

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1985

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 – Tel. 47.23.54.32

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Assembly Documents

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP	
BOGAERTS August	SP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
DEJARDIN Claude	PSC	
MICHEL Joseph	PS	
NOERENS René	PVV	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS	
BONNEL Raoul	PVV	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
LAGNEAU André	PRL	
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS	
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	
VAN DER ELST Frans	VU	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BEIX Roland	Socialist	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
BOURGES Yvon	RPR	
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS	
President of the Assembly		
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist	
MAYOUD Alain	UDF	
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.	
SENES Gilbert	Socialist	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist	
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist	
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP	

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist	
BOHL André	UCDP	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist	
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist	
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist	

MM. GALLEY Robert	RPR	
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR	
HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist	
KOEHL Emile	UDF	
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist	
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left	
NATIEZ Jean	Socialist	
OEHLER Jean André	Socialist	
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist	
ROSSINOT André	UDF	
SOUVET Louis	RPR	
VERDON Marc	Socialist	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD	
ANTRETTER Robert	SPD	
BERGER Markus	CDU/CSU	
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU	
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD	
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD	
HAASE Horst	SPD	
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen	
MM. KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU	
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU	
NEUMANN Volker	SPD	
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU	
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP	
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD	
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU	
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU	
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU	
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU	

Substitutes

MM. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU	
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD	
ERTL Josef	FDP	
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU	
MM. GANSEL Norbert	SPD	
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU	
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU	
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD	
HORACEK Milan	Die Grünen	
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU	
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD	
LEMMRICH Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU	
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU	
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU	
MM. SCHEER Hermann	SPD	
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD	
SOELL Hartmut	SPD	
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU	

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Sir	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Dame	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 2nd-5th December 1985**

I. Political Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Developments in China and European security | <i>Report tabled by MM. Michel and van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. WEU and the strategic defence initiative – The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative – The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Disarmament | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative – Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – The auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Rules of Procedure

- | | |
|--|---|
| Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure | <i>Report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |
|--|---|

VI. Parliamentary and Public Relations

- | | |
|---|--|
| Parliaments, public opinion and defence | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |
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ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session
Paris, 2nd-5th December 1985**

MONDAY, 2nd DECEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session.
5. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly.
6. Address by Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Disarmament:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

WEU and the strategic defence initiative:

– The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects):

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;

– The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee; .

– Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals):

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

General debate.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative.
Resumed general debate.

4 p.m.

2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

WEDNESDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
Resumption and close of the general debate.
2. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – The auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

12.30 p.m.

5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of the French Republic.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
Votes on the draft recommendations and draft resolution.
3. Developments in China and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Michel and van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 5th DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

10.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolutions.
5. Parliaments, public opinion and defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.

CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1984*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984 - 21st May 1985.

LETTER FROM THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984, DULY CERTIFIED - 19th July 1985.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984 - 19th June 1985.

APPENDICES

Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1984.
Financial position as at 31st December 1984.

Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1984.

Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1984.

Appendix IV : Provident fund - Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1984.

**Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
of the Assembly for the financial year 1984**

21st May 1985

Sir,

In accordance with Article 13 of the Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1984 in accordance with the statements attached hereto which refer to :

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure - financial position as at 31st December 1984 (Appendix I);
 - (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);
 - (c) Contributions (Appendix III);
 - (d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows that a sum of F 75 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure is F 168,190. The difference between these two figures, F 168,115, represents the excess of receipts over those estimated made up as follows :

	F	F
- Bank interest	279,386	
- Sundry receipts	13,501	
- Sale of publications	31,051	
- Levy on the salaries of Grade A staff	56,843	
- Contributions 7%	<u>358,334</u>	
		739,115
- Receipts for 1984 estimated in the budget		<u>571,000</u>
		<u>168,115</u>

3. Excess expenditure under certain sub-heads of the budget amounting to F 781,542 has been met by transfers between sub-heads within the same head. On the other hand, excess expenditure under Head I - Expenditure for staff - and Head VI - Pensions - amounting to F 153,557 and to F 45,701 have been met by transfers from the other heads of the budget.

4. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1984.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1984 these amounts totalled F 2,761,413 as shown at Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 534,090.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. On 31st December 1984 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J.M. CARO
President of the Assembly

Sir Gordon DOWNEY, K.C.B.
National Audit Office
Audit House
Victoria Embankment
LONDON EC4Y ODS

**Letter from the external Auditor to the President
of the Assembly submitting the accounts
of the Assembly for the financial year 1984,
duly certified**

19th June 1985

Dear Sir,

I have the honour to submit the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1984, duly certified.

2. I also enclose my report as required by Article 15 of the Financial Regulations.

Yours faithfully,
Gordon DOWNEY

The President of the Assembly
Western European Union
43, avenue du Président-Wilson
75775 PARIS Cedex 16

**Report of the external Auditor to the
Assembly of Western European Union on the
accounts for the financial year 1984**

General

1. The following financial statements were submitted to me by the President :

- summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1984 and financial

position as at 31st December 1984 (Appendix I);

- statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1984 (Appendix II);
- statement of sums received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Western European Union Assembly budget for 1984 (Appendix III);
- account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1984 (Appendix IV).

2. My audit, which was carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, included an appraisal of the Assembly's financial procedures and was supported by such tests of the records and transactions as appeared to me to be necessary.

Summary of income and expenditure

(Appendix I)

Financial position during 1984

3. The budget provided for expenditure of F 15,333,200 of which F 571,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 15,333,125. Income amounted to F 15,501,315 comprising F 14,762,200 from contributions and F 739,115 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 168,190 arising from a budgetary surplus of F 75 (as shown at Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 168,115.

Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits

(Appendix II)

5. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads. However, in accordance with a procedure approved in 1973, the Secretary-General informed the Council that expenditure had been incurred in excess of budget provision on Head I (Expenditure for staff - F 153,557) and Head VI (Pensions - F 45,701), and that the total of F 199,258 had been met from savings on other heads.

Financial impact of extraordinary session of Assembly

6. The financial statements include expenditure of F 316,512 in respect of an extraordinary session of the Assembly held in Rome in October 1984. There was no budgetary provision for this expenditure. As a result, other expenditure totalling F 70,770, mainly in respect of budgeted expenses connected with the December 1984 session of the Assembly, could not be met from the budgetary credits provided for 1984. The expenditure has therefore been charged to the 1985 budget. The President of the Assembly has informed the Council of this procedure which was adopted in order to meet exceptional expenditure and which avoided the need for a supplementary budget.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

7. The provident fund continues to operate for those members of staff who opted to remain affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme was introduced. At 31st December 1984 three staff members were fully affiliated to the fund and two others maintained balances in it. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union. At the end of the year the fund's deposits were held in French francs, sterling, German marks and Japanese yen. Variations in the exchange rates between the French franc and the other currencies resulted in a net gain of F 351 in the value of the Assembly members' deposits during the year. This gain has been credited to the individual accounts of the members of the fund in proportion to their holdings.

8. I have received a certificate from the fund's investment managers showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1984 and confirming the share of these deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund at 31st December 1984. This share is equivalent to the balance of F 2,761,413 on members' accounts as shown at Appendix IV. Thus, at 31st December 1984, the assets of the fund were sufficient to meet its liabilities.

9. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Gordon DOWNEY
(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor

19th June 1985

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1984

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)		14,762,200
<i>Miscellaneous</i>		
(A) Sundry receipts		
Bank interest	279,386	
Sundry receipts	13,501	
Sale of publications	31,051	
Levy on salaries of grade A officials	56,843	
(B) Pensions		
Contributions (7 %)	358,334	
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	-	
		<u>739,115</u>
		15,501,315
Expenditure under budget authorisation	15,133,867	
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads I and VI .	<u>199,258</u>	
Total expenditure (see Appendix II)		<u>15,333,125</u>
Excess of income over expenditure		<u>F 168,190</u>

*Financial position as at 31st December 1984**Assets*

Cash at bank	478,716	
Sundry advances	314,057	
Accounts receivable	<u>94,434</u>	
		<u>F 887,207</u>

Liabilities

Accounts payable	719,017	
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>168,190</u>	
		<u>F 887,207</u>

Certified correct :

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration

I certify that I have examined the foregoing financial statements, comprising the summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities, in accordance with Article 14 of the financial regulations of the Assembly. In my opinion the financial statements present fairly the financial position of the Assembly of WEU at 31st December 1984, and the financial transactions for the year ended on that date.

Signed : Gordon DOWNEY
Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

19th June 1985

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in Fr

DETAILS	Total budget for 1984 ¹	
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i> (a) Salaries of permanent establishment	5,754,000	
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B, and C), including travelling expenses and insurance	75,000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i> Allowances, social charges, etc.		
(A) Allowances		
(a) Household allowance	238,100	
(b) Children's allowance	204,600	
(c) Expatriation allowance	505,000	
(d) Compensatory rent allowance	16,000	
(e) Overtime	33,000	
(f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff		
(g) Education allowance	120,000	
(h) Allowance for language courses	2,000	
(B) Social charges		
(a) Social security	664,000	
(b) Supplementary insurance	181,000	
(c) Provident fund	100,500	
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials		
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	5,000	
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	10,000	
(c) Removal expenses	20,000	
(d) Installation allowance	30,000	
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	15,000	
(f) Medical examination	7,000	
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)	300,000	
Total of Head I	8,280,200	

1. Documents 954 and A/WEU/BA (84) 4.

IX II

ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984

ncs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	114,470		5,868,470	6,022,027	153,557
		1,603	73,397	73,397	-
	3,255		241,355	241,355	-
		24,692	179,908	179,908	-
	8,772		513,772	513,772	-
	7,978		23,978	23,978	-
	22,066		55,066	55,066	-
		22,889	97,111	97,111	-
		1,224	776	776	-
	123,691		787,691	787,691	-
	29,649		210,649	210,649	-
	11,926		112,426	112,426	-
		3,735	1,265	1,265	-
		8,924	1,076	1,076	-
	31,927		51,927	51,927	-
	7,531		37,531	37,531	-
	1,773		16,773	16,773	-
	29		7,029	7,029	-
		300,000			
	363,067	363,067	8,280,200	8,433,757	153,557

DETAILS	Total budget for 1984
HEAD II – EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i> 1. <i>Temporary staff</i>	
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly	745,500
2. <i>Linguistic staff</i>	
(A) <i>Interpretation services</i>	
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly	272,500
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of com- mittees between sessions	348,000
(B) <i>Translation services</i>	
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly	650,000
3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i>	5,000
4. <i>Installation of equipment for sessions</i>	350,000
5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i>	82,500
6. <i>Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem allowances)</i>	80,500
Total of Head II	2,534,000
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i> 1. Premises	433,000
2. Work on the building	30,000
<i>Sub-Head 5</i> Capital equipment	73,000
Total of Head III	536,000

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	114,214		859,714	859,714	-
	90,819		363,319	363,319	-
		56,716	291,284	291,284	-
		80,072	569,928	569,928	-
			5,000	3,423	1,577
		11,865	338,135	277,358	60,777
	24,120		106,620	106,620	-
		80,500	-	-	-
	229,153	229,153	2,534,000	2,471,646	62,354
		31,073	401,927	359,419	42,508
			30,000	30,000	-
	31,073		104,073	104,073	-
	31,073	31,073	536,000	493,492	42,508

DETAILS		Total budget for 1984
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents	447,000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Office supplies and hire of machines	288,000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	1,333,000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	40,000
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Official cars	40,500
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Bank charges	500
Total of Head IV		2,149,000
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE		
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	125,000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Expenses for representation and receptions	150,000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Committee study missions	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	290,000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	68,000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Expenditure on information	253,000
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	253,000
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	12,000
Total of Head V		1,157,000
HEAD VI - PENSIONS		
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A) Pensions	
	(a) Retirement pension	381,600
	(b) Invalidity pension	170,300
	(c) Survivors' pension	40,800
	(d) Orphans' pension	20,300
	(B) Allowances	
	(a) Household allowance	16,500
	(b) Dependants' allowance	30,500
	(c) Education allowance	8,000
	(d) Relief allowance	
	(C) Severance grant	
	(D) Supplementary insurance	9,000
Total of Head VI		677,000
TOTAL		15,333,200

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1984, and paid for up to 31st Ma

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		11,296	435,704	421,867	13,837
			288,000	258,319	29,681
			1,333,000	1,302,716	30,284
			40,000	36,513	3,487
	11,296		51,796	51,796	-
			500	17	483
	11,296	11,296	2,149,000	2,071,228	77,772
		35,000	90,000	89,133	867
	18,714		168,714	168,714	-
	1,011		4,011	4,011	-
	63,557		353,557	353,557	-
		17,000	51,000	50,442	558
		39,226	213,774	200,686	13,088
			253,000	253,000	-
			3,000	814	2,186
	7,944		19,944	19,944	-
	91,226	91,226	1,157,000	1,140,301	16,699
		32,383	349,217	349,217	-
	42,598		212,898	212,898	-
	262		41,062	41,062	-
		8,243	12,057	12,057	-
	487		16,987	16,987	-
		9,523	20,977	20,977	-
		5,578	2,422	2,422	-
	9,324		9,324	55,025	45,701
	3,056		12,056	12,056	-
	55,727	55,727	677,000	722,701	45,701
	781,542	781,542	15,333,200	15,333,125	75

5, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1984**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1983	Budget surplus 1983	Budget for 1984 (Revised)	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 54,619	(-) 172,559	1,451,616	1,224,438
France	120	(-) 111,088	(-) 350,967	2,952,440	2,490,385
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 111,088	(-) 350,967	2,952,440	2,490,385
Italy	120	(-) 111,088	(-) 350,967	2,952,440	2,490,385
Luxembourg	2	(-) 1,852	(-) 5,849	49,208	41,507
Netherlands	59	(-) 54,619	(-) 172,559	1,451,616	1,224,438
United Kingdom	120	(-) 111,088	(-) 350,967	2,952,440	2,490,385
	600	(-) 555,442	(-) 1,754,835	14,762,200	12,451,923

Amounts paid by the Secretariat-General to the Assembly	13,007,365
1983 budget surplus	<u>1,754,835</u>
1984 budget	<u><u>14,762,200</u></u>

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1984

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1984	2,437,070		
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	167,294	Withdrawals	74,800
Repayments of loans by staff members	51,460	Management fee	12,898
Interest received during the year	192,936		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1984	351	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1984	2,761,413
	<u>2,849,111</u>		<u>2,849,111</u>

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I certify that I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1984.

19th June 1985

Gordon DOWNEY
*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor*

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1984*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1984, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Foschi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, Schmitz, Stokes (Alternate: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur

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SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986

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- VI. Foreseeable trend of pensions in the period 1986-90
- VII. Trend of the real increase in Assembly budgets for the financial years 1983-86

1. Adopted in committee by 6 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Foschi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster, Morris, Oehler, Pollidoro, Rauti, Schmitz, Stokes (Alternate: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. Political orders

1. At the May 1985 session, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, presenting a report on the activities of the Presidential Committee, underlined that since the ministerial meeting in Paris on 12th June 1984 Western European Union had entered a period of reactivation and restructuring, the guidelines for which were laid down in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984.
2. He also recalled that at the December 1984 session the Assembly had drawn the first conclusions concerning the reactivation of WEU, inter alia instructing the Presidential Committee in Order 58 "to establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU".
3. At the close of its ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, the WEU Council underlined the important rôle of the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active contribution to the revitalisation of WEU.
4. At its May 1985 session, the Assembly, whose aim is to give the Council its full support in the fundamental task of bringing about the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the various bodies contributing to Europe's security, said it expected the Council to give it the wherewithal to pursue fruitful co-operation with it. To this end, it instructed the Presidential Committee:
 - in Order 59 to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly was soon to make for improving its conditions of work;
 - in Order 60 to consider and discuss with the chairmen of the permanent committees the organisation of a mini-session of committee meetings to be held before the December part-session, in sufficient time to allow reports to be circulated two weeks before the Assembly first sits.
5. Finally, at its meeting on 19th February 1985, the Presidential Committee decided to defer until 1986 the preparation of a brief on the political union of Europe, which was the subject of a motion for an order tabled by Mr. Tummers and others on 5th December 1984.

2. Operating budget

2.1. General

6. All the orders mentioned above give a precise outline of the political context in which the Assembly's budgetary estimates for 1986 should be placed.
7. Since its creation, the Assembly's activities have expanded although its secretariat has remained very small (additionally affected by the loss of an hors cadre post) and in all evidence its means have become increasingly out-of-date and ill-suited to meeting the demands of its heavier workload.
8. The Assembly's participation in the reactivation of WEU therefore necessarily means changing its structures and equipment. In other words, like the ministerial organs, it has to revise its budget. It would in fact be paradoxical to consider that only the Assembly's tasks are unaffected by the reactivation of WEU when consideration is being given to increasing the number of staff of the Secretariat-General and giving it new means by making use of sums available in the budget due, in particular, to the change in the tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments.
9. As a result, the draft budget for 1986 now before you reflects the Assembly's real requirements without taking account of the zero growth criterion. Here it should be underlined that apart from requirements connected with the reactivation of WEU this criterion can no longer be applied in the manner indicated by the Council (the rate of increase in the total net budget must be equal to or, even better, lower than the inflation rate shown by the general index of consumer prices) since its application would inevitably lead to a progressive reduction of resources in real terms and in the long run a cutback in the Assembly's activities.
10. This is due to the fact that most budget sub-heads are not represented in the basket of consumer prices serving as a basis for the assessment of price increases and they are liable to vary considerably in

the light of market conditions. In fact, the rise in the cost of services and equipment under these sub-heads has been distinctly higher than the average inflation rate.

11. Moreover, the adverse effects of applying this criterion are well known since over the years it has led to a reduction in real terms of sums granted involving, as was the case in 1985, a cutback in activities. It would be more objective to calculate budgetary adjustments for each category of expenditure in accordance with the inflation rate for each category.

12. In preparing the budget for 1986, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration took account of the fact that in order to carry out its tasks in the new political context created by the Rome declaration the Assembly must be able to develop its relations with the Council and with other parliamentary assemblies and enjoy a certain degree of flexibility in organising its debates and committee meetings. It must also be able to give due dimensions to the projects it considers politically essential.

13. But in this it needs the assistance of a qualified, suitably-equipped secretariat and experts from the Council's agencies. It must also have the resources it needs to organise its meetings, committee visits and public relations.

14. The operating budget for 1986, as analysed below, indicates under the various heads the estimates which correspond to the Assembly's requirements thus defined.

15. Compared with the budget for 1985, there are the following differences :

	1986	1985	Difference	Increase
Total expenditure.....	19,961,300	15,628,400	4,332,900	27.72%
Net total.....	19,557,300	15,170,400	4,436,900	28.91%

16. This is a large increase compared with the previous year, but can be reduced considerably (to below 20%) if the comparison takes into account the trend of Assembly budgets in the last three years. There was in fact a decrease in real terms in the operating budgets for 1984 and 1985 (cf. Appendix VII).

17. Moreover, in view of the size of this increase the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration considered it necessary to indicate the order of priority which should be attributed to the various categories of expenditure.

18. This order is as follows :

- first priority: expenditure connected with the activities of Assembly bodies (travelling expenses, recruitment of experts, sums allocated to the political groups, etc.);
- second priority: modernisation of equipment;
- third priority: creation of new posts in the Office of the Clerk.

19. In the third-priority category, the new posts whose creation is requested are also listed in order of priority.

2.2. Analysis of expenditure

20. Since the technical criteria followed when preparing the budget are described in the explanations following each head, the criteria governing the assessment of requirements will be given in this explanatory memorandum, particularly requirements stemming from application of the orders referred to in section 1 above.

Head I - Permanent staff

21. (a) The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly includes (see organogram at Appendix I):

- the private office of the President;
- committee services;
- administrative service;
- external relations and information service;
- translations and publications service.

22. (b) Private office of the President. By adopting Amendment 1 to the draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 tabled by Sir Paul Hawkins, the Assembly recognised the need to allow its President, like his colleagues in other European assemblies, to be assisted by a head of the private office. The Council having rejected this proposal, the creation of a permanent Grade A3 post should again be requested in the 1986 budget. The creation of this post would allow a head of the private office to be recruited for the term of office of each President.
23. (c) The committee services include the committees of the Assembly except for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the documentation section.
24. In adopting the budgets of recent financial years, the Assembly expressed the opinion that it would be desirable to strengthen this service by the addition of a Grade A3 official to assist committees according to requirements, draft minutes and replace secretaries in the event of absence.
25. The increase in committee work makes this new post essential and urgent.
26. Moreover, two assistants should be recruited capable of operating word processors : one would be assigned to the assistant to the committee service and the other to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations which has so far had to work in a state of permanent emergency.
27. (d) The reorganisation of the administrative service can no longer be deferred. The preparation and implementation of the budget, accounting and bookkeeping, organising committee meetings, preparing sessions and symposia, financing journeys by the President, rapporteurs and members of the Office of the Clerk, recruiting and paying temporary officials (approximately 500 contracts per year), the administration of the permanent staff and keeping their files, including security files, the organisation of security services and the supervision of general services represent an increased task which cannot be interrupted.
28. To cope with the multiplicity and complexity of these duties, the service, led by one Grade A5 official, has only one Grade B6 chief accountant and a Grade B3 assistant to the head of service.
29. The disproportion between the magnitude of this service's tasks and the staff available is evident. One only has to compare the staff of the ministerial organs of WEU in London and in Paris to see the precarious situation in which this service operates ¹.
30. It is not unimportant to note that the small number of staff assigned to the administrative service of the Assembly does not allow the duties of each official to be defined accurately. The chief accountant and the assistant (Grade B3 shorthand/typist) help each other in all areas without it being possible to make a breakdown of duties in accordance with certain universal principles such as the separation between the duties of accountancy and of bookkeeping.
31. In view of the fact that the growth in the Assembly's activities in all areas is tending to aggravate this situation, it seems important to make provision at least for the creation of a Grade B3 bookkeeping post.
32. Furthermore, if it is considered that the assistant to the head of service has duties extending well beyond the attributions of a bilingual shorthand/typist, it would be only legitimate and fair to make this a Grade B4 post.
33. (e) The press and external relations service and the translations and publications service have asked for no increase in staff at the present juncture. They are able to recruit temporary staff, which is

1. The staff of the administrative services of the ministerial organs in London and in Paris and those of the Assembly are as follows:

	London	Paris	Assembly
Head of division	1 A5	1 A6	1 A5
Head of finance and administrative section		1 A5	
Assistant head of the finance and administrative section		1 A4	
Assistant head of division	1 A3		
Administrator	1 A2		
Chief accountant			1 B6
Accountants	1 B4	3 B4	
Assistant to the head of division	1 B3	1 B4	1 B3
Administrative assistants	1 B4	1 B3	
Assistant accountant		2 B2	
	6	10	3

not the case for committee services and the administrative service for which only permanent officials have the required experience to perform the duties of these services efficiently.

34. (f) In the revision of strengths, it is necessary to ask for the creation of a post of chauffeur to drive the official car.

35. The availability of a chauffeur would allow this car to be used for the President of the Assembly too and, insofar as possible, dispense with the practice of occasionally hiring a chauffeur-driven car which the frequent presence of the President at the seat of the Assembly makes extremely costly.

36. In the explanations relating to the estimates under Sub-Head 22 "Official cars", it is specified that the cost of hiring a car in this way would be not less than F 140,000 per year, which corresponds to the annual salary of a Grade C3 chauffeur.

37. It is also important to note that whereas the Assembly at present has only one car without chauffeur the ministerial organs in Paris have two chauffeurs and two cars and the Secretariat-General in London also has two chauffeurs and two cars.

38. (g) To sum up, estimates of expenditure in the 1986 budget should take account of the following variations in the strength of the Office of the Clerk, which are listed according to the order of priority attributed to each new post:

<i>Creation of new posts</i>		F
First priority:	1 Grade B3 accountant	171,000
Second priority:	1 Grade B3 assistant for the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations	185,000
Third priority:	1 Grade A3 assistant committee secretary	350,000
Fourth priority:	1 Grade B3 assistant to the assistant committee secretary	160,000
Fifth priority:	1 Grade A3 head of the private office	300,000
Sixth priority:	1 Grade C3 chauffeur	140,000

Regrading

Post of assistant to the head of administration from Grade B3 to Grade B4	1,200
	1,307,200

Head II - Temporary staff

39. Assembly Orders 58 and 60, referred to in section 1, have serious financial implications for this head of the budget. Meetings of the body for liaison with the Council provided for in Order 58 and twice-yearly sessions of committees in the capital of one of the member countries mean that teams of interpreters have to be recruited. If it is considered that a full team (two booths, four interpreters) costs between F 10,000 and F 15,000 approximately per day at current rates, depending on whether the interpreters are recruited locally or not (in the latter case, travelling expenses have to be added), it can be seen that implementation of these two orders would require additional sums averaging approximately F 200,000.

40. Estimates under this head also take account of the fact that the sittings and interpretation services have to be strengthened during Assembly sessions because of the large number of meetings of political groups and committees, which has been the case for several sessions.

41. In the 1986 budget, it is therefore proposed to increase the number of interpreters recruited during sessions from twelve to fourteen. The same is true of the security service which is demanding an increase of two in the team of ushers if the security measures now necessary are to be implemented.

42. In addition to this expenditure resulting from the proposed reactivation of WEU, there are the increases in the salaries of temporary staff who, particularly in certain highly-qualified categories (verbatim reporters, précis writers and parliamentary secretaries), represent a very high percentage (12 to 13%). This is due to the policy followed by the co-ordinated organisations which seeks to bring the salaries offered closer to rates on the private market: without this revaluation it would be impossible to recruit such staff.

43. It is expected that the cost of recruiting a documentalist to prepare the brief on European political union would be offset by savings under Sub-Head 8 of this head, provided the creation of the new posts requested in Head I is authorised.

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

44. Estimates under Sub-Heads 10 to 14 of this head are merely a renewal of last year's sums, these being moreover almost entirely under the control of the international secretariat of the SAC, which is responsible for co-ordinating and managing joint expenditure programmes.

45. Conversely, estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17, details of which are given in the three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk given at Appendix IV, show a considerable increase compared with sums granted for 1985.

46. This is due to the fact that the improvement in the Assembly's working conditions, which was the subject of Order 59 referred to in section 1, can be achieved only by modernising the equipment of the Office of the Clerk, together with the revision of its structure as set out in Head I.

47. In this connection, the following considerations illustrate and justify the proposals for new equipment contained in the three-year programme :

48. (a) For its sessions the Assembly has had the benefit of equipment on loan from a few firms free of charge, i.e. :

- from Gestetner: 3 type 309 offset machines;
2 stereotypers for offset;
2 type 2002 and 2006 photocopiers;
- from Rank Xerox: 1 type 1075 photocopier;
- from Canon: 1 type 305 photocopier.

49. However, these firms have informed us that at the present economic juncture it will no longer be possible to provide this equipment free of charge. This difficulty can but make working conditions worse for the reproduction service which is already in difficulty because of the considerable increase in the volume of its work. It is therefore necessary to improve this service's equipment, which at the moment has two offset machines and one stereotyper, by purchasing a third offset machine and a second stereotyper, the first remaining in service as long as its condition allows.

50. (b) It has been proved that the word-processing equipment obtained last year meets our requirements from the standpoint of efficiency and cost. It is not without importance to underline that the hire of five word processors has, as expected, allowed considerable savings to be made, easily covering the cost of their hire.

51. The system must now be completed by the purchase of three more word processors, thus allowing other types of work to be computerised and further savings to be made in the cost of printing documents.

52. It should be possible to save about F 100,000 and this sum has been deducted from printing costs under the following head.

53. The cost of purchasing these three word processors is included in the three-year programme (F 290,000). Should this seem too much for a single financial year, the leasing method used for the first five word processors might be adopted, which would involve an annual expenditure of F 85,000 for five years.

54. (c) The conversion of three electronic typewriters (for the private office of the President, the secretariat of the Clerk and the secretariat of the Head of Administration) into an electronic screen system would be desirable to facilitate the work of the assistants concerned when preparing the many documents emanating from their respective secretariats.

55. (d) The acquisition of a personal computer with wages and bookkeeping software is the only way to adapt the accounting service (which includes only one person at the present time) to the growing requirements of the Assembly. This computer was already requested in the 1985 budget.

56. (e) As matters now stand, the Assembly can provide the temporary services during sessions with only seventeen electric typewriters which are very old models and the number of which is diminishing since, no longer being on the market, they can no longer be repaired. The Office of the Clerk is there-

fore obliged to provide temporary staff with very old mechanical typewriters which are kept mainly to allow secretarial work to be continued in the event of electricity cuts.

57. No longer familiar with the use of such machines, temporary staff are constantly asking for machines of better performance in order to ease their work and make it more efficient. It therefore seems essential to replace these machines progressively with effect from 1986.

58. (f) Another problem which is raised repeatedly is the installation of a telex. A telex is made available to members of the Assembly during sessions but the Office of the Clerk is not equipped with one. In spite of the unfavourable opinion given by the Budget Committee in London, the general advantages of such an installation cannot be denied, as has been pointed out by many parliamentarians. It therefore seems essential to make provision for installing a telex in the Office of the Clerk in 1986.

59. (g) Finally, it has become urgent to replace certain office furniture. First and foremost provision should be made for purchasing furniture meeting the correct medically-agreed working conditions for assistants using word processors.

Head IV - General administrative costs

60. Estimates under this head call for the following remarks :

61. (a) An increase of F 100,000 in the estimate for Sub-Head 18 is proposed to meet the growing volume of all forms of communication, particularly by telex, whose installation is requested in 1986.

62. (b) In spite of the increase in the volume of work, estimates for the purchase of paper and other office supplies have risen very little due to the trend of prices in this sector. This is possible thanks to the use of more rational methods of work aimed at reducing paper consumption.

63. (c) The cost of printing and publishing documents is affected by the brief on the political union of Europe to be prepared in 1986 in accordance with the decision of the Presidential Committee, as indicated in section 1.

64. However, up to F 100,000 of the cost of printing this brief, estimated at F 150,000, can be offset by savings which it will be possible to make in printing costs thanks to the purchase of three new word processors.

65. Compared with 1985, there is therefore an average increase of 9% in the estimate under this sub-head (paper and labour), plus F 50,000 for the publication mentioned above.

66. (d) The recruitment of a chauffeur allows the lowest possible estimate under Sub-Head 22 "Official cars", including the cost of repairs, garage, petrol, etc., for the official car. As indicated in the explanations to Head IV, if the recruitment of a chauffeur is not authorised, sums under this sub-head will have to be increased by F 140,000 to allow a chauffeur-driven car to be hired for the President when he is present in the Paris offices.

Head V - Other expenditure

67. As indicated in the analysis of expenditure under Head II, Assembly Orders 58 and 60 have serious financial implications for the interpretation service and also affect estimates under Sub-Head 27 since the new programme of work of the Assembly bodies necessarily requires the availability of sums allowing members of the Office of the Clerk to attend committee sessions and meetings of the committee for relations with the Council which are not held in Paris.

68. To this end, sums requested in 1986 for official travel are F 140,000 higher than those granted in 1985, which represents a strict assessment of requirements in the light of the increase in travelling and per diem allowances.

69. An increase of F 50,000 in sums requested for the expenses of experts is due to the fact that the kind of study to be conducted in the context of the reactivation of WEU is expected to require greater recourse to experts in the various areas of defence policy, armaments control and disarmament.

70. Finally, there are considerable increases in estimates for the travelling expenses of the President of the Assembly, committee chairmen and rapporteurs (F 100,000), the expenses of political groups (F 100,000) and representation expenses (F 50,000).

71. Your Rapporteur considers that the activities of the Assembly bodies which are likely to increase in the context of the reactivation of WEU - to which there have been many references in this explanatory memorandum - fully justify these increases which, moreover, represent the minimum essential for exercising such activities.

2.3. Analysis of receipts

72. The greater interest being shown by the mass media and public towards WEU since the Rome declaration augur wider circulation of WEU Assembly publications. Estimates under "Sale of publications" for 1986 are therefore double those of last year.

73. Estimates for other types of receipts are based on provisions in force and on experience.

2.4. Summary of estimates

74. A summary of operating budget estimates for 1986 (expenditure and receipts) is given at Appendix V.

75. In this table an indication is given of the proportion of total expenditure and the net total (expenditure less receipts) represented by each head of the budget. For comparison, data relating to the 1985 budget are given in the same table.

3. Pensions budget

3.1. Analysis of expenditure

76. Estimated expenditure on pensions in 1986, taking into account the same changes in scales as for permanent staff, is higher than for the previous financial year because of the retirement of two Grade A officials.

77. Moreover, foreseeable expenditure for 1985 will exceed estimates because of the payment of a leaving allowance to an official who resigned during the year.

78. Appendix VI to this budget shows the foreseeable trend of expenditure on pensions for the next five years, based on the age of staff. It can be seen that this expenditure is fully covered until 1987 by staff contributions (7%) and theoretical WEU contributions (14%), which are not included in the budget.

79. As from 1988, expenditure will exceed receipts, but it is logical to bear in mind the sums reimbursed to member states for validation of past service and it can be considered that the administration of pensions will be positive for several years to come.

3.2. Analysis of receipts

80. Receipts in the budget come from the serving staff's contributions to the pension scheme, calculated at the rate of 7% of basic salaries.

*Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts
for the financial year 1986*

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
PART I Operating budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	10,877,000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	3,036,400	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1,909,100	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2,420,500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	1,718,300	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		404,000
	19,961,300	404,000
NET TOTAL		19,557,300
	19,961,300	19,961,300
PART II Pensions budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	940,000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		476,000
	940,000	476,000
NET TOTAL		464,000
	940,000	940,000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		20,021,300

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of scales in force on 1st January 1985², adjusted in accordance with the following expected increase :

4.5% as from 1st July 1985 (this adjustment taking account of the foreseeable rate of inflation and the effects of the variation in economic parity between France and Belgium),

5% as from 1st July 1986.

No adjustment is provided for in respect of the first half of 1986 since the foreseeable increase in the cost of living for that period is less than 3%. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 690,000.

A list of staff of the Office of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix II. This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with the financial year 1985. Justification for these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)³;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)⁴;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Sub-Head 4

As can be seen from the sub-heads concerned, the sum requested is to cover the cost of recruiting new staff. Under "Removal expenses", account has been taken of the fact that one of the two Grade A officials due to retire in 1986 will be leaving Paris.

In the column "Expected expenditure in 1985" has been included the sum paid to a Grade B official who left the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to take up a similar post in the Secretariat-General in London.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

2. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the Councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the committee's 159th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report).

3. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

4. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has nominated.

Head II - Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1986	Sums authorised for 1985	Expected expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly			
6.1. Sittings service 1,079,000			
6.2. Interpretation service 389,000			
6.3. Translation service 790,000			
6.4. Other services <u>50,000</u>			
	2,308,000	1,850,000	1,820,000
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	560,000	350,000	350,000
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	60,000	60,000	80,000
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges			
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 4,200			
9.2. Provident fund for interpre- ters 100,000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters <u>4,200</u>			
	108,400	89,800	86,400
TOTAL OF HEAD II.....	3,036,400	2,349,800	2,336,400

Explanations

Sub-Head 6

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III. As specified in the explanatory memorandum, two additional interpreters and two additional ushers will be recruited for sessions. Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1985 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, i.e.:

4.5% increase as from 1st July 1984;

5% increase for 1985.

These adjustments amount to F 135,000.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for Grade L4.8 staff, plus 6%.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, roneo staff, etc.).

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on a total of 200 working days (of which 120 in Paris and 80 elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1986 amounts to F 30,000.

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1986. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.

Although exceptional expenditure due to the temporary recruitment for two months of a documentalist to prepare the brief on "The political union of Europe" is included under this sub-head, the sum requested is the same as in 1985 since it is expected that fewer staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new posts of assistant and one new post of accountant, requested under Head I.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. Two-thirds of premiums are paid by the Office of the Clerk and one-third by the interpreters.

Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1986	Sums authorised for 1985	Expected expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	470,000	430,000	430,000
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms	15,000	15,000	4,200
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	340,000	315,000	320,000
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organisation of sessions	45,000	27,000	40,000
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15,000	15,000	12,000
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture	79,500	10,000	10,000
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	594,800	75,000	57,000
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	349,800	272,000	260,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III.....	1,909,100	1,159,000	1,133,200

Explanations

Sub-Head 10

Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises. They include the fixed annual sum of F 30,000 which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as its share of the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard.

The international secretariat of the SAC is responsible for co-ordinating and managing the programme for such expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, the ACA 45% and the SAC 25%.

Sub-Head 11

Outside Paris, Assembly committees normally meet in committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases it is to be expected that the Assembly will have to pay for the hire of a room or the cost of installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to cover such expenditure if necessary.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services and of the hire of metal-detecting equipment necessary for improving security measures.

Sub-Head 13

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social Council, etc.).

Estimates are based on expenditure in the financial year 1985 and take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services.

Sub-Head 14

The same sum is requested for 1986 as for 1985 to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum.

Head IV - General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1986	Sums authorised for 1985	Expected expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	580,000	480,000	440,000
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	260,000	238,000	240,000
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of documents	1,490,000	1,138,000	1,310,000
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents	50,000	44,800	44,000
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars	40,000	60,000	60,000
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges	500	500	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2,420,500	2,141,300	2,094,500

Explanations

Sub-Head 18

The increase of F 100,000 as compared with 1984 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation of 5%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in the Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communication. Moreover, expenditure relating to the use of a telex in 1986 will be charged to this sub-head.

Sub-Head 19

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the purchase of a third offset machine, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1985 is slight and is mainly due to the variation of prices in this sector.

Sub-Head 20

Estimates under this sub-head take into account:

- the cost (F 150,000) of printing the brief on "The political union of Europe;" (see explanatory memorandum);
- foreseeable variations in prices for this category of expenditure (9%).

However, the purchase of three new word processors in addition to those already in service will allow estimated savings of F 100,000 to be made in the cost of printing documents. It should be recalled that in 1985 sums under this sub-head were already reduced by F 155,000 thanks to the lease of five word processors and adoption of a computerised system of printing the documents of the three political committees.

Sub-Head 21

The increase of 12% corresponds to the increase in the INSEE index for books and newspapers for the most recent twelve-month period known at the time this budget was drawn up and to changes in exchange rates for publications purchased outside France.

Sub-Head 22

Compared with 1985, estimates under this sub-head are much lower due to the fact that the recruitment of a chauffeur, requested under Head I, will allow the official Assembly car to be made available to the President in normal conditions. Should this recruitment not be authorised, estimates under this sub-head will have to be increased by F 140,000 to allow a chauffeur-driven car to be hired when the President is present at the Assembly (estimate: 2 days per week, i.e. F 3,500 × 40 weeks = F 140,000).

Sums requested will be used for foreseeable repairs to the official car, insurance, garage, petrol, etc.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V - Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1986	Sums authorised for 1985	Expected expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	239,000	139,000	110,000
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation	210,000	160,000	170,000
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions	3,300	3,300	700
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	450,000	310,000	434,000
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor	120,000	70,000	70,000
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information	300,000	275,000	260,000
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups	373,000	273,000	273,000
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000	3,000	-
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes	20,000	20,000	10,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V.....	1,718,300	1,253,300	1,327,700

Explanations

Sub-Head 24

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by governments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1986 (see explanatory memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 25

The increase of F 50,000 compared with the 1985 budget is due to the rise in the cost of meals in restaurants in the Paris area and to greater requirements due to the increased activities of the various Assembly organs.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study missions.

On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year.

Sub-Head 27

The increase in sums requested for 1986 compared with last year is justified by:

- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1985 (211th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts) and the increase in the cost of air travel, amounting on average to 11%;
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the Office of the Clerk to organise meetings and visits of the various Assembly committees. It should be noted that for the same reasons the Assembly will probably have to present a supplementary budget in 1985.

Sub-Head 28

It is to be expected that the type of studies to be carried out in the framework of the reactivation of WEU will require greater recourse to experts in the various aspects of defence policy, armaments control and disarmament. An increase of F 50,000 in estimates under this sub-head is therefore requested.

Sub-Head 29

The increase of 8.75% over sums granted in 1985 is an average between the 6.5% increase in the cost of representation and the 11% increase in travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 30

The Assembly's increased activities have repercussions on estimates for the expenditure of political groups. An increase of F 100,000 is considered necessary, including an increase due to the effect of the rate of inflation.

Sub-Head 31

There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1985.

Sub-Head 32

The same amount is requested as in 1985.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B - Receipts

	Estimates for 1986	Budget for 1985	Expected receipts in 1985
Sale of publications	110,000	50,000	70,000
Bank interest	250,000	250,000	250,000
Social security reimbursements	8,000	8,000	65,000
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials	36,000	150,000	67,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS.....	404,000	458,000	452,000

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calculated on the basis of experience.

The amount of the levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials has been calculated at the rate of 1.5% of such salaries up to 30th June 1986 in accordance with the 203rd report of the Co-ordinating Committee, approved by the WEU Council on 3rd July 1985.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A - Expenditure**Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1986	Sums authorised for 1985	Expected expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving allowances			
1.1. Retirement pensions	630,000		
1.2. Invalidity pensions	192,000		
1.3. Survivors' pensions	46,000		
1.4. Orphans' or dependants pensions	-		
1.5. Leaving allowances	-		
	868,000	626,500	680,000
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances			
2.1. Household allowances	27,000		
2.2. Children's and other depen- dants' allowances	24,000		
2.3. Education allowances	5,000		
	56,000	45,000	45,000
Sub-Head 3 - Supplementary insurance	16,000	12,000	11,500
TOTAL OF HEAD I	940,000	683,500	736,500

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

In 1986, the Assembly will be paying six pensions, as follows:

- four old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules and take into account the date on which two new pensions will become payable in 1986.

In 1985, a leaving allowance was paid for which provision had not been made in the budget estimates for 1985 and this led to excess expenditure under Sub-Head 1.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 *bis* of the collective convention in force.

Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

Section B: Receipts


	Estimates for 1986	Budget for 1985	Expected receipts in 1985
1. Contributions by permanent officials	476,000	341,000	380,000
	476,000	341,000	380,000

Explanations

Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary).

APPENDIX I

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly



* New post requested.
 1 Duties provisionally exercised by the Clerk.
 2 Duties provisionally exercised by Mrs. Amory

APPENDIX II

*Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk
proposed in the 1986 budget*

Grade	Duties	1986 budget	1985 budget	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Senior counsellor	1	1	-
A5	Counsellors	4	4	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
A3	Secretaries	3	1	+ 2
A2	Translators	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Personal assistants	5	4	+ 1 ¹
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	7	6	+ 1
B3	Accountant	1	-	+ 1
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
C3	Chauffeur	1	-	+ 1
		33	27	+ 6

1. Regrading of a B3 post.

APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly.....	1 a	16	1,211	19,376	41,174
	1 b	18	1,211	21,798	
Heads of sections.....	1 a	10	861	8,610	48,678
	1 b	12	1,113	13,356	
	1 a	10	1,113	11,130	
	1 b	14	1,113	15,582	
Sergeant-at-arms.....	1 b	12	989	11,868	11,868
Parliamentary secretaries.....	3 a	10	723	21,690	45,090
	2 b	12	975	23,400	
Précis writers.....	3 a	10	737	22,110	57,714
	3 b	12	989	35,604	
Verbatim reporters.....	7 a	10	989	69,230	223,514
	13 b	12	989	154,284	
Assistants.....	10 a	10	329	32,900	293,300
	1 a	18	329	5,922	
	1 a	22	329	7,238	
	1 a	10	378	3,780	
	1 b	16	581	9,296	
	2 b	14	581	16,268	
	28 b	12	581	195,216	
Head ushers.....	3 b	12	630	22,680	6,842
	1 a	10	311	3,110	
Ushers.....	1 a	12	311	3,732	73,128
	8 a	10	282	22,560	
	1 a	12	282	3,384	
	1 a	14	282	3,948	
	1 a	12	311	3,732	
	1 a	24	311	7,464	
Offset-assemblers.....	5 b	12	534	32,040	28,200
	10 a	10	282	28,200	
	114	388			829,508
Adjustment for 1986.....					59,000
					888,508
Travelling expenses.....					190,000
					1,078,508
Rounded up to					1,079,000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st January 1985.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	8 a	10	347,000
	6 b	12	
	14		347,000
	Adjustment for 1986		25,000
			372,000
	Travelling expenses		17,000
			389,000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st January 1985, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2,127.55. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimate ¹	Total F
Revisers	3 a	861	77,490	245,850
	4 b	1,403	168,360	
Translators	3 a	688	61,920	237,270
	5 b	1,169	175,350	
Assistants	6 a	329	78,960	229,320
	2 a	378	30,240	
	3 b	581	69,720	
	2 b	630	50,400	
	28		712,440	712,440
	Adjustment for 1986			50,654
				763,094
	Travelling expenses			26,000
				789,094
			Rounded up to	790,000

1. Based on 30 days for revisers and translators and 40 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX IV

Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk*(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1986	1987	1988
	<i>A. Reproduction equipment</i>				
1	1 RX 1045 photocopier	Hire (blocked rate): F 1,713 per month Maintenance (indexed rate): F 2,000 per month in 1985.	45,000	45,000	45,000
2	1 RX 3107 photocopier	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance (indexed rate): F 1,614 per quarter in 1985.	6,500	6,500	6,500
3	3 Gestetner offset machines	1 type 311, purchased in 1984: maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 329, purchased in 1985: maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 329, purchase price maintenance (indexed rate).	6,500 4,000 65,000 4,000	6,500 4,000 4,000	6,500 4,000 4,000
4	2 Gestetner electrostatic stereotypers	1 Gestetner PM9: purchase of a new offset machine means it will remain in use as long as possible and the maintenance contract will therefore be extended (indexed rate). 1 Gestetner OE 3: purchase price maintenance (indexed rate).	1,200 69,000 3,700	1,200 3,700	1,200 3,700
5	1 Gestetner 100 binding machine	Purchased in 1978, this machine is still in good condition and it will be possible to use it for another five years, until the current maintenance contract expires (indexed rate).	1,100	1,100	1,100
6	1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapling machine	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required. Since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant, the expediency of continuing this form of maintenance is being examined. The estimate is based on experience.	3,500	3,500	3,500
7	1 AM International addressograph	This machine is on hire for a five-year period which began on 1st July 1981. Maintenance is included in the cost of hire. The expediency of renewing the contract when it expires on 30th June 1986 is being examined.	18,000	18,000	18,000
8	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	700	700	700
9	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Purchased in 1964 } These machines are in good working order and no maintenance contract seems necessary. Purchased in 1974 }			
10	1 Orpo-Thermomatic binding machine				
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>				
	<i>(a) Office of the Clerk</i>				
11	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriter	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in very good condition. (Two of them will be converted into ETV 300 word processors.) (Cf. 26 ter below.)			

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets																	
			1986	1987	1988															
12	1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in very good condition. Like the two mentioned above, it will be converted into an ETV 300 word processor. (Cf. 26 ter below.)																		
13	4 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (2 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	This is a very old model which is no longer repairable, not having been on the market for some time. These typewriters will remain in service as long as they are usable, but it is to be expected that they will have to be replaced in the very near future. (Cf. 18 bis below.)																		
14	2 IBM electric typewriters (1 with an English keyboard and 1 with a French keyboard)	These are in poor condition and should therefore be replaced. (Cf. 18 bis below.)																		
15	3 Olivetti calculating machines	Two of these machines were purchased between 1968 and 1979 and are in good working order. To meet the growing needs of the Administration Service, a third should be purchased.	1,800																	
	<i>(b) For use during sessions</i>																			
16	4 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (1 with an English keyboard and 3 with French keyboards)	These typewriters are the same model as those under 13 above. They are assigned to national delegations and need replacing as they can no longer be repaired. (Cf. 18 bis below.)																		
17	4 IBM electric typewriters (2 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	These typewriters are the same model as those under 14 above. They are assigned to national delegations and political groups and need replacing. (Cf. 18 bis below.)																		
18	3 Olivetti Editor electric typewriters (with Italian keyboards)	Purchased secondhand in 1980, these typewriters are assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters. They need replacing. (Cf. 18 bis below.)																		
18 bis		Replacement of 17 typewriters under 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18 above at a rate of 4 per year for 3 years and 5 in 1989.	24,000	24,000	24,000															
19	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters (19 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep the best of them in reserve in case of electricity cuts.																		
20	Electronic typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, and subject to the purchase of the 17 typewriters mentioned in 18 bis above, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session:																		
		<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>1986</th> <th>1987</th> <th>1988</th> <th>1989</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>English keyboards</td> <td>14</td> <td>12</td> <td>10</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>French keyboards</td> <td>13</td> <td>11</td> <td>9</td> <td>7</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		1986	1987	1988	1989	English keyboards	14	12	10	7	French keyboards	13	11	9	7			
	1986	1987	1988	1989																
English keyboards	14	12	10	7																
French keyboards	13	11	9	7																
		<table border="1"> <tbody> <tr> <td>English keyboards</td> <td>14,900</td> <td>12,750</td> <td>10,600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>French keyboards</td> <td>13,000</td> <td>11,000</td> <td>9,000</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	English keyboards	14,900	12,750	10,600	French keyboards	13,000	11,000	9,000										
English keyboards	14,900	12,750	10,600																	
French keyboards	13,000	11,000	9,000																	
		The rates indicated relate to electronic typewriters, the electric ones hired until now no longer being available.																		

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1986	1987	1988
21	<i>(c) Maintenance and repairs</i>	All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for this purpose. Moreover, a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	6,000	7,000	7,000
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>				
22	2 UHER 5000 dictaphones	Purchased in 1971 and 1980, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1986-88.			
23	11 Grundig Stenorette dictaphones	Purchased between 1963 and 1983, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1986-88.			
24	1 Grandjean stenotyping machine	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order. It is planned to keep it in use for the next five years.			
25		Overall estimate for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4,000	5,000	5,000
25 bis	Telex	Hire.	20,000	20,000	20,000
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>				
26	5 Olivetti ETS 2010 word processors with 4 printers	These have been hired on a five-year quarterly leasing basis. Indexed maintenance contract.	132,700 30,000	132,700 30,000	132,700 30,000
26 bis	3 Olivetti ETS 2010 word processors with printers	It is planned to purchase these machines to complete the system indicated in 26 above. Indexed maintenance contract.	290,000 14,000	18,500	18,500
26 ter	3 Olivetti ETV 300 word processors	These include the conversion of 3 electronic typewriters assigned to the secretariat of the President, the Clerk and the Head of Administration. Indexed maintenance contract. Training courses.	90,000 13,000 6,000	13,000	13,000
27	1 personal computer with "wages" and "bookkeeping" software	This purchase was already proposed in 1985 in order to modernise the administration service. Indexed maintenance contract.	55,000 2,000	7,000	7,000
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>				
28	Various offices	Purchase, already proposed in 1985, of 5 "computer" desks for committee assistants using word processors. It is planned to purchase 5 others in 1987.	35,000	35,000	
29	Various offices	Replacement of furniture already proposed in 1985.	20,000		
30	Various offices	Replacement of other furniture.	8,000	12,000	8,000
31	Swivel armchairs and easy chairs	Some were reupholstered in 1985 and the rest should be done in 1986.	8,000		
32	Metal cupboards	Purchase of two cupboards.	4,000		
33	Metal filing cabinets	Purchase of two filing cabinets for the archives.	4,500		

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets		
Head	Sub-head		1986	1987	1988
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	28	35,000	35,000	
		29	20,000		
		30	8,000	12,000	8,000
		31	8,000		
		32	4,000		
		33	4,500		
				79,500	47,000
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	3	65,000		
		4	69,000		
		15	1,800		
		18 bis	24,000	24,000	24,000
		26 bis	290,000		
		26 ter	90,000		
		27	55,000		
		594,800	24,000	24,000	
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1	45,000	45,000	45,000
		2	6,500	6,500	6,500
		3	14,500	14,500	14,500
		4	4,900	4,900	4,900
		5	1,100	1,100	1,100
		6	3,500	3,500	3,500
		7	18,000	18,000	18,000
		8	700	700	700
		20	27,900	23,750	19,600
		21	6,000	7,000	7,000
		25	4,000	4,000	4,000
		25 bis	20,000	20,000	20,000
		26	162,700	162,700	162,700
		26 bis	14,000	18,500	18,500
		26 ter	19,000	13,000	13,000
27	2,000	7,000	7,000		
		349,800	350,150	346,000	

APPENDIX V

*Comparison between the various budget heads and total amounts
in the 1985 and 1986 budgets**(percentage)*

	1985			1986		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
EXPENDITURE						
I. Permanent staff	8,725,000	55.83	57.51	10,877,000	54.49	55.62
II. Temporary staff	2,349,800	15.03	15.49	3,036,400	15.21	15.52
III. Premises and equipment	1,159,000	7.42	7.64	1,909,100	9.56	9.76
IV. General administrative costs	2,141,300	13.70	14.11	2,420,500	12.13	12.38
V. Other expenditure	1,253,300	8.02	8.26	1,718,300	8.61	8.78
TOTAL A (expenditure)	15,628,400	100	103.01	19,961,300	100	102.06
RECEIPTS	458,000		- 3.01	404,000		- 2.06
TOTAL B (net)	15,170,400		100	19,557,300		100

APPENDIX VI

Foreseeable trend of pensions in the period 1986-90*(calculated in accordance with 1986 scales)*

Grade	Basic salary	No. of monthly contributions taken into account	% of salary	Pensions				
				1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
A6	} Pensions already being paid			322,000	322,000	322,000	322,000	322,000
A3				224,000	224,000	224,000	224,000	224,000
B4				136,000	136,000	136,000	136,000	136,000
C1				46,500	46,500	46,500	46,500	46,500
A6	452,462	306	61	149,000	298,000	298,000	298,000	298,000
A4	359,220	333	65.5	60,000	240,000	240,000	240,000	240,000
A5	423,667	325	64.16			270,000	295,000	295,000
A5	423,667	402	70			325,000	325,000	325,000
Employees' contributions				937,500	1,266,500	1,861,500	1,886,500	1,886,500
Theoretical WEU contribution				1,428,000	1,428,000	1,428,000	1,428,000	1,428,000
Difference				+ 491,500	+ 162,500	- 433,500	- 458,500	- 458,500

APPENDIX VII

*Trend of the real increase in Assembly budgets
for the financial years 1983-86*

Financial year	Total	Nominal increase (%)	Inflation rate (%)	Real increase
<i>(a) Total expenditure (operating budget)</i>				
1983	14,095,000	-		
1984	14,656,200	3.98	7.4	- 3.42
1985	15,628,400	6.63	6.5	+ 0.13
1986	19,961,300	27.72	5	+ 22.72
				+ 19.43
<i>(b) Net total (operating budget)</i>				
1983	13,990,000	-		
1984	14,426,200	3.11	7.4	- 4.29
1985	15,170,400	5.15	6.5	- 1.35
1986	19,557,300	28.91	5	+ 23.91
				+ 18.27

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1984 AND 1985 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur*

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on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1984 and 1985

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submitted by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur

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- VI. Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1981

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase, Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Biefnot, Bohl, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Mitterdorfer), Foschi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster, Morris, Oehler, Pollodoro, Rauti, Schmitz, Stokes (Alternate: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial years 1984 and 1985***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter ;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents ;
- (iii) Considering that :
 - (a) the new structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional reform announced in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984;
 - (b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are merely a renewal of the budget for 1983;
 - (c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis;
 - (d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth was applied;
 - (e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expenditure instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision on this matter.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur)

I. Preliminary considerations

1. Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly states that :

“ The Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated. ”

To this end, a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is responsible for presenting a report which has to be technical since only budgetary and administrative questions are the responsibility of this committee.

At the present juncture, during the period in which the ministerial organs of WEU are being reshaped and the budgetary implications of which will be impossible to assess before 1986, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration considered it should submit a single report to the Assembly dealing with the 1984 and 1985 budgets.

II. Aspects of the 1984 and 1985 budgets

2. Further to its responsibilities, last year the committee studied the budget of the ministerial organs for 1983 on a cost-effectiveness basis in order to ascertain that their tasks were fulfilled in the most efficient and economical manner.

Conversely, the 1984 and 1985 budgets cannot be studied from the same angle since in application of the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence in Rome in October 1984 and as indicated in paragraph 1 the structure of the ministerial organs is being completely revised to adapt it to their new tasks in the framework of the reactivation of Western European Union.

3. To obtain more specific indications about this revision, your Rapporteur met the Secretary-General of Western European Union in London on 7th February 1985. He confirmed that the WEU budgets for 1984 and 1985 were merely a renewal of the 1983 budget and did not therefore reflect the new structure and work of the ministerial organs. Furthermore, their tasks have not yet been defined and relevant studies are being continued. The WEU Council of Ministers will probably be informed of the conclusions of these studies in the course of 1985.

On the basis of the decisions then taken it is possible that a revised budget will be drawn up for 1985 setting out the means necessary for the various ministerial organs of WEU in the framework of their new structure.

Even that budget will inevitably be an interim one. It will depend on the estimates of requirements for 1986 in terms of the organisation's new duties and reorganisational costs themselves which will certainly involve changes in the structure of staff.

4. *Rebus sic stantibus*, the present report can but take note of this quite exceptional situation in which no valid opinion could be given on the 1984 and 1985 budgets of the ministerial organs.

III. Action taken on Recommendation 409

5. Your Rapporteur feels he should take this opportunity however of mentioning Recommendation 409 on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1983 in order to ascertain its present validity in the light of the new trends set out in the Rome declaration.

The WEU Council sent the Assembly its reply to this recommendation on 26th September 1984. It was an interim reply preceding the Rome declaration and announcing measures to be taken but without specifying the type and scope of these measures.

6. The first paragraph of the recommendation referred to the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating joint services. Clearly no final answer can be given immediately on this matter, but the Secretary-General mentioned to your Rapporteur the serious difficulties standing in the way of such a merger, be it accomplished in London or in Paris.

Indeed, the problem of a suitable seat would arise since neither the present seat in London nor the one in Paris could accommodate all the organs of WEU, even taking account of the effects of integrating joint services.

At the present economic juncture, which as everyone knows is having severe repercussions on the WEU budgets, it would be unrealistic to contemplate such a solution. In addition, it should also be recalled that some members of the staff might not be able to re-locate which would give them the right to indemnities for loss of job and this would prove to be a

heavy burden for the budgets of the bodies concerned. Your Rapporteur realises that these considerations are well founded, but in spite of the complexity of uniting the two seats it would seem essential to examine closely every facet so that the governments, and in particular those of the two host countries, will be able to reach their decision, which is fundamentally political, when the time comes.

7. On staff policy, the principle of flexibility recommended by the Assembly seems to have been adopted already. Here, most of the posts which have become vacant recently in the ministerial organs have not been filled pending the restructuring of these organs and new appointments have been made on the basis of fixed-term contracts. This practice can but be encouraged. This is also in conformity with the present trend in all the co-ordinated organisations which, through fixed-term recruiting, are trying to avoid staff becoming ossified. It is considered preferable to recruit national officials for a given task for a specific and relatively short period who then return to their national administrations. Moreover, permanent contracts lead to pensions which, because of the system chosen, destabilise the budget and, consequently, the contributions to be paid by the governments.

8. The separation of the operating budget from the pensions budget for the application of the zero growth criterion has not yet been agreed to by all the governments. When the various budgets of WEU for 1985 (including that of the Assembly) were being discussed, some delegations wished this growth rate to be applied to all the budgets. It is to be noted however that at meetings held in Paris on 31st January and 1st February 1985, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee decided to examine this question.

Your Rapporteur can but refer to the arguments presented by Mr. de Vries in his report on the budget of the ministerial organs for the financial year 1983 and emphasise the need to apply this criterion only to the operating budgets so as to avoid, in the future, the various organs of WEU being obliged to reduce their activities in order to compensate for the cost of pensions, which rises steadily as staff members retire (cf. Appendix VI).

To apply zero growth to the whole budget, including pensions, is not commensurate with the system chosen for paying pensions as they become due. The situation would have been different if a system of insurance based on annual payments had been chosen. It would have been normal for such payments to have been part of the operating budget. Conversely, since the present system has been adopted, actual expenditure is irregular and may rise or

fall sharply due, for instance, to the unexpected death of an official or pensioner.

Your Rapporteur therefore believes the choice of system makes it imperative to separate the operating budget from the pensions budget.

9. It is not unimportant to underline that the application of zero growth to the total budget inevitably leads to a progressive reduction of resources in real terms and consequently to an enforced reduction in the work of the WEU bodies. In practice, this growth rate is equal to or even lower than the increase recorded in the general index of consumer prices calculated on the basis of price variations of a broad spectrum of articles which do not include certain items and services which appear in the WEU budget. Prices for the latter vary considerably depending on market conditions. Paper is a good example since its cost increased in 1984 by 25% to 30%, mainly due to the rising dollar exchange rate.

In conclusion, while respecting the principle of zero growth, it would be desirable to change the way it is applied. Your Rapporteur believes that if the work of WEU is to be safeguarded in real terms appropriate budgetary adjustments should be adopted for different categories of expenditure and rates of inflation applicable to each of these categories calculated in accordance with official indices.

It is interesting to recall that this procedure is already followed by the OECD which is an authority in economic and financial matters.

10. On staff policy, in its reply to the Assembly's Recommendation 409, the Council said that "the position of the combined staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations has improved considerably". In 1984, machinery for consultation and conciliation was set up by joint agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the representatives of the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations of the Co-ordinated Organisations (CPAPOC). This constitutes a significant improvement in relations between the two parties concerned. In view of its interest, a document from the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General summarising the mechanism for consultation and conciliation and the background to this question is appended to the present report.

Regarding the "feasibility study on comparison of duties, grades and levels of remuneration in the co-ordinated organisations, other international organisations, certain civil services and certain private sector firms", mentioned in paragraph 8 of the report by Mr. de Vries, a preliminary draft report to the Councils was drawn up in September 1984 by the Co-

ordinating Committee of government budget experts. In this report, it is proposed that the study in question be entrusted to a private firm whose terms of reference would be agreed by the Council. This study will certainly be of great value since it will cover all problems connected

with the status of staff and particularly career prospects.

The committee wishes the Council's decisions on these questions to be communicated to the Assembly as soon as possible.

APPENDIX I

*WEU budget estimates for 1984**Proposed expenditure and income
for the total budget*

	Section A	Section B	Section C	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
<i>Expenditure</i>				
Salaries and allowances	1,276,880	10,417,800	22,105,300	32,523,100
Travel	30,305	180,600	747,900	928,500
Other operating costs	202,730	720,950	1,068,850	1,789,800
Purchase of furniture and equipment ..	12,030	31,000	61,500	92,500
Building	-	25,000	45,000	70,000
Total ordinary costs	1,521,945	11,375,350	24,028,550	35,403,900
Pensions costs	111,935	1,507,130	3,802,300	5,309,430
TOTAL for all costs	1,633,880	12,882,480	27,830,850	40,713,330
<i>Income</i>				
WEU tax	475,490	3,560,100	7,612,200	11,172,300
Other receipts	42,530	182,000	396,500	578,500
Total ordinary receipts	518,020	3,742,100	8,008,700	11,750,800
Pension receipts	46,670	301,000	696,000	997,000
TOTAL for all receipts	564,690	4,043,100	8,704,700	12,747,800
NET TOTAL (whole budget) ¹	1,069,190	8,839,380	19,126,150	27,965,530
Budget surplus 1982 (-)	107,733	300,574	522,080	822,654
Contributions required in 1984 *	961,457	8,538,806	18,604,070	27,142,876
1. Difference 1984/1983	- 2.47 %	+ 4.66 %	+ 13.07 %	+ 10.27 %

*Contributions **

	600ths	£	Francs
Belgium	59	94,543.27	2,669,049.47
France	120	192,291.40	5,428,575.20
Germany	120	192,291.40	5,428,575.20
Italy	120	192,291.40	5,428,575.20
Luxembourg	2	3,204.86	90,476.26
Netherlands	59	94,543.27	2,669,049.47
United Kingdom	120	192,291.40	5,428,575.20
	600	961,457.00	27,142,876.00

APPENDIX II

WEU budget estimates for 1985*Proposed expenditure and income
for the total budget*

	Section A	Section B	Section C	TOTAL B + C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
<i>Expenditure</i>				
Salaries and allowances	1,296,910	11,206,900	23,729,650	34,936,550
Travel	39,750	174,400	550,500	724,900
Other operating costs	212,600	760,790	1,115,090	1,875,880
Purchase of furniture and equipment ..	2,720	22,500	73,900	96,400
Building	-	25,000	45,000	70,000
Total ordinary costs	1,551,980	12,189,590	25,514,140	37,703,730
Pensions costs	137,890	1,611,100	4,747,500	6,358,600
TOTAL for all costs	1,689,870	13,800,690	30,261,640	44,062,330
<i>Income</i>				
WEU tax	486,840	3,922,500	8,241,700	12,164,200
Other receipts	43,620	234,500	528,900	763,400
Total ordinary receipts	530,460	4,157,000	8,770,600	12,927,600
Pensions receipts	48,200	329,000	751,600	1,080,600
TOTAL for all receipts	578,660	4,486,000	9,522,200	14,008,200
NET TOTAL (whole budget) ¹	1,111,210	9,314,690	20,739,440	30,054,130
Budget surplus 1983 (-)	109,983	1,193,033	698,757	1,891,790
Contributions required in 1985 *	1,001,227	8,121,657	20,040,683	28,162,340
1. Difference 1985/1984	- 3.93 %	+ 5.38 %	+ 8.43 %	+ 7.47 %

Contributions *

	600ths	£	Francs	Less amounts blocked	Francs (net)
Belgium	59	98,453.99	2,769,296.77	73,750.00	2,695,546.77
France	120	200,245.40	5,632,468.00	150,000.00	5,482,468.00
Germany	120	200,245.40	5,632,468.00	150,000.00	5,482,468.00
Italy	120	200,245.40	5,632,468.00	150,000.00	5,482,468.00
Luxembourg	2	3,337.42	93,874.46	2,500.00	91,374.46
Netherlands	59	98,453.99	2,769,296.77	73,750.00	2,695,546.77
United Kingdom	120	200,245.40	5,632,468.00	150,000.00	5,482,468.00
	600	1,001,227.00	28,162,340.00	750,000.00	27,412,340.00

APPENDIX III

Establishment of Western European Union

	1984 and 1985 budgets				1983 budget				+ or -			
	A	B	C	Total	A	B	C	Total	A	B	C	Total
Secretary-General	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Deputy Secretary-General	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Director	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	-	2	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Hors grade	3	1	1	5	3	1	1	5	-	-	-	-
A7	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
6	1	-	3	4	1	-	3	4	-	-	-	-
5	2	1	6	9	2	1	6	9	-	-	-	-
4	-	4	8	12	-	4	8	12	-	-	-	-
3	3	-	1	4	3	-	1	4	-	-	-	-
2	2	-	2	4	2	-	2	4	-	-	-	-
A grades	8	5	21	34	8	5	21	34	-	-	-	-
L5	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
4	1	1	-	2	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
3	1	3	2	6	1	3	2	6	-	-	-	-
2	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
L grades	4	4	2	10	4	4	2	10	-	-	-	-
B5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	8	4	9	21	8	4	9	21	-	-	-	-
3	7	7	6	20	7	7	6	20	-	-	-	-
2	5	-	3	8	5	-	3	8	-	-	-	-
1	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
B grades	22	11	18	51	22	11	18	51	-	-	-	-
C5	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
4	1	4	-	5	1	4	-	5	-	-	-	-
3	8	3	9	20	8	3	9	20	-	-	-	-
2	2	-	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C grades	11	7	10	28	11	7	10	28	-	-	-	-
Total	48	28	52	128	48	28	52	128	-	-	-	-

A - Secretariat General.

B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX IV

*Recommendation 409 adopted by the Assembly
on 21st June 1984 and reply of the Council***RECOMMENDATION 409**³*on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1983*⁴

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that :
 - (a) the future structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of political decisions to be taken on this matter by the Council;
 - (b) it would consequently be pointless at the present juncture to express an opinion on the cost-effectiveness of these organs;
 - (c) it would however be possible to make budgetary savings if the restructuration of the ministerial organs included unification of the Paris and London headquarters and the integration of their services;
 - (d) in preparing the budget the criterion of " zero growth " was applied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters with a view to integrating joint services;
2. Adopt flexible criteria in its staff recruitment policy, in view of new tasks to be accorded to the ministerial organs of Western European Union;
3. Specify that the criterion of " zero growth " applies only to operating expenses and that expenditure and income relating to pensions should therefore be set out in a separate section of the budget;
4. Inform the Assembly of the stage reached in the studies on improving the status of staff announced in the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 340 and the participation of staff associations in the consultation and conciliation structure of the co-ordinated organisations.

3. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1984 during the first part of the thirtieth ordinary session (6th sitting).

4. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Vries on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 983).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ⁵***to Recommendation 409***

1. and 2. Discussions on the reactivation of WEU have not yet reached the stage at which the new tasks of the organisation, the Council and its subsidiary bodies can be clearly defined. Conclusions on these matters must first be reached before the future structure, size, location and other administrative requirements can be foreseen. Included in this second stage of the Council's considerations would be recruitment policy.

3. The criterion of "zero growth" is already applied to the budget of the ministerial organs. The present budget format includes a separate statement of pensions' costs. While these have been taken into consideration by governments in determining the total acceptable budget, the Council is aware that with increases foreseeable in pensions' costs over the coming years, the situation will have to be kept under review.

4. The position of the combined staff associations of the co-ordinated organisations has improved considerably over the past few years. The previously ad hoc attendance of staff representation at meetings and discussions in the framework of co-ordination has given way to regular and overall participation by the associations. Negotiations on this matter still continue within the co-ordinated organisations and in the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts, at present concentrating on refining current procedures for consultation and on possible conciliation structures.

5. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th September 1984.

APPENDIX V

*Proposed mechanisms for concertation and conciliation*⁶

12th December 1984

The background to the appraisal exercise

1. At end-1982 the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations of the Co-ordinated Organisations (hereinafter CPAPOC) formulated a number of proposals aimed, as it put it, at fully associating staff representatives in the process of salary determination in the co-ordinated organisations. As it has evolved since 1958, operating without any written rules of procedure, this procedure requires the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts (CCG) to consider salary adjustment proposals formulated by the secretaries-general after consultation with their staffs, and to make recommendations to the various councils/committees of ministers. Before finalising its report the CCG hears the viewpoints of the secretaries-general and the staff associations.

The substance of the CPAPOC proposal (see CSG/W(83)5) is that :

- (a) A tripartite consultative committee be established where representatives of governments, the secretaries-general and the staff associations would meet together on an equal footing. On the basis of salary review proposals referred to it by the secretaries-general and, as the case may be, by one of the other partners, the tripartite committee would negotiate a jointly agreed recommendation or, failing this, duly note the different positions.
- (b) A conciliation commission composed of independent persons be established, which would be entrusted, on the initiative of one or other of the parties, with responsibility for making recommendations to the councils on matters where there is serious disagreement.

The initial thinking of the secretaries-general

2. The representatives of the secretaries-general and CPAPOC had a number of discussions on the issue, which was subsequently raised by the secretaries-general on 12th November 1983.

The latter indicated that they too were dissatisfied with co-ordination as it applied to salaries and pensions, chiefly because it eliminated contacts in this area at political level between the secretaries-general and governments.

They did not however feel that it was appropriate at this juncture to go back to the suggestions, first mooted in 1977, that a "group of wise men" be mandated to review co-ordination procedures.

They stated that they found the proposal for a tripartite structure unrealistic since the views of the government experts could be obstructed by the other two parties.

They nonetheless instructed the heads of administration to look into ways of improving consultations with staff representatives and the possibility of introducing some kind of conciliation procedure in the co-ordination mechanism. At the same time, they were concerned that the broad lines of salary policy be discussed at the appropriate political level and that the Co-ordinating Committee remain the technical organ with its responsibility confined to formulating recommendations.

CPAPOC talks with heads of administration

3. In pursuance of this mandate, the heads of administration prepared a first exchange of views with CPAPOC which took place on 8th March 1984 in Strasbourg. After informing the secretaries-general on 23rd March in Paris of the broad lines of their joint reflection and obtaining agreement in principle to further talks along the same lines, the heads of administration held two more joint meetings with CPAPOC, the first on 19th June in Strasbourg and the second on 15th September in Paris.

Although falling short of what was sought by CPAPOC, which indicated that it wished to return to the issue of tripartite representation at a later stage, the following proposals do constitute an acceptable response to the concerns expressed on both sides of the table.

Bilateral consultations between the representatives of the secretaries-general and CPAPOC

4.1. It has become evident that consultations between heads of administration and CPAPOC could and should be more frank and substantive.

⁶. Document of Standing Committee of Secretaries-General (CSG/W(84)1).

In recent months there has been a move in this direction, resulting in a climate of greater mutual confidence.

Such consultations might be along the following lines :

4.2. Representatives of the secretaries-general and CPAPOC would hold consultations prior to any salary adjustment or review proposals being made and on any proposed amendment to the adjustment and review procedure.

They would also consult, at the initiative of the representatives of the secretaries-general or of CPAPOC delegates, on any question relating to salaries, allowances and pensions that, while not on the Co-ordinating Committee's agenda, one or other party wished to have discussed or to have action taken.

4.3. Unless the parties decided otherwise, consultations would be in two stages :

- (a) A preparatory meeting at which all the aspects participants felt should be taken into account would be freely discussed.

Regarding salaries, there would be a first reaction to the proposals the secretaries-general felt able to make pending the discussions to be held with CPAPOC. CPAPOC delegates would be briefed on the main elements underpinning these preliminary proposals.

- (b) In view of the constraints imposed by the timetable for decisions on each question, another meeting would then be scheduled within a reasonable time-limit.

At that meeting participants would seek to align their positions, as far as they were able, in order to reach a formulation of the proposal or recommendation that reflected common positions.

4.4. What would happen if bilateral consultations did not fully harmonise the different standpoints ?

- (a) When a question required, in the view of both parties, to be submitted to the councils/committees and/or the Co-ordinating Committee but there were differences of opinion on the precise proposal to be made, due note would be taken of the divergent view of CPAPOC and this would be set out in annex to the proposals of the secretaries-general.

- (b) When disagreement concerned the very principle of referral to the councils/committees and/or Co-ordinating Committee, with the representatives of the secretaries-general deeming such

referral to be inopportune, the secretaries-general would nonetheless set out in a document the standpoint of the staff associations, appending the note drafted by the latter, while reserving the right to indicate that they did not support it and even that they did not wish to see it discussed.

Communication of the proposals of the secretaries-general

5. Both the heads of administration and CPAPOC delegates share the concern of the secretaries-general that the Co-ordinating Committee should operate at its proper technical level, without obscuring the political dialogue that should exist between the secretaries-general and governments.

It is therefore suggested that, when circumstances warrant, the proposals of the secretaries-general be communicated directly to the councils/committees in order to draw their attention to aspects of particular importance and invite them to give the Co-ordinating Committee some broad policy guidelines.

In other cases, in particular when it is a matter of routine application of a current adjustment procedure, proposals would continue to be communicated directly to the Co-ordinating Committee.

But whether communicated directly or via the councils/committees, the salary proposals of the secretaries-general, supplemented if need be by additional or independent CPAPOC proposals, will in any case come before the Co-ordinating Committee.

Procedure at Co-ordinating Committee level

6.1. It is on this phase of the procedure involving the Co-ordinating Committee that, as has been said, the views of CPAPOC and of the representatives of the secretaries-general have been the farthest apart from the start.

While a genuinely tripartite approach would seem to be ruled out, the budget experts retaining in the last analysis responsibility for making recommendations to councils/committees, the process of framing such recommendations could and should involve a greater exchange of views with the two other parties.

6.2. There is thus a need to develop methods of seeking a consensus between the parties. To this end the rôle of the Co-ordinating Committee Chairman in actively seeking such a consensus should be formally recognised.

Furthermore, when it is a question of applying an existing procedure without seeking to amend it, use might be made of tripartite working parties – an approach that has already been adopted on occasion – and also the preparation, under the leadership of the Co-ordinating Committee Chairman, of a joint report setting out any conflicting positions.

6.3. In its report the Co-ordinating Committee should not only note the arguments invoked by the two other parties but also set out these arguments in such a way that the councils/committees are fully briefed, for each of the points in the report, on what they actually involve.

Here, simply appending the views expressed by the secretaries-general and the staff, without further action, may be deemed insufficient.

Recourse to independent expert opinion

7.1. Assuming that the recommendation to be forwarded to the councils/committees remained a matter for the experts, it would seem that in case of serious conflict between this recommendation and the views of the other parties, the Co-ordinating Committee report could no longer automatically be the sole draft decision to be submitted to the political organs.

7.2. Should the Co-ordinating Committee's recommendations be such as to be prejudicial to the proper functioning of the organisations and/or to the basic rights of staff, the secretaries-general and the staff should be able to supplement the dossier with an independent expert opinion which is accepted as authoritative.

Here we are not speaking of recourse to any of the traditional methods of settling labour disputes and, in particular, of establishing an arbitration mechanism between the Co-ordinating Committee on the one hand and the secretaries-general and staff on the other. The object of the exercise would be to demonstrate, should the need arise, that the Co-ordinating Committee's proposals run counter to the proper functioning of the organisations or to the basic rights of their staff.

7.3. In practical terms this could imply the following:

- that one person, or better still, a three-man group be appointed for a two-three year period by the councils/committees on a revolving basis. They would be selected on the basis of their recognised competence and total independence. In the case of a three-man group, the persons should be of different nationalities. They would be appointed

on the basis of a list put forward by the secretaries-general after consultations with CPAPOC. Since the matter is of concern to all the organisations, the decision of the council called upon to appoint the persons would become effective only after an appropriate lapse of time, during which the other councils, duly informed, could make known their own decision to approve or reject the choices made. Should one of the councils object, the secretaries-general would make fresh proposals after appropriate informal contacts with governments;

- that, as soon as the secretaries-general had noted the existence of serious disagreement with the Co-ordinating Committee, they would forward the latter's report to this entity, the councils being duly advised that recourse was being had to the procedure they had instituted. The person (or group of persons) would forward the conclusions within a reasonable time-limit to the secretaries-general with copies to CPAPOC and the Co-ordinating Committee. The secretaries-general would then transmit the Co-ordinating Committee's report and the conclusions to their respective councils;
- before resorting to such a procedure, the representatives of the secretaries-general would naturally consult with CPAPOC. Their statement to the effect that the matter was being referred back to the three-man group of experts, with the point(s) of serious disagreement highlighted therein, would set out the staff position.

7.4. In order to initiate the same procedure in CPAPOC – on the assumption that, after consultation, the secretaries-general would feel it unnecessary to have such recourse – the following changes might be envisaged in order to gain the support of the councils/committees :

- the three-man group, formally asked by CPAPOC to formulate an opinion, would give a provisional ruling on the existence of serious disagreement. Should it deem that the situation is not one in which its opinion can be validly sought, it would return the dossier to the secretaries-general for direct consideration by the Councils;
- the introduction of such a procedure could be decided for an initial two-year period and then considered afresh at a subsequent stage.

APPENDIX VI

Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1981

(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1981-1985)

	1981			1982			1983			1984			1985		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
	£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£	
Secretariat-General	1,021,160	104,160	10.20	1,113,957	104,880	9.41	1,028,515	67,830	6.59	1,069,190	65,265	6.10	1,111,210	89,960	8.07
Standing Armaments Committee ...	F 7,034,670	F 861,800	12.25	F 7,969,630	F 1,199,500	15.58	F 7,313,890	F 1,131,450	15.47	F 8,839,380	F 1,206,130	13.65	F 9,314,690	F 1,282,100	13.76
Agency for the Control of Armaments ..	14,907,470	2,217,100	14.87	16,461,940	2,803,100	17.02	14,910,050	2,004,500	13.44	19,126,150	3,106,300	16.24	20,739,440	3,995,900	19.27
Office of the Clerk	10,866,000	106,000	0.97	12,282,000	126,000	1.03	13,893,000	240,000	1.73	14,762,200	677,000	4.58	15,470,900	683,500	4.42

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(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1981-1985)

Pensions	1981					1982					1983					1984					1985				
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total
Retirement	7	17	9	1	34	7	18	13	2	40	7	20	14	3	44	7	23	13	2	45	9	23	13	2	47
Survivors'	1	10	3	1	15	1	9	3	1	14	1	9	3	1	14	2	9	4	1	16	3	9	4	1	17
Orphans'	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1	-	1	2	3	1	-	-	4	3	1	-	-	4
Invalidity	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	1	2
Totals	9	28	12	3	52	9	28	16	4	57	9	30	17	5	61	13	33	17	4	67	16	33	17	4	70
Total establishment ²	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	27	150	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149

SG = Secretariat-General.

ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments.

SAC = Standing Armaments Committee.

O of C = Office of the Clerk.

1. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.

2. Excluding hors cadre officials.

RECOMMENDATION 424 ¹

on the disaster in Mexico

The Assembly,

Deeply moved by the disaster which has struck Mexico;

Anxious to demonstrate the active sympathy of Europeans towards the Mexican people,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to express their solidarity through action to help victims by affording them humanitarian, material and financial assistance, using the most appropriate framework for this purpose.

1. Adopted on behalf of the Assembly by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 24th September 1985.

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)

REPORT ¹

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 4 with 5 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown (Alternate: Dr. Miller), Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Jung), Gerstl, Giust, Sir Anthony Grant (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Huyghues des Etages (Alternate: Baumel), Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report and another on emerging technology and military strategy *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

10th January 1985 – Ministry of Defence, The Hague

General G.L.J. Huijser, Chief of Defence Staff;
 Lt. General G.W. Boerman, National Armaments Director;
 Major General Ir. C.M. van den Bergh, Director of Matériel, Army;
 Commodore Ir. W.J.A. van Raay, Deputy Director Matériel, Navy;
 Major General Ir. H. Boekenoogen, Director of Matériel, Air Force;
 Brigadier General Ir. E.B. van Erp Taalmankip, Matériel Department, Air Force;
 Dr. Bert Kraamers, Policy Planning Staff;
 Colonel H.A. Konzy, Chief, Planning Division, Army Staff;
 Colonel de Jong, Information Department, Air Force;
 Lt. Colonel Vollema.

25th January 1985 – Ministry of Defence, Bonn

Major General Hüttel, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Politico-Military Affairs;
 Colonel Wiesmann, Politico-Military Affairs;
 Colonel Rode, NATO Affairs;
 Colonel Dingler, Armaments Co-operation;
 Colonel Bromeis, Operations;
 Lt. Colonel Dr. Schilling, Military-Strategic Affairs;
 Lt. Colonel Lehr, Defence Planning;
 Lt. Colonel Wenger, Defence Intelligence;
 Dr. Schloenbach, Armaments;
 Mr. Wenthe, Armaments Research.

8th February 1985 – London

Chatham House RIIA

Mr. John Roper, Research Fellow, former Chairman of the committee.

Ministry of Defence

Mr. Nigel Nicholls, Assistant Under-Secretary, Defence Staff;
 Mr. John Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary, International Procurement;
 Mr. Nigel Hughes, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser;
 Mr. Brian Hawtin, Head of NATO/UK Policy Division;
 Mr. T.M. Bossom, Head Resources and Programmes Division;
 Wing Commander R. MacKendrick, Defence Policy Staff;
 Dr. Waters, Scientific Staff;
 Colonel G.J. Barnett, Defence Concepts Staff;
 Miss Hilary Thompson, NATO Policy Division.

Plessey Electronics

Mr. Peter Bates, Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom Representative to NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG).

14th February 1985 – NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Mr. Robin Beard, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support;
 Mr. M. Weiss, Director of Armaments and Defence Research;

Mr. N. Spridgen, Armaments and Defence Research;

Mr. J.M. Stewart, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy.

25th February-1st March 1985 – Washington

25th February – Department of Defence

Mr. George Bader, Principal Director, European and NATO Policy, ISP;

Dr. Harlan Straus, Director, Northern Europe Region, ISP;

Mr. Louis Michael, Assistant Under-Secretary, Plans and Development, DRE;

Dr. James Tegnalia, Assistant Under-Secretary, Conventional Initiatives, DRE;

Ms. Mary Ann Gilleece, Deputy Under-Secretary, Acquisition Management;

Mr. Walter Henderson, Senior Negotiator, International Acquisition;

Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director, NATO and European Affairs, DRE.

26th February – Department of Defence

Mr. Ronald S. Lauder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, ISP;

Dr. Steven D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Trade and Security Policy (East-West Trade);

Mr. Randy Bell and Mr. Robert Fiss, Office of Regional Policy Issues, ISP;

Mr. Talbot Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary, International Programmes and Technology, DRE.

State Department

Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Bureau.

Consultant

Dr. Steven Canby.

27th February – State Department

Mr. James Huff, Director, Benelux Department;

Mr. Martin Wenick, Director, Northern European Affairs;

Mr. James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs.

Department of Defence

Major General Klein, Vice-Director, J5, Plans and Policy, JCS;

Colonel Robbins ; Major Emerson ; Major Dials;

Lt. Colonel Sandrock;

Commander Sheffield.

House of Representatives

Mr. Warren Nelson, Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee.

28th February 1985

The Raytheon Corporation Boston, Mass.

1st March 1985 – National Security Industrial Association, Washington

Mr. George Newsome, Chairman of the International Committee and representative of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson;

Colonel Bruce E. Green, USA (Ret), International Committee Executive.

Representatives of United States industry

Mr. M. Edward Carlson, Director, International Programmes Honeywell, Inc.

Mr. Harley A. Cloud, Director of Technology, Federal Systems Division IBM Corporation;

Mr. Walter R. Edgington, Vice-President Marketing, GTE Business Systems Corporation;

Mr. Harold V. Larson, Manager International Representation, Rockwell International Overseas Corp.;

Mr. George H. Perlman, Vice-President International Martin Marietta Corporation;
 Mr. Arthur J. Stanziano, Vice-President Government Affairs, Hazeltine Corporation;
 Mr. John C. Stockett Jr., Consultant, Sanders Associates, Inc.;
 Mr. H.C. Witthaus, Industry-Government Relations, General Motors Corporation;
 Mr. Richard G. Woodbury, Vice-President, Contraves Goerz Corporation.

Representatives of Department of Defence

Mr. Frank Cevasco;
 Dr. Harlan Straus.

8th March 1985 – Paris – Ministry of Defence

Mr. Henri Conze, Deputy Director, International Relations, Délégation Général pour l'Armement;
 Mr. Mazens, DGA;
 Général Juin, Deputy Director, GPES;
 Colonel Baer, Defence Staff, IBEG;
 Colonel Brunet, Defence Staff – Plans and Policy;
 Colonel de Linage, Defence Staff – General Studies;
 Professor J. Lestel, Research and Study Directorate, DGA.

The committee as a whole met at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt. General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on emerging technology and military strategy. It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed by General Charles de Llamby, Commander First French Army, and members of his staff, and at Headquarters French Forces in Germany Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-Chief, and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff.

The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and 20th May when it discussed earlier drafts of a combined report on emerging technology and military strategy, which also dealt with SDI.

At a further meeting in Geneva on 24th July 1985, the committee was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

- H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;
- H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;
- H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;
- H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;
- H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
- H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

At that meeting, the committee asked the Rapporteur to separate the parts of his draft report which dealt with the strategic defence initiative, and with emerging technology and military strategy.

Following its meeting in Turkey and Greece from 23rd to 30th October when the committee took evidence for a forthcoming report on European security and the Mediterranean, the committee then discussed and adopted the present report on the strategic defence initiative at a further meeting at the seat of WEU in London on 4th November 1985.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on the strategic defence initiative

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983 and the invitation from the United States Secretary of Defence of March 1985 for allied countries to explore possible co-operative efforts “ on data and technology short of ABM component level ”;
- (ii) Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology both for civilian applications and for military applications which will enhance the stability of defence and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;
- (iii) Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States that will enhance security and stability, will not undermine existing arms control agreements, or compromise the negotiation of future agreements;
- (iv) Noting that the strategic defence initiative has raised some questions both from European governments and within the United States administration, and that Article IX of the ABM treaty prohibits the transfer to other states of ABM systems or components limited by the treaty;
- (v) Expressing the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear deterrence which can only strengthen the defence of Europe;
- (vi) Welcoming the better prospect of progress in the bilateral negotiations on “ space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range ”, and welcoming the Council’s attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413, according to which “ relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion ”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Agree a common response to the United States’ strategic defence initiative which should:
 - (a) stress the importance of avoiding an arms race in space;
 - (b) accept research compatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will enhance stability and security;
 - (c) permit European industry to participate on mutually advantageous terms in appropriate areas of SDI research;
2. Give priority and special emphasis to a joint European programme for defence and arms control purposes, including observation and communications satellites, and to promoting civil technological research of Eureka type within ESA and the European Communities;
3. Urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ensure that space defensive measures of themselves do not become an obstacle to balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons;
4. Emphasise the need, when the results become available, for the United States and its European partners to discuss the possible military and strategic implications of research on SDI;
5. Instruct the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually on the arms control impact of the SDI.

Draft Resolution
on the strategic defence initiative

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States that will enhance security and stability, will not undermine existing arms control agreements or hamper the negotiation of future agreements;
- (ii) Noting that the strategic defence initiative has raised some questions both from European governments and within the United States administration;
- (iii) Stressing the fundamental importance of the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of all attempts at East-West agreement on arms control, and drawing attention to the important statement on SDI by the WEU Council in its reply to Recommendation 413: “ relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion ”,

CALLS upon the Congress of the United States, pending the outcome of current arms control negotiations, to ensure that the SDI in itself does not become an obstacle to balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee reported on President Reagan's strategic defence initiative, more popularly known as star wars, and allied reactions to it as recently as last December¹ and on that report the Assembly recommended that the Council: "2. Agree common instructions to the representatives of those WEU countries participating in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva with a view to securing ... a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems; ..." ². The committee returns to the subject in this report in implementation of the decision of the Presidential Committee of 24th September 1985 on the strategic defence initiative:

- " (i) The Presidential Committee *agreed* on the need to ensure that the WEU Assembly could debate this matter.
- (ii) The Presidential Committee considered that the Assembly should be enabled to debate the SDI, in accordance with the following procedure, on the basis of a single draft recommendation to be submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, while giving the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions the task of reporting on those aspects of the SDI within their area of responsibility.
- (iii) The chairmen of the three committees would ensure close consultation between their committees so as to help the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to concert his views with those of the Rapporteurs of the other two committees prior to the adoption of the preliminary draft recommendation, so that a draft recommendation could be prepared which was likely to obtain the agreement of the three committees.
- (iv) The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was requested to communicate its draft recommen-

... dation to the other two committees concerned in sufficient time, i.e. before the London meetings, and the Rapporteurs would express the views of their respective committees thereon.

- (v) In any event, it would be for the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to table amendments expressing their points of view on the SDI if they were unable to endorse the text proposed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments..."

1.2. In accordance with paragraph (iii) above, the preliminary draft recommendation and resolution were communicated to the Rapporteurs of the other two committees concerned for their opinion before the report was discussed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

1.3. The subject is of particular importance to WEU in that, fortuitously perhaps, "collective consideration" by the Council "in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme"³, became the first substantial defence item for decision on the Council's agenda since the reactivation of WEU announced in the Rome communiqué in October 1984. The fact that at the time this report was drafted no final agreement had been reached in the WEU Council reflects the diverse attitudes to the initiative among European governments.

II. History of ballistic missile defence

2.1. In the 1960s the United States developed a series of anti-ballistic missile systems based on high-speed missiles with nuclear warheads. The Nike Zeus in 1964 and Nike X of 1968 were cancelled as ineffective by President Johnson; the successor Sentinel was similarly cancelled by President Nixon in 1969, to be followed by the Safeguard system based on the Sprint and Spartan missiles actually deployed in the 1970s but dismantled after a vote in Congress in 1975. The Soviet Union for its part deployed the Galosh ballistic missile defence system which at one time had one hundred missile sites

1. Report on the control of armaments and disarmament, Document 998, explanatory memorandum, Chapter III, 3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

2. Recommendation 415 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1984.

3. Quoted from the Bonn communiqué of the WEU Council ministerial meeting, 23rd April 1985.

around Moscow, now reduced to thirty-two. Successive United States Secretaries of Defence did not perceive these systems as potentially effective against the growing numbers of Soviet ballistic missiles, but they were occasionally described as possibly effective against a smaller third nuclear power such as China. Certainly the proliferation of offensive nuclear warheads was always seen as a means of penetrating an adversary's ABM system, at less cost than that of the system. The then Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, said in March 1967: "I do not think there is a senior civilian or military official in the Defence Department that does not believe that we should react to the (Soviet) ABM deployment by expanding our offensive force ..."⁴.

2.2. The negotiations of some eighteen months which led to the signature of the interim SALT agreement and the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems on 26th May 1972 were devoted in part to persuading the Soviet Union to the United States view that a more stable strategic balance could be achieved by limiting ABM systems and accepting the concept of mutual assured destruction than by attempting to construct missile defences which could in any case be penetrated at relatively less cost by swamping them with more offensive warheads or decoys.

2.3. As permitted under the 1972 ABM treaty, the United States under previous administrations continued basic research at relatively low intensity on both directed energy (laser) and particle beam technology. In the words of the last statement to Congress of the Carter administration's outgoing Under-Secretary of Defence Research and Engineering in January 1981: "The major effort is the high-energy laser space defence research ... in FY 1982 construction of the advanced test accelerator for the particle beam technology programme will be completed and additional low-energy beam propagation experiments will be conducted with the experimental test accelerator." Reports of the Secretaries of Defence of previous administrations also noted the existence of a Soviet programme on lasers and particle beams, but expressed the opinion that the latter had failed to solve the problems of basic physics, and implied that the Soviet Union had embarked too early on a development programme.

(a) Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems

2.4. The Soviet Union has had an anti-ballistic missile defence system based on 32 Galosh missiles with nuclear warheads deployed round

4. Quoted from United States Congressional Research Service Report No. 85-48F: The strategic defence initiative and United States alliance strategy, February 1985.

Moscow since the ABM treaty was signed in 1972. According to the IISS: "reports suggest that new missiles are being deployed. A little more information on radar deployments has become available; it is not clear whether this represents new deployments or merely new data ... two new anti-ballistic missile systems - the SH-04 (exoatmospheric) and SH-08 (endoatmospheric) have been reported."⁵

2.5. The April 1984 edition of the United States publication "Soviet military power" devotes more space than earlier editions to Soviet ABM defence, claiming "64 reloadable above-ground launchers" for Galosh ... "The Soviets are upgrading this system to the 100 launches permitted under the ABM treaty ... the new Moscow defences are likely to reach fully operational status in the late 1980s". The report claims that the Soviet Union has "an improving potential for large-scale deployment of modernised ABM defences well beyond the 100-launch ABM treaty limits" which "could be accomplished within the next ten years". The study continues:

"Soviet directed energy development programmes involve future ABM as well as anti-satellite and air defence weapons concepts. By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic missile defence. The many difficulties in fielding an operation system will require much development time, and initial operational deployment is not likely in this century. Ground- and space-based particle beam weapons for ballistic missile defence will be more difficult to develop than lasers. Nevertheless, the Soviets have a vigorous programme under way for particle beam development and could have a prototype space-based system ready for testing in the late 1990s."

2.6. In the week of 7th October, there was controversy in Washington over the size of the Soviet ABM programme, when Mr. Robert McFarlane, the White House national security adviser, asserted that the Soviet Union had "the most advanced" space defence programme "on the face of the earth", an assertion that did not tally with more measured administration briefings to Congress committees in the course of the year when, for example, the House appropriations sub-committee had been told that in lasers and particle beams the Soviet Union had "no identifiable lead in the applications of these technologies to a space-based strategic defence"⁶.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 1984-85.

6. International Herald Tribune, 1st October 1985.

(b) President Reagan's initiative

2.7. The genesis of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative announced in his speech of 23rd March 1983, has become clearer to your Rapporteur following his discussions in Washington. The proposals did not originate in the Pentagon, either with the joint chiefs-of-staff or in the office of the Secretary of Defence, but in the White House itself. They are attributed partly to the President's Science Adviser, Mr. George Keyworth, and partly as a response to public opinion revealed in polls and in mail reaching the White House which showed growing public anxiety over nuclear weapons. The language of the announcement reflected this preoccupation: "I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." The aim was "to eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles" – there was no reference to tactical and theatre nuclear missiles, cruise missiles or bombers. The Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, had seen only an early draft of the statement, and was in Europe attending a Nuclear Planning Group meeting when it was delivered, taking the Pentagon by surprise and leaving most of the experts sceptical.

2.8. In the ensuing two years however, under pressure from the White House, the initiative has been developed into a full-scale programme with a new organisation within the Department of Defence – the Strategic Defence Organisation under Lt. General James A. Abrahamson – and various scattered research projects have been grouped under the direction of this organisation. Budgetary requests for FY 1986 now before Congress are \$3.7 billion for this project which, the committee understands, would compare with the \$1.25 billion for the continuation of the pre-existing research programmes, had the SD initiative not been taken. Evidence given to Congress in 1984 by the then Under-Secretary of Defence Research and Engineering, Mr. DeLauer, was: "We plan an aggressive adequately funded programme to pursue the relevant technologies at the maximum reasonable rate. For fiscal year 1985 we are requesting approximately \$2 billion (total for DoD and DoE). We anticipate that during the fiscal year 1986-89 period, approximately \$24 billion will be required."⁷

2.9. No longer however is it claimed that SDI would be "the means of rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete". In the terms

7. Hearings of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 1st March 1984, page 477.

of the January 1985 White House hand-out on the SDI: "The strategic defence initiative, by itself, cannot fully realise this vision ... for this we will need to seek many solutions ... the SDI takes a crucial first step ... The SDI research programme will provide to a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems." The possibility will be investigated of destroying offensive strategic missiles either shortly after launch (the boost phase); during the post-boost phase both before and after multiple warheads are released from their carrier; and finally during the terminal phase when the separate warheads are re-entering the atmosphere. Defensive systems might be ground-based or space-based, or a combination of both. The weapon system might use directed energy (lasers) or particle beams or more conventional projectiles. The main thrust of the programme is towards non-nuclear devices, although the possible use of nuclear devices for generating high-energy X-ray pulses is also understood to be under investigation.

2.10. Congressional support for SDI will have been affected by two reports from the Congress Office of Technology Assessment published on 24th September 1985 on SDI and on anti-satellite systems (ASAT). The former concluded that a perfect SDI was not feasible, and that an unstable one could be destabilising. Mr. Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, commented that "after spending billions and billions of dollars we could find that we have bought ourselves greater instability than the world has ever confronted in the atomic age".

2.11. The House of Representatives Defence Appropriations Committee in October 1985 recommended \$2.5 billion for SDI for FY 1986 (beginning 1st October 1985) compared with the administration request for \$3.7 billion. During FY 1985 the Pentagon is reported to have awarded about 1,000 SDI contracts worth more than \$1 billion⁸.

(c) Public presentation of SDI

2.12. The difference in emphasis in public statements by members of the present United States administration makes clear the internal divisions concerning the realities and priorities of SDI, which reflect some of the questions raised by European leaders.

2.13. On the one hand Mr. Paul Nitze, the special adviser on arms control to the United States President and Secretary of State, speaking in Philadelphia on 20th February, described the

8. International Herald Tribune, 22nd October 1985.

stringent criteria by which SDI technology would be judged before any decision might be taken to deploy a system:

“The criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of such technologies will be demanding. The technologies must produce defensive systems that are survivable; if not the defences would themselves be tempting targets for a first strike. This would decrease rather than enhance stability.

New defensive systems must also be cost-effective at the margin, that is it must be cheap enough to add additional defensive capability so that the other side has no incentive to add additional offensive capability to overcome the defence. If this criterion is not met, the defensive systems could encourage a proliferation of countermeasures and additional offensive weapons to overcome deployed defences, instead of a redirection of effort from offence to defence ...

If the new technologies cannot meet these standards, we are not about to deploy them.”

2.14. Mr. Nitze described the three phases envisaged for the SDI programme: the near term of “at least the next ten years” during which deterrence would continue to be based on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation while the United States pressed “for radical reductions in the number and power of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms ... We will be pursuing the SDI research programme – in full compliance with the ABM treaty which permits such research ... We have offered to begin discussions in the upcoming Geneva talks with the Soviets as to how we might together make a transition for a more stable and reliable relationship based on an increasing mix of defensive systems.” Defining the transition, Mr. Nitze enumerated the criteria for deploying defensive systems, quoted in the previous paragraph, saying: “the transition would continue for some time, perhaps for decades. As the United States and Soviet strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals decline significantly, we would need to negotiate reductions in other types of nuclear weapons and involve, in some manner the other nuclear powers.” Finally, in the ultimate period “given the right technical and political conditions, we would hope to be able to continue the reductions of nuclear weapons down to zero. The global elimination of nuclear weapons would be accompanied by widespread deployments of effective non-nuclear defensives.”

2.15. In contrast to Mr. Nitze, Mr. Richard Perle, the United States Assistant Under-

Secretary of Defence for international security policy, has consistently cast doubt on the value of the existing arms control treaties including the 1972 ABM treaty:

“... The irrelevance of the treaties, designed to regulate the competition in strategic weapons, has become increasingly clear as the Soviet build-up has continued ... Every strategic weapon added to both United States and Russian arsenals since 1972 has been added under the terms (sometimes interpreted generously by the Soviets) of one treaty in force, one expired but still observed and one never ratified but adhered to nevertheless.”⁹

III. SDI and arms control

3.1. Article V of the 1972 ABM treaty provides that: “Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based or mobile land-based.” Agreed statement D appended to the treaty provides that:

“In order to insure fulfilment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the treaty, the parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the treaty.”

3.2. The prohibitions are reiterated in the January 1985 White House hand-out on SDI which adds however:

“That agreement does permit research short of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component. This is the type of research that will be conducted under the SDI programme. Any future national decision to deploy defensive systems would of course lead to an important change in the structure of United States and Soviet forces. We are examining ways in which the offensive/defensive relationship can be managed to achieve a more stable balance through strategic arms control.”

9. “Arms: Too serious to fudge”, article contributed to The Times, 21st March 1985.

However the White House security adviser, Mr. McFarlane, suddenly claimed in the week of 7th October that statement D would permit *testing* and *development* of advanced anti-missile technologies – a claim at variance for example with Mrs. Thatcher's understanding following her talks with President Reagan in December 1984 (paragraph 4.1). It is understood that President Reagan then gave a ruling on administration policy on 11th October, which was announced by Mr. Shultz in his address to the North Atlantic Assembly on 14th October when he said the SDI "research programme is and will continue to be consistent with the ABM treaty. The treaty can be variously interpreted as to what kinds of development and testing are permitted, particularly with respect to future systems and components based on new physical principles." He said: "It is our view, based on a careful analysis of the treaty text and the negotiating record, that a broader interpretation of our authority is fully justified. This is however a moot point; our SDI programme ... will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations. Furthermore, any SDI deployment would be the subject of consultations with our allies, and to discussion and negotiations, as appropriate, with the Soviets in accordance with the terms of the ABM treaty. Our policy thus reflects: the defences to peace and stability, and his vision of a 'balance of safety' replacing the 'balance of terror'; our commitment to pursue the programme as currently structured, which is consistent with a restrictive interpretation of our obligations under the ABM treaty; our judgment that the SDI programme ... will be adequate to answer the question of whether a cost-effective and survivable defence against ballistic missiles is feasible."

3.3. As amended by a 1975 protocol, the ABM treaty prohibits the deployment of more than one ABM site by each party. Article IX provides that:

"To assure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty."

which would limit co-operation with other states if a new ABM system were to be deployed.

3.4. Under the ABM treaty the parties also undertake in Article VI: "B. not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward."

3.5. The joint United States-Soviet statement issued on 8th January following the meeting in

Geneva between the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, stated that: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate-range with all the questions considered and resolved in their inter-relationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth ..." It is agreed that the current Geneva negotiations can be divided into three groups to deal respectively with space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate nuclear weapons.

3.6. The Soviet Union has recognised that basic research is permitted under the ABM treaty, and that it is conducting "scientific research on space problems". "We do not deny the right or possibility to proceed with fundamental research. But laboratory study and research is one thing, developing prototypes and testing space weapons is an entirely different thing", said Marshal Akhromeev, Soviet Chief-of-Staff¹⁰. The Soviet Union has however called for SDI to be abandoned as a condition of agreement in the bilateral negotiations. Progress will therefore depend on careful definition of permitted research.

3.7. In a BBC interview on 30th October 1985, President Reagan, asked whether the United States would share SDI technology with the Soviet Union, replied "Why not?"

IV. European opinion

4.1. In expressing public support for United States research under SDI, while recalling that the Soviet Union is also undertaking such research, European leaders have stressed that their support is limited to research. The British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, in her December 1984 meeting with President Reagan at Camp David agreed four points which the British authorities have since reiterated more frequently than those of the United States:

- the United States and western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments;
- the SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation;
- the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence; and

10. Interview published in New York Times, 13th October – quoted here from Le Monde, 15th October 1985.

- East-West negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides. "

Speaking about these four points in the House of Commons on 19th March, Mrs. Thatcher said "research is permitted and constraints on deployment are those contained in the anti-ballistic missile treaty signed in 1972 both by the Soviet Union and the United States, which permitted research but required negotiation before testing and deployment in accordance with the terms of the treaty. "

4.2 The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, addressing the Royal United Services Institute in London on 15th March, first stressed the historical importance of the ABM treaty whereby "The United States and the Soviet Union committed themselves for an unlimited period to restrict active defences against the nuclear threat from ballistic missiles to a very low level ... The net effect was to eliminate the option of full-scale deployment of defensive systems, perceived in 1972 to be destabilising, costly and in any case ineffective, and to enhance the strategy of nuclear deterrence through the clear recognition of mutual vulnerabilities." He went on to raise fundamental questions about SDI, pointing out that space was currently used by both sides for communications and surveillance satellites and that the West faced the problem of anti-satellite systems, exacerbated by Soviet deployment of a limited capability which it was logical and prudent for the United States to balance. He continued:

"On the other hand we must recognise the heavy western dependence upon the existing utilisation of space technology and particularly upon satellites for intelligence purposes. We must also recognise that the prospect at a time of crisis of either side being faced with a loss of its strategic eyes and ears would be gravely destabilising. It could provoke a new and even more threatening stage in any East-West confrontation ... There may be equally good grounds for negotiating some constraints upon elements of anti-satellite activity. I welcome the readiness expressed by President Reagan ... to consider such mutual restraint while the negotiations ... explore possibilities for concrete agreements ... The government takes the view that if negotiations were to succeed in imposing mutual constraints on anti-satellite systems these could have a helpful impact over a period of years. We should take that opportunity now if it is in the western interest."

Turning to SDI, Sir Geoffrey continued:

"As the United States administration themselves recognise the programme is

geared to a concept which may in the end prove elusive ... Treaty obligations specifically allow for research to continue into defensive systems. Evidently it is pointless to try to impose constraints which cannot be verified. Most activities in laboratories or research institutes come into that category. The ABM treaty recognised this when it drew a distinction between research on the one hand and development, testing and deployment on the other ...

But what should happen if and when decisions are required on moving from the research to the development stage? ... at that stage the judgments to be made will only partly depend upon technical assessments about the feasibility of defences. Even if the research shows promise, the case for proceeding will have to be weighed in the light of the wider strategic implications of moving down the defensive road ...

The history of weapons development and the strategic balance shows only too clearly that research into new weapons and study of their strategic implications must go hand in hand. Otherwise research may acquire an unstoppable momentum of its own, even though the case for stopping may strengthen with the passage of years ... in his 1983 address President Reagan himself acknowledged that a mix of offensive and defensive systems could be 'viewed as fostering an aggressive policy'. Uncertainty apart, would the establishment of limited defences increase the threat to civilian populations by stimulating a return to the targeting policies of the 1950s? Most fundamental of all would the supposed technology actually work? And would it ... provide defences that not only worked but were survivable and cost effective? These are the key questions to be answered by the research that is being undertaken on both sides ...

There would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot line of the twenty-first century, liable to be outflanked by relatively simpler and demonstrably cheaper countermeasures. If the technology does work, what will be its psychological impact on the other side? President Reagan has repeatedly made it clear that he does not seek superiority. But we would have to ensure that the perceptions of others were not different ...

If it initially proved feasible to construct only limited defensives, these would be bound to be more vulnerable than com-

prehensive systems to countermeasures. Would these holes in the dyke produce and even encourage a nuclear flood? Leaving aside the threat to civilian populations, would active defences provide the only feasible way of protecting key military installations? Might we be better advised to employ other methods of protection, such as more mobile and undersea forces?

Finally on the technology side could we be certain that the new systems would permit adequate political control over both nuclear weapons and defensive systems, or might we find ourselves in a situation where the peace of the world rested solely upon computers and automatic decision-making?

Then there is the question of cost. The financial burden of developing and deploying defences goes far beyond the additional cost of providing defences against the non-ballistic missile threat. No one at present can provide even a guesstimate of the total sums involved. But it is fair to assume that these will run many hundreds of billions of dollars ...

We shall have to ask ourselves not only whether the West can afford active defences against nuclear missiles. We must also ask whether the enormous funds to be devoted to such systems might be better employed ... might it be better to use the available funds to improve our capability to oppose a potential aggressor at a time of crisis with a credible, sustainable and controllable mix of conventional and nuclear forces?

... President Reagan spoke of the need to reverse the erosion of the ABM treaty. It represents a political and military keystone in the still shaky arch of security we have constructed with the East over the past decade and a half. But to go beyond research into defensive systems would be inconsistent with the terms of the ABM treaty as it stands. It was agreed at Camp David last December that any deployment beyond those limits would have to be a matter for negotiation. We would have to be confident that that formidable task could actually be managed on a mutually acceptable basis ... I do attach importance to convincing the Soviet leadership that we in the West are indeed serious in our aim of maintaining strategic stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. We do not want to give them the impression that we have something else in mind. We are serious about arms

control and we must be seen and heard to be so.

Finally ... we must be sure that the United States nuclear guarantee to Europe would indeed be enhanced as a result of defensive developments. Not only enhanced at the end of the process but from its very inception.

But we also have to consider what might be the offsetting developments on the Soviet side, if unconstrained competition in ballistic missile defences beyond the ABM treaty limits were to be provoked. In terms of NATO's policy of forward defence and flexible response, would we lose on the swings whatever might be gained on the roundabouts?

Deterrence has worked and it will continue to work. It may be enhanced by active defences. Or their development may set us on a road which diminishes security. We do not know the answer to that question. Meanwhile four clear points emerge. First, ... in the words of Sir Winston Churchill 'be careful above all things not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands'. Secondly, ... we must be especially on our guard against raising hopes that it may be impossible to fulfil. We would all like to think of nuclear deterrence as a distasteful but temporary expedient. Unfortunately we have to face the harsh realities of a world in which nuclear weapons exist and cannot be disinvented. Words and dreams cannot by themselves justify what the Prime Minister described to the United Nations as the 'perilous pretence' that a better system than nuclear deterrence is in reach at the present time. Thirdly, any deployment of space-based or other defences must be a matter for negotiation ... In the words of the White House statement of 3rd January 'deployments of defensive systems would most usefully be done in the context of a co-operative equitable and verifiable arms control environment. A unilateral Soviet deployment of such defences ... would destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for twenty years.' I warmly welcome the clear statements of the United States administration's view that deployments would need to be a co-operative endeavour to be embarked upon in an arms control context."

The fourth factor was the linkage between offensive and defensive systems. If offensive forces were lowered dramatically " then the case

for active defences may be correspondingly strengthened. Conversely radical cuts in offensive missiles might make the need for active defences superfluous.”

4.3. As already reported by the committee¹¹, France, in a major statement to the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 12th June 1984, called on the countries concerned, but in the first place the United States and the Soviet Union, to engage in multilateral negotiations on the properly verified limitation of new anti-ballistic missile technologies, which would prohibit both new anti-ballistic missile systems as well as anti-satellite systems, directed energy systems and particle beam systems. France called in particular for:

- (i) the strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, including the prohibition of any that could reach satellites in high orbit;
- (ii) the prohibition for a renewable period of five years, of the deployment or testing anywhere of directed energy systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites; ...
- (iii) an undertaking by the United States and the Soviet Union to extend to the satellites of third countries the provisions concerning immunity of certain space objects on which they have already agreed bilaterally.

4.4. In August 1985 in a further statement in the conference the French representative made less far-reaching proposals, but noting the close relationship between ASAT systems and ABM systems, proposed there should be multilateral negotiations to ban high-altitude ASATs and to protect satellites of third parties, while ABMs were left to the bilateral negotiations.

4.5. A recent press report has summarised the French position as recognising three drawbacks to the SDI:

- “(i) by developing space defence the United States will incite the Soviet Union to do the same which could have unfortunate consequences for the credibility of the French striking force, whose delivery vehicles would encounter new obstacles;
- (ii) through his Messianic references to star wars, Mr. Reagan may demobilise public opinion, naturally suspicious of nuclear weapons, by making it believe that there was an alternative to deterrence. For the United

States to devote colossal sums to strengthening their nuclear weaponry would in no way reduce this risk;

- (iii) the SDI in any case faces Europe with a technological challenge. Paris does not believe in the sincerity of the offers of co-operation – very vague in any case – made by Washington. These offers are intended above all to ‘tetanise critical reaction to SDI’ and to undermine European initiatives in this field. It is recalled that the United States has never viewed with favour the establishment of European co-operation in high technology fields, examples cited being Airbus and Ariane.”¹²

4.6. In Germany, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chancellor and the President of the Republic all referred to SDI in the course of one week. In Bonn on 18th March, Mr. Genscher issued a five-page article on “A new chapter in East-West relations” welcoming the opening of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva:

“... The aim, agreed on 8th January between the United States and the Soviet Union which is to seek to prevent an arms race in space, represents an attempt at ‘preventive arms control’...

... The aim of the Geneva negotiations affects the basic security interest of the Europeans and fundamental questions affecting the common security of the western alliance. We are satisfied therefore that the United States are ready for overall consultations which will accompany the process of negotiation in Geneva and will give us the possibility to participate in them. What is important is to fully safeguard the strategic unity of the alliance, avoid instability, and ensure that the United States allies in Western Europe participate in the development through close and confident consultations, and are not decoupled from technological innovation. Until there is a better strategy to prevent war, the strategy of flexible response must remain valid. It is a strategy adapted to preventing war. Nothing, absolutely nothing, must compromise this overriding moral aim. Therefore any new development must be assessed to see whether or not it brings us nearer to the aim of preventing war. Nothing must be done which would make a war in Europe possible, because even a war waged only with conventional

11. Report on the control of armaments and disarmament, Document 998, explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.14, 3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

12. Le Monde, 22nd March 1985.

weapons would be, for the people of Europe, in view of the state of technology, a far worse catastrophe than the second world war.

... It is of great importance that the Europeans should not limit themselves to a rôle of spectator in the negotiations between the great powers. After having maintained the network of East-West relations during a period when contacts between the great powers were disturbed they must ensure from now on that the new phase is not limited to relations between the main powers and to questions of security, but embraces the whole of East-West relations, and fully benefits Europe."

4.7. Addressing the annual conference of his CDU party in Essen on 20th March, Chancellor Kohl said "we are leaving our decision open one way or the other on the implementation of the SDI". SDI had the advantage of having brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table, and he concluded that "the more successful the Geneva negotiations are in drastically reducing the numbers of defensive nuclear weapons in both the East and the West, the more the stationing of weapon systems in space may become superfluous ... we will continue to advocate that the Europeans develop a joint position and convince our American allies".

4.8. Finally the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, in a lecture in Cambridge on 31st January is reported to have said that the theory of a strategic defence that could enhance United States and allied security needed to be tested, but that the case remained to be proved. He welcomed the four points agreed between Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan in December 1984 and added that "it will at the very least be extremely difficult to devise a system of strategic defence which meets these objectives of balance, no superiority and enhanced deterrence"¹³. Addressing the North Atlantic Assembly on 11th October he said:

"... we need a convincing answer to the point which the Soviet Union keeps making about the SDI: in brief, that they can't be expected to accept deep reductions in strategic weapons if they risk waking up one morning to find that what they have left has been degraded by the successful United States deployment of a system of ballistic missile defence.

The fact, surely, is that they run no such risk. First of all because any question of deployment is a long way down the line, and the Soviet leaders know it: just as they

know that the open nature of American society gives them many more opportunities of keeping an eye on things than is the case the other way round. Secondly, because if deployment were thought desirable once the results of the SDI research programme had been thoroughly evaluated, it would be very much in the interests of the United States to do what they have made clear that they would do - which is to seek to negotiate the transition to a strategic balance more dependent on defensive and less on offensive weapons. And finally, because whatever problems may be left can surely be dealt with by negotiating appropriate safeguards to accompany or form part of any new agreement on offensive arms."

4.9. With the reservations quoted in the foregoing paragraphs, the European countries have generally supported in public the United States decision to conduct research into the possibilities of ballistic missile defence, within the terms of the ABM treaty, but on the understanding that that treaty does not permit testing or development of such weapon systems.

V. United States offer of European participation

5.1. In the course of discussions with European leaders early in 1985, representatives of the United States administration, in explaining the SDI initiative, suggested that European countries might wish to share in SDI research. Mrs. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl are reported to have said that their countries might be interested in participating in research. This possibility was mentioned to your Rapporteur during his discussions in Washington, but European participation in SDI research appeared not to have been worked out in any detail with the Defence Research and Engineering Department in the Pentagon.

5.2. Shortly before the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Luxembourg on 26th and 27th March 1985 Mr. Weinberger took the unusual step of writing to the Ministers of Defence in all NATO countries and Japan, Australia and Israel, asking for a reply to the United States SDI proposals "within sixty days", and then releasing the text to the press:

"Dear Colleague,

In the period since President Reagan introduced his vision for the strategic defence initiative (SDI), many of our allies have informally expressed an interest in participating in this research programme. At the same time, some of our friends have sought clarification of our policy and

13. The Guardian, 1st February 1985.

attitude toward such co-operation. I am writing to you today both to make clear my government's views on this important subject and to begin a direct dialogue with you thereon.

As you know, the purpose of the SDI is to determine whether there are cost-effective defensive technologies that could enhance deterrence and increase stability. Because our security is inextricably linked to that of our friends and allies, we will work closely over the next several years with our allies to ensure that, in the event of any future decision to deploy defensive systems (a decision in which consultation with our allies would play an important part), allied, as well as United States, security against aggression would be enhanced. Moreover, the SDI programme will not confine itself only to an exploitation of technologies with potential against ICBMs and SLBMs, but will also carefully examine technologies with potential against shorter-range ballistic missiles.

The United States will, consistent with our existing international obligations including the ABM treaty, proceed with co-operative research with the allies in areas of technology that could contribute to the SDI research programme. Pursuant to this policy, the United States is permitted and is prepared to undertake such co-operative programmes on data and technology short of ABM component level as may be mutually agreed with allied countries.

If your nation is interested in exploring possible co-operative efforts or contributions, I would ask, as a first step, that you send me, within sixty days, an indication of your interest in participating in the SDI research programme and of the areas of your country's research excellence that you deem most promising for this programme. In order to provide a more comprehensive basis for our assessment of pertinent capabilities and to help expedite the process, the United States is prepared to arrange meetings in Washington so that your government's scientific/technical representatives may receive detailed briefings on the SDI programme during this period.

We would expect to give your response prompt consideration with a view to initiating as appropriate bilateral discussions on specific areas and arrangements for co-operation ...¹⁴

5.3. The communiqué of the Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting on 27th March mentioned support for SDI *research* in these terms:

"We have continued the comprehensive consultations on the political and strategic implications of the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI). This is designed to establish whether recent advances in technologies could offer the prospect of significantly more effective defence against ballistic missiles. We support the United States research programme into these technologies, the aim of which is to enhance stability and deterrence at reduced levels of offensive nuclear forces. This research, conducted within the terms of the ABM treaty, is in NATO's security interest and should continue. In this context, we welcome the United States invitation for allies to consider participation in the research programme."

5.4. Negotiations are now taking place with the United States to explore the possibility of concrete participation in the SDI either directly by European firms with appropriate expertise or possibly, in the case of Germany and the United Kingdom, through governmental agreement.

5.5. After the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group on 30th October 1985, it was announced that Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Heseltine had reached agreement in principle on provisions for British participation in SDI research, but the agreement was understood to be in general terms and did not offer Britain a specific share in excess of \$1 billion which Mr. Heseltine had been seeking.

WEU position

5.6. The Ministerial Council of WEU duly examined SDI at its Bonn meeting on 23rd April 1985, but without agreeing on a joint position, as the communiqué shows:

"The Ministers also examined questions associated with research efforts concerning strategic defence. They agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme and instructed the Permanent Council accordingly. In this context they underlined the importance of the continuing bilateral consultations with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance as an essential element of allied cohesion."

5.7. The Council, in its reply to Recommendation 413 on 11th April, adopted a clear position

14. Quoted from Atlantic News, 29th March 1985.

concerning the restrictions imposed on SDI by the ABM treaty and stressed the importance of not eroding the latter:

“The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion.”

5.8. The committee hopes that a co-ordinated reply from WEU can be agreed, but notes that actual replies to the United States invitation to participate in SDI will be given individually by governments.

VI. Conclusions

6.1. The committee notes the reservations on SDI expressed by European circles quoted above. It finds the procedure of the Weinberger letter to allied Defence Ministers, asking for a reply within sixty days and then released to the press, a quite inappropriate way to handle relations between allied governments, especially on an issue of fundamental importance on which views are known to be divided.

6.2. The committee's chief conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation and draft resolution, but the committee also endorses the French proposal that a treaty to ban high-level anti-satellite weapons and to protect satellites of third parties should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 above).

VII. Opinion of the minority

7.1. The report as a whole was adopted by the committee by 11 votes to 4 with 5 abstentions. The minority voting against the report felt the reference to an arms race in paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation to be superfluous, claiming that the SDI was a defensive initiative which could not contribute to an arms race. That minority would have replaced paragraph 1(b) of the draft recommendation with the words: “1(b) accept research compatible with the ABM treaty”.

7.2. Among members abstaining one would have added at the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation the words: “before considering direct European participation in SDI”. The same member would have included in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation the words of Recommendation 415 adopted by the Assembly in December 1984, which called for “... a ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM system”.

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)

AMENDMENTS 1 to 12 ¹

tabled by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur,
on behalf of the General Affairs Committee

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;”.
2. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“(ii) Believing that Europe collectively must pursue the development of independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;”.
3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “stability” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;”.
4. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
5. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“(v) Believing that a strategic defence system might play a complementary rôle in the policy of nuclear deterrence;”.
6. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert after the words “Recommendation 413” a footnote reference to refer to a footnote setting out the text of paragraph 3 of the Council’s reply to Recommendation 413, which reads:

“3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion.”
7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “Recommendation 413” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the proposals for the United States’ European allies to take part in the SDI programme;”.

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 agreed to; amendment 5 negatived).

8. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ defence initiative ” insert:
“ or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe’s own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries ”.
9. In paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ participate ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:
“ in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology ”.
10. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“ (d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe’s technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme; ”.
11. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered; ”.
12. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“ 6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe’s security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative. ”

Signed: Hill

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)

AMENDMENTS 13 and 14 ¹

tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt

13. Amend paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper to read:
“ensure that European industry is associated only with due respect for national interests and on mutually advantageous terms in appropriate areas of SDI research;”.
14. In the French text of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “*De prier l’Union Soviétique et les Etats-Unis de faire en sorte que*” and insert “*D’insister auprès de l’Union Soviétique et des Etats-Unis pour que*”.

Signed: Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment 13 not moved; amendment 14 withdrawn).

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects)

AMENDMENTS 15 to 24 ¹

tabled by Mr. Gansel and others
on behalf of the Socialist Group

15. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“ Believing that an extension of the arms race into space as raised by the strategic defence initiative must be prevented since it will bring only the illusion of more security and in fact will endanger strategic stability and create within the alliance zones of unequal security; ”.

16. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology for civilian applications which among other things will also assist in surveillance, verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures; ”.

17. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

18. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “ strategic and intermediate-range ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“ noting the Council’s attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413 according to which ‘relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation under the terms of the ABM treaty’, and welcoming their further statement in that reply that ‘in view of the contribution of this treaty to stability the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion’, ”.

19. Leave out paragraph 1(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ (b) not accept research incompatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will endanger stability and security; ”.

20. Leave out paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper.

21. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“ 3. Urge all states to refrain from testing and developing anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons and from preparing for an arms race in outer space; ”.

22. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ space defensive measures of themselves do ” and insert “ research in space defensive measures in itself does ”.

23. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ when the results become available ”.

24. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ possible ” and insert “ political as well as the ”.

Signed: Gansel, Millan, Miller, Stoffelen

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendments 15, 17, 19, 20, 21 and 23 negatived; amendments 16 and 22 not moved; amendment 18 withdrawn; amendment 24 agreed to).

*WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur*

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on WEU and the strategic defence initiative – the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

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submitted by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), *van der Werff* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl (Alternate: *Dreyfus-Schmidt*), Lagneau (Alternate: *Péciaux*), Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), Muller, Prouvost, *Lord Reay*, MM. Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: *Baumel*), Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti (Alternate: *Gianotti*), de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the alliance, disarmament and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end;
- (iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this end;
- (iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Bonn communiqué and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions;
- (v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation;
- (vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people;
- (vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communiqué, the Council will increasingly inform the press of its activities;
- (viii) Having carefully studied the legal implications of Order 63,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of disarmament questions, the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their respective tasks;
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disarmament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned;
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security:
 - (a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appropriate means;
 - (b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems;
6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations;
7. Pursue its effort to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees of the Assembly;
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the European Community in a joint security policy.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The report now prepared by the General Affairs Committee has a twofold title. The committee had proposed "The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" at the time your Rapporteur was appointed. Subsequently, the Presidential Committee decided to group the three reports of the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions under the overall title "WEU and the strategic defence initiative" so as to allow a wide-ranging debate on President Reagan's strategic defence initiative at the December 1985 session.

2. This modification of the General Affairs Committee's original intentions is in many respects justified, particularly in view of the fact that in November 1985 the WEU Council, meeting in Rome at ministerial level, is to try to achieve agreement between all member countries on their answer to the United States Government's proposal that they participate in the SDI. There is therefore a close link between WEU's activities in 1985 and Europe's reactions to the American proposal and this link has become official since the communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 23rd April 1985.

3. Moreover, for many years the governments of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance have avoided using the term "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance, perhaps lest this indicated a widening gap between the two shores of the Atlantic. Yet the idea of an Atlantic community based on two pillars came from the American side, being referred to for the first time in President Kennedy's speech in Philadelphia in April 1962. This being so, in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 the Council gave an accurate definition of what this European pillar of the alliance might be, recalling *inter alia* that:

- "a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members";
- there are "specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and military dimensions";
- "increased co-operation within WEU will also contribute to the maintenance

of adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, to the pursuit of a more stable relationship between the countries of East and West by fostering dialogue and co-operation";

- there is a "need to make the best use of existing resources through increased co-operation, and through WEU to provide a political impetus to institutions of co-operation in the field of armaments".

4. Your Rapporteur considers this to be a definition of the reasons why the seven governments decided to reactivate WEU and of how Europe's participation in the defence of Europe might be organised at the present juncture, i.e. insofar as this expression has any meaning, the constitution of the "European pillar" of the alliance.

5. Finally, on 24th September 1985 the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to refer to the General Affairs Committee the implementation of Order 63 on the institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU. This order, adopted at the May 1985 session, instructed the Presidential Committee:

"To ask the competent committee for the preparation of a report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU. The report should consider also the following possibilities:

- (a) responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU also with respect to the Assembly;
- (b) responsibility of the different expert secretariats for both the Assembly and the other organs of WEU;
- (c) one single budget for all WEU organs including the Assembly;
- (d) centralisation of all WEU organs in one place;
- (e) consideration of all other possibilities suitable further to promote the cause of WEU.

This report should restrict itself to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities as a basis for the necessary political follow-up and an eventual

decision by the competent bodies according to the Brussels Treaty. ”

6. The same day, the General Affairs Committee, meeting in Paris, made your Rapporteur responsible for implementing this decision, which seemed logical since the Assembly's institutional links with other organs of WEU forms part of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The study requested will be the subject of a separate chapter.

II. The Atlantic Alliance and the defence of Europe

7. Without wishing to go back to the origins of the Atlantic Alliance, it must be noted that at present it is not well adapted to certain facets of the world today. Set up at a time when only the United States had nuclear means, the alliance was intended first and foremost to allow Western Europe to benefit from the umbrella of nuclear deterrence and thus ensure its security, which was threatened by the Soviet Union's overwhelming preponderance on the European continent, and international peace. Since then, the development of Soviet nuclear armaments and then its naval force and the lead it has taken in space have completely changed the nature of the worldwide military balance and of the threats to Western Europe and the rest of the free world. Furthermore, the period of prosperity enjoyed by Europe until 1973 and the growth of the European Community brought about a new division of economic forces and, to a certain extent, a new sharing of political influence and military strength within the western alliance.

8. In these conditions, it was inevitable that differences would emerge among the allies on all security matters and that the European allies would call for a new sharing of influence and responsibilities between them and their American allies. It was of course General de Gaulle who most vigorously put forward plans to change the relationship between Europe and the United States in the Atlantic Alliance and who consequently took the most extreme steps with France's withdrawal from NATO and the build-up of a French national nuclear force. But although the other European members of the alliance did not wish to go so far, the Harmel plan, whose conclusions were adopted by the North Atlantic Council in December 1967, was an attempt to respond to what Henry Kissinger called transatlantic misunderstandings and, on the American side, President Kennedy's reference to the two pillars of the Atlantic community showed that he too was alive to the need to rebalance the alliance.

9. The trends that started with that first crisis have continued and the question of the

respective shares of Europe and the United States in joint defence responsibilities still exists, perhaps not as a global problem but rather as a series of questions to which no satisfactory answer has yet been found.

10. (i) *The limitation of armaments and relations between members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Pact* have also been internal matters for the alliance since the United States and the Soviet Union started negotiations on the subject during President Kennedy's term of office.

11. Naturally, the European members of the alliance could but welcome unreservedly the fact that the two great powers were trying, through disarmament agreements, to terminate what was known as the cold war, to limit the numbers of nuclear weapons each side deployed, to take useful precautions to avoid war breaking out by surprise or by accident and to ban the deployment of barriers of anti-ballistic missiles which would have considerably reduced the effects of mutual deterrence. If in 1979 they subscribed to the two-track NATO decision on the deployment of Euromissiles, it was in the firm hope that this decision would allow serious negotiations to be held between the two great powers to avoid such deployment. The opening of wide-ranging Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva at the beginning of 1985 on strategic nuclear weapons, Euromissiles and the development of space weapons met with wholehearted approval in Europe.

12. However, a secondary effect of these negotiations was to strengthen the position of the two great powers within their respective systems of alliance. Their allies were in fact left out of these negotiations which nevertheless concerned them in more than one respect, first because American nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of the western deterrent system on which Europe's security is based, second because the Soviet Union has always insisted that account be taken of United Kingdom and French nuclear weapons when calculating the number of means of delivery authorised for each side and finally because the intended system of balance leads – and this is obviously one of the Soviet Union's aims – to the European countries becoming more dependent on the two great powers, i.e. Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. The terms of the problem are obviously different in the West but the dominating position of the United States in the Atlantic Alliance has nevertheless been reinforced.

13. It is evident that it is in everyone's interest to pursue and succeed with these negotiations and that the presence of the partners of the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva would not make success easier. The solution proposed by the Americans and endor-

sed by their allies is to hold appropriate consultations in NATO. This is effectively done, but the fact that the United States meets a diversity of European countries gives it a privileged position which generally allows it to ensure ratification of decisions already taken in Washington and which have often already been applied. There is no doubt that intra-European consultations on the limitation of armaments would give Europe greater weight in the alliance.

14. The declaration adopted by the seven WEU countries in Rome in October 1984 showed that the seven governments were well aware of this need and it was not by chance that they decided to start studying disarmament matters in WEU as from February 1985. When the General Affairs Committee visited Washington in June 1985, in their answers to questions put by a member of the committee, American leaders did not hide the fact that these consultations were not to the liking of the American authorities and that approaches had been made, as announced by the press but never confirmed by the European governments and reported by Mr. van der Sanden in his report on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, presented to the Assembly at its session in May 1985 (Document 1012). It is moreover easy to believe that the American negotiators in Geneva have no wish to have their own positions weakened by European points of view being divulged which might be different from their own. In such circumstances, it is difficult to see a solution to the difficulty arising from the American monopoly in nuclear weapon negotiations.

15. One means has perhaps been found since the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe whereby all the European countries join the two great powers in negotiations on certain aspects of disarmament and on the freedom of states and individuals in Europe. This is the purpose of the current Stockholm meeting. But it is common knowledge that only the secondary aspects of disarmament are being tackled there, whereas the most important matter for Europe's security is still the nuclear aspect of deterrence and will perhaps become the development of defence technology in space, neither of which is on the agenda of the CSCE. At least the disarmament questions and confidence-building measures on the agenda could be studied among Europeans in WEU.

16. Finally, on 2nd October 1985, during his official visit to Paris, Mr. Gorbachev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, made new proposals on the limitation of armaments. It is not the aim of this report to consider the proposals concerning the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, but one about holding direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the

Western European nuclear powers. At the time of writing, it is too early to know the answers of the countries concerned or even to assess the possible consequences of such negotiations should Mr. Gorbachev's proposal be accepted. It is nevertheless clear that such a matter concerns the security of Western Europe as a whole and also that it cannot be dealt with without taking account of the Soviet-American negotiations. A new area is thus being opened up for consultations between European members of the Atlantic Alliance before concerting their approach, as is necessary, with that of their American allies.

17. (ii) *The question of western strategy* arose when Soviet nuclear power became operational and United States territory was no longer out of reach of enemy missiles. Quite understandably, the United States then sought doctrines whose main aim was to avoid all-out nuclear war. It concentrated its efforts on acquiring second-strike capability and consequently on developing its possibilities of defending Europe by conventional means and then by increasingly sophisticated nuclear means: tactical missiles, Euro-missiles, cruise missiles and enhanced radiation weapons.

18. Thus the United States quickly turned to burden-sharing within the alliance. The European members were invited to develop their conventional weapons, while the Americans would make an effort to diversify their nuclear weapons. In fact, little heed was paid to them, two European countries acquiring their own nuclear weapons and the others allowing their defence budgets to become progressively lower, in spite of the principles proclaimed in NATO.

19. In fact, the United States' European allies have always been afraid that the evolution of strategy and of American weapons might lead to an "uncoupling", i.e. a radical distinction being drawn between United States and European defence. They have used all means at their disposal, and in particular meetings of the North Atlantic Council, to obtain certain guarantees from the United States:

- (a) the permanent stationing, since 1949, of strong American land and air forces in Europe to demonstrate the American commitment to defend Europe;
- (b) the adoption of strategic doctrines to carry hostilities into potential enemy territory. One might wonder however whether the balance of conventional forces really allows this;
- (c) the development of consultations in NATO between allies on political and military matters;
- (d) making American nuclear weapons available to certain European armies

in accordance with a two-key system, allowing the United States, if necessary, to ban the use of these weapons by those holding them (December 1956).

20. Other attempts were made to meet European wishes, for instance the creation of a multi-lateral nuclear force, transported by surface vessels, but it soon became clear that such attempts failed to meet Europe's security requirements. They in no way offset the increasingly wide gap between American and European strength and did nothing to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States which alone was able to decide the level of retaliation to an attack. Nor did they respond to Europe's fear that the deterrent effect of American nuclear weapons might lessen because a retaliatory capability existed outside American territory, i.e. the possibility of pursuing a war, even nuclear, with the hope that the territory of the two great powers would be safeguarded.

21. However, two measures partially overcame these disadvantages. First, in December 1966 the Defence Planning Committee organised in NATO a Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and a Nuclear Planning Group and at the ministerial meeting in Athens in May 1962 the circumstances in which NATO might be forced to resort to nuclear weapons were examined. In principle, these measures ensured Europe's participation in alliance strategy in the North Atlantic Treaty area. But the inevitably worldwide, and not only North Atlantic, nature of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union considerably reduced their scope since it was quite obvious that there could be no question of influencing the United States' freedom of decision in the use of its nuclear weapons.

22. Furthermore, the existence of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and France allows these two countries, each in its own specific conditions, to play an independent rôle if their security is threatened. The present cordial relations between France and its European partners, particularly the Federal Republic, has allowed the French Government to announce that it considers France's security would be threatened long before enemy forces crossed the Rhine and, without of course renouncing its freedom of decision as to the use of its nuclear weapons, France has shown its willingness to strengthen co-operation with its partners on defence matters, so as to allow them to benefit from the deterrent effect of its nuclear weapons. At its Ottawa meeting in 1974, the North Atlantic Council had recognised the advantages of the British and French nuclear weapons, and the subsequent improvement in military co-operation between France and its allies gives these advantages a firmer foundation, a fact which is sometimes forgotten.

23. There can obviously be no global solution to the problem of Europe's share in alliance strategy and disarmament which is perfectly satisfactory to everyone. However, the situation would be improved if Europeans could agree among themselves and consult each other in order to carry greater weight. Here too the Rome declaration provides a number of favourable factors since it provides that henceforth the Ministers of Defence of the seven countries will attend meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers and that matters relating to alliance strategy will be one of the aims of the organisation's work. This seems particularly necessary in view of the fact that the strategic defence initiative agreed upon by the United States Government in 1983 will, as and when its effects are felt, raise problems to which its European allies will have to find appropriate answers. Your Rapporteur will refer to this problem later. In any event, he considers it hardly desirable for Western Europe not to follow the present trend of American space research and not to provide itself with the means of conducting a continuing joint study of the consequences this may have for its security.

24. (iii) *Security matters arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area* cannot remain alien to Western Europe which is the part of the world most concerned by international trade for its energy and raw material supplies and for outlets for its various activities. While Western Europe's military capability limits its possibilities of action over very long distances, several of its countries have nevertheless in recent decades had to resort to force to attain various aims. Furthermore, Europe cannot rely on the United States alone to support its own concept of western interests on the five continents. Since the Vietnam war, the United States has been extremely cautious in its commitments outside the American continent and it has sometimes seemed useful, for international order and peace, for European countries to take direct action in the Middle East, Africa or the South Atlantic. Conversely, it has happened that action by the United States, particularly on the American continent, has fallen well short of securing the unanimous agreement of its European partners.

25. Certainly, not all the European countries have the same means of acting outside the NATO area. Some, such as the Federal Republic, preclude such action. Not all have the same relationship with African or Asian countries, although developments resulting from the Lomé Agreements between the European Community and a large number of developing countries is tending to extend to the Community as a whole the privileged trade relations which several of its members had with their former colonies, from an economic point of view at least. Any compulsory form of consultation or action is

therefore unthinkable here, since any initiative, which can only be taken by states, would thus be paralysed. Better all-round mutual information and understanding regarding the action some might have to take should at least prevent such action leading to disagreement liable to jeopardise European solidarity and harm the credibility of the western defence system both inside and outside the alliance.

26. The political consultations which have been developed over the years between the member countries of the European Community help to bring points of view closer together and certain countries have proposed setting up a permanent international secretariat for these consultations. However, it is still difficult to tackle defence questions in such a context because of the presence of countries which do not wish to do so, such as Ireland, or whose defence policy differs significantly from that of their partners, as is at present the case of Greece. In all probability therefore the WEU Council will be retained to tackle such questions, at least in cases where this proves impossible in a wider framework. The principle of unanimity for all decisions will allow each country the freedom it needs vis-à-vis its partners for taking action whenever it seems necessary. This is no doubt the case the Ministers had in mind when stating in the Rome declaration that they "may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world".

27. *(iv) The production of armaments* is also a permanent difficulty for the Atlantic Alliance to which it has not yet been able to find a satisfactory solution. It arises in terms of military efficiency because the existence of different equipment and armaments among the armies which would have to fight together on the same territory creates logistic problems that are difficult to solve and in economic terms because the growing sophistication of modern weapons makes research and the development of prototypes increasingly expensive and limits the procurement possibilities of national armies. Joint organisation of production therefore seems logical, but in spite of many declarations in this sense it has never been possible to carry it out satisfactorily.

28. Any attempt to effect this organisation within the Atlantic Alliance would encounter difficulties which seem insuperable because of the difference in the size of American and European industries on the one hand and of the requirements of the American armed forces and of individual European countries on the other. This precludes equitable transatlantic burden-sharing. The two-way street in trade which NATO has often proclaimed as its aim has never worked satisfactorily because the arms trade in the alliance has always been tipped strongly in

favour of the United States, and this can hardly be otherwise. However, a steady effort to ensure interoperability of armaments may allow a solution to be found to certain logistic problems, but even this means certain countries adopting standards different to their usual practice which would involve additional expenditure which is not always accepted lightly.

29. It should also be recalled that in certain European countries arms production is an important sector of the economy, it makes a substantial contribution to employment and the trade balance and it stimulates scientific and technological research. This is particularly so in France. Such countries cannot consider giving up the production of certain equipment or weapons for the sake of rationalised production in the Atlantic community, because the consequences might seriously jeopardise their future activities.

30. For all these reasons, it may be thought that co-operation in arms production should be sought in a European rather than an Atlantic context in order to protect everyone's interests. Recent examples in civil production such as Airbus indicate that Western Europe has sufficient industrial power and markets to allow its products to face up to the international market alongside American firms, which is increasingly difficult for the national industries of European countries in many sectors.

31. There have been many attempts to achieve European armaments co-operation and some joint projects between several European countries have been technical and economic successes. These include combat aircraft and helicopters, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons systems and ships of small tonnage and the attempts which have failed must not eclipse the successes. Nor should it be forgotten that such co-operation has generally been between only a small number of countries on the basis of agreements specific to each programme.

32. This should lead to a considered assessment of actual possibilities in this connection. Today it still seems utopian to hope that all the European members of the alliance will need the same equipment at the same time. The business of the European combat aircraft which has just led to a clash between those advocating a heavy aircraft, such as the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and Italy, and those in favour of a lighter multirôle aircraft, such as France, shows that behind industrial rivalry there are also military requirements which do not always correspond at the same time.

33. The choice of one aircraft by part of Western Europe and of another by other countries is probably not of such great importance as some have portrayed. Well-planned co-operation should allow Europe to produce several

types of aircraft from among which military headquarters could procure the type they need when they need it. This might involve certain countries in the production of aircraft which they did not need in the immediate future, but it would also mean all countries having to conform to a principle of European preference which has never really been applied.

34. The question of joint production has existed ever since the recovery of the European armaments industry and in 1955 WEU set up a Standing Armaments Committee to prepare joint production agreements. Neither this committee nor other more recent attempts to overcome the obstacles of all kinds in the way of joint production have ever resulted in any continuity in European co-operation. The task which the Seven apparently wish to attribute to the SAC, if the Rome declaration is to be believed, would be considerably different from its initial one and from those of other European bodies responsible for arms production since it would be mainly to give political impetus to such production, which probably means trying to remove obstacles. This would conform fully to the decisions taken a long time ago by the Seven in the SAC which has been concentrating increasingly on economic and legal studies of a general nature.

35. (v) *The question of the reactions of the population of Europe to defence matters* came into the limelight with the large-scale demonstrations organised by pacifist movements following NATO's twofold decision on Euromissiles in December 1979. Your Rapporteur does not wish to reopen the discussion on the influence which the Soviet Union may have had on pacifist movements in this connection, but he has to recognise that the spread of these demonstrations was one of the reasons why the seven governments considered, proposed or accepted the reactivation of WEU. They therefore felt that the activities of a European organisation with security and defence responsibilities would be useful for restoring flagging confidence among the people of Europe in the defence of Europe. Similar reasons probably induced the Americans to approve the reactivation of WEU at a time when they themselves were becoming more confident in the will and ability of their own government to defend the United States and its allies.

36. Another sign of the diminishing determination of the European members of the alliance to take part in an active security policy is to be seen in the difficulty many of them are having in acting on the decision of principle taken by the members of the Atlantic Alliance to increase their defence budgets by 3% per year in constant terms so as to meet their requirements in modern conventional weapons. This percentage was raised to 4% after the North Atlantic

Council adopted the Rogers plan which called for more sophisticated weapons in order to implement the alliance's new strategic concept. These difficulties have revealed that the European governments' agreement to the Rogers doctrine did not obtain the backing of the people, and parliaments do not seem convinced of the need to give priority to a major financial effort to allow alliance strategy to be guided in the direction proposed by SACEUR. It is clear that such a divergence between collective decisions and what can in fact be done in each country is liable to jeopardise the cohesion of the alliance and it is logical that the democratic countries should respond to this challenge not only on a national level but also by strengthening parliamentary activity at Western European level to allow Europeans to play a real part in the adoption of doctrines on which their security is based.

37. There are thus many – and in most cases long-standing – reasons for improving the coherence of the European element in a defence system of which the Atlantic Alliance will obviously remain the keystone. However, the trend of United States defence policy in the last two years, with the announcement of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative in 1983, provided new reasons and added urgency for organising the European pillar of the alliance.

III. Europe and President Reagan's strategic defence initiative

38. President Reagan's announcement on 23rd March 1983 that the United States was to embark upon a vast research programme for new weaponry to use space, at least as a relay, for protection against enemy missiles caused a considerable stir in Europe. His invitation to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to take part in this programme compelled the governments to think how they might answer this proposal.

39. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go into the technical aspects of the matter, for which other Assembly committees are responsible. He merely wishes to set out some of the conclusions he was able to draw from the General Affairs Committee's meetings in Washington in June 1985.

40. (i) President Reagan's initiative is not an innovation, introducing a space dimension to United States defence policy. The most knowledgeable American authorities are in fact convinced that the Soviet Union started to develop the means necessary for using space for its own defence a long time ago by perfecting its anti-missile missile systems. In fact, the Soviet Union is at present the only country in the world to have deployed both an anti-ballistic

and an anti-satellite system. It is now well ahead. But the Americans, for their part, did not wait for President Reagan's speech before examining the advantages of using space for their security and using new technology, particularly laser technology. Under the 1983 initiative, large sums - \$26,000 million over a period of five years - are to be earmarked for the pursuit and extension of this research programme. But study of the United States budgets for 1984-85 and 1985-86 raises the question whether this figure will in fact be reached by the end of this five-year period.

41. (ii) Although results have already been achieved, it is impossible at the present stage of knowledge to specify what the end result will be and when. It seems out of the question that the means considered will make it 100% certain that all enemy missiles will be destroyed, at least in a given time, even if it is assumed that the enemy will not develop more or less effective counter-measures. In other words, it is to be assumed that towards the end of the century it will be possible for the United States - and probably also the Soviet Union - to have anti-missile defence systems of limited and perhaps dubious effectiveness.

42. (iii) In any event, the American decision has been taken. Thousands of millions of dollars have been earmarked and it is not for Europe to wonder whether it is a good or bad thing to conduct such research which depends only to a very small extent on European participation.

43. (iv) Participation does not necessarily mean that European states should take part in the entire programme. The idea is that the American authorities should procure certain equipment from European firms which have reached a higher technological level than their American rivals in specific areas. A number of such contracts have already been signed.

44. (v) The question of the deployment of a new anti-missile defence system has not yet arisen and will not do so until considerable progress has been made thanks to current research. The conditions may vary depending on progress at the Geneva negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States to limit war in space and also on knowledge of Soviet measures and American reactions following the 1988 elections.

45. (vi) Consequently, the question of a radical revision of western strategy which would arise if defensive weapons were to play a new rôle, deterrence having hitherto been ensured only by offensive weapons, is not a topical one. In the United States itself, the government is encountering active and effective opposition in Congress to its policy of deploying new under-

ground MX strategic ballistic missiles on American territory. In other words, it in no way believes that deterrence by strategic nuclear weapons is a thing of the past nor is it at all sure that Congress will agree to pass from the research to the deployment stage in view of still open questions about the cost and effectiveness of the proposed defence system.

46. Your Rapporteur considers these few comments point to a number of measures for Europe which in any event will become necessary in the next few years :

47. (a) Progress achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union in the use of space must be followed closely.

48. (b) It must be ensured that the participation of European firms in the American programme does not lead to a brain drain of technicians and scientists towards the United States but provides work for firms in Europe itself and allows them to improve their knowledge of the technology they use and not merely sell licences to American firms. In June 1985, the committee met several people in the United States who made no secret of their fears that indiscretions by their European partners might put a brake on Europe's participation in the SDI programme. Even if this were only a pretext to explain in advance American reluctance to divulge technology developed under the SDI, it is clear that events in Europe during summer 1985 can but strengthen American reservations.

49. (c) Considering that American firms are in any event the main beneficiaries of the SDI in terms of finance, technological progress and its spin-off, it is essential for Europe to make a research and development effort which will allow its own firms to remain competitive. Such an effort does not have to be linked with defence policy and the French Government has proposed a programme to its partners known as Eureka which aims at developing nine non-military aspects of European technology. At its meeting in Bonn in April 1985, the WEU Council of Ministers agreed to refer consideration of these proposals to the European Community. These proposals were in principle welcomed by France's partners. On 4th September 1985, it was learned that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had decided to allocate DM 3,000 million for this programme over a period of five years.

50. Often the people the General Affairs Committee met in the United States said they had no objection in principle to the SDI and Eureka programmes being developed at the same time, but they also said they knew little about the Eureka programme and did not wish to commit their country on this matter. European observers, for their part, while underlining the technical compatibility between the two pro-

grammes, have raised the question of financial compatibility, and it is clear that the French Government is afraid that some of its major partners may keep their participation in the Eureka programme unduly small in order to be able to invest more in research connected with the SDI programme. For instance, at the meeting between President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl at Brégançon on 26th August 1985 it was announced that the Federal Republic would not take part in the production of a Franco-German infrared observation satellite, the only type with an all-weather capability.

51. (d) In the military field proper, Europe must take full account of the fact that:

- (i) the SDI will not lead to deployment for an as yet undetermined number of years and that it is not sure it ever will;
- (ii) it is not yet possible to assess the degree of security it will offer;
- (iii) it is not at all sure that systems deployed as a result of the SDI will effectively be able to destroy medium- or short-range missiles, i.e. ensure as much security for Europe as possibly for the United States.

52. In such conditions, Europe cannot give up a system of deterrence which still places the accent on offensive weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. But if the idea spreads that the future depends on defensive weapons and that in the long run offensive weapons are destined to be relegated to the arsenal of obsolescent weapons, it is liable to become increasingly difficult to make an already hesitant public opinion accept the financial and other efforts necessary for the maintenance and development of nuclear weapons which will nevertheless remain for many more years the principal instruments of a policy of peace-keeping through deterrence.

53. (e) The fact that the United States and its second nuclear strike force are one day to be better protected against a first Soviet strike is obviously advantageous for the alliance as a whole, since such security will make a first Soviet strike more improbable. However, if the protection of the United States and Western Europe is to be ensured by different means, in increasingly different conditions and in accordance with even more different strategic hypotheses, there will be a greater risk of Europe's territory being uncoupled from that of the United States, with all the drawbacks this entails for Europe's security.

54. Although your Rapporteur in no way suggests that Western Europe should reject President Reagan's proposal that it take part in the

SDI programme, for all the above reasons he wishes to emphasise that it must proceed with caution, ensuring at one and the same time the pursuit and speedier development of its technology and the maintenance and constant improvement of the whole of its present conventional and nuclear defence system.

55. The fact that the SDI stems from a purely American decision, in which the United States' allies were asked to take no part, can but remind the European members of the Atlantic Alliance of the need for better consultations and for making their voice better heard to defend their own security interests. It makes it even more urgent to develop the various elements which your Rapporteur analysed in the previous chapter for allowing a European pillar to be formed in the alliance. First and foremost, a continuing study of Europe's security requirements is needed in this hour of uncertainty about the views of our American allies and the Soviet Union regarding the probable trend of their own defence systems, first in the context of requirements for the Geneva negotiations and then, in a more or less distant future, in order to take account of the deployment of new weapons. Europe must obviously not cling to concepts which would be rendered obsolete by these trends, but it is essential for it to rely only on tangible achievements and to avoid abandoning prematurely the strategy of deterrence which has ensured its security for forty years in favour of the more "moral" defensive as opposed to offensive weapons. A defence policy is more or less "moral" depending on whether it is offensive or defensive and not on the type of strategy on which it is based.

56. It is evident that it would be disastrous if a deep rift formed between the European members of the alliance over the answer to be given to the American proposal because once again it would leave the United States alone to decide what the strategy of all the allies should be. Meeting in Bonn on 12th April 1985, the seven WEU ministers showed they understood this fully when they decided to devote the next WEU ministerial meeting to the search for a co-ordinated answer to the American proposal. It is not yet possible to foresee the decisions they will take on that occasion. Your Rapporteur has no intention of anticipating these results, but it seems to him as difficult to imagine Europe giving a negative answer as to foresee the full consequences of a positive one. In any event, he considers the conditions he has just mentioned are necessary for true understanding between Europeans and Americans. While in Washington he had the impression that the American authorities were prepared to give them favourable consideration, but no formal promise was given.

57. Press reports after General Abrahamson's visit to Rome at the end of August 1985 indicate that the Italian Government for its part has decided to participate actively in the SDI research programme. It is difficult to know what this participation will in fact be and whether it implies anything other than industrial agreements. Moreover, press reports claim that it proved impossible, at two or three meetings of experts in WEU in the spring and early summer of 1985, to work out a joint seven-power position towards the American proposals. However, the Seven do not seem to have given up trying. But in the circumstances one may wonder whether the Italian decision might not make it more difficult to reach agreement at the ministerial meeting in November. This moreover has been so for positive or negative remarks made on the subject by leaders of other countries.

58. For the time being, Europe must take account of existing developments in the use of space for defence purposes, which, moreover, has advantages for the maintenance of balance and peace and verifying that countries respect the treaties they have signed. This is in particular the case for communications and observation satellites. Again, it is certain that the Soviet Union already has means of destroying satellites in low orbit and in August 1985 the United States showed that it also had this capability. There can obviously be no question of reverting to the previous situation but if the increased militarisation of space is to be avoided the agreements concluded between the two great powers in 1972 in the ABM treaty must be extended. France has made firm proposals at the Geneva disarmament conference including, in particular, a limit on anti-satellite systems, a ban on those capable of reaching satellites in high orbit, a ban on the deployment of and experiments with directed-energy weapons for a period of five years, which would allow the pursuit of research under the SDI programme but not the deployment of arms thus developed, strengthening the existing system of declaring all space objects and the extension to third countries of the American-Soviet convention ensuring the immunity of some of them. It would be well worth while for such proposals to be studied by the United States' European allies with a view to preparing a European position not only towards participation in SDI but also towards measures for avoiding the balance of forces in the world being disturbed too quickly.

IV. The reactivation of WEU

59. The Rome declaration and subsequent decisions taken by the WEU Council show clearly that the seven governments agree that WEU is not and should not become a military

organisation. The only possibility at present is to integrate European forces in NATO or to maintain forces under national command. Neither the countries which have opted for the first solution nor those which preferred the second are thinking of converting to a European defence system and it is still impossible to envisage a European defence union, in the context of the European Communities, for instance. Conversely, WEU can play a major rôle in allowing the European members of the alliance to compare their views on the principal aspects of their defence policy. This is allowed by its statute, based on a treaty of alliance but involving no limitation of national sovereignty in planning and implementing their security policy. But WEU is destined to remain a political organisation and any ambiguity which may remain in this respect was removed by the Rome declaration. It is therefore by political means that WEU can help to build the European pillar of the alliance, or even form a pillar of the alliance itself, without in any way claiming to replace either the integrated NATO commands or national military authorities. The letter the Secretary-General sent to your Rapporteur on this subject, given in paragraphs 75 to 97 of this report, examines the other aspect of the problem, i.e. the place WEU can take in a European union, in terms which your Rapporteur readily endorses.

60. These are the limits within which thought should be given to what the European pillar should be and the rôle WEU can play in forming it. From this angle, WEU after the Rome declaration will be very different from what it was before 1985. Until then it had been paralysed by the military commitments imposed by the control of armaments. These commitments have been abolished and the rigid structure which prevented WEU from being an effective political forum thereby disappeared.

61. The governmental side seems to have managed to break free from the heritage of the first thirty years of WEU history and think about what the organisation's new activities might be. Thus, the Council of Ministers has taken several initiatives with a view to guiding WEU in new directions. However, the implementation of these initiatives seems to be encountering certain difficulties. For example, a meeting of disarmament experts was in fact held in Bonn in February 1985, as the American authorities confirmed to the General Affairs Committee, but produced no serious results following an approach from Mr. Burt, then United States Under-Secretary of State. Why did the European governments make a mystery of a fact which was reported in the international press and confirmed by Mr. Burt himself? This raises a serious weakness in WEU to which your Rapporteur will revert later, i.e. keeping the

public, press and Assembly informed about the Council's work.

62. Similarly, according to the press, meetings of experts have been held in London, most recently in July, to endeavour to harmonise member governments' answers to President Reagan's proposal. The press also reported that this meeting was a failure. As far as your Rapporteur knows, no information was given to the Assembly about these meetings. No communiqués seem to have been issued, which means he does not know how reliable this press information may be. But if these meetings really failed, there are strong grounds for concern, if not about the will of the governments to revive and reactivate the WEU Council, at least about how they will effectively be able to follow up the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué. After relinquishing disarmament matters and in view of difficulties in the joint production of armaments, if the Council gives up the aims it set itself in the principal question facing the alliance now and for some time to come, i.e. participation in American research designed to allow a complete revision of alliance strategy, little substance will be left for the European pillar which WEU might form.

63. Furthermore, the slow progress being made with the reorganisation of WEU appears to contradict the will proclaimed by the ministers in Rome and Bonn to give new impetus to the organisation's activities. Your Rapporteur wishes to resume here a number of questions which the Assembly has already put to the Council but to which it has never received satisfactory answers.

64. (i) What results have been achieved at the meetings of experts held in WEU to consider reforming the organisation or specific matters such as disarmament or member countries' answers to President Reagan's proposal? Will they be followed up? How will the Assembly be informed of their activities?

65. (ii) What tasks are to be given to the Secretariat-General and to the three agencies which the Bonn communiqué announced would be set up?

(a) What exactly is meant by the "political impetus" which WEU should give to the joint production of armaments? The initial task of the Standing Armaments Committee was mainly to prepare the technical aspect of agreements between governments. However, since this activity remained fairly limited and other bodies such as the IEPG undertook parallel work, the international secretariat of the SAC was asked to conduct more general studies on the conditions for developing European armaments co-opera-

tion. Has this trend been confirmed. What consequences would such a decision have for the SAC itself?

(b) The nature of the work to be done by a disarmament agency is still very vague, particularly following rumours about the Council's activities in this area. Would it keep the Council permanently informed of the state of disarmament questions? If so, what sources of information would the new agency have? How independent would it be of member countries and of information transmitted to it by them? Would its conclusions be published? It is clear that only an effective increase in the Council's work on disarmament and the limitation of armaments would be able to give the agency a meaningful programme of work justifying the attribution of means, including computers, needed for processing the vast volume of detailed data without which it is hard to see how the agency could play a useful rôle.

(c) The rôle of a third agency for studying defence policies is even more vague.

In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to recall a proposal made by Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to the Assembly at its session in November 1984, that a European institute be set up to conduct research into defence questions. Presumably this proposal, about which the Assembly has since received no information, encountered obstacles as may be expected in view of the development of so many such establishments in WEU countries in the last ten years. Nevertheless, the question has been raised, particularly in military circles, as to whether such a proposal would not be useful for the cause which the Council intends to uphold, provided a slightly different definition is given of the institute's aims. Indeed, what Europe needs is not so much a new research centre as a body able to give public opinion and those who shape and inform it a better grasp of the European dimensions of security problems.

Consideration might therefore be given to setting up not a research institute but a study institute to organise information and training courses for young leaders from member countries such as army officers, civil servants, European officials or persons exercising various civilian activities such

as journalists, engineers, university staff, etc. Such institutes exist in certain countries and their experience might be used and adapted to a European scale. They might also be asked to take part in the work of a European institute which would use these bodies for conducting courses which should be of short duration.

A European defence institute might therefore have only a lightweight structure with the task of planning and organising courses conducted by institutes in member countries. It might be worked out by the WEU agency responsible for defence questions because it would correspond to one of the essential aims which the Council set itself, i.e. to make public opinion understand the requirements of European security.

69. (iii) According to the Rome declaration, the Council intended to give the Assembly a somewhat similar task. As a parliamentary body the Assembly can do this only in a parliamentary manner, i.e. through debates and votes, and the Council can in no wise expect to impose either its agenda or a fortiori the conclusions which must be drawn from its debates. In any other case, the Council would certainly encounter firm opposition from the whole Assembly, which would thus defend the Council's intention as expressed in the Rome declaration, i.e. to make European public opinion aware of the requirements of Europe's security by parliamentary means. Any parliamentary assembly that was docile towards the governmental organs of the organisation would be immediately discredited.

70. This implies that:

- (a) the reorganisation of WEU must leave the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly completely independent of the ministerial organs, even in administrative matters;
- (b) the budget granted to the Assembly must be sufficient to allow it to carry out its activities in satisfactory conditions and, within the limits of its annual budget, it will have greater independence than in the past in the breakdown of appropriations between the various budget heads, with due respect of course for existing regulations, particularly where the staff are concerned;
- (c) the Assembly must be kept satisfactorily informed about the activities of the Council and all its dependent organs, which has not been the case to

date, particularly in regard to the meetings which have been held in 1985 on matters relating to the reorganisation of WEU, disarmament and the SDI. It is, to say the least, strange that information published in the press on these activities should have been confirmed by a government which is not a member of WEU, when the Council and the authorities of member countries have constantly evaded the issue when asked about this matter. However satisfactory it may be, the Council's annual report will be issued too late to be able to serve as a basis for a useful exchange of views between the Council and the Assembly.

71. Several times the Council has proposed holding confidential meetings with certain members of the Assembly and the Assembly set up a special committee for these contacts, which was an important concession to the Council's views. Nevertheless, being parliamentary, an assembly like ours cannot easily delegate responsibilities other than to properly constituted committees in view of the necessary representation of political groups and national delegations whose own responsibilities stem solely from Assembly decisions and which can do nothing other than prepare Assembly sessions. An increase in the number of informal meetings, ad hoc committees and privileged contacts might well distort the parliamentary character which our Assembly must retain. There is no question here of opposing the procedure for dialogue proposed by the Council and accepted by the Assembly, but the danger of taking such procedure too far must be stressed. The Assembly as a whole is the Council's partner in a relationship which must be kept public. Only its permanent committees are composed so as to ensure the correct representation of national delegations and political groups. Informal contacts must not be allowed to encroach upon this obligation imposed by the parliamentary system.

72. Conversely, initiatives by the Council are to be welcomed. First, it has replied unusually quickly to Recommendation 420 adopted in May 1985 on a report by Mr. van der Sanden. This reply reached the Office of the Clerk on 23rd September, allowing your Rapporteur to mention it here and consequently start a dialogue between the two WEU organs. Second, on 8th May, the Permanent Council sent members of the Assembly a report on the reorganisation of the WEU agencies which, unfortunately, is confidential and cannot therefore be examined in this report. Finally, there is a letter from the Secretary-General in answer to your Rapporteur's letter asking for his opinion

on the reorganisation of WEU. Just as unfortunately, the Secretary-General, although agreeing to most of his letter being quoted in the present report, would not agree to the information he gave about the reorganisation of the agencies being quoted. Your Rapporteur wishes to thank him for his confidence and congratulate him on the new style he has thus given to relations between the Council and the Assembly. However, he can but note that since he is obliged to respect the confidential nature of information given to him in confidence, he cannot refer, in this report, to the essential question of the reorganisation of the WEU technical agencies.

73. In regard to the reply to Recommendation 420, the Assembly, while noting that the Council confirms its intention to intensify its work and exchanges with the Assembly, also notes with interest:

- (a) the Council's definition of the nature and rôle of the presidency, since it clears up certain ambiguities arising from new practices in relations between the Council and the Assembly during the period of reactivation;
- (b) the will expressed by the Council to improve WEU's public relations and information activities;
- (c) the decision to set up three new agencies without delay;
- (d) the intention to continue its consideration of the possible enlargement of WEU parallel with current work on reactivating WEU;
- (e) the confirmation of its search for a co-ordinated answer by member countries to the SDI proposal.

74. The Secretary-General's letter to your Rapporteur had the great merit of providing realistic answers to questions the Assembly has been raising for some time, and your Rapporteur can do no better than quote the main parts:

75. "... The establishment of a European union is the aim set by the Twelve, and also by the Seven of WEU who are among the Twelve. This union is to comprise a whole series of dimensions: economic, foreign policy, technological, security among others.

76. The Ten - or future Twelve - have so far succeeded in developing their economic dimension through the Communities and their foreign-policy dimension through political co-operation. It is noteworthy, moreover, that because of the difficulties inherent in the construction of Europe these two dimensions are within different frameworks: a supranational framework for the Communities and an intergovernment

framework for political co-operation. It is a fact that this task of building Europe has encountered several types of obstacles which forced it to grow in different directions depending on circumstances rather than logic, somewhat like a plant forced by stonework to grow in directions that nature did not intend.

77. So far, the Ten have not succeeded in providing their security dimension.

78. However - without referring to the European Defence Community which was, in this connection, the closest so far to success - efforts have not been lacking. Since 1970 they have even increased. The most recent attempts have come up against the fact that three governments have found it impossible to go beyond a consultation among the Ten on the political and the economic aspects of security. Statements by these governments give the impression that this situation will continue, at least in the near future, in the case of Ireland and Greece.

79. I believe that it is the accumulation of failures or half-failures in the attempts by the Ten to work truly in concert in the realm of security - as well as an increasing interest both by public opinion and governments in the problems relating to the defence of Europe - that essentially prompted the initiatives for reviving the union. What could not be done among the Ten the Seven decided, at this point, to do together, especially as they had the instrument available which up to that time they had scarcely used. During the organisation's 'dormant' years, the Assembly was moreover an exception and its activities were particularly worthy and remarkable.

80. Against this background, the reactivated WEU stands as a clear beginning to a European security dimension, as one of the elements in the process of the construction of Europe - admittedly at another level, since there are only seven and not twelve members - but nevertheless alongside the Communities and political co-operation.

81. The fact that Western European Union is thus one of the elements in the construction of Europe implies a series of consequences for that organisation.

82. Consider the following:

83. (a) There must be sustained co-ordination and co-operation between WEU and the other two European dimensions - the Communities and political co-operation.

84. This means that the various bodies of the Ten and the Seven must define and implement the most suitable procedures for achieving such relations. The Council must realise this. WEU's Secretariat-General and agencies must act accordingly. The matter is no less impor-

tant, on the contrary, for the WEU Assembly which is directly exposed to public opinion where active support is vital to the pursuit and deepening of the construction of Europe and particularly the successful development of a European security dimension. Its relations with the European Parliament are therefore of particular significance.

85. (b) Secondly, the imminent accession of Spain and Portugal to the Communities and, as a consequence, their participation in European political co-operation raises the problem of these two countries' relations with Western European Union. Lisbon moreover has already made a formal approach.

86. (c) Lastly, the most recent developments on the European integration scene which affect the Communities and political co-operation inevitably have consequences for WEU also. Both the report of the ad hoc committee for institutional questions (Dooge Committee) and the United Kingdom's proposed agreement on political co-operation and the Franco-German proposal for a treaty on European union, which were all put before the European Council in Milan last June, and also the Netherlands and Italian proposals subsequently put forward, bring up the question of the European security dimension. Nor will the intergovernmental conference ignore this matter. If its work was to prove that today the Twelve as a whole were prepared, without any misgivings, to introduce this security dimension into the work of constructing Europe this would be a new development that would immediately change the destiny of the union. Either it would be enlarged to include all the members of the Community and become, at the level of the Communities and political co-operation, a third element in the Europe of the Twelve, or it would be dissolved within the Twelve and its essential responsibilities would be taken over, for example, by political co-operation.

87. However, the information available does not suggest that this assumption is correct. This being the case, the revitalised Western European Union remains the only European forum for reflection and consultation on security problems and must fully assume this responsibility in close co-operation with the two other elements in the work of constructing Europe, while being prepared to adapt itself to future developments and ensuring close collaboration with the Atlantic Alliance.

88. For, on the other hand, this part of the work of constructing Europe which is the reactivated WEU is also placed in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

89. Are not all its member states also members of the alliance and do not all their

governments agree in considering and proclaiming that there can be no credible defence of the West, and hence of Western Europe, without the alliance?

90. Through a better balance, the reactivation of WEU cannot fail moreover to strengthen the alliance significantly.

91. The new Western European Union, the beginning of a European pillar of the alliance, must therefore have close contacts and most effective co-ordinated relations with the alliance as such and with each of the allies which are not included among the Seven.

92. It is in such a context that I see the reorganisation of WEU whose Council should, in my opinion, be able to handle all matters relating to the security of Europe within its Atlantic context.

93. The agencies should therefore be in a position to provide the Council with studies allowing it to exercise these essential responsibilities.

94. ... For specific matters, the Council might have recourse to expert working groups from the capitals, as is now the case with the SDI working group, and the agencies might, where appropriate, for certain questions, call upon consultants.

95. The Secretariat-General would have at one and the same time a rôle of serving the Council, co-ordinating various work and, with the agreement of the Council, providing impetus.

96. The closest possible contact should be maintained with the Assembly at the level of both the Council and the Secretariat-General.

97. These are the considerations I wished to convey to you. At this stage, they are mainly of a personal nature, but of course at the same time they guide the action which, under the authority and with the approval of member states, I recently started as Secretary-General of WEU ...".

98. Your Rapporteur felt it important for the Assembly to be given this information on the views of the Secretary-General of WEU because he believes they will further the deliberations of the Assembly, its dialogue with the Council and, eventually, the reactivation of WEU.

99. The prospects opened up by the Secretary-General obviously raise the question of the possible consequences of the trend in the Independent European Programme Group indicated in the communiqué adopted at the close of its London meeting on 18th June 1985. Among other things, it says that "a key objective of the IEPG is the development of a ... European

defence industry" and that "the establishment of a permanent IEPG secretariat will be studied and the results will be discussed at the next meeting". This signifies that the Ministers of Defence are in the process of reactivating the IEPG just when the Ministers for Foreign Affairs claim to be reactivating WEU, with the same methods and topics.

100. The Council repeatedly claims that it wishes to avoid duplication. Is it not in the process of creating duplication? Perhaps the Ministers of Defence are not left enough room in the WEU framework and the way the Ministers for Foreign Affairs seem to be monopolising the WEU Council may be a reason for this transformation of the IEPG into a European defence organisation parallel with WEU but escaping parliamentary control. However this may be, it should be noted that the Secretary-General's arguments would lose much of their weight if a European defence policy were to be worked out in a body such as the IEPG, which was originally set up to organise exchanges of views on armaments questions between European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance, and if the Ministers of Defence failed to make effective use of WEU to give the necessary political impetus to European co-operation in these matters and, in general, to tackle defence and disarmament questions among Europeans.

101. Your Rapporteur reserves the right to add to this analysis later in the light of any further information he may obtain about decisions prepared or taken by the Council in October and November 1985.

V. Tightening institutional links between the Assembly and the other WEU organs

102. The Assembly has always been intent on establishing closer relations with the Council. It cannot be said that the Council, in spite of its statements, has always been of the same mind. It must be noted, however, that since it undertook to give new life to WEU it has adopted a far more positive approach. In particular, mention may be made of the frequent meetings between the President of the Assembly and the Chairmen-in-Office of the Council since June 1984, meetings between the Council and the committee set up for that purpose by the Assembly in December 1984, the fact that the Council has twice received memoranda from the Presidential Committee prior to its ministerial meetings and has taken them into account, at least when preparing its Rome meeting in 1984, the Secretary-General's presence at the meeting of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on 4th November 1985 to speak about the Council's relations with the press and his agreement to address the Assembly at the

session in December 1985. All these facts underline an obvious effort by the Council to make a significant improvement in its relations with the Assembly.

103. It therefore appears that a number of institutional barriers to satisfactory exchanges between the Council and the Assembly have been removed. It is clear that the place occupied by armaments controls in WEU's work until 1985 helped to prevent a closer relationship between the two organs of WEU. The requirement of government control over the Council was firm and the margin of initiative or even freedom of speech allowed to the Secretary-General were very limited. It is now evident that the removal of most of these controls, the attribution of new tasks to the Council and the appointment of a Secretary-General determined to make the most of this situation for the benefit of the organisation as a whole and the development of relations between the Council and the Assembly in particular have brought about a deep-rooted change in the Council's attitude towards the Assembly. If this change is confirmed, many of the reasons which led to the adoption of Order 63 will no longer apply.

104. Conversely, as drafted, *paragraph (a)* of that order contains a number of ambiguities and opens the door to certain dangers for the Assembly's independence. The paragraph refers to the "responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU also with respect to the Assembly". But Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty specifies that:

"The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."

Hence it is the Council, i.e. the governments, that is responsible for keeping the Assembly informed. Its Chairman-in-Office has to present the annual report to the Assembly, whereas the Secretary-General, who exercises the chairmanship of the Permanent Council, the Council's subsidiary organ, and is the Council's head of administration, is made responsible by the Council for gathering the information necessary for preparing the annual report and drafting the text of the report for adoption by the government representatives. He can therefore have no direct responsibility towards the Assembly.

105. This interpretation is in every way confirmed by paragraph 3 of the reply to Recommendation 420, which reads:

"In view of the intensification of the Council's activities, the Rome declaration stipulated that the presidency should be

given a leading rôle in preparing replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions.

.....

However, the presidency as such is not an autonomous institution, and its actions and declarations cannot be separated from those of the Council as a whole. Under these circumstances, there is no need for the presidency to present an activity report separate from the one regularly submitted by the Council to the Assembly."

106. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Council and responsible to it and can hardly also be responsible to the Assembly. It is difficult to imagine the Assembly electing the Secretary-General of the organisation since, in view of his duties, his task is to serve the Council. Unlike, for instance, the Commission of the Community, which has certain powers under the Rome Treaty, the treaty grants him no independence. Moreover, in view of the nature of the Council's responsibilities towards the governments, the case of WEU cannot be assimilated to that of the Council of Europe, where the Parliamentary Assembly has wider powers in areas which the governments consider less essential than that of security.

107. The very nature of WEU made it necessary to have a dual administration, i.e. the Secretariat-General, responsible only to the Council, and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly led by a Clerk elected by the Assembly and whose responsibilities are defined in the Charter of the Assembly. In budgetary matters in particular, he is placed under the authority of the President in accordance with Article VIII (b) of the Charter. The fact that the Office of the Clerk is independent of the Council and Secretariat-General is an essential guarantee of the Assembly's freedom of information and expression and your Rapporteur believes it would be most dangerous to relinquish this. Should differences again arise in the future between the two WEU organs it would be deplorable if the officials working for the parliamentarians did not have the required degree of independence of the executive.

108. In this connection, it is necessary to recall the care with which the national parliaments of all the WEU member countries have kept their staff independent of the executive. It should also be pointed out that when certain member countries have had difficult relationships with their partners, as in the case of France in 1969, the Assembly managed, thanks to the independence of the Office of the Clerk, to avoid the paralysis which then gripped the Council: the WEU crisis did not harm the Assembly.

109. Finally, the modified Brussels Treaty defines the Assembly's duties as being supervisory rather than those of a legislative assembly. The impact of the texts it adopts is therefore limited and the governments are not bound by its recommendations. Conversely, supervisory duties imply total independence and any decision limiting that independence would be a violation of the treaty.

110. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur, while welcoming the new Secretary-General's concept of his responsibilities towards the Assembly and the way he makes maximum use of the possibilities of initiative the governments allow him, proposes not examining the establishment of organic links between the Secretariat-General and the Assembly because this would necessarily lead to a change in the institutional links between the Assembly and the Council as defined by the Charter of the Assembly which itself stems from the modified Brussels Treaty.

111. In regard to *paragraph (b)* of the order, "different expert secretariats" should probably be taken to mean the three agencies which the Council is setting up in place of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. The prospects of these agencies were referred to in the previous chapter. For several years, co-operation has been developing between the Assembly committees and the ACA on the one hand and the international secretariat of the SAC on the other at the request of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The Council in fact authorised the two agencies to co-operate with the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly for the preparation of certain reports. But it imposed certain conditions:

- (i) that each Assembly request be submitted to the Council which alone decides on the appropriate steps to be taken;
- (ii) that all expenditure involved in such co-operation be borne by the Assembly budget, including the travelling expenses of members of the secretariat.

112. The Council thus provides the Assembly with technical assistance which, in the opinion of the Council, should be subordinate to the other tasks of the agencies. The removal of most controls and the creation of new agencies with tasks more concerned with information than implementation obviously makes it easier for them to contribute to the information of the Assembly and to co-operate with the Office of the Clerk. But the Council has not modified the conditions it laid down for their assisting the

Assembly with its work. It has thus respected the separation of powers within WEU and the Assembly has no complaint about this. It is indeed difficult to imagine the Council's subsidiary organs taking part in the Assembly's supervisory work. This separation of powers therefore means the WEU technical organs can take part only in the preparation of documents which may be of assistance to rapporteurs or be used as appendices to reports under the responsibility of the agencies. It must not lead to the agencies, which depend on the Council, taking over from the Office of the Clerk, which must remain an exclusive service of the Assembly.

113. Within this framework imposed by the treaty, outlined by the Council and accepted by the Assembly, the closest possible co-operation should be planned between the WEU technical organs and the Assembly.

114. *Paragraph (c)* of the order proposes a single budget for all the WEU organs. This is now the case since the governments have to give their opinion on all the budgets relating to the whole organisation. However, it is inevitable to maintain the separation between the budgets of the ministerial organs which constitute a unit composed of three sections – perhaps four or two after the WEU structures have been reorganised – and the budget of the Assembly. Moreover, for a long time and with sound reasons the Assembly has been asking for greater independence in the exercise of the right to break down its own budget between the various heads and sub-heads within the limits of the overall budget granted by the Council. In present circumstances, it cannot insist on the Council submitting to it for prior authorisation the breakdown of the budget within the heads which concern it. It merely informs the Assembly and asks it for an a posteriori opinion on these heads. This practice conforms well to the nature of the Assembly as defined in the modified Brussels Treaty by ensuring that the Assembly has its due supervisory powers. Your Rapporteur finds it hard to imagine that a very different practice is possible and does not wish Order 63 to lead to the Council having an even greater right to oversee the Assembly than in the past.

115. This right already has serious disadvantages for the Assembly's independence, particularly as it leads with increasing frequency to untoward, petty and irksome interventions by government officials, which make it difficult to apply certain decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, disrupt the work of the Office of the Clerk and detract from the normal progress of the careers of the Assembly officials.

116. *Paragraph (d)* refers to the centralisation of all WEU organs in one place. This is a very logical proposal which has already been the subject of several Assembly recommendations.

Hence it can but endorse this proposal once again, although fully aware that transferring a seat requires slow and difficult negotiations and transactions.

117. Among the “other possibilities suitable further to promote the cause of WEU”, referred to in *paragraph (e)*, your Rapporteur wishes to underline the importance of keeping the press and public opinion properly informed about the Council's work. It would appear that information published in the press following the meeting of experts held in July 1985 to prepare a co-ordinated answer by the seven governments to the American proposal to take part in the SDI was inaccurate and unduly pessimistic. Such vexations would probably have been avoided if the Council had issued a communiqué after that meeting setting out the conclusions.

118. Your Rapporteur well realises the dangers of giving the public information about ongoing negotiations. However, he considers that official information issued jointly by all the parties concerned is preferable to tendentious information resulting from a leak. Moreover, he considers that the development of relations between member countries of the European Community in the last thirty years or more has completely changed the nature of these relations and that traditional diplomatic practice based largely on secrecy has given way to more open methods. The question is whether WEU is prepared to take account of this trend.

119. While keeping, as urged by Order 63, “to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities”, with due respect for the modified Brussels Treaty, your Rapporteur has to be rather restrictive in his answers to the questions raised in this order. He feels that any other form of answer would be liable to call the treaty in question. He does at least consider that all the proposals in his draft recommendation correspond to *paragraph (e)* of the order since they endeavour to take as a basis what is known about the present position of WEU when defining the possibilities available for “promoting the cause of WEU”. He does not wish present circumstances to endanger the fundamental principles to which both the Assembly and the Council have always expressed their attachment.

VI. Conclusions

120. More than a year after the Rome declaration, it is still quite difficult to assess the position with regard to the reactivation of WEU and to know whether it is actually on the way to becoming the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The question is not one of the institutions themselves which, in the present fluctuating situation of the WEU bodies, can be

reorganised as the governments wish. The question is whether it is possible to form such a pillar and whether the governments really wish to do so. No other body, now or in the near future, will be able to achieve this result if the Seven fail to do so within the fairly flexible framework now offered by the WEU bodies which have been freed from their former commitments.

121. The governments must therefore agree upon far more fundamental questions if they wish, in one way or another, to shape a European entity within the Atlantic Alliance and, in spite of progress in this sense, it is not at all certain that they agree on this goal. If it is true that an American objection made them stop examining disarmament matters, that they cannot agree on a definition of the rôle of the WEU agencies, on a joint armaments policy, on the co-ordination of their answers to President Reagan's proposal that Europe participate in the SDI or on giving the Assembly the means to exercise, in a parliamentary context, the task

which they themselves assigned to it, there is every reason to have doubts about the reactivation of WEU and even about the possibility of giving substance to Europe's effective participation in western defence.

122. The Seven probably have little time left to pull themselves together and follow up the intentions set out in the Rome declaration. There are already many signs that these intentions may not be followed up. Yet the Soviet Union and the United States now seem to be considering very new developments in their defence policies and the technology required to back up these policies. If, in the near future, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance do not manage to co-ordinate their views on defence matters and if they fail to develop the new technology being applied in Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States by appropriating the necessary sums for large-scale investment in the development of European technology they may fall so far behind that they will be unable to catch up and may seriously jeopardise their security in the very near future.

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative; ”.

Signed: Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment negatived).

WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

AMENDMENT 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim

2. Leave out paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately; ”.

Signed: Spies von Büllesheim

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment agreed to).

Developments in China and European security

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by MM. Michel and van der Werff, Rapporteurs*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Sir Russell Johnston, Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl (Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Lagneau (Alternate: Pécriaux), Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Muller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet (Alternate: Baumel), Rumpf, van der Sanden (Alternate: de Kwaadsteniet), Spitella, Vecchietti (Alternate: Gianotti), de Vries (Alternate: Tummers).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on developments in China and European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the major part played by China in the world balance and the maintenance of peace and the even more important rôle it will have to play in the near future;
- (ii) Considering that the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas and may develop independently of ideological and institutional differences;
- (iii) Considering that the major aim of the Chinese Government is the country's economic and social development;
- (iv) Considering that a condition of this development is the maintenance of peace in Asia and throughout the world and welcoming the fact that the Chinese Government evidently shares this conviction;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds between China and Western Europe;
- (vi) Deploring developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage all possible initiatives to ensure that current negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons also take the Far East into consideration so as to avoid weapons deployed in Europe being moved towards that region;
2. Study and assess the extent to which Cocom restrictions hinder the continued development of the People's Republic of China;
3. Urge member governments to develop their countries' political, technological and scientific, commercial and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China, in particular by:
 - (i) increasing trade between China and Western European countries;
 - (ii) developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe;
 - (iii) facilitating cultural exchanges, particularly by establishing European cultural institutes in China.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Michel and van der Werff, Rapporteurs)

I. Introduction

1. This text is the third report by the General Affairs Committee on China and European security. The first, presented by Sir Frederic Bennett in 1978, drew attention to China's reappearance on the international stage after a long absence due to the cultural revolution and emphasised that this re-emergence of China as a power, far from being a further threat to Europe and its interests in the world as many people then feared, was on the contrary a factor which would stabilise the balance, serve the cause of international peace and eventually meet Europe's known interests. This report interested the Chinese authorities sufficiently for them to contact the committee, invite an official of the Office of the Clerk to visit China and then invite the committee to visit the People's Republic of China in April 1983.

2. This allowed the committee to instruct Mr. Caro to present a further report which, based on a vast amount of information obtained during the committee's visit to China, was able to go more deeply into the ideas expressed by Sir Frederic. The report helped to inform the West about China's steps to develop its economy in order to improve forthwith the standard of living of its people, to abandon an oppressive system in favour of a renewal of freedoms of all kinds and to foster the resumption of foreign trade, essential for the Chinese economy. Thanks in particular to an address given to it by Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister, the committee's visit to China helped the development of relations between China and Western Europe.

3. It is clear that the report, presented by the committee and adopted by the Assembly in June 1983, gave a picture of developments in the People's Republic of China which the latter considered fair since in 1984 the Institute of Foreign Affairs in Beijing invited the former Rapporteur, who had in the meantime become President of the Assembly, to pay a further visit to China, accompanied by about fifteen parliamentarians. Mr. Caro proposed that the Presidential Committee be invited to make this visit but, since that body does not present political reports, the General Affairs Committee has been asked to draw the conclusions from the visit the dates of which were fixed, by agreement between the Presidential Committee and the Chinese authorities, for the period 7th to 20th October 1985.

4. During its visit, the Presidential Committee was able to visit six provinces: Guanxi,

Sichuan, Shaanxi, Sinkiang, Gansu and Hebei. In each case, it was received by the most senior provincial authorities, given first-hand information about their economic situation and, in Sinkiang, was briefed in detail about the frontiers between that immense province and neighbouring countries. In Beijing, the Presidential Committee was received by Li Xiannian, President of the People's Republic of China, who granted it a one and three-quarter hour audience during which the President described his country's defence policy and answered questions put by the European parliamentarians. The committee was also received by Zhou Nan, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Xu Xin, Vice-President of the Institute of Strategic Studies and Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, Professor Huan Xiang, Director General of the International Study Centre, and many other senior authorities. It also inspected an armoured division in the Beijing area.

5. Each of your Rapporteurs was able to be present for only part of this visit, but between them covered the whole programme. Their report can therefore draw information from the visit to China. They have nevertheless been able to draw on other sources of information from the West or from China which have contributed significantly to shaping their opinions. This has been made easier by the steady improvement in information about China which can be obtained through official Chinese publications, the presence of a growing number of western journalists in China and the increasing prominence given to their articles in our newspapers. In particular, they were able to make use of a major study entitled *Das Reich der Mitte in Reformstimmung* published in Nos. 85, 90, 93, 104, 120, 131, 159 and 225 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in 1985 and of many articles in *Beijing Information*. They were also able to take direct or indirect advantage of the increasing number of exchanges of official or unofficial delegations between Western European countries and China, more business or tourist travel in China and western scientific publications on the People's Republic of China. This spectacular development fully confirms what the committee observed in 1983 and which was set out in Mr. Caro's report. It now remains to follow up and complete what was then written.

6. The present document has therefore drawn much from the Presidential Committee's visit to China but is not merely a report of the visit. It has sought information from a variety of sources and, in the main, expresses the opinion of the Rapporteurs alone.

II. Economic development

7. There is no doubt that China's remarkable economic development, noted by the committee in 1983, is continuing. On the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Chinese revolution on 1st October 1984, Deng Xiaoping announced that the target of quadrupling 1984 agricultural and industrial production by 2000 was realistic. Growth in the period 1979-83 points in this direction but it is doubtful whether it will be possible to maintain this growth rate and bottlenecks which it is possible to remove only by long-term investment might slow down this new great leap forward in the next few years. Admittedly, the seventh five-year plan which is to start in 1986 attempts to solve these problems, particularly in transport and communications, but it is not certain that fifteen years will be enough. There are signs that the development of China has run up against a number of difficulties, some of which can already be listed and to some extent analysed.

8. (a) Application of the policy of the "four modernisations" campaigns defined by Zhou Enlai in 1964 but taken up again systematically by Deng Xiaoping and imposed as from 1978 was a spectacular success. In 1984, China produced 407 million tons of grain as compared with 304 million in 1978, thus allowing it, in spite of a steadily-growing population, not to import any grain for the second year running. Results are believed to be even better for cotton and oilseed.

9. However, agriculture seems to have been developed with little investment and without any noticeable increase in the area cultivated, mainly due to a rise in manpower productivity encouraged by the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products and the release of peasant energy. Thus, agricultural productivity is reported to have increased by 4.8% per year in recent years, which is considerable. However, such a rise cannot be expected to continue for long with these methods alone. Increasingly, higher productivity will require investment and China's means are too limited for it to be able to invest enough in agriculture. The only possibility might be to ask the peasants whose income increased considerably when prices were freed to finance this technological revolution, and this places the Chinese authorities before a delicate choice: either allow a rural aristocracy to re-emerge which can reintroduce a system of exploiting men by invested capital, or resume, through state intervention, at least part of the initiative it had left to the peasants. It is understandable that the Chinese Government is leaving this option open as long as circumstances do not force it to make a difficult choice between official ideology and economic requirements.

10. (b) The third plenum of the twelfth central committee, meeting in Beijing in December 1984, decided that China would not confine itself to improving the way the system worked but would start transforming essential structures by reintroducing the law of the market, extending to towns and the industrial sector measures taken in country areas in 1978; in this way prices would progressively recover their rôle as economic indicators as they were freed and firms would recover their independence at the expense of centralised planning. It is evident that this trend has hardly started, except in certain regions with special economic status.

11. One may wonder whether measures which were a success in the country can be applied in towns without jeopardising certain elements of social and political stability. It is obviously more difficult for rural society than for industrial and urban society to organise itself to defend corporate interests and to translate their economic independence into social and political claims. Already in 1984 there was unrest in certain towns as a protest at the rapid and probably excessive rise in agricultural prices. What would happen if freeing industrial prices and wages were to jeopardise the social discipline and moral order on which the government had so far counted? The western press has reported three violent demonstrations of discontent in the first half of 1985, in Ji'an, Beijing and Tianjin. In the latter case, peasants were demanding a bonus of 7.5 yuan, granted only to town-dwellers, probably because of the rise in agricultural prices.

12. For some time now, even in official publications including, apparently, the People's Daily in December 1984 there have been reports of questioning the relevance of marxism in the economic sector. Admittedly, capitalist pollution is still rejected with horror but one may wonder how much of that pollution can the régime survive and at what point would ideology be called in question. It is clear that it has perceived this danger and, since 1983, a number of repressive measures have been imposed on sectors where the search for a profit had led to disputable results. Thus, the entire administration of the island of Hainan Dao has recently been the subject of inquiries and sanctions for having taken advantage of its position as China's maritime gateway to bring a large number of luxury goods into the markets of mainland China, which was not without serious repercussions on the country's currency reserves, since the equivalent of \$1,600 million is believed to have been diverted in this way by the provincial administration.

13. (c) China's economic development has run up against the weakness of its energy resources. After having stagnated for a long time at about 100 million tons per year, its oil production rose

to 114 million tons in 1984 and its coal production to 770 million tons, placing China in the first rank in the world, but this is not enough for a country of 1,000 million inhabitants in the process of equipping itself. China is therefore considering building up a nuclear energy industry and has been seeking western partners capable of building nuclear plants on its territory. On 10th June 1985, it signed a memorandum with the Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of the German group Siemens, providing for the supply of four pressurised-water reactors, the first of a planned series of ten reactors. The importance of this programme in the eyes of the Chinese leaders can be seen from the fact that they did not hesitate to infringe the principle to which they were nevertheless attached that China should avoid dependence on foreign countries by not asking for credit. The cost price of each plant being almost \$1,000 million, it was able to avoid this drawback, but it seems to have been most exacting in obtaining transfers of technology corresponding to its purchase. Nuclear co-operation agreements have been concluded with a number of other countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Netherlands in 1984 and 1985. However, the drop in oil prices in 1984-85 seems to have slowed down the rate at which nuclear plants are being built.

14. Here too one may wonder how far China is prepared to go towards the progressive adoption of international trade standards. It would appear that a sharp drop in its currency reserves, which are believed to have fallen from \$16,000 to \$8,000 million in a year, particularly due to the development of trade evading state supervision, is placing it before a difficult choice between strengthening exchange controls and related police operations or accepting the risk of a large external debt in order to speed up the rate of industrialisation. So far, the government seems to have taken the limited risks involved in moderate indebtedness, and this is perfectly justified for a country in the process of equipping itself.

15. (d) The policy of decentralisation to the benefit of the provinces, which are henceforth authorised to negotiate directly with foreign firms for the purchase of durable goods, also involves certain risks, particularly evolution at different rates leading to differences in employment, wealth and even food resources. This would strengthen the centrifugal elements which necessarily exist among such a large population spread over such a vast territory. The counter-balance of these risks is obviously the power of a single centralised party, but it seems inevitable that this party will either have to revise its policy of decentralisation or, in turn, submit to its effects.

16. (e) The fundamental question raised by the economic evolution of China today, now that its government has to choose between continuing a policy of liberalisation whose social and political consequences it would have to accept, or reverting to orthodox marxism which would probably comfort the political system left over from the 1949 revolution but which might jeopardise the economic developments which have been launched since 1975, is to know what is the real aim of the Chinese leaders. Do they wish to make China a great power as quickly as possible, capable of playing a leading rôle in the twenty-first century, mastering and applying all modern technology and firmly raising the standard of living of the population, or do they wish to keep in power a party and ideology which would have to resort to authoritarian and repressive methods in order, like the Soviet Union, to maintain a dictatorship which could but grow harsher with the growth in the economic, social, cultural and political consequences of opening up the country? On 11th August 1985, Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, answered this question by defining the aim of the party as being to make China one of the most prosperous and most powerful countries of the twenty-first century. But there are many signs that if this really is the Chinese Government's aim, some sections of the people and party share it in only small part. On this point, there seems to have been a political struggle within the party since the fall of the gang of four.

17. (f) As your Rapporteurs have pointed out, a number of bottlenecks stand in the way of very fast economic growth. Instances noted are the following:

18. (i) The inadequate communications network makes it difficult to transport people and goods from one province to another. The Chinese Government is well aware of this situation and in October 1985 decided to encourage investment, particularly foreign investment, in harbour and rail installations and for several years it has been improving the road and air infrastructure. These are long-term programmes which will inevitably be very expensive. Their effects will not be felt for several years.

19. (ii) Similarly, the weakness of the hotel infrastructure is an obstacle to the development of tourism in China, which was considerable in 1985, and increases the difficulty of establishing economic relations between the Chinese provinces and western firms whose participation is sought in China's economic development.

20. (iii) The non-convertibility of the yuan is also an obstacle to trade. It is certainly still difficult to imagine full convertibility as matters now stand in China but a move towards convertibility of the national currency step by step is

essential if China is to accede to the world market.

21. (iv) The most serious bottleneck facing the Chinese economy is probably due to inadequate training at executive level. A far younger generation is now taking over from the older generation, the generation in between having been the principal victim of the cultural revolution which occurred at the time they should have been at university. But the inadequacy of teaching establishments and the decline in traditional culture which has been only partially replaced by a modern culture mean that the generation which will have to assume heavy responsibilities in firms at a very early age is not well prepared to deal with present-day management problems because it does not have a full grasp of the technical means available. It is not enough to have well-equipped firms; someone must be ready to keep them going, to manage them, to adapt them. It is not certain that the new Chinese managerial staff are ready to meet this challenge, although a few individuals seem to manage. The same remark probably applies to workers at all levels. In any event, this is the impression your Rapporteurs gained from their only too brief contacts with Chinese industrial firms during their visit in 1985.

22. (v) To equip China obviously means resorting to technology, investment and co-operation from countries with more advanced economies. But the Chinese Government's legitimate and praiseworthy concern not to incur too many debts forces it to find immediate large-scale outlets for the country's production. But China's western partners, although prepared to sell, are poor customers for China's industry. They are prepared to import from China only raw materials or low-level agricultural and industrial products or handicrafts. China is not yet close to the position in which it will be able to provide the international market with finished products equal to its equipment requirements in every sector. The same is true for services and even tourism, which is attracted by China's natural and artistic riches but which cannot be received on a large scale because of its underequipment.

23. (vi) Finally, firms seem to be having serious management problems. Your Rapporteurs can do no better in this connection than to quote from the speech by Zhao Ziyang, Prime Minister, on 18th September 1985, explaining the proposal for the seventh five-year plan to the national conference of the Chinese Communist Party:

"... Our enterprises are backward in technology and even more so in management. Therefore, technological transformation should be conducted during the

period of the seventh five-year plan. However, it is even more urgent and of more practical significance to raise operational and management skills. During this period, we must try, through reform, to tighten overall quality control and labour discipline, train workers and staff members so as to increase their professional competence and upgrade the operations of enterprises in every respect. All this must be done if we are to shift the focus of work of enterprises to the improvement of economic efficiency. We should impress on all workers and cadres that improving product quality and reducing the consumption of raw materials are the most practical ways to fulfil the seventh five-year plan..."

24. Furthermore, the West does not like compensated contracts which oblige its exporting industries to become the sales agents for imported goods which they are not equipped to handle. But the West will be able to expand its exports to China only if it makes a determined effort to take Chinese products whether under compensated contracts or not. It is also natural for China to try to develop its trade relations not only with the third world but also with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries which are better able to handle compensated contracts because of the way their economies are organised. By about 1980, Sino-Soviet trade had fallen to an extremely low level for political reasons. It increased considerably in 1984 and 1985 although it does not yet represent a large proportion of China's trade, but it is to be expected that this increase will continue, particularly if the more serious causes of tension between the two countries can be overcome. Europe should not be over-concerned about this because it must realise that the Chinese leaders have no intention of reverting to the position where China depended on the Soviet Union in the years after the 1949 revolution. China is trying to diversify its economic and trade partners, which at present means increasing its trade with planned-economy countries. Europe, which would benefit from any development of China's trade, has nothing to fear; it must merely ensure that it too offers China conditions which are favourable to the development of its own trade with China.

25. However, some mystery remains about the organisation of production in China: firms receive raw materials and supply finished products and prices are fixed without direct reference to costs. For instance, in the rest of the world, the petrochemical industry is in the hands of a small number of persons – managers, technical staff and workers – whereas in China the industry employs more than 50% more staff than would be normal, the aim being to provide

additional, or superfluous, posts to reduce unemployment. Admittedly, labour costs are not very high.

26. The management of the Chinese economy is naturally not the business of Europeans, yet considerations about China's domestic régime must not prevent them from developing their economic or even political and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China. Nevertheless, insofar as the choices made in the next few years will lead to long-term trends, Europe must take these matters into account. Many European firms have already gambled on the pursuit of the liberal trend which began ten years ago and have used the investment possibilities offered by China to secure a place in a market which they expect to expand quickly. But the European countries too need to foresee what kind of economic and political partner they can expect to find in China. In this connection, recent political developments in the People's Republic of China can provide them with useful pointers.

III. Political developments

27. There have been no spectacular changes in China since 1983, but signs have been noted of a desire to break progressively with the past and to improve the Chinese people's share in running the country. In this connection, there can be no doubt that the national conference of the Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing in September 1985 was of very great interest.

28. There have been reports in the western press of the fact that younger officials are being appointed to positions in the party, state and provincial administrations. For instance, in June 1985 eight ministers, six of whom had reached the age of 65, were replaced by persons whose average age was under 55. Similarly, the Party's Political Bureau has been reduced to twenty full members and two alternates instead of twenty-five and four, and six of its members are newcomers who are much younger than the others. Many other leaders have been asked to retire and, in the civil service, retiring age has been lowered to sixty. It has been announced that the present leaders will withdraw in the next few years and many of those moving into positions of responsibility have had modern training, including in some cases women such as Mrs. Wan Shaopen who has just been appointed Governor of the Province of Jiangxi at the age of 54. Many of them are engineers and technicians.

29. In 1984, the party completely reviewed its lists of members and excluded those whose behaviour might be detrimental to its reputation and also many persons responsible for the

excesses of the cultural revolution and probably opponents of the more open policy. This purge appears to have affected several hundred thousand party members. In December 1984, the People's Daily published two editorials questioning the universal truth of the thoughts and writings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, emphasising that marxism was not a dogma but a guide to action and that Deng Xiaoping had moved away from orthodoxy with his economic policy to ensure China's prosperity thanks to foreign investment, recourse to market forces and limited freedom for firms. One of these editorials moreover took as an authority the words of Mao Zedong underlining the need for realism.

30. But there are other areas in which the Presidential Committee's visit to China allowed useful information to be obtained, although this was not necessarily the aim of its enquiries. Your Rapporteurs will therefore merely make a few comments without claiming to reach firm conclusions. It is clear, for instance, that there is still dissension among the Chinese leaders about the principal courses which the country should follow, but no official information was given in this connection.

31. It was very apparent that decentralisation has become a fact and that the provincial authorities now have a wider margin of independence than before, particularly in regard to economic initiatives, including those involving relations with countries, regions and firms outside China. The initiatives taken by some of these provincial authorities show a desire at least as great as that of the central government to activate regional economic development and to open the door to the outside world. But integrating these local or provincial wishes into national planning obviously raises certain problems, and your Rapporteurs were unable to determine to what extent they had been solved.

32. Nor is there any doubt that discussion of major economic and social options is more open than in the past. Various opinions are to be heard about government policy and the forces which exist within the party itself, although the Chinese press is still very conformist in its references to the policy pursued by the government. This at least provides an abundance of information and your Rapporteurs could not fail to be struck by the good will shown by all the political and industrial leaders they met, not only in their briefings but also in their detailed, objective and sincere answers to the questions put. The fact that military staff of various ranks spoke without restraint and likewise answered the questions put to them by foreign parliamentarians should be strongly emphasised.

33. Procedure for appointing the representatives of the people in legislative bodies is

obviously a test of progress towards a representative system and of the people's endorsement of government policy. Your Rapporteurs were unable to go deeply into this matter, but noted that some of those elected did not represent the party and that even among party candidates some were removed by the electorate at the last elections because of their attitudes towards major questions now being discussed in connection with the guidelines to be adopted for the country. Similarly, it appeared that it was possible to reach fairly senior posts in firms without belonging to the party.

34. It is evident that there is a political discussion in China about the fundamental question of the shape of the "four modernisations", i.e. about the kind of power which the state and party should exercise, first in economic matters and subsequently in the overall life of the country. This discussion is no longer held, as in the past, in secret among a small group of leaders, but nor is it an open discussion, as it would be in western countries. It is a hushed discussion in which the uniformity of words and principles expressed may conceal very different attitudes and in which it is difficult for the outside observer to determine the ins and outs.

35. It immediately became apparent that there was a very wide consensus in the country on three essential points: maintaining the national unity restored by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, priority for economic development and rejection of the cultural revolution whose adverse effects are still being felt. Within this consensus, there are signs of divergences between advocates of early, radical liberalisation and supporters of the predominance of marxist-leninist ideology. It is clear that the leaders around Deng Xiaoping have to ensure that this consensus is maintained on important matters, avoiding a rupture with the two main tendencies, thus forcing them to fight on two fronts: against those abusing their new-found freedom and thus providing arguments for the conservatives – and everything indicates that such people are sometimes repressed severely – and against those who toe the ideological line too strictly and who would thus paralyse liberal development; this seems to be the course followed by the recent purges within the party.

36. Is it possible to say which elements of society are to be found on each side? The western press has sometimes given indications, for instance placing army leaders on the side of the orthodox marxist-leninists, but your Rapporteurs saw no proof of this, except perhaps in the importance attached to political instruction, i.e. the teaching of marxism-leninism, among the troops and in military academies. They also felt it was the younger elements, at least in the circles to which they had access, who were the

most in favour of early, radical liberalisation, while older people were at least more cautious.

37. In spite of the existence of such divergences, the breadth of the basic consensus should not be underestimated. But it is to be feared that the obstacles which continued economic development will inevitably encounter may bring grist to internal quarrels whose consequences are difficult to foresee. Hence there is no doubt that if Europe wishes China to become a strong economic partner and, above all, an important factor of political stability and balance in Asia and throughout the world, it is in Europe's interest to encourage China's economic development and to steer well away from anything that might appear to be intervention in the country's internal affairs.

IV. Chinese power

38. When it visited China in 1983, the committee obtained very little information about Chinese military strength. The President of the Assembly asked the Chinese authorities to ensure that the visit planned for 1985 enabled participants to obtain a better idea of the policy of the People's Republic of China in this area. The Presidential Committee's conversations with the President of the Republic were concerned mainly with China's defence policy and the information thus obtained was further elaborated in meetings with several civil and military leaders. Moreover, it has now become easier to know more about Chinese military power since the publication of an important study in France in 1984¹. There is no question of your Rapporteurs trying to summarise this book, but it was a great help to them in their perception of the defence problems of the People's Republic of China.

39. Information obtained in 1983 showed Chinese defence to be based on a policy of deterrence whose three main components were number, space and time, thus indicating that the Chinese leaders were making no secret of the obsolescence of their weapons nor the inadequacy of their doctrine in face of the requirements of modern warfare. However, at that time China had conducted nuclear tests and it was known to have long-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Chinese army had been deployed along the Ussuri and in Mongolia, in India and on the Vietnamese frontier in conditions which did not allow implementation of the people's war doctrine as defined by Mao Zedong. More recent information only confirms that China's defence policy is far more elaborate and much better adapted to changing

1. Georges Tan Eng bok: *La modernisation de la défense chinoise et ses principales limites - 1977-1983*, published by the *Fondation pour les études de défense nationale*, Paris, 1984 (380 octavo pages).

circumstances than the Chinese leaders allowed it to be thought in 1983.

40. Moreover, the Chinese Government has taken a number of new measures which suggest that its doctrine has changed considerably. In 1983, China's army of about 4 million men was the largest in the world. However, this means only 4 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants compared with 4 soldiers per 300 inhabitants in the Soviet Union, 4 per 200 inhabitants in Vietnam and 4 per 400 to 500 inhabitants in Western Europe and the United States. In other words, the ratio between the army and the population is one of the lowest among the great powers. Yet in 1984 the Chinese Government decided to reduce troop levels by a quarter, bringing them down to 3 million, i.e. about 4 soldiers per 1,300 inhabitants and an overall level similar to that of the Soviet Union. In addition to this army, however, there is a people's militia, obviously ill-equipped to wage modern warfare, often not even armed and composed of young men about to start their military service or who have just completed it. It receives some training, but serves only as a reserve, an instrument of deterrence against invasion and a peace-keeping force.

41. This probably indicates that without renouncing the deterrent value of the huge population in the event of an invasion, the Chinese authorities tried to economise by reducing the numbers in service. Conversely, they seem to have made considerable efforts to improve the equipment of their forces. Some observers have deduced that priority was now being given to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, thanks inter alia to the development of missiles with multiple warheads. Officers have also had further training and younger officers have been recruited, there is specialisation in each branch of military training, there has been a general improvement in weapons, logistic support and engineering. The people's militia has been reorganised and new deployment doctrines have been drawn up, particularly in relation to the search for local superiority and counter-offensive. During manoeuvres in Ningxia in 1982, consideration was given for the first time to tactical nuclear weapons being used by the Chinese army. In fact, victories in India, setbacks in Vietnam and on the Ussuri and defeats in Mongolia point to a significant modernisation of the Chinese forces which are having difficulty in adapting themselves to parameters which are not those of revolutionary warfare.

42. In 1983, China was undoubtedly busy working out a new strategy and new tactics commensurate with its technical capability with a view to pursuing, with various degrees of success, a defence policy rather different to what it was then claimed to be.

43. In addition to the People's Liberation Army, Chinese sources admittedly underline the existence of a large people's militia which closely resembles the picture the West may conjure up of the people under arms. In August 1981, Fu Zhong, Assistant Director of the General Political Department, published an article stressing the fact that the People's Liberation Army and the militia were merely two separate aspects of the people under arms, in the context of the unified armed force system, a legacy of the doctrines of the revolutionary mobilisation of the people formerly worked out by Mao. But once there are well-trained, well-equipped forces, their tasks will most probably diverge increasingly from those of the people's militia.

44. It would perhaps be simplistic to claim that one is responsible for defending frontiers and the other for keeping internal public order, but in the long run a system of this kind tends to lead to such a difference in tasks. Furthermore, the 1982 constitution, unlike those of 1975 and 1978, no longer underlines the omnipotent, omnipresent nature of the Chinese Communist Party but makes the army subject to state authority. The party admittedly continues to dominate and control the state, but the distinction drawn between their respective areas of responsibility is certainly not without significance. It should be added that when Deng Xiaoping gave up most of his party and state duties between 1981 and 1983 he retained the chairmanship of the party's Military Affairs Committee, thus ensuring that military authority remained subject to that of the state.

45. An examination of known data about the formation and deployment of the Chinese armed forces confirms the impression that in the past ten years they have been moving quickly towards the modernisation of armaments and logistics at the expense of troop levels. To a growing extent, known manoeuvres and the equipment used indicate that the use of Chinese forces is planned in terms resembling those for western armed forces. This does not mean that there are not still a number of weak points, particularly armaments, but it seems that priority is now being given to means which would allow modern warfare to be waged, i.e. which would allow China to use force not only for a defensive strategy but also to back offensive action in East Asia. While it is clear that the People's Republic of China is far from being equipped to face up to the very great powers, it may in a few years' time have the wherewithal to act against Taiwan or Vietnam, if it manages to isolate one or other of these potential opponents, which it has not yet managed to do.

46. Finally, China has developed nuclear weapons which it is steadily perfecting. However, these weapons are not a threat to the United States or the Soviet Union and are not

close to being so. The Chinese Government seems to attribute only a limited deterrent rôle to them, there being no question of relying on them to ward off a conventional attack, but merely to discourage a potential enemy from using his own nuclear weapons, which, politically, means the will to withstand nuclear blackmail. This gives the measure of the true value of conventional weapons. President Li Xiannian told members of the Presidential Committee that China considered all nuclear weapons to be strategic from the moment they could reach the territory of another country. However, there are differences between information given in the western press about the recent development of China's nuclear capability and ballistic arsenal and the very modest place accorded to them in the speeches by Chinese leaders.

47. However, at the march past on 1st October 1984 marking the thirty-fifth anniversary of the People's Republic of China, and again at the one on 10th October 1985, foreign observers were struck by the presentation of many sophisticated weapons produced in China itself: new tanks, jeeps, armoured troop carriers, self-propelled guns up to a calibre of 150 mm, medium-range missiles and CSS-NX4 submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to the Military Balance 1984-85, China has a Xia-class submarine capable of launching twelve missiles with a range of 2,800 km, but four are believed to be under construction out of a total programme of eleven submarines. The first missile firing from a submarine dates back to October 1982. The very rapid progress made by China in regard to launchers should also be underlined, although it produces only light-weight satellites not exceeding 50 kg. But it has just proposed two launchers on the world market which would be rivals of the European Ariane rocket and NASA means of delivery. Moreover, it is the world's fourth power for satellites, after the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan, since it has launched fourteen and there is little doubt that the Chinese space programme also has military aspects as was shown at the last Le Bourget air show.

48. However, certain observers consider that China's capability is still limited, particularly when moving from the prototype stage to mass production. They point out that most new conventional weapons produced by China are still developments of Soviet models from about thirty years ago and that progress in the armaments industries has been far slower than in other industries since 1972. However, progress has been noted recently in the production of military aircraft and helicopters. Furthermore, everything indicates that major efforts have been made to modernise the training of officers, to

initiate them in inter-service co-operation, and of the troops, thanks to an increase in the number of regular forces, the recruitment of younger officers and the use of new equipment such as laser simulators which the Presidential Committee saw being used in the armoured unit it visited. The Chinese authorities did not conceal the fact that the recent decision to reduce troop levels from four to three million men was intended to allow military expenditure to be diverted to the modernisation of conventional weapons.

49. However, it is clear that the Chinese army still has weaknesses compared with more modern armies which, according to Tan Eng bok, are to be found mainly in all aspects of electronic warfare, air defence, particularly for low altitude penetration or in cloudy weather, and both tactical and strategic mobility. However, while your Rapporteurs share the author's view that experience of low-intensity fighting which the Soviet army acquired from its operations in Afghanistan may diminish the effectiveness of Chinese action along its communication and logistic support lines in the event of invasion, they do not agree with his view that the rusticity of the theatre of operations makes the Soviet forces' material superiority over the People's Liberation Army more relative. They wonder, in fact, whether experience from the war in Mongolia in 1969 did not prove precisely the reverse: in the wide open spaces of the steppes, Soviet technological superiority seems to have had the maximum effect.

50. Another subject of controversy is the amount of China's military expenditure. According to Chinese sources consulted by your Rapporteurs, expenditure amounts to about 1.7% of GNP, which would be a very small proportion. However, the Military Balance points out that comparisons with other countries are extremely difficult because, on the one hand, Chinese GNP is not calculated in the same way as that of western countries and, on the other hand, the Chinese military budget, published in 1983 and 1984, does not show all the expenditure which would be included in the corresponding heads of western budgets. However this may be, even if it is more than the 1.7% of GNP quoted by the Chinese authorities, the Chinese defence budget is still a small one. The 25% reduction in troop levels decided in 1984 should allow some saving in pay and maintenance so as to be able to modernise conventional weapons which in many sectors seem extremely decrepit.

51. President Li Xiannian drew the Presidential Committee's attention to the fact that defence was last on the list of the "four modernisations", after agriculture, basic industry and science and technology. He stressed that it was above all economic progress that would provide

the basis for China's security and productive investment had "priority in time" over military expenditure. Nothing the Presidential Committee noted, moreover, allows this policy to be doubted.

52. This situation explains the positions adopted by China in disarmament matters, as the President of the Republic also explained to the Presidential Committee. Indeed, China is mainly concerned about ending the qualitative arms race throughout the world because it does not wish the gap separating it from the great powers to grow even wider. Thus, it advocates a very large reduction in the nuclear arsenals of both great powers and is against President Reagan's strategic defence initiative and any other military use of space which, according to President Li Xiannian, must remain "the common property of mankind". Conversely, the Chinese authorities seem to welcome the efforts made by Western Europe to organise its defence and improve its armaments.

53. Hence, it is through the progressive modernisation of its conventional weapons and the development of its air force and navy that China intends to support its more active diplomatic efforts, the enormous potential levels of its militia and its nuclear armaments remaining complementary factors designed essentially to safeguard national territory through deterrence and, in the case of tactical nuclear weapons, to guarantee that the potential adversary cannot remain sole master of a possible escalation.

V. External policy

54. It is quite clear that China's external policy today corresponds to a number of principles stemming from the means at its disposal, its situation in the world, problems inherited from the past and its hopes for the future. They may be defined as follows:

- (i) to avoid major clashes, particularly with the two great powers;
- (ii) to keep external threats away from its frontiers;
- (iii) to assert itself as a great power, since otherwise it cannot expect to have a say in world affairs, or above all in Asian affairs, relying mainly on the third-world countries;
- (iv) to abide by the principle of the integrity of Chinese territory as it existed before the unequal treaties of the nineteenth-century;
- (v) to maintain economic and other relations with countries which can help its development, without any of them

gaining a place in the Chinese economy that might threaten China's independence;

- (vi) to develop exchanges of all kinds, including cultural exchanges, with Western Europe in view of the high degree of convergence between the Chinese and European perception of conditions for maintaining peace in the world.

55. The consequences of this programme are many and the first of them concerns *Sino-Soviet relations* which, after a period of close co-operation lasting about ten years after the Chinese revolution, deteriorated to a point at which there were several armed confrontations. It is clear that the programme of "four modernisations" requires a period of calm free of the threat of conflict and allowing military expenditure to be reduced in the wake of the firm steps already taken in 1980 and 1985. According to recent Chinese sources, such expenditure has fallen from 16.3% to 11.9% of the country's budget, a relatively low proportion, but it is known that indications of figures must be accepted with circumspection. However, they show a tendency which cannot fail to have serious implications for China's external policy and in particular for its relations with its Soviet neighbour. They explain why bilateral talks have been held for the last five years for normalising Sino-Soviet relations.

56. The Chinese authorities have obviously no intention of reverting to the situation as it was before 1960, i.e. one of almost exclusive dependence in economic, foreign policy and ideological matters, in other words the internal management of the country. That period of close co-operation left bitter memories, and the only reason for seeking closer contact with the Soviet Union seems to be the prospect of diversifying external relations, particularly economic and trade, and consolidating peace which China needs for a long time to come, although the Chinese authorities are not altogether convinced of the peaceful intentions proclaimed by the Kremlin.

57. Your Rapporteurs were in fact able to see that Sino-Soviet relations were less tense than in 1983 and leaders from the two countries meet periodically to try to improve them. The seventh round of meetings was held in October 1985. The Soviet Union and China had already signed an agreement in July for the modernisation of seventeen Chinese firms by the Soviets and the creation of seven new firms. There is expected to be a spectacular development in trade between the two countries in the next five years. But political difficulties remain. China is certainly soft-peddalling on its claim to have the nineteenth-century unequal treaties abro-

gated, but the Soviet Union is prepared to make no concessions on this point, any more than on the three major Chinese claims: Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and withdrawal of Soviet forces and missiles from Central Asia. Although there has been a sharp increase, Sino-Soviet trade is still not very significant and while some détente between the two governments was noted at Mr. Chernenko's funeral, it is developing only very slowly, which points to difficulties ahead.

58. It is the question of *Cambodia* that has the most serious effect on relations between China and its neighbours. However, there has been some evolution. Whereas the Khmer Rouge had hitherto dominated the opposition and had China's support, the latter has become far more favourably inclined towards other groups in that opposition, and in particular the coalition leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Moreover, the announcement in September 1985 that the leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, was retiring will probably encourage reconciliation between the coalition factions and should facilitate support from a number of other countries.

59. Admittedly, the Vietnamese army's military successes in Eastern Cambodia and its pressure on Thailand have allowed the area under the control of the Pnom Penh régime to be extended but they also consolidated the hostility of the ASEAN countries to Vietnam which has still not managed to have this régime recognised by the United Nations. This is one of the many points on which the positions of the Western European countries are very close to those of China, since they all consider the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces to be the condition for the restoration of peace in Cambodia.

60. A consequence of this matter has been to force China to keep a large force along the *Vietnamese frontier*, where there are continual skirmishes, although past incidents at the time of the offensive in Eastern Cambodia encouraged Beijing to be cautious in bringing pressure to bear on Vietnam. Furthermore, disputes about control over the P'eng-hu Lieh-tao Islands compel China to keep naval forces in the South China Sea and reduces its means of action vis-à-vis Taiwan. But Beijing's only condition for restoring normal relations with Vietnam is the evacuation of Cambodia.

61. Recent information indicates that the Cambodian resistance movement had some success during the summer of 1985. Furthermore, the government in Hanoi has undertaken to evacuate Cambodia before 1990. Although the Chinese authorities seem to have only very limited confidence in these promises, there have been clear signs of détente in Sino-Vietnamese relations in recent months. There is little doubt

that the Soviet Union for its part is encouraging détente between the two countries.

62. China seems to have few illusions about the concessions it can expect from the Soviet Union in regard to its other two conditions for the re-establishment of normal relations. It is even afraid that the development of Soviet-American talks on Euromissiles may lead to a greater concentration of Soviet nuclear armaments along its western frontier as Mr. Gromyko proposed in his speech in Bonn on 17th January 1983.

63. It gives the Afghan question only third place in its list of claims on the Soviet Union, although the Chinese leaders consider the Soviet operation to be an imperialist one and that its true aim is to allow the Soviet Union to have access to the southern oceans. China affirms its support for the Afghan resistance movement, but bearing in mind that the Sino-Afghan frontier is in a very inaccessible region, that the roads leading from Afghanistan to China are controlled by the Soviet Union, that China affords the Afghan resistance movement very little support and that there are very few Afghan refugees in China, it can be seen that China does not consider Afghanistan to be an area vital for its security.

64. The frontiers between China and the Soviet Union have raised serious problems and caused several armed conflicts in recent decades. During the second half of the nineteenth century, tsarist Russia extended its territory in Central Asia and the Far East at the expense of the Chinese empire, prevented by its weakness from defending its territory effectively. The 1860 Beijing treaty ratified a de facto situation which was favourable to Russia but the latter continued its expansionist policy and in 1884 a second treaty recognised the annexation of 440,000 sq.km. of territory which had hitherto been Chinese. In all, these two treaties deprived China of 540,000 sq.km. They did not put an end to Russian and subsequently Soviet encroachment which in 1949 took in a further 30,000 sq.km. Moreover, the state of Mongolia was set up at the expense of the Chinese empire. These annexations were often obtained when frontiers were fixed unilaterally on the spot by the Russians under the treaties which the Chinese called unequal. Their government was unable to exercise its right to take part in fixing frontiers or to defend lines which had already been fixed and which were moved unilaterally by the Russians. Only after the end of the Korean war did China start to take serious defensive action against this steady encroachment, but it did not always have the upper hand.

65. Nevertheless, China and the Soviet Union have achieved a relatively stable frontier. Its

length and the fact that it crosses desert and often mountainous regions inhabited by nomad shepherds of the same ethnic origins on both sides cause frequent incidents but, on the Chinese side at least, there seems to be no wish to allow them to degenerate into hostilities. Members of the Presidential Committee had the impression that China was not applying its birth control legislation to Sin Kiang but that its policy was, on the contrary, aimed at strengthening national minorities.

66. China now seems to be showing great moderation in this matter. It is anxious to restore normal relations – which of course does not mean privileged – with the Soviet Union and is trying to reach an agreement which might be based on the 1860 and 1884 treaties, i.e. to fix frontiers accurately by recovering territories acquired by the Soviet Union without this being confirmed by treaty. Should there be restitution, China would agree to negotiations based on the principle of reciprocal compensation. It would be prepared to give up its right to territories acquired by the Soviet Union on the basis of treaties only on condition that the Soviet Union recognises that these were unequal treaties because of the failings of the Chinese empire at the time they were concluded and implemented. This is a very ambiguous requirement since the notion of unequal treaty has no legal meaning and there is little doubt that by using it China is looking to the future. It is not therefore surprising that so far the Soviet Union has not been very receptive towards these proposals, but there are signs that Mr. Gorbachev's government might be more flexible than its predecessors.

67. It is evident that Europe has no reason to take umbrage at a reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union which would not jeopardise the independence of China's policy whether at home or abroad. It would be absurd to place China before a choice between East and West which it does not want and cannot make for reasons both of internal stability and external policy, not the least aspect of which is continued American support for Taiwan. For all these reasons, your Rapporteurs wish to warn against a too hasty and unduly negative western reaction in the event of China developing its relations with the Soviet Union in the coming years, as seems likely.

68. Relations between China and the western countries have in fact continued to develop since 1983. Similarly, *Sino-American relations* have improved although, in spite of the visit by Zhao Ziyang, Chinese Prime Minister, to the United States in 1984, they have not taken a decisive turn. The dispute between the two countries relates first to the *Taiwan relations act* which the Chinese Government thought jeopardised the advantages it expected to derive from the

resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States on its renunciation of the two-China doctrine. American slowness in applying the decision to reduce arms deliveries to Taiwan and stubborn opposition to the delivery of high-technology products to China, particularly large-capacity computers because they might be used for military purposes, still cause sharp discontent in Beijing.

69. The *Taiwan* question is far more delicate because the government in T'ai-pei is not prepared to recognise China's sovereignty over the island and continues to claim to be the only legitimate government of the whole of China. It has refused to negotiate with Beijing on Taiwan's possible return to China. The Chinese Government has to face the fact that if the future of Taiwan is not settled in the next ten years its return to China will become increasingly problematical owing to differences in the evolution of mainland China and of the island. It has moreover never excluded the possibility of using military means to bring Taiwan back under Chinese sovereignty although, since 1979, it has stopped bombing Taiwan's dependent islands which are close to the Chinese coast and now speaks of reunifying the two parts of China rather than liberating the island. In fact, it is now using peaceful means to defend its cause but it does not want renunciation of the use of force to make the authorities in Formosa even more unyielding.

70. Since 1979, there have been repeated offers, particularly after the agreement on Hong Kong, to hold negotiations between Guo Min Dang and the Chinese Communist Party. The purpose would be to make Taiwan an administrative region with a special statute allowing the inhabitants of Taiwan to take part in running the central state and allowing them to retain independent jurisdiction, armed forces, administration and even their own intelligence network. They would retain their freedom in budgetary, fiscal and foreign trade matters. They would be free to travel, even in mainland China, and their property and economic system would be respected.

71. So far, the Taiwan authorities have preferred to consider offers from Beijing as mere propaganda, arguing that uncertainty about the future of the Chinese régime meant that the word of its present leaders might not hold in the future and that they could not recognise its liberalisation because of the inadequacy of the reforms introduced. Their reasons are of a domestic nature: the per capita gross national product is ten times higher in Taiwan than on the mainland, making reunification unattractive, and the Formosans are showing some reaction against Chinese immigrants. In spite of the growing part played by the original inhabitants of Taiwan in Guo Min Dang's government, an

independence movement is emerging in the island. Finally, they know that although the military balance is not in their favour, China cannot, with impunity, remove troops from its frontiers, particularly in the south and west, for an operation against Taiwan, and the United States Taiwan relations act of 10th April 1979 guarantees American support for the island's authorities. As emphatically recalled by Zhao Ziyang during his visit to the United States in January 1984, Beijing considers this act contrary to international law and is insisting that it be repealed.

72. Beijing's policy towards Taiwan is therefore still marking time. The most it can do is firmly reject the two-China doctrine, endeavour to have Taiwan expelled from the last international organisations where it still occupies its place and forbid all its partners to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan and supply it with weapons. Even the United States Government has undertaken to reduce progressively its supplies of arms to Taiwan and since the incident provoked by the sale of two Netherlands submarines in 1980, relations between the Netherlands and China have returned to normal, the other Western European countries refraining from supplying arms to Taiwan.

73. In the eyes of the Chinese Government the Taiwan question is therefore far from solved and is a fairly heavy drag on its foreign and defence policies. It is quite obvious that remaining on good terms with China means pursuing a cautious policy towards Taiwan although Europe has active trade with the island. When questioned by members of the Presidential Committee, moreover, the Chinese authorities did not deny that the People's Republic of China too was trading with Taiwan, although, it was affirmed, on a small scale.

74. Even easier are *China's relations with Japan* on the one hand and with the *Western European countries* on the other. Japan is naturally still the leading supplier of equipment to China, but China's concern not to become unduly dependent on a supplier, customer or possibly creditor who plays too large a part in Chinese affairs is in fact making the Beijing Government try to develop its trade with the West and also with its Far Eastern neighbour, which is obviously very well-placed for penetrating the Chinese market, but it is at a disadvantage because of certain disputes dating back to the Sino-Japanese war and fear of it occupying, by peaceful means, the positions it occupied prior to 1945. In 1983, Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang impressed upon the General Affairs Committee the importance he attached to co-operation between China and Europe and indeed he and the Chinese Government have made repeated visits to Western Europe and North America and received a

number of leaders from Western European countries in 1984, such as Chancellor Kohl, Mrs. Thatcher, Juan Carlos, King of Spain, and Mr. Eanes, President of Portugal, not to speak of many third-world leaders, whereas the only ranking leader of the Soviet bloc received during that year was Mr. Arkhipov, Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.

75. Developments in the Hong Kong and Cambodian questions have facilitated relations with Western Europe, whose only difficulties perhaps stem from the application of Cocom rules banning the delivery of certain equipment to the eastern countries. The European members of the Atlantic Alliance must seek to remove as quickly as possible the remaining obstacles to trade with a country which there is no reason to assimilate with the Soviet Union's allies, whatever its economic, social and political options may be.

76. The Chinese Government had a major success when it signed a joint declaration with the United Kingdom on the future status of *Hong Kong*. This was of no mean importance since, although the territory in question is small, its economic activity is considerable. The main question was what kind of régime would be applied after its return to China. To a certain extent, the attitude adopted by China's partners in a far more serious matter, that of Taiwan, will depend on the establishment of a régime acceptable to the population of Hong Kong and to international society as a whole.

77. While the United Kingdom was prepared to accept the return of the entire territory of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, it was anxious to ensure that it retained economic freedom and a certain degree of political independence, and China agreed to negotiate on that basis, as summed up in the slogan "one country, two régimes" which allowed an agreement to be signed on 19th December 1984 to the satisfaction of both parties. In this matter, China was most uncompromising about the question of sovereignty but extremely moderate in the pressure it exercised to this end, since it tried neither to cause trouble nor to isolate the British colony in order to reach a solution more in conformity with its views on economic management. Finally, the status of Hong Kong should leave it a broad degree of independence and allow it to remain a leading commercial centre and China's gateway to the rest of the world.

78. Naturally, when this agreement was announced there were reactions, albeit limited, from individuals and firms which had invested in Hong Kong. The territory has remained active and there are signs, including widespread building in housing, ports and industry, that business has resumed and that confidence in the

future is still strong. The Shenzhen economic area on the People's Republic of China side of the Hong Kong frontier has developed considerably. It trades with Hong Kong on a large scale and the Hong Kong dollar is used there on the same basis as the Chinese yuan.

79. This steady progress in relations between China and Western Europe was demonstrated by the signature in Brussels on 21st May 1985 of a trade co-operation agreement between the People's Republic of China and the European Community, represented by the Chairman-in-Office of its Council, Mr. Andreotti. The official communiqué, issued by both parties, summed up the agreement as follows:

"Of the main provisions of the agreement, the following should be noted:

(a) *as regards trade*, the agreement adopts the provisions of the non-preferential trade agreement concluded in 1978 for a period of five years and renewed since then from year to year;

(b) *as regards economic co-operation*

(i) the agreement stipulates that within the limits of their respective competence, the two parties will develop economic co-operation in all the spheres subject to common accord. In this connection, it cites:

- industry and mining;
- agriculture, including agro-industry;
- science and technology;
- energy;
- transport and communications;
- environmental protection;
- co-operation in third countries;

(ii) the agreement provides for the encouragement of various forms of industrial and technical co-operation, such as joint production and joint ventures, the transfer of technology, visits and the organisation of seminars, technical assistance, including the training of staff, a continuous exchange of information, etc.;

(iii) the agreement also contains provisions aimed at promoting investment and improving the favourable investment climate;

(iv) the Community states, for its part, that it is prepared, within the context of its development aid activities, within the means at its disposal and in accordance with its rules, to continue its development activities in China. Thus, the Community intends to continue its efforts, for example, in the spheres of agriculture and energy in

the form, in particular, of technical assistance, transfers of technology and training activities.

(c) As in the 1978 agreement, a joint committee is required to manage the new agreement. Its tasks will be, in particular, to examine means and new opportunities of developing trade and economic co-operation and to make recommendations.

(d) The agreement is concluded for a period of five years and may be tacitly renewed from year to year."

80. If this agreement is compared with Zhao Ziyang's statement to the General Affairs Committee in 1983, it can be seen how far trade has increased between Western Europe and the People's Republic of China in directions desired by both the Chinese authorities and members of the committee.

81. However, there still seem to be obstacles to the development of relations between Europe and the People's Republic of China. First is the lack of balance in their trade relations. Wishing to ensure a relative balance in its trade and payments, China's partners in Europe are prepared to sell it European products even on most favourable terms. They are more hesitant, however, about concluding contracts involving their firms with Chinese firms which are generally nationalised. Finally, relations with the People's Republic of China are very unbalanced because Chinese products do not easily find buyers on European markets.

82. But the picture of China's external policy would not be complete if limited to this list of problems and relations. What seems far more important is that China is really in the process of becoming a world power, which was not so apparent in 1983. Its diplomacy is active and increasing its representatives throughout the world, particularly in third-world countries, and it seems to be taking an active interest in the problems of the Pacific Ocean, not to speak of Africa. It is making itself heard more than ever before in the United Nations and other international organisations.

83. Its press is very active and shows a keen interest in European questions just as, moreover, the European press gives an ever-growing place to Chinese questions. Contacts with Chinese leaders of all ages, but in particular with the younger ones, and at all levels of responsibility, even in the most remote provinces of western China, convinced the members of the Presidential Committee that everywhere there was a very strong desire for an opening towards Europe. Although Western Europe's interest in China really exists, it has not yet been translated into

an adequate economic effort, nor has enough been done to become acquainted with the country, its language and its civilisation.

VI. Conclusions

84. The Presidential Committee's recent visit to China allowed your Rapporteurs to obtain much valuable information. It can first be seen that relations between the People's Republic of China and Western Europe have never been so good or promising, particularly from an economic standpoint. Far from harming Europe's interests or international peace, the growing power of the Chinese state seems on the contrary to be improving the balance of forces in the world. Western Europe might use this fact as basis for extending its dialogue with China to political and military matters relating to the security of both parties and world peace.

85. But this is possible only on the condition that Europe makes no mistake about what it might expect from the People's Republic of China, which has neither the means nor the intention of forming part of an alliance to bring threats or pressure to bear on the Soviet Union from the other side. In spite of efforts to modernise its weaponry its military power is limited and will remain so for a long time to come, its main purpose being to defend Chinese territory. This course seems to guarantee that the rôle China can play will be above all for détente and the promotion of peace. It is abundantly clear that the Chinese authorities have absolutely no intention of taking joint military action with the West nor do they wish to upset the balance of trade further by the large-scale procurement of weapons in the West.

86. Again, it is evident that the convergences which the Chinese Government likes to stress between European views and its own are a fact, particularly in regard to Asian affairs which are still foremost among Chinese concerns. They may be turned to advantage in the common interest and for the promotion of international peace if Europe supports the legitimate but limited claims of the Chinese Government in that area. For instance, however the situation in Taiwan may develop, the Chinese in no way expect Europe to break away from the United States, being well aware of the rôle the latter plays in the world balance and for the security of Europe and China. But they seem to be hoping that Europe will take steps to convince the United States and the Taiwan authorities that direct negotiations between the latter and the government in Beijing are essential if a reasonable political solution is to be found to this matter.

87. The other remark your Rapporteurs wish to make is that Europe has not made enough effort to face a world in which China occupied a place commensurate with its size, population and brilliant culture. Chinese studies are still a matter for a small number of experts and the Chinese language does not receive the attention it deserves in education in Europe. At present, the wish to establish contacts is urging the Chinese to make a considerable effort to allow its élite to accede to western languages and culture. But this opening will be satisfactory for all only if European societies show greater interest and make a more sustained effort. This is not an area in which the WEU Council exercises its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty, but it may be the responsibility of the Assembly to remind the governments represented there of this necessity.

Developments in China and European security

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:
“Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being massacred,”.
2. In paragraph 3(ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the Chinese language and culture” and insert “Chinese culture”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 10th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment 1 agreed to; amendment 2 negatived).

***WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
(Proposals)***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted in committee by 7 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fourré, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: Parry), MM. Hengel, McGuire (Alternate: Sir John Osborn), Mezzapesa, Rizzi, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell (Alternate: Tummers).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that it is now time to give new emphasis to a balanced, jointly-agreed European space policy and welcoming the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985;
- (ii) Aware of the need to develop markets, within Europe and worldwide, which will ensure economic returns from the large sums expended on space programmes;
- (iii) Noting that applications of space operations, for instance in telecommunications and meteorology, are hampered by over-nationalistic-minded governmental administrations and institutional monopolies;
- (iv) Considering the recognised benefits for mankind of the utilisation of space;
- (v) Considering the need to promote the manufacture in space of new products in the sectors of pharmacy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials;
- (vi) Considering that Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services;
- (vii) Considering also that European space industry is far more scattered and less rationalised than American industry, resulting in over-equipment and excess capacity, which will raise serious problems if the prospect of market stagnation is confirmed;
- (viii) Considering that Europe cannot remain in the van of space development if it fails to tackle the problems of a permanently-manned space station;
- (ix) Considering that the civil and military space budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union are almost seven times larger than the space budgets of the Western European countries;
- (x) Considering that Europe cannot therefore remain outside joint space defence programmes;
- (xi) Welcoming the establishment of the new space agency in Italy and the new space centre in the United Kingdom which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: participation in the American space station and further development of the European launcher system – Ariane-5 with the HM-60 engine – leading to an independent European manned transportation system;
2. To help the European aerospace industry to start a necessary period of reorganisation to ensure its independence and competitiveness in the international market;
3. To define the co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activities can be discussed and determined;
4. To accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications, surveillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to strengthen strategic stability in relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as indicated in the NATO statement of 8th January 1985;
5. To pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In its original programme of work the committee had decided that it would follow the traditional pattern and call its report on the colloquy held in Munich from 18th to 20th September 1985 "guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe". However, the Presidential Committee decided that a wide-ranging debate on the strategic defence initiative (SDI) should be held at the 1985 December session. The committee has therefore decided to accept the Presidential Committee's decision to link its report on the colloquy with the WEU position on SDI.
2. In the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the WEU member countries underlined the need for Western Europe to make the optimum use of existing industrial military resources through increased co-operation; WEU should provide the framework for organising co-operation in armaments.
3. The reactivation of WEU meant that it would play a major political rôle in allowing the European members of the alliance to compare their views on the principal aspects of their security and defence policies. WEU is a military-political organisation, and it should help to further European unity by political means.
4. Following this line of thinking and action, the committee has stressed time and again that Europe must preserve an independent European capability in space affairs.
5. In his welcoming address to the colloquy in Munich, the Minister President of the Free State of Bavaria, Dr. Franz-Josef Strauss, stressed that Europe was able to hold its own in all sectors of technology such as engine manufacturing, aircraft construction, missiles, electronics and many other areas as long as Europeans worked together and avoided divergencies.
6. In the European aerospace industry, research and development on all future technologies is being conducted at a very high level for the benefit of all industry. This is one reason why it is so important for Europe not to leave aerospace to other countries but to play its own part in full. It should not be unduly influenced by others and should try to compete with the large American aerospace industry sectors and not accept a position of subcontractor.
7. Ever since the committee organised its first colloquy in 1973, it has emphasised that European security depends inter alia on the development of its own aerospace technology and that it should face up to the technological challenge of the United States.
8. At its second colloquy in 1976, it concluded that Europe should conquer its own place in the world market of aerospace products. Three years later, at its colloquy in Brussels, the conclusion it reached was that the cost and time-span of modern aerospace programmes were so great that Europe should harmonise its requirements and efforts and, in 1982, that international aeronautical consortia should be established by governments and industries, to assure effective co-operation.
9. Although earlier colloquies placed strong emphasis on the industrial and civil aspects of aerospace programmes, the committee never lost sight of the military use of space which was also one of its main interests from the very outset.
10. In 1984, it adopted two reports on the military use of space, both submitted by Mr. Wilkinson and both commented upon by the Ministerial Council of WEU, which was of the opinion that the problem of the military use of space was a particularly appropriate and topical subject for discussion and analysis. Of course because of the unanimity rule the Council did not go into great detail and, in its replies communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1984 to the recommendations on the military use of space, it stated that the existence and potential development of anti-satellite systems would pose a problem of immediate concern and development in the field of anti-ballistic missiles and raise new questions about the future relationship between offensive systems and anti-ballistic missile technology. Furthermore, it pointed to the implications of the 1967 outer space treaty.
11. The Council acknowledged that the European space industry is a reality, that its achievements are considerable and that its potential is significant. Furthermore, Europe's international influence, and to some extent its security, will in the long term depend on the position it will occupy in space activities.
12. Our committee therefore established a programme for this colloquy inviting the political leaders of our countries to indicate the problems and policies from a national and European point of view. It invited the industrial representatives to give their views on Europe's attitude towards space industrial policy and

asked the representatives of international organisations to indicate the needs and activities of their organisations for the promotion of the European position inside and outside Europe. The purpose of the colloquy was to analyse the space challenge for Europe and therefore allow it to obtain a better knowledge of the facts and problems which were to be discussed in the Assembly. The aerospace policies of the member countries, their international aspects, the exploitation and commercialisation of space know-how and, finally, the strategic defence initiative and European technical co-operation with regard to this United States initiative are all of great interest to the Assembly.

II. The aerospace policies of the member countries

13. In conveying details about the policies of the member countries, your Rapporteur is able to make use of the addresses of ministers and secretaries of state who were kind enough to attend the colloquy in Munich and give their views on national and European space policies.

14. In this report your Rapporteur will follow closely the programme of the colloquy as established by its preparatory committee. He therefore can but start with a short description of his own country's contribution¹.

Federal Republic of Germany

15. The space policy of the Federal Republic is based on three principles. First, intensive participation in joint European programmes in the framework of ESA; second, international co-operation beyond Europe and especially transatlantic co-operation with the United States; third, supplementary national scientific and technological activities.

16. To underline the importance of space research and technology, it should be noted that since 1962 the Federal Government has spent more than DM 11 billion on this discipline. In 1985 DM 800 million is available to the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology of which DM 400 million is earmarked as the Federal contribution to ESA, which is approximately 25% of the ESA budget.

17. In the national framework more than 300 multiannual projects are being implemented; their cost is estimated at DM 1.2 billion of which only 20% for national projects and 80% for international co-operative programmes.

18. By 1990, government appropriations for space will rise to more than DM 1.5 billion. These sums cover about 2% of total research and development expenditure in the Federal Republic; in the next decade this will probably reach 3%.

19. The most important projects with German participation are Spacelab, Ariane, communication and data-transmission satellites, observation and meteorological satellites and finally scientific satellites.

20. The large-scale financial effort to develop space technology for the future will be worth while only if success is also achieved in developing markets which assure an economic return on the expensive space programme in terms of increased employment and income.

21. The applications of space operations in telecommunications and earth observation by weather satellites for example would not have come about without action by governments and parliaments, or perhaps not at such an early stage. It will be possible to finance their further development however when large enough markets develop to generate funds for these services.

22. New markets for space application are coming into view. It has been proved that the space environment, in particular microgravity, facilitates the development and, to a certain extent, even the manufacturing of new products in the areas of pharmacy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials.

23. The first Spacelab mission commanded by the Federal Republic will include seventy further experiments. Europe will therefore be able to improve its know-how for the industrial exploitation of space in the field of microgravity.

24. American and Japanese companies are already investing in this market. Europe is still hesitant about using the new technologies and further initiatives by user industries are necessary for Europe not to fall behind the United States and Japan in applying space technology. The establishment of Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services on a joint European initiative based on market economic principles. The order book of Arianespace now includes almost thirty launches representing some DM 3 billion.

France

25. From the very start of space activities, the French Government has been most active in promoting European space collaboration. After the Diamond series of launchers it advocated space Europe, understanding full well that to gain a strong position in this area Europe had to

1. See the official record of the colloquy.

make a unified effort in order to be independent of the two superpowers.

26. It recognises that the space sector is dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, the only nations with a full and ambitious military space programme. For instance, the Soviet Union conducts about a hundred launchings a year and the Europeans only a few each year.

27. In the United States, total civil and military space budgets are almost seven times greater than space expenditure by the European countries. Europe has nevertheless gained a strong position in several essential areas.

28. Apart from its launching capabilities, it occupies a prominent position in application satellites, which it can both build and operate; Meteosat exists. Europe has a communications satellite system operated by Eutelsat, the Franco-German *Symphonie* communications satellite and Franco-German television satellites. The French *Spot* programme, in which Belgium and Sweden are taking part, looks very promising for civil earth observation.

29. Europe is well placed in space sciences.

30. In the near future however this rosy picture might change if Europe fails to come to grips with the problems of a permanently-manned space station.

31. Europe will have to face up to this fundamental change, which implies a coherent manned space programme composed of two main elements: participation in the American space station and a transportation system which will include the *Hermes* spacecraft.

32. None of this however will be enough as long as Europe keeps away from military space activities. It therefore has to take up the civil and economic space challenge, match the progress of new competitors such as Japan and broach the second challenge, a military, political and security one, which also requires an answer from the European countries as a matter of particular urgency since, with a few rare exceptions such as the military communications satellites of the United Kingdom and France, Europe is totally absent from space defence programmes.

33. France is determined to play a leading international rôle in Europe's technological revival, particularly in the launching of major new space activities.

Italy

34. With several other countries Italy is in favour of a feasibility study of the French *Hermes* project and hopes that in the future this

will become a European programme. Italy believes it is now time to revitalise and give new emphasis to the European space policy. For that reason the Italian Government has accepted a draft law on the establishment of an Italian space agency. The real purpose of this agency would be to provide Italy with a powerful agency to bring the Italian space programme as well as the international programme to a successful conclusion.

35. Italy is planning to increase considerably its participation in the European Space Agency. At the same time, it hopes that Italian influence in the agency will increase in step with its financial contribution. The agency will be the instrument enabling the Minister for Research and Technology to implement government decisions on space and it will have to verify the results achieved.

36. The Italian programme calls for long-term negotiation with the United States based on the principle of equal partnership. The first programme to which this should apply is the production and management of the first space station. This is considered to be extremely important because if Europe fails to agree with the United States in this first programme it might well miss future opportunities.

United Kingdom

37. Like Italy, the United Kingdom too has recently established a single focal point to which the government can turn for advice and technical support for its space policy. The British national space centre should promote the development of space technology in the United Kingdom and improve the use of public resources. For this reason industry was invited to play a major rôle in the new national space centre. This centre emphasises the government's commitment to the development of space technology for industrial, scientific and defence purposes.

38. ESA will remain the cornerstone of British civil space activities and the United Kingdom will continue to play a major rôle in ESA's future activities.

39. The aim of the government is to ensure the best use of available technology and avoid waste through unnecessary duplication of effort. It will also seek to pursue several space efforts concurrently. The centre should enable the easy transfer of the results of publicly-funded research into the civilian economy.

40. The government recognises that there are hazards, for example in the competition that may arise for resources and technical talents between very different kinds of activity, but it still thinks the effort well worth making.

41. The centre should provide a single focus for space research and development in support of government and the private sector.

42. In the applications field, communications satellites have been of great importance and now broadcast satellites are being launched. The United Kingdom is the largest user of satellite capacity in Europe with half a dozen United Kingdom television channels beaming into cable heads and hotels throughout Europe.

43. In 1986 the first British astronaut will be flying in space and that year will also see the launching of the Hubble space telescope.

44. On the future space station, important questions of technology transfer and terms of access will have to be discussed with the American authorities.

45. The United Kingdom wants a balanced space programme which could be explained as an equilibrium between activities such as the development of launchers, manned space vehicles and space station activities, which are the means of conducting space research leading to the achievement of more effective space services.

III. International aspects

46. Space is inherently open and without boundaries. The committee has often emphasised this in discussions with the WEU Council. Co-operation across national borders in Europe is a necessity but not the only reason why the Western European nations should collaborate in space. Space is also expensive and requires a high level of technical effort and well-trained manpower. This was also recognised during the meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985. They agreed to a long-term programme which may be summarised as follows:

- science: this is a mandatory programme. The Council decided to increase it by 5% per annum until 1989 – the first increase in more than a decade;
- earth resources: in addition to the ERS-I satellite due for launch in 1989, an earth observation preparatory programme (EOPP) was approved, the aim of which is to develop the subsequent mission in this field;
- microgravity: to prepare for the future utilisation of microgravity in space and, in a first phase, to promote fundamental life science and material science research;

- telecommunications: the new programme provides, after the launch of the Olympus satellite (large experimental direct-broadcast satellite) for in-orbit demonstration missions for new techniques, a direct-relay satellite (similar to NASA's TDRS), and possibly a navigation satellite;
- launchers: it was decided to develop Ariane-5 (see below), using a high-power cryogenic engine, HM-60;
- in-orbit structure: the programme will consist mainly of the development and flight of the recoverable platform (launched with the United States shuttle), known as Eureka (not to be confused with Eureka) and space station;
- there is also a technology programme covering all general space technology, platforms, in-orbit communications, power supplies, etc;
- budget: the total budget for 1985 is 970 MAU (million accounting units: one AU is about \$0.81). The 1990 budget is planned to reach 1,650 MAU;
- by 1989, 52% of the budget will be oriented towards infrastructure, and 48% will be mission-related expenditure;
- personnel: the agency has an authorised complement of 1,400 staff for 1985.

47. The ministers thus voted for a balanced programme to expand Europe's independent capabilities and competitiveness in all sectors of space activities. Your Rapporteur can point to this even amidst those who doubt Europe's potential for integration.

48. The development of Ariane and of a number of satellite projects with a myriad of applications for telecommunications and earth observation has served to establish the Europeans' worldwide space reputation which has been reinforced by the successful Spacelab missions. With the completion of development activities on Spacelab and Ariane-4, the European aerospace industry has attained a level which allows the committee to say that every technologically feasible space project can now be carried out in Europe. Europe's offering in space technology is now part and parcel of the international market.

Space station

49. It was therefore only logical for the European ministers to consider President Reagan's offer to participate in manned space travel. The resolutions adopted in Rome by the ESA

Council of Ministers on 31st January 1985 were the first response by Western Europe to the great new challenges which the colloquy addressed. By deciding to build the Columbus space station and further develop Ariane into a heavy-payload launch vehicle, Europe opened the door to taking its place on the leading edge of space development in the coming twenty years. This not only presents a challenge to Europe's integration potential, it also challenges its capability in terms of the much conjured technology transfer.

50. Europe's integration capability must prove itself, for example, in the case of Columbus, in the individual decisions to commission systems management and system elements in the industries of ESA member states. As a rule, the distribution of ESA contracts is guided by the level of the financial shares of the member countries. This system should also be applied for large-scale projects such as Columbus.

51. The capability for technology transfer between the United States and Europe is also at test.

52. Many Europeans still react with disbelief and incomprehension when they receive reports that individual United States agencies allegedly attempt, out of lack of trust, to cut off European engineers from the flow of information. These agencies overlook the fact that the decisions to co-operate in building a space station are based on the political determination stemming from the common interests of the western alliance. But in working towards the objectives sought in the Columbus programme an agreement between all the participating governments should be signed to reinforce that political determination and safeguard its implementation.

53. The space station is a logical extension of the lessons and experiences of the last twenty-five years. The move towards more widespread and personalised services, the need for even greater reliability and the finite capacity of the orbital resource, all point to the need for larger, more closely-integrated space systems such as can be achieved only by man's intervention in orbit, and the space station is to be the first step on the road towards this objective.

54. But it is not only what the space station will technically enable that will be important. Equally important will be the effect the space station will have in capturing the imagination of the young and encouraging them to pursue high technology careers upon which the continued growth of the world as a whole depends. Success in this area too will be an important manifestation of the bonds between the western democracies. But co-operation implies genuine partnership within Europe and between Europe and the United States, for, although technically successful, Spacelab as Europe's contribution to

the space shuttle programme has fallen somewhat short of real operational success, with operating costs and access arrangements making it relatively unattractive to the customers for whom it was intended. Europe does not want to make this kind of mistake again.

55. ESA now has eighteen months of intensive work in the definition stage of the space station project which will determine mission, design and cost details. In parallel, there will be detailed governmental discussions to clarify the important questions of technology transfer and terms of access which will be crucial to Europe joining the building and operational phases. This might be a mutually-beneficial co-operative programme with an impact extending well into the twenty-first century.

56. Following the January 1985 European ministerial decision to proceed with the Columbus programme, ESA and NASA concluded an agreement which defines respective responsibilities during the phase B definition and preliminary design period and which establishes a process for making a number of key hardware decisions involving the contributions of our partners midway through phase B.

57. This agreement also sets the stage for a long-term United States-European partnership covering the development, construction, operation and utilisation phases of the space station programme (that is phases C, D and E). While formal negotiations on United States-European co-operation during these phases have not yet begun, a considerable number of efforts are under way on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare technically and politically for this process.

58. When the space station becomes operational, people will be living and working in space around the clock, 365 days a year, well into the next century. The space station is also different because it is evolutionary in character. The initial space station will have the built-in potential for phased evolutionary development to meet future requirements.

59. The space station will consist of a manned base with accompanying unmanned platforms, one of which will probably be in polar orbit for earth observation purposes.

60. The space station will be a versatile and effective facility, serving a diverse range of functions. It will be:

- a laboratory in space for the conduct of science as well as the development of new technologies and related commercial products;
- a permanent observatory, to look down upon the earth and out into the universe;

- a servicing facility where payloads and spacecraft are resupplied, maintained, upgraded and, if necessary, repaired;
- a transportation centre where payloads and vehicles are stationed, processed, and propelled to their destinations;
- an assembly facility where, due to ample time on orbit and the presence of appropriate equipment, large structures are put together and checked out;
- a manufacturing facility where human resourcefulness and the servicing capability of the space station combine to enhance commercial opportunities in space;
- a storage depot where payloads and parts are kept on orbit for subsequent deployment; and
- a staging base for future endeavours in space.

IV. Exploitation and commercialisation of space know-how

61. There is no doubt that space will play an increasing rôle in the economic and political future of the entire planet. It will start becoming preponderant with the installation of permanently-manned platforms, i.e. in the last decade of this century. Consequently, in view of the potentialities of this new world which is to be conquered and exploited, it can be said with little risk of error that the fate of mankind will soon be determined in space.

62. All investment in space, whether military or civil, will thus be decisive and its economic and political profitability guaranteed. But for the time being only the United States and the Soviet Union are in a position to exploit space with all the military and civil consequences this involves. Can Western Europe, the world's third space power but whose space budget cannot at present be compared with those of the two superpowers, take up the most serious challenge it has ever faced throughout its history?

63. Bearing in mind, however, that Western Europe's economic wealth amounts to 75% of that of the United States and is greater than that of the Soviet Union, and knowing Europe's industrial and especially aeronautical traditions, its space underdevelopment is surprising. It is easier to explain when the market structure is considered: half United States space expenditure is of military origin and the same is certainly true in the Soviet Union. In the rest of the world, the proportion is a small one. Hence it is clear that military competition between the two great powers fostered their space develop-

ment. However, civil commercial applications are far from negligible: a large-scale communications satellite market has developed in the world; the meteorological and earth resources observation satellite market is smaller; the direct television satellite market is making a faltering start. Apart from these military and commercial markets, there is another one which might be called one of prestige or sovereignty which includes the American moon conquest programme, scientific satellites and the space platform programmes.

64. One of the main features of this market is that it is largely captive, i.e. not subject to open international competition. This is the case in particular of military or civil programmes financed by states, either directly or through the intermediary of international agencies, to which the law of fair return applies when these states have an industrial space potential. This universally recognised and accepted principle has logical but rather strange effects in terms of industrial coherence: in order to respond to a call for bids, industrialists have to join in a configuration similar to that of the customer. If the call for bids is a national one, firms from the same country keep together; an ad hoc industrial consortium is set up if the customer is an international agency. The only notable exception to this rule concerns space transport for which the present shortage of means has led to greater market transparency. In its practical application to the western world, this means that the American market is almost reserved for American firms, the European market is reserved for European firms and for a joint international agency such as Intelsat or Inmarsat a joint consortium has to be set up. Within Europe itself, the rules are identical: national associations if the programme is national, bilateral if the programme is bilateral and international if the programme is international, like those managed by the European Space Agency or Eutelsat. Open to general competition are the markets of countries equipping themselves with satellites and which have no space industry of their own. Even in this case, industrial associations may be set up, either to bring in additional know-how or to obtain a better political impact.

65. As for market trends, one thing now seems certain, i.e. that military escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union will speed up, offering American industry major possibilities of technological and economic development. The communications satellite market seems finally to be growing less quickly than expected for lack of solvent customers, whether for communications proper or for television, and should come into balance with that of cables and in particular optical fibres; there is now an overcapacity of satellites in orbit. Demand for other commercial satellites will probably remain

slight. There remain the major innovatory programmes for space stations and associated vehicles which will give considerable impetus to industrial development and lead to commercial applications of microgravity.

66. It must be recognised that, thanks to the political will of governments, the spirit of co-operation which has prevailed and also the competence and dynamism of the agencies and industry, the results obtained have been quite remarkable and the degree of independence attained by Europe in space matters is already considerable. Using Ariane, it is capable, for itself and also for its customers, of launching communications, meteorological, direct television and earth resources observation satellites.

67. The standard of European products is no lower than that of American products; on both sides of the Atlantic there are sometimes difficulties, or even setbacks, and the ability to overcome them is equal.

68. However, precisely because of the law of fair return, European industry is relatively far more scattered than American industry and its installation corresponds more to the political will of the host countries than to industrial rationalisation. It also leads to considerable over-equipment. It would appear that at the present juncture and under present programmes there is an excess capacity in the European space industry which would raise serious problems if the prospects of market stagnation were confirmed.

69. Our industry is therefore trying to export its products; it has managed to do so for satellite launching services by Ariane and also a communications system, but here it is encountering direct American competition.

70. Progress in satellite telecommunications has been remarkable and certainly was not foreseen on such a scale twenty-five years ago in terms of numbers of spaceborne transponders, i.e. radio transmission channels through satellites in geostationary orbit. In 1984, the total annual amount spent on space activities in the western hemisphere has been assessed as approximately \$20 billion, a considerable growth from the zero point some twenty-five years ago.

71. In 1965, the first Intelsat satellite carried two transponders providing a capacity of 480 voice channels. This year's Intelsat satellite can operate 45 transponders with more than 50,000 voice channels.

72. In Europe a family of telecommunications satellites is now established totalling sixteen satellites; the technology allowing television and sound broadcast to be distributed directly to the domestic user will require an extension of the satellite network, which the Commission of the EEC calls "television without frontiers".

73. There appears to be a potential market for satellite broadcast receivers of some 3 million units for each of the larger member countries.

74. Exploitation of telecommunication satellites in Europe will probably depend on the approach adopted by institutional bodies, the national PTTs. Much may depend on the possible proliferation of independent operators.

75. Next to communications satellites should be mentioned those operated by the international maritime satellite organisation, Inmarsat, which was established to provide ship-to-shore communications by satellite. Its member countries are Japan, Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. A new series of these satellites will come into service from 1988 onwards.

76. Eutelsat operates the European communication satellite system, which your Rapporteur will mention again further on.

77. Other application satellite programmes are: a possible satellite navigation programme with eighteen ship-to-shore and aircraft satellites. However the present system in use seems to be sufficient for the civilian user but no doubt once the military have developed a more accurate system this will also be used for civilian purposes.

78. A system of application satellites already established consists of meteorological and earth observation satellites. ESA will develop and launch the ERS-1. The technology involved also has a very obvious military application.

79. Future potential for commercial space activities lies in the possibility of manufacturing products and substances in zero gravity conditions. They include alloys, new types of glass, magnetic materials, enzymes and pharmaceuticals, to name but a few.

80. Commercial exploitation can however only start with the advent of the space station. In this context the Eureka programme has special relevance.

Eureka

81. At the same time, ESA looks forward increasingly to the first flight of the European retrievable carrier (Eureka). Europe is providing the world with a "first" in the shape of Eureka, because it seeks to combine the economic retrieval ability of the shuttle with the demands of scientists for flights beyond the eight or so days which the shuttle can give. Transported in the shuttle orbiter into low earth orbit, the Eureka platform with its cargo of experiments is launched and then boosted by its own built-in propulsion unit to an altitude of about

500 kilometres. At the end of each mission (typically six months) it will descend under its own propulsion system and be recovered by the shuttle and returned to earth. From 1988 onwards Eureka will be available, and ESA believes that when its potential is realised it will afford scientists a unique vehicle combining the more desirable features of shuttle and satellite flight.

Eutelsat

82. The European telecommunication satellite organisation has some twenty-six member countries and its convention entered into force on 1st September 1985. The organisation was set up jointly by the Western European countries on the initiative of the PTTs. Two Eutelsat satellites are now in operation; the second generation of satellites is scheduled for 1989. The telephony on Eutelsat satellites will become operational by early 1986. Two channels are in use for television programmes within the framework of Eurovision. Eutelsat is now studying additional uses and markets for existing services and resources. A viable satellite system can offer direct television broadcasting to millions of households throughout Europe.

83. The political question to be answered is whether the deregulation of telecommunication services in Europe will be a sound economic prospect for the development of telecommunication services throughout Europe.

V. The strategic defence initiative and European co-operation

84. During the colloquy, many speakers referred to the SDI in a political, military, industrial or economic context. Some were for, others against, but, most important, the ministers outlined the political positions of their respective countries.

85. Your Rapporteur will revert to this after first trying to define what SDI is really all about at this particular juncture.

86. SDI is nominally a five-year research programme on which the United States Department of Defence plans to spend \$26 billion by 1990. However, the chances of obtaining this sum within the expected period are slight. In the current financial year, only \$1.4 billion was appropriated and, for the fiscal year starting in October 1985, it seems likely that only \$2.4 billion will be obtained instead of the \$3.7 billion requested. In spite of this reduced rate, it is a large programme by anyone's standards. General Abrahamson has been described as the only man who has ever exceeded a limitless budget.

87. Not surprisingly, there is considerable industrial interest in the programme, and amongst the university institutes too. Apart from the most important industrial contracts seven main consortia have so far been formed to address the principal areas of research to develop specific technologies.

88. Some small contracts have been, or are in the process of being awarded to European companies. Although welcome as a flow of cash eastwards across the Atlantic, it has aroused the fear that the contracts would only be in specific areas where the United States felt that Europe could usefully supplement the United States' capacity and that it would not lead to any worthwhile transfer of technology. General Abrahamson was recently advocating the award of contracts from his budget to allow European contractors to address the strategic problems of SDI from a European angle and to say what additional areas of research might be appropriate. Before replies could be given, the Eureka initiative occurred and the present position seems to be that most European firms have the green light to accept SDI contracts provided that they keep their defence departments informed. The United States is almost certain to want some more formal commitment from all or some European states before there can be any real participation. The United States probably needs political support for the concept of the programme more than its industry needs European aid. On the other hand, many European firms have a real contribution to make in many of the principal areas. Most people in European industry are very cautious at the moment in the hope and expectation of clearer governmental guidance.

89. *Mr. Curien, French Minister of Research and Technology*, thought space activities were necessary in Europe in a defence context, first in national frameworks and then in co-operative frameworks which still had to be defined.

90. These activities should relate to non-aggressive applications of space technology: communications, gathering information, navigation, etc., which allow the defensive potential of present means to be maintained without becoming involved in a new arms race.

91. Moreover, the value of using space for security purposes goes far beyond a mere growth in the potential of the armed forces: a good knowledge of the world situation would allow Europe to play a greater rôle on the international stage in times of crisis. The idea of using satellites on an international basis for crisis management and treaty verification might be followed up, so that the European countries would be able to form their own opinion on whether international agreements were being respected, involving or not the superpowers. They could also act

in full knowledge of the facts with a view to establishing stable relations between third-world countries.

92. Over and above these traditional applications of space technology for political and military purposes, which would certainly be of benefit to Europe, the American SDI and similar efforts by the Soviet Union clearly raise the question of Europe's attitude towards an anti-ballistic programme with a strong space element. France for its part considers that such a programme can but revive the arms race and that it is therefore undesirable. The concept of an absolutely impenetrable barrier is admittedly attractive, but it is not certain that it is feasible and the erection of a partial barrier could but lead to a strengthening of offensive means.

93. While seeking to limit the extent and strategic consequences of the militarisation of space, Europe cannot with impunity keep its distance from traditional military space activities. Moreover, the necessary efforts to meet the military space challenge and those corresponding to the civil challenge will help each other. Strong civil space technology, particularly in launchers, is an essential basis for the early development of defence applications. Sending men into space moreover can but assist the security aim which corresponds to the political and military challenge by making Europe appear as a great technological power. Implementation of space programmes needed in both the civil and the military fields would moreover increase the programme of work of the European space industry and thereby increase its competitiveness. It would also be accompanied by advanced research and development work whose results would improve the qualitative performance of application satellites and keep European industry in a competitive position internationally.

94. By embarking upon a major space programme, with both civil and defence components, Europe is not only meeting the twofold space challenge just mentioned. It is undertaking activities which still stimulate the energies and abilities of research centres, laboratories and industry and it will give further impetus to one of its main economic sectors, the aerospace industry, generator of employment and exports. It is proposing an exalting theme to its technicians, engineers, research workers and young people as a whole. It is promoting research in line with the technological renewal that is now central to the concerns of the governments of most European countries.

95. *Mr. Timmermann, Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic*, underlined that it should be borne in mind that considerable success has been achieved by the European countries in using aerospace technology for civilian

purposes, also in competition with the United States.

96. If these European activities were extended to military applications, this would substantially improve the cost-effectiveness of civilian European aerospace programmes.

97. Therefore, from an economic perspective as well, it will be of vital importance for Europe not to miss the train that will lead it to the technology of the twenty-first century if Europe does not wish to fall back into an inferior position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.

98. The Secretary of State disagreed however with the French Minister on European participation in the SDI. He was of the opinion that a government-to-government accord should be reached at the end of this year or early 1986.

99. It was of vital interest for the Federal Republic to take part in the United States research effort.

100. The main object of this American programme is to explore space technologies and to find ways and means of implementing a new security concept – a concept which is no longer exclusively aimed at deterring Soviet aggression by the threat of nuclear retaliation but whose aim it is to intercept and destroy strategic missiles and their warheads before they are able to reach the territory of the United States and its allies. One should not accept the easy slogan of a “militarisation of outer space”.

101. On the one hand, space has already been used for military purposes for many decades, for instance by operating reconnaissance, early warning and communications satellites, and by testing anti-satellite weapons, ballistic missiles, and anti-ballistic missile systems. Moreover, all intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles and their warheads are nowadays crossing space close to the earth.

102. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that many of the abovementioned weapon systems contribute towards making peace safer in the present political and strategic situation. In particular, reconnaissance, early warning and communications satellites are of vital importance for armaments control and crisis management.

103. From this it follows that the use of space for defence purposes offers a wide range of advantages, but President Reagan's strategic defence initiative has opened up a new dimension.

104. This, however, confronts the European NATO partners with the challenge of entering into a selective participation in the research and development of new technologies that may emerge in the future with a view to remaining

able to pursue a constructive dialogue, at least with the United States.

105. To what extent, and in which technological fields German participation in SDI is feasible and necessary is the subject of detailed talks.

106. Europe cannot stand aside if the world powers intensify their systematic efforts for a military utilisation of space.

107. Therefore, we should jointly pursue considerations on a European anti-missile system which, either independently or as an element of SDI, would open up space as a dimension of defence.

108. This is all the more true if, as generally expected, the use of space for defence purposes is going to improve the chances of reducing the danger of war.

109. Greater stability in the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact may, for instance, be achieved by improving early warning, tracking and surveillance capabilities with the aid of satellite-based systems, and possibly also by developing effective strategic systems reducing the danger of successful enemy attack.

110. The NATO countries support the objectives of the negotiations between the two world powers as described in their joint statement of 8th January 1985, that is, "to prevent an arms race in space and terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and to strengthen strategic stability".

111. All of us have a vital interest in the success of the Geneva negotiations because research for the purposes of strategic defence based on systems operating in outer space opens up a new dimension of armament efforts – efforts in which the Soviet Union is already actively involved.

112. As long as the military challenges posed by the Soviets are still on the increase, we have no alternative to keeping pace with them.

113. Viewed against this background, the United States research programme on SDI is one of the efforts which are justified, politically necessary and relevant to the security interests of the Atlantic Alliance.

114. *Mr. Pattie, United Kingdom Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology*, was in agreement with the German Secretary of State. The United Kingdom Government had also accepted the invitation to participate in the research phase of this technology.

115. A programme with the size and complexity that SDI appears to have will bring a great deal of civil spin-off from the research which will have to be done.

116. The United Kingdom will be looking for a genuine co-operative rôle and a sharing of the necessary technology rather than, as has happened sometimes in the past, providing intellectual capacity in the shape of scientists and engineers from our universities and institutions – the "brain drain". Before any decisions are made the government will need to know what is being proposed, who will be paying the bill, what will be produced and where the work will be carried out.

117. *The Italian Minister for Research and Technology, Mr. Granelli*, underlined the need for a joint position on participation in the SDI to be adopted by the member countries of Western European Union.

118. Italian participation in the stage of research into the possibility of implementing the SDI project should not be interpreted as anticipating the general political and strategic effects of operational decisions which all countries consider premature and which the European countries in particular will have to assess carefully.

119. In Italy, the government is in the process of defining the timetable and conditions for a commitment limited to research which, at government level, will have to determine very specifically the various sectors, conditions for co-operation, rules for technological transfers and relations with other national or European scientific and technological programmes such as Eureka.

120. The positions of the various European governments towards all these problems should be guided by caution and flexibility. Where co-operation with the Americans is concerned, it will be at least eight years before we reach the stage at which the SDI might be implemented and all defensive systems reorganised at world level.

121. It is therefore unacceptable to exclude as a matter of principle participation in a common research stage for space defence. But at the same time we must reject any claim to move automatically onto the implementation of a system when we do not even know how it will really work. It is moreover well known that Italy, in this connection, considers the limits laid down in the ABM treaty cannot be transgressed.

Industrial points of view

122. The basic point of view of the aerospace industry may be summed up as follows:

123. Space technology cannot guarantee the industrial future (no technology can do this), but it is an important condition for the continuation of the technically advanced European industrial

nations which lack natural resources. Furthermore, it may be concluded that any decoupling of an industrial nation from space technology – however motivated – involves serious national risks, which logically stem from the need for industrial nations to pursue seriously any possibility of technical progress such as space technology.

124. The efforts and the resources that the European industries have devoted to ESA space technology developments have brought important achievements and the generalised growth of industrial capabilities.

125. The European industry has now to face the new space challenge for the next fifteen years and will be deeply involved in preparing and carrying on the multifaced and most advanced programme of the new space era in order to keep in line with the technological boom of the future.

126. The result of the recent Rome conference has shown an unexpected consensus of European countries to participate in many challenging projects.

127. In parallel with the major items of the future such as Columbus, Ariane-5, Hermes, ERS-1 and so on, two new initiatives have been triggered, one in the United States and the other in Europe: SDI and Eureka.

128. The main development themes of the SDI for space industries are: radar technologies and space image radars; optical technologies and space imaging lasers; boost and space surveillance systems; new weapons; battle management and communications; space power and logistics; and robotics, while the five priority themes of Eureka are: informatics (large and fast computer); robotics and artificial intelligence; communications (wide-band communications and components); biology and new materials.

129. Your Rapporteur has listed the major themes of the two initiatives to stress that the projects are not opposed or to be seen as alternatives. *The Eureka project*, designed according to the financial resources Europe can mobilise, consents important advanced technologies in areas where a strong recovery is necessary. *The SDI project*, through its size and fixed goals, can be developed with the economic resources that only the United States can offer.

130. Apart from political considerations, scientific and technological collaboration between the two shores of the Atlantic will become more and more necessary for the common interest of the western world and humanity.

131. For many of these themes European industry has a good starting basis of existing joint ventures and complementary experience, but it should avoid a narrow, egoistic approach and parochialism. Fruitful co-operation bet-

ween industries in a European and in an Atlantic framework could help to create a common western space culture.

132. However, your Rapporteur will also indicate some *negative industrial aspects* and first with regard to the SDI. Of course European industry welcomes the proposal to take part in the American SDI programme for the space defence of the United States. The proposal has raised high hopes because of the scope of the programme announced. But Europeans must not forget that there are constraints to a significant movement of credit across the Atlantic, i.e. on the one hand problems relating to military secrecy will become increasingly strict as the programme approaches the application stage and, on the other hand, economic and social requirements. Probably therefore the participation of European firms in the SDI programme may not be a factor of substantial development.

133. At the same time, European space industrialists, having obtained scientific and technical results which are surprising if compared with the resources at their disposal, should be aware that the market they can reach is tending to shrink, even if prestigious programmes are being launched. Industrial overcapacity already exists and will have to be absorbed. There is no doubt that European firms will soon have to embark upon a stage of necessary reorganisation to ensure their survival.

Points of view of scientists

134. The 23rd March 1983 proposal by President Reagan to build up a laser-weapon defensive system by the end of the century spurred the debate on the possible destabilising effects of anti-satellite weapons. It did not, however, introduce new concepts of anti-satellite systems, which have already been under consideration for a number of years. A conventional anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) has been under development since the 1960s, both in the United States and the Soviet Union. More sophisticated and innovative anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) are now being designed and prototypes are about to be tested.

135. Several different issues are involved. One concerns the feasibility of such systems. Another is whether such systems, if and when deployed, would provide sufficient protection. A third concerns the human and financial costs involved in research and development and implementation. The fourth relates to the question, already mentioned, whether such development would promote peace or on the contrary provoke a further destabilisation. The fifth and last concerns the consequences with regard to the uses of space for socio-economic

development in general and in developing countries in particular.

136. The Presidential speech supported the over-optimistic views of some authorities that engineers and scientists would be able to produce a technological fix to liberate the world from the spectre of nuclear holocaust. Other experts on the contrary provide ample evidence that the feasibility of such systems on purely theoretical grounds is rather doubtful at the least.

137. Viewed against this background, one could argue logically that funding research and development for anti-satellite weaponry would constitute sheer waste, not to speak of the costs of their eventual deployment. This reasoning carries even more weight if one considers the huge demand for highly qualified research staff, technical personnel and funds needed for the research and development alone. The costs for deployment of such weaponry at the required massive level to ensure some degree of protection would be really staggering. Even the vast human and financial resources of the most powerful industrialised nations would be heavily taxed by such a development to the extent of diverting much-needed resources from civilian uses and improvement of human services.

138. A final argument against the deployment of anti-satellite defensive systems, or in more general terms against the militarisation of space, is that it would curtail peaceful uses of space. This would not only be a case of draining resources away from operational uses of space technology for socio-economic development and the related research and development. It would also claim a disproportionate part of the dimension "space" itself, which is not unlimited. Furthermore it would hamper international cooperation in space, without which peaceful uses of space simply would not be viable, one of the reasons being the increased distrust among the "non-space" nations with regard to the intentions of the space powers.

139. Finally your Rapporteur wants to mention an *opposite view* by stating that three points should be emphasised which seem essential. First, WEU, but also Europe, must grasp the fact that at present there is no longer any real major technological obstacle to the development and deployment of first-generation SDI systems. They are within the reach of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The decision is therefore purely a political one. But it might fundamentally upset the present balance, particularly for Europe. Second, no European country alone can carry out such an undertaking. But Western Europe can. However, it has a choice between doing nothing, co-operating with the United States at the risk of becoming irreversibly dependent and, finally, providing itself

with the means of acceding to independence. It has the technological capability. Provided its people are made aware of the real problems, the financial means can be obtained. That too is a political question. Third, whatever decision is taken, the technological and economic spin-off will be considerable: more than three thousand patents exploited as a result of the Apollo moon-conquest programme have repaid investment more than ten times over, and there are several thousand others still to be exploited. Europe will or will not be present in this implacable competition whose real stake is its place, and perhaps even its survival, in the twenty-first century. This too is a political question.

140. Perhaps for the first time in history, the long-term repercussions are liable to be irreversible for Europe. Apart from the constraints and pressure brought to bear on political leaders by their own people and the various interest groups of which they are composed, part of their joint task as Europeans should at least be to make the community aware of the true problems which exist and above all of the fundamental stakes.

VI. Conclusions

141. In its reply of 27th November 1984 to Recommendation 410 on the military use of space in the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson, the Council pointed out that, with regard to the implications of developments in space, opportunities already existed in this field for European industry. However, during the colloquy in Munich which was a space forum to solicit opinions from governments, industry, scientists and parliamentarians on the long-range goals of European space activities, it became quite clear that there had been many successful developments in civil applications of space but the present situation was giving rise to discontent and anxiety.

142. This resulted mainly from the following factors: (i) European investment in space was less than one-tenth that of the United States; (ii) the European aerospace industry was too scattered and had excess capacity; (iii) the space market could be widened only if national markets became less protectionist; (iv) a European market required European standards; (v) European industry was too slow in developing new products to be manufactured in space; (vi) the absence of a military space programme hampered the European aerospace industry.

143. Governments of member countries should realise that space is becoming more and more important not only for scientists and industrialists but also for the general public. European institutional bodies tend to defend their monopolies and are very reluctant to develop new

means in communications, television, etc., to serve the general public.

144. Transport systems which were started during the last century are subsidised with vast sums of money which increase every year in all member countries, whereas science and technology, and especially space budgets, are the first to suffer from economic stagnation.

145. Space is inherently an international matter and, for Western Europe, only joint action makes sense, whereas separate national state activities will not be able to give an adequate response to the space challenge for Europe.

146. Turning to the military aspect, it should be realised that the challenge of the Soviet Union is still increasing and there is no alternative for Europe but to keep pace.

147. Military space programmes would of course increase the programme of work of the European space industries and thereby increase their competitiveness in the world market.

148. It is emphasised that in this context military does not mean weapons. It means financial appropriations from defence budgets. Many military uses of space such as communications, early warning and observation systems are obtaining United Nations endorsement under the heading of activities for peaceful purposes.

149. The committee has often proposed that in the absence of a European military space strategy and of co-ordination for establishing European military space programmes, the WEU Ministerial Council should handle these matters.

150. The reactivation of WEU should induce member governments to give a major political rôle to the WEU Council and Assembly in defining the principal aspects of security and defence policy with regard to European space questions.

151. SDI is not a space programme but a first step in developing a new dimension in military strategy. The use of space, satellites and mili-

tary hardware in space can be considered in the same way as the introduction of military aircraft in the early decade of this century. This introduction completely revolutionised the science and technology of warfare. Whether one accepts this fourth dimension or not is of relatively little importance as it will be impossible to return to the status quo ante. One should not forget that in the end it is man who decides whether this research project will be used to improve or destroy life. This is true for space developments and for technological developments in general.

152. The WEU Assembly could play a rôle in promoting, if not a common point of view between all partner countries, at least an understanding of the different political attitudes which exist in governmental, industrial and scientific circles. It should be realised that the consequences of SDI research and development might result in future developments of major importance for our economic and industrial well-being with widespread civil applications.

153. Even if Europe participates in the research and development, it need not take subsequent steps involving the stationing of hardware. It might be another ten years before any decision has to be taken on this aspect.

154. In the draft recommendation, the committee has urged member governments to adopt a coherent space programme including a manned space programme since Europe cannot remain in the van of space developments if it fails to come to grips with the problems of a permanently-manned space station. This is also true if Europe remains outside a joint space defence programme.

155. To develop such a programme, however, an adequate framework has to be agreed upon, in which European space activities in a defence context could be discussed, decided and promoted.

APPENDIX I

*Programme of the colloquy, Munich, 18th-20th September 1985***10 a.m. First sitting**

Mr. Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly of Western European Union

Dr. Franz-Josef STRAUSS
Minister President of the Free State of Bavaria

Dr. Detlef BOESSER
Councillor of the city of Munich

Mr. Christian LENZER, MdB
Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

Mr. Martin GRÜNER, MdB
Parliamentary Secretary of State, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, Co-ordinator for German Aerospace Policy
(The aerospace policy in Europe from the economic point of view)

Dr.-Ing. Othmar HEISE
Vice-President, MBB

(Space technology, guarantee of Europe's industrial future)

3 p.m. Second sitting

Mr. Hubert CURIEN
French Minister for Research and Technology
(France's space policy in the European framework)

Mr. Luigi GRANELLI
Italian Minister for Research and Technology
(Italy's space policy in the European framework)

Mr. Geoffrey PATIE
United Kingdom Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology
(The United Kingdom's space policy in the national and European framework)

Dr. Albert PROBST, MdB
Parliamentary Secretary of State, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology
(The Federal Republic's space policy in the European framework)

Thursday, 19th September 1985**9 a.m. Third sitting**

Mr. Henri MARTRE
President of Aérospatiale
(Europe's independence in space matters)

Prof. Dr. M. TIMMERMANN
Secretary of State for Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany
(Space from the defence point of view)

Prof. Dr. Caesar VOÛTE
International Institute for Aerial Survey and Earth Sciences (ITC)
(Peace and the challenge of space)

Mr. Cesare FANTÒ
President of Selenia Spazio
(Intra- and extra-European industrial co-operation)

Prof. Marceau FELDEN
University Nancy I and University Paris XI
(Space and defence: technological data)

Prof. Ing. Ernesto VALLERANI
General Manager, Aeritalia Space Systems Group
(Industrial co-operation from the European union viewpoint and co-operation in the Atlantic Alliance)

3 p.m. Fourth sitting

Prof. Dr. Reimar LÜST
Director General of the European Space Agency
(Future developments of ESA activities and Europe's future in space)

Dr.-Ing. Willi SCHRÖTER
Director, Operations Department Eutelsat
(Present and future of European space telecommunications)

Mr. John HOLT
Managing Director, Space and Communications Division British Aerospace
(Commercialising space know-how)

Mr. James ZIMMERMAN
NASA European Representative
(Future developments in United States space activities)

Friday, 20th September 1985

9.30 a.m. Fifth sitting

Summing-up by:

Mr. Roy GIBSON
former Director General of ESA, General Rapporteur for technical questions

Mr. Christian LENZER, MdB
Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, General Rapporteur for political questions

Mr. Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly of Western European Union

11.30 a.m. Press conference

APPENDIX II

*List of participants**(a) Speakers*

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***WEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
(Proposals)***

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Dreyfus-Schmidt

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment negatived).

*WEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
(Proposals)*

AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ¹

*tabled by Mr. Gansel and others
on behalf of the Socialist Group*

2. Leave out paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.
3. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities, ” and insert “ in so far as they are designed to promote joint European civil space activities ”.
4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ military ”.
6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 6 as follows:
“ 6. To give full support to development of a Eureka programme of which space technology should be a part. ”

Signed: Gansel, Millan, Miller, Stoffelen

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendments negated).

*WEU and the strategic defence initiative
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
(Proposals)*

AMENDMENT 7 ¹

tabled by Mr. Blaauw

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements ” and insert “ To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme addressing all civil and military space activities and including space and ground segments, with emphasis on two main elements: ”.

Signed: Blaauw

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (amendment not moved).

The European fighter aircraft for the nineties

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

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 - The northern four - Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway
 - Implications of the national requirements
 - Industrial implications of a four-nation EFA without France
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- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Lenzler (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fouré, Garrett, Sir Paul Hawkins (Alternate: Parry), MM. Hengel, McGuire (Alternate: Sir John Osborn), Mezzapesa, Rizzi, Schmidt, Souvet, Spies von Büllenheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell (Alternate: Tummers).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the decision of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom to initiate the project definition of a common Eurofighter aircraft to meet the operational requirements of their air forces from the mid-1990s;
- (ii) Understanding the reasons which led the Government of France to seek to procure an aircraft based on the Rafale experimental aircraft for the French air force and navy in the 1990s;
- (iii) Mindful of the necessity for the members of the western alliance to utilise their resources for defence as effectively as possible;
- (iv) Conscious of the calls for improved interoperability and standardisation of equipment on the part of Western European Union member nations repeatedly made by this Assembly;
- (v) Recalling the political impetus given to increased rationalisation and collaboration by the European aerospace industry at the WEU colloquy on international aeronautical consortia in London in 1981;
- (vi) Aware that such aircraft currently in service as the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Atlantic, Transall, and Tornado have already demonstrated the industrial, logistic and military benefits of collaborative production and joint procurement albeit with differing modes of collaboration and project management in each case;
- (vii) Eager to reform governmental and industrial structures so as to harmonise operational requirements, co-ordinate re-equipment timescales and choices and utilise industrial capacity on a collaborative basis within the WEU member countries;
- (viii) Convinced that such reforms are increasingly urgent in order to meet Western Europe's requirements for military aircraft at reasonable cost and to compete on more equal terms with United States manufacturers both within the NATO market and worldwide;
- (ix) Believing that WEU and this Assembly in particular have a vital rôle in helping to overcome national self-interests and the parochial political impediments which stand in the way of Western European integration of the procurement and production of high technology defence equipment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states to:

1. Ensure that the Independent European Programme Group issues regular reports of its proceedings to the Assembly of WEU in order that members of the Assembly may monitor more closely the progress of Western European arms co-operation;
2. Accede to requests to join WEU which have been or may be made by such non-member countries as Portugal or Spain respectively so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe;
3. Utilise to the full the experience gained in the management of previous international collaborative aerospace projects, and in particular of the Panavia Tornado, in deciding the governmental and industrial management structures to be adopted for the Eurofighter;
4. Invite the governments of France on the one hand and of the four Eurofighter consortium nations on the other to request the participation of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in the production and procurement of their respective fighter aircraft to replace the F-16 in the late 1990s;
5. Work vigorously towards the adoption of a similar collaborative approach towards the definition, development, production and procurement of other military aircraft for the air forces of Western Europe and in particular of a multirôle aeroplane for such missions as transport, maritime reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling;

6. Persuade the member nations of the Eurofighter consortium to standardise to the maximum extent possible weapon systems and equipment to be incorporated into the Eurofighter so as to enhance the aircraft's interoperability and facilitate its logistic support;
7. Initiate discussions both in the Independent European Programme Group and among the industrial interests concerned on making the Eurofighter consortium a durable industrial arrangement on the lines of Airbus Industrie which could produce a family of military aircraft.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. There are today a large number of different types of interceptor and offensive support aircraft in service with the air forces of Western Europe in spite of such successful collaborative programmes as the Tornado between the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, the F-16 between Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, and the Jaguar between France and the United Kingdom.
2. The fulfilment of essentially national operational requirements, differing tactical doctrines between the air staffs of the various Western European air forces, varied geographical and military criteria, together with disparate industrial and budgetary considerations have all militated against a coherent and internationally rationalised policy for the production and procurement of fighter aircraft in Western Europe.
3. In addition the United States air force has operated some aircraft in Western Europe such as the A-10 Thunderbolt and the F-15 Eagle which are not in the inventory of any Western European air force. Such astonishing disparity of equipment must seriously degrade the effectiveness of NATO air forces. The inherent mobility and appetite for consumables of air power put a premium upon interoperability standardisation. The flexibility and availability of NATO air forces are seriously impaired if the capacity to refuel, rearm and preferably to carry out at least first-line servicing does not transcend national boundaries in Europe.
4. The procurement of the F-16 by four air forces in Northern Europe while unwelcome to the Western European aerospace industries was undoubtedly in operational terms substantial progress. Even more so the procurement of Tornado by the Italian air force, West German air force and navy, and the Royal Air Force was logistically a great step forward, even if the full operational benefit of such commonality could not be fully derived owing to differing armaments and weapon carriage requirements.
5. The Assembly of Western European Union and especially the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions have placed great emphasis on the importance, for the rationalisation of air force inventories within the member nations, of a collaborative programme for the production and procurement of the next generation of fighter aircraft. In particular Document 874 on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments (Mr. Brasseur - 1981) and Document 916, on international aeronautical consortia - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 10th February 1982 (Mr. Wilkinson - 1982) gave strong political support to this collaborative process.
6. Indeed the encouragement of practical industrial collaboration and joint procurement is part of this organisation's very *raison d'être*. They bring tangible economic and military benefit in their own right as well as being a practical means towards closer Western European unity within the alliance in the security policy field. Without a concertation of operational requirements and re-equipment timescales within the member countries it is clear that what Mr. Thomas Callaghan Junior has called the "structural disarmament" of the alliance would take place in view of the relative price effect whereby the cost of high technology defence equipment escalates above the rate of inflation and in view of the fact that fewer and fewer member countries are for political reasons willing to augment their defence spending by at least the NATO target of a 3% annual increase in real terms.
7. In other words rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability are imperative necessities. Without collaboration in the armament field NATO nations will be buying less and less for more and more unless they are prepared to accept performance degradation in their new equipment which would be unthinkable in the face of the growing sophistication of Warsaw Pact armaments. To politicians, industrialists and military men alike the new European combat aircraft has represented the touchstone of the collaborative spirit within the member countries of Western European Union.
8. For most Western European air forces the mid to late 1990s are a period when a large number of existing frontline aircraft need to be replaced. These old aircraft are in technical terms the third generation of jet combat aircraft. The new fourth-generation combat aeroplanes which will replace them will all have as standard features new technology which characterise only some of today's fighters.
9. Above all the next or fourth generation of air combat vehicles will be control configured, that is to say, inherently unstable with active computer-commanded flying control systems which ensure maximum performance at any point in the aircraft's flight envelope. Fire control will be highly automated, much navigational, target-acquisition and tracking data colli-

mated to permit head-up operation of the aircraft by the pilot in most flight modes. The cockpit environment will be highly ergonomic with the key aircraft and weapon systems for combat operated directly from the control column and throttle. More exotic metals like lithium will replace much conventional duralumin alloy and a great deal of composite construction will ensure an exceptionally strong, durable yet light structure. Even with the active air-to-air guided weapons of the future like AMRAAM there will still be a premium upon agility in air combat. The chief limitation upon manoeuvrability is likely to be pilot tolerance which will require new developments such as anti-'g' suits actuated off the computerised flight control system to ensure inflation before the sudden onset of high acceleration forces.

II. The requirements

10. There was sufficient commonality of operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales for the chiefs-of-staff of the French, German, Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom air forces to sign in late summer 1984 a joint staff target outlining agreed parameters of performance and specification to which officials and industrial representatives of the five nations should work in seeking to agree a common aircraft. Of course there were differences of precise operational requirement between the respective chiefs of air staff but they believed sufficient commonality existed to make a single aircraft solution practical.

11. From the industrial point of view previous partnerships in European combat aircraft production had always been either bilateral, like the Franco-British Jaguar, or at best trilateral, as in the case of the British-German-Italian Tornado. As a consequence full economies of scale had never been realised and European fighter aircraft production runs were far shorter than those of United States competitors such as the F-18 and F-16 which consequently proved extremely successful in export markets. Indeed the F-16 obtained the celebrated *marché du siècle* in being selected by the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway for their air forces and co-produced in a massive offset deal in those countries which also participated in the production of F-16s purchased by third countries. Rightly or wrongly, Franco-British rivalry was in retrospect often alleged as the cause of the decision by the four northern tier NATO nations not to procure a European fighter. However, it must also be admitted that they are operationally well satisfied with the F-16 and although appreciation of the United States dollar led to a major escalation in cost, industrially there was considerable benefit for the four European partners in the programme.

12. Even so, a lesson was learned by the Europeans that if possible a wider collaboration should be achieved than for previous projects. Above all, the perfect combination was envisaged as being British engine expertise allied to France's traditional success in exporting fighter aircraft together with German productive reliability and resources plus Italian engineering innovation and flair. Such an analysis is simplistic of course but the Europeans were determined that never again would the Americans be allowed to divide and rule their market. The solution could only lie in a wider international collaboration open even to other potential partners such as the Spanish and the northern four but essentially founded on the four principal aerospace nations of Europe - Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and France. Above all there should not be competing European programmes such as the dogfight in days gone by between the Jaguar and Mirage. Such a scenario was necessarily over-optimistic in view of differing industrial traditions and precise operational requirements between the potential partner nations.

III. The individual national situations

French air force

13. The French air force requires some 250 new combat aircraft to replace the Jaguar and Mirage III primarily in the offensive support and reconnaissance rôles from the mid-1990s. An air defence capability, while useful, is secondary since the Mirage 2000 is only now beginning to enter squadron service and will have a useful operational life well into the next century.

French fleet air arm

14. The French fleet air arm will require 86 new aircraft from the mid-1990s to replace the Crusader in the air defence rôle and the Eten-dard IVP in the reconnaissance rôle operating from the nuclear-powered successors of the carriers Foch and Clemenceau.

Italian air force

15. The Italian air force requirement is for 150 new aircraft to replace the Lockheed F-104S in the air superiority rôle in the mid-1990s. Offensive support will be fulfilled by the AM-X aircraft currently being jointly developed by Aeritalia and Embraer of Brazil.

German air force

16. The German air force will require 250 new aircraft in the mid-1990s to replace the Phantom F-4 for air defence. The interdiction, recon-

naissance and electronic countermeasures rôles will be carried out by the Tornado and close air support by the Alpha-Jet.

Royal Air Force

17. The British air force will require some 250 new aircraft in the air superiority rôle in the early to mid-1990s. The Tornado GR-1 will perform the interdiction, strike/attack and reconnaissance rôles and the Harrier GR-5 the close air support rôle. Since the demise of air staff target 403, the Royal Air Force has not been looking for a Jaguar replacement as such since the offensive support Jaguar squadrons in the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in Germany are being re-equipped with the Tornado. Jaguar squadrons in the United Kingdom are being retained for the time being, although they too will ultimately need to be re-equipped. The Tornado F-2 and F-3 are being introduced into service to replace most of the Phantom F-4 squadrons in the United Kingdom in the air defence rôle although the two F-4 squadrons are being run on as are the two Phantom F-4 interceptor squadrons in Royal Air Force Germany. The prime deficiency of the RAF's current order of battle lies in a genuine air combat vehicle. Experience with the Jaguar has clearly demonstrated that it is preferable to have an aircraft optimised for air combat with a secondary air-to-ground capability rather than the other way round.

Spanish air force

18. The Spaniards' requirement for a new aeroplane is probably the least immediate of the four EFA partners. They are beginning to take delivery of the F-18A primarily for the offensive support rôle, but with an impressive secondary interceptor capability. For air defence the Spanish air force has the Mirage F-1. It also has some 22 Phantom F-4s. The Spaniards would like to procure between 100 and 150 new aircraft to replace their Mirages and Phantoms towards the end of the 1990s.

The northern four - Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway

19. The F-16 consortium nations will probably be able to operate the aeroplane satisfactorily with system enhancements until at least the late 1990s. Thereafter their operational requirements would seem very similar to those of the four EFA partners - an air superiority aircraft with a secondary air-to-ground rôle.

Implications of the national requirements

20. The above brief summary does demonstrate that the French air force and navy are seeking a somewhat different aeroplane from that required by the other European nations who seem likely to need to procure new fighter aircraft during the decade of the 1990s. It is certainly very distinct from the requirements of the four EFA partners. Certainly industrial considerations reinforced the decision of the French Government on 1st August 1985 to part company with the other four nations and to pursue the procurement of an aeroplane more closely matched to French operational requirements than any compromise five-nation aircraft.

21. As the French Prime Minister Mr. Fabius explained to the *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale* on 13th December 1984:

“ France has decided to continue to develop an aircraft which meets its operational requirements and is based on its industrial and commercial know-how. It will therefore be different from the interceptor on which the four countries with which we were holding discussions are going to cooperate. But the way still remains open for co-ordinated aeronautical production.”

In other words the door was kept open to an eventual decision to launch either another collaborative programme to meet the French combat aircraft requirement or, even after a reassessment of the situation, to rejoin the EFA programme. Spokesmen of the four EFA nations have also sought not publicly to discount the chance of a French change of heart. However in practical terms as work-sharing packages are decided and the project becomes increasingly defined, such a prospect necessarily becomes more and more difficult. Clearly there has been a commendable effort at a political level not to allow hard feelings or recriminations to develop over the failure of a five-nation collaboration to materialise. At an industrial level there were mixed feelings.

22. Certainly the French air force and naval requirements did seem to predispose the choice by France of an aircraft of rather different specification from that sought by the other four nations. Above all, not being optimised for air combat engine performance was not quite such a critical criterion for France. The latest technology and high power for the engine were however definitely necessary if the air superiority rôle of the other nations could be met. For France, therefore, the SNECMA M-88 powerplant currently under development was ideal for the rather lighter and less agile French aircraft whereas the four other nations needed an ultra-modern high-technology engine of even higher

performance than the GE-404 which powers the F-18 or than the Turbo-Union 199 which powers the Tornado. Rolls-Royce is working on just such a new military engine, the XG-40, so in both cases the respective powerplant considerations meant that there were additional reasons for a different project to be pursued by France from that adopted by the four EFA nations. Nevertheless the crucial factor was that carrier compatibility for the French navy and lesser requirement for high specific excess engine power of the French air force meant that, while French officials were prepared to compromise on their ideal weight of 8.5 tons for the aircraft by accepting perhaps a maximum of 9.5 tons, this was done reluctantly. Furthermore France always had the export potential of the project very much in mind and in the French view the heavier the aircraft the higher the cost and this could fatally degrade the saleability of the aircraft in export markets.

Industrial implications of a four-nation EFA without France

23. Both the United Kingdom and France have been building technology demonstrator fighter aircraft which are due to fly in the late spring of 1986. In the case of France it is the ACX or Rafale. In the case of Britain it is the EAP or experimental aircraft programme. The ACX is a purely national project, whereas the EAP has had participation from the Panavia partners, although it is noteworthy that the German Government withdrew support from its predecessor design the ECA (European combat aircraft).

24. British Aerospace and six British partner companies have invested about \$120 million in the EAP and the British Government has invested another \$85 million. It remains to be seen how much credit they receive for the work when the shares of the development costs of EFA are worked out. The EAP at about 11 tons is considerably heavier than Marcel Dassault's Rafale and heavier too than EFA.

25. Aviation Week quotes the EFA as having an operational empty weight of about 21,500 lbs, that is, halfway between that of the General Dynamics F-16C and the McDonnell Douglas F-18A. Its two engines will develop about 21,750 lbs of thrust and its wing area will be 540 square feet. Although French official sources stress that Rafale is purely a demonstrator it is expected that even if not an exact pre-prototype of the adopted French design it will form the basis of it. Indeed throughout the long negotiations about thrust and engine power it was always felt by the four EFA nations that Rafale was the French blueprint of the ideal collaborative aircraft.

26. French industrial spokesmen claim that the outcome of the talks was satisfactory – first for the British since they would obtain the lion's share of the contract, secondly for Marcel Dassault, because it was not locked into a collaborative programme with the Panavia partners in which it would have been in a minority position, and thirdly for Europe, since the Americans would now have to compete against two European aircraft, not one.

27. Certainly there is a potential niche in the market for the new European combat aircraft since the United States air force's advanced tactical fighter will be a much heavier and more costly aircraft to replace the F-15. By the mid-1990s even derivatives of the F-16, F-18 and F-20 will be outclassed by EFA. However, the unit cost of EFA could have been still lower with an initial production run some 336 units greater with French participation. Nevertheless the Panavia partners always put ability to meet the threat – such as the MIG-31 – before exportability and the Spanish interest has been a technological as well as an operational benefit, especially for engine capability since Spain has limited current capability in the powerplant area now.

IV. Patterns of collaboration

28. Although the four EFA partners deny it, EFA will be produced on essentially the Panavia and Turbo-Union models, plus Spain. Doubtless the management structure will be tailored to suit the requirements of the new programme and the exact governmental agency to supervise the programme has yet to be defined. The industrial headquarters will be in Munich and talks on work-sharing are already in progress there. The United Kingdom and Germany will each manufacture 33% of the aircraft, Italy 21% and Spain 13%.

29. Probably there will be individual assembly lines in the four countries with separate production flight tests, but a single development flight test centre. There will be differences of in-service dates between the partners and variations in national weapon systems and equipments. It is hoped that the maximum commonality can be achieved.

30. Marcel Dassault of France has always had a different philosophy about collaboration, believing strongly in the merits of clear design leadership rather than equal partnership in this field. If they attract Fokker of the Netherlands or SABCA of Belgium into their new fighter the relationship would be subcontractual as with the F-16.

V. Conclusions

31. The whole EFA saga has probably turned out for the best. The Panavia partners and Spain are happy. The French do not have to reconcile operational requirements which they always felt were irreconcilable and the respective industrial interests are satisfied. Even the element of competition between EFA and the French aircraft may be healthy in the short term. However for the next generation after EFA when the costs will be even higher it will be imperative to harmonise operational requirements and to produce a single European aeroplane.

32. After the committee had adopted this report in London on 6th November 1985, it was learned that President Mitterrand had made a

proposal to Chancellor Kohl in Berlin on 10th October 1985, which was restated at the meeting between the two leaders on 8th November 1985. There were two sides to this proposal: first, France would take a 5 or 10% share in the EFA consortium and, second, a new consortium should be established to build a lighter fighter aircraft. Together with the other European countries, France wished to establish a joint military aircraft construction programme to build fighters, transport and trainer aircraft and also weapon systems. This probably means two or more European aerospace consortia.

33. Your Rapporteur believes this new development may well require a follow-up report in the near future, particularly since the French plan is expected to be discussed at the next meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 14th November 1985.

The European fighter aircraft for the nineties

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 ¹

tabled by MM. Pignion and Bassinet

1. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraph:

“ Welcoming the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes; ”.

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe ” and insert “ to allow a larger number of European countries to take part in joint reflection on security matters ”.

3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

“ Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% participation in the consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for Europe to participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft; ”.

Signed: Pignion, Bassinet

1. See 12th sitting, 5th December 1985 (amendments 1 and 3 amended and agreed to; amendment 2 negatived).

Parliaments, public opinion and defence

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur*

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on parliaments, public opinion and defence

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- I. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 411
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Dame Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Bonnel (Alternate: Dejardin), Cavaliere, Goerens, Hackel (Alternate: Antretter), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller, MM. Noerens, Sénès, Stoffelen (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

on parliaments, public opinion and defence

The Assembly,

- (i) Having studied the report of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, public opinion and defence;
- (ii) Convinced that the necessary improvement in public awareness of western security and defence questions and particularly of the functions and activities of the Assembly of Western European Union in this respect calls for new efforts at both national and international level,

CALLS ON NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. To intensify their efforts to follow up the activities of the WEU Assembly in national parliaments, political groups, committees and vis-à-vis the public;
2. To invite governments to take specific steps to provide the public with substantial information about WEU in general and the Council's activities in particular;
3. To keep a continuing watch over the relevant governmental activities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This is the first report to be presented by this committee to the Assembly of Western European Union since 23rd May 1985 when the Assembly adopted Resolution 70 on the amendment of Rule 42 *bis* extending the responsibilities of the committee whose title was changed to "Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations". A new task was attributed to the committee in that a new paragraph was added to Rule 42 *bis* stipulating that the committee shall:

“(c) make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries”.

2. The new scope of the committee cannot be without consequences for its future activities, but effective action is extremely difficult in view of the strict limitations imposed by the Assembly's difficult budgetary situation.

3. At this stage already a fundamental question arises which concerns both governments and parliaments: Is the pursuit of an effective public relations policy really possible within the limits of the rigorous principle of zero growth?

4. This problem does not concern Western European Union alone. It was *Lord Carrington*, the Secretary-General of NATO, who, at the opening session of the thirty-first annual assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Oporto, Portugal, made the following remarks:

“I sometimes think that our paymasters have a rather exaggerated view of the virtues of the shoe-string in the information business. A business which the western democracies cannot afford to neglect, because it is the essence of our system that policies – and especially policies for the longer haul – will only succeed if they are understood and seen to make sense.”

5. Probably an effective information policy cannot be pursued without financial support. But this is of course only one aspect. There is also the question of the rôle parliamentarians should play vis-à-vis the public in security and defence matters at national and international level. All activities in this new field need very careful consideration before making concrete proposals or reaching conclusions. The purpose of this report is therefore merely to collect data likely to highlight interrelations between parliaments, public opinion and defence questions in order to establish a basis for working out a public relations policy for the Assembly.

6. This analysis will not therefore be theoretical but will seek to spell out the duties of WEU parliamentarians towards the public and public opinion and to provide guidelines for fulfilling these duties. In a further report firm proposals for the Assembly's public relations policy should be elaborated.

II. The different interrelations

(i) Parliaments and defence

7. The rôle of parliaments in defence matters has many facets, most of which have already been examined by different committees of the Assembly of Western European Union. In May 1977 the Assembly took note of an information report entitled "Members of parliament and defence" presented by *Mr. Delorme* on behalf of the then Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. His study covered the rôle of members in national parliaments and was based on a questionnaire sent to the parliaments of all member countries. A major part of the report dealt with the relationship between parliaments and governments in defence matters.

9. One of the Rapporteur's conclusions was that "in spite of differences between countries, parliaments have important *legislative* and *supervisory* powers" in defence matters. But on the other hand he stated that apart from some exceptions, "it would appear that the planning of defence policy is the prerogative of the executive and even of the government assisted by committees of experts".

10. Referring to the Netherlands, where a defence council attached to the government includes representatives of both chambers, the Rapporteur concluded that this example was worthy of consideration in order to allow the legislature to be associated with defence planning from the outset. Otherwise the fundamental question had to be raised as to whether the nature of modern warfare did not make parliamentary powers illusory.

11. It is worth repeating these considerations because they also have repercussions on the question of whether governments and parliaments have a joint or separate function vis-à-vis public opinion.

12. Turning to the European level, the Assembly of Western European Union has only limited supervisory powers vis-à-vis the Council. For

that very reason, the Assembly has always been concerned that national governments and the Council should keep parliamentarians informed about security and defence planning.

13. In this context, the Assembly adopted specific recommendations such as:

- Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information adopted on 12th May 1970; and
- Recommendation 333 on parliaments and defence procurement adopted on 22nd May 1979 on reports from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

14. In their Rome declaration ministers supported the idea of more contact between the Council and the Assembly and in the Council's reply to Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the people, communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985, it was affirmed that "the enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states".

15. But for the moment these intentions are still waiting to be carried into effect and the position of WEU parliamentarians, caught between the Council and the public, remains difficult.

(ii) Public opinion and defence

16. In the abovementioned report by *Mr. Delorme*, one result of the questionnaire was summarised as follows:

"All the answers show the interest of the population in defence matters. Parliamentarians are frequently questioned on the subject and the political parties have to give them prominence in their electoral undertakings."

17. But such a result does not say anything about the main preoccupation of the public in security and defence, nor does it give any idea of the level of knowledge among the population. "Interest in defence matters" may also mean: conscientious objection, noise from military flights, damage caused by manoeuvres, equipment supply problems, stationing of troops, military installations, pollution control, etc.

18. One major and at the same time particular aspect was handled in a very comprehensive way in the report *Mr. Lagorce* presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on deterrence and the will of the people on which Recommendation 411 was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1984.

19. It is worth quoting the following assessment from the explanatory memorandum as an example:

"Your Rapporteur considers it important, and it corroborates the various poll results that he has been able to consult, that international peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the balance of forces, although real and serious, are not the main preoccupation of the majority of Europeans... The inadequacy of the West's means of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, does not seem very serious to a large majority of Europeans."

20. As a consequence, the Assembly in Recommendation 411 recommended that the Council "continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe".

21. The Council in its reply "shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats... this is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate". There is therefore agreement between the Assembly and the Council on the general need for an improved information policy.

22. All parliamentarians should use this reply in asking their respective governments about how they are really implementing this information effort towards the public. But the breakdown of tasks between parliamentarians and ministerial organs in this respect needs further clarification.

23. It is interesting that the Council further referred to the document "WEU and public awareness" which had been prepared by the Permanent Council and had been approved at the meeting at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985. The document was annexed to the reply and contains some ideas concerning the Assembly's rôle in public relations which will be examined below.

24. In fact it cannot be denied that parliamentarians too have an important responsibility towards the public and public opinion in security and defence matters.

(iii) Parliaments and public opinion

25. The responsibility of parliamentarians towards the public is mainly based on the fact that they are elected by the population and represent the interests of the people. WEU parliamentarians have a twofold responsibility

towards their national electorate and at European level.

26. The population has the right to be kept regularly informed by its representatives about their activities. Conversely, parliamentarians should listen to their electors in order to take account of their views on all relevant questions. Consequently, as already stated in the report by Mr. Delorme, parliamentarians have mainly an information rôle towards the public.

27. This information rôle is a duty which should not be limited to parliamentary activities but should include opinions on political decisions and action taken by governments. Parliamentarians should seize every opportunity of improving public knowledge and awareness of defence and security matters where they are better informed than the average citizen. In providing their assessments of the situation and of governmental activities, parliamentarians must also to some extent provide information on government actions.

28. As a first result, it may be said that parliamentarians are something of a link between governments and the people. It is important to realise that parliaments and parliamentarians are responsible towards the people and not towards government. But governments are responsible both towards parliaments and towards the people. Parliaments have to represent and interpret the will of the people vis-à-vis the governments. The question is whether they have also to interpret governmental action vis-à-vis the people. This question will be examined in the following section with particular regard to the responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians.

III. The responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians in security and defence questions vis-à-vis the public

29. When the Assembly decided to enlarge the competence of this committee in order to improve public awareness of its work, it became the committee's duty to examine the improvement of technical means for reaching the wider public within the given financial limits and also the substance of the message to be conveyed to the public.

30. To determine the substance of the Assembly's activities, the point of departure is the fact that the Assembly of Western European Union is the only international parliamentary institution with responsibility in defence and security matters backed by an international treaty.

31. The former Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,

therefore raised a crucial point, when he stated in his speech to the WEU Assembly in Paris on 22nd May 1985:

“ The Assembly bears great responsibility with regard to the *democratic legitimation* of our endeavours. It represents at an international level *democracy* in practice on matters of security policy. ”

32. It is interesting to note that in addressing the North Atlantic Assembly in Stuttgart on 20th May 1985, the Federal Chancellor, Mr. Kohl, underlined, with regard to that assembly too, that it was of importance in representing the democratic element of the Atlantic Alliance. But on the same occasion the President of the Bundesrat deplored that the North Atlantic Treaty did not, in fact, make provision for true participation at parliamentary level and stated that it had been overlooked that the legislative organs too were able to take most important decisions for the alliance.

33. Bearing in mind the stronger position of WEU parliamentarians, who have the backing of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Assembly's Charter, and reiterating the Ministers' wish expressed in the Rome declaration “ to see the Assembly playing an increasing rôle ” also with regard to public opinion, it seems urgent for the Assembly to define its responsibilities and position in this respect on the basis of its legal and political independence.

34. A central aspect of the Assembly's public relations policy should therefore be to strengthen public awareness of the fact that the existence and activities of the WEU Assembly mean first and foremost that European defence and security policy is *democratically supervised* at both European and national level.

35. This democratic structure of WEU based on an international treaty is unique in the whole world and should be brought more often to the attention of the public by comparing it, for instance, with the totally different situation in the Warsaw Pact organisation which was created as a reaction to the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty and to the Atlantic Alliance, but does not provide any specific parliamentary supervision.

36. In the Assembly's public relations policy, parliamentarians could always advocate an improvement of the democratic structure of WEU, bearing in mind that the powers of parliamentarians are still incomplete at European level. On the other hand, there are good reasons for explaining in public the advantages of having parliamentary supervision in WEU both at international and national level.

37. In working out a public relations policy, in substance it should be borne in mind, of course,

that the Council and its subsidiary bodies form, together with the Assembly, one and the same organisation, Western European Union. There are certainly matters of common interest which concern the organisation as a whole, for instance to make WEU better known to public opinion. The publication of an information booklet such as "Western European Union" prepared on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was undoubtedly in the interest of the whole organisation.

38. But is it possible to join the Assembly and the ministerial organs in common action for public relations as advocated in the document entitled "WEU and public awareness" prepared by the Permanent Council and endorsed by the Ministers on 23rd April 1985?

39. First of all, it is gratifying that the Council recognises the importance of an improved public relations policy and that steps are being taken to carry this policy into practice. In the above-mentioned document, the rôle of the Assembly is described as follows:

"III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving 'to consolidate the consensus among public opinion' on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls inter alia for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion."

40. In her address to the Assembly on 21st May 1985, *Baroness Young*, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, explained the rôle the Assembly should play in this context, as follows:

"... the Assembly has a significant function, together with member governments, in the process of improving public information and generating what has been called 'reassurance' about our defence policies... As representatives of the public, and with obligations towards them, parliamentarians have a most important part to play in this process. The

main aim of debate in the Assembly is to develop ideas and proposals in defence and security and to keep governments up to the mark. In so far as is possible, however, we in the United Kingdom believe that it should also be to create and expand a consensus within our countries, cutting across party political boundaries, about the need for the alliance and the defensive nature of its purpose and strategies as well as those of its member states. We in the Council are indebted to the Assembly for its work in developing the thrust behind the renewal process and for the critical exchange of views which has such importance in our daily work as we governments account for ourselves in responding to Assembly recommendations and questions. But let us also become indebted for the development of public understanding of the defence and security option open to us as Council members."

41. The Assembly of course is always prepared to explain to the public its own views on the whole spectrum of security and defence problems facing Europe. On the other hand, there were some good reasons for the Assembly to clarify its position in Recommendation 420 "welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activities but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work" and recommending that the Council "inform the public and press about its own activities".

42. There are mainly two reasons why the Assembly and its members are not in a position to carry out the task of explaining to the public the defence and security options open to the Council and/or member governments.

43. The first reason is a practical one. Parliamentarians are never informed well enough about all aspects of Council and government concepts and planning in security and defence policy. The improvement of contacts between the Council and the Assembly is still to be implemented and effective parliamentary participation in decisions will remain difficult.

44. The second reason is a political one. The Assembly has an albeit limited control and supervisory function vis-à-vis the Council. Its position will therefore always be a critical one even in the case of an enhanced dialogue between the two main WEU institutions which are the Assembly and the Council.

45. Consequently, the options open to the Council have to be interpreted and explained in public by the Council itself and its member governments. On the other hand, it is the task of all WEU parliamentarians to explain the Assembly's positions on the Council's activities and decisions.

46. The better the information conveyed to the public by the Council at European level and by the governments at national level, the more rewarding will be the public dialogue on these issues.

47. It emerges from the foregoing considerations that the Assembly has to elaborate its own public relations policy. One aspect of this policy has been mentioned already in paragraphs 34 and 35. On the other hand, an exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly about efforts to improve public awareness of WEU matters will be useful. It was therefore most useful that the Council transmitted the document on WEU and public awareness to the Assembly. Undoubtedly it contains useful suggestions which should be assessed for the Assembly's public relations work. In addition, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is very grateful that the new Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Cahen, has agreed to address the committee on the subject of improving WEU's public relations activities and every opportunity of discussing each other's intentions should be seized.

48. For elaborating the substance of a public relations policy for the Assembly, the themes listed in the WEU and public awareness document might provide a useful collection of the main problems now facing Europeans.

49. The Assembly's positions on actual problems of western security and defence are set out mainly in recommendations addressed to the Council and according to Rule 42 *bis*, paragraph 3 (a), it is particularly the duty of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to "select from texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in national parliaments".

50. It will be one of the new duties of the committee to propose a procedure for bringing Assembly recommendations to the attention of the public and to examine to what extent criteria for selecting texts for parliaments are valid for the public too.

51. The committee should also examine whether the Assembly should draw up more general documents for use in public in which the Assembly's function and position would be described in a political context. Such considerations should be co-ordinated with the General Affairs Committee and the Presidential Committee.

52. After the necessary review of the general function of the WEU Assembly with regard to the public and after collecting some first elements of a future public relations policy in substance, it will be necessary to examine the practical means available to parliamentarians for

reaching the public in security and defence matters.

IV. The means of reaching public opinion in security and defence matters

(i) Governmental action

53. Referring to the document on WEU and public awareness according to which "the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and ministers in the national governments of member states", it might be added that successful joint political action by the governments and/or by the Council would be an even more effective public relations policy than political speeches and joint declarations.

54. The Assembly for its part will continue to urge the Council and the governments to take such political action.

(ii) Parliamentary action

55. The intensification of parliamentary action at European and national level also attracts more public attention.

56. In this connection WEU parliamentarians could and should do far more than heretofore. The arrangements for follow-up action in national parliaments on the activities of the WEU Assembly still seem to be insufficient. Parliamentarians who are not members of the WEU Assembly still know very little about what goes on in WEU.

57. It therefore goes without saying that the initiative taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for making the consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries (information-action) has to be continued.

58. Nevertheless there are other aspects where your Rapporteur believes an improvement could be made in attracting the public's attention to WEU matters. They are listed hereafter.

59. On 27th October 1975, ten years ago, in Document 681 this committee suggested to the Assembly and its Presidential Committee that every two years a session be held away from the permanent seat of the Assembly. This suggestion is still valid, but additional financial means will be necessary if it is to be implemented.

60. The chairmen of national delegations should play a greater part in co-ordinating follow-up action in national parliaments. It could be suggested therefore that the committee invite to its meetings once or twice a year, the chairmen of national delegations.

61. Procedure for transmitting texts selected for debate in national parliaments and follow-up action should be re-examined. At the moment, these texts are transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments under cover of an official letter expressing the wish that these texts be used as material for speeches or questions to ministers.

62. It would be useful to send copies of these letters also to the chairmen of delegations and the rapporteurs for the selected recommendations in order to encourage them to promote follow-up action in the national parliaments.

63. At present, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations sends a letter with suggested questions on the texts selected to committee members. It would also be useful for the chairmen of delegations to be sent copies of these letters and also the rapporteurs for the recommendations in question. If possible, the rapporteurs should advise the committee on how to proceed with follow-up action in the parliaments.

64. A member should be appointed from each parliament to report to the committee once or twice a year on the follow-up action in his parliament. For this, he should ask for the assistance of the secretariat of the relevant national delegation. He should also remain in permanent contact with the chairman of the delegation and use his connections with committees concerned and the political groups.

65. Some delegations meet briefly prior to each Assembly session in order to co-ordinate procedures during the session. Why not meet after the session too in order to co-ordinate follow-up action? Such meetings could be held in the different member parliaments.

66. Apart from putting questions to the government, it would be very useful if every member made an effort to mention Western European Union in general, WEU Assembly recommendations or other activities of the organisation in speeches made at plenary sessions of the national parliaments.

67. It was requested in the previous report that every national government be asked to report regularly to parliament on its activities in WEU matters. Such reports should contain not only facts but also political assessments and decisions and should be debated both in committee and in plenary session.

68. Reverting to the activities of the Assembly, all committees should endeavour to make the recommendations the Assembly transmits to the Council as concise and specific as possible in order to strengthen their effectiveness. This will improve the Assembly's position in requesting a comprehensive reply without undue delay.

(iii) *Action vis-à-vis the public and public opinion*

69. For the means of reaching the public directly, the problems are even more delicate.

70. From the very outset the notions "public" and "public opinion" have to be defined clearly. The public is not identical with the press and media although the latter play a prominent rôle in shaping public opinion. The public also includes the different private and public institutions such as clubs, schools, universities, churches, pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, etc.

71. But first, the public is composed of an enormous number of *individuals* who are subjected to a wide variety of impressions and influences.

72. Because of the complexity of the subject, this report can outline only some aspects of the problem of reaching public opinion on security and defence matters.

73. In a further report this subject should be examined in detail. At present only the main questions to be solved can be listed without claiming to be exhaustive.

74. Among the great number of individuals, are there groups whose attitude in security and defence matters should be considered as crucial?

75. What is the rôle and attitude of young people? In the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, every third citizen is less than twenty years old. The German Bundeswehr has so-called "youth officers" whose duty is to seek contacts with young people in order to inform them about questions related to defence and military service.

76. Who has the greatest influence on individuals and particularly on young people? Families, schools, universities, churches, trade unions and other pressure groups, all sorts of associations and clubs, political parties, or the mass media such as television, radio and press?

77. Is the number of publications and the wealth of information so enormous that many people are saturated by all kinds of published opinion?

78. What are the effects of the so-called "genius of the period" (*Zeitgeist*) which is often marked by reflections of important contemporary philosophers?

79. If an improvement is to be made in public awareness and understanding of security and defence matters, two different means might be mentioned, i.e. approaching the population directly, or approaching opinion leaders.

(a) Approaching the population directly

80. There are various possibilities. A good example was the participation of the President of the Assembly, *Mr. Caro*, in several political discussions organised by different organisations such as the Europa Union in Hamburg in June 1985. Every member should seize the opportunity of taking part in such conferences and discussions where a large audience may be found.

81. Provided the financial question can be settled, groups of young people could be invited periodically to come to Paris in order to discuss security questions with members of the Assembly. Apparently, the Council of Europe and national parliaments already receive many more visiting groups than the Assembly of WEU.

82. A special problem is the question of creating a regular WEU publication. The financial implications are evident. Nevertheless it should be worth studying the activities of similar organisations in this respect.

83. The Eurogroup for instance recently made an effort by publishing an illustrated booklet entitled "Western defence, the European rôle in NATO". Several other publications are issued by NATO, such as the NATO Review, now published six times a year in several languages. Every two months the North Atlantic Assembly publishes a document entitled "News" with a summary of its activities and a calendar of events.

84. These are only a few examples. Is it not worth studying the possibility of creating an attractive information review dealing with WEU questions? It could also provide a forum where members and other prominent politicians would have an opportunity of addressing the public. Apart from the budgetary question it is obvious that it should first be established whether such a publication should be created under the aegis of the Council or of the Assembly.

85. Would it be possible to find a film producer to produce a film on the activities of the Assembly and Western European Union as a whole? Eurogroup was able to produce such a film for public showing.

86. These are only first considerations which have to be examined very carefully.

(b) Approaching opinion leaders

87. The possibility of establishing contacts with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) dealing with questions of defence and security, research institutes, universities, etc., might be studied. (It should be recalled that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the Council of Europe has even created a sub-

committee for relations with non-governmental organisations.) The purpose of such contacts might be to ensure that these organisations take due account of WEU and its Assembly in their own work and particularly in their publications which sometimes have an important influence in forming the opinions of politicians.

88. The problem might be illustrated by one example: every two weeks the German society for foreign policy (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*) publishes a periodical entitled *Europa Archiv*. In its documental part, this review always takes account of important events and documents relating to WEU. But this does not seem to have a visible effect on authors of articles which are published in the same periodical. In a recent copy of *Europa Archiv* dated 25th August 1985, there was an article on burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance – the future of the American military presence in Europe.

89. In a footnote, the author gave bibliographical data about the general problem of burden-sharing. No mention was made of Mr. Wilkinson's report adopted by the Assembly of Western European Union on 29th November 1983 on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance which was the basis of the Assembly's Recommendation 396. Nor was there any substantial examination of the contents of Mr. Wilkinson's report in the text of the article.

90. There are many reviews, newspapers and periodicals at national and European level interested in publishing articles on European security questions. It would be a good opportunity for the President of the Assembly, the chairmen of the committees, rapporteurs or other members to use these channels for making the Assembly's positions known to the public.

91. Turning to relations with the press and journalists, it is first the Press Counsellor who should advise the committee on how to present the activities of the Assembly in a more effective way in the different countries.

92. But it is worth repeating that this committee has already examined the problems of relations with the press twice in recent years. Indeed, *Dame Jill Knight* herself presented two information reports on this matter: on 3rd December 1980, Document 865 on relations with parliaments with preliminary observations on relations between parliaments and the press, and, on 28th April 1981, Document 873 on relations between parliaments and the press – the WEU Assembly and the press. At that time, stress was laid on three main concerns: (i) the WEU Assembly was not of sufficient interest for the members themselves; (ii) an extremely small sum was available in the Assembly's information budget compared with that of the European

Parliament and the Council of Europe; (iii) the Council was inactive and failed to provide the Assembly with adequate information.

93. WEU's new prospects following the reactivation agreed by ministers in the Rome declaration should provide an opportunity to improve the interest of the press in the Assembly's work too. Before considering new technical proposals which, of course, have to be prepared, it seems crucial to stimulate the interest of members themselves in WEU matters.

V. Activities of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

94. The committee met in Paris on 22nd May, in Rome on 11th June and in London on 5th November 1985. In accordance with Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, it selected from texts adopted by the Assembly at the first part of its thirty-first ordinary session the following recommendations to be debated in the parliaments, i.e.:

- 417 on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act;
- 420 on the new outlook for WEU - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council;
- 421 on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council;
- 423 on the state of European security - the central region.

95. These texts were transmitted with a letter from the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments expressing the hope that they would be of interest and provide subject matter for speeches or questions to ministers.

96. In a letter addressed to committee members on 9th September 1985, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations enclosed draft questions relating to the subjects covered in the relevant recommendations and invited members to inform the Office of the Clerk of the questions they actually put.

97. Reactions so far have been practically nil. Only *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges* put a question on Recommendation 420 in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 11th July 1985.

98. It was also *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges* who asked her government about the future rôle of WEU following the Rome declaration (4th June 1985) referring to Order 58 adopted by the Assembly. On 2nd July 1985, she put a question on Recommendation 413 on the military

use of space and on Luxembourg's contribution to the budget of Western European Union.

99. It emerges from this result that there are active members but very few of them keep the secretariat informed about their follow-up activities. Your Rapporteur therefore believes the procedure should be improved as quickly as possible. He made the relevant proposals in paragraphs 60 to 66.

100. The committee has continued to organise information meetings in member parliaments. On 11th June 1985 an information meeting was held with members of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament and the press at the Italian Senate. The relevant summary record is appended. There was a large attendance on the Italian side, and the local press reported the event. Briefings were given by members of the committee as follows:

- the duties of the new WEU (by *Mr. Giust*);
- the Assembly of WEU (by *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges*);
- relations between WEU, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries (by *Mr. Eysink*).

101. It is planned to hold the next information meeting in the German Bundestag in February 1986. On 5th November 1985, the committee had the pleasure of being addressed in London by *Mr. Cahen*, the new Secretary-General of Western European Union, on the subject of improving WEU's public relations activities.

VI. Conclusions

102. (i) Both the Council and the Assembly agree that efforts have to be made to improve public awareness of defence matters in general and of WEU matters in particular.

103. (ii) As for the Council and its member governments, the best public relations policy would be successful political action.

104. (iii) Member governments should be asked to report regularly to parliament on their activities in WEU matters.

105. (iv) Parliamentarians in each member country should urge their respective governments to implement the Council's reply to Recommendation 411, according to which the effort of informing European opinion is essentially the responsibility of each member state.

106. (v) Parliamentary action, and particularly follow-up action in national parliaments on the Assembly's recommendations, has to be inten-

sified with greater participation by the chairmen of national delegations and rapporteurs.

107. *(vi)* A member should be appointed from each parliament to report to the committee once or twice a year on the follow-up action in that member's parliament.

108. *(vii)* In connection with actions vis-à-vis the public and public opinion, the Assembly has to work out its own public relations policy taking into account that new ways of informing the public about its activities must not involve new expenditure.

109. *(viii)* In substance, a central point in the Assembly's public relations should be to explain the significance of WEU's democratic structure and the fact that Western European security and defence policy is democratically verified and supervised at both national and European level. On this basis, the Assembly should explain its specific activities in public, using, in the first place, the recommendations it adopts.

110. *(ix)* All reasonable means of approaching opinion leaders and the population directly will be helpful to stimulate public interest in WEU.

APPENDIX I

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ³*to Recommendation 411*

1. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.

2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate.

3. Parallel to this effort, in the context of joint reflection on this matter, the Council, which met at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, approved a document entitled "WEU and public awareness". This document is annexed to the present reply.

4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the preoccupations of European public opinion which the Assembly can convey to the Council. The enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states. Whilst assuring the security interests of the member states and maintaining closer co-operation between them, this policy makes it possible to preserve peace and to seek genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. This position has been approved by all the member states of the alliance and frequently reaffirmed, in particular in the Washington declaration of 31st May 1984 which demonstrates the full agreement and unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying their security.

5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integrated military structure adopted the dual-track decision of December 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Europe which had been distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of forces and stressed that western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded.

Hence the allies regretted the breaking-off of talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and the WEU Council can but welcome the opening of a new round of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985.

6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations - multilaterally in the appropriate fora, but also bilaterally - on all the problems relating to the various arms control questions. In this connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold regular consultations with the United States on the negotiations in Geneva. Furthermore, the United States regularly inform the NATO Council about these negotiations.

7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies, which include, inter alia, studies in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council takes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field.

8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond the competence of WEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries at both bilateral and multilateral level and specifically at European level within the framework of the Lomé Convention, recently renewed for a second time.

3. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985.

WEU and public awareness

Introduction

I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 29th October :

“ The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit proposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. ”

I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to the *themes* WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the *means* by which this presentation is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.

Themes

II. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European organisations. They emphasised :

- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ;
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ;
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

II. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration.

II. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its public relations, with the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :

- (a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it should never be taken for granted ;
- (b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of force imbalances and the present threat ;
- (c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive dialogue and co-operation ;
- (d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
- (e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level of forces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
- (f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of armaments ;
- (g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ;
- (h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.

II. (iv) In view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to

develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American nuclear guarantee.

II. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be achieved.

Means

III. (i) There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled :

- WEU Assembly ;
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- WEU member governments.

Assembly

III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving "to consolidate the consensus among public opinion" on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls *inter alia* for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion.

III. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable public attention during its biennial sessions.

III. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across to a wider audience the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of defence and security issues (see paragraph III. (x) below) might also incorporate these ideas.

III. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. This will to a large extent be a national task ; but WEU institutions can also play a rôle by helping to spread information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribution of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if in future Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater contact between members of parliament of member states and the media.

Council/Secretary-General/Agencies

III. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU.

III. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appropriate, speeches.

III. (viii) There is probably a rôle for a public relations and information unit within the Secretariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distributed by the unit.

Agencies

III. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways :

- (i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for distribution ;
- (ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in London.

National governments

III. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put across the agreed themes.

III. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the agreed themes and the rôle of WEU in the context of European security.

III. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council will be instructed to look at this problem periodically during its regular sessions. When the Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.

Conclusion

IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and transatlantic unity.

APPENDIX II

*Summary record
of the information meeting with members of the two chambers
of the Italian Parliament and the press at the Italian Senate,
Rome, on Tuesday, 11th June 1985, at 4.30 p.m.*

The meeting was organised at the invitation of the Italian Delegation and in the context of the special action of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in the WEU member parliaments.

The following Italian parliamentarians attended the meeting:

Mr. Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly ;

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the WEU Assembly ;

Mr. Vecchietti, Vice-Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly.

Senate :

The following members were present :

MM. Accili, Frasca, Gianotti, Marchio, Mezzapesa, Milani, Mitterdorfer, Palumbo, Spitella (all members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly).

Foreign Affairs Committee

Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the committee ;

MM. Bernassola, Malagodi, Pierrelli, Rumor.

Defence Committee

Mr. Ferrara, Vice-Chairman of the committee ;

MM. Butini, Falluchi, Saporito.

Chamber of Deputies :

The following members were present :

MM. Foschi, Martino, Sinesio (all members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly).

Defence Committee

Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the committee

Mr. Stegagnini, Vice-Chairman of the committee ;

MM. Di Re, Zanini.

At the beginning of the meeting briefings were given by members of the committee as follows :

- the duties of the new WEU (by Mr. Giust) ;

- the Assembly of WEU (by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges) ;

- relations between WEU, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries (by Mr. Eysink).

The following discussion was launched by questions put by members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to their Italian colleagues.

Mr. Goerens asked whether Italian parliamentarians felt they were sufficiently informed about WEU matters and if they wished to suggest improvements.

Mr. Eysink asked what was the attitude in Italy towards the SDI and Eureka programmes.

On the SDI, *Mr. Bianco*, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, said there was a need of a specific European forum to discuss these problems. There were still too many bilateral talks and relations between different European countries and the United States. The general feeling in Italy was that WEU should play an important rôle in harmonising the position of Western European countries in this matter.

This position was endorsed by *Mr. Milani* who raised the question of the rôle the Assembly could play within WEU.

Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said this was perhaps the eve of a strategic revolution. In this connection, WEU could have a new function in voicing Europe's view. He was convinced Italy wished to address these matters, but the main question was whether the British, French and Germans had the same intention. Another question was the enlargement of the organisation with the accession of Portugal and Spain. In his view these countries could not be kept outside. If European positions were not harmonised, decisions would be taken elsewhere without Europe.

Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, said as a matter of fact there was little interest for WEU in his committee. The problem was whether we had the ability to define a joint European defence policy. Unfortunately there was no united Europe. The type of relationship between the United States and Europe was not clear. Membership of NATO was fundamental

for Italy. A difficulty was that there was no identity between NATO and WEU, so it was impossible to reach a special European position on security matters. WEU had the advantage of including France.

Another difficulty came from the United States which failed to understand European needs. There was a danger of drifting away from each other and this could damage the relationship. If the United States had contacted its European allies on the problem of the neutron bomb prior to reaching decisions many difficulties would have been avoided.

In the SDI, it should be carefully considered whether it might not lead to new unbalances.

He agreed with Mr. Taviani, recalling the European Defence Community which had been extremely important for Italy. It was important for the creation of Europe which should not be merely a Europe for trade. In the European Community there were too many conflicts. Had the defence community succeeded, the history of Europe would have been quite different.

WEU could have a future but it should work for Europe's unity.

Mr. Martino thought further meetings were needed to be able to reach a decision in the Assembly on the SDI.

Mr. Malagodi asked whether the *relationship between Eurogroup and WEU* was taken carefully into consideration. As for the United States, it had to be noted that what the Americans considered to be consultations meant

only information after decisions had been reached. If there had been real consultations a problem such as that of the *neutron bomb* would never have happened.

As for the SDI, he believed the Soviets would double the number of their missiles.

There was adequate co-operation in NATO between chiefs-of-staff, but there was a need for a political forum. Security was not just a question of money. He was very pleased that this meeting was being held to discuss these questions.

Mr. Stegagnini mentioned that the Italian Chamber of Deputies had tried to put forward a *bill on the export of armaments*. A question was whether that bill corresponded to legislation in other parliaments. *There should be a united European position* in this matter. Furthermore, WEU should work for better *co-ordination of standardisation*. There was still too much competition within Europe.

Sir John Page asked what Italian parliamentarians expected from the new Italian presidency of the WEU Council.

Mr. Vecchiotti said future developments depended mainly on three countries: *France, Britain and Germany*. If the three were in agreement, the others would follow. Italy wanted WEU to be extended *to all other Western European countries*.

Mrs. Knight thanked all parliamentarians for their contributions and closed the meeting at 6.30 p.m.

***Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges ²
by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllesheim and Unland, Rapporteurs***

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the revision of the Rules of Procedure

(Each rule referred to in the draft resolution is followed by the initial of the Rapporteur concerned.)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllesheim and Unland, Rapporteurs

APPENDIX

Comparison of present text and proposed amended text

1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions.
2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Schulte (Chairman); MM. Eysink, Woodall (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Antoni (Alternate: Gianotti), Antretter, Coleman (Alternate: Jessel), Corrie, Delehedde (Alternate: Sénès), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Gorla, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (Alternate: Konen), MM. Koehl, Lapenta, Marchio, Michel, Pécriaux, Spies von Büllesheim, Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff, Wilquin (Alternate: Beix).*
N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter

The Assembly,

DECIDES

1. To amend Article III of the Charter as follows:

Leave out the whole of paragraph (a) and insert:

“ Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives. ”;

2. To amend Article IV of the Charter as follows:

In paragraph (b), leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

3. To amend Article XI of the Charter as follows:

Leave out Article XI and insert:

“ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years.

(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretariat-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.”

4. To amend the English text of Article XII of the Charter as follows:

In paragraph (a), leave out “ Proposals ” and insert “ Motions ”.

Draft Resolution
on the revision of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. *Rule 2 S*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts. ”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

2. *Rule 3 S*

At the end of the paragraph, leave out “ or substitutes ”.

3. *Rule 4 S*

In paragraph 2, leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

4. *Rule 5 S*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the oldest representative present shall take the Chair until the election of the President has been announced.

2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly. ”

5. *Rule 6 S*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay. ”

6. *Rule 7 S*

Leave out the title and insert:

“ Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates ”.

Leave out paragraph 1.

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. ”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

7. *Rule 8 E*

Leave out paragraph 3.

8. *Rule 11 E*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, add: “ When in the Chair ”.

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

“ If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over. ”

9. *Rule 15 E*

In paragraph 1 of the English text, leave out “ for any reason ” and insert “ without having been invited by the President of the Assembly ”.

Add a paragraph 4:

“ 4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the Chamber for the purpose of photographic and/or sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presidential Committee. ”

10. *Rule 22 S*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

“ Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them. ”

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made. ”

11. *Rule 24 S*

Leave out “ in accordance with Rule 7 ”.

Add a paragraph 2:

“ 2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register. ”

12. *Rule 27 S*

In paragraph 4, leave out “ may ” and insert “ shall be invited to ”.

English text only: after “ debate ”, insert “ may ”.

13. *Rule 28 U*

In paragraph 2, redraft the end of the first sentence to read: “ and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision ”.

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

“ (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.

(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.

(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.

(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members. ”

Rule 30 is therefore deleted.

14. *Rule 29 S*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting. ”

Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.

15. *Rule 31 S*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the

latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the President decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak.”

Leave out paragraph 6 and insert:

“ 6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response. ”

In paragraph 7, after “ determining of ”, insert “ the order of business of the Assembly ”.

16. *Rule 32 S*

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the debate. ”

17. *Rule 34 E*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

“ Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 2(c), add: “ or if the President so decides ”.

In paragraph 4, after the first sentence, insert:

“ Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The President shall announce the result. ”

18. *Rule 35 E*

At the end of paragraph 1(b), add: “ (see Rule 34, paragraph 1) ”.

At the end of paragraph 1(c), add:

“ In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4). ”

Leave out paragraph 2.

19. *Rule 39 E*

At the end of paragraph 2, add former paragraph 3 of Rule 8:

“ The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. ”

In paragraph 5, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

In paragraph 6, leave out “ Rule 8, paragraph 3 ”, and insert “ paragraph 2 above ”.

20. *Rule 40 E*

In paragraph 5, leave out “ Bureau of the Assembly ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

21. *Rule 41 E*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, insert: “ In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, ”.

In paragraph 4, leave out “ and methods of voting (Rule 34) ” and insert “ methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) ”.

Leave out paragraph 4(b).

In paragraph 4(c), after “ but ” insert “ elections or ”.

Add a paragraph 4(d):

“ (d) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee. ”

22. *Rule 42 E*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28. ”

Add a paragraph 4:

“ 4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events. ”

23. *Rule 47 U*

Leave out paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and insert:

“ 1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau. His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year.

2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level.

5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. ”

24. *Rule 50 U*

In paragraph 2, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

25. *Rule 51 U*

In paragraph 1 of the French text, leave out “ résolution ” and insert “ décision ”.

26. *Reference to substitutes S*

Leave out reference to substitutes in the following rules: 2, 5, 13, 26, 27 (first sentence of paragraph 6), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 (paragraph 2, line 4), 39, 41 (except in paragraph 7), 43 (except in paragraph 6), 45 and 51.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland, Rapporteurs)

Rule 2

There is a contradiction in the concept of an ordinary session in paragraphs 1 and 2. The wording proposed makes a clear distinction between the ordinary session which is annual and part-sessions.

There is a contradiction between Rules 2 and 3. Since, according to Rule 2, paragraph 1, "The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require", Rule 3 on convening extraordinary sessions seems pointless. The ordinary session is all the part-sessions the Assembly holds during the year since it meets "not less than once in the course of any calendar year".

The wording of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Council of Europe is better and should be taken as a model. The following amendment is proposed:

Leave out paragraph 1 of Rule 2 and insert:

"Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts."

Leave out paragraph 2 of Rule 2 and renumber paragraphs 3 and 4 accordingly.

Rule 3

These provisions should be brought into line with those of Article III of the Charter and the words "or substitutes" left out.

Rule 4

The following amendment is proposed:

Leave out "the Bureau of the Assembly" and insert "the Presidential Committee of the Assembly".

This amendment takes into account the Presidential Committee's responsibilities under Rule 2, paragraph 3, and Rule 14.

Rule 5

The following drafting amendment is proposed to the French text only:

Leave out "jusqu'à la proclamation du Président élu" and insert "jusqu'à la proclamation de l'élection du Président".

Rule 6

In paragraph 3, leave out "may examine these credentials and report at once to the

Assembly" and insert "may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay".

In fact this committee has not been convened for a very long time and it is responsible only for examining the validity of the documents attesting credentials which have been received from the appropriate authorities.

Rule 7

The committee considered it useful to set out the general principle that unless otherwise stipulated in the Rules of Procedure the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. It is therefore possible to leave out the reference to substitutes in many of the rules (see paragraph 20 of the draft resolution). It is evident that in all cases where they have the same powers as representatives, substitutes have the same obligations.

Rule 11

The provisions of this rule give the President wide enough powers to allow him to solve any procedural problem and to settle any incident, if necessary in consultation with the Assembly.

It should be noted in particular that repeated points of order delay the Assembly's work and that the President, responsible under Rule 11 for maintaining order, may stop them to allow the Assembly to continue with the debates on its agenda.

Comments in the present report on the tabling of amendments (Rule 29) and the right to speak (Rules 31 and 33) emphasise the extent of the President's powers when in the Chair. It is proposed, however, to stress that these powers are linked with the fact that he is effectively in the Chair. If he takes part in a debate, the committee considers he should not resume the Chair until the debate is over. It is therefore proposed to add, at the beginning of paragraph 2, "When in the Chair" and, at the end of paragraph 2, "When the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over."

These provisions are applicable to a Vice-President replacing the President in accordance with Rule 12.

*Rule 15**Paragraph 1*

After "Chamber", add "without having been invited by the President of the Assembly..."

The purpose is to allow access to the Chamber for persons who are not members of governments of member countries but who have been invited by the Presidential Committee to attend and often to speak (representatives of non-member governments, non-governmental speakers, parliamentary observers, etc.).

Rule 22

Whereas the official report distributed after each sitting gives the full text only of speeches delivered in French and English, the proceedings issued after each session give the full text in French and English of all speeches, irrespective of the official language in which they were delivered.

Among the arrangements made for this purpose, mention should be made of the possibility for speakers to ask the verbatim reporters to give them the transcription of their speeches a few minutes after they have been delivered. A copy of this transcription may also be given to a delegation secretary at his request.

It might be useful for this to be set out in the Rules of Procedure. It is therefore proposed to add a new paragraph 2 to Rule 22 as follows:

"2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made."

The present paragraph 2, as amended, would be added to paragraph 1 since it relates solely to the summary report in English and French (the word "sténographie" in the French text being left out and "compte rendu" inserted).

Rule 24

The revised Rule 7 now covers all the rights of substitutes independently of their attendance at a given sitting in replacement of representatives.

By making the links between the powers of substitutes and signature of the attendance register more flexible, the amendment to Rule 7 therefore clearly gives substitutes rights such as that of convening an extraordinary session, fulfilling the duties of Provisional President or standing for election to a committee bureau.

Conversely, the rights and duties of substitutes in the context of a given sitting must be specified. For this purpose, Rule 24 should be revised by deleting the reference to Rule 7, which is now pointless, and by inserting a new paragraph as follows:

"Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register."

It is proposed to retain the reference to substitutes in rules indicating the *area of application* of a general rule and to delete it in rules defining the powers and obligations incumbent upon members of the Assembly, the powers and obligations of substitutes being, in accordance with the principle laid down in Rule 7 revised, identical to those of representatives.

*Rule 26: Interpretation**Paragraph 2*

The present rule authorising explanations of vote only after the vote on the text as a whole conforms to practice in the Council of Europe. The purpose of this is to avoid another general debate being started before the vote on the text as a whole, since certain speakers might be tempted to influence the decision of their colleagues at the last minute. It thus allows the Assembly to vote on the text as a whole immediately after the debate on the amendments.

Only those who wish to explain the meaning of their votes speak. They are necessarily limited in number, which is a considerable advantage in view of the brevity of sessions.

Rule 27

Draft the beginning of paragraph 4 as follows:

"The Chairman of the Council shall be invited to present the report orally to the Assembly..."

The purpose of this amendment is to bring the drafting of the rule into line with the corresponding paragraph of the Charter and to make the English and French texts concord.

Rules 28 and 30

Rule 30 concerns motions for orders. In the Assembly's vocabulary, a text emanating from a committee is a draft and a text emanating from members of the Assembly is a motion.

After noting the difference between draft orders in reports and motions for orders as referred to in Rule 30, it is therefore necessary to stipulate to what extent the provisions appli-

cable to motions for recommendations, opinions or resolutions, covered by Rule 28, also concern motions for orders.

The following differences should be noted:

- (i) motions under Rule 28 must be submitted in writing and signed by at least ten representatives, whereas a single representative may lay a motion for an order on the table of the Assembly;
- (ii) motions under Rule 28 are submitted to the Assembly for inclusion in the register of the Assembly, whereas motions for orders may be put to the vote without prior reference to committee and may in this case be adopted directly;
- (iii) where the debate is concerned, Rule 28 lays down that when the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned. Rule 30 says nothing in this respect but it is customary to treat a motion for an order in the same way as a motion within the meaning of Rule 28;
- (iv) finally, the notion of an order is not defined but it is generally considered that its purpose is to give a mandate to the President or to an Assembly committee.

In view of the facility with which a motion for an order may be tabled and adopted, the Assembly is liable to find itself bound by a text adopted without debate by a chance majority.

To allow the Assembly to keep control of its proceedings, three methods may be considered:

The first, to which the Assembly of the Council of Europe seems to be turning, is to introduce into the Rules of Procedure a precise definition of the notion of an order laying down in particular that an order may not relate to a new subject but must relate to a question already included in the register of the Assembly and keep to matters of form, transmission, execution or procedure, without tackling the substance of the question.

The second is to delete completely the notion of an order which is possible since in fact members of the Assembly generally resort to points of order to raise matters which would be the subject of a motion for an order if the motion for an order were thus defined. Draft orders submitted by committees for the purpose

of instructing an Assembly body to carry out a specific task may also be termed draft resolutions.

The third method has the advantage of being clear and simple and should be given preference. It is to define an order as a mandate given to an Assembly body and to deal with motions for orders under Rule 28 like motions for recommendations, opinions or resolutions. Thus completed, Rule 28 would be the same as paragraph 3 of Rule 42 which sets out the form of the substantive text of reports and also mentions draft orders.

The latter solution would imply redrafting the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Rule 28 to read: "and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision".

Finally, a definition should be made of motions tabled in the Assembly by ten of its members and drafts included in committee reports. It would be desirable to take this opportunity of dispelling the ambiguity arising from the plurality of meanings attributed to the word "resolution". It may in fact designate an Assembly text addressed by its President to international organisations, governments or national parliaments or an Assembly decision relating to its operation or the status of its members: amendments to the Charter (Article XII) or the Rules of Procedure (Rule 51), the appointment of a committee of investigation (Rule 39, paragraph 5), request for the waiver of immunity (Rule 50, paragraph 2).

Rule 28 might consequently set out the following definitions:

- "(a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.
- (b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.
- (c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.
- (d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members.

The adoption of this amendment would imply deletion of Rule 30.

Rule 29: Interpretation

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the Assembly has time to see amendments before they are debated, while leaving the President the possibility of relaxing this rule if necessary.

Rule 31: Interpretation

This amendment is intended to allow the President to ascertain the number of speakers early enough before a debate to be able to foresee the length of the debate and, if necessary, make the appropriate arrangements to organise it. This provision would moreover facilitate the President's task as set out in Rule 31, paragraph 2: "As far as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately upon speakers for and against the matter under discussion." Equally it allows him to avoid a succession of speakers of the same political group or the same nationality.

Paragraph 6

The committee considered the unduly vague notion of a personal statement should be defined. On the other hand, it wished to leave the President greater freedom to choose when a member of the Assembly may reply to a personal affront.

Paragraph 7

After "determining of" add "the order of business of the Assembly".

Speaking time should be limited for speeches on the adoption of the draft order of business in the same way as for determining the orders of the day of sittings and procedural matters.

Rule 33: Interpretation

The President may have included in the draft order of business a proposal to hold a debate on one or more reports. He may also make such a proposal during the session should this seem necessary.

In regard to speaking time for various categories of speaker, proposals were made in the memorandum by the President (Document 1016). This is a question of practice and not one for the Rules of Procedure. In this connection, the Assembly must be able to adapt the provisions it agrees upon according to circumstances.

Paragraph 1

Just as the President regularly limits the speaking time in general debates under Rule 33, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure, there should be no problem if he at the same time limits speaking time on amendments.

*Rule 34**Paragraph 1*

Add at the end of the paragraph: "Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast."

The purpose of this amendment is to specify that the rule applicable to roll-call votes is also applicable to votes by sitting and standing.

Paragraph 2

This amendment allows the President to resort to roll-call votes when, for instance, he considers it to be the only way to allow the Assembly to vote clearly.

Paragraph 4

It is proposed to amend this paragraph by adding the provisions in italics:

"4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. *Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall announce the result.*"

Inclusion of the provisions in italics recalls the provisions of Rule 10 for nominations other than those of members of the Bureau of the Assembly.

*Rule 35**Paragraph 1(b)*

Add: "(See Rule 34, paragraph 1)".

Paragraph 1(c)

Add at the end of this paragraph:

"...In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected. (See Rule 34, paragraph 4)."

These provisions, applicable to the election of members of the Bureau of the Assembly under Rule 10, may be extended to cover all elections.

Paragraph 2

Leave out this paragraph whose provisions are included in Rule 34, paragraph 1.

Rule 36

The present rule that the quorum is calculated in accordance with the number of signatures on the register of attendance and not the number of representatives effectively present in the Chamber has so far proved satisfactory. It avoids a minority being able to prevent the Assembly from voting by leaving the Chamber. It no doubt prevents a parliamentarian from

insisting on the postponement of a vote by invoking the insufficient number of representatives present, but the President may always, at the request of a member of the Assembly, and with the agreement of the latter, postpone a vote or suspend the sitting. Moreover, it is his task, in the exercise of his responsibilities under Rule 11, to avoid a surprise vote. Conversely, calculating the quorum on the basis of the number of representatives present would result in the Assembly and its President again becoming powerless in face of certain manoeuvres aimed at preventing the majority from being able to express its political wishes.

Rule 39

Paragraph 2

See the proposed amendment to Rule 8.

Paragraph 6

The reference should no longer be to Rule 8, paragraph 3, but to Rule 39, paragraph 2.

Rule 40

Paragraph 5

Leave out "Bureau" and insert "Presidential Committee".

This is an overall responsibility of the Presidential Committee rather than the Bureau.

Rule 41

Paragraph 2

According to Rule 40, authorisation is necessary for appointing one or more members of a committee to carry out an information or study visit. A fortiori, the authorisation of the Presidential Committee would be necessary for appointing a sub-committee in view of the financial implications of such a decision.

The following amendment is therefore proposed:

Add at the beginning of Rule 41, paragraph 2, "In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5."

Paragraph 4(b)

This paragraph is not clear. It would be better to leave out this paragraph and amend paragraph 4 as follows to include a reference to Rule 35 on majorities, which is clearer.

In the first paragraph of paragraph 4, after "(Rule 32)" read "methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) shall apply...".

Paragraph 4(c)

An election is not simple deliberation but a major decision. It should therefore be made

quite clear that the same quorum rules apply for electing the bureau of a committee or its rapporteurs as for the vote on a report as a whole.

The following amendment is therefore proposed:

"A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members is present, but *elections or the vote on a report as a whole...*"

Paragraph 4(d): "Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee."

The addition of this new paragraph is to avoid the ambiguity that might stem from the fact that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. It might be considered that this rule was applicable to the bureau of a committee. Rule 7, paragraph 3, makes it clear that substitutes may be elected to the bureau of a committee. Affirmation of this in Rule 41 adds to the clarity and coherence of the rules.

Rule 42

The purpose of this amendment is to allow the Assembly time to examine reports, account being taken of the time required for preparing texts, translating the last corrections, printing and mailing.

It shall nevertheless still be possible for the Assembly, in certain strict conditions, to debate a report adopted after the required time-limit.

Rule 47

At the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on 4th December 1984, the Chairman read out a letter from Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, communicating the following resolution by the Bureau dated 12th November 1984:

"The Bureau of the Assembly,

Anxious to guarantee the Assembly's right to exercise in full its supervision of all matters within its purview;

Noting that in exercising this right the Assembly is limited in respect of the mandate it confers upon the Clerk and any Clerk Assistant as long as the duration of these mandates is not fixed;

Considering this shortcoming should be overcome by the adoption of new provisions guaranteeing that the Assembly can exercise its right in this respect;

Feels it desirable to fix a five-year time-limit on the mandate of the Clerk and any Clerk Assistant, this mandate being renewable by decision of the Assembly,

Asks the President to proceed to transmit the present resolution to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so that the latter may report to the Assembly on this matter, if possible at the December 1984 session. ”

Since lack of time did not allow a report to be presented at the December 1984 session, the President of the Assembly asked the committee to report on this matter at the May 1985 session.

The Rapporteur first submitted an oral report at the meeting of the committee in Palermo on 22nd February 1985.

The matter was discussed at length and general agreement on the principle of an amendment was reached without a vote. Consequently, the Rapporteur drafted the proposed amended text of Rule 47 and presented it orally to the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 15th April 1985. In this presentation he underlined the following points:

- the political basis and starting point for the work of the committee was exclusively the resolution of the Bureau dated 12th November 1984;
- the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is a purely technical

organ. In this specific instance, its tasks were merely to work out the technical and legal means of implementing a political decision by the Bureau;

- as for the legal aspects, the present Clerk was elected in December 1980 for an unlimited period. An amendment of Rule 47 could not have retroactive effect. It could be applicable only in future provided the post of Clerk became vacant.

The Presidential Committee fully endorsed these considerations and authorised the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to pursue its work on this basis.

An amendment to Article XI of the Charter will be necessary. According to Article XII of the Charter, proposals to amend the Charter are to be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives.

Your Rapporteur proposes therefore to submit to the Assembly the attached draft resolution. The text corresponds to that of the proposed amendment to Rule 47 but is shorter since in the Charter only the basic principles should be set out.

APPENDIX

*Comparison of present text and proposed amended text
of the Charter and Rules of Procedure**Charter**Present text**III. Sessions of the Assembly*

(a) The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives and substitutes.

(b) The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

IV. Seat of the Assembly

(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.

(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly decides otherwise.

XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations; that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

(b) The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as members of the Office of the Clerk.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

*Proposed amended text**III. Sessions of the Assembly*

(a) Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives.

(b) The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

IV. Seat of the Assembly

(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.

(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.

XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years.

(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(a) Proposals to amend the Charter of the Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives. After consideration of the report thereon by the competent committee or committees, such amendments require the approval of a majority of the representatives of the Assembly.

(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and of any subsequent amendments thereto, shall require an absolute majority of the votes cast.

XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(a) Motions to amend the Charter of the Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives. After consideration of the report thereon by the competent committee or committees, such amendments require the approval of a majority of the representatives of the Assembly.

(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and of any subsequent amendments thereto, shall require an absolute majority of the votes cast.

*Rules of Procedure**Present text*

RULE 2

Date and duration of sessions

1. The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.
2. An ordinary session may be divided into two or more parts.
3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives and substitutes.
4. The Presidential Committee shall inform representatives and substitutes of the dates of the opening or resumption of an ordinary session not less than six weeks beforehand.

RULE 3

Extraordinary sessions

The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives or substitutes.

RULE 4

Seat of the Assembly

1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly decides otherwise.

RULE 5

Provisional President

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the oldest representative or substitute present shall discharge the duties of President until the election of the President has been announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the oldest representative or substitute is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the election of the President, or with the election or the report of the Credentials Committee.

Proposed amended text

RULE 2

Date and duration of sessions

1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.
2. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives.
3. The Presidential Committee shall inform representatives of the dates of the opening or resumption of an ordinary session not less than six weeks beforehand.

RULE 3

Extraordinary sessions

The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

RULE 4

Seat of the Assembly

1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.

RULE 5

Provisional President

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the oldest representative present shall take the Chair until the election of the President has been announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly.

RULE 6

Ratification of credentials

1. The credentials of representatives and substitutes shall be attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials formally communicated to the President of the Assembly by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the parliaments or governments of member states subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. A committee of five representatives or substitutes chosen by lot may examine these credentials and report at once to the Assembly.
4. Any representative or substitute whose credentials are contested may take his seat provisionally with the same rights as other representatives and substitutes until the Assembly has made a decision on his case.

RULE 7

Substitutes and alternates

1. Any representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as representatives in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A substitute who is a committee chairman or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
4. Representatives and substitutes may sit on committees either as titular members or as alternates.

Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the chairman of the committee, he may also be replaced by any other representative or substitute of the same nationality as himself.

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2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the parliaments or governments of member states subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay.
4. Any representative or substitute whose credentials are contested may take his seat provisionally with the same rights as other representatives and substitutes until the Assembly has made a decision on his case.

RULE 7

Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates

1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
2. A substitute who is a committee chairman or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
3. Representatives and substitutes may sit on committees either as titular members or as alternates.
4. Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the chairman of the committee, he may also be replaced by any other representative or substitute of the same nationality as himself.
5. The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. Alternates may not however be elected to the bureau of a committee.

The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. Alternates may not however be elected to the bureau of a committee.

RULE 8

Duration of term of office of representatives and substitutes

1. The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or from the date of their appointment by member states if the session of the Assembly precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and subject to the ratification of the credentials by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated through parliamentary elections or through death or resignation or through invalidation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives and substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly.

RULE 11

President

1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each sitting the date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer communications to the appropriate committees.
2. The President shall neither speak in debate nor vote, his substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit resolutions to international organisations, governments and national parliaments.

RULE 8

Duration of term of office of representatives and substitutes

1. The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or from the date of their appointment by member states if the session of the Assembly precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and subject to the ratification of the credentials by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated through parliamentary elections or through death or resignation or through invalidation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

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1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each sitting the date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer communications to the appropriate committees.
2. When in the Chair the President shall neither speak in debate nor vote; his substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place. If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit resolutions to international organisations, governments and national parliaments.

RULE 13

Maintenance of order

1. The President shall call to order any representative or substitute who departs from it.
2. If the offence is repeated, the President shall again call the representative or substitute to order and cause the fact to be recorded in the minutes of proceedings.
3. In the event of a further offence (other than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the President may exclude the offender from the chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the representative or substitute who committed the offence be censured and excluded from the chamber for a period not exceeding four days. The representative or substitute upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.
5. After the representative or substitute concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of censure shall be taken without debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the maintenance of order, the President may cause such words to be deleted from the official report of debates. He shall have similar power as regards any intervention by a representative or substitute who has not obtained prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that may have been allotted to speakers.

RULE 15

Public order in the chamber and galleries

1. No person shall enter the chamber for any reason except representatives and substitutes, ministers who are members of the Council of Western European Union, other ministers of member states and officials whose duties require their presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the galleries shall remain seated and in silence. Any person expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at once by the ushers.

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2. If the offence is repeated, the President shall again call the representative to order and cause the fact to be recorded in the minutes of proceedings.
3. In the event of a further offence (other than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the President may exclude the offender from the chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the representative who committed the offence be censured and excluded from the chamber for a period not exceeding four days. The representative upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.
5. After the representative concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of censure shall be taken without debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the maintenance of order, the President may cause such words to be deleted from the official report of debates. He shall have similar power as regards any intervention by a representative who has not obtained prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that may have been allotted to speakers.

RULE 15

Public order in the chamber and galleries

1. No person shall enter the chamber without having been invited by the President of the Assembly except representatives, ministers who are members of the Council of Western European Union, other ministers of member states and officials whose duties require their presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the galleries shall remain seated and in silence. Any person expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at once by the ushers.
4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the chamber for the purpose of photographic and/or sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presidential Committee.

RULE 22

Reports of debates

1. A report of debates at each sitting shall be compiled in French and English and distributed within as short a period as possible. A speech delivered in French or English shall be reproduced verbatim in the report compiled in the language in which the speech was delivered; a summary report of the simultaneous interpretation of the speech shall be incorporated in the report compiled in the other language. When a speech is delivered in an official language of a member state other than French or English, a summary report of its simultaneous interpretation shall be incorporated in the reports compiled in French and English.
2. Speakers are required to return the reports of their speeches to the Office of the Clerk not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them.
3. After each session or part-session the reports of debates shall be published in full in French and English.

RULE 24

Register of attendance

At each morning and afternoon sitting, each representative or his substitute shall sign the register of attendance in accordance with Rule 7 before taking his place.

RULE 26

Order of debates

1. A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the report of the committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the report unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, representatives or substitutes may present explanations of votes.

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2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made.
3. After each session or part-session the reports of debates shall be published in full in French and English.

RULE 24

Register of attendance

1. At each morning and afternoon sitting, each representative or his substitute shall sign the register of attendance before taking his place.
2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register.

RULE 26

Order of debates

1. A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the report of the committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the report unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, representatives may present explanations of votes.

RULE 27

Debate on the annual report

1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union to each representative and substitute, together with related documents.
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the competent committees the relevant chapters of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union.
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees shall be held before the opening or resumption of the session.

These committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in reports of the committees to the Assembly.

If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published, with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.

4. The Chairman of the Council may present the report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate take place on the annual report and on the message of the Chairman of the Council.
5. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by the committees shall begin not earlier than twenty-four hours after the distribution of their reports.
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the annual report, or any part of the report, must be signed by at least ten representatives or substitutes. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of the representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 28

Motions

1. Motions may be tabled by representatives or substitutes on any matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.
2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a recommendation, opinion or resolution. They shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at least ten representatives or substitutes.
3. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit,

RULE 27

Debate on the annual report

1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union to each representative and substitute, together with related documents.

2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the competent committees the relevant chapters of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union.

3. Meetings of the appropriate committees shall be held before the opening or resumption of the session. These committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in reports of the committees to the Assembly. If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published, with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.

4. The Chairman of the Council shall be invited to present the report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate may take place on the annual report and on the message of the Chairman of the Council.

5. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by the committees shall begin not earlier than twenty-four hours after the distribution of their reports.

6. A motion to disagree to the content of the annual report, or any part of the report, must be signed by at least ten representatives. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of the representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 28

Motions

1. Motions may be tabled by representatives on any matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.

2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision. They shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at least ten representatives.

- (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.

refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee.

Motions which are in order shall be printed and distributed immediately.

4. When the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned.

RULE 29

Amendments

1. Any representative or substitute may propose and speak to amendments. The President shall decide whether they are in order.

2. Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be printed and distributed before their consideration by the Assembly. The President shall have the power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments.

3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.

4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the text to which they relate.

5. If two or more amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the original text shall be put to the vote first.

6. When several contradictory amendments are tabled, the President may rule that they be debated together, their authors speaking in turn before the amendments are put to the vote one by one.

7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate.

(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.

(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.

(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members.

3. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee. Motions which are in order shall be printed and distributed immediately.

4. When the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned.

RULE 29

Amendments

1. Any representative may propose and speak to amendments. The President shall decide whether they are in order.

2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting.

3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.

4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the text to which they relate.

5. If two or more amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the original text shall be put to the vote first.

6. When several contradictory amendments are tabled, the President may rule that they be debated together, their authors speaking in turn before the amendments are put to the vote one by one.

7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate.

8. The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the chairman or rapporteur of the committee.

9. The reference back of an amendment to committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it.

10. When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur or the committee chairman.

RULE 30

Orders of the Assembly

1. Any representative or substitute may lay on the table of the Assembly a motion for an order of the Assembly. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order.

2. Such a motion may be put to the vote without being referred to committee.

RULE 31

Right to speak

1. No representative or substitute may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives or substitutes shall speak from their place and shall address the Chair; the President may invite them to come to the rostrum.

2. Representatives or substitutes wishing to speak shall either enter their names before the opening of the sitting in a register provided for the purpose or ask for the right to speak in the course of the sitting. The President may, in the interests of the debate, depart from the order in which representatives or substitutes have entered their names or have asked to speak. As far as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately upon speakers for and against the matter under discussion. Once begun, a speech may not be interrupted and resumed at the following sitting.

3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a point of order. He may, however, with the permission of the President, give way during his speech to allow another representative or substitute to put to him a question on a particular point in his speech.

4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call him to order. If a speaker has already

8. When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur or the committee chairman.

RULE 30

Orders of the Assembly

Deleted.

RULE 31

Right to speak

1. No representative may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives shall speak from their place and shall address the Chair; the President may invite them to come to the rostrum.

2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the President decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak.

3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a point of order. He may, however, with the permission of the President, give way during his speech to allow another representative to put to him a question on a particular point in his speech.

4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call him to order. If a speaker has already been called to order twice in the same debate, the President may, on the third occasion, forbid

been called to order twice in the same debate, the President may, on the third occasion, forbid him to speak during the remainder of the debate on the same subject.

5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs on a question under discussion shall be allowed to speak whenever they wish.

6. A representative or substitute who wishes to make a personal statement shall be heard, but only at the end of a sitting.

7. No representative or substitute may speak for more than five minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, personal statements, comments on the adoption of the minutes of proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining of the orders of the day of a sitting and all questions of procedure.

RULE 32

Procedural motions

1. A representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

- (a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;
- (b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the adjournment of the debate;
- (c) to move the closure of the debate;
- (d) to move reference back to committee.

Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report.

None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the rapporteur or the chairman of any committee concerned.

4. In addition, a representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the Chair.

him to speak during the remainder of the debate on the same subject.

5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs on a question under discussion shall be allowed to speak whenever they wish.

6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response.

7. No representative may speak for more than five minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, personal statements, comments on the adoption of the minutes of proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining of the order of business of the Assembly, the orders of the day of a sitting and all questions of procedure.

RULE 32

Procedural motions

1. A representative shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

- (a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;
- (b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the adjournment of the debate;
- (c) to move the closure of the debate;
- (d) to move reference back to committee.

Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report. None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the rapporteur or the chairman of any committee concerned.

4. In addition, a representative shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the Chair. The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the debate.

RULE 34

Methods of voting

1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required.
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:
 - (a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure;
 - (b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire;
 - (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast.

RULE 35

Majorities

1. The majorities required are the following:
 - (a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly;
 - (b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast;

RULE 34

Methods of voting

1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:
 - (a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35 (a) of the Rules of Procedure;
 - (b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more representatives present in the chamber so desire;
 - (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more representatives present in the chamber so desire or if the President so decides.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall announce the result.

RULE 35

Majorities

- The majorities required are the following:
- (a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly;
 - (b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast (see Rule 34, paragraph 1);

- (c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.
2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.

RULE 36

Quorum

1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the representatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative or substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee.

RULE 39

Appointment of committees

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the Assembly shall set up the following permanent committees:
- (i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
 - (ii) General Affairs Committee;
 - (iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
 - (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
 - (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as follows: Belgium 3; France

- (c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4).

RULE 36

Quorum

1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the representatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.
3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee.

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Appointment of committees

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the Assembly shall set up the following permanent committees:
- (i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
 - (ii) General Affairs Committee;
 - (iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
 - (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
 - (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as follows : Belgium 3, France

5; the Federal Republic of Germany 5; Italy 5; Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 3; the United Kingdom 5.

The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as follows: Belgium 2; France 4; the Federal Republic of Germany 4; Italy 4; Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 2; the United Kingdom 4.

3. The Assembly may set up special committees during the session, which may be reappointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall fix the total number of seats in such committees and the number of seats to be allotted to each member state.

4. When setting up committees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly shall have regard to the activities of other European organisations.

5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly may appoint committees of investigation as provided for in Article VII (f) of the Charter, the composition, terms of reference and duration of which shall be defined in a resolution.

6. Candidatures for membership of committees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided for in Rule 8, paragraph 3, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for their composition taking into account the representation of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly may invite the chairmen of political groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a committee.

7. The bureau of each committee shall be composed of a chairman and two vice-chairmen. Representatives or substitutes who are members of governments shall not be members of the bureau of a committee.

RULE 40

Powers of committees

1. Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.
2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly on their reports.
3. Should a committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a

5, the Federal Republic of Germany 5, Italy 5, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, the United Kingdom 5. The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as follows: Belgium 2, France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, the United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly.

3. The Assembly may set up special committees during the session, which may be reappointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall fix the total number of seats in such committees and the number of seats to be allotted to each member state.

4. When setting up committees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly shall have regard to the activities of other European organisations.

5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly may appoint committees of investigation as provided for in Article VII (f) of the Charter, the composition, terms of reference and duration of which shall be defined in a decision.

6. Candidatures for membership of committees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided for in paragraph 2 above, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for their composition taking into account the representation of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly may invite the chairmen of political groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a committee.

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Powers of committees

1. Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.
2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly on their reports.
3. Should a committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a

conflict arise over the competence of two or more committees, the question of competence shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee or the Assembly.

4. Committees of the Assembly may request the Council to communicate documents or information necessary for their enquiries.

5. A committee may, with the approval of the Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or several of its members to undertake a mission for purposes of information or study.

RULE 41

Procedure in committees

1. A committee shall meet when convened by its chairman or at the request of the President of the Assembly, either during or between sessions.

2. A committee may, in the interest of its work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it shall at the same time determine the composition and competence. However, the number of members of a subcommittee may not exceed a third of the membership of the full committee.

3. Any two or more committees or subcommittees may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects coming within their competence, but may not reach a joint decision.

4. The rules adopted for the Assembly concerning the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 10), the minutes of proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions (Rule 32), and methods of voting (Rule 34), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, subject to the following provisions :

(a) A committee shall vote by show of hands, unless any representative or substitute requests a vote by roll-call. The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll shall be called alphabetically beginning with the letter "A". Election shall take place by secret ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is optional.

(b) Voting in committee shall be by absolute majority of the votes cast, provided that election shall be by relative majority at the second ballot, if necessary. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected.

(c) A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members are present,

conflict arise over the competence of two or more committees, the question of competence shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee or the Assembly.

4. Committees of the Assembly may request the Council to communicate documents or information necessary for their enquiries.

5. A committee may, with the approval of the Presidential Committee, appoint one or several of its members to undertake a mission for purposes of information or study.

RULE 41

Procedure in committees

1. A committee shall meet when convened by its chairman or at the request of the President of the Assembly, either during or between sessions.

2. In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, a committee may, in the interest of its work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it shall at the same time determine the composition and competence. However, the number of members of a subcommittee may not exceed a third of the membership of the full committee.

3. Any two or more committees or subcommittees may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects coming within their competence, but may not reach a joint decision.

4. The rules adopted for the Assembly concerning the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 10), the minutes of proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions (Rule 32), methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, subject to the following provisions:

(a) A committee shall vote by show of hands, unless any representative requests a vote by roll-call. The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll shall be called alphabetically beginning with the letter "A". Election shall take place by secret ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is optional.

(b) A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members are present, but elections or the vote on a report as a whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the members of the committee are present.

(c) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee.

but the vote on a report as a whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the members of the committee are present.

5. The chairman of the committee may take part in discussions and may vote, but without having a casting vote.

6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. Unless a committee decides otherwise, representatives and substitutes may attend meetings of that committee even though they are not members, but they may not take part in its discussions.

A representative or substitute who has moved a motion which has been referred to a committee may, however, be invited by that committee to take part in its discussions in an advisory capacity.

7. The conditions in which any person who is not a representative or substitute may be heard by a committee shall be decided by that committee. If the committee agrees, such a person may take part in the discussions at the discretion of the chairman.

8. The conditions in which the officials of Western European Union and experts are heard by a committee shall be determined in each case after agreement with the Council.

9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up for each committee meeting.

10. Unless a committee decides otherwise, and subject to the confidential character of information communicated by the Council, the only texts which shall be made public shall be the reports that have been agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of the chairman.

RULE 42

Reports of committees

1. The committees shall appoint a rapporteur for each subject, who shall be responsible for the preparation of the report of the committee and for introducing it to the Assembly. The final report of a committee shall comprise an explanatory memorandum and a substantive text.

2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, state the result of the vote taken in committee on the report as a whole and, if the committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the minority.

3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation or opinion addressed to the Council, a draft resolution or a draft order.

5. The chairman of the committee may take part in discussions and may vote, but without having a casting vote.

6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. Unless a committee decides otherwise, representatives may attend meetings of that committee even though they are not members, but they may not take part in its discussions. A representative who has moved a motion which has been referred to a committee may, however, be invited by that committee to take part in its discussions in an advisory capacity.

7. The conditions in which any person who is not a representative or substitute may be heard by a committee shall be decided by that committee. If the committee agrees, such a person may take part in the discussions at the discretion of the chairman.

8. The conditions in which the officials of Western European Union and experts are heard by a committee shall be determined in each case after agreement with the Council.

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2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, state the result of the vote taken in committee on the report as a whole and, if the committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the minority.

3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28.

RULE 43

Urgent procedure

1. At the request of the Council, of the committee concerned, or of ten or more representatives or substitutes, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after the first vote included in the orders of the day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly and at the latest at the beginning of the next sitting.
3. The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question other than to justify the request or to reject the urgent procedure. In connection with a request for urgent procedure, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session.
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assembly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 26, decide that the debate on the substance of the text shall be held on an oral report of the appropriate committee, either at the beginning of the orders of the day of the next sitting or at a later date during the current part-session.
6. Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However, if that report has been adopted unanimously, the Assembly may decide at the request of the committee to keep it on its agenda, unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events.

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Urgent procedure

1. At the request of the Council, of the committee concerned, or of ten or more representatives, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after the first vote included in the orders of the day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly and at the latest at the beginning of the next sitting.
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6. Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 45

Written questions

1. Any representative or substitute may put written questions to the Council in accordance with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text of such questions shall be transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the Council. Questions and answers shall be published by the Clerk of the Assembly.

2. All questions governed by this rule to which an answer has not been given within a period of one month shall be published, together with a statement that no reply has been received.

RULE 47

Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as members of the Office of the Clerk.

3. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

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Written questions

1. Any representative may put written questions to the Council in accordance with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text of such questions shall be transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the Council. Questions and answers shall be published by the Clerk of the Assembly.

2. All questions governed by this rule to which an answer has not been given within a period of one month shall be published, together with a statement that no reply has been received.

RULE 47

Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau. His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year.

2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level.

5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

RULE 50

Waiver of the immunity of representatives and substitutes

1. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a member state for the waiver of the immunity of a representative or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The committee shall immediately consider the request, but shall not make any examination of the merits of the case in question. The representative or substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by the committee. The report of the committee shall conclude with a draft resolution for the retention or the waiver of the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automatically be included as the first item of the orders of the day for the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report has been laid upon the table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform the authority which submitted the request of the decision of the Assembly.

RULE 51

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be supported by ten or more representatives or substitutes. They shall be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, as provided by Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the committee shall be included in the orders of the day in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with the relevant texts.

RULE 50

Waiver of the immunity of representatives and substitutes

1. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a member state for the waiver of the immunity of a representative or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The committee shall immediately consider the request, but shall not make any examination of the merits of the case in question. The representative or substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by the committee. The report of the committee shall conclude with a draft decision for the retention or the waiver of the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automatically be included as the first item of the orders of the day for the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report has been laid upon the table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform the authority which submitted the request of the decision of the Assembly.

RULE 51

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be supported by ten or more representatives. They shall be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, as provided by Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the committee shall be included in the orders of the day in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with the relevant texts.

***Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure***

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Bianco and others

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.
2. Leave out paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure (Rule 47).

Signed: Bianco, Amadei, Antoni, Mezzapesa, Foschi, Rauti, Masciadri, Giust, Sinesio, Martino, Sarti, Mitterdorfer, Francese

1. See 12th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENTS 3 to 9 ¹

tabled by Lord Hughes and others

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, leave out “ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years. ” and insert “ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years. ”.
4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

“ 9. *Rule 14*

In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out ‘and’.

In paragraph 1, line 6, after ‘committees’ insert ‘and one member appointed by each political group’.

In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out ‘The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee’. ”
5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly. ”.
6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ and there is no opposition to it ”.
7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Leave out paragraph 4(b). ”.
8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau ” and insert “ Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee ”.
9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4, line 1, leave out “ shall ” and insert “ may ”.

Signed: Hughes, Tummers, Hardy, Büchner, Stoffelen, Blaauw, van Tets, Jung, Cifarelli, Staels-Dompas

1. See 12th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENT 10¹

tabled by Mr. Schulte and others

10. In paragraph 3, line 9, of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out “, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.” and insert “and the three agencies for security questions.”

Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Büllesheim, Unland, Lenzer, Berger, Enders, Ahrens, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Gansel, Staels-Dompas

1. See 12th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENT 11 ¹

tabled by Mr. Schulte and others

11. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 5, leave out “, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.” and insert “ and the three agencies for security questions.”.

Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim, Unland

1. See 12th sitting, 5th December 1985 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament

INFORMATION REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur

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- (e) Comprehensive test ban
- (f) Space
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APPENDICES

- I. Countries participating in arms control and disarmament negotiations by bloc
- II. Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament from the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, 1st August 1975
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- V. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons (covered by SALT II), July 1985

Introductory Note

In preparing this information report, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

Non-proliferation treaty review conference, Geneva, 12th and 13th September 1985

H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom;
 Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor;
 Mr. Ian Kenyan, Expert;
 H.E. Mr. Duncan Campbell, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Australia;
 Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, United States Delegation;
 H.E. Mr. Milos Vajvoda, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia;
 H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador, Representative of Japan;
 H.E. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Sri Lanka;
 H.E. Mr. F.J.A. Terwisscha van Scheltinga, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation;
 Mr. A.J. Meerburg, Adviser;
 H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Representative of Egypt;
 H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10th October 1985

Mr. Steven Ledogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States;
 H.E. Mr. Eric Da Rin, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;
 H.E. Mr. J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;
 Mr. Bots, Deputy Permanent Representative;
 General Cornelius de Jager, Netherlands Army, Chairman of the Military Committee;
 Brigadier General Ilenio Sanotto, Italian Army, Deputy Assistant Director (Arms Control and Disarmament), Plans and Policy Division of the International Military Staff;
 Colonel H. Hoerner, German Army;
 Colonel P. Schmitz, German Air Force;
 Mr. A. Bonfanti, Mr. Salmon, Disarmament and Arms Control Section, Political Affairs Division, International Staff.

The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 24th July 1985 and was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

- H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;
- H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;
- H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;
- H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;
- H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;
- H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the officials who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In particular, the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the preparation of the committee's report on disarmament.

This information report is intended to be a factual document prepared by the Rapporteur at the request of the committee; it has not been approved by the committee.

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee has regularly reported on disarmament and arms control problems, most recently in both May and December 1984¹, the reports usually concentrating on one or two particular sets of negotiations. In view of the slightly improved prospects for movement in some at least of the various forums where arms control is discussed, the committee decided at its meeting on 21st May 1985 to produce a comprehensive report on "all current arms control and disarmament negotiating forums, both bilateral and multilateral; those dealing with nuclear weapons and those dealing with other aspects of arms control".

1.2. At its meeting on 4th November, the committee had before it the first draft of such a report, but realised that because of the broad scope of the report and the committee's own busy programme, there was insufficient time to study it. The committee also decided to postpone adoption of the report until after the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to be held on 19th and 20th November, so that the Assembly at its session beginning on 2nd December might have before it a report which took account of the summit meeting. However, in view of the technical problems involved in preparing and circulating a large report to all representatives, the committee requested the Rapporteur to produce the present factual information report, based on the explanatory memorandum to his first draft report, for advance distribution.

1.3. This information report therefore summarises the situation concerning five forums of arms control negotiations: bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons; and the multilateral forums on mutual and balanced force reductions (Vienna); the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm); the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva); and finally the non-proliferation treaty review conference held in Geneva in September.

II. International developments

2.1. Reporting last year the committee had to note that "the general atmosphere of East-West relations had deteriorated since the active period

1. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 972, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries; Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 998, 3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

of détente in the 1970s ... This is an unpropitious background for current negotiations. The situation is further complicated by the two successive changes at short interval in the leadership of the Soviet Union, and the presidential election year in the United States. Indeed, in retrospect it appears that the minimum mutual confidence between the United States and Soviet leadership that is needed for any far-reaching agreements has not been re-established since the period of Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev ...". While multilateral negotiations were then continuing in the other forums noted above, there had been no bilateral negotiations between the two superpowers since the Soviet walkout at the end of 1983.

2.2. The committee felt that "at the present time, the European members of the alliance must bear a far greater share of responsibility for maintaining and developing relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, and if necessary in taking the initiative with specific proposals in certain fields at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva which could open the way to mutually advantageous agreements in the arms control field"².

2.3. Since then the general atmosphere of East-West relations has improved slightly. In some respects the United States administration appears to be taking a slightly more positive attitude to arms control, and the urgings of the European countries, through quiet diplomacy and bilateral conversations quite as much as within formal structures such as the North Atlantic Council, can take credit for this. European attitudes have undoubtedly significantly strengthened the hand of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, who seeks to approach the bilateral negotiations realistically, in his permanent struggle with the more hawkish elements of the Reagan administration led by the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, and the Assistant Secretary, Richard Perle, who has been on record on a number of occasions as advocating a breakout from the existing constraints of the ABM treaty and SALT II.

2.4. The European allies themselves are in a stronger position both to approach arms control negotiations in the multilateral forums in which they participate and to press their own view on the United States. The five-year debate on the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles has largely subsided, over 150 are already deployed in four of the countries that agreed to accept

2. Document 998.

them, parliamentary confirmation of the Netherlands decision is now confidently expected.

2.5. In the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev has shown himself to be a self-confident leader in firm control. Although his chief experience and future concerns are and will be with the reinvigoration of the Soviet economy, he has already demonstrated a thorough grasp of arms control issues, most recently in the speech made at a reception in the National Assembly in Paris on 3rd October in the course of which he appeared to break with past Soviet policy on a number of points. His proposals for the complete prohibition of "cosmic attack weapons" and for a reduction of 50% in nuclear weapons "capable of reaching the territory of the other", and his statement of willingness to accept a separate agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe are commented on in Chapter IV below as is his statement of readiness to begin direct discussions with France and the United Kingdom on the nuclear forces of those countries. Mr. Gorbachev continued however to make a number of other points which appear to be new. Recalling the proposal of the Eastern European countries' Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) to establish direct links with the European Economic Community, Mr. Gorbachev then appeared to refer to European political co-operation when he said "to the extent that the EEC countries act as a 'political entity', we are ready to seek common language with them also on concrete international problems. That could take various forms including parliamentary links, in particular with those who represent the European Parliament ... we do not think for example that there should be an eternal taboo on the possibility of establishing, in some form, contacts between the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance as organisations". In the past, when for instance NATO initiated its proposal for the opening of MBFR negotiations, the Soviet Union had resolutely refused to deal with the Secretary-General of NATO.

2.6. The most important concrete sign of the improved prospects for progress was of course the January agreed statement by the United States and the Soviet Union agreeing to reopen direct bilateral negotiations, this time concurrently in the three fields of strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and space weapons, and the subsequent opening of these negotiations in Geneva on 12th March 1985.

2.7. The forthcoming summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva on 19th and 20th November is not expected to solve detailed problems of the various arms control negotiations discussed in this report, but it could contribute to re-establishing some of the mutual understanding bet-

ween two leaders, both firmly in the saddle, that in retrospect can be seen to have characterised the Nixon-Brezhnev era.

III. Negotiating forums for disarmament and arms control

3.1. This report discusses the current status of negotiations in five separate forums dealing with arms control and disarmament. In the absence of any recent concrete agreement in this field it is often forgotten that so many sets of negotiations are currently in progress. For completeness they are described here.

3.2. The bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons are dealt with in the following chapter. They dominate public attention, newspaper headlines about "Geneva arms talks" generally refer to them, completely ignoring the other multilateral arms control talks which have been continuing for many years in the same city.

3.3. In Vienna the only strictly bloc-to-bloc talks between twelve NATO and seven Warsaw Pact countries on what NATO usually refers to as mutual and balanced force reductions have continued without any agreement since 1973. They are entirely closed to the public; documents tabled by each side are not released; public information concerning them comes from briefings given by spokesmen for either side.

3.4. In Stockholm since the beginning of 1984 the Conference on Disarmament in Europe has been in progress with the participation of 35 countries from Europe, the United States and Canada - the same countries as the parties to the Helsinki final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. While the conference itself does not meet in public session the speeches and proposals of various participants have usually been made public. The conference is convened to secure agreement on more far-reaching confidence-building measures than those included in the Helsinki final act, and there are prospects that it will succeed in doing so before the end of 1986.

3.5. In Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament and its various predecessors has been meeting twice a year since the 1960s. It represents the principal worldwide multilateral negotiating forum for arms control treaties, including in the past the partial test-ban treaty, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the biological weapons convention. Today there are forty participating countries from all parts of the world. Its plenary sessions are in public.

3.6. Lastly in this report there is an account of the review conference of the non-proliferation

treaty held this year in September in Geneva. That treaty like the biological weapons convention, provides that a review conference of the parties shall be held five years after its entry into force, and these review conferences have become self-perpetuating at five-yearly intervals.

3.7. For convenience a summary of countries participating in the foregoing sets of negotiations is given at Appendix I.

Alliance consultation

3.8. Arrangements for allied consultation in these various sets of arms control negotiations vary with the nature of negotiations themselves; it is most intense and structured in the case of the MBFR negotiations which are strictly NATO-Warsaw Pact bloc-to-bloc, with no neutral or non-aligned countries present. A special MBFR working group with subgroups, meets in NATO headquarters from time to time and both the Council, the Military Committee and their respective staffs are involved in studying and preparing the western position in the negotiations. This consultation process appears to be watertight, no proposal is tabled by the West in Vienna without its having been approved by the North Atlantic Council as representing the policy of the alliance as a whole. Consultation in Brussels is supplemented by on-the-spot consultation within the ad hoc group where the western delegations in Vienna meet among themselves together with representatives from SHAPE and the international military staff. It appears that in the last two years the Military Committee, and international military staff have played a more active rôle in studying and preparing western positions both in the MBFR positions, including the question of associated measures, and in discussing confidence- and security-building measures for presentation in Stockholm. On the other hand, as far as the Vienna negotiations are concerned the western position does not appear to be discussed in other allied bodies such as the WEU Council or within European political co-operation.

3.9. As far as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm is concerned, in view of the essentially military nature of the confidence- and security-building measures being proposed by the West in those talks, NATO and its Military Committee again play a prominent part in preparing the agreed western position, and there is further consultation within the western caucus of delegations from the NATO countries which meet together in Stockholm. There was of course considerable economic and political content in the CSCE negotiations leading up to the Helsinki final act, and the machinery of European political co-operation played a prominent rôle. In Stockholm it appears that the delegations from the European Community

countries meet only occasionally as a caucus, essentially to keep Ireland informed of progress – Ireland has chosen not to join the neutral group of countries in their caucus meetings in Stockholm. Nevertheless delegates of the NATO countries speaking at the Stockholm conference reflect individual policies of their own countries in addition to the agreed allied position.

3.10. As far as the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is concerned, consultation in NATO is a more sporadic affair with occasional meetings in Brussels of experts from national capitals. Delegations of the NATO countries in Geneva give general support to proposals from other allied countries, but proposals they introduce into the conference do not necessarily represent an agreed NATO view. A particular case is the United States draft treaty for the banning of chemical weapons introduced in Geneva in July 1984, which apparently was discussed in NATO only a few days beforehand; the terms of the treaty have been generally supported by allied speakers in Geneva, but specific aspects of that draft treaty – as mentioned below – do not represent the collective position of the NATO countries. European political co-operation is also known to review the position of the Community countries in Geneva negotiations, as well as in the United Nations General Assembly debate on disarmament. Prior to United Kingdom accession to the European Community in 1973 this task was always carried out within the WEU Council.

3.11. As far as the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned, the United States consults the allies within the North Atlantic Council on a regular basis. There are times when this consultation appears to the European governments to amount to little more than prior notification, often at short notice, but given the permanent state of tension between the White House, State Department, and Department of Defence which characterises the American policy-making process, allied influence on Washington policy, through bilateral contacts as much as through formal collective consultation in Brussels, is probably greater than may at times appear. During most of the Reagan administration it has operated to strengthen the hand of the State Department in the internal Washington debate. Since 1979 a Special Consultative Group has met periodically in the NATO headquarters to consult on the bilateral negotiations concerning intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). It has been pointed out that the United States chairmanship of this group, held until his appointment as Ambassador to Bonn by Mr. Richard Burt, is an anomaly. Comparable NATO bodies are chaired by senior members of the NATO interna-

tional staff, reflecting the status of the Secretary-General as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council in both ministerial and ambassadorial session. Statements made by the Chairman of the SCG are felt to escape the checks of the NATO machinery, and may not always accurately reflect the views of the group as a whole.

3.12. Despite the recent reactivation, the WEU Council in all this has not so far played a significant rôle, except in the attempt to prepare an agreed reply to Mr. Weinberger's invitation for European allied participation in the strategic defence initiative. The tentative meeting of disarmament experts from Ministries for Foreign Affairs, held under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ruth in Bonn in February 1985, appears from all accounts to have been a timid affair and to have encountered some opposition from the United States. There has however been a meeting of the Permanent Council with experts from national capitals to assess the recent Soviet proposals in the bilateral negotiations.

3.13. Allied consultation in preparation for the forthcoming summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to be held in Geneva on 19th and 20th November is a classic case history of how not to consult allies. A casual White House initiative, obviously unco-ordinated with the State Department, led President Reagan to invite other leaders of the seven-nation economic summit group – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom – to a meeting in New York on 24th October to consult in preparation for the summit meeting. The White House announced the invitations on 30th September, without the customary prior consultation with the intended guests through diplomatic channels, and in some cases before the invitations had been received. The opportunity was no doubt being taken because of the scheduled presence in New York of some of the heads of governments at that time for the United Nations General Assembly. The initiative in practice offended both some of the intended guests, to whom the abrupt invitation appeared as a summons, and the remaining nine excluded NATO countries. President Mitterrand of France declined the invitation. Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in a co-ordinated move with Mr. van den Broek, the Dutch Foreign Minister, let it be known that he had written to Mr. Shultz, the United States Secretary of Defence, pointing out that NATO remained the proper forum for allied consultation. Mr. Shultz offered to go to Brussels himself to meet other NATO Foreign Ministers who might be available at a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 15th October. In the event some nine ministers were able to attend that meeting, but as the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom

already had other commitments that could not be rearranged at such short notice, the NATO meeting inevitably took on some of the appearances of a second-best arrangement for those excluded from the New York meeting. In practice it provided Mr. Shultz with a useful platform on which to reaffirm that the United States would stick to a narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty concerning the extent of SDI research that it permitted.

IV. Bilateral negotiations

4.1. Since the Soviet Union walked out of the two sets of bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) and the strategic arms reductions talks (START) at the end of 1983, following the initial NATO deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, the bilateral talks were in abeyance throughout 1984.

4.2. After the meeting between the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, and the then Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, in Geneva on 8th January 1985 an agreed statement on their resumption was issued:

“The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate-range with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth ...”

4.3. Bilateral negotiations were resumed in Geneva in 1985 in a first session from 12th March to 16th July, and a second from 19th September to 7th November. Delegations from the two sides comprise three principals, one of which represents their country in the three specialised groups which now meet on space weapons; strategic weapons; and intermediate-range weapons. The committee examines the question of space weapons, the ABM treaty and the strategic defence initiative in a separate report³. The primary concern of the European allies here will be to urge the United States to agree on a mutually satisfactory definition of “permitted research” for SDI, to ensure that the ABM treaty is not eroded through the “broad” definition that the Department of Defence, unsuccessfully so far, has been pressing for. Not a great deal has emerged in public concerning the detailed negotiating positions of the two sides in the other two sets of negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. This is usually to be taken as a good sign that the dis-

3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative – the strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects), Document 1033, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh.

cussions are in earnest, but little progress can be expected before the November summit meeting.

Strategic nuclear weapons

4.4. The United States has recalled what is publicly known about its negotiating position on strategic nuclear weapons most recently in Mr. Shultz's address to the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco on 14th October where he said that the United States had proposed a reduction of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles to 5,000 on each side, a considerable reduction in the numbers and yield of ballistic missiles, and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic bombers and air-launched cruise missiles carried by them.

4.5. Mr. Gorbachev in his speech at the reception given in the National Assembly in Paris on 3rd October gave a partial explanation of the latest Soviet proposals which at first sight appeared attractive :

“A few days ago we proposed to the Government of the United States to come to terms on the total prohibition of space strike arms for both sides and to reduce really radically, by 50%, the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory.”⁴

4.6. Mr. Nitze, the United States co-ordinator of arms control policy, subsequently briefed the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 9th October concerning the detailed proposals which the Soviet Union had finally tabled in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on 30th September. It is clear from subsequent press reports that the Soviet offer was one of 50% reduction in strategic missile launchers and aircraft (not warheads) and was not limited to intercontinental weapons but extended to all United States forward-based weapons in Europe including the recently deployed cruise and Pershing missiles, as well as carrier-based and land-based tactical aircraft in Europe and Asia that are within range of Soviet territory. At the same time, this definition would of course exclude Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 missiles in range of Western Europe, China and Japan. It is understood that the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear charges, which is assumed to include warheads of all missiles including cruise missiles, as well as aircraft bombs, should be limited to 6,000 on each side with not more than 60% in any leg of the triad comprising ICBM; SLBM; weapons carried in aircraft. The Soviet Union also implied concessions to limit missile throw-weight in which it has superiority.

4.7. In proffering this definition of strategic nuclear weapons the Soviet Union was reverting to its negotiating position on SALT at the

beginning of the 1970s. To be acceptable to the United States, and to alliance interests in general, any separate agreement on strategic weapon systems will almost certainly have to be limited to the same categories of systems as those included in the two existing SALT agreements, i.e., weapons of intercontinental range, based on the territory of one of the superpowers or in submarines, and capable of reaching the territory of the other.

4.8. The United States put forward new detailed proposals in Geneva on 1st November which President Reagan the previous day said called for “deep cuts, no first-strike advantage, defensive research ... and no cheating”. Details have not been made public. Although described in Moscow as “old proposals”, it is clear that the latest proposals from both sides represent the start of serious negotiations.

4.9. Meanwhile, the United States and the Soviet Union (with the ambiguity concerning the SS-25 missiles referred to in paragraphs 4.25 et. seq.) continue to respect the still unratified SALT II agreement signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev in 1979. On 17th September 1985, the United States Department of Defence announced that President Reagan had ordered the dismantling of the Poseidon nuclear missile submarine Sam Rayburn with sixteen missiles as the seventh Ohio class submarine Alaska with twenty-four missiles began its sea trials. The United States has also announced that subject to reciprocity it will continue to respect the SALT II limits after 31st December 1985. The treaty would have expired then, but its Article XIV also states “the objective of the parties to conclude well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting strategic offensive arms to replace this treaty on its expiration”. Present levels of strategic nuclear weapons covered by the treaty are shown in Appendix V.

Intermediate-range nuclear weapons

4.10. With the steady deployment since the end of 1983 of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, NATO is today in a stronger position regarding this category of weapons system than in the past. The public debate about the validity of NATO's 1979 dual decision to deploy 572 INF systems, while negotiating reductions in such systems with the Soviet Union, has largely subsided. Since the end of 1983 when the deployment of the first Pershing and cruise missiles in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom was publicly announced, the policy followed by the countries having accepted deployment of these weapons on their territory appears to be not to comment on actual numbers deployed at any one time. From such public statements as have been made from time to time, and from various

4. Soviet News, 9th October 1985.

press reports, it appears that the status of the NATO deployment schedule is approximately as shown in the following table :

NATO INF deployment schedule

Country	Base	Maximum levels agreed in 1979		Probable status October 1985		Notes
		Pershing II	Cruise	Pershing II	Cruise	
Belgium	Florennes	-	48			
Germany	Mutlangen	36	-	36		
	Heilbronn	36	-	9		
	Neu Ulm	36	-	9		
Italy	Bitburg	-	96			Due in 1986
	Comiso	-	112		48	
Netherlands	Woensdrecht	-	48			Due in 1988
United Kingdom	Greenham	-	96		48	
	Common Molesworth	-	64			Due in 1988
Totals		108	464	54	112	

4.11. The total numbers of Pershing and cruise missiles deployed probably exceeds 150, although Mr. Allen Holmes, speaking as the United States Chairman of the NATO Special Consultative Group, said on 17th September that the number was 118 – a lower number than that referred to by Lord Carrington at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Luxembourg in March.

4.12. Under the terms of the Netherlands Government decision of 1st June 1984, a final decision on deployment of the 48 cruise missiles in the Netherlands scheduled for 1988 was to be dependent on the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed on 1st November 1985 being greater than the number on 1st June 1984 when it was reported to be 378. In the light of the NATO NPG assessment that 441 were deployed⁵, the Netherlands Government duly took the decision to deploy on 1st November 1985, and on 4th November signed an agreement to this effect with the United States.

4.13. A letter from Mr. Lubbers, the Prime Minister, to parliament explaining the decision, referred to the government's attempt to "do something of its own to promote arms control while remaining within the framework of the alliance's defence policy". However, an exchange of letters with Mr. Gorbachev had shown "that the Soviet Union is not prepared to match our efforts to achieve arms control and arms reductions"⁶. The Netherlands is now

consulting with a view to abolishing the nuclear strike rôle of its dual-capable F-16 aircraft and the nuclear rôle of its Orion maritime patrol aircraft, so that in addition to the cruise missiles it will retain a nuclear rôle only for the Lance tactical missile and 8-inch howitzer – all of course relying on United States warheads. In the event of a bilateral INF agreement being concluded, the number of cruise missiles to be deployed in the Netherlands could be adjusted accordingly. Parliamentary approval of the government decision is now expected⁷.

4.14. During 1984 the number of SS-20 missiles actually deployed by the Soviet Union appears to have remained frozen at the level of 378 reported in the Nuclear Planning Group communiqué of 7th April 1984. Of these 243 were reported to be within range of Europe, although that figure is not officially given in the NPG communiqué. The subsequent NPG communiqué on 12th October 1984 did not state the number of SS-20 missiles deployed, and the difference of interpretation on the issue between the United States and its European allies became apparent after the meeting. The communiqué stated that: "New SS-20 bases, east and west of the Ural mountains, are under construction which, when operational, will significantly increase the number of deployed SS-20 launchers." Mr. Weinberger after the meeting informed journalists that "to my knowledge ... there are additional SS-20 missiles since the January count that are ready and able to be

5. Paragraph 4.17.

6. Quoted from Atlantic News, 6th November 1985.

7. Subsequently approved by 80 votes to 69 on 13th November 1985.

shot". The difference of opinion appeared to reside in the state of readiness of certain SS-20 missiles. The NPG communiqué of 29th March 1985 stated unambiguously however that: "the current SS-20 force is composed of 414 SS-20 launchers with 1,242 warheads".

4.15. Following the meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group – the group of national experts that consults on progress of the intermediate-range part of the bilateral negotiations on nuclear space weapons – on 17th September 1985, the new United States Chairman, Mr. Allen Holmes, in a press statement said: "the group reviewed in detail recent developments in the Soviet SS-20 force. They noted that despite the moratorium on LRINF deployments declared by General Secretary Gorbachev on 7th April the Soviet Union has continued to deploy new SS-20s and that the current Soviet SS-20 force has grown to 441 launchers." The status of declarations made by the chairman of a NATO group is of course different from that of a communiqué formally issued by a meeting, the latter having to be approved unanimously by the participants. It has also been pointed out to your Rapporteur that, as mentioned in paragraph 3.11, there is an anomaly in having a United States chairman of a NATO committee such as the Special Consultative Group.

4.16. The issue of numbers of SS-20 deployed has become more complex with other remarks made by Mr. Gorbachev in his speech in the National Assembly reception in Paris on 3rd October 1985 already quoted in another context:

"You know that we have announced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. The number of SS-20 missiles that the Soviet Union has on stand-by alert in the European zone is now 243. This means that it precisely accords with the level of June 1984, when the additional deployment of our missiles was started in response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The SS-20 missiles that were additionally deployed in the process have been withdrawn from standby alert and the stationary installations for housing these missiles will be dismantled within the next two months. This is verifiable. As to our reply measures in respect of the territory of the United States itself they continue to remain in force.

I also wish to explain the meaning with which we invest the term 'European zone' in this case. This is the zone in which medium-range missiles capable of striking targets on the territory of Western Europe are deployed.

It should be added to this that we have already totally phased out the old, and very powerful, SS-5 missiles and are continuing to phase out SS-4 missiles. This means that taken as a whole the numbers of medium-range carrier missiles in the European zone of the USSR is now much smaller than ten or even fifteen years ago."

4.17. NPG communiqués have never made a clear distinction between Soviet SS-20 missiles in the Far East, targeted on China and Japan, and those in the European and central areas of the Soviet Union which can reach targets in Europe. But the famous July 1982 "walk in the woods" abortive compromise discussed by the United States and Soviet negotiators, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Kvitsinsky, was reported to have suggested a limit of 75 land-based missile launchers for each side in Europe, but with a further 90 SS-20 missile launchers permitted to the Soviet Union in the area east of 80° East longitude agreed to be out of range of European targets. While the SS-20 is a mobile missile, cruise and Pershing II are at least as mobile. In some circumstances stocks in the United States could be held to offset SS-20 missiles east of 80° East longitude.

4.18. The communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on 29th and 30th November states unambiguously that "the total SS-20 force has further increased to 441 launchers with 1,323 warheads". As before no breakdown is given concerning missiles in range of European targets (those in European and central parts of the Soviet Union, west of 80° East longitude) and those in the east targeted on China and Japan. Another respected estimate⁸ for July 1985 shows a total of 423 SS-20 and 120 SS-4 among Soviet IRBMs, of which all the SS-4 and 216 SS-20 would be in the European part of the Soviet Union, 45 SS-20 in the central part, and the remainder (162) in the Far East. These figures show 261 SS-20 in range of European targets, compared with 243 claimed by Mr. Gorbachev (paragraph 4.15).

4.19. The INF negotiations are of course considerably complicated by the issue of other weapons systems, including the Soviet shorter-range SS-21 and SS-22 nuclear missiles now deployed in the Democratic Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia. The SS-22 in particular is reported to have a range of 900 kilometres probably bringing it well within range of targets in Germany and the Benelux countries. The question of which nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe should be included in an INF agreement is also very complex. In his 3rd October speech in

8. The Military Balance 1985-86, IISS, 1st November 1985.

Paris quoted above, Mr. Gorbachev however stated categorically:

“Concerning medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. With the aim of making agreement easier on their speediest mutual reduction, we consider it possible to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, outside of direct connection with the problem of space and strategic arms.”

British and French nuclear forces

4.20. Mr. Gorbachev's surprise offer of direct discussions – not negotiations – with Britain and France was made in the same Paris speech in the sentence following his offer of a separate agreement on INF forces:

“In this connection I consider it important to explain our position on such a question as the place of the nuclear potential of France and Britain in the European balance of forces. This potential is growing rapidly and we can no longer ignore it. It was said from the French side that the nuclear forces of France are not subject to discussion without her participation. This stands to reason. It follows from this that it is time to start between us a direct dialogue on this theme and try to find an acceptable way out through joint effort. The Soviet Union is prepared for such a direct dialogue with France just as with Britain, of course.

Here I want to stress that we will take into account the security interests of France in the most attentive manner. And today, as it appears to us, the question of a reduction of her armaments is not on the agenda.”

4.21. President Mitterrand was quick to decline the Soviet invitation. According to the press the invitation to the United Kingdom was subsequently confirmed in a three-page letter from Mr. Gorbachev to Mrs. Thatcher⁹. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has stated since Mr. Gorbachev's Paris speech that Britain would be prepared to look at its own position if the superpowers agreed very substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear weapons, and if there was no improvement in the Soviet strategic defence capabilities. The French position in the past has been to insist also that imbalance of conventional forces in Europe should be reduced, and chemical weapons eliminated, before consideration could be given to negotiating on French nuclear forces.

4.22. Throughout the SALT negotiations in the 1970s the western powers were at pains to

exclude any discussion of French and British nuclear forces in purely bilateral talks and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, in the SALT I interim agreement on strategic offensive arms signed on 26th May 1972 the Soviet Union was careful to preserve its own position in a unilateral statement which is reprinted in the official United States text of the treaty and related statements and understandings:

“On 17th May 1972 Minister Semenov made the following unilateral statement of the Soviet side:

‘Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the United States, but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the interim freeze agreement the United States and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 US submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However if during the period of effectiveness of the agreement United States allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines...’.

There follows in the official United States text the statement made subsequently on 24th May to the effect that “the United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement”.

4.23. The committee in previous reports has always taken the view that while United States and Soviet nuclear weapons remain at their present very high levels there can be no case for negotiating reductions in the relatively small levels of nuclear weapons controlled by the two European governments. It is obvious at the same time that the Soviet Union must take account of the levels of these forces in its own assessment of the threat, and indeed a recent British defence white paper makes precisely that claim which Soviet spokesmen have been delighted to quote. The introduction of MIRVs to French and British forces in the future will significantly increase their capability. The Trident D-5 missile scheduled to be fitted to British submarines in the 1990s can carry up to ten MIRVs, although the United Kingdom has stated that it does not intend to deploy this number. This aspect will certainly complicate the arms control situation. The Soviet Union may again insist on appending a unilateral statement to the sepa-

9. Daily Telegraph, 17th October 1985.

rate agreement on INF systems that Mr. Gorbachev has specifically offered, since the Soviet systems to be counted in such an agreement threaten the territory of only the European allies.

4.24. The committee in the past has pointed out that any concept of nuclear balance can be discussed only in terms of all nuclear weapons systems – there cannot be a European theatre balance separate from a United States-Soviet Union strategic balance – in part because many of the intercontinental Soviet systems are designed and deployed to be able to strike targets in Europe as well as in the United States. For the purpose of arms control agreements however it will be easier to agree on a separate package of reductions affecting only INF forces. The forward-based United States systems including cruise and Pershing missiles must be kept firmly within any such package in order to secure reductions in SS-20 missiles in particular.

“Cheating”

4.25. United States allegations of breaches of existing arms control agreements by the Soviet Union have been described in previous reports. The chief allegations have concerned the construction of a phased array radar at Abalokova near Krasnoyarsk, said to breach the ABM treaty; the conduct of some nuclear tests in excess of 150 KT in breach of the (unratified) threshold test-ban treaty, and the deployment of two new ICBMs including an SS-25 in breach of the (unratified) SALT II treaty. European governments have not found all United States allegations proven, and press reports¹⁰ have spoken of strong disagreements on this issue with Mr. Weinberger who was said to be demanding a tough NATO statement condemning Soviet violations.

4.26. The NPG communiqué of 30th October 1985 reported that “we received a detailed briefing from the United States Secretary of Defence on the evidence of Soviet treaty violations. We take the most serious view of this and call on the new Soviet leadership to take the steps necessary to assure full compliance with its commitments”. The communiqué expressed concern at the “testing and deployment of new strategic systems, including the SS-X-24 and the recently deployed SS-25, ...” (thus accepting the SS-25 as a new system rather than an improved SS-13 as claimed by the Soviet Union), but made no other specific endorsement of the United States allegations.

4.27. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is said to have offered to suspend work on the Abalokova radar if the United States would suspend the conversion of its early warning radars at Thule,

Greenland, and Fylingdales, United Kingdom, to phased array as now planned.

V. Mutual and balanced force reductions

History

5.1. The communiqué of the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg on 14th June 1967 first indicated NATO interest in force reductions: “if conditions permit, a balanced reduction of forces by the East and West could be a significant step towards security in Europe. A contribution on the part of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries towards a reduction of forces would be welcomed as a gesture of peaceful intent.” Following the adoption by the North Atlantic Council on 14th December that year of the Harmel report on the future tasks of the alliance pledging the NATO countries to seek détente in parallel with defence, the North Atlantic Council issued the so-called Reykjavik signal at their meeting in that city on 25th June 1968. An annex to the communiqué contained a declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions which was spelt out in more detail in the declaration attached to the North Atlantic Council ministerial communiqué issued in Rome on 27th May 1970 which read as follows:

“3. Ministers invite interested states to hold exploratory talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, with special reference to the central region. They agree that in such talks the allies would put forward the following considerations:

- (a) mutual force reductions should be compatible with the vital security interests of the alliance and should not operate to the military disadvantage of either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical and other considerations;
- (b) reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity, and phased and balanced as to their scope and timing;
- (c) reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their weapons systems in the areas concerned;
- (d) there must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions.”

5.2. From the NATO standpoint, these proposals to some extent were a counter to the calls made by the Warsaw Pact countries for a conference on security in Europe. The two processes led finally to the opening of the Helsinki confe-

10. Sunday Times, 27th October 1985.

rence on security and co-operation in Europe, and the convening in Vienna on 31st January 1973 of exploratory talks between twelve NATO and seven Warsaw Pact countries on mutual force reductions which on 28th June produced an agreement providing for the formal opening of negotiations in Vienna on 30th October that year.

5.3. The preparatory talks agreed that negotiations would be on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe". The decision-making or direct participants were to be: Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States on the NATO side and Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union on the Warsaw Pact side. Special status countries allowed to speak but not participate were to be: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey on the one hand, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania on the other. Reductions were to be discussed of all forces within the area comprising the territory of the decision-making countries other than the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union. The NATO countries would be negotiating under the handicap that United States reductions would be withdrawn 6,000 km across the Atlantic, Soviet reductions only 600 km overland. But NATO had an advantage in the depth and area of reductions of 600 km and 549 sq. km on the Warsaw Pact side, compared with 300 km and 317 sq. km on the NATO side.

Proposals in 1982

5.4. The committee having reported from time to time¹¹ on the progress of the MBFR negotiations, the full history of proposal and counter-proposal is not repeated here. To describe the present situation it is most convenient to start with the two draft treaties proposed in 1982.

5.5. On 18th February of that year Poland on behalf of the Warsaw Pact introduced a draft treaty for a phase 1 agreement with the following provisions:

- (i) reductions of 13,000 United States troops and 20,000 Soviet troops, each to include a complete division and subunits equivalent to an armoured brigade, together with all their armaments and combat equipment. The reductions were to be completed within one year and the troops withdrawn to their own countries located so as not to threaten the security of the other (indirect) participants;

- (ii) a freeze on all other forces in the reduction area for the duration of phase 1;
- (iii) phase 1 to last for three years;
- (iv) in the subsequent phase 2 agreement would be reached on proportionate reductions of forces of all direct participants to common collective ceilings of 90,000, reductions of each country to be proportionate to the country's proportionate contribution to the total forces in the area at the outset; the forces of no participant ever to exceed 50% of the 900,000 ceiling;
- (v) associated measures to be commensurate with the volume of the reductions, monitoring posts to be established at exit points during the period reductions were taking place, comprising one representative from each of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the country from which the forces were being withdrawn. There would then be notification of troop movements and exercises and prohibition of exercises in excess of 50,000 men;
- (vi) the ceiling of 900,000 never to be exceeded even during exercises or rotation of troops.

5.6. The NATO side replied on 8th July 1982 with a more comprehensive draft treaty covering four stages of reductions over seven years:

- (i) reductions to achieve common collective ceilings on each side of 900,000 men including not more than 700,000 ground troops;
- (ii) reductions to be achieved in four stages within seven years, each stage to be fully verifiable;
- (iii) levels of forces agreed to be within the reductions area at the outset to be specified in the treaty;
- (iv) first-stage withdrawals of 13,000 United States ground forces and 30,000 Soviet ground forces to be achieved within twelve months;
- (v) in the second phase lasting two years a further reduction of 31,000 NATO forces and of 93,000 Warsaw Pact forces, to include 33,000 Soviet forces;
- (vi) stages 3 and 4 over a total of four years, to bring levels down to the agreed collective ceilings.

5.7. The NATO countries then on 18th November 1982 tabled details of associated mea-

11. Document 972, cited above, and Disarmament, Document 909, 20th April 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Vohrer.

tures to be linked to the proposed treaty which would provide for:

- (i) pre-notification of out-of-garrison activities by one or more divisions;
- (ii) observers to be invited to out-of-garrison activities;
- (iii) prior notification of major troop movements within the reductions area;
- (iv) an annual quota of eighteen ground or air inspections or both;
- (v) permanent exit/entry points with permanent observers through which all forces entering or leaving the reductions area would be required to pass;
- (vi) exchange of information on forces to be withdrawn and continuing exchange of information on strength and organisation of remaining forces;
- (vii) no interference with national means of verification.

Warsaw Pact counter-proposals in 1983

5.8. In response to the western proposal, on 17th February 1983 the Warsaw Pact made a series of proposals leading up to a draft treaty tabled on 23rd June 1983 relating in particular to the third stage.

5.9. The final version of the Warsaw Pact proposals made provision for a three-stage reduction: (i) withdrawal within a period of one year of 13,000 American troops and 20,000 Soviet troops to be effected by mutual example outside the framework of an agreement; (ii) a declared collective freeze on all troop levels and armaments in the reductions area pending the conclusion of the final agreement; (iii) a written agreement reducing troop levels within three years to a common collective ceiling of 900,000 men with sub-ceilings of 200,000 for air forces and 700,000 for land forces, each side fixing and declaring the volume of national reductions and sub-ceilings.

5.10. For verification purposes, the new proposal still insisted on the use of national technical means, but dealt with the general control problem less restrictively than in the past. On the one hand, it accepted an exchange of information on residual forces after the withdrawals. On the other hand, it accepted three control measures, the first two of which were subject to the prior agreement of the party to be inspected:

- (i) verification by observers of the withdrawal of forces;
- (ii) verification of the common ceiling by on-the-spot inspections following the withdrawal of forces;

- (iii) establishment of four or five designated permanent entry and exit points, with observers.

Agreement and points of disagreement - end 1983

5.11. After twelve years of negotiations, no agreement had been signed in Vienna. At least four points nevertheless emerged from the various proposals exchanged which were accepted by both sides:

- (i) reductions were to lead to common collective ceilings limiting to 900,000 the number of troops stationed in the reductions area¹², of which land forces were not to exceed 700,000 (the rest consisting of air forces);
- (ii) reductions were to be effected in stages: during stage 1, only American and Soviet forces were to be withdrawn;
- (iii) in principle, reductions were to relate both to armaments and to troop levels;
- (iv) associated measures (including means of verification) were to be listed at appendix to an agreement on force reductions. Permanent entry and exit points with observers were to be designated.

5.12. The principal points of disagreement remaining at the end of 1983 may be summed up as follows:

- *Ceilings:* The Warsaw Pact asked for separate sub-ceilings for each country's troop levels or at least a guarantee that no state would account for more than 50% of common collective ceilings and for a sub-ceiling of 200,000 for levels of air forces. The Warsaw Pact above all feared a situation in which, even theoretically, Germany could one day provide the major part of western forces in the area; NATO for its part refused to allow the Warsaw Pact to have any say in national forces making up the common ceiling.
- *Armaments:* The Warsaw Pact sought specific agreements on the withdrawal of armaments outside the area at the same time as the troops they equipped. NATO, anxious to retain the possibility of reinforcements from

12. Territory of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the West and of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland in the East.

across the Atlantic (and Channel) in the event of crisis, would endeavour to maintain within the area stocks of armaments, particularly heavy armaments, earmarked for reinforcements brought in by air.

- *Verification:* NATO asked for the right to effect, on request, a specific number of inspections (eighteen) each year on land or from the air, and the right to send observers to manoeuvres or troop movements – even outside the reductions area – the latter having to be notified beforehand. The Warsaw Pact accepted the principle of observation and inspection only with the agreement of the party inspected, but in 1983 for the first time it accepted the principle of

designated permanent entry and exit points, with permanent observers.

- *Data:* NATO asked that prior to any reduction in forces there should be prior agreement on data, i.e. levels of troops in the reductions area whose presence was recognised by both blocs. While the Warsaw Pact did not dispute the figures given by NATO for allied troop levels in the area, NATO estimates of Warsaw Pact troop levels in the area were higher by 145,000 than the figure put forward by the Warsaw Pact itself.

Since details of this discussion about figures have not been published, the following table, based on various sources, gives an approximate summary of the situation.

Present levels of forces in MBFR reductions area

	NATO			Warsaw Pact			Warsaw Pact superiority		
	Ground defence	Air force	Total	Ground defence	Air force	Total	Ground defence	Air force	Total
NATO estimate	790,000	203,000	993,000	980,000	240,000	1,220,000	190,000	37,000	227,000
Warsaw Pact estimate	not disputed by Warsaw Pact			815,000	182,000	997,000	25,000	-21,000	4,000

Among sources consulted are:

- Report for United States House Sub-Committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 21st April 1983.
- Keesings, Volume XXIX, page 31990.
- Previous report of the committee, Document 909, op. cit. 5-48.
- International Herald Tribune, 20th and 23rd April 1984.

The western initiative of April 1984

5.13. On 19th April 1984, NATO put forward another proposal, relaxing its position with regard to the data problem, while stating that it expected as a counterpart that associated measures would be improved as compared with those proposed in July 1983 but not yet specified. NATO proposed that forces should no longer be classified by military formation but according to the type of mission, which would allow the number of combat, combat support and logistic elements to be counted. Only the first two categories were to be taken into account in the prior exchange of data which were no longer expected to be so accurate, figures not too different from western estimates being considered acceptable (according to a spokesman, up to 5 or 10%). In this renewed, relaxed framework, reductions were to be effected in three stages:

- (i) the withdrawal of 13,000 and 30,000 combat and combat support troops by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, and a freeze on the ceiling thus attained as regards United States and Soviet forces. These withdrawals would be effected essentially by complete unit, but up to 10% by the withdrawal of individuals. This first stage was to be immediately followed by a verifiable undertaking not to bring in reinforcements applying to the overall level of land forces of all direct participants;
- (ii) the following year a second stage would consist of the exchange and verification of information relating to the forces of all participants so as to determine the volume of collective reductions to be accepted by each

alliance in order to reach ceilings of 700,000 for land forces and 900,000 for land and air forces as a whole;

- (iii) in the third stage, from the third to the fifth year after conclusion of the agreement, direct participants, with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union, would effect agreed reductions.

5.14. In the minds of the western negotiators, NATO concessions over data and the duration of reductions were to be offset by stricter associated measures than those proposed in 1982, but in the eighteen months which have elapsed since the April 1984 proposals were made the NATO countries do not appear to have managed to reach agreement on the stricter associated measures which they had announced. It seems in effect that in the last three or four years the western countries have been finding it increasingly difficult to work out joint positions, so that it takes longer to prepare each proposal made by the NATO countries in Vienna.

The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 14th February 1985

5.15. The western proposal was not accepted by the eastern countries. They criticised the fact that the data problem was still intact, the inequality in restrictions affecting half the Warsaw Pact forces in the area, i.e. those of the Soviet Union, and claimed that the non-reinforcement commitment was fragile and the verification measures unrealistic.

5.16. The Warsaw Pact countries submitted a further proposal on 14th February 1985 which included a certain number of concessions as compared with their 1983 proposals.

- They submitted the *basic provisions of a limited agreement on an initial withdrawal*, still 13,000 troops from American land forces and 20,000 from those of the Soviet Union, the reductions to be effected by combat units with their own equipment, but allowing 10% of the troops to be withdrawn as individuals. As in the case of the 1983 proposal, the agreement was to be accompanied by an undertaking on a collective, national basis not to increase troop levels and armaments on either side.
- The United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange lists of units to be withdrawn and notify the beginning and end of their withdrawals.
- Withdrawals were to be verified by observers at designated exit points and by national technical means.

- Both sides were to undertake to continue to negotiate common collective ceilings of 900,000 men, of which 700,000 for land forces.

Present situation

5.17. From information available it appears that compared with their 1983 proposals, the Warsaw Pact countries have proposed a written agreement for the phase 1 withdrawals by United States and Soviet forces; have accepted the principle of withdrawals to be by complete units as NATO proposed in 1984; and have maintained their concession of agreeing to permanent designated entrance and exit points to be manned by observers both during and after the initial withdrawals. Important differences between the two sides remain however - the Warsaw Pact text insists on units being withdrawn complete with their equipment, admits in the initial phase the withdrawal of only 20,000 Soviet forces compared with 30,000 demanded by NATO, and does not accept on-site inspection except with the prior consent of the country to be inspected. Otherwise the points of agreement and disagreement between the two sides remain as described in paragraphs 5.11 et seq.

5.18. As pointed out above, for the last four years, the NATO countries have found it much more difficult to agree among themselves on proposals to be tabled in Vienna. For the last eighteen months they have ostensibly been discussing certain more far-reaching associated measures to be tabled following their 1984 proposals. Your Rapporteur understands however that in practice a more fundamental reappraisal of the western position is under way.

Conclusions

5.19. The opening of MBFR negotiations represented the price that the Soviet Union was ready to pay for the convening of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe the object of which, in Soviet eyes, was to secure recognition of the de facto boundaries in Europe which had resulted from the end of the war in 1945. Once this result had been obtained, albeit at the price of further concessions from the Soviet Union in the Helsinki final act, the MBFR problem lost some of its interest for the Soviet Union - hence the long-drawn-out discussions on data and associated measures, and the still limited scope of the points so far agreed in Vienna.

5.20. One western interest in the MBFR debate originally had been to offset the risk of even partial unilateral withdrawals by United States forces stationed in Europe, while fostering détente and providing the basis for possible future co-operation between the two blocs. Moscow on the other hand, a secretive state since the days of the csars, has not so far been

prepared to accept adequate inspection in territory under its influence, and continues to see the Central European glacis and the present balance of forces as the best means of protecting its western frontiers. The Soviet Union also will be reluctant to reduce its forces stationed in the other Warsaw Pact countries lest the Polish syndrome should spread to its other satellite allies. Simultaneously, however, the Soviet Union is interested through the MBFR negotiations in securing some control over the forces of the Federal Republic of Germany.

5.21. As the committee has pointed out in previous reports, although the Vienna negotiations have been in the doldrums for several years, certain progress has been made in addition to the points noted in paragraph 5.11.

VI. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm)

A. Background

6.1. The committee last reported on the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, as the Stockholm conference is officially styled, in May 1984¹³. It will be recalled that the conference is a development of the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe, which resulted in the signing of the final act by the foreign ministers of the 45 participating states on 1st August 1975, and the proposal by the French President in the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978.

6.2. The Helsinki final act of some 60 pages comprises three chapters or baskets, the first containing, inter alia, reference to development and co-operation between states to foster understanding, mutual confidence and security. The signatories "recognising that this measure deriving from political decisions rests on a *voluntary* basis" agreed¹⁴:

- (i) that they will notify their major manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops in the area of application: the territory in Europe of participating countries or, in the case of Turkey and the Soviet Union, within 250 km of a common frontier with another participating state. The area includes the airspace, ocean areas adjoining and associated airspace;

- (ii) that they may also notify smaller military manoeuvres if they so wish. As a gesture of good will, participating states on a voluntary and bilateral basis may also invite observers to attend military manoeuvres;
- (iii) the participating states recognise that at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, they may notify their major military movements;
- (iv) that, with regard to other measures, they may promote exchange of military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

The participating states also agreed that they recognised the need to lessen military confrontation and to promote disarmament, and that they respected the security interests of participating states.

6.3. The French proposal of 1978 was for a conference on disarmament in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, to proceed in two phases – first confidence-building measures, second actual disarmament measures. It was agreed subsequently to seek a mandate for such a conference at the Madrid CSCE review conference which opened on 22nd November 1980 but concluded only on 6th September 1983, with agreement inter alia on a mandate for a first phase of a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe¹⁵.

6.4. The mandate stated specifically that confidence- and security-building measures "will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area" (which includes ocean areas "adjoining Europe") "and airspace. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content". It further provided that "the next follow-up meeting of the participating states of the CSCE to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4th November 1986, will assess the progress made during the first stage of the conference". The period of nearly three years thus allowed for the Stockholm CDE conference virtually ensured that negligible progress would be made in the first two years, as participants are rarely inclined to make major concessions until the deadline approaches.

B. Opening positions at Stockholm 1984

6.5. The opening session at Stockholm, which commenced on 17th January 1984, saw the collective submission of a paper on confidence-

13. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 972, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries.

14. Emphasis added. Full text at Appendix II.

15. Text at Appendix III.

and security-building measures by the sixteen NATO nations on 24th January. Their proposals contained six concrete information measures, in the conviction that openness on military matters should be extended well beyond those provided for by the Helsinki measures :

- measure 1: the exchange of military information;
- measure 2: the exchange of forecasts of activities notifiable in advance;
- measure 3: notification of military activities;
- measure 4: observation of certain military activities;
- measure 5: conformity and verification;
- measure 6: the development of means of communication.

6.6. The initial Soviet position was made clear by a speech by Ambassador Grinevsky on 31st January 1984. However, apart from a paper submitted by Romania on 25th January, the Warsaw Pact countries submitted no documents until one tabled by the Soviet Union on 8th May 1984. As outlined in the Grinevsky speech the Soviet and Warsaw Pact proposals were essentially declaratory, including (i) a no-first-use of nuclear weapons undertaking; and (ii) a treaty on the non-use of force, but included some more concrete measures; (iii) reductions in military budgets; (iv) banning of weapons of mass destruction and the non-stationing of such weapons where they are not at present stationed; (v) nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe; and lastly, offering hope of eventual compromise with the NATO position; (vi) significant confidence- and security-building measures including limits on the scale of military manoeuvres; notification of major land and air force manoeuvres; notification of major troop movements - to cover the whole of Europe including adjoining sea and ocean area and airspace.

6.7. The eight neutral non-aligned nations (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Malta, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) tabled their own paper on 9th March which included nine concrete proposals for CSBMs reflecting many of the NATO proposals, but adding constraints on the deployment of military equipment. They were joined by Liechtenstein on 10th May. On 8th November, Malta proposed measures related to the Mediterranean Sea area. The representatives of Ireland, the Vatican and Monaco have not associated themselves with any proposals submitted so far.

C. Developments in 1985

(i) The NATO position

6.8. Between 27th January and 27th February 1985 the NATO countries circulated six papers which elaborated, clarified and defined in some detail the measures proposed in the paper circulated in the previous year. In outline the proposals are as follows:

6.9. *Measure 1*, the exchange of military information, would require each participating state to exchange information concerning its military command organisation in the area of application in writing and not later than 1st January each year. The information would include the organogram of the command structure of the land and land-based air forces in the zone, including their normal locations, with details of the major ground forces, and combat units of both armed services.

6.10. *Measure 2*, the exchange of forecasts of activities in advance, would require the participating states to exchange annual forecasts of military activities in the zone of application for each notification required by measure 3 which follows. These forecasts should be issued not later than 15th November for the following year.

6.11. *Measure 3*, the notification of military activities, would require warning to be given 45 days in advance of out-of-garrison land activities, when one or more ground force divisions or equivalent formations of 6,000 or more ground troops or forces having a certain number of combat vehicles (yet to be specified) are operating under a single command. Mobilisation activity would be notified when 25,000 troops or the major combat elements of three or more divisions are involved. Amphibious activity involving three or more battalions or 3,000 amphibious troops is likewise to be reported. Short-term out-of-garrison land activity mounted as an alert measure is to be notified at the time of commencement.

6.12. Participating states would report any activity taking place on their territory even if the forces of that state are not taking part. This, however, would not limit the obligation of the state participating in the out-of-garrison activity on the territory of another participating state from notifying the activity also. The notification would include, if applicable, the name and objectives of the exercise and the name of the headquarters conducting the activity. The timetable of the exercises and its geographical boundaries are to be given along with the names of the participating states. The dates on which those taking part are due to return to their normal peacetime locations are to be notified. The number of participating troops, directing staff and umpires for each participating state are to be supplied. Amphibious and airborne troops, as

well as ground-based tactical air force units and ship-shore gunnery personnel, are to be included.

6.13. The activity would be related to forecasts made under measure 2. If the information had been changed or not previously forecast, a statement to that effect would be made.

6.14. *Measure 4* covers observation of certain military activities to which participating states would invite observers from all other participating states to observe all forces engaged, including forces other than those of the host state. Certain safeguards are contained in the measure; for instance, the host state is not required to invite observers from another participating state with which it does not enjoy diplomatic relations. Observers need not be invited to "Alert Activity" unless such an activity exceeds 48 hours, and then only after 36 hours have elapsed. The observers would normally be the military attachés accredited to the host state. Invitations would be dispatched via normal diplomatic channels.

6.15. The host state is to supply observers with accommodation and transport in the zone of activity; however, observers would be able to use their own vehicles to reach a transfer point near the zone of activity. Observers are to be permitted to remain in telecommunication contact with their nearest national authorities during the activity. The measure includes details of the host state responsibilities in providing observers with sufficient scenario details to follow the evolution of the activities in the zone.

6.16. *Measure 5* covers compliance and verification, and provides that national technical means can be employed without interference. In addition, each participating state would be allowed to demand up to two inspections each year, but must state its reasons for making such a demand. Inspections may take place on the ground or take the form of an aerial inspection. The inspections are only to be carried out in areas where there is normal unrestricted public access; military establishments, armament factories, etc., will not be entered. The proposed measure gives details of time-limits for acceding to requests for challenge inspections and for the logistic and communications rights of these inspection teams.

6.17. *Measure 6* covers the means of communication for achieving confidence-building for which it is proposed that participating states would have dedicated communication links for contacting each other for the expeditious handling of CSBMs.

(ii) *Soviet proposals*

6.18. The proposals tabled by the Soviet Union on 8th May 1984 are prefaced, inter alia, by

remarks on attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance and the assertion that Europe and the entire world requires a radical turn in the policy of states away from confrontation to peaceful co-operation. The document proposes:

- (a) participating states of the conference possessing nuclear weapons should assume an obligation through multilateral agreement or unilateral declaration not to be the first to use them;
- (b) the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations would be a major confidence-building measure, which would include neutral and non-aligned states as well as the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance states;
- (c) states represented at the Stockholm conference could participate in the efforts to halt the further growth of military spending and reallocate the released resources for assistance to developing countries;
- (d) the banning of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, and the non-stationing of such weapons in areas where they are not at present stationed. Such steps would also facilitate agreement to ban chemical weapons and destroy stockpiles of such weapons on a global scale;
- (e) a positive view is taken of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and in Northern Europe and on both sides of a contact line between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces;
- (f) manoeuvres should be limited to a certain maximum level to facilitate differentiation between large-scale manoeuvres and preparation for hostilities. Prior notification of major manoeuvres and movements and transfers above a certain level should be notified. A system of invitation for observers should be developed.

6.19. From 20th May 1985 three papers were presented by Warsaw Pact countries covering proposals for the notification of land, sea and air manoeuvres respectively. Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union tabled the documents on *prior notification of major manoeuvres of land forces* as well as parallel activity in the adjoining sea or airspace conducted independently or jointly with participating states. It defines a major manoeuvre as one where the numbers, to include land forces and any other air, naval, amphibious and airborne components

participating in the manoeuvre, exceed 20,000 troops. It would require notification to be given by each state taking part in the manoeuvre to all other participating states via normal diplomatic channels 30 days in advance of its start or at the first possible opportunity if it is arranged at short notice. Notice of multinational manoeuvres will be given by the state on whose territory the manoeuvre is to take place even if the troops of that state are not to take part. Other states involved in the manoeuvre are to give notification in accordance with the requirement of the measure.

6.20. Prior warning of the move or the transfer of the troops to the manoeuvre area from another area is to be given in accordance with the measure for notification of military movements (transfers). Notification of major manoeuvres is to include:

- the designation of the manoeuvre;
- the purpose of the activity with a description of the activity of the troops engaged;
- the states participating;
- the strength and components of the force;
- the area of conduct of the manoeuvre;
- the time-frame of the manoeuvre and the time the participants will be away from their permanent locations. Besides this, the participating states will, whenever possible, supply information with regard to the composition of their forces, the military hardware involved and other military information.

6.21. Bulgaria, Poland and the Soviet Union tabled the parallel proposal for *prior notification of major manoeuvres of naval forces*. The proposal defines a major manoeuvre of naval forces as one involving 30 combat ships and 100 military aircraft, whether carrier- or land-based, but excluding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The notification requirements and the information to be supplied correspond closely to those proposed for the land forces.

6.22. The German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the Soviet Union tabled the document on *prior notification of major manoeuvres of air forces*. It defines such a manoeuvre as one either independent or in combination with land and naval forces, in the course of which it is foreseen that more than 200 military aircraft will be in the airspace over the notified area at the same time. The rest of the proposal concerning notification and the nature of the information to be supplied largely follows that proposed for the other two armed services.

6.23. Following the three foregoing proposals, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on 21st June 1985 tabled a proposal on *prior notification of major military movements and transfers*. The document calls for an explanation of major movements (transfers) of land and air forces in Europe and in the adjoining seas and associated airspace within the area of application, as well as movements into or out of this area, covered by the confidence-building measure. A major movement is defined as the change in location of more than 20,000 troops or 100 aircraft, and notification is to be given 30 days in advance of the start of the movement, or at the earliest opportunity if the decision is taken at shorter notice. Should movements by the forces of several states take place on the same territory under a common plan and the total number exceed the level of notification then the state on or into whose territory the movements are effected would give notification.

6.24. The notification is to provide the general purpose of the movement or transfer and the states involved. The types and numerical strength of the land and air force personnel are to be supplied, together with the time-frame of the movement. The starting and terminal points of the transfer are to be given. The units of troops and air forces involved, the mode of movement and the route to be taken are to be provided whenever possible.

6.25. Romania, the idiosyncratic member of the Warsaw Pact, had tabled its own proposals for confidence- and security-building measures on 25th January 1984:

- at least 30 days' warning with full details should be given of military manoeuvres exceeding 18,000 to 20,000 land troops, or 5,000 special forces such as paratroops or amphibious troops, or more than 10 or 12 warships displacing a total of 50,000 to 60,000 tons, or by air forces involving more than 40 to 50 fighter aircraft;
- 30-day notification of military movements involving two or more divisions, or movement of heavy equipment for these or equivalent formations;
- observation to be provided for;
- prior notification of emergencies involving a state of alert for national or foreign forces;
- maximum ceilings to be imposed on manoeuvres of 40,000 to 50,000 land forces or numbers to be specified of warships and fighter aircraft;
- prohibition of military manoeuvres near state borders as a step towards demilitarised zones;

- nuclear-free zones much as proposed by the Soviet Union on 8th May 1984;
- a freeze on the establishment of military bases or stationing of troops on the territory of other states;
- establishment of a system of communications between states and measures to prevent conflict by error or accident;
- a freeze on military expenditure at 1984 levels.

(iii) *The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) proposals*

6.26. The NNA countries have added nothing to their proposals circulated on 9th March 1984. It will be recalled that the list of concrete measures they put forward was closer in philosophy to the NATO approach than to that of the Warsaw Pact in advocating in a preamble concrete measures in order to give effect to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force. The measures proposed included :

- (a) major military manœuvres to be notified earlier and in more detail than in the Helsinki final act;
- (b) prior notification of small-scale military manœuvres, which are conducted close to each other, in time and space, if the total numbers involved exceed the level to be defined for (a);
- (c) prior notification of major military manœuvres involving amphibious, sea-transported, airborne, or air-transported troops or a combination thereof;
- (d) prior notification of major military movements giving their organisation level, the number of troops involved and their transport, etc.;
- (e) prior notification of major military activity in the adjoining sea area and airspace which affect security in Europe when they constitute part of other notifiable activities;
- (f) invitation to send observers to manœuvres and movements subject to notification, with observers enjoying improved conditions for observation;
- (g) prior notification of redeployments of major military units and rotation of personnel;
- (h) annual exchange of information on major military activities planned in advance;
- (i) upper ceiling on major military manœuvres and separate lower cei-

lings for amphibious or airborne manœuvres;

- (j) constraints on the redeployment of units and/or equipment for sustained offensive operations in certain areas;
- (k) the foregoing would include adequate verification provisions which correspond to their content;
- (l) the standard reporting system on military expenditure elaborated by the United Nations should be applied by member states.

D. Procedure

6.27. The conference was unable to agree on the establishment of working groups – essential for detailed negotiation – until towards the end of 1984 when proposals based on those by Sweden and Finland were accepted for the creation of two working groups: (a) to deal with notification and observation of military activities; and (b) other questions. The two groups also meet together as a combined working group.

6.28. The establishment of the working groups and the January 1985 announcement of the resumption of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva have resulted in a business-like negotiating atmosphere at the sessions of the conference so far this year.

E. Comparison of positions and conclusions

6.29. A comparison of the proposals so far put forward by the NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral countries is given in summary form in the following table.

6.30. The prospects for some eventual agreement in the Stockholm conference remain good; although the starting positions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries were far apart, neither, when the small print is examined, excludes the possibility of concessions to take account of some of the major demands of the other.

6.31. Thus, the NATO countries will be primarily concerned to secure mandatory invitations to observers, with the best possible facilities for observation, to all significant out-of-garrison activities, and also if possible the right to a limited number of challenge inspections each year. The Helsinki final act, it will be recalled, makes the invitation of observers to exercises purely discretionary, and does not require them to be provided with reasonable observation facilities. The full exchange of information called for in the NATO proposals is also highly desirable to provide the sort of picture of the

Comparison of proposals to July 1985 in summary

Item	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Neutral and non-aligned
<i>A. Confidence- and security-building measures</i>			
Exchange of information	Participating states to exchange information each year on their military command organisation, with details of land forces and land-based air forces in the zones and their normal locations.	No proposal.	Annual exchange of information on military activities planned in advance.
Advance notice of military activities.	(i) annual forecast of notifiable military activities; (ii) 45 days' notice, with specified details, of each notifiable activity; (iii) short-term alert activities to be notified on commencement; (iv) notice to be given both by countries on whose territory activity occurs, and by country whose forces are involved.	No corresponding proposal; (ii) 30 days' notice with specified details of notifiable manoeuvres, or notifiable troop movements; (iii) notice at first opportunity for activities arranged at short notice; (iv) notice to be given both by countries on whose territory activity occurs and by country whose forces are involved.	No corresponding proposal; (ii) earlier and in more detail than Helsinki final act.
Zone covered.	"The zone" as defined in mandate of conference (see Appendix III).	Notification of manoeuvres to cover parallel activity in the adjoining sea or airspace conducted independently or jointly with participating states.	Adjoining sea area and airspace which affect security of Europe when part of other notifiable activities (language of mandate of conference).
Notifiable activities.	(i) out-of-garrison activity by one or more divisions or 6,000 men under single command; (ii) mobilisation of 25,000 men or three divisions; (iii) amphibious activity by 3,000 amphibious troops.	(i) land manoeuvres by more than 20,000 men including air, naval and amphibious components; (ii) naval manoeuvres by 30 combat ships excluding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and 100 military aircraft, carrier- or land-based; (iii) air manoeuvres, whether independent or in combination with land and naval forces with 200 military aircraft in notified airspace; (iv) movements or transfer of a total of 20,000 troops or 100 aircraft. To be notified by state on whose territory the activity occurs if total of movements of troops of different nationality exceeds level of notification; (v) movements to areas of manoeuvres to be notified as troop movements.	(i) to include several small manoeuvres in proximity if totals would be notifiable; (ii) amphibious airborne and sea-borne manoeuvres; (iii) redeployments of major military units and rotation of personnel.
Limitations on manoeuvres and movements.	No proposal.	Ceiling (to be specified) on size of manoeuvres.	(i) upper ceilings on major military manoeuvres, separate lower ceilings for amphibious and airborne manoeuvres. Constraints on redeployment of units and equipment for sustained operations in certain areas.
Observers.	Invitations to all participating states (with whom diplomatic relations exist) to send observers, normally the accredited military attachés, to certain military activities, including activity by foreign troops on territory of the inviting state. Observers to be invited to "Abert" activities exceeding 48 hours, after first 36 hours. Specified facilities for observers.	A system of invitations to be worked out.	Invitations to send observers to notifiable manoeuvres and movements, with improved conditions for observation.

Item	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Neutral and non-aligned
Compliance and verification.	No interference with national technical means. Each participating state may request, with reasons, up to two inspections each year. May be ground or air inspections, but limited to areas of normal unrestricted public access (not military establishment, arms factories, etc).	No proposal.	Adequate verification measures corresponding to content.
Communications.	Dedicated communications links between participating states to handle CSBMs.		
Military expenditure.	No proposal.	States to participate in efforts to halt increase in military spending.	Standard United Nations reporting system on military expenditure to be adopted.
<i>B. Other proposals</i>			
Item	NATO	Warsaw Pact	Neutral and non-aligned
No first use of nuclear weapons.	No proposal.	Multilateral agreement or unilateral declaration on no first use of nuclear weapons.	
Nuclear-free zones.	No proposal.	Favoured in Northern Europe, Balkans, and both sides of contact line between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.	
Non-use of military force.	No proposal.	Treaty on the non-use of military force.	Preambular reference in CSBM proposals recalls duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force.
Non-stationing of chemical weapons.	No proposal.	Ban weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons. Non-stationing of such weapons in areas where not at present stationed.	

Warsaw Pact military structure that is already available in the case of the military structures of NATO countries, through the more open nature of the western societies.

6.32. The Warsaw Pact countries have been primarily concerned with their declaratory proposals on the non-use of force and the non-first use of nuclear weapons, although Mr. Gromyko indicated in his opening speech in 1984 that they would be satisfied if one of those two demands was met. They are then concerned to secure notification of manoeuvres not only in the whole of Europe as provided for in the mandate agreed in Madrid, but also of independent manoeuvres in adjoining sea areas and airspace. In the Madrid mandate the NATO countries conceded only that such manoeuvres would be notifiable "whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe...". The Warsaw Pact anxiety to set ceilings on the size of manoeuvres reflects the fact that Warsaw

Pact manoeuvres, even before the Helsinki final act, have tended to be on a smaller scale than those of NATO, and usually to involve the troops of fewer countries at any one time.

6.33. Prospects of a compromise remain. While the NATO military posture would not permit a declaration on the non-first use of nuclear weapons, and while NATO countries insist that a specific treaty on the non-use of military force would merely undermine the long-established undertakings to this effect in many binding international agreements including the Charter of the United Nations, the NATO countries might well accept in a document containing mandatory concrete confidence- and security-building measures some preambular reference recalling the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force. The fact that the Warsaw Pact proposals for notification of naval manoeuvres specifically exclude nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines would seem to be a gesture to make it easier for NATO countries to

accept notification of manoeuvres in the adjoining sea areas to Europe in certain circumstances.

6.34. But as the committee pointed out in its previous report the fact that the Stockholm conference is scheduled to report to the Vienna CSCE review conference only in November 1986 makes it unlikely that significant progress will be made at the current seventh session in Stockholm which opened on 10th September.

6.35. A table showing implementation of confidence-building measures under the Helsinki final act is at Appendix IV. Warsaw Pact countries have invited observers from NATO countries to manoeuvres only once since 1979.

VII. Conference on Disarmament

(a) General

7.1. On 24th July 1985 the committee for the first time met in Geneva for briefings on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and was privileged to be addressed by the representatives of Italy, Mexico (Chairman of the ad hoc committee on a comprehensive programme of disarmament), Poland (Chairman of the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons), Egypt (Chairman of the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space), Australia (Chairman of the ad hoc committee on radiological weapons), the United States and the Soviet Union. The committee as a whole is thus in a better position than before to report on the work of the conference, although rapporteurs of the committee have regularly called on representatives to the conference and its predecessors at various times over the past twenty years.

7.2. The Conference on Disarmament, which meets in the United Nations building in Geneva, is intended to be the principal multilateral negotiating body for concluding actual agreements on arms control or disarmament. It reports to the United Nations General Assembly and receives remits from it. Composed of 40 countries at present, including all WEU countries except Luxembourg, (membership at Appendix I), it has evolved from the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the 1960s which negotiated the non-proliferation treaty and was previously known as the "Committee on Disarmament".

7.3. The conference is under constant pressure for more countries to join it; its mandate already provides for non-member countries to participate in its work. At the same time, it is recognised that the greater the number of participating countries, the less effective it can be as a negotiating forum. Privately agreement has been reached on the enlargement of the conference

by four countries to be one western group, one socialist, and two non-aligned. These will be Norway (western), Bangladesh and Senegal (neutral and non-aligned) but formal agreement is blocked because Vietnam, proposed by the socialist group, is vetoed by China.

7.4. The multilateral agreements negotiated in the conference or its various predecessors are: the partial test-ban treaty (1963); non-proliferation treaty (1968); seabed treaty (1971); biological weapons convention (1972) and the environmental modification treaty (1978).

7.5. The conference normally holds two sessions a year from February to April inclusive and from June to the end of August when the conference agrees its report to the United Nations General Assembly which sits in the autumn.

7.6. Quite apart from the East-West conflict over arms control issues, there is a fundamental conflict within the Conference on Disarmament between the 21 non-aligned countries (a majority of whom are pressing for nuclear disarmament by the superpowers, guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons, and general and controlled disarmament) on the one hand, and the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the other (which are prepared to concentrate on certain limited measures - principally, at the present time, a chemical weapons ban - on which agreement might be reached while leaving nuclear disarmament to possible bilateral negotiations).

(b) Programme of work of the conference

7.7. The agenda agreed on 7th February for the 1985 session, the same as the previous year, was as follows, with the time subsequently allotted for discussion in brackets:

1. Nuclear test ban (four weeks)
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race (four weeks)
3. Prevention of nuclear war (two weeks)
4. Chemical weapons (four weeks)
5. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (three weeks)
6. Negative security guarantees (two weeks combined with item 8)
7. Radiological weapons (two weeks)
8. Comprehensive programme on disarmament (two weeks combined with item 6)
9. Annual report, etc. (three weeks)

From the standpoint of the western countries, and of East-West relations in general, items 1, 4, 5, and 7 are significant, and are discussed in some detail below.

(c) *Ad hoc committees*

7.8. Since the negotiating body reached its present size the substantive drafting of treaties has been undertaken in ad hoc committees of the conference, when consensus is reached on terms of reference for a committee to draft a treaty. In 1985 as in 1984 such committees have been established on chemical weapons (chairman: Poland) and on radiological weapons (chairman: Australia). In both years there has been an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive programme of disarmament (chairman: Mexico) but the 1984 committee on negative security assurances is replaced this year by an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (chairman: Egypt) but with terms of reference permitting it only to "examine ... issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

7.9. There is considerable pressure from the group of 21 and from the group of socialist states for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban, but the western group has been prepared to support terms of reference which would permit such a committee to examine only problems of verification; consequently no agreement has been reached, but an ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events has been meeting for some four years.

(d) *Chemical weapons*

7.10. A treaty to ban the possession or production of chemical weapons has been actively discussed in the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors since 1980 when the corresponding United States-Soviet Union bilateral negotiations were broken off. An ad hoc working group by the end of 1983 had reached consensus on many general provisions of a treaty including some lists of chemicals to be permitted for industrial purposes, or prohibited as not having industrial applications, and general concepts of verification including inspection of the destruction of stocks; routine inspection of specified chemical plants, and provision for some sort of inspection by challenge of disputed activities. The Soviet Union had conceded the right of continuous inspection of the process of destruction of stocks of chemical weapons.

7.11. At the 1984 session of the conference the working group was converted into the ad hoc committee now responsible for drafting a treaty.

On 15th April 1984 the United States Vice-President, Mr. Bush, introduced in person a draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons which in part embodied in treaty language many points on which consensus appeared to have been reached. The United States draft contained however the disputed Article X providing for special on-site inspection which would give a major party the right to demand inspection of any installations or locations owned or controlled by a government within 24 hours.

7.12. Allied countries have given general support to the United States draft, but it has not been endorsed by NATO countries which were shown the draft in Brussels only six days before it was tabled in Geneva. The Soviet Union and its allies have described Article X as unacceptably intrusive, but have not offered any alternative draft convention of their own. Privately several European allies have let it be known that the provisions would be too intrusive for their own chemical industries.

7.13. Apart from the fundamental disagreement on Article X, a number of other points require detailed negotiation before a convention could be concluded. These include more precise definition of chemical production to be permitted for industrial purposes, the possible use of non-lethal chemicals for military purposes (tear gases, etc., and herbicides); as well as the question of prohibitions to be included in a convention - the 1925 Geneva Convention already prohibits the use of chemical weapons in war, but not the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons. It is not yet clear whether a new convention should duplicate the 1925 Protocol by banning use, as well as production and stockpiling.

7.14. Particular urgency attaches to the negotiation of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, on the one hand because of continued Soviet production of these weapons, and the decision of the United States administration to begin construction of production facilities for binary chemical weapons, and on the other because of the verified use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in 1984, which the committee detailed in its last report.

7.15. However there is a lack of hard evidence concerning the level of Soviet chemical weapon stocks. United States public estimates have varied with administration policy, being low when the United States 1969 decision to cease production of chemical weapons was being justified, to as much as 700,000 tons, but a figure commonly quoted by allied ministers is 300,000 tons¹⁶ of weapons. United States statements

16. E.g. Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in answer to a question in the WEU Assembly, 4th December 1984.

concerning Soviet chemical and biological weapons capabilities and use continue to be alarming, but assessments of stocks are mostly unquantified and allegations of use non-specific since past United States allegations failed to find independent substantiation; more emphasis is placed on the potential danger from third countries:

“The Soviet Union maintains a massive chemical and expanding biological and toxic capability and has repeatedly used or sponsored the use of such weapons in violation of their treaty obligations. In addition, chemical weapons have proliferated throughout the world with potentially grave consequences for us and our allies ...”¹⁷.

7.16. The United States assessment of Soviet intentions however has been toned down in 1985:

“Although we no longer believe the Soviets intend to use chemical weapons on a massive scale, the selective use against special targets cannot be ruled out. Responding to this threat of chemical warfare has been a particularly difficult issue for our nation to face. The question we must address is how to ensure these weapons are not used against either civilians or the men and women of our armed forces ...”¹⁸.

In the third week of October 1985, the United States House Appropriations Committee voted against the administration request for \$164 million for the resumption of the manufacture of chemical weapons. On 28th October, the Department of Defence then released an updated version of an October 1983 report by the Defence Intelligence Agency, which claimed inter alia: “storage depots for chemical warfare agents within the USSR have undergone a significant increase in storage capacity since the late 1960s ... we believe chemical weapons are co-located with conventional weapons in forward areas facing NATO”. A map included in the report showed 32 chemical warfare storage sites in Warsaw Pact nations including many in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, close to the West German border. The text of the report makes clear however that defensive equipment such as respirators and protective clothing is also stored in “chemical weapons depots”. The DIA report gives no figure for the present levels of Soviet chemical weapons stocks.

7.17. Despite earlier reports of deteriorating stockpiles, United States stocks of serviceable chemical weapons remain large. A recent aca-

demical study is reproduced in the table hereafter¹⁹. As the same study points out, President Reagan's Chemical Warfare Review Commission reported in June 1985 that claims that these stocks had deteriorated were “exaggerated and inaccurate”. The problem the United States forces have is that some weapons for which these stocks are designed are obsolete – this is true in particular of the 105 mm howitzer no longer in service. But the large numbers of 155 mm rounds for example will remain serviceable for a long time.

7.18. Towards the end of the session of the conference in late August some progress was made on ostensibly technical details such as how binary- or multiple-component chemical weapons should be covered by a treaty, and what toxicity criteria should be employed. It was also tacitly agreed that consultation should continue in Geneva before the resumption of the conference in February 1986 – it is understood there were informal consultations in Geneva in October on specific issues such as permitted activities, declaration of stocks, and compliance and verification, and that there will be an informal session of the working group in January 1986.

7.19. A very constructive invitation was also extended by the Netherlands Delegation to a workshop on verification of the prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons to be held in the Netherlands in early June 1986 where representatives of the chemical industry would be able to explain to the diplomatic representatives the practical problems of verifying the absence of prohibited activities by the chemical industry.

7.20. There are signs of desire for progress on the part of most delegations. Against them has to be set: first the refusal of the Soviet Union so far to make any concrete counter-proposal to the United States 1984 draft treaty with its unacceptable Article X, and other signs that the Soviet Union is no longer seeking progress on a chemical weapons ban in Geneva, either because the Soviet forces intend after all to retain their considerable chemical weapons capability, or because they believe the present United States administration cannot be deterred from resuming production of chemical weapons. The other signs of declining Soviet interest in a total comprehensive ban are the Warsaw Pact proposals put forward both bilaterally and in the CDE conference in Stockholm for a chemical weapons-free zone in Europe, and the Soviet proposals for a treaty on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

7.21. Secondly, against the positive signs of progress has to be set the refusal of the United

17. United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, FY 1986, page 281.

18. Idem.

19. Julian Perry Robinson in Sussex University ADIU report; September-October 1985.

American chemical weapons: estimates from open sources

Item	Number held	Tons of agent fill
<i>GB nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
105 mm howitzer rounds	900,000	750
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	200,000	850
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs	13,000	1,300
<i>VX nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	300,000	950
2,000 lb aircraft spraytanks	900	630
<i>Mustard gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
4.2 in mortar rounds	470,000	1,400
105 mm howitzer rounds	480,000	700
155 mm howitzer rounds	300,000	1,700
<i>Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsoleted, or for weapons no longer in service</i>		
115 mm rockets	480,000	2,500
Leakers, land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds	320,000	1,400
<i>Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage</i>		
1 ton drums of GB nerve gas	5,700	4,300
1 ton drums of VX nerve gas	2,300	1,800
1 ton drums of mustard gas	14,000	12,600
<i>Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities</i>		
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB	410,000	1,700
500 lb aircraft spraybombs, binary VX	44,000	4,100
227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?)	?	?

Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases, 93.3% is in the United States, 1.4% in West Germany, and 5.3% on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The holdings in Ger-

many constitute some 17% by agent weight of all of the available nerve-gas howitzer ammunition.

States to modify the particular verification article in its 1984 draft treaty that is known publicly to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and privately is known to be unacceptable to those of its allies that have substantial chemical industries.

7.22. The Military Appropriations Bill for FY 1986, approved by the House of Representatives on 30th October 1985, did not authorise the production of chemical (binary) weapons as requested by the administration.

(e) Comprehensive test ban

7.23. For several years the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban to prohibit nuclear weapon tests in all environments, including underground, has been the single most discussed disarmament issue in the United Nations General Assembly. In autumn 1984 three main resolu-

tions were adopted on the subject. The first two, 39/52 and 39/60, were adopted by 123 votes with two against (United Kingdom-United States)²⁰ and 24 abstentions (China, the remaining NATO countries less Greece). Resolution 39/52 reiterated the General Assembly's condemnation of all nuclear tests; called upon the three depositary governments of the partial test-ban treaty (Soviet Union-United Kingdom-United States) to abide by their undertaking to achieve the early discontinuance of all tests, and meanwhile to accept a moratorium; and appealed to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate immediately multilateral negotiations on a treaty to halt all tests. Resolution 39/60 urged the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promp-

20. France was recorded as voting against the first of these two resolutions, but informed the secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

tly to negotiate a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and tests by all states as a matter of the highest priority.

7.24. A third resolution 39/53 adopted by 124 votes to 0 with 24 abstentions (all five nuclear weapon powers; the allies of the Soviet Union) specifically urged the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban at the beginning of the 1985 session; to resume immediately substantive work on a comprehensive test ban with a view to the negotiation of a treaty; to take steps to establish an international seismic monitoring network to monitor nuclear explosions and determine the capabilities of such network; to investigate a possible international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity.

7.25. A nuclear test ban therefore formed the first item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in 1985 as in previous years. But as noted above agreement has not been reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to draft treaty language on a nuclear test ban because the western group of countries on United States insistence was prepared for an ad hoc committee only to discuss verification. China which hitherto had said it would not participate in such an ad hoc committee has reversed its position in 1985.

7.26. An ad hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify some seismic event has been working within the framework of the conference on the possibility of verifying nuclear explosions through an international seismic network, and has continued to work in 1985.

7.27. From 1977 to July 1980 there were tripartite negotiations in Geneva on a comprehensive test ban between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States which in the words of the tripartite report to the conference dated 30th July 1980 "made considerable progress in negotiating the treaty". There have not since been substantive negotiations on drafting a treaty. The threshold test-ban treaty limiting underground nuclear test explosions to 150 KT, and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States on 3rd July 1974 and 28th May 1976 respectively, have remained unratified.

7.28. The attitude of the United States to a comprehensive test ban has been reversed since its participation in the trilateral negotiations mentioned above. In his opening remarks to the non-proliferation review conference which opened in Geneva on 27th August, Mr. Kenneth Adelman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated unequivocally:

"For our part we remain committed to a complete ban on nuclear testing as a long-term goal. But we do not agree it should be the next step in our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. A nuclear test ban would not reduce the number of nuclear weapons ..."

7.29. The United Kingdom, in opposing negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the present time, has advanced different reasons. The British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Richard Luce, addressing the same non-proliferation conference in Geneva on 29th August, referred to a comprehensive test ban in these terms:

"... the verification problems continue to be a major obstacle ... Until solutions to them become available, we believe any resumption of formal negotiations would be premature ... We believe that a comprehensive test ban which allowed any militarily significant cheating by its signatories would not be in the interests of international stability or security. But it remains the British Government's view that a properly verified treaty which met the security interests of all parties would be a significant contribution to containing the proliferation of nuclear arms."

7.30. The United States is known to have a substantial nuclear test programme ahead of it, although reports differ as to whether more tests are required on warheads for the MX and Midgetman missiles which are under development. United States tests continue to be conducted on the Nevada test site in its metropolitan territory, and United Kingdom tests, about one a year, are conducted there also. All these tests have been conducted underground since the conclusion of the partial test-ban treaty in 1963. France, although not a party to that treaty, has also declared that future tests will be underground, and has not conducted atmospheric tests since 1974. Continued French testing in Mururoa in the Pacific has encountered considerable political opposition from South Pacific countries. Although inspectors from one country visiting the test site at French invitation found no evidence of radioactive contamination, spokesmen have claimed that French tests could be conducted on French metropolitan territory, possibly in the Massif Central where suitable geological conditions prevail, if the French authorities believed that there was no risk of contamination.

7.31. There remains little doubt that the main obstacle to negotiation of a comprehensive test ban remains the United States requirement to continue testing. The Soviet Union, immediately after having conducted five nuclear tests of its own, announced a moratorium on further

Soviet tests from 6th August 1985 – the anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb – until 1st January 1986, and thereafter if the United States also suspended testing. The United Kingdom would be unlikely to continue testing if the United States stopped, and indeed would be deprived of its present test site in Nevada. As far as improvement in nuclear weapon design is concerned it is unlikely that United States designs are behind those of the Soviet Union; the question of which country has conducted most tests is complex, and cannot be directly related to the advance of weapon design. From 1945 to the end of 1984 the United States conducted a total of 745 nuclear tests; the Soviet Union 554. Since 1971 however the United States in most years has conducted significantly fewer nuclear explosions than the Soviet Union, the figures being 183 and 305 respectively. However, about one-third of those Soviet explosions have been conducted outside the Soviet weapon-test areas, and are believed to have been for peaceful purposes such as the exploitation of oil-fields. The United States has not recently conducted peaceful nuclear explosions, having completed its earlier ploughshare project in the early 1970s. On this basis the two superpowers would seem to have conducted approximately equal numbers of nuclear weapon-test explosions during the last fifteen years²¹.

7.32. President Reagan on 6th July 1985 elaborating on a proposal he had made in the United Nations General Assembly on 24th December 1984, invited the Soviet Union to send observers with technical measuring equipment to the United States Nevada test site, to monitor United States test explosions. It is a feature of the technical argument concerning the ability to monitor nuclear test explosions by distant seismic networks that initial calibration tests are desirable in order to establish at points close to the test site the relationship between the yield of nuclear weapon tests in the geological strata concerned, and the magnitude of the seismic waves produced. Regrettably the Soviet Union has declined this invitation. In conversation with journalists on 5th August, President Reagan also appeared to offer from an unspecified date a moratorium on United States nuclear testing once tests scheduled for the MX and Midgetman missiles had been completed, but this interpretation of an impromptu suggestion was subsequently denied by official spokesmen.

7.33. Certainly the technical claim by the United Kingdom that existing seismological verification efforts might not detect even substantial nuclear explosions no longer appears

21. Data concerning numbers of nuclear explosions quoted in this paragraph are drawn from the SIPRI Yearbook 1985, Chapter 2, and from the paper on nuclear explosions, CD/430, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by the Swedish Delegation on 7th February 1984.

very credible in the light of expert evidence from other countries. Even the United Kingdom appears to have reduced its technical claims in this connection. A technical paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by that country in 1984 claimed that by decoupling (exploding a nuclear device in a large underground cavern) an explosion as large as 300 kilotons might go undetected by seismic means. The more comprehensive paper submitted by the United Kingdom in 1985²² does not repeat that claim, saying only:

“The size of cavity required to achieve full decoupling increases with the yield of the explosion and there is debate about the maximum size of cavity which would remain sufficiently stable for a decoupled test. It is therefore not possible to estimate precisely how large an explosion could be effectively decoupled but the decoupling of several tens of kilotons cannot be ruled out.”

That is a significant reduction on the 300-kiloton claim of 1984. Other experts have estimated that in order to decouple an explosion of only eight kilotons a cavern the size of the great pyramid would be required at a depth of two kilometres. That would be equivalent in volume to a spherical cavity 170 metres in diameter.

7.34. Other allied governments in the Conference on Disarmament have not supported the position taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in their approach to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The representative of the Netherlands for example speaking on 13th August 1985 said: “The early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a major objective of the Netherlands Government. We regret that for the second year in a row it has been impossible to resume our work” – a clear reference to the failure to establish an ad hoc committee with a mandate to negotiate a treaty. The representative continued with a number of constructive proposals including suggestions for the provision of regional seismic networks within the territory of nuclear weapon powers, to supplement a worldwide international network with which the ad hoc group of scientific experts had been experimenting. He recalled that such arrangements had been discussed in the trilateral negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in 1980. He quoted the report from the United States Lawrence Livermore laboratory in May 1983 to the effect “that a network that includes fifteen high-quality array stations in the Soviet Union ... would have a 90% degree of confidence of detecting decoupled explosions with yields as small as 3 to 10 kilotons.”

22. CD/610, 9th July 1985.

7.35. Dr. David Owen, a former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, speaking in Geneva at the time of the opening of the non-proliferation treaty review conference at the end of August 1985 was particularly scathing of the technical argument that tests would be undetectable. He claimed that governments "bend the scientific evidence to fit the political judgments of leaders who are not prepared to state openly their true wish, namely to continue to test"²³. Dr. Owen in an earlier article²⁴ proposed that three calibration tests should be carried out on United States and Soviet test sites in the presence of observers with technical equipment from the other party, and that thereafter there should be a three-year moratorium on all other nuclear tests by the two superpowers while a comprehensive test ban was being negotiated.

7.36. The committee notes that, with the exception of two or three of the nuclear weapon powers, world opinion is now almost unanimous in believing that negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty should begin forthwith. On 12th September 1985 the European Parliament adopted by 128 votes to 18, with 13 abstentions, Resolution B2-845/85 on the importance of the non-proliferation treaty review conference whereby the parliament:

- " (i) considers it necessary that talks on a comprehensive test ban treaty should begin as soon as possible;
- (ii) calls urgently on all the countries that possess nuclear weapons to embark forthwith upon consultation to this end;
- (iii) welcomes the United States Senate's vote in summer 1984 calling on President Reagan to resume negotiations for a CTBT;
- (iv) supports the forthcoming House of Representatives' amendment to the defence bill to cut off funding for explosive nuclear testing, subject to a reciprocal halt by the Soviet Union;
- (v) welcomes the Soviets putting on record their willingness to be involved in a testing moratorium starting this Hiroshima day, August 6th;
- (vi) calls in particular on the two member states that possess nuclear weapons to lead the way in submitting proposals to the other nuclear states ... "

At the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty review conference referred to in the next section the final declaration adopted by consensus

23. Observer, 1st September 1985.

24. Sussex University ADIU report, March-April 1985.

without objection contained three paragraphs (on which the United States reserved its position) calling in the strongest terms for a test ban and concluding:

" The conference deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all states in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon states party to the treaty (i.e. non-proliferation treaty) to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear weapon states to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament. "

7.37. On 24th October, the Prime Ministers of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania addressed a proposal to the United States and the Soviet Union calling for a twelve-month moratorium on all nuclear weapon tests, and offering to contribute to adequate verification through the installation of seismic detection systems on their own territories.

(f) Space

7.38. The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space left the United States more isolated than on any other disarmament issue at the United Nations General Assembly debate in autumn 1984. Resolution 39/59 was adopted on 12th December 1984 with no votes against and only one abstention - that of the United States.

7.39. The resolution reiterated that the Conference on Disarmament was the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum with a primary rôle of negotiating an agreement or agreements "on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space" and requested the conference to establish an ad hoc committee "with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement ...". As noted above, because of western objections, the terms of reference of the ad hoc committee established by the conference instructed it merely to "examine ... issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space", which the non-aligned and socialist countries finally accepted in the absence of consensus on a mandate for the ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty.

7.40. Speaking in the ad hoc committee on 5th August 1985 the French representative stressed the close relationship between anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Recognising the importance of the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were

dealing with some aspects of space weapons, he called for a distinction to be made between topics properly the subject of the bilateral negotiations, and those which should be discussed multilaterally in the Conference on Disarmament. Stressing the importance of preserving the existing ABM treaty he repeated a French proposal of 1984 for the negotiation of a ban on high-altitude ASAT systems, the development of which would be verifiable because such systems had not yet been tested by any country.

7.41. In the Conference on Disarmament on 20th March 1984, the Soviet Union tabled a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space, and from space, against the earth which would ban the placing of weapons in orbit or on celestial bodies designed to destroy objects on earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space. The treaty would also prohibit any interference with space objects belonging to other states, and would prohibit the testing, production or possession of any anti-satellite systems. It would also prohibit the use of manned spacecraft for any military purpose. The draft treaty makes no reference to anti-ballistic missile systems as such, or to directed-energy systems.

7.42. The committee deals in another report with the SDI and the aspects of the bilateral negotiations which concern it.

(g) Radiological weapons

7.43. Radiological weapons are hypothetical weapons which would consist of highly radioactive material and a bursting charge of conventional explosive; they would be designed to produce extensive radioactive contamination of the ground on bursting. There is some doubt as to whether such weapons could be constructed in practice, because they would be highly radioactive even before firing, which might make it impossible to handle them.

7.44. In 1979 the United States and the Soviet Union nevertheless tabled an "agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons". They no doubt saw it as a cosmetic device on which it would be easy to reach agreement, designed partly to offset criticism by non-aligned countries about lack of progress on disarmament by the superpowers.

7.45. In 1984 the Conference on Disarmament established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty and has re-established the committee in 1985. Sweden and some non-aligned countries, fundamentally critical of the superpowers' attempt at a purely cosmetic exercise, have introduced another theme into the discussion - suggesting that a treaty should also ban conventional attacks on civilian nuclear installa-

tions, on the grounds that such attacks could release radioactive contamination creating the same effect as that which the hypothetical radiological weapons are purported to produce. The debate has been largely bogged down since with arguments about whether such a prohibition should be included in the same or a separate convention, and how such civilian nuclear installations should be defined. The ad hoc committee established two working subgroups on the two issues. To its report on 22nd August 1985 it attached a compilation of draft provisions of a treaty, prepared by the Chairman, and will continue its work in 1986.

(h) Other topics

7.46. The remaining topics on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament may appear less realistic to western allied countries; nevertheless several are important to delegations of other countries represented in the conference or the United Nations General Assembly, particularly to those of certain non-aligned countries.

7.47. Four resolutions on the *prevention of nuclear war* or assurances for non-nuclear states against nuclear weapons and similar topics were adopted at the 1984 United Nations General Assembly session, the western allies voted against three. A proposal to set up an ad hoc committee in the conference on the prevention of nuclear war was opposed chiefly by the United States. Although an ad hoc committee on assurances for non-nuclear weapon countries was set up at the 1984 session it was not reconstituted in 1985.

7.48. Instead an ad hoc committee on a *comprehensive programme of disarmament* was established in 1985. Among the proposals of the second special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly was one for such a programme to be drawn up by 1986. It is a variant of proposals for general and complete disarmament discussed in the United Nations framework for more than 30 years.

7.49. The topic *cessation of the nuclear arms race* has been discussed in the conference in conjunction with a nuclear test ban, and assumes importance in the context of Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, and the review conference on that treaty discussed in the next chapter.

VIII. Non-proliferation treaty review conference

8.1. A conference of all parties to the non-proliferation treaty to review its application convenes every five years; such a conference met in Geneva from 27th August to 21st September 1985 - fifteen years after the treaty entered into force.

Summary of provisions

8.2. The non-proliferation treaty is to some extent unique as a treaty in classifying parties under the two heads, nuclear weapon parties, and non-nuclear weapon parties; the former are defined as states who manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 1967 – a definition which embraces the five present nuclear weapon powers, although France and China have not acceded to the treaty. Under Article I, nuclear weapon states undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other state, and not to provide assistance in the construction of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon states. Under Article II non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons. Under Article III non-nuclear weapon states undertake to accept safeguards on civilian nuclear installations through a safeguards agreement negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and all states undertake not to provide nuclear material or equipment unless subject to the safeguards provided for in the article.

8.3. It is recalled however that the treaty embodies a number of other significant obligations. Article IV provides for the right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to be assisted by other parties in so doing. Article V provides that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be made available to non-nuclear weapon states – although no circumstances have arisen under which this article has been applied. Most importantly under Article VI each party undertakes “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.

8.4. While the review conference was able to note that Articles I and II had been applied, the greater part of the debate turned on Article VI, and the failure of the nuclear weapon powers in particular to make detectable progress on negotiations to limit nuclear weapons. The overwhelming consensus of the conference was to call for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, referred to above.

Parties

8.5. The number of parties to the treaty has risen from 115 at the last review conference in 1980 to 130 in 1985. Apart from the nuclear weapon powers, China and France, there remain significant non-parties to the treaty including in particular India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Spain. From the beginning of 1986 Spain will be in an anomalous position as the only member

of the European Community apart from France which is not a party to the non-proliferation treaty. This will affect the way in which safeguards are applied to nuclear installations in Spain. France has declared that it will behave in the same way as parties to the treaty.

8.6. The report of the IAEA to the review conference states that at the end of 1984 safeguards agreements under Article III of the treaty were in force with 78 of the 121 non-nuclear weapon powers – these covered the great bulk of significant nuclear installations concerned. Safeguards have also been accepted with respect to civilian nuclear installations, in different ways, by the nuclear weapon powers, France, United Kingdom, the United States and, with effect from 10th June 1985, the Soviet Union. China, after the conclusion of the review conference, surprised the IAEA annual congress in Vienna on 24th September by announcing that it also would place “some of its civilian nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards”.

The non-proliferation régime

8.7. The position of the significant parties listed above continues to cause anxiety. India in particular conducted a nuclear explosion which it claimed to be peaceful in 1974. Such an explosion would have been prohibited by the treaty had India been a party to it which refers throughout to “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”, it having been argued throughout the negotiation of the treaty that no meaningful distinction could be made between the two. India has consistently refused to accept safeguards on much of its nuclear activities. There are consistent reports of the preparation of fissionable material for nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Although Libya is a party to the NPT, and its nuclear installations safeguarded by the IAEA, there are further reports of Libyan assistance to Pakistan for the manufacture of an “Islamic bomb”. Speaking in New York on 21st October, President Zia of Pakistan reiterated an earlier pledge to accede to the non-proliferation treaty and accept international safeguards if India did the same; he denied that Pakistan was about to conduct a nuclear test, and said that the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta was “a very modest research programme” to make the country self-sufficient for its energy requirements; he denied that Pakistan had built a plutonium reprocessing plant²⁵. Other reports in the past have referred to the capability of the production of, or even possible possession of, nuclear weapons by Israel and South Africa. Nevertheless the non-proliferation régime has been strengthened in the interval between the two review conferences. Egypt in particular acceded to the treaty in 1982.

25. International Herald Tribune, 22nd October 1985.

8.8. As an authoritative and thoughtful report²⁶ the non-proliferation régime is a broader concept than mere accession to the non-proliferation treaty. There are still relatively few countries in a position to supply significant assistance to a civilian nuclear industry; their export policy is a significant factor in the non-proliferation régime, because civilian nuclear installations, if they comprise nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, or uranium enrichment facilities, can be misapplied to the production of nuclear weapons. A second support for the non-proliferation régime comes from the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones by states in certain areas of the world. The Tlatelolco treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed on 14th February 1967 and entered into force on 22nd April 1968. There are 23 parties to the treaty. The South Pacific nuclear-free zone treaty has just been signed on 6th August 1985 at Rarotonga, in the Cook Islands, by eight members of the South Pacific forum – Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, New Zealand, Niue, Tuvalu and Western Samoa.

8.9. Significant backup to IAEA safeguards has been the adoption by the nuclear suppliers group, originally known as the London Club, of guidelines for nuclear transfers, originally negotiated from 1975 to 1977 by seven significant suppliers of nuclear facilities: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States. These founder countries were joined in 1978 by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. The guidelines for nuclear transfers agreed on 21st September 1977 have formed an important basis for regulating international supplies of nuclear materials and installations. Since January 1978 seven more countries have informed the IAEA that they would apply the guidelines: Australia, Finland, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and Bulgaria, and South Africa announced unilaterally in 1984 that it would follow the guidelines in its export policy.

8.10. Consideration was given to updating the guidelines at a meeting of western members of the original London Club held in Luxembourg in February 1985, and from which, apparently at United States instigation, the Eastern European

members, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union, were excluded. The latter thereupon organised their own meeting in Bratislava on 14th and 15th February and issued their own communiqué calling for a further strengthening of the international non-proliferation régime. It is now understood however that a broader meeting of all parties to the original London agreement is being arranged in Vienna on the initiative of the United Kingdom in November 1985. Despite the relative success of the London agreements international competition in the supply of nuclear facilities leaves some weaknesses in the non-proliferation régime. Not all WEU countries have insisted on the full application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear material and facilities on the territory of recipient states.

Proceedings of the review conference

8.11. Compared with the 1980 review conference, the one just concluded was conducted in a constructive atmosphere despite the sustained criticism of the nuclear weapon powers for their failure to make progress on nuclear disarmament under the terms of Article VI of the non-proliferation treaty. There was general support for the non-proliferation treaty, but of course the principal critics of the treaty such as India excluded themselves as they are not parties.

8.12. In the final declaration adopted by consensus on 21st September 1985 the parties solemnly declared "their conviction that the treaty is essential to international peace and security; their continued support for the objectives of the treaty ...". Among other points made in the recommendation are a concern about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel and a call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of nuclear facilities or resources to those countries. In supporting the non-proliferation régime the declaration urged non-nuclear weapon states not parties to the treaty to undertake a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards, and urged exporting states to take effective steps towards achieving such a commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of safeguards. It expressed the view that accession to the non-proliferation treaty was the best way to achieve that objective, without however making it a precondition.

26. New approaches to non-proliferation: a European approach, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, April 1985.

APPENDIX I

*Countries participating in arms control
and disarmament negotiations by bloc*

Country	Stockholm CDE	Geneva CD	Vienna MBFR ¹	Number of involvements
Western group				
<i>NATO nations</i>				
Belgium	X	X	X	3
Canada	X	X	X	3
Denmark	X		I	2
France	X	X		2
Federal Republic of Germany	X	X	X	3
Greece	X		I	2
Iceland	X			1
Italy	X	X	I	3
Luxembourg	X		X	2
Netherlands	X	X	X	3
Norway	X		I	2
Portugal	X			1
Spain	X			1
Turkey	X		I	2
United Kingdom	X	X	X	3
United States	X	X	X	3
<i>Other western allies</i>				
Australia		X		1
Japan		X		1
Socialist group				
<i>Warsaw Pact</i>				
Bulgaria	X	X	I	3
Czechoslovakia	X	X	X	3
DDR (East Germany)	X	X	X	3
Hungary	X	X	U	3
Poland	X	X	X	3
Romania ²	X	X	I	3
USSR	X	X	X	3
<i>Other Warsaw Pact ally</i>				
Mongolia		X		1
Neutral and non-aligned				
Austria	X			1
Cyprus	X			1
Sweden	X	X		2
Yugoslavia	X	X		2
Finland	X			1
Liechtenstein	X			1
Malta	X			1
San Marino	X			1
Switzerland	X			1
Algeria		X		1
Argentina		X		1
Burma		X		1
Brazil		X		1
Cuba ³		X		1
Egypt		X		1
Ethiopia ³		X		1
India		X		1

Country	Stockholm CDE	Geneva CD	Vienna MBFR ¹	Number of involvements
Indonesia		X		1
Kenya		X		1
Morocco		X		1
Mexico		X		1
Nigeria		X		1
Pakistan		X		1
Peru		X		1
Iran		X		1
Sri Lanka		X		1
Venezuela		X		1
Zaire		X		1
<i>Members of no group</i>				
China		X		1
Ireland	X			1
Monaco	X			1
Vatican	X			1
Total: 58	35	40	19	

1. Note on MBFR participants: I = indirect participant; U = the status of Hungary has not been determined.
2. In the Conference on Disarmament, Romania also attends meetings of the NNA.
3. In the Conference on Disarmament, Cuba and Ethiopia also attend meetings of the socialist group.

APPENDIX II

***Document on confidence-building measures
and certain aspects of security and disarmament
from the final act of the conference on security
and co-operation in Europe, Helsinki***

1st August 1975

The participating states,

Desirous of eliminating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus of contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in the world;

Determined to strengthen confidence among them and thus to contribute to increasing stability and security in Europe;

Determined further to refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the declaration on principles guiding relations between participating states as adopted in this final act;

Recognising the need to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating states lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities;

Taking into account consideration relevant to efforts aimed at lessening tension and promoting disarmament;

Recognising that the exchange of observers by invitation at military manoeuvres will help to promote contacts and mutual understanding;

Having studied the question of prior notification of major military movements in the context of confidence-building;

Recognising that there are other ways in which individual states can contribute further to their common objectives;

Convinced of the political importance of prior notification of major military manoeuvres for the promotion of mutual understanding and the strengthening of confidence, stability and security;

Accepting the responsibility of each of them to promote these objectives and to implement this measure, in accordance with the accepted criteria and modalities, as essentials for the realisation of these objectives;

Recognising that this measure deriving from political decision rests upon a voluntary basis;

Have adopted the following:

I

Prior notification of major military manoeuvres

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating states through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and airspace.

In the case of a participating state whose territory extends beyond Europe, prior notification need be given only of manoeuvres which take place in an area within 250 kilometres from its frontier facing or shared with any other European participating state, the participating state need not, however, give notification in cases in which that area is also contiguous to the participating state's frontier facing or shared with a non-European non-participating state.

Notification will be given twenty-one days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and

the states involved in the manœuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating states will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces.

Prior notification of other military manœuvres

The participating states recognise that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale military manœuvres to other participating states, with special regard for those near the area of such manœuvres.

To the same end, the participating states also recognise that they may notify other military manœuvres conducted by them.

Exchange of observers

The participating states will invite other participating states, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and good will towards all participating states, to send observers to attend military manœuvres.

The inviting state will determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of their participation, and give other information which it may consider useful. It will provide appropriate facilities and hospitality.

The invitation will be given as far ahead as is conveniently possible through usual diplomatic channels.

Prior notification of major military manœuvres

In accordance with the final recommendations of the Helsinki consultations the participating states studied the question of prior notification of major military movements as a measure to strengthen confidence.

Accordingly, the participating states recognise that they may, at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence-building, notify their major military movements.

In the same spirit, further consideration will be given by the states participating in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to the question of prior notification of major military movements, bearing in mind, in particular, the experience gained by the implementation of the measures which are set forth in this document.

Other confidence-building measures

The participating states recognise that there are other means by which their common objectives can be promoted.

In particular, they will, with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations.

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* *

In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective of confidence-building, the participating states, when conducting their military activities in the area covered by the provisions for the prior notification of major military manœuvres, will duly take into account and respect this objective.

They also recognise that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions set forth above, together with further efforts, could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence.

II

Questions relating to disarmament

The participating states recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world.

III

General considerations

Having considered the views expressed on various subjects related to the strengthening of security in Europe through joint efforts aimed at promoting détente and disarmament, the participating states, when engaged in such efforts, will, in this context, proceed, in particular, from the following essential considerations:

- the complementary nature of the political and military aspects of security;
- the interrelation between the security of each participating state and security in Europe as a whole and the relationship

- which exists, in the broader context of world security, between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean area;
- respect for the security interests of all states participating in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe inherent in their sovereign equality;
 - the importance that participants in negotiating forums see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other states participating in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and, in return, the justified interest of any of those states in having their views considered.

APPENDIX III

***Mandate approved in Madrid on 6th September 1983
for the conference on confidence- and security-building
measures and disarmament in Europe***

The participating states,

Recalling the provisions of the final act according to which they recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Have agreed to convene a conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

The aim of the conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the states signatories of the final act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective, and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

Thus the conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

The first stage of the conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17th January 1984.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating states, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area¹ and airspace. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area¹ and airspace is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating states taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within

1. In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.

the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the conference.

Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the final act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the final act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the conference.

Taking into account the abovementioned aim of the conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating states of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4th November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the conference.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the final act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating states to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, timetable and other organisational modalities for the first stage of the conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25th October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

(Madrid, 6th September 1983)

APPENDIX IV

*Implementation of confidence-building measures**1. Notification of military manœuvres under the CSCE régime by NATO countries*

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manœuvre	Size of manœuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
September	FRG	Grosse Rochade	68 000	23	-
October	USA	Certain Trek	57 000	34	Yes
Oct/Nov	USA	Reforger 75	53 000	21	-
September	Turkey	Deep Express	18 000	21	-
October	Norway	Batten Bolt	8 000	24	-
Oct/Nov	Netherlands	Pantersprong	10 000	14	-
<i>1976</i>					
September	FRG	Grosser Bär	50 000	21	Yes
September	USA	Gordian Shield	30 000	21	-
September	USA	Lares Team	44 000	21	Yes
Feb/Mar	Norway	Atlas Express	17 000	21	-
September	Norway	Teamwork	13 500	21	Yes
October	Denmark/FRG	Bonded Item	11 000	21	-
November	Britain	Spearpoint	18 000	23	Yes
<i>1977</i>					
September	USA	Cardon Edge	58 700	21	Yes
September	FRG	Standhafte Schatten	38 000	21	Yes
May	USA	Certain Fighter	24 000	23	-
September	Denmark	Arrow Express	16 000	21	Yes
September	Belgium	Blue Fox	24 500	21	-
Sep/Oct	Netherlands	Interaction	12 000	21	Yes
October	Turkey	Tayfun 77	15 000	30	Yes
<i>1978</i>					
September	FRG	Blaue Donau	46 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Shield	56 000	24	Yes
September	Netherlands	Saxon Drive	32 500	24	Yes
September	FRG	Bold Guard	65 000	24	-
March	Norway	Arctic Express	15 300	30	Yes
September	Norway	Black Bear	8 200	30	-
<i>1979</i>					
Jan/Feb	USA	Certain Sentinal	66 000	25	Yes
September	USA	Constant Enforcer	29 000	21	Yes
September	FRG	Harte Faust	60 000	21	Yes
March	Norway	Cold Winter 79	10 000	30	-
Sep/Oct	Turkey	Display Determination 79	18 000	32	-
October	France	Saone 79	16 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Keystone	18 000	21	-
<i>1980</i>					
September	FRG	St. Georg	44 000	24	Yes
September	USA	Certain Rampart	40 000	21	Yes
September	Britain	Spearpoint	90 000	24	Yes

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
March	Norway	Anorak Express 80	18 200	31	-
September	Norway	Teamwork 80	16 800	28	Yes
October	France	Marne 80	17 000	10	-
<i>1981</i>					
September	USA/FRG	Certain Encounter	45 600	24	Yes
September	FRG	Scharfe Klinge	48 000	21	Yes
October	Britain	Red Claymore	23 000	21	-
March	Norway	Cold Winter	11 000	21	-
September	Norway	Barfrost	9 000	21	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark	Amber Express	15 000	21	Yes
October	Belgium/FRG	Cross Fire	21 000	21	-
October	France	Farfadet	4 000*	14	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Norway	Alloy Express	14 200	30	-
Sep/Oct	Denmark/FRG	Bold Guard 82	47 200	24	Yes
September	USA/FRG	Carbine Fortress 82	73 000	24	Yes
September	FRG	Starke Wehr	35 000	21	Yes
September	France	Langres 82	17 000	4	-
<i>1983</i>					
	Norway	Cold Winter 83	10 000		-
	USA/FRG	Confident Express	> 25 000		Yes
	FRG	Wehrhafte Loewen	> 25 000		Yes
September	FRG/Neth.	Atlantic Lion	> 25 000		Yes
	Britain	Eternal Triangle	> 25 000		-
September	Denmark	Ample Express	> 25 000		-
	France	Moselle 83			-
<i>1984</i>					
<i>A. Major manoeuvres</i>					
March	Norway	Avalanche Express	25 000	29	Yes
September	Britain FRG	Lion Heart 84 (Full Flow)	132 000	24	Yes
		<i>plus</i>			
		Spear Point 84			
September	FRG	Flinker Igel	55 000	22	Yes
September	USA/FRG	Certain Fury	50 000	21	Yes
<i>B. Smaller-scale manoeuvres</i>					
September	France	Doubs 84	20 000	32	Yes
September	Denmark	Bold Gannet 84	21 000	22	No

* To Mediterranean CSCE countries only.

2. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by Warsaw Pact countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
1975					
None					
1976					
Jan/Feb	USSR	Kavkaz	25 000	21	Yes
June	USSR	Sever	25 000	21	Yes
April	Hungary	-	10 000	1	-
October	Hungary	-	15 000	0	-
September	Poland	Tarcza 76	35 000	21	Yes
1977					
Mar/Apr	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Karpatia	27 000	21	Yes
1978					
February	USSR	Berezhina	25 000	21	Yes
July	USSR	Tarcza 78	30 000	21	-
September	USSR	Kavkaz II	25 000	21	-
1979					
February	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba	26 000	21	-
April	USSR	-	25 000	21	-
July	USSR	Neman	25 000	21	Yes
mid-May	Hungary	Shield 79	25 000	*	Yes
1980					
July	USSR	-	30 000	21	-
September	GDR	Brotherhood in Arms	40 000	21	-
August	Hungary	Dyna 80	18 000	1	-
1981					
September	USSR	Zapad 81	100 000**	21	Yes***
1982					
January	USSR/CSSR	Druzhba 82	25 000	21	-
September	Bulgaria	Shield 82	60 000	21	-
1983					
January	Hungary	Danube 83	over 20 000	few days	-
June	Hungary	Kunsag 83	14 000	6	-
July	USSR		50 000	21	-
July	USSR		26 000	21	-
September	USSR		23 000	21	Yes
1984					
A. Major manoeuvres					
June/July	USSR	-	60 000	22	No
September	CSSR	Shield 84	60 000	21	No

* Verbal notifications on 3rd May 1979.

** According to TASS on 5th September 1981.

*** Only from Warsaw Pact countries.

3. Notification of military manoeuvres under the CSCE régime by neutral and non-aligned countries

Date	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre (no. of men)	Notification given (no. of days)	Observers invited
<i>1975</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	-	18 000	25	-
November	Switzerland	-	40 000	31	-
<i>1976</i>					
October	Yugoslavia	Golilja	24 000	24	Yes
November	Sweden	Poseidon	12 000	30	-
<i>1977</i>					
March	Sweden	Vönn 77	10 000	21	Yes
October	Spain	Podenco	8 000	53	Yes
November	Austria	Herbstübung	12 000	37	-
<i>1978</i>					
November	Austria	(Command Post Exercise)	5 000	20	-
<i>1979</i>					
March	Switzerland	Nussknacker	34 000	28	Yes
October	Switzerland	Forte	27 000	33	Yes
November	Austria	Area Defence Exercise 79	27 500	45	Yes
<i>1980</i>					
None					
<i>1981</i>					
Oct/Nov	Spain	Crisex 81	32 200	25	Yes
October	Switzerland	Cresta	25 000	33	-
<i>1982</i>					
March	Sweden	Norrskén	23 000	30	Yes
September	Sweden	Sydfront	25 000	30	-
<i>1983</i>					
<i>B. Smaller-scale manoeuvres</i>					
September	Yugoslavia	Unity 83	22 000	35	Yes
Sept/Oct	Sweden	Ostkust	20 000	31	No
<i>1984</i>					
			None		

APPENDIX V

Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons (covered by SALT II), July 1985

Type	United States				Soviet Union				
	Maximum range (km)	No. of warheads each	No. of missiles or aircraft	Total warheads	Total warheads	No. of missiles or aircraft	No. of warheads each	Maximum range (km)	Type
<i>ICBMs</i>									<i>ICBMs</i>
Titan II	15,000	1	26	26	520	520	1 or 3	9,600-13,000	SS-11
Minuteman II	11,300	1	450 ¹	450	60	60	1	10,000	SS-13
Minuteman III	13,000	3	550	1,650	600	150	4	10,000	SS-17
					3,080	308	10	16,700	SS-18
					2,160	360	6	10,000	SS-19
					?	?	1	8,500?	SS-25
Sub-total			1,026	2,126	6,420	1,398			Sub-total
<i>SLBMs</i>									<i>SLBMs</i>
Poseidon C3	4,600	10-14	304	3,040	39	39	1	1,400	SS-N5
Trident C4	7,400	8	312	2,496	336	336	1-2	3,000	SS-N6
					292	292	1	7,800	SS-N8
								9,100	
					12	12	1	3,900	SS-N17
					1,568	224	1-7	6,500-	SS-N18
								8,000	
					540	60	9	8,300	SS-N20
					?	16	?	?	SS-N23
Sub-total			616	5,536	2,787	979			Sub-total
Total BM			1,642	7,662	9,207	2,377			Total BM
<i>Aircraft</i>									<i>Aircraft</i>
B52G	12,000	12 ALCM + 8	151 ²	2,520	500	125	2-4	12,800	Bear Tu-95
B52H	16,000	8	90		180	45	4	11,200	Bison Mya-4
Sub-total			141	2,520	680	170			Sub-total
Total				10,182	9,987				Total

Source: IISS Military Balance 1985-86.

1. Including 8 Minuteman for communications purposes.
2. Including 61 in non-nuclear rôle armed with Harpoon.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 417 to 424

RECOMMENDATION 417 ¹

*on East-West relations
ten years after the Helsinki final act ²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that close co-operation between the American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance is the basis of Western European security and the maintenance of peace;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's security means protecting it against local or global attacks;
- (iii) Considering that in many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that this has not facilitated efforts for peace;
- (iv) Welcoming the meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching agreements to terminate the armaments race;
- (v) Considering that the development of exchanges between East and West is likely to contribute to the reduction of tension;
- (vi) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, is the essential charter for the reduction of tension in Europe, but that the principles it defines are still far from being applied everywhere, particularly where human rights are concerned;
- (vii) Considering that the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act provides an opportunity to review its effectiveness as a contribution to peaceful coexistence in Europe;
- (viii) Considering that WEU's rôle is to take the necessary steps to make the voice of the European pillar of the alliance heard on matters relating to security, as specified in the Rome Declaration;
- (ix) Considering that WEU's action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particular the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;
- (x) Considering that a dialogue with members of the United States Congress is essential for the information and deliberations of members of the WEU Assembly on matters of this kind,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Regularly examine the state of all negotiations on disarmament and the limitation of armaments with a view *inter alia* to achieving through joint action:
 - (a) agreement with the eastern countries to specify the implications of the principles set out in the final act of the Helsinki conference;
 - (b) more confidence-building measures, particularly through the presence of observers at military manoeuvres, in the context of the negotiations now being held in Stockholm;
 - (c) the definition of a joint position on matters discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva conference with a view to agreement on the conditions for limiting the armaments race;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Haase on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1013).

2. Make use of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference to obtain confirmation by all the signatory powers of their determination to apply effectively all the principles contained in the final act, particularly those relating to:

- (a) respect for human rights;
- (b) the inviolability of frontiers;
- (c) the territorial integrity of states;
- (d) non-interference in the internal affairs of another state with immediate application to Afghanistan;
- (e) equality of treatment between nations and their right to self-determination;
- (f) co-operation between states;
- (g) the establishment of confidence-building measures;

3. In the appropriate forums, actively promote:

- (a) the development of trade between eastern and western countries;
- (b) the adaptation of Cocom practice and lists to an increase in trade which does not jeopardise the West's security;
- (c) in agreement with the United States, the participation of Europe in space research of a scientific nature;
- (d) agreement between Western and Eastern European countries on improving protection of the environment;

4. On the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact, seek agreement between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other in order to define the principle of non-recourse to the threat or use of force as set out in the Helsinki final act, while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and bearing in mind that any reaffirmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 417

The Council notes with interest the Assembly's recommendations concerning East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act.

1. The countries of WEU attach great importance to the full implementation by all the participating states in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe of all the principles and provisions laid down in the final act.

They deplore the delays and breaches on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries in fulfilling the solemn intentions and commitments expressed in Helsinki ten years ago, such as those concerned with the seventh principle of the final act – the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces for more than five years is a flagrant violation of several fundamental principles enunciated in the final act.

The unhelpful attitude of the countries of the Warsaw Pact towards the comprehensive package of concrete confidence-building and security measures presented to the Stockholm conference by the member countries of WEU and their allies in the Atlantic Alliance, has so far hindered the progress of negotiations leading to an agreement satisfactory to all the thirty-five participants.

These examples demonstrate that the provisions of the final act are far from being fully implemented, but this is clearly not a reason to reject the process as being inappropriate to the aims being pursued. The member governments of WEU had this concern in mind on the occasion of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the final act.

2. The Council emphasises that the development of the CSCE process must be balanced. Compliance with the provisions of the final act as a whole is vital to the achievement of lasting peace, security, justice and well-being in Europe. It is not possible to isolate one aspect or one principle and to ignore the others. Real progress in the field of human rights, as in other fields, must be made to enable the CSCE process to make a genuine contribution to the improvement of East-West relations. In this connection, the Council regrets the outcome of the recent meeting of human rights experts in Ottawa which highlighted the gap that continues to exist between commitments freely entered into by participating states and concrete results at the individual level.

3. As to the Stockholm conference, which is an integral part of the CSCE process, the member states of WEU are in favour of an agreement on concrete confidence-building and security measures.

These measures, covering the whole of Europe, must be militarily significant, politically binding and properly verifiable. They will thus be able to give new and concrete effect and expression to the existing duty of all the participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force.

The member countries of WEU have actively co-operated within the Atlantic Alliance in drawing up a coherent set of concrete confidence-building and security measures.

These measures, which would lead to greater mutual transparency, contain specific commitments relating in particular to the exchange of military information, the prior notification of military manoeuvres, the invitation to send observers and verification measures.

In this context, the Council draws attention to the undertaking by the member countries of WEU and their allies in the Atlantic Alliance never to use their weapons except in response to attack.

4. With regard to the Geneva arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, the member states of WEU are kept informed by the American allies within the framework of the North Atlantic Council and bilaterally and, for those states concerned, within the special consultative group set up to formulate positions on INF.

With regard to the United States strategic defence initiative, the Council of WEU is continuing its collective consideration in order to achieve, as far as possible, a co-ordinated reaction to the United States invitation to participate in the research programme.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1985.

In the context of the revitalisation of WEU, it is clear that the Seven intend to pay special attention to examining the abovementioned questions concerning the security interests of the European countries.

5. Member countries of WEU act both bilaterally and within the appropriate forums to promote the development of trade between the countries of the East and of the West and also to promote co-operation in the field of environmental protection.

Furthermore, they have always demonstrated their concern to develop trade with the countries of the East in a way which does not jeopardise their own security.

As regards co-operation in the field of environmental protection, the Council notes with satisfaction the results of the conference of environment ministers which took place in Munich from 24th-27th June 1984 under the aegis of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.

RECOMMENDATION 418¹
on Cyprus and European security²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- (ii) Considering that the association of the Republic of Cyprus with the European Community, its participation in the Council of Europe and that of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Alliance give the member countries of WEU the right and duty to do their utmost to promote the establishment of lasting peace on the island;
- (iii) Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the restoration of peace in Cyprus;
- (iv) Welcoming the decision taken by the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Express its support for the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and use all the influence it may have with the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities to promote the conclusion of a final agreement on this basis.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1008).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 418***

The governments of the member states of WEU share the concerns of the Assembly in this matter.

The member governments have for some time been acting within appropriate international fora, with the aim of contributing to an eventual agreement for the reconciliation of the differences between the parties to the dispute.

The member governments very much hope that a fair and permanent solution may be found through the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The member governments wish to confirm their full support for the current initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General whose efforts they have encouraged in this matter from the beginning.

Recently the problem was studied within the framework of European political co-operation and the Ten once again launched an appeal to the parties concerned in the hope that they would co-operate with the Secretary-General's initiative and that they would avoid any action which might hinder progress.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th October 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 419 ¹

***on the military use of computers –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the preponderant importance of computers for the defence of the western world, whether they are incorporated in weapons systems or used for command, control, communications and intelligence;
- (ii) Considering the importance of military computers which have been prime movers for the development of civil computer industries for the last twenty years;
- (iii) Considering also that, since the failure of Unidata – Philips, Siemens and CII – Western Europe has had no common co-ordinated policy and is only now starting the Esprit programme which covers no military use;
- (iv) Considering the United States and Japanese challenge in the world computer market and Western Europe's backwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a common European policy and, on the other hand, co-operative action with American and eventually Japanese firms;
- (v) Considering the extremely fast development of computer technology;
- (vi) Considering the need to face up to this phenomenon and, to this end, instructing its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to prepare a supplementary report on this important question in order to keep the Assembly informed of the evolution of the situation in the economic, technological and military sectors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the member governments to stimulate and co-ordinate research and development of basic technologies for manufacturing very-high-speed integrated circuits and provide the funds necessary to encourage the industries concerned;
2. Draw up a common policy in a Western European framework based on a co-ordinated strategy to be worked out by the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments for the military applications of computer systems;
3. Prepare the ground for the next generation of military computers in weapon systems which will be interchangeable and interoperational between units of European forces assigned for the common defence;
4. Promote a single European market for military computers, and particularly supercomputers, which will stimulate the civil market;
5. Advocate a common computer language to facilitate the interoperability of all systems used by the armed forces of Western Europe;
6. Call for the standardisation of computer components such as very-high-speed integrated circuits.
7. Reflect on the impact on European computer industries due to the research and development to be undertaken in connection with the American strategic defence initiative and European-American co-operation on the space station.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1007).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 419***

1. The Council welcomes the Assembly's initiative and shares its assessment that the military use of advanced computer technology is of outstanding significance and that great importance attaches to close co-operation among all allies for the sake of the alliance's cohesion and collective defence. European computer technology has reached a high level. The Council is aware, however, that efforts to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of European industry merit special attention.
2. The Council also realises that the military use of computers is but one aspect of the wide-ranging applications of advanced computer technology and that thus the market for military computers is much smaller than that for civilian ones. Considerations on the military use of computers cannot, therefore, be detached from the civilian applications sector. Yet it should not be overlooked that military demand for computers can trigger off important innovation serving civilian purposes, too.
3. In view of the growing significance of advanced technology, the Foreign and Defence Ministers reaffirmed at their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 the determination of member countries to take the necessary steps in the European Communities to strengthen Europe's own technological capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.
4. European efforts in the field of information technology are already being made at various levels; mention should be made of Eureka, the Esprit programme and – with regard to the military use of computer technology – the considerations for joint European projects within the scope of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), as initiated by the relevant ministers.
5. The Council welcomes these efforts. WEU should afford them its political support and encouragement, but without causing unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort.
6. As regards co-operation among armed forces, the Council considers it necessary for the computer systems used to be interoperable in line with military requirements. WEU member countries therefore support all endeavours to achieve this goal. The prerequisite for this is the early harmonisation of the national operational requirements in the relevant bodies. Only in this way will it be possible to determine which type of systems is suitable for meeting those requirements.
7. Some WEU member countries have decided to facilitate the interoperability of their computer systems used in the armed forces by adopting the common ADA computer language selected in the alliance.
8. Interoperability can also be fostered by standardising important components. The Council thus shares the Assembly's view that the development of components deserves particular attention and should be supported as a suitable means serving this end. The Council welcomes the initiatives already taken by some member countries in this respect.
9. As stated in the communiqué issued by the Foreign and Defence Ministers after their meeting on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, the governments are continuing their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd October 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 420¹

***on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***²

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking cognisance of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 and the Bonn communiqué of 23rd April 1985;
- (ii) Noting that the information the Council has thus given to the Assembly regarding its activities is incomplete and inadequate;
- (iii) Noting that the activities organised by the presidency of the Council have been developed significantly, that the treaty makes it incumbent on the Council to inform the Assembly but that present procedure is inadequate;
- (iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe;
- (v) Underlining that the Assembly's activities make a major contribution to the cohesion of the European peoples for their joint security and therefore help to deter destabilising operations against the western defence system;
- (vi) Recalling that the Assembly can play the rôle assigned to it in the Rome Declaration only if it has precise information and satisfactory co-operation from the Council, the material means it needs for its work and if it remains totally independent from the Council, particularly when involving public opinion;
- (vii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries;
- (viii) Recalling that only the national delegations are in a position to give this work the necessary continuity;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activities but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work;
- (x) Welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence;
- (xi) Welcoming the decisions taken by the Council to support the efforts of the United States to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of armaments, to pursue its own efforts to give the United States a co-ordinated answer from the seven governments on the strategic defence initiative and to stress the importance it attaches to respect for commitments set out in the treaties in force;
- (xii) Recalling that Portugal's application for membership of WEU is in complete conformity with the joint interest of the Western European countries and the guidelines decided by WEU in the Rome Declaration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the American invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative;
2. Ensure the full participation of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council throughout the parliamentary debate on the Assembly's reply to the annual report of the Council so that he may, in particular, make known his opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee examined by the Assembly;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1012).

3. Submit to the Assembly a report by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on the activities of the presidency at the same time as the report on the organisation adopted by the Permanent Council;
4. Ensure that the Assembly is effectively informed of all joint activities by the Seven, including meetings of Ministers of Defence and meetings organised by the presidency of the Council;
5. Inform the public and press about its own activities;
6. Define without delay the attributions of the three agencies which it has decided to set up, particularly so as to allow the Assembly to act accordingly;
7. Take a favourable decision as soon as possible on Portugal's application for membership of WEU in application of Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 420***

The Council has examined with particular attention the Assembly's report on the new outlook for WEU as well as the recommendations adopted following this report.

1. With respect to questions associated with the United States strategic defence initiative, the Council can state the following: At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, the Ministers decided to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme. Work in this connection has already been started by the Permanent Council and these questions are being examined on a continuing basis.

2. The Council wishes to assure the Assembly of the importance that the member states as a whole attach to its reply to the Council's annual report in view of the fact that the questions dealt with in these documents directly affect the organisation's activity and its subsequent development. The Council, moreover, has on several occasions acknowledged the important contribution that the Assembly's deliberations have made to the revival of WEU. The Assembly also knows that the reforms adopted at the ministerial meeting in Rome stem to a large extent from its own work. It was in the spirit of maintaining and extending the dialogue with the Assembly that, at its last session in May, the Chairman-in-Office, representing the Council, spoke at length on the problems dealt with in the report of the General Affairs Committee and endeavoured to reply to all the questions put by the parliamentarians present.

3. In view of the intensification of the Council's activities, the Rome declaration stipulated that the presidency should be given a leading rôle in preparing replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions. It also recommended the improvement of the contacts that traditionally take place after the ministerial meetings of the Council and, more generally, the improvement of the procedures under which the Assembly is kept informed by the presidency, whose representatives could – between the Assembly sessions – keep the various committees up to date with the work of the Council, as noted in the document on the institutional reform of WEU. In addition, the presidency naturally contributes actively to the preparation of and follow-up to ministerial meetings.

However, the presidency as such is not an autonomous institution, and its actions and declarations cannot be separated from those of the Council as a whole. Under these circumstances there is no need for the presidency to present an activity report separate from the one regularly submitted by the Council to the Assembly.

4. In the light of the foregoing, one cannot properly speak about "meetings organised by the presidency" since any initiative of this type stems from a collective decision of the member states. As mentioned earlier, the Council endeavours to keep the Assembly informed, as completely as possible, of all the activities of the Seven by the use of existing procedures and in particular after ministerial meetings, as was the case with the three ministerial meetings that have taken place since the spring of 1984. It is then the rôle of the presidency of the Council, in co-ordination with the presidency of the Assembly, to inform the latter and to direct the discussions at the same time as taking note of the Assembly's wishes vis-à-vis the Council.

5. As indicated in the communiqué released after the ministerial meeting in Bonn, the Ministers have studied the possibility of improving WEU's public relations and information activities. In this context, consideration is being given to how the Council could develop – without involving new expenditure – means of informing the public and press about its own activities. The Ministers in Bonn approved the report on "WEU and public awareness" containing concrete suggestions of how to improve WEU's public relations activities.

6. The Assembly is aware that the reorganisation of WEU's technical organs, linked with the ending of control activities in accordance with the Assembly's wishes, has been a very important part of the work carried out on the revitalisation of the institutions of WEU. The Council decided to set up three new agencies arranged on the basis of the threefold tasks defined in the Rome document on the institutional reform of WEU. This decision taken in Bonn means that the fundamental conditions are

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th September 1985.

now fulfilled for these agencies to be set up rapidly and for specific assignments to be given to them, even though it is obvious that, for practical reasons, they can only reach full working capacity after a certain period of time.

7. The Ministerial Council at its meeting in Bonn has considered the various problems that may be raised by the accession of non-member states to the modified Brussels Treaty. The interest already shown in this by certain states is welcomed as a sign of encouragement by the Seven who intend to continue consideration of this question in parallel with the ongoing reactivation of WEU.

RECOMMENDATION 421 ¹

***on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent steps taken by the Council to implement the Assembly's demand that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s;
- (ii) Expressing its appreciation of the successfully completed work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments over the last thirty years, which has contributed to the present solidarity of Europe;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 providing for all aspects of European security to be discussed in the WEU Council and for the ministerial organs of WEU to be reorganised to provide institutions, available to the Council and to the Assembly, to study these questions;
- (iv) Welcoming the references in the communiqué of the Bonn ministerial meeting of the Council on 22nd and 23rd April which show that Ministers discussed questions of European security, disarmament, armaments co-operation and research and the creation of a technological community within the European Communities;
- (v) Welcoming in particular the emphasis placed in the communiqué on the need for "agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space" and the importance attached "to respect for existing treaty obligations";
- (vi) Welcoming the establishment of the three agencies for security questions as evidence of the Council's determination to continue active study of all the foregoing questions;
- (vii) Calling for the provisions of the Rome Declaration to be fully and continuously implemented,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep under continuous study at permanent and ministerial level all major problems affecting European security;
2. In particular continue to keep under continuous review all outstanding East-West arms control and disarmament questions, attaching equal importance to those negotiated in a multilateral and in a bilateral framework, with a view to reaching a common position on:
 - (a) President Reagan's strategic defence initiative and a reply to Secretary Weinberger's invitation for allied participation, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure respect for existing treaty obligations;
 - (b) the treaty to ban chemical weapons being negotiated in the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
 - (c) General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of a six-month unilateral freeze on the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe;
 - (d) a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the reported Soviet offer to accept a moratorium on all nuclear testing from the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb;
3. Entrust the new WEU agencies for security questions with the tasks identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, including an urgent study of the cost of the joint production by Western European Union of observation satellites to provide independent intelligence relevant to arms control and security;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum; see the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1019).

4. Subject to reciprocity by Warsaw Pact countries, declare the levels of forces, and in the future the levels of nuclear weapons, stationed on the territory of all WEU countries, as a contribution to confidence-building measures;
5. Make material provision to ensure that the new agencies for security questions will be able to provide more fully effective assistance to Assembly committees than the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has been in a position to provide in the past;
6. Make adequate budgetary provision to enable all WEU organs to carry out their respective tasks.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 421

1. In the framework of the reactivation of WEU, the Council has, at both ministerial and permanent level, intensified its discussions of problems concerning European security, including arms control and disarmament questions. Pursuant to the decisions taken at the last ministerial meeting in Bonn, the Permanent Council is currently examining the strategic and technological aspects involved in the United States invitation to participate in the research programme on SDI, in order to work out as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction to this invitation.
2. The Council takes due note of the interesting suggestion by the Assembly to entrust one of the new WEU agencies with the task of preparing a study on the costs of the joint production by WEU countries of observation satellites. The new agencies, however, are still in the process of being set up. Once this process has been completed, specific studies may be assigned to them.
3. The Council is very much in favour of greater mutual transparency as a means of building confidence between the countries of East and West. To this end, the western participants to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have proposed a series of measures, including provision for the exchange of information on military forces. In the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, western participants have tabled figures on their forces in the reduction area but a dispute has arisen about the eastern figures which has not yet been resolved.
4. The Council is prepared, as in the past, to consider the possibility of assistance in the preparation of Assembly reports by staff members of the future agencies, along the lines defined when previous requests were made. The Council has indicated that such requests would be considered on a case-by-case basis and that the assistance provided would be with the handling of the data gathered by the Assembly committee concerned, it being understood that such a procedure would have no budgetary implications.
5. The Council will ensure that the reorganisation of WEU will remain within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget without weakening WEU's ability to play its rôle.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th October 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 422¹***on the situation in Lebanon***²

The Assembly,

Greatly disturbed by the situation in Lebanon, which is disrupted by internal warfare accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their disposal to help to restore peace by acting directly, as well as in the framework of international organisations likely to exert an influence in favour of peace;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn appeal to the Government of Lebanon and all the internal parties concerned and to the governments of neighbouring countries to respect human rights for all Lebanese, whatever their race or creed;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon with a view to promoting a transitional solution guaranteeing the population against a resumption of the massacres;
4. Ask all member countries of Western European Union to associate themselves with these steps.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1025).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 422

The recommendations made by the Assembly correspond to appraisals and preoccupations unanimously shared by the governments of the member states of the organisation.

On several occasions, both in a national capacity and in the international contexts of which they are part, they have expressed themselves in favour of a solution to the Lebanese crisis based on the overcoming of conflicts and the cessation of acts of indiscriminate violence between the various communities. Such a solution would safeguard Lebanon's unity, territorial sovereignty and independence.

It is with deep concern that the member states of WEU look upon the grave consequences of the Lebanese crisis in the humanitarian field. They are dismayed by the tragic spiral of violence which has regrettably only been halted for short and ephemeral periods of truce.

In such circumstances it is essential that the communities in the Lebanon should find again the path to dialogue and negotiation, in order to achieve internal stability and preserve the unity of that country.

The Italian Foreign Minister, when he was also President-in-Office of the EC Council of Ministers, visited Beirut and Damascus to assess the prospects for a settlement of the present conflict, including the possibility of holding a Lebanese national conference of reconciliation, and to communicate the Ten's preoccupations as stated in their Brussels declaration on 20th May 1985 in this respect.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th July 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 423¹***on the state of European security – the central region***²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the long-standing Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers of men, tanks, guns and aircraft in the central region has not diminished;
- (ii) Aware however that with the improved defence effort made by most NATO countries in the last five years more modern equipment is now reaching NATO forces which still enjoy some qualitative advantages in training and equipment;
- (iii) Stressing that the European countries provide some 80 to 90% of the ready forces and equipment in place in Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming the important contribution to allied defence made by the French conventional forces stationed in Germany and in France which in the event of hostilities, should the French President so decide, could be placed under the operational control of NATO commanders;
- (v) Noting that a referendum on continued Spanish membership of NATO is expected to be held in March 1986;
- (vi) Recognising that the stationing of over 400,000 allied troops on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany represents a considerable social burden borne by that country in the interests of allied defence;
- (vii) Recalling that considerable further improvement in the effectiveness of the allied defence effort can be made at no additional cost through standardisation and interoperability of equipment, and that logistic arrangements are still in need of improvement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge in the North Atlantic Council:

1. That a renewed effort be made to establish a genuine European defence industry with a view to improving standardisation and interoperability;
2. That advantage be taken of any opportunities to reposition forces stationed in Germany to alleviate the present unsatisfactory deployment;
3. That published NATO force comparisons take account of French and Spanish forces;
4. That Spain be requested to assign to SACEUR a modern mobile force of at least one division as an early reserve for the central region, and that Spain be asked to respond to the NATO annual review questionnaire as is the custom of all other NATO countries.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd May 1985 during the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Dr. Miller on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1018).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 423

1. The Council has noted with great interest the Assembly's report on the state of European security in the central region and the recommendation adopted on this subject. However, the Council considers that it is not its rôle, as such, to make recommendations to another body, of which the member states of WEU are members and where they are able to express themselves individually.

With respect to the problems referred to by the Assembly, the Council wishes to reaffirm the importance that it attaches, within the framework of WEU's competence, to the security interests of Europe and in particular to promoting European armaments co-operation. On this point they recall the rôle of the SAC and, generally, the political impetus that WEU intends to give by supporting all co-operative efforts within Europe, including those of the CNAD and the IEPG.

In this connection, the Council has noted with satisfaction the efforts made by the Defence Ministers of IEPG member states to achieve this by agreeing to seek an improvement in the efficient use of resources in the European defence industrial base through:

- (a) greater discipline in not launching a national development project where one already exists elsewhere, nationally or collaboratively in Europe;
- (b) greater readiness to adopt equipment already in production in Europe;
- (c) greater readiness to apply competition in managing European collaborative projects;
- (d) encouragement in the formation of industrial relationships, both for specific projects and, preferably, on a more permanent base.

IEPG Defence Ministers have also directed that a study be entrusted to an independent group of "wise men" with findings to be presented by mid-1986 on enhancing the competitiveness of the European armaments industry.

The Council believes that this high level of activity demonstrates the effort which is being made to establish the European defence industry on a firmer basis, which will enhance the European contribution to the common defence effort of the alliance.

2. With regard to points 2, 3 and 4 of the Assembly recommendation, the Council takes note of the views expressed, but considers that it is not its rôle to give its opinion on these questions which, as regards the first, falls within the competence of the Atlantic Alliance and which, as regards the other two, come within the sovereignty of the states concerned.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 424¹

on the disaster in Mexico

The Assembly,

Deeply moved by the disaster which has struck Mexico;

Anxious to demonstrate the active sympathy of Europeans towards the Mexican people,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to express their solidarity through action to help victims by affording them humanitarian, material and financial assistance, using the most appropriate framework for this purpose.

1. Adopted on behalf of the Assembly by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 24th September 1985 (Document 1032).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 424

The Council shares the Assembly's feelings regarding the disaster in Mexico.

As soon as the extent and the effects of the earthquake were known, the WEU member countries participated in the massive movement of international solidarity to assist the victims. They immediately sent out equipment to hasten the release of those who were trapped, the most advanced instruments available to locate survivors still buried beneath the rubble, teams of first-aid workers and specialised medical teams. Both financial and material assistance in the form of medical supplies, blankets, etc., has also been provided for the Mexican authorities.

The member governments of WEU also join their partners in the larger organisations to which they belong, in particular the European Community, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order that measures be taken to help Mexico overcome the effects of this disaster.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th October 1985.

*Written Questions 253 and 256 to 261 and replies of the Council***QUESTION 253**

*put by Mr. Goerens
on 6th December 1984*

Many estimates in the defence budgets of the various WEU and NATO countries do not always have a direct connection with military expenditure proper.

The question which I have the honour to put therefore refers to sums earmarked for technological research in the defence budgets of the various WEU countries and the United States.

What percentage of the military budgets of the WEU countries and the United States respectively is earmarked for technological research?

What percentage of defence budgets of the WEU countries and the United States is earmarked for advanced technology?

REPLY BY THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 4th July 1985*

According to the economic study prepared by the Standing Armaments Committee on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, the declassified version of which for the period 1975-83 was communicated to the Assembly in November 1984, the expenditure on research and development is considered as military expenditure proper.

The percentage of the budgets assigned to research out of the total expenditure and armaments expenditure of each of the member countries of WEU is shown in tables 1 (c) to 7 (c) inclusive (line 5) of Annex II to the above-mentioned document.

Concerning the United States, the Council is not in a position to answer the question as it does not have the respective data at its disposal.

QUESTION 256

*put by Mr. Masciadri
on 14th March 1985*

What measures does the Council intend to take to ensure that the A-129 helicopter (Mangusta) produced by the Italian group Agusta is

adopted by the armed forces of the WEU countries in view of the fact that a Franco-German consortium is at present planning to produce a new combat helicopter with specifications similar to those of the one being produced by Agusta? Does the Council not think it would be more logical to choose the Italian helicopter, and what possibilities are there for industrial co-production between the countries concerned so that economic forces are not dispersed?

Production will start on Agusta's multi-purpose light combat helicopter at the end of this year and prototype tests have given exceptional results; moreover, the Franco-German project is still at the simple prefeasibility study stage.

Production of two similar helicopters would be contrary to the goal of standardising the armaments of Western European countries.

REPLY BY THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1985*

Letter from the Secretary-General

.....

I have the honour to refer to Written Question 256 put to the Council by Mr. Masciadri.

After a detailed study of this question at its meeting on 25th November the Council instructed me to inform you that it very much regrets that it is not able to give a collective answer to the matter concerned.

.....

(signed) A. Cahen

QUESTION 257

*put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985*

How high are the salaries for the permanent staff of WEU in Paris and London (for each level and category, including the Clerk of the Assembly)?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 27th September 1985*

In reply, reference is made to the attached current salary scales. (This document has been distributed to members of the Assembly as an appendix to the letter from the Clerk dated 3rd October 1985.)

QUESTION 258

*put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985*

Does the Council of Ministers of WEU support a future merger of the European Parliament and the parliamentary Assembly of WEU?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 27th September 1985*

The question of a merger of the two parliamentary institutions does not arise at present. The foreign and defence ministers, however, in the document on the institutional reform of WEU, have stressed the value of developing a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments and parliamentary institutions.

QUESTION 259

*put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985*

Is the Council of Ministers convinced that the realisation of the strategic defence initiative (SDI) does not in any way weaken or injure the non-proliferation treaty (NPT)?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 11th October 1985*

The United States have repeatedly stated that the strategic research programme is being

carried out in conformity with existing treaty obligations.

QUESTION 260

*put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985*

Have there been any consultations or are there any future consultations planned in the framework of the debate concerning the European union with the Government of the neutral Republic of Ireland concerning future WEU membership?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 11th October 1985*

There have been no such consultations, nor are any planned.

QUESTION 261

*put by Mrs. Kelly
on 26th July 1985*

Does the Council of Ministers of WEU desire to see all EEC members join WEU?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 18th October 1985*

Whilst bearing in mind the question of a possible enlargement of WEU, the Council's efforts at the moment, however, are directed towards setting up the new structures of the organisation, in accordance with the decisions reached in Rome and then Bonn.

Moreover, discussion among the Twelve about co-operation in the security field – which might have an impact on the issue raised by the honourable member – is under way in the context of the negotiations about a treaty on political co-operation.

Disarmament

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Statements issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev,
Geneva, 21st November 1985

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, van den Bergh, Bonnel, Bourges, Brown, Cox, Dejardin, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Giust, Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Huyghues des Etages (Alternate: Baumel), Konen (Alternate: Hengel), de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: van der Sanden), Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Atkinson).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report and the separate information report (Document 1040), *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows :

Non-proliferation treaty review conference, Geneva, 12th and 13th September 1985

H.E. Dr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Deputy Representative of the United Kingdom;

Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor;

Mr. Ian Kenyan, Expert;

H.E. Mr. Duncan Campbell, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Australia;

Mr. Thomas Barthelemy, United States Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Milos Vojvoda, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia;

H.E. Mr. Ryukichi Imai, Ambassador, Representative of Japan;

H.E. Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Ambassador, Leader of the Delegation of Sri Lanka;

H.E. Mr. F.J.A. Terwisscha van Scheltinga, Ambassador, Leader of the Netherlands Delegation;

Mr. A.J. Meerburg, Adviser;

H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Representative of Egypt;

H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10th October 1985

Mr. Steven Ledogar, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States;

H.E. Mr. Eric Da Rin, Ambassador, Deputy Secretary-General;

H.E. Mr. J.G.N. de Hoop Scheffer, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands;

Mr. Bots, Deputy Permanent Representative

General Cornelius de Jager, Netherlands Army, Chairman of the Military Committee;

Brigadier General Ilenio Sanotto, Italian Army, Deputy Assistant Director (Arms Control and Disarmament), Plans and Policy Division of the International Military Staff;

Colonel H. Hoerner, German Army;

Colonel P. Schmitz, German Air Force;

Mr. A. Bonfanti, Mr. Salmon, Disarmament and Arms Control Section, Political Affairs Division, International Staff.

The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 24th July 1985 and was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Mr. Mario Alessi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Italy;

H.E. Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mexico and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;

H.E. Mr. Stanislaw Turbanski, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons;

H.E. Mr. Saad Alfarargi, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Egypt and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space;

H.E. Mr. Richard Butler, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Australia and Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons;

H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;

H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Soviet Union.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of WEU, London, on 4th November to discuss the first draft of a comprehensive report on disarmament. It met again at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 22nd November when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the officials who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In particular, the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the preparation of the committee's report on disarmament.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on disarmament

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that has resulted from the summit meeting in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the agreement to hold further summit meetings as well as meetings of ministers and experts on various issues, and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements;
- (ii) Considering the present status of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva;
- (iii) Considering the conclusions of the third review conference on the non-proliferation treaty held in Geneva;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of a concerted European position on all issues discussed in these forums in order to ensure that proper weight is attached to the requirements of European security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the machinery and practice of consultation in NATO attaches full weight to the views of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues;
2. Hold preliminary discussions itself on disarmament and arms control issues whenever a member government feels that proper weight is not being given to the European position in NATO or that European political co-operation has been unable to discuss an issue;
3. Request the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals of the Soviet Union in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, and to seek an early interim agreement on INF systems providing for the lowest levels compatible with the interests of allied security of United States systems based in Europe and comparable Soviet systems;
4. Request countries participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations to press for an early first phase agreement in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
5. (a) Pending agreement in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on improved compulsory confidence-building measures, urge the Warsaw Pact to extend regular invitations to manoeuvres to observers from NATO countries under the terms of the Helsinki final act;
(b) Instruct the Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions to study the verification and observer régime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact manoeuvres;
6. (a) Urge member countries in the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to the urgent negotiation of treaties to ban chemical weapons and all nuclear tests;
(b) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear test explosions with a view to establishing reliable seismic calibration data and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties;
7. (a) Request nuclear countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, to make arrangements as soon as possible to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as mentioned in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the non-proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it;
(b) Urge all members of IAEA to further improve its safeguards and to establish arrangements for international plutonium storage and spent fuel management;

(c) Urge all parties to the London nuclear suppliers' group guidelines for nuclear transfers to continue co-operation and improve the application of the guidelines;

(d) Urge member governments to insist on the full application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and installations in recipient countries before authorising the export of civilian nuclear material or facilities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee has regularly reported on disarmament and arms control problems, most recently in both May and December 1984¹, the reports usually concentrating on one or two particular sets of negotiations. In view of the slightly improved prospects for movement in some at least of the various forums where arms control is discussed, the committee decided at its meeting on 21st May 1985 to produce a comprehensive report on "all current arms control and disarmament negotiating forums, both bilateral and multilateral; those dealing with nuclear weapons and those dealing with other aspects of arms control".

1.2. At its meeting on 4th November, the committee had before it the first draft of such a report, but realised that because of the broad scope of the report and the committee's own busy programme, there was insufficient time to study it. The committee also decided to postpone adoption of the report until after the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held from 19th to 21st November, so that the Assembly at its session beginning on 2nd December might have before it an up-to-date report. However, in view of the technical problems involved in preparing and circulating a large report to all representatives, the committee requested the Rapporteur to produce a separate factual information report, based on the explanatory memorandum to his first draft report, for advance distribution².

1.3. This report therefore attaches only a short explanatory memorandum to the draft recommendation. Reference should be made to the corresponding headings of the information report for the factual information which the committee had before it in making its recommendations. After examining recent international developments affecting arms control negotiations, the information report recalls the present negotiating forums for disarmament and arms control and discusses arrangements for alliance consultation with respect to them. The report then describes the status of each of the five forums concerned: bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons; the multilateral

forums on mutual and balanced force reductions (Vienna); the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm); the Conference on Disarmament (Geneva); and finally the non-proliferation treaty review conference held in Geneva in September.

II. International developments

2.1. The committee obviously welcomes the establishment of direct contact between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva summit from 19th to 21st November. While no concrete agreement on details concerning any set of arms control negotiations was to be expected, the committee hopes that the meeting and the decision to hold further regular meetings will establish a degree of mutual understanding between the two leaders that will make possible some agreement on different aspects of arms control in the future.

2.2. The agreed statement issued after the meeting³ contains hopeful cosmetic language including agreement "that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and "the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional"; it makes constructive reference to all arms control topics discussed in this report with the notable exception of a comprehensive test ban, although the statement contains no specific agreement on any of these issues. Indeed it notes that "serious differences remain on a number of critical issues".

2.3. Chief among these is obviously President Reagan's strategic defence initiative or "star wars" about which General Secretary Gorbachev at the concluding press conference which he alone gave in Geneva is reported as saying that "the door to an arms race in outer space must be firmly slammed shut". Saying that President Reagan considered star wars a shield, Mr. Gorbachev continued "but we, I hope, convincingly proved that no, it is a space weapon which could be used against rockets, could be used against satellites, and ... against installations on earth ... it is a new type of weaponry"⁴. In contrast, President Reagan in his statement at the closing ceremony said "... we know the questions that must be answered: will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to

1. Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 972, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. de Vries; Control of armaments and disarmament, Document 998, 3rd December 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

2. Document 1040.

3. Appendix, (a).

4. AP.

non-nuclear defensive (arms)⁵ or systems to make this a safer world?". The committee reports elsewhere on the strategic defence initiative⁶. Preambular paragraph (i) of the draft recommendation comments on the summit.

III. Negotiating forums and alliance consultation

3.1. The committee particularly welcomes the fact that President Reagan went in person to NATO in Brussels on 21st November to brief a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the results of the summit. Weaknesses in earlier arrangements for consultation are described in paragraph 3.13 of the information report. In paragraph 3.11 of that report, attention is drawn to an anomaly in NATO consultation arrangements concerning the Special Consultative Group on the INF negotiations. Now that the person of the SCG chairman has changed, the committee feels there is a case for changing the system.

3.2. As far as the rôle of the WEU Council is concerned, the committee welcomes the discussion of prospects for the summit meeting to which most of the Rome ministerial meeting on 14th November was devoted. The information report in paragraph 3.12 points out the otherwise modest rôle of the WEU Council. The committee recognises that provided the views of the European allies can be co-ordinated in European political co-operation, and carry sufficient weight in the North Atlantic Council, there is no particular virtue in duplicating such discussion in the WEU Council on a systematic basis. The machinery must however exist to permit the WEU countries to consult and adopt collective positions on important disarmament and arms control issues whenever their military nature precludes proper discussion in European political co-operation and consultation in NATO fails to attach full weight to European views. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft recommendation are worded accordingly.

IV. Bilateral negotiations

4.1. In the days before the summit, further details emerged in the press (see table hereafter) of the proposals put forward in the Geneva bilateral negotiations aimed at "preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth" in the words of the agreement of 8th January 1985, which are repeated in the summit statement.

4.2. The statement agreed at the summit⁷ notes that the leaders "agreed to accelerate the work at these (nuclear and space arms) negotiations" and "called for early progress ... including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement". "Effective measures of verification" are to be agreed. A new concept introduced in the statement calls for study of "centres to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments of the Geneva negotiators". The modernisation of the hot line is recalled.

4.3. The committee's views on any concept of nuclear balance as expressed in previous reports is recalled in paragraph 4.24 of the information report. The committee recommends that the United States be urged to bear these considerations in mind in the bilateral negotiations. The information report describes what is publicly known of the present status of the bilateral negotiations and notes (paragraph 4.8) that serious negotiations have started. The committee hopes that each party to the bilateral negotiations will examine with the utmost attention the latest proposals of the other. Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation is addressed to the United States as the party negotiating in the interests of the alliance.

V. Mutual and balanced force reductions

5.1. On MBFR the statement agreed at the summit says simply:

"The two sides emphasised the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results."

5.2. After reviewing the status of these negotiations described in Chapter V of the information report, the committee believes there is scope for a major political initiative from the western side, following the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November, to secure at least the desired initial agreement on the withdrawal of certain United States and Soviet forces. On this particular point the positions of the two sides are not too far apart. A possible first phase agreement could be based on the following points:

- *initial withdrawals*: agreement exists on the initial withdrawal of 13,000 United States forces; a compromise should be found between the figures of 30,000 or 20,000 Soviet troops which the two sides have proposed for withdrawal in the first phase;

5. Unintelligible word.

6. Document 1033.

7. At appendix.

The arms proposals: a balance sheet⁸

Figures compiled by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

		Current Balance		Soviet Proposal October 1985		US Proposal November 1985	
	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)	US 1,630 (1,030 ICBMs) (600 SLBMs)	Soviet 2,352 (1,398 ICBMs) (954 SLBMs)	US 815	Soviet 1,176	US 1,250-1,450	Soviet 1,250-1,450
				Applies 50% cut across the board using US figures. Soviet Union counts all US strategic and medium-range systems at 3,360 and Soviet ones at 2,500 (not including SS-20s). Using Soviet figures, 50% cut would result in 1,680 systems for US and 1,250 for Soviet Union.		Freedom to mix between ICBM and SLBM launchers.	
Strategic forces	ICBM and SLBM warheads	7,506 (2,130 ICBMs) (5,376 SLBMs)	8,830 (6,420 ICBMs) (2,410 SLBMs)	6,000	6,000	4,500	4,500
	Heavy bombers	263	480 includes 300 Backfires Soviet Union says this is not a strategic bomber.	131	90 Backfires not included	350	350 includes 300 Backfires
	Air-launched cruise missiles	1,176	200	0	0	1,500	1,500
	Missile throw weight *	4.4 million pounds	11.9 million pounds	Not included	Not included	Not to exceed 6 million pounds.	Not to exceed 6 million pounds.
	New systems			Ban on new types of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Soviet Union has not defined what it considers to be new types.		Ban on all new heavy ICBMs and mobile missiles, including Soviet SS-18 modernisation and replacement plans. Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 mobile missiles, and US Midgetman mobile missiles.	
Medium-range forces	Medium-range launchers	134 Pershing 2s and ground- launched cruise missiles (one warhead each)	270 SS-20s in Europe plus 171 in Asia for total of 441 (3 warheads each)	No Pershing 2s; 100 ground- launched cruise missiles.	243 SS-20s in Europe plus a freeze on SS-20s in Asia, currently at 171.	140 ceiling on Pershing 2s in Europe and ground- launched crui- se missiles.	140 SS-20s 89 in Asia, totalling 229.
	Medium-range bombers	254 (198 F-111s and 58 FB-111s)	553 (includes Backfires)	127 Derived from applying 50% cut to US figures.	276	Willingness to discuss restraints.	

* Weight that can be lifted off and carried onto target.

– *equipment*: the western allies have so far made insufficient proposals concerning the withdrawal of equipment although it was agreed at the outset that the official designation of the talks was “mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe”. The geographical imbalance

makes it impossible for NATO to accept the withdrawal of all United States equipment 6,000 kilometres across the Atlantic to the United States, while Soviet equipment would be withdrawn only 600 kilometres overland to the Soviet Union. NATO could however accept the withdrawal to a depot in some rear area in Europe to be designated, of the equipment of American units to be withdrawn from the zone;

8. International Herald Tribune, 18th November 1985.

- *inspections*: NATO could afford to offer the Soviet Union permanent observers on rear area depots containing withdrawn equipment, in exchange for the right to a specified number of annual inspections in the Warsaw Pact part of the zone;
- *data*: if the number of United States and Soviet forces to be withdrawn under an initial agreement is acceptable to both sides, and if their effective withdrawal and non-return is verified through permanent exit/entrance points with observers, as now appears to have been conceded by the Warsaw Pact, then the problem of reaching agreement on estimates of numbers of forces remaining within the zone after the initial withdrawals can be postponed to a second stage agreement involving reductions by the forces of all countries down to the agreed 900,000 ceiling;
- *subceilings on national components*: NATO will accept only common collective ceilings for the forces of the two sides, whereas the Warsaw Pact in a second stage continues to insist on some form of subceiling for the forces of each country. NATO could afford in this context to allow the Warsaw Pact to take account of levels of national forces which NATO countries make public in any case through the annual publication of their defence budgets and in many other forms. Such figures would not of course form part of any initial agreement, but the Soviet Union might well wish to make some unilateral declaration in accepting an initial agreement, such as it has made in the past on different issues in other arms control agreements.

5.3. A limited initial agreement in Vienna would have both a concrete advantage in reducing, even if only slightly, the levels of forces on both sides and a psychological advantage in providing an incentive to pursue the talks to their second phase. Parallel progress in Stockholm on confidence-building measures can also have a direct impact on the associated measures called for in Vienna. Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation is formulated accordingly.

VI. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm)

6.1. On the Conference on Disarmament in Europe the statement agreed at the summit makes constructive comment:

“... they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually-acceptable confidence- and security-building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.”

This reflects the terms of likely agreement already foreshadowed in paragraph 6.33 of the committee's information report.

6.2. Chapter VI of the information report describes progress of the conference so far. The committee again calls for a sense of urgency to be injected into the negotiations. It proposes specifically (paragraph 5(b) of the draft recommendation) that the new WEU agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions should begin a study of the verification and observation régime that should desirably emerge from agreement in Stockholm and should prepare to plan and co-ordinate the activities of observers from the WEU countries – normally the military attachés of those countries en poste in the various Warsaw Pact capitals who will be enabled to observe manoeuvres in those countries. Co-ordinated arrangements could ensure for example that with one observer from each of the seven WEU countries specialists could be available in different fields such as armour, artillery, ground-support aircraft, etc. A co-ordinated debriefing after exercises would ensure that a maximum amount of information was derived from the operation.

6.3. As the information report notes, Warsaw Pact countries have invited observers from NATO countries to manoeuvres only once since 1979. Pending agreement on more binding measures in Stockholm they should be urged to resume invitations (paragraph 5(a) of the draft recommendation).

VII. Conference on Disarmament (Geneva)

7.1. The information report describes the work of this forty-nation conference, pointing out that the two most urgent topics, ripe for agreement, are a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban. The committee concludes that negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty should be given the highest priority in multi-lateral negotiations. It recommends that the Council call on the United States and the Soviet Union to ratify the bilateral peaceful nuclear explosions and threshold test ban treaties, urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' invitation to observe weapon tests for calibration purposes, and call for the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty to be initiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as a matter of urgency at the beginning of 1986.

7.2. The committee, as last year, concludes in the light of available evidence that at present stocks of chemical weapons available to the alliance are effective and sufficient to deter the use of such weapons by an adversary. It therefore recommends that the United States be urged not to resume production of chemical weapons at present, that every effort be made to achieve substantial progress in 1986 on the negotiation of a treaty to ban chemical weapons, with particular emphasis on realistic verification measures, and that the situation be again reviewed at the end of 1986. Paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b) of the draft recommendation embody these conclusions.

7.3. The agreed summit statement⁹ again has constructive comments on a chemical weapons ban:

“ The two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.”

This foreshadows progress in the Conference on Disarmament, prepared through bilateral discussions, and the new concept of measures to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons. In contrast there is no summit reference to a comprehensive test ban, reflecting United States opposition noted in the information report.

7.4. The committee deals in another report¹⁰ with the SDI and the aspects of the bilateral negotiations which concern it. It endorses here

the French proposal and recommends that a mandate be given to the ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for the urgent negotiation of a treaty to ban anti-satellite systems, in particular high altitude ASAT.

VIII. Non-proliferation treaty review conference

8.1. The information report describes the working of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the review conference of parties to the treaty held in Geneva in September 1985. The committee recommends that all nuclear weapon countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, should be requested to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as soon as possible, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the non-proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it. It recommends that every effort should be made to improve further existing IAEA safeguards, in particular through provision for international plutonium storage and management of spent fuel. It further recommends that all parties to the London guidelines for nuclear transfers should meet to consider their updating, and should be urged to continue to co-operate in their application. It considers it important that the acceptance of full IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and facilities on the territory of a recipient non-nuclear weapon country should be a precondition for the export of any such material or facilities by any country. Paragraphs 7(a) to (d) of the draft recommendation are formulated accordingly.

8.2. The committee particularly welcomes the very favourable references to nuclear non-proliferation in the agreed summit statement¹¹, in particular “enlarging its membership” with reference to the non-proliferation treaty, the “strengthening of the IAEA” and its safeguards and the intent to continue regular bilateral consultations on non-proliferation.

9. At appendix.

10. Document 1033.

11. At appendix.

APPENDIX

*Statements issued by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev,
Geneva, 21st November 1985**(a) Joint statement issued by
President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev**(Extracts)*

...These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of United States-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve United States-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and time of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

Security

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the United States for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognising that any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasised the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

Nuclear and space talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the joint United States-Soviet agreement of 8th January 1985, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiation of these agreements effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

Risk reduction centres

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centres to reduce nuclear risk, taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernisation of the Soviet-United States hotline.

Nuclear non-proliferation

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the United States to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their interest in strengthening, together with other countries, the non-proliferation régime and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent review conference of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USSR and the United States reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic

Energy Agency and to support the activities of the agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-United States consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

Chemical weapons

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

MBFR

The two sides emphasised the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually-acceptable confidence- and security-building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

Process of dialogue

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State, as well as between the heads of other ministries and agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of ministries and departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognising that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges on a regular basis...

(b) Statement by General Secretary Gorbachev

(Extracts)

...The President and I have done a huge amount of work, gone into great detail, we have really done it in depth. And we have done it totally openly and frankly. We have discussed several most important issues: the relations between our two countries and the situation in the world today.

These are issues and problems the solving of which in the most concrete way is of concern both to our countries and to the peoples of other countries in the world. We have discussed these issues, basing our discussions on both sides' determination to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

We have decided that we must help to decrease the threat of nuclear war. We must not allow the arms race to move off on into space. And we must cut it down on earth.

It goes without saying that discussions of this sort we consider to be very useful. And in its results you find a clear reflection of what the two sides have agreed together.

We have to be realistic and straightforward. And therefore, the solving of the most important problems concerning the arms race and increasing hopes of peace, we did not succeed in reaching at this meeting.

So of course there are important disagreements on matters of principle that remain between us. However, the President and I have agreed that this work of seeking mutually-acceptable decisions for these questions will be continued here in Geneva by our representatives.

We are also going to seek new kinds of developing bilateral Soviet-American relations. And also, we are going to have further consultations on several important questions where for the most part our positions again are completely different.

All this (sic) we consider these forthcoming talks to be very, very useful. But the significance of everything which we have agreed with the President can only of course be reflected if we carry it on into concrete measures. If we really want to succeed in something, then both sides are going to have to do an awful lot of

work in the spirit of the joint commission which we, the joint statement which we have put out.

And in this connection I would like to announce that the Soviet Union for its part will do all it can in this co-operation with the United States of America in order to achieve practical results, to cut down the arms race, to cut down the arsenals which we have piled up and give, produce the conditions which will be necessary for peace on earth and in space.

We make this announcement perfectly aware of our responsibility both to our own people and other peoples of the earth. And we would very much hope that we could have the same approach from the administration of the United States.

(c) Statement by President Reagan

(Extract)

We have packed a lot into the last two days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh start in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and we have done this.

General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held comprehensive discussions covering all elements of our relationship. I am convinced we are heading in the right direction.

We have reached some useful interim results which are described in the joint statement that is being issued this morning. In agreeing to accelerate the work of our nuclear arms negotiators, Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace.

I believe that we have established a process for more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two

days of talks should inject a certain momentum into our work on the issue between us, a momentum we can continue at the meeting that we have agreed on for next year.

Before coming to Geneva I spoke often of the need to build confidence in our dealings with each other. Frank and forthright conversations at the summit are part of this process. But I am certain General Secretary Gorbachev would agree that real confidence in each other must be built on deeds, not simply words.

This is the thought that ties together all of the proposals the United States has put on the table in the past and this is the criteria by which our meetings will be judged in the future.

The real report card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years. But we know the questions that must be answered: will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to non-nuclear defensive (unintelligible word) or systems to make this a safer world?

Will we join together to help bring about a peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America, so that the peoples there can freely determine their own destiny without outside interference? Will the cause of liberty be advanced? And will the treaties and agreements signed past and future be fulfilled? The people of America, the Soviet Union and throughout the world are ready to answer yes.

I leave Geneva today and our fireside summit determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There is hard work ahead. We are ready for it.

General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask you to join us in getting the job done, as I am sure you will. Thank you.

Disarmament

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“, prevent the sovereignty of each member country being violated and ensure that in any event the standards of treaties and of international law are respected;”.

Signed: Antoni, Masciadri, Pecchioli, Vecchietti, Rubbi, Francese

1. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendment negatived).

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 ¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals ” and insert “ the United States and the Soviet Union to examine with the utmost attention the reciprocal proposals ”.

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ” and insert “ providing for the full verification of withdrawals ”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendments negatived).

Disarmament

AMENDMENTS 4 and 5 ¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

4. Leave out paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Urge the nuclear countries to apply Resolution 49/1952 of the United Nations and the resolution of the European Parliament of 12th September 1985 on the urgency of promoting negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, urge the United States itself to apply the moratorium decided by the Soviet Union and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties ; ”.
5. Leave out paragraph 7(d) of the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Urge member governments to ensure that as far as possible Cocom restrictions no longer concern nuclear material and installations, while respecting defence guarantees. ”

Signed: Antoni, Rubbi, Vecchiotti, Pecchioli, Francese

1. See 7th sitting, 2nd December 1985 (amendment 4 withdrawn; amendment 5 negatived).

The strategic defence initiative

OPINION ¹

*on the draft recommendation adopted by
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
on 4th November 1985*

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)

1. The Presidential Committee expressed the wish that the Assembly's three political committees each submit a report on WEU and the strategic defence initiative in the area for which it is responsible. As these three reports are to be the subject of a joint debate in plenary sitting on 3rd and 4th December 1985, it was agreed that only the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments would include a draft recommendation on the strategic defence initiative, the other two committees being asked to give an opinion on the draft recommendation adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

2. Accordingly, the report on WEU and the strategic defence initiative – the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (Document 1034), submitted by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and adopted by the latter on 5th November 1985, contains a chapter on the strategic defence initiative which is the true explanatory memorandum of the opinion of the General Affairs Committee on the report submitted by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and adopted by that committee on 4th November 1985.

3. Your Rapporteur was appointed on 5th November so as to be able to table the General Affairs Committee's proposed amendments to the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. This is the subject of the present document. For the substance, he refers to Chapter III of Mr. Berrier's report.

Amendments

*to the draft recommendation
adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments*

Preamble

After paragraph (i), add a new paragraph as follows (which would become paragraph (ii)):

“(ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;”

Paragraph (ii) (which would become paragraph (iii)):

Amend this paragraph to read:

“(iii) Believing that Europe collectively must pursue the development of independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;”

Paragraph (iii) (which would become paragraph (iv)):

Leave out from “will not undermine” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Chairman); MM. Hardy (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), van der Werff (Vice-Chairman); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier (Alternate: *Baumel*), Bianco (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), Bogaerts, Burger, Hill, Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: *Atkinson*), Mrs. Kelly, MM. Koehl, Lagneau, Lagorce, Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitezza, Vecchiotti, de Vries.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

“and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;”

Paragraph (iv)

Leave out this paragraph.

Paragraph (v)

Amend this paragraph to read:

“(v) Believing that a strategic defence system might play a complementary rôle in the policy of nuclear deterrence;”

Paragraph (vi)

1. Leave out from “according to which” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the proposals for the United States’ European allies to take part in the SDI programme;”

2. Add a footnote as follows (paragraph 3 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 413):

“3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployments will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion.”

Operative text

Paragraph 1

In the first sentence, after “defence initiative” insert:

“or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe’s own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries”

Paragraph 1 (c)

Leave out from “on mutually” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology”

After paragraph 1 (c), add a new paragraph as follows (which would become paragraph (d)):

“(d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe’s technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme;”

Paragraph 3

Amend this paragraph to read:

“Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered;”

After paragraph 5, add a new paragraph as follows (which would become paragraph 6):

“6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe’s security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative.”

*Action by the Presidential Committee***REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly*

1. The Presidential Committee is authorised by the Rules of Procedure, and encouraged by the requirements of political life, to take the necessary measures to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action.
2. The Assembly meets only a few days each year in two part-sessions. But it does not consider that its tasks are limited to a critical examination of the annual report which the Council is invited, in the modified Brussels Treaty, to submit to it each year. Its supervisory duties and also its duties as instigator require an uninterrupted dialogue with the Council. The reactivation of WEU, or at least the increase in the Council's activities, makes the continuity of this dialogue even more necessary and the responsibility of the Presidential Committee in this connection even more important.
3. The Presidential Committee is in a position to assume this responsibility. It is not only the Assembly's steering body, responsible inter alia for fixing the date and place of sessions, determining its agenda and organising its debates, it is also a political body. Apart from the chairmen of committees, it includes the chairmen of political groups, who are regularly asked to attend its meetings, and a representative of each national delegation, since it includes the Bureau.
4. Unlike the Assembly and its other committees, the Presidential Committee is probably not weighted *de jure* from the standpoint of the national delegations nor *de facto* from the standpoint of the political groups. It therefore seeks a consensus. But it is able to act because all points of view are represented in it, even if not necessarily in a balanced manner.
5. Since the last session, the Presidential Committee has therefore continued its work in the three areas which traditionally require its attention. It has continued its efforts to improve conditions for the dialogue with the Council. It has studied the programme of work of the Assembly and the financial conditions for carrying it out. It has taken the steps necessary in the light of current events and in this context thought fit to adopt a draft recommendation on behalf of the Assembly to promote the expression of the solidarity of the WEU member countries with the Mexican people so sorely tried by the earthquake which caused many victims and serious damage in the country's capital.
6. In this connection, the Council informed the Assembly of measures taken by its members in a bilateral or international framework to assist the victims by immediately sending equipment to hasten the release of those who were trapped and providing financial and material assistance for the Mexican authorities.
7. But neither the Council's replies to recommendations nor its replies to written questions (some of which reach parliamentarians very late) suffice to ensure the continuity of the dialogue with the Council. In the spirit of the 1984 Rome declaration, the Assembly therefore instructed the Presidential Committee, in Order 58, "to establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU".
8. Since the Assembly is finding it difficult, for financial reasons, to accomplish its mission, it also instructed the Presidential Committee, in Order 59, "to invite the Council... to give favourable consideration" to the budgetary proposals the Assembly was soon to make for improving its conditions of work.
9. The Presidential Committee therefore informed the Council of its wish to organise the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly on the basis of these two orders, specifying that "the first refers mainly to arranging the political dialogue between the Assembly and the Council so that the Assembly may be informed and heard in due time, whereas the second seeks to establish a consensus with the Council for the Assembly to be provided with the budgetary means of fulfilling its mission".
10. In this spirit, it was proposed to organise a meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Permanent Council. This suggestion was agreed to in principle, but it proved difficult to apply and the meeting was postponed until the next session. The purpose was to establish new procedure allowing the Presidential Committee to keep the Permanent Council informed of its concerns, the Permanent Council being composed of the ambassadors to the Court of St. James and a senior official from the Foreign Office. It meets regularly in London under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General. It would thus be possible for the Permanent Council to inform the Presidential Committee of the

progress of the Council's work, for the Presidential Committee to inform the Permanent Council of certain difficulties encountered by the Assembly and for both bodies to smooth out obstacles standing in the way of relations between the Council and the Assembly.

11. It was impossible to hold this meeting for reasons which were apparently minor but which were in fact important, since it was a matter of ensuring that members of the Presidential Committee could take part in a real working meeting. An Assembly committee can in fact meet usefully only if it has simultaneous interpretation. The Council, which is accustomed to its own methods of work, had not realised the importance of this point for the representatives of national parliaments. This misunderstanding has now been cleared up and thanks to the action of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, to whom the Assembly should express its gratitude, the Presidential Committee will meet during the session with both the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Permanent Council. It is to be hoped that on that occasion it will be possible to agree to arrange for the Presidential Committee to meet the Permanent Council, whenever necessary, in between ministerial meetings which, it is to be hoped, will allow certain outstanding problems between the governmental and parliamentary bodies of the organisation to be settled by flexible procedure.

12. Another meeting could not be held because of circumstances over which the partners had no control, i.e. the meeting between the Committee for Relations with the Council and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council which had to be postponed because of the ministerial crisis in Italy. The Assembly was therefore unable to inform the Council of its views before the ministerial meeting in Rome.

13. In spite of these mishaps, the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has developed thanks to the meetings between the President of the Assembly and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, i.e. with the German and Italian Ministers for Foreign Affairs successively. These meetings have borne fruit and in particular allowed preparations to be made for the traditional meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Council at ministerial level. The most recent meeting was held in Rome on 14th November.

14. Members of the Presidential Committee who were present were thus able to be informed before the press of the results of the meeting which had just been held. However, in the very brief time assigned to this meeting (forty-five minutes) the Presidential Committee was unable to start a real dialogue which would have been an exchange of views on the matters raised

rather than information being conveyed to parliamentarians. Moreover, the information given was then communicated to the press. I will leave the task of analysing it to others. It is not for the Rapporteur of the Presidential Committee to draw his own conclusions from the results of the ministerial meeting. He must underline, however, that while the results obtained by the Presidential Committee were meagre in building up relations with the Council, they were even more disappointing in budgetary matters since no answer has been given to the proposals and requests made on behalf of the Assembly.

15. The Presidential Committee saw that to implement the Assembly committees' full programme of work would mean slight overspending under two sub-heads of the budget relating to the travelling expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk and the cost of interpretation. Since the Council imposed large reductions in estimates under the 1985 budget, it seemed very difficult to offset this overspending by savings under other sub-heads. In spite of many letters, each of which gave further details, the Permanent Council has not answered the wishes expressed by the Assembly.

16. The same is true for the draft budget for the financial year 1986 which was drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, as provided for in the Charter, in consultation with the Presidential Committee. It is paradoxical to note that the Permanent Council has not followed the procedure to which it visibly attached such great importance last year since it failed to make its opinion known before the Assembly studied the draft budget thus prepared. Admittedly, we were aware of the negative reactions of many budget experts but as of now no official opinion has been brought to our attention by a responsible Council body.

17. Hopes placed this time last year in the effects of the decisions taken in Rome on the occasion of the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of WEU have thus been disappointed. It is certainly not the fault of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council who has, on the contrary, made praiseworthy efforts to allow the Assembly to benefit from the political and financial conditions it needs for the accomplishment of its mission. I propose that the Assembly convey its warmest thanks to him when he addresses it next Wednesday. Our disappointment is in fact due to the absence of agreement in the Council on giving Western Europe the means of making its voice heard in areas which concern its own security. The difficulty which the Presidential Committee has had in making itself heard is therefore but the sign of a languishing European will.

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1986*

PREVIOUS QUESTION ¹

*moved by Sir Dudley Smith
on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration
under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the procedure for approving Assembly budgets as set out in the attached note;
- (ii) Considering that the opinion of the Council has not yet been communicated to the Assembly;
- (iii) Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on a budget which provides for various options and sets priorities,

DECIDES

That the draft budget is withdrawn from the agenda of the session.

Signed: Dudley Smith

Note

Procedure in force for approving Assembly budgets is as follows:

- (i) the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration produces a draft budget;
- (ii) this draft, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, is sent to the Council for an opinion;
- (iii) the Council gives its opinion, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments;
- (iv) in the latter case, if the Council's amendments are not acceptable and the matter cannot be settled by correspondence, they are discussed at a joint meeting;
- (v) the draft budget, as eventually agreed, then continues through the Assembly's normal procedure;
- (vi) the budget, as then approved by the Assembly (during the second part of the annual session), goes back to the Council and, if it has not been further amended by the Assembly, the Council can formally approve it without further discussion.

1. See 10th sitting, 4th December 1985 (previous question agreed to).

Iran-Iraq war

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ¹

tabled by Mr. Bianco and others

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the serious human and financial losses caused by the war between Iran and Iraq;
- (ii) Considering the present régime's insistence on continuing the war between Iran and Iraq, which is a serious threat to peace and tranquillity in the area and throughout the world;
- (iii) Considering the will of the Iranian people to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion, which finds a positive point of reference in the peace plan of the National Resistance Council;
- (iv) Considering further the resolutions submitted to and adopted by the Council of Europe,

CONDEMNS the policy of the Iranian régime, which continues to be based on recourse to war and the violation of human rights, as dramatically demonstrated by the list of 12,028 victims in the Mujaheddin publication.

Signed: Bianco, Palumbo, Martino, Sinesio, Amadei, Mitterdorfer, Sarti, Rauti, Cifarelli, Giust

1. See 11th sitting, 4th December 1985 (motion referred to the Presidential Committee).

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1986*

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

*tabled by Sir Dudley Smith
under Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Having decided not to vote on its draft budget at the present session;
- (ii) Noting that:
 - (a) most of the Council's budget experts were in favour of strict application of the principle of zero growth to the budget of the Assembly;
 - (b) they did not take account of the fact that the reactivation of WEU has further aggravated the difficulties which the Assembly has already encountered in fulfilling its tasks, whereas they have demonstrated their intention to take into consideration the effects of reactivation on the Secretariat-General in London;
 - (c) the Council has not adopted a position on the draft budget of the Assembly;
 - (d) this draft budget provides for different options depending on the opinion of the Council and specific priorities,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable conditions.

Signed: Dudley Smith

1. See 10th sitting, 4th December 1985 (motion agreed to).

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