nations or heads of government lecture the others to the effect that the post-1945 situation forced them into a special position which simply had to be accepted, are no help at all. Forty years and more after the event, I am not prepared to accept this, at least on behalf of my children. Instead, it must be sensibly discussed in a joint dialogue, and with this in mind I appeal for co-operation in finding a sensible solution rather than mere indulgence in mutual remonstrance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are meeting on the morrow of a very important event, the latest NATO meeting in Brussels, and we have to bear this in mind not only as we debate the report before us this morning but throughout our business today. The fact is that what took place in Brussels a few days ago considerably changes the data and basis of a certain strategy for the defence of Europe. There are some positive elements and others that we have to study seriously.

Of the positive aspects, the first is that President Bush has reversed a psychological situation in which we felt that we were always trailing behind by comparison with the attractive proposals made by the East, and in particular by Mr. Gorbachev. After weeks of uncertainty and hesitation the head of the largest country of the West has won back the initiative, and this is very important.

Next, a serious crisis threatening the unity of the alliance has been averted. In the last few months, and more particularly the last few weeks, the ill-concealed disagreement between the Federal Republic and the United States clearly contained the potential seeds of serious difficulties for the future of NATO. So we have to be pleased at the fact that this reversal of the situation has, apparently and on the surface, resolved these problems. The underlying problem is still there but too serious a confrontation has been avoided and things have been made easier for the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and his government.

The fact remains that as Europeans we have to study the consequences of the proposals accepted by NATO very carefully. The first thing I note is that for the first time for forty years the head of the American executive has announced a big reduction in United States troop strengths in Europe: the 10% reduction is a start. For years this worry has been with us; today it is a fact: the reduction of the United States contingent in Europe has begun. This is an important point.

The second is our impression of a return to a kind of bilateralism in United States and Soviet relations because I do not need to tell anyone that the preparation of Mr. Bush's decisions involved very little consultation with the allies: the European governments learnt about these decisions only hours before they were announced. It was certainly a very profitable operation for President Bush, first in terms of media coverage, and then vis-à-vis the Congress and public opinion in America. We have to see this objectively, but there is nevertheless a slight danger, especially with regard to the negotiations to come. The important point now, following the declarations of principle, is what is

going to happen next, first between the European and American allies and next between NATO and the eastern bloc. Within that framework, we must be very watchful and not nurture too many illusions.

The third cause for unease in this context is that perhaps – without wholly realising it – the West has thrown away a vital card which it had so far kept up its sleeve in all the talks with the Soviets.

This major advantage that the Soviets have long sought to capture, and which we have just let go, is the inclusion of aircraft, and that immediately opens up wholly new possibilities.

You know that the Soviets make a distinction, which is very difficult to define from our point of view, between defence aircraft and attack aircraft and that the structures of the Soviet air force are totally different from ours. That means that any comparison of aircraft numbers on both sides is subject to many different parameters. In addition, there is also the – for us – very dangerous question of single- or dual-capability aircraft, i.e. equipped for purely conventional and nuclear missions. It is not by accident that this point has been raised by the Soviets looking for any way round to the only subject of debate that interests them, namely nuclear weapons.

Discussions about conventional weapons are a bait and a lure to get us to fall in as quickly as possible with the unchanging objective of the Kremlin, i.e. the complete denuclearisation of Europe. One must therefore be very careful in this area. This is not the place for a technical debate on this question – outside experts are studying these matters – but I did want to draw attention to this question, which is one of the implications of the Brussels agreement.

Let us not harbour any illusions! Declarations have been made and decisions taken in Brussels, inter alia on conventional negotiations, but it is obvious that the six months time-limit is unrealistic. Six months is not enough to solve the problem of disposing of tens of thousands of servicemen and weapons. It will take a considerable time. The Soviets, well aware of the taste of certain westerners for nuclear negotiations, may well manoeuvre us into an entirely new situation by taking us at our word, and, as it becomes clear that the problems of conventional weapons cannot be solved in six months, proposing in Vienna an interim agreement in order to start nuclear discussions immediately, a provisional agreement that it would be very difficult for us to refuse.

An agreement on the conventional annexes is not just a matter for the diplomats. Following the model on which the Atlantic Alliance has operated from the start, it has to be ratified by the United States Congress and by the par-

Mr. Baumel (continued)

liament of each of our sixteen countries. In addition, not only does the agreement have to be ratified and signed by the governments, it has to be implemented and that cannot be done in six months or even a year. We are therefore going to be driven into a corner by this timetable and by the determination of the Soviets, supported by some of our European partners, to get on with the nuclear debate as soon as possible. This question needs to be studied.

Another important point to be examined is what will happen between the allies? Drastic reductions have been decided upon. How will these be shared out among the various members of the Atlantic Alliance? What reductions will our German friends and our partners in Luxembourg, Belgium, Britain and France be asked to make? All this is still very vague. Before going into talks with the other side we have to talk among ourselves. Nor do I know whether such discussions are already planned between Americans and Europeans to study these various points within NATO.

Appearances are deceptive. To announce and perhaps even achieve substantial reductions in conventional weapons would have no real meaning if, after a large number of obsolete weapons had been eliminated, the rate of production and manufacture of modern weapons were still maintained on one side. It would even be an elegant and convenient way of getting rid of a whole heap of scrap no longer serving any useful purpose – except perhaps in official statistics – and to replace a weak army by a tougher, more offensive and more effective one. This, incidentally, matches the thinking of certain Soviet marshals who consider that the USSR under Brezhnev and during the last fifteen years was wrong to overdevelop certain weapons rather than concentrate Soviet efforts on a number of particularly important and effective points, possibly alongside a fundamental reshaping of Soviet strategy.

These considerations should provide food for thought in the work of our committees and in this Assembly at this and future sessions. It is a long-term task.

The Brussels summit has considerably changed some of the foundations on which our security was based. We should not, admittedly, take a pessimistic view but the facts have to be considered and we should try to do so bearing in mind the need to uphold three essential principles: the cohesion of the alliance, the defence of European interests relative to those of our American partner and the reduction of the excessive disparities and imbalances between East and West.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to express my warm thanks to Mr. Caro and Mr. Baumel for their efforts. It will surprise neither of these gentlemen to learn that I am in substantial agreement with their views. However, it will also come as no surprise to you that I must take issue with some of the comments made by Mr. Soell and Mr. Klejdzinski.

I believe there are one or two fundamental observations to be made on the question of European security policy.

First, we must realise that this development came about because the alliance maintained its unity in the dispute over the arms build-up. It is falsely claimed that the Soviet Union evinced a willingness to accommodate us prior to our decision on the arms build-up. On the contrary, the behaviour of the Soviet Union is a response to the determination of the western alliance to implement that decision.

Although the opposition in our own country predicted that an ice age would settle on the negotiations, precluding their ever being pursued again, it was in fact this strength of purpose which ensured that new negotiations were initiated, leading as a first step to the Reykjavik settlements.

With regard to the security debate as a whole, we have now entered a phase which raises a question for Germany in particular. This was made very clear by Mr. Klejdzinski who forcefully reminded us that the events of forty years ago must be put behind us. He reminded me a little of a current bestseller in the Federal Republic of Germany, written by the well-known historian Arnulf Bahring and entitled *Der Neue Grossenwahn*, or *The New Megalomania*. It has to do with certain aspects of present German policy.

If we examine what Mr. Klejdzinski has said here – and I have no wish to contradict him – for instance his comments regarding nuclear artillery, he must of course be prepared to consider how a situation of this kind came about and whether we were not perhaps a little careless over the INF agreement. I am thinking only of the question of the Pershing IA missiles, which in my view was not properly resolved at that juncture. And he must also be prepared to say whether the opposition in the Federal Republic really has an alternative to put forward.

During the European election campaign I recently took part in a discussion panel with Mr. Gerhard Schmid, the SPD's leading candidate in Bavaria. He is a member of the party council and its regional chairman – an important Social Democrat Party officer.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In Bavaria!

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Yes, Bavaria is part of the Federal Republic of Germany. I know that the SPD only has 25% of the vote in Bavaria at present, but that is not significant in this context. What was significant in the debate, Mr. Klejdzinski, was the question of low-flying aircraft, and what Mr. Baumel had to say in connection with the new negotiations, in particular.

Mr. Gerhard Schmid of the European Parliament said that we could dispense with low-flying aircraft. We needed to deploy more missiles and must include cruise missiles in our calculations in order to maintain nuclear deterrence. I would agree with him, but that is not the view of the SPD as presented in the Bundestag.

This of course points to the fact that the, as it were, popular pressure to do away with nuclear weapons altogether is precisely the aim pursued by Soviet policy in Europe for decades. There was the Rapacki plan and there were other proposals emanating from the eastern bloc, but I am one of those who believe that European security since 1945 has primarily been assured by the fact that we had nuclear deterrents on both sides. I am convinced that even in the future we shall be unable to banish these weapons from the world, just as in the Middle Ages the Popes did not succeed in banning the murderous crossbow, which they had eternally damned. All they could do was to allow the crossbow to be overtaken by later developments.

I therefore take the view, ladies and gentlemen, that we must not forget the nuclear component when we talk about disarmament. We must realise that negotiations on conventional weapons will last for some time and will not be entirely simple.

Anybody who attended the talks with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov at the embassy yesterday evening may remember one remark he made. He said that the American offer concerning the reduction of conventional forces must embrace not only American troops stationed in other countries, but also other nations' troops stationed abroad, including, say, the Franco-German brigade, or the Rhine Army, to take another example.

This of course leads to immediate confrontation with Western European Union, as established under the Brussels Treaty, which states that one of the bases of the alliance of Western European Union is the maintenance of the Rhine Army on the continent of Europe. It follows that if any progress is to be made with these negotiations, an amendment must first be

made to the WEU treaty, if Mr. Karpov's interpretation is to become a reality.

Ladies and gentlemen, I should now like to make two further comments on other problems, not related to disarmament.

My first remark concerns developments in the eastern bloc alliance. Here we have to recognise that various movements are under way. What is happening in Hungary can only be welcomed, and the elections in Poland have demonstrated that the Communist Party no longer enjoys any standing among the population. However, a Polish Government spokesman declared that these election results were not compatible with social needs – a familiar ploy from the past. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* leader today correctly points out that communist parties are just not prepared to relinquish power voluntarily.

I have no desire to mention Romania or, indeed, the German Democratic Republic in this context, since apart from Vietnam, the GDR is the only country which has faithfully backed those who gunned down the peacefully demonstrating students in the Square of Heavenly Peace.

The problem of perestroika, which we all welcome, is therefore still unresolved among the Soviet Union's allies.

Turning to the Soviet Union itself, I believe the congress of deputies has shown that, here too, the problems are not so straightforward. We must remember that Dr. Sakharov, the winner of the Nobel peace prize, was howled down when he dared to express some criticism of the Red Army's venture into Afghanistan.

I think that the Soviet Union's central problem with perestroika is one that most western countries faced in the past but have long since overcome, that is to say the problem of decolonisation. Whereas the western countries have separated themselves from their colonies, and the latter have become emancipated, independent and free, this problem has not yet been solved where the Soviet Union is concerned.

Today we read of another fifty fatalities in Uzbekistan, and we shall no doubt shortly hear more about Armenia, Georgia or the Baltic states. This brings it home to us that the problem of tsarist colonialism itself has not been solved in the Soviet Union, as the communists in Russia simply adopted this colonialist system and preserved it intact.

Georgia and Armenia will continue to be a problem. Immediately after the collapse of the tsarist empire, Georgia was a social democratic socialist republic. The German Reich thought so highly of this republic that it sent the press secretary of the then Reich President Ebert, a social democrat, to Tbilisi as ambassador. By the time he arrived the Red Army had already put an end

Mr. Müller (continued)

to this republic. As we know, the consequences of the pact between Hitler and Stalin immediately affected not only the Baltic states but also a part of Romania, the present-day Soviet Republic of Moldavia, because states like Romania and the Soviet Union, which were not at war with each other, had to give up certain areas of land under the terms of the pact between the two dictators.

Not until these problems of Russian colonialism have been solved will perestroika and glasnost become truly successful and lead to a further improvement in the maintenance of peace between East and West.

(Mr. de Beer, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to follow my colleague, Mr. Müller. His reminders of the past, and some of the similes that he used in his speech, were an interesting extension of the contents of the report. But I may be slightly more optimistic about the steps that we can take, and I believe that the report is a little more optimistic, too. It argues that recent changes in the attitudes and actions of the Soviet Union, reflecting a better appreciation of the success of the approach in western countries, based on the principles of security, not force, and on the free movement of ideas, people and goods, not controls, provide opportunities for making decisive progress in arms control and reduction and, of course, better co-operation between East and West. In doing so with such clarity and insight, the report makes an important contribution to the process of arms control and reduction.

Western Europe and the western alliance have always shown determination in promoting, jointly, national security and disarmament. In the present improved circumstances, even greater imagination must be applied to such efforts, with a sincerity and integrity that can be found only in those all-embracing principles of human rights and democratic values.

In his opening address to this session of the Assembly, the President reminded us that we must introduce ever more strongly “disarmament and détente” aspects into our consideration of the requirements of peace in Europe. The report provides invaluable background information and analysis and is a further prompt to do just that.

The need to focus on European requirements and interests, short-term and long-term, even during moments of uncertainty and instability, which are inevitable during periods of rapid

change, was underlined on Monday by the Secretary-General.

In this, I believe, there is room for a new WEU initiative to redefine the needs of defence and security as our contribution to détente, over, around and through the iron curtain. As this report pointed out, and as Keith Speed reminded us earlier this week, the political ramifications of defence are as important as the military.

In that context, I should like to draw attention to one or two aspects of the excellent explanatory memorandum – points that have a continuing bearing on all our thinking and the future work of this Assembly. In paragraph 7, Mr. Pontillon reports the view of Soviet authorities that Mr. Gorbachev’s perestroika is not just one man’s vision. Rather, the report says, it is a reflection of the reality to which the Soviet Union is only now facing up.

If that is correct, and I believe it is, the reforms now taking place in the Soviet Union have a greater base of substance and a better chance of continuing than if they rested only on Mr. Gorbachev himself and the inevitable uncertainties of his leadership and political career – although, if the report is true, those uncertainties do not loom as large as many think. We must carefully but supportively encourage those forms of evolution and reform. That must be our attitude to defence matters as well as many others.

Secondly, Mr. Pontillon draws attention in paragraph 30 to the two fundamental concepts underlying the Soviet Union’s strategic thinking on defence – the concept of “reasonable sufficiency”, copied from the West, although it still has to be turned into practice in the East; and the concept of “mutual security”. Taken together, those two concepts, now shared by East and West, give a new direction to talks and thinking about deterrence, whether nuclear, so-called conventional or chemical.

They must have been a major influence on the arguments and agreements advanced and reached in Vienna in January and on the agreement to hold the ten review sessions, building towards the fourth major review conference in Helsinki in March 1992. They must have provided the new environment in which force reductions could start, not only in the Soviet Union, but, as the report says, in the German Democratic Republic, in Czechoslovakia, in Bulgaria, in Poland, and in Hungary. They must also have provided the environment in which the Soviets published for the first time – rather to my surprise, and I believe to that of many people in the West – their own account of forces stationed in Europe by both the West and the Warsaw Pact countries. It is only that report which makes possible for the first time the

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

second of Mr. Pontillon's recommendations, which is to be particularly welcomed.

Thirdly, in the report's conclusion, the Rapporteur emphasises the apparent change in Soviet defence thinking, from one based on collective security seen in terms of confrontation to one in which arms limitation would be considered no longer as a stage in a test of force but as a means of ensuring stability, with the security of all concerned being guaranteed. That is an immensely important statement and an important part of the analysis of this report.

WEU should have a part to play in discussing and suggesting new methods of force planning and deployment as lower levels of conventional forces most particularly are called to cover the same territory as hitherto, with no detriment to the defensive deterrent efficacy of that force.

In that new, less negative and less threatening context of new Soviet attitudes, carefully planned force reductions should be achievable. I welcome the third recommendation of the report – that the WEU Council maintain an involved watching brief and a co-ordinating function as agreements to ban, limit and destroy are discussed. That is the point made so emphatically by Mr. Baumel earlier today.

Most particularly, such a rôle must improve WEU's capacity to contribute to the debate on how best to verify those agreements and to see that they are being kept, and to promote within our countries and our parliaments the facts of a changing and evolving defensive relationship.

It was very apparent from the WEU seminar on public perceptions of European defence, held in London only last March, that public understanding of and support for defence issues in Europe need a clear European focus. We in this Assembly must allocate sufficient energy and money to make that possible.

I would lastly seek to bear upon the good will of my colleagues and repeat the plea that I made at the opening of this Assembly, and at our previous Assembly, for greater visibility to be given to the contribution that WEU can make to lowering the threshold of armaments and to disarmament thinking and plans by specifically identifying that function through titling and specific tasks within our committee structure.

The President told us on Monday that the question and the description of our committees had been referred to Council. It strikes me as rather peculiar that such reference is necessary for such a domestic matter having to do only with the organisation of our work and identification of our tasks – especially when we continually reiterate our desire and right to be independently responsible for our own affairs.

However, in the circumstances, I hope that the suggestion to Council contains a recommendation for a high-profile identification of disarmament as one of our major areas of interest, particularly when European cohesion on defensive issues and disarmament has never been more important.

WEU does not have a perfectly defined rôle, but it does have a special and specific rôle in defence matters. Our Assembly can provide stimulus to new and innovative thinking within WEU, and that can provide an immensely important pressure point within the western alliance, especially as the Vienna talks continue. I believe that this report is an intellectually stimulating and challenging contribution to our ability to live up to the high expectations that we set ourselves and the performance that people expect of us.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I also welcome the report and congratulate the Rapporteur on this contribution to East-West relations and Western European security. As has been said, it has been overtaken by events.

The sixth recommendation states that the Council should:

“ In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fulfilling the conditions and expressing the desire to take part; ”

I welcome that recommendation, but, as my colleagues here who are also members of the Council of Europe will know, at its last assembly in Strasbourg, the Council agreed to set up a special guest status – a new membership category. We hoped that that special guest status could be given to the Eastern European countries that have shown a desire to participate in the work of the Council of Europe. If they fulfil the conditions laid down by the Council of Europe, they should be able to apply for that special guest status.

That recommendation by the assembly was handed over to an appropriate committee – the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries. At a recent meeting in Bern, the committee unanimously agreed that if the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia applied for special guest status, the application should be accepted. That is a tremendous breakthrough for the Council of Europe. If those countries apply and if the next meeting of the assembly accepts the committee's recommendation, the Council of Europe will extend its influence over the whole of Europe, within various categories of membership, from East to West and North to South. We are coming close

Mr. Lambie (continued)

within the Council of Europe to Mr. Gorbachev's "common European house". I welcome that and the report is one move towards such a position.

We in Western European Union should look at the relevance of our union to the new idea of a common European house. I have always believed that Western European Union was built on the basis of the cold war. However, if we can achieve political co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe within the Council of Europe, I must question the relevance of Western European Union and of its counterpart in the Warsaw Pact area. As politicians take over in Europe, I hope that the influence of the military and of arms manufacturers will be reduced to allow us to achieve peace in Europe.

Some of the recommendations of the report have been overtaken by recent decisions in Brussels. Not so long ago at a conference in Florence organised by WEU, I was criticised for being very optimistic about the future of Europe and about world peace. I was criticised because I unhesitatingly welcomed the peace initiatives of President Gorbachev. I said that as politicians in Western Europe we should welcome and fully support President Gorbachev's peace initiatives. He should be supported within the Soviet Union and in Europe as he tries to achieve perestroika and glasnost. Indeed, those ideas should be adopted by politicians throughout the world.

I stated in Florence that I was speaking there as an optimistic European politician. I had just returned from a visit to the United States where I had found the born-again-Christian colonels moving about the Pentagon in ever-increasing numbers. The industrialists who run Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics among others had not come to terms with Mr. Gorbachev's peace initiatives. They were not optimistic; they were pessimistic because they saw the end of their reign in the Pentagon and of their power as arms manufacturers, supplying arms to anyone who would accept them and who would use them in any war, anywhere.

Today, I am optimistic again and congratulate President Bush on his initiatives also. As the colonels in the Pentagon and the arms manufacturers in Seattle, San Diego and Fort Worth could not come to terms with Mr. Gorbachev's initiative, I wonder how they will come to terms with these initiatives of Mr. Bush. Not only did President Bush out-Gorbachev Gorbachev, but he has put forward ideas that, if achieved and if they result in co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States, will result in our seeing a new era of peace throughout the world.

Therefore, I hope that they can come to terms with the initiatives and that we shall achieve some movement when President Gorbachev addresses the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July. I hope that we shall get an answer and a Soviet response to the encouraging initiatives of President Bush.

Earlier in the debate I thought that I was listening to the German parliament and to pre-election speeches from either side of the German political scene. I know that there has been a little fudging in relation to Germany and to short-range nuclear weapons in President Bush's initiative, but nevertheless the initiative is there. Despite the fudging we should accept the initiative and ensure that everyone accepts not only Mr. Gorbachev's initiative but the American initiative. I hope that that will be the outcome and that my optimistic remarks in Florence will become generally acceptable in this Assembly.

Sometimes when listening to my English conservative colleagues – I use the word "English" advisedly – members of the Assembly must think that Britain, and especially its Conservative Party, is composed of cold-war warriors. Although that is not true, unfortunately many of them are here. Indeed, because I thought that my colleague, Mr. Wilkinson, would speak before me I had prepared a special answer to what I knew that he would say, but as he is not here, I shall have to omit that part of my speech. Although the cold-war warriors of the English Tory Party are here, they number only a handful.

According to the British press, Mr. Norman Tebbit, a former Chairman of the Tory Party and the man who organised and orchestrated what I acknowledge to have been that tremendous victory for the Tory Party in Britain's last general election, delivered a lecture yesterday in London. He was even more optimistic than me. He forecast that within five years we should see the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of American troops from Germany. I am not as optimistic as that, but if Mr. Tebbit, whom I have always thought of as an even worse cold-war warrior than some of those who are here, is optimistic and sees tremendous changes coming in Europe as a result of the initiatives of Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush, I will give them my full support and I hope that my English Tory colleagues will also give them their full support.

I hope that we shall see not only the withdrawal of all American troops from Europe within the next five years, but also the withdrawal of all British troops from the Rhine within the next five years to allow us to return to a more normal and peaceful footing in the whole of Europe.

Mr. Lambie (continued)

I welcome the report, but things have moved on. We have reached a stage when we are going to see the peacemakers inheriting Europe. If we can do that, I do not give a damn whether the born-again-Christian colonels in the Pentagon or McDonnell-Douglas, Boeing or General Dynamics are worried that they find, as George Younger said yesterday the Soviets are finding, that whenever defence forces are cut back, there are many industrial problems.

I hope that the Russians have industrial problems, but change their war factories into peace factories. I hope that McDonnell-Douglas, Boeing and General Dynamics also have problems, which at the end of the day they will solve within the political policies of the United States. I hope that they will not solve them by selling arms to whomever will use them wherever in the world there is the possibility of a war.

I hope that we will support the report in spite of its fudges at the edges and despite the fact that it is now out of date in many respects. Much work went into the report and I want to congratulate the Rapporteur on bringing the report forward to give us the opportunity to discuss it within the relationship of East-West security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first of all congratulate our colleague Robert Pontillon for his report that gives us an all-embracing view of developments in the countries of Eastern Europe. These developments inevitably have an impact on East-West relations and on the security of Europe and the Rapporteur dealt with them well.

If we agree that conservatism in the East has gone, then that means we have to review our relations with the countries on the other side of the iron curtain.

I shall first attempt to look at what happened after 1945, namely the division of the world into two blocs, of opposing ideologies, the West with the ideal of democracy and the Eastern European countries with the communist model, which they believed would impose itself throughout the world. Opposed ideologically, the two were also, of course, politically and militarily opposed, not in Europe, where security was ensured by the nuclear deterrent, but in more limited conflicts and, more generally, in the developing countries where this ideological confrontation was the invariable background. A direct confrontation in Europe not being possible, we saw the development of such concepts as peaceful coexistence and détente, but there

was always one primary datum: the rigid conservatism of society in the Eastern European countries.

Four years ago, in 1985, a movement began, first in the Soviet Union and then in Poland, intended to bring at least this rigid conservatism to an end. In Hungary the movement had started earlier, beginning with economic changes and then spreading into the political sphere. Today then, we are in a different situation, a new situation that forces us to ask questions, to think again about our involvement and about the very essence of our rôle in East-West relations.

In the Soviet Union, on the economic front, opposition to perestroika stems from the inertia that has built up over the years. On the political front, Mr. Gorbachev's attempts to use pressure from public opinion to change the faces at the head of the party are provoking twofold resistance: from the diehards on his right and, on the left, from those who now enjoy some freedom through glasnost. Then, as we see every day, there is the question of the minorities who are, it is true, taking advantage of the changes to press their demands.

Finally, with regard to the USSR, I would say that Mr. Gorbachev is clearly still a centralising force and the party monopoly is there to stay. But we also find that there are many who believe the reforms have to be brought about by a change in economic policy. The USSR is in deep economic stagnation and could well, in the long term, forfeit its great power status. This is where the real problem lies and, consequently, it is essential for the USSR to have relations with Eastern Europe in the nature of a privileged partnership.

In Poland, the economic situation is critical. The growth of the opposition movement and the weight of its pressure has left General Jaruzelski no choice. He needs the support of the opposition to save the economic situation. The June elections confirmed the victory of the opposition. Solidarity won all the seats in the senate and all the seats it could stand for in the Diet – 35% – making it even more necessary for General Jaruzelski to take decisions.

In Hungary, the economic situation is also difficult. Freedom of expression, already satisfactory from an East European country, is going to be increased since the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Party decided on 11th February 1989 to return to a multi-party system, the only reservation being that the new parties have to accept socialism. Elections are to take place this year. On the situation in Hungary, therefore, it is true that here too we must be on the watch.

Unfortunately, the other countries are not following suit, some, like the Democratic Republic

Mr. Fourré (continued)

of Germany and Czechoslovakia, being a long way behind.

What are the implications of this situation? The first point is that this greater détente means we have to redefine our own attitude. In so doing, we should not, to my mind, separate the political from the security aspect in our relations with the East. So long as there is a failure to respect human rights and freedoms, the threat will persist.

We shall also need to assist this democratic transition by an open attitude. In the present context, the increasing volume of trade can only speed up the movement towards democratisation in the East and we should be part of it.

At the military level, we are faced with a dilemma. The line taken by Mr. Gorbachev – at least in public – is that of reasonable sufficiency, but it is obvious – as was said this morning – that the Warsaw Pact has such a stockpile of weapons that it would take many years for the Soviet position to qualify as truly defensive. Furthermore, Mr. Gorbachev's position is not yet secure. The diehards, even now, could regain control. We cannot at present therefore weaken our security. At the same time, we cannot continue to act as if there were no progress towards disarmament.

However this may be, negotiated and verifiable disarmament of whatever kind is preferable to unilateral disarmament.

As regards the common European house, this concept of Mr. Gorbachev's creation is still somewhat vague. If its aim is a European security system which would neuter one by one the countries of Western Europe it has to be rejected. If, on the contrary, the concept is the same as that presiding over the CSCE process it should be supported with these three objectives in view: the circulation of persons and ideas and human rights in general; the development of economic co-operation; mutual and verifiable disarmament with stability as its aim.

Mr. Robert Pontillon confirms and develops these objectives in his report and draft recommendation. In my opinion they should today be unanimously approved by our Assembly.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Although I am not a born-again-Christian colonel in the Pentagon, my remarks will not disappoint my socialist colleague, David Lambie.

I congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon, on an excellent report. His explanatory memorandum embraces factually and objectively most of the current points of conflict between East and West, and his recommendations strike the right balance between caution and optimism. My only criticism, which my colleague Tim Rathbone has echoed, is that the Rapporteur has missed an opportunity to define that further progress that we in WEU require from the Soviet Union before we can confidently say, "Yes, truly, the evil empire has gone, never to return" and upon which it would then be prudent and responsible for us to reduce our guard.

As the report makes plain, scarcely a month goes by without some new, unprecedented and encouraging move in the Soviet Union and in much of Eastern Europe towards a more civilised and freer way of life and upon which prosperity can be achieved. Those countries that have yet to move – most notably East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania – are becoming more isolated by the day by those, including some of the Soviet Union's own republics, who are ever more daring in seeking to challenge the authority of the Kremlin and the ideology of the communist party. Who would have thought that Solidarity candidates would have swept the board in free elections in Poland in the same decade in which martial law was imposed and Solidarity outlawed; that Hungary could conceivably qualify to join the Council of Europe in the foreseeable future; that elected members of the Congress of People's Deputies in the Soviet Union would be allowed to criticise authority so openly, sometimes so bitterly, and to be seen on television doing so; or that so many human rights commitments would be entered into, genuinely, we must assume, in the Vienna concluding document in January, which are now, only five months later, being reviewed and enhanced at the CSCE conference currently taking place at the other end of the Avenue Kléber as we sit here? All those and much more, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, constitute clear evidence that is encouraging public opinion in all our WEU and NATO member states to conclude that the Soviet threat has receded and that our defence capabilities must similarly be reduced.

As the report makes clear, as our Secretary-General made clear in his address to us on Monday, and as Mr. Younger said yesterday, that time has not yet arrived. We must consider the other side of the coin. Last week, in response to President Bush, Mr. Honecker said that the Berlin wall, which remains one of the most significant sources of tension in Europe, would "last for a thousand years". As we debated yesterday, we have just seen what at least one communist power can do to its own people when its unelected authority is challenged – and China is a nuclear power.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

Inside the Soviet Union itself, which has been notably silent on the events in China, only last month it retaliated in a similar wholly unacceptable way on the streets in Georgia, and last week in Uzbekistan. The Kremlin does not intend to allow public opinion to assert itself through genuine elections in a real democracy, and its leaders remain ideologically committed to Lenin's global revolution.

Given those realities and many more, I hope that we will give full support to Mr. Pontillon's recommendations before us today, to follow closely, through verification, the implementation of the Soviet renouncement of its offensive strategy and of the abandonment of its first-strike capacity; to confer closely with our American allies to ensure that European security is fully maintained; and to use the framework of the Council of Europe to pursue an active dialogue with Eastern Europe and the Supreme Soviet on matters that concern us.

On that latter point, in paragraph 96 the report refers to the West agreeing to attend a human rights conference in Moscow in 1991. It does not say that our attendance would be conditional – conditional on further progress. We should spell out soon what that progress must be so that the Soviet Union will be under no misunderstanding about whether it is acceptable for us to attend that conference. We in the Committee for Relations with European Non-Member Countries are working on that report right now.

Because public perceptions of defence in Europe in particular are so vulnerable to Soviet proposals and propaganda at this time, it is important for us in WEU to state clearly and regularly that for the foreseeable future there can be no question of abandoning our nuclear deterrent, of allowing our short-range nuclear weapons to become obsolete, of withdrawing all American troops from Europe, or of allowing the Soviets to share our technological superiority by abandoning Cocom. Indeed, it is important that we in WEU should be less ambivalent about SDI and show a greater interest and determination that its development should be pursued with the utmost speed, because that is precisely what the Soviet Union is doing.

If I am accused of using the language of the cold war and not of peace, let us remember that Adolf Hitler's favourite word was "peace". WEU was born out of his war and it was charged with applying the lessons of that war and of history generally. As the report makes clear, it was Mr. Khrushchev who first embarked on perestroika, and he faced difficulties in containing his Eastern European empire, and he was replaced. We hope, of course, that that will not be the fate of Mr. Gorbachev, but history

tells us that it cannot be excluded. For us in WEU it is the end of unelected communism in the Kremlin which is the bottom line upon which we must insist before we even consider compromising our own defence. That is one propaganda initiative that Mr. Gorbachev has yet to announce.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first warmly congratulate Mr. Pontillon. Whatever our political judgment of his report – and I must say immediately that mine is very positive – it is a well-written, cogent and coherent analysis of the complex problem of East-West relations. It was certainly not an easy task to recount their recent history, because it is not yet easy to see whether or to what extent the changes in the East are fundamentally irreversible and whether these are firm steps on the way toward democracy or mere accidents in the history of Europe. My conviction is that it will be difficult to hold back the wind of freedom, witness the dramatic events in China and the more peaceful happenings in Poland.

The conditions for East-West dialogue where confidence can prevail have now been met. Admittedly, the four years – or rather less – of Gorbachev change are not long enough to assess how deep it goes and provide firm proof of someone's good intentions. As the old proverb says, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. It would be a tragic parody to say that so was Tiananmen Square. But if we look at some of the things Mr. Gorbachev has done – unilateral arms reduction and transparency about the USSR's defence budgets – the four years start to mean something, enough at least for us to agree with President Bush that the change in the Soviet Union and the East is an unquestionable and revolutionary change.

Admittedly, we are at the stage of declarations of principle and new strategies. It is the stage where certain theoretical ideas may still be vague and uncertain as regards their practical consequences – for example, the Soviet principle of "reasonable sufficiency" which, even in Soviet circles as the Rapporteur has clearly shown, is varyingly interpreted. But what counts is the step-by-step progress in the concrete area of détente. What counts is that the iron curtain is coming down along the Austro-Hungarian frontier – which turns our eyes towards another, the Berlin wall, in the hope that that too will come down in the not too distant future. What counts finally, is the major innovations in disarmament issues proposed in the report on "Deterring through the turn of the century" presented by a group of congressmen of both parties led by Senator Samuel Nunn. Apart from their technical aspects, these innovations prove

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

one important thing, namely, that the American leaders have largely got over their reservations about the changes in the Soviet Union, which, as Mr. Baumel said a moment ago, had NATO at a standstill and unable to react in the right way. This inability was overcome at the recent Brussels meeting.

The West must make an adequate response to these changes and the proposals that have been put forward "without compromising its security and without abandoning, in détente, what it managed to defend during the cold war" – I quote the Rapporteur.

In the final paragraphs of the recommendation that we are asked to approve, the Rapporteur calls on Western Europe to take every opportunity without hesitation to promote and consolidate the dialogue on all questions relating to the human and civil principles of life and not only on social and economic activities. This summons must be widely and unconditionally welcomed by all the institutions of free Europe: the Council of Europe, WEU, the Economic Communities and the European Parliament. The EEC was right a few days ago to ask the Council of Ministers of the Twelve for authority to negotiate an agreement for economic and trade co-operation with the Soviet Union similar to the agreement it already has with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. And the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries and Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe were also right to decide in favour of granting special observer status to certain East European countries. These are the first concrete responses by Western Europe to the overtures from the East. I am sure they will help to give Mr. Gorbachev, and those with the same sincere approach as his, the support that is necessary for these good intentions to be translated into reality and for the climate of mutual confidence to grow and East-West dialogue to intensify. This, as the Rapporteur wrote: "rather than the number of missiles each of the great powers will retain... can be the starting point for true disarmament".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Pontillon has produced an excellent report which deals comprehensively with a highly complex problem. It is a huge topic, and I shall mention only one or two topics.

It is significant that the recent NATO summit already makes parts of the report almost out of date. That is no criticism of the report, but it is a sign of how quickly and unpredictably matters

are moving in this area. There is no doubt that glasnost, perestroika and arms reduction are now unstoppable.

The rôle of the media has been crucial. We have seen for ourselves the events at Chernobyl. We saw the young man land his light aircraft in Moscow. There is much more openness in the Soviet Union, and a combination of this public awareness and the economic necessities of life means that the process will continue. As most speakers have said, we should warmly welcome those events. Having called for a change of heart by the Soviet Union for all these years, it would be churlish not to accept that change of heart. That sometimes happens in politics in my country. Politicians on one side of the divide do their best to persuade people on the other side to agree with them, and if they decide to cross the floor of the House of Commons, we get worried and wonder whether we should allow them in. That is a complete contradiction in terms. If we have persuaded people to change their minds and join us, we should welcome them when they do.

The word "trust" is becoming rather overworked in this context. We should talk more about co-operation than about trust. In this world, little is done on trust. In the United Kingdom, and I suspect in the countries of most members, we do not buy houses on trust. We have the house carefully surveyed and obtain certificates, and when we buy the house we get contracts to say exactly what we are buying. Even in the holy state of matrimony, where one would think that trust should be the prime factor, in Britain and, I am sure, elsewhere we demand a certificate to show that we have been married, so that there is no room for doubt. Even in the most intimate parts of our lives, where we could expect to use the word "trust", we proceed with caution and with adequate documentation. That must apply equally to arms reduction.

One point that comes out of the report is that the Soviet Union is taking a less active rôle in other countries. The most obvious example is the withdrawal from Afghanistan. All those moves are extremely welcome and might mean that there is now real hope for a more peaceful world.

There is no doubt that taxpayers throughout Europe will be increasingly reluctant to pay for the defence of their nations if they believe that it is not as necessary now as it used to be. There is a great need in all our nations for houses, hospitals, roads and other things, and there will be increasing pressure on all of us to reduce our defence budgets. It will be even more important for us to explain to our electorates the need to be vigilant and to keep our guard up.

We must explain the steps that we are taking and say that, regrettably, matters cannot change

Mr. Lord (continued)

quite as rapidly as people might wish. It also means that, especially in Western European Union, we must be ready to co-operate and to put together the ideas that have been discussed this morning. With NATO and all our allies, we must organise our defence posture as quickly as possible so that it may be seen as a credible deterrent, although certainly considerably reduced. If we can do that quickly and maintain our defence posture, we can hope to satisfy both our defence requirements and the inevitable demands in our countries to reduce defence budgets.

In terms of safety, I agree with George Younger: the step-by-step approach is the right one. We must keep moving forward steadily. We must avoid euphoria, however tempting, and we must remember – I do not want to pour cold water on current events – that the Soviet Union is still producing a new submarine every six weeks. That speaks for itself.

To turn that great industrial machine around from defence to more peaceful purposes – as Mr. Lambie suggests the Soviet Union and the United States should do – is wholly laudable, but it will not be done without pain. No one knows better than Mr. Lambie the effect that that might have on industrial processes and jobs. After so many years of such machines grinding along, it is very difficult to change quickly without repercussions.

Unfortunately, we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons. As many speakers have said, their existence over the past forty years has kept the peace. I do not know whether, by Mr. Lambie's definition, I am a cold "cold war warrior". If so, in the context in which he spoke, I would probably be proud to accept the description.

The present changes have been brought about by people in our nations standing firm. Yes, times are changing now, but, yes also, how easy it is to have hindsight! Some might say that all these changes are thanks to those cold war warriors who had the fortitude to stand firm all those years. I am sure that Mr. Lambie, whom I know reasonably well, will agree that it is better to have cold war warrior politicians that dead young warriors on our battlefields.

The Soviet Union is obviously closely and deeply linked into Europe, and there is much talk now of the common European house that we should all like to see. WEU is uniquely placed to play a part in this – as is the Council of Europe.

It occurred to me how unusual the Council of Europe is when we consider that, within the space of ten months, it has been addressed by a Polish Pope and by Lech Walesa, the leader of an oppressed Polish trade union, and that it is

shortly to be host to the leader of the nation which is oppressing those very Poles. That says an enormous amount about what a great part the Council of Europe can play in bringing together opinion from all over the world and what a great strength it gives us to use that opinion.

I repeat how valuable I have found this report and how much it contributes to our side of the debate. I believe, as I said, that WEU is now uniquely placed to play a major rôle in these exciting developments – and we must not fail to take this opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, congratulate Mr. Pontillon on a substantial, thoughtful and well-balanced report. I wish to make only a few remarks, in view of the time, on behalf of the Liberal Group.

The dispute within NATO has now been resolved, or at any rate postponed, and for that I am grateful. One finds that problems are hardly ever solved: they are usually put off, and they change their form in the intervening period. In that dispute between the Kohl-Genscher approach and the Thatcher-Younger approach, we are on the side of Mr. Genscher and Mr. Kohl.

In Mr. Genscher's words, whoever seeks disarmament must negotiate on disarmament. The German CDU-CSU-FDP coalition deserves high praise as the principal catalyst in creating the political circumstances that have culminated in placing NATO in a much more positive negotiating posture vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact than might otherwise have been the case. President Bush certainly responded very well, even if, as Mr. Baumel said, with minimal consultation; but the rôle of Mr. Kohl and Mr. Genscher was crucial and in the end very beneficial to the alliance and to the atmosphere within the disarmament process.

As Mr. Pontillon rightly says, we are now moving into an era of dialogue, not confrontation. Of course one moves cautiously, but one must move. Evidently, views on short-range modernisation will be determined in the West by the rate of progress in the Vienna talks, but, speaking for myself, I would not exclude simultaneous negotiations on shorter-range nuclear forces. That, incidentally, is a position taken in a discussion paper on East-West relations published by the social and liberal democrats in the United Kingdom over a week ago.

Secondly, Mr. Pontillon's report rightly describes the changes in the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries in an encouraging but also a prudent way. Change will certainly be uneven, both in geography and in time. We should not allow ourselves to be depressed

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

by that. There will be setbacks, in other words we should not expect this change to be steady and smooth.

For example, in Mr. Pontillon's description in paragraph 19 of what he called the opening up of the cultural spectrum as a consequence of glasnost, I notice a reference to Pasternak's works being published in the Soviet Union. When I read that, my mind went back to 1972 and my first visit to the Soviet Union. I went to Moscow university as one of a series of visits, because I was at that time the foreign affairs spokesman – of the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom. I thought that, as a university, it would be a place of open thought and discussion.

I asked the principal whether they had the works of Boris Pasternak available. He replied: "No, most certainly we do not. He is an enemy of the Soviet people." It will be very difficult to change that attitude which I dare say persists in many parts of the Soviet Union, and certainly in a number of other Warsaw Pact countries, to one of openness.

In our response, we should try to avoid triumphalism, a condition that is very much to be observed on the right of the political spectrum – rather like measles, and as disagreeable to behold. For example, the possibility of a country such as Hungary – or, indeed, Poland, as various speakers have said – becoming not only a guest-status member but a fully fledged member of the Council of Europe is now a reality.

In the face of that possibility, I very much hope that people will not seek to divide the Warsaw Pact into a system of knock and answer on demand, because that would simply produce instability for no certain return. On the other hand, we must not let up in our pressure for the improvement of human rights where change is slow, as, for example, in the German Democratic Republic, the GDR to which Mr. Caro referred. I have friends in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic who deeply resent the fact that their friends – I am talking about friends, not relatives for whom particular arrangements apply – of working age cannot visit them even if those people themselves can go to the GDR. That is intolerable in a common European house. I recently flew from Budapest to East Berlin and the contrast between the political atmospheres in those two cities was astounding.

Although economic matters are not one of the Assembly's prime interests, none the less they are referred to in recommendation 7 of the draft recommendation. Indeed, economic success is basic to the success of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms and hence to the improvement of East-West

relations. The West should consciously seek to accelerate and underpin those reforms. That means making managerial, technical and political expertise available. When I was in Hungary I was continually asked: "How do you run a political party? How do you conduct a political campaign?" Those people have no such experience. The Federal Republic of Germany already provides one thousand management places per year for people from the East. We must ease technological transfer and promote joint ventures.

Mr. Rathbone's point about the visibility of WEU is worth underlining. The Assembly provides a unique opportunity for the discussion of defence matters in an atmosphere of internationalism and political pluralism. However, we should face the fact that the impact on the public is meagre. As Mr. Rathbone said, if we sought to give our thinking on the disarmament process a much higher profile, that position might change. We should certainly give more thought to changing it in some way or another, because otherwise, although we may lecture each other and produce wise reports, nobody reads them and that is not a very good rôle for the Assembly.

I repeat what Mr. Rathbone said, that this Assembly, with its regular access to ministers and experts, has the potential to be a highly significant pressure point in a complex scenario the outcome of which will certainly affect the lives of all of us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – On the fortieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance, we witness structural and significant changes in East-West relations. I am happy to note that the latest NATO summit meeting was held at a time of such change and was concluded successfully. It demonstrated, for perhaps the first time in recent years, the ability of the West to keep the initiative and to set the agenda of East-West relations by drawing not only on our successful past, but on our imagination and vision for the future.

We all welcome the new and promising trend in East-West relations, which is leading towards a world in which there will be more understanding, more dialogue, more co-operation and more peace. We hope that mutual, honest and persistent efforts for the continuation of that process will be forthcoming. In doing so, the alliance should adhere to the basic tenets of the consensus that has brought about today's success. It is important that, when devising and adjusting its policies towards the East, the alliance should always fully consult its member states and should try to harmonise policies.

Mr. Cetin (continued)

The new mentality in the Soviet Union and the East is welcome and should be helped and supported, but we must keep in mind unforeseen and unpredictable changes in its leadership and policies. I am sure that supporting Mr. Gorbachev's policies will help to prevent such changes, but it is desirable and necessary that the winds of change from the Soviet Union and Moscow should inspire other Warsaw Pact countries, especially in relation to human rights.

The policy of assimilation that has been pursued by the Bulgarian Government against the Turkish minority in that country is a case in point. The peaceful demonstrations recently staged by some among that Turkish minority to demand the restoration of their rights and status resulted in death. We all know that Bulgaria is forcibly deporting hundreds of ethnic Turks to third countries, compelling them to leave behind all their property and in many cases members of their families. Finally, the broad issue of arms control will have a marked influence on the future shape of our world. Especially in arms control negotiations with the East we must bear in mind that arms control is not an end in itself, but a means of achieving more security for all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Böhm, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. BÖHM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I also welcome the overall trend in East-West relations which is reflected in Mr. Pontillon's report and in most of the contributions to this debate. On one point, however, some contributions to the debate incorrectly assessed the realities of European developments in relation to the Soviet Union over the past four decades. I learned with astonishment that some of our colleagues here feel we should show some gratitude to Mr. Gorbachev, or that the West must react to him.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am firmly convinced that the competition between systems which has been going on in Europe for the last four decades has been won by the West and that this fact provides the basis for determining our whole future policy towards the Soviet Union.

The cold war was a defensive war by the West against the communist claim to world domination. We remained strong and determined, and this strength and determination alone has provided the opportunity, now and in the future, for the Eastern Europeans to regain their freedom. Pluralistic democracy and human rights in the political sphere, together with the market economy, have prevailed against dictatorship and totalitarianism and against the centrally planned economies of the East. In other

words, communism has lost the competition and Mr. Gorbachev is the response to the West's success and is reacting to western strategy. This is not the shining hour of Mr. Gorbachev, who now occupies centre stage in European politics. On the contrary, this hour belongs to men like Churchill, Schuman, Monnet, De Gasperi and Adenauer, for it was they who preserved peace and freedom for Europe.

Western Europe, as the haven of peace and freedom and an island of prosperity in the world, has proved so attractive that communism is now attempting to introduce our systems of management, in order to save what can still be saved, that is to say democratic structures in the state and the party and market-economy structures in the economic sphere. On the other hand, apart from a number of bizarre figures and a few communist reactionaries, I see nobody in Western Europe who would wish to saddle our system with communist methods of management.

The western concept has also proved successful in the armaments debates of recent years. The adoption of Pershing missiles paved the way for disarmament. The principle worked again, and what discussions we had here, in this chamber, in 1983 and 1984! The supporters of the arms build-up were right!

Ladies and gentlemen, all in all, we can be satisfied with our performance. We will help and support the developments in the East as the outcome of the failure of communism in Europe and throughout the world.

But we must continue to be on our guard. Vigilance is and will remain the price of freedom, especially now. A glance at Poland reveals the communist reaction, in the non-recognition of the results of democratically conducted elections, and in China, in their reply to the uprising of students and workers.

We want to build a European house together, but the last colonial power on earth wants to move in. Perestroika, or reconstruction, must take place in the Soviet Union first. The peoples of Asia and the Baltic peoples must be given their freedom and sovereignty. Only then will it be possible to live together really comfortably in a European house, given a Russian republic which sees itself as a European power.

I therefore recommend not blind enthusiasm, which confounds the wish and the reality, but circumspection on the part of us all, in the knowledge that the competition between the systems has led to success for our side, establishing a good basis for the future, provided that the West continues to be united and resolute.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I very much appreciate the kind and in some cases possibly too flattering remarks that have been made about the report and the Rapporteur.

Mr. Rubbi and Mr. Soell have spoken about the nuclear deterrent, the one seeking to clarify its fundamental rôle and the other asking whether the time has yet come to throw off the constraint of the atom. It is very clear that this question does need to be asked and we share the concern that motivates it. In our view, nuclear weapons will remain a key factor in our security for some time to come; in Europe they are the only means we have to compensate for the imbalance in conventional weapons. History teaches that peace has never been ensured by the balance of conventional forces alone; but nuclear weapons, which are not intended to win a war, are for all that – at least this is the French definition – non-war weapons and it is on that fact that their rôle as a deterrent is based.

I should like to point out to both members that our favourable assessment of recent developments in the Soviet Union does not blind us. We well realise that the USSR will have no compunction – why should it? – in using disarmament as a means of weakening and dividing the West, in particular by exploiting or even flattering the anti-nuclear sentiment of a large section of public opinion in Western Europe.

It was clear to us in Moscow that the denuclearisation of Europe is still the declared Soviet objective; but we know that this would make its superiority in the conventional field all the greater. It is in that sense that we need to have both audacity and wisdom.

In the main, I share the views of President Caro and, in particular, what he said about the need to take the views and concerns of the German people into account and his feeling that the European pillar should be strengthened by the inclusion of France. President Caro played an essential part in the preparation of The Hague declaration and the opening of the dialogue with the East. I am delighted that we have the same point of view.

Mr. Klejdzinski stressed the need to design a system ensuring the security of both East and West. I entirely agree with him. Paragraph 4 (a) of our draft recommendation meets this concern and I would like him to be convinced of this.

Other speakers were concerned that the East-West dialogue might turn into a kind of United States-USSR private line. I raised this point myself in my introductory remarks. May I add that the inclusion of what are called “combat” aircraft in the Vienna talks does indeed present a problem and is, moreover, the subject of the only reservation entered by France

and the United Kingdom in Brussels. This is also true of the pressing need to clarify the position amongst the allies, before talks where the nuclear problem is to be tackled are opened. My fear is that the shortening of the deadlines in Brussels could be an obstacle to the opening of this very necessary dialogue.

I must say, with Mr. Müller's permission, that I find his assessment of the situation a little pessimistic and over-sceptical. It is very probably because NATO exists and has shown such firmness that we are now reaping the dividends of our strong stand, but there are other factors influencing and determining what is now under way – irreversibly to my mind – in the Soviet Union. Someone once told a French politician that pessimists are contemplatives. I should like to try to persuade Mr. Müller of the need for us not to be spectators lining the road, but resolute and watchful actors in the transformation that is coming. We must move with and encourage perestroika and glasnost; we must not let this chance go by.

I should like to thank Mr. Rathbone for his favourable judgment of the proposals in the report including those on the Assembly's rôle in the promotion of WEU and its responsibility in the development of co-operation in Europe.

Mr. Lambie, with his characteristic warmth and optimism and that typically Scottish fire that always draws a sympathetic response from the other partner in the “auld alliance”, has listed our reasons for confidence. He rightly stressed the importance of the decision by the Political Committee of the Council of Europe last week in Norway to grant special guest status to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary. For me this spells the start to fresh European co-operation in sectors where it is not only possible and desirable but necessary.

I hope that on 6th July in Strasbourg Mr. Gorbachev will react positively to this overture from Western Europe. Those who heard Mr. Karpov at the Soviet Embassy noted his positive response to the proposals made by the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels.

My colleague and friend Jean-Pierre Fourré summed up perfectly the French approach to current events. I can only endorse his assessment on which no additional comment is necessary. I readily agree that the report is vague on the definition of security levels below which it would be unwise to stray. But as Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee I did not think I should anticipate proposals which are the direct responsibility of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. For all that, when I suggest that we should not lower our guard too soon I am expressing a concern and caution similar to those voiced by Mr. Atkinson a few moments ago, even though I do not fully

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

share his judgment of the threshold at which the Soviet Union would finally become credible. I agree with Mr. Mezzapesa that it is the small steps that eventually become giant strides. Today the Soviet Union is responding to the Brussels proposals. We should accept this favourable sign and echo President Bush's words: "the results would dramatically increase stability on the continent and transform the military map of Europe".

Mr. Lord prefers "co-operation" to "trust". I do not want to get into a debate on semantics, but it seems to me that the basis of worthwhile co-operation has to be trust in one's partner. In those terms, I think that liaison between the two levels of co-operation, Vienna and Stockholm, where confidence measures and the prevention of surprise attacks are being discussed, is good. As with disarmament, which is one facet of security, trust seems to me to feed and enrich the understanding between peoples on which co-operation depends.

Sir Russell Johnston goes further than I think feasible in the short term, but his pragmatic and typically British thinking in no way invalidates the approach I suggest, which is a blend of openness and caution. I agree with the need for greater vigilance as regards human rights and the Soviet Union's slowness to revise its penal code, our two basic concerns in this connection. Of course, our public relations need to be better organised and I have not given up hope, with the support of the new Secretary-General, that we may persuade the executive of this organisation to provide us with the resources we need simply to do our job and fulfil our responsibilities.

I shall now answer the last speaker who raised an important question, namely, what has caused this change in Eastern Europe. In fact, that poses the more general problem of the identity of the West. What is the West today? Can it be defined by frontiers or values? If we say frontiers, at what point does a liberalised Warsaw Pact country – I am thinking of Hungary – cease to be part of the East and become neutral or even join the West? If we say values, what are the values that continue to make East and West different? Is Europe the product of a geography of values based on the need we share with the United States to protect democracy and human rights; or is it the pressure of physical geography that will win out in the end? This is a very big question which I am certainly not going to answer at this late hour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pontillon.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the

General Affairs Committee I wish to express my warm thanks to all the participants in this debate, while special thanks and appreciation go to our Rapporteur and our committee Secretary.

This report deals with a difficult and complex subject, which is not made any easier by the fact that only a few days ago, at the NATO summit last week, new facts emerged which had to be covered in the report. While the Rapporteur made no secret of his own opinion, he always strove for consensus, and I am especially grateful to him for this.

The committee discussed the report at two meetings and approved it, with one vote against and one abstention. At a further meeting yesterday we discussed the addendum, as well as some of the draft amendments you have before you. On behalf of the committee I request you to approve the report and addendum.

Developments in some of our neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe and the relaxation of East-West tensions offer opportunities for both East and West. The opportunities are indicated in the report, while recognising that we shall not achieve tangible results overnight. We shall need staying power. I believe that we should use these opportunities and use them courageously, but also with careful deliberation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the draft recommendation contained in Document 1187, addendum and amendments.

I have been informed of six amendments to this text, which will be taken in the following order: Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Soell, Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Pieralli, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski which will be debated together, and Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Soell.

If Amendment 5 is adopted, Amendment 6 will fall.

Mr. Klejdzinski and others have tabled Amendment 3 which reads as follows:

3. At the end of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:

"regretting, however, that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (such as nuclear artillery) are excluded;"

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to support his amendment.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, with regard to Amendment 3 I would say only – and in this scenario we can see what is possible by way of negotiations – that I have suggested, sharing the view of other col-

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

leagues, that it is nonetheless regrettable that no negotiations have been conducted on battlefield nuclear weapons.

I will give my reasons. If battlefield nuclear weapons are political weapons and serve only for deterrence, the fact remains that over 4 000 nuclear warheads are stockpiled in the Federal Republic of Germany, that the Lance missile with 88 launchers is also deployed in the Federal Republic, and that another 762 or 750 warheads are lying there in readiness. Each has the implied explosive power of a Hiroshima bomb.

If anybody tries to explain to me that weapons deployed in this way, with the explosive capacity referred to, are intended for purposes of political deterrence, my answer must be that I am unable to grasp this, although I have stated elsewhere that our present strategy rests on both the conventional and the nuclear elements. But it must at least be understood – and that is my present point – that we currently regret that we have not negotiated, and perhaps cannot negotiate, on battlefield nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – This amendment has not been studied by the committee. However, I must say that it is in the same spirit as others that the committee turned down.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands.)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Mr. Soell and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads as follows:

5. In the new sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after “conventional armaments”.

I call Mr. Soell to support his amendment.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am in favour of the deletion of the second part of the new sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the recommendation in the addendum to Mr. Pontillon's report, because I do not think we should link the start of negotiations on short-range missiles to the success of the negotiations on conventional disarmament. Indeed I believe that such negotiations should be initiated as quickly as possible.

Some members stated earlier that success in INF disarmament had been achieved largely as a result of the previous arms build-up. In the logic of this situation, given a ninefold superiority on the Soviet side and the Lance missiles already deployed in the West I do not understand why we do not at once enter into negotiations, more particularly as the Soviet side has declared itself ready to reduce its asymmetrical armaments status.

Using this argument, logic seems to me to demand that we should eliminate asymmetries independently of each other. This is, after all, the fundamental principle of the Vienna negotiations. Any linking of the negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles to success in the negotiations on conventional weapons is in any event irrational.

I therefore ask you to approve this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am not in favour of any such intermingling of the problems. There is no doubt that sensible negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles will be possible only after a decision has been reached on conventional weapons. In my opinion, anything else would only make the process more difficult. Clarity on the subject of conventional weapons must first prevail.

I therefore ask you to reject the draft amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has rejected the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands.)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Pieralli and others have tabled Amendment 6 which reads as follows:

6. In the new sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the implementation of this limitation” and insert “their success”.

I call Mr. Pieralli to support his amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am opposed in principle to these so-called linkages between various types of weapon; if the linkage idea had been followed we would have no agreement on INF. However, there is an objective connection between conventional

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

weapons and tactical nuclear weapons and that is to some extent recognised by both sides.

Whilst President Bush is saying that a reduction of Soviet superiority in conventional weapons could open the way to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anatoli Karpov, told a WEU delegation yesterday that if the present levels of short-range nuclear weapons remained unchanged, they would assume greater importance in the event of a reduction of conventional weapons. With our amendment, while we prefer immediate talks in parallel with those in Vienna, we accept a linkage between progress in one set of negotiations and the opening of another, but – and this is the purpose of our amendment – we do not want the imposition of over-rigid conditions that might form an obstacle to positive and, we would hope, speedy progress.

This is why we prefer, in place of what is proposed by Mr. Pontillon, a more general but more flexible wording which would link the opening of negotiations on short-range missiles, not just with the negotiations on conventional weapons, but with a positive conclusion to these negotiations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – The Rapporteur himself would be glad to support Mr. Pieralli's wording. Unfortunately he has to defer to the committee's rejection of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

We come now to the joint consideration of Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others reads as follows:

1. Redraft paragraph 4 (*b*) of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“(b) avoid options which might revive the atomic rearmament race such as the modernisation of very short-range missiles and nuclear weapons and, for this type of weapon, too, resort to the method of holding negotiations;”

Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski and others reads as follows:

4. Leave out paragraph 4 (*b*) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“(b) define a security system guaranteeing our common security in East and West, independently of the fact that the deterrence is currently based on conventional and nuclear systems;”

I call Mr. Pieralli to support his amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the amendment we have tabled does not contradict the main practical decisions reached at the NATO summit in Brussels. Its purpose is to find a compromise between those who believe in the need to negotiate on tactical nuclear weapons purely and simply to obtain a reduction because they think the nuclear deterrent has to be kept for a long time to come, and those who, like me, believe that there must be negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in order to phase them out completely.

The emphasis is placed on the value of such negotiations, which is why the text I am now proposing to the Assembly was unanimously approved by the Senate of the Italian Republic with the single exception of the Republican Senators, who abstained. I hope that the amendment will meet with similar treatment in this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski to support Amendment 4.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the purpose of this draft amendment is to establish the intention or at least the negotiating objective, supported by us as a matter of principle, that in the long term nuclear deterrence must be dispensed with. The wording proposed by the Rapporteur is capable of being misunderstood at least in its implications, since he says that our security system is conditional on the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. I take the view that the nuclear and conventional elements are currently part of our system of deterrence, but that we must in the long term dispense with nuclear deterrence. That is the sole message of the draft amendment.

I ask you to agree to my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 1 and 4?...

I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*). – I strongly urge the Assembly to vote against the amendment, because it would deprive us of an option that we might need – the future replacement of Lance.

Mr. de Beer (continued)

We all hope that it will not be necessary to use that option, but we should not exclude it and that is what the amendment would do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has not studied Amendment 4 but it can see no real conflict with the original wording of paragraph 4 (b). I therefore leave the decision to the wisdom of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negated.

I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, would it be possible to let us know the results of the voting, as some doubts have arisen here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The voting was equal: 13 for and 13 against.

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is negated.

Mr. Soell has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Urge that there should be early negotiations about mutual reductions of all kinds of short-range tactical nuclear forces and battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe;”

I call Mr. Soell to support this amendment.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I need not repeat what I have already said in support of Amendment 2. I only wish to point out once again that the fact that there are at present over 4 000 nuclear artillery warheads arouses the impression that a nuclear war confined to Europe is indeed part and parcel of the western defence doctrine.

This is in itself a great deterrent, which constantly gives rise to doubts about the credibility of western defence.

That is why we have here given primacy to including battlefield nuclear weapons in our demand for early negotiations.

It is because of the existence of these doubts that I ask for acceptance of this draft amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?..

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has not been able to study this amendment but I think it is no exaggeration of its attitude to say that this one is similar in inspiration to others that have been negated by the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negated.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1187 and addendum, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five or more representatives present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1185 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed 1.20 p.m.)

¹. See page 30.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1185 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Soell, Mr. Caro, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
Replies by Mr. Chevènement to questions put by: Mr. Caro, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Banks.
5. Changes in the membership of committees.
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.30 p.m. with Mr. de Beer, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee,
Doc. 1185 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council, Document 1185 and amendments.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, I should like to begin with a sincere word of welcome to our new Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen. When he was a member of our committee, soon to be known as the Political Committee, for which he also acted as Rapporteur, we found him to be a parliamentarian with a wide knowledge of matters connected with WEU. His activities as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and as the Netherlands Minister of Defence undoubtedly added invaluable to that knowledge, and as a result he certainly has no ground to make up as Mr. Cahen's successor, despite the fact that there have been many new developments in WEU in recent years.

In this connection, I should also like to pay my respects to the outgoing Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, who has worked on WEU's reactivation with great commitment, contributing new initiatives such as the regular information letter which is so useful to the Assembly.

Mr. President, I should also like to thank the Secretary of our committee, Mr. Burgelin, who has helped me with the preparation of this report.

Time and again we have witnessed new and extremely interesting developments on the international scene shortly before the WEU Assembly's part-sessions. This time is no different. Both the eastern bloc and NATO have come forward with extremely important proposals, which may lead to further disarmament and so to détente in East-West relations. President Bush's attendance at the NATO summit

1. See page 33.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

last week resulted in a large measure of agreement among the NATO partners on the political line to be followed, for instance on conventional forces, as set out in the comprehensive concept.

If anything is clear, it is the fact that, as long as the protection of Western Europe depends first and foremost on the nuclear umbrella, the reduction of inequality in the conventional sphere will be particularly important for the WEU countries. Mr. Pontillon's report, which was debated this morning, makes it completely unnecessary for me to consider these new and recent developments in greater depth.

I shall therefore confine myself to the institutional problems that still await a solution, the implications of the accession of the new member countries, Portugal and Spain, and the consequent necessary amendments to the Brussels Treaty and, in conclusion, a few comments on the relationship between WEU and the European Community.

Mr. President, I will begin with the institutional problems. Twice in the past I have called in this Assembly for the implementation of the decisions taken completely freely and independently by the Council of Ministers. Since The Hague platform, almost total silence has descended on the question of collocation. It would seem that not even the Council of Ministers is discussing it any more. As the Rapporteur of this Assembly's General Affairs Committee, I really do not want to have to revert to this subject time after time. I am well aware that the question of collocation is irrelevant to Western Europe's security, but I would add that for this and other reasons I fail to understand how a country can be so obstinate in blocking decisions already taken. Surely this should not be possible.

Mr. President, in Recommendation 467 the Presidential Committee advocated the establishment of a "European institute for advanced security studies in order to promote a European spirit of defence". The establishment of an institute of this nature might enable the agencies' remaining problems to be solved. It is my firm conviction that the establishment of an institute of this kind might make these agencies superfluous in the sense that the single agency referred to in The Hague platform would not need to be created.

I have a few words to add on this. Firstly, it should be remembered that an institute like this must perform a useful function within WEU. To put it another way, there is, of course, absolutely no point in setting up an institute resembling the many that already exist in the member countries. That would simply result in the dupli-

cation of studies that in all probability are already being undertaken. The main rôle of a new institute must be to serve the function which WEU has to fulfil, now and in the near future, as the European pillar within the NATO alliance.

Secondly, a decision must be taken on the responsibility for an institute of this kind. Should it be accountable to the Permanent Council or the Secretary-General? What relevance will it have to the Assembly? These are questions that need to be answered.

The Permanent Council has now begun to look into this matter, as the Secretary-General's letter reveals. I have also considered the subject in paragraphs 51 to 60 of the report that I have the honour to present to the Assembly today on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. I will not read out the paragraphs but just give the following summary. The institute should have a very small staff. Its goal – the promotion of a European spirit of defence among the public – can then be achieved in a number of ways, without the staff of the institute having to do all the work itself. On the contrary, it would collect existing information, whether or not on the basis of studies already made, promote certain studies that are needed if the institute's objectives are to be achieved, and trigger new developments by involving experts from the member states, regardless of the work they do there.

It is therefore proposed that an administrative board should be established, composed of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, the President of the Assembly, the Secretary-General and the Clerk of the Assembly. This controlling and supervisory body might also include a member from each member state, for example – and this is simply an example – the director of a national institute for international security and co-operation. It would then be possible to prevent the same work from being done twice or three times over, and also to ensure that the studies carried out are directly geared to WEU's current needs. By suggesting these options, Mr. President, this Assembly's General Affairs Committee has sought to make a positive contribution to the work now being done by the Permanent Council and other bodies.

Mr. President, to conclude this part of my presentation, I just want to refer to the importance of paragraph 8 of part I of the draft recommendation, in which the Council of Ministers is asked to define a draft statute for this new institute and to consider its implementation with the Assembly.

Mr. President, in my report I merely recall the colloquy which the General Affairs Committee held earlier this year in Florence. A detailed report of this colloquy has now appeared and is available in print. There is just one thing I want

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

to say today, in the context of the research institute that is to be set up. Many speakers in Florence said that a blueprint for European defence should be drawn up. This blueprint cannot simply be a working document prepared by the Council of Ministers. On the contrary. I must point out that, even after the decisions on the reactivation of WEU, the Council of Ministers in fact continues to be an intergovernmental body, in which European security is discussed from national angles.

The operations in the Gulf, to which the Secretary-General also refers, may have gone a major step further – the Assembly warmly welcomed this – but no more than this first step was taken. I am firmly convinced that only this Assembly's constant and unremitting contribution is capable of repelling the excessive influence of national interests, and thus opening the way to what has purported to be a union, Western European Union, for the last thirty-five years. It is therefore absolutely essential that the Assembly should be represented on the board of the new institute.

Let me add something else. Again in Florence, many prominent speakers strongly emphasised the need for the rôle played by our Assembly to be strengthened. In his résumé Secretary-General Cahen said that Europessimism had given way to a positive approach to Europe's rôle in the NATO alliance. The increasingly positive recognition in the United States of this rôle imposes obligations on the whole of the WEU organisation. As Rainer Barzel said in Florence, to strengthen WEU is to strengthen NATO.

Mr. President, virtually every paragraph of The Hague platform refers to the efforts being made to achieve European unity. And that is a good thing. Attached to the report I am now presenting on behalf of the Assembly's General Affairs Committee, in Appendix II, is the European Parliament's resolution of 14th March 1989. This resolution surprised me. Although WEU is mentioned once, this resolution makes it sound very much as if security matters already fell within the European Parliament's terms of reference. That is not the case at present, and only recently some members of the Council of Ministers pointed out once again that it is the Assembly which is entitled to discuss security issues.

What the European Parliament has in fact done through this resolution is to assume powers which it does not have and which, except where they concern the economic aspects of security, co-operation and arms production, cannot be derived from the single European act. What the European Parliament should have done was to call for the amendment of the EEC treaty. Only

then might it have considered security issues in such depth as it has now done in this resolution. It is therefore not for our Assembly to give any support at all to the ideas that have been put forward from time to time suggesting changing the composition of our Assembly so that half its members would have to come from the European Parliament. The retention of the dual mandate – membership of a national parliament and of the WEU Assembly – is still also of decisive importance for other completely different reasons.

I will only refer in this context to the still totally inadequate machinery of democratic control available to the European Parliament, which is unable to call ministers to account, especially where matters not covered by the Treaty of Rome are concerned.

But the crucial aspect of the General Affairs Committee's opinion, which I completely share as your Rapporteur, is that the WEU countries are Western European members of NATO, which is not true of all the countries belonging to the European Community, or of a country like Austria, which is showing considerable interest in acceding to the Community. After all, they are not countries – I am thinking of Ireland – which are able to share the responsibilities arising from the NATO treaty and the Brussels Treaty. That is a factor which I would call essential for a defence alliance.

Mr. President, I will not at this point make any further comment on the revision of the treaty as a result of the accession of Portugal and Spain. The report is sufficiently clear on the subject, and the aim is in fact that the Assembly should make a contribution to the work being done by the Council. I think I am right in saying that the Council appreciates this. It seems to me highly desirable that the Council consult with the Assembly on the substance of the issue as soon as it has completed a first version for amendment. I hope our suggestions will make a valuable contribution in this respect.

Mr. President, the Council of Ministers is studying the applications from Greece and Turkey for membership of WEU. The Assembly has made its views on this plain in the past, in line with the opinion expressed by the General Affairs Committee. The problems that exist between the two countries must first be completely resolved, the question of Cyprus being of crucial importance. We must await further developments, and express the hope that a satisfactory solution can be found to this long-pending problem.

Mr. President, I will say in conclusion that major changes have occurred in recent years, months and even weeks. To take up Mr. Ahrens's words, the opportunities for and chances of ensuring security in the world at a

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

lower level of armament are growing. Major changes have occurred or are still occurring in the eastern bloc countries. But words are not enough: they must be followed by deeds. And what we do not know at the moment – to use the words of the outgoing Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, once again – is which changes will lead to new changes. The western world's concept of security may change, but the underlying premise must be that the NATO alliance and, in it, a Western Europe speaking with one voice is still prepared to contribute to its defence in such measure that world peace, which we have now fostered with the NATO alliance for almost forty-five years, is also preserved for our children. It is here that this Assembly must retain an influential voice.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Pieralli, the first speaker on the list.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden. I would like to refer briefly, and without going into detail, to a number of aspects of the future of European security from the standpoint of the existing institutions and the changes they are likely to go through.

A valuable feature of Mr. van der Sanden's report is that it presents alternative options and makes a tentative attempt at reconciling those options. In particular I would like to voice some views on relations between WEU, the Community and the European Parliament, a matter already considered in the report and the subject of some members' views at our Monday afternoon sitting.

The statement that WEU is the only European organisation with responsibility for dealing with defence problems is certainly correct. But that is not wholly true any more if we use the word security in its full and not solely military sense. In that case the Council of Europe and the European Community also have a rôle.

In my view it is right to reject the idea of our parliamentary Assembly consisting automatically, in whole or in part, of members of the European Parliament. For as long as the European Parliament has no real powers of decision over Community policy as a whole it is right for the WEU Assembly to continue to consist of representatives of the national parliaments. Otherwise, after stripping the national parliaments of so much of their powers and responsibilities and reducing them to ratifying committees for Community rules and directives decided by governments on their own, they would then lose defence policy too. Nor, in exchange, would there be a supranational European assembly endowed with real powers of

decision. That having been said, however, we have to see the future of European security in the context of a Community that is making greater demands and a quickening process of European integration.

I am sure that I shall not jeopardise a friendship by which I am honoured if I say to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, à propos his comments on the European Parliament, that although we can claim that the problem of defence is ours and ours alone we cannot prevent the European Parliament from discussing security policy and passing any resolutions it thinks fit. I do not say this for party reasons, the Italian communist MEPs abstained in the vote on Mr. Penders' motion.

It is true, as Sir Geoffrey says, that no one answers the phone at the European Parliament when the issue is security. But I do not think that MEPs are looking for an answer from the Council of Ministers or the executive commission of the European Community. The audience they seek is wider: it is European public opinion. They do so wearing a badge that is better known than ours and their purpose is to present to European public opinion a broader prospect and a more deeply-felt need for a defence and security policy: their aim is to achieve as quickly as possible a European union founded not only on the single market, but also on a common currency and common economic, fiscal, social, environmental and cultural policies and on a common external policy of which defence would be an integral part. The fact that there is an increasing thrust in this direction is now confirmed.

In Italy on 18th June, alongside the European elections, we shall also be voting in a referendum which asks the electorate to say whether they agree that the new European Parliament should have constituent powers; all our political parties are urging their members to vote yes. What is more, the single European act is already binding on some of the subjects I have referred to and we should not forget that there is an agreement to re-open the debate on European union after 31st December 1992.

An attitude of intolerance towards the European Parliament does no service to WEU. It would be wrong to be too afraid, because WEU membership is also increasing with applications which to my mind bear the same political stamp as marks the trend towards European union. I believe that WEU should send a signal to the Community indicating a more open attitude by deciding that in order to join a country has to be not only a member of NATO but also a member of the European Community. In any case, that is how things already are, Spain and Portugal included.

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

Lastly, I feel that we could take up some of the proposals for co-operation between our assemblies and the European Parliament made in the report presented by Mr. Malfatti on behalf of the Italian Delegation at the colloquy in Florence on the future of European security.

They are as follows: first the participation of permanent observers from the two assemblies in their respective plenary sessions and committee meetings with the right to speak but not to vote, second, the establishment of a standing committee composed of representatives of the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly which would hold periodical information and co-ordination meetings, third periodical, scheduled meetings of the presidents of the two parliamentary institutions and fourth a mutual, scheduled information report and periodical study visits by the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly and the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament.

I do not say that we should implement them all or all at the same time: an overdose could be harmful. But we could choose one or two of these proposals by agreement with the European Parliament that is to be elected in a few days time and mandate our President, Mr. Goerens, to make contact with the future president of that parliament.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. van der Sanden has presented his report with his usual exactitude and has added a range of interesting new points relating especially to amendments to the Brussels Treaty. I fully support his thoughts on this matter.

This also applies, in particular, to the question as to how we can bring members of the Atlantic Alliance, who cannot for the time being become members of Western European Union, although they are prepared to collaborate here, into closer association with Western European Union. I also fully support the proposals in this sense.

In issues affecting, say, problems of the Mediterranean countries or problems of the Near East, that is to say, areas which are also relevant to European security, I believe it is sensible to associate these countries in the work of the committees, if this is technically possible.

I also particularly support his thoughts on the European institute for advanced security studies. Our aim here is not to create an extensive new apparatus, but to build up a co-ordination centre capable of integrating the expertise which our various countries already possess at different levels and in different areas.

There are, of course, obstacles to consensus, rooted in the differing interests of the individual members of Western European Union, but many problems – of perception, analysis and practical conclusions – also arise from the fact that there has never in the past been a centre in which this kind of expertise and information could be collected. We are faced with widely differing situations in the various European countries.

Perhaps the reason why developments in Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, are differently interpreted is partly due to the fact that very different emphasis is placed on research devoted to the analysis of these events.

Perhaps I may quote the example of the Federal Republic of Germany, where the number of researchers, not only in scientific institutes but also in large private enterprises, political organisations, the government, parliament and political institutions, runs into four figures. These researchers not only write papers but hold meetings and initiate debates, both between themselves and with researchers in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

It is my belief that an alliance of democracies which prizes openness, scientific exchange and rationality is specially called upon to move this kind of activity more vigorously into the centre stage. It should be placing the focus of interest not only on the 19th century tools such as military forces and diplomacy, but increasingly on collaboration between research workers and the fruits of this collaboration, and should create the essential conditions for doing this within the framework of WEU.

As I said: this does not call for a large apparatus; it calls above all for the ability to co-ordinate the relevant dialogue.

If we do this over the next few years, and if we involve the Assembly – and here I completely support what Mr. van der Sanden said concerning the representation of the Assembly on the administrative board of this institute – then certain over-reactions, for instance in the development of public opinion in some countries and its assessment by public opinion in other countries, will probably diminish, and far greater normality will be introduced into evaluating the public opinion of other countries. I very much hope that broader, scientifically underpinned and specialised discussion will have a positive effect on public opinion.

In conclusion, when I consider the hysterical reactions of American public opinion, for instance, with regard to the short-range nuclear missile debate within NATO, then I appreciate that there is clearly a huge shortfall as regards a really rational assessment of the kind of debates

Mr. Soell (continued)

being conducted, say, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

I hope that an institute of this kind would be one way of helping to make such debates much more rational and realistic.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I will begin by thanking Mr. van der Sanden and the General Affairs Committee for their excellent report. European security, if I may say so, is very much our business because Western European Union is the only European organisation with responsibility for defence matters; consequently, it has more and more reason to speak and, where possible, act.

As we said this morning with regard to the decisions taken by NATO, our ceaseless concern must be to build and strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and to make it operational.

Furthermore, on the eve of the European elections on 18th June, the paramount debate, via the single market, will be on European union which should seek to elevate Europe to great power status with the potential, between the two superpowers, to influence European security problems, security in the Mediterranean and on its eastern shores in particular – in which connection may I spare a thought for our fellow men in Lebanon – and the third world, where the language of European civilisation fails perhaps to get through in the face of ideological and market competition.

Europe's upward progress depends on two essential factors. The determination and aspirations of the people are there. But governments and members of parliament have a fundamental rôle to play in that they are able to advance the two essential features of what one day I hope will constitute European sovereignty: first, defence and a common foreign policy, and secondly, a common currency.

As regards defence, we have the capability and authority to be able to define the rights that we hope soon to acquire.

In this connection, thanks to Mr. van der Sanden's report, we feel ourselves to be full participants in the great debate in the run-up to the elections to the European Parliament, one of whose purposes will be clearly to define the active rôle we each have to play.

Whilst perfectly assured of the powers we have under the modified Brussels Treaty, which is not in competition in the sphere of defence with any other treaty and in particular the Treaty of Rome, we know that we have to move with society, mores and thought and that our

duty to public opinion is to demonstrate that Europe is one and indivisible.

How many European electors get lost wondering exactly what the Council or Europe, the European Parliament, WEU and – as I would so much like to have been able to say – the European defence organisation are. We should be careful not to help anchor the idea of European diversity, bad as it is for media coverage, in the public mind. On the contrary, we should make it easier to simplify the concept of Europe as a future political entity and ensure the public knows about our additional inter-institutional work.

We are already at that stage, but we shall frequently be returning to this debate vis-à-vis the European Parliament, which is increasingly aware of the need for external political co-operation to be supplemented, within the European Community framework, by an increasingly reliable approach to defence problems. We know very well that there is no evading this fact and that WEU's mandate, mission and essential vocation is not just to discuss Europe's defence and therefore general and external policy problems, but also fully to shoulder its rôle of co-ordination.

Hence I call on our Assembly and the Council of Ministers to supply and continuously renew this initiative with all the imagination and know-how that requires. I also hope – and I am pleased that our new Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, is here to hear us – that with the Secretariat-General supplying the momentum, we shall have enough imagination to ensure co-ordination with the European Parliament and the parliaments of the Atlantic Alliance, so that all the members of these parliaments speak with one voice, whatever the forum in which their mandate gives them the right and responsibility to be heard.

WEU co-ordination should help the idea of a European defence policy to progress. Otherwise European defence will remain divided up among several organisations, each claiming responsibility – I almost said identity – for itself.

Furthermore, relations need to be improved with those countries that are not represented here. In other forums we have talked about relations with the countries of Eastern Europe aspiring one after the other to democracy, freedom and the "common European house", as Mr. Gorbachev would say.

I am thinking in particular of those countries that are members of the Atlantic Alliance but which for various reasons take no part in the activities of Western European Union. We were pleased to welcome our Portuguese and Spanish friends, but there are others waiting on the doorstep: Turkey, Greece, Norway, Denmark and perhaps more. With all these countries, in

Mr. Caro (continued)

the same spirit of co-ordination and cohesion, we need to maintain the closest possible relations.

I am sorry that because of certain incidents which could have been avoided – in particular the dissolution of the Greek parliament – we have no Greek observers at this part-session, as we have had before. However, we have been sent messages – letters and other papers – from the Greek Government. Incidentally, I should like the views that the Greek Government has voiced on these subjects to be taken into account in the same way as they would have been had we had Greek representatives sitting alongside our Turkish friends. Greece's policy has changed. It supported the recent NATO decisions in Brussels and in particular the decision taken following The Hague platform.

All this should enable us to tread wisely and carefully but also creatively so as to achieve co-ordination and make WEU the spearhead – the pun is unintended – of European defence. But this will only be possible to the extent that, with the help of the Council, we think up new proposals and ideas. In this connection, Mr. President, and out of pure courtesy, I would hope that at the end of this session the presidency will communicate to us the content of the letters sent to the Assembly by the Greek Government.

Mr. van der Sanden's report contains the basic elements for WEU's realisation of its rôle in the great plan for tomorrow. That plan cannot be framed outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, of which WEU is an integral part or without WEU playing its part as promoter, leader and builder of the WEU of tomorrow – a political union set up, moreover, to that end and henceforth for the defence and security of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that Mr. Caro deserves a response to his point about the Greek Ambassador's letter. I will transmit what he has said to the permanent President of the Assembly, to be discussed in the Bureau.

Mr. CARO (*France*). – Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Yet again, we owe Mr. van der Sanden a warm debt of gratitude for another report, this time on the future of European security at a time which is particularly critical for the development of our organisation and the future of the western alliance. Mr. van der Sanden's reports are always thorough, informative and well documented. They have balance and cohesion, and they contribute greatly to the work of this Assembly.

I should like to take up two points made by the Rapporteur. The first is brought out in paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, in which he refers to the decision of the member governments "on the ... accession of Portugal and Spain... to prepare a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty".

The second arises in paragraph (iv), in which he notes that the Council "has said it is 'willing to meet those needs of the Assembly which are the direct result of enlargement'".

On the first point, I earnestly hope that the Council, in its revision of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols of Paris in 1954, will not in any way water down the binding mutual security provisions which are in the treaty, which apply both to threats to the security of the signatory countries within Europe and to the mutual security provisions relating to threats to the interests of the signatories outside Europe.

I also hope that there will be no watering down of the provisions of the platform laid down in The Hague in 1987. I am sure that that will not happen, but I believe that the out-of-area provisions of the Brussels Treaty are, as the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence made clear yesterday, of particular importance. There was a time when a number of Western European countries felt able and, indeed, were able to secure their own security interests out of area. The classic example was French intervention in Chad, in Central Africa and in Zaire. There was also British intervention in the south Atlantic and the south Arabian region.

Then came the crisis during the Iran-Iraq war when it became clear that only joint action by the members of Western European Union could secure the co-ordinated and effective naval response necessary to preserve freedom of navigation in the Gulf. That precedent is critical and is one that we may have to follow, although not necessarily in that theatre. It will not necessarily apply to naval forces only, but possibly to air forces or to air-mobile and amphibious forces as well. It would be well if we exercised that possibility through both political war gaming in the necessary decision-making process and conceivably through the creation of appropriate standing forces to undertake the required operations.

The Secretary of State also suggested a rôle for WEU in concerting a European policy for military space applications. We in the Assembly have long advocated such a policy and did so long before the Council took it up. I shall spell out yet again the areas of importance, which include launcher technology, not just an indigenous ballistic missile capability for Europe but also the development of reusable and possibly manned space vehicles; sensing for satellite sur-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

veillance and reconnaissance; telecommunications; electronic intelligence; anti-satellite capabilities and possibly anti-ballistic missile architectures; laser technologies and directed energy beam technologies.

We must realise that space technology will be more and more critical for our security policy and for our defence. We must decide whether Europe wishes to be a great power in that area or whether it will ignore that area of military activity altogether and leave it to the super-powers. If that is our choice, so be it, but collectively we shall be all the more vulnerable if that is our choice.

The Secretary of State for Defence then spelt out the important work of the Independent European Programme Group, which we in the Assembly have whole-heartedly backed. He undertook to communicate to the incoming Belgian presidency our desire to be informed regularly about the work of the IEPG. That is exceedingly important, because if we do not build a constituency of political support for European armaments collaboration, we cannot imagine that it will occur automatically and spontaneously.

There are many developments that will need great political courage and the support of elected representatives such as ourselves who sit in our own national parliaments and who can help push them through. I refer, for example, to the creation of a common research fund and to the rationalisation of European research and development resources in the military sphere.

For the future of European security I hope that we do not allow this organisation to become a forum that is distinct from NATO for arms control purposes. I believe very firmly that the interests of the western alliance are indivisible in that area. Strenuous efforts will be made by the Soviets to divide our attitudes to arms control from those of our North American and Canadian allies. Those attempts must be rigorously resisted. I hope that we will not try to adopt a different position here from that adopted in NATO. That is why I and other members of the Conservative and Christian Democrat Group were so critical of the amendments moved by socialists and others in yesterday's debate.

I hope that, in its determination to meet the needs of the Assembly, which are the direct results of enlargement, the Council will consider the possibility that WEU will eventually be enlarged beyond the present seven members and the nine nations, with the two that are to join, to perhaps eleven or more members.

It is especially important that the flank nations – such as Turkey and Norway – should

join. In the platform, we said that we were keen to defend Europe at its frontiers. Norway and Turkey have direct borders with the Soviet Union. Turkey in particular faces difficulties, because it has troublesome neighbours in the Bulgarians, Iraqis and Syrians. I hope that we will respond positively to applications to join WEU and make the necessary provisions to welcome applicants who fulfil the provisions for membership.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by expressing my thanks to Mr. van der Sanden for an extremely good and penetrating report. I want to divide my remarks into several parts. First, I want to respond to Mr. Pieralli. I believe that he has perhaps got it slightly wrong. He is swimming against the tide and is out of step with most people. That may be based on a misunderstanding.

I made it clear yesterday that I was not in any way opposed to the European Parliament. However, I was opposed to spending time and money on subjects about which it had no competence. Mr. Pieralli said that the European Parliament was talking to a wider audience. There is no point in talking about a wider audience and confusing it if the parliament has no power. The public will say that those people are talking about A, B and C on defence, but they can do nothing. This Assembly's work runs the risk of people asking whether it has any power. I suggest that that is wrong. Equally, the suggestion from my friend, Mr. Malfatti, that, from time to time, the President of our Assembly should join the President of the European Parliament to discuss matters such as defence has no relation to what is proposed for the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

The Council of Europe and the European Parliament are going to get together because they have similar and overlapping powers. However, I believe that there is no purpose in talking to the European Parliament on defence, because it has no powers. That is my view, and it is shared by Mr. van der Sanden. Similarly, it is the view of Mr. Soell and Mr. Wilkinson. It was also the view expressed very firmly yesterday on behalf of the Council of Ministers by Mr. Younger. I hope that we can now bury the European Parliament's interest in defence and that my friend Mr. van der Sanden, who I believe has told me this, will accept my two amendments which make that point and add them to the report later.

Having disposed of the less important matters, I want to consider other issues. In his report, Mr. van der Sanden is considering the balance of what is happening in the Soviet Union and its relationship elsewhere in the

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

world. The balance is difficult; if Mr. Gorbachev proceeds too fast without getting results for his home population or for the military, he runs the risk of being discarded. I do not think that that would be in our interests or those of the Soviet Union. If he goes too slowly, he will again run the risk of having his own population telling him that perestroika and glasnost have produced nothing. He may then witness the kind of problems that we have seen in Georgia and elsewhere and that are being reflected a hundredfold, alas, in China. He has a very difficult tightrope to walk, and the points made by Mr. van der Sanden in his report are timely.

In the West, we must proceed step by step. We must be certain that, as we make particular reductions and consider particular matters, we do not leave ourselves in a position in which, if there were a sudden reversal of policy in the Soviet Union – not by Mr. Gorbachev, but by others – we leave our populations in a vulnerable position. We must make a step-by-step approach on the basis of trust. So far, so good. Those who want us to go more quickly are gambling. I do not want to play Russian roulette. I want to be certain of where I am going.

Some of us had an interesting meeting last night with Mr. Karpov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of negotiations on arms negotiations. We talked about building up confidence. I asked him a question and I said to my interpreter – as, alas, I was the only person not speaking French – “He will either not want to answer my question, or he will give a very long answer”. I was wrong. I told Mr. Karpov that we had talked about confidence-building and I asked what kind of confidence there was. Could we, for example, expect to see the further development of what we have been seeing in the Soviet Union, with the show trials of the 1930s now being denounced and the Russians being told that they were false; or that the responsibility for Katyn was now much more clearly in the Russian camp? Could we perhaps see a relaxation and the giving back of independence to the Baltic republics?

I received a most interesting answer. We were all told by Mr. Karpov that that was up to the inhabitants of the Baltic republics. If they wished to vote for independence, that was their right. He hoped, he said, that they would vote to remain within the Soviet Union. I found his remark interesting. I delivered by hand today a letter to Mr. Karpov, thanking him for what he said and asking him specifically what steps the inhabitants of the Baltic republics must take to demonstrate whether they wanted to regain the independence that was taken from them in that shady deal between Molotov and von Ribbentrop.

I look forward to receiving my answer. I hope that there will be a referendum there. It will be interesting. I live in hope. However, that would, I think, be one of the greatest demonstrations of confidence that we could see. We talk about human rights, but there are three countries in which freedom is still not available. It would be a great credit to the Soviet Union if it allowed a referendum. If the three republics become independent again, I would not be unhappy if, of their own free will, they wished to become allies of the Soviet Union.

Free will is the thread that runs through Mr. van der Sanden's report. We in Western European Union represent a collection of countries that have joined together of their own free will to defend our rights and those of our citizens. As long as there is a danger that we relax too swiftly, as Mr. van der Sanden points out, it is right to go slowly. The ancient Italians had a saying, “*festina lente*”. That is my view also, and I fully support Mr. van der Sanden's report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is now the fourth report on the same subject by Mr. van der Sanden since December 1987. As before, we are faced with the as yet unsolved question as to how and whether we Europeans will succeed in finding ways of dealing jointly with the problems of European security in a rapidly changing world.

Our esteemed Rapporteur has treated the problems at issue in the same exemplary manner in his present report as in his previous analyses and proposals on this subject. I agree with his conclusions and with the draft recommendation. I have some brief comments to make on some points, but wish first to say something of a general nature.

The issue of future European security is more pressing than ever, and in this sense I see a close connection with the equally soundly based report by Mr. Pontillon, which we discussed and adopted this morning. If we look at the internal developments in some Eastern European countries, say in Hungary and Poland, from which news reaches us almost daily indicating that the ossified power structures established there since 1945 are beginning to lose their rigidity, and where the first, albeit modest, steps have been taken towards democratisation, we realise that no one could have predicted such a trend even a few years ago without being taken for a romancer.

This naturally also applies to developments in the Soviet Union, which Mr. Pontillon has dealt with thoroughly. Just in the last few days, we have received fresh news of ethnic conflicts in that huge country, this time from Uzbekistan. What the effect of these centrifugal forces will be

Mr. Antretter (continued)

we do not yet know, but what we do know is that we in Europe cannot be indifferent to these events.

Yesterday we discussed in detail the events in the People's Republic of China. I do not wish to reopen that debate now, although it would seem that the latest information has already made yesterday's resolution obsolete. I only wish to say – and I am sure that all the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments who were with me in China feel the same – that the pictures of the unimaginably brutal assault of the armed forces on the students shocked me all the more because we had recently been the guests of those same forces. Units of the army are now firing on each other, and against the backdrop of this flood of news the death in Iran of Ayatollah Khomeini is rather relegated to the background, although its consequences for the development of Islamic fundamentalism and its effects on the situation in the Near and Middle East are likely to be of great significance to Europe.

Why do I give this list of examples, which could go on and on? Because they show that there has been a lot of movement on our planet, and because all these events are likely to be related more or less closely to the future shape of European security. It therefore seems all the more urgent that we Europeans, who are members of WEU, should finally pull ourselves together and bring to a successful conclusion our sometimes small-minded disagreements on questions of organisation and ideas, which have been going on for years. While the most sensational things have been happening in the world, we in WEU have been chiefly concerned with ourselves for nearly five years. Let us not fool ourselves: WEU has so far achieved only one concrete result in the outside world, the joint naval exercise in the Persian Gulf, which was no mean success for WEU.

But what about our influence on specific security problems in Europe itself? After all, it is these which provide the main justification for the existence of our organisation. Where has Europe made its voice heard in this area?

The formulation of a comprehensive western concept on security and arms control matters is not an issue which has just arisen in recent weeks. We can all still feel the effects of the clash of fundamental differences of opinion between the members of the alliance on this subject.

The platform on European security interests adopted in October 1987 gave WEU absolutely clear tasks in these areas of concern. The foreign and defence ministers jointly decided – and I quote:

“ We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing

future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe.”

The ministers went on:

“ We are committed to elaborate further our comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament in accordance with the alliance's declaration of 12th June 1987.”

But what actually happened? At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 3rd and 4th April this year there was plainly only an informal exchange of ideas on the real points of dispute in devising a concept of this kind. Apparently no attempt was even made on this occasion to arrive at common positions. A spectacular initiative on the part of the new American President at the NATO summit in Brussels was needed before a compromise was found.

It is to the credit of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of this Assembly that on the parliamentary side it had already succeeded in establishing a common WEU position on current arms control questions when it adopted Mr. de Beer's report in Bonn at the end of April. This was the time when the waves of public disagreement on both sides of the Atlantic concerning the future treatment of short-range nuclear missiles were at their highest.

The voice of Europe was therefore heard in the parliamentary context at least. But it was not heard by the public at large, and was literally drowned in the general din of the publicly conducted dispute.

Mr. President, this example shows how far we still are from our aim of exerting a decisive influence on the shaping of European security. It therefore comes as no surprise that the report in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on this year's meeting of our Assembly was headed “ Aftermath of NATO at the WEU Assembly meeting in Paris ”, as though our sole function were to regurgitate what has long been decided elsewhere.

At the Florence colloquy I thought it important to state that WEU could not much longer confine itself to the rôle of a mere debating forum, but unfortunately I have the impression that some governments have very little interest in altering this state of affairs.

This was apparent, for example, in the address given by Mr. Younger, the United Kingdom minister, in presenting the Council report. The attitude of the United Kingdom Government emerges still more clearly from an answer to a question on arms control tabled by Mr. Hill in

Mr. Antretter (continued)

the House of Commons in February. The answer was as follows:

“ The WEU Council is a forum for exchanging views on security and arms control issues. The responsibility for defining and publicising joint positions on specific aspects of arms limitation rests with NATO. ”

I do not know the extent to which this view is shared by all members of the Council. If that is the general opinion, we cannot expect to hear the voice of Europe on defence and armament questions in the future, either.

Mr. Schäfer, the Federal German Defence Minister, recently worded the case somewhat differently in Bonn. He said that WEU had developed into an active European forum for consultation on current questions of security policy – but even this description does not take us much further.

I fully agree with Mr. van der Sanden when he says that the present world situation, when so much is in a state of flux, is not the proper moment for sweeping decisions on the security of Europe. That is true, thank God, but we do not know whether the proper moment may not suddenly arrive, sooner than we expected. It would then be regrettable if our WEU were still to be caught unprepared.

Finally, two concrete points: I have the impression that the Council intends to take a long time over the revision of the Brussels Treaty. However, even though this operation merits thorough deliberation, the work should go ahead briskly, and the Assembly should be regularly informed of progress.

Perhaps the next report may again contain something on the Franco-German defence council, whose secretariat recently started work in Paris. Although this is a bilateral organ, it must concern us all.

I should like to congratulate Mr. van der Sanden on his present report, as on the previous ones, but I do not feel we can release him yet. We shall have to ask him to continue to pursue this topic in the way we have all come to value.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tascioglu.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my congratulations to Mr. van der Sanden for his excellent report on the future of European security and his skilful description of the events prompting the European countries to take special interest in the various aspects of security in Europe. He has also produced an extremely good summary of the activities of the Council, while reserving a specific chapter for his thoughts about the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty.

The high quality of this report encourages me to put forward a number of comments on certain points made in chapter III of part one dealing with the enlargement of WEU and to add a few details about the treatment of the Turkish application to join WEU.

I do not feel competent to give an opinion on what the Rapporteur calls certain difficulties about Greece's candidature, but the analogy he has tried to draw between the Turkish and Greek applications leads me to point out three things.

First of all, Turkey has always given absolute priority to the objectives of the alliance whose value and strategic thinking Turkey shares.

Next, although relations with the countries of the Middle East occupy an important position in Turkish foreign policy, my country – which has greatly suffered from acts of terrorism – has so far never missed an opportunity to condemn any show of weakness with regard to terrorist practices in the most vigorous manner.

Lastly, I can assure you that when making its application Turkey was motivated by the wish to make its contribution to the security of Western Europe. It believes that contribution to be essential. It is one that Turkey has never grudged over the forty years it has been in the Atlantic Alliance, though this has meant considerable sacrifices. Turkey has its bilateral problems with Greece, but it has no intention on that account, as is suggested in the report, of calling on its WEU partners to attain certain aims or enhance its national ambitions.

As to the suggestion that the Turkish Government has sometimes reacted to threats to its internal stability by means that are not in accord with the principles set out in Article III of the modified Brussels Treaty, I must confess that I do not see the grounds for this allegation, nor do I quite perceive what the Rapporteur is referring to. To me it is unjustified.

Conscious of the spirit of the wording of Article III of the modified Brussels Treaty, I shall simply say that Turkey, as a founder member of the Council of Europe and UNESCO and heir to an exceptional cultural heritage, will spare no effort to strengthen and deepen its comprehension of the principles of common civilisation and to develop cultural exchanges with and among the countries of Europe.

May I lastly voice my categorical disagreement with the statement in paragraph 32 to the effect that further enlargement of WEU would weaken the European pillar of the alliance and that the Council answered the Greek and Turkish applications in this sense at the close of its meeting on 3rd April 1989. Solely on the basis of the WEU Council's reply to the Turkish Government's application, I can assure you that in his

Mr. Tascioglu (continued)

letter the British Foreign Minister was kind enough to stress the importance that all the members of WEU attached to my country's substantial contribution to the defence of Europe. He also wrote that the high-level consultations proposed would in no way constitute an alternative to Turkey's accession.

On the subject of enlargement, I would once again emphasise the importance for security of the flanks of Europe. In its conviction of the key nature of indivisibility as one of the principles of European security, Turkey – with its long frontiers with Warsaw Pact countries and located in one of the most unstable areas of the world – considers that its early accession to WEU will make a vital contribution to the formulation of a strategy for European security, particularly in the present state of East-West relations.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is now closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by expressing my thanks and respect to the speakers for the particularly friendly way in which they have treated this report this afternoon. I am very happy about this, and I believe I can express these thanks on behalf of the whole committee and of our Secretary, who, as I have already said, rendered such excellent assistance while this report was being drawn up.

Mr. President, the points that have been raised by the Assembly during this debate today do not require much in the way of a response from me. As I intimated in my presentation this morning, the essential elements of this report clearly find wide support in the Assembly. As I have already said, I am very grateful for this.

The dissonant note – if I may so call it without wishing to overstate it – expressed by the first speaker, Mr. Pieralli, to which Sir Geoffrey has in fact largely replied, was not very pronounced. After all, Mr. Pieralli made it very clear that he felt that the European Parliament cannot be made responsible for defence policy. He added that a referendum might be held on whether the EEC Treaty should be amended. That is not so very far removed from my own opinion and that of the General Affairs Committee, which has always said that the European Parliament should steer clear of defence unless and until the Treaty of Rome is amended. If people want to consider whether it needs to be amended, I shall be the last to object. I do not therefore think that the gap between Mr. Pieralli and myself is so wide, if he also draws the logical conclusions at the present time and in present

circumstances from the actual differences between the Treaty of Rome and the Brussels Treaty.

I am, of course, very grateful to Mr. Soell for his particularly friendly attitude to my report, whose proposals he endorsed. I am also grateful to him for his detailed comments on the institute that is to be established and for emphasising that it should not lead to the emergence of a large, new apparatus. I will summarise and borrow his observations. He said there is a need for a centre where thinking, research and knowledge can be concentrated as an analytical back-up for WEU's work. If we see it in these terms and manage to create an institute with a very small staff of its own, I believe we shall be on the right lines.

I would add one sentence, although I must admit straight away that I have not put this idea forward in committee. I will therefore see if the Chairman, Mr. Ahrens, nods his approval or shakes his head. It might be best if the staff of the new institute did not need to consist of officials taken on, as it were, for thirty years. It might be best if they were officials seconded to the institute by WEU, on foreign service lines. They could work for the institute for four years, for example, and then be transferred elsewhere. Since this idea seems to meet with general approval, I will urge the Council of Ministers to take it up.

Mr. President, my thanks to my friend, Mr. Caro, for his cogent statement. He concentrated primarily on the point that the European public must be informed of the concepts for which we in WEU stand as regards our united defence of this area within NATO. Our views correspond in every way.

Mr. Caro also spoke of the possible further enlargement of WEU, and I would refer here to the interesting statement made by our Turkish colleague, Mr. Tascioglu. I think I made my own view fairly clear in my introductory comments this morning. Paragraph 30 of the report emphasises that Turkey makes an extremely important contribution to the overall NATO concept of the defence of European and NATO territory. I say in this paragraph: "... that Turkey is not a member of the European Community but provides NATO with the largest army and makes an essential contribution to western security."

Why have I quoted this sentence, Mr. President? The Hague platform also refers to the desirability of WEU's further enlargement in the future, with the requirements of membership of the European Community and NATO co-ordinated. That is a supplementary comment from me on what I have already said, very emphatically, during my presentation. There must be no misunderstanding: the strengthening

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

of the NATO alliance, as it is taking shape in WEU, will be possible only if a number of conditions are satisfied. I hope and expect that we Europeans will be able to speak with one voice in the strengthened WEU and so be able to increase Western European influence.

I hope Greece and Turkey will both work on a solution to the Cyprus problem within the United Nations.

Mr. Wilkinson spoke at considerable length about the general situation, making reference to paragraph 3. I must say that I am very grateful to him for his contribution. Above all, he appealed to the Council of Ministers to uphold The Hague platform. He also discussed the out-of-area problems, the Gulf still being the only, though very important, example of the application of Article VIII of the treaty.

I hope Mr. Wilkinson will not take it amiss if I do not respond to his very detailed statement on highly technical matters. All I will say is this: when I turn the key in my car, the engine has to start. If it does not, I am completely lost. His technical remarks prompt me to say that we have in this organisation a committee that concerns itself with such matters. May he continue to make a contribution on these matters.

I have already dealt with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's comments when replying to Mr. Pieralli. He asked a specific question. He assumes I will not make any fuss about the two amendments. They say what the report says. As I said once again this morning in completely undiplomatic terms, straight from the shoulder, we are in total agreement. I see no need to reiterate this in the recommendations, but I have no objection at all to the amendments.

Mr. Antretter also signified his approval of the report. I am grateful to him for his statement. His comments ranged from China through the Middle East to Western Europe. He will appreciate that, after what our friend, Mr. Pontillon, said this morning, I see no need to go into these problems. They have already been discussed at length today.

My sincere thanks to everyone for their pleasant participation in the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the debate. The vote on the draft recommendation and amendments will be taken at tomorrow morning's sitting.

The sitting will now be suspended until 6 p.m., when we are to hear the address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

(The sitting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 6.10 p.m. with Mr. Fourré, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair)

4. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

Minister, may I first apologise on behalf of Mr. Goerens, President of our Assembly, who, because of pressing commitments, is unable to welcome you here. I therefore welcome you on his behalf and on behalf of all our members with great personal pleasure.

Coming after the visit by Mr. Roland Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, your presence here today, as Minister of Defence, confirms the interest that France takes in WEU in a particularly crucial period for European defence.

We are indeed delighted at the convergence of views between the French Government and our Assembly, particularly on the question of the Europe institute for advanced security studies.

We also hope for your backing for the Assembly's request that steps be taken to improve working conditions following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. We pin considerable hope on you, Minister, to ensure that this co-operation between the Assembly and the European institute for advanced security studies takes place in better conditions and in better premises.

Finally, I should like to thank you for the hospitality and facilities made available in particular to our Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of which I have the honour to be Vice-Chairman.

After these few words of welcome, Minister, I invite you to the rostrum.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – On 6th February last I was able to outline the French defence doctrine to your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, together with my point of view on the development of East-West relations and on Western European Union's missions. I am now pleased to have this opportunity to continue the dialogue with your Assembly, especially as this session comes at a most propitious time since I consider the recent Atlantic Alliance summit to be one of the most important of all the events that have taken place in recent months, bringing about a change of climate in East-West relations that could open up new prospects for the future of our divided continent.

I should first like to analyse briefly those events before looking at the rôle that WEU could play in this new context.

Clearly, it is the disarmament initiatives that concern us most directly. Since Mr. Gorbachev's

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

speech on 7th December to the General Assembly of the United Nations, proposals have come thick and fast from the Warsaw Pact countries. Skilfully presented they could give the impression of considerable drive in contrast with what certain people have described as the Atlantic Alliance's more reserved or even reluctant attitude towards the disarmament process; incidentally, it would be better to use the term reduction in armaments rather than disarmament, because that is nearer the truth.

However, we know that in reality the attitude of the Atlantic Alliance is a dynamic one. Indeed, on several occasions, the East has picked up concepts and proposals developed by the West, and turned them to its own advantage, a particular example being the "reasonable sufficiency" notion which has always been the basis of the French concept of deterrence. But when all is said and done we are pleased to see some of these concepts flourishing away from home and we are also pleased to see that some other Atlantic Alliance proposals, particularly concerning equipment, whilst not taken up as they are by the Warsaw Pact countries, have at least caused them to change their attitude. We think it is particularly important that at the recent Brussels summit, which many forecast would be a failure, there was on the contrary, evidence of receptivity for new ideas.

President Bush's proposals were made at the right time. We would probably have preferred them to have been the result of prior consultation with all the Atlantic partners and we regret that in certain respects they seem to be typical of the bilateral approach of the super-powers. But the important thing is to have snatched the initiative not only in the battle for public opinion that Mr. Gorbachev began but also in this broad debate on arms reduction. In any event, we fully approve the fundamental principles underlying these new western proposals.

We particularly appreciate the unambiguous reaffirmation of the validity of the concept of nuclear deterrence and the priority given to conventional disarmament. This is an essential point. In our view, the imbalances in this area are the main cause of the threat to the security of our continent. We are pleased, too, that the alliance said no to a third zero option, though not excluding any types of weapons from the negotiations, particularly those of more specific interest to one or other of the allies. This is a sound approach: it is reasonable to assume that progress, which we hope to be rapid in the field of conventional disarmament, will help to bring about a climate of confidence, the key condition for enlarging the scope of disarmament negotiations.

In all then, it was a balanced package that the alliance managed to define, whilst avoiding the trap of anticipating events, because the succession of Warsaw Pact proposals over recent months, a skilful blend of withdrawals and cuts, destruction and mothballing, warheads and rockets, may have given an illusion of continuous progress and results already achieved, whereas in fact the implementation of the measures announced has hardly started if at all.

We welcome the present overtures from the Warsaw Pact. In spite of their ambiguities and inadequacies, we believe them to be very positive signs of a change in climate and so many steps in the right direction. Now that the USSR has accepted certain ceilings suggested by the Atlantic Alliance for tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery, it seems that we can count on a common will to succeed.

But we should not forget the realities, in particular the ongoing Soviet defence effort that Mikhail Gorbachev himself has just confirmed by providing data, for the first time, on the Soviet defence budget and admitting the accuracy of western estimates which up to then had always been disputed.

In a word, openness and watchfulness must more than ever command our attitude towards the Eastern European countries as I explained last February to your Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. This package from the West which has just been defined meets that criterion. We are pleased about that and I am sure it will enable us to conduct the Vienna talks with some serenity, since the Warsaw Pact now has to answer the West.

Among the new proposals by President Bush, one point deserves particular attention from this point of view. If the proposals were applied, more than 300 000 Soviet soldiers would leave the satellite countries. This could have very positive consequences for the domestic development of countries like Poland, Hungary and the Democratic Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia.

It is now up to the Warsaw Pact to provide tangible evidence that it is prepared to tackle seriously these complex talks that are essential for the future of peace in Europe and cannot therefore simply be media exercises.

In the long term, our only guarantee of lasting security would be to have a common system of values in West and East, based on our democratic ideals of freedom.

I was recently able to put this view in Moscow: I said that our concepts of human and civil rights and of relations between the state and the citizen had to draw closer together if we were to ensure genuine European security.

An analysis of the changes taking place in the East justifies some legitimate hope but it also confirms the need for cautious vigilance.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

As I have just said, I went to the Soviet Union in April last. It was the first official visit by a French Defence Minister since 1977. It was a fascinating visit which enabled me to assess the in some cases spectacular changes taking place in that country and in the other countries of Eastern Europe. Naturally, I am thinking in particular of Hungary and Poland. There is unquestionably a new wind blowing in the USSR; double-speak is less in evidence and daring ideas can be voiced. The changes go much farther than the economic reforms of the sixties and seventies had accustomed us to. All sectors of society are now involved and if the transformations now under way are fully effected we shall see a real change in relations between the party, the state and the people.

To explain this new idea of glasnost, it may be said to be an attempt to introduce the values of light and transparency into a rigid society which, whether Russian or Soviet, has never really known democracy, at least not for some considerable time.

It is in our interest to seize this chance of putting real disarmament measures into practice and, in general, increasing the exchanges between the two halves of our divided continent whose rapprochement as François Mitterrand, the President of the French Republic, said will constitute the overriding issue of the end of this century and into the next. For our part, we are now discussing the resumption of military exchanges broken off since the invasion of Afghanistan and, in the coming months, we shall be signing an outline agreement along the lines of those we operated in the seventies.

There are many uncertainties, however, still clouding not only the future of the process that has begun but also the future of the USSR which even so, by the nature of things, will long remain a superpower, given the size of its population, its vast area, the nature of its neighbours and I would add – for a long time to come no doubt – its own nature.

How can we be sure that the changes will be irreversible? The events in Beijing give cause for thought. There are major problems in the Soviet Union regarding food supplies, where the situation has worsened since 1985, public health and even safety, as illustrated by a recent accident.

The changes also throw up stark contradictions, accentuating the inequalities and heightening social tension. There is also the awakening of nationalist feelings; the grave incidents in Georgia have recently reminded us that the application of the law to government is yet to come in the USSR. What is going on in the Soviet Union today is a complete re-reading of

its past history, and in particular of the terms of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 which, let us not forget, paved the way to the second world war.

The changes are of course positive, but we should be vigilant. Once again, this does not mean that we should not take an open attitude and try to encourage the trend. But we should not lower our guard too soon. Were we to anticipate events before declared intentions have been put into effect, we would be acting irresponsibly. On the contrary, we must explain to public opinion why we need to maintain a credible defence capability. I think this is particularly true for us Europeans, because we tend to reason in the framework of East-West relations and, in fact, in the framework outlined by the relations between the two superpowers. We forget that between the two nuclear mountains and the many times redundant Soviet and American arsenals, there is a sort of lowland formed by the nations of Western Europe with a defence capability whose sufficiency can hardly be said to have been reasonable for many years now.

In the new and shifting context that I have just described, I think it is time for us Europeans to decide what our own interests are and to assert our identity, our European identity.

In that connection WEU is a privileged forum and it is my wish that we should speed up the implementation of The Hague platform on security interests adopted in October 1987.

For example, I feel that an Assembly like yours should examine all the implications for Europe of President Bush's proposals. To take just one illustration, consider the forces stationed in Europe. Mr. Bush proposed that they be reduced to 275 000 men on either side, the Soviet and the American side. You will certainly have noticed that Mr. Shevardnadze referred to the status of United Kingdom and French forces, but there are others: Canadian, Belgian and Dutch. But how should the European factor be allowed for? Should we not be working harder on the construction of what has been called the European pillar of defence but would in fact be a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance? I would prefer, incidentally, the term "European defence base" which would also be one of the pillars of European security at the level of the whole continent because although, as the President of the Republic said, disarmament is one aspect of security, there is another aspect which is a certain defence stance based on sufficiency and from which it would be irresponsible to try, too soon, to finesse.

So it seems that there is work to be done; and what place could be better than your Assembly for the demonstration of our awareness of this defence identity as the key contribution to the construction of lasting security on our continent?

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

Various concrete proposals have been put forward since 1987. I hope you will bear with me if I refer particularly to four French initiatives to which we attach particular importance and which were developed, *inter alia*, at the last ministerial meeting in April in London. You know them well from having worked on them yourselves. They are the initiative on space, verification of conventional and chemical disarmament agreements, meetings of chiefs of staff and the setting up of an institute for advanced strategic studies.

Taking space co-operation first, I think that this initiative has had a favourable reaction from this Assembly. There is nothing surprising in that since it has many points in common with the proposals made in the two reports that you adopted last year, Mr. Fourré's report on a future European satellite agency and Mr. Malfatti's report, which is more concerned with the technical problems of setting up such an agency and the technical and scientific aspects of verifying arms control by satellite.

France considers that space facilities can make an important contribution in two areas: arms control agreement verification and crisis management. What could be more important than monitoring the development of crisis situations to prevent their escalation! In this age of deterrence, the distinction between war and peace is no longer meaningful. So we must have the wherewithal to bring crisis situations under control.

WEU is a particularly appropriate forum for discussing such a subject for several reasons. First, the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe and the verification of the agreements to which we hope they will lead are the very direct concern of WEU member countries. Next, all these countries have the necessary technical skills. Third, from the very beginning WEU has had sound experience in verification through its agencies and by its very vocation. What is more, this is a growth sector where there is no fear or risk of duplication or competition with NATO.

Hence it seemed to us particularly desirable that WEU, in a field where there could be no suggestion of aggressive intent or accusations of ulterior motives, should develop its own capabilities to ensure that whatever the situation it has the information it needs to judge for itself whether disarmament agreements are being respected and to know what is happening in crises affecting its members. In our view, these two aspects go together and an independent crisis evaluation capability seems essential if we are to consolidate this European identity that I have referred to.

We welcome the Assembly's early recognition of this necessity, and I do not deny that we have drawn our inspiration from the reports that I have already mentioned. I am not, however, certain that all our partners in the Council are aware to the same extent of the need to move forward quickly in this direction. I hope you will help us to convince the more reticent among them.

In this connection, I must stress that what we propose is pragmatic and progressive and in no way implies the immediate provision of a vast network of very costly satellites. One first modest step could consist of pooling the images and processing facilities already available in the various member countries. Training could also be envisaged, e.g. in image interpretation. It would only be a start, of course, but we have to start somewhere.

The second subject which I should like to address, and which supplements the first, concerns the verification of disarmament agreements.

The purpose of our space initiative is to study the use of space facilities, not only for the verification of disarmament agreements, but also for crisis management. It would involve a review of existing space facilities and the assessment of future needs and how to meet them. You know that Europe spends possibly ten times less on space research and development than the United States and the USSR.

The initiative on chemical and conventional disarmament has two aspects. First, defence objectives have to be better defined. How are surprise attacks to be avoided? How is balance to be defined? Are balance and parity the same thing? Is there a minimum threshold of military equipment below which it would be dangerous to fall? What is the impact of geographical factors on European security? I am thinking in particular of the asymmetry between the two parts of our continent: the continuous land mass of the USSR extending to Vladivostok on the Pacific, as opposed to the 3 750 miles of ocean separating Europe from the United States.

Second we have to think about the problems of conventional and chemical disarmament agreement verification, since space facilities are not the only resources likely to be used. The principles and procedures on which verification agreements should be based and the various techniques that can be used need to be defined, the necessary specialists will have to be trained and the cost of the measures planned will require to be studied.

All this is very important for the future of the security of our continent if, as I and many of you believe, we are right to go down the road of armaments reduction. We cannot at one and the same time make arms reduction our objective

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

and pay no attention to the monitoring and verification facilities necessary for elementary vigilance.

The third proposal, which I myself made in London last October, concerns meetings of chiefs of staff of the member countries. May I point out, incidentally, that these meetings could, on various points, generate some useful stimuli at the highest level. They could also prompt thought on other subjects such as the harmonisation of procurement programmes, even though there is also the Independent European Programme Group. Discussion could extend to training methods and many other practical questions relating to the implementation of the platform on European security interests adopted by WEU in 1987. Did not this document confirm member countries' commitment to pursue European integration including security and defence and did it not also make provision that defence ministers and their representatives be involved in the work of WEU?

Groups of military experts have already been set in place. Meetings of chiefs of staff would crown the structure. I am sure that I can count on your Assembly to overcome the reservations that we all know are voiced in private. It is vital that they be overcome if we want there to be some reality in the work we are doing in this Assembly.

The fourth proposal concerns the European institute for advanced strategic studies. The latest project is given in the proposal made by the French Prime Minister. Mr. Michel Rocard, at the first European session of the IHEDN last November. I shall be brief on this point, since President Goerens sent a recommendation to the Presidency of the WEU Council, following the last session of your Assembly, which is entirely in accord with the French proposals. I should like to express my thanks to him, and though he is not here I know you will do so for me. I should also like to make this public statement of my satisfaction to you.

The structure to be set up should, in any event, be very light. It could be divided into three units corresponding to the three tasks of the institute.

First, studies and publications. This is a matter of providing WEU with an independent source of information and analysis on the military situation in Europe – or what the Prime Minister called “ a European openness centre ” – and a capability for producing independent strategic analyses. I feel that we would all stand to gain from some deep thinking about our strategic concepts which need to be harmonised, but first of all we need to know what they are and I

often find that this is not the case. Once they are better known, we could try to line them up on one another to our mutual advantage.

Second, it would be useful to arrange for liaison with competent independent institutes which could be commissioned to produce studies and organise colloquies or other activities targeted at public opinion. We have a rôle to play vis-à-vis public opinion. We all know that defence questions have a very long-term timeframe. Weapon systems are researched and built over a period of years, sometimes decades, and when they are brought into service it is for twenty or thirty years or even longer. An aircraft carrier can easily be in service for forty or fifty years. So defence policy cannot be subject to the passing whims of public opinion. This is a real problem for all defence policies. They are far too dependent on the pressure of the moment.

The third unit would monitor the meetings of the institute for advanced European defence studies. After the success of the first session in Paris last year, Belgium and then Italy offered to host following meetings. A small permanent secretariat would assist with organisation and office work and with passing on the experience gained.

The common underlying objective of all three units might be defined as the harmonisation of the security doctrines of all the member countries. It is an idea to which I personally attach particular importance. Without a common concept it will not really be possible for us to set in place the European defence policy that we all want.

In my address last February I explained my belief that this concept should be based on the nuclear deterrent, which alone suited the geopolitical conditions on our continent because it does not aim to win a war but to prevent it from breaking out. I shall not go any further on this point because we agreed to allow time for a short debate and I have to leave you in about a quarter of an hour.

Ladies and gentlemen, I shall be particularly happy to have that exchange of views with you because one of the most interesting features of WEU is the fact that governments and members of parliament can join in such discussions.

I was explaining a moment ago that we have a duty to educate public opinion which is by nature prone to follow the mood of the day and to misread the realities to which I have just referred, interpreting them in the light of understandable hopes. Our security will not be ensured if our defence policy is not based on consensus, which can only come from in-depth thinking.

It is clearly my duty as a minister of defence to help bring that consensus about which can only come from a shared resolve.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

As members of parliament you have a fundamental rôle which is complementary to that of the governments. As natural intermediaries between government and public opinion you can help us better to foresee and understand the feelings of our fellow citizens in neighbouring countries and thus lead to a better understanding of our security policies. In brief, you can contribute to the gradual development of a European defence policy arising from the juxtaposition of several national policies, though not from that alone; in other words we should build on the clear ideas which, and I should like to congratulate you on this, are increasingly coming out of your debates.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Minister. I understood you were ready to answer questions from members of our Assembly.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – In your address, Minister, you approached the problem of disarmament agreements from the verification angle, particularly with respect to our country's position. You also referred to the need to find a balance.

May I ask you to explain what, in your view, is the nature of this balance? Is it that between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or between Western Europe and Eastern Europe? And what does it imply, in your view, for the balance between the countries of Western Europe whose defence budgets – as you said yourself – differ considerably?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – The concept of balance relates both to conventional and chemical weapons in the negotiations as they are at present. This is the remit both in Vienna and Geneva. It is a question of achieving a certain balance in equipment and, since President Bush's recent proposals, in the military forces stationed on either side of the line between the two blocs.

Mr. Bush has started off a process which, if continued, would lead to a gradual and partial withdrawal of United States troops from Europe, since the ceiling he proposed is 275 000 men for both United States and Soviet troops. As I said, this should make us think and prompt us to seek a better definition of European identity in terms of security.

In any event, the question is very relevant for geopolitical reasons bound up with the situation of the countries of Western Europe which is not the same in every case. I need go no further. I

would simply say that the strategic space in Western Europe is tight and the defence effort is not greatly developed.

Looking at the percentage of gross domestic product spent on defence, the highest figure is in the United Kingdom at 4.6%, next is France at 3.7% and then Germany at 3.1%. I could quote higher figures; Greece must be spending a great amount, say about 6%. But it is not the percentage of GDP which is most significant, it is the total expenditure and the way it breaks down. For example, France spends an exceptional amount on equipment, as it represents 54% of its defence budget, whereas Germany and the United Kingdom spend roughly 40% on equipment.

France's equipment spending is therefore much greater which also has to do with our exceptional defence strategy. We have our own independent deterrent. It is costly, taking almost 30% of our equipment budget. Germany is not in the same position as we are. The United Kingdom spends 50% less than we do. Also, because of its continental and maritime position and with the interests that it has to defend throughout the world, France has to do several things alone and at the same time: maintain a larger army than the United Kingdom and a larger navy than Germany.

Within our budget we do many things. Should we increase that effort? Today I presented the Council of Ministers with a bill for updating the defence programme; our spending will perhaps increase slightly less than at first planned, but it compares favourably with what one sees elsewhere.

I think we should look objectively at the situation in most Western European countries. This is one of the reasons why I felt it useful to stress the need for a certain European defence identity, an issue which we would do well, I feel, to take very seriously.

I did not intend to imply that the withdrawal of American troops was an early prospect. United States troops will certainly remain in Europe for a long, long time. But it is obvious that 320 million Europeans cannot expect 250 million Americans to go on defending them forever. I think it is common sense for Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own defence. They should not be cradled with the kind of constant assistance which, in the end, would reduce our old nations to protectorates.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, what status do you envisage for the proposed European institute for advanced defence studies? Should it be under the direction of the WEU Council or should it be genuinely inde-

Mr. Baumel (continued)

pendent? Where would it get its information from? Who would decide what it should study and would the results of its studies be published?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I have not given as much thought as you to the matter that you have just raised – and for a good reason. But I think it would be a good thing for the institute to come under WEU and its organs.

Naturally, I leave it to the Assembly to decide upon a status that would give some independence to the institute, ensure it had competent staff, enable it to obtain information where it thought fit and to have recourse, I repeat, to certain independent institutes; it would draw up its own programme of studies, report to the Assembly and be responsible for its own publications.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I shall speak in French to make it easier for you to reply. Has France already presented firm, detailed and concrete proposals to the Council regarding the projects you have described?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Roland Dumas, Mr. Renon, Secretary of State for Defence and I have all made a number of proposals in official statements and some of them have been directly submitted to the Council.

But clearly it is difficult to go much further. More detailed reports can of course be produced. But those that you have already published – I mentioned earlier the reports by Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Fourré – and I could also have mentioned Mr. Pontillon's report and many others – represent a considerable volume of work which are enough to provide a starting point. What is important is the political will.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – You have painted a very optimistic picture, Minister, of present developments in the Soviet Union, whereas for several years, the French Government has been actively modernising every aspect of its deterrent – submarines, ballistic missiles, medium-range air-to-ground missiles and the Hades missile – whilst

maintaining close technical co-operation with the United States in the nuclear field.

If the alliance should begin a process of negotiation on short-range missiles could the French Hades be tacked on to that process?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – My answer to Mr. Wilkinson will not surprise him. Our deterrence is based on the sufficiency concept. It is minimum deterrence. Before throwing our capability into the negotiations basket, we should take a look at the arsenals of the two super-powers.

In case you have forgotten I will remind you that on either side there are 12 000 strategic warheads, the object of the START negotiations that are shortly to reopen being to reduce this number to 6 000, provided that is – and having recently been in the Soviet Union I had an opportunity to talk with Soviet arms officials – that progress with the strategic defence initiative does not jeopardise the attempt to reduce these arsenals. I do not need to labour this point. Clearly, the better the anti-missile defences, the greater the temptation for the potential enemy to maintain the arsenals that already exist, redundant several times over as they are and capable of destroying the planet a similar number of times.

Then what about short-range missiles? Each side has thousands of tactical nuclear warheads, in the form of either short-range missiles or, worse still, nuclear artillery ammunition for use on the battlefield.

So I would simply point out that the modernisation of our deterrent reflects the French desire to maintain in continental Europe a deterrent meeting the yardstick of sufficiency. Our short-range weapons, at the moment Pluto and in the future Hades, not to forget the airborne medium-range air-to-ground missiles, are all final warning weapons, not theatre weapons, since they are not intended to be used in a war which is precisely what we aim to avoid.

To understand our doctrine clearly, therefore, it must always be remembered that our weapons are political; they are non-use weapons, whose purpose, as François Mitterrand says, it not to win a war but to prevent one. We have no plan to use nuclear weapons for winning battles or compensating for conventional inferiority. Our doctrine is that of deterrence and we are naïve enough to think that if one had to define a doctrine meeting not only France's but also the other European countries' rightly understood European interests, the wisest choice would be the doctrine that was aimed at preventing war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany* (Translation)). – I believe, Minister, that my question follows on very well from what Mr. Wilkinson was saying.

When you talk about deterrence, Minister, do you consider that this requires the arsenal of about 4 500 warheads which are currently being kept in readiness as a deterrent in central Europe?

And what do you have to say about the fact that, while the Brussels summit agreement looks forward to negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles, it contains not a word about nuclear battlefield weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I shall try to answer your question as I have understood it. Our word "deterrence" is translated into German by Abschreckung but that is a very imperfect rendering of the concept. If I had to find a German translation I should say Kriegsverhinderung durch Abschreckung. Our concept signifies that we have the means of inflicting on a potential aggressor damage that is greater than the prize we would represent. It is what we call sufficiency. And, of course, we must also take anti-missile defences into account. We have to adjust to developments in enemy defences and make sure of our missiles' ability to penetrate them by all kinds of complicated systems that I shall not go into.

Finally, as regards the pre-strategic components, these again are weapons that should make an adversary think twice and deter him from using conventional weapons to get under our deterrent guard that way. But I repeat that the final warning concept in this case too is that of a single strike against purely military targets immediately before deploying the strategic deterrent proper.

Have I answered the whole of your question? I feel I have missed part of it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to repeat my question, Minister. My question expressed a doubt as to whether we need about 4 500 warheads for nuclear deterrence in the category of short-range weapons. I wanted you to explain whether this order of magnitude is really necessary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Let me be absolutely clear. I have spoken as a French Minister and made no attempt to deal with NATO nuclear weapons.

Four thousand warheads is a lot, seen in isolation. But the other side have rather more. According to figures that I have seen, the number is somewhere between 6 000 and 10 000. And if we consider the number of launchers, the ratio is one to fifteen.

But there is a tendency to mix up wholly different things: the nuclear artillery that I referred to and the short-range weapons that can reach targets located deep inside a country and which have some deterrent effect, not that of the French strategic deterrent I have mentioned, but in the ordinary sense of the word. They are, for all that, terrible weapons.

The position defined by the Atlantic Alliance at its Brussels summit is that priority should go – and quickly – to conventional weapons and that later, if the USSR makes a number of unilateral withdrawals, talks be opened aimed at a partial withdrawal of Russian short-range weapons, many of which are indeed very, very short-range. But here again, although this flexible response concept has never been adopted by France, I should not wish to criticise it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I do not want to go on talking about battlefield nuclear weapons – although the idea appeals to me – because I do not wish to venture on to that slippery slope.

I would like to address myself instead to what you said about the reconnaissance satellite. I am in agreement with you, especially as regards your assessment of our need for such a satellite. I should be interested to know your views on its design. Is it to be an all-weather reconnaissance satellite; will it be produced by a European consortium as a matter of industrial policy, and how many reconnaissance satellites do you think are needed?

I should be specially interested to know whether any consideration has been given to financing, at foreign and defence minister level, as I assume that the project, if it goes ahead, will cost several billion deutschmarks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I should first point out that the Helios satellite will be a joint French, Spanish and Italian satellite so we already have

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

an all-European satellite. With a resolution of ten metres it will allow comparatively sharp observation.

You asked me what satellites we shall need in the future. I have just said that we should begin at the beginning, by pooling the images we have available, and organise training sessions. Then we should certainly somehow manage to place an all-weather satellite in orbit because disarmament verification and crisis management will involve regions where apart from night following day there is also fog and cloud. Central Europe is not exactly the Mediterranean. So we shall need satellites, radars and even infra-red satellites for night time photography. This will cost a billion or two but if we can share this fairly it will be money well spent and more useful than much of the spending on some very expensive programmes, which I, like a number of my European colleagues, am in a position to pass an opinion on.

In peace as in war and crises it is very important to be able to see. This is how a soldier's training begins: he is taught to see, if possible without being seen. This kind of satellite, therefore, would allow us to see what is going on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – Although this may suffer somewhat in translation, what does the Minister mean by the “whim of public opinion”, when politicians rarely talk about the whims of public opinion when being voted into office?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I think you mean “unfavourable”. Let us say that we live in a society where the power of the image projected by the audio-visual media, I mean television, is of course considerable. Opinion surveys are our regular diet and hardly a day passes without the results of several polls being published. It is a trend in our opinion-conscious society – and a very human one – for politicians, whose jobs depend on elections, to look at these results with great attention, especially when voting time comes round. So there is a tendency for attitudes to be based on the daily message of the opinion polls rather than on well-reasoned policy with the well-being of the population in mind in the conditions of our time.

My reference to the whims of public opinion did not necessarily imply anything unpleasant. Public opinion in France prior to the last war, it will be remembered, was not over-alarmed by the danger that Hitler represented at the time. If an opinion poll had been taken at the time of Munich at least a few people would have been

very much in favour of appeasement with Hitler. And if public opinion had been surveyed on the Danzig issue there is no certainty that France and the United Kingdom would have declared war.

In a word, I think that politicians have a responsibility of their own. They should define this in terms of public well-being, and of what they believe to be true, not just in terms of the shifting moods of public opinion, sometimes extremely belligerent and sometimes totally pacifist. To my mind we need to speak the language of common sense.

Even in the United States we can see that public opinion has greatly changed. After all, between the time of “the evil empire” and that of Mr. Gorbachev's smiling face a lot has happened. It is not so much the situation in the Soviet Union that has changed. It has indeed changed, but what can also be said is that our perception of that situation has changed even more.

I could give many other examples. You have understood me because you are all experienced politicians, so I do not need to explain to you what you probably know better than I do. In any event, I should like to thank you for listening to me and for the opportunity to have this discussion, brief though it has been. Unfortunately I have other commitments.

I simply hope that your Assembly will increasingly consolidate its rôle in a period that will help our continent to find the European identity in defence that I have mentioned and which, to my mind, is a necessity for the peoples of Europe at the present time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, thank you for kindly replying to the questions you have been asked, and which, along with your address, have enabled us to understand France's position and your personal support for the rôle and action of our Assembly.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Netherlands Delegation has notified me of the following changes in committee membership.

On the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it is proposed that Mr. Maris should replace Mr. de Kwaadsteniet as a titular member and that Mr. de Kwaadsteniet should replace Mr. Maris as an alternate member.

On the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, it is proposed that Mr. de Kwaadsteniet should replace Mr. de Jong as a titular member and that Mr. de Jong should replace Mr. de Kwaadsteniet as an alternate member.

The President (continued)

On the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, it is proposed that Mr. de Kwaadsteniet should replace Mr. de Jong as an alternate member.

Are there any objections ?...

These changes are agreed to.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 8th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1185 and amendments).

2. New technologies and their implications for European defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1186 and amendments).

3. Parliamentary and public relations (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1181).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.10 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 8th June 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1185 and amendments*).
Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Ahrens.
4. New technologies and their implications for European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1186 and amendments*).
5. Parliamentary and public relations (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution (Doc. 1181)*).
Speakers: The President, Sir William Shelton (*for Mr. Burger, Rapporteur*), Mr. Hunt, Mr. Tummers, Lord Mackie, Sir William Shelton, Mr. Pontillon (*Chairman*).
6. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1185 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council, Document 1185 and amendments.

Two amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation, Amendments 1 and 2 tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and others. They will be taken in that order.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Believing the attempts of the European Parliament to take over the European security file to be misplaced,”

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to support his amendment.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I had hoped after the tenor of yesterday's debate that all I would need to do this morning was to move my two amendments together formally. Alas, I understand that my friend Mr. Pieralli will not allow me to do that, because he intends to speak against them. Therefore, I need to remind the Assembly of what happened yesterday.

I made it clear yesterday and on the first day that I was a supporter and wanted to encourage the largest vote possible for the European Parliament, but for it to do the work that it is given under treaty. My view was confirmed in our debate by speakers from all parties and it was endorsed on behalf of the Council of Ministers by the British Secretary of State for Defence.

My friend, Mr. Pieralli – and I mean “my friend”, because, although we might have totally different political views, I like him very much as a person – made clear his view yesterday, which

1. See page 36.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

I believe is wholly misplaced. He is trying to encourage the European Parliament to do work for which it has no mandate.

I would like to see a massive 70% vote throughout Europe in the elections next week. That may be a false hope, but I would like to see it. I would like the people who are elected to take a different view from that of the current European Parliament. I would like the new members to realise that they have a massive amount of work to do for 1992 in economic and social matters and in everything except defence. That is the purpose of my two amendments. I want to make clear what is clear to everyone except, if I may say so, the members of the European Parliament and, I fear, to my friend, Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. van der Sanden's report and the speeches this week have made the position clear. I want to add to Mr. van der Sanden's recommendations. These two amendments will endorse what is in the report and what has been said by myself and other members. I am perfectly happy that my one speech will cover the two amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – If I have understood correctly, Mr. Pieralli will be speaking against the amendment without jeopardising the entente cordiale between him and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to say straight away to my friend, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, and the Assembly that I am not against both amendments but only the first and that is because Amendment 2 makes a general reaffirmation – which also covers the drift of Amendment 1, whereas Amendment 1 – apart from the differing opinions we may have, not about the European process but about the possible functions of the European institutions – also raises a problem of timing.

I wonder whether the eve of the elections to the European Parliament – Sir Geoffrey admits that there is some risk of a less than massive participation by the electorate – is the right time for us to adopt a position that sounds as though it is in direct conflict with the European Parliament.

I feel that the Assembly could vote unanimously for Amendment 2, which restates a general function of WEU as regards the application of the single act. I would therefore appeal to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to have the courtesy to withdraw Amendment 1 in order to avoid an untimely political act on the part of WEU on the eve of the European parliamentary elections – regardless of the opinions we may have. I think I have made myself clear enough and I would

invite Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to take my point. Should he not change his mind – I feel it may be difficult to make him do so – I have to say that I shall be voting against Amendment 1 and for Amendment 2.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and others have also tabled Amendment 2, which reads as follows:

2. At the end of part I of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“9. Ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the single European act does not affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;”

This amendment has been supported by its proposer.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2?...

What is the opinion of the committee on these two amendments?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to make a brief comment on Amendment 1. The committee has not discussed either of the amendments, but I think it would have been in favour of their adoption had they been discussed.

I do not share Mr. Pieralli's fear that Amendment 1 may have a negative effect on the level of participation in the elections to the European Parliament in ten days' time. Nor, however, do I believe that it will bring the European Parliament back to the path of virtue. The point is not only that the European Parliament is busying itself with defence questions for which it has no mandate, but that the public at large is given the impression that the European Parliament can make things happen in defence and security policy issues. The result is, for example, that in parts of the Federal Republic of Germany where problems sometimes arise with the British, French, Canadian, Dutch, Belgian or American troops stationed there, members of the European Parliament are invited and make statements, and the population is subsequently disappointed when nothing happens, because nothing can happen.

We should say this quite plainly as I am convinced that the European Parliament has and will have so many other things to do for which it has real responsibility that it does not need to concern itself with defence and security matters on which it is not competent to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. New technologies and their implications for European defence

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1186 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on new technologies and their implications for European defence and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1186 and amendments.

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, more than twelve years ago Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Haslett analysed the tremendously rapid developments in connection with sea power in three extremely important papers. The first concerned submarines, the second aircraft and the third electronics. It was, needless to say, Sir Henry Tysert who had urged him to undertake these studies.

This is extremely important, because in fact it was already being recognised at that time that, in addition to the design of the operational activities of weapon carriers, completely separate functions are essential for the weapon system and for its control and guidance – electronics, in other words. Each of these three components has its own period of usefulness: only two or three years in the case of electronics, a maximum of ten to fifteen years for weapon systems and really no more than twenty or, at

best, twenty-five years for the carrier – ship, aircraft or tank. And even then, modernisation, updating, mid-life conversion and so on are necessary.

In time of war this whole process is greatly accelerated, the weapon as originally designed also being quickly adapted to a variety of operational requirements. Anyone familiar with the history of the Sherman tank, the M-4, between 1938 and 1946, for example, will know what I mean. Or if you prefer a typical example at sea or in the air, you have the torpedo. You know as well as I do that a tremendous amount of work is being done on what is in fact the third generation of torpedoes now in use: heavy ones for ships and light ones for aircraft. You will also know, of course, that the cost of what is in itself a small weapon system is in fact so high that, apart from the ones in operation today, no sensational new torpedoes will be coming on to the market between now and 2005.

That, then, is one part of this report. From the many experts – to whom I am very grateful for their willingness and frankness – I learnt that completely new and major high-technology innovations are unlikely until the year 2000. In the meantime consolidation and greater operability of existing programmes can be expected. But I would add straight away that in Western Europe and the United States far more attention will certainly be paid to the ergonomic aspects of the relationship between man and machine than in the past. The problem raised by this relationship was recognised as early as the eighteenth century. Today the need for a solution is growing, because as systems are perfected the warning and decision periods are becoming inhumanly short, while the flow of information, already difficult to control and select, is also growing disproportionately. The members of the committee will recall the introduction of the integrated strike and mission planning systems which we were able to inspect in the United States and elsewhere.

As a result of all these complex developments and adjustments, cost prices are rising so steeply that one-for-one replacement of all major weapons systems is completely out of the question today. This financial constraint becomes far more serious when we realise how wide the gap now is in each country between our military programmes and the defence budgets adopted. Too much is also expected of the disarmament or arms control negotiations, which may perhaps succeed in the long term. We are also familiar with the forecasts for the air show that will be opening at Le Bourget tomorrow. The forecasts of sales of new combat aircraft are unfavourable, despite recognition of the need for replacements. A presentation by the French Prime Minister in the Defence Committee and statements in the United States indicate that a

1. See page 37.

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

reduction of defence budgets is already under consideration. Reductions are being announced unilaterally. Has there been any consultation with the partners, and what does this mean for the various armed forces?

In addition to the "funding gap" phenomenon to which I refer in footnote 21 to paragraph 65 of the report, I would draw attention to page 24 of last month's edition of the journal *Eurostratégie*. I need only quote the heading: "Budgets de défense: le chaos et la nécessité". Where detection is concerned, we are constantly struck by professional blindness, among high tech fanatics, for example. The incredibly expensive, "invisible" Stealth aircraft can probably be detected by any AWACS and certainly by any radar satellite. There is also political blindness. The existence of such an aircraft and the intention to make it operational may exert unreasonable pressure on arms reduction negotiations. I have outlined a similar problem with regard to satellites and the anti-satellite system as a response to them.

I refer to a great deal more in the report, but I will not summarise it all. The real question concerns the future of the defence industry. Should it be concentrated in Europe, or, as has recently been proposed in Britain, should we buy weapon systems off the shelf where they are cheapest, in other words mainly in the United States? Or should we try to forge closer industrial links through co-ordination in Europe, possibly in consultation with the United States, which would also make it possible for us to pay for weapons in the future and to spare the taxpayer?

Two aspects are not given sufficient exposure in this report. I have said that the defence industry should bear in mind the financial and economic aspects of its requirements, but I have not referred to the environmental aspects directly connected with this. Production of and working with weapons also pose the danger of soil, water and air pollution. In addition to air pollution, there is no denying that annoyance is also caused by the tremendous noise pollution occurring during tank manoeuvres and aircraft exercises. We parliamentarians must not overlook this aspect when weighing up the pros and cons.

I should like to generalise on this point and make an explicit appeal to us all to seek to reconsider the goals of our security and peace policy systematically and formulate them precisely and then to specify and regularly adjust, both collectively and individually, the numbers of people and quantities of equipment and resources needed for their implementation. "Us all" means ourselves, as parliamentarians

responsible for European society, our colleagues in the national parliaments and the executives we elect, in this case WEU's Council of Ministers, which would perhaps best be done by commissioning the European institute for advanced security studies.

There is another point that has received insufficient attention, which has something to do, of course, with the specific field covered by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. I am convinced that in the final analysis no conflict will be resolved solely by high tech equipment. The determining factors will be man's endurance and perseverance, confidence in the government and military commanders and faith in the good cause for which he is fighting. All this will, in the end, tip the balance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van der Werff.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – As a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I thank the Rapporteur for the help and advice he has given me from his long experience. That has enabled me to participate in the committee's work during my short time as a member of the Assembly. I know that he is withdrawing from WEU, so I take this public opportunity to thank him for the companionship, and indeed friendship, that we have built up.

It is against that background that I welcome the general implications of the report, but I have tabled amendments because I am disturbed about certain aspects. In this organisation, if one happens to be absent from the final meeting of a committee, one discovers after all the negotiations that something that one thought had been accepted has suddenly disappeared from the report; some of the hardliners begin to speak up again and include recommendations which, in this case, neither the Rapporteur nor the committee as a whole supported when I was present.

As I said yesterday, when the committee visited the United States, we met at the Pentagon not only the political advisers but also the civil servants who service the politicians. At that time, the Pentagon was worried about the implications of a change of President. The Americans have a very good system; when a President changes, so do the officials. President Reagan's officials had all had to tender their resignations, and these poor people did not know whether they would get their jobs back under President Bush. One can imagine their fear and apprehension.

We also visited Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, General Dynamics and LTV in Dallas – the

Mr. Lambie (continued)

major defence suppliers not only of the United States but of the world. They, too, were apprehensive – first, about the effects of Mr. Gorbachev's peace initiative on public opinion in the United States and in the world. They were worried that world public opinion would not support ever-increasing defence expenditure. One can understand why big companies such as Boeing, with its present problems over quality control, were apprehensive.

Secondly, like the Pentagon, those companies were also apprehensive about the onset of 1992. They were afraid of the effects of the single European act on their trade with Europe. To put it bluntly, they were afraid of the birth of fortress Europe and the possibility that the Europeans would become isolationists, no longer buying American defence equipment. That was the background to our visit.

The Americans are always in favour of international co-operation, so long as they supply the equipment. They do not want co-operation that means that independent companies take part in research and development. They are interested only in European companies and defence industry becoming contractors or subcontractors to their industry. They are not interested in European industry or in the employment consequences if European companies withdraw from research and development.

One thing about the Americans is that they are always truthful. They make it clear that they are in favour of co-operation with Europe after 1992 but that that co-operation should be on the basis of contracting or subcontracting. That is why I am disappointed with the report. Although the Rapporteur asked for co-production between American and European industries, that does not cover research and development. That is the reason for my first amendment, which I hope the Rapporteur will accept.

My good colleague and parliamentary neighbour, George Younger, earlier this week voiced the opinion of our Prime Minister that we must get value for money in everything – that we should buy off the shelf if it is cheaper than producing things ourselves. It therefore seems that my country supports the American idea that the United Kingdom should be a subcontractor of the United States.

That is not my opinion or the opinion of my constituents – and it is not the opinion of George Younger's constituents. It is not even the opinion of George Younger himself, speaking as a constituency member and my parliamentary neighbour. It may be his opinion as Secretary of State, but when it comes to extra work for a British Aerospace factory in his constituency, by

God he is a Scot first and foremost, and to hell with the Americans, Boeing and anyone else. I am therefore speaking on behalf of George Younger, in his capacity as my neighbouring member of parliament in Ayrshire, where we are defending the rights of British Aerospace against that big, bad American company, Boeing, which keeps undercutting prices in order to sell planes that we should be supplying from British Aerospace. I shall be visiting the opening of the Paris air show tomorrow, and hope that I do not meet any representatives of Boeing after making this speech today.

As I have said, the Americans think of us solely as subcontractors, which is not how we, as representatives, wish to be seen. We want the Europeans to be involved in research and development and to build up our European industry.

My second amendment deals with the issue of countries taking unilateral action to cut their defence expenditure, possibly affecting the overall balance of forces in that country. That is pie in the sky. The Rapporteur was speaking as a Dutch member of parliament and he will not tell the Dutch people that the amount that their country spends on military and defence expenditure should be determined by those outside the Netherlands. He could not support that proposition. Listening to our French colleagues and noting how they voted two days ago, I cannot imagine them accepting that the United Kingdom should determine how much money the French spend on defence. The Germans might do that because in their defence policy they agree with everyone; but the Dutch, French and British want to determine their own policies. Therefore, although it is all very well to say that countries should not take unilateral decisions, they will do so despite 1992 and the single European act.

I was disappointed yesterday when I listened to the speech of the French Minister of Defence, who said that defence policies were too serious to be left to the whims of public opinion. Indeed, my colleague, Tony Banks, gave the French Minister of Defence the opportunity, in reply to a question, to say that he might have been wrongly translated, but the Minister said "no" and that that was his opinion. I can imagine the Chinese Government holding a similar opinion about what is happening in China and saying that Chinese political problems and policies are too serious to be left to the whims of Chinese students. It is the same argument. I am a democrat and accept that in a democracy one decides things by voting – some you win and some you lose – but one must accept the decision and fight for it irrespective of whether it went against one's opinion or policy.

Mr. Lambie (continued)

The Rapporteur might have satisfied the defence industry and the generals, colonels and all the other people who get their bread and butter from the military machine, but he was not speaking on behalf of the individual countries of Western European Union or on behalf of the people of Western Europe when he said that countries should not be allowed to take unilateral action on defence expenditure. That is why I have tabled these amendments.

Finally, I thank the Rapporteur for the excellent report, which contains a tremendous amount of information and many facts. However, it would be even better and could be adopted unanimously if the Rapporteur were to accept the two amendments that I have tabled on behalf of the Socialist Group.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too would like to thank Mr. van der Werff for his excellent and highly instructive report on new technologies and their foreseeable applications to military equipment.

I do not want to focus what I have to say on the purely technical questions raised by technological progress but simply to put a number of points to you prompted by the information contained in the report.

As you have said, the use of the new technologies in new weapons systems has to meet two requirements. They have to make it possible first to have more efficient weapons, and second and more importantly to improve the cost-effectiveness ratio.

The point is that costs have tended to go up exponentially with each new generation of weapons. Hence the phenomenon of structural disarmament referred to by Mr. Callaghan, whom you quote in the report. In other words, if the cost-effectiveness ratio fails to improve it could be feared that the balance of forces will not be reached.

At that point a number of questions arise. For air-land combat, the new technologies are applied to the destructive weapons themselves and the control systems for these weapons – the C3I. Unfortunately, as you say in your report, intelligent weapons are highly dependent on the C3I and there is no guarantee that in the event of hostilities the small number of C3I vectors will not be destroyed in the first few hours. What would the effectiveness of these blinded weapons be then? There is an uncertainty about this point and that and the risk of vulnerability in our future security systems give cause for concern.

Second, the semi-automatic nature of the use of intelligent weapons raises the problem of the mistaken use of a weapon should there be a functional failure of the control system. The examples you give in the report of the USS Vincennes shooting down a commercial Iran Air airbus and the dogfight between the American F-14 Tomcats and Libyan MiGs are very revealing. In the first case, the result goes wholly against one of the present objectives of armaments control which, precisely, is to prevent unintended conflicts from breaking out.

Lastly, with regard to the FOFA doctrine of counter-attack against the second echelon forces of the Warsaw Pact, I feel it may be useful to look back at the origins of that doctrine. It was thought up as an answer to the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces and to raise the threshold for the use of NATO nuclear weapons. But since the specific objective of the Vienna talks is to even out asymmetries and prevent any possibility of a large-scale offensive, will the FOFA doctrine still have any *raison d'être* if the talks are successful? Would not the FOFA doctrine, which is defensive as it stands, then take on an offensive hue?

More generally, is not the modernisation of conventional weapons, on whoever's side they are, in contradiction with the goals of disarmament?

As regards the application of new technologies in the space sector we have always been opposed to President Reagan's SDI programme because this would have destroyed the nuclear deterrent equilibrium and started up the arms race all over again. The development of ASAT weapons, partly connected with the SDI, seems to us destabilising. These military observation satellites have become indispensable systems for the verification of disarmament agreements and to prevent outbreaks of hostilities. A number of satellites are also used for defence communications and their destruction would blind the country whose satellites were attacked.

On this issue, France put forward a draft treaty to the Disarmament Committee in 1984 proposing, first, very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems including the prohibition of any capable of reaching high-orbit satellites, which it is most important to safeguard from the standpoint of strategic equilibrium; second, a ban, for a renewable period of five years, on directed-energy weapons systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at a great distance and a parallel ban on the relevant test; third, a strengthening of the existing notification system instituted by the 14th June 1975 convention on the registration of space objects, under which every state or organisation launching a space vehicle would undertake to provide more detailed information about the characteristics

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

and missions of the items launched so as to improve the feasibility of verification; fourth, an undertaking on the part of the United States and the USSR to extend the bilateral agreements they already have on the immunity of certain space vehicles to the satellites of other countries.

Given the fact that we have to prevent the arms race being continued in space, the main thrusts of these proposals are therefore still valid today. With that reminder, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I now conclude my contribution to this debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – This is my first time here as a delegate to the Assembly of Western European Union. I speak with some trepidation in such a distinguished and prestigious international body. I compliment my good friend David Lambie on his speech. As he is a wily old Scot, I am rather surprised that he forgot the first lesson of politics, which is being there. One has to be there to ensure that the recommendations that one wants actually go through.

I do not like the tone or, indeed, the inherent message of the report on new technologies. I believe that the document bears the imprimature of cold war military attitudes and avaricious international arms manufacturers. The language in the introduction regarding Mikhail Gorbachev's security initiatives is almost entirely dismissive, and the suggestion that the favourable reception that such initiatives have received among the western press and public opinion is lacking in realistic base. I believe that that is elitism of the worst kind, and I reject it entirely. I agree with what my good friend David Lambie said in that respect.

In any conflict between what politicians believe people want and what people say they want, I opt to support the latter. Perhaps it was unrealistic for Chinese students to demonstrate for democracy on the streets of Beijing, but were they wrong to do that? I doubt that any of us in this Assembly would say that they were wrong.

The prescription in the introduction, as throughout the document, is for an enhanced arms race. The language used is that of the unreconstructed cold war warrior. In the conclusion of the document, I could almost see the generals and arms manufacturers rubbing their hands together in expectation at the thought of all that shiny new hardware and massive profits.

In paragraph 7 of the introduction, we see the nub of it. It assumes the primary position of mil-

itary planners. The military propose and the politicians will dispose. The paragraph states:

“It is therefore of the greatest importance for politicians to be fully aware of the most probable battlefield environment in the Central European area.”

My response to the generals and the military planners is that it is of the greatest importance that they are fully aware of the determination of all sane politicians to avoid a probable battlefield environment in Central Europe. That is what public opinion in West and East demands, and it is what as politicians we must achieve, and that is what the generals must obey.

Frankly, I do not have a great deal of time for generals. I tend to regard them rather like second-hand car dealers – their statements should never be taken at face value. That is as true of generals in the West as in the East. We may see that from the words of General Albert Sluzar. If he has been correctly translated in the document, I believe that the Soviet authorities need to move him on to less stressful duties – perhaps parking enforcement in Moscow would seem to be the most appropriate.

The section of the report on Soviet posture in security policy is simplistic, polemical and inaccurate. It is simplistic to suggest that Mr. Gorbachev's mainspring for his security policy proposals is purely economic. At some stage, we might have to admit the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev has no more desire to end up as a small crisp on an ash heap than we have in the West.

Of course Mr. Gorbachev wants to achieve economic improvements for the Soviet people. Presumably, we want the same for our peoples. However, the statement in paragraph 20 is manifestly absurd. It reads:

“His main objective is a far better performance of the national economy which, ever since the communist party took office, has not been able to satisfy the basic needs of the population.”

I assume that that sentence is not suggesting that under the tsars life for the Russian masses was one long carnival. I must make that assumption.

Therefore, one must turn to the matter of satisfying basic needs. Of course, that very much depends on what we believe constitutes basic needs. In my humble opinion, basic needs are about health, jobs, homes and food. Basic needs do not amount to luxury flats, expensive dinners, Gucci shoes, Cartier watches, and Porsche sports cars. Such items of conspicuous consumption are difficult to obtain in the Soviet Union, no doubt. However, they are not readily

Mr. Banks (continued)

available in much of Western Europe for working class people, either. So we should beware when the words "basic needs" are used. I have seen thousands of homeless people in the United States and in the United Kingdom. There are beggars on the streets of Washington and London. How then can the West say that the Soviets are not satisfying basic needs when clearly we have not done so in our own countries?

Of course, Mr. Gorbachev might fail with his internal changes but it will not be because of frustrated consumerism in the Soviet Union. Such changes are more likely to founder on the rocks of nationality, separatism among the Soviet republics and the possibility of war between Eastern European nations. Those are Mr. Gorbachev's greatest threats. If such situations arise, there would be very obvious dangers for the West. Given the nature of events in the East, we are largely bystanders, but that does not mean that there is nothing that we can do.

Since there is an economic dimension to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, we can best advance our interests by extending economic co-operation to the Soviets. Greater industrial investment by western countries, economic aid and hard currency loans would assist them and us.

Returning to section II, I see a major internal inconsistency. Initially it refers to Mr. Gorbachev's motivation for security policy proposals as being economic. Later it suggests that the resources he saves from conventional arms reductions might be used to enhance other weapons systems. Those two statements might be individually correct, but they cannot both be correct at the same time. It is worth asking ourselves some crucial questions about Mr. Gorbachev's motives. Are they essentially economic or Machiavellian, designed to lull unsophisticated Europeans into a sense of false security, or are they that Mr. Gorbachev has no great desire to end up prematurely dead and that his motives are not unlike our own?

Instincts are important in politics, and my instincts tell me that Mr. Gorbachev should be trusted. After all, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said that he is a man she could do business with. I recommend that Mr. Gorbachev counts his change if he is doing business with Mrs. Thatcher. Despite all that, I realise that there are still some people here who do not easily give up their enemies, and would not do so even if their enemies were to sue for unconditional surrender.

The depressing conclusion of the report is that the arms race is inevitable. Paragraph 165 states:

"This inevitably implies an arms race. Only very radical – for the time being possibly utopic – agreements would manage to put an end to this spiral."

That sentence could have been written in the board rooms of the arms manufacturers or the military headquarters in Washington, London, Paris or Moscow.

I support what my good friend David Lambie said. The recommendation urging WEU governments to prevent cuts in defence budgets is unrealistic, unacceptable and represents a gross interference in the political affairs of member states. As a British labour member of parliament, I will be urging a future labour government to make massive reductions in military expenditure and to use the resources liberated on more socially desirable objectives. I find the report to be misleading and pessimistic. It is not pessimism based on an objective assessment of political and military developments, but, rather, contrived pessimism designed to support the arguments of warmongers and profiteers. I reject its sterile tone and conclusions and hope that colleagues will do likewise, although I doubt that they will.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking members. Taking them in order, I start with Mr. Lambie and Mr. Lagorce, to whom I am grateful for their kind words about myself and the report.

I will admit straight away that the American version of the spoiling system is typical. It left the committee, which just happened to be in Washington at that time, with an impression of uncertainty. What I am less inclined to admit, and what I did not entirely deduce from the discussions we had with industrialists, is that American industry would not be prepared to negotiate with a view to co-operating in some form of balanced co-production. I would point out that there are already instances of balanced co-production. There are weapons systems being produced simultaneously in the United States and Europe.

But I would refer to a major problem that will arise here in the very near future. The problem is that, as the cost of research and development and the cost of making both carriers and weapon systems operational are rising all the time, and as our interests and those of our taxpayers differ in some respects, we must try to strike a balance and to reach a decision on how we should do this in Western Europe. If we intend to make a joint effort in our countries to maintain our own industry and our own know-how, we must

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

realise that we must first be prepared to examine the results of research and development, as the Americans do. Our production must then be in large quantities, since anything else would be completely irresponsible in economic terms, forcing the taxpayer to pay more than any of us would wish. So we must consider now the choice of the next generation of weapons systems after the year 2000. We cannot leave this until 2000: it must be done now. I do not think, incidentally, that 1992 need bring the era of fortress Europe at all, but it may well be a time for reflection.

The members of the national parliaments, of course, decide on the budget, which is drawn up at national level, but I will come back to this when I discuss Amendment 2. I will, of course, take up Mr. Lambie's provocative challenge immediately. It has in fact always been a parliament's right: the right to adopt the budget is the basis of democracy. This is how the democratic system began, in Britain, the Netherlands and all the Western European countries. We stand by that, of course.

But let me explain what I mean. If at a given moment one member of an alliance cancels the money for, say, anti-aircraft defence and another the money for mine-sweepers, without first consulting the other members, we have a generally destabilised defence apparatus. And that would be completely irresponsible. Unilateral in this context means not being one-sided with respect to each other as an ally. In other words, we do consult with each other about overall planning. So make sure you inform each other during these consultations if there is a financial difficulty, and that you reach agreement on how to do this.

Mr. President, I was extremely pleased to hear what Mr. Lagorce had to say. I am grateful to him. He made an explicit reference once again to the essential aspects of quality and costs on the one hand and the required quantities directly associated with these factors, on the other. I think this is very important, but I would like to point one thing out to him.

It has specifically to do with air-land matters – in other words the Central European battlefield situation. It seems to me – and surely this is also in the best tradition of French seapower – that we in fact have the same problems at sea. At sea, too, we have the problem of satellites, AWACS and monitors, which means that the position of ships is also dependent on the three Cs, control, command and communications, and also intelligence. I feel I need to enlarge on his comments to the effect that vulnerability will have to be one aspect of hi-tech studies in the next ten to fifteen years. This vulnerability to enemy interference must be reduced.

Mistakes are indeed made, but some of them may actually be due to dependence on a radar screen, to incorrect information and also – to revert to the professional blindness I referred to just now – to human failings when the unexpected happens. I will admit straight away that the FOFA concept is a process in which there will be less need for arms reduction measures to produce results. However, I should point out at this stage – and I address this to Mr. Banks – that the problem for us parliamentarians is that, while we have a series of declarations of intent, we do not yet know the implications of their translation into deeds. It is too soon for that, and the assessment, the analysis, is not yet complete. We are not yet in that situation. The time may come. We very much hope so.

When we talk about defensive and offensive armament, we must realise that an offensive concept – as was indeed the case in the structure of the Warsaw Pact armed forces – does not simply transform itself. There is still a great deal to be done at both the highest and the lower levels.

Mr. President, Mr. Lagorce broached quite another difficult problem, the question of stabilisation and destabilisation of satellites and anti-satellite weapons, as explicitly referred to in my report. He said he felt the control of anti-satellite weapons and aggression in space should be dealt with as two separate issues. In a sense this is also an extension of the point I raised. There must be a division between the lower and higher atmosphere. A ban – under a treaty, of course – on operational anti-satellite activities above a given altitude is very much what I have in mind. I also feel we should aim at this, as already stated in some of the proposals. Once again, I am grateful that this point has been emphasised.

Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Banks on his maiden speech. He has tried to make a lasting impression. But has he read everything carefully? After all, in the passages he quoted I have said that, whatever the circumstances, generals depend on the decisions taken by politicians, ministers in the first instance and ministers in parliament in the second. I thought that was precisely what democracy required and that it certainly applied to British democracy. That is surely the basis of democracy. If we agree on that, we also agree that it is precisely what is stated in the passages he has criticised.

Secondly, I must say that I am disappointed in Mr. Banks. He goes right back to the tsars and communist leaders in the Kremlin. I can do that too, Mr. President: they are typically the same representatives of an absolutist and unscrupulous government. But in the meantime there has been a spark of hope for the Russian people.

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

There was a spark of democracy between 1917 and 1920. This spark of hope of a better and higher economic standard of living for the Russian people was extinguished by the emergence of the Communist Party. I did not hear Mr. Banks referring to this.

Mr. Banks is deeply disappointed in me because I talk about troop reductions and at the same time say that the troops are becoming stronger. It would reduce the burden on the taxpayer if troop reductions were at the same time to lead to weaker troops. If troop numbers are reduced, the relatively stronger elements will become stronger still. You can read this in Darwin's theory, which I assume Mr. Banks is familiar with and himself applies.

I just want to refer to the last point made by Mr. Banks in this context. I say there is still a competitive system. Let us be realistic. It would be unwise not to acknowledge a deeply human situation, which is that we live in an achievement-orientated society, where the aim is always to be faster, bigger and better. If we can continue to control high technology, I am convinced we shall be on the right track. But if high technology dictates what we achieve, mankind will be in danger. That is the point on which Mr. Banks and I, despite the difference of approach, will agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I only took on responsibility for the committee yesterday it would perhaps have been better if Mr. Wilkinson had been present since he took an active part in the preparation of Mr. van der Werff's important report. However, since I was fortunate enough to take part in an important visit to the United States of America where we were able to make contacts and learn for ourselves about that country's level of technology and its problems in co-operation with Europe, I feel I can say that the report before us is not only very well balanced but also very well documented. Above all it draws Assembly members' attention to those new technological and scientific problems which may have to be evaluated politically in order for the necessary decisions to be taken.

I would remind the Assembly of the French Defence Minister's reference yesterday to the need for and utility of reconnaissance satellites in the context of the new disarmament projects now on the table. This subject is given very close and detailed examination in the report, including the defensive devices to be built into the satellites – I refer here to anti-satellite

systems – and all the new technologies involved in dealing with this problem.

To me, the most significant aspect of the report lies in the effort that is made to provide all of us together with the responsible members of the various governments with as comprehensive a document as possible to serve as an aid to decision-making on industrial co-operation. As Mr. Lambie has reminded us in sparkling fashion, we strongly urged in the United States how desirable it was that the United States should change its attitude on technological collaboration with Europe.

We asked that the various memoranda of understanding which each country has with the United States, and which hitherto have been one-way only, should now be two-way, as – formally – they ought to be. We want this co-operation to be not merely between the United States and the individual countries but also between the United States and Europe and to work possibly in the Europe to United States direction. This is a positive idea put forward by the committee during its visit and I believe it was accepted by United States political and industrial leaders especially with 1992 in mind when European industry and co-operation will no doubt carry greater weight. This is a problem that the United States has so far viewed with some apprehension: the arrival of a new giant on the industrial and technological scene – which is what Europe is gearing itself to become – will certainly present problems for the hegemony that American industry has so far had.

The report also draws politicians' attention to these problems and merits, in my view, that all members of the Assembly vote for it not only because, as I was saying, it is the fruit of deep thought and discussions with our opposite numbers in the United States and other countries but also because I think it can provide a serious frame of reference for the political decisions to be taken on the use of the new technologies in the defence sphere and for forecasting forthcoming events in connection with disarmament and monitored arms reductions.

As far as the two amendments tabled by Mr. Lambie are concerned, the committee is in favour of Amendment 1 which refers to the desirability of collaborating in research and development with the United States as well and not only in European co-production, but against Amendment 2 for the reasons clearly set out by the Rapporteur. It would create problems for the use of armed forces and for the Assembly itself since to some extent our efforts tend to keep us united in our defence commitments and certainly to limit – I would not say prevent – any unilateral initiatives which would place the overall European defence effort in doubt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Two amendments, 1 and 2 have been tabled by Mr. Lambie and others and they will be taken in that order.

Amendment 1 reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “co-production” insert, “including research and development”.

You have already supported this amendment, Mr. Lambie. Do you wish to speak again?

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I developed my argument for the amendment in my previous speech, and since the Chairman has said that the committee accepts it, I will not add to what I have already said.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

The committee has already given its opinion.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Amendment 2 reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph 5 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Lambie to support his amendment.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I developed the argument for this amendment also in my earlier speech, but I should like to add something, since the Chairman says that the committee recommends its rejection.

Everyone knows that paragraph 5 (b) is, to use an English expression, pie in the sky. Members of this Assembly are hypocrites – I use that word advisedly – to come here and vote for the proposition that their governments should not be allowed to carry out a democratic decision because it might affect the armed forces of Europe. They are hypocrites to vote for that if they vote differently in their own parliament.

I say to my French colleagues, especially the conservatives, that they cannot vote here for a European defence policy and then vote in the National Assembly for a French defence policy.

As for the Dutch, they are at the moment cutting defence expenditure. I do not know whether the Rapporteur voted for that, but since it was proposed by his government, I suppose he did. He therefore voted in his own country for a defence expenditure cut which affects European forces overall, and he then comes here as a European to vote against that proposal.

I therefore say to members: do not be hypocritical. Let us vote in Paris as we would vote at home. If we do that, we will vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Lambie can of course speak for himself, and he may speak for the Scottish Labour Party. However, I doubt whether he speaks for Mr. Kinnock. He certainly does not speak for Mr. Younger. I repudiate what he said about Mr. Younger. It is not the normal practice to make such statements about a colleague who is not present. Having known and worked with Mr. Younger rather longer than Mr. Lambie has, I say quite firmly that he never says one thing in one place and something else in another.

Mr. Lambie is trying to destroy the whole concept of alliance, whether it be NATO, or WEU as the European pillar of NATO. We act together. If we agree upon a policy, it is wholly wrong for any one country unilaterally to go against it. Either one belongs to an organisation and supports it, or one gets out; one does not take unilateral action along the lines suggested by Mr. Lambie.

Mr. Lambie would probably not disagree that, had the British Labour Party been united, it might not have done so badly at the last two general elections. That is the lesson that he should draw from disunity. I do not want to see WEU disunited.

We all want reductions in armaments: that is the theme of all our discussions and reports. This amendment goes against that trend. Mr. van der Werff, speaking in the same context as he did yesterday, wants balanced, step-by-step disarmament. He is perfectly right to say that one country cannot take an isolated step which would damage the cohesion that we all seek. I therefore hope that the amendment will be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I have asked for the floor because Mr. Lambie said that the Dutch parliamentarians voted differently in the Netherlands from the way they vote in the Assembly. He has got hold of the wrong end of the stick. The government parties have decided to allow real growth of defence spending to rise rather less quickly, but it is still rising in relation to the growth of national income. If Mr. Lambie is saying that at home we vote for cuts and here for an increase in the budget, he is not presenting the facts correctly. I felt it important to make that clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – To avoid this kind of incident in future I would ask all members of the Assembly to confine themselves to the debate on the amendments. Nothing else can be discussed.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the text may have given rise to some misunderstanding. That was not the intention, and I apologise. I thought it was clear. The point is that there are mutual agreements within an alliance and that within the framework of these relationships there must be provision for constant consultation. If one or more countries in an alliance reduce their defence budgets or turn to specialisation unilaterally, without consulting the other members, the alliance is weakened to the point of jeopardy. That is what I wanted to say. I suggest you look at what it says in paragraph 5 (b) of the draft recommendation: “to prevent any unilateral cuts in defence budgets which might cause unilateral rôle changes in their armed forces”. Surely no one in the Assembly of WEU wants that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote.

Mr. Klejdzinski, you wish to speak. For what reason?

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I do not know, of course, whether the Rules of Procedure allow for further comment, but Mr. de Beer's remarks have introduced a fresh interpretation. In normal circumstances this would not be allowed to pass.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sorry, but this discussion is not possible.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I understand. But in my view it is not possible for the chairmen or the rapporteurs, either.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You may not intervene any longer, Mr. Klejdzinski.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 2 is negated.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*¹.

I take this opportunity to congratulate our colleague, Mr. van der Werff, on his report and thank him for all that he has done for our Assembly.

I am sure, Mr. van der Werff, that you will be missed by all of the members. On their behalf may I wish you every success in your future activities and invite you to come back from time to time and see us as an honorary member of WEU.

(*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

5. Parliamentary and public relations

(*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1181*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliamentary and public relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1181.

In the absence of Mr. Burger, I call Sir William Shelton to present the report.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – First, I bring the Assembly the apologies of our colleague, Mr. Burger, who is unavoidably detained in Luxembourg, where important elections are taking place.

Secondly, I am sure that I speak for all of us in congratulating Mr. Burger on his report. It is extraordinarily well presented and I am sure that we would all wish to convey our congratulations to Mr. Burger on that.

Thirdly, I am sure that Mr. Burger, our Rapporteur, would wish to express his thanks to the secretariat for the help that I am sure that it has given him in his work.

It might be thought that, given the great events that we have been discussing in the past few days, this report would be of comparative unimportance, but such is not the case. This report to ourselves, to Western European Union, is of considerable importance. I remind the Assembly of the references made by Mr. Chevènement in his excellent speech yesterday to the importance of public opinion. He said

1. See page 39.

Sir William Shelton (continued)

that Western European Union should encourage the emergence of a European defence policy and that that should contribute to the emergence of public consensus.

However, unless we have adequate parliamentary and public relations, how can we do that? Looking at the report, how well did the Assembly perform last year? I shall not give my opinion, because all members can draw their own opinions from reading the report.

The report falls principally into four parts. Although these points are not necessarily in their order of importance, I refer first to the seminar organised by the United Kingdom, when it held the presidency of the Council, on changes in public perceptions of European defence. It was held in Lancaster House at the beginning of March this year. The Assembly was invited to send a delegation and we must regard that as a welcome sign of co-operation between the Council and the Assembly. Our colleagues, Mr. Pontillon and Mr. Tummers, and myself were members of that delegation. We attended and played a full part in the seminar, speaking in the plenary session and playing a part in the working parties.

Certain recommendations on publicity emerged from the Assembly and can be found in the report. The Chairman of our committee, Mr. Pontillon, made an interesting suggestion that we should set up a Western European Union public relations committee with equal numbers of members from the Assembly and the Council. No doubt that suggestion will give rise to comment and consideration in the future. In the context of the co-operation that we saw then, I suggest that work in that area has only just started and that much more will take place.

I shall refer now to the other public relations activities of the Council of Western European Union. As can be seen from the report, member governments and the Council clearly recognise the importance of public relations, but no clear view has emerged about how effective public relations might be achieved.

I draw colleagues' attention to the criticisms expressed by our Rapporteur in paragraph 13 about the way in which the Council apparently handles its own public relations. The Rapporteur stated:

"the Council cannot just hand over public relations to a small press and information unit in the Political Affairs Division of the Secretariat-General whose limited resources allow only the circulation of a daily press review which is, moreover, not received by parliamentarians."

I will not comment on that. I have not been a rapporteur, but colleagues may want to draw their own conclusion about it. Within that section of the report, colleagues will see that an association of alumni of European advance defence study sessions has been created. That is quite a long title. It was created following the first European session organised in Paris last November. We understand that Belgium is to host another European advance defence study session this year and we hope that members of the Assembly might well be invited to it.

The third section of the report to which I want to draw attention relates to the action taken in member parliaments to highlight Western European Union's activity. At the beginning of this year, the Chairman of our committee sent members draft questionnaires reminding them to introduce references to selected texts in their national parliaments and some details of that are included in the report. Certainly in the French, British, Luxembourg, West German and Dutch Parliaments action seems to have been taken on that suggestion by our Chairman. However, colleagues will see from that list that certain parliaments were not present. No doubt colleagues will wish to take that into account in future.

As we can see from the report, the Rapporteur intends to raise in national parliaments Recommendation 467 for the creation of a European institute for advanced security studies. I remind colleagues of what one can only regard as the encouraging response given to a question by Mr. Chevènement about that subject yesterday.

The fourth part of the report to which I want to draw attention concerns the brief resumé in paragraph 29 about initiatives taken to improve the Assembly's information policy. Among the initiatives was that the press service should take steps to increase the speed of circulation of the communiqués. A new publication, "Letter from the Assembly", has been circulated under the responsibility of the press counsellor. The Presidential Committee has asked about the designing of a logo for WEU. Those seem to have been the more important initiatives judged by the report. Again, colleagues will want to reach their own conclusions about whether that represents a satisfactory and adequate response to the needs of the press and publicity.

Finally, reference is made to the ratification of the United Kingdom and the welcome accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. There are other important points. It is considered that any debates in national parliaments on any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty could well have an influence in discussions in the Council. However, the report states that unfortunately it does not seem that many parliaments have had such debates or are likely to have them. That

Sir William Shelton (continued)

seems to be rather unfortunate. There are signs of closer co-operation between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. However, the Rapporteur points out that the committee has a limited mandate, as was already mentioned in our committee meeting this morning. Colleagues are no doubt aware of the limited mandate and status of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. No doubt that limited mandate will attract attention and comment from colleagues. I commend the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Sir William, for stepping into the breach at almost the last moment and for giving such a comprehensive and extremely good Rapporteur's report.

The debate is now open.

The first speaker is Mr. Hunt.

Mr. HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – I am sure that we are all very grateful to Mr. Burger for his report. As you have just said, Mr. President, we are also particularly grateful to Sir William Shelton for so ably deputising on his behalf to present the report to the Assembly today.

This report once again highlights the perennial problems facing WEU on how to secure proper publicity for our work and how to give our activities and decisions a much higher profile within our member countries. I am afraid that it is clear that the much acclaimed revitalisation of WEU has certainly not been matched by a corresponding increase in the public awareness of our work in security and defence.

We must recognise that, by our very nature, we are not a particularly newsworthy body. We rarely indulge in histrionics. Our debates are generally low-key and restrained. In media terms, we are a pretty dull lot. In spite of that, as Mr. Burger's report indicates, much more could be done to bring our debates to the notice of the public and of our fellow parliamentarians. It cannot be too often said that each of us here has a personal responsibility in that respect. Each of us must become an active ambassador for WEU in our parliaments and within our constituencies.

Mr. Burger's report is critical of the fact that, in a debate on the defence and foreign affairs budgets in the Dutch Parliament, no member of the Netherlands Delegation to the WEU Assembly spoke to give the Assembly's position. It seems to me that such criticism is a bit harsh on our Dutch colleagues, because the Rapporteur's strictures could equally apply to most, if not all, delegations to this Assembly.

We simply do not do enough to make the activities of WEU better known. I sometimes suspect that some parliamentarians deliberately keep a low profile about WEU and their work here on the basis that the wider the knowledge about our work, the greater will be the competition for places on the various delegations, perhaps that is an unworthy thought, and I must not pursue it this morning.

I was particularly pleased to see Mr. Burger's favourable comments on the seminar organised in London in March, to which Sir William referred, on changes in public perceptions of European defence. As we can see from the report, that seminar received distinguished contributions from the chairman of the committee, Mr. Pontillon, and from Sir William Shelton. In his report, Mr. Burger mentions the four specific suggestions which emerged from the seminar on how our public relations could be improved. These were the need to indicate a clear European dimension in defence matters, the need for regular contact with the media, the need to define a European consensus, and the importance of using language accessible to the public. On that last point, I warmly applaud the publication of the "Letter from the Assembly" to which Sir William alluded this morning. Mr. Burger himself hopes that that will arouse more interest than the previous orange booklet with which we are all familiar and which, in my view, was both dated in style and dull in content. However, the letter is a much more lively and interesting publication. It is easily readable and much more up to date in its layout and language. I hope that it will be produced regularly and widely circulated.

In Appendix I of Mr. Burger's report we are provided with the text of Mr. Pontillon's address to the recent WEU seminar in London. One phrase in his speech on that occasion caught my eye:

"It is in Europe's interest for public opinion to realise more fully that the existence and activities of the Assembly mean that Europe's security policy is subject to democratic supervision at European level."

That seems to me to summarise perfectly the rôle and importance of this Assembly and the need for us to give reassurance to a public which is at present bemused and, to some extent, brainwashed by a skilful Soviet propaganda machine. I do not want in any way to decry or devalue Mr. Gorbachev's remarkable achievements. I acknowledge and applaud much of what he has done.

Yesterday, we debated Mr. Pontillon's report on the development of East-West relations. As members will recall, that report underlines the fact that, according to recent opinion polls, a large section of German public opinion now

Mr. Hunt (continued)

considers that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat. Mr. Pontillon rightly warns us that pressure from public opinion in the countries of the alliance could lead to an unduly sharp reduction in the western defence effort, whereas the measures actually taken by the Soviet Union and its allies are still very limited. That is true, and it again underlines the importance of WEU getting our message across – the message that it is not a case of the nice Mr. Gorbachev against the hard-faced cold war warriors about whom we have heard in this session. We must remain vigilant and prepared.

The policies and decisions of WEU are not reached in some remote bunker. They are founded upon democratic accountability – the accountability of generals and ministers alike – through the Assembly and through our national parliaments. If we can get that message across, we shall in turn be able to bring reassurance to the peoples of our respective countries and ensure a much greater understanding of the vital issues that are at stake in our continuing debates about defence and security. The report is a helpful step in that desirable direction. I welcome it and hope that it will receive the unanimous support of members of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is slowly becoming a tiresome tradition for us to begin our contributions to the debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations with comments on the numbers present in the chamber. At the moment there are ten parliamentarians here, including you, Mr. President, and yet what we are discussing is the rôle the parliamentarians with their dual mandate have to play here and in the national parliaments. The committee chaired by Mr. Pontillon has, of course, a mandate for this specific aspect, but the members of this Assembly should surely take an interest in what this committee does on their behalf.

I do not want to enter into competition with the various committees of this Assembly by saying which is more important and which should perhaps be considered less important. But I do feel that this committee in particular, not in terms of the hierarchy but of its function, has a place within the Assembly as a whole that the parliamentarians themselves should rate more highly. Its function is to pass on the findings of the Assembly to the national parliaments. I feel that all our activities here remain too confined to this chamber, unless we ensure that enough pressure is exerted through the committee producing this report for those activities to carry over into the national parliaments.

What is interesting about our dual mandate is that we can talk about peace and security here, that we address our remarks to a council of ministers, and that we can talk to these ministers again at home.

I shall return shortly to the change in the status of this committee and the possible change in its name. Its name is, after all, its visiting card.

Mr. President, the draft resolution is addressed to the chairmen of the national delegations. I am pleased to see that they are all here.

There is an additional element in our relations with parliaments – a subject that has been discussed several times this week – namely relations with the European Parliament. I do not want to go over again what Mr. van der Sanden has said about this. He said something that conflicts with the views of his fellow party member, Mr. Penders of the European Parliament. One of them says that matters of peace and security fall within WEU's terms of reference and that its members should come from the national parliaments. The other says that they should come from the European Parliament. The two of them will undoubtedly fight it out one day, but I am glad that, as a member of our Assembly, Mr. van der Sanden feels as he does.

This does not mean that we should not be building up a relationship with the European Parliament. However difficult it may be, and with however much scorn we may be received, I am also in favour of ensuring that we let the European Parliament know that our work on behalf of European peace and security is related to that parliament. The European Parliament's primary concern, of course, has to do with the market. Naturally it must be able to carry on the business of the market in conditions of peace and security and be satisfied that these conditions are being attended to. But, as you will gather from my statement, that is a third inference. In the first instance, responsibility for peace and security rests with us. It will be an additional task for Mr. Pontillon and his committee to guide relations with the European Parliament along the right lines.

Mr. President, we had an appeal from the French Defence Minister, Mr. Chevènement, yesterday concerning the additional duties we will have to the public – he spoke in a rather doctrinal way about pedagogical duties – once WEU's institute for advanced security studies has been set up. It seems to me that this committee of ours will also have to develop a special relationship with that institute and see how – just as Mr. Chevènement indicated – it attempts to introduce the image of peace and security to the public in the right way. That is very important. We have fortunately reached a stage

Mr. Tummers (continued)

in WEU's development where we have to rewrite our PR booklet, our information report. We must ensure that the institute is introduced in it in the right way, that the report is effective where Spain and Portugal are concerned, and that these two countries are included there in the overall structure. The information report is about to be revised, and we must make good use of this opportunity.

Mr. President, in conclusion I want to mention one or two points in connection with the possible change in the name of our committee and its status. At the moment, as discussions at its meetings in the past have revealed, our committee does not have the same status as WEU's other committees. Its name is the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, and it would be almost impossible to make it shorter. I do not see any great need to change its name, which reflects its tasks very accurately.

I see the committee's status as covering not only the recording of the general activities undertaken within the organisation, but also the ideas put forward here, which appear in resolutions or recommendations at the end of a part-session, in order to consider how they can best be passed on to the parliaments. Its status is therefore rather more important than that of a mere serving hatch: its task is to ensure a satisfactory interaction of all the activities, and to select and pass on what is interesting. After all, if a recommendation or resolution calls for an attempt to get WEU's activities on to the agendas of the national parliaments – that is what the resolution says, but whether it can easily be done is the question – the first move must surely be to present a document which is not only important but also stimulating enough for the national parliaments to put it on their agendas. This entails our making it very clear each time precisely what the task is and who shall be carrying it out. Parliamentarians have a duty not only to state their views on the subject in hand, but also to make sure that the treaties are observed as they stand. They must not be sloppy about this. We must know precisely what we have to do and what the European Parliament has to do. This may change, but then we will abide by the amended text.

Mr. President, we are not, after all, a reserve institute within NATO. In saying this, I am quoting the new Secretary-General who said in a Dutch newspaper on his appointment, that we were a suitable reserve institute within NATO. I cannot shout it loud enough. He is not here, and I do not know where he is. I do not know how loud I have to shout to make him hear. We have the status of a parliament, and the NATO parliament does not have this status at all. I should therefore like to hear what the new Secretary-

General actually meant when he referred to us as a "reserve institute". He may be a reserve officer and so find it easy to say this. I have not said much about the other aspects of Mr. Burger's report. I hope the Chairman of the committee considers my contribution suitable enough to give the work of our committee a further push in the right direction.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers. Your words were heard by a very senior representative of the Secretary-General, so you will not need to write to him. They will be related.

The final speaker in this debate is Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall make a fairly brief speech to this crowded chamber. This is an important report on an important subject. There are many ways of getting publicity. Mr. Hunt mentioned the sort of speech that we sometimes hear – we have heard some today – which might be an effort to obtain publicity. If you were to take the chair in a bathing costume, Mr. President, it might lead to a certain amount of interest in our yellow press, but we cannot rely on general public interest of that sort.

Mr. Goerens's initiative in getting a little money to advance the distribution of material to the press and to expand the list is very useful, but it is not enough. We must try to get through to the serious press of Europe the excellence of the reports presented to the Assembly by our rapporteurs.

I attended the General Affairs Committee colloquy in Florence, to which Mr. Pontillon referred in his speech. It was very interesting, but I noticed that when our invited experts got a chance to speak, they spoke at great length and many of them could not speak at all well. If we ask experts to address us, we should have smaller committee-type sessions and give those whom we invite, including press experts from publications such as *The Economist*, the chance to take part in discussions. That would have an effect on the coverage that we receive. *The Economist* sent people to that conference, but I found no reference in its pages to the Florence colloquy. That was extremely disappointing, because it was important and should have been mentioned.

To flatter Mr. Pontillon, may I say that the twenty-page report that he presented on East-West relations provided a wide review of excellent quality, deserves wide publicity and should be quoted widely in the press. Not all reports are excellent, even though they are always regarded as such by the people who refer to them. But in my time I have seen reports that should have received much wider publicity, as should the reaction to them.

Lord Mackie (continued)

There are many shades of opinion in this Assembly, and all those shades of opinion are resolved in the recommendations passed by the Assembly which give a much clearer expression of what is generally thought in Europe than do the opinions of the various political parties. That should be much more widely known, but it will become known only by all of us getting hold of our contacts in the press and drawing their attention to the excellence of the material coming from Western European Union.

In Britain, reports from the select committees of the House of Commons and the House of Lords receive wide publicity in the press. There is no reason why that should not be true of reports coming from this Assembly. Reports from the European Parliament receive a good deal of publicity, for example, in the technical press. I am thinking of the agricultural press. But reports by the Agricultural Committee of the Council of Europe are seldom mentioned in the agricultural press. We have an enormous amount of work to do to ensure that what we do here receives proper publicity and proper credit from the general public.

I and my colleagues in the House of Lords are probably very much to blame for not taking advantage of the system there. Although in the House of Commons question time is rapid-fire and moves quickly to get through as many questions as possible, in the House of Lords we have only four questions which continue until interest in them has dried up. Sometimes we have more than half an hour for four questions, and in that time we could put important points and obtain the government's attitude. So I end by saying *mea culpa*. I shall try to do better in the House of Lords.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Lord Mackie.

That concludes the list of speakers.

I am sure that, when the Rapporteur replies, he will wish to repudiate any suggestion that the occupant of the presidential chair should appear in a swimming costume.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – Since we all wish you well, Mr. President, we would advise you not to follow the advice of the noble lord, Lord Mackie.

I am grateful to the three colleagues who have intervened in this debate with such wise words. Mr. Hunt said that each of us has a personal responsibility to be an active ambassador for WEU, and he put his finger on the point. Each of us must feel a sense of responsibility to this body when we are in our national parliaments. I recognise that that takes an effort of will. I do not know about my colleagues, but I am inclined

to compartmentalise my life. It is different when I am in the House of Commons and in my constituency, and when I am in Europe it is different again. One should try to take an overall view.

Lord Mackie's words, as always, were wise and welcome. Mr. Tummers made a good point about the relationship with the European Parliament. It is one that we should take on board just as, I am sure, we welcome his interest in the status of the committee. Knowing Mr. Tummers, I am sure that he will move to get something done about that.

Mr. Tummers pointed out that only ten of our colleagues were present for this debate. Perhaps he will share my surprise at the knowledge that a major press conference arranged by the Assembly is proceeding at the moment, in the presence of the President. I am surprised because it may seem to those who take this factor into account that the recognition that we seek outside these walls should also be given within them.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir William.

I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – This is an excellent report that Sir William Shelton has presented on Mr. Burger's behalf, supplemented as it is by contributions from Mr. Hunt, Mr. Tummers and Lord Mackie whom I would like to thank for their work and for being here, which is all the more praiseworthy in that the small number of members present relieves me of the need to speak at any great length.

This debate underlines the importance we attach to our rôle of information and liaison with parliaments and public opinion – an essential rôle if we are to promote a European spirit of defence, which in its turn is inseparable from the reactivation of WEU.

I have two brief points, Mr. President. First of all I hope that the excellent initiative taken by the United Kingdom presidency this year will become a permanent practice in this Assembly and a constant feature of our activity that future presidencies should maintain.

Next, I trust that our suggestion, referred to by Sir William in his report, i.e. the institution of a public relations committee composed of equal numbers of representatives of the Assembly and national parliaments, will be favourably received by the new Secretary-General and likewise become practical reality as his predecessor Mr. Cahen was kind enough to say.

My last remark is addressed more specifically to you Mr. President. Reference has been made to the need to upgrade the mission, credibility, interest and importance of our committee. As

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges you are going to receive a proposal under that heading. Knowing how interested you are in this project I have no doubt, echoing what Mr. Tummers said a moment ago, about the friendly welcome that proposal will receive at your hands.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pontillon. Flattery will get you everywhere. I shall keep an open mind in my other capacity about what I decide to do when your document comes forward.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1181.

We shall vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted¹.

6. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has now come to the end of its business for the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session.

I therefore declare adjourned the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.)

1. See page 40.

INDEX

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS

	Page		Page
A			
Action by the Presidential Committee			
Presentation of the report	48-49		
Debate on the report	49-51		
Address by:			
The Provisional President	42-43		
The President	43-47		
Mr. van Eekelen	51-54		
– Questions and answers	54-56		
Mr. Younger	68-73		
– Questions and answers	73-80		
Mr. Chevènement	150-155		
– Questions and answers	155-158		
Attendance lists	15, 19, 24, 29, 33, 36		
C			
China (see: Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China)			
Committees			
Changes in the membership of – ..	62, 158-159		
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China			
Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure	47-48, 63-64		
Vote on the request for urgent procedure	65		
Presentation of the oral report	95-97		
Debate on the report	97-112		
Vote on the draft resolution	112		
Credentials			
Examination of –	42		
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council			
Presentation of the report	83-85		
Debate on the report	86-91		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Kittelmann .	94		
– Adoption of the amendment	94		
Amendment 2 by Mr. Soell	91		
– Rejection of the amendment	91		
Amendment 3 by Mr. Soell	92		
– Rejection of the amendment	92		
Amendment 4 by Mr. Hardy	93		
– Adoption of the amendment	93		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Klejdzinski .	93-94		
– Rejection of the amendment	94		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Feldmann ...	94-95		
		– Amendment to the amendment ..	94
		– Adoption of the amended amendment	95
		Vote on the amended draft recommendation	95
D			
Development of East-West relations and Western European security			
Presentation of the report	113-115		
Debate on the report	115-134		
Amendment 1 by Mr. Pieralli	136-137		
– Rejection of the amendment	137		
Amendment 2 by Mr. Soell	137		
– Rejection of the amendment	137		
Amendment 3 by Mr. Klejdzinski .	134-135		
– Rejection of the amendment	135		
Amendment 4 by Mr. Klejdzinski .	136-137		
– Rejection of the amendment	137		
Amendment 5 by Mr. Soell	135		
– Rejection of the amendment	135		
Amendment 6 by Mr. Pieralli	135-136		
– Adoption of the amendment	136		
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	137		
F			
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council			
Presentation of the report	138-141		
Debate on the report	141-150		
Amendment 1 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	160-161		
– Adoption of the amendment	161		
Amendment 2 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	161		
– Adoption of the amendment	162		
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	162		
M			
Minutes			
Adoption of the –	63, 83, 113, 138, 160		
N			
New technologies and their implications for European defence			
Presentation of the report	162-163		
Debate on the report	163-169		

INDEX

	Page
Amendment 1 by Mr. Lambie	170
– Adoption of the amendment	170
Amendment 2 by Mr. Lambie	170-171
– Rejection of the amendment	171
Vote on the amended draft recommendation	171
O	
Observers	47
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989	
Presentation of the report	65-66
Debate on the report	66-67
Vote on the draft recommendation.	68
Order of business	
Adoption of the –	47
Orders of the day	12, 17, 22, 27, 34
P	
Parliamentary and public relations	
Presentation of the report	171-173
Debate on the report	173-177
Vote on the draft resolution	177
President	
Address by the Provisional –	42-43
Election of the –	43
Address by the –	43-47
R	
Report of the Council, Thirty-fourth annual (second part)	
Presentation by Mr. Younger	68-73
– Questions and answers	73-80
S	
Session	
Opening of the –	42
Adjournment of the –	177

	Page
State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north	
Presentation of the report	56-57
Debate on the report	57-62
Amendments 1, 2 and 3 by Mr. Fourré	80
– Amendments not moved	80
Amendment 4 by Mr. Fourré	80-81
– Rejection of the amendment	81
Vote on the draft recommendation.	81
T	
Texts adopted:	
Recommendations	
– 467: Establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies	16
– 468: Budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989	20
– 469: State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north	21
– 470: Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position	25
– 471: Development of East-West relations and Western European security	30-31
– 472: Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	37-38
– 473: New technologies and their implications for European defence	39
Resolutions	
– 80: Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	26
– 81: Parliamentary and public relations	40
V	
Vice-Presidents	
Election of –	47

INDEX OF SPEAKERS

	Page		Page
A			
Mr. Ahrens (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	99-100
Action by the Presidential Committee	51	Development of East-West relations and Western European security	117-118
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	65, 101-102, 111-112	Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	143-144
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	134	Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	155
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	156		
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	161	Mr. Cetin (<i>Observer from Turkey</i>):	
Mr. Antretter (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Development of East-West relations and Western European security	131-132
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	102-103	Mr. Chevènement (<i>Minister of Defence of France</i>):	
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	146-148	Address by –	150-155
Mr. Atkinson (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Replies to questions	155-158
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	127-128	Mr. Cox (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
B		Question put to Mr. Younger	78
Mr. Banks (<i>United Kingdom</i>):		Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	105, 112
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	158	E	
New technologies and their implications for European defence	166-167	Mr. van Eekelen (<i>Secretary-General of WEU</i>):	
Mr. Baumel (<i>France</i>):		Address by –	51-54
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	120-121	Replies to questions	54-56
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	155-156	Mr. Eicher (<i>Belgium</i>):	
Mr. de Beer (<i>Netherlands</i>):		Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	111
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	83-85, 90-91, 92, 93, 93-94, 94-95	Mr. Encarnação (<i>Observer from Portugal</i>):	
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	110-111	Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	111
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	136-137	Mr. Ewing (<i>United Kingdom</i>):	
New technologies and their implications for European defence	170	Question put to Mr. Younger	75
Mr. Böhm (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):		Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	87
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	132	F	
C		Mr. Fassino (<i>Italy</i>):	
Mr. Caro (<i>France</i>):		Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	100-101
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen . .	55	Mr. Feldmann (<i>Federal Republic of Germany</i>):	
State of European security – intervention forces for the centre and the north	81	Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	89-90, 94

	Page
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	104-105
Dame Peggy Fenner (United Kingdom):	
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989	66-67
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (United Kingdom):	
Action by the Presidential Committee	49-50
Question put to Mr. van Eekelen ..	55
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	91, 92, 93
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	145-146, 160-161
New technologies and their implications for European defence	170
Mr. Fourré (France):	
Action by the Presidential Committee	48-49
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	126-127

G

Mr. Gabbuggiani (Italy):	
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	108-109
Mr. Goerens (Luxembourg):	
Address by –	43-47
Observers	47
Election of Vice-Presidents	47

H

Mr. Hardy (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Younger	73
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	86, 93
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	98
Mr. Hunt (United Kingdom):	
Parliamentary and public relations .	173-174

I

Mr. Irmer (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Question put to Mr. Younger	78-79

Page

J

Mr. Jessel (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Younger	75
Sir Russell Johnston (United Kingdom):	
Question put to Mr. Younger	75
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	130-131
Mr. Jung (France):	
Examination of credentials	42
Address by the Provisional President	42-43
Election of the President	43

K

Mr. Kittelmann (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	91, 94
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	95-97
Mr. Klejdzinski (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	88, 92
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	103-104
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	118-119, 122, 134-135, 136
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	157
New technologies and their implications for European defence	171

L

Mr. Lagorce (France):	
New technologies and their implications for European defence	165-166
Mr. Lambie (United Kingdom):	
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	124-126
New technologies and their implications for European defence	163-165, 170
Mr. Linster (Luxembourg):	
Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989	67

Page
 Mr. Lord (*United Kingdom*):
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 129-130

M

Lord Mackie (*United Kingdom*):
 Parliamentary and public relations . 175-176

Mr. Martino (*Italy*):
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 107-108

Mr. Mezzapesa (*Italy*):
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 128-129

Mr. Müller (*Federal Republic of
 Germany*):
 State of European security – inter-
 vention forces and reinforcement for
 the centre and the north 57-58
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 110
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 121-123, 135

N

Lord Newall (*United Kingdom*):
 State of European security – inter-
 vention forces and reinforcement for
 the centre and the north 60-61
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 102

P

Mrs. Pack (*Federal Republic of
 Germany*):
 Opinion on the budgets of the minis-
 terial organs of Western European
 Union for the financial years 1988
 (revised) and 1989 65-66

Mr. Pieralli (*Italy*):
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 135-136
 Future of European security – reply
 to the annual report of the Council 141-142, 161

Mr. Pontillon (*France*):
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 113-115, 133-134,
 135, 136, 137
 Parliamentary and public relations . 176-177

R

Mr. Rathbone (*United Kingdom*):
 Action by the Presidential Com-
 mittee 50-51
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 123-124

Mr. Reddemann (*Federal Republic of
 Germany*):
 Question put to Mr. van Eekelen .. 55
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 109-110

Mr. Rubbi (*Italy*):
 Development of East-West relations
 and Western European security 115-116

S

Mr. van der Sanden (*Netherlands*):
 Question put to Mr. van Eekelen .. 54
 Question put to Mr. Younger 76
 Future of European security – reply
 to the annual report of the Council 138-141, 149-150

Mr. Sarti (*Italy*):
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 106

Mr. Scheer (*Federal Republic of
 Germany*):
 Question put to Mr. Younger 73-74
 Current aspects of arms control: the
 Western European position – reply
 to the annual report of the Council 91, 93

Mr. Scovacricchi (*Italy*):
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 98-99

Sir William Shelton (*United
 Kingdom*):
 Parliamentary and public relations . 171-173, 176

Sir Dudley Smith (*United Kingdom*):
 State of European security – inter-
 vention forces and reinforcement for
 the centre and the north 59-60
 Condemnation of the repression and
 massacre of students and others in
 the People's Republic of China 106-107

Mr. Soell (*Federal Republic of
 Germany*):
 Question put to Mr. Younger 79
 Current aspects of arms control: the
 Western European position – reply
 to the annual report of the Council 92

INDEX

	Page
Development of East-West relations and Western European security	116-117, 135, 137
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	142-143
Mr. Speed (United Kingdom):	
State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north	56-57, 81
Mr. Stegagnini (Italy):	
State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north	61-62
Question put to Mr. Younger	76
New technologies and their implications for European defence	169
Mr. Steiner (Federal Republic of Germany):	
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	157
Sir John Stokes (United Kingdom):	
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	107

T

Mr. Tascioglu (Observer from Turkey):	
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	148-149

	Page
Mr. Tummers (Netherlands):	
Parliamentary and public relations .	174-175
W	
Mr. van der Werff (Netherlands):	
Question put to Mr. Younger	77
New technologies and their implications for European defence	162-163, 167-169, 171
Mr. Wilkinson (United Kingdom):	
Condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China	47, 63-65, 97-98
State of European security – intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north	58-59
Question put to Mr. Younger	77-78
Current aspects of arms control: the Western European position – reply to the annual report of the Council	87-88, 94
Future of European security – reply to the annual report of the Council	144-145
Question put to Mr. Chevènement .	156

Y

Mr. Younger (Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council):	
Address by –	68-73
Replies to questions	73-80

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